Policing and Crime Bill (Sixth sitting)
Tuesday 12th April 2016
(8 years, 8 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 12 April 2016 - (12 Apr 2016)
The Minister for Policing, Fire, Criminal Justice and Victims (Mike Penning)
I beg to move amendment 148, in clause 50, page 60, line 18, at end insert—
“(8) In the Criminal Justice Act 2003—
(a) in section 24A(5)(b) (purposes for which person may be kept in police detention) for “section 37D(1)” substitute “section 47(4A)”, and
(b) in section 24B(5) (application of provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984)—
(i) omit paragraph (a), and
(ii) in paragraph (c) at the end insert “except subsections (4D) and (4E)”.”
This amendment is consequential on the changes made in clause 50. It relates to persons who are arrested because they are believed to have failed to comply with conditions attached to a conditional caution.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 3—Release without bail: fingerprinting and samples.
Government new clause 4—Release under section 24A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
Government new clause 5—Duty to notify person released under section 34, 37 or 37CA of PACE that not to be prosecuted.
Government new clause 6—Duty to notify person released under any of sections 41 to 44 of PACE that not to be prosecuted.
New clause 48—Scrutiny of investigatory capabilities—
“(1) Police and crime plans produced under Chapter 3 of Part 1 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, must include an annual assessment of the capability of the police to properly investigate crimes within the 28-day pre-charge bail time limit.
(2) The assessment must consider any—
(a) changes to the number of suspects released without bail,
(b) resource constraints, including staff numbers,
(c) safeguarding requirements of victims, witnesses and suspects, and
(d) issues around multiagency work.”
This new clause would make it mandatory for Police and Crime Commissioners to produce an annual assessment of the capability of police forces and other agencies to meet the mandated 28 day pre-charge bail limit.
New clause 49—Cooperation of relevant agencies in investigations—
“(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations require relevant agencies to cooperate promptly with police in carrying out investigations of suspects.
(2) Relevant agencies may include, but are not limited to—
(a) the Crown Prosecution Service,
(b) forensic examiners,
(c) health authorities, and
(d) banks and financial institutions.
(3) Alongside any additional duty to cooperate, the Home Secretary must carry out an assessment of the relevant agency’s resource capacity to provide relevant information or services within the 28 day limit for cases where suspects are released on pre-charge bail.”
This new clause would allow the Home Secretary to mandate cooperation of relevant agencies with police forces in conducting investigations, and would allow for scrutiny of whether relevant agencies have the necessary capacity and resource to cooperate within the required length of time.
Mike Penning
Briefly, the Government amendments and new clauses in this group are consequential, to ensure that we tidy up any loose ends. I know that the shadow Minister will speak in a moment to new clause 48 and, if I may, I will respond to his concerns when he has done so.
Jack Dromey (Birmingham, Erdington) (Lab)
Let me say at the start that we agree with the principle of what the Government are seeking to achieve. We want to raise issues of practicality that were cited, for example, in the evidence given to the Committee by both the National Police Chiefs Council and the chief superintendents.
New clause 48 would make it mandatory for police and crime commissioners to produce an annual assessment of the capability of police forces and other agencies to meet the mandated 28-day pre-charge bail limit. I stress again, as we said on Second Reading, that reform of police bail is absolutely overdue. The current system has been criticised from both sides, on the grounds that it unfairly leaves people under investigation for long periods before they have even been charged for an offence and that it does not offer the necessary safeguards in the cases of people who pose more of a risk to the public. I will say more on that later.
A more targeted approach is therefore needed that does not unfairly restrict the liberty of people whose guilt is far from proven but that has teeth when it needs to. The case of Paul Gambaccini is a stark example of why the system has to change. We are in complete agreement that we need a common-sense approach to cases in which people have been on bail continuously but no evidence is found. Investigations need to be conducted swiftly and fairly, yet a 2013 BBC freedom of information request, to which 40 police forces responded, found that 71,256 people were on pre-charge bail and 5,480 had been on bail for more than six months. Our concern is that the Government are mandating a 28-day pre-charge bail limit, the aim of which is welcome, but are not addressing the root causes of delays in investigations.
Let us start with the key problem with cases such as that of Paul Gambaccini: individuals who are suspected of a crime but who are not ultimately charged can be under investigation for a long time before a decision not to charge is reached. As we are well aware, that can have a hugely negative impact on the lives of suspects and their families, and in cases where charges are brought and suspects are eventually found guilty, we do not want a system that involves prolonged periods before victims see any kind of justice. We therefore need to tackle why these investigations take so long.
Alongside the measures contained in this Bill, the Government need to have a careful look at where the system can be improved, where extra capacity is needed and what impact reductions in resources are having. For example, Home Office workforce figures show that 40,000 police jobs were cut between 2010 and 2015, with a 30% cut in police community support officers, 20% fewer police staff jobs and 13% fewer police officers. The police are therefore juggling carrying out investigations with patrols, immediate response to emergency incidents and life-saving preventive work. Resources will inevitably have an impact on how quickly police forces can get things done and how able they feel to prioritise investigative work.
Do the Government have any considered idea of what impact resource reductions are having on the capability of forces to carry out timely investigations? What resources will be required under this clause? For example, as regards a super structure of police superintendents to oversee the changes proposed by the Government, the point has been made very strongly by the chief superintendents that it would take out several of their number whose job it would be to supervise the new arrangements that the Government seek to put in place. Crucially, our amendment would require an assessment of this question by police and crime commissioners themselves.
Similarly, cuts to the Crown Prosecution Service and to other agencies are being seen to have a knock-on effect, and I will come back to that point shortly. We do not want the outcome of these proposals to be simply that more people are released not on bail. Chief Constable Alex Marshall noted in his evidence to the Committee that, according to the College of Policing’s bail pilot, early indications of the data were that 70% of those released on pre-charge bail
“were bailed for more than 28 days.”
This was because officers were waiting, while
“getting professional statements from doctors and others, getting phones and computers analysed, taking detailed statements from vulnerable victims of crime, getting banking information and details, and getting forensics analysed”.
He went on:
“We agree that the time limits should be closely monitored…The onus will rest on many people across the system to respond much more quickly to requests from the police conducting their investigation.”––[Official Report, Policing and Crime Public Bill Committee, 15 March 2016; c. 78, Q45.]
He is absolutely right. We do not want a situation in which, due to factors beyond their control, police have no choice but to release not on bail in order to meet the time limit. Clearly, in cases where bail conditions play a necessary role in safeguarding, this would have serious consequences for victims, witnesses and the general public.
In the Government’s consultation, suggestions from respondents included consideration of the needs of the victims of crime, including safeguarding requirements and special interview requirements. The need to safeguard complex investigations was also raised. Early indications of the College of Policing’s pilot were that, of the 950,000 arrests in a year, about 30% were released on pre-charge bail. If that starts to change dramatically, and many more people are released not on bail due to the proposals in the Bill, the Government will have to reflect on and address that. That is why the part of this amendment that requires an assessment of any changes in the number of people released not on bail is so important. Alex Marshall’s comments relate very closely to new clause 49 and the issue of third-party delays preventing police officers from taking critical decisions within the required timeframe in an investigation.
This amendment would allow the Home Secretary to mandate co-operation of relevant agencies with police forces in conducting investigations, and would allow for scrutiny of whether relevant agencies have the necessary capacity and resource to co-operate within the required length of time. The Crown Prosecution Service, forensic examiners, health authorities, banks and financial institutions, to name but a few, are all third parties that the police rely on in the preparation of a case, so the Government’s proposals in the Bill address only one part of the investigatory process.
In the Government’s own consultation on the proposal, they found that the most commonly raised suggestion was that matters outside police control should be taken into account, such as Crown Prosecution Service timescales, forensic examinations—including digital—and international inquiries.
In the 119 responses—or 40% of those who responded —highlighting the resource implications of each model, the most commonly raised issues were on the need for increased resources, including greater staff numbers. As Committee members will be aware, a number of pieces of existing legislation impose statutory duties on third parties to provide reports or information within a set timeframe, such as the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013, the National Health Service Act 2006 and the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003. However, as we have argued with pre-charge bail limits, the Government must not just mandate co-operation by third parties, they must also assess the relevant agencies’ capacity and, crucially, take a proactive approach to ensuring that agencies have the tools at their disposal to provide relevant information or services within the limit. For example, when consulted on the proposals, the Ministry of Justice highlighted concerns that the numbers of cases that would fall to be considered in the Crown court will exceed the available capacity in Crown court centres. Further to that, the Government proposed to have all pre-charge bail hearings dealt with in the magistrates court. I would be interested in the Government’s assessment of the capacity of magistrates courts and the ability of the Ministry of Justice to accommodate the projected costs of the additional hearings.
The Government need to listen on this important issue. In principle, they are doing the right thing in terms of the direction of travel, but they need to listen to the widespread concerns about the practicalities of implementing their proposals; they need to listen to what the police and other agencies are telling them about the major constraints on timely investigation, address those constraints and take a comprehensive approach to scrutinising the role of all agencies in the investigatory process, including, but not limited to, the police. That is what these two new clauses seek to achieve, and I urge the Government to take further action in parallel with their proposals in the Bill.
Mike Penning
May I say at the outset that I acknowledge and understand where the shadow Minister is coming from, even though I disagree on the need for the new clauses? We acknowledge that the new system will put pressures on the forces. We accept that, but at the moment we have a situation where the police can have unlimited police bail. That is unacceptable. We have consulted, listened carefully and 28 days should be the marker going forward. Of course, a superintendent or above can authorise extensions, and magistrates can authorise beyond that. We absolutely accept that the police will need more time in some complex cases and where the crime changes, but they have to explain why, unlike in the present system.
Whether and how the new system is working will be assessed by Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary within its police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy reviews. That is a robust system. I do not think there is a PCC or chief constable in the country who would argue that Tom Winsor’s regime is not fair and robust. Sometimes they say to me that it is not fair and robust—but it is independent, it is there, and that is exactly right. We will keep the need for further reporting under review, but I do not want to put further bureaucracy on to the PCCs.
I fully understand the inter-agency point. We need to break down the silos so that we work more closely together. However, the shadow Minister referred to the consultation in his comments; a clear majority—two thirds—of consultation responses were in favour of establishing memorandums of understanding between the agencies rather than a statutory review. That is what the consultation said, and that is why we have gone down this route rather than the statutory one. I say again that we will keep that under review—but if there is a consultation where two thirds respond in favour of one way, and they are then completely ignored in favour of the statutory route, they will argue, “What is the point of a consultation?”.
It is so early in the morning to disagree already, but although I understand where the shadow Minister is coming from, the Government, sadly, do not feel the need for new clauses 48 and 49.
Jack Dromey
First, the Police Minister is right to be frank: this set of proposals will put pressure on not just the police but a whole range of other agencies. I note what he said of Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and its PEEL reports, and I add that the College of Policing and the Home Affairs Committee will keep this matter under review. I also welcome the proposed memorandum of understanding so that we can make the new system work. On that basis, and given those assurances, we will not press our amendments to a vote.
Amendment 148 agreed to.
Clause 50, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 51 to 59 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 60
Restrictions on places that may be used as places of safety
Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 157, in clause 60, page 68, line 29, at end insert—
“( ) Before a house, flat or room where a person is living is used as a place of safety the patient must first be offered one of the following locations as an alternative place of safety—
(a) a residential accommodation provided by a local social services authority under Part III of the National Assistance Act 1948 or under paragraph 2 of Schedule 8 to the National Health Service Act 1977;
(b) a hospital as defined by the Mental Health Act 1983; or
(c) a mental health care home.”
This amendment would require that a patient was offered a health-based place of safety as an alternative to their, or someone else’s, home being used as a place of safety.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 159, in clause 61, page 69, leave out lines 31 to 38 and insert—
“the point at which the decision is taken to remove a person to a place of safety, or keep them at the current place of safety.”
This amendment would mean that the permitted period of detention started when the decision was taken to remove a person to a place of safety, rather than the point at which they arrived at the place of safety.
Amendment 158, in clause 61, page 69, line 31, leave out “24” and insert “12”.
This amendment reduces the permitted period of detention to 12 hours.
Government new clause 28—Protective searches: individuals removed etc under section 135 or 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983.
New clause 11—Detention in places of safety: annual reporting—
“(1) Police forces in England and Wales must publish an annual report containing statistics on the usage of the power to detain a person in a place of safety.
(2) This report shall contain, but need not be limited to, information on—
(a) the number of detentions;
(b) the age of detainees;
(c) the length of detention; and
(d) the location of the detention.”
This new clause would require police forces to report annually on the number of detentions in places of safety, including information on the age of the detainee and the location and duration of the detention.
New clause 12—Access to Independent Mental Health Advocates—
“(1) A person detained in a place of safety under section 135 or 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 shall have the right to an independent mental health advocate (see section 130A of the Mental Health Act 1983).”
This new clause would extend the right to an independent mental health advocate to those detained under sections 135 or 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983.
New clause 50—Powers under the Mental Health Act 1983: reporting and review—
“(1) One year after section 59, 60 and 61 of this Act come into force the Secretary of State must lay before parliament a report on the impact of the changes to powers under the Mental Health Act 1983 on mental health assessment and outcomes.
(2) This report shall contain, but need not be limited to, information on—
(a) length of time taken from commencement of mental health assessment of an individual under sections 135 or 136 of the Mental Health Act, to either the discharge, admittance to hospital or extension of period of detention of these individuals,
(b) availability of trained medical professionals to carry out assessments, and
(c) availability of hospital beds for persons deemed to require inpatient care.
(3) In producing this review the Home Secretary must consult the Secretary of State for Health.”
This new clause would make it mandatory for the Home Secretary to report on the impact of Section 59, 60 and 61 on mental health assessment and outcomes. This would allow for scrutiny of whether the proposals improve the outcomes for those subject to police detention and mental health assessment, and whether health providers have the capacity to carry out timely assessments and provide any necessary inpatient care.
Mr Kevan Jones
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Howarth. I have said in Committee, and on the Floor of the House, that I recognise that the Government are trying to make progress on ensuring that the way in which people with mental illness are treated by the police is both compassionate and secures them the help that they deserve. The problem that is evident today, and will be as the Bill continues its journey through this House and the other place, is that although the Home Department is trying to improve the situation, the elephant in the room is the resources and activities of the Department of Health. This is an area in which two Departments are intertwined, because the issues are quite clearly not, in essence, a police matter, although the police are left to resolve the problem.
Amendment 157 recognises that the Government have tried to emphasise that a police cell is the worst place for not only a young person but an adult. I commend the Government’s initiative in trying to ensure that few adults, and certainly no children, are detained in a police cell. We have to ask why they are currently detained, which is—I am going to be very political—because of the reduction of beds and facilities by the Department of Health. I have tabled amendment 157 because the Government, quite helpfully, have no objection to a place of safety, under the Mental Health Act 1983, being someone’s flat or home, because that is a place in which those individuals can be supported by mental health services and other agencies. That is important. The problem is that it might become the default position that people are forced to stay in their homes if an alternative is not available. I put it to the Committee that most of us, given the choice between staying at home or being in a police cell, would stay at home. However, that does not guarantee that home is the best place of safety.
James Berry (Kingston and Surbiton) (Con)
The hon. Gentleman makes a good point and speaks with authority on the subject. Does he recognise that there are some excellent local examples of clinical commissioning groups working well with the police? In Kingston we have a new project where the mental health trusts, the clinical commissioning group and the Met police have come together to provide just the kind of facility we are talking about. Although there is more to do nationally, there are some good local examples of the policy working.
Mr Kevan Jones
I agree with the hon. Gentleman. One of the few good things that came out of the Health and Social Care Bill was that it allowed local providers to develop contracts out of the box, perhaps with the third sector and others, to provide good local services. I am on record as having said that. I have to say that in my own area and nationally that has not happened in practice because unfortunately the default position is that the contracts that have been awarded are so large that a lot of small, good voluntary organisations that could provide those services are not getting a look in.
The hon. Gentleman makes a good point about the project in his constituency, but we need to ensure that there is uniformity across the piece. If we have a situation where the only option is for people to go to a police station or stay at home, that is not satisfactory.
Amendment 159 is also probing, aiming to explore and again bring pressure on the Department of Health. With regard to the time limits put in place around the place of safety, it is important that people are assessed quickly. It is no good waiting, in a police cell, hospital or any other facility, for a long time without assessment.
When being removed to a place of safety, it is important that the assessment is made quickly and undue time limits are not in place, for example, if someone has to travel a long distance to access a service. At the point of detention, a decision would start with the removal of the individual, certainly in terms of Lord Crisp’s report for the Commission on Acute Adult Psychiatric Care. That gives examples of people having to travel up to 50 km to access a mental health bed. If that were done in the back of a police car or van, it could take a long time and add to that individual’s distress. Again, I want to get the Minister’s thinking; I do not think for one minute that she wants anyone to be detained for an unduly long time without assessment. We are probing to find out what the Government are thinking in terms of trying to put pressure on the services that provide assessments. Can we get intervention at an earlier stage?
Amendment 158 is linked to the previous amendment and is another probing amendment. I welcome the reduction from 72 to 24 hours, showing again that the Government want to improve the situation. This probing amendment would further reduce the time from 24 to 12 hours. I would like to understand the Government’s rationale for agreeing to 24 hours. Under existing and proposed legislation, if someone is clearly incapable of assessment, that period can be extended. The Royal College of Psychiatrists has a target of three hours for someone to be assessed. I accept that there are difficulties: for example, if someone is intoxicated or has some other issue, with drugs or anything else, an assessment may not be possible for a long time, but I think that 24 hours is too long.
I have tabled these amendments to assist the Minister to press her Health colleagues to push the boundary. I accept what the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton said about some excellent local provision. We do need a uniform service, but it would be completely wrong for individuals to be detained longer than necessary. I would not, for one minute, suggest that any healthcare professional, police officer or the Government, for that matter, want to detain people. Early diagnosis and assessment are in the interest of the individual and help to ensure an efficient use of time.
Let me deal with new clauses 11 and 12. I may push new clause 11 to a vote because it is important. One fear I have is that we have before us a Home Office Bill which deals with the problem faced by police forces up and down the country of people being detained under the Mental Health Act. The right aim of the Home Secretary is to ensure that no one is detained in a police cell. Certainly, her target for young people is welcome and she clearly wants to get to a position whereby no adult is detained in a police cell either. The problem I have with that is that we may achieve the target in terms of the police—a police authority or a police and crime commissioner may be able to stand up and say, “We have nobody in police cells who has been detained under the Mental Health Act”, but unless we have some indication of what has actually happened to those individuals, it could mask a problem. It could move away from the clear spotlight that has been put on this, certainly in terms of young people being detained in police cells.
If the answer to the written question that we ask every year is that nobody is being detained in police cells, that is good, but if people are languishing in the community without support, or are unable to access the treatment that they want, that would let the Department of Health—again, not the Home Office—off the hook in terms of its responsibility to those individuals. It is important that we have reliable statistics, because we need to see where there are pressures, which there certainly are. Having talked to my local police force, I know that forces throughout the country are dealing with a lot of mental illness problems that they are not qualified to deal with. The system has failed when people with such problems turn up in police cells, so we need to address that.
I feel passionately about new clause 12, because, very strangely, the only people who are not allowed advocates under the Mental Health Act are people who are sectioned under section 135 or 136. I am not sure why that was agreed when that Act passed through this place. It may have been to do with cost, and I understand that if we offer everyone who is sectioned an advocate, costs will be incurred, but we are talking about ensuring that people with mental illness are given the right approach and support. If someone is arrested for any other crime, they should have an advocate to speak on their behalf. Many people think that those with mental illness will have family members or others to help them, but there are clearly individuals who do not, so there is no one there to speak on their behalf. There are also individuals who go into crisis whose family members have never experienced anyone with mental illness and so will not know the right questions to ask or the rights of the individual.
The need for an advocate is particularly relevant to the issue I mentioned earlier: the home becoming a place of safety. Is someone really going to object to their home becoming the “place of safety” if they have no one to advocate for them or understand their position? I do not think they would. The default position would be that the easiest option is to stay at home, even though it might not be the best option for some individuals, so advocacy is very important.
As I said on Second Reading, sections 135 and 136 are unique powers that are, quite rightly, not used lightly. They are used to protect either the individual themselves or the people who might be in danger from their actions, but that still leads to people’s liberties being taken away from them. If the default position in this country is that someone who is arrested for a crime is entitled to legal representation, it is not too much to ask in this day and age that people who are detained—we are not talking about a massive number of cases—should at least, within a permitted period, be allowed an advocate to speak on their behalf and advise them. Properly done, that may well save time and money by ensuring that the individual takes the advice they are offered and by allowing the system—the police and health services—to ensure that that person is directed to the help they require.
The Chair
As I understand it, the hon. Gentleman has expressed his intention to press new clause 11 to a Division.
The Chair
It might be helpful to the Committee if I point out that although both new clauses can be debated at this point, any Divisions will come later when we deal with new clauses.
Jack Dromey
I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham, who is a brave and doughty champion of those who have suffered from mental illness. There is no question but that real progress has been made in recent years, and he can take credit for the outstanding role that he has played in that process, which we see the benefits of in our constituencies and across the country.
I have seen non-custodial places of safety at the Oleaster suite in Birmingham and in the form of street triage arrangements around the country, including one team of three outstanding police officers in the east midlands. One of them took me to one side and said, “I’m passionate about what I do because my brother was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic eight years ago. I’ve supported him; I now want to support others like him.” The Home Secretary is absolutely right to say that a police cell is no place for an ill person. I therefore completely support everything that my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham has said.
I want to speak only to new clause 50, although we support what has been said in respect of new clauses 11 and 12 and I will briefly refer to them. In our country there is a right to be represented, and that is all the more important in circumstances where there is a vulnerable individual—often one who is going through a terrible trauma in their life—who requires the support and advice that an independent representative or advocate can give. We therefore strongly support what my hon. Friend has said in respect of new clauses 11 and 12.
Returning to new clause 50, I will take this opportunity to repeat the concerns that were expressed across the House on Second Reading—the debate on these issues was excellent—and the concerns of medical professionals and the police. Although we welcome the objective of the proposals, the combination of the changes could put professionals in a difficult position. Assessments of those detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 cannot be completed until a bed has been identified. Professionals should not have to choose between breaking the law by exceeding the 24-hour period if a bed cannot be identified and not breaking the law but releasing someone who should be detained. Yet HMIC has found that some of the most common reasons why the police used custody as a place of safety include
“insufficient staff at a health-based place of safety”
and
“the absence of available beds at the health-based place of safety”.
I am sure that the Minister recognises that such problems will not be fixed by the Bill or even by the Home Office. It is therefore essential that, alongside the Bill, the Home Secretary and the Health Secretary work together to ensure that health service commissioners open sufficient beds and train sufficient professionals to deliver these welcome new commitments. New clause 50 would make it mandatory for the Home Secretary to report on the impact of the proposals in the Bill on mental health assessment and outcomes.
The hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker) spoke eloquently on Second Reading. He said:
“We cannot make demands on the police to change the way they do things in providing places of safety unless we actually provide places of safety.”—[Official Report, 7 March 2016; Vol. 607, c. 59.]
He is absolutely right. There are not enough beds in this country for mentally ill people who are suffering real crises and, as my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham has said, where beds are made available, long distances sometimes have to be travelled to take the individual in question to a safe place where they can be looked after. We therefore need cast-iron guarantees from the Department of Health that it is in a position to support police officers in treating those suffering from mental health crises with the dignity and support that they deserve.
The mental health crisis care concordat requires NHS commissioners to commission health-based places of safety for that purpose. It states:
“These should be provided at a level that allows for around the clock availability, and that meets the needs of the local population. Arrangements should be in place to handle multiple cases.”
However, there is not a specific statutory duty to commission health-based places of safety. In theory, the Mental Health Act could be amended to introduce a duty for clinical commissioning groups to commission suitable and sufficient health-based places of safety for persons detained under sections 135 or 136. Have the Home Office or the Department of Health considered that? We understand that, strictly speaking, such legislation is outside the scope of the Bill, but in parallel with the provisions here, the Home Office must have assurances from the Department of Health that they are going to make available the necessary capacity. That is why it is crucial to our amendment that the Secretary of State for Health is consulted. The Home Secretary and the Health Secretary should work together to ensure that the proposals improve the outcome for those subject to police detention and mental health assessment, and that health providers have the capacity to carry out timely assessments and provide any necessary in-patient care.
In conclusion, is there welcome progress in the right direction? On that there is absolutely no hesitation. However, on the issues that I have raised, the Government have yet to give assurances. I urge the Minister to act, to give Parliament, the public and the police whatever assurances are possible to ensure that the proposals in the Bill are not only brought forward with worthwhile intentions but implemented in practice, and that we avoid the possibility that in some cases they will do more harm than good.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Karen Bradley)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Howarth, and to be back from Easter recess; I hope you had a pleasant break. I also pay tribute to the hon. Member for North Durham, who has campaigned tirelessly on this issue for many years and who is known as a leading advocate for those suffering with mental health conditions, be they crises or long-term conditions. I respect him enormously; I look forward to meeting him soon to discuss the many points he has raised today and to ensuring that the Government take notice of his experience and expertise and that we can work together on these matters.
I also want to make a point about what we are dealing with here. In a section 135 or section 136 detention, we are not dealing with a long-term condition that is being managed; we are dealing with a crisis—with somebody who, for whatever reason, either for their own protection or that of others, needs to be detained under the Mental Health Act. This has to be a short-term detention, and it should be one in which they are treated with dignity and respect. Somebody who breaks their legs does not get taken to a police cell, and nor should somebody having a mental health crisis. They have committed no crime, but for their own safety and that of others, they need a short-term temporary detention. That is not the same as being sectioned long term under the 1983 Act; it is a short-term issue. It might arise, for example, as a result of alcohol or drug abuse, because of some personal issue that has happened, or—let us admit it—because there has been a failure, where something has been identified from a health perspective but without identifying that the individual may go into crisis. It is about the crisis.
I want to pay tribute to my own police and crime commissioner, Matthew Ellis in Staffordshire, who I think was the first police and crime commissioner to identify how much police time was being taken to deal with people in a mental health crisis. He estimated that it was 20%: one in five police days were taken up with dealing people in a mental health crisis. It says a lot about the system that was in place, in which it was easier for police to deal with this than it was for health workers. We know that we are dealing with a problem that has grown up over many years; we are tackling it and ensuring that it is dealt with appropriately.
I want to assure the Committee that this issue is not just dealt with by the Home Office. I work very closely with other Departments: not just the Department of Health, where my right hon. Friend the Minister for Community and Social Care is as absolutely determined as I am to ensure that this matter is dealt with, but the Department for Communities and Local Government, the Department for Education and others. We need to ensure that we are all working together to identify the signs of mental health issues and ensure they are dealt with so they do not lead to a crisis. That is the important point.
The crisis care concordat, a cross-Government initiative, has led to a halving of the number of people being detained in police custody, but that is not good enough. That is why we are taking the steps in the Bill. We want to see this practice as the very rare exception when somebody in a mental health crisis ends up in police custody. We want the vast majority, and certainly those under 18, to be in a health-based place of safety.
The shadow Minister made a point about the east midlands police officer’s family member. Since I took on this brief, a number of people have spoken to me about their personal experiences of mental health in their families. This is something we are all waking up to in many ways. The issue has not been recognised for many years and I am glad we are talking about it and recognising the scale of the problem and ensuring that support is available.
I will turn to the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for North Durham. As he said, amendment 157 seeks to introduce a requirement to offer a health-based place of safety before a private home is used. When a person is in a mental health crisis, it is important that they have access to the appropriate medical care at the earliest stage. I know we all agree on that.
In most section 136 cases people will be taken to a health-based place of safety, as is the case today. Usually, that will be a bespoke facility provided by the NHS that meets the national standards set out by the Royal College of Psychiatrists. The shadow Minister and I and my colleague who previously dealt with mental health have all visited health-based places of safety and been incredibly impressed by the work to provide somewhere safe and secure but also does not feel like a police cell. It feels like a medical setting and is comfortable. I visited one in Sussex—I know I have a Sussex MP behind me—where Katy Bourne, the excellent police and crime commissioner, has done incredible work on ensuring that there are sufficient and appropriate places of safety.
That facility at Crawley hospital has private access; the patient does not walk through the main hospital and A&E. The patient comes through a private door at the back into the mental health unit but in a secure section 136 facility where there is a bed, a private room and a bathroom. That is somewhere where someone can be treated with dignity while they experience the crisis, and can be diagnosed appropriately. Great credit should be paid to the many clinical commissioning groups and police and crime commissioners who are working together to ensure that those places of safety are there.
Maria Caulfield (Lewes) (Con)
I am slightly concerned by Opposition amendments that want to create a national picture. Having a bespoke local model has meant that Sussex has gone from having one of the highest levels of detention of people in crisis to one of the lowest. That is working very well for the police, the health service professionals and, most of all, for the patients.
Karen Bradley
My hon. Friend, who represents her Sussex constituency extremely well, is right. When we looked at the figures, we asked why Sussex has a problem. It has Beachy Head and that is a particular problem. There is no Beachy Head in Staffordshire. There is a particular problem that the police and crime commissioner and the health services in Sussex have to deal with. The work that has been done there should be commended. Katy Bourne has worked not just to provide the health-based places of safety but with the Richmond Fellowship to understand the problems. That includes understanding why people are not always able to go to a health-based place of safety. It is shocking to discover that there are many health-based places of safety that will not take a person under the influence of alcohol.
We know that the majority of crises occur when somebody is under the influence of alcohol or drugs, so it is important to educate and have appropriate facilities. I visited an excellent facility in Merseyside where they are able to cope with somebody under the influence of alcohol, give them time to sober up and recover from the alcohol or drugs, and then assess them appropriately as to their ongoing medical care needs.
Jack Dromey
The Minister speaks with authority and sincerity, and we welcome the progress that has been made. Unusually, what we want to do on this occasion is strengthen the arm of the Home Office because, while it is true that there are excellent examples of good provision all over the country, it is uneven and patchy, and too many people who suffer mental illness are still being let down. The crucial point—she may be coming to this—is how the Home Office addresses the reality that, ultimately, it is the Department of Health that funds this provision. Unless the Department of Health is compelled to work with the Home Office, the Home Office will forever have problems.
Karen Bradley
I know that it will seem odd to the shadow Minister for a Home Office Minister to refuse further powers, but I will at this stage. I will return to that point later.
I will deal first with whether a health-based place of safety is the most suitable place of safety in every case, which goes to the nub of amendment 157. As the hon. Member for North Durham knows, a private home can already be used as a place of safety for a person detained under section 136 of the 1983 Act if the occupier consents. Clause 60 will make it possible to use a private home as a place of safety after a section 135 warrant has been used to enter those premises.
Where consideration is given to using a private home, it should be because it is the most appropriate place of safety for meeting that person’s needs, and not due to a lack of better health-based alternatives. In determining which place of safety to take a person to, those involved will need to consider all the relevant circumstances in the round. However, if the person concerned is particularly frail or likely to be very distressed if away from familiar surroundings, removing them from a home setting may be judged to be, on balance, more harmful than helpful. Conducting the mental health assessment in the home may therefore prove both quicker and a more satisfactory experience for all concerned. Similarly, it may be preferable to take a young person to their family home, rather than detaining them in a strange place where they know no one.
There is no question of a person being taken to a private residence or forced to remain there against their will. The use of a private dwelling as a place of safety will require the active consent of both the person detained and the occupiers of the residence.
The shadow Minister talked of street triage. When I have met street triage teams across the country and seen mental health clinicians working with law enforcement, the best cases have been where the law enforcement officer has allowed the mental health professional to take responsibility for the necessary decisions. I have seen examples of the mental health professional, rather than the police officer, going into the place where the individual in crisis is, assessing them and determining whether they should be arrested or detained, whether at their own home, at somebody else’s home or in a health-based place of safety.
Anybody who has been in a police custody suite—I hasten to add that it was not as an inmate, in my case—will know that it is stark and brightly lit, with no shade and nowhere to hide. It is a horrible environment for somebody who is ill to find themselves in. Going to a health-based place of safety is a much better option, but it may be that some people can be treated better and get the appropriate care in their own home. I assure the hon. Gentleman that we are not saying that there is no need for health-based places of safety—absolutely not. We are determined that health-based places of safety will be available as they are needed, but for some people it is better to be treated in their own home. In the majority of cases I genuinely believe that the health-based place of safety is the best place, but for a small number that will not be the case.
The Bill is designed to increase the flexibility that police and medical professionals have to act in the best interests of the person concerned in a wide range of circumstances, while ensuring that appropriate safeguards remain in place to prevent abuses of such a system.
Amendment 159 seeks to provide that the period of detention would commence when a decision to detain was made, rather than on the person’s arrival at a place of safety. As the hon. Member for North Durham will know, sections 135 and 136 enable someone to be removed to a place of safety if that is required. Once they arrive at the place of safety, it is essential that the mental health professionals have sufficient time to conduct the assessment and arrange any further care and treatment that are required. Any individual in such a circumstance must have the opportunity to have a thorough assessment that is not driven by detention deadlines.
Amendment 159 would unfairly penalise both the people in need of care and the health professionals assessing them if the decision to remove them was taken in an isolated place and if getting them to a place of safety would take some time. I know from my constituency that in isolated rural constituencies, things just take more time. As it happens, one also cannot give birth in Staffordshire Moorlands because there is no maternity facility. If one goes into labour, it will take at least half an hour to reach a maternity hospital. That is the reality of isolated rural communities.
Similarly, what about situations in which removal is difficult and risky for all concerned—for example, when someone is threatening to jump off a bridge? An attending police officer would probably make the decision to detain very soon after arriving on the scene, but it might take time to get the individual off the bridge. Would it be reasonable to require the police officer, in that highly pressured situation, to think about the clock ticking towards a time when they would have to release the person, whether or not they had managed to get them to a suitable place for a mental health assessment?
I do not think that that is what the hon. Gentleman intends with his amendment. I think he intends to ensure that the person is transported to a place of safety as quickly as is reasonable. That can be addressed through guidance and the performance management of ambulance response times, rather than through legislation. Front-line professionals need to make the right decisions, taking account of the circumstances and the individual’s best interests.
Amendment 158 seeks to reduce further the permitted period of detention. As far as I can see, there is no disagreement among members of the Committee that the current period of up to 72 hours is much too long. It was put in place to take into account bank holidays, weekends and so on, but that is not good enough. We cannot have a situation in which, because someone has a mental health crisis on the Friday night of a bank holiday weekend, they find themselves in a police cell for 72 hours. That is simply unacceptable. It cannot be right to hold someone who is suffering a crisis and is in urgent need of a mental health assessment against their will for up to three days anywhere, not just in a police cell.
Clause 61 deals with that issue by introducing the concept of a permitted period of detention, and setting that period at 24 hours. We have also allowed for an extension by a further 12 hours if—and only if—the person’s clinical condition merits it. This is not a target time. Just as they are now, we expect that the vast majority of cases will be resolved much more quickly. The Royal College of Psychiatrists has recommended, as a matter of good practice, that the assessment should start within three hours of the person being detained, and that has been built into the Mental Health Act code of practice. I want to be clear that 24 hours is not a target. We do not expect that a mental health assessment will start at 23 hours. We want it to start as soon as is reasonably practical, to ensure that the person gets the assessment and treatment that they need as soon as it is required.
We have been told by stakeholders that there will be occasions when the clinical condition of the person is such that they simply cannot be assessed immediately—for example, because they are intoxicated through drugs or alcohol. We have listened to that advice, and the maximum permitted period of detention has been set at 24 hours so that time is built in for the effects of intoxication to wear off. Otherwise, we would risk creating a situation in which the assessment process was made difficult or impossible because the person was unable to participate fully.
Equally, a shorter maximum detention period would risk the person having to be released before they had been assessed because they were not yet clinically fit to participate. Clearly, that would be in no one’s best interests. For those reasons, we have set the permitted period of detention at 24 hours. In the Government’s view, that provides a good balance between keeping periods of detention as short as reasonably possible and making sure that the assessment can be carried out in the most effective way.
The provision for an extension of not more than 12 hours over and above the original 24 hours, is for the very rare cases where the clinician responsible for carrying out the assessment is satisfied that the person’s clinical condition is such that the assessment cannot be started or completed within the 24-hour period. I want to be clear here: the provision to extend beyond 24 hours will be based solely on the person’s clinical condition. There is no scope for it to be used in any other circumstance, such as staffing problems.
In practice, the average period of detention is now less than 11 hours. That time includes the person being detained, the assessment being made and any future care or treatment arrangements arising out of that assessment being put in place. In the majority of cases, the necessary processes are already completed well within 24 hours. Of course, we recognise that the reduction to 24 hours may represent more of a challenge in some areas than others, but the work that is going on across England to improve mental health crisis care services, backed by both the national crisis care concordat and the 94 local concordat groups, is helping to develop services that can respond to the changing needs of the areas they serve.
I hope that I have reassured the hon. Member for North Durham that the 24-hour time limit is not some arbitrary figure that has been chosen for convenience, but a deliberate decision that seeks to establish the balance between compulsion and care that I mentioned earlier.
New clause 11 seeks to introduce an annual reporting requirement in respect of detention in places of safety. The Government agree that the police should be transparent about the use of their powers under the Mental Health Act, so that we can see how often these sensitive powers are used, who they are used for and what further actions are taken. That will enable the changes being made through the Bill to be monitored effectively. It is only through looking at the data that we are in the position we are in. When my right hon. Friend the Policing Minister had responsibility for this area, he was determined to get to the bottom of what was and was not working well, and to make the decisions and changes that were needed to get to things working well across the country.
The Health and Social Care Information Centre and the National Police Chiefs Council publish annual data on detentions under sections 135 and 136 of the 1983 Act. For section 135, data are provided by health services covering the volume of detentions in which people are taken to a health-based place of safety. For section 136, the data include the numbers of people taken to police custody and health-based places of safety and are provided by the police and health services respectively.
However, we know that police data in this area have varied in quality. As a result, the Home Office is working with forces across England and Wales on a new data collection system for section 135 and 136 detentions to raise the level of consistency across the country. The new data set is voluntary in 2015-16, but will become a mandatory part of the Home Office’s annual data requirement for all forces in England and Wales from April this year—this month.
The annual data requirement will capture not only the number of detentions, but the age, ethnicity and gender of the people detained; the place of safety used, including, where applicable, the reason for using police custody; and the method of transportation and, where a police vehicle is used, the reason why. We intend to publish the data annually to ensure that there is full transparency, so I hope the hon. Member for North Durham will not need to ask written questions at that point.
Mr Kevan Jones
I welcome what the Minister has said, as it goes to the core of what new clause 11 aims to achieve. In what format will those data be published? Will there be a consistent approach, as she suggests, so that areas can be compared? That is the other important point to consider as this legislation progresses: we must ensure that it is working, that people do not end up in police cells and that we have comparable data from different areas.
Karen Bradley
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. If we do not have comparable data, we cannot compare. My right hon. Friend the Policing Minister, who set this work in train, was adamant that we needed comparable, appropriate data, which would be available online, so that we could make a fair comparison.
It is a fair suggestion that the length of time for which people are detained should be recorded, but there are practical difficulties. It would be incredibly difficult for the police to keep such information, because, quite frankly, we do not want police officers to be part of the process once somebody has been detained under section 135 or 136 of the Mental Health Act, apart from in the very rare cases where a police station is used.
Mr Kevan Jones
As I said, my amendments are probing amendments. I thank the Minister for the full way in which she has responded to them. I know, and I want to put it on the record, that she, too, has a genuine interest in this subject and wants to do the best for individuals who suffer mental health problems.
I welcome the Minister’s response to new clause 11. The data are going to be very important, because they will attest to whether the changes are working. By comparing areas with one another, local scrutiny will allow areas to improve their situations and to learn from best practice. As she said in response to an intervention, what happens in one area can be transferred to another.
I hear what the Minister says about new clause 12. I accept her point that this situation is very different from being sectioned under section 2 of the Mental Health Act, but for people to be detained without any right to advocacy is unique. Like her, I do not want to overburden or inhibit the system, but there needs to be a basic right for individuals to have access to information. Given her commitment to further discussions on new clause 12, I shall not press it to a vote, but we may come back to it on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 60 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 61 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 62
Application of maritime enforcement powers: general
Amendment made: 214, in clause 62, page 71, line 29, at end insert—
“( ) a National Crime Agency officer having the powers and privileges of a constable in England and Wales under the Crime and Courts Act 2013, or”.—(Karen Bradley.)
This amendment makes express provision for National Crime Agency officers to come within the definition of law enforcement officer that applies for the purposes of Chapter 4 of Part 4.
Clause 62, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 63 to 76 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 77
Firearms Act 1968: meaning of “firearm” etc.
Lyn Brown (West Ham) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 227, in clause 77, page 81, line 7, leave out subsection (5).
This amendment would remove the exception for airsoft guns from the definition of a lethal barrelled weapon.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Howarth. I, too, hope that you had a really happy holiday—I am learning from the Minister how to do these things.
The amendment would remove the exemption for airsoft guns from the definition of a lethal barrelled weapon from the Bill. It has been tabled as a probing amendment to understand why the Government have allowed an exemption in this case.
Lyn Brown
Oh heavens!
The Bill exempts airsoft weapons from the 1 J limit. If we pass the Bill without making the amendment, airsoft weapons will be allowed to exceed that limit; instead, they will not be able legally to exceed 1.3 J, or 2.5 J for a single-shot weapon. Why has the exemption for airsoft weapons been put in place? If the Home Office is of the view that a 1 J threshold successfully identifies a lethal weapon in other instances, why are airsoft weapons any different?
Deputy Chief Constable Andy Marsh has cited evidence from the Forensic Science Service that the 1.3 J and 2.5 J thresholds would not be lethal for airsoft weapons, as was noted by the Law Commission, but that research is from 2001 and therefore more than 14 years old. There must surely be something more recent. If there is not, why is that? Why have we not commissioned something?
Mike Penning
Unless my information is wrong, that research was done in 2011.
Lyn Brown
Well, my research tells me it was in 2001. We will wait for some inspiration on that.
There is some dispute about whether airsoft guns can be converted into weapons that can shoot lethal ammunition. I am told that numerous YouTube videos exist in which enthusiasts claim that they can do exactly that. It was revealed by a 2013 freedom of information request that the American Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives believes that some airsoft weapons can be converted. Given that, the Minister needs to explain the rationale behind the exemption of airsoft weapons from the standard 1 J limit. If 1 J is the definition of lethality and airsoft weapons can, as we understand, be converted to be lethal, it seems to me that they should comply with the 1 J limit and not be allowed a 1.3 J limit.
I accept that the Minister might well talk about the fun he has on his holidays playing these weird games.
The Chair
Order. The Committee will be fascinated to hear about the Minister’s holiday activities, provided that they are germane to the Bill.
Lyn Brown
Absolutely, Mr Howarth. My mind is boggling. I think I need to get back to the issue at hand.
The Minister may argue that the 1.3 J threshold is necessary to protect the airsoft industry, but the truth is that airsoft weapons could still be produced and carried without a firearms licence without this exemption; they would just have to be below the 1 J threshold of lethality. If airsoft guns are toys and not weapons, I do not see the problem with them being less powerful than lethal weapons. If airsoft enthusiasts still wish to have a powerful airsoft gun over the 1 J threshold, they could still do so without the exemption; they would just have to apply for the same licence and subject themselves to the same checks that we would expect for any other weapon that powerful. It does not seem to be too onerous a set of regulations to comply with.
Britain rightly prides itself on having among the most stringent gun control laws in the world. We see the public and their safety as the primary clients of gun control legislation. Elsewhere in the world, the so-called rights of gun owners are given preference, with tragic consequences. In this context, the Committee will be interested to know that Japan—where airsoft was invented and is profoundly popular—imposes a single 0.98 J limit on all guns, including airsoft weapons. Japanese manufacturers of airsoft weapons were happy to sign up to those regulations so, again, I do not see the need to exempt airsoft.
There must be a case for saying that a single power limit for all weapons, without exemptions or loopholes, would be legally preferable and more enforceable. That is what our amendment would achieve, and I know it is something for which the Gun Control Network, which was founded in the aftermath of the Dunblane tragedy, has campaigned. I look forward with interest to hearing what the Minister has to say.
Before I finish, I will talk about the use of airsoft weapons as realistic imitation firearms. These weapons are designed to look almost exactly like real firearms, and are only exempt from laws against the manufacture of realistic imitation firearms because of a set of defences provided in the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006. In other countries, such as Canada, airsoft weapons are treated as realistic replica weapons and regulated as such.
On seeing these guns, I was immediately worried that they could easily be used to threaten and intimidate. There is no doubt that the owners and manufacturers of these weapons pride themselves on their guns looking exactly like the most deadly of weapons. I urge members of the Committee to go online and look for themselves. Websites such as Patrol Base sell guns that look exactly like military assault rifles.
I was not surprised to read that a cache of airsoft weapons was seized in December from an ISIS terror cell in Belgium. Two men were arrested and military fatigues, airsoft weapons and ISIS propaganda were found in their property. Brussels’s main new year’s eve fireworks display was cancelled as a result of the find.
Let’s face it: if a terrorist walked down Whitehall with one of these guns and threatened to shoot us, we would fear for our lives and comply with the instructions given by the bearer of the gun if we were unable to run for our lives. Even if these weapons are not lethal, they can certainly bring fear and terror. I ask the Minister whether any thought has been given to reviewing the exemption for airsoft guns from the laws against realistic imitation firearms in the light of the incident in Belgium. If not, I strongly urge him to think about it.
I feel so passionately about this matter that if the Minister is unable to help us today, I would be happy if he would consider it further, write to me and perhaps come back to it on Report.
Mike Penning
As the shadow Minister indicated, we have some of the toughest firearms laws in the world. That is how it should be, and we will continue to strengthen and tighten the laws, providing clarity for the police and the public. I have looked at several aspects related to this matter.
I have two girls and I used to see toy guns when I went to toy shops with them when they were very young. Even as an ex-military man, I would not know the damn difference, from a distance, if someone came down Whitehall with one. Nevertheless, we are not going to ban all children’s toy guns. It is an offence to use a toy gun, or any other kind of replica, in that way. There are powers on the statute book.
I should declare that I have never used an airsoft weapon and I have never been to one of the play sites, but nearly 50,000 people do have the kind of fun that I have not enjoyed. Given the days I spent with real weapons, I would not fancy taking up such an invitation, but plenty of people do.
We looked carefully at proportionality and whether or not the 1 J limit recommended in the Law Commission’s report would have an adverse effect on the public’s enjoyment. We looked carefully at whether the police or the National Ballistics Intelligence Service had reported any instances of airsoft guns causing serious injuries, and they had not. We had to look at whether the effect would be proportionate on people who were enjoying an activity against which there was no evidence whatever. The Law Commission itself discussed in its report whether changing the limit would be proportionate. We have looked into the matter and can find no evidence of injuries.
We already have restrictions. I accept that other countries have made different legal decisions. I lived in Canada for a short time. Interestingly, hunting rifles and other weapons are freely available there, yet the velocity of airsoft weapons is restricted. We think that the existing legislation is proportionate. If someone wants to adapt one of these guns, other legislation is immediately triggered. For example, if it becomes a weapon and they are unlicensed, the sanction is five years or a fine. If someone creates a weapon from something that is not designed to be one and it becomes a firearm, that is captured by a completely different piece of legislation. If someone comes wandering down the street with a toy gun, let alone one of the weapons we are discussing, it is an offence if they use it inappropriately or in a threatening manner.
We do not want to prevent 50,000-odd people from enjoying themselves, even if they are enjoying themselves in ways that are slightly different from how the shadow Minister and I enjoy ourselves.
Jake Berry (Rossendale and Darwen) (Con)
Was any research undertaken into what difference such a change would make? Airsoft weapons have been known to cause injuries, even when used in safe, recreational settings. Did the Department undertake any research into the likelihood of reduced injury if the power of the weapons was reduced from the proposed 1.3 J limit to 1 J or even 0.98 J, which is the limit in Japan?
Mike Penning
We looked at the evidence from the police and the National Ballistics Intelligence Service. Yes, there have been injuries, in which there might have been other factors, but the police have not reported any instances of serious injuries.
I understand the shadow Minister’s concern about something that neither of us are likely ever to enjoy, but 50,000-odd people do and I do not want to prevent them from doing so. I hope she will withdraw her amendment.
Lyn Brown
I hear what the Minister says, but I have not heard an explanation of why an airsoft weapon could not be 1 J or less than 1 J, as is the case in Japan. No evidence has been put forward today to suggest that that would stop the enjoyment of people who want to run through forests waving firearms. The other point that I do not understand is why it would spoil their enjoyment if airsoft weapons were a different colour—pink, red or green—so that they did not look as realistic as they do at the moment.
Mike Penning
I have finished. I am sorry, but I do not agree.
Amendment 227 negatived.
Clause 77 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 78 and 79 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 80
Applications under the Firearms Acts: fees
Lyn Brown
I beg to move amendment 228, in clause 80, page 83, line 31, leave out
“the amount of any fee that may be charged”
and insert
“that the fee charged must be equal to the full cost to the tax payer of issuing a licence.”.
This amendment would ensure that the firearms licensing system achieves full cost recovery.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 229, in clause 80, page 84, line 7, leave out
“the amount of any fee that may be charged”
and insert
“that the fee charged must be equal to the full cost to the tax payer of issuing a licence.”.
This amendment would ensure that the firearms licensing system achieves full cost recovery.
Amendment 230, in clause 80, page 84, line 27, leave out
“the amount of any fee that may be charged”
and insert
“that the fee charged must be equal to the full cost to the tax payer of issuing a licence.”.
This amendment would ensure that the firearms licensing system achieves full cost recovery.
Lyn Brown
These amendments would be a first step towards ending state subsidy of gun ownership. They would achieve that goal by ensuring that the full costs of licensing prohibited weapons, pistol clubs and museums are recovered.
Full cost recovery was a Labour manifesto pledge. It is a key objective of the Gun Control Network, and it is even stated as a policy goal in the explanatory notes accompanying the Bill. It would therefore appear that we are all united in wanting to achieve the same end. However, the Bill would bring the licensing fee regime of prohibited weapons, pistol clubs and museums in line with the fees regime that exists for standard section 1 firearms. That is a problem. I do not believe that the fees regime for section 1 firearms provides for full cost recovery, so I do not have the confidence that these proposals will achieve full cost recovery for the licences that they control.
The Bill deals with relatively narrow issues around licensing fees. At the moment, there is no system to recover costs from the licensing of prohibited weapons. Subsection (1) will allow authorities to set fees for very powerful, prohibited weapons, such as rocket launchers, which can only be obtained with the permission of the UK Defence Council. The fee will be variable and set by the Secretary of State by regulations, just as is presently the case for ordinary section 1 firearms.
Subsections (2) and (3) deal with the licensing of pistol clubs and museums respectively. At the moment, such fees are fixed under the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988, and the Secretary of State does not have the power to change them by secondary legislation. The Bill will bring the licensing system for those institutions in line with the licensing system for individual firearm owners by granting the Secretary of State the power to change the fees by regulation and by allowing variable fees. The Bill does not actually propose any change in the fees for pistol clubs or museums, and as a result the amount of money that these proposals involve is relatively small.
The Government estimate that these changes will bring in £570,000 a year for the Home Office, £78,000 for the English and Welsh police, £42,000 for the Scottish Government and £6,000 for Police Scotland. As it is said, every little helps. That increased revenue is welcome, as is the capacity for the Secretary of State to change the fees when the costs of licensing increase; but however welcome these changes are, the unfortunate truth is that these proposals will only make a small dent in the gun ownership subsidy that still persists in this country.
In the previous Parliament, the Labour party campaigned on full cost recovery. Fees for section 1 firearms had remained frozen for too long, and as a result the taxpayer was subsidising gun ownership to the tune of £17 million a year. That is insane. The police estimated that the cost of licensing a firearm was £196, yet the fee was stuck at £50. The taxpayer was paying three quarters of the cost of a gun owner getting a licence.
To be fair to the coalition Government, they did respond to the pressure. A working group was set up by the Home Office, the police and the British Association for Shooting and Conservation to consider the matter. After negotiations, it proposed that an £88 fee would be mutually acceptable to the police and shooters. The £88 fee was considerably short of the £196 that the police had independently estimated to be the true cost of licensing guns, but it was still a welcome increase. The £88 fee was finally introduced just before the general election. However, the fee was frozen for 14 years before it was finally increased. The £88 fee was arrived at only after negotiations with BASC and was not imposed following independent estimates.
Our amendments to the Bill would mandate the Secretary of State to set the cost of a licence for prohibited weapons, pistol clubs and museums at the full cost to the taxpayer. A legal requirement that the fee match the full cost would take some of the politics out of the process. The fee decisions would be based on an evidential analysis, conducted by the Home Office, of the true cost to the taxpayer. If the process proved to be successful for prohibited weapons, pistol clubs and museums, the Minister could consider extending it to section 1 firearms. This legislation could be a first step to true full cost recovery.
I will be interested to hear the Minister’s views on the issue. I urge him to accept amendments 228, 229 and 230. The taxpayer should not have to subsidise gun ownership, as it currently does. Our amendments would be a first step to bringing that unfairness to an end once and for all. Labour pushed hard for full cost recovery in the previous Parliament, and we have seen some movement from the Government on the issue. I urge the Minister to work with us, both by accepting our amendments today and by looking at the issue of section 1 licences in the future, to achieve what seems to be a realistic and realisable common goal.
Mike Penning
We are as one on the fact that the taxpayer should not subsidise licensing. The Bill, which is about Home Office licences, will not have an effect on police fees. However, given that the shadow Minister referred to police licence fees, I will respond to that as well. I completely agree that this should have been done years and years ago, under several Administrations. I will therefore look at police licence fees, which the Bill does not do, but which the hon. Lady was referring to.
The legislation has been changed. As from April 2015, police licence fees increased by between 23% and 76%, depending on the certificate type. That is the first increase since 2001. Once the new police online system, eCommerce, is introduced, fees will recover the full costs of licensing. That is specific: it is in the legislation. I had problems myself with the coalition Government, along with several of my colleagues.
Let us look briefly at the Home Office licence fees. I completely agree that it is wrong that the taxpayer is subsidising other organisations. Currently, combined, the authorisation and licensing of prohibited weapons, shooting clubs and museums costs the taxpayer an estimated £700,000 a year. I do not feel that the amendment is necessary: I will explain why. Clause 80 will create a consistent set of charging powers across all Home Office firearms licences and authorities. The Government’s intention is that licence holders, and not the taxpayer, should pay the full cost. The Government will set fees at the appropriate level, based on clause 80, but with agreement from the Treasury. Fees will be set out in a public consultation later this year, which will give affected organisations the chance to raise any issues. Final fee amounts will be introduced via regulations subject to the negative procedure.
Lyn Brown
What is the need for consultation on this? If the Home Office is going to impose the full cost of the licence fee on the person who is applying for the licence, what are we consulting about? If the consultation comes back with some interested group saying, “We can’t afford this—we only really want 50% or 30%,” might the Government be minded to agree with that, rather than impose the full 100% of the cost?
Mike Penning
There are frustrations in being a Minister, as former Ministers know. Consultation is a requirement, because we are likely to be challenged in law. That is why we consult. We will say what we want to do and then consult. One area where there may be real concern is the cost to museums. That is right. Other organisations may want to put their four pennyworth in, as often happens in consultations. We would not want to have a massively adverse effect on museums, though, so we will need to look at that. When proposing changes to legislation or to use delegated powers, it is always best to consult.
Jake Berry
Other people affected by this will be gamekeepers. For example, several gamekeepers in my constituency require a firearm for their job; so I hope that the Government will consider extremely widely. I do not think that, as a matter of principle, we should be saying that the Government should never subsidise sports. I am not particularly interested in volleyball, but I am very happy that we had the London Olympics, with £9 billion of Government money spent on hosting them. I do not think that the principle that we should never subsidise sport should be set out in law, so I hope that the Government will consider this and consult widely.
Mike Penning
I fully understand what my hon. Friend is saying. There is now a confusion between police licence fees and Home Office licensing fees. Gamekeepers will be dealt with under police licensing for shotguns for the control of vermin and so on. This part of the legislation is different: it is to do with Home Office licensing, for armed guards or merchant shipping, for example. Whether a museum is holding weapons—they are still tangible weapons—is separate. I understand that there is confusion: we look at police fees and licensing and think of that as one thing, but they are two different things. Police licensing fees have been set for the first time since 2001, but that is a different issue altogether. I will write to my hon. Friend to confirm exactly what I just said. However, with that and what I propose about using delegated legislation powers later in the year in mind, I hope that the hon. Lady will withdraw her amendment.
Lyn Brown
I am grateful to the Minister for making my day—that is a great birthday present for tomorrow. I look forward to receiving his letter, which will provide clarification. I will bring this back on Report if everything is not as hunky-dory as we think. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 80 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 81
Guidance to police officers in respect of firearms
Amendment made: 215, in clause 81, page 85, line 20, leave out from “must” to end of line 22 and insert
“have regard to any guidance issued under section 55A that is relevant to the appeal.”.—(Mike Penning.)
This amendment requires a court or sheriff hearing an appeal against a decision by the police under the Firearms Act 1968 to have regard to any guidance issued to chief officers of police under the new section 55A of that Act inserted by clause 81.
Clause 81, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 82 to 90 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 91
Power to impose monetary penalties
Lyn Brown
I beg to move amendment 231, in clause 91, page 94, line 37, leave out “50%” and insert “200%”.
This amendment would increase the maximum civil penalty for breaking financial sanctions from half the value of the funds or resources involved to double the value.
The Opposition support the measures in the Bill that will toughen up the enforcement of financial sanctions. We appreciate that financial sanctions are an important diplomatic and strategic power, but we are concerned that the penalties proposed are too light and may not deter an individual from taking a calculated risk.
I am sure we all welcome the news that in recent weeks ISIS has been in retreat in parts and has lost the ancient city of Palmyra. I have no doubt that the financial sanctions that the UK and other countries have placed on 258 individuals and 75 entities that support ISIS have played their part, but, as the executive director of the Iraq Energy Institute told the Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee last month, ISIS’s spending patterns suggest that it must still be receiving substantial donations and outside financial assistance. That is an important reminder that those who break financial sanctions can be a serious threat to national security and to British interests. Those people must be stopped and punished.
The Bill introduces sensible and welcome measures on enforcing financial sanctions, which we support. For example, we support the changes in clause 89, which will allow the Secretary of State to increase the penalty for breaking EU financial sanctions to seven years’ imprisonment. That matches the maximum penalty for breaking an asset freeze under the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010. Given the severity of the crime, that is a far more fitting penalty than the two years currently provided for.
Clauses 97 and 98 address the gap in time between the UN passing a financial sanction resolution and our Government adopting the EU regulations needed to implement it. The Bill will allow the Treasury to enforce United Nations financial sanction resolutions immediately by introducing temporary sanctions as an interim measure. This sort of interim measure seems entirely reasonable, given the importance of financial sanctions to national security. It was, indeed, recommended by Lord Rodger in the Supreme Court when reviewing the case of Mohammed Jabar Ahmed.
Although I support the general thrust of the measures on financial sanctions, there are a few areas in the Bill where I seek assurances from the Minister. In particular, I am concerned that the civil penalties introduced by clause 91 might be perceived as a mere slap on the wrist by those contemplating illegal business activity: that the civil penalties might be light enough that breaking sanctions might be considered to be a risk worth taking. Clause 91(3) states that the maximum civil penalty for breaking financial sanctions is either £1 million or
“50% of the estimated value of the funds or resources”,
if that is more than £1 million. I wonder whether this is insufficient.
I know that £1 million sounds a lot—it is for me—but imagine an individual selling a property in the London property market with a value well in excess of £1 million to a foreign buyer who is subject to financial sanctions. Members of the Committee may have seen last year’s Channel 4 documentary that showed a buyer posing as a Russian official who told the vendors of London properties that his funds were embezzled. Those dealing with him seemed completely and utterly unperturbed. We were not told by the journalists that they were subsequently contacted by any of the vendors to withdraw their interest in the sale, in reconsideration of the fact that the funds were embezzled.
Of the Mossack Fonseca companies tied up in the Panama papers leak, 2,800 appear on the UK Land Registry list of overseas property owners and have assets worth more than £7 billion. It is little wonder that Donald Toon of the National Crime Agency has said that
“the London property market has been skewed by laundered money.”
There is little doubt that London property is seen as a safe haven for both legitimate and illegitimate investors. So my contention is that the threat of being fined 50% of the value of the property might not be sufficient deterrent to stop an individual seller undertaking a sale. As I understand the Bill, the vendor would still be able to keep 50% of the proceeds of a sale even if they are caught. That, if they received it in cash, might be more valuable to them than alternative revenue streams they could have received from the property. I would be grateful if the Minister let me know whether my reading of the Bill is correct. If it is, I would be grateful if she explained why she thinks that that is reasonable. If we want to discourage people who are contemplating engaging with an illegal business, the civil penalties need to be stronger.
I accept that the Minister—getting all my arguments in at once—may stand up and say that these are only civil sanctions and that anyone engaging in illegal business activity will still be subject to criminal sanctions, which include custodial punishments. That may well be the case, but the civil standard of proof of “the balance of probabilities” is a lot easier to meet than the criminal standard of “beyond reasonable doubt”. That is particularly true with regards to financial crime, where the complexities of the financial system have seen calls for fraud cases to sit outside the jury system. That is not a call I agree with, as an individual, but it has been considered and debated in the recent past.
There is a danger that the new Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, run by the Treasury, will rely on civil punishments rather than on the more difficult to achieve criminal punishments. If that is the case, the low level of civil penalties might actually only make the problem worse. Financial sanctions are an important diplomatic and strategic power. Individuals or companies breaking financial sanctions are a serious threat to the national interest and must be stopped.
Policing and Crime Bill (Seventh sitting)
Tuesday 12th April 2016
(8 years, 8 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 12 April 2016 - (12 Apr 2016)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 6 - Question accordingly agreed to.
Lyn Brown (West Ham) (Lab)
In conclusion [Laughter.] Financial sanctions are an important diplomatic and strategic power. Individuals or companies breaking financial sanctions are a serious threat to the national interest and must be stopped. We cannot allow the civil penalties introduced under the Bill to be perceived as a mere slap on the wrist, and a reasonable risk to take for those who would do business with people they should not. By accepting our amendments, the Minister could prevent that from happening.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Karen Bradley)
May I start by wishing the hon. Member for West Ham happy birthday for tomorrow? I hope we will not be sitting down to do this the day after her birthday, so I hope she enjoys her day without having to worry about getting up for Committee the next day, although she will obviously continue to represent her constituents in the excellent way that she does.
The enforcement of financial sanctions is vital to our foreign policy and national security, but it is also important to note that the size of a breach and the culpability of those involved in a breach will vary from case to case. It is therefore important to ensure that the enforcement of financial sanctions is both appropriately targeted and proportionate.
I will respond to some of the points made by the hon. Lady. I welcome her support for these measures. I reassure her that the new Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, or OFSI, and the increased resource behind sanctions enforcement will ensure that financial sanctions make the fullest possible contribution to the UK’s foreign policy and national security goals, as well as helping to maintain the integrity of and confidence in the UK financial services sector.
I would also like to reassure her that OFSI will not seek to use monetary penalties as an alternative to a criminal prosecution. Where a serious breach of the kind described by the hon. Lady is identified by OFSI, the full range of potential enforcement mechanisms will be considered. Although the monetary penalties set out in the Bill will provide a valuable contribution, prosecution and asset seizure under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 will also be available.
I note that the Crown court will, on conviction, be able to impose an unlimited fine. We intend to consult shortly on where and when to use monetary penalties. The proposed maximum limits of £1 million or 50% of the value of the breach are based on evidence about the value of breaches reported to the Treasury over the past two years. We believe that those levels are both proportionate and adequate to remove profits made from breaches of financial sanctions and provide a sufficient deterrent.
The hon. Lady will also be aware that the clause already obliges the Treasury to keep the maximum limits under review, and it includes a power to vary that figure by regulations. Clearly, if it turns out that the provisions are not appropriate, based on the evidence we have today, we can always vary that figure. Finally, I would like to reassure the hon. Lady that if evidence shows that the limits should be set at a higher level we can, and we will, change them.
In the context of the civil sanction regime, it is right that the legislation should provide clear and proportionate limits on the amount of the financial penalty. We believe that, based on the evidence, £1 million or 50% of the estimated value of the funds is an appropriate limit and, accordingly, I urge the hon. Lady to withdraw her amendment.
Lyn Brown
I am grateful to the Minister for that clear and concise answer to the points that I made. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 91 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 92 to 102 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 12 agreed to.
Clauses 103 to 107 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 1
Initiation of investigations by IPCC
‘(1) Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002 (handling of complaints and conduct matters etc) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 4 (reference of complaints to the Commission), in sub-paragraph (7), in the words before paragraph (a), after “occasion” insert “, or that has been treated as having been so referred by virtue of paragraph 4A”.
(3) After paragraph 4 insert—
“Power of Commission to treat complaint as having been referred
4A (1) The Commission may treat a complaint that comes to its attention otherwise than by having been referred to it under paragraph 4 as having been so referred.
(2) Where the Commission treats a complaint as having been referred to it—
(a) paragraphs 2 and 4 do not apply, or cease to apply, in relation to the complaint except to the extent provided for by paragraph 4(7), and
(b) paragraphs 5, 6, 6A, 15 and 25 apply in relation to the complaint as if it had been referred to the Commission by the appropriate authority under paragraph 4.
(3) The Commission must notify the following that it is treating a complaint as having been referred to it—
(a) the appropriate authority;
(b) the complainant;
(c) except in a case where it appears to the Commission that to do so might prejudice an investigation of the complaint (whether an existing investigation or a possible future one), the person complained against (if any).
(4) Where an appropriate authority receives a notification under sub-paragraph (3) in respect of a complaint and the complaint has not yet been recorded, the appropriate authority must record the complaint.”
(4) In paragraph 11 (recording etc of conduct matters otherwise than where conduct matters arise in civil proceedings), omit sub-paragraph (5).
(5) In paragraph 13 (reference of conduct matters to the Commission), in sub-paragraph (7), in the words before paragraph (a), after “occasion” insert “, or that has been treated as having been so referred by virtue of paragraph 13A”.
(6) After paragraph 13 insert—
“Power of Commission to treat conduct matter as having been referred
13A (1) The Commission may treat a conduct matter that comes to its attention otherwise than by having been referred to it under paragraph 13 as having been so referred.
(2) Where the Commission treats a conduct matter as having been referred to it—
(a) paragraphs 10, 11 and 13 do not apply, or cease to apply, in relation to the matter except to the extent provided for by paragraph 13(7), and
(b) paragraphs 14 and 15 apply in relation to the matter as if it had been referred to the Commission by the appropriate authority under paragraph 13.
(3) The Commission must notify the following that it is treating a conduct matter as having been referred to it—
(a) the appropriate authority;
(b) except in a case where it appears to the Commission that to do so might prejudice an investigation of the matter (whether an existing investigation or a possible future one), the person to whose conduct the matter relates.
(4) Where an appropriate authority receives a notification under sub-paragraph (3) in respect of a conduct matter and the matter has not yet been recorded, the appropriate authority must record the matter.”
(7) In paragraph 14A (duty to record DSI matters), omit sub-paragraph (2).
(8) In paragraph 14C (reference of DSI matters to the Commission), in sub-paragraph (3), after “occasion” insert “, or that has been treated as having been so referred by virtue of paragraph 14CA,”.
(9) After paragraph 14C insert—
“Power of Commission to treat DSI matter as having been referred
14CA (1) The Commission may treat a DSI matter that comes to its attention otherwise than by having been referred to it under paragraph 14C as having been so referred.
(2) Where the Commission treats a DSI matter as having been referred to it—
(a) paragraphs 14A and 14C do not apply, or cease to apply, in relation to the matter except to the extent provided for by paragraph 14C(3), and
(b) paragraphs 14D and 15 apply in relation to the matter as if it had been referred to the Commission by the appropriate authority under paragraph 14C.
(3) The Commission must notify the appropriate authority that it is treating a DSI matter as having been referred to it.
(4) Where an appropriate authority receives a notification under sub-paragraph (3) in respect of a DSI matter and the matter has not yet been recorded, the appropriate authority must record the matter.”
(10) In section 29 of the Police Reform Act 2002 (interpretation of Part 2 of that Act), in subsection (1), in paragraph (a) of the definition of “recordable conduct matter”, for “or 11” substitute “, 11 or 13A”. —(Karen Bradley.)
This new clause is intended to take the place of clause 14. The amendments of Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002 in the new clause are aimed at giving the IPCC the ability to consider whether or not it is necessary for a complaint, conduct matter or DSI matter to be investigated and, if so, to determine what form the investigation should take, as soon as the IPCC becomes aware of the complaint or matter.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 2
Sensitive information received by IPCC: restriction on disclosure
‘(1) Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002 (complaints and misconduct) is amended as follows.
(2) After section 21 insert—
“21A Restriction on disclosure of sensitive information
(1) Where the Commission receives information within subsection (3), the Commission must not disclose (whether under section 11, 20 or 21 or otherwise) the information, or the fact that it has been received, unless the relevant authority consents to the disclosure.
(2) Where a person appointed under paragraph 18 of Schedule 3 to investigate a complaint or matter (a “paragraph 18 investigator”) receives information within subsection (3), the paragraph 18 investigator must not disclose the information, or the fact that it has been received, to any person other than the Commission unless the relevant authority consents to the disclosure.
(3) The information is—
(a) intelligence service information;
(b) intercept information;
(c) information obtained from a government department which, at the time it is provided to the Commission or the paragraph 18 investigator, is identified by the department as information the disclosure of which may, in the opinion of the relevant authority—
(i) cause damage to national security, international relations or the economic interests of the United Kingdom or any part of the United Kingdom, or
(ii) jeopardise the safety of any person.
(4) Where the Commission or a paragraph 18 investigator discloses to another person information within subsection (3), or the fact that the Commission or the paragraph 18 investigator has received it, the other person must not disclose that information or that fact unless the relevant authority consents to the disclosure.
(5) In this section—
“government department” means a department of Her Majesty’s Government but does not include—
(a) the Security Service,
(b) the Secret Intelligence Service, or
(c) the Government Communications Headquarters (“GCHQ”);
“intelligence service information” means information that was obtained (directly or indirectly) from or that relates to—
(a) the Security Service,
(b) the Secret Intelligence Service,
(c) GCHQ, or
(d) any part of Her Majesty’s forces, or of the Ministry of Defence, which engages in intelligence activities;
“intercept information” means information relating to any of the matters mentioned in section 19(3) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000;
“Minister of the Crown” includes the Treasury;
“paragraph 18 investigator” has the meaning given by subsection (2);
“relevant authority” means—
(a) in the case of intelligence service information obtained (directly or indirectly) from or relating to the Security Service, the Director-General of the Security Service;
(b) in the case of intelligence service information obtained (directly or indirectly) from or relating to the Secret Intelligence Service, the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service;
(c) in the case of intelligence service information obtained (directly or indirectly) from or relating to GCHQ, the Director of GCHQ;
(d) in the case of intelligence service information obtained (directly or indirectly) from or relating to Her Majesty’s forces or the Ministry of Defence, the Secretary of State;
(e) in the case of intercept information, the person to whom the relevant interception warrant is or was addressed;
(f) in the case of information within subsection (3)(c)—
“relevant interception warrant” means the interception warrant issued under section 5 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 that relates to the intercept information.
21B Provision of sensitive information to the Commission and certain investigators
‘(1) A person who provides information that is intelligence service information or intercept information to the Commission or a paragraph 18 investigator (whether under a provision of this Part or otherwise) must—
(a) make the Commission or the paragraph 18 investigator aware that the information is intelligence service information or (as the case may be) intercept information, and
(b) provide the Commission or the paragraph 18 investigator with such additional information as will enable the Commission or the paragraph 18 investigator to identify the relevant authority in relation to the information.
(2) In this section, “intelligence service information”, “intercept information”, “paragraph 18 investigator” and “relevant authority” have the same meaning as in section 21A.”
(3) In Schedule 3 (handling of complaints and conduct matters etc), in Part 3 (investigations and subsequent proceedings)—
(a) omit paragraph 19ZD (sensitive information: restriction on further disclosure of information received under an information notice);
(b) in paragraph 22 (final reports on investigations: complaints, conduct matters and certain DSI matters)—
(i) after sub-paragraph (6) insert—
“(6A) Where a person would contravene section 21A by submitting, or (as the case may be) sending a copy of, a report in its entirety to the appropriate authority under sub-paragraph (2) or (3)(b), the person must instead submit, or send a copy of, the report after having removed or obscured the information which by virtue of section 21A the person must not disclose.”;
(ii) in sub-paragraph (8), at the end insert “except so far as the person is prevented from doing so by section 21A”;
(c) in paragraph 23 (action by the Commission in response to an investigation report under paragraph 22), after sub-paragraph (2) insert—
“(2ZA) Where the Commission would contravene section 21A by sending a copy of a report in its entirety to the appropriate authority under sub-paragraph (2)(a) or to the Director of Public Prosecutions under sub-paragraph (2)(c), the Commission must instead send a copy of the report after having removed or obscured the information which by virtue of section 21A the Commission must not disclose.”;
(d) in paragraph 24A (final reports on investigations: other DSI matters), after sub-paragraph (3) insert—
“(3A) Where a person would contravene section 21A by sending a copy of a report in its entirety to the appropriate authority under sub-paragraph (2)(b), the person must instead send a copy of the report after having removed or obscured the information which by virtue of section 21A the person must not disclose.”” —(Karen Bradley.)
Paragraph 19ZD of Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002 currently imposes restrictions on the further disclosure by the IPCC of certain sensitive information received by it under an information notice. This new clause replaces paragraph 19ZD with new section 21A of the 2002 Act, which applies irrespective of how the IPCC has obtained the information. New section 21A also applies to investigators appointed under paragraph 18 of Schedule 3 to the 2002 Act (investigations by an appropriate authority under the IPCC’s direction). New section 21A is supplemented by new section 21B, which is intended to assist those needing to comply with section 21A.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 3
Release without bail: fingerprinting and samples
(1) The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 61(5A) (fingerprinting of person arrested for a recordable offence) —
(a) in paragraph (a) omit “in the case of a person who is on bail,”, and
(b) in paragraph (b) omit “in any case,”.
(3) In section 63(3ZA) (taking of non-intimate sample from person arrested for a recordable offence)—
(a) in paragraph (a) omit “in the case of a person who is on bail,”, and
(b) in paragraph (b) omit “in any case,”.—(Karen Bradley.)
Sections 61(5A) and 63(3ZA) of PACE allow fingerprints and samples to be taken from persons released on bail. Because of changes in the Bill, persons will be released without bail (rather than on bail) unless pre-conditions are met. The amendments change those sections so they cover persons released without bail too.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 4
Release under section 24A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003
(1) Section 24A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (arrest for failure to comply with conditions attached to conditional caution) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (2) for paragraphs (b) and (c) substitute—
“(b) released without charge and without bail (with or without any variation in the conditions attached to the caution) unless paragraph (c)(i) and (ii) applies, or
(c) released without charge and on bail if—
(i) the release is to enable a decision to be made as to whether the person should be charged with the offence, and
(ii) the pre-conditions for bail are satisfied.”
(3) In subsections (3)(a) and (4) for “subsection (2)(b)” substitute “subsection (2)(c)”.
(4) After subsection (8) insert—
(8A) In subsection (2) the reference to the pre-conditions for bail is to be read in accordance with section 50A of the 1984 Act.”—(Karen Bradley.)
This new clause changes the provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 relating to persons who are arrested because they are believed to have failed to comply with conditions attached to a conditional caution. To reflect the changes made in the Bill, those persons will be released without bail (rather than on bail) unless pre-conditions are met.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 5
Duty to notify person released under section 34, 37 or 37CA of PACE that not to be prosecuted
(1) The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 34 (limitations on police detention) after subsection (5A) (inserted by section 42 of this Act) insert—
(5B) Subsection (5C) applies where—
(a) a person is released under subsection (5), and
(b) the custody officer determines that—
(i) there is not sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence, or
(ii) there is sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence but the person should not be charged with an offence or given a caution in respect of an offence.
(5C) The custody officer must give the person notice in writing that the person is not to be prosecuted.
(5D) Subsection (5C) does not prevent the prosecution of the person for an offence if new evidence comes to light after the notice was given.
(5E) In this Part “caution” includes—
(a) a conditional caution within the meaning of Part 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003;
(b) a youth conditional caution within the meaning of Chapter 1 of Part 4 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998;
(c) a youth caution under section 66ZA of that Act.”
(3) Section 37 (duties of custody officer before charge) is amended as follows.
(4) After subsection (6) insert——
(6A) Subsection (6B) applies where—
(a) a person is released under subsection (2), and
(b) the custody officer determines that—
(i) there is not sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence, or
(ii) there is sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence but the person should not be charged with an offence or given a caution in respect of an offence.
(6B) The custody officer must give the person notice in writing that the person is not to be prosecuted.
(6C) Subsection (6B) does not prevent the prosecution of the person for an offence if new evidence comes to light after the notice was given.”
(5) After subsection (8) insert—
(8ZA) Where—
(a) a person is released under subsection (7)(b) or (c), and
(b) the custody officer makes a determination as mentioned in subsection (6A)(b),
subsections (6B) and (6C) apply.”
(6) Section 37B (consultation with Director of Public Prosecutions) is amended as follows.
(7) After subsection (5) insert—
(5A) Subsection (5) does not prevent the prosecution of the person for an offence if new evidence comes to light after the notice was given.”
(8) Omit subsection (9).
(9) In section 37CA (release following arrest for breach of bail) after subsection (4) insert——
(5) Subsection (6) applies where—
(a) a person is released under subsection (2), and
(b) a custody officer determines that—
(i) there is not sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence, or
(ii) there is sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence but the person should not be charged with an offence or given a caution in respect of an offence.
(6) The custody officer must give the person notice in writing that the person is not to be prosecuted.
(7) Subsection (6) does not prevent the prosecution of the person for an offence if new evidence comes to light after the notice was given.”
(10) In section 24B(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (application of provisions of Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984)—
(a) in paragraph (d) for “(5)” substitute “(5E)”, and
(b) in paragraph (f) for “(6)” substitute “(6C)”.—(Karen Bradley.)
This new clause requires a custody officer to notify a person released under section 34(5), 37(2) or (7)(b) or (c) or 37CA(2) of PACE if it is decided not to prosecute. So the person is put in the same position as a person released under section 37(7)(a) (who is notified under section 37B(5)).
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 6
Duty to notify person released under any of sections 41 to 44 of PACE that not to be prosecuted
(1) The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 41 (limits on period of detention without charge) after subsection (9) insert—
(10) Subsection (11) applies where—
(a) a person is released under subsection (7), and
(b) a custody officer determines that—
(i) there is not sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence, or
(ii) there is sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence but the person should not be charged with an offence or given a caution in respect of an offence.
(11) The custody officer must give the person notice in writing that the person is not to be prosecuted.
(12) Subsection (11) does not prevent the prosecution of the person for an offence if new evidence comes to light after the notice was given.”
(3) In section 42 (authorisation of continued detention) after subsection (11) insert—
(12) Subsection (13) applies where—
(a) a person is released under subsection (10), and
(b) a custody officer determines that—
(i) there is not sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence, or
(ii) there is sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence but the person should not be charged with an offence or given a caution in respect of an offence.
(13) The custody officer must give the person notice in writing that the person is not to be prosecuted.
(14) Subsection (13) does not prevent the prosecution of the person for an offence if new evidence comes to light after the notice was given.”
(4) In section 43 (warrants of further detention) after subsection (19) insert——
(20) Subsection (21) applies where—
(a) a person is released under subsection (15) or (18), and
(b) a custody officer determines that—
(i) there is not sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence, or
(ii) there is sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence but the person should not be charged with an offence or given a caution in respect of an offence.
(21) The custody officer must give the person notice in writing that the person is not to be prosecuted.
(22) Subsection (21) does not prevent the prosecution of the person for an offence if new evidence comes to light after the notice was given.”
(5) In section 44 (extension of warrants of further detention) after subsection (8) insert——
(9) Subsection (10) applies where—
(a) a person is released under subsection (7), and
(b) a custody officer determines that—
(i) there is not sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence, or
(ii) there is sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence but the person should not be charged with an offence or given a caution in respect of an offence.
(10) The custody officer must give the person notice in writing that the person is not to be prosecuted.
(11) Subsection (10) does not prevent the prosecution of the person for an offence if new evidence comes to light after the notice was given.” —(Karen Bradley.)
This new clause requires a custody officer to notify a person released under section 41(7), 42(10), 43(15) or (18) or 44(7) of PACE if it is decided not to prosecute. So the person is put in the same position as a person released under section 37(7)(a) (who is notified under section 37B(5)).
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 22
Combined authority mayors: exercise of fire and rescue functions
‘(1) The Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (4).
(2) After section 107E insert—
“107EA Exercise of fire and rescue functions
(1) This section applies to a mayor for the area of a combined authority who—
(a) by virtue of section 107D(1), may exercise functions which are conferred on a fire and rescue authority in that name (“fire and rescue functions”), and
(b) by virtue of section 107F(1), may exercise functions of a police and crime commissioner.
(2) The Secretary of State may by order make provision—
(a) authorising the mayor to arrange for the chief constable of the police force for the police area which corresponds to the area of the combined authority to exercise fire and rescue functions exercisable by the mayor;
(b) authorising that chief constable to arrange for a person within subsection (4) to exercise functions exercisable by the chief constable under arrangements made by virtue of paragraph (a).
(3) An order under subsection (2) may provide that arrangements made under the order—
(a) may authorise the exercise of any fire and rescue functions exercisable by the mayor;
(b) may authorise the exercise of any fire and rescue functions exercisable by the mayor other than those specified or described in the order;
(c) may authorise the exercise of fire and rescue functions exercisable by the mayor which are specified or described in the order.
(4) The persons mentioned in subsection (2)(b) are—
(a) members of the chief constable’s police force;
(b) the civilian staff of that police force, as defined by section 102(4) of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011;
(c) members of staff transferred to the chief constable under a scheme made by virtue of section 107EC(1);
(d) members of staff appointed by the chief constable under section 107EC(2).
(5) Provision in an order under section 107D(1) for a function to be exercisable only by the mayor for the area of a combined authority is subject to provision made by virtue of subsection (2).
(6) This section is subject to—
(a) section 107EB (section 107EA orders: procedure), and
(b) section 37 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (prohibition on employment of police in fire-fighting).
107EB Section 107EA orders: procedure
‘(1) An order under section 107EA(2) may be made in relation to the mayor for the area of a combined authority only if the mayor has requested the Secretary of State to make the order.
(2) A request under subsection (1) must be accompanied by a report which contains—
(a) an assessment of why—
(i) it is in the interests of economy, efficiency and effectiveness for the order to be made, or
(ii) it is in the interests of public safety for the order to be made,
(b) a description of any public consultation which the mayor has carried out on the proposal for the order to be made,
(c) a summary of the responses to any such consultation, and
(d) a summary of the representations (if any) which the mayor has received about that proposal from the constituent members of the combined authority.
(3) Subsections (4) and (5) apply if—
(a) the mayor for the area of a combined authority has made a request under subsection (1) for the Secretary of State to make an order under section 107EA(2), and
(b) at least two thirds of the constituent members of the combined authority have indicated that they disagree with the proposal for the order to be made.
(4) The mayor must, in providing the report under subsection (2), provide the Secretary of State with—
(a) copies of the representations (if any) made by the constituent members of the combined authority about that proposal, and
(b) the mayor’s response to those representations and to the responses to any public consultation which the mayor has carried out on that proposal.
(5) The Secretary of State must—
(a) obtain an independent assessment of that proposal, and
(b) in deciding whether to make the order, have regard to that assessment and to the material provided under subsection (4) (as well as the material provided under subsection (2)).
(6) An order under section 107EA(2) may be made only if it appears to the Secretary of State that—
(a) it is in the interests of economy, efficiency and effectiveness for the order to be made, or
(b) it is in the interest of public safety for the order to be made.
(7) The Secretary of State may, in making an order under section 107EA(2) in relation to the mayor for the area of a combined authority, give effect to the mayor’s proposal for the order with such modifications as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate.
(8) Before making an order which gives effect to such a proposal with modifications, the Secretary of State must consult the mayor and the combined authority on the modifications.
(9) In this section—
“constituent council”, in relation to a combined authority, means—
(a) a county council the whole or any part of whose area is within the area of the combined authority, or
(b) a district council whose area is within the area of the combined authority;
“constituent member”, in relation to a combined authority, means a member of the authority appointed by a constituent council (but does not include the mayor for the area of the combined authority).
107EC Section 107EA orders: further provision
‘(1) An order under section 107EA(2) may make provision for the making of a scheme to transfer property, rights and liabilities (including criminal liabilities) from a fire and rescue authority or the combined authority to the chief constable (including provision corresponding to any provision made by section 17(4) to (6) of the Localism Act 2011).
(2) A chief constable to whom an order under section 107EA(2) applies may appoint staff for the purpose of the exercise of functions exercisable by the chief constable by virtue of the order.
(3) A chief constable to whom an order under section 107EA(2) applies may—
(a) pay remuneration, allowances and gratuities to members of the chief constable’s fire and rescue staff;
(b) pay pensions to, or in respect of, persons who are or have been such members of staff;
(c) pay amounts for or towards the provision of pensions to, or in respect of, persons who are or have been such members of staff.
(4) In subsection (3) “allowances”, in relation to a member of staff, means allowances in respect of expenses incurred by the member of staff in the course of employment as such a member of staff.
(5) Subject to subsections (6) to (8), a person who is employed pursuant to a transfer by virtue of subsection (1) or an appointment under subsection (2) may not at the same time be employed pursuant to an appointment by a chief constable of the police force for a police area under Schedule 2 to the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011.
(6) Where an order under section 107EA(2) is in force in relation to the chief constable of the police force for a police area, the person who is for the time being the police force’s chief finance officer is to be responsible for the proper administration of financial affairs relating to the exercise of functions exercisable by the chief constable by virtue of the order.
(7) Subsection (5) does not prevent a person who is employed as a finance officer for fire functions from being at the same time employed as a finance officer for police functions.
(8) In subsection (7)—
“finance officer for fire functions” means a member of a chief constable’s fire and rescue staff who—
(a) is not a chief finance officer of the kind mentioned in subsection (6), and
(b) is employed to carry out duties relating to the proper administration of financial affairs relating to the exercise of functions exercisable by the chief constable by virtue of an order under section 107EA(2);
“finance officer for police functions” means a member of a chief constable’s civilian staff within the meaning of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 who—
(a) is not a chief finance officer of the kind mentioned in subsection (6), and
(b) is employed to carry out duties relating to the proper administration of a police force’s financial affairs.
(9) Where an order under section 107EA(2) is in force, the combined authority to which the order applies must pay—
(a) any damages or costs awarded against the chief constable to whom the order applies in any proceedings brought against the chief constable in respect of the acts or omissions of a member of the chief constable’s fire and rescue staff;
(b) any costs incurred by the chief constable in any such proceedings so far as not recovered by the chief constable in the proceedings;
(c) any sum required in connection with the settlement of any claim made against the chief constable in respect of the acts or omissions of a member of the chief constable’s fire and rescue staff, if the settlement is approved by the authority.
(10) Where an order under section 107EA(2) is in force, the combined authority to which the order applies may, in such cases and to such extent as appears to the authority to be appropriate, pay—
(a) any damages or costs awarded against a member of the fire and rescue staff of the chief constable to whom the order applies in proceedings for any unlawful conduct of that member of staff;
(b) costs incurred and not recovered by such a member of staff in such proceedings;
(c) sums required in connection with the settlement of a claim that has or might have given rise to such proceedings.
(11) In this section “fire and rescue staff”, in relation to a chief constable to whom an order under section 107EA(2) applies, means—
(a) staff transferred to the chief constable under a scheme made by virtue of subsection (1);
(b) staff appointed by the chief constable under subsection (2).
107ED Section 107EA orders: exercise of fire and rescue functions
‘(1) This section applies if—
(a) an order under section 107EA(2) makes provision in relation to the area of a combined authority, and
(b) by virtue of the order, fire and rescue functions exercisable by the mayor for the area of the combined authority are exercisable by the chief constable of the police force for the police area which corresponds to that area.
(2) The chief constable must secure that good value for money is obtained in exercising—
(a) functions which are exercisable by the chief constable by virtue of the order, and
(b) functions relating to fire and rescue services which are conferred on the chief constable by or by virtue of any enactment.
(3) The chief constable must secure that other persons exercising functions by virtue of the order obtain good value for money in exercising those functions.
(4) The mayor must—
(a) secure the exercise of the duties which are exercisable by the chief constable or another person by virtue of the order,
(b) secure the exercise of the duties relating to fire and rescue services which are imposed on the chief constable by or by virtue of any enactment,
(c) secure that functions which are exercisable by the chief constable or another person by virtue of the order are exercised efficiently and effectively, and
(d) secure that functions relating to fire and rescue services which are conferred or imposed on the chief constable by or by virtue of any enactment are exercised efficiently and effectively.
(5) The mayor must hold the chief constable to account for the exercise of such functions.
107EE Section 107EA orders: complaints and conduct matters etc
‘(1) If an order is made under 107EA(2) that enables arrangements to be made for the exercise of functions by members of a police force or the civilian staff of a police force, the Secretary of State may by order amend Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002 (persons serving with the police: complaints and conduct matters etc) in consequence of that provision.
(2) If an order is made under section 107EA(2) that enables arrangements to be made for the exercise of functions by members of staff transferred to a chief constable under a scheme made by virtue of section 107EC(1) or appointed by a chief constable under section 107EC(2), the Secretary of State may by order make provision of the type described in subsection (3) in relation to those members of staff.
(3) The provision referred to in subsection (2) is—
(a) provision corresponding or similar to any provision made by or under Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002;
(b) provision applying (with or without modifications) any provision made by or under Part 2 of that Act.
(4) The Secretary of State may by order, in consequence of any provision made under subsection (2), amend Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002.
(5) Before making an order under this section the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the Police Advisory Board for England and Wales,
(b) the Independent Police Complaints Commission,
(c) such persons as appear to the Secretary of State to represent the views of police and crime commissioners,
(d) such persons as appear to the Secretary of State to represent the views of fire and rescue authorities, and
(e) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
107EF Section 107EA orders: application of local policing provisions
‘(1) The Secretary of State may by order—
(a) apply (with or without modifications) any provision of a local policing enactment in relation to a person within subsection (2);
(b) make, in relation to such a person, provision corresponding or similar to any provision of a local policing enactment.
(2) Those persons are—
(a) a mayor for the area of a combined authority to which an order under section 107EA(2) applies,
(b) a chief constable to which such an order applies, and
(c) a panel established by virtue of an order under paragraph 4 of Schedule 5C for such an area.
(3) The power conferred by subsection (1)(a) or (b) includes power to apply (with or without modifications) any provision made by or under a local policing enactment or make provision corresponding or similar to any such provision.
(4) The Secretary of State may by order amend, revoke or repeal a provision of or made under an enactment in consequence of provision made by virtue of subsection (1).
(5) In this section “local policing enactment” means an Act relating to a police and crime commissioner.
(3) In section 107D(6)(b) (general functions exercisable by the mayor for the area of a combined authority) after “section 107E” insert “or 107EA”.
(4) In section 120 (interpretation) after the definition of “EPB” insert—
““fire and rescue authority” means a fire and rescue authority under the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004;”.
(5) In section 26 of the Fire Services Act 1947 (firefighters’ pension scheme) (as continued in force by order under section 36 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004) in subsection (5A) (as inserted by paragraph 12 of Schedule 1)—
(a) omit the “or” at the end of paragraph (a), and
(b) after paragraph (b) insert—
“(c) a transfer to the chief constable under a scheme made by virtue of section 107EC(1) of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009, or
(d) an appointment by the chief constable under section 107EC(2) of that Act.”
(6) In section 63 of the Police Act 1996 (Police Advisory Board for England and Wales) in subsection (4) (as inserted by paragraph 15 of Schedule 1) for “also imposes a requirement” substitute “and section 107EE of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 also impose requirements”.
(7) In section 38 of the Police Reform Act 2002 (police powers for civilian staff) in subsection (11A) (as inserted by paragraph 17 of Schedule 1) after paragraph (b) insert—
“(c) any member of staff transferred to that chief constable under a scheme made by virtue of section 107EC(1) of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 (transfer of property, rights and liabilities to chief constable to whom fire functions of combined authority may be delegated);
(d) any member of staff appointed by that chief constable under section 107EC(2) of that Act (appointment of staff by chief constable to whom fire functions of combined authority may be delegated).”
(8) In section 34 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (pensions etc) in subsection (11) (as inserted by paragraph 9 of Schedule 1)—
(a) omit the “or” at the end of paragraph (a), and
(b) after paragraph (b) insert—
“(c) transferred to the chief constable under a scheme made by virtue of section 107EC(1) of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009, or
(d) appointed by the chief constable under section 107EC(2) of that Act.”
(9) In section 37 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (prohibition on employment of police in fire-fighting) (as substituted by paragraph 10 of Schedule 1) in subsection (3)—
(a) after “whom” insert “—(a)”, and
(b) after paragraph (a) insert “, or
(b) functions of a fire and rescue authority which are exercisable by the mayor of a combined authority have been delegated under an order under section 107EA(2) of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009.”
(10) In Schedule 8 to the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (appointment, suspension and removal of senior police officers) in paragraph 2 (no appointment until end of confirmation process) in sub-paragraph (1AA) (as inserted by paragraph 23 of Schedule 1) after “section 4F of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004” insert “or section 107EA(2) of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009”.
(11) In Schedule 1 to the Public Service Pensions Act 2013 (persons in public service: definitions) in paragraph 6 (fire and rescue workers) in paragraph (aa) (as inserted by paragraph 24 of Schedule 1)—
(a) omit the “or” at the end of sub-paragraph (i), and
(b) for the “or” at the end of sub-paragraph (ii) substitute—transferred to the chief constable under a scheme made by virtue of section 107EC(1) of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009, orappointed by the chief constable under section 107EC(2) of that Act, or”.”
(i) transferred to the chief constable under a scheme made by virtue of section 107EC(1) of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009, or
(ii) appointed by the chief constable under section 107EC(2) of that Act, or”.” —(Mike Penning.)
This new clause makes provision for and in connection with enabling the mayor of a combined authority by whom fire and rescue functions are exercisable to delegate those functions to the chief constable for the police area which corresponds to the area of the combined authority.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Minister for Policing, Fire, Criminal Justice and Victims (Mike Penning)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Mike Penning
New clause 22 applies the single employer model to combined authority mayors to enable mayors with both policing and fire functions to delegate fire functions to a single chief officer, who will employ both police and fire personnel. This allows combined authority mayors to realise the core benefits of collaboration between the police and fire services, for example by bringing together a senior management team or allowing rapid consolidation of back-office functions. The candidates for metro mayor who are coming forward are particularly looking for that collaboration: it will be essential to producing the efficiencies, economy and effectiveness needed. The new clause will give metro mayors the ability to function in the way we all expect them to.
Lyn Brown
The new clause will give metro mayors the power to put in place a single employer model for the fire service and for the police force, where they have taken on the role of fire and rescue authority and police and crime commissioner. There are already provisions in the Bill that enable metro mayors to take on responsibility for the governance of policing and fire, but there is no existing legislation to give a mayor who has taken on both roles the power to implement the single employer model.
As we discussed in a previous sitting, the Bill provides for police and crime commissioners who have taken responsibility for fire and rescue to put in place a single employer model; the new clause extends this power to mayors. Since we were opposed to the single employer model then, it will be no surprise to the Minister or the Committee that we are still opposed to it now. The Committee will be relieved to hear that I am not going to repeat the arguments I made on the first day against the single employer model in quite as much detail today—the Committee has heard my concerns, and I am sure the Minister took note of them—but I would like to re-address the important arguments.
A large proportion of the work carried out by the fire service is preventive: smoke alarms are checked, sprinklers are fitted and homes are made safer. This preventive work is not an add-on to the fire service’s work; it is at the core of what it does. We need to be honest: there are some people who would not welcome a policeman into their homes without a warrant. Police officers turning up at their door can be a scary experience. There are fears that under the single employer model it may be more difficult for the fire service to carry out vital preventive work if a member of the public is concerned that the firefighters coming into their home may have to share information with or report back to their boss, the police.
There is a fundamental difference between the humanitarian service that the fire and rescue service provides and the law enforcement service carried out by the police. This is not an attack on our police, who provide an important public service, as we all know. However, for the public to allow firefighters into their homes for preventive checks, there has to be a level of trust in the fire service, which is quite simply not paralleled elsewhere.
There is also the issue of workers in the police force and the fire and rescue service enjoying different terms and conditions of employment, not least around the right to strike. I think there are legitimate fears that the single employer model will be used as a means of cutting back on the workers’ rights of those in the fire service.
Finally, I am concerned about extending the power of the single employer model to metro mayors at this late stage in the legislative process. By including that in a late amendment, the Government have not given those living in metropolitan areas the time to consider and be consulted about what is on offer. Will the Minister explain why this important part of the Government’s reform is being made via an amendment at this late stage?
Mike Penning
I am, sadly, not surprised that Her Majesty’s Opposition continue with the concern that they raised about the PCCs. The principle here is pretty simple: that it will have no operational effect on the fire service. There are two separate pillars of funding—two separate positions to be in. We have tabled numerous amendments, which is quite normal; we are making sure that there is no anomaly between PCCs and mayors.
There was initial support from Her Majesty’s Opposition. The shadow Policing Minister said:
“I think that police and fire services logically sit within the context of a combined authority.”—[Official Report, 14 October 2015; Vol. 600, c. 376.]
I agreed with him at the time. What we are now discussing—who trusts whom going into homes—has nothing to do with that; it is to do with whether we have the same system for PCCs as we have for mayors. That is the reason for the amendments.
Jack Dromey (Birmingham, Erdington) (Lab)
This point has been raised previously. It is one thing to seek to get all the statutory agencies effectively to collaborate as part of a combined authority. It is another thing altogether to merge the police and the fire service. We have no problem with the former, but we are opposed to the latter.
Mike Penning
I respect the shadow Policing Minister’s position. There are very few things we disagree on, particularly in the Bill, but on this particular point we disagree. There will be plenty of time on Report and in the other place to discuss that further, but it would be wrong to leave an anomaly between PCCs and mayors, which is why the Government have tabled these amendments. I hope the Committee will approve them.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 42—Offence of breach of pre-charge bail conditions relating to travel: interpretation.
New clause 43—Breach of pre-charge bail—
“(1) A person commits an offence if, having been released on bail under sections 37, 37C(2)(b) or 37CA(2)(b) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 under investigation for a terrorism offence or serious crime offence they breach any of the terms of their bail specified that place restriction on their ability to travel including surrendering their passport and/or place conditions on their residency.
(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable on summary conviction to 6 months imprisonment or a fine or to both.
(3) For the purposes of this section, serious crime shall be specified of the Secretary of State by order.”
This new clause would make it an offence for those suspected of serious crimes and terrorism to break bail conditions linked to travel.
Government amendment 226
Mike Penning
This is a very important Government new clause and amendment, which I discussed with the shadow Minister outside the room, but I think it is particularly important that we debate them properly in Committee. The issue of suspected terrorists absconding from pre-charge bail was quite rightly raised on Second Reading. In January, the Prime Minister indicated to the Liaison Committee that the Government would look very carefully at the issue to avoid a repeat of instances in which somebody is not charged, released on police bail and then breaks the conditions of that police bail within the counter-terrorism context.
This new clause is about counter-terrorism suspects, a subject on which I know the Opposition would like to expand. Although I will keep under review any other offences that are alleged against somebody who has been released on pre-charge bail, the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 already lists a range of offences, including membership of proscribed organisations, that would prevent bail from being granted. The new clause relates to people for whom bail has been granted because the police need to continue with their investigations and do not have evidence to give them concern about a more serious offence taking place. The breach of this bail would carry a maximum penalty of 12 months imprisonment. This very important Government new clause enacts the commitment that we made, and I look forward to the Opposition’s response.
Jack Dromey
The starting point for us is that we may have our disagreements on other fronts but there is unity across the House in opposition to the grotesque threat posed to our nation by terrorist violence. There is utter determination that we rise to the challenge of keeping our communities safe. On Second Reading, my right hon. Friend the Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham), the shadow Home Secretary, called on the Government to toughen the police bail regime for terror suspects, and we are pleased that the Government have listened and are now taking action.
James Berry (Kingston and Surbiton) (Con)
Is the hon. Gentleman aware that that was in fact a recommendation of the Select Committee on Home Affairs? The right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) circulated something to the Committee this morning saying that it was his cross-party Committee that brought the issue to the Government’s attention, and it is something on which we all agree.
Jack Dromey
All I would say is that this measure was not part of the original Bill. It is certainly true that the Home Affairs Committee has done valuable work on this matter, but ultimately it was our proposal on Second Reading that led to the Government’s welcome shift. The fact that there is cross-party support is also welcome.
If we believe that the Government have moved, we are not convinced that they have yet gone far enough. The issue of principle is simple: it should not be right that terror suspects on pre-charge police bail have previously been able to leave the country with ease to escape justice, and it is essential that the loophole is closed as a matter of urgency. The Government’s new clause would make it an offence for those suspected of terrorism to break bail conditions linked to travel.
On Second Reading, my right hon. Friend the Member for Leigh referred to the case of Siddhartha Dhar, who absconded while on police bail and went to Syria via Dover, as a prime example of the unacceptable loophole in the current system. In reference to what the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton said earlier, the Home Affairs Committee investigated forensically and collected evidence on this important issue. That was strongly buttressed by the compelling evidence given by the head of counter-terrorism, Mark Rowley, and Sara Thornton, the chair of the National Police Chiefs Council, when they came before this Committee. They both made it absolutely clear that they wanted to see the removal of the limitations currently obtaining, which are operational constraints.
Although we welcome the Government’s amendment and new clause, we want to ensure that in cases such as that of Siddhartha Dhar the police are able to insist on a suspect’s passports being handed over when they are in the custody suite. We should not wait to write to them after they have been released to say, “Please, would you hand over your passport?” because we risk that they may have already used the opportunity to leave the country, as Mr Dhar did. The Home Affairs Committee recommended that to the Government some considerable time ago, and we welcome the fact that Ministers are now acting, but their proposal does not set out how exactly the police can seize travel documentation, where necessary. For example, will the police be able to accompany the suspect to wherever his or her passport is being stored? Could they prevent a suspect from leaving until documentation is brought to the station? Will the police be able to request the surrender of passports and travel documents as a condition of release from custody? What exactly does the Policing Minister envisage happening next time the police arrest a terrorist suspect who inconveniently does not have his travel documentation on him at the time of arrest? I would be grateful if the Government would set out in some detail how they see this working.
Mike Penning
The new clause is about breach of a bail condition that carries a 12-month sentence. The police already have the power to set police bail conditions and, if they wish, they could say that a person cannot be released on bail until their travel documents have been surrendered. That could be part of the bail. It could be seven days. They already have the powers. It is not within the Bill because it does not need to be.
Jack Dromey
I have looked at what the Minister said in our earlier discussions, in particular in relation to the Terrorism Act 2000. There is no provision for bail, before or after charge, under the Terrorism Act. Under the Act it boils down to either charging or releasing a suspect; the initial detention limit is 48 hours, which is extendable, and there is no existing terrorist legislation, therefore, that provides for the police to seize a passport from a terrorist suspect or relates to the enforcement of pre-charge bail conditions.
Jake Berry (Rossendale and Darwen) (Con)
An interesting point in the case of terrorism is that many—not all—people accused of terrorism offences will have dual nationality and more than one passport. Has there been any thought as to how that would be discovered by the police, if the information was not volunteered, and what provisions may be required to get someone to surrender passports of another country as well as their British passport?
Jack Dromey
The hon. Gentleman makes a very good point. That is precisely why I referred earlier to “passports”. There have been a number of cases of people having dual nationality in the way the hon. Gentleman has suggested. Fundamentally, this is about making sure that we do not have somebody like Dhar who walks out of the police station, says, “Yeah, okay, I will surrender my passports, I will be back tomorrow” and is then on the first plane to get out of the country. It is about certainty beyond any doubt that that simply cannot happen in future. Relatedly, have the Government looked at the issue of the ability of agencies to communicate immediately when passports are to be surrendered—for example, crucially, the Border Force? We look forward to clarification on these crucial points.
On another issue, the Government proposal applies only to terrorist suspects and not to those suspected of serious crimes. There is no question but that there is something uniquely awful about the terrorist threat to our country but, having said that, our new clause includes serious crime offences to be specified by the Secretary of State in regulation and so would address cases where, for example, suspects have fled the country before standing trial over rape allegations. The Minister has very helpfully said that he will keep this matter under review. We hope, however, that the Government will now give the Home Secretary that power; of course, it is for the Home Secretary to determine, in consultation, how that power is exercised thereafter.
The Minister was right when he said that the National Police Chiefs Council highlighted that it would like this power not to be confined to counter-terrorism. We urge the Government to include suspects of other offences in their proposals. As such, in circumstances where the Government are taking action, we will not press our new clause to a vote today. We seek assurances from the Government on the points I have raised as soon as possible, however, and we stand ready for further dialogue before Report. I very much hope that we can go to Report with a common position. In that dialogue, we will seek a strengthened clause and we will work with the Government to make sure that the pre-charge bail regime truly has teeth. We will return to this on Report; for now, on this crucial issue, we urge the Government to reflect and I stress, once again, that we very much hope that we are able to make common progress by the time of Report. The way we vote on Report will depend on whether we can put our hand on our hearts and say that never again will there be a case like that of Dhar.
Mike Penning
I am genuinely pleased that the shadow Minister is not going to push this to a vote. Perhaps it is right that a subject of this seriousness is debated on the Floor of the House on Report. Yet again, I offer the shadow Minister my help and that of my Bill team to see if we can come to a consensus.
The shadow Minister asked specifically whether the police can accompany the person who was still under arrest before they were given police bail, to ascertain their travel documents; under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, they can do that. Where police have already requested under the arrest warrant their immediate surrender, they can accompany the individual to their place of residence. If they breach that—in other words, they try to abscond and so on—that is where the sanctions in the new clause apply.
Of course, the shadow Minister is absolutely right that under the Terrorism Act 2000, there is no bail—a point that I made earlier on. This proposal relates to other alleged offences. Let us see what position we can come to. It is very important, because we are all as one in wanting to protect the public. We are as one in wanting people who are suspected of terrorism offences not to abscond. But the police have substantial powers at the moment. I have discussed that with them extensively to make sure that they use their existing powers, including making sure that they have the travel documents.
I do not want to go into individual cases. It is for officers in an operation to make operational decisions, not for politicians, but it is for us to give them the powers and to say to them, sometimes, “By the way, you already have the powers and you should use them.” I am pleased that new clause 43 will not be moved and we offer as much assistance as possible to reach consensus, as we have done throughout the progress of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 41 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 42
Offence of breach of pre-charge bail conditions relating to travel: interpretation
“(1) This section defines words used in section (Offence of breach of pre-charge bail conditions relating to travel)(2).
(2) “Travel document” means anything that is or appears to be—
(a) a passport, or
(b) a ticket or other document that permits a person to make a journey by any means from a place within the United Kingdom to a place outside the United Kingdom.
(3) “Passport” means—
(a) a United Kingdom passport (within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971),
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, or by or on behalf of an international organisation, or
(c) a document that can be used (in some or all circumstances) instead of a passport.
(4) “Port” means—
(a) an airport,
(b) a sea port,
(c) a hoverport,
(d) a heliport,
(e) a railway station where passenger trains depart for places outside the United Kingdom, or
(f) any other place at which a person is able, or attempting, to get on or off any craft, vessel or vehicle in connection with leaving the United Kingdom.”.—(Mike Penning.)
This new clause defines certain terms used in NC41.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 7
National Assembly for Wales: devolution of responsibility for policing
“(1) In Schedule 7 to the Government of Wales Act 2006 after paragraph 20 insert—
Policing
21 Policing, police pay, probation, community safety, crime prevention.
Exceptions—
National Crime Agency
Police pensions
National security”.—(Liz Saville Roberts.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd)
: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Diolch yn fawr, Mr Cadeirydd. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Howarth. This is a probing new clause, and I do not intend to press it to a Division. None the less, I draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that policing in Wales is an anomaly in the UK. Although policing is a devolved power in Northern Ireland and Scotland, Welsh policing remains reserved to Westminster. At the same time, the Welsh police forces are unique in the UK in that they are non-devolved bodies operating within a largely devolved public services landscape.
When we were discussing the police and fire authorities earlier in Committee, I was aware that there were perhaps cost implications for the police forces in Wales that are not necessarily appreciated. We are seeing changes happening even during the progress of the Bill. It is as important to draw attention to that as much as to the principle of devolving policing.
The Welsh police forces are unique in the sense that they are required to follow the agenda of two Governments; crucially, that means that Welsh police forces operate on the basis of English priorities, such as knife crime. Some of these issues are major problems in England but less so in Wales; correspondingly, issues that are significant in Wales have a lower priority here. Thus, while there are clear and numerous benefits to devolving policing, the arguments for keeping it reserved to Westminster appear to be comparably weak—and weakening, given that it is already devolved to Scotland and Northern Ireland.
That was, of course, reflected in the recommendations of the Silk commission, which was set up by the previous coalition Government and comprised a nominee from each of the four main parties, academics and industry experts. It received written evidence, heard oral evidence and visited every corner of Wales; it was a very broad consultation project. It heard evidence from the police themselves calling for the devolution of policing, and the report recommended as such. All four parties represented on the Silk commission recommended that policing be devolved, as has every Member of the National Assembly.
Jack Dromey
Wales is a proud nation, well served on the one hand by some excellent Labour Members of Parliament on this Committee, including my hon. Friends the Members for Swansea East and for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney, and on the other hand by a first-class police service. Like the Policing Minister, I have seen that first hand in Wales—more recently in north Wales with David Taylor, looking at the good work being done to tackle rural crime.
In south Wales, only last weekend, together with my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea East, I was looking at how the police safeguard public order at major public events, in that case a football match. I was deeply impressed by the police officers that we met—Jason, Steve and Joe—who were all doing a first-class job together with their police and crime commissioner Alun Michael. They are rooted in the community and talk about the community. That is a style of policing that has evolved over the past 20 years and is popular with the people of Britain as a whole, and Wales in particular.
So Wales is a proud nation, well served. It is right, nevertheless, that the people of Wales have a greater say over the policing of Wales. It is also right that the Welsh Assembly has the right to draw up in partnership a policing plan for Wales. That would be in partnership, on the one hand, with the four forces and their police and crime commissioners and, on the other hand, a range of statutory agencies.
Historically, Labour is the party of devolution. We do support the devolution of greater powers over policing to Wales but time and thought are necessary to get it right. I was speaking only last night with Carwyn Jones, and he has talked about a 10-year process of evolution of the arrangements in Wales and those between Wales and the rest of the UK.
Time and thought are necessary due to the sometimes complex interface with other areas in the criminal justice system and Government, but they are also necessary because I do not believe that anyone is proposing that all powers be devolved to Wales. The hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd made the point that the work of the National Crime Agency on serious and organised crime would clearly not be devolved. Likewise, counter-terrorism strategy would clearly not be devolved. As an example at the extreme end, when I was in Swansea with my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea East, we talked at length about the policing of the NATO summit and how to keep safe Heads of State from all over the world. Clearly, that would not be devolved either.
It is therefore a question of working through those crucial principles at the next stages. How can the people of Wales have a greater say in their policing? How best can the Welsh Assembly have the right to draw up a policing plan for Wales, in consultation with others? Then comes a process of evolution of the existing arrangements to achieve those objectives. I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her comments, including that she would not push the amendment to a vote. She has raised important and complex issues, but the amendment is not the appropriate vehicle to resolve them; they will require resolving in the next stages.
Finally, I could not let an opportunity like this go by without reminding the Committee that in Labour Wales, a Labour Administration has made a difference to policing, with 500 extra PCSOs, 200 of them in south Wales. It was a privilege to meet some of them at the weekend. They are good men and women on the ground keeping our communities safe, thanks to what a Labour Administration did.
Mike Penning
I reiterate the comments made by the shadow Policing Minister about the tone of how the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd introduced her amendments. It has been useful. The issue is enormously complicated for Wales as part of the United Kingdom. The obvious references to Scotland and Northern Ireland are difficult to add to a report, not least because they have completely independent and different criminal justice systems. There is only one police force in Scotland now, and there has been only one police force in Northern Ireland for many years.
This issue must be decided by the people of Wales. The Government have made it clear that if there is not consensus within the Silk commission’s proposals, we will not consider devolving full powers to the Government of Wales and the Welsh Assembly. I heard the hon. Lady say that there is consensus, and that is certainly true of the correspondence and conversations that I have been having. I reiterate what the shadow Police Minister said. I have visited Wales on many occasions. There are many Conservative MPs there, not least the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions. What I am trying to indicate politely is that it is not a one-party state.
PCC elections will be held in Wales imminently. They will give the people of Wales the best chance to decide what sort of policing they want in their part of the world. That is devolution, and that is democracy. Although I understand that this is a probing amendment, I am also pleased that new clause 7 will not be pressed to a vote.
Liz Saville Roberts
I welcome the change of standpoint by Labour MPs. Possibly it indicates a shift since the process undertaken through the St David’s day negotiation resulted in not all the recommendations of the Silk report being adopted, even though they were cross-party.
On devolution and the issues to be decided by the people of Wales, when I was discussing the draft Wales Bill, we were told that in the St David’s day discussions certain issues had been brought ahead or otherwise. I note that the people of Wales did not support the police commissioners in that state when that decision was made.
Finally, another issue that is developing as we speak, in the nature of devolution, is the development of a distinct legal jurisdiction, with a separate legislature in Wales able to produce its own legislation. Although we are talking about 10 years, I anticipate and very much hope that we will see policing devolved to Wales before then. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 10
Annual Report by Chief Inspector of Constabulary
“In Part 2 of the Police Act 1996, omit section (4A) and insert—
“(4A) A report under subsection (4) must include the chief inspector’s assessment of—
(a) The efficiency and effectiveness of policing, and
(b) The crime and non-crime demand on police in England and Wales for the year in respect of which the report is prepared.”.”—(Jack Dromey.)
This new clause would add a duty for HMIC to assess demand on police on a yearly basis in addition to the efficiency and effectiveness of policing.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Jack Dromey
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
We believe it is appropriate to charge the chief inspector of constabulary with producing reports on a regular basis, not just on the efficiency and effectiveness of policing but, crucially, on the crime and non-crime demand on police in England and Wales for the year in respect of which the report is prepared and for two and five years ahead. For example, we may disagree on how to handle cybercrime, but it is common ground across the House that it is a major and growing area of crime and a relatively new development; we must therefore always properly assess the demand on the police service before making decisions about how best to meet that demand.
To be quite frank, the problem is that things are increasingly difficult for the police. Some 18,000 police officers and some 5,000 police community support officers have gone. The thin blue line has been stretched ever thinner; ever fewer are being asked to do ever more, on four fronts in particular.
First, following scandals in recent years, there is now a great national will to do everything necessary to protect children in our society. Only last week, Simon Bailey, the chief constable who heads up the police’s multi-faceted strategy on the protection of children, said that it was already costing the police £1 billion, and that that would rise to £3 billion by 2020, such are the scale and complexity of the cases involved, both current and historical, and the investigation necessary.
Secondly, there has been an enormous increase in cybercrime. As we were rehearsing only yesterday, someone is more likely to be mugged online than in the street. Some of the major banks have estimated 20% or 30% increases in attempted crime against their customers every year. The scale of it is enormous.
Thirdly, there is the sheer scale of what is required for counter-terrorism. Last November, the Government decided not to go ahead with what would have been 22% cuts on top of 25% cuts. One reason for that decision was the strong representations, made by people like Mark Rowley and Bernard Hogan-Howe, that numbers matter, both for surge capacity in the event of a Paris-style attack and for neighbourhood policing, which was described by Peter Clarke, the former head of counter-terrorism, as the “golden thread” that runs from the local to the global. The patient building of community relationships is key to gaining intelligence; as a consequence, arrests for terrorism are now happening at the rate of almost one a day. As Bernard Hogan-Howe and Mark Rowley have said before the House, that is a consequence of good neighbourhood policing, but it is incredibly resource-intensive.
Fourthly, there is the wider problem of the police being increasingly seen as the force of last resort. In his powerful contribution this morning, my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham rightly made the point that, if there are no other agencies ready to respond, the police are the force of last resort. Sara Thornton, the chair of the National Police Chiefs Council, said recently that the police tend to be the people who, after 5 o’clock on a Friday, can be counted on to turn out when others perhaps do not because they no longer have the resources. Classically that includes going after looked-after children.
Mike Penning
Let me say from the outset that I recognise the importance of understanding the demand on police forces, which is exactly where the shadow Policing Minister is coming from. However, I do not see the need for new clause 10, as we are actually doing many of the things that the shadow Minister has asked for.
It is for a chief constable to assess the demands that their forces face and ensure that resources are allocated accordingly. The purpose of inspectors of constabulary is clearly set out in section 54(2) of the Police Act 1996. Their role is to inspect the “efficiency and effectiveness” of every force. Section 54(4) and section 54(4)(a) of the 1996 Act require the chief inspector of constabulary to prepare an annual report, and for that report to include his assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of policing in England and Wales.
Reliable, independent information is crucial in understanding the demands on the police force. It is for this reason that the Home Secretary asked the inspectorate to introduce annual, all-force inspections, which has led to the development of the Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy—commonly called PEEL—programme. As part of the efficiency assessment, the inspectorate assesses how effectively each force understands and is responding to the demand that it faces. The inspectorate also works with forces to support them to better understand the demand that they face. There is work going on as we speak, including from the College of Policing, which I think everybody accepts has been a great success.
That includes the development of force management statements, which will be prepared with chief constables, and are intended to ensure that information on a force’s available resources and the demand they face is produced annually to an agreed standard—ensuring the same across all forces—and is accessible to chief constables, PCCs and, most importantly, the public. I accept that this is a work in progress, but it is in progress, and the police are doing it themselves with the inspectorate and the College of Policing so, respectfully, I do not see the need for new clause 10. I hope that the shadow Minister understands that.
Jack Dromey
Some of the things that the Minister said were helpful. We have common ground on wanting to understand the nature of need. I hope that the Minister’s comments on what the Government are doing and will do in the next stages will contribute to exactly that. In those circumstances we will not push the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw it.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 16
Digital Crime Review
“(1) The Secretary of State shall have a duty to provide for a review of legislation which contains powers to prosecute individuals who may have been involved in the commission of digital crime in order to consolidate such powers in a single statute.
(2) In the conduct of the review under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must have regard to the statutes and measures that he deems appropriate, including but not limited to—
(a) Malicious Communications Act 1988, section 1,
(b) Protection from Harassment Act 1997, section 2, 2a, 4, 4a,
(c) Offences against the Person Act 1861, section 16, 20, 39, 47,
(d) Data Protection Act 1998, section 10, 13 and 55,
(e) Criminal Justice Act 1998, section 160,
(f) Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, section 30(1), (3),(5),(6), 78(5),
(g) Computer Misuse Act 1990, as amended by Serious Crime Act 2015 and Police and Justice Act 2006,
(h) Contempt of Court Act 1981,
(i) Human Rights Act 1998,
(j) Public Order Act 1986, section 4, 4a, 5, 16(b), 18,
(k) Serious Organised Crime Act 2005, section 145, 46,
(l) Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006, section 48,
(m) Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2014, section 32, 34, 35, 36, 37,
(n) Protection of Children Act 1978,
(o) Obscene Publications Act 1959,
(p) Crime and Disorder Act 1998, section 28, 29-32,
(q) Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 145, 146,
(r) Communications Act 2003, section 127, 128-131,
(s) Data retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, section 4,
(t) Sexual Offences Amendment Act 1992, section 5,
(u) Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015,
(v) Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, section 33(5), 29(6),
(w) Criminal Damage Act 1971, section 2,
(x) Sexual Offences Act 2003, section 4, 8, 10, 62,
(y) Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, section 43,
(z) Magistrates Court Act 1980, section 127,
(aa) Suicide Act 1961, section 2(1) as amended by Coroners and Justice Act 2009,
(ab) Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, section 63,
(ac) Theft Act 1968, section 21, and
(ad) Criminal Law Act 1977, section 51(2)
(3) It shall be a duty of the Secretary of State to determine for the review any other statute under which persons have been prosecuted for a crime falling under section 1 of this Act.
(4) In the conduct of the review under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must consult with any person or body he deems appropriate, including but not limited to—
(a) the Police,
(b) Crown Prosecution Service,
(c) judiciary, and
(d) relevant community organisations.”—(Liz Saville Roberts.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 17—Surveillance and monitoring: offences—
“(1) A person commits an offence if the person—
(a) uses a digital device to repeatedly locate, listen to or watch a person without legitimate purpose,
(b) installs spyware, a webcam or any other device or software on another person’s property or digital device without the user’s agreement or without legitimate reason,
(c) takes multiple images of an individual unless it is in the public interest to do so without that individual’s permission and where the intent was not legitimate nor lawful,
(d) repeatedly orders goods or services for another person if the purpose of such actions is to cause distress, anxiety or to disrupt that person’s daily life,
(e) erases data remotely whilst a digital device is being examined by the police or any other lawful investigation,
(f) monitors a digital device registered to a person aged 17 or less if the purpose of that monitoring is to obtain information about a third person,
(g) monitors any other person’s digital device if the intent of the monitor is either to damage or steal data from that person, or
(h) creates a false persona on line without lawful reason if the purpose of such a creation is to intend to attempt to defraud, groom, impersonate or seriously damage the reputation of any other person.
(2) A person guilty of an offence under subsections (1)(a) or (b) is liable on conviction to a term of imprisonment not exceeding 12 months or a fine.
(3) For the purpose of subsection (1)(a) “repeatedly” shall be deemed as on two occasions or more.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (1)(d) is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding the statutory limit.
(5) A person guilty of an offence under subsections (1)(e), (f), (g) or (h) is liable on conviction to a term of imprisonment not exceeding 12 months.
(6) The Secretary of State shall introduce restrictions on the sale of spyware to persons under the age of 16 and requests all persons who are purchasing such equipment to state their intended use of such equipment.”
New clause 18—Digital crime training and education—
“(1) It shall be the responsibility of the Home Department to ensure that each Police Service shall invest in training on the prioritisation, investigation and evidence gathering in respect of digital crime and abuse.
(2) It shall be the responsibility of the Home Department to ensure that all Police services record complaints and outcomes of complaints of digital crime and abuse.
(3) It shall be the responsibility of the Secretary of State for the Home Department to publish annual statistics on complaints and outcomes of digital crime and abuse.”
Liz Saville Roberts
Diolch yn fawr. Forgive me if my understanding of procedure is incorrect; I am learning as I go along. I speak about these three new clauses and then I take a response, if I understand correctly.
Liz Saville Roberts
Thank you very much. I am just covering myself in case something goes terribly wrong.
New clause 16 would place a duty on the Secretary of State to undertake a review of all relevant legislation that contains powers to prosecute people involved in digital crime, and to consolidate those powers in a consolidation Bill. This is because prosecution can currently be initiated using a confusing array of criminal legislation. There are 30 Acts listed here; there are actually more than that but these are the most relevant. Some date back to the 19th century. Existing provision is therefore evidently fragmentary and inadequate, and that is a hindrance to effective prosecution. It allows abuse—which, interestingly, we are talking about, from all directions, more and more—to continue unchecked, up to a point.
A very high threshold is set for the prosecution of hate crime over the internet, and this is understandable, but the way this threshold is interpreted varies between police forces across the country. Indeed, this is true of many aspects of digital crime. People’s experiences when they approach the police can vary widely under these interpretations, and the fact that so many pieces of legislation have to be referred to does not bring any additional clarity when clarity is what we need, first and foremost. So consolidation is the theme of new clause 16.
New clause 17 relates to offences associated with surveillance and monitoring. It would make it an offence, for example, to post messages or images that are discriminatory, threatening or would cause distress or anxiety. It would make it illegal to install spyware or webcams without good reason. It would also place further responsibilities on social media platforms to block offensive postings or postings inciting violence, for example. Current legislation is insufficient to deal with actions whereby people are now using digital means to harass or carry out crime.
New clause 18 is concerned with digital crime training and education. Given that the College of Policing estimates that half of all crimes reported to front-line officers now has a cyber element, there is a real need to consider how we prepare police personnel at all levels to deal with this problem. It is estimated that there are 7 million online frauds a year and 3 million other online crimes. The Chief Constable of Essex, Stephen Kavanagh, has warned that the police risk being swamped with digital crime cases. None the less—this is where training is important—I have been informed that only 7,500 police officers out of a total of 100,000 across Wales and England have been trained to investigate digital crime. This is a particularly significant area because it is extremely new to senior police officers in particular; it has not been part of their training in the past. There is also an issue for the police in that those who are particularly efficient at dealing with digital crime are often offered posts outside the police service.
To summarise this simplistically, it appears that the police, historically, were trained to deal with 20th century crimes, while we are now seeing crime shifting online. From those answering phones in call centres to those dealing with front-line issues, they all need training to respond appropriately to what threatens to become overwhelming. How do we identify what is crime that needs to be addressed and what is unfortunate social behaviour, which we would not condone but we would not necessarily associate with the police? There have been instances in the past of misinterpretation of the most adequate approach. I do not intend to push these new clauses to a Division, but I await the Minister’s response with interest.
Jack Dromey
The hon. Lady made a compelling case. I have three points. First, there is the nature of the growing threat and, I hate to say it, the terrible things that people do in the privacy of their homes, including, for example, hate crime and abuse on social media, which are absolutely unacceptable.
Secondly, the hon. Lady is right when she says that there is a real problem of capacity in the police force. Stephen Kavanagh is an impressive chief constable. Some of us struggle with digital literacy, but the figure to which he referred of fewer than one in 10 people being digitally literate is chilling given the scale and rapid rise of digital crime and cybercrime.
Thirdly and finally, the hon. Lady makes a good point about strategy in the police service. For example, with the national fraud strategy, the police have been moving down the path of a national product but local delivery. Local delivery means the work that the police do in terms of prevention and their being more digitally literate in future. Indeed, Gavin Thomas, the new chairman of the Police Superintendents Association, recently said that many more younger police officers who understand the technology need to be recruited. The hon. Lady has put her finger on a very important set of issues relating to a rapidly growing area of crime, the sheer scale of which the police are struggling to cope with.
Karen Bradley
I am very grateful to the hon. Lady, whose constituency I am going to try to pronounce correctly. I last dealt with this pronunciation when we considered the Serious Crime Bill last year. I have the luxury of the Solicitor General, who is a very adept Welsh speaker, to prompt me on how to pronounce this: Dwyfor Meirionnydd.
Karen Bradley
Not bad. I will not try again, but at least I have got that far. I am very grateful to the hon. Lady for tabling the new clauses, because they give the Committee the opportunity to debate these important issues. I hope to reassure her that the Government are absolutely committed to tackling them.
Digital crime and cybercrime are threats that we take very seriously. The Government continue to invest in law enforcement capabilities nationally, regionally and locally to ensure that law enforcement agencies have the capacity to deal with the increasing volume and sophistication of online crime. Through the national cyber-security programme, we invested more than £90 million in the previous Parliament to bolster the law enforcement response, and we will continue to invest. As the Chancellor announced in November, the Government have committed to spending £1.9 billion on cyber-security over the next five years, including for tackling cybercrime.
Additionally, we have invested in the national cybercrime unit in the National Crime Agency and created cyber teams in each of the regional organised crime units. Those teams provide access to specialist capabilities at a regional level. I think that we can all accept that it is expensive to have such technical support available to every force at a local level, and that is why the regional organised crime units, with their fantastic cyber units that are accessible to all forces, are incredibly impressive.
I remember visiting the south-east regional organised crime unit during the last Parliament, when organised crime was part of my portfolio, and meeting the young lady who had sat in that unit and cracked the case—I do not know if hon. Members remember it—of the Xboxes that no one could access at Christmas because of the activity of some hackers. A young lady working in one of our regional organised crime units here in the UK solved that crime and found the individuals responsible. We should be proud of the work that those forces do and the fact that we have such incredibly talented individuals working in the ROCUs.
James Berry
Does my hon. Friend agree that a lot of this online crime—online fraud—is not local crime but happens in boiler rooms that sell, or mis-sell, things across the whole of the UK, and that there needs to be a collective national approach to it? A lot of this work is done by Action Fraud, which is based in the City of London police, so that the people committing these crimes that affect people across the UK are investigated in a single place here in London.
Karen Bradley
My hon. Friend gets this absolutely right. As a central repository of intelligence and information, Action Fraud can work out which force is best placed to investigate. It may well be that that is the National Crime Agency or an international force. I will give an example. One of my constituents could go to the marketplace in Leek in Staffordshire Moorlands and have a fraud committed on them there. It would be very clear that that had happened in Staffordshire Moorlands and that Staffordshire police should investigate. But if that happens online, the criminal could be based in eastern Europe, or the far east, or anywhere in the UK. Action Fraud can put that information into a central repository and get the links; that means that we have an excellent facility for finding the right force to investigate and for finding the criminal.
Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham)
I do not disagree with what the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton was saying. These things are best looked at nationally—some of the conspiracies are clearly international as well—but does the Minister also agree that one of the problems with Action Fraud is that many people who have contacted it feel let down because of a lack of feedback about what happens in their individual case, or how their individual case may well be helping a bigger fraud?
Karen Bradley
The hon. Gentleman makes a valid point. I had ministerial responsibility for Action Fraud, then my right hon. Friend the Policing Minister covered it and it now sits within the portfolio of the Minister for Security. We have all identified that problem and the City of London police are taking action to address that. They understand that feedback.
There has been a problem that local forces feel that they can pass the information to Action Fraud and it will deal with everything. There is a still an obligation on the local force to feed back to the individual. The crime has still been committed on that individual in the local force area, and it is incredibly important, and incumbent on the local force— working with Action Fraud—to make sure that feedback is given. I echo the hon. Gentleman’s comments.
It is important to make the point that crime is crime—whether it happens online or offline, it is crime. Somebody stealing money from someone is theft. It may be fraud. It may be that it could be prosecuted under some other offence, but it does not matter what the offence is—it is still crime. We need to make sure that the police have the capabilities to understand where the evidence is. It is not like somebody breaking into your home leaving fingerprints, but they will be leaving fingerprints online. There will be digital fingerprints all the way back. We need to make sure that the forces have the capability to see that and that local forces also know the opportunities that this affords.
One of my favourite examples of the great opportunity of online is that if somebody breaks into a house and they are carrying a smartphone, it will try to find the wi-fi. There will be a digital fingerprint from that smartphone. That is an opportunity for local forces to be able to crack more crimes.
We need to ensure that training is happening. Working across the Home Office with local forces, the National Crime Agency and ROCUs, I know that there is an incredible amount of work going on to ensure that local forces and police officers—bobbies on the beat—understand the problem that they are dealing with and how to tackle it. But it is crime. It does not matter whether it is online or offline: it is crime.
Turning to the new clauses, I will deal first with new clause 16, which calls for a digital crime review. As the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd explained, the aim of such a review is to consolidate into a single statute criminal offences and other powers relevant to tackling digital crime and the misuse of digital devices and services. She made a very persuasive argument, but I am far from persuaded that such a lengthy and costly exercise would deliver the benefits she seeks. I do not accept her premise that the criminal law is defective in this area. As a general principle, any action that is illegal offline is also illegal online.
Legislation passed before—in some cases, well before—the digital age has shown itself sufficiently robust and flexible to be used today to punish online offending. Consequently, most of the long list of statutes and offences in new clause 16 relate to offending that may be carried out by both digital and non-digital means. I think the terminology is that this is cyber-enabled crime: it is the same crime that has always happened—it is just that the digital platform of the internet enables criminals from thousands of miles away to have access to victims here in the UK and across the world that they would never have had access to without the internet.
Crime is crime. It does not matter whether it is 20th-century or 21st-century crime—it is crime, and it needs to be tackled. The offences that have long been tested in the courts and in the legal system are the right ones to use, whether they have been committed online or offline.
The new clause suggests that the Government should review, with a view to producing a single statute, all legislation
“which contains powers to prosecute individuals who may have been involved in the commission of digital crime”.
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to separate all those powers from those used to prosecute non-digital crime. The new statute would not consolidate the powers, as the new clause suggests. Rather, it would inevitably reproduce and duplicate many existing offences, which would also need to be retained in existing legislation for non-digital offending.
That is not to say that, where we identify specific gaps in the law or new behaviours that ought to be criminalised, we will not take action to plug those gaps. Indeed, the Bill will criminalise the live streaming of offences relating to the sexual exploitation of children. Years ago, none of us would even have thought it possible, but there is live streaming and we need to make sure that we deal with it.
Likewise, in the last Parliament we created a new criminal offence of disclosing private sexual photographs and films
“without the consent of an individual who appears in the photograph or film, and with the intention of causing that individual distress.”
That is what we would perhaps call revenge porn. I think we can all see that that crime may have been committed before, but a partner sharing a photograph with a few friends in the pub, although equally offensive, is not as destructive as that photograph appearing online and being available across the world for millions of people to see. It is very important that where there is criminality and we see gaps like that, we act. We are determined to do so, and will continue to do so. I mentioned that the hon. Lady’s predecessor was a member of the Public Bill Committee that considered the Serious Crime Act 2015. In that Act, we further strengthened the Computer Misuse Act 1990.
New clause 17 seeks to create a raft of new offences relating to digital surveillance and monitoring. I presume that the intention is to address issues such as harassment and stalking offences, which can now occur through digital means. I want to be absolutely clear: abusive and threatening behaviour, in whatever form and whoever the target, is totally unacceptable. That includes harassment committed in person or using phones or the internet. The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 introduced specific provisions to deal with incidents of harassment, including the offences of harassment and putting people in fear of violence—offences that may be committed by online or offline behaviour, or a mixture. The 1997 Act also enables victims to apply for an injunction to restrain an individual from conduct that amounts to harassment, and it gives courts the power to make restraining orders. Those powers are regularly used to successfully prosecute offences committed by digital means.
I want to add one other point. I do not think that the issue we are discussing is whether the offence exists or whether it is sufficient; it is about understanding the offences and ensuring that the public and law enforcement know the offences and use them appropriately. I have experience of this in my own constituency: a business run by one of my constituents was subjected to an online trolling attack. I made the point that if my constituent had walked down the street and paint had been thrown at her, we would all have understood that offence. This was, effectively, digital paint being thrown at her from hundreds of miles away to destroy her business. That does not change the fact that she was being harassed. The issue is not that the offences are in some way lacking; it is about ensuring that they are known and understood, and that appropriate evidence is gathered.
Mims Davies (Eastleigh) (Con)
Does the Minister agree that online and offline behaviour is partly an educational issue? If my 12-year-old was at the shops for four or five hours, doing what they wanted, unmonitored and unchecked, I would certainly ask who they were talking to, what they were doing and what was going on. There are parents who allow this behaviour, probably not seeing the dangers out there in respect of who children are talking to and what they are getting up to for a significant amount of time.
Karen Bradley
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is so important. I co-chair, along with the Minister for Children and Families and Baroness Shields, the UK Council for Child Internet Safety—UKCCIS. It is a very important forum, bringing together internet service providers, education providers and people who have the ability to influence young people and parents. Parents must understand that they need to turn their filters on; it may be a pain to have to occasionally put in a password when looking at a website, but those filters will protect their children.
We are also consulting on age verification for pornography. When I was growing up, it was not possible to access the kind of images that children can download on their smartphones and look at in playgrounds up and down the country. It simply was not available. Again, we have to be clear: if a child cannot purchase that material offline in a corner shop, newsagent or specialist retailer, they should not be able to access it online. We need to make sure that we have those safeguards in place.
We need to get rid of any suggestion that this is too difficult or too hard, and say to parents that they need to understand what the dangers are and to make sure that filters are in place so that their children are protected online. Schools have a role to play in that, too, as we all do. I would be happy to write to all Committee members on the work that we are doing, which they can share with their constituents and local headteachers. I will be delighted if we can get more information to headteachers and others about the work that is being done to protect children online.
New clause 18 deals with digital crime training and education, which is linked to the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Eastleigh made. I support the underlying objective, but I do not think that we need to legislate to require police forces to provide such training. Since the introduction of the College of Policing’s cybercrime training course in February 2014, more than 150,000 modules have been completed across all forces, and in September last year the College of Policing launched the second phase of its mainstream cybercrime training course for police forces. This is a modular course consisting of a series of self-taught and interactive modules that are accessible to all police officers and staff, which provides an introduction to how to recognise and investigate cybercrimes.
We need to get rid of the barriers and obstacles that make people think that they cannot investigate a crime because it happened online. They absolutely can; it is the same type of crime. It is money being stolen, it is harassment, it is stalking or it is grooming. These are all crimes. The fact that they happen online does not change the nature of the crime.
Additionally, more than 3,900 National Crime Agency officers have completed digital awareness training as part of equipping the next generation of highly-skilled digital detectives. The national policing lead for digital investigation and intelligence is co-ordinating a programme of activities to equip forces with the capabilities and technology to effectively police in a digital age and protect victims of digital crime. We need to repeat this point: it is not for the Home Office to mandate this training. Whitehall does not know best here. Delivering that training is something that the police are rightly leading on.
In conclusion, the Government recognise that tackling digital crime is one of the most important challenges that the police face today, and we continue to support and invest in the police to ensure that they have the resources and the capability to respond effectively. Having answered the points that the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd made, I hope that I have persuaded her not to press her new clauses.
Liz Saville Roberts
As I stated earlier, this is a probing new clause. The very purpose of tabling it was to hear the response. I am very pleased to hear that the view on cybercrime is that “crime is crime”. The Minister very effectively described it as “digital paint” being thrown at her constituents.
I believe, in line with those who advise us, such as Stephen Kavanagh, that there is room to look at this matter in a slightly different way. Training is a significant consideration. It has been brought to my attention that, although there are some powerful, centralised initiatives, the front-line work of all police personnel is significant, because there have been cases like the one that I mentioned, in which somebody in a call centre, taking the first contact call, did not interpret the harassment as something that should be taken as a crime. We should be very alert to the means by which we can strengthen the response.
James Berry
Does the hon. Lady agree that this is not just an issue for the Government to tackle, but an issue for internet companies? Whereas online banking fraud has been quite effectively tackled by the banks, companies such as Google, Twitter and Facebook need to do much more. They are some of the richest companies in the world, with some of the best technical brains in the world and if this was an advertising opportunity by which they could make money, they would be up it like a rat up a drainpipe. This is about protecting users and the public, and they need to do a lot more. It is not just an area for Governments; it is an area for the people who are making money out of these services.
Liz Saville Roberts
I had sat down, but I will stand up again. I agree entirely. What is very interesting is how we define, as a society, the behaviour that parents should be addressing in their children and how children should be taught to behave online. What behaviour is socially unacceptable, what is the behaviour in which the police should be involved, and what behaviour really is a threat to safety?
Karen Bradley
Before the hon. Lady sits down, I would like to give a quick response to the point about internet companies. I want to put it on the record that many internet companies are working very hard with the Government to deal with this issue. There is always more that can be done, but Google, for example, works with the Government and the Internet Watch Foundation to make sure that we close down inappropriate or illegal content as soon as it is identified—if not before it is identified, in fact. I pay tribute to them for the work they have done with the Government on that.
Liz Saville Roberts
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 19
Modern technology: specialist digital unit (child abuse)
“(1) The chief officer of each police force in England and Wales must ensure that within their force there is a unit that specialises in analysing and investigating allegations of online offences against children and young people.
(2) The chief officer must ensure that such a unit has access to sufficient digital forensic science resource to enable it to perform this function effectively and efficiently.”—(Liz Saville Roberts.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 20—Child sexual abuse: specialist unit—
“(1) The chief officer of each police force in England and Wales must ensure that within their force there is a unit responsible for working with local agencies to coordinate early identification of children at risk of child sexual abuse, including child sexual exploitation, and early identification of children and adults at risk of sexual offending.”
Liz Saville Roberts
Diolch yn fawr iawn. Everyone will know how to say “thank you” in Welsh by the end of the afternoon.
New clauses 19 and 20 relate to offences against children. New clause 19 relates to online offences against children and calls for modern technology specialist digital units for child abuse. Again, these are probing amendments and are pertinent to what we have just been discussing. New clause 19 would ensure that every local police force has a specialist digital child abuse unit with the latest equipment and expertise to analyse, investigate and take action in relation to online offences against children, including children being groomed and forced to commit sexual acts online, and the making and sharing of sexual images and videos involving children.
We have talked about the explosion of online crime, so I will not go through it again, but I echo the concerns that the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, the Children’s Society and Barnardo’s raised during oral evidence to the Committee about the lack of capacity and expertise within local police forces to tackle these crimes. Beyond the cases that reach the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre threshold, local forces are left with a huge volume of other cases where children are at risk, which they do not have the expertise or capacity to deal with adequately.
Emerging findings from research by the NSPCC show that the scale of this type of offending is far greater than previously thought. The sheer volume of offenders, devices and images relating to online offences against children has left the police swamped and unable to protect children to the best of their ability. In one sense, the increase in recording and reporting is to be welcomed, as these crimes are now being recorded. None the less, they are increasing, which is an issue that we should be addressing.
Recent reports by Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary on the responses of individual police forces to child protection cases have revealed significant delays—in some cases of up to 12 months—in the forensic analysis of the devices of suspected offenders. We are talking about children here. Some of those delays can pose serious risks to the safeguarding of children, leaving offenders free to continue abusing or exploiting other victims, not to mention the impact on the child victim. While the expertise and capacity of high-tech and cybercrime units are crucial, it is child protection and offender management knowledge and skills that are vital to ensuring that children are best protected.
The Prime Minster gave child sexual abuse the status of a “national threat” in the strategic policing requirement, but what assessment has been made of the increased policing capacity and expertise needed to deal with this issue, given the rise of online offences, and what reassurances can the Minister give that those will be made available? What steps are Ministers taking to ensure that police forces are trained and have the necessary technical capacity to investigate such offences using the newest technology available?
New clause 20 is concerned with preventing child sexual exploitation and with the establishment of specialist units for child sexual abuse. It would help to ensure that all police forces had the resource and support that they needed to work with other local agencies to prevent child abuse, including child sexual exploitation. This subject is particularly pertinent to me because I work with North Wales police. Of course, the Macur review, which discusses this area, was published recently. That review was based on the Waterhouse inquiry, one of the recommendations of which was that there should be a children’s commissioner for Wales. How forces operate in respect of these issues is very significant. I am glad to say that my force, North Wales police, has a child sexual exploitation unit.
In the current economic climate, the police and others face a significant challenge in focusing on prevention. By the time incidents of grooming or sexual abuse come to the attention of the police, it is too late. The Government need to send a clear message that the early identification of children at risk, and of adults and children at risk of offending, is vital. Improving identification of children at risk means confronting difficult issues. Around a third of sexual offences are committed by children under the age of 18. That is often called peer-on-peer abuse. Barnardo’s is currently running a cross-party inquiry into how we can improve our responses to such young people, many of whom have themselves been the victims of abuse or trauma. Police and local agencies must have the resources that they need to work together, and in partnership with charities and others, to prevent horrific crimes such as child sexual exploitation. Will the Minister commit to ensuring that that will happen?
Lyn Brown
I support new clauses 19 and 20. New clause 19 would ensure that there was a unit specialising in analysing and investigating allegations of online offences against children within each police force, and new clause 20 would ensure that there was a unit responsible for working with local agencies to co-ordinate early identification of children at risk of sexual abuse. This is important preventive work.
A report by the Children’s Commissioner in November last year showed that only one in eight children who are sexually abused are identified by professionals. I really do not think that that is good enough. Early identification is incredibly important. The National Police Chiefs Council lead for child protection and abuse investigation, Chief Constable Simon Bailey, has said that
“by the time a child reports sexual abuse the damage has been done and we must do more to stop the abuse occurring in the first place.”
I could not agree more.
We need to do better on early identification, and the specialist units provided for in new clause 20 would help towards that end. The provision for a specialist unit within each police force would mean that both the police and the Crown Prosecution Service had a specialist or specialists working exclusively on child sexual exploitation, just as now happens with domestic violence. Many police forces already have specialist units dealing with child sexual exploitation and that is to be welcomed, but it would be good to see this replicated across the country if possible. Making the provision of specialist units statutory will help to give vulnerable children in all areas of the country a much greater chance of having their abuse recognised before it is too late.
The last decade has seen a huge increase in the number of children with access to the internet, particularly using smartphones and tablets. Current data shows that 65% of 12 to 15-year-olds, and 20% of eight to 11-year-olds own their own smartphone. In 2004, Barnardo’s identified 83 children as victims of some kind of online abuse, but today that number is in the thousands. Clearly, the way in which perpetrators of child sexual abuse contact and groom vulnerable children is changing, and those of us who wish to prevent these awful life-damaging crimes must change the way that we work too.
Barnardo’s 2015 report states that
“young people at risk of harm online may not have any previous vulnerabilities that are often associated with being victims of sexual abuse and exploitation”.
As a result, these victims are less likely to be known to the authorities and the police may only identify cases of exploitation when it is really rather too late. Encouragingly, in July 2014, initial outcomes of Operation Notarise showed that 660 people suspected of sharing illegal images of children had been arrested and around 500 children had been safeguarded. I welcome the good work that the police and charities like Barnardo’s are doing to combat online child sexual exploitation, but this is not the time to be complacent. I am very interested in hearing the Minister’s response to the suggestions in these new clauses.
Karen Bradley
I fully understand why the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd has tabled these new clauses. I believe that they have been prompted at least in part by concerns about significant digital forensics backlogs in some forces, which were highlighted by the recent Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary national child protection investigations. I thank HMIC for the work that it did. It is very important that we all understand what is happening on the ground and that there is an honest appraisal of the work that local police forces are doing, so that police and crime commissioners and others can take the necessary steps to ensure that those issues are addressed.
It almost does not need saying, but I will say it anyway: we can all agree that child sexual exploitation, whether on or offline, is an abhorrent crime and that the police and other relevant agencies must up their game to effectively respond to such crimes and safeguard vulnerable children. The shadow Minister and others have made reference to last year’s report by the Children’s Commissioner. It is worth setting out the context in which we are operating.
The Children’s Commissioner estimated that there are about 225,000 cases of child abuse a year. Of course, the vast majority of that was intra-familial abuse and, as the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd mentioned, peer-on-peer abuse—children-to-children, or young people to children abuse. Child sexual exploitation online is part of the problem, but intra-familial abuse is an enormous part of it. The national policing lead, Simon Bailey, is very clear on the work that needs to be done in schools, with social services and others, working in multi-agency safeguarding hubs, to ensure that children are protected and that we have places for people to go. For example, the Government launched the child sexual abuse whistleblowing helpline, which was one of the recommendations in the Louise Casey and Alexis Jay report on Rotherham. The report said that there needed to be a safe place for professionals to report concerns that child sexual abuse that had been reported had not been dealt with. The NSPCC runs that helpline for the Home Office, and will help to make sure that children can be protected.
Lyn Brown
May I probe the Minister a little on the idea that we do not need specialist units? We now have specialist units within our police forces for domestic violence, which are provided for across the country. They seem to me to have had a massive impact on the safety of women in our communities; they have raised the issue locally and have meant that we are tackling domestic violence so much better than we were. Since those units have had such an impact on domestic violence, may I ask her gently to go away and think about them a bit more, rather than rejecting them out of hand, because they may be the answer to child exploitation and child abuse within our localities.
Karen Bradley
I understand exactly the hon. Lady’s point, but I think we need to differentiate between online and offline exploitation of children. Policing online exploitation is a detailed, technical job that requires great skill and depth. CEOP, which is part of the National Crime Agency, leads on that nationally, with the child abuse image database that is rolled out to all forces, and with their expertise. The Prime Minister committed £10 million to CEOP at the first WePROTECT summit at Downing Street in December 2014; my right hon. Friend the Minister for Policing, Crime and Criminal Justice was there. We have the specialist capability sitting within CEOP to give all local police forces access to data on online grooming and exploitation.
However, dealing with child sexual abuse in a wider context—not necessarily online—has to be part of every police officer’s work: working with the multi-agency safeguarding hub, with social services, with health professionals and others to ensure that we identify the victim. It is not as easy as finding a victim online—although that is not easy either—because these are very hidden crimes. We need to ensure that they are the business of every police officer, that all officers are aware of what is involved, and that we work within the multi-agency safeguarding hub.
Frankly, it is far too often the police who end up leading on this matter. When a crime is committed, the police absolutely have a role to play. But if there is an allegation of abuse within a family context, two big burly coppers turning up at the front door may not be as successful as a social worker or a health professional. We need to get the right professionals and it needs to be an operational local matter; it is not something that we should be mandating nationally. With that in mind, I hope I have persuaded the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd to withdraw her new clause.
Liz Saville Roberts
I reiterate the point that the hon. Member for West Ham made: there is a risk, when making something everybody’s responsibility—particularly children and safeguarding—that it becomes nobody’s responsibility. It was felt that the particular focus required for the police to deal with domestic abuse would not have come about without units present in every police force; that prompts similar questions for child sexual exploitation, which is very much in the same area.
I do not intend to press the matter to a Division, but I hope we will be able to discuss it further. We are all aware of incidents such as those in Rotherham—we can all list them—and the ongoing cases within Operation Pallial; we know that we have not solved the problem, in any shape or form.
Karen Bradley
May I make an analogy with mental health, which we were debating earlier? I think the difficulty there was that the police stepped into a void that no other agency was stepping into. We have the opportunity here to have multi-agency and cross-agency working, to really help children. My fear is that, if we mandate the police to be the agency that deals with the problem, it will all be police-driven. I am not sure that that is in the best interest of the victims or that it is the best way to tackle this issue. I think that there has to be a multi-agency response, which is what we are working towards through the work that all multi-agency safeguarding hubs and others are doing.
Liz Saville Roberts
I thank the Minister for her comments, which I appreciate, but none the less it strikes me that in my own area North Wales police, evidently as a result of the Waterhouse inquiry and Operation Pallial, which is, of course, ongoing, felt it needed a child sexual exploitation unit. We know that child sexual abuse is not restricted to certain areas of the country. Yes, many cases—the majority of cases, possibly—are intra-familial and we have talked about peer-on-peer, but if it was felt to be significant and necessary in north Wales, and wherever the other units are, I feel strongly that it is necessary throughout all police forces. I ask the Minister to consider this again on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 21
“Offence of abduction of a vulnerable child aged 16 or 17
‘(1) A person shall be guilty of an offence if, knowingly and without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, he—
(a) takes a child to whom this section applies away from the responsible person; or
(b) keeps such a child away from the responsible person; or
(c) induces, assists or incites such a child to run away or stay away from the responsible person or from a child’s place of residence;
(2) This section applies in relation to a child who is—
(a) a child in need as defined in Section 17 of the Children Act 1989;
(b) a child looked after under Section 20 of the Children Act 1989;
(c) a child housed alone under part 7 of the Housing Act 1996;
(d) a child who is suffering or is likely to suffer significant harm subject to Section 47 1(b) of the Children Act 1989.
(3) In this section “The responsible person” is—
(a) a person with a parental responsibility as defined in the Children Act 1989; or
(b) a person who for the time being has care of a vulnerable child aged 16 and 17 by virtue of the care order, the emergency protection order, or section 46, as the case may be; or
(c) any other person as defined in regulations for the purposes of this section.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both such imprisonment and fine; or
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years.
(5) No prosecution for an offence above shall be instituted except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.”—(Liz Saville Roberts.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Liz Saville Roberts
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Diolch yn fawr iawn eto byth. You may be glad to hear that this is the last time you will be hearing my voice on another aspect of children’s safeguarding in relation to abduction. Again, I shall not be pushing new clause 21 to a Division. This probing measure concerning child abduction warning notices, or CAWNs, would ensure that police can protect vulnerable 16 and 17 year- olds by the same method they use to protect younger children.
Child abduction warning notices are used by the police to disrupt inappropriate relationships between children and people who seek to groom them. We mentioned earlier that children are maturing sexually earlier, but not emotionally. There are, of course, people who are very vulnerable although they have reached the age of 16 or 17. These notices are civil orders stemming from the Child Abduction Act 1984. In addition to their use with under-16s, they can currently be used to protect very limited groups of vulnerable 16 and 17 year- olds—those children who have been formally taken into care under section 31 of the Children Act 1989, those subject to an emergency protection order and those in police protection. This, as you can imagine, accounts for a very small number of vulnerable 16 and 17 year-olds. Latest statistics for England show that just 190 16 and 17 year-olds were taken into care under section 31 last year. This left a further 4,320 young people of that age who became looked-after in the same year who would not have the same protections if they were at risk of sexual exploitation.
This is particularly concerning when reported sexual offences are on the rise. In Wales alone there was an increase from 1,545 incidents in 2013-14 to 1,903 in 2014-15. Anything we can do to prevent these offences, including using child abduction warning notices, is vital, as I am sure we would all agree. Professionals working with vulnerable young people and charities such as the Children’s Society and Barnardo’s have consistently argued that CAWNs should be available for police to use in the protection of all vulnerable 16 and 17-year olds. Will the Minister therefore consider closing this loophole in the law?
Lyn Brown
I do not want to repeat everything the hon. Lady has said, but I agree with much of it. Child abduction warning notices can only currently be issued with regard to children under the age of 16, or to 16 and 17 year-olds formally taken into social care under a section 31 notice. We believe that, when it comes to sexual exploitation, this is simply too narrow a definition of a child and that there are very vulnerable 16 and 17 year-olds who could be protected by a child abduction warning notice. The most recent annual statistics available show that only 190 children aged between 16 and 17 were taken into care by their local authorities under a section 31 notice and would thus be able to be protected by a child abduction warning notice. However, a further 4,320 young people of that age are looked after by their local authorities and, as the law currently stands, they are not able to receive that form of protection. The Children’s Society report, “Old enough to know better?”, calculated that the number of 16 and 17-year-olds who live outside the family and are vulnerable to sexual exploitation is actually as high as 7,200. Whatever the exact number, there is clearly a substantial gap between the number of vulnerable 16 and 17-year-old children and the number eligible to be protected by a child abduction warning notice.
Karen Bradley
As with other amendments that the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd has tabled, I understand and have great sympathy for the intention behind the new clause, but there are problems, as I hope she and the shadow Minister would acknowledge. Sixteen and 17-year-olds are adults. They are lawfully able to get married. They are generally deemed capable of living independently of their parents and are otherwise able to make decisions affecting their way of life, not least in sexual matters. Extending the offence of abducting a child who is capable of exercising his or her own free will could therefore raise difficult issues. We therefore need to think very carefully about and debate this matter. I would be delighted to meet the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd and the shadow Minister to discuss it, and I have talked to the Children’s Society about it.
We have a very difficult balance to strike here. We discussed this issue—and will be discussing it shortly—in connection with the coercive control offence when we debated the Serious Crime Bill last year. The difficulties we have—of recognising and ensuring that we respect the rights of somebody who is legally able to leave home and legally able to engage in sexual intercourse, while recognising their need for protection and their vulnerabilities —are considerable, and there is a very fine line. The fact is that there are many 21 and 22-year-olds who are incredibly vulnerable people. It is about the nuance and where we draw the line on these matters.
Lyn Brown
I appreciate that the Minister is doing her best here and I appreciate having the opportunity to talk about this issue, but my colleague on the team—my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion)—who is not here today is probably the better person to talk to about it. However, I just say to the Minister that the children who have been in and out of care are so vulnerable. They are desperate for love, affection and to be able to put down roots. They are so vulnerable. We really should be able to find a way through the difficulties with the law with regard to 16 and 17-year-olds to provide protection for this small number of very vulnerable young people.
Karen Bradley
I understand the hon. Lady’s point. I am working closely with my colleagues in the Department for Education to ensure that children in care have special treatment. To be clear, children in care do get different treatment from those who are otherwise vulnerable.
I will give an example, which I raised with the Children’s Society when it gave evidence, of where that could create problems. In an honour-based violence situation, a young person may have chosen to leave home because they fear what might happen to them there. I have heard horrendous examples of 16 and 17-year-old girls who left home and were forced to go back to their parents because they were vulnerable and that was the best place for them. In some cases, that led to the most horrendous outcomes. We have to be very careful and mindful of the fact that we confer rights on 16 and 17-year-olds over and above the rights that are conferred on 14 and 15-year-olds.
I appreciate fully the hon. Lady’s point about ensuring that children in care have special protections and, as I say, I am working closely with the Department for Education to ensure that we deal with that. I hope that she will recognise that the Government have legislated to introduce new civil orders, sexual risk orders, and slavery and trafficking risk orders, which provide the police with powers to tackle predators of 16 and 17-year-olds. We need to use those orders and civil powers, not make a blanket decision at this stage without having thought very carefully about the consequences.
That is why I would appreciate having a discussion. I understand that the hon. Lady referred to the hon. Member for Rotherham. I would be happy to meet them both to discuss this issue further, but we need to be careful. Before making a blanket decision on a matter such as this, we need to think about all the risks and consequences for all young people, on whom, as I say, at 16 and 17 we confer rights of adulthood in many ways. We need to respect those rights. For that reason, although the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd said that she would not press the new clause to a Division, I would be happy to discuss this issue further.
Liz Saville Roberts
I thank the Minister for her full response and I appreciate that she is endeavouring to address this issue. I am particularly concerned that, as we are very much aware, vulnerable 16 and 17-year-olds can be targeted and are more open to abuse because they have reached an age at which some people perceive that it is legal to act so. The 1984 Act gives some precedent for us to look at those groups of people. If three categories of young people are already defined in that Act, are there other categories that we could look at pushing ahead with? However, I appreciate what the Minister said about being cautious about taking a blanket approach and I would very much like to take her up on her offer to meet her and the hon. Member for Rotherham. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 44
Controlling and coercive behaviour in non intimate or family relationships in relation to a child aged 16 and 17
‘(1) Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act is amended as follows.
(2) After Section 76, insert—
“76a Controlling and coercive behaviour in non intimate or family relationships in relation to a child aged 16 and 17
(1) A person (A) commits an offence if—
(a) A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour towards a child (B) aged 16 or 17 that is controlling or coercive,
(b) at the time of the behaviour A and B are not in an intimate or family relationship which each other,
(c) the behaviour has a serious effect on B, and
(d) A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will have a serious effect on B.
(2) A’s behaviour has a ‘serious effect’ on B if—
(a) it causes B to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence will be used against B, or
(b) it causes B serious alarm or distress which has a substantial adverse effect on B’s usual day-to-day activities, or
(c) it inhibits B’s ability to withhold consent to activities proposed by A through A supplying B with drugs or alcohol.
(3) In this section the ‘non intimate or family relationships’ are relationship other than those defined in Section 76.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or a fine, or both;
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or a fine, or both.”’—(Carolyn Harris.)
This new clause would make controlling and coercive behaviour towards a 16 or 17 year old a criminal offence.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Carolyn Harris (Swansea East) (Lab)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Howarth. I congratulate the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd—I can say it—on the excellent way in which she presented her arguments on the measures tabled in both her name and mine. I support everything that she said.
New clause 44 would make controlling and coercive behaviour towards 16 and 17-year-olds a criminal offence. I cannot accept the argument that 16 and 17-year-olds are that capable of knowing their own minds; there seems to be a contradiction if they are capable of making decisions about their sexual behaviour but are not permitted to vote. That aside, this behaviour—child sexual exploitation—is happening every day in our constituencies and communities and in the homes of many young people. That behaviour takes many forms, and it is our job to ensure that the law is able to address them all.
Through the Serious Crime Act 2015, the Government introduced a new offence of coercive and controlling behaviour. That rightly seeks to prevent vulnerable individuals in intimate and family relationships from suffering abuse. It recognises that domestic abuse is wrong and illegal, and that individuals do not need to prove specific instances of sexual or physical violence. The 2015 Act focuses on habitual arrangements, but there are parallels to be drawn in other contexts. In the case of child sexual exploitation, police often struggle to prove specific instances of sexual or physical violence. Supplementary documents to the Government’s guidance, “Working Together to Safeguard Children”, acknowledged that
“Violence, coercion and intimidation are common, involvement in exploitative relationships being characterised in the main by the child or young person’s limited availability of choice resulting from their social/economic and/or emotional vulnerability.”
However, the current offence of child sexual exploitation is much more narrowly defined in legislation. It mentions power and coercion, but it must go further. In particular, we must recognise the role of drugs and alcohol in coercing a child into sexual activity in a private residence. Will the Minister commit to reviewing the offence in the 2015 Act, and will she consider what more can be done to ensure that those who are grooming children using drugs and alcohol receive appropriate sentences?
Lyn Brown
I speak in support of my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea East. As the Minister rightly said, children aged 16 and 17 are over the age of consent, but there is no doubt that they can still be victims of child sexual exploitation. Often without financial means and the life experience necessary for complete independence, children can be manipulated and pressured into complying with the wishes of those who have power over them. They may find themselves in a situation where they are frightened of saying no to someone, or stressed that if they say no they will lose the financial support and assistance that that person provides them with. However, under current legislation, it is very difficult for the police to prosecute in those situations, as they are required to prove specific instances of sexual or physical violence. The new clause would make it easier to protect that vulnerable group of people from grooming and sexual exploitation.
The Serious Crime Act 2015 introduced a new offence of coercive and controlling behaviour in the home and I welcomed that move, as it rightly seeks to protect those individuals in intimate and family relationships who suffer the agony of domestic abuse. It recognises that domestic abuse is wrong and illegal, and for the first time it established that individuals do not need to prove specific instances of sexual or physical violence in order to demonstrate they have been the victim of the crime of domestic abuse. A partner who manipulates, bullies and emotionally torments is an abuser and the law finally recognises that.
The new clause would extend the provisions on manipulative and controlling behaviour to protect 16 and 17-year-olds in non-habitual arrangements with their abuser. It would make any behaviour that has a serious effect on a child, such as increasing their levels of stress or creating the fear of violence, controlling and coercive. It would, for example, have applied to the girls in Rotherham who were described by the Jay report as fearing the violent tendencies of their abusers, even if the men had not directly and physically attacked them. I would be grateful if the Minister would seriously consider the new clause.
Jake Berry
I want to speak briefly to the new clause to say that I hope the Minister will listen to the arguments being made. It is a hugely important issue. I pay tribute to the work that she has done on violent and coercive behaviour.
This is not an issue that I was particularly aware of, though I was aware that the Government had taken action. If anyone is a fan of “The Archers”, they will have heard, I am sure, the sensitive and good way that the issue is being covered in a relationship on that programme, which has made huge steps in raising awareness. I have been deeply shocked by this form of abuse, to the point of being unable to listen to a programme that I have listened to for the last 15 years.
I am extremely proud of the Minister and our own Government for all that we have done so far, but I hope that she will listen to Opposition voices and perhaps take this away to review. Protecting 16 and 17-year-olds, in the way that we have already done, is something that we should investigate, even if just for the future.
Karen Bradley
We had this debate when we introduced the coercive control offence in the Serious Crime Bill in 2015. It goes back to the points that we discussed during debate on previous clauses about the need to respect individuals’ right at 16 or 17 to leave home, marry legally and make decisions, and how best to respect that in law. I am a great believer in legislating where there is a true gap in the law—where new legislation is needed because at the moment prosecution cannot be brought.
On the offence of coercive control, my hon. Friend the Member for Rossendale and Darwen mentioned “The Archers”. He may well have spotted me on “Countryfile” on Sunday night, discussing exactly that point. It was very difficult; we knew that there was a problem. When I was talking about the issue at a meeting recently, I met a lady who grabbed me afterwards with tears in her eyes—a well-to-do lady, somebody whom one would perhaps not expect it to have happened to—and said, “That was me 30 years ago. All the police told me was that they had to hope he kicked my door in, because then they could get him for criminal damage.” There was no offence available that the police could use.
That is the point. Is there an offence available, and is it possible to get a prosecution? The answer goes back to the point that we were discussing earlier about digital offences. Where an offence exists, it is not a case of re-legislating or creating new offences; we should ensure that the offence is used. It will be understood by the courts and the legal system, and we need to ensure that the police understand it and use it appropriately. However, where there is no offence and protection cannot be offered, the Government want to take note and listen. I fear that on this issue, there are offences already in place. A suite of powers are available to the police and others. Therefore, although I am happy to discuss the point, I am not persuaded that at this stage, the amendment is the right approach.
The new coercive control offence, which we commenced on 29 December last year, was introduced to address a specific gap in the law and capture patterns of abuse in an intimate partner relationship. Patterns of abuse outside an intimate partner relationship, which the new clause seeks to address, are already captured by harassment, the test for which is partially replicated in the proposal, and stalking offences, which can apply to patterns of abuse directed against 16 and 17-year-olds.
One question that we faced when considering the coercive control offence was how to get evidence. Much of what the hon. Member for Swansea East and the shadow Minister discussed involves gathering evidence. We have seen from stalking offences that it is perfectly possible for the police to gather evidence of persistent or repetitive behaviour to ensure prosecutions, which is what we all want.
The hon. Member for Swansea East mentioned child sexual exploitation. I hope that she has seen that we have recently consulted on the definition of child sexual exploitation, making it clear that the term applies to children under 18 and thus includes 16 and 17-year-olds. As I said, stalking and harassment also apply to 16 and 17-year-olds. The new domestic abuse offence enacted in the Serious Crime Act 2015 means that 16 or 17-year-olds in intimate partner relationships who are coerced or controlled are covered by the new criminal law. Equally, if a 16 or 17-year-old is living with a parent or other family member who seeks to control them in a way that causes them to fear violence or feel alarmed or distressed, the domestic abuse offence offers protection. For the sake of completeness, I should say that if a young person does not live with the family member or parent concerned, existing harassment legislation will offer the same protection.
The hon. Lady discussed gangs and the approaches that they might take in terms of drug trafficking and so on. That is precisely the reason why the Government’s new ending gang violence and exploitation programme, which has replaced our ending gang and youth violence programme, is there.
The point that the hon. Lady makes about vulnerable young people being exploited by gangs, under what is known as the county line phenomenon, is something that we are determined to tackle, but it is possible to tackle it using existing legislation and offences; it does not require a new offence. For example, the Policing and Crime Act 2009 introduced a new civil tool that allows the police or a local authority to apply for an injunction against an individual to prevent gang-related violence and, from 1 June 2015, gang-related drug dealing, which we discussed during the passage of the Serious Crime Act last year.
A wide range of powers are available. I would be very happy to sit down and thrash out whether there really is a gap in the law, or whether it is merely that the existing powers are not being properly used; we need to be clear on that. I hope at this stage that the hon. Lady will withdraw her new clause.
Carolyn Harris
We believe that there is still a gap in the existing harassment legislation that is not covered, as was recently proven in Rotherham. I thank the hon. Lady for her comments and I am delighted that she has offered further conversation on this important matter. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 45
Prevention of child sexual exploitation and private hire vehicles
“(1) The Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 is amended as follows—
(a) after section 47(1) insert—
“(1A) A district council must carry out its functions under this section with a view to preventing child sexual exploitation”.
(b) at end of section 48 (1) insert—
“(c) a district council must carry out its functions under this section with a view to preventing child sexual exploitation”.
(2) Section 7 of the London Cab Order 1934 is amended as follows—
(a) after Section 7(2) insert—
“(2A) Transport for London must carry out its functions under this section with a view to preventing child sexual exploitation”.
(3) Section 7 of the Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998 is amended as follows—
(a) after Section 7(2) insert—
“(3) The licensing authority must carry out its functions under this section with a view to preventing child sexual exploitation”.—(Carolyn Harris.)
This new clause would place local authorities under a duty to consider how they can prevent child sexual exploitation when they issue licences for taxis and private hire vehicles.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Carolyn Harris
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Licensing authorities have a duty to protect children from harm. Horrific cases that we have seen on television, in connection with Rotherham, have highlighted the need for this amendment, which could bring us a step closer to making our communities safer for our most vulnerable children. We already place duties on authorities that license premises to sell alcohol to carry out functions with a view to protecting children from harm. This amendment would create similar duties for licensing authorities in relation to taxis and minicabs. We know that taxis and private hire vehicles often feature in cases of child sexual exploitation. Indeed, in February of this year, Mohammed Akram was found guilty of sexual activity with a child under the age of 16, which took place in the back of his cab. He was sentenced to five years in prison.
This is not to say that all drivers are inherently likely to be involved in these crimes. The vast majority of drivers are law-abiding citizens but, along with other night-time economy workers, they have a role to play in helping to keep young people safe. Licensing authorities have a role to play in raising awareness so that drivers can spot the signs of harm and know how to intervene. There have been examples of good practice in Oxford, but we should have good practice across the United Kingdom. We need much more consistency.
Barnardo’s has been working with a range of night-time economy workers across the country to help improve awareness of children at risk. It is a part of the move towards prevention, which we need to see in this area. Will the Government consider introducing new duties on licensing authorities so that communities can be confident that all taxi and minicab drivers are able to spot the signs of abuse, and can help to keep children safe?
Lyn Brown
As my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea East said, the new clause would place local authorities under a duty to consider child protection when they issue licences for drivers of taxis and private hire vehicles. We support it because we think it could lead to important safeguarding measures.
Taxi drivers do a fantastic job up and down the country. I could not happily live my life without them. More than 242,000 licensed vehicles in England provide transport for millions of people every day. Outside of rural areas, interestingly, there is a high satisfaction level—about 68%—with taxi and private hire services. The review of child exploitation in Oxford made it clear that taxi drivers can and do play a very positive role in tackling grooming and child exploitation. The report noted that taxi drivers had driven young girls to the police station when they were worried that the girls were being sexually exploited, and that they were well regarded across the city because of the role that they had played.
However, we have to recognise that in some of the grooming rings exposed in recent years taxi drivers have not played such a positive role. Taxi drivers have been reported as abusing their position of power when they collect young people. The independent inquiry into child sexual exploitation in Rotherham found:
“One of the common threads running through child sexual exploitation across England has been the prominent role of taxi drivers in being directly linked to children who were abused”.
This is, quite clearly, a problem that needs to be tackled. I believe that my hon. Friend’s amendment could pave the way for important safeguarding measures that, frankly, should already be in place. For example, a number of local authorities up and down the country have imposed “conditions of fitness” tests on taxi drivers. These can involve criminal record checks and even live reporting to licensing authorities if a taxi driver commits a criminal offence after they have been granted a licence. Realistically, I do not believe that a licensing authority could carry out its duty to promote the prevention of harm to children, which is what the new clause provides for, without conducting checks on all drivers.
The Department for Transport provides guidelines on how local authorities should assess the criminal records of those who wish to have a licence to drive a private hire vehicle. The guidelines state that authorities
“should take a particularly cautious view of any offences involving violence, and especially sexual attack.”
Those are proportionate and appropriate words. However, because local authorities have discretion to interpret what is meant by a “fit and proper” person to drive a private hire vehicle, not all private hire vehicle drivers outside London are even subject to a criminal record check. We should consider reversing that; I believe that this proposed statutory duty to protect would have precisely that effect.
Other good practice can be considered. In Oxford, taxi drivers have been trained how to respond if they believe that their customers are victims of sexual exploitation. The independent review suggests there is evidence that that training is working. With a statutory duty in place to promote the prevention of child sexual exploitation, we could see such practices replicated across the country. Will the Minister say what measures the Government have put in place to ensure that best practice, like that in Oxford, can be shared across the country?
Karen Bradley
I hope that I am going to cheer everybody up—spoiler alert! I am not going to repeat the arguments made by the hon. Member for Swansea East and the shadow Minister, who have summed up the problem exactly. We have been working closely with the Local Government Association and others to ensure that best practices are spread. I recently enjoyed a taxi ride from Stoke-on-Trent station to my constituency home, in which the taxi driver, without knowing who I was, told me all about the safeguarding training he had been through that day. It was very good to hear him share that knowledge with someone he thought was a complete stranger to it.
We still need to go further. I have been working with the Under-Secretary of State for Transport, my hon. Friend the Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough (Andrew Jones) on the further reforms that are urgently needed on taxi and private hire vehicle licensing arrangements.
Although I absolutely agree with the spirit of the new clause, I suspect—the hon. Member for Swansea East may be shocked to hear this—that more will be required, with respect both to strengthening the Bill’s provisions and to making additional amendments to relevant legislation. I assure her that I am committed to delivering this change; we want to ensure, working with colleagues at the Department of Transport, that those exercising licensing functions have access to the powers and are subject to the appropriate duties that best ensure that our licensing arrangements provide the strongest possible protections. Once we have determined the best way forward, we will carefully consider what legislative vehicle is most appropriate to make any necessary changes. I cannot promise that that will be in this Bill, but it may be. With that assurance, I hope that the hon. Lady will be content to withdraw her new clause.
Carolyn Harris
I am happy to withdraw it. In the words of my hon. Friend the Member for West Ham, “You’ve made my day”. Thank you very much.
Carolyn Harris
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 46
Child sexual exploitation: assessment of needs for therapeutic support
‘(1) Where police or a local authority have received a disclosure that a child who has been sexually exploited or subject to other forms of child abuse, police or the local authority must make a referral to a named mental health service.
(2) The named mental health service must make necessary arrangements for the child’s treatment or care.
(3) The Secretary of State must by regulations—
(a) define “named mental health service” for the purpose of this section;
(b) specify a minimum level of “necessary arrangements” for the purpose of the section.”
This new clause enables the Future in Mind report’s recommendation that those young people who have been sexually abused or exploited should receive a comprehensive initial assessment, and referral to appropriate services providing evidence-based interventions according to their need.—(Mr Kevan Jones.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 47— Child sexual exploitation: duty to share information—
“The local policing body that maintains a police force shall have a duty to disclose information about children who are victims of sexual exploitation or other forms of abuse to relevant child mental health service commissioners in England and Wales.”
See the explanatory statement for NC46.
Mr Jones
The new clauses are probing. This afternoon we have talked about some of the issues surrounding child exploitation. This is about the support that should be given to the victims of child exploitation. The NSPCC and the Children’s Society have been campaigning very hard to ensure that victims of sexual and physical abuse have access, as a matter of course, to therapeutic services. It is true that these things are costly—we talked about that this morning—but in my experience of talking to organisations that deal with such cases, proper, early intervention, especially with young victims, can save money in the long term, by preventing greater trauma many years later.
New clause 46 says that where police or others receive a disclosure that a child has been sexually exploited or subjected to other forms of child abuse, they should refer them to mental health services. It comes back to the question we asked this morning about whether reference to mental health services is a police function. Yes, it is, in terms of investigating the crime that was committed, but how do we then put the holistic bubble around the victim and support them? We need to ensure that the perpetrator of the abuse is taken to court and dealt with, while making sure that the individual gets the emotional and mental health support that they need. Is that naturally a police issue? Directly, no, it is not, but as the Minister said this morning, it is about how we create a link-up between the police service, the health service and other support services.
I accept that some of the services will be provided not by statutory services but by the voluntary sector. A great organisation in my constituency called the Just for Women Centre works with women who have been victims of domestic violence or abuse. It was very interesting listening to the debate this afternoon about victims coming forward. The spike in Durham has come out of the Savile revelations, but it is not about well-known individuals; the issue in that local group is the number of people who have come forward to report family members who abused them over many years.
There has been huge concentration, nationally, on the more high-profile figures, but in local areas a lot of victims who have never come forward before have now done so and are in need of a huge amount of emotional support. This provision refers to children, but without the support given to many of the women at the Just for Women Centre in Stanley in my constituency, early abuse would have led to other problems. Talking to those individuals, we hear that their problems throughout life stem from the fact that they were abused as youngsters. I commend Durham police for their proactive approach to investigating such cases and ensuring that victims get the proper emotional support.
New clause 47 is about information sharing. It says that local policing bodies shall maintain a duty to disclose information about a child who has been a victim of sexual exploitation to the relevant mental health services. I can hear minds crunching among the civil servants in the room, saying that there are obviously problems about sharing information and so on. I accept that, but if we are to ensure that those young people do not fall through the cracks between our statutory services, some method of getting that information to the services that count needs to be put in place.
I accept that ultimately, victims cannot be forced to accept help, but it must be on offer for them. Many of the women whom I have met who have been supported by the Just for Women Centre in my constituency had years of anguish and torment, the root cause of which was not getting help and assistance when they were young. If we can put in place a system that prevents that for future generations, that early intervention could prevent a lifetime of mental health issues, relationship problems and other things. As I said, these are probing amendments to explore how we can put in place practical support for victims of sexual and physical child abuse.
Lyn Brown
New clauses 46 and 47 act on a recommendation made in a joint report by NHS England and the Department of Health in 2013 called “Future in mind”, which argued that we need to ensure that those who have been sexually abused and/or exploited receive a comprehensive assessment and referral to the services that they need, including specialist mental health services.
In 2014, the NSPCC produced a summary of the academic literature on the relationship between childhood sexual abuse and victims’ later mental health. In each instance, the NSPCC offered a conservative estimate of the known impact of one on the other. Despite that effort not to sensationalise, the numbers are truly shocking. Children who are victims of sexual abuse are twice as likely to suffer from depression as those who are not victims. They are three times as likely to attempt suicide, to self-harm or to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder at some point in their lifetime and twice as likely to become dependent on alcohol, meaning that their physical health as well as their mental health is endangered.
All the evidence shows that the trauma and emotional confusion that follows childhood sexual abuse leaves victims more likely to suffer from poor mental health. We should, as a matter of course, do all we can to prevent that from happening, or at least to ensure that those mental health issues are made easier for victims to manage. That involves high-quality and appropriate mental health treatment and professional emotional counselling. There is evidence, for example, that abuse-specific therapeutic interventions relieve depressive symptoms among victims.
New clause 46 would require police or local authorities to make a referral whenever they receive a disclosure that a child has been the victim of sexual or other abuse. They would have to make a referral even if they do not believe there is enough evidence or grounds to take further legal action. That is important, because the burden of proof necessary for law enforcement to use its full array of powers is obviously higher than the level of suspicion needed for our full safeguarding and health measures to be utilised.
The NSPCC has found that delays between children suffering from traumatic events and receiving treatment lead to exacerbated mental health issues and we know that victims of sexual abuse have often had difficulty in being believed by the professionals charged with their care and protection. Duties to refer are not new to our legal system when dealing with safeguarding measures. For example, some employers must refer an individual to disclosure and barring services whenever an allegation of a sexual or abusive nature is made. The provisions in the new clause would not charge local authorities or the police to carry out the task of diagnosis, which they are not trained to do. It would be a precautionary measure that applied to all those about whom they receive a disclosure, not just those they believe to be suffering from a mental or emotional health issue. It is a sensible proposal, in keeping with established safeguarding practice and the assignment of appropriate professional duties.
The proposals are also well thought out. New clause 47 would put a duty on the police to share information with the relevant mental health service commissioner in their area. I believe that that new clause would work with new clause 46 to create a culture of collaboration between law enforcement, health agencies and local government, which is needed if the victims of child sexual exploitation are to be given the care and support that they need.
Karen Bradley
I thank the hon. Member for North Durham for again raising a very important issue. He is absolutely right. We must make sure that vulnerable or traumatised children must never fall through the gaps between services. I would appreciate it if, when we meet, we could discuss the way that that might best be addressed, because I am not convinced that the best way is a mandatory way. For example, some young people who are abused or exploited do not develop mental health problems and I have a nervousness about intervening unnecessarily, which could create unintended harms. We need to make sure that we intervene where we need to and that each child is treated as an individual and has the care that they need; I do not think that it should be mandated.
Mr Kevan Jones
I take the Minister’s point. We cannot force anyone to have treatment, but the offer of some support for individuals would make a real difference.
Karen Bradley
I would really appreciate talking this matter through outside the Committee, and I would like the shadow Minister to attend that meeting as well. There is work being done. The shadow Minister mentioned the “Future in mind” report, which the Department of Health is working on to ensure that an emerging workforce strategy is put in place. Perhaps we can discuss that privately.
The hon. Member for North Durham referred to civil servants getting slightly scared about the idea that personal data should automatically be disclosed to third parties. I appreciate the good intentions, but I do think that that is a dangerous road to be travelling down. We need to have a conversation about how best to manage that.
It is right that we need to make sure that children get support. I have talked about the children I have met who have experienced abuse. They need the right support. At what point do they go into recovery? At what point can they lead a functioning life? It is clear from the work we are doing through the troubled families programme that in the families who have gone through the programme, there are multiple problems—mental health, abuse, domestic abuse and other problems. We need to tackle all of those. I know these are probing amendments and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will allow us to discuss them at length outside this room.
Mr Kevan Jones
I thank the Minister for her reply. Discussing these issues is worth while. I know there is an onus on things somehow being about cash, especially in a time of austerity, but I have to say that, if properly implemented, the new clause would save money in the long term as well as help individuals. Nevertheless, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 51
Suspension of Licences
“(1) Licensing Act 2003 is amended as follows—
(2) After section 171 insert—
“171A Suspension of Licences
(1) A licensing authority may suspend a premises licence, or a club premises certificate if the holder of the licence or certificate has failed to pay the non-domestic rates due, from one or more previous financial years, to the licensing authority in respect of the premises for which the licence or certificate relates.
(2) A licensing authority may not suspend a premises licence or a club premises certificate using the powers granted by this section if—
(a) the licensing authority is unable to demonstrate that earlier efforts to secure payment of the debt have been made but have failed, or
(b) either—
(i) the licence holder failed to pay the required amount of non-domestic rates at the time it became due because of an administrative error (whether made by the holder, the authority or anyone else), or
(ii) before or at the time the non-domestic rates became due, the holder notified the authority in writing that the holder disputed liability for, or the amount of, the rates.
(3) If a licensing authority suspends a premises licence or club premises certificate under subsection (1), the authority must give the holder of the licence or certificate notice of the grounds on which the licence or certificate has been revoked and specify the day the suspension takes effect.
(4) The date specified in the notice under subsection (3) must be at least 10 working days after the day the authority gives the notice.
(5) The amendments made by this section apply in relation to any outstanding non-domestic rates which are owed to the licensing authority six months after the commencement of this section.””—(Lyn Brown.)
This new clause would enable a licensing authority to suspend a premises licence where a business has wilfully or persistently failed to pay the business rates due to the licensing authority.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss:
New clause 52—Cap on Licensed Premises—
“(1) Amend the 2003 Licensing Act as follows.
(2) At the end of subsection 3 of section 18 insert—
“(c) have regard to the cumulative impact of granting the licence application given the number of other licensed establishments in the vicinity of the applicant premise.”
This new clause would allow local authorities to reject a licensing application on the grounds that there are already too many licensed premises.
New clause 53—Public health licensing objective—
“(1) The Licensing Act 2003 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 4(d) insert—
“(e) promoting public health.””
This new clause would make promoting public health a statutory objective for licensing authorities.
Lyn Brown
These new clauses have all been tabled to help local authorities to carry out their alcohol licensing function.
New clause 51 would enable a licensing authority to suspend a premises licence where a business had wilfully or persistently failed to pay the business rates due. It has been tabled with the support of the Local Government Association. New clause 52 would allow local authorities to reject a licensing application if they felt there were already enough licensed premises in a particular area. New clause 53 would make promoting public health a statutory objective for licensing authorities.
New clause 51 has been tabled because, as the law stands, local authorities must issue licences to businesses even when they may owe debts running into tens of thousands of pounds. I am told by the LGA that that has become a problem in some localities, such as West Sussex, where local authorities are struggling to collect the business rates to which they are entitled. The new clause would end the problem by allowing local authorities to suspend the licence of an establishment that has persistently failed to pay its business rates. The hope is that the power would rarely be used, as premises would change their behaviour as they would no longer have reason to see their local authority as a soft creditor.
The new clause is by no means an attack on drinking establishments. We recognise the role that they play in our communities as social hubs that are an important part of our cultural heritage. The Opposition want to ensure that we keep as many of our well-run drinking establishments open as possible. We understand that the proposal could be seen as a threat to that, which is why it contains a power for a local authority to revoke a licence that would apply only if it was able to demonstrate first that earlier efforts to secure payment of the debt had been made but failed. That safeguard is included to ensure that the power is used only as a last resort.
Furthermore, the power to revoke a licence would not apply if the business failed to make the payment because of an administrative error on the part of the holder, the authority or anybody else—for example, the business’s bank. Taken together, those safeguards would ensure that the power to revoke licences was used only as a very last resort and would protect well-run local pubs from accidentally having their licence removed because of an administrative error.
The Local Government Association predicts that the safeguards, alongside the Government’s extension of small business rate relief, would mean that we would not see important community pubs closing as a result of the new power. However, the power would enable local authorities to ensure that they do not lose out on important revenue to which they are entitled and on which many of our basic services rely.
New clause 52 would allow local authorities to reject a licensing application if they felt they were saturated with licensed premises in a particular area. The Licensing Act 2003 allows local authorities to reject licensing applications only in a limited and defined set of situations: either where the premises has not demonstrated that it will meet statutory licensing objectives, or where door or cover supervision is not provided for.
Home Office guidance suggests that a local authority can refuse a licence based on
“the potential impact on the promotion of the licensing objectives of a significant number of licensed premises concentrated in one area.”
However, a local authority can do so only if it demonstrates in its licensing statement that the number of licensed premises in its area has already had a negative cumulative impact on its licensing objectives. That is called a cumulative impact policy and means that local authorities have to wait until they can demonstrate a negative impact on the prevention of crime and disorder, public safety, the prevention of public nuisance or the protection of children from harm. That leaves local authorities powerless to act until after the fact, and I just do not think that that is right. I believe that the licensing objectives are incredibly important and I want to give local authorities the power to be proactive to ensure that they are upheld.
For instance, a small town with two large nightclubs could not reject an application for a licence from a third nightclub even if the local authority believed that it would not be appropriate for the town to have yet another nightclub. It is of course important to consider the individual characteristics of the premises concerned, but it is also important to consider the individual characteristics of our towns and cities, which many residents want to see conserved. In effect, local authorities have no power to control the number of licensed premises in any given locality until they can demonstrate that it is having an adverse impact on one of their licensing objectives, by which point it would be rather late.
New clause 52 would allow a local authority to reject a licensing application based on the belief that an area is already saturated with drinking establishments. It would give local authorities a sure footing and a legal foundation to allow them to be proactive in ensuring that their licensing objectives are met, and more power over how their towns and cities look and operate.
New clause 53 would make promoting public health a statutory objective for licensing authorities. I do recognise—honest—the important place that pubs, clubs, bars and restaurants play in our society. Drinking is a social activity, and drinking establishments are essentially social places where people go for conversation, relaxation and pleasure. I understand that in our busy and stressful lives, the socially integrative, egalitarian environments in our favourite locals can be the perfect way to switch off and unwind. For me, a decent beer, a good meal, an engaging book and the company of my four-legged friend is a great joy and a perfect way to spend a weekend afternoon or an evening. I also acknowledge that that can provide significant public health benefits—it certainly does for me—but we must not lose sight of the significant impact that drinking can have on public health.
It is well known that there is a causal relationship between alcohol consumption and a range of health problems, including alcohol dependency, liver diseases, some cancers and cardiovascular diseases. Furthermore, it can lead to unsafe behaviour and thus the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. The World Health Organisation estimates that 5.1% of the global disease burden is due to harmful use of alcohol. New clauses 52 and 53 would enable local authorities to reject licensing applications on the basis that the number of premises in an area was having a negative impact on public health. We cannot ask local authorities to be responsible for public health and then not give them the powers that they say they need to have an impact upon it.
I understand that implementing public health as a licensing objective in Scotland has proved to be somewhat difficult; however, that should not deter us from at least considering it. Alcohol clearly has a major impact on public health, so local authorities should be enabled to consider that impact when undertaking their licensing function. I believe that we have to find a way of successfully implementing what was attempted in Scotland. Local practitioners certainly think so; a recent Local Government Association survey of directors of public health found that nine out of 10 were in favour of adding a public health objective to the Licensing Act 2003, saying that it would help them do their jobs more effectively. Our amendment has the support of the Local Government Association.
Karen Bradley
I thank the shadow Minister for her comments. I too have read the very informative LGA briefing. I ought to declare an interest in that I am not just an avid—and regular—user of licensed premises. I grew up in a licensed premises, and my brother still has a licence and runs the family pub, which has been in the family since 1967. I think we probably have some experience of these things. Perhaps I could deal with the new clauses in the order that I am attracted to them.
I will start with new clause 51. The four licensing objectives that local authorities have are the prevention of crime and disorder, public safety, the prevention of public nuisance, and the protection of children from harm. It is very important that we stick to those when we come to look at the new clause. The hon. Lady will know that there is a provision in the 2003 Act for the licensing authority to suspend a premises licence or club premises certificate if the premises has failed to pay the annual fee. That power is directly linked to the local authority’s need to obtain a fee from premises in order to carry out its functions. If it is not paid it undermines licensing authorities’ ability to operate fully, and it is therefore right that they should have the corresponding power to suspend the licence and thus the legal operation of such premises.
Business rates are a different matter. They must be paid by not just licensed premises but all businesses. There are already enforcement remedies available to local councils for the non-payment of those rates. I am not sure that linking the payment of business rates to the right to hold a licence to sell alcohol is necessarily an appropriate route to take. I am therefore afraid that I cannot commend new clause 51 to the Committee.
New clause 53 seeks to introduce a health-based licensing objective. I want to assure the hon. Lady that the Government have sympathy for the view that considerations of public health should play a greater role in licensing, and we remain interested in the possibility of introducing a health-related licensing objective. However, this is neither the right time nor the legislative vehicle to do so. It may superficially seem straightforward, but licensing decisions must be proportionate and made on a case-by-case basis. To try to establish direct causal links between alcohol-related health harms and particular premises would be very difficult. Without the necessary processes and supporting evidence in place, licensing decisions based on health grounds would be unlikely to stand up to legal challenge.
Lyn Brown
I have an awful lot of sympathy with what the hon. Lady says, especially about this not being the right legislative vehicle. It was an opportunity for us to test the waters.
We did not envisage this new clause being about the health risk of a particular pub, premises or bar, but about the amount in a particular area, or possibly the type of risks in a particular area. Effectively, the new clause would allow local authorities to take that into consideration when making decisions on licences.
Karen Bradley
I understand the hon. Lady’s point. I should make the point that the public health requirement, in the case of two-tier authorities, is on the county council, as it is in my case, but the district council deals with licensing. Licensing decisions are taken on a case-by-case basis, so we would be asking a district or borough council to take a licensing decision on an individual premises on the basis of a public health implication that may or may not be properly founded. I want to assure the hon. Lady that Public Health England is looking at the lessons learned from the evidence-based work that was done in 2014-15. A consultation process would need to follow, but it is looking carefully at that point.
New clause 52 covers the cumulative impact. The hon. Lady linked new clauses 52 and 53, but I do not think we need to do that. I hope that she has read avidly the Government’s modern crime prevention strategy, which was published just last month, because in that we made a commitment to put cumulative impact policies on a statutory footing.
Mr Kevan Jones
It is my understanding that if a local authority draws up a local policy, it can use cumulative impact to refuse further licences in an area.
Karen Bradley
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. There are already more than 200 cumulative impact policies in England and Wales and they allow local authorities to control the number or type of licence applications granted in an area where it can be shown that high numbers or densities of licensed premises are having an adverse impact on the licensing objectives. They can also put a levy on such premises. However, the cumulative impact policies currently have no statutory basis and it is unclear whether all local authorities are making best use of the power. That is why we intend to place them on a statutory footing both to maximise their effectiveness and to improve local authorities’ ability to ensure that the right premises for their area are granted licences to sell alcohol and late-night refreshment.
Mr Kevan Jones
I am a bit of an anorak on the Licensing Act 2003 from when we were in power. The Minister makes an important point about putting cumulative impact on a statutory footing. One thing that confuses the public is that while the ability to reduce licences or take action is there—the onus is on the local authority—in many cases they do not use the powers they have got.
Karen Bradley
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that local authorities do not necessarily use the powers available to them and this measure will ensure that they understand those powers and use them. I hope that he and the hon. Member for West Ham understand that the change requires proper consultation with those affected. We need to consult the licence trade, the alcohol industry and local authorities. Therefore—I hope that the hon. Lady will forgive me—we need a little time to undertake such consultations. We will do them as quickly as possible. I cannot promise that they will have been completed in time for Report, but suffice it to say that we support the objectives behind new clause 52 and will seek to bring forward proposals of our own as quickly as possible.
Lyn Brown
The Minister has obviously delighted me. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Schedule 1
Disciplinary proceedings: former members of MoD Police, British Transport Police and Civil Nuclear Constabulary
“1 The Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987 is amended as follows.
2 (1) Section 3A (regulations relating to disciplinary matters) is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (1A) insert—
“(1B) Regulations under this section may provide for the procedures that are established by or under regulations made by virtue of subsection (1A) to apply (with or without modifications) in respect of the conduct, efficiency or effectiveness of any person where—
(a) an allegation relating to the conduct, efficiency or effectiveness of the person comes to the attention of the chief constable of the Ministry of Defence Police, the Ministry of Defence Police Committee, the Independent Police Complaints Commission, the Police Investigations and Review Commissioner or the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland,
(b) at the time of the alleged misconduct, inefficiency or ineffectiveness the person was a member of the Ministry of Defence Police, and
(c) either—
(i) the person ceases to be a member of the Ministry of Defence Police after the allegation first comes to the attention of a person mentioned in paragraph (a), or
(ii) the person had ceased to be a member of the Ministry of Defence Police before the allegation first came to the attention of a person mentioned in paragraph (a) but the period between the person having ceased to be a member of the Ministry of Defence Police and the allegation first coming to the attention of a person mentioned in paragraph (a) does not exceed the period specified in the regulations.
(1C) Regulations made by virtue of subsection (1B) must provide that disciplinary proceedings which are not the first disciplinary proceedings to be taken against the person in respect of the alleged misconduct, inefficiency or ineffectiveness may be taken only if they are commenced within the period specified in the regulations, which must begin with the date when the person ceased to be a member of the Ministry of Defence Police.”
(3) In subsection (2), for “The regulations” substitute “Regulations under this section”.
3 In section 4 (representation etc at disciplinary proceedings), in subsection (4)—
(a) in the definition of “the officer concerned”, after “member” insert “or, as the case may be, the former member”;
(b) in the definition of “relevant authority”—
(i) after paragraph (a) insert—
(ii) after paragraph (b) insert—
4 In section 4A (appeals against dismissal etc), in subsection (1)(a), after “member” insert “, or former member,”.
5 Regulations made in pursuance of section 3A(1B) of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987 (as inserted by paragraph 2)—
(a) may not make provision in relation to a person who ceases to be a member of the Ministry of Defence Police before the coming into force of paragraph 2 of this Schedule;
(b) may make provision in relation to a person who ceases to be a member of the Ministry of Defence Police after the coming into force of paragraph 2 of this Schedule even though the alleged misconduct, inefficiency or ineffectiveness occurred at a time before the coming into force of that paragraph, but only if the alleged misconduct, inefficiency or ineffectiveness is such that, if proved, there could be a finding in relation to the person in disciplinary proceedings that the person would have been dismissed if the person had still been a member of the Ministry of Defence Police.
Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003 (c. 20)
6 The Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003 is amended as follows.
7 In section 36 (police regulations: general), after subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) To the extent that subsection (1) concerns regulations made in pursuance of section 50(3A) of the Police Act 1996, or matters that could be dealt with by such regulations, the reference in subsection (1) to constables or other persons employed in the service of the Police Force includes former constables and other persons formerly employed in the service of the Police Force.”
8 In section 37 (police regulations: special constables), after subsection (1) insert—
“(1ZA) To the extent that subsection (1) concerns regulations made in pursuance of section 51(2B) of the Police Act 1996, or matters that could be dealt with by such regulations, the reference in subsection (1) to special constables of the Police Force includes former special constables of the Police Force.”
9 In section 42 (police regulations by Secretary of State), in subsection (3)—
(a) after “50(3)” insert “or (3A)”;
(b) after “51(2A)” insert “or (2B)”.
10 Regulations made under section 36, 37 or 42 of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003 that make provision that applies regulations made in pursuance of section 50(3A) or 51(2B) of the Police Act 1996, or that deals with matters that could be dealt with by such regulations, in relation to former constables, and former special constables, of the British Transport Police Force and other persons formerly employed in the service of the British Transport Police Force—
(a) may not make provision that would not be permitted in relation to former members of a police force and former special constables by section 22(7)(a);
(b) may make provision that would be permitted in relation to former members of a police force and former special constables by section 22(7)(b).
Energy Act 2004 (c. 20)
11 The Energy Act 2004 is amended as follows.
12 In section 58 (government, administration and conditions of service of Civil Nuclear Constabulary), in subsection (1)(a), after “members” insert “or former members”.
13 (1) In Schedule 13 (directions by Secretary of State about Civil Nuclear Constabulary), paragraph 3 (government, administration and conditions of service) is amended as follows.
(2) After sub-paragraph (2) insert—
“(2A) To the extent that sub-paragraph (2) concerns provision that may be made in pursuance of section 50(3A) of the Police Act 1996, the reference in sub-paragraph (1) to members of the Constabulary includes former members.”
14 Provision made by the Civil Nuclear Police Authority that relates to former members of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary and matters which are the subject of regulations made in pursuance of section 50(3A) of the Police Act 1996—
(a) may not be provision that would not be permitted in relation to former members of a police force and former special constables by section 22(7)(a);
(b) may be provision that would be permitted in relation to former members of a police force and former special constables by 22(7)(b).”—(Mike Penning.)
This new Schedule includes amendments relating to the Ministry of Defence Police, the British Transport Police Force and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary which produce an equivalent effect to the amendments at clause 22 of the Bill.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Schedule 2
Office for Police Conduct
Part 1
Amendments to Schedule 2 to the Police Reform Act 2002
Introductory
1 Schedule 2 to the Police Reform Act 2002 is amended in accordance with this Part of this Schedule (see also paragraph 54 below for further minor and consequential amendments).
Director General
2 (1) Paragraph 1 (chairman) is amended as follows.
(2) For sub-paragraph (1) substitute—
(1) The Director General holds office in accordance with the terms of his or her appointment.
(1A) A person who holds office as Director General must not be an employee of the Office (but may have been such an employee before appointment as the Director General).”
(3) In sub-paragraph (2) for “chairman of the Commission” substitute “Director General”.
(4) In sub-paragraph (3)—
(a) for “chairman of the Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(b) for “chairman” substitute “Director General”.
(5) In sub-paragraph (4)—
(a) for “chairman of the Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(b) for “chairman” substitute “Director General”.
(6) In sub-paragraph (5) for “chairman” substitute “Director General”.
Appointment etc of members
3 After paragraph 1 insert—
“Appointment of members
1A (1) The non-executive members of the Office are to be appointed by the Secretary of State.
(2) A person who is a non-executive member must not be an employee of the Office (but may have been such an employee before appointment as a non-executive member).
1B (1) The employee members of the Office are to be appointed from the staff of the Office by the non-executive members.
(2) If the non-executive members propose to appoint an employee member, the Director General must recommend a person to the non-executive members for appointment.
(3) The Director General may also recommend a person to the non-executive members for appointment as an employee member without any proposal having been made under sub-paragraph (2).
(4) On a recommendation of a person for appointment under sub-paragraph (2) or (3), the non-executive members may—
(a) appoint the person, or
(b) reject the recommendation.
(5) If the non-executive members reject a recommendation they may require the Director General to recommend another person for appointment (in which case this sub-paragraph applies again and so on until somebody is appointed).”
4 (1) Paragraph 2 (ordinary members of the Commission) is amended as follows.
(2) In sub-paragraph (1) for “an ordinary” substitute “a non-executive”.
(3) Omit sub-paragraph (2).
(4) In sub-paragraph (3) for “an ordinary” substitute “a non-executive”.
(5) In sub-paragraph (4)—
(a) for “an ordinary”, in both places, substitute “a non-executive”;
(b) for “five” substitute “three”.
(6) In sub-paragraph (5) for—
(a) for “An ordinary” substitute “A non-executive”;
(b) for “his office as a member of the Commission” substitute “from being a non-executive member of the Office”.
(7) In sub-paragraph (6)—
(a) for “an ordinary” substitute “a non-executive”;
(b) omit paragraph (b).
(8) Omit sub-paragraph (8).
5 After paragraph 2 insert—
“Terms of appointment etc: employee members
2A (1) A person holds office as an employee member in accordance with the terms of his or her appointment (subject to the provisions of this Schedule).
(2) Those terms may not include arrangements in relation to remuneration.
(3) An appointment as an employee member may be full-time or part-time.
(4) The appointment of an employee member terminates—
(a) if the terms of the member’s appointment provides for it to expire at the end of a period, at the end of that period, and
(b) in any event, when the member ceases to be an employee of the Office.
(5) An employee member may resign by giving written notice to the non-executive members.
(6) The non-executive members may terminate the appointment of an employee member by giving the member written notice if they are satisfied that any of the grounds mentioned in paragraph 2(6)(a) to (g) apply in relation to the employee member.”
6 Omit paragraph 3 (deputy chairmen) (including the italic heading before that paragraph).
7 Omit paragraph 5 (chief executive) (including the italic heading before that paragraph).
Vacancy or incapacity in office of Director General
8 After paragraph 3 insert—
“Director General: vacancy or incapacity
3A (1) This paragraph applies if—
(a) the office of Director General is vacant, or
(b) it appears to the Office that the ability of the Director General to carry out the Director General’s functions is seriously impaired because of ill health (whether mental or physical).
(2) The Office may, with the agreement of the Secretary of State, authorise an employee of the Office to carry out the functions of the Director General during the vacancy or period of ill health.
(3) A person who falls within section 9(3) may not be authorised under this paragraph to carry out the functions of the Director General.
(4) A person who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of three months or more may not, at any time in the five years following the day of sentence, be authorised under this paragraph to carry out the functions of the Director General.
(5) Paragraph 1(6) applies for the purposes of sub-paragraph (4).
(6) Authorisation of a person under this paragraph ceases to have effect—
(a) at the end of the vacancy or period of ill health,
(b) on the Office revoking the authorisation for any reason, or
(c) on the Secretary of State withdrawing agreement to the authorisation for any reason.”
Remuneration arrangements
9 (1) Paragraph 4 (remuneration, pensions etc of members) is amended as follows.
(2) In sub-paragraph (1), for the words from “the chairman” to the end substitute “the Director General as the Secretary of State may determine”.
(3) In sub-paragraph (2)—
(a) in paragraph (a), for “chairman, deputy chairman or member of the Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(b) in the words after paragraph (b) for “Commission” substitute “Office”.
(4) After sub-paragraph (2) insert—
(3) The Secretary of State may make remuneration arrangements in relation to non-executive members of the Office.
(4) Remuneration arrangements under sub-paragraph (3)—
(a) may make provision for a salary, allowances and other benefits but not for a pension, and
(b) may include a formula or other mechanism for adjusting one or more of those elements from time to time.
(5) Amounts payable by virtue of sub-paragraph (4) are to be paid by the Office.”
Staff
10 (1) Paragraph 6 (staff) is amended as follows.
(2) For sub-paragraph (1) substitute—
(1) The Office may appoint staff.”
(3) In sub-paragraph (2) for “Commission”, in both places, substitute “Office”.
(4) In sub-paragraph (3)—
(a) for “Commission” substitute “Office”;
(b) after “staffing” insert “(including arrangements in relation to terms and conditions and management of staff)”;
(c) for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
(5) In sub-paragraph (4)—
(a) for “Commission”, in the first place, substitute “Office”;
(b) for “Commission”, in the second place, substitute “Director General”.
(6) After sub-paragraph (4) insert—
(4A) The powers under this paragraph are exercisable only by the Director General acting on behalf of the Office (subject to the power under paragraph 6A(1)).”
(7) In sub-paragraph (5) for “by the Commission of its” substitute “of the”.
Delegation of functions
11 After paragraph 6 of Schedule 2 insert—
“Delegation of functions
6A (1) The Director General may authorise a person within sub-paragraph (2) to exercise on the Director General’s behalf a function of the Director General.
(2) The persons within this sub-paragraph are—
(a) employee members of the Office;
(b) employees of the Office appointed under paragraph 6;
(c) seconded constables within the meaning of paragraph 8.
(3) The reference in sub-paragraph (1) to a function of the Director General is to any function that the Director General has under this Act or any other enactment.
(4) A person (“A”) who is authorised under sub-paragraph (1) to exercise a function may authorise another person within sub-paragraph (2) to exercise that function (but only so far as permitted to do so by the authorisation given to A).
(5) An authorisation under this paragraph may provide for a function to which it relates to be exercisable—
(a) either to its full extent or to the extent specified in the authorisation;
(b) either generally or in cases, circumstances or areas so specified;
(c) either unconditionally or subject to conditions so specified.
(6) Provision under sub-paragraph (5) may (in particular) include provision for restricted persons not to exercise designated functions.
(7) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (6)—
(a) “designated functions” are any functions of the Director General that are designated by the Director General for the purposes of this paragraph (and such functions may in particular be designated by reference to the position or seniority of members of staff);
(b) “restricted persons” are, subject to any determination made under sub-paragraph (8), persons who fall within section 9(3).
(8) The Director General may, in such circumstances as the Director General considers appropriate, determine that persons are not to be treated as restricted persons so far as relating to the exercise of designated functions (whether generally or in respect of particular functions specified in the determination).
(9) The Director General must publish a statement of policy about how the Director General proposes to exercise the powers conferred by sub-paragraphs (7)(a) and (8).
(10) The statement must in particular draw attention to any restrictions on the carrying out of functions imposed by virtue of their designation under sub-paragraph (7)(a) and explain the reasons for imposing them.
(11) The exercise of the powers conferred by sub-paragraphs (7)(a) and (8) is subject to any regulations under section 23(1) of the kind mentioned in section 23(2)(g) (regulations limiting persons who may be appointed to carry out investigations etc).
(12) An authorisation under this paragraph does not prevent the Director General from exercising the function to which the authorisation relates.
(13) Anything done or omitted to be done by or in relation to a person authorised under this paragraph in, or in connection with, the exercise or purported exercise of the function to which the authorisation relates is to be treated for all purposes as done or omitted to be done by or in relation to the Director General.
(14) Sub-paragraph (13) does not apply for the purposes of any criminal proceedings brought in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by the authorised person.”
Protection from personal liability
12 After paragraph 7 insert—
“Liability for acts of the Director General
7A (1) A person holding office as the Director General has no personal liability for an act or omission done by the person in the exercise of the Director General’s functions unless it is shown to have been done otherwise than in good faith.
(2) The Office is liable in respect of unlawful conduct of the Director General in the carrying out, or purported carrying out, of the Director General’s functions in the same way as an employer is liable in respect of any unlawful conduct of employees in the course of their employment.
(3) Accordingly, the Office is to be treated, in the case of any such unlawful conduct which is a tort, as a joint tortfeasor.”
Regional offices
13 For paragraph 9 (power of Commission to set up regional offices) substitute—
9 (1) The Office may set up regional offices in places in England and Wales.
(2) But the power under sub-paragraph (1) is exercisable only by the Director General acting on behalf of the Office (subject to the power in paragraph 6A(1)).
(3) The power under sub-paragraph (1) may be exercised—
(a) only with the consent of the Secretary of State, and
(b) only if it appears to the Director General necessary to do so for the purpose of ensuring that the functions of the Director General, or those of the Office, are carried out efficiently and effectively.”
Proceedings
14 In paragraph 10 (proceedings), after sub-paragraph (1) insert—
(1A) But the arrangements must include provision for—
(a) the quorum for meetings to be met only if a majority of members present are non-executive members of the Office, and
(b) an audit committee of the Office to be established to perform such monitoring, reviewing and other functions as are appropriate.
(1B) The arrangements must secure that the audit committee consists only of non-executive members of the Office.”
Part 2
Minor and Consequential Amendments to the Police Reform Act 2002
15 The Police Reform Act 2002 is amended in accordance with this Part of this Schedule.
16 For the italic heading before section 9, substitute “The Office for Police Conduct”.
17 (1) Section 10 (general functions of the Commission) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1)(a) omit “itself”.
(3) In subsection (1)(e) for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”.
(4) In subsection (1)(f) for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
(5) In subsection (3) for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
(6) In subsection (3A) (as inserted by this Act), for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
(7) In subsection (3B) (as inserted by this Act), for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
(8) In subsection (4), in paragraph (a)—
(a) for “it”, in both places, substitute “the Director General”;
(b) for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”.
(9) In subsection (6)—
(a) for “it” substitute “the Director General”;
(b) for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”.
(10) In subsection (7)—
(a) for “it”, in both places, substitute “the Director General”;
(b) for “its”, in both places, substitute “the Director General’s”.
18 (1) Section 11 (reports to the Secretary of State) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1)—
(a) for “its”, in the first place it occurs, substitute “the Office’s”;
(b) for “Commission shall” substitute “Director General and the Office must jointly”;
(c) for “its”, in the second place it occurs, substitute “their”.
(3) For subsection (2) substitute—
(2) The Secretary of State may also require reports to be made (at any time)—
(a) by the Director General about the carrying out of the Director General’s functions,
(b) by the Office about the carrying out of the Office’s functions, or
(c) jointly by the Director General and the Office about the carrying out of their functions.”
(4) After subsection (2) insert—
(2A) The Director General may, from time to time, make such other reports to the Secretary of State as the Director General considers appropriate for drawing the Secretary of State’s attention to matters which—
(a) have come to the Director General’s notice, and
(b) are matters which the Director General considers should be drawn to the attention of the Secretary of State by reason of their gravity or of other exceptional circumstances.”
(5) In subsection (3)—
(a) for “Commission” substitute “Office”;
(b) for “Commission’s” substitute “Office’s”.
(6) After subsection (3) insert—
(3A) The Director General and the Office may jointly make reports under subsections (2A) and (3).”
(7) In subsection (4)—
(a) for “Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(b) for “it”, in both places, substitute “the Director General”;
(c) for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”.
(8) In subsection (6) for “Commission” substitute “Office”.
(9) After subsection (6) insert—
(6A) The Director General must send a copy of every report under subsection (2A) —
(a) to any local policing body that appears to the Director General to be concerned, and
(b) to the chief officer of police of any police force that appears to the Director General to be concerned.”
(10) In subsection (7) for “Commission”, in both places, substitute “Office”.
(11) In subsection (8)—
(a) after “subsection” insert “(2A) or”;
(b) for “Commission” substitute “Director General or the Office (as the case may be)”.
(12) In subsection (9)—
(a) after “subsection” insert “(2A) or”;
(b) for “Commission” substitute “Director General or the Office (as the case may be)”.
(13) In subsection (10) for “Commission” substitute “Director General”.
(14) In subsection (11)—
(a) for “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General”;
(b) for “it” substitute “the Director General”;
(c) for “(3)” substitute “(2A)”.
(15) After subsection (11) insert—
(12) The Office must send a copy of every report made or prepared by it under subsection (3) to such of the persons (in addition to those specified in the preceding subsections) who—
(a) are referred to in the report, or
(b) appear to the Office otherwise to have a particular interest in its contents, as the Office thinks fit.
(13) Where a report under subsection (2A) or (3) is prepared jointly by virtue of subsection (3A), a duty under this section to send a copy of the report to any person is met if either the Director General or the Office sends a copy to that person.”
19 In section 12 (complaints, matters and persons to which Part 2 applies), in subsection (6)(a) for “Commission” substitute “Director General”.
20 (1) Section 13B (power of the Commission to require re-investigation) (as inserted by this Act) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place (including the heading), substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (1)—
(a) for “it”, in both places, substitute “the Director General”;
(b) in paragraph (b), before “under” insert “(or, in the case of an investigation carried out under paragraph 19 of Schedule 3 by the Director General personally, is otherwise completed by the Director General)”.
(4) In subsection (2) for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
(5) In subsection (3) for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
(6) In subsection (9)—
(a) for “it” substitute “the Director General”;
(b) for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”.
(7) In subsection (10)—
(a) for “it” substitute “the Director General”;
(b) for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”.
21 (1) Section 15 (general duties of local policing bodies, chief officers and inspectors) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (3), in the words after paragraph (c) after “Director General” insert “of the Agency”.
(3) In subsection (4)—
(a) for “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General”;
(b) for “Commission’s” substitute “Office’s”.
22 (1) Section 16 (payment for assistance with investigations) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place except as mentioned in sub-paragraph (3), substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (4), for “the Commission”, in the second place where it occurs, substitute “Office”.
(4) In subsection (5)(b), after “Director General” insert “of that Agency”.
23 (1) Section 17 (provision of information to the Commission) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place (including the heading), substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (2)—
(a) for “it” substitute “the Director General”;
(b) for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”.
24 (1) Section 18 (inspections of police premises on behalf of the Commission) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place (including the heading and provisions inserted by amendments made by this Act), substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (2)(b), for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”.
25 (1) Section 19 (use of investigatory powers by or on behalf of the Commission) is amended as follows.
(2) In the heading, for “Commission” substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (1), for “Commission’s” substitute “Director General’s”.
26 (1) Section 20 (duty to keep complainant informed) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place (including provisions inserted by amendments made by this Act), substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (1)(b) for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”.
(4) In subsection (3) for “it”, where it occurs after “as”, substitute “the Director General”.
(5) In subsection (8A) (as inserted by this Act)—
(a) for “its” substitute “their”;
(b) after “submitted”, in the first place it occurs, insert “(or finalised)”;
(c) after “submitted”, in the second place it occurs, insert “(or completed)”.
(6) In subsection (9) for “its” substitute “their”.
27 (1) Section 21 (duty to provide information for other persons) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place (including provisions inserted by amendments made by this Act), substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (6)(b) for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”.
(4) In subsection (8) for “it”, where it occurs after “as”, substitute “the Director General”.
(5) In subsection (11A) (as inserted by this Act)—
(a) for “its” substitute “their”;
(b) after “submitted”, in the first place it occurs, insert “(or finalised)”;
(c) after “submitted”, in the second place it occurs, insert “(or completed)”.
28 In section 21A (restriction on disclosure of sensitive information) (as inserted by this Act), for “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General”.
29 In section 21B (provision of sensitive information to the Commission and certain investigators) (as inserted by this Act), for “Commission”, in each place (including the heading), substitute “Director General”.
30 (1) Section 22 (power of the Commission to issue guidance) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place (including the heading), substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (3)(c) for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
31 (1) Section 23 (regulations) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (2)(o) for “it” substitute “the Director General or the Office”.
32 In section 24 (consultation on regulations) for paragraph (a) substitute—
“(a) the Office;
(aa) the Director General;”.
33 In section 26 (forces maintained otherwise than by local policing bodies), for “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General”.
34 In section 26BA (College of Policing), for “Commission”, in both places, substitute “Director General”.
35 (1) Section 26C (the National Crime Agency) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1)—
(a) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(b) before “and other” insert “of the National Crime Agency”.
(3) In subsection (2) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “the Office or its Director General”.
(4) In subsection (4) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission”, in both places, substitute “Director General”.
(5) In subsection (5)—
(a) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(b) for “Commission’s”, in both places, substitute “Director General’s”;
(c) for “Commission” substitute “Director General”.
36 (1) Section 26D (labour abuse prevention officers) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (4), for “Commission’s”, in both places, substitute “Director General’s”.
37 (1) Section 27 (conduct of the Commission’s staff) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission’s”, in each place (including the heading), substitute “Office’s”.
(3) In subsection (4) for “Commission” substitute “Office and the Director General”.
38 Omit section 28 (transitional arrangements in connection with establishing Commission etc).
39 (1) Section 28A (application of Part 2 to old cases) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place other than in subsection (3) of that section, substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (1), for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
(4) In subsection (4), for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
40 (1) Section 29 (interpretation of Part 2) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1)—
(a) omit the definition of “the Commission”;
(b) after the definition of “death or serious injury matter” insert—
““the Director General” means (unless otherwise specified) the Director General of the Office;”;
(c) after the definition of “local resolution” insert—
““the Office” means the Office for Police Conduct;”.
(3) In subsection (6)—
(a) for “Commission” in each place substitute “Director General”;
(b) omit “itself”.
41 In section 29C (regulations about super-complaints) (as inserted by this Act), in subsection (3) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission”, in both places, substitute “Director General”.
42 (1) Section 29E (power to investigate concerns raised by whistle-blowers) (as inserted by this Act) is amended as follows
(2) For “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (2) for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
43 (1) Section 29F (Commission’s powers and duties where it decides not to investigate) (as inserted by this Act) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General”.
(3) In the heading—
(a) for “Commission’s” substitute “Director General’s”;
(b) for “where it decides” substitute “on decision”.
44 (1) Section 29G (special provision for “conduct matters”) (as inserted by this Act) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (2)—
(a) or “it”, in both places, substitute “the Director General”;
(b) for “its” substitute “the”.
45 (1) Section 29H (Commission’s powers and duties where whistle-blower is deceased) (as inserted by this Act) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General”.
(3) In the heading for “Commission’s” substitute “Director General’s”.
(4) In subsection (1) for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
46 In section 29HA (duty to keep whistle-blowers informed) (as inserted by this Act), in subsection (1)—
(a) for “Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(b) for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
47 In section 29I (protection of anonymity of whistle-blowers) (as inserted by this Act) for “Commission”, in both places, substitute “Director General”.
48 In section 29J (other restrictions on disclosure of information) (as inserted by this Act), for “Commission”, in both places, substitute “Director General”.
49 In section 29K (application of provisions of Part 2) (as inserted by this Act), for “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General”.
50 In section 29L (regulation-making powers: consultation) (as inserted by this Act), for “Commission” substitute “Director General”.
51 In section 29M (interpretation) (as inserted by this Act), in subsection (1)—
(a) omit the definition of “the Commission”;
(b) after the definition of “conduct” insert—
““the Director General” means the Director General of the Office for Police Conduct;”.
52 In section 36 (conduct of disciplinary proceedings), in subsection (1)(a) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct”.
53 In section 105 (powers of Secretary of State to make orders and regulations), in subsection (5) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct”.
54 (1) Schedule 2 (the Independent Police Complaints Commission) is amended as follows.
(2) For the italic heading before paragraph 1 substitute “Director General”.
(3) For the italic heading before paragraph 2 substitute “Terms of appointment etc: non-executive members”.
(4) In paragraph 7—
(a) for “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Office”;
(b) for “chairman or as a deputy chairman of the Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(c) omit “or as a member of it”.
(5) In paragraph 8—
(a) for “Commission”, in both places, substitute “Office”;
(b) for “Commission’s”, in both places, substitute “Office’s”.
(6) In the heading before paragraph 9 omit “of Commission”.
(7) In paragraph 10—
(a) for “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Office”;
(b) for “Commission’s”, in each place, substitute “Office’s”;
(c) in sub-paragraph (5)(c) omit “by the chief executive or”.
(8) In paragraph 11—
(a) for “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Office”;
(b) in paragraph (a) for “chairman, a deputy chairman” substitute “Director General”;
(c) in paragraph (b) for “chairman” substitute “Director General”.
(9) In the italic heading before paragraph 12, for “Commission’s” substitute “Office’s”.
(10) In paragraph 12—
(a) in the words before paragraph (a), for “Commission” substitute “Office”;
(b) in paragraph (a) for “Commission” substitute “Office”;
(c) in paragraph (b) for “Commission” substitute “Director General”.
(11) In paragraph 13 for “Commission” substitute “Office”.
(12) In paragraph 14—
(a) for “Commission” substitute “Office”;
(b) in paragraph (a), after “it” insert “or the Director General”;
(c) in paragraph (b)—
(i) after “it”, in both places, insert “or the Director General”;
(ii) for “its” substitute “their”.
(13) In the italic heading before paragraph 15, for “Commission” substitute “Office”.
(14) In paragraph 15 for “Commission” substitute “Office”.
(15) In paragraph 16 for “Commission” substitute “Office”.
(16) In paragraph 17 for “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Office”.
(17) In the italic heading before paragraph 18, for “Commission” substitute “Office”.
(18) In paragraph 18 for “Commission”, in both places, substitute “Office”.
55 (1) Schedule 3 is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place where it occurs, substitute “Director General”.
(3) For “Commission’s”, in each place where it occurs, substitute “Director General’s”.
(4) For “it”, in each place where it occurs and is used as a pronoun in place of “the Commission”, substitute “the Director General”.
(5) For “its”, in each place where it occurs and is used to mean “the Commission’s”, substitute “the Director General’s”.
(6) The amendments made by virtue of sub-paragraphs (2) to (5)—
(a) include amendments of provisions of Schedule 3 that are inserted, or otherwise amended, by other provisions of this Act (whether or not those other provisions come into force before or after the coming into force of this paragraph);
(b) do not apply if otherwise provided by another provision of this paragraph.
(7) In paragraph 19 (investigations by the Commission itself)—
(a) in the heading omit “itself”;
(b) in sub-paragraph (1) omit “itself”;
(c) for sub-paragraph (2) substitute—
(2) The Director General must designate both—
(a) a person to take charge of the investigation, and
(b) such members of the Office’s staff as are required by the Director General to assist the person designated to take charge of the investigation.
(2A) The person designated under sub-paragraph (2) to take charge of an investigation must be—
(a) the Director General acting personally, or
(b) another member of the Office’s staff who is authorised to exercise the function of taking charge of the investigation on behalf of the Director General by virtue of paragraph 6A of Schedule 2 (delegation of Director General’s functions).”;
(d) in sub-paragraph (4) for “member of the Commission’s staff” substitute “person”;
(e) in sub-paragraph (5) for “member of the Commission’s staff” substitute “person designated under sub-paragraph (2)”;
(f) in sub-paragraph (6) for “members of the Commission’s staff” substitute “persons”;
(g) in sub-paragraph (6A) for “member of the Commission’s staff” substitute “person designated under sub-paragraph (2) who is”.
(8) In paragraph 19ZH (further provision about things retained under paragraph 19ZG) (as inserted by this Act)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (2) for “Commission’s” substitute “Office’s”;
(b) in sub-paragraph (4)(a) for “Commission’s” substitute “Office’s”.
(9) In paragraph 19A (as substituted by this Act), in sub-paragraph (2)(b) after “investigating” insert “or, in the case of an investigation by a designated person under paragraph 19, the Director General,”.
(10) In paragraph 19F (interview of persons serving with police etc during certain investigations), in sub-paragraph (1)(b) for “the Commission itself” substitute “a person designated under paragraph 19 (investigations by Director General)”.
(11) In paragraph 20 (restrictions on proceedings pending conclusion of investigation), in sub-paragraph (1)(b) at the end insert “or, where under paragraph 19 the Director General has personally carried out the investigation, a report has been completed by the Director General”.
(12) In paragraph 20A (as substituted by this Act)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (1)(a) after “investigating” insert “or, in the case of an investigation by a designated person under paragraph 19, the Director General,”;
(b) in sub-paragraph (3) after “and” insert “(where the person investigating is not also the Director General carrying out an investigation under paragraph 19 personally)”;
(c) in sub-paragraph (4)(b) after “investigation” insert “or, where the investigation is carried out under paragraph 19 by the Director General personally, finalise one,”.
(13) In paragraph 21A (procedure where conduct matter is revealed during investigation of DSI matter)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (1), omit “or designated under paragraph 19”;
(b) after sub-paragraph (2A) (as inserted by this Act), insert—
(2B) If during the course of an investigation of a DSI matter being carried out by a person designated under paragraph 19 the Director General determines that there is an indication that a person serving with the police (“the person whose conduct is in question”) may have—
(a) committed a criminal offence, or
(b) behaved in a manner which would justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings,
the Director General must proceed under sub-paragraph (2C).
(2C) The Director General must—
(a) prepare a record of the determination,
(b) notify the appropriate authority in relation to the DSI matter and (if different) the appropriate authority in relation to the person whose conduct is in question of the determination, and
(c) send to it (or each of them) a copy of the record of the determination prepared under paragraph (a).”;
(c) in sub-paragraph (5), after paragraph (a) insert—
(aa) is notified of a determination by the Director General under sub-paragraph (2C),”.
(14) In paragraph 22 (final reports on investigations: complaints, conduct matters and certain DSI matters)—
(a) for sub-paragraph (5) substitute—
(5) A person designated under paragraph 19 as the person in charge of an investigation must—
(a) submit a report on the investigation to the Director General, or
(b) where the person in charge of the investigation is the Director General acting personally, complete a report on the investigation.”;
(b) in sub-paragraph (6) after “submitting” insert “or, in the case of an investigation under paragraph 19 by the Director General personally, completing”;
(c) in sub-paragraph (8) after “submitted” insert “or, in the case of an investigation under paragraph 19 by the Director General personally, completed”.
(15) In the italic heading before paragraph 23 (action by the Commission in response to investigation reports), for “response” substitute “relation”.
(16) In paragraph 23—
(a) in sub-paragraph (1)(b) before “under” insert “, or is otherwise completed,”;
(b) in sub-paragraph (1A) (as inserted by this Act), after “submission” insert “or completion”;
(c) in each of the following places, after “receipt of the report” insert “(or on its completion by the Director General)”—
(i) sub-paragraph (2);
(ii) sub-paragraph (5A) (as inserted by this Act);
(iii) sub-paragraph (5F) (as inserted by this Act).
(17) In paragraph 24A (final reports on investigations: other DSI matters)—
(a) after sub-paragraph (2) insert—
(2A) Sub-paragraph (2)(a) does not apply where the person investigating is the Director General carrying out an investigation personally under paragraph 19, but the Director General must complete a report on the investigation.”;
(b) in sub-paragraph (3) for “this paragraph” substitute “sub-paragraph (2) or completing one under sub-paragraph (2A)”;
(c) in sub-paragraph (4) after “receipt of the report” insert “(or on its completion by the Director General)”;
(d) in sub-paragraph (5) (as inserted by this Act) after “receipt of the report” insert “(or on its completion by the Director General)”.
(18) In the italic heading before paragraph 24B (action by the Commission in response to an investigation report under paragraph 24A), for “response” substitute “relation”.
(19) In paragraph 28A (recommendations by the Commission)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (1)—
(i) after “received a report” insert “(or otherwise completed one in relation to an investigation carried out under paragraph 19 by the Director General personally)”;
(ii) in paragraph (b) for “Commission itself” substitute “or on behalf of the Director General”;
(iii) in paragraph (c) after “24A(2)” insert “or (2A)”;
(b) in sub-paragraph (4)(a) after “receipt” insert “or completion”.
(20) In paragraph 28B (response to recommendation), in sub-paragraph (12) (as inserted by this Act) after “received a report on” insert “(or otherwise completed one on in relation to an investigation carried out under paragraph 19 by the Director General personally)”.
56 (1) Schedule 3 is further amended as follows (but these amendments apply only if this Schedule comes into force before the coming into force of Schedule 4 to this Act).
(2) In paragraph 19B (assessment of seriousness of conduct under investigation), in sub-paragraph (1) after “investigating” insert “or, in the case of an investigation by a designated person under paragraph 19, the Director General,”.
(3) In paragraph 20A (accelerated procedure in special cases)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (1)—
(i) for “his” substitute “an”;
(ii) after “conduct matter” insert “or, in the case of an investigation by a designated person under paragraph 19, the Director General,”;
(iii) for “he” substitute “the person investigating”.
(b) in sub-paragraph (3) for “his belief” substitute “the belief referred to in sub-paragraph (1)”.
(4) In paragraph 23 (action by the Commission in response to an investigation report), in sub-paragraph (6) after “receipt of the report” insert “(or on its completion by the Director General)”.
57 (1) Schedule 3A (whistle-blowing investigations: procedure) (as inserted by this Act) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General”.
(3) In paragraph 1(1) omit “itself”.
(4) In paragraph 4(2)—
(a) for “it”, where it occurs in the first place, substitute “the Director General”;
(b) for “its” substitute “the”.
Part 3
Other Minor and consequential amendments
Superannuation Act 1972 (c. 11)
58 In Schedule 1 to the Superannuation Act 1972—
(a) in the list of entries under the heading “Royal Commissions and other Commissions”, omit the entry relating to the Independent Police Complaints Commission;
(b) in the list of entries under the heading “Other Bodies”, insert at the appropriate place—
“The Office for Police Conduct.”;
(c) in the list of entries under the heading “Offices”, omit the entries relating to—
(i) the Chairman of the Independent Police Complaints Commission;
(ii) the Commissioners of the Independent Police Complaints Commission;
(iii) the Deputy Chairman of the Independent Police Complaints Commission.
House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975 (c. 24)
59 In Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975 (bodies of which all members are disqualified), omit the entry relating to the Independent Police Complaints Commission and insert at the appropriate place—
“The Office for Police Conduct.”
Northern Ireland Assembly Disqualification Act 1975 (c. 25)
60 In Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the Northern Ireland Assembly Disqualification Act 1975 (bodies of which all members are disqualified), omit the entry relating to the Independent Police Complaints Commission and insert at the appropriate place—
“The Office for Police Conduct.”.
Police Pensions Act 1976 (c. 35)
61 In section 11 of the Police Pensions Act 1976 (interpretation), in subsection (2A)(ba) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Office for Police Conduct”.
Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987 (c. 4)
62 In section 4 of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987 (representation etc at disciplinary proceedings), in subsection (5)(a) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Office for Police Conduct”.
Aviation, Maritime and Security Act 1990 (c. 31)
63 In section 22 of the Aviation, Maritime and Security Act 1990 (power to require harbour authorities to promote searches in harbour areas), in subsection (4)(b)(i) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct”.
Police Act 1996 (c. 16)
64 (1) The Police Act 1996 is amended as follows.
(2) In the following provisions, for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct”—
(a) section 50(3A)(a) (regulation of police forces) (as inserted by this Act);
(b) section 51(2B)(a) (regulations for special constables) (as inserted by this Act);
(c) section 87(1) (guidance concerning disciplinary proceedings etc) (as amended by this Act).
(3) In the following provisions, for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Office for Police Conduct”—
(a) section 84(5) (representation etc at disciplinary and other proceedings);
(b) section 88C(5)(d) (effect of inclusion in police barred list) (as inserted by this Act);
(c) section 88K(3)(d) (effect of inclusion in police advisory list) (as inserted by this Act).
(4) In section 54(2D) (appointment and functions of inspectors of constabulary)—
(a) in paragraph (a)—
(i) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct (“the Director General”)”;
(ii) for “that Commission” substitute “the Director General”;
(b) in paragraph (b)—
(i) for “that Commission”, in both places, substitute “the Director General”;
(ii) for “its” substitute “his or her”.
Freedom of Information Act 2000 (c. 36)
65 In Part 6 of Schedule 1 to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (other public bodies and offices: general) omit the entry relating to the Independent Police Complaints Commission and insert at the appropriate place—
“The Office for Police Conduct”.
Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (c. 21)
66 In section 4I of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (as inserted by this Act), in subsection (5)(b) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct”.
Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 (c. 11)
67 (1) The Commissions for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 18 (confidentiality), in subsection (2)(g)—
(a) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct”;
(b) for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”.
(3) In section 28 (complaints and misconduct: England and Wales)—
(a) in subsection (1), for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct (“the Director General”)”;
(b) in subsection (2)—
(i) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission”, in both places, substitute “Director General”;
(ii) for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”;
(c) in subsection (3) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(d) in subsection (4) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission”, in both places, substitute “Director General”.
(4) In section 29 (confidentiality etc), in subsection (3)—
(a) in the words before paragraph (a), for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct”;
(b) for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”;
(c) in paragraph (a), for “Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(d) in paragraph (b), for “Commission” substitute Director General”.
Police and Justice Act 2006 (c. 48)
68 (1) In section 41 of the Police and Justice Act 2006 (immigration and asylum enforcement functions and customs functions: complaints and misconduct)—
(a) in subsection (1) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct (“the Director General”)”;
(b) in subsection (2A) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(c) in subsection (3) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(d) in subsection (4)(b), for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(e) in subsection (5) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(f) in subsection (6) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission”, in both places, substitute “Director General.
(2) In the heading before that section for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct”
Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 (c. 20)
69 In section 107EE of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 (section 107EA orders: complaints and conduct matters etc) (as inserted by this Act), in subsection (5)(b) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct”.
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (c. 25)
70 In section 47 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (meaning of “interested person”)—
(a) in subsection (2)(k) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct”;
(b) in subsection (5) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct”.
Equality Act 2010 (c. 15)
71 In Part 1 of Schedule 19 to the Equality Act 2010 (public authorities: general), under the heading “Police” omit the entry relating to the Independent Police Complaints Commission and insert at the appropriate place—
“The Office for Police Conduct”.
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (c. 13)
72 (1) The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 65 (disqualification from election or holding office as police and crime commissioner: police grounds), for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Office for Police Conduct”.
(3) In Schedule 7 (regulations about complaints and conduct matters), for “Independent Police Complaints Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct.”—(Mike Penning.)
This new Schedule contains amendments to the Police Reform Act 2002 and other enactments in connection with the re-naming of the Independent Police Complaints Commission as the Office for Police Conduct and the creation of the new position of Director General.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
Clauses 108 and 109 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 110
Extent
Amendments made: 149, in clause 110, page 109, line 23, leave out “paragraph” and insert “paragraphs 15E and”.
This amendment and amendment 150 provide for the consequential amendment to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in amendment 108 to extend to the whole of the United Kingdom, reflecting the geographical extent of that Act.
Amendment 150, in clause 110, page 109, line 23, leave out “that paragraph” and insert “those paragraphs”.
See the explanatory statement for amendment 149.
Amendment 216, in clause 110, page 109, line 24, at end insert—
“() section (Combined authority mayors: exercise of fire and rescue functions)(11);”.
This amendment provides for the amendment to Schedule 1 to the Public Service Pensions Act 2013 in NC22 to extend to the whole of the United Kingdom, reflecting the geographical extent of that provision.
Amendment 154, in clause 110, page 109, line 28, at end insert—
“( ) section 22(8), so far as relating to paragraphs 1 to 5 of Schedule (Disciplinary proceedings: former members of MoD Police, British Transport Police and Civil Nuclear Constabulary), and those paragraphs;”.
This amendment is consequential on NS1.
Amendment 217, in clause 110, page 109, line 28, at end insert—
“( ) section (References to England and Wales in connection with IPCC functions)(2) and (3);”.
This amendment is consequential on NC23.
Amendment 218, in clause 110, page 109, line 39, after “sections” insert “62(2) to (5),”.
This amendment, together with amendment 219, provides expressly for the procedure relating to the exercise of the regulation-making power in clause 62(3)(f) to form part of the law of the United Kingdom. The regulation-making power may be used to add to the list of persons who are law enforcement officers for the purposes of Chapter 4 of Part 4 and who may therefore exercise the maritime enforcement powers in hot pursuit by virtue of clause 64 (which also extends to the United Kingdom).
Amendment 219, in clause 110, page 109, line 39, leave out from “73” to end of line 40.
Please see the explanatory statement to amendment 218.
Amendment 220, in clause 110, page 109, line 40, at end insert—
“( ) sections (Application of maritime enforcement powers in connection with Scottish offences: general)(2) to (7), (Exercise of maritime enforcement powers in hot pursuit in connection with Scottish offences) to (Maritime enforcement powers in connection with Scottish offences: other supplementary provision) and (Maritime enforcement powers in connection with Scottish offences: interpretation);”.
This amendment, together with amendment 224, set out the extent of NC29 to NC39.
Amendment 151, in clause 110, page 110, line 3, leave out “and 13” and insert “, 12E to 12G, 12L, 12N, 12AE, 12AH, 12AL to 12AS, 14A to 14D, 15D and 17C”.
This amendment provides for certain of the consequential amendments in amendments 106 to 109 to extend to England and Wales and Scotland, reflecting the geographical extent of the Acts they amend.
Amendment 221, in clause 110, page 110, line 5, at end insert—
“() section (Combined authority mayors: exercise of fire and rescue functions)(5) and (8);”.
This amendment provides for the amendments to section 26 of the Fire Services Act 1947 and section 34 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 in NC22 to extend to Great Britain, reflecting the geographical extent of those provisions.
Amendment 152, in clause 110, page 110, line 7, leave out “and 104” and insert “, 104 and 114”.
This amendment provides for the consequential amendment to the Equality Act 2010 in paragraph 114 of Schedule 2 to extend to England and Wales and Scotland, reflecting the geographical extent of that Act.
Amendment 153, in clause 110, page 110, line 7, at end insert—
“( ) section22(8), so far as relating to paragraphs 6 to 14 of Schedule (Disciplinary proceedings: former members of MoD Police, British Transport Police and Civil Nuclear Constabulary), and those paragraphs;”.
This amendment is consequential on the new Schedule NS1.
Amendment 222, in clause 110, page 110, line 7, at end insert—
“() section (Office for Police Conduct)(9), so far as relating to paragraphs 61 and 71 of Schedule (Office for Police Conduct), and those paragraphs;”.
This amendment provides for specified amendments in Part 3 of NS2 to have the same extent as the provisions amended.
Amendment 223, in clause 110, page 110, line 15, at end insert—
‘( ) Section (Office for Police Conduct)(9), so far as relating to paragraphs 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, 67 and 68 of Schedule (Office for Police Conduct), and those paragraphs, extend to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.”.
This amendment provides for specified amendments in Part 3 of NS2 to have the same extent as the provisions amended.
Amendment 226, in clause 110, page 110, line 17, after “paragraphs,” insert
“and sections (Offence of breach of pre-charge bail conditions relating to travel) and (Offence of breach of pre-charge bail conditions relating to travel: interpretation)”.
This amendment provides for NC41 and NC42 to extend to England and Wales and Northern Ireland.
Amendment 224, in clause 110, page 110, line 19, leave out “extends” and insert
“and (Application of maritime enforcement powers in connection with Scottish offences: general)(1) and (8), (Restriction on exercise of maritime enforcement powers in connection with Scottish offences) and (Maritime enforcement powers in connection with Scottish offences: obstruction etc) extend”.—(Mike Penning.)
Please see the explanatory statement for amendment 220.
Clause 110, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 111
Commencement
Amendment made: 225, in clause 111, page 110, line 41, at end insert—
‘( ) Before making regulations appointing a day for the coming into force of any provision of sections (Application of maritime enforcement powers in connection with Scottish offences: general) to (Maritime enforcement powers in connection with Scottish offences: interpretation) the Secretary of State must consult the Scottish Ministers.”. —(Mike Penning.)
This amendment provides that the Secretary of State must consult the Scottish Ministers before bringing NC29 to NC39 into force.
Clause 111, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 112 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Mike Penning
On a point of order, Mr Howarth. As is customary as we come to the conclusion of the Committee stage, we as joint Ministers will put some votes of thanks together, particularly to you, Mr Howarth, and to your co-chair, Mr Nuttall. Both of you have been very pragmatic in expediting the Bill.
I also pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary. She is the new crime Minister, having taken over crime responsibilities from myself, when I took on something called fire.
I turn to the Opposition Front Bench, and I hope that this goes on the record. I think that this is the way that Bills should be scrutinised: agree on what we agree on, disagree on what we disagree on and talk sensibly inside and outside the Committee. We will never agree on everything but we can see that a rather large Bill has gone through Committee stage in probably record time, but with scrutiny in the areas of disagreement. I think that that is right. I pay tribute to the Opposition Front-Bench spokespeople.
My own Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for Dover, has expedited these discussions brilliantly, together with his opposite number, the hon. Member for Manchester, Withington: the Whips Office has done expertly. We have to say that, don’t we?
My Parliamentary Private Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for Calder Valley is missing—it is outrageous —so I have a trainee PPS, my hon. Friend the Member for Lewes, who has been doing absolutely brilliantly. I do not think she managed to pass me anything at all, which is very good.
The Bill managers have done brilliantly well. If I have the list right, the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice, the Treasury, the Department for Transport, the Department of Health, the Department for Communities and Local Government, the devolved Assemblies and Administrations, and the Wales Office, the Scotland Office and the Northern Ireland Office—I have probably missed one or two off—have all been part of a very large but very important Bill, and been part of the process. Legislation will obviously come forward through the Bill based on that.
Hansard, who hate me, because I never pass any notes to them—thank you very much indeed. The Doorkeepers have also done brilliantly well. Can I particularly thank the people who I give the hardest time to: the lawyers in the Home Office?
Jack Dromey
Further to that point of order, Mr Howarth. First, in terms of the team behind the Bill, can I thank the Clerks and all those who have worked with us throughout the Committee stage, for their professional support at all hours of the day and night, as we discovered on one particular occasion? Secondly, like the Police Minister—
Jack Dromey
Like the Policing and Fire Minister, I thank all those who have supervised our proceedings, including the Doorkeepers and Hansard, all of whom play a very important role.
I want to come straight to the heart of one thing that the Policing and Fire Minister said. The Bill has been professionally debated, with substantial common ground. Where there has not been common ground, we have disagreed not for the sake of it but in order to focus on areas in need of further probing and areas of disagreement. On the former, I welcome some of the commitments given to next-stage dialogue on issues relating to children and mental health. We will take advantage of the offers made. On the latter, there are areas of disagreement, particularly in relation to fire and volunteers. There are also areas where we hope the Government will go further in the next stages, such as pre-trial bail. All these things have been properly rehearsed, recorded and debated in the Committee.
Finally, I thank all Committee members. The debate has been conducted in a good-humoured way throughout. I also particularly thank my fellow shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for West Ham, for her prodigious efforts throughout the Bill’s passage. We look forward to Report.
The Chair
On behalf of all those who must remain silent, I thank Committee members for the tributes that they have paid to everybody involved, including the Doorkeepers, Hansard, the Clerks and those who serve the Ministers. On behalf of my co-Chair and myself, I thank the Front Benchers and every individual Committee member. You would be amazed how often the Chair gets it wrong. Thank you for not noticing. It has been a good-humoured Committee, as has already been observed. Co-operation with the Chair has been excellent. On behalf of my co-Chair and myself, I thank each and every Committee member for that co-operation and good humour.
Bill, as amended, to be reported.
Speaker’s Statement
Thursday 19th May 2016
(8 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: CWH Notices of Amendments as at 13 April 2016 - (14 Apr 2016)
Mr Speaker
In accordance with Standing Order No. 122D, I must announce the arrangements for the election of the Chair of the Backbench Business Committee for the new Session. If there is more than one candidate, the ballot will be held in Committee Room 16 from 11 am to 1.30 pm on Wednesday 25 May. Nominations must be submitted in the Table Office between 10 am and 5 pm on the day before the ballot, Tuesday 24 May. In accordance with the Standing Order, only Members who do not belong to a party represented in Her Majesty’s Government may be candidates in this election. A briefing note with more details about the election will be made available to Members and published on the intranet.
Bills Presented
Higher Education and Research Bill
Presentation and First Reading (Standing Order No. 57)
Secretary Sajid Javid, supported by the Prime Minister, Mr Chancellor of the Exchequer, Secretary Theresa May, Secretary Nicky Morgan, Secretary Greg Clark, Matthew Hancock and Joseph Johnson, presented a Bill to make provision about higher education and research; and to make provision about alternative payments to students in higher or further education.
Bill read the First time; to be read a Second time tomorrow, and to be printed (Bill 4) with explanatory notes (Bill 4-EN).
Finance Bill
Presentation and resumption of proceedings (Standing Order No. 80B)
Mr Chancellor of the Exchequer, supported by the Prime Minister, Secretary Sajid Javid, Secretary Nicky Morgan, Secretary Greg Clark, Greg Hands, Mr David Gauke, Damian Hinds and Harriett Baldwin, presented a Bill to grant certain duties, to alter other duties, and to amend the law relating to the National Debt and the Public Revenue, and to make further provision in connection with finance.
Bill read the First and Second time without Question put, and stood committed to a Committee of the whole House in respect of clauses 7 to 18, 41 to 44, 65 to 81, 129, 132 to 136 and 144 to 154 and schedules 2, 3, 11 to 14 and 18 to 22, and to a Public Bill Committee in respect of the remainder (Standing Order No. 80B and Order, 11 April); to be printed (Bill 1) with explanatory notes (Bill 1-EN).
Investigatory Powers Bill
Presentation and resumption of proceedings (Standing Order No. 80A)
Secretary Theresa May, supported by the Prime Minister, Secretary Philip Hammond, Secretary Michael Fallon, Secretary David Mundell, Secretary Theresa Villiers, the Attorney General, Robert Buckland and Mr John Hayes, presented a Bill to make provision about the interception of communications, equipment interference and the acquisition and retention of communications data, bulk personal datasets and other information; to make provision about the treatment of material held as a result of such interception, equipment interference or acquisition or retention; to establish the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and other Judicial Commissioners and make provision about them and other oversight arrangements; to make further provision about investigatory powers and national security; to amend sections 3 and 5 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994; and for connected purposes.
Bill read the First and Second time without Question put (Standing Order No. 80A and Order, 15 March); to be considered tomorrow, and to be printed (Bill 2) with explanatory notes (Bill 2-EN).
Policing and Crime Bill
Presentation and resumption of proceedings (Standing Order No. 80A)
Secretary Theresa May, supported by the Prime Minister, Mr Chancellor of the Exchequer, Secretary Michael Gove, Secretary Jeremy Hunt, Secretary Greg Clark, the Attorney General and Mike Penning, presented a Bill to make provision for collaboration between the emergency services; to make provision about the handling of police complaints and other matters relating to police conduct and to make further provision about the Independent Police Complaints Commission; to make provision for super-complaints about policing; to make provision for the investigation of concerns about policing raised by whistle-blowers; to make provision about police discipline; to make provision about police inspection; to make provision about the powers of police civilian staff and police volunteers; to remove the powers of the police to appoint traffic wardens; to enable provision to be made to alter police ranks; to make provision about the Police Federation; to make provision in connection with the replacement of the Association of Chief Police Officers with the National Police Chiefs’ Council; to make provision about the system for bail after arrest but before charge; to make provision to enable greater use of modern technology at police stations; to make other amendments to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984; to amend the powers of the police under the Mental Health Act 1983; to extend the powers of the police in relation to maritime enforcement; to make provision about deputy police and crime commissioners; to make provision to enable changes to the names of police areas; to make provision about the regulation of firearms; to make provision about the licensing of alcohol; to make provision about the implementation and enforcement of financial sanctions; to amend the Police Act 1996 to make further provision about police collaboration; to make provision about the powers of the National Crime Agency; to make provision for requiring arrested persons to provide details of nationality; to make provision for requiring defendants in criminal proceedings to provide details of nationality and other information; to make provision to combat the sexual exploitation of children; and for connected purposes.
Bill read the First and Second time without Question put (Standing Order No. 80A and Order, 7 March); to be further considered tomorrow, and to be printed (Bill 3) with explanatory notes (Bill 3-EN).
Policing and Crime Bill
Tuesday 26th April 2016
(8 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 13 June 2016 - (13 Jun 2016)
15:46 - The House divided: - Ayes: 200 / Noes: 308 - Question accordingly negatived.
16:03 - The House divided: - Ayes: 209 / Noes: 303 - Question accordingly negatived.
16:19 - The House having divided: - Ayes: 200 / Noes: 307 - Question accordingly negatived.
19:00 - The House divided: - Ayes: 182 / Noes: 306 - Question accordingly negatived.
19:14 - The House divided: - Ayes: 182 / Noes: 305 - Question accordingly negatived.
Lyn Brown (West Ham) (Lab)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Mrs Eleanor Laing)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 21, in clause 2, page 3, line 14, at end insert—
‘(8) For the purposes of this Bill, when considering whether a collaboration agreement would improve the effectiveness and efficiency of one or more emergency services that shall include the effectiveness and efficiency with which the emergency service is able to meet its duties under the mental health care concordant.”
This amendment would explicitly enable a collaboration agreement to cover duties placed on emergency services by the mental health care concordant.
Amendment 3, page 6, line 3, leave out clause 6.
This amendment, along with amendment 4, would prevent Police and Crime Commissioners from taking over the functions of Fire and Rescue Authorities.
Amendment 5, page 11, line 1, leave out clause 8.
This amendment would prevent combined authority mayors from combing their fire and rescue service and police force under a single employer.
Amendment 4, page 144, line 2, leave out schedule 1.
This amendment, along with amendment 3, would prevent Police and Crime Commissioners from taking over the functions of Fire and Rescue Authorities.
Amendment 2, in schedule 1, page 145, line 16, at end insert—
“4AA Power to change title of police and crime commissioner
(1) This section applies if the Secretary of State makes an order under section 4A.
(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument change the title of a police and crime commissioner appointed as a fire and rescue authority.”
This would enable the Secretary of State to change the name of police and crime commissioners to reflect their new additional responsibility for the fire service. The Secretary of State would have the power to make such a direction in secondary legislation at some point in the future.
Amendment 20, page 145, line 16, at end insert—
‘(7) No order can be made under this section until the Secretary of State has conducted a review assessing the funding required by the fire and rescue service to secure the minimum level of cover needed to secure public safety and maintain fire resilience.
(8) The review carried out under section (7) must assess the impact of the level of cover on—
(a) fire related fatalities;
(b) non-fatal fire related casualties;
(c) the number of dwelling fires and other fires;
(d) the number of incidents responded to, and
(e) the strength and speed of response to incidents.”
This amendment would require the Home Secretary to conduct a review on the level of funding the FRS requires in order to secure public safety before she may make allows police and crime commissioner to be a fire and rescue authority.
Amendment 6, page 157, line 33, at end insert—
‘(4) An order under section 4A, whether modified or not by the Secretary of State, may only be made with either: consent of all of the relevant local authorities and relevant fire and rescue authority, or a majority vote by local people through referendum.”
This amendment would ensure that a PCC can only take over a Fire and Rescue Service with the approval of local people or their local representatives.
Lyn Brown
I am delighted to see you in the Chair, Madam Deputy Speaker.
We oppose the Government’s proposals to allow police and crime commissioners to take over fire and rescue services, and amendments 3, 4 and 5 would delete the provisions in the Bill that would enable them to do so. We have also tabled amendments to mitigate the risks if the Government’s proposals are enacted.
Amendment 6 would ensure that a PCC could take over a fire and rescue service only with local support expressed either by elected councillors, with the unanimous agreement of all the local authorities affected, or directly through a referendum. Amendment 20 would require the Home Secretary to review the level of funding the fire service needed to secure public safety. New clause 20 would give fire services in England a statutory responsibility to deal with flooding. The Minister said in Committee that he was minded to consider that particular provision. He has not jumped to his feet to say he wants to take it as a Government new clause, but I live in hope.
When the Minister responds, I hope he will set out what benefits he believes PCCs will bring to the fire and rescue service. What skills and expertise do they have that our fire and rescue authorities do not? How will they help the fire service to cope with the new challenges it faces when dealing with major incidents such as flooding and terrorist attacks? What indication is there that the governance of the fire service is broken or substandard and needs replacing? The Government have not even begun to answer these questions or to make a case for the reforms.
Jake Berry (Rossendale and Darwen) (Con)
Does the hon. Lady agree that the reason that the governance of the fire service needs to be changed is that very few of our constituents would know the name of every person on the local authority fire panel? Given her involvement with the Bill, could she herself name every person on her local authority fire panel?
Lyn Brown
My fire service is provided through the Greater London Authority, and I know that should I want to talk to anybody about London’s fire service, I could talk to those elected GLA Members—and I do know their names—or to the Mayor. When people in my local authority want to have an impact on a local service, they tend to approach their local councillors, which I think is not a bad route, but the reforms would change that. People would not be able to go to their town hall to talk about services that have an impact on them. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (James Berry) heckles me gently in a low voice and says, “They would be elected.” I know that Newham might be unusual but its councillors are elected too, and certainly the councillors at the GLA are elected.
James Berry (Kingston and Surbiton) (Con)
But they are not elected to a specific responsibility, as PCCs are. People who vote for PCCs know they can hold them to account specifically for policing, and that will now be extended to the fire service.
Lyn Brown
I say gently to the hon. Gentleman that the turnout last time for PCC elections was dismal. I hope it will be significantly better this time, but when I was on the doorsteps last year, in parts of the country other than my own little patch in London I did not find that people knew who their PCC was. I say gently to him that our constituents do not know that when they go to the polls next week they will be electing a PCC who might be taking over their fire service. The Bill will not have been enacted by then.
I think that the timing and, as I will explain, the way we have done this has been wrong. The consultation preceding the Bill did not seek the views of experts and specialists on the substance of the proposals. It set out how a PCC could assume control of a fire and rescue service and then asked consultees what they thought of the process. It did not ask them what they thought of the proposals themselves, and it did not ask whether the proposals would increase public safety or lead to better governance.
It is not in the impact assessment—that very thin impact assessment, which I am sure that the Members who sat on the Bill Committee will have read—but the Knight review of the future of the fire service recommended that PCC takeovers be attempted only if a rigorous pilot could identify tangible and “clearly set out benefits”. The Government chose to ignore this key recommendation and are instead proceeding before any evidence has been gathered about the likely benefits, costs and threats to the plan. It is utterly reckless. The impact assessment is threadbare. The only rationale offered for this intervention is the Government’s belief that there needs to be greater collaboration between emergency services. No one thinks otherwise, but the Government have not provided any justification of why it is more likely to occur under PCCs or any analysis of the current barriers to collaboration. It is policy without evidence or clear rationale.
Kate Hoey (Vauxhall) (Lab)
I agree with everything my hon. Friend is saying. She knows—and surely the Government know—how much co-operation already goes on. It does not have to be prescribed in this top-down way; it works organically and it works really well.
Lyn Brown
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. There is really good collaboration now between all parts of our public services—between fire and police, fire and ambulance, and fire, ambulance and police—and I understand the Government’s wanting to move that agenda further and encourage more collaboration, but this bit of the Bill does not do it. As I will explain, I believe it will in fact deter some boundary and border merges, which would be a massive problem.
The Government’s cavalier approach to this public service upheaval is completely indefensible, given the significant risks that the proposals represent to the fire and rescue service. PCCs are still a nascent institution. The Home Affairs Select Committee has said:
“It is too early to say whether the introduction of police and crime commissioners has been a success.”
We do not know whether they have succeeded in their core duties, so why are the Government proposing to expand their portfolios by giving them control of the fire service too? I think the Government want to bolster the powers and budgets of PCCs to help them through their difficult inception and that the proposals are a step towards PCCs becoming mini mayors. A vital public service, such as fire, should not be pawned off to save struggling Whitehall inventions or to overturn a public vote against the creation of a mayor. Unlike mayors in combined authorities, the PCCs will be completely free from the democratic scrutiny provided by local government, and the creation of the extended office will not have been approved by local people.
The most serious risk, however, is that fire, with its much smaller budgets and less media attention than policing, will become an unloved, secondary concern of its new management—a Cinderella service. I have raised this point repeatedly with the Minister in Committee and in other debates, but he has not indicated what he might do to mitigate the risk. I am not the only one who thinks this: Peter Murphy, the director of public policy research at Nottingham Business School, has argued that if the fire service were to slip into the status of a Cinderella service, it would only repeat what happened the last time fire had to share an agenda with policing. I will quote him in full, because it gets to the heart of the matter:
“If the proposals ore implemented, there is a very strong chance that the fire and rescue services would go back to the ‘benign neglect’ that characterised the service from 1974 to 2001 when the Home Office was last responsible for fire services. Police, civil disobedience, immigration and criminal justice dominated the Home Office agenda, as well as its time and resources. If the fire service becomes the lesser partner in a merged service, the long-term implications will include smaller fire crews with fewer appliances and older equipment arriving at incidents. Prevention and protection work, already significantly falling”—
he is so right about that—
“will result in fewer school visits and fire alarm checks for the elderly”.
What a chilling vision for the future of our fire service!
Catherine West (Hornsey and Wood Green) (Lab)
My hon. Friend is making some excellent points. Does she agree that this proposal, combined with the 17% cut that we have already seen in the service across the country, could lead to a risky situation, particularly for many vulnerable households?
The Minister for Policing, Fire, Criminal Justice and Victims (Mike Penning)
I listened carefully to the quotations, and I would be chilled if any part of what was said were factually true. If there were an attempt to combine the emergency services, fire and police, we would have moved to one funding stream. I categorically ruled that out, so this sort of scaremongering—not from the shadow Minister but from others—is flawed. There is a separate funding stream in the precept for the police. The only bit that is going to be amalgamated, should the PCCs be like the Metro Mayors in this respect, would relate to the back office and the administrative side.
Lyn Brown
But should a PCC take over the fire service, we would have a person in charge whose main attention was on policing and all that policing involved. The media focus much more on policing than they do on the fire service. The fire service will be secondary. Although the Minister rightly says—I do not doubt him—that the two funding streams will be different, I do not know how long that will last, and in truth, neither does he, because things move on. We had police and crime commissioners under the last Government; this Government are now proposing police, crime and fire commissioners. What will happen in a couple of years’ time? I do not know. There might be accounting efficiencies in order to save costs, and the budgets might well be merged. I do not think that these proposals make any sense.
A further risk is that these proposals will make mergers of fire services more difficult, which would be a real setback, as inter-fire mergers increase resilience and achieve significant savings. The 2007 merger of the Devon and Somerset fire services was supposed to deliver £3 million of savings in the first five years. It actually bettered that target by £600,000.
The Minister will know that Martyn Underhill, the Independent PCC for Dorset—I am trying to keep this politically neutral—has said that he has no interest in running the fire service. Why? It is because Dorset and Wiltshire fire service has undergone a merger that proposes to bring significant savings and increase the resilience in that area. He does not want to interfere with the process, and he is really wary about his office having responsibility for Wiltshire. I admire this decision, made by Commissioner Underhill, but how many potential mergers of fire services will not even be considered as a result of PCC takeovers and the need for coterminosity? I remind the Minister that until a few months ago, this Government trumpeted mergers as a key to the future of the fire service; yet they are now, sadly, going to slip off the agenda.
I know that the Minister has little sympathy with the particular argument I am about to make, but I am a brave soul. A large proportion of the work carried out by the fire service is preventive. There is a danger that these proposals will make this preventive work a little more difficult. It is a humanitarian service. We need to be honest: the police service is not a humanitarian service. The two services are seen differently by some communities, and these proposals could make the fire service’s preventive work more difficult.
There are some people who would not welcome a policeman into their home without a warrant. Police officers turning up at the door can be a scary experience. Firefighters go into people’s homes and work spaces, and check that smoke alarms and electrical appliances are safe. They fit sprinklers and even look for worrying signs that might concern other services, such as the NHS and council care services. This preventive work is not an add-on to the fire service’s work; it is at the core of what it does—keeping people safe, so that they do not have to be rescued further down the line.
Mike Penning
I do not quite understand—perhaps I do, but I do not think it is fair—why the shadow Minister is conflating operational work that the police do with operational work that the fire service does. Of course, a lot of work is done together, particularly at road traffic collisions, but there is nothing in the Bill that would conflate the two in the way that the shadow Minister suggests.
Lyn Brown
First, they will not be equal partners, because we are talking about a big service and a small service. Secondly, in the minds of some of our communities, the police and the fire service will become one and the same. They will have one boss, and there will be an anxiety that someone coming through the door to fix a smoke alarm might have a different agenda.
Mike Penning
The hon. Lady’s constituency is in London, where there is a Mayor, and the mayoral system will take over fire. Is there the same concern in London and in Manchester? Actually, the Labour candidate in Manchester wants the powers as a Metro Mayor.
Lyn Brown
In London, the service is run by a Mayor and elected councillors. It is not run by an individual whose other job is to be the police commissioner. I think there is a difference, and I believe that our communities will think there is a difference. We cannot prescribe how people think and what they worry about, but this concern has been raised with me.
James Berry
Does the hon. Lady not accept that her comments could be interpreted by the police as quite insulting? They do a lot of preventive and humanitarian work. As she knows, the hon. Lady’s submission comes right out of the Fire Brigades Union’s consultation document, which I also thought was quite insulting to the great work that our police officers do in the very areas that she highlighted.
Lyn Brown
The police I meet on my doorsteps and streets are dead pragmatic souls. They understand the sensitivities that some communities have: they treat some of my refugee communities with extraordinary sensitivity to overcome the natural barrier that is there. What I am saying to the hon. Gentleman is that there is a natural barrier. That is no slur on our police force; our police force are an enforcement agency, and not really a humanitarian service. The police are there to implement the law. Let us move on.
The Minister is not passing over a service that does not have some difficulties. The fire and rescue service has been subject to a cumulative cash cut of £236 million or 12.5% since 2010—and, of course, there is more to come. [Interruption.] Is the Government Whip trying to engage me? Does he want to intervene? It seems not. I just thought I would give him a chance.
Mike Penning
I believe that what one of my colleagues was trying to say from a sedentary position is that we should not wash over the debacle and the huge costs of the regional fire control centres that the previous Labour Administration forced on the fire service. [Interruption.]
Lyn Brown
Is that right? When I was a Whip, I was taught that I should be seen and not heard. I am sure that the hon. Member for North East Cambridgeshire (Stephen Barclay) did not want to intervene on me at all. The issue of regional fire control centres has been well thrashed out in this Chamber. There were a myriad reasons why they did not work, and I accept that they did not.
Let us return to what the Government have been doing. Here we are in 2016, and it feels as though they have been here forever. The fire and rescue service has been subject to a cumulative cash cut of £236 million, or 12.5%, since 2010, and, of course, there is more to come. We know from the local government funding settlement that fire and rescue services are expected to cut spending by a further £135 million by the end of the Parliament. A stretched service will be squeezed even further.
As a result of these cuts, 7,600 firefighters have already been lost, and the Government have repeatedly ignored warnings that the cuts may be putting services at risk. Their proposals will not protect a single firefighter’s job, or put a single firefighter back in service. I have been told by fire chiefs that their services will “not be viable” under the Government’s proposed spending plans, and I am sure that they have told the Minister exactly the same thing.
The National Audit Office has calculated that there was a 30% reduction in the amount of time spent on home fire checks and audits over the last Parliament. That is a huge reduction. The NAO has said that the Government have “no idea” of the impact of that on public safety. It has also said that, as the Government refuse to model the risk of cuts, they may only know that a service has been cut too long after the fact—that is, after public safety and the lives of the public have been put at risk.
I was not surprised, although I was dismayed, by the latest English fire statistics, which cover the period between April and September 2015. They show that there were 139 fire-related fatalities during that time, 31 more than occurred during the same period in 2014. There were 1,685 non-fatal fire casualties that resulted in hospital treatment, a 10% increase on 2014. Fire and rescue services attended about 93,200 fires, 7% more than in 2014.
The Government have cut the fire service, cut firefighters, and overseen a massive reduction in the amount of preventive work undertaken. I know that we are talking about a spike over just a couple of quarters, but there are statistical signs that the service may be feeling the awful effects of the cuts that have been made. So what do the Government do? Do they stop the cuts while they undertake a proper risk assessment? Do they begin to develop minimum standards for the number of stations and firefighters, and for preventive work? No. The Government want to pass on the responsibility to police and crime commissioners, who have had to deal with similar cuts in police budgets, and who have lost 12,000 front-line police officers. They are not even assessing the level of funding that PCCs would need to maintain resilience and keep the public safe.
This is a good line. By passing the buck without the bucks, the Government could be asking PCCs, who will be new to the fire service and its complexity, to undertake further potentially dangerous cuts. The PCCs will not know what the risks are, because the Government refuse to model them. That is why we tabled amendment 20, which would require the Home Secretary to carry out an assessment of the level of funding that fire services need to keep the public safe.
Our fire and rescue authorities are trusted experts on the fire service. The councillors who serve on them often have years of experience, and have gained a genuinely deep knowledge and judgment from overseeing the strategic direction of fire services in their areas. Given the trust and respect that local fire authorities have, allowing PCCs to take over a fire and rescue service without their support poses the clear risk that employees, and the public, will perceive newly empowered PCCs as an unwelcome central imposition. Our amendment 6 would ensure that a PCC who does take over a fire and rescue service can do so only with the approval of the locally elected representatives on the relevant councils, or, alternatively, of local people through a referendum.
Jake Berry
The hon. Lady has raised the interesting issue of a local referendum. I wonder whether she can tell the House—so that we can consider her amendment properly—what the cost of such a referendum would be for each fire and rescue authority, and also who would pay. She has expressed concern about the removal of budgets from fire and rescue authorities. Perhaps if they were the ones who paid, more firefighters would be removed from the front line.
Lyn Brown
The referendum would take place on the same day as any local council election. We would not want an election to be prohibited by costs. As for where the costs should lie, I think that they should lie with the Government, because, after all, it is they who have proposed these changes. If the hon. Gentleman wants someone else to pay, perhaps it should be the Government’s arm, the PCCs. As he has rightly pointed out, their budgets are larger than those of any fire authority.
Jake Berry
First, will the hon. Lady tell us what her amendment would do, and who would pay for it? Secondly, will she tell us what estimate she has made of the cost?
Lyn Brown
One of the joys of being in opposition is that we have to do our own work ourselves; we do not have a phalanx of willing employees to do it for us. Once the House had passed the amendment, I would need to rely on the Government and their civil servants to help us to work out the cost. If the cost became prohibitive, I could suggest that the Government drop this silly idea altogether, and save loads of money.
James Cleverly (Braintree) (Con)
I have sat patiently while, on a number of occasions, the hon. Lady has referred to elected councillors being elected to fire authorities. Can she clarify, for the edification of the House and the public, that no elected councillors are elected to the fire authority in London—which covers her constituency—or, indeed, to the vast majority of fire authorities in the country?
Lyn Brown
I wonder what kind of interaction Conservative Members have with their local councillors, but I can only imagine that it ain’t good, because every time I raise this issue, anxiety is expressed about the genuine nature of locally elected members.
I can only say that I have a much better relationship not only with Newham councillors, but with GLA councillors. They are elected. They face the electorate. They are elected to a body which then places them on another body that is responsible for fire, just as they are given responsibilities for social services, education, leisure services, and so forth. It is the same process. I support democracy and I support my democratically elected councillors, who are doing a jolly good job in very difficult times to keep services going. Conservative Members should not denigrate their local councillors quite so much.
James Cleverly
I assume that this is entirely my mistake; I probably did not make my question clear enough, and I take full responsibility for that. I will have another crack at this. Can the hon. Lady name any local councillor or London Assembly member who has been elected by the people of Newham to sit on the fire authority?
Lyn Brown
In London, as the hon. Gentleman knows, the people of Newham elect a GLA councillor and the GLA councillors then determine which parts of the work they will undertake for the GLA. I do not see that that is a problem. The same thing happens in Newham. When we elect 60 Labour councillors—and zero councillors from any other party—we then give them jobs looking after social services, education, recreation and so on. I can tell the hon. Gentleman the name of the councillor who has the fire remit in my council. He is Councillor Bryan Collier and he is a wonderful bloke. He has been doing the job for decades and he has lots of knowledge.
Mike Wood (Dudley South) (Con)
Speaking as someone who was a councillor until this time last month, I bow to no one in my appreciation of the importance of local government. However, the shadow Minister demonstrates a strange understanding of democracy given that she seems to prefer the patronage of local council group leaders to the direct mandate involved in being elected on to a body by voters.
Lyn Brown
I am bemused by the contempt that Conservative Members are showing for local councils. I hope for the hon. Gentleman’s own sake that he does not have a Tory-led local authority waiting for him when he goes back home on Thursday. Frankly, if I were a member of his council, I would be sitting on his doorstep waiting to have a word, because that is really not on. [Interruption.] Oh, really? That is such a shock! The chuntering from the Government Back Benches is outrageous. I don’t even know where I got to in my speech.
If the Government do not trust local authorities—and it seems clear that they do not—perhaps they will be pleased to accept our amendment, which would allow the decision on whether to place PCCs in control of fire services to go directly to the electorate. The Government’s reforms are fundamentally about the transfer of power from the collective democratic representation of local councils to a single individual, and the creation of mini mayors across England. The Minister knows this to be true, and he knows there is no democratic mandate for it—none at all. If he accepted our amendments, he could right that wrong and ensure that each local community could decide for itself what was in the best interests of its fire and rescue service. That would be a real localism agenda.
New clause 20 would give fire services in England a statutory responsibility to deal with flooding, as is already the case for their Scottish and Northern Irish counterparts. In December, much of the north of England was devastated by flooding. Many homes were flooded, bridges connecting communities were washed away, major roads were blocked and, in Lancaster, a sub-station was flooded leaving tens of thousands of homes without power. In December alone, firefighters responded to more than 1,400 flood incidents across the north-west, and on Boxing day, 1,000 people were rescued in Greater Manchester. The work of our firefighters was brilliant during those difficult days. I am sure that Members on both sides of the House would agree on that, if on nothing else.
However, fire services have expressed concern that they were not properly equipped to deal with that situation and that they lacked basic kit such as boats and dry suits. Frankly, that is not good enough. I believe that this stems from the fact that it is unclear who holds the primary responsibility for responding to floods.
When flooding is not formally the responsibility of any service, it will not be given the priority it deserves in budgeting and planning. If we are going to continue to ask fire services to deal with major incidents such as flooding, we should say so in this place so that proper provision can be made and they can prepare comprehensively for incidents. Stories of volunteers and the Army mucking in might be heart-warming, but that is simply no substitute for a properly organised and funded rescue service.
Before I finish, I would like to touch on the issue of privatisation. The Minister gave us categorical assurances that there would be no changes or movement in that regard, and that is why we have tabled no amendments on privatisation. I am going to hold the Minister to his word, but I am sure that those in the other place will want to do a bit of digging to ensure that I am right and he is right, and that there can be no privatisation of our fire services under this legislation.
Amanda Milling (Cannock Chase) (Con)
I would like to speak to amendment 2, which is in my name and those of several right hon. and hon. Members across the House. Part 1 of the Bill sets out the measures to encourage greater collaboration between emergency services, a topic that I have spoken about several times in the House. Clauses 6 and 7 will give police and crime commissioners the opportunity to extend their responsibilities to include fire and rescue services. I have been calling for that extension for some time now, and I secured a Westminster Hall debate on the topic last year. As I said on Second Reading, I welcome the inclusion of those clauses in the Bill.
The introduction of police and crime commissioners in 2012 created greater transparency and democratic accountability in policing, with PCCs replacing unelected and unaccountable police authorities. Extending the responsibilities of PCCs to include fire and rescue authorities will mirror those benefits. As we have been hearing, fire and rescue authorities are made up of elected councillors, but they are not directly accountable to the public for those specific roles, as they are appointed to those positions. As I have said before, that is very different from, and should not be confused with, democratic accountability.
The introduction of directly elected PCCs means that the public can scrutinise their performance, precept and priorities, and exercise their approval—or, indeed, disapproval—at the ballot box. The public will get their chance to decide on the performance of the first tranche of PCCs in a couple of weeks’ time, on 5 May. It is absolutely right that the guardianship of the fire and rescue services should also be directly accountable to the public, and given the synergies between the two services, it is logical that PCCs should take on that responsibility, too.
James Cleverly
Does my hon. Friend agree that, far from overlooking the attributes of our firefighters, it would be an advantage to local communities if highly trusted, experienced firefighters were given the opportunity to extend their preventive remit to areas such as crime prevention advice as well as fire prevention advice?
Amanda Milling
I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention. This is about collaboration, and prevention extends across our emergency services.
Amendment 2 is designed to provide the public with greater clarification on the role of the police and crime commissioner. If a PCC does take on the responsibility for fire and rescue services, it is important that the public are clear that the individual is responsible for both the police service and the fire and rescue service. I have called for the title change in the House before, and it will help to address some concerns raised on Second Reading, in Committee and earlier that the change represents a police takeover.
Kate Hoey
I rise to support new clause 20 in particular. I declare an interest as chair of the Fire Brigades Union parliamentary group. Giving fire and rescue services a statutory responsibility for leading the emergency services in response to flooding is something on which we have had meeting after meeting over the years with Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Ministers, who have all said that they supported it, and with Ministers from different Departments. It goes so far, but then it stops. There is clearly a Treasury argument here somewhere, but I feel strongly about the matter. There has been an increase in floods over recent years, and we have seen how our fire and rescue services have responded. What is happening seems wrong when we rely on them.
Let us look at the data from last year. Thirty-four fire and rescue services provided assistance in the worst-affected areas. Data collected by the FBU, which does a good job in getting it, from individual fire and rescue services found that firefighters responded to at least 1,400 flood incidents across north-west England and 450 incidents in Yorkshire. As we saw on our television screens, with politicians lining up to thank them and say how brave they had been and how wonderful they were, firefighters rescued people from a wide range of hazardous situations, evacuating people in advance of coming floods and making various other emergency interventions. It seems strange that we give our firefighters great praise for doing something that we and local people automatically expect them to do, yet we do not make their leading of the emergency services a statutory responsibility. I can only assume that the Government do not want to spend what might be some extra resources on ensuring that firemen and firewomen and all the rescue services are properly equipped.
We have seen terrible examples of when firemen and women have not had the right safety or protective equipment and have had to do things without the correct clothing, with things running out in some areas. They still did those things, but that is wrong and I genuinely do not understand the situation. I am sure that the Minister supported the proposal at one time. Many Ministers have supported it, but when they get into a position in which they actually have to make the decision or are allowed to get involved in it, they seem to change their mind. I hope the Minister will respond to that and that we will get the opportunity to support the change in a vote today.
I now turn briefly to the other issues. I share the position of the shadow Front-Bench team on police and crime commissioners. There is no public appetite for change. Wherever I have been around the country, no one has been clamouring for reform of how we govern our fire services or for any responsibility to be transferred to PCCs. I have not heard any evidence today—we may hear it from the Minister, but I doubt it—that there is a problem with the current governance arrangements. No one has convinced me that the change would deliver an emergency service that is more economic, efficient and effective or would help to improve public safety. We all want co-ordination, and I welcome that co-operation and co-ordination have gone further in some parts of the country than in others. As my hon. Friend the Member for West Ham (Lyn Brown) said from the Front Bench, we want to see more of that, but we do not need to bring it in this top-down, totally anti-democratic way.
I am not at all ashamed to say that I believe that firefighters and police officers perform different roles. That does not mean that we do not value equally the roles of both, but they perform different roles and have different remits. A police officer is seen as a legal person and someone who is there to uphold the law. A fireman or firewoman, or anyone involved in the rescue services, is seen very differently. Having a single employer will begin to confuse that in the public mind. The preventive work that firefighters do and the way that they are trusted, implicitly and completely, by the public could well be jeopardised if the changes go through.
The Bill and this change would do nothing at all to invest in fire and rescue services’ resources. I have already mentioned the work that goes into responding to large-scale flooding incidents and providing emergency medical response. The Government should focus on putting extra resources into initiatives that will actually lead to the changes and to co-ordination.
Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)
I am sure that my hon. Friend would agree that this is frankly more about saving money than improving the service. She probably noticed that the burden has been shifted on to local authorities, with the 2% increase. Eventually, the entire burden for fire and police will be shifted on to local authorities. Then we will have a situation of profligate spending—we have been here before—and local authorities will get capped.
Kate Hoey
Absolutely; there is no doubt this is a cost-cutting exercise. I accept that these days everybody has to have constraints on the public purse, as far as is possible, but there are ways of doing that and this bureaucratic way seems to have been brought in by people who have had the idea for a long time and now have seen an opportunity to push it forward. The Government should not be pursuing these almost ideological ways of trying to save money. They should be looking at ways of improving our emergency services and ensuring that they co-ordinate well together. It would be wrong to transfer this responsibility to a PCC. We have a valuable, popular fire service that has the confidence of the public, and we should be very wary of making those changes, which I think will have a really detrimental effect on not only how the public see the service, but on its effectiveness out there in the country. I hope we will be able to make some changes to this proposal and that when Members get the opportunity they will vote to put a stop to something that is very wrong indeed.
Several hon. Members rose—
James Cleverly
I am obliged to you for calling me, Madam Deputy Speaker, although I apologise if I leapt to my feet rather more quickly than colleagues had anticipated. I am keen to speak in this debate, having served on the Bill Committee and, for a number of years, as chair of the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority. I feel that I speak with a fair degree of authority on the implications of different governance models, because the LFEPA had to go through the process of making substantial changes to the London fire brigade and I saw at first hand the widespread misunderstanding of the governance arrangements, both of the London fire brigade, through the London fire authority and to the Mayor, and more widely and nationally.
I like clarity; it is a cornerstone of democracy that people can follow the golden thread from the decisions they make at the ballot box, through to the people who make the decisions about the provision of their public services and, ultimately, on to the delivery of those services. This is important, because when things go right in the delivery of those services, people should know who to reward at the ballot box. Perhaps more importantly, if things do not go well, voters should know who they can punish at the ballot box. That is a cornerstone of the democratic model, to which I am sure we all subscribe.
Previously, when we had police authorities, there was a break in that golden thread, because people did not know who ran their police force. They were probably aware of where the police headquarters were, although I am being generous when I say that. I suspect that in many parts of the country people might have had a vague idea that the police headquarters would be in the big town—the county town. People in my constituency are aware that the police headquarters were in Chelmsford, but I would be surprised if many were able to name their chief constable and absolutely amazed if any were able to name the local councillors who sat on the police authority.
Catherine West
I agree with the hon. Gentleman, in that my mailbox is full of matters such as housing. However, the mail on policing and fire is more about anxiety at the level of cuts since 2010. I would like a reassurance that all this meddling on governance is not going to lead to further service reductions in terms of our crucial bobbies on the beat, firefighters who turn up on time and all the rest of the expectations that the community rightly has of our emergency services.
James Cleverly
I intend to deal a little later in my speech with some of the financial benefits that come with greater collaboration and co-working in the back office. If the hon. Lady will bear with me, I will return to that point.
Jake Berry
I wish to bring my hon. Friend back to his point about how people may know the name of their chief constable but would not know who was on their former police authority. Does he agree that one real benefit of a PCC is that people will know not only the name of their chief constable, but also of their PCC? In addition, they will be involved in setting the priorities for policing in their own area. In the forthcoming PCC elections in Lancashire, one of our top priorities, which we are out there campaigning on—with success, we hope—is tackling rural crime, which is hugely important to the towns and villages around Rossendale and Darwen. The PCC election has given us the opportunity to say, “Tackle cybercrime and speeding, but also prioritise rural crime” and, thus, get people really involved with their own policing.
James Cleverly
My hon. Friend raises an important point, which goes to the heart of the fundamental change in the relationship between people in the local community and the police force that represents it. It gives those people an opportunity periodically—once every four years, or indeed sooner—to hold PCCs to account. We have seen an example of where the priorities and the actions of a PCC have fallen below the level of legitimate expectation. That person was then forced to stand down and a PCC by-election took place, which really focused the minds of the people in South Yorkshire about what the role of their PCC should be. That requirement for PCCs to hold themselves to account before the electors goes to the heart of the success of the PCC model, and it is important to expand that success to the fire and rescue service.
Antoinette Sandbach (Eddisbury) (Con)
The hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green (Catherine West) spoke about cuts, but Cheshire’s PCC has been very successful at putting more officers on to the frontline. He is collaborating with his local fire and rescue service, and there will be co-location in the police headquarters in Winsford. That is an example of where co-operation is delivering more for less very effectively, and in a way that is protecting people in Cheshire, particularly in my constituency.
James Cleverly
I thank my hon. Friend for making that point, which reinforces one of my beliefs. We hear a lot of talk in this Chamber about what people want, but all the evidence I have received, including from the extensive research carried out during the changes we made to the London fire brigade in my former role as the chair of the LFEPA, shows that what people really want is certainty. That goes to a point Opposition Members have made about people having quality public provision when they need it, where they need it. We should subordinate structures to the delivery of that agenda. I also believe that the changes proposed by the Government go a long way towards protecting those structures.
Julian Knight (Solihull) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend share my incredulity at the Labour party’s talk about cuts, given that, if I am not mistaken, it was the shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham), who went on the record calling for 10% cuts in the police budget? Perhaps my hon. Friend will reflect on that for a moment—
James Cleverly
My view is that we judge people by what they say. I know that there will be indignation from Labour Members, but as we have seen when the Labour party was in government the quality of the delivery of public services is not always totally interwoven with the budgets allocated to them. Indeed, there are massive opportunities to get more for less, and surely that should be the acme of performance.
Lyn Brown
May I say to the hon. Member for Solihull (Julian Knight), who has just taken his place in this Chamber, that, frankly, this has been a better debate than that? His unreasonable slur on the Opposition is about our stance on the police services rather than on the fire services. It would be really good if he read the Whips’ report more carefully before he intervenes next time.
May I say to the hon. Member for Braintree (James Cleverly), to whom I have been listening, that his points are interesting and have some validity, but London is rather different from areas outside London? Over decades, London has got used to having a single seat of government—even though there was an interregnum when the Greater London Council was disbanded. The reality is that when our constituents do not know where to go to complain about a service or to bring up an issue, they end up at the door of our town halls. It does not matter whether we are talking about Newham or Newcastle, that is where they go.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Mrs Eleanor Laing)
Just before we proceed, may I say with great respect to the hon. Lady that, although she has many points to make which the House should hear, interventions must be short.
James Cleverly
London’s exceptionalism is often held up as the reason why things that happen in London cannot possibly happen elsewhere. I have to say that, having served in office both in London and in Essex, I do not subscribe to that view. There are many things that national Government can learn from what a Conservative administration has done in London. I will go even further and say that London could learn plenty of things from other parts of the country, including from my wonderful county of Essex.
Mr Jim Cunningham
The hon. Gentleman is making some interesting arguments, but the problem that we have in the west midlands—if we leave the Mayor and his authority to one side—is the frequency of change in the local superintendents. They change and the public do not really get to know them. In the past, before the Layfield report and the major reorganisations of the 1970s, people were able to identify who was in charge of the local police force and knew exactly who to go to. That is the problem that we have in the west midlands.
James Cleverly
That is a fair point. I have had a number of people talk to me about the speed with which police officers move through posts, so I do not disagree with the hon. Gentleman.
Let me drag myself kicking and screaming back to the point that I was trying to make, because I have inadvertently found myself speaking more about policing than about fire and rescue services. I think it is legitimate, because what we have seen in London is a very clear line of accountability. Londoners may not be able to identify their nearest—I do not use the word “local” here—fire authority member. The hon. Member for West Ham (Lyn Brown) mentioned the local councillor on Newham council who has responsibility for fire and safety, but that councillor does not sit on the London fire authority. In fact, the reason I asked her specific questions is that I know who sits on the London fire authority—I am probably one of the few people in this Chamber or elsewhere who does—and I know that no one from the London borough of Newham, either elected or appointed, is on that authority. When the people of Newham want to cast judgment on the delivery of fire services in that borough, the only person they can either reward or punish at the ballot box is the Mayor of London, who, we should remind ourselves, is also the police and crime commissioner for London.
I want to address the hon. Lady’s point about the fire service being starved of resources so that we can support what she feels is the higher-profile policing service. After the changes that the London fire authority made, the Mayor of London, who is the budget holder for both the police and fire authorities, made a commitment to protect the London fire budget irrespective of the budgetary award from central Government. He was able to do so, because he could flex his budgets over the two areas. Far from starving resources from fire and rescue to give to policing, he was able to protect fire and rescue by dipping into his broader budget. Therefore, I fundamentally disagree with this idea that a police and crime commissioner who has responsibility for both policing and fire services would automatically and obviously rob Peter to pay Paul. That view is reinforced by the fact—the Minister has stated this from the Dispatch Box on a number of occasions—that the budget lines are separate.
Before I conclude, I will touch on the concerns that were raised by the shadow Front-Bench team about the single employer model. There are many instances where the employer has very different types of employee in terms of public sector delivery. No one confuses civil servants at the Ministry of Defence with members of the Special Air Service. Ultimately, both are employed by the same organisation; there is no confusion in the minds of the public there. Indeed, in the fire and rescue service and the police force, we have both uniformed and non-uniformed members of staff. The police service has warranted officers, police community support officers and non-uniformed civilian staff, and they are all under the same employer and there is no public confusion about the different roles. The idea that, somehow, the British public are too dim-witted, or too slow on the uptake, to be able to tell the difference between a copper and a firefighter is an argument that is so bereft of power that it should be disregarded.
The British people deserve to know who to punish or to reward at the ballot box in relation to fire and rescue, because, like policing, it is a vital public service. I have no doubt that, next week, we will see a much greater engagement and turnout in the police and crime commissioner elections than we have seen previously because people now understand in more detail what they are voting for. They have seen where the police and crime commissioners have done well, as highlighted in Cheshire by my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury (Antoinette Sandbach), and where they have done less well, and the PCCs will be held to account at the ballot box. When it comes to the delivery of fire and rescue provision, the British people deserve just as much a say as they do on policing, so I am happy to support the Government’s position, and I call on the House to reject the new clause put forward in the name of the shadow Minister.
Jake Berry
Having spoken on Second Reading and served on the Bill Committee, it is a real pleasure to be here on Report. Initially, I want to address my comments to new clause 20, which was proposed by the Opposition. The aim of the new clause, which is to give fire and rescue services the lead in flooding, is good. However, I disagree with the new clause overall, and I will go on to say why I do not think it is necessary.
I was selected as the Conservative parliamentary candidate for Rossendale and Darwen in 2007. On 13 January 2017, it will be 10 years since I was selected—hopefully, there is a big celebration to come. In that period, the village of Irwell Vale in my constituency has, I think, flooded four times. The aptly named village of Waterfoot has flooded three times, and Whitewell Bottom has flooded twice. Like so many areas that have grown up because of the industrial revolution, the towns and villages of the Rossendale and Darwen valleys are built on the valley floor so that the manufacturers and industrialists of the day could take advantage of water power.
Like many other areas in the north-west of England, we have been subject to severe floods over the past 10 years, no more so than on Boxing day when we had what the Environment Agency called a once-in-75-years flood, having had a once-in-25-years flood a few years previously. Having been working closely with the residents of Irwell Vale who are still out of their homes four months on from the flood, I know the huge impact that flooding has and the huge family disruption it can cause.
Julian Knight
My hon. Friend is making a powerful case from personal experience. Does he agree that flexibility is crucial? That is what he is describing. Surely if someone has the skills and the wherewithal to tackle the situation and they are on the scene, they should be allowed to do so without fear of legal recourse.
Jake Berry
My hon. Friend makes my point very clearly. People should try to prevent flooding or loss of life only when it is safe for them to do so and when they believe that they have the capacity to deal with the situation—for example, members of the armed forces or police officers, who are extremely brave, or the Environment Agency or the water board. The clause would put an unnecessary straitjacket on the response to floods in Lancashire. Although I support much of what it seeks to achieve, putting that in primary legislation is probably a step too far.
As an update, I can tell the House that the people of Rossendale are well served. We have the impending visit of the Minister with responsibility for floods, the Under-Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, who is coming to Irwell Vale on 13 May. I do not think he knows what is going to greet him. I will make sure that there is an angry mob to talk to him about the response of the Environment Agency, but no one should tell him that. I hope it can remain our secret. I hope that in future the Environment Agency may be in a position to take a lead in the Rossendale valley, looking at a full catchment solution.
Mr Jim Cunningham
The hon. Gentleman mentions the Minister with responsibility for floods. In the 1970s we had a Minister with responsibility for drought. He was expected to bring the rain when necessary.
Jake Berry
There is no drought in Lancashire, but if the hon. Gentleman wants me to come to Coventry to do the rain dance, I am more than happy to do so if it is required.
Amendment 2, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Cannock Chase (Amanda Milling), has been signed by right hon. and hon. Members across the House. Having been involved in the Bill since Second Reading, it is clear to me and probably to everyone who has spoken on the Bill or served on the Committee that the recognition accorded to police and crime commissioners is at an all-time high. We first went to the polls on a wet November evening in my constituency to elect a police and crime commissioner. When I went knocking on people’s doors saying, “This is an important national election. You must come out and vote”, I was met with blank faces. People did not know what the office had been created for and they did not understand what police and crime commissioners would do.
Everyone who heard the evidence session on the Bill, with some excellent contributions from police and crime commissioners all over the country, would say that that has now changed. I may fundamentally disagree with much of the evidence given by Vera Baird to the Committee, but I have heard of her. I listen to Radio 4 in the morning and I often hear her, usually beating up the Government. She is raising the profile of police and crime commissioners, as are police and crime commissioners across the country.
The general public like the idea of having one individual whom they can hold accountable for the performance of their local police service. The old police panel was remote. It was appointed and was therefore unaccountable. I compare that to the situation today with my local PCC. He has taken road shows all around Lancashire, going out there and talking to people about what they would like policing priorities to be over the next four years. I am slightly sceptical about his new-found fondness for going out and meeting the public. It seems like a last-ditch attempt to be re-elected. I hope that Andy Pratt, the Conservative candidate, who has 30 years’ service as a police officer, will win in Lancashire so that, like many other areas of the country, including Cheshire and Staffordshire, we can have our PCC all year round, not just every four years at elections.
Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)
If a member of the public has a problem, are they no longer allowed to go to the police chief? Do they have to go to the police and crime commissioner, or are there two centres? Can people write to the chief of police and say, “I’m really worried about this”, or are they expected to go to the police and crime commissioner?
Jake Berry
There is nothing precluding people from writing to their local chief constable. As chief constables are primarily responsible for the operational work of their local police force, if the query related to an operational matter, I would recommend that people wrote to their chief constable. People like to raise matters with the police and crime commissioner as well, but that is one democratically accountable, known individual who can put pressure on the chief constable on their behalf. I am sure the chief constable would be happy to hear from someone living somewhere in Lancashire, but he might be quicker to reply to their letter if the police and crime commissioner had his foot on the chief constable’s throat about the issue—[Interruption.] Indeed, or the MP. Many people do come and see me.
Richard Drax (South Dorset) (Con)
My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. I have a couple of observations. First, I was not happy with the politicisation of the police force. It was wrong that we should have Labour or anyone else as PCCs. That worries me. Secondly, does my hon. Friend agree that there is potential for conflict between the PCC and the chief constable? In some cases the PCC is a former policeman, but PCCs may have no experience of the police, yet have the power to appoint and sack someone who may have 35 years’ experience. I am not happy with that, either.
Jake Berry
On the politicisation of the police force, that may have been driven by low turn out. Even though the Labour party opposed the office of police and crime commissioner in its last manifesto, I note that it is standing a candidate in every division. At the last election there were many independent candidates standing as police and crime commissioners. At the evidence session of the Bill, we had the independent police and crime commissioner for north Wales, Mr Roddick, come to give evidence. He was excellent. If I lived in North Wales, I would probably vote for such an excellent individual with a fantastic vision for policing. If he were a Conservative, I would definitely vote for him. Many independents have been successful.
Jack Dromey
(Birmingham, Erdington) (Lab): The hon. Gentleman says that we need the highest possible turnout. Of course, historically turnout at police and crime commissioner elections has been low. Does he therefore share our surprise that the Home Office has committed to spend the grand total of £2,700 on advertising for this year’s PCC elections?
Jake Berry
I have a lot of respect for the shadow Minister, but I think it is slightly disingenuous to say that the turnout was low, because it was the first ever such election, it was held in November and it was not coterminous with other elections. Given the interest in the local elections in all our constituencies, I think that the turnout will be slightly higher. With regard to the £2,700, I am surprised that the Home Office has spent so much. I do not think there should be any state funding for political parties or elections, so he will not find me lobbying the Home Office to spend more.
Let me return to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset (Richard Drax) about politicisation of the police. Support for our police and crime commissioners has grown, including for excellent independent police and crime commissioners. In Lancashire we have a police and crime commissioner who I think is very much at the beck and call of the chief constable. Although there needs to be a close working relationship between the two, I think that the police and crime commissioner often needs to be a critical friend, because he is not there to fight only for the interests of the police and police officers, as important as that is; he should be there to fight for, and put forward the voices of, people across Lancashire who want an improved policing service.
As I said in an intervention, one of the things I would like our police and crime commissioner to prioritise after the May elections, whoever he may be and whichever political party he may be from, is rural crime. That is driven not by Preston, Blackburn or Blackpool, the major conurbations in the county, but by villages such as Tockholes, Hoddlesden, Weir, Cowpe and Waterfoot in my constituency, where rural crime has a major impact on people’s lives. I hope that whoever wins the election is listening to this debate and will prioritise that. I think that can be the role of a police and crime commissioner: not to push the police’s agenda, but to push the people’s agenda in the area they represent.
Amanda Milling
Does my hon. Friend agree that that is absolutely the point of a police and crime commissioner: to represent the public? In doing so, they can look at things differently. For instance, the police and crime commissioner in Staffordshire has demonstrated innovation and is looking at ways in which the police can use technology to do the admin while out and about on our streets, rather than having to sit behind a desk.
Jake Berry
I agree with my hon. Friend. Let me mention one of the best examples I know of a police and crime commissioner taking a different approach. I met the police and crime commissioner for Cumbria shortly after he was elected. He had previously been headmaster of a Lancashire school. He said, “Do you know that there is no rape crisis centre in Cumbria? That is absolutely disgraceful for a police area of this size.” He took some of his PCC budget that was meant to be spent on administration and set up a rape crisis centre. I think that shows just how police and crime commissioners who really care about their areas—it is nothing to do with politics—can make a huge different to policing. When he was elected he said, “This is one of the things that I am going to change, because it is a disgrace that Cumbria does not have one.” In fact, he changed that within 18 months of the election. As a result of such actions, the recognition and popularity of police and crime commissioners has grown, and I believe that the same will happen with police and fire commissioners.
We all have immense respect for police officers and fire officers, but we accept that they do very different jobs. The public often see them working together and co-operating—for example, at the scene of an accident—but the idea of those two separate services having a common leadership will take longer for the public to understand. That is why I believe amendment 2 is absolutely necessary to improve an otherwise excellent Bill.
Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (The Cotswolds) (Con)
It is surprising what inspiration one can get when sitting in this place. I am delighted to speak to this group of amendments, and I do so in the very good hope that I can curry favour with my hon. Friends on the Front Bench and that they will give me everything I want when we come to discuss the next group of amendments. I therefore hope that they listen very carefully to what I have to say.
I think that this is an excellent clause, because it is enabling but not prescriptive. It enables fire and rescue authorities to be taken over by PCCs, but it does not compel them to be. That is where I take issue with the Opposition provisions. I have huge respect for fire and rescue authorities, which do a fantastic job. In my area of Gloucester, the authority is under the control of the county council, and—this is why I am pleased the clause is enabling not prescriptive—I would not want it to be transferred to the PCC, who is an independent and who is not doing a particularly good job. That is why the clause is excellent: it deals with everything on a case-by-case basis.
Having said that, I must mention my experience of having the Fire Service College in my constituency. The college provides major training for the fire service and does some amazing blue-light collaborative training involving the fire, police and ambulance services. As my hon. Friend the Member for Rossendale and Darwen (Jake Berry) said, it is essential that those services work as collaboratively as possible in an emergency. The services in Gloucestershire are coterminous and relatively small, compared with some of the larger, urban authorities, and the chain of command works incredibly well, with each service knowing exactly what it is supposed to do in any given circumstances. It is essential, particularly with more sophisticated and frequent emergencies—whether flooding or, regrettably, things such as terrorism—that the blue-light services work closely together.
Training for such events could be improved. Resilience training for all three blue-light services, working together in emergencies, could be improved. If, God forbid, they are ever really tested in a big emergency—particularly one that takes place at multiple locations—they will need their training and collaboration to be of the highest order. That is where some of the mergers of fire and rescue authorities and PCCs could help.
Having said that, my area is looking at an ever-increasing fire and rescue service operating under the county council. It is not just operational efficiency that I am looking forward to from the Government’s proposals, but administrative efficiency. Let me give the example of Cirencester—the biggest town in my constituency. The fire station there was formerly operated by professional firefighters; it is now moving towards retained firefighters, and there will not be quite so many of them. The premises is vast, and it is maintained at public expense, but the police could usefully use it for their authority too.
We therefore begin to get the idea, which should be pushed more and more, that our precious public resources can be better utilised—in the case of property, if more than one public authority occupies it at once. However, that requires a different mindset from authorities. The police are used to having their police station, and the fire services are used to having their fire station, and hitherto, in some cases, the two have never felt it appropriate to mix. We can achieve significant efficiencies by merging the two, particularly when it comes to property.
Jake Berry
I am sure my hon. Friend will agree that, when we go out and talk to our constituents, we see that they really care about the people out on the street and the frontline. We cannot measure a service by how many buildings it occupies in our town. Is my hon. Friend aware of the shared fire and rescue training and police training in Northern Ireland, which has saved tens of millions of pounds? That shows that, where co-operation is done right, and the police and the fire service maintain their independence, significant savings can be made.
Geoffrey Clifton-Brown
I am grateful to my hon. Friend, because that gives me the opportunity yet again to praise what the Fire Service College is doing in Moreton-in-Marsh. It is a large establishment on about 600 acres. It is on an old airfield, and it includes a runway used as a practice motorway on which motorway pile-ups can be simulated using real scrapped cars, so that the police, fire and ambulance services can then train in a big joint exercise. The college has offices they set on fire, and the police, fire and ambulance services can use that to train. It also has a ship it can set on fire. It has all sorts of huge facilities.
Geoffrey Clifton-Brown
In case my hon. Friend misunderstands, let me say that they do these quite sophisticated training exercises using a model ship, a model aircraft and an actual office block. This is a really good example of how collaborative training should be run. We should do much more of that, and we need much more of it to involve resilience, so that we can train people for the really sophisticated emergencies we face.
The Cotswolds have suffered considerably as a result of flooding in recent years. When we have had flooding, it has been distressing to see people taken out of their houses and sometimes evacuated, and to see their belongings completely wrecked. I must praise the emergency services hugely, because they are always there in the middle of the night and in the most difficult circumstances—often cold and wet—trying to deal with very demoralised and unhappy people.
We should act more collaboratively, but we should pay a great tribute to the emergency services, because they do a hugely good and dedicated job on behalf of all of us.
Mike Penning
May I praise, as I did in Committee, the tone of the debate and the measured way in which it has been taken forward, even though we will obviously disagree on certain issues?
Thirty years ago, I wrote a paper on better collaboration between the emergency services, covering the ambulance, fire and police services. I was wrong, because it should have included the coastguard—as a former shipping Minister, I would say that, wouldn’t I?
Let me say at the outset that I have much sympathy with some aspects of the provisions that have been tabled today. We may be able to look at some of them again and to bring back proposals in the Lords. However, I fundamentally disagree with others, because they would rip the heart out of the Bill—I am looking at the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for West Ham (Lyn Brown), who knows exactly what I mean.
Let me also say that I am enormously proud to be the first police and fire Minister, and that role is perhaps an indication of how seriously the Government take some of the concerns the fire service and the shadow fire Minister have. I actually gave up huge swathes of my policing portfolio, including responsibility for the National Crime Agency and organised crime, to other Ministers, so that I could take on this portfolio. The work has taken up a huge amount of my time—that is not just because of this Bill—because I have been on an enormously steep learning curve from when I was a fireman all those years ago. The job has changed, although some of the semantics and language have not. Some things have changed enormously fast, but some have not changed as fast as we would perhaps all like.
Because we have a fantastic fire service, there has been a decrease of 17% in fire-related fatalities and of 50% in reported fires over the past 10 years. I am concerned about the correlation between those two figures, and I have asked my officials to look at that. As the shadow Minister said, there is an increase at the moment. We should not take one year as an example, and there may be, very sadly, some one-off events. I vividly remember, as roads Minister, going to the terrible fire on the M5 following a road traffic collision where many people survived the RTC, got out of their vehicles, and sadly lost their lives to fire.
Bob Stewart
Friends of mine who are serving in the armed forces are finding it increasingly difficult to move into the police or the fire service. Could the Minister help in any way, because the training that the armed forces give to my friends is so important and should be utilised to make our police and fire services even better than they already are?
Mike Penning
This issue has been very close to my heart for some time. For instance, we have a real issue coming down the line with a shortage of heavy goods vehicle drivers, and yet some 40% of the armed forces leave with an HGV licence, as I did.
Many fire services around the country have not been recruiting recently, although I understand that some have started to recruit now, but the police are most certainly recruiting. The Metropolitan police have brought in the right policy of making sure that people serving in the police force in London can represent their community, so they come from the community they live in. When the commissioner first proposed this and said that it was the right thing to do, I said, “Be very careful, because you would have excluded me from joining the Met. Although I grew up in Edmonton, you would have said that I’d been away for five years and so would not be allowed to join the police force.”
The rule has been changed, and, quite rightly, the police force in London will now allow someone to join even if they have been in the armed forces for some time. This is a very important area, especially as the police are now recruiting extensively. Only the other day, I took the passing out parade at Hendon, with over 200 officers. I think that in excess of 2,000 officers are coming through training in London imminently.
Perhaps because of my background in the military and in the fire service, I understand that neither organisation likes change. I listened to the arguments made earlier about why there was opposition to PCCs possibly taking control of the fire service in a managerial way, in the same way as they took over from the police authorities. It is almost an identical argument that says, “What experience do they have? Surely it’s better that we let the councillors who have sat on the committee for 20 years, with all that experience, do it.”
The introduction of PCCs was fundamentally opposed by Her Majesty’s Opposition—I understand why—who had it in their manifesto to abolish them. They did not win the election for many reasons, not least because people such as Vera Baird and Paddy Tipping are excellent PCCs in their parts of the world. Vera Baird has absolutely transformed victim support in her part of the world, as have many others. I know the candidates up there will say, “You shouldn’t name names”, but actually we should give praise where it is due. There have been good independents. I want Conservative PCCs to win in every single seat, but we have to be pragmatic, and if others are elected, then let us make sure that we can work together.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) touched on the concerns about whether PCCs have the necessary experience. Some PCCs do have lots of experience within the police force, but that is not necessarily relevant. When the Prime Minister appointed me as shipping Minister, I said, “You do realise, Prime Minister, that my constituency is the furthest away from the sea in the whole country?” He said, “Yes, but you should question whether the way things have always been done is the right way.”
I use the example of armed guards on ships. When I arrived at the Department for Transport, we were having massive problems with Somali pirates. I simply said, “Why hasn’t the Royal Navy been able to do that job with the Marines—no navy in the whole world is more capable—and so allow people to protect their property?” So we convinced other countries and the International Maritime Organisation that we should allow that. I did not look at that from the perspective of a shipping person; I looked at it as an outside individual who was trying to say, “Let these people have an opportunity to do that.” That idea had been looked at by people who were much more experienced than I was in shipping, and it had been rejected on more than one occasion because it was not possible. I came in from the outside and said that it was possible.
Richard Drax
I am most grateful to the Minister for giving way. I think that he misunderstood me: I was not saying that a PCC should or should not be a police officer. Some are, and some are not. I was saying that I had concerns about the powers that they have to appoint and sack police officers, who may have had 25 or 30 years’ experience. I think that that role should be left to the Home Office and the Home Secretary.
Mike Penning
I understand where my hon. Friend is coming from. That is a bit of a different issue, and not part of what we are talking about. There is a disciplinary process to go through, which is now, quite rightly, transparent as a result of other measures in the Bill.
Amendments 3 to 6, tabled by Her Majesty’s Opposition, would decimate the PCCs’ role. I know exactly why the shadow Minister has tabled them, because we had a very similar debate in Committee. The shadow Minister knows full well that I will not accept them, and if she presses them to a Division, we will attempt to vote them down.
In principle, we completely agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Cannock Chase (Amanda Milling) on amendment 2. We need to do some work around it to ensure that it encapsulates titles other than the PCC, and we can work together on it before the Bill goes to the Lords, where we will introduce a Government amendment that will be very similar to amendment 2 but will be drafted in such a way as to make sure that no consequential issues arise.
Amanda Milling
May I press my right hon. Friend on that point? Is it the Government’s intention to table amendment 2, or an equivalent amendment, when the Bill goes to the other place? If I get that assurance, I will not press the amendment to a vote.
Mike Penning
If I had had the clearance today, I would have supported amendment 2, but there are issues on which I need to get clarification. We will introduce in the Lords basically what my hon. Friend is asking for, because it is important that the public understand exactly what they have got. Of course, the Bill will receive Royal Assent long after the elections. Some PCCs have, quite rightly, put in their manifestos now what they would like to see, but there is an issue about whether the title should include police, fire and rescue.
Jake Berry
I hope that the Minister will take the opportunity to deal with a point that I raised about the clause. Will he confirm that, before the Secretary of State makes a direction under secondary legislation, as envisaged by the clause, there will be wide consultation? Will he confirm that the Government will consult widely with the fire and rescue service, in particular, given the concerns that it has raised about maintaining not only its operational independence, but an element of independence in the eyes of the public?
Mike Penning
That is exactly what will be proposed. This is not one size fits all, and it will not be imposed, in that we would like an agreement locally. Clearly, that may not be possible in some parts of the country. Then it will be for the PCC to put a business case to the Home Secretary, and then we will go out to independent review when the consultation takes place. Fundamentally, we are not trying to interfere with operational firefighting and the operational police; this is more to do with dealing with administrative costs to save the moneys that we all know could be saved.
In Lancashire, for example, I met the chief constable and the PCC, and they told me that they were going to use some of the reserves to build a new police station in Blackpool. I said, “Fantastic news. I wondered what you were going to use the allocated reserves for. But you have had a conversation with the fire service as well, haven’t you? You cannot put a fire station into a police station, because the big red trucks do not fit in the foyer, but you most certainly can put a police station in a fire station.”
Jake Berry
To come back to my specific point about the clause, my question is: if this or a similar clause comes forward in the Lords, will there be wide consultation, especially with the fire service, before the Secretary of State gives direction about the national title to be used by police and crime commissioners? I would be grateful if the Minister could answer that question.
Mike Penning
It is vital that we get the title right and that there is a national title for those taking on those responsibilities. At the same time, there will be consultation not only with the FBU and the other unions and with the chief fire officers and their association, but with the chief constables and the Police Federation. The title will be with us for a long time. When I first joined the fire service—I think it was the fire service, not the fire and rescue service, at the time—I was, sadly, a fireman; I say that because in my time we did not have fire ladies. We were not called firefighters then. I think it is sad that that change did not happen many years earlier.
I want to touch on the issue of flooding. I was so impressed by our firefighters and ambulance crews, and by the local communities, volunteers, local authorities and police in areas where flooding took place. Flooding is becoming more and more a part of the fire and rescue service’s work. However, that is not new. There is a lovely place on the edge of Epping forest called Theydon Bois—it is in Essex, but quite close to east London, where the shadow Minister resides—where flash floods were a regular occurrence, and we used to go there. As a full-time firefighter, I regularly used to go there.
In Committee, I said that I would keep an open mind about the need to change the title to reflect areas of responsibility. In my opinion, this has nothing to do with money. Normally, I agree with nearly everything that the hon. Member for Vauxhall (Kate Hoey) says, but on this occasion, I do not. Her constituency is only partially affected by the Bill, because the Mayor has now taken over direct responsibility for the fire service in London—that had been called for for some considerable time—so I am not surprised that PCCs are not at the forefront of conversations when she knocks on constituents’ doors in her part of the world.
There are real benefits to come from the collaboration that can take place. I am not saying that no collaboration is now taking place, but much more can be done. In particular, there is more work to do with ambulance services, especially with the triage units on blue light vehicles. I will soon have the honour and the privilege to go to America to pay my respects at the site of 9/11 in New York. No policing and fire Minister has yet done that, which I think is a sad indictment. One of the main reasons why I want to go to New York is to look at its firehouses, as they are called. Another reason is the fact that paramedics are carried in the back of fire appliances, which we need to consider very carefully in this country.
Geoffrey Clifton-Brown
I have enormous sympathy with what my right hon. Friend is saying. It is absolutely clear that we need closer collaboration. However, in Gloucestershire we do not at the moment want the fire and rescue service to be put under the control of the PCC, so will he give us an assurance that it will not be forced to do so against its wishes?
Mike Penning
I cannot do so because that is not part of the Bill. The Bill provides for agreements where they can be made. Where no agreement can be reached, as will happen in many areas, the PCC can make a business case to the Home Secretary, if the PCC decides to do so; frankly, if there is so much opposition in Gloucestershire, the PCC might see the writing on the wall and decide not to do so. The business case will then go out to independent review, and only then will the Home Secretary make a decision.
I am enormously keen not to make this a one-size-fits-all provision. However, there has to be a backstop provision in case no one can reach an agreement and no one can move forward. In a perfect world, we would not be in a situation where we had to make it a statutory requirement to collaborate, but, frankly, collaboration in some parts of the country is not of the standard we would expect in the 21st century. We therefore need measures to take forward such collaboration.
Finally, amendment 21 is about the concordat. I have talked about that, and other bits and bobs, particularly with the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones). I do not think it would be good to put that on a statutory footing—in other words, to make that law. The concordat seems to be working really well, so let us see how that evolves with these agreements. The shadow Minister did not refer to that, but it is relevant. We spoke about it in Committee and I will keep a really close eye on how the concordat works, but I do not think that at this early stage putting that into law is the answer .
I hope that I have alleviated the concerns of my hon. Friends. I hope, although I do not expect, that the Opposition have listened to the assurances that I have given, not only here but in Committee.
Mike Wood
Clearly, close collaboration is important not only for efficiency, but for the delivery of effective prevention work. Can my right hon. Friend give additional assurances that the revenue streams of fire services such as that in the west midlands will be protected, including for commercial activities?
Mike Penning
I have given categorical assurances in Committee and here that there will be two funding streams and that they will not be combined. Even so, whether it is a mayoral system or a PCC system, I would expect there to be better collaboration on how that money is spent. With that in mind, I hope that none of the amendments, none of which were tabled by the Government, will be pressed.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)
I ask the Serjeant at Arms to investigate the delay in the Aye Lobby.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Karen Bradley)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 32—Police volunteers: inspection.
Amendment 11, in clause 35, page 57, line 39, leave out subsection (1A).
This amendment removes the ability for volunteers to be given the powers of a Constable or Police and Community Support Officer.
Amendment 12, page 58, line 2, at end insert—
‘(2A) The chief officer of any police force may not place a volunteer in any role which requires the use of force or restraint.’.
This amendment would prevent volunteers being placed in roles which may require the use of force or restraint which should only be performed by officers and members of police staff.
Amendment 13, page 59, line 1, leave out subsection (9B).
This amendment removes the provision for volunteer PCSOs to be issued with CS spray and PAVA spray.
Amendment 10, page 59, line 31, at end insert—
‘(12) This section cannot come into force until the House of Commons approves a report under subsection 46(6) of the Police Act 1996 which guarantees no annual reduction in funding in real terms to local policing bodies in each financial year until 2020.’.
This amendment would guarantee that police funding would be protected in a police grant settlement approved by Parliament before proposals to grant additional police powers to volunteers can be brought forward.
New clause 1—Sale of knives and certain articles with blade or point to persons under eighteen: due diligence checks—
‘(1) The Criminal Justice Act 1988 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 141A, after subsection (4) insert—
“(4A) Due diligence serving to confirm the material facts in relation to a sale over the internet of with respect to the age of a purchaser must include, but is not limited to—
(a) age verification on delivery,
(b) online age verification, and
(c) offline follow up checks.
(4B) The Secretary of State must publish guidance, which the Secretary of State may revise from time to time, on how due diligence verification and checks under section (4A) are to be carried out.’.
This new clause provides a triple lock to ensure that knives are not illegally sold over the Internet to under-18s.
New clause 7—Amendments to the Firearms Act 1968—
‘(1) The Firearms Act 1968 is amended as follows.
(2) Omit section 5(1A)(f).
(3) Omit sections 5A(4), (5), (6), (7) and (8).
(4) Omit section 7(1) and insert—
“(1) A person who has obtained from the chief officer of police for the area in which he resides a permit for the purpose in the prescribed form may, without holding a certificate or authority under this Act, have in his possession a firearm and ammunition in accordance with the terms of the permit.”
(5) At the end of section 28A add—
“(8) Where an individual has applied for the renewal of a certificate before its expiry but the chief constable has not, as at the date of its expiry, determined whether or not to grant the renewal, the certificate is to continue to have effect until the application is determined.”’.
The new clause seeks to make a number of technical changes to the 1968 Firearms Act covering expanding ammunition, section 7 temporary permits and the renewal of firearms certificates in order to clarify the law and reduce the administrative burden on the police and shooting community.
New clause 8—Amendments to the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988—
‘(1) The Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 15(1) (Approved rifle clubs and muzzle-loading pistol clubs) omit the first “rifle” and for the second “rifle” substitute “firearm”.
(3) Omit section 15(2) and insert—
“(2) Any club may apply for approval, whether or not it is intended that any club members will, by virtue of subsection (1) above, have firearms subject to section 1 or ammunition in their possession without holding firearm certificates.”
(4) Omit section 15(4) and insert—
“(4) The application of subsection (1) above to members of an approved club may—
(a) be excluded in relation to the club, or
(b) be restricted to target shooting with specified types of firearm, by limitations contained in the approval.”
(5) In section 15(7) omit “rifle”.
(6) In section 15(10) omit the first “rifle”.
(7) Omit sections 15(11) and (12).’.
The new clause allows a club to be approved for any type of Section 1 firearm so that if a person using a shotgun or long-barrelled pistol is taken ill, or the firearm malfunctions, another authorised person can legally ‘possess’ (handle) that firearm to assist and/or make it safe.
New clause 9—Authorised persons permitted to lend firearms—
‘(1) In the Firearms Act 1968, omit section 11(5) and insert—
“(5) A person may, without holding a shot gun certificate, borrow a shot gun from the owner or occupier of private premises or a person authorised by the owner or occupier and use it on those premises in the presence of the owner, occupier or authorised person.”
(2) In the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988, omit section 16(1) and insert—
(a) the owner, occupier or authorised person in whose presence it is used holds a firearm certificate in respect of that rifle; and
(b) the borrower’s possession and use of it complies with any conditions as to those matters specified in the certificate; and
(c) where the borrower is of the age of 17, the owner, occupier or authorised person in whose presence the rifle is used is of or over the age of 18.”’.
The new clause would clarify the law as regards who can lend a shotgun or rifle to another person. This addresses the uncertainty currently caused by the term ‘occupier’ in relation to the borrowing of a shotgun or a rifle by a person without a certificate.
New clause 19—Events, festivals and gatherings: control of flares and fireworks etc.—
‘(1) A person is guilty of an offence if he has an article or substance to which this section applies in his possession—
(a) at any time during the period of a qualifying event, festival or gathering when he is within the venue or in any area from which the event, festival or gathering may be directly viewed or physically accessed, or
(b) while entering or trying to enter a venue or area defined in paragraph (1)(a) at any time during the period of the qualifying event, festival or gathering, or
(c) while travelling by any means towards a qualifying event, festival or gathering with the intent to enter a venue or area as defined under paragraph (1)(a).
(2) It is a defence for the accused to prove that possession is with lawful authority.
(3) This section applies to any article or substance whose main purpose is the emission of a flare whether for entertaining, illuminating or signalling (as opposed to igniting or heating) or the emission of smoke or a visible gas or a noise intended to simulate an explosion; and in particular it applies to fireworks, distress flares, fog signals, and pellets and capsules intended to be used as fumigators or for testing pipes, but not to matches, cigarette lighters or heaters.
(4) The Secretary of State may be regulations define or amend—
(a) a “qualifying event, festival or gathering”,
(b) a “period of an event, festival or gathering”,
(c) a “venue or area from which the event, festival or gathering may be directly viewed or physically accessed”, and
(d) articles and substances falling under subsection (3).
(5) The power to make regulations under subsection (4) shall be exercisable by statutory instrument but such an instrument may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.
(6) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable on summary conviction—
(a) in the case of an offence under subsection 1(a) or (b) to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, and
(b) in the case of an offence under subsection 1(c) to a fine not exceeding level 2 on the standard scale.
(7) Nothing in this section shall apply to persons, articles or substances that are lawfully present at, entering, travelling to, or being transported towards, a qualifying event, festival or gathering by virtue of being a planned part of the event, festival or gathering under the responsibility, regulation and control of the organisers.’.
New clause 21—Firearms: Full recovery of the licence costs—
‘(1) The Firearms Act 1968 is amended as follows.
(2) At the end of section 53 insert—
“(4) The Secretary of State must set the sum payable at the full cost to the tax payer of issuing a licence.”’.
This new clause would help to ensure full costs recovery of the licencing of guns.
Amendment 7, in clause 106, page 115, line 22, leave out “the amount of any fee that may be charged” and insert
“that the fee charged must be equal to the full cost to the tax payer of issuing a licence.”
This amendment would help to ensure full costs recovery of the licencing of guns.
Amendment 8, page 115, line 41, leave out
“the amount of any fee that may be charged”
and insert
“that the fee charged must be equal to the full cost to the tax payer of issuing a licence.”.
This amendment would help to ensure full costs recovery of the licencing of guns.
Amendment 9, page 116, line 19, leave out
“the amount of any fee that may be charged”
and insert
“that the fee charged must be equal to the full cost to the tax payer of issuing a licence.”.
This amendment would help to ensure full costs recovery of the licencing of guns.
Amendment 1, in clause 107, page 117, line 14, at end insert
“and
(c) other relevant stakeholders.”.
This amendment would require other relevant stakeholders to be consulted in drawing up statutory guidance to the police. The current non-statutory guidance involves consultation between the Home Office, police, shooting organisations and others and all existing parties, not just the police, should be accommodated within the new statutory framework.
Government amendment 62.
New clause 17—Alcohol abstinence and monitoring: cost recovery—
‘(1) The Criminal Justice Act 2003 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 212A, insert at the end of subsection 7(b)—
“(c) arrangements for recovering the cost of testing from the offender by the police.”’.
This would allow the Secretary of State to include to make provision for the police to charge an offender subject to an alcohol abstinence and monitoring requirement for the costs of testing their compliance with such a requirement.
Karen Bradley
At this stage I will speak to the Government new clauses and amendment, and I will respond later to the points that are made about other amendments.
Chapter 1 of part 3 will enable chief officers to designate police staff with a wider range of police powers. They will also be able to confer police powers, other than the core powers reserved for warranted officers, on volunteers. The intention is that the powers that can be conferred on employed staff and designated volunteers are the same. This includes the power to carry and use defensive sprays, such as CS gas and PAVA spray, where the chief officer considers that there is an operational case for this. It is already the case that chief officers can equip police community support officers with defensive sprays, and to that extent the Bill codifies the existing position.
New clause 31 makes necessary consequential amendments to the Firearms Act 1968 to ensure that police volunteers are civilian officers for the purposes of that Act. The effect is that they do not then need a certificate or authorisation under section 1 or 5 of the 1968 Act in order to carry a defensive spray.
Andrew Gwynne (Denton and Reddish) (Lab)
I understand perfectly what the Minister is trying to do here, but I am not sure that there is a consensus out there for volunteers to be equipped with CS gas, for example. Does she understand the concern that the public have about that?
Karen Bradley
If the hon. Gentleman had been part of the Committee, he would have heard the extensive deliberations and debate that we had about that issue. In my response to the amendments later, I will come to the specific point about volunteers. I would like to hear the arguments before I respond, but I am aware that there are concerns, although I may not agree with them.
The new clause puts community support volunteers and policing support volunteers in the same position as police officers and police civilian staff. We are also taking the opportunity to make it explicit on the face of the 1968 Act that special constables are members of a police force for the purpose of that Act and therefore similarly do not require a certificate or authorisation under the 1968 Act when equipped with a defensive spray. This will avoid any doubt being created by the insertion of a specific reference to policing support and community support volunteers within the meaning of “Crown servant” in the Firearms Act.
Bob Stewart
I am sure the Minister will give an affirmative answer to my question. Can she confirm to people listening that anyone issued with such sprays will be fully trained in their use and that the sprays will not just be handed out?
Karen Bradley
My hon. and gallant Friend makes an important point and I can assure him that appropriate training will be given.
Government new clause 32 clarifies that designated community support volunteers or police support volunteers may be subject to inspection, just like any other member of a police force, and can be served with a notice requiring information or access to premises. As with other members of a police force, they would have no right of appeal against such a notice.
As I said, I will respond to the other amendments in this group when winding up the debate.
Jack Dromey
May I start by giving the apologies of the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham), as to why he cannot be here today? He is at the Hillsborough inquest. Twenty-seven years ago a terrible wrong was done. Ninety-six husbands, wives, fiancés, brothers, sisters, sons and daughters died. The fact that today justice was done is due both to the remarkable persistence of the families to ensure justice for those who died, and to the outstanding leadership of my right hon. Friend who, in his courage, persistence and championing of a noble cause, has served the people not just of Liverpool, but of this country well.
We welcome many of the proposals before the House today, which follow our exchanges in Committee. I do not intend to speak to them all in detail. We welcome the move on pre-charge bail to prevent terrorists, such as Dhar, from ever fleeing the country before charge. We welcome the protection of police whistleblowers. We welcome moves to improve the way that the police deal with people suffering a mental health crisis, such as no longer considering a police cell to be a place of safety. We welcome moves to ensure that 17-year-olds detained in police custody are treated as children, which is something my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) has fought very hard for.
We support changes to the Fire Arms Act 1968 that will tighten our gun laws in line with recommendations made by the Law Commission. We support the duty on emergency services to collaborate. We will deal with many of these issues in some detail on the second day on Report. We also welcome moves made by the Government on other issues that emerged during our consideration of the Bill. For example, agreement has been reached following the excellent campaign run by David Jamieson, the police and crime commissioner for the west midlands, on the banning of those hideous zombie knives, whose only purpose can be to kill or maim.
However, given that the Bill purports to complete police reform, I am bound to say that there are a number of issues that should have been in the Bill but are not. The Bill does not help the police to adapt to a world in which crime is changing and moving increasingly online. There is a gaping hole in the Government’s policing policy on the failure to tackle—or even to acknowledge in the Bill—cybercrime, or to help the police deal with the consequences of the Government’s swingeing spending reductions. On child sexual exploitation and abuse, although the one clause is a welcome step, for a Bill that purports to be focused seriously on this grotesque manifestation of all that is worst in our country, one clause alone is not enough. The Bill does not go far enough on some of the issues it seeks to address, such as police accountability, but we will return to some of those on day 2.
Having spelled out those areas of the Bill that we agree with, I am bound to say that there are critical areas with which we fundamentally disagree. We have just had a debate, led by my formidable hon. Friend the Member for West Ham (Lyn Brown), opposing the compulsory takeover of fire authorities by PCCs. Our strong view, as she indicated, is this: yes to greater collaboration; no to hostile takeovers that take place regardless of what local elected representatives and local people think.
The other highly controversial proposal that we are debating today is about giving police powers to volunteers. Let me make it absolutely clear that there is a long and honourable tradition going back 150 years of special constables. There is a more recent tradition, but one that is profound within the communities we serve, of volunteer engagement in neighbourhood watch. For example, the admirable Maureen Meehan, chair of the Stockland Green neighbourhood watch in my constituency, does outstanding work to ensure that the community is safe, working with the police. Indeed, in this House we have the police parliamentary scheme. My hon. Friend the Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Gerald Jones) has had a fascinating insight into policing in the Met and in south Wales, and subsequently he has waxed lyrical about the work he has seen, for example on mental health, but also working with volunteers.
We are strongly in favour of enhancing citizen engagement and voluntary efforts. As the great Robert Peel said,
“the police are the public and the public are the police”.
Therefore, the role of the citizen in policing is key. But the public demand that police functions are discharged by police offices, which is essential. We are extremely concerned that the proposals contained in the Bill are an attempt by the Home Secretary to provide policing on the cheap.
Andrew Gwynne
My hon. Friend hits the nail on the head. Most people outside Parliament will see through this, because they are seeing the number of police officer and PCSOs in their own neighbourhood policing teams cut, and the Government are proposing to hand those powers to civilians.
Jack Dromey
My hon. Friend is exactly right. In all the surveys of public opinion about the visibility of the police over the past couple of years, the public have complained more and more that they no longer see their police officers or PCSOs, that they no longer have contact with them, that the police no longer have roots in the community and that neighbourhood policing is being progressively hollowed out. People want neighbourhood policing—the bedrock of British policing—to be rebuilt, but not using volunteers.
Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)
I understand the point the hon. Gentleman is making, although I do not agree with him. Does he accept that there are circumstances in which we all have police powers? If I witness somebody committing what I consider to be an indictable offence, I am able, as a citizen, to arrest them without a warrant. Does he agree, therefore, that if we are going to have volunteers among the police—unless he wants to do away with them completely—they should at least be trained? If they then find themselves in a situation of danger where they may have to act as a police officer, they can do so, perhaps using purely that power of citizen’s arrest?
Jack Dromey
The problem is that the Government have failed to spell out how they will ensure that these volunteers are properly trained and properly accountable, or how there will be clarity about their role—as I will say later, the Government have ruled out nothing in terms of the role volunteers might play in the next stages. The hon. Gentleman will no doubt want to come back on that issue, but on the particular point he raised, perhaps he will wait until I get to the relevant part of my speech.
Antoinette Sandbach
The Labour-run Welsh Government have funded community support officers, who perform a very similar role to the one proposed. What is the distinction? Would the hon. Gentleman’s proposals not prevent the use of such community support officers?
Jack Dromey
I am very familiar with what has happened in Wales. All credit to the Labour Government in the Welsh Assembly for funding 500 PCSOs. I was in south Wales but two weeks ago, and I met some of the PCSOs concerned—in south Wales alone, there are 200 PCSOs on the beat, which is very popular with the public. However, they are employed by the police service; what is being proposed here is a new generation of volunteer PCSOs. As I will say later, the issue is not just training and accountability, but that volunteers will be able to use certain powers—I am thinking particularly of the issue of CS gas, and I think the public will be incredulous when it becomes clear exactly what the Government propose.
Vera was right, and no wonder. In the last five years, Government funding to police forces has seen the biggest cuts to any police service on the entire continent of Europe—a staggering 25% cut. For that five-year period, the Government’s alibi was, “Yes, we cut the police, but we also cut crime.” It is not true that they have cut crime. The statistics on police recorded crime, increasingly cleaned up over the past couple of years following criticism from this House, among others, show violent crime up by 27%, homicides up by 11%, a 9% rise in knife crime, and overall police recorded crime up by 7%. The Government continue to rely on the crime survey for England and Wales, but that does not include a whole number of areas of crime. In two months’ time, when cybercrime and online fraud is included in the crime statistics in the crime survey for England and Wales, it will show crime nearly doubling.
Karen Bradley
I hope that the hon. Gentleman, for whom I have a great deal of respect, is not confusing reported crime with the prevalence of crime. The independent crime survey for England and Wales is very clear that prevalence of crime is down but the reporting of crime is up. I hope that he would welcome the fact that we have more reported crime, because it is only by getting those reports of crimes that the police are able to solve them.
Jack Dromey
I agree that proper reporting and recording have been absolutely key—for example, in relation to sexual offences. However, in saying, “We cut the police but we have cut crime”, the Government have relied on the crime survey for England and Wales, where the projections, including those from the Office for National Statistics, are that when online fraud and cybercrime are included, there will be a potential increase of 5 million offences, nearly doubling crime. Therefore, with the greatest respect to the Minister, for whom I have great respect, the alibi of five years will be blown apart.
Karen Bradley
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that such crime was happening before but was not included in the crime survey under the previous Labour Government, that this Government are making sure that it is included, and that we need to be honest about prevalence so that we can tackle the problem?
Jack Dromey
If I agree that it should have been included in the past, I hope the Minister will agree that in future never again will I hear the Government say, “We’ve cut crime.” Crime is not falling; crime is changing.
Sir Edward Garnier (Harborough) (Con)
This is all very interesting, but surely the central point of the hon. Gentleman’s argument is that clause 35 should be deleted, full stop. All these pussy-footing little amendments that he has tabled are really designed to undermine the concept of the volunteer. He disagrees with the concept of volunteers; the Government clearly think they are a good thing. Why does he not just speak to that argument rather than wasting our time with amendments 11, 12 and 13, which are actually designed to make it difficult for someone to perform the function of a police volunteer?
Jack Dromey
With the greatest respect, I would not downplay the significance of this, including to the public out there whom we serve. We will come specifically to two issues relating to amendment 10, on volunteers, and amendment 13, on volunteer PCSOs being able to carry CS gas and PAVA spray.
It is simply not true that crime is falling. Nor is it true that the Government have protected the frontline. The Policing Minister has been good enough to acknowledge that he inadvertently misled Parliament by suggesting that. Nor is it true that police funding has been protected. Last November, the Chancellor of the Exchequer said:
“The police protect us, and we are going to protect the police.”—[Official Report, 25 November 2015; Vol. 602, c. 1373.]
Sir Andrew Dilnot has now made it clear that a £160 million cut, in real terms, in this financial year alone would be sufficient for 3,200 police officers. The inconvenient truth for the Government is that 18,000 officers have gone and ever fewer are doing ever more, just when demand is growing. Coming to the point made by the right hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier), that is crucial in this respect: given the context in which this Bill has been introduced, our amendment 10 would block proposals to grant additional police volunteers until the Government have passed a police funding settlement that guarantees that funding to police forces will be protected in real terms. The Government said that it would be protected last November, but that is not true. We ask that it now be the case, rather than the phoney police promise that we heard from the Chancellor of the Exchequer last November.
Antoinette Sandbach
I am aware of the hon. Gentleman’s experience of south Wales and his knowledge of the cuts made to South Wales police by the police and crime commissioner. If he comes to Cheshire, he will see that there have been increases on the frontline in my constituency, where there is a Conservative police and crime commissioner. If he goes to mid-Wales, he will see that there have been increases on the frontline in Dyfed-Powys, where there is a Conservative police and crime commissioner. Surely, the two are not linked.
Jack Dromey
The interesting thing about what the hon. Lady says is that the current police funding formula skews funding away from metropolitan areas towards leafy Tory shires. Why is the west midlands hit twice as hard as Surrey? If we ask the police and crime commissioner for Surrey, we find that he agrees. To add insult to injury, the Government finally said, “We admit that the formula is unfair. We will change the formula,” which led to the omnishambles before Christmas when they had to abandon the proposed changes to the formula.
Sir Edward Garnier
I have been listening with deep fascination to the hon. Gentleman for the last 15 minutes or so, but he is yet to come to amendments 11, 12 or 13. Are there any arguments in support of those?
Jack Dromey
Absolutely. Under the current arrangements in the police service, there is an agreement between the Home Office, the National Police Chiefs Council, the College of Policing and the police staff unions that police support volunteers should bring additionality to the workforce but should under no circumstances replace or be a substitute for paid police staff. The Government claim that they have protected police funding and that they are not using the provisions to plug holes left in the workforce from funding reductions. If plugging gaps in our hollowed-out police service is not the Government’s aim in these ill-though-out proposals, there should be no reason whatsoever for them not to support amendment 10.
Kit Malthouse
The hon. Gentleman needs to realise that he is walking into a cul-de-sac, which may not be of his own making. Independent custody visitors are essentially police volunteers who visit custody suites, and a case could probably be made by a smart lawyer that they substitute for custody officers in their supervisory role. Are they the kind of people that he wants to get rid of?
I urge the hon. Gentleman to listen to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier). We have a duty in this House not to create Heath Robinson legislation. Amendments 11, 12, 13 and 10 seem to me to be an extraordinarily roundabout way to disagree with what the Government are trying to do through the previous amendments. Surely the hon. Member for Birmingham, Erdington (Jack Dromey) should simply vote against those amendments, rather than creating this Byzantine structure to negate what the Government are trying to do.
Jack Dromey
It is quite right, for reasons that I will come to, that those amendments have been tabled, but the amendment that we will press to a vote is amendment 10. As I have just said, the Government should not plug gaping gaps in the police service with volunteers; the police service should be properly funded in real terms. Not until that happens should the Government proceed with their proposals for a new generation of volunteers—for whom, as I will come on to say, there are no constraints thus far on what they might be able to do.
I turn to exactly that point: the proposal that there should be no limits in law on where the chief constable can place volunteers—no limits on the operational role that volunteers might play, including in some of the most vital, sensitive and demanding areas. The public will be rightly dismayed by the Government’s refusal to rule out the use of volunteers in tackling child sexual exploitation, terrorism and serious crime. There has been no clarity in the Government’s proposals thus far about the role that volunteers should play in those areas. We have asked for clarity, but none has been forthcoming.
I now turn to accountability in relation to volunteers. Under the Bill’s provisions, when police officers and special constables have been dismissed following disciplinary proceedings, their details will be added to the barred list held by the College of Policing, and chief officers will not be able to appoint anyone on the list as an officer, a member of police staff or a special constable. However, the Bill does not provide for volunteers dismissed for misconduct to be added to the barred list, which is why we sought to amend the Bill in Committee. Will the Minister explain what mechanisms are in place to ensure that volunteers who abuse their powers cannot serve again?
Andrew Gwynne
My hon. Friend is being generous in giving way. Does he not also suspect that, perhaps as an unintended consequence, this might place volunteers in very risky situations?
Jack Dromey
That is absolutely right. I will mention something similar in a moment. If we have volunteers—I again stress that there is a long and honourable tradition of volunteers working in and with our police service—we must, to be frank, go the extra mile to ensure that they are not subject to risk or harm. If they are ill-trained and there is no framework of accountability, issuing them with CS gas and leaving them to get on with it might lead to very serious consequences indeed, not just for members of the public but for the volunteers themselves.
Bob Stewart
Forgive me; my experience is not with the police, but I know very well that the police service, just like the armed services, would not issue CS gas or the like without very strict controls and very strict training. I am quite sure that volunteers would not be given any less training in the use of such chemicals in pursuit of their duty.
Jack Dromey
As the hon. Gentleman knows, I used to be chairman of the defence unions. I am proud of my long association with members of our armed forces, of which he was an admirable example. It is extraordinary—I have given some reasons for this, and I will come on to others—that there is no clarity about training and accountability. A proposal has simply been inserted in the Bill for volunteer PCSOs to be issued with CS gas and PAVA spray, which raises fundamental issues of concern. I suspect that if this was raised with members of the public in the hon. Gentleman’s constituency, they would say, as was the case in Hove and in my constituency at the weekend, “What planet are they living on?”
Sir Edward Garnier
If I can just bring the discussion back to this planet, I accept that the Labour party does not want volunteers to be able to enter our police system in the way proposed by the Bill, but where on earth does the hon. Gentleman get that idea? I hope he is just making it up as he goes along, because if he has thought about his arguments I am even more worried than I was a moment ago. Where in the Bill does it say that anybody is going to be handed a noxious substance such as CS gas or the other spray without adequate training? It defies belief that anyone with common sense would advance that argument, and it is even less likely that a consequence of the measure would be that they would not get that sort of training. It is just bananas.
Jack Dromey
The right hon. and learned Gentleman should put that question to his Front-Bench colleagues so that the concerns he has just expressed can be allayed. The concerns raised during detailed scrutiny of the Bill in Committee were heard but not acted on, and that is precisely why we are having this debate today.
On the principle of volunteers in the police service, I went out of my way to say at the beginning of this debate that there is a long and honourable tradition of excellent men and women serving as special constables and in neighbourhood watch teams. Had we won the election in May 2015, we had plans to enhance the role played by local people in having a local say over the policing of their local communities, including greater volunteering and co-operation with the police. The question is where we draw the line on what is and what is not appropriate. Perhaps I could visit the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s constituency and we could ask the first 100 people we meet, “What do you think of volunteer PCSOs being able to carry CS gas?” I suspect that I know the answer we would get.
Sir Edward Garnier
That, I respectfully suggest, is not a very clever question, because it is loaded to produce the answer that the hon. Gentleman wishes to receive. He is very fond of other volunteers, but he does not like clause 35 volunteers. If I asked anybody in his constituency or in mine, “What do you think about untrained people carrying shotguns, police weapons or CS gas?”, of course they would say that that was not very sensible, but the question removes reality from the practical application of the Bill. No volunteer within the ambit of clause 35 is going to be walking around Market Harborough, still less the hon. Gentleman’s own constituency, without having been properly trained in the use of the materials, weapons or instruments to which they will be given access. That is just plain silly, and I wish he would move on to something rather better.
Jack Dromey
I agree it is plain silly that the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s Front-Bench colleagues have not answered those questions. When they speak today and during the Bill’s subsequent stages, I have no doubt that he will pose those questions and say, quite rightly, that it would indeed be silly for something to happen without proper training or accountability. At the moment, for the reasons I have spelled out, that just is not in the Bill.
Antoinette Sandbach
Traditionally, matters such as training are not put in legislation, but that does not mean that they do not happen. There is no requirement to include training in the Bill, but it still goes on.
Jack Dromey
With respect, I disagree with the hon. Lady. If we look at the training received by the police, PCSOs and police staff, we see that there is guidance and that an agreement has been reached. The existing framework is very helpful, but as the Bill stands there is nothing for the new breed of volunteers that the Government seek to introduce. The hon. Lady might want to put that question to her own Front-Bench colleagues.
It is our very strong view that the use of CS gas and PAVA spray should be undertaken only by officers who are regularly trained in their usage and, importantly, in the law surrounding their use. In the words of Vera Baird:
“We have lost 861 police officers and 940 police staff since 2010 through government cuts which can’t be replaced by volunteers”.
She also said:
“many volunteers want to support the work of police officers—not to do their jobs for them. The use of CS gas and PAVA spray is something that should only be undertaken”
by sworn officers,
“who are regularly trained on their usage and importantly in the law surrounding their use”.
She is absolutely right. She went on:
“Rather than extending the role of volunteers, the Government needs to start funding police forces properly, to allow Chief Constables and Police and Crime Commissioners to recruit more police officers, who can go on the beat and serve local communities.”
The Government need to have a proper conversation with the police and the public about what they see as the acceptable use of force by volunteers, in a context in which institutions such as the Independent Police Complaints Commission have already raised serious issues about the use of force by fully trained warranted officers. With regard to that proper conversation, only today we received a briefing from the National Council for Voluntary Organisations, which has already said about the proposals in the Bill that
“the development of volunteering in policing needs to be driven by a clear vision and strategic direction”
and that the Government have not fully articulated
“what role the reforms will play in moving towards a different and improved model of policing beyond how it may offer forces greater flexibility and reduce costs.”
To return to the proposal on CS and PAVA, our police service has and needs the power to use force where necessary when carrying out its duty to protect the public. It is clear that the public understand that, and indeed, expect and rely upon it. However, under the UK’s tradition of policing by consent, they also expect that those who use force will be properly trained and qualified, and there will be proper accountability. The Government simply have not made the case for the proposal and we will therefore be voting against it.
I hope that, even at this late stage, the Government will listen to, for example, Winston Roddick, the chair of the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners, who said about the proposal:
“I have serious reservations about it... I think that the proposal raises points of principle about arming members of the public to do something by the use of arms, which goes further than the common law principle of acting in reasonable self-defence.”––[Official Report, Policing and Crime Public Bill Committee, 15 March 2016; c. 51, Q67.]
Bob Stewart
The hon. Gentleman—he is actually a friend of mine—and I both know that we arm members of the public in our reserve forces. With training, they do exactly the same on operations as any normal regular soldier, and they are sent on operations into really dangerous positions.
Jack Dromey
I am very familiar with what the hon. Gentleman has said. I am proud to have many friends who are reserves; they play a very important role in the armed forces. Crucially, they are properly trained and equipped, and work within a framework of accountability. That is exactly what has not been proposed—or at least spelled out—by the Government for volunteer PCSOs. That is precisely what we are seeking to draw out, and for that reason we will be voting against the Government’s proposals.
I will say one final thing on volunteering before I move on briefly to other provisions in the Bill. I return to what the NCVO has said; to be frank, it has captured our concern:
“The proposed approach to volunteering, through the creation of volunteer positions that are ‘equivalent’ to or ‘mirror’ paid roles, risks misunderstanding the nature of volunteering and the full contribution it can make. Rather than the language of equivalence we hope the government will recognise this and start to reflect a language of distinctiveness and complementarity. This will help ensure a more successful police volunteering programme.”
The NCVO is absolutely right that the Government have, in this respect, simply got it wrong.
I turn now briefly to other issues dealt with in Committee by my formidable colleague, my hon. Friend the Member for West Ham. Our new clause 21 and amendments 7, 8 and 9 would help to ensure full cost recovery of the licensing of guns. That is a crucial objective of the Gun Control Network. It is also a goal that the Government profess that they wish to achieve. In Committee, the Minister for Policing, Fire, Criminal Justice and Victims told us:
“We are as one on the fact that the taxpayer should not subsidise licensing.”––[Official Report, Policing and Crime Public Bill Committee, 12 April 2016; c. 259.]
We will hold him to his words, and so look for an assurance on when the Government will move to full cost recovery. We note that some forces are already moving in that direction. It cannot be right that an overstretched police service that has lost 18,000 police officers and 5,000 PCSOs should have to subsidise gun licences, and we look forward to the Minister’s response on that. He says that the e-commerce scheme will deliver full cost recovery, but we will see. Are we moving to full cost recovery, and when will that be achieved?
Several hon. Members rose—
Kit Malthouse
What an honour it is to be called before all these august Members!
In respect of amendments 11, 12, 13 and 10, I congratulate the hon. Member for Birmingham, Erdington (Jack Dromey) on manfully—or indeed womanfully—arguing what seems to be a lost cause; Conservative Members eloquently made the case that the proposals are nonsense.
Fundamentally, the hon. Gentleman is saying through his amendments that he does not trust a chief police officer to get right the architecture around volunteers used in their organisation. He is saying that a chief constable cannot be trusted to organise and train volunteers correctly—but if they cannot be trusted to do that relatively simple task, how can they be trusted to handle some of the risks that they face on a daily basis, even with their warranted force? As he considers these matters over the next couple of hours, I urge him to think about withdrawing his amendments and simply to vote against the Government’s amendments if he believes that to be right. His would be Heath Robinson legislation, as I said, and the House has a duty to keep things simple.
I am extremely supportive of new clause 1. As the hon. Gentleman said, the proliferation of knives, particularly these unpleasant zombie knives, has caused a huge problem, particularly in urban areas and especially in London. We have seen some tragic cases over the last two or three years. A while ago, as people will remember, there was some alarm about air rifles and air-powered weapons; as a result, the legislation on purchasing air rifles was changed so that they could not be bought other than face to face. Now, when someone buys an air rifle online, it has to be delivered by the firearms dealer, who has to verify, face to face on the doorstep, that the person is who they say they are and of the correct age, and that the weapon can be sold to them lawfully. Alternatively, there is a mutual network of firearms dealers operating in such a way that someone can buy from one and pick up from another, who will verify that person’s identity and age.
I am 6 feet 2 inches—nearly—and quite a big chap. I am much more frightened of zombie knives than of air rifles, so I urge the Government to look carefully at new clause 1. It would be a valuable addition to our armoury as we try to keep these weapons out of the hands of people who should not have them. Having said that, I do not think it would be a silver bullet—not much we do in the House is; many of these knives are bought on the dark web, where things are a little more amorphous, identities more difficult to find and things are often posted illegally. Many firearms are bought on the dark web and sent to the UK through the normal post, but the police are becoming quite sophisticated at picking them up, and the same could be true of knives. I therefore urge the Government to adopt the new clause.
I am similarly supportive of new clause 19, on flares at public events. They are not allowed at football matches any more, but elsewhere they often cause injury and terror—people, particularly children, are frightened of them—so it would be sensible to outlaw their use in those circumstances.
Finally, I will speak briefly—we are pressed for time—to new clause 17, which stands in my name. This is a probing amendment, as they say, and I have no intention, at this stage, of putting it to a vote, but I will give Members the back story because it might well appear in the other place.
Members might remember that three or four years ago City Hall ran a big campaign to get a disposal on to the books called “compulsory sobriety”, which manifested itself as alcohol abstinence monitoring orders made against people who have committed a crime where alcohol was a contributory factor. Essentially, an offender, rather than going to prison, which would mean losing their job and contact with their family, is sentenced to wear an alcohol-testing tag or bracelet that, for three, four or six months, tests their skin every 30 seconds to make sure they are not drinking. If they drink and the tag detects it, a signal is sent, the police apprehend them and they go back into the criminal justice system and might well get a custodial sentence. Effectively, the offender is in charge of their own custody.
These orders have been hugely successful in the United States. In South Dakota, where they started, there has been massive compliance and a drop in the number of people arrested for drink-driving and dying on the roads. I learned this morning that there has also been an increase in life span because there is less drinking. South Dakota is a big, flat state; there is not much to do except drink a lot and beat each other up, as in parts of this country. That was happening an awful lot, until these orders were introduced by the now famous prosecutor, Larry Long. They have changed the alcohol environment there entirely.
We managed to get the orders on the statute book here, and a pilot in Croydon over the last couple of years has resulted in a 93% compliance rate among offenders fitted with a tag and an extremely good reoffending rate—once someone has had three to six months off the booze, they do not tend to go back but instead learn the error of their ways. However, there is one aspect of the scheme in the states that we did not adopt but which they think is critical to its success: the ability to charge offenders for their own testing.
In the United States, when somebody is put on this disposal and they go to be tested, more often than not they appear twice a day at the police station, blow into a breathalyser and pay a buck, or a dollar, a test. Effectively, that is money that they would otherwise have spent on booze. From the point of view of the criminal justice system, that makes the scheme self-financing.
Sir Edward Garnier
I can see that my hon. Friend is on to a good thing here. As someone who has not sentenced anyone to this type of order but has sentenced people to the drug testing orders under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, I would like to ask whether this should be a compulsory requirement. Is it that the police “must” or “may” charge? If it is the former, I think my hon. Friend will find that many people who fall into this sentencing remit will be so chaotic, at least to start with, that they will not have the finances to be able to reimburse the state for the charge.
Kit Malthouse
My right hon. and learned Friend makes a valid point. However, these people are somehow financing an alcohol habit, so they are paying for alcohol. I think my right hon. and learned Friend would be surprised at the demographic of offenders. In the US, this was more often used for repeat drink-driving than anything else. In this country, repeat drink-driving is predominantly a crime of white, middle-aged, professional men; it is they who get done most for this offence. One hopes that they would indeed be able to afford to pay the cost.
My right hon. and learned Friend is, however, right that the proposal is that the police “may” charge. They do not have to. If a PCC believes it would be useful, they could apply to the Home Secretary to run a scheme on a charging basis and then decide on the charge. It might be 50p a day, a pound or £3—who knows? It will depend on the area and the level of offences committed.
Having this particular power adds two critical things to the scheme. First, one of the successes in the US is that the scheme gives offenders the notion that they are in control of their destiny. Every time they reach for a drink, they have to think about the consequences. That is why there is such high compliance—because people feel they are in control. At the same time, having to pay provides an even greater sense of ownership of the disposal. Offenders understand that this is a punishment; they understand that they have to take responsibility and finance the scheme themselves. It is essentially “the polluter pays”.
Secondly, although this disposal has been wildly successful in London and has spread to the rest of the capital, it took a lot of up-front Government funding to get the scheme out there. The Ministry of Justice had to put in £500,000 and the Mayor has done the same to get the facilities out and around town. If we want the disposal to spread so that other PCCs take it up, there needs to be a business case. Bluntly, I am a Conservative, and if there is a flow of income coming from this disposal to a PCC in a way no other disposal will allow, I believe PCCs would be more likely to use it and invest the money up front; they would know that the income would come in to finance it.
I realise that offenders paying for their own punishment would be a new departure for the British criminal justice system, but I think it could be useful given that alcohol abstinence monitoring orders are themselves a new departure. There may be some cultural difficulties. When I first proposed the disposal, I went to see my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), who was then Lord Chancellor. His first response was to say, “Good grief, you can’t stop people from having a pint!” I explained that if these people break somebody’s jaw or cause a crash because they have been driving drunk, of course we can. If we put them in prison, we stop them drinking. This was just a way of doing that, I explained, without incarcerating people. It is much cheaper, much quicker and, if the Government are kind enough to think about this new clause—perhaps following it up in the other place—the disposal could be self-financing and help to save a huge amount of money.
Andrew Gwynne
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse). I start by saying that I have always been supportive of the police; I was brought up to be. I can remember my mum telling me as a very young child that if I ever got lost the police were my friends and that I should always seek out a police officer, who would always try to find where my mum and dad were. That is hopefully an ethic that I have passed on to my own children. That, I think, is where we must start.
In this country, there is a degree of consensus about the nature of policing, because we have developed, over a long period, the concept of policing by consent. I think that Parliament, when passing legislation both here and in the other place, must do everything in its power to ensure that we do not move away from that important concept. A number of measures in the Bill deserve to be scrutinised properly before Parliament decides whether it is appropriate to extend the powers in the way that the Minister proposes.
Jake Berry
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right about the role that special constables play in our police force. They are vital to policing throughout the United Kingdom. Will he join me in calling on the Government, when the Bill goes to the other place, to consider extending the protection of the Police Federation to special constables, who cannot join the federation unless there is a change in primary legislation? I think that that would be a good way of ensuring that when special constables go out there and take risks, they benefit from the protection of a proper trade union.
Andrew Gwynne
I entirely agree. I am very proud that the headquarters of the Greater Manchester Police Federation are in the Reddish part of my constituency, in Stockport. The work that the federation does in supporting police officers is absolutely brilliant, and, as the hon. Gentleman says, it is crucial that we extend that support and protection to special constables. After all, they are doing the job of a police constable. When we talk about the role of volunteers, it is important for us to do so in the context of what we expect volunteers operating in the police service to do.
My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Erdington, who spoke passionately about these issues, was right to draw attention to the important role of the home watch. In all our constituencies there will be home watch schemes led by dedicated members of the public and volunteers, working alongside the police and police community support officers. They provide a vital connectivity between the community and the police service, which, even following the introduction of neighbourhood policing, is still considered by too many of our constituents to be fairly remote from public concerns. So I support volunteers being the eyes and ears of the police on the ground and in schemes such as home watch.
Also, in my constituency, we have some very dedicated volunteers manning the front desks at the few police stations that are still open. They are playing an important role in ensuring that continuity of service is provided to members of the public. We often hear Ministers talking about protecting the police frontline, but to a number of my constituents who have experienced police station closures and front desk closures, that actually was their frontline. That was where they could get face-to-face access to the police service when they needed it. Were it not for police volunteers in Dukinfield in my constituency, for example, that police front desk would have closed in the same way that ones at the Denton and Reddish police stations have done. Those closures are a retrograde step for the communities that I represent.
Bob Stewart
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that, when the public see a police officer, they simply see a police officer? They do not look at them and wonder whether they are volunteer police officers or not. Volunteers who man desks do not wear the uniform, but wearing the uniform immediately tells the public that someone is a police officer. They do not think, “Is that a reserve officer?” They think, “That is a police officer”, and that is great.
Andrew Gwynne
It is great, and I think that the hon. Gentleman is inadvertently making my case for me that we should not be giving CS gas to volunteers who are not wearing the police uniform. My point is that we already have volunteer police officers. They are called special constables and they have the full power of a police constable and wear the uniform of a police constable. They wear the uniform with pride and they volunteer with pride, and we should be supporting the extension of the special constable programme rather than extending powers to other volunteers, which I do not think is appropriate. I take the hon. Gentleman’s point that, when people see someone in a police uniform, they do not care whether they are a special constable or a paid member of the police force. They just see them as a police officer. There is an important distinction that we must consider in examining some of the powers that Ministers are proposing. That is why we need clarity from the Minister before we decide whether to support the extension of these powers. I sincerely urge Members to exercise caution before we extend them.
My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Erdington also mentioned the parliamentary police service scheme. I was pleased to be able to take part in that scheme back in 2007, when I was Parliamentary Private Secretary to the then Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith. That seems a long time ago now. Taking part in the scheme provided an invaluable insight into the work of the police. I was posted with my own police force, Greater Manchester police, although I was a bit gutted that I was unable to go out on the beat in my own constituency. I was told that that was in case the police ended up nicking any of my constituents. I was gutted because I had a long list of people I would have liked to call on. Leaving that aside, it really was an invaluable experience. I had not appreciated just how complex the police service in an area such as Greater Manchester is. Indeed, it was not really until the end of my experience on the police service scheme that I began to appreciate not only the complexity of the organisation but how it all fitted together.
I want to talk about one experience that really changed my view of the police. Before coming to this House as a Member of Parliament, when I was a local councillor in Tameside, and following my election to this place, I took the view that the police were a pretty remote service, because when my constituents needed them, they never seemed to call on them when they were expected to arrive. On one day, I called in at Oldham police station, where I was posted on the parliamentary scheme, and was to go out on response calls with a very dedicated police officer. We looked at the computer screen and 14 jobs were waiting for the police officer. We took the job at the top of the list, but just as we were about to set off, he received a call on the radio to go to the local hospital, because a girl—a teenager of a similar age to my eldest son—had been picked up by the police and it was suspected that she had been raped at a house party.
The police officer had received Nightingale training to deal with such cases, so we did not go to job No. 1 on the computer screen; we went to the hospital. It was inspirational to see the officer’s work. He was able to get the girl to open up and to get the necessary information out of her. The father in me wanted to bash the girl around the head and say, “What on earth were you doing at that house party instead of being at school where you should have been?” That is the paternal instinct, but the police officer was so caring, gentle and professional that he was able to get the information.
That story is relevant because I was back in my constituency that afternoon at a public meeting in Reddish and one of my constituents started complaining about a neighbourhood nuisance issue in the field at the back of her house. She had called the police at the time, but an officer did not come round. Indeed, the police officer did not come round until two days later. I had to gently remind that lady that she might have been job No. 1, No. 2 or No. 3 on the computer screen—it was in a different borough, but it is just an example—and that we might have been going to head out to her when the police officer got called off on Nightingale duty. I asked her, “If that was your granddaughter, what would you think was the most important job for that police officer to go to?” She conceded that it was to go and look after the girl in hospital rather than to come and see her. That is where the public’s perception of the police’s work is out of kilter with the real pressures on the police service, not just in Greater Manchester, but across the country, and that is why we must tread carefully when considering how we move away from the traditional policing models. The development of neighbourhood policing has been invaluable, and a move away from it would be a retrograde step.
I suspect that part of the reason that the Minister has come to the House to try to extend the powers of police volunteers is to fill the gap that the Government have created. I will provide an example from my constituency. Greater Manchester lost the equivalent of five officers every week over the course of 2015 and has lost 1,445 officers since the Government came to office, which has an impact on what the police service can provide. I appreciate that this is where the Government are trying to fill the gap with volunteers, but I ask them to think carefully about how they approach the matter. If their approach—it is not clear in the Bill—is that volunteers will be trained to become special constables, that is different from a member of the public, with good intentions no doubt, being taken on by a police force and trained to a certain level, but not actually becoming a police officer. That is what most people outside Parliament will be concerned about.
I will use another local example. Back in 1998, Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council—a Labour local authority —decided to complement the Labour Government’s neighbourhood policing team policy with a team of council officers called the Tameside patrollers. They were to be trained in a similar way to PCSOs, and were to wear a uniform that, although in Tameside council’s corporate colours, rather than the police colours, looked similar to a police uniform. They were also to work as part of the neighbourhood policing team.
Jake Berry
Will the hon. Gentleman accept that Parliament is not seeking to extend the power to volunteers? It is seeking to extend the power to chief constables to make the decision on whether volunteers should have CS or PAVA spray. How long does he think that a chief constable would be in office if someone—perhaps an accountant—came in to volunteer on a complicated fraud case and he said, “While you’re in here, take this CS gas spray.”? I think the hon. Gentleman is being unduly alarmist.
Andrew Gwynne
I would sooner be unduly alarmist than face a situation in the future where somebody may have been approved inappropriately to have this facility. It is the duty of Parliament to legislate well. We need to be much clearer in the Bill about what we intend so that there can be no ambiguity in respect of a chief constable in future. It should be perfectly clear what Ministers intend with regard to the use and the extent of this power.
All it would take is for the Minister slightly to amend and to clarify those points, and we might then have a different view. Unless the legislation that we pass is completely clear, and the intention is completely clear, we run the risk at some stage in the future of somebody who is inappropriate having that power extended to them.
Jake Berry
Is the hon. Gentleman seriously suggesting that Parliament should sit until the recess and come up with an exhaustive list of circumstances in which chief constables could use this power? Surely the appropriate thing to do is to trust our chief officers to use the power responsibly, which is exactly what this Bill does.
Andrew Gwynne
I hope that we would not have to face a situation in which chief constables inappropriately use the powers that the Government are seeking to extend to them, but it is our duty to legislate for a situation where that might be the case. I do not want, at some stage in the future, a chief constable to be all over the headlines of the national press because they have done something that they should not have done but to get out of that because the intention of the Act was not clear. All I am asking for is some clarity from the Minister. If we have to wait to get this right, the Government have the power to carry over legislation. Bills do not fall at prorogation if the Government want to carry them over. Actually, the Government could easily amend the Bill and clarify the point during the remaining stages.
Kit Malthouse
The hon. Gentleman is making a peculiar point. If he is saying that, essentially, we should not give chief constables a particular power because, at some point in the future, they may well fall foul of it or misuse it, then there are lots of other powers that we give chief constables to which he may wish to apply that rule. For instance, a chief constable is able to license a police officer to handle a firearm. If that firearm is used incorrectly, as we have tragically seen in the past, then the chief constable faces the consequences—whether that be legal consequences or otherwise. Does he think therefore that this principle that we cannot trust these highly trained and highly experienced chief constables to use their discretion should be applied to other perhaps more critical areas of their operation?
Andrew Gwynne
The hon. Gentleman has, inadvertently, made my case for me. He talks about extending firearms powers to police officers. That is the difference—he is talking about police officers. Chief constables are accountable for police officers. What we are talking about here is extending the use of CS gas to volunteers. We need to be very clear in the Bill what Parliament intends and how Parliament expects that power to be used. If the power is abused or misused, it is Parliament that will be at fault because it has not been clear about the fact that these are volunteers, not police officers.
I appreciate that other Members want to contribute to the debate. I return to the fundamental point about policing by consent. If we extend to volunteers, who are not warranted police officers in the form of special constables, powers that we would expect warranted police officers to be given, Parliament must be very careful and clear about the intention and the use of those powers, so that there are appropriate checks and balances if those powers are misused or abused, which we hope they will not be.
Several hon. Members rose—
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. We have seven more speakers, plus the Minister, so I am a little concerned that we will not get everyone in.
Mr David Burrowes (Enfield, Southgate) (Con)
I shall try to rattle through my contribution. I shall speak to my new clause 1, but first let me mention new clause 17. I welcome the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse) and pay tribute to his work as deputy mayor on championing alcohol abstinence and monitoring requirements. I did my bit in the Commons and in the Lords to ensure that the new clause eventually got on to the statute book and we need to make it have meaningful effect.
The evidence from what is happening in London, which is spreading, and the impact on the offender, not least as a result of the inconvenience of having to pay, is significant and supports the South Dakota model. That needs to be taken into account when the measure goes to the other place. There are those in the other place—Baroness Finlay and others—who champion the cause and who will look carefully at the evidence and give further impetus to cost-effective efforts to help those caught up in the cycle of alcohol-related offending.
I welcome the cross-party support for new clause 1 and the support from my hon. Friends the Members for St Ives (Derek Thomas), for Colchester (Will Quince), for South Thanet (Craig Mackinlay), for North West Hampshire, for Richmond Park (Zac Goldsmith), for Romford (Andrew Rosindell), for Congleton (Fiona Bruce) and for Altrincham and Sale West (Mr Brady). Some more recent supporters such as my hon. Friends the Members for Gower (Byron Davies), for Eastbourne (Caroline Ansell) and for Windsor (Adam Afriyie) did not quite make the cut last night to get their names on the amendment paper.
Over a number of years there has been support to ensure that knife crime legislation was fit for purpose and that it dealt properly with the issues of enforcement, recognising as do all of us who represent constituencies that have, sadly, been affected by knife crime, that much work is needed on prevention. I welcome the Government’s work over a number of years to ensure that we tackle knife crime both at its source and when it comes to court. I and a former Member, Nick de Bois, championed mandatory sentencing for repeat knife offending and I welcome the fact that that has now reached the statute book and is being implemented. We will continue to monitor that to ensure that it is implemented properly.
More needs to be done. No one can be complacent about the need to review legislation and to use the opportunities presented by the Bill to deal with knife crime. At 11 pm last night there was another incident of stabbing in the borough of Enfield, where a 28-year-old was stabbed twice in the abdomen and twice in the head in what was probably a gang-related incident. An off-duty police officer found the victim opposite Edmonton police station. The case reminds us of the impact of knife crime.
New clause 1 focuses on the sale of knives, particularly online sales, to those who are under age. I recognise that in some ways that is of marginal relevance. When I talk with police officers about gang crime, they explain that the easiest way for a youngster to obtain a knife is by getting one from the kitchen, or from someone else, or an adult might purchase it for them, so we have to recognise that there are other areas where we can tackle the prevalence of knives that would not be tackled by new clause 1.
Gerald Jones (Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney) (Lab)
According to the National Audit Office, police forces saw their funding from central Government fall by 25% in the previous Parliament. The Chancellor and the Home Secretary have been rebuked by the statistics watchdog for claiming in the November spending review that police funding would be protected in this Parliament. As my hon. Friend the shadow Policing Minister said, Sir Andrew Dilnot, chair of the UK Statistics Authority, noted that the budgets would be cut by £160 million in real terms between 2015-16 and 2016-17. The result is that 18,000 officers have been cut by this Government, 12,000 from the frontline. This has led to police forces being overstretched and struggling with the challenges that they face. In many areas, specialist teams are stretched, and sometimes being merged, leading to even more pressure on the frontline.
I oppose the Government’s attempts in this Bill to plug the holes that they have created in the workforce with volunteers. I recognise the excellent work done by special constables, as highlighted by many right hon. and hon. Members. Some weeks ago, I had the privilege of spending some night shifts with the Lambeth division as part of the police service parliamentary scheme. I was absolutely impressed by the dedication, commitment and professionalism of all the specials I met in having to deal with fighting, robbery, assault and a range of all sorts of offences during those shifts. For many years, my own father was a special constable in south Wales, so I absolutely appreciate the role played within the policing family by special constables, as well as the other volunteers who work to support the police through neighbourhood watch, police and crime panels, and a range of other roles. However, there is a big difference between volunteers bringing additionality to the police workforce and volunteers acting as replacements for paid police staff.
One of the most concerning results of police cuts has been the reduction of in the number of neighbourhood policing teams. Under the Labour Government, we saw significant investment in local policing teams. That had a really positive impact in reducing crime, building rapport with local communities, and raising awareness and visibility. Sadly, we are witnessing the loss of local neighbourhood policing, and that is a huge backward step.
Peter Kyle (Hove) (Lab)
My hon. Friend is making an incredibly powerful point about the importance of neighbourhood and community policing. Does he agree that the other important aspect is stability for our economy? Increasingly, particularly in constituencies such as mine in the far south of England, high numbers of self-employed people are working at home and therefore need stability in order to boost our economy and retain economic growth within the community where a lot of our economic activity now takes place. It is not just about personal harm; it is about economic stability as well.
Gerald Jones
My hon. Friend makes a good point that I fully agree with. Unfortunately, across the country we are seeing the loss of the neighbourhood policing that has grown over the past 10 or15 years or so. That is a very retrograde step.
Jim McMahon (Oldham West and Royton) (Lab)
Failsworth in the borough of Oldham had one of the borough’s reassurance projects, which were the forerunners of the model of neighbourhood policing that we all see and respect today. The police station in that area is now closed. There is not a single custody cell in the whole borough of Oldham, and there are only two PCSOs left in the township, one of whom is likely not to be there if the cuts continue. The seven neighbourhoods that were in the borough of Oldham have now changed so that they stretch from Manchester’s city boundaries all the way through to Saddleworth and towards Huddersfield. That is not a neighbourhood, by anybody’s standards.
Gerald Jones
My hon. Friend makes a good point. As a local councillor, I spent many years working with the neighbourhood policing team in my communities, organising monthly advice surgeries and working with the team to resolve issues that were brought up. Cases that we as local councillors come across often have a two-pronged effect: are they a policing issue or a council issue? Very often, issues cut across both. The ability of elected local councillors to work with local neighbourhood policing teams has had a positive impact on solving crime that was, in some cases, low level, but that often led to bigger issues brewing if it was not resolved at an early stage. Local neighbourhood policing is essential to resolve community tensions, bring communities together and act as that visible part of policing that, unfortunately, we came to take for granted but that is no longer there in the way it once was. The Government should fund police forces properly and allow police and crime commissioners and chief constables to recruit more police officers to be visible on our streets, and to have the positive impact on crime that we became used to under the previous Labour Government.
Antoinette Sandbach
In fact, those people are community support officers, not police community support officers. Policing is not devolved to the Welsh Assembly Government, so the position is that they are community support officers. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Swansea East (Carolyn Harris), who is speaking from a sedentary position, might want to check that. The Welsh Assembly Government do not have devolved powers over policing or justice.
Gerald Jones
I accept that the Welsh Assembly Government do not have power over policing, but there is no difference between the 500 PCSOs that the Welsh Government fund—they are part of the policing family—and other PCSOs. They are certainly not what is being proposed in the Bill; they are paid police community support officers who work in communities across Wales. Sadly, because of the Conservative cuts, the number of PCSOs has been drastically reduced elsewhere. Wales is the only area where PCSO numbers have increased, and I am thankful that I represent a Welsh constituency where that is the case. I close by asking the Minister to confirm whether she expects the volunteers to plug the gap that the Government have created by cutting the number of PCSOs.
Geoffrey Clifton-Brown
You have caught me out of my place, Mr Deputy Speaker, but I am sure that what I have to say will still be perfectly valid.
Geoffrey Clifton-Brown
I probably did. I start by drawing attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I am the chairman of the all-party group on shooting and conservation, and I am a shotgun and firearms certificate holder. I have tabled several amendments that are technical, so I will take them slowly. They have the support of the British Shooting Sports Council, the Countryside Alliance and the British Association for Shooting and Conservation. Those associations cover very large numbers of lawful certificate holders.
I rise to speak to new clauses 7, 8 and 9 and amendment 1. New clause 7 has three purposes. First, subsections (2) and (3) relate to expanding ammunition. Expanding ammunition is required under the Deer Act 1991 and the Deer (Firearms etc.) (Scotland) Order 1985 to shoot deer, and it is the humane option for pest control and humane dispatch. It is therefore widely possessed. Certificates are rendered more complex by the inclusion of the additional authority to acquire and possess it. Expanding ammunition is also safer than fully jacketed ammunition, being less prone to ricochet.
It is my understanding that the National Police Chiefs Council has asked for a revision of this provision. Currently, special authority has to be given on a firearms certificate for the possession of expanding ammunition, which requires additional administration for the police. The new clause would simplify the licensing process, save resources for the police and facilitate the movement of such ammunition for the trade. Moving expanding ammunition back to section 1 of the Firearms Act would reduce the administrative burden. It is also illogical to have a type of ammunition that is banned by one Act, but required to be used by another.
Secondly, subsection (4) of my new clause 7 would replace the existing section 7(1) of the 1968 Act to address an anomaly in the Act as regards section 7 permits. The insertion of words “or authority” would extend section 7 temporary permits to cover section 5 items held on a firearms or shotgun certificate. That would help in a variety of circumstances when temporary possession has to be authorised—for example, when there are firearms or ammunition among a deceased person’s effects that have to be disposed of by the executors.
Thirdly, subsection (5) of new clause 7 would clarify the law with regard to certificate renewals, and replicate the provision in Scottish legislation that ensures that the possession of firearms remains lawful when there is a delay in renewal. This has happened to me. An application may be made to the police in good time, but because of the number of certificates that the police have to inspect and then decide whether to grant, they do not actually renew the certificate on time. Unless they issue a section 7 temporary permit, the person holding the firearms or shotguns is doing so illegally because the certificate has not been renewed. I therefore suggest the adoption of the Scottish solution.
A recent freedom of information request to all police forces in England and Wales has shown that there has been a substantial increase in the number of section 7 temporary permits issued during the past five years. For example, the number of permits issued in Hampshire has increased by over 15 times, from 79 in 2010 to 1,205 in 2015. It should also be noted that some of the police forces inspected by Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary have failed to issue a section 7 temporary permit to individuals whose certificates have expired, placing those individuals in an illegal situation through no fault of their own. Of the 11 police forces inspected by HMIC, between one and 168 firearms holders were currently in that category in each police force area. Simply by deeming the existing certificate to be in force until it is renewed by the police would reduce the administrative burden on them, and not place the individual certificate holder in the invidious position of holding illegal firearms.
New clause 8 would extend Home Office club approval to cover section 1 shotguns and long-barrelled pistols used for target shooting at clubs approved by the Home Office. These clubs are very strictly vetted. They may possess firearms for the use of their members, who may temporarily possess one another’s firearms. This allows the club to instruct new members in safety and shooting skills, as it is required to do under its licence, and for a range officer to take possession of a firearm on the range in the event of a problem.
At present, the Home Office may approve target shooting clubs to use only rifles or muzzle-loading pistols. Long-barrelled pistols and section 1 shotguns are increasingly popular for target shooting, but because of the limitations placed on firearms for which Home Office approval may be given, only the person—this is the critical bit in relation to new clause 8—on whose firearms certificate the long-barrelled pistol or shotgun is entered may use it at the club. This has adverse consequences in that clubs may not possess such arms for the use of members, and may find that the possession stricture makes safety instruction difficult and, critically, prevents range officers from taking control of such firearms should there be a problem. For example, if the weapon jams or, even worse, if something serious, such as a heart attack, strikes the user of the firearm, the range officer in the club cannot lawfully take possession of the firearm. New clause 8 seeks to amend that provision.
New clause 9 addresses the problem caused by the term “occupier” in relation to the borrowing of a shotgun without a shotgun certificate under section 11(5) of the Firearms Act 1968, and the borrowing of a rifle without a firearm certificate under section 16(1) of the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988. I will cut a lot of verbiage from my explanation of the new clause by illustrating it with an example. Suppose, Mr Deputy Speaker, that I invite you to shoot on my shoot and I am the occupier. If you bring a friend, he can borrow my gun, because I am the occupier, but he cannot borrow your gun, because you are not the occupier, even though you might be a lawful certificate holder.
Recent inquiries made to police forces suggest a lack of clarity as to how the term “occupier” is understood, but it is construed narrowly. The organisations that I have mentioned carried out a survey. When asked under a freedom of information request for their definition of “occupier”, the majority of police forces relied on guidance. Sussex police force replied that “occupier” meant
“either the owner of the land or the person possessing the sporting (shooting) rights over the land”.
The Durham police force, however, defined “occupier” as
“an owner, lessee or authorised person over the age of 18 years who holds a firearm certificate and who owns or is responsible for land that has rights of hunting, shooting, fishing or taking game”.
Those two examples make it crystal clear how different police forces construe the meaning of the word “occupier”.
The Law Commission’s scoping consultation concluded the following on the lack of definition:
“It has been reported to us by a number of stakeholders that this provision poses real problems in practice for shooting enthusiasts. This is because it inconsistently limits this very temporary, restricted loan of shotguns, with the result that some novices wishing to shoot are arbitrarily forced to take out shotgun certificates in their own names”.
By simply replacing the word “occupier” with
“the owner, occupier or authorised person”,
anyone granted a lawful certificate by the local constabulary would become the authorised person. The new clause deals with the anomaly.
Moving rapidly on to my amendment 1, this Bill will give the Home Office the right to produce statutory guidance by which the police will have to abide, but the shooting organisations fear that they will not be consulted as part of that process. That would be monstrously wrong, because the thousands of lawful certificate holders would not have a say in that guidance. My amendment simply states that other organisations must be consulted on that statutory guidance.
I would like to spend 30 seconds on the Opposition’s amendments on full cost recovery. If they look carefully at the work of the fees working group, they will see that all the organisations, including the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Home Office and the shooting organisations, agreed that the system allows for full cost recovery. Put simply, the police must adopt the new, computerised efficiency systems to give them those reductions in costs. Unfortunately, not all constabularies are complying with that new e-commerce system. I ask the Minister to encourage all 42 constabularies to adopt the system so that they can get the maximum efficiencies and keep their costs to the lowest possible level. That would benefit all certificate holders. Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker, for allowing me this opportunity.
Nigel Adams (Selby and Ainsty) (Con)
I want to speak to new clause 19, which appears in my name and those of many right hon. and hon. Members from parties on both sides of the House. Members may recall my promotion of a ten-minute rule Bill on the subject in question a couple of weeks ago, so I hope they will indulge me while I provide a quick summary.
My new clause seeks to ban those attending live music events from carrying or using flares, fireworks or smoke bombs. In 2014 there were 255 incidents involving such items, which can be very dangerous as they can burn at temperatures of up to 2,000 °C. Although we are lucky that no one in this country has died from such incidents recently, such deaths have occurred elsewhere in the world, so we should try to act now to prevent that from happening here.
Antoinette Sandbach
I rise to add my support to new clauses 7, 8 and 9. In particular, it is important that people who are not seen as a risk when holding firearms—I declare that I hold a shotgun certificate—do not suddenly become a risk overnight because their certificate has expired. New clause 7, and particularly subsection (5), is a sensible amendment to firearms legislation.
If an application to renew a certificate has been received by the local firearms team but it has been unable to deal with it in time, it seems wrong that members of the public who have exercised their responsibilities appropriately and within the terms of their licence should be criminalised overnight by the failure of the police force to deal with that application in time. I urge the Minister to take that into account. New clause 7 would make matters administratively simpler for the police, and avoid unnecessarily criminalising people who have otherwise done nothing wrong.
Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend agree that in that situation, one way forward that the shotgun licence holder is given is to apply for a temporary permit? Yet that application is made to the same firearms department, which is already overburdened with work, and it requires the same amount of work as issuing a permanent permit. We need some mechanism such as that proposed in the new clause.
Antoinette Sandbach
I totally agree. The new clause would remove that unnecessary duplication of effort and allow the police to concentrate on getting through a backlog of licence renewals, or processing them quickly and effectively.
Let me highlight some of the anomalies behind new clause 9. As a landowner I could lend somebody a gun that is lawfully in my possession and that I am authorised to hold. Many children are taught to walk around with unloaded guns for many years, so that they learn how to use shotguns safely. Those guns are never loaded, but children are taught how to carry one, how to keep other people safe, and how to cross fences. That is a valuable part of training, and it makes a nonsense of the current unclear legislation on the term “occupier”—my hon. Friend the Member for The Cotswolds (Geoffrey Clifton-Brown) spoke about how different police forces interpret that term, which indicates that there is something of a postcode lottery regarding where someone lives and how the law is applied.
The new clause brings much needed clarity to the process, and I urge the Minister to consider taking the matter further. If he cannot accept the new clause today, perhaps he will commit to it being considered in the other place. It is clear that these new clauses do not involve further risk—or indeed any risk—to the public.
The hon. Member for Birmingham, Erdington (Jack Dromey) mentioned the police funding formula. In many areas, rural policing is like rural schooling and delivery of services. The policing formula does not support delivery of policing in rural areas—indeed, it tends to favour metropolitan areas. I have many examples of that. I know from previous experience that North Wales police were underfunded by £25 a head. It would be quite wrong, therefore, to give the impression that the leafy shires are better funded than metropolitan areas; that simply is not the case. The difference, particularly in Dyfed–Powys or indeed Cheshire, has been the way the PCC has allocated resources to frontline policing.
Jack Dromey
With the greatest respect, I have to correct the hon. Lady. If we compare metropolitan forces with areas such as Surrey, Sussex and Hampshire, we will see that the evidence is stark. In addition, after the debacle over the police funding formula, proposals were made for transition arrangements, but all the emphasis has been on helping Conservative areas, which cannot be right.
Antoinette Sandbach
I simply do not accept that. The “damping” provisions have ensured that metropolitan areas have had substantially more funding, and rurality is not adequately accounted for in the funding formula to reflect the difficulty of policing often very large areas. After all, communities in rural areas deserve to be policed in exactly the same way and to have the same support and cover as those in metropolitan areas. I want to correct the impression that that is not the case.
In Cheshire, the PCC’s approach to services has led to a substantial increase on the frontline in the number of warranted officers. PCCs are making choices about where to allocate resources, but the examples from Cheshire and elsewhere, such as Dyfed–Powys, show that we can protect frontline services and even increase frontline policing using the funding settlements made over the last few years. The examples are out there, and I invite members of the public to check them out.
Karen Bradley
I start by joining the hon. Member for Birmingham, Erdington (Jack Dromey) in paying tribute to the right hon. Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham) and his work to expose the tragedy at Hillsborough. I also pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, who instigated the coroner’s inquiry and made sure we had the inquest. Had it not been for her work, we would not be here today with the unlawful killing judgment that we are all grateful for.
I agree with the hon. Gentleman that the Committee was good natured. There was a great deal of agreement and consensus, and where there was agreement—and even where there was not—the debate was good natured. I must, however, take issue with some of his points. We had a bit of a debate during his contribution about crime, but the figures are clear: since 2010, crime is down. He is right, however, that reported crime is up, and that is good news. We want victims to come forward and we want the police to believe them. We want to ensure that when a crime has been committed, it is reported and recorded, so that we have the best possible chance of catching the criminal and bringing them to justice.
The hon. Gentleman talked about the changing face of crime and seemed to imply that the Bill had failed. I hope he will acknowledge that the Investigatory Powers Bill, currently in Committee, deals with many of his points about the changing face of crime. He is right that there are new ways criminals can attack us and get to us.
Before the internet, a criminal simply could not get to somebody sitting in Leek, in my constituency of Staffordshire Moorlands, or to Joe and Josephine Soap in The Dog and Duck in Erdington, who we have heard much about in our debates. They could simply not get to those people from places such as the far east, eastern Europe and so forth. Now, thanks to the internet, they can. The internet has provided a great opportunity, but it also means that criminals have access to that opportunity. I believe that the Investigatory Powers Bill being debated upstairs addresses many of the points that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Erdington raised.
Jack Dromey
May I briefly intervene in support of new clause 1? There is no doubt that welcome steps have been taken, but what the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate (Mr Burrowes) and others have proposed, with cross-party support, is the imposition of clear obligations and responsibilities, in law, to which those engaged in the selling and provision of knives must be held. Are the Government rejecting that approach?
Karen Bradley
The law is clear. Selling a knife to anyone under 18 is against the law, and anyone who does so is breaking the law. What we are seeking is the best way in which to ensure that that responsibility is upheld and there is appropriate enforcement of the law, and that means ensuring that retailers adhere to the code of practice. It is a voluntary code of practice, but we want the onus to be on the retailer rather than on the Government. The key issue is effective implementation and enforcement of the law as it exists. My hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate pointed out that such matters are not generally covered by primary legislation, and tend to be dealt with in, for instance, codes of practice. I shall be happy to look into whether there are suitable ways of enabling the code to be implemented by prosecution services or others, and I will keep my hon. Friend apprised of developments.
Let me now deal with the new clauses relating to firearms which were tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for The Cotswolds (Geoffrey Clifton-Brown) and supported by my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury. I think that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier) has left the Chamber, but I sensed that he was about to support them as well.
The purpose of the firearms provisions in the Bill is to close the most pressing loopholes in the current legislation, which are open to exploitation by criminals. The Government accept that firearms legislation needs a general overhaul, but our priority must be to address the issues that pose the greatest risk to public safety. The Law Commission recommended that firearms legislation be codified, and we are giving careful thought to the case for that. We may be able to consider some of the proposals in new clauses 7, 8 and 9 as part of such an exercise. The provisions in the Bill have been subject to detailed consideration and consultation by the Law Commission, unlike the proposals presented by the British Shooting Sports Council. We need to think carefully about the impact on public safety before legislating on any of these matters, and I assure my hon. Friend that we will do just that.
Geoffrey Clifton-Brown
With great respect to my hon. Friend, it sounds as though she is shunting my new clauses into the very long grass, which would simply not be acceptable to the millions of lawful holders of firearms and shotguns. There will be a great deal of pressure on my hon. Friend. Will she please assure us that she is not shifting this into the very, very long grass?
Karen Bradley
I can assure my hon. Friend that that is not the case. I understand that he had a productive meeting with officials yesterday to discuss his new clauses. As I have said, our No. 1 priority must be to promote public safety, but I accept that we also need an efficient licensing regime that minimises bureaucracy and inconvenience both to the police and to legitimate holders of firearms certificates. We will study my hon. Friend’s new clauses further, and if there are elements that can sensibly be taken forward without our compromising public safety, I shall be happy to look into whether it might be possible to do that in the Bill. I will keep my hon. Friend informed of progress in advance of the Committee stage in the other place.
I recognise that amendment 1 is intended to enable those with practical expertise to contribute to the development of the guidance to the police. We will consult widely on the first edition of the new statutory guidance, and that consultation will consider the views of shooting organisations as well as of the police. However, this is not a matter for legislation.
The hon. Member for West Ham (Lyn Brown) has tabled amendments relating to firearms fees. Currently, combined, the authorisation and licensing of prohibited weapons, shooting clubs and museums cost the taxpayer an estimated £700,000 a year. It is our intention that licence holders, not the taxpayer, should pay for the cost of the service. The proposed fees will be set out in a public consultation and the Government must consider any evidence put forward about the impact of the fees on particular categories of licence holders. I cannot pre-empt the consultation but, for example, organisations in the voluntary or civil society sector might put forward a case.
Fees for firearms and shotgun certificates issued by the police are separate and were increased in April 2015. Those were the first increases since 2001. My hon. Friend the Member for The Cotswolds talked about the police’s new online e-commerce system. Once that has been introduced across all 43 forces, fees will recover the full cost of licensing.
Jack Dromey
I have a very quick question for the Minister. Is she therefore giving us an assurance that we are moving to full cost recovery, and that never again will the police have to subsidise the cost of issuing gun licences?
Karen Bradley
Yes. I understand that the Minister for Policing, Fire, Criminal Justice and Victims will write to Opposition Front Benchers with further information when we have further details of the consultation.
My hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse) has tabled new clause 17 on the question of sobriety orders. He and I had a good discussion on this yesterday, and I am keen to explore the areas that he has talked about. He has rightly made the point that it is currently not possible to make offenders pay for the cost of their tags, and to do so would represent a departure from what we are doing in other parts of the criminal justice system. So, if he will allow me, I would like to explore the matter further, check for any unintended consequences and other points and perhaps continue to discuss the issue with him so that we can ensure that we get this measure right if it is appropriate to introduce it.
My hon. Friend the Member for Selby and Ainsty (Nigel Adams) tabled new clause 19, and I want to start by praising him. He should take great pride in having identified a real gap in the law. He is quite right to say that we do not want to see hundreds of young people—and perhaps not-so-young people—at festivals being maimed by flares. The Government fully support the intention behind the new clause but we need to be sure that there would be no unintended consequences.
It is for that reason that the Home Secretary and I have agreed with my hon. Friend to work together to table a Government amendment on this issue in the other place. I can assure him that when the Bill is enacted, such an amendment will be on the face of the legislation. I can also assure him that we will work to ensure the timely implementation of the amendment so that the law is in force by the time of next year’s festival season. I think I picked up some references in his contribution to a great artist who passed away last week. I can assure him that, at next season’s festivals, people will be able to party like it’s 1999.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 31 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 32
Police volunteers: inspection
‘(1) In section 54 of the Police Act 1996 (appointment and functions of inspectors of constabulary), in subsection (7) (as inserted by section 34), after paragraph (a) insert—
“(aa) persons designated as community support volunteers or policing support volunteers under section 38 of the Police Reform Act 2002;”
(2) In Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996 (further provision about Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary), in paragraph 6D (as inserted by section 33), after sub-paragraph (1A)(c) insert—
“(ca) a person designated as a community support volunteer or a policing support volunteer under section 38 of the Police Reform Act 2002;”.’.—(Karen Bradley.)
This new clause makes provision about how the law relating to police inspections under the Police Act 1996 applies to those designated as community support volunteers or policing support volunteers under section 38 of the Police Reform Act 2002. The amendment of section 54 clarifies that inspections of police forces may include inspections of designated volunteers. The amendment of Schedule 4A is related to amendment 48 and means that designated volunteers served with a notice under paragraph 6A of that Schedule requiring the provision of information have no right of appeal against the notice (and, hence, are in the same position as constables serving with a police force and civilian staff designated under section 38 of the 2002 Act).
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
Policing and Crime Bill
Wednesday 26th October 2016
(8 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 55-II(b) Amendments for Committee, supplementary to the second marshalled list (PDF, 62KB) - (26 Oct 2016)
Lord Rosser
“Statutory duty on flooding
The Secretary of State shall make provision for the fire and rescue services in England to lead and co-ordinate the emergency service response to—(a) rescue people trapped, or likely to become trapped, by water; and(b) protect people from serious harm, in the event of serious flooding.”
Lord Rosser (Lab)
My Lords, the amendment requires the Secretary of State to make a statutory provision for the fire and rescue services in England to lead and co-ordinate the emergency service response to serious flooding.
Part 2 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 sets out the statutory core functions of fire and rescue authorities: fire safety, firefighting, and rescuing people and protecting them from harm in the event of road traffic accidents. The 2004 Act also gives the Secretary of State the power to give fire and rescue authorities functions relating to other emergencies, including outside the fire and rescue authority’s area. This is an order-making power and does not require primary legislation.
There is thus no statutory duty on the fire and rescue services for emergencies arising from flooding, yet flooding is on the increase. Government figures show that in 2007 there were 14,000 flooding calls; in 2011-12 there were 16,000; and in 2013-14 there were 18,000. I also sense that the extent of flooding is becoming more serious. The Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service said that on Boxing Day last year it deployed two-thirds of its available resources on flood response. The 2008 Pitt review into the 2007 floods said that a statutory duty would be beneficial and recommended that the Government should urgently put in place a fully funded national capability for flood rescue, with fire and rescue authorities playing a leading role underpinned as necessary by a statutory duty.
The case for a statutory duty on the fire and rescue services is now stronger than it was in 2008, with more and more flood calls but fewer staff, less equipment and fewer fire stations. In parts of the United Kingdom there is already a statutory duty on flooding, namely in Scotland since April 2013 and Northern Ireland since January 2012. A statutory duty would assist in adding to the resilience of fire and rescue services when faced with flooding, assist with strategic planning between fire and rescue services and local resilience forums, and underscore the need to resource fire and rescue services specifically for flooding.
The Government’s approach to date appears to be that there is no need for a statutory duty because the fire and rescue services will turn up as necessary anyway even though it is not a statutory core function. On the basis of that argument one might as well remove all the existing statutory core functions of the fire and rescue services on the basis that they will turn up anyway. The reality is that additions are made to statutory functions to reflect changing circumstances.
The fire service has been rescuing people from road traffic crashes for decades, but it was felt that a statutory duty was needed and the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 addressed that. The fire service had been providing fire protection for centuries, but a statutory duty was introduced in 1947. Now is surely the time to introduce a statutory duty on flooding to reflect and recognise the vastly increased role of the fire and rescue services in this area of emergency provision. The Government talk about the need to reform our emergency services and bring them up to date. Perhaps the Government need to do the same for the statutory functions of the fire and rescue services. I beg to move.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, while I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, on a statutory core function or a statutory duty on flooding for the fire and rescue service, we are a little concerned about the wording of his amendment which reads:
“The Secretary of State shall make provision for the fire and rescue services in England to lead and co-ordinate the emergency service response”.
It is accepted practice among all the emergency services that the police co-ordinate during the emergency phase of any emergency, whether flooding or anything else, partly because there is a duty on the police to investigate. For example, one can imagine a scenario where flooding is caused by a criminal act. It is generally accepted practice and has been for many years that the police service should lead and co-ordinate in every emergency situation. That is slightly different from what the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is saying in terms of the fire and rescue services having a statutory core function or duty but we do not believe that that should be to lead and co-ordinate in the case of flooding.
The Earl of Erroll (CB)
My Lords, I know nothing about this but a question suddenly occurred to me. If this is a statutory duty that these services are undertaking, will this help them secure funding to do it properly?
The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)
My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, I recognise the sterling work and professionalism of the fire and rescue authorities in providing a brilliant service to the various communities during the significant number of flooding incidents, especially in December and January. The noble Lord talked about the Greater Manchester FRA, to which I pay full tribute. When I visited some of the affected areas, such as Rochdale, Salford and Bury over the new-year period, there was clearly effort from not just the community and police but the fire and rescue service. It provided fantastic input into what was a very successful operation in clearing up various areas.
It is clearly important that a timely and co-ordinated response is provided at these critical incidents. A number of agencies are involved generally in rescuing people from floods, particularly in coastal areas, including the Royal National Lifeboat Institution and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, as well as fire and rescue authorities and the local charitable organisations that play a vital part in many communities. However, direction rests with local resilience forums for local responders to work out the arrangements that work best in their area. Often, this will be the fire and rescue authority but there may be many valid reasons—as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, outlined—why they might choose a different responder in different circumstances and if that works locally. We do not want to reduce this flexibility with a one-size-fits-all approach as there may be good reasons why, in some areas and on some occasions, it makes more sense for a different responder to take the lead. The fact that two noble Lords have slightly different views on how that might be is proof of that.
I will give an example. During and in the direct aftermath of serious flooding, it has been vital for other agencies including voluntary groups to provide services to protect people from serious harm and to distribute clean water to those affected. Depending on the extent of the incident, it may be necessary for the Royal Air Force to take a major role, as with the flooding in 2007 when it deployed Sea King helicopters from as far afield as Cornwall, Anglesey and Yorkshire for the rescue of 120 people. There are advantages to a permissive, multi-agency regime where responders have broad powers and local discretion rather than a prescriptive duty for flooding or indeed any other type of critical incident we can identify. There is no question that fire and rescue authorities have the power they need to respond to floods. They have responded to all major flooding events and usually provide the most resources.
I welcome the scrutiny that this amendment provided of the arrangements for the emergency services’ response to flooding. To answer the brief question from the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, in terms of something being on a statutory footing, yes, it would necessitate a funding stream. However, for the reasons I have given and from the experiences I have had, I believe that the existing regime with broad, permissive powers gives both fire and rescue authorities and local resilience forums the flexibility they all need. On that note, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Rosser
I thank noble Lords who contributed to this short debate, and the Minister for her response. I think she said that the fire and rescue services did respond to all major flooding events, which is certainly my understanding of the situation.
It seems a little odd that even if there may be objections to the precise wording of our amendment, there is no willingness to write in a statutory duty and function in respect of flooding for our fire and rescue services. We know that they play a key role. If I understood the Minister correctly she indicated that, if this was on a statutory footing, the fire and rescue services would of course have to be provided with the resources to carry out that activity. Bearing in mind the issues that fire and rescue services face over resources, one has a suspicion that one reason for the reluctance of government to go down this road may be that it would require that commitment of resources, even though the Government have acknowledged that the fire and rescue services do respond to all major flooding events. Obviously, I am disappointed with the Government’s reply but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)
My Lords, as the way in which policing is delivered evolves, it is important that the powers and remit of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary also evolve to ensure that it remains able to inspect and report on the totality of policing.
As forces rightly place an increasing emphasis on collaboration between emergency services, certain policing functions, such as answering 999 calls, may be delivered by employees of other emergency services without any formal contractual arrangements in place. HMIC must be able to require access to information and premises from these other services when they are related to the delivery of policing functions. That is what these amendments will achieve.
Amendments 165 and 166 extend the definition of a police force for the purposes of an inspection to include non-policing bodies delivering policing functions, even where there is no formal contract in place. In keeping with the scheme provided for in the Bill, such other persons delivering policing services would not be able to appeal against an information notice served on them by HMIC. Amendments 123 and 164 give HMIC and the new inspectors of fire and rescue authorities access to premises in which other services are delivered alongside those that they are inspecting; for example, HMIC would be able to access premises shared by a police force and a fire and rescue service.
I trust the Committee will agree that these are sensible refinements of the inspection provisions in the Bill. I beg to move.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, if I say this at the beginning of the afternoon, I hope I will not have to repeat it, but I declare an interest as having been a member of the police service for 30 years. In moving Amendment 124, I will also speak to the other amendment in this group, Amendment 127.
Clause 12 allows a police and crime commissioner—or the Mayor’s Office for Policing And Crime in relation to the Metropolitan Police district, or the Common Council in relation to the City of London police area—to choose to take on direct responsibility for receiving and recording complaints against the police and keeping the complainant informed of progress.
The problem here is that this may further confuse the public about who they should complain to. People are already unsure whether they should complain to a local police station, to the IPCC or to a third party. This change will inevitably mean that in some parts of the country, the complaint needs to be made to the police and crime commissioner—the local policing authority, to use a generic term—who will then deal with the complaint and keep the complainant informed. In other cases, it will be the police service itself, depending on whether the local policing authority takes up the offer provided by the legislation to take on the handling of complaints.
The idea of giving local policing authorities responsibility for complaints against the police, as opposed to the chief officer, is a good one. It will introduce a further element of independence into the police complaints system, but allowing local policing authorities simply the option—and indeed allowing local policing authorities to be persuaded by their chief constable not to take responsibility away from her or him—appears to me to be a fudge. Indeed, the more a chief constable tries to persuade his or her PCC not to take away the responsibility, the more the PCC should resist such pressure, in my opinion. This amendment would require the local policing authority to take over these statutory responsibilities, to ensure independence and clarity for the public.
I turn to Amendment 127. Clause 22 inserts into Section 23 of the Police Reform Act 2002, titled “Regulations”, a new paragraph which gives local policing authorities the power,
“to delegate the exercise or performance of powers and duties conferred or imposed on them”,
in relation to the handling of complaints against police. In a subsequent subsection, which inserts new paragraphs into the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, the expression used is to “arrange” for another person,
“to exercise a function that the police and crime commissioner has”.
Although the Explanatory Notes give reassurance that liability remains at the top, Amendment 127 is intended to probe why there is a difference in the wording between the two different subsections and to ensure that the delegation of powers and duties does not include delegation of responsibility. I beg to move Amendment 124.
Lord Bach (Lab)
My Lords, I declare my interest as a police and crime commissioner, for Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland. I will say a few words about this very interesting amendment, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, neither to praise it nor to condemn it, but just to tell the Committee something that it is probably aware of anyway. I suspect I speak for other police and crime commissioners as well when I say that as we speak here, we are considering which way to go, given the possibilities that the Bill opens up for us in terms of complaints. It is very interesting that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, suggests that we should not have that option but should be compelled, as it were, to take all complaints at a low level and consider them. I am not so sure he is right—I do not know. I think there may in the end be a tendency among a number of police and crime commissioners, once the Bill is an Act and this legislation is law, to not take full responsibility for all complaints. I am not quite sure what the Government would like in this case: it may be that they really do not have a preference, and it would be interesting to hear from the Minister whether they do or not.
I have to tell the noble Lord that the chief constable in my patch has done absolutely nothing up until now to try and persuade me not to take the full gamut, but it may be different elsewhere. It is an interesting debate and I look forward very much to hearing what the Minister has to say. I suspect, if the Bill remains as it does up until it becomes an Act, then police and crime commissioners around the country will be doing different things.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and Parliament’s only living breathing PCC, the noble Lord, Lord Bach, for an insight into their views and the opportunity for your Lordships’ Committee to debate the provisions in the Bill that seek to give more responsibilities for handling complaints to local policing bodies.
The Government are committed to reforming the police complaints system so that complaints made against the police are responded to in a way that restores trust, builds public confidence and allows lessons to be learned. The reforms also increase the independence and accountability of the complaints system by enhancing the role of police and crime commissioners and their equivalents in London. The Bill seeks to strengthen local accountability by giving PCCs explicit responsibility for the performance of the complaints system locally and the responsibility for those appeals currently heard internally by forces.
As the noble Lord, Lord Bach, has tried to tease out of the Government, Clause 12 gives PCCs the ability to choose to take on the additional complaints functions of handling low-level customer services issues, the initial recording of complaints and communicating with the complainant throughout the process. Amendment 124 to Clause 12 would remove this ability to choose, instead giving PCCs the mandatory responsibility for all these complaints functions. However, the Government’s intention is to ensure that PCCs can choose the model that would work best for them in their local area. As the noble Lord says, this will look different across the country in future as that local choice is made.
PCCs are very well placed to listen to the concerns of their constituents. The reforms will provide PCCs and forces with the flexibility to deliver a complaints service that responds to the needs of their local area rather than trying to operate within some sort of rigid system that does not reflect operational or community differences. For example, a PCC might wish to give his or her force the ability to deliver a more customer- focused complaints handling system before making a judgment on taking on additional responsibilities. However, the Government have acknowledged the concerns raised with regard to different models operating across the country. This is why the Bill enables PCCs to choose to take on only specific duties within a reformed and streamlined framework. Responsibility for the formal handling of complaints will remain with forces or, in the more serious and sensitive cases, with the IPCC.
Lord Bach
I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way. I should have mentioned this and asked her the question in my earlier remarks. A lot of police and crime commissioners want to know, if they decide to extend their powers—I know they will be extended to some extent anyway, but if they are fully extended—whether resources will follow. That is quite an important issue for them, and I wonder whether the Minister can help us.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I will correct this if I am wrong. While I am not guessing, I am assuming that, particularly where you have the model with a mayoral PCC as well, the mayoral precept will enable some of those mayoral functions. On the additional resources, I would like to write to the noble Lord before Report as I would not want to say something to the Committee now that simply was not true.
Amendment 127 to Clause 22 relates to the ability of PCCs to delegate their complaints-related function. The amendment seeks to clarify the difference in language in the subsections of the clause, and I am happy to do that.
The reason for the difference in language between the subsections is that it aims to replicate the language already used in the corresponding Acts. Although subsection (1) uses different language to that in subsections (2) to (4), the policy intention and result is the same. Local policing authorities should and will be able to delegate their complaints-related functions. Regardless of whether any complaints-related functions have been delegated, the local policing body will retain ultimate responsibility for the complaints performance in its area. This follows the same model as chief constables delegating their complaints responsibilities to more junior ranks, where the chief constable is still ultimately responsible for the outcome.
I hope that those comments have reassured noble Lords and that the noble Lord will feel happy to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation on Amendment 127, which is a probing amendment. I am not as enthusiastic about her response to Amendment 124, and I am grateful that we have the noble Lord, Lord Bach, here as a living, breathing police and crime commissioner who can bring his experience to this. I have to say that, bringing my experience as a police officer, I believe that there would be great benefit if there was one system that members of the public knew and could rely on. For example, it would be of great benefit to the public if the decision on whether complaints were investigated was taken out of the hands of the police.
The Minister said that the purpose of the new provision was to restore trust. If the purpose is to restore trust and a PCC decides not to take up the offer, what are the constituents in a PCC’s area to think about that? However, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I fear it will be like this for the rest of the afternoon. Amendment 124A is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, and I shall speak to the other amendment in the group, Amendment 124B.
Clause 14 amends Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002 in relation to keeping complainants—people who have complained about the police—informed of the progress of the investigation of their complaint. Subsection (3) substitutes the matters contained within it for those matters that subsection (3) of the 2002 Act required the complainant to be kept informed about. Basically, subsection (3) sets out what the complainant needs to be kept abreast of. One of the matters in the 2002 Act was to keep the complainant informed of,
“any provisional findings of the person carrying out the investigation”.
This requirement is no longer listed in the new subsection (3), and the amendment is to probe why it is no longer a requirement. Amendment 124B relates to the substitution of subsection (9) in Section 21 of the 2002 Act made by Clause 14(7), which again omits “any provisional findings” from the requirements in the 2002 Act. I beg to move.
Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)
My Lords, I understand absolutely the objective of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and I have a lot of sympathy with what he is trying to get at. However, perhaps there is also need to look at the extent to which the public who have been victims of crime are also kept informed of the progress of investigations into those crimes. In exactly the same principles that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has outlined in terms of complaints against police officers, ought they perhaps also be applied to people who have been victims of crime?
Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)
I am slightly concerned about the phrase “provisional findings”, because it does not define when that is in an investigation. I should declare an interest that I was head of the complaints investigation branch of the Metropolitan Police Service, the subtitle for whom was the “Prince of Darkness”. One knew the provisional findings, but one had that word “provisional” in front. It slightly worries me that we are pushing a process forward where the complainant is given information that new information then changes. It feels an odd thing to be doing. I would like to know why it has been withdrawn in this Bill, as it may have been withdrawn on quite sensible grounds.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, the current process for keeping complainants and other interested persons updated on the handling of their complaint is overly complicated, with Sections 20 and 21 of the Police Reform Act 2002 heavily prescriptive on what exactly a force, or as the case may be the local policing body or IPCC, must do and when. This often results in a box-ticking process and perverse outcomes rather than any genuine consideration of what is best for the complainant.
The Bill simplifies this process. Clause 14 amends Sections 20 and 21 of the 2002 Act to create a broad statutory duty on forces to ensure that they keep relevant parties updated on the progress of the handling of the complaint, the outcome of the complaint, and any right of review. This allows for many of the various notification duties on appropriate authorities currently scattered throughout Schedule 3 to the 2002 Act to be consolidated into one place, and for Sections 20 and 21 of that Act to be extended beyond just complaints where there was an investigation.
This broad requirement is in line with the wider changes to the complaints system where the various routes for resolving a complaint—for example, disapplication, discontinuance and local resolution—have been replaced with a general duty to consider the reasonable and proportionate response to a complaint. Greater discretion for forces in deciding how to keep the relevant parties updated on progress reflects the wider intention to trigger a culture change in forces in the handling of complaints. We want a system that encourages proper consideration to be given to the needs of the complainant, rather than officers simply following a very set procedure regardless of the nuances of the case.
I want to reassure the noble Lord that the Government fully expect that where there has been an investigation into a complaint, updating complainants on the progress of the handling of the complaint will include forces informing them of any provisional findings of that investigation. In keeping with the overall intention to simplify the complaints system and to empower forces in how they deal with complaints, this is not something we consider is necessary to prescribe in primary legislation. Instead, it is for the IPCC to consider whether what is meant by updating on the progress of the complaint is better explored in IPCC statutory guidance. Guidance may be able to better reflect best practice and the principle that all cases need to be treated slightly differently.
The noble Lord, Lord Harris, asked about keeping victims of crime informed on progress. He makes a valid point about victims of crime, but this is not a matter for these clauses. We have a later amendment about the rights of victims of crime.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am very grateful to noble Lords for their contribution to this short debate. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Blair of Boughton. It could be that giving “provisional findings”, which are not the ultimate findings, could create a false sense of expectation in the complainant and so forth. However, the question was around not whether that should be there but the reason for it being there. As the noble Lord, Lord Blair, said, there may be a sensible reason for taking it out in the new legislation, but I failed to hear a sensible reason for why it was formerly in primary legislation but will no longer be. Perhaps between now and Report we may be able to unearth that reason. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
“(aa) the complainant (who must be questioned as to whether he wishes the complaint to be recorded) does not indicate a wish that it not be recorded, or”
Lord Paddick
My Lords, Amendment 125 is tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I shall speak also to Amendment 126. In Schedule 5, Part 1 of Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2000 is amended after sub–paragraph (6) by inserting a new sub-paragraph (6A) in relation to when a complaint against police must be recorded. It states that a complaint must be recorded if,
“at any time the complainant indicates a wish for the complaint to be recorded”.
Our amendment adds a requirement that the complainant must be asked whether he wishes the complaint to be recorded and states that unless he positively indicates that he does not wish the complaint to be recorded, it must be recorded.
From a wealth of personal experience in this area, I know that it is very easy for a complainant to be misled, albeit unintentionally, about whether his complaint will be formally recorded or even to be dissuaded from having a legitimate complaint recorded. The current wording gives the police or the local policing body, if it takes over responsibility, the ability not to record a complaint unless the complainant specifically asks that it be recorded. If the police inspector at the front counter tells the complainant not to worry but to leave it to him as he will have a word with the officer concerned and there is no specific request that the complaint be recorded, it could result in a complaint not being recorded when the complainant believes that it has been. This amendment is designed to reduce the chance of that happening.
Amendment 126 relates to a different issue: the conduct of chief officers of police. Part 3 of Schedule 5 is intended to require the referral of all complaints and matters concerning the conduct of chief officers to the Independent Police Complaints Commission by inserting new paragraphs into Part 3 of Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002. They provide new powers to enable the Secretary of State to specify in regulations that the IPCC must independently investigate all complaints, recordable conduct matters, and deaths and serious injury matters which relate to the conduct of a chief officer or the Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police.
Assistant commissioners of the Metropolitan Police wear the same badge of rank as, and are considered to be at least the equivalent of, chief constables or chief officers. In fact, they are paid at the highest rate of chief officer, with the exception of the commissioner and deputy commissioner of the Met, a salary equivalent to that of the chief constables of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, Police Scotland, the West Midlands Police and Greater Manchester Police. The assistant commissioner of the City of London Police wears the insignia of, and is considered equivalent to, a deputy chief officer and is outside the scope of this provision and the amendment. Will the Minister explain why assistant commissioners of the Metropolitan Police are not included with the deputy commissioner of the Metropolitan Police as officers complaints about whom must be referred to the IPCC? Our amendments would add assistant commissioners of the Metropolitan Police to the list of compulsory referrals. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for explaining the purpose of the two amendments. The handling of complaints about the police must be customer-focused, simple to understand and transparent throughout. It is widely accepted that the current system is confusing, complicated and, in many cases, unclear. Through the reforms made in the Bill, we are ensuring that cases are dealt with quickly and effectively, for the benefit not just of the public but of officers who have done nothing wrong. Many forces already currently operate customer service teams through which all complaints about the force are filtered and whereby they try to resolve quality-of-service issues as soon as possible. The reforms in the Bill explicitly provide for that sort of model and try to make it as bureaucracy free and straightforward as appropriate.
The evidence is that this approach works. In Derbyshire in 2014-15, for example, 47% of issues raised about the force were handled outside of the formal complaints system. In Northumbria, where the triage team sits in the office of the police and crime commissioner, 36% of issues raised about the force in the first six months of 2014 were handled in this manner, with 92% of complainants happy with how their issue was handled—and this is increasing. The Government want to encourage forces and local policing bodies such as PCCs to adopt this more customer-focused approach and to resolve as many complaints as possible quickly, simply and to the complainant’s satisfaction through this route. Amendment 125 would require complainants explicitly to confirm that they were content for the force or PCC to seek a customer service solution to their issue outside of the formal complaints system. I put it to the noble Lord that this approach risks limiting what forces can achieve through informal resolution.
The Government believe that this confirmation process would lead to fewer issues being dealt with in this way and, contrary to the policy intent, increase the number dealt with in the formal system. We think it right that, unless the complainant has offered an alternative view or the complaint falls into one of the categories outlined in the legislation for why this form of resolution is inappropriate—I shall discuss the safeguards shortly—the force or PCC should first have the opportunity to draw on their experience to seek to resolve the matter through its own customer service processes. I reassure the noble Lord that the Bill includes extensive provisions to ensure the complainant is in control in this process and that forces can resolve issues outside of the complaints system only when it is appropriate to do so.
There is a clear expectation on PCCs, with their new explicit responsibility for oversight of the complaints system locally, as provided for in Clause 21, to ensure clear communication is provided to complainants about their rights when they make a complaint and how the process will work. This includes explaining that, if at any point a complainant wants his or her complaint to be recorded, it will be recorded. If the force pursues a customer service solution that falls short of the complainant’s view on what constitutes a satisfactory resolution, they can request that the complaint be recorded and handled formally. There is a statutory duty at the outset of a complaint to contact the complainant to understand how the complaint might be best resolved. Statutory guidance will also make clear that, 10 days after receipt of a complaint, it should be formally recorded, even if a customer service approach may have been proportionate. This is to ensure that this form of resolution is limited to only those issues that can be resolved quickly. Beyond that, if there is any indication that the complaint might result in disciplinary or criminal proceedings, or might meet the criteria for mandatory referral to the IPCC, it must be recorded.
Finally, there will also be a requirement on forces, to be detailed in regulations or secondary legislation, to keep some information on the issues they resolve outside of the formal complaints system—the name of the complainant, the issue, and how it was resolved. This will allow PCCs locally to scrutinise those data and HM Inspectorate of Constabulary to inspect the robustness of the decision-making of forces in deciding what is suitable for an informal resolution. Given these safeguards, we are satisfied that there is no need for an explicit requirement that the complainant must agree at the outset to an issue being resolved informally. Ultimately, the priority for most complainants is that their complaint is dealt with to their satisfaction and as quickly as possible.
I turn to Amendment 126. The complaints and discipline system is designed on the premise that, unless matters are of exceptional seriousness and sensitivity and are therefore referred to the IPCC, they should be dealt with—in accordance with the legislation—within the force’s chain of command. The exception is where there is no ultimate senior officer, such as would arise where a complaint is made against a chief constable. In these cases, most complaints are investigated by the IPCC but some may end up being investigated by chief constables of other forces. In his independent review of the police disciplinary system in England and Wales, Chip Chapman recommended that all such investigations should be undertaken by an independent body. The Government agree with this recommendation and that is why the Bill introduces a new regulation-making power that will require complaints regarding the conduct of chief officers to be referred to the IPCC to determine whether it should conduct an independent investigation or direct an investigation. However, although the rank of Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service is one of the highest ranks in England and Wales, there is no need to include it in the proposed measure because it can be reasonably expected that the commissioner or deputy commissioner will oversee any investigation. I hope that this clarifies the matter and that, on the basis of my explanation, the noble Lord will feel free to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. As far as Amendment 125 is concerned, I have no issue with a complainant being offered the option of informal resolution or a “customer service solution”—I never heard of that when I was in the police service; it shows how things have moved on—or a formal complaint. The problem we keep encountering in this House is the Government saying, “Well, it’s going to be be in statutory guidance and of course, in practice, if it’s a serious complaint or something that should be recorded, it will be recorded”. Unfortunately, the real world is not quite as ideal as the Minister makes out.
As far as Amendment 126 is concerned, I was with the noble Baroness until she said that matters needed to be referred to the IPCC where there was no ultimate senior officer. Quite clearly, in the case of the Deputy Commissioner of the Met, which is a specific rank for which any complaints have to be referred to the IPCC, there clearly is an ultimate senior officer: the Commissioner of the Met. Unfortunately, the explanation given by the noble Baroness does not help me to understand why the Deputy Commissioner of the Met is specifically mentioned.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
Perhaps I can explain a bit further. While new paragraph 5(1)(a) of Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002, inserted by Schedule 5 to the Bill, does cover the Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service, this is because, in the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012, the deputy commissioner is treated in the same way as the commissioner. The Secretary of State is responsible for appointing the investigator of any conduct matter relating to both the commissioner and deputy commissioner. There is no mechanism to allow investigations into the deputy commissioner to be conducted internally. I hope that I have not confused the noble Lord further; I am just seeking to clarify the position.
Lord Bach
I hope that the noble Lord will forgive me for asking the noble Baroness about something that she said in her summing up a little while ago about the position of chief constables. She said that any complaint against them would automatically go to the IPCC. There is a view that says that this is slightly harsh and is not necessary and will mean more work for the IPCC in some cases than is necessary. What is the view of the IPCC on that proposal? It seems to some of us that the IPCC is overburdened and overworked. Does it really want the most trivial complaint against a chief constable—they do exist, it has to be said—to have to go to the IPCC without investigation? Is that not too extreme a measure?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I think I said in my summing-up—if I missed it, I apologise—that most complaints are investigated by the IPCC but some may end up being investigated by chief constables from other forces. I am guessing that those will be the more low-level investigations. Therefore, not absolutely everything has to go to the IPCC. I do not know the IPCC’s view on this but Chip Chapman has recommended that all investigations should be undertaken by an independent body.
Lord Blair of Boughton
Perhaps I may intervene again—and again I declare my interest as a former commissioner. The mailbox of the Metropolitan Police is pretty large and contains lots of complaints about the fact that the commissioner has failed to do something. The commissioner is probably blissfully unaware of thousands of complaints. Is it being suggested that, every time somebody says, “I wish to complain about the Commissioner of Police of the metropolis because Constable Such and Such did not put a ticket on a car outside my house”, that is a complaint against the commissioner? It would be the same for chief constables.
There is a sense here that we are losing sight of the scale of the mailbox. There is a famous story of one of my predecessors who came from outside the force finding out that not all letters that were addressed to the commissioner came to his office. A week later, he realised why—when the mailbags fell in through the door. There has to be a level of reasonableness and, at the moment, I am not hearing that reasonableness. I am hearing the idea that everything will be sent to the IPCC or investigated by another chief constable. We could block the entire system unless we get a degree of reasonableness—and I am not sure where that is going to appear. I put that surmise to the Minister.
Lord Swinfen (Con)
Will my noble friend look at the practicality of the matter, which has been so well explained?
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am very grateful to those who have contributed to this short debate and to the Minister. As regards the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Blair, my reading of this is that it concerns complaints against the commissioner himself rather than vicarious liability responsibility—which, of course, the commissioner carries for all his officers. The clue lies in the fact that the legislation goes on to talk about “death or serious injury” matters—not that the commissioner is known for using physical violence against people.
Lord Bach
I am so sorry to interrupt again. I wonder whether there is a proper distinction between a complaint per se and a complaint that may be laid vicariously at the commissioner’s or chief constable’s door. Who will make that distinction when the complaint comes in? It will add to the existing bureaucracy and is another reason for listening very carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Blair, suggested a minute or two ago.
Lord Paddick
I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bach, and I will leave it to the Government to respond. The deputy commissioner of the Met was, at least at one stage, considered to be a first among equals among assistant commissioners. I will have to read the second part of the Minister’s explanation on that issue. As regards the other matter, again, I will want to read carefully what the Minister said—but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, in moving Amendment 126A, which is also in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, I will speak to Amendment 165A in this group.
Clause 18 deals with sensitive information received by the IPCC and restrictions on disclosing that information. It amends Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002 by inserting new Clause 21A, subsection (3) of which defines sensitive information as including,
“information obtained from a government department which, at the time it is provided to the Commission or the paragraph 18 investigator, is identified by the department as information the disclosure of which may, in the opinion of the relevant authority … cause damage to national security, international relations or the economic interests of the United Kingdom or any part of the United Kingdom”.
When this House recently considered the Investigatory Powers Bill, where matters were considered to be related to the economic interests of the United Kingdom it was made explicit that these were only where the economic interests were directly linked to national security. Amendment 126A would insert the wording,
“so far as those interests are also relevant to the interests of national security”,
to make it explicit in this Bill as well as in the Investigatory Powers Bill. Amendment 165A makes a similar change to the term “economic interests” in Clause 35, which amends Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996 in relation to the restriction on disclosure of sensitive information acquired by Her Majesty’s inspectors of constabulary. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, Clause 18 increases the protections afforded to any sensitive information that is obtained by the Independent Police Complaints Commission in the course of its investigations or by a police or National Crime Agency investigator conducting an investigation under the direction of the IPCC. Clause 18 ensures that where the IPCC or investigator receives “sensitive information” it must not disclose that information without the consent of the “relevant authority”, as defined in the clause. To assist the IPCC or investigator in fulfilling this requirement, Clause 18 places a duty on the person providing the information to make the IPCC or investigator aware that the information is sensitive and to provide enough detail to permit the identification of the appropriate “relevant authority”. Clause 35 does likewise in respect of sensitive information received by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary.
“Sensitive information” in this context means: first, that provided by or that which relates to the security and intelligence services; secondly, information derived from interception; and thirdly, information provided by a government department which may, if disclosed, cause damage to national security, international relations or the economic interests of the country or any part of it. In such instances, the government department must identify it as such when it provides the information to the IPCC or investigator. Amendments 126A and 165A seek to narrow the third part of this definition by carving out information which may cause damage to the economic interests of the UK or part of the UK, unless there is a national security link. In effect, this would mean that the IPCC, investigator or HMIC would not need the relevant authority’s consent to disclose certain economically sensitive information that could, if disclosed or handled inappropriately, have a negative economic impact on the country. The drafting approach taken in the Bill in relation to the definition of “sensitive information” is not new. The drafting simply replicates the existing definition in paragraph 19ZD of Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002, which these provisions replace.
I stress that the primary purpose of Clauses 18 and 35 is not to prevent sensitive information being provided for legitimate reasons, such as to the CPS in the event of criminal proceedings, but, rather, to protect that information and ensure that it is handled appropriately. Simply because a piece of information falls under the definition of “sensitive information” in Clauses 18 or 35, the relevant authority cannot unreasonably withhold its consent to its disclosure; it is a matter of public law that decisions made by the relevant authorities must be both reasonable and rational. The Government are simply closing a gap to provide additional certainty and reassurance around the handling of sensitive information, not to prevent any greater disclosure than is absolutely necessary.
I hope that that has clarified the matter for the noble Lord and that he is content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
I am very grateful to the Minister for that lengthy explanation, but it does not answer the question that I asked. The drafting may not be new but my understanding is that it is inconsistent with the Investigatory Powers Bill. We sought clarification and the Government agreed to put it on the face of the Bill that economic interests meant economic interests that are likely to impact on national security. It may be consistent with previous legislation but my understanding is that it is not consistent with the most recent legislation. That is the question that I hoped she would answer. I understand and accept everything that she has said; it is what is missing that is key.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
Perhaps I can provide further clarification, although I am not sure that it will clarify matters much better. Clause 18 talks about,
“the economic interests of the United Kingdom or any part of the United Kingdom”.
Clause 62 of the Investigatory Powers Bill says,
“in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom so far as those interests are also relevant to the interests of national security”.
There is a variation in the drafting of the two Bills because the provisions serve entirely different purposes. It is right that where authority is being sought to obtain communications data or to issue warrants for the purpose of the economic well-being of the UK, it should be done only where it is also relevant to the interests of national security. In Clause 18 of this Bill, the definition of “sensitive information” is intended to provide a safeguard to ensure that, whenever the IPCC handles particular types of information that originate from the security services or from government departments, it checks with the relevant authority before disclosing that information. The noble Lord does not look convinced but I hope that that has provided further clarification.
Lord Paddick
I need to improve my poker face skills. I am very grateful to the Minister for that explanation. I will read it to see whether I can get the answer to my question from what she has said, but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, in moving Amendment 128 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee I will speak also to the other amendments in the group—Amendments 129 and 130. These are probing amendments that relate to which bodies can be designated as being eligible to bring super-complaints against the police.
Bodies are to be designated by the Secretary of State through regulations. Clause 25 inserts a new Section 29B into Part 2A of the Police Reform Act 2002. Subsection (5) of new Section 29B states:
“The Secretary of State must, before making regulations under subsection (3) or (4), consult such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate”.
However, it does not require the Secretary of State to consult on subsection (1). Adding in reference to subsection (1) means that the Secretary of State would have to consult before making the regulations that designate which bodies should be capable of bringing super-complaints. Those regulations presumably will set out the criteria referred to in subsections (3) and (4). That means that there will be consultation on those as well.
Amendment 129 lists the three bodies—the Law Society of England and Wales, the National Council of Voluntary Organisations, and Citizens Advice—that, along with others as specified by the Secretary of State, would be made “authorised” persons for the purposes of subsection (2)(d). That gives them a role in designation, as they are likely to know the territory and issues involved, know their members and know which the good non-governmental organisations are, and so on.
Amendment 130 is intended to ensure that the first regulations made under subsections (1), (3) and (4) of new Section 29B are subject to the affirmative resolution process. I beg to move.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)
My Lords, this section of the Bill gives the power to designated bodies to make super-complaints to Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary. The complaints can be made where, in the opinion of those bodies, a feature of policing is harming the public and needs to be looked at.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, listed three organisations to make these super-complaints to be put on the face of the Bill. I have some sympathy with the amendments that have been put forward, but I understand that they are probing amendments. I hope that when the noble Baroness replies she can give us some indication of the organisations likely to be designated to make these complaints under the regulations. It is important that, when creating these new powers, we have some idea of what the organisations are likely to be. Are those listed in the amendment likely candidates to be designated when this comes into force, or are there others?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Kennedy, for the opportunity to debate the provisions in the Bill that will create a new system of policing super-complaints.
There are currently three extant super-complaints systems, having been originally created in the Enterprise Act 2002. These systems exist in the commercial sector, the financial system and in payments regulation. All relate to systemic issues affecting consumers relating to private sector organisations. The police super-complaints system, although based on the success of these antecedents, will be the first such system to address issues in the public sector.
A super-complaint is defined in Clause 24 as a complaint that,
“a feature, or combination of features, of policing … by one or more than one … force is, or appears to be, significantly harming the interests of the public”.
Only bodies designated for the purpose of these provisions will be able to make a super-complaint, but any body can be designated if it meets the relevant criteria. Those criteria for designation will, following consultation, be laid out in regulations. The system will be “owned” by the HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, so as to be sufficiently independent of government. Ultimately, this system will allow charities and advocacy groups to raise systemic issues they identify in policing in a more effective way, leading to the improvement of policing in England and Wales.
I turn now to the noble Lord’s amendments which focus on the regulations relating to designated bodies and the designation process contained in Clause 25. The designated bodies able to make a super-complaint will be set out in regulations. Amendment 128 would require the Government to consult on such regulations. We have provided in Clause 25 for consultation on the regulations setting out the criteria for designation, but we do not believe that it is appropriate to consult each and every time a new body is given designation status. Any body that is so designated will have been assessed as meeting the criteria for designation. The Government believe that the criteria are the key to getting the right bodies involved in the system. This is why it is the criteria rather than the bodies themselves that will be subject to consultation. Following consultation on the criteria, further consultation on the resulting list of designated bodies would be unnecessary and, if conducted every time a body is designated, would be burdensome.
On Amendment 129, the Government agree that the nature of the bodies involved in the super-complaints system is key to its success. That is why we shall be consulting widely on the criteria for designation. Furthermore, the Government intend to include a requirement in the criteria for designated bodies to act as umbrella bodies for smaller organisations. This will ensure that any bodies that notice a systemic issue with policing, but are not designated, are still able to raise an issue through another organisation.
We have engaged with a number of key bodies, including Citizens Advice, in the development of this policy. We will continue to work with these bodies throughout its implementation to ensure that the system works in the public interest. It will of course be open to Citizens Advice, the Law Society and the National Council for Voluntary Organisations to apply for designated body status, but that decision is a matter for them. The Government would welcome the input of your Lordships on any particular bodies or organisations that may work towards the improvement of policing through becoming designated bodies.
Amendment 130 would require the first regulations made in relation to designation to be subject to the affirmative procedure. The Government set out the rationale for applying the negative procedure to these regulations in their delegated powers memorandum. That memorandum has been considered by the Delegated Powers Committee which did not take issue with the application of the negative procedure whether on the first or subsequent exercise of these powers. The negative procedure is consistent with the legislative framework applicable to existing super-complaints systems and I see no good case for departing from it here.
Having given these provisions in the Bill the airing they deserve, I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
The noble Baroness has talked about consultation on the regulations. Is there a timescale for when that will take place because obviously the Government will complete their consultation and make a decision before the regulations come into force? Can she give us some idea of when it will be?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
If there is a timescale that we know of, I will write to the noble Lord, but I do not have it here in my notes.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, it is clear that the Government have given a great deal of thought to the concept of super-complaints. Have they made any assessment of how many such super-complaints might be presented and what proportion of the time of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary is likely to be devoted to looking into such matters?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
We do not know how many super-complaints will be made because it is difficult to judge that. The point about the super-complaints is that they will make an enormous difference to the way things are done. It was interesting to note that in March this year the then shadow Home Secretary, Andy Burnham, held a seminar with the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, which brought together groups that are still campaigning for justice, such as the Shrewsbury 24 campaign, the Orgreave Truth and Justice Campaign, and Justice 4 Daniel. A common thread runs through all of these groups but the way the system works at the moment forces them all to plough their own furrow; it does not allow them to join forces. The super-complaint proposal will rebalance the system in their favour and mean that they can join together.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, perhaps I may pursue the point about the regulations one more time. The noble Baroness has said that there is no timescale but that she will write to me if she can find out if there is. I should say to her that this issue is very important to the campaigns she has just listed. If this legislation gets on to the statute book without us knowing where we are with the regulations, of course it cannot come into force. I hope that she will take back to the department and her ministerial colleagues that the consultation should be done with the utmost urgency. There is no point in passing the legislation if people cannot actually make their complaints.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I do not have a timescale. I do not want to give the noble Lord false information, so it is only fair that I write to him.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am very grateful to noble Lords who have contributed to the debate, and for the response given by the Minister. I have a confession to make: I did not write the amendments. I am glad to see that everyone fell into the same trap I did. The intention of Amendment 128, whether or not it would be the effect, is for there to be consultation on the regulations, not each time an organisation is designated. It could be that it is a mistake in the drafting—I can say that because I did not draft them.
The organisations listed in Amendment 129 are suggestions as to who authorised persons should be under the Act, not who the designated bodies should be. The authorised persons are those who can make representations to the Secretary of State to have a particular body designated or removed from the list of designated bodies. That is what I believe I explained when I introduced the amendment. The list that includes the Law Society and so forth is not a list of bodies that we think should be designated, but a list of people who should be authorised persons who can then ask the Secretary of State to add or remove people from the list of designated bodies.
I will read again the view of the Delegated Powers Committee so far as Amendment 130 is concerned, but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 128.
Lord Rosser
“Police complaints and the media
(1) Subject to subsection (3), the Prime Minister must commission an independent inquiry into the operation of the police complaints system in respect of relationships between the police and media.(2) The matters that are the subject of the inquiry shall include, but shall not be limited to—(a) how adequately police forces investigate complaints about police officers dealing with people working within, or connected to, media organisations;(b) the thoroughness of any reviews by police forces into complaints of the type referred to in paragraph (a);(c) in those cases where a complaint of the type referred to in paragraph (a) led to a criminal investigation, the conduct of prosecuting authorities in investigating the allegation;(d) whether any police officers took illegal payment to suppress investigations into complaints about relationships between police officers and people working within, or connected to, media organisations;(e) the implications of paragraphs (a) to (d) for the relationships between media organisations and the police, prosecuting authorities, and relevant regulatory bodies, and recommended actions.(3) The inquiry may only start once the Secretary of State is satisfied that it would not prejudice any relevant ongoing legal cases.”
Lord Rosser
My Lords, the amendment would provide for the Prime Minister to commission an independent inquiry into the operation of the police complaints system in respect of relationships between the police and media. It also states that the inquiry may start only once the Secretary of State is satisfied that it would not prejudice any relevant ongoing legal cases.
The objective of the proposed new clause set out in the amendment is to seek to hold the Government to their promise to the victims of press intrusion to hold a second stage of the Leveson inquiry to look at the culture of relations between the police and the press. In November 2012, the then Conservative Prime Minister reminded the victims of press intrusion that when he set up the Leveson inquiry he had also said there would be a second part to investigate wrongdoing in the press and the police, and that his Government remained committed to the inquiry as it was then established. He then went on to say:
“It is right that it should go ahead, and that is fully our intention”.—[Official Report, Commons, 29/11/12; col. 458.]
However, real doubts about the Government’s willingness to honour that promise have arisen. Ministers have subsequently used language that suggests it is no longer a question of when the inquiry will go ahead, but rather of whether it will go ahead.
Police-press relations is a significant area still to be addressed. We have yet to start to make changes to properly put right, once and for all, the kind of wrongs that have now come to light, for example, following the Hillsborough tragedy. Briefings by the police in the immediate aftermath of the tragedy had a profound adverse impact, not just on the families who had lost loved ones, but on thousands who had been at the match and returned home in a state of some trauma, only to read a few days later that the police were blaming them for the deaths of their friends and family. It surely cannot be right that a police force is able, unattributably or otherwise, to brief damning and unproven information to a newspaper. The extent and reasons for such practices, both previously and more recently, must be investigated independently and openly and those practices brought to an end.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. The second stage of Leveson is a very important stage of the investigation into the conduct of the police and the media. It is essential that it is carried out as soon as possible, bearing in mind that there may be outstanding criminal cases that need to be dealt with first.
It is understandable that a slightly one-sided picture has been given of the relationship between police and press. There are many entirely appropriate relationships between the media and press which are beneficial to the public interest. For example, appeals for witnesses to a serious crime can receive the wide publicity sometimes required only with the co-operation of the media and local press. There are searches for missing persons, where an appeal needs to be made nationally to try to identify where a vulnerable person might be. Clearly, there are examples of the opposite. Hillsborough is one. Another rather common example is where, sadly, the police brief the media casting doubt on the character of those who died at the hands of the police.
I am not saying that it is entirely a positive relationship but it is necessary for the police to have a relationship with the media. It is important to differentiate between positive and appropriate relationships and negative and entirely inappropriate ones, particularly, as happened with the phone hacking case, where there was at least the opportunity for critics of the police to suggest that their lack of enthusiasm initially to investigate phone hacking by the media might have had something to do with that too-close relationship. For those reasons, I support the amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, I, too, support the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Rosser. I agree with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I very much support the police. They do a fantastic job for us and put their lives on the line every day to keep us safe.
The noble Lord is right when he talks about the need for an appropriate relationship between the media and the police, and how important that is. Equally, as my noble friend Lord Rosser said, there are obviously times when things go wrong. Clearly what happened at Hillsborough was an absolute tragedy. Can you imagine losing a loved one on that day and then having to endure the abuse in the media which has clearly now been shown not to be true? We should pay tribute to the steely determination of the Hillsborough families to get justice for their loved ones. They not only lost them but saw their names dragged through the mud.
It is important that we get to the point where the Government can clarify that they will proceed with the second stage of Leveson. There are some nuances between the statement we had from the previous Prime Minister and what we had from this Dispatch Box more recently. That difference might just be a few words which mean nothing at all, but we need to be clear that this should go ahead and that the Government are determined that any prosecution dealing with this will proceed.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who contributed to this debate. I join the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, in paying tribute to the victims of the Hillsborough disaster, which took place not far from where I live.
As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, explained, this amendment would require the Prime Minister to establish what is colloquially referred to as the Leveson 2 inquiry into the relationships between the police and the media. It is worth noting that the drafting of this amendment goes beyond the terms of reference of the Leveson inquiry. Part 1 examined the culture, practices and ethics of the media; if it goes ahead, Part 2 is to examine wrongdoing in the press and the police, including the failure of the first police investigations into phone hacking and the implications for police and press relations.
This amendment would, for example, extend the remit of Leveson 2 to cover how the police investigated any complaints about their dealings with people connected to the media, and to the conduct of the CPS where complaints led to criminal investigations. This is well outside the scope of the current inquiry terms of Leveson 2. The Government are of the view that it is not necessary to legislate to require Leveson 2 as it is already set up under the Inquiries Act 2005. As the noble Lord will be aware, there are still ongoing criminal cases relevant to the subject matter of the Leveson inquiry. I welcome the fact that subsection (3) of the proposed new clause recognises the importance of not prejudicing those outstanding criminal proceedings. We have always been clear that these cases, including any appeals, must conclude before we consider part 2 of the inquiry. Given this, and the fact that we already have an appropriate legal framework in the Inquiries Act, it is not an appropriate matter for further legislation. There is an established process in place for taking this matter forward. On that basis, I hope the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Rosser
The Minister referred to subsection (3) in the amendment, which states:
“The inquiry may only start once the Secretary of State is satisfied that it would not prejudice any relevant ongoing legal cases”.
She also made reference to Leveson 2. Is it the Government’s position that once ongoing cases have been determined, the second stage of Leveson will take place, or—as I think the Minister said on behalf of the Government—that once outstanding cases have been resolved, the Government will only consider whether to proceed with the second stage of Leveson? Can the Minister clarify what she said? Are the Government saying that once outstanding cases have been resolved, Leveson 2 will take place, or is the Minister simply confirming what now appears to be the Government’s stance—unlike the promise that was given—that they will only consider whether to move to the second stage of Leveson?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
It is the latter. We will make a decision on Leveson 2 once the outstanding cases have been concluded.
Lord Rosser
Can the Minister say why the position has changed from the very clear and specific commitment given by the previous Prime Minister that the second stage of Leveson would take place?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, both the current Prime Minister and the previous Prime Minister were very clear that all the cases of Leveson 1 should be concluded before Leveson 2 is considered.
Lord Rosser
Is the Minister saying on behalf of the Government that the previous Prime Minister did not give a commitment that the second stage of Leveson would take place? Is she really saying on behalf of the Government that the previous Prime Minister gave a commitment only to consider whether the second stage of Leveson should take place?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I would have to look at the exact words that the previous Prime Minister used before I contradicted the noble Lord. I certainly do not want to contradict the noble Lord. In terms of the process, both the current Prime Minister and the previous Prime Minister were clear that Leveson 2 could not proceed until Leveson 1 was concluded.
Lord Rosser
I find the Government’s response most unsatisfactory but at least the Minister has confirmed that there has been a complete shift in the Government’s stance. I will say what I think: the Government have now gone back on the very clear undertaking that was given by the previous Prime Minister that the second stage of Leveson would take place.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I hope I did not make it clear that we have gone back on the decision but we will make a decision on Leveson 2 once those outstanding cases have been concluded, which is rather different from going back on what was said.
Lord Rosser
The promise that was given was that there would be a second stage of Leveson. If the Government are now saying that once the outstanding cases are concluded they will only consider whether they should move to a second stage of Leveson, that is going back on the promise that was given. It is no longer specific. Does the Minister not agree?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I think we are going to have to agree to differ that we have not gone back but we will consider it once those cases have concluded.
Lord Rosser
I accept that the Committee will not want me to continue with an argument over the difference in wording, but I will simply restate my stance that for the Government now to say that they will only be considering a second stage of Leveson is not what the previous Prime Minister said in the promise he gave to the victims of press intrusion. I strongly regret the answer that we have received from the Government today, but nevertheless beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, in moving Amendment 132 I will speak also to our Amendments 135, 136 and 137 in this group and in support of Amendments 133 and 134, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.
Clause 27 relates to investigations by the IPCC of concerns raised by whistleblowers and inserts a new Part 2B into the Police Reform Act 2002. If we were asking for this clause to not stand part of the Bill, it would be a case of 2B or not 2B—but that is not what we are asking for. I am just checking to see whether noble Lords are awake. New Section 29D of the 2002 Act defines a whistleblower as a person who,
“raises a concern … about a police force or a person serving with the police”,
and who is,
“under the direction and control of a chief officer of police”,
at the time. However, it does not cover cases where the whistleblower is currently under the direction and control of a chief officer. One potential scenario is where the whistleblower is a witness to an incident that happened before he or she joined the police service, and wishes to draw the matter to the attention of the IPCC. Our Amendment 132 would legislate for that scenario.
I move on to Amendments 135, 136 and 137. New Section 29I of the 2002 Act allows the Secretary of State, by regulations, to set out the circumstances where the identity of the whistleblower may have to be disclosed. This may be done only for permitted disclosure purposes, one of which is,
“the institution or conduct of criminal proceedings”.
Our concern is that a whistleblower may not realise that his or her identity may be revealed if the investigation turns into a criminal one, and that the whistleblower should be informed at the outset that this might be the case, so that they can withdraw the concern if they are worried by that prospect. Amendment 135 addresses that issue.
New Section 29E of the 2002 Act sets out the actions of the IPCC if it chooses not to investigate, including making recommendations in the light of the concern. Subsections (4) and (5) allow the Secretary of State to make regulations in relation to such a scenario, including, in (5)(a), to,
“describe the kinds of recommendations that the Commission may make”.
Our Amendment 136 is aimed at ensuring that the IPCC is not restricted as to what recommendations it can make by adding that the Secretary of State,
“may not specify an exclusive list of recommendations”.
In new Section 29L of the 2002 Act, the Secretary of State is required to consult various bodies before making regulations about whistleblowers. We believe that organisations representing police officers and staff should be included in the list of groups who must be consulted. Our Amendment 137 makes this change. We also support, as I mentioned, Amendments 133 and 134, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. I beg to move Amendment 132.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, this section of the Bill deals with whistleblowing and investigations by the IPCC. It provides a new power for the IPCC to investigate matters raised by a police whistleblower without the matter having to be raised with the police force concerned, and provides further powers to protect the identity of the individual or individuals concerned. All the amendments in this group are in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, with the exception of Amendments 133 and 134 in the name of my noble friend Lord Rosser.
Amendment 132 seeks to provide as much clarity as possible and allows for the eventuality that the person making a complaint could still be under the direction and control of a chief officer of police. This amendment raises an interesting point, which was highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, when he presented his scenario to the House a few moments ago. I hope that when the Government respond they will be as clear possible in their reasoning if they do not think the amendment is necessary.
The amendments in the name of my noble friend seek to add clarity to this section of the Bill by making clear that these provisions cannot be used if the matter is subject to an ongoing investigation. Amendment 134 would allow for whistleblowing protections to be applied to police witnesses. These are good amendments that would strengthen what is proposed by the Government.
When reading and thinking about Amendment 135, I was not completely convinced that it was either necessary or should in fact be there. Having said that, I listened to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and I think that he persuaded me on those.
I am not sure what Amendment 136 adds to the Bill as it would not put in the Bill an exclusive or exhaustive list. Amendment 137 is completely correct: organisations representing police officers and staff must be consulted before regulations are made concerning this section of the Bill. It is not good enough to rely on the subsection that talks about other organisations that are deemed appropriate. Those organisations deserve to be in the Bill when it leaves this House.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Kennedy, for the opportunity to debate the provisions in the Bill that will strengthen protections for police whistleblowers. The Government are committed to ensuring that those working for the police have the confidence to come forward to report concerns of malpractice and misconduct within the service.
Forces should, and do, provide channels for staff to raise such issues in confidence. However, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary has found that the quality of reporting arrangements and support offered to whistleblowers varied considerably by force, and a key concern was a lack of trust in confidential reporting. That is why, through Clause 27 and Schedule 6, we are creating a specific power for the Independent Police Complaints Commission to investigate whistleblowing allegations. If the IPCC decides to investigate, it does not have to refer the matter to the force unless the concern is about a conduct-related matter for the purposes of Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002. Even if it decides not to investigate, it will have to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the whistleblower’s identity is protected. These changes will give officers and staff much greater assurance that their concerns will be considered objectively and discreetly.
I have listened with interest to the points raised by the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Kennedy, and on two points I have some sympathy—I see that I have surprised the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. The first is dealt with in Amendment 132, which seeks to modify the definition of a whistleblower to include those raising a concern about matters that occurred within a police force prior to them joining the police. The legislation as currently drafted allows for existing and former members of a police force to raise concerns about matters that occurred while they were serving. It is evident that some cases of police misconduct and malpractice can go unreported for some time, and it may be appropriate that there be some scope for this to be brought to light, as prescribed under new Part 2B, by a whistleblower who had joined the force at a later stage.
Amendment 133, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, addresses the concern that there is a risk under the new provisions that a police officer or staff member interviewed as a witness in connection with a Part 2 investigation by the commission could be deemed a whistleblower, and that this could lead to confusion and complexity. Amendment 133 would prevent the IPCC having to start a new investigation where one is already under way in relation to the concern that has been raised. I am sympathetic to that point.
However, it is not the intention of the legislation to capture those providing factual information in an existing investigation. Rather, the aim of the legislation is to encourage whistleblowers to come forward and capture those concerns that are not being investigated but, in the public interest, should be considered independently by the IPCC and subject to its recommendations.
For this reason, I have less sympathy with Amendment 134, which would allow the IPCC discretion to confer whistleblowing status on any individuals providing evidence in existing investigations. We do not wish to create an expectation among police witnesses that the IPCC could offer them protections in return for giving their evidence. I understand that the IPCC has concerns about the protections available for those who provide it with evidence, but this is a much broader issue which needs be considered in the longer term, beyond the narrow confines of the whistleblowing provisions and in consultation with all relevant policing stakeholders.
Amendment 135 would impose an express duty on the IPCC to inform a whistleblower that his or her identity may be disclosed in the course of any criminal proceedings and to give the whistleblower an opportunity to withdraw the concern. The legislation is quite clear on the protection of anonymity and the circumstances in which a whistleblower’s anonymity might cease to be protected. As well as criminal proceedings, such circumstances could, for example, include the interests of national security and allegations of misconduct against the whistleblower him or herself. It is not practicable for the primary legislation to include every possible prescription. We would expect the IPCC to do its best to ensure that police officers were aware of the limitations of anonymity before they raise their concern, as I do not believe that it would be practical or desirable to provide for a concern to be withdrawn or unsaid by a whistleblower.
Guidance will support the new provisions, including an update of the College of Policing’s Reporting Concerns guidance, to promote awareness and understanding of these important reforms for whistleblowers. The protections offered by the new process that the Government are providing for whistleblowers can only go so far, and certainly not at the expense of allowing criminals to escape justice.
Amendment 136 would restrict the power of the Secretary of State to stipulate the matters on which the IPCC can make recommendations to a police force in cases where it has decided not to investigate a whistleblower’s concerns. I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that the intention is not to provide the Secretary of State with the power to prescribe an exclusive list but merely to describe the kinds of recommendations that the IPCC may make. The purpose of the provision is to assist the IPCC in those cases where it decides, with the whistleblower’s consent, to refer the matter to the appropriate authority.
Finally, in response to Amendment 137, the Bill already requires the Secretary of State to consult on the whistleblowing regulations with police staff associations as members of the Police Advisory Board for England and Wales. This matter was discussed in the House of Commons and subsection (5) of new Section 29M to the Police Reform Act 2002 was inserted on Report there to provide for this requirement.
On the understanding that I will consider further, in advance of Report, Amendments 132 and 133, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
I was pleased that the Minister was sympathetic to the point I made on Amendment 133; that is certainly progress. My noble friend raised an important point. We do not want it not to be addressed in legislation on the suggestion that it will come back as guidance, and then we have as an unintended consequence when the guidance is not strong enough that someone makes a complaint and what we thought could not happen does. We need to reflect on that, and perhaps the Government could come back on Report, because I think my noble friend has identified an important issue: we would not want a conflict there to cause problems in future.
Lord Paddick
I am very grateful to the Minister for her explanation and for admitting the concern of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary that support for whistleblowers at present is patchy. We welcome the changes that the legislation brings in terms of reassurance to whistleblowers. I am grateful that the noble Baroness has undertaken to take away our Amendment 132 to see whether anything can be done.
I am not sure that whistleblowers will be reassured by the noble Baroness’s response to Amendment 135, that the IPCC will do its best to keep their identity secret. Again, we are discussing whether something should be in the Bill or in statutory guidance, and if in statutory guidance it will be adhered to in the real world.
On Amendment 136, we understand that it is not the intention to restrict the recommendations that the IPCC can make in response to an issue of concern raised by a whistleblower that is not investigated by the IPCC. However, perhaps the Minister might consider putting in statutory guidance the fact that it is not the intention of the legislation to restrict the number or type of recommendations that the IPCC can make. I will reflect on what she said about Amendment 137, which appears to be a reasonable explanation. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 132.
“(c) condition A, B or C is satisfied in relation to the person. (3AA) Condition A is that the person ceases to be a member of a police force after the allegation first comes to the attention of a person mentioned in subsection (3A)(a).(3AB) Condition B is that the person had ceased to be a member of a police force before the allegation first came to the attention of a person mentioned in subsection (3A)(a) but the period between the person having ceased to be a member of a police force and the allegation first coming to the attention of a person mentioned in subsection (3A)(a) does not exceed the period specified in regulations under this section.(3AC) Condition C is that—(a) the person had ceased to be a member of a police force before the allegation first came to the attention of a person mentioned in subsection (3A)(a),(b) the period between the person having ceased to be a member of a police force and the allegation first coming to the attention of a person mentioned in subsection (3A)(a) exceeds the period specified for the purposes of condition B, and(c) the alleged misconduct, inefficiency or ineffectiveness is such that, if proved, the person could have been dealt with by dismissal if the person had still been a member of a police force.(3AD) Regulations made by virtue of subsection (3A) as they apply in a case where condition C is satisfied in relation to a person must provide that disciplinary proceedings may be taken against the person in respect of the alleged misconduct, inefficiency or ineffectiveness only if the Independent Police Complaints Commission determines that taking such proceedings would be reasonable and proportionate having regard to—(a) the seriousness of the alleged misconduct, inefficiency or ineffectiveness,(b) the impact of the allegation on public confidence in the police, and(c) the public interest.(3AE) Regulations made by virtue of subsection (3A) may make provision about matters to be taken into account by the Independent Police Complaints Commission for the purposes of subsection (3AD)(a) to (c).”
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the important amendments in this group relate to the circumstances in which disciplinary action may be taken against former police officers and former special constables.
Clause 28 will allow for the extension of the disciplinary regime to former officers where an allegation arose before they resigned or retired, or arose within a period of time following their resignation or retirement. The relevant period will be specified in regulations and we have made it clear that we intend to specify 12 months. On Report in the Commons, the then Policing Minister undertook to bring forward amendments which would set aside the 12-month time limit in exceptional circumstances. The government amendments in this group make good on that commitment.
I start by recognising, as the whole House does, that the vast majority of police officers and special constables conduct themselves with absolute integrity. They serve our communities with distinction and loyalty throughout their careers and, in doing so, demonstrate the values set out in the College of Policing’s Code of Ethics on standards of professional behaviour. Nevertheless, and regrettably, a small minority do not meet the high standards of professionalism that the public rightly expect. The public also expect those suspected of serious misconduct to be subject to formal disciplinary proceedings and that, where officers are in the wrong, they are held to account for their actions. Indeed, that is what both the public, and the majority of decent, dedicated and hard-working police officers in this country deserve.
The Bill already contains significant reforms to increase the accountability of former police officers. As I have indicated, the provisions in Clause 28, and the accompanying regulations, will ensure that where an allegation that could have led to dismissal had the officer still been serving comes to the attention of a force within 12 months of an officer’s resignation or retirement, or where an individual resigns while an investigation is ongoing, this can be investigated or continue to be investigated and that, where appropriate, disciplinary action can be taken to hold the officer to account for serious wrongdoing. Where a case is proven, the new police barred list will ensure that the individual concerned is prevented from future service in policing.
These are important steps, but we need to go further, particularly in the wake of high-profile cases where there is a perception that retired officers suspected of committing the most serious acts of gross misconduct have not been held to account where such acts cause serious harm to public trust and confidence in policing. In these cases, which can emerge long after individuals have left policing, there is more to be done to prevent the perception that officers who have left policing are able to evade accountability. We recognise the strength of feeling in relation to such cases and, in particular, the public concern that police officers who commit the most serious acts of wrongdoing should be held to account for their actions. The Government also recognise the importance of ensuring that the measures introduced are proportionate for policing as a whole and fair for individual officers.
The amendments that stand in my name achieve this important principle of accountability and do so in a way that is robust, fair and proportionate. In effect, these create the new exceptional circumstances test, which will be applied by the IPCC and, in due course, by the director general of the Office for Police Conduct, following the reforms to the IPCC. In our view it is right that the decision as to whether the exceptional circumstances test is met is taken by an organisation independent of government and free from any politicised decision-making. The IPCC carries out its role and functions in a way that is well established within the sector as the independent watchdog for policing.
It would be only in those cases where this test is met and the IPCC has determined that it would be reasonable and proportionate to do so that disciplinary proceedings could be instigated. In deciding whether the exceptional circumstances test is met, the IPCC will have to have regard to the seriousness of the alleged misconduct, inefficiency or ineffectiveness, the impact of the allegation on public confidence in the police and the public interest. We will set out in regulations the matters to be taken into account by the IPCC in making such a determination.
This will mean that disciplinary proceedings can be brought in relation to the most serious matters which are considered of an exceptional nature where serious and lasting harm has been caused to public confidence in policing as a result of the wrongdoing. As with the original provisions set out in Clause 28, the exceptional circumstances test will not operate retrospectively. As such, these provisions will apply only to those officers who are serving on or after the date that they come into force. Where there is a finding that the former officer would have been dismissed at a subsequent misconduct hearing, the individual will be barred from future service in police and other law-enforcement agencies.
Amendment 138 gives effect to these changes in respect of former police officers, Amendment 140 in respect of former special constables and Amendment 144 in respect of former MoD police officers. Amendments 139, 141 and 145 clarify that, in cases where the investigation or disciplinary proceedings concerning the former officer, special constable or member of the Ministry of Defence Police arise from a decision to reinvestigate a matter previously closed, this can lead to disciplinary proceedings only in cases which either meet the exceptional circumstances test or where the reinvestigation commences within the specified time limit. Amendments 160, 161 and 162 are consequential on the main amendments and the changes to the governance of the IPCC. They provide that, in future, these determinations will be made by the director general of the Office for Police Conduct.
Amendments 149, 150 and 151 clarify the operation of the police advisory list. The amendment makes it clear that the duty on chief officers and others to report officers to the College of Policing applies only in the case of officers who at the time of leaving the force are under active investigation. The amendments will mean that in circumstances where an officer was previously under investigation while serving but the investigation concluded with no disciplinary proceedings being brought and subsequently the officer leaves the force, the duty to report the officer to the college shall not apply. This eliminates potential ambiguity in the legislation and makes it clear that reports are required only when an individual is subject to an ongoing investigation.
Amendments 142 and 143, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, are directed at the same end as the key government amendments in this group. I hope that, having heard my explanation of the government amendments, the noble Lord is satisfied that they deliver a similar outcome. I commend the government amendments to the Committee and I beg to move Amendment 138.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, we broadly welcome the government amendments in this group and, subject to what the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, has to say on the Labour amendments, they seem to cover similar ground.
I have some questions, but I agree with the Minister that the overwhelming majority of police officers are honest, decent people who want only to do their best to protect and serve the public. However, if an officer has left the service and, within 12 months, an investigation takes place which, if the officer was still serving, could have resulted in that officer being sacked, what sanctions would be available against such an officer, other than their name being added to the banned list?
I understand that “exceptional circumstances”, in terms of the most serious acts of wrongdoing, needs to be defined by an independent body. We will come later on in our considerations to talk about the Independent Police Complaints Commission and whether it is truly independent. It is slightly concerning that one criterion that the IPCC would have to look at, in deciding what action to take, is the impact on public trust and confidence in the police, because it could take the decision that the impact of exposing serious misconduct through an investigation would have such a detrimental impact on that trust and confidence that it would use it as a reason not to investigate rather than an obligation to do so. So we have to be very careful about the grounds on which the IPCC should or should not consider something to be exceptional wrongdoing.
Clearly, many members of the public will be very concerned, or disappointed, that the legislation will not be retrospective, particularly with regard to those involved in the aftermath of the Hillsborough disaster. The concern is not with the rank and file officers in that case; the concern is with what happened in the aftermath, and the leadership exercised at Hillsborough. However, as I say, we are generally supportive of the government amendments.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, first, I associate myself with the comments made by the Minister and by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in paying tribute to the police and how they conduct themselves. They are a fantastic group of people, who protect us every day, and we are very lucky to have them looking after us.
As we have heard, this section of the Bill concerns disciplinary proceedings against former police officers and former special constables, and the amendments in this group are to both the relevant clauses and schedules. Generally, I am content with the government amendments, and supportive of them. My noble friend Lord Rosser tabled Amendments 142 and 143 before the Government tabled their amendments, and we are very happy with what the Government have proposed.
I accept entirely the point that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made about “exceptional circumstances” being defined by an appropriate body. Could the Minister give us some idea what the Government’s thinking is on that matter? Having said that, I support the government amendments.
Lord Condon (CB)
My Lords, I apologise for not being here at the start of this grouping; I intended to speak but I was slightly delayed. I want to add my support to the Government, to the Opposition and to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for moving these amendments. It is vital for public confidence that there should be no sense that police officers, once retired, can somehow escape the consequences of actions that, in other circumstances, would have been dealt with by discipline. Certainly, as a former commissioner, I accept that until I draw my last breath I should be accountable for everything that I did during my time as a police officer. I say that with a clear conscience but, if there were any aspect that could have led to a criminal case or disciplinary case, I would of course want that to be tested and examined with the full rigour of the law or disciplinary process, and I would want the same to apply to other people who had retired.
My only reservation—it is not even really a reservation—is that, for more junior officers in particular, a line can never be drawn under their service and what they did as police officers, and they should be held accountable. I think that they and their relatives would take comfort—when looking at an incident that was, perhaps, 20 or 30 years old, where the law, public morality around an issue, or cultural issues may have changed—that there is some test that prevents vexatious or frivolous complaints from that earlier time being put into a process. I take enormous comfort that in, for example, Amendment 142 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Paddick, there is a pretty high bar that the Secretary of State has to determine that investigating and, if appropriate, hearing a case is both necessary and proportionate. Those words will be of enormous comfort to the vast majority of retired police officers—men and women who have sometimes put their lives at risk serving the public. They would want to feel that their honourable service has been recognised. I wholeheartedly support the Bill, what is behind these amendments and the spirit of the amendments moved by the Opposition.
Lord Blair of Boughton
My Lords, I also apologise for not joining this particular part of the debate earlier. I absolutely agree with and amplify what my noble friend Lord Condon has said. Part of the difficulty for some of the most senior officers in the system, which my noble friend and I and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, obviously are—we therefore have to declare interests to your Lordships—is that you end up during your period of service, particularly the period of top command, with cases that are headlines for years and which are investigated and investigated. It would mislead the House to say that my noble friend Lord Condon and I have not spoken about it—we have, although not in the Chamber. I urge those putting forward Amendment 142, the Government and the Opposition, to keep the words “necessary and proportionate” in mind, otherwise there is no end to some of these cases. This is a matter that our legislature needs to think about as it brings forward this kind of amendment. I agree absolutely with my noble friend, and I am sure that I speak for other noble Lords who have been senior police officers, that this is the right way forward.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords who have responded to both the government amendments and the other amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, talked about the ultimate sanction for someone who had retired. The ultimate sanction is that the officer is found to have committed gross misconduct at a public misconduct hearing, with the panel finding that the officer would have been dismissed, and, therefore, as a consequence, should be added to the police barred list. Inclusion on the police barred list would see the officer banned from any future service in policing and added to the published list for a period of five years. Perhaps the noble Lord was referring to a police officer in this situation who had retired anyway and had no intention of going back into the police. However, if I had served 40 years in an organisation, such a judgment would be a pretty awful outcome for my career. Therefore, although there would be no actual effect on the person’s life, the ultimate judgment of misconduct in public office would fulfil that purpose.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way but my understanding is that, in the past at least, it has been possible in exceptional circumstances for a disciplinary authority to reduce the pension, for example, of somebody who is dismissed or forced to resign from the police service. Will the noble Baroness write to me explaining whether that sort of sanction might be available?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I will certainly write to the noble Lord. I can envisage such a situation where somebody was sanctioned before they retired. In fact, I have the answer—the cavalry arrived in the nick of time. The measure will not directly impact an officer’s pension. However, if criminal activity is identified following an investigation and the officer is convicted, it will be open to the force, as now, to apply for some of the officer’s pension to be forfeited.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, was disappointed that the measure was not retrospective in circumstances such as Hillsborough. I think that most noble Lords would share that disappointment. However, we make laws in line with established principles. It is in line with established principles that new laws generally should not be retrospective. They will apply only to officers who are serving when the relevant provisions are commenced. These matters do not in any way affect criminal investigations and prosecutions which, as now, can be pursued at any stage. So, yes, it is disappointing, but it is in line with established practice.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, asked about the exceptional circumstances. I repeat that the IPCC will have regard to the seriousness of the alleged misconduct, the inefficiency or the ineffectiveness, the impact of the allegation on public confidence in the police and the public interest. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Blair and Lord Condon, for making the very important point about the necessity and proportionality of these measures.
The period specified”
“(c) condition A, B or C is satisfied in relation to the person. (2BA) Condition A is that the person ceases to be a special constable after the allegation first comes to the attention of a person mentioned in subsection (2B)(a).(2BB) Condition B is that the person had ceased to be a special constable before the allegation first came to the attention of a person mentioned in subsection (2B)(a) but the period between the person having ceased to be a special constable and the allegation first coming to the attention of a person mentioned in subsection (2B)(a) does not exceed the period specified in regulations under this section.(2BC) Condition C is that—(a) the person had ceased to be a special constable before the allegation first came to the attention of a person mentioned in subsection (2B)(a),(b) the period between the person having ceased to be a special constable and the allegation first coming to the attention of a person mentioned in subsection (2B)(a) exceeds the period specified for the purposes of condition B, and(c) the alleged misconduct, inefficiency or ineffectiveness is such that, if proved, the person could have been dealt with by dismissal if the person had still been a special constable.(2BD) Regulations made by virtue of subsection (2B) as they apply in a case where condition C is satisfied in relation to a person must provide that disciplinary proceedings may be taken against the person in respect of the alleged misconduct, inefficiency or ineffectiveness only if the Independent Police Complaints Commission determines that taking such proceedings would be reasonable and proportionate having regard to—(a) the seriousness of the alleged misconduct, inefficiency or ineffectiveness,(b) the impact of the allegation on public confidence in the police, and(c) the public interest.(2BE) Regulations made by virtue of subsection (2B) may make provision about matters to be taken into account by the Independent Police Complaints Commission for the purposes of subsection (2BD)(a) to (c).”
The period specified”
“(c) condition A, B or C is satisfied in relation to the person. (1BA) Condition A is that the person ceases to be a member of the Ministry of Defence Police after the allegation first comes to the attention of a person mentioned in subsection (1B)(a).(1BB) Condition B is that the person had ceased to be a member of the Ministry of Defence Police before the allegation first came to the attention of a person mentioned in subsection (1B)(a) but the period between the person having ceased to be a member of the Ministry of Defence Police and the allegation first coming to the attention of a person mentioned in subsection (1B)(a) does not exceed the period specified in regulations under this section.(1BC) Condition C is that—(a) the person had ceased to be a member of the Ministry of Defence Police before the allegation first came to the attention of a person mentioned in subsection (1B)(a),(b) the period between the person having ceased to be a member of the Ministry of Defence Police and the allegation first coming to the attention of a person mentioned in subsection (1B)(a) exceeds the period specified for the purposes of condition B, and(c) the alleged misconduct, inefficiency or ineffectiveness is such that, if proved, the person could have been dealt with by dismissal if the person had still been a member of the Ministry of Defence Police.(1BD) Regulations made by virtue of subsection (1B) as they apply in a case where condition C is satisfied in relation to a person must provide that disciplinary proceedings may be taken against the person in respect of the alleged misconduct, inefficiency or ineffectiveness only if the Independent Police Complaints Commission determines that taking such proceedings would be reasonable and proportionate having regard to—(a) the seriousness of the alleged misconduct, inefficiency or ineffectiveness,(b) the impact of the allegation on public confidence in the police, and(c) the public interest.(1BE) Regulations made by virtue of subsection (1B) may make provision about matters to be taken into account by the Independent Police Complaints Commission for the purposes of subsection (1BD)(a) to (c).”
The period specified”
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
We also have Amendment 148 in this group and the Government have Amendment 147. These are not such big issues but are the sort of thing that we try to cover in Committee. Clause 29 addresses the police barred list and the police advisory list. Clause 29(6) states:
“The Secretary of State may by regulations … make provision that … corresponds or is similar to that made by Part 4A of the Police Act 1996”.
We are not at this point querying the Police Act or Part 4A of it, but rather the words “similar to”. I understand the need to make regulations which will correspond with something. That seems to follow naturally, although sometimes the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee may comment on that. However, the power to make similar regulations seems potentially a wide provision and I am not sure what it means. I hope that the Minister will explain that in responding to Amendment 146, which is a probing amendment.
Government Amendment 147 seems one of the least contentious bits of today’s business. As regards Amendment 148, Schedule 8 contains a provision about the effect of including someone in the police barred list. Certain people are required to check the barred status of potential employees or appointees. The persons are listed as being,
“a chief officer of police; a local policing body; the chief inspector of constabulary; the Independent Police Complaints Commission”,
but also,
“a person specified in regulations”.
Again, there is rather wide scope in that latter provision which could have wide implications. Our Amendment 148 would provide for an affirmative resolution to be passed before the regulations were introduced. One is so pleased by little victories. I am delighted that the Minister has added her name to Amendment 148, which we will be very happy to move in due course. I beg to move Amendment 146.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, explained, this group of amendments responds to two issues raised by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in its report on the Bill in respect of provisions in Clause 29 and Schedule 8, which provide for the creation of a new police barred list and a police advisory list to be held by the College of Policing.
The first issue raised by the Delegated Powers Committee related to the regulation-making power in Clause 29(6), which enables provision to be made which corresponds or is similar to that made by new Part 4A of the Police Act 1996 and which relates to a person who is or has been employed or appointed by a quasi-policing body. As the committee pointed out, certain aspects of the operation of the police barred and advisory lists will be determined by regulations made under new Part 4A of the 1996 Act and it will most likely be necessary, when exercising the power in Clause 29(6), also to make provision corresponding or similar to that contained in such regulations.
I am grateful to the Delegated Powers Committee for highlighting this gap in the regulation-making power in Clause 29(6), which Amendment 147 will address. The amendment will enable regulations made under Clause 29(6) to make provision that corresponds or is similar to that made by or under new Part 4A of the 1996 Act.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am indeed happy. The insertion of the words in Amendment 147 give the clause a completely different meaning. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 146.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, in moving Amendment 147A, which is also in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, I will speak to our other amendments in this group, Amendments 147B, 150A and 151A.
Schedule 8, which is to be inserted as part of Part 4A of the Police Act 1996, outlines the procedures with regard to the police barred list and a duty to report dismissals to the College of Policing, which is responsible for maintaining the list. Amendment 147A removes the requirement to report cases where a civilian police employee has been dismissed for reasons of efficiency or effectiveness. The amendment probes whether the barred list should be confined to wrongdoing such as dishonesty or the inappropriate use of violence rather than a person being deemed to be inefficient or ineffective.
Amendment 147B has a similar effect on the provisions in new Section 88A(6), which defines “dismissed”. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chisholm of Owlpen, just said, someone’s employment prospects could be fundamentally affected by being placed on the police barred list. Does she not think it slightly disproportionate to include people who are considered to be inefficient or ineffective on the barred list and thereby affect their employment prospects so fundamentally?
Amendment 150A has a similar effect on the requirement to report resignations and retirements in the face of an allegation of inefficiency or ineffectiveness. Amendment 151A allows someone reported as having resigned or retired in the face of an allegation to be able to appeal against the decision to report his resignation or retirement. I beg to move.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, I have listened carefully to the case put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for these amendments. The Government are clear that the provisions on the police barred and advisory lists should apply to police officers and civilian staff equally where individuals have been dismissed or face allegations that could lead to their dismissal for reasons of serious misconduct, incompetence or unsatisfactory performance.
The provisions for civilian staff use the language of “conduct, efficiency or effectiveness” to mirror the language in Sections 50 and 51 of the Police Act 1996, under which regulations concerning discipline for police officers are made. This is a catch-all term to encompass all circumstances that could lead to a dismissal, through the processes related to performance and conduct. The barred list provisions are designed to protect against those who have been dismissed from policing being recruited to another force or policing body having been found to have fallen so far below the standards expected of those working in policing that they have been dismissed.
Amendments 147A and 150A would remove grounds of effectiveness from the relevant categories of dismissal that could lead to a civilian member of staff being added to the barred list. It is my view that “efficiency and effectiveness” are inextricably linked; therefore, to remove one of these factors would seriously undermine the ability of these mechanisms to capture individuals who have been dismissed or who are under ongoing investigation for matters of competence or performance.
Dismissal in these cases would arise only following a prescribed and lengthy process to establish that the individual’s performance or competency has fallen well below the standards expected on a consistent basis or relate to a matter so severe that dismissal is justified. For example, the Police (Performance) Regulations 2012 define gross incompetence for officers as,
“a serious inability or serious failure”,
to perform the duties to a satisfactory standard or level.
As drafted, these amendments would create a disparity in the way that civilian staff are treated compared to their counterparts holding the office of constable with regard to what would be captured by, and the effect of, these provisions. In the Government’s view it would not be desirable to make such a distinction and create such a different approach to the information and individuals that would be captured by the barred and advisory lists for civilian staff versus police officers.
Amendments 147B and 151A seek to create a new right of appeal, specifically with regard to inclusion on either the police advisory or barred list. This is neither necessary nor desirable. Our approach is clear: if an individual has been dismissed from policing, they should be added to the barred list to prevent them rejoining another force or policing body at a later stage. It is important to note that new Sections 88F and 88L of the Police Act 1996, as inserted by Schedule 8, already provide for removal from the barred list and the advisory list. There is an existing route for appeal against dismissal via the Police Appeal Tribunal or employment tribunal. As a result, in the circumstances that a decision to dismiss an individual is overturned, this will result in the individual being removed from the barred list. This is explicitly provided for by Schedule 8.
As we see greater flexibility in roles, functions and powers exercised by civilian staff, as designated under the powers set out in Clause 37, it is important that the police barred list provisions adequately capture individuals who have been dismissed from the police service. This flexibility and application of policing powers must, in the view of the Government, be accompanied by appropriate safeguards, protections and accountability.
The police advisory list provisions are in place to ensure that adequate information is captured where an individual leaves a force while investigatory or disciplinary proceedings are ongoing. This list does not represent a statutory bar but creates a framework for capturing this information for future policing employers to take into account as part of the vetting process. To add an appeal route to this process would therefore undermine the ability of police forces and policing organisations to adequately subject incoming candidates to vetting procedures and take account of the fact that a candidate may be subject to an ongoing investigation or disciplinary process.
As with the barred list, the advisory list provisions contain safeguards so that an individual will remain on this list only while proceedings are ongoing. Where it is determined that no disciplinary proceedings will be brought or are withdrawn, or where disciplinary proceedings conclude without there being a finding that the individual would have been dismissed, the individual’s name and details must be removed from the advisory list.
Ultimately, the right of appeal against inclusion on the advisory list exists within a misconduct hearing, where it will be determined whether the individual should be dismissed and so be added to the barred list. Where dismissal is not the outcome, they will be removed when the process concludes.
Given that explanation, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her lengthy explanation of what the barred list and the advisory list are about. However, that is not what the amendments seek; the intention behind them is to suggest that it is disproportionate to include on the lists those who are accused of being inefficient or ineffective.
Although I accept some of the points that the noble Baroness has made, it just spurs us on to look at whether the amendments we have tabled for Committee need to be refined. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, bearing in mind what the Minister said about the impact that this provision might have on employment prospects—presumably generally and not re-employment in a police service—we question whether the inclusion of “efficiency or effectiveness” is over the top.
I understand the parallel with gross incompetency for police officers. I would be interested to hear whether, since its introduction, that provision has yet broken its duck in terms of a person having been dismissed for gross incompetency. More research is to be done and no doubt we will return to this issue at later stages of the Bill. However, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 147A.
“(1A) But the duty in subsection (1)(a) does not apply if, before the person resigns or retires, it is determined that no disciplinary proceedings will be brought against the person in respect of the allegation.”
“Appeals to Police Appeals Tribunals
(1) Schedule 6 to the Police Act 1996 (appeals to Police Appeals Tribunals) is amended as follows.(2) In paragraph 1 (appeal by a senior officer), in sub-paragraph (1), in the words before paragraph (a), for “Secretary of State” substitute “relevant person”.(3) In paragraph 2 (appeal by a member of a police force other than a senior officer or by a special constable), in sub-paragraph (1)—(a) in the words before paragraph (a), for “relevant local policing body” substitute “relevant person”;(b) omit paragraph (d);(c) at the end insert—“(e) one shall be a lay person.”(4) After paragraph 2 insert—“2A(1) For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, “the relevant person” means the person determined in accordance with rules made by the Secretary of State._(2) Rules under sub-paragraph (1) may make—(a) different provision for different cases and circumstances;(b) provision for the relevant person to be able to delegate the power to appoint the members of a tribunal._(3) A statutory instrument containing rules under sub-paragraph (1) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”(5) In paragraph 10 (interpretation)—(a) after paragraph (a) insert—“(aa) “lay person” means a person who is not, and has never been—(i) a member of a police force or a special constable,(ii) a member of the civilian staff of a police force, including the metropolitan police force, within the meaning of Part 1 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (see section 102(4) and (6) of that Act),(iii) a person employed by the Common Council of the City of London in its capacity as police authority who is under the direction and control of the Commissioner of Police for the City of London,(iv) a police and crime commissioner,(v) a member of staff of a police and crime commissioner, or of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, within the meaning of Part 1 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (see section 102(3) and (5) of that Act),(vi) a constable within the meaning of Part 1 of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 (2012 asp 8) (see section 99 of that Act),(vii) a member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland or the Police Service of Northern Ireland Reserve,(viii) a member of the British Transport Police Force or a special constable appointed under section 25 of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003,(ix) an employee of the British Transport Police Authority appointed under section 27 of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003,(x) a member of the Ministry of Defence Police,(xi) a person (other than a member of the Ministry of Defence Police) who is under the direction and control of the chief constable for the Ministry of Defence Police,(xii) a member of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, or (xiii) an employee of the Civil Nuclear Police Authority appointed under paragraph 6 of Schedule 10 to the Energy Act 2004,”;(b) omit sub-paragraph (c).(6) In consequence of the other provision made by this section—(a) in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, in Part 1 of Schedule 22, omit paragraph 11(6)(b);(b) in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, in Part 1 of Schedule 16, omit paragraph 47(2)(b).”
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, Clause 30 is designed to implement two of the recommendations made by Major-General Chip Chapman in his review of the police disciplinary system. Major-General Chapman recommended that the system of police appeals tribunals should be made more transparent and independent by introducing a lay member to the panel. He also identified that enabling greater collaboration between forces would improve consistency of outcomes.
Clause 30, as currently drafted, provides flexibility for the Secretary of State to establish who can be selected to serve on police appeals tribunals and for setting out the administrative arrangements for these tribunals in rules. In its report on the Bill, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee argued that it was inappropriate to leave to secondary legislation the details of who would be eligible to serve on the tribunals.
The Government have accepted the Delegated Powers Committee’s recommendation on this point, and the government amendments in this group ensure that the individuals who may serve as panel members of a police appeals tribunal will, as now, be set out in primary legislation. However, it remains our intention to further strengthen the independence of police appeals tribunals by replacing the current retired police officer panel member—for panels hearing appeals by non-senior officers—with a lay person member, and the replacement Clause 30 amends Schedule 6 to the Police Act 1996 to this end.
The replacement clause, together with Amendment 172, defines a lay person for these purposes. In broad terms, it means any person who has not previously worked in policing, including as a police officer, as a member of the civilian staff of a police force or as a police volunteer. Amendment 232 makes a consequential change to the extent clause. Importantly, the introduction of lay members will bring a greater degree of independence to police appeal proceedings.
Lord Rosser
Lord Rosser
Clause 32 provides for the current Independent Police Complaints Commission to continue in existence but to be renamed the Office for Police Conduct. The effect of this group of amendments would be to retain the word “Independent” in the title of the renamed organisation. On the face of it, this may seem a somewhat minor point. However, it is not, as the name that is chosen for an organisation can significantly determine how it is perceived by those who come into contact with it and by the wider public.
The Independent Police Complaints Commission has had the word “Independent” in its title for, I believe, some 14 years, and it sends an important message: it is meant to be independent. Removing it from the new name of the organisation will also be regarded, by the public generally but particularly by those with whom it has specific dealings, as sending a message about its status, and it is a message that is unlikely to be helpful—namely, that it is no longer meant to be independent, including in its relationship with the police.
Currently, the word “Police” is in the title, but so too is “Independent”. In future, under the provisions of the Bill only the word “Police” will be seen in the title by those who need to deal with the renamed organisation. As it is, at times there is already an issue of some public mistrust over the perception of the police investigating the police, and the proposed name change will certainly not help in that regard.
What are we to make of the title, Office for Police Conduct? Would not the natural assumption be that this was some police body, part of the organisation, accountable to the organisation and certainly not separate and independent from the police service? How will that assist in establishing the trust or securing the confidence of those with whom the organisation comes into contact? Not all of them will necessarily at the time of that contact have the highest regard for the police—the obvious example being a bereaved family in the early days of an investigation by the current IPCC.
I hope that the Government will reflect seriously on this point and on the significance of the removal of the word “Independent” from the title of the renamed organisation, and will accept the amendment. I beg to move.
Lord Condon
My Lords, I support this amendment. For those who have monitored the police complaints process and helped advise complainants, the word “independent” has always had enormous significance. It is not a word of little value—it has huge significance for conveying the nature of the organisation that is carrying out complaints and overseeing complaints. I make no apology for reminding the House that I went on the record as commissioner to argue for a totally independent police complaints system. I put enormous value on the word “independent”, then and now, and I encourage the Government to think again on this issue.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, I have some sympathy with the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for precisely the reasons that he and the noble Lord, Lord Condon, outlined. On the other hand, we also have very important organisations that do not have the word “independent” in their title; for instance, Ofcom and Ofgem. So it is not unusual for organisations not to have the word “independent” in their title—but I hope that the Minister will consider the matter carefully.
Lord Condon
Would the noble Earl accept that, in the history of police complaints, more so than for “Of-anything”, the word “independent” has always had huge significance, and that there are many organisations, campaigners and individual long-time complainants for whom, in this context, “independent” is worth far more than in the context of a complaint against a gas company?
Earl Attlee
The noble Lord makes a very good point. I hope that the Minister will also remind us why we are changing the name at all. Legislation could be used to change the function, composition or governance of the body, but I would like to be reminded why we are changing the name at all. The general public are used to the term “IPCC” and they know what it does —and now we are changing it.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I added my name to the three amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Condon, and say to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, that the IPCC has an uphill task because, necessarily, it has to rely to a large extent on former police officers as investigators. It does not do itself any favours by appointing, as it has done at least at some point in its history, a former staff officer to a Commissioner of the Met as its head of investigations—that hardly inspires confidence in those looking at it subjectively from the outside or conveys the message that it is completely independent.
Cynics might say that removing “Independent” from the title of the organisation is an outbreak of honesty in the Government. But that is not the direction that we should be moving in. This should not be seen simply as a cosmetic change; it needs to have some substance behind it. To call it the Office for Police Conduct, without “Independent” in there, is manna from heaven to those who want to criticise the new body as not being independent at all. For those reasons, I strongly support these amendments.
Lord Bach
My Lords, surely this is just a matter of common sense. Can we not cut through everything that has been said? I absolutely support what my noble friend Lord Rosser, and the noble Lords, Lord Condon, and Lord Paddick, have said—it is just a matter of common sense. Anyone who has been in government knows that sometimes Governments hold up the most obvious and common-sense approach for no apparent reason at all—we did it, and I fear this may be an example of the Minister’s Government doing it. It is quite clear that the word “independent” should be included. It would make it much clearer to the general public. Surely this is something that the noble Baroness can take away and consider, and perhaps come back and agree that it is just pure common sense.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I thank the noble Lords who have spoken so clearly on this amendment, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Bach. I will outline why the Government want to change the name. The aim is to ensure that the organisation has a corporate structure and governance arrangements that enable it to carry out efficiently and effectively its expanded role in the police complaints and discipline systems.
My noble friend Lord Attlee pointed out that not every independent body has the word “independent” in its title—he mentioned Ofgem and Ofcom, and Ofsted is another example.
I understand that the body’s constitution alone does not guarantee public trust in its independence, but neither necessarily does incorporating the word “independent” in its title. That said, I understand the contrary argument, put forward by the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Condon, that adding the word “independent” to the name might change some people’s perceptions and encourage them to come forward if they have concerns about police conduct. Therefore, although I remain to be persuaded of the case for the amendments, I will reflect between now and Report on the points that noble Lords made so well in this short debate. On that basis, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Rosser
I thank the Minister for her response and thank all noble Lords who participated in this short debate. I note that the Minister, on behalf of the Government, is not committing herself to agree to the change, but she agreed to reflect on the matter and on what has been said this afternoon and perhaps come back to it on Report. I thank her for that and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Rosser
Lord Rosser
The effect of these amendments is to give the director-general of the Office for Police Conduct a power to create regional directors, including a national director for Wales, and that as a minimum four of the regional director positions should be excluded from having a former police background, with a similar bar on the national director for Wales.
The Bill provides a specific bar on the director-general having previously worked for the police and creates a power for him or her to apply that bar to certain specified roles. Currently, all the IPCC’s commissioners—who are both its governing board and its senior public-facing decision-makers—can never have worked for the police. That has delivered a diverse group of people with senior experience in other fields in those roles to complement the policing experience of other staff and senior managers. As I understand it, the IPCC’s clear view is that this should continue to be the case for those who, like commissioners, are the public face of the organisation in the regions and its senior decision-makers. Obviously, the point of tabling the amendment is to seek the reasons for the decisions the Government appear to have made on this point and which are enshrined in the Bill.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, the underlying thinking here ties in quite closely with the debate on the previous group, and I am not sure that anyone said then that losing the word “Independent” from the title was particularly significant because of the very fact that it will be a change—more significant than if one was creating a new organisation and not having the word in its title from the start. That thought is part of the reason for our Amendment 158A in this group, which in fact the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has explained to the Committee. It would also mark a change so that all the members of the body, if I can use a neutral term, could not be appointed from those who are—summarising around a third of a page—cops or ex-cops. That change would be a significant one, and again it is about the perception of independence as well as actual independence. We may hear that there are some practical reasons, or reasons of experience, that has caused the Government to move in this direction in their decisions on the structure and this part of the body’s governance, but I do not think that it is a good direction to go in.
As regards Amendments 157 and 158, in our view it would be wise to have a geographic spread, but if there is going to be a truly independent “Office”, it should be allowed to sort out its own arrangements, although anyone with any sense in the organisation would want to be sure that the regions of England, as well as the nation of Wales, are heard loudly and clearly.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the Bill provides for the existing commission to be replaced by a single executive head, the director-general, and for corporate governance to be provided by a unitary board with a majority of non-executives. These reforms address the recognised weaknesses of the existing commission model, under which most of the commissioners are engaged in operational activity and in the governance of the organisation. This has resulted in blurred lines of accountability. The commission itself recognises the need for change and there was clear support for the new director-general model in the response to the public consultation on the proposed reforms.
As the single executive head, the director-general will be accountable for the efficiency and effectiveness of the reformed organisation. That is why the legislation provides the director-general with the flexibility to determine the executive structure of the organisation, including the composition of his or her senior team. The director-general needs the freedom to shape the organisation in the way they see best to deliver high-quality, timely and independent investigations into police conduct, a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Amendment 157 would tie the hands of the director-general as it would require the corporate structure of the Office for Police Conduct to include a minimum of four regional directors plus a national director for Wales.
The Government expect the Office for Police Conduct to have a regional presence, as the IPCC does, but as with the IPCC now and since its creation more than a decade ago, the Government do not see the need to legislate for a regional structure. A requirement for a specified minimum number of regional and national director posts would limit the director-general’s future flexibility to respond to the changing needs and circumstances of the organisation. In addition, this particular amendment would put regional directors on the board. That would undermine the core strengths of the new governance model and risk replicating the blurred lines of accountability within the existing commission structure.
I turn now to Amendments 158 and 158A, which relate to positions in the Office for Police Conduct that should not be open to those who have worked for the police. The Government recognise that public confidence in the independence of the organisation relies on certain key decision-making roles not being open to those with a police background. That is why there will be an absolute bar on the director-general from ever having worked for the police. We do not think that there should be statutory restrictions on those who are members of the office—in effect, the board of the reformed organisation. The core functions of the office are set out clearly in the Bill and include ensuring the good governance and financial management of the organisation. These functions are quite distinct from the functions of the director-general. The director-general, as the single executive head, will be solely accountable for all casework and investigation decisions, not the board. It is not right that a suitably qualified individual could not be appointed to a corporate governance role as a member of the board simply because he or she once worked as a police civilian, perhaps for just a short period many years previously.
With regard to employee roles, the Bill provides the director-general with an express power to designate functions and roles that are restricted, including senior operational and public-facing positions. The power means that the director-general will be able to ensure that the OPC has the right mix of staff, including those with valuable policing experience, while also having the power to place restrictions to help bolster public confidence in the OPC’s impartiality and independence. However, as I said, it is important that the director-general can secure public confidence in the work of the Office for Police Conduct. The Bill recognises the need for transparency in the director-general’s decision-making and places a requirement on the director-general to publish a statement of policy on the exercise of these particular powers of recruitment.
To conclude, we believe the provisions in the Bill strike the right balance by placing core aspects of the OPC’s governance in the legislation while ensuring that there is flexibility and transparency in appointments. On that note, I hope the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, are reassured of the Government’s intentions and that they will be content not to press their amendments.
Lord Rosser
Can I ask the Minister whether the Government accept that, under the Bill’s terms, as far as the public face of the organisation and its very senior decision-makers are concerned, we could end up with a situation where only one, namely the director-general, has not previously worked for the police?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I think what I outlined in my speech to noble Lords was that the director-general would need to outline how he proposes the board will work and his position in it. The Bill recognises the need for transparency, as the noble Lord pointed out. It places a requirement on the director-general to publish a statement of policy on the exercise of these particular powers of recruitment. I imagine that if he decided to have a board full of former police officers he would want to explain why, in his particular case, this was necessary.
Baroness Hamwee
Would the Minister accept that the bit the public will be aware of—like the change from an organisation with the term “independent” in its title—is the change from a board structure where there is a bar on all members of the board having been police officers or involved with the police service to a situation where there need not be, not the detail of the report of the director-general explaining the fine detail of their thinking? It is a much broader issue than the Government are acknowledging.
Lord Rosser
I thank noble Lords who have participated in the debate, and the Minister for her response setting out what the Government’s position is and the thinking behind the Government’s wording in the Bill. Issues have been highlighted in the debate about the potential implications and the extent to which one could end up in a situation where very few people indeed in the public face of the organisation and its senior decision-makers had not worked for the police, since the terms of the Bill do not preclude that happening. It precludes it only as far as the director-general is concerned.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I profusely apologise for intervening, but I thought I would give the noble Lord the full information I have before me. There is a backstop power for the Secretary of State to set out in regulations restrictions on which posts can be held by former police. Perhaps that is a conversation to be had. It would be very unusual for the director-general to pack his or her board full of ex-police officers, but there is this backstop power for the Secretary of State. I apologise for intervening on the noble Lord.
Lord Rosser
Not at all. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for that intervention, further clarifying the position as far as the Government are concerned. One might say that it is not entirely satisfactory that one would have to have a backstop power to prevent a situation arising where very few, if any, of those who are the public face of the organisation or its senior decision-makers are not people who have previously worked for the police. Some might feel that that should be better enshrined in the Bill itself.
Nevertheless, this short debate has highlighted quite an important issue. I hope the Government might be prepared to reflect on what has been said, and on the significance of the issue raised, in the context of the future role and perception of the Office for Police Conduct. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, Amendments 159, 163 and 233 in this group are technical and consequential amendments arising from the changes to the IPCC’s governance arrangements that we have already debated. I can provide noble Lords with further details if required, but for now I beg to move.
“Investigatory Powers Act 2016
72A(1) The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is amended as follows._(2) In section 59 (section 58: meaning of “excepted disclosure”), in subsection (4)(c)—(a) for “the Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “the Director General of the Office for Police Conduct”;(b) for “its functions” substitute “the Director General’s functions”._(3) In section 107 (power to issue warrants to law enforcement officers), in subsection (11)—(a) for “the chairman, or a deputy chairman, of the Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “the Director General of the Office for Police Conduct”;(b) omit “by the Commission”._(4) In section 108 (restriction on issue of warrants to certain law enforcement officers), in subsection (2), for paragraph (h) substitute— “(h) the Director General of the Office for Police Conduct;”._(5) In section 134 (section 133: meaning of “excepted disclosure”), in subsection (3)(b)—(a) for “the Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “the Director General of the Office for Police Conduct”;(b) for “its functions” substitute “the Director General’s functions”._(6) In Schedule 4 (relevant public authorities and designated senior officers), in Part 1—(a) omit the entry relating to the Independent Police Complaints Commission, and(b) after the entry relating to the Office of Communications insert—
“Office for Police Conduct | Director or an equivalent grade | All | (b) and (i)” |
“The Director General of the Office for Police Conduct. | A person falling within paragraph 6A(2) of Schedule 2 to the Police Reform Act 2002 who is designated by the Director General for the purpose.” |
Baroness Jolly
“Forces maintained otherwise than by local policing bodies
After section 26(3)(b) of the Police Reform Act 2002 (forces maintained otherwise than by local policing bodies) insert—“(c) the Royal Military Police;(d) the Royal Air Force Police; and(e) the Royal Navy Police.””
Baroness Jolly (LD)
My Lords, I will not detain the House long on this small but very important amendment. This is the first time I have spoken on the Bill. The interest is relatively niche and relates to the three service police forces and the 160,000 men and women who serve in our Armed Forces.
The aim of the amendment is to insert a clause that extends the remit of the IPCC to the service police forces. I am not alone in this desire. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary recommended that oversight of service police should be brought within the competence of the IPCC. In a report last year on the Royal Military Police, the Army’s investigative and policing branch, stated:
“There was insufficient public scrutiny of RMP investigations. The RMP does not report to the public, and investigations into RMP wrongdoing are carried out by an internal Professional Standards Department or the Provost Marshal of another service police force”
It added:
“The Provost Marshal acknowledged to HMIC that a strategic risk to the RMP is inadequate independent oversight of its own independence.”
Only last week, the RMP finally admitted to failings in a rape case in 2009, that of Anne-Marie Ellement, a member of the Royal Military Police, who claimed that two of her colleagues raped her. She took her own life in 2011. The MoD said, seven years after the rape case, that it was clear that mistakes were made and apologised to the family.
Had the IPPC’s remit covered service police forces there would have been another avenue to take the concern. This is a terrible case and I am sure the service police forces have taken a long hard look at themselves, but it is not the only case where they have been found wanting. Had there been the opportunity, an independent complaints commissioner could have intervened.
I feel sure that the Minister will refer to the chain of command—this is important to military discipline—and the fact that there is a Service Complaints Commissioner. There is, but the system was ineffective in this case. Our servicemen and women have rights and those rights are best upheld if this amendment is accepted.
I remind the Minister that in 2014, the Defence Select Committee called for a timescale to be set out to bring the service police under the auspices of the IPCC. Has such a timetable been agreed? If the answer is no, in the light of this week’s announcements, how much more likely it is that the MoD would review the situation?
Lack of accountability of the service police undermines the rule of law and makes it harder for them to undertake their function of policing by consent. This amendment gives the opportunity to bring the three police services into the same independent system of oversight as applies to the rest of us. If the Minister is not able to help this afternoon, will she agree to meet me to look at it further? I beg to move.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Jolly and myself. My noble friend has made a very strong case, not just because it was Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary’s recommendation that the three service police forces should come under the remit of the IPCC. Those responsible for the Royal Military Police have accepted that the organisation is at a strategic risk because it does not come under the remit of the IPCC. If the Government are not prepared to accept the amendment, it would be very interesting to hear from the Minister why not.
Lord Rosser
I will just add briefly to the comment made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, at the end of his speech. If the Government do not feel inclined to accept the amendment, there is a need—I am sure it will happen when the Government respond—to hear precisely what their reasons are for not going down that road. It has been said that no comparable body to the IPCC exists to deal with complaints about service police forces. A significant number of forces and agencies do fall within the jurisdiction of the IPCC, including, I understand, the Ministry of Defence Police. If the Government do not accept the amendment, like the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I wait to listen with interest to their reasons why not.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
As the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, has explained, this amendment seeks to put the service police within the remit and jurisdiction of the Independent Police Complaints Commission.
We do, of course, support the need for independent oversight and scrutiny of the Royal Navy Police, the Royal Military Police, and the Royal Air Force Police, including the key objective of having an independent mechanism to investigate complaints against them. I am also aware that Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary has recommended that the Government should consider further whether the IPCC could be the appropriate mechanism.
The Government have given early consideration to this, including discussions with the IPCC. To bring the service police under the remit of the IPCC is potentially a major change. Although only a small number of cases may be involved, it could mark a significant shift for the IPCC far beyond its current operations in England and Wales. As the chair of the IPCC has said,
“There are inherent and significant differences between the remit and jurisdiction of the service police and those of the Home Office Police forces”.
In addition, the IPCC is currently part way through a major programme of expansion to build its capacity and capability to investigate all serious and sensitive allegations against civilian police forces. This Bill will further strengthen the IPCC’s remit and powers and, in light of its expanded role, the Bill also provides for the reform of the organisation’s corporate structure and governance to deliver a more capable and resilient organisation.
At this stage, the IPCC’s capacity for further change to its role is constrained. That is why the Government, led by the Ministry of Defence, are seeking alternative options. Recent work with the Ministry of Defence has been focused on the development of a common complaints procedure across the three service police forces. This procedure covers complaints made by serving and non-serving military personnel against a member of the service police carrying out a policing function, irrespective of location. There is now also a protocol between the service police forces to ensure that, where there may be a conflict of interest around the investigation of a complaint, one service police force may investigate another. The next phase of the Ministry of Defence’s work is to consider how best to introduce a mechanism that will provide for the independent oversight of these complaints, wherever in the world they are made.
I hope that the noble Baroness will understand that, in the light of the work being taken forward by the Ministry of Defence, and the risks that could arise if we sought to impose new responsibilities on the IPCC at a time when it is already going through a substantial reform programme, I cannot commend this amendment to the Committee. I accept, however, that the noble Baroness wants to see more progress towards finding a long-term solution to this issue. I can certainly undertake to write to the Armed Forces Minister to draw his attention to this debate, but for now I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment. Of course, I am more than happy to meet the noble Baroness.
Baroness Jolly
I thank the Minister for her comments and my noble friend Lord Paddick, and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for their support. I understand that it would be a large change for the IPCC to undertake this extra work. I imagine that a certain amount of the capacity would go from one organisation to the other. One of the things I would like to understand is the timescale of all this, so perhaps when the Minister and I meet, this is the sort of area we could discuss.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, I am quite neutral, but obviously interested in this debate. The noble Baroness talked about a large increase in work for the IPCC or the successor organisation. In support of the noble Baroness, there are not that many service policemen and policewomen. It is not clear to me why it should generate a huge amount of extra work.
I have to say to the Minister, that she has not absolutely convinced me that there is the capacity in the service system to investigate really effectively a service police force when something goes wrong. However, I have to say I am still neutral.
Baroness Jolly
I have no comment on that one. I thank the noble Earl for his remarks and in the meantime beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, Amendment 164A is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I will also speak to the other amendment in the group, Amendment 164B. Clause 35 addresses the powers of inspectors—that is, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary—to obtain information, to secure access to police premises, and other matters by substituting paragraphs 6A and 6B in Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996. New paragraph 6B talks about the powers of inspectors to obtain access to police premises and paragraph 6B(1)(a)(iii) talks about who can be served with a notice requiring them to allow access to premises, including,
“a person providing services, in pursuance of contractual arrangements (but without being employed by a chief officer of police of the police force or its local policing body)”.
The amendment deletes “but” and replaces it with “with or”, so it would cover a person who is employed by the police, as well as someone who is not. Amendment 164B makes a similar change to who can appeal against such a notice. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the amendment presumably aims to ensure that inspectors have comprehensive access to premises used for policing purposes, and that Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary is able to inspect the totality of policing in a landscape where functions are increasingly delivered by multiple agencies. The noble Lord nods; I thought that was probably the aim. The Government wholeheartedly agree with that aim, which is the purpose of this Bill’s inspection provisions.
The amendment does not actually further that aim. The current wording already ensures that inspectors have access to any premises used in the delivery of policing functions, whether they are occupied by the force itself, the local policing body, another emergency service acting in collaboration with the force or a private company carrying out the activities of a force under a contract. I put it to the noble Lord that these amendments would not, in practice, extend the categories of premises to which an inspector had access. Any premises occupied for the purposes of a police force by persons employed under contract by the chief officer are already captured in these provisions. That being the case, I think the noble Lord would agree that the amendments were unnecessary. I invite him to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. Clearly the amendment is not designed to extend the category of premises that HMIC would be able to access. It is about extending the category of person upon which a notice could be served. It appears to us that the wording in the Bill is restrictive and needs to be broadened. We are trying to broaden the category of person on which the notice can be served.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
It might be helpful to the noble Lord to hear that this is covered by government Amendment 166, which ensures that any other person who is,
“by virtue of any enactment … carrying out the activities of”,
a police force is subject to inspection.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful for that second explanation and will consider it carefully. In the interim, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“(g) any other person who is, by virtue of any enactment, carrying out any of the activities of a police force.”
“(d) any other persons if, or to the extent that, they are engaged by virtue of any enactment in carrying out the activities of the police force.”
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, I will not detain the House very long with this amendment. Amendment 167A, in the name of my noble friend Lord Rosser, is a probing amendment. We tabled it to get on the record the thinking of the Government in this respect, and to raise our concerns. From these Benches, we are more content with the idea of employed staff being designated to use the weapons as outlined in new subsection (9B), but we have some reservations about the authorisation of volunteers to use them. I think the public would have some concerns about arming volunteers with CS and PAVA sprays. It may be seen as a step too far.
It would be useful if, when the noble Baroness responds to the debate, she could tell the House how many PCSO posts have been lost in the last six years. It appears on looking at this that it could be regarded as policing on the cheap: reduce the number of PCSOs in full-time employment and then get these volunteers and arm them with these weapons. Those are our concerns.
There is also a Clause 38 stand part debate in this group. We tabled that for the same reason: to get on record the Government’s thinking here and to outline our concerns at this stage. I beg to move.
Lord Paddick
I support the amendment tabled in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and again express my concerns about this move to give police volunteers considerable powers, including authorising them to use incapacitant sprays. I share the concerns that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, expressed in terms of public confidence in volunteers being given these weapons.
If somebody wants to volunteer to get involved in the use of force in the exercise of police powers, as would be the case in using incapacitant sprays, there is an avenue open to them: volunteer to become a special constable. They then have all the powers of a regular police officer, undergo extensive training and wear uniform almost indistinguishable from a regular police officer. As a consequence, there is no need for this Bill to give other volunteers the powers in this clause. If they want to help the police service by volunteering for other activities that do not involve the use of force, then of course it is open to them to do so, but in that case they would not need the powers that this clause would give volunteers.
Again, this adds complexity to what is already a complex policing family. There is already confusion among some members of the public about the different powers available to police community support officers compared with police constables; for example, at the scenes of road traffic accidents, where police community support officers have to stand at the side of the road and wait for a police officer to turn up to take control of any resulting traffic congestion because they do not have the power to direct traffic. Having volunteer community support officers would add a further level of complexity and confusion in the eyes of the public. Not only do we consider this clause unnecessary, but we feel that it could add to confusion and further undermine what the police service is trying to achieve in very difficult circumstances in the face of significant cuts to its budget.
Baroness Redfern (Con)
My Lords, I support the powers of police civilian staff and police volunteers, who deliver extra support and complement our police officers. In Lincolnshire two years ago the first VPCSOs were recruited as an extra uniformed visible presence in local communities, supporting the work of regular PCSOs in providing reassurance and support to local people. The word “extra” is important as these officers were designed not to replace existing provision but to supplement it.
The VPCSO role is varied but includes: giving advice and reassurance to victims and witnesses of crime; supporting policing operations by providing reassurance to members of the community; working with police officers, PCSOs and other police staff on policing priorities; and working within the local policing team on minor incidents, crime inquiries and anti-social behaviour, with a commitment to at least four hours a week on patrol in their local area.
The force has developed a role profile for VPCSOs with eligibility requirements that are the same as for PCSOs, such as minimum age, residency, skills and qualities, health, and vetting. Applicants undertake a selection process that includes an interview to test that their personal qualities meet those required in the role profile. Induction and initial training is undertaken over five weekends, followed by a further two weekends’ consolidation a few weeks later once they have gained some experience.
From a pilot stage to a valued part of visible policing in Lincolnshire, this has been pioneered and funded entirely by the PCC and chief constable and has offered an innovative way to supplement local policing while enhancing the range of opportunities available to local residents who wish to volunteer and contribute to their community. It is also a possible route to becoming a regular officer. The important changes in the Policing and Crime Bill to allow VPSCOs to have powers will improve the flexibility and efficacy of the role. Most importantly, these officers offer an extra uniformed, visible presence, thus addressing many, many residents’ requests and supporting our valued police officers.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Redfern, emphasises the potential value of police volunteers and the role that she described. The difficulty is that we are debating several issues almost simultaneously—and she may almost have been anticipating the next group. The specific point that the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Rosser relates to is the provision to enable those volunteers to use CS spray, PAVA spray and other specified weapons.
The concern that a number of us have, which is why it is important that we debate this and understand exactly what the implications are, is that this is a significant extra step. Having police volunteers who advise the public or patrol with a uniform in various areas to help create a visible presence, we can all understand and would value and welcome. The point at which you give them the power to use force against fellow citizens is actually an extremely significant change, and it raises all the issues about the level of training that they will receive.
The noble Baroness, Lady Redfern, talked about the training that is provided. Obviously, that is valuable, although I suspect that five weekends of training are probably what you need to learn all the other functions before you get on to what is essentially the power to use violence against other members of the public. There are issues around accountability and how all these things are managed. Before we take the step of saying that people who have volunteered and have had some training, albeit a comparatively small amount, can be allowed to use CS spray or other weapons against other citizens, we have to think about it extremely carefully.
Lord Condon
My Lords, I support the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Harris. I do not turn my mind totally against this provision but, from my experience, the way you equip people heavily influences how they think about what they are doing: their role and how they react. Like other noble Lords, my inclination at this stage, subject to reassurance from the Government, is that the cut-off point for incapacitant sprays should probably stay at special constable, where there is a level of training, supervision, scrutiny and public acceptance of their role that there is not for volunteers. Incapacitant sprays can and have killed. To equip a volunteer who may have good but relatively basic training with a spray that can kill a fellow member of the public is an enormous step and we need reassurance from the Government that it is absolutely necessary.
Lord Deben (Con)
My Lords, this has been a very useful discussion. I find myself slightly closer to the Government’s position than that of the noble Lord who spoke from the other side, but I have considerable sympathy with his argument.
There is a terribly difficult problem, which I hope my noble friend will address, of confusion about who these people are, who is in which category, and the like. I happen to have a close relative who sought to be a special constable and discovered that the difficulties of becoming a special constable are really quite considerable. I hope that my noble friend can help me by explaining that this is not a way of getting out of the difficulties of the one by producing something different, which would mean that we are not facing up to some really fundamental issues about how people become special constables and whether we are making it easy for people who would like to make this contribution.
What the debate has really raised are perfectly genuine concerns that this may not quite have been thought through in the way we would like it to be. As it is such a delicate issue, I hope it could be taken rather more widely than in the actual amendment, by thinking a bit about the way in which the public will understand the distinction between these categories. This bit of additional power given to people who decide to volunteer shines a light on the problem and on the confusion which I am not sure has actually been overcome in the debates that we have had so far.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. It is of course very difficult not to stray into other amendments when talking about something in the round. I thank my noble friend Lady Redfern for laying out her experience of using volunteer police officers in Lincolnshire. It must be one of the first areas in the country to do that, so it was very useful to have that information in the round. In thinking about my noble friend Lord Deben’s point about the importance of the public knowing the difference between a volunteer and a special police constable, or indeed a fully trained officer, I asked myself whether I wondered, when my children were at school, what the difference was between the teaching assistant and the fully trained teacher. In fact, as long as they both contributed to my child’s education, I was not that much bothered—but it may be an issue for some people and I recognise the point that my noble friend makes.
Amendment 167 returns to an issue that was debated at length in the House of Commons: namely, whether it is ever right for designated members of police staff, or the new category of designated volunteers, to carry these particular sprays for defensive purposes. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has also given notice that he intends to oppose the question that Clause 38 should stand part of the Bill.
I hope that I can assist the Committee by first explaining what Clause 38 seeks to achieve. It makes necessary consequential amendments to the Firearms Act 1968 to ensure that police volunteers come within the definition of “civilian officers” for the purposes of that Act. The effect of this is that they do not then need a firearms certificate or authorisation under either Section 1 or Section 5 of the 1968 Act in order to carry a defensive spray. The clause simply puts community support volunteers and policing support volunteers in the same position in relation to defensive sprays that police officers and police civilian staff are currently in.
Clause 37(6) makes it clear that police staff and volunteers cannot use other weapons within the meaning of the Firearms Act 1968 unless the Secretary of State makes regulations under new Section 38(9B)(b) of the Police Reform Act 2002. Any such regulations would be subject to the affirmative procedure.
Lord Paddick
To clarify what the noble Baroness has just said, could the Secretary of State, by regulations, authorise police volunteers to carry guns, if they were so minded?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I will repeat that Clause 37(6) makes it clear that police staff and volunteers cannot use other weapons within the meaning of the Firearms Act 1968 unless the Secretary of State makes regulations under new Section 38(9B)(b). Yes, it does read like that—but, as the law currently covers this, it is only trained police officers within London who can be armed.
Lord Paddick
Yes, but I think the Minister has just agreed with me that, through regulations, the Secretary of State could allow police volunteers to be given guns without the need for a firearms certificate. That is slightly worrying.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I am pretty much as certain as I ever can be about anything that it is not the intention of the Bill to allow volunteers to carry guns—but I suspect that I need to provide some further clarification, and hopefully I will do that.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, perhaps I can help my noble friend. It may be that the provision is to allow different types of, say, pepper spray, because the legislation itself is quite specific about which chemicals can be used. There may be future developments in chemicals, and I suspect that the provision in the Bill allows the Secretary of State to specify them. It would be helpful if my noble friend could constrain the Secretary of State by saying that they will never authorise civilian volunteers to have firearms—except perhaps to move them around in police premises.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
It is pretty much on the tip of my tongue to say that, but I think that noble Lords know exactly what the Government’s intentions are.
Lord Harris of Haringey
I think the Minister has unfortunately raised a large red herring, which will certainly prove to be one if she gets the clarification that she wants on it. However, although the intent may not be to allow this, the current wording suggests that it might be used in that way. The specific issue is that a very clear line is being crossed by saying that volunteers can be authorised to use sprays—pepper sprays or whatever else—and that is the distinction. Although the clause may or may not give the Secretary of State powers to increase the list—the Minister way be about to get the answer—or even to specify particular pepper sprays, the concern is about the use of the spray in the first place and whether it is right that a volunteer, despite not having gone through all the other training which is necessary, is able to do that.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
Yes, I totally take the noble Lord’s point, and I am hoping the clarification will arrive from my left in the next five minutes.
As we have made clear in our delegated powers memorandum, this is intended as a future-proofing provision to cover any self-defence equipment not yet invented—and I am not talking about guns. We are also taking the opportunity to make it explicit in the 1968 Act that special constables are members of a police force for the purposes of that Act, and therefore similarly do not require a certificate or authorisation under the 1968 Act when equipped with a defensive spray. This will avoid any doubt being created by the insertion of a specific reference to policing support and community support volunteers within the meaning of “Crown servant” in the Firearms Act.
I turn next to the various points that have been raised in relation to equipping staff.
Lord Deben
I did not quite understand the bit about things that have not yet been invented. The reason I did not understand is that I am not sure that I would be very happy about giving powers to give permission for the use of something that has not been invented, because I do not know whether what has not been invented would be something that I would like to give people the powers to use, if you see what I mean. This is a very dangerous route down which to go.
Earl Attlee
My noble friend does not need to worry about that at all, because it will be under the affirmative procedure, so Ministers will have to justify it. I have to say that future-proofing this seems to me to be a sensible thing to do, although on the other hand I slightly have sympathy for the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey.
Lord Condon
Before the Minister finally sits down, I ask her to acknowledge and perhaps clarify this point. We are considering this very important crossover point from special constables being given these powers to volunteers having them in the context of what the Bill is also doing. It is enhancing the role of police and crime commissioners by giving them the ability to consider taking on the responsibility for fire and rescue services, and giving them the power to appoint the fire chief as the overall chief officer for policing and for fire. The Bill will create a model whereby, for example, a relatively young 32 year-old police and crime commissioner in an area can choose to appoint the fire chief as the overall chief officer of policing and fire in that area—admittedly, with the approval of the Secretary of State—and in that context a young, relatively inexperienced PCC with a chief officer who may not have a police background could take decisions on what volunteers could and could not do. The notion of them being given potentially lethal force is quite a big issue. I look forward to the Minister, as I am sure she will, giving us some reassurance about the notion of volunteers being able to have pepper sprays that in theory can kill people.
Lord Paddick
I do not want to prolong the agony, but another aspect of this is that members of the public should be reasonably sure about what level of force they are going to encounter from whom. As I say, special constables now are virtually indistinguishable from regular police officers; if a special constable decides to use a defensive spray, that will not come as a shock to the member of the public. In terms of the way that the member of the public interacts with a police officer or special constable, they may or may not use force against that individual on the basis of what they anticipate the reaction of that person to be, or the ability of the person to respond to it. When it comes to a volunteer police community support officer, who does all the wonderful things that the Minister said earlier, I think it is going to be a bit of a shock, and an unreasonable one, to expect such a volunteer to respond with an incapacitant spray.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, may I perhaps make a bit of progress on what I was already outlining? Much of what I am going to say answers the questions that noble Lords are asking.
The argument has been put forward that issuing PCSOs with defensive equipment is somehow incompatible with those officers’ primary role, which is to engage with members of the public in their communities. If we examine the way in which different forces equip their PCSOs, we can see that there are different approaches. Some forces equip their PCSOs with body armour and some do not, and the same is true of handcuffs, yet all forces use their PCSOs as the key point of engagement with their local communities. I was one of the people who was very sceptical about PCSOs, but they now have a lot of respect in communities across the country. If the prevailing security situation were such that a particular chief officer considered it necessary to issue their PCSOs with defensive sprays—I emphasise to noble Lords that none has to date—the Government consider that they should be able to, subject of course to the test of suitability, capability and training already set out in the Police Reform Act 2002.
It has also been argued that it is impractical to train volunteers in the use of defensive sprays, to which our response has two limbs. First, if an officer or volunteer has not been properly trained in the use of any power, the law simply does not allow a chief officer to designate that officer or volunteer with the power in question. Section 38(4) of the Police Reform Act 2002, as amended by Clause 37 of the Bill, already states that a chief officer cannot designate the person with a power unless they are satisfied that they are both suitable and capable of exercising the power and that they have received adequate training in the exercise and performance of the powers and duties to be conferred.
However, we do not consider that it is impractical to train volunteers in the use of defensive sprays. On 31 March this year, there were over 16,000 special constables in the 43 police forces in England and Wales and the British Transport Police, all of whom have the full powers of a police officer, performed on a volunteer basis for at least 12 hours per month.
I was grateful to listen to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, at Second Reading, on his strong support for members of the special constabulary, with whom he will definitely have worked during his career policing. As he said, special constables receive extensive training and have all the powers of a regular constable. Many of those specials patrol on a regular basis with their full-time colleagues and they carry identical equipment, including body armour, batons and defensive sprays—again, in exactly the way as their full-time colleagues. It is therefore patently not the case that it is impractical to train volunteers in the use of such equipment. Any volunteer who did not want to carry such a spray, could not undertake the training or was not suitable would not be designated by their chief to carry and use it, even if others in their force were so designated.
Lord Harris of Haringey
But we might drift off the point. Could the Minister clarify why, rather than encouraging more people to go through the special constable route where they take the affirmation about their role and everything else, the Government are suggesting instead that there be a volunteer category that would not be the same as special constables but would have exactly the same access to equipment?
Lord Paddick
On a very similar point, the Minister just said that while chief constables have the power to issue incapacitant spray to PCSOs, no chief constable has done so to date. Why do the Government now feel it necessary to give chief constables the power to give incapacitant spray to volunteer community support officers?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
It is simply to give chief officers the flexibility to use their workforce and their volunteer force to the best end in fighting crime and reassuring communities. The noble Lord, Lord Harris, asks why, for example, a volunteer cannot simply become a special constable. There are many reasons why you might want to be a volunteer rather than a special constable. We are focused today on the deployment of PAVA and CS spray, but actually a volunteer could be a police volunteer. They could be a retired accountant, for example, or a retired lawyer, and may want to bring their skills to the police but may not want to volunteer for any more than that, or indeed become a special constable.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I am talking about the powers that volunteers may have in the round. There may be myriad different powers, not just the one that we are focusing on.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, talked about policing on the cheap. I remember that when PCSOs were introduced, I said, “Oh, it’s only policing on the cheap”, but actually I have seen the really good benefit that they have brought. As my noble friend Lady Redfern says, they are not a replacement for the police force but a really valuable extra on the streets of Lincolnshire, providing crime fighting for the police.
On that very lengthy note, and thanking all noble Lords for their interventions, I wonder if the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, would like to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, this has been an interesting debate—quite an extraordinary debate really, has it not? We talked about helpful PCSOs and the work they do helping communities; we got on to CS spray and other sprays. They may be issued with guns—we are not quite sure. We were then told that the Government also want to take a power in case things are invented in future. I am pleased I tabled the amendment: it has certainly dragged a few things out from the Government for us. I think we will have to come back to these issues on Report. I hope that the Government will look at our debate, because there are one or two loose ends hanging there.
The most important contribution came from the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Condon. Both of them have been very senior police officers, and if they are expressing concerns, the House should listen very carefully. It is important when we grant any new powers that we make sure that people are trained properly to use them. As we heard, these sprays can kill people, which is really serious. We must worry about putting anything in someone’s hands that can do that.
I also want to pay tribute to volunteer PCSOs, who do a fantastic job as the noble Baroness, Lady Redfern, outlined. I will leave it there, but I am sure we will come back to these issues on Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Policing and Crime Bill
Wednesday 26th October 2016
(8 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 55-II(b) Amendments for Committee, supplementary to the second marshalled list (PDF, 62KB) - (26 Oct 2016)
Lord Rosser (Lab)
Our key concerns about Clause 37 relate to the additional powers that could be given to police volunteers under this clause. I hope that in response the Government will set out in some detail the boundaries or limits of those powers that can be given.
Of course, the police could not do their job without a voluntary army, but a voluntary army should not do the job of the police. The Bill enables chief officers to designate a wider range of police powers to police volunteers. We are concerned that this measure may be a move by the Government to provide cut-price policing and we fundamentally oppose giving policing powers to volunteers to fill the gaps left by the drastic reduction in officer and staff numbers over the past five years. More than 40,000 policing jobs were lost between 2010 and 2015 as a result of government cuts to the police service: approximately a 30% cut in police community support officers; 20% fewer police staff jobs; and 13% fewer police officers. It is not appropriate that those people should be replaced by volunteers through the provisions in the Bill, particularly in roles that are clearly operational in nature.
As I understand it, there is a current agreement between the Home Office, the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the College of Policing and the police staff unions that police support volunteers should bring additionality to the police force, but the agreement goes on to say that they should under no circumstances replace or substitute for paid police staff.
Our police service has the power to use necessary proportionate force in appropriate circumstances. We do not want volunteers to be placed in roles that may require the use of force or restraint and which should be only for officers and members of police staff. Our police service has and needs the power to use force where necessary when carrying out its duty to protect the public. However, under our tradition of policing by consent the public also expect that there will also be accountability, proper training and high professional standards on the part of those who use force in appropriate circumstances. I suggest that those expectations can be met only by warranted police officers and, where appropriate, members of staff.
We are also concerned by the suggestion that there may be circumstances where volunteers will be placed in risky situations. Volunteers have an important role to play in supporting police, but should not place themselves in potentially dangerous situations. A police and crime commissioner for Northumbria has said:
“Rather than extending the role of volunteers, the Government needs to start funding police forces properly, to allow Chief Constables and Police & Crime Commissioners to recruit more police officers, who can go on the beat and serve local communities”.
To reiterate, we believe that the greater use of volunteers in the police service apparently envisaged under the Bill—we are not talking about special constables—is potentially dangerous, particularly in the context of the continuing cuts to police budgets. This year police services in England and Wales are facing real-terms cuts to their budgets which will not be backfilled by the local precept.
We believe it is dangerous to impose those cuts in the context of the provisions of the Bill, with the Government not saying precisely what the boundaries and limits are of what volunteers can and cannot do under the terms of the Bill. I hope that in responding the Government will now seek to remedy that and that the response will not reveal—as, going by the previous debate, I fear it will—that volunteers, rather than just bringing additionality to the police workforce, can in reality be used to replace or be substitutes for paid police staff because of the sheer range of operational and other roles they can be given under the terms of the Bill.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)
My Lords, this clause introduces additional flexibility into the way that the police can deploy their staff by extending the powers of chief officers to designate their staff with powers and by introducing, for the first time, a power to designate volunteers with powers. At this point, I should repeat what I said in the previous debate—that, just as PCSOs are not policing on the cheap, volunteers are not policing on the cheap, either. They all contribute to the force that is the police and all have their different parts to play. This clause, together with the other changes in Chapter 1 of Part 3 of the Bill, will give chief officers the flexibility they need to best shape their workforce to local circumstances.
Volunteers have much to offer policing, including those with specialist skills, for example, in IT or forensic accountancy, which we talked about before, and not just in the use of PAVA spray and CS spray. Special constables are volunteers with all the powers of a constable, but it makes no sense that volunteers who do not want to become specials because they do not want to have powers at all times—this has been previously discussed—or to undertake the physical demands of personal safety training cannot be conferred with a narrower set of powers relating to a particular role. Currently the law also puts unnecessary restrictions on a chief officer who wishes to maximise the operational effectiveness of police staff. These provisions remove those barriers.
Chapter 1 of Part 4 of the Police Reform Act 2002 enables chief police officers to confer some or all listed powers on their civilian staff by designating them to undertake specific functions in one or more of four categories: police community support officers, known as PCSOs; investigating officers; detention officers; and escort officers. Clause 37 amends the 2002 Act to amalgamate the categories of investigating officers, detention officers and escort officers into the single category of “policing support officers”, who would then be designated with the necessary powers to carry out their particular roles. The clause also enables a chief officer to designate a police volunteer as either a community support volunteer or a policing support volunteer.
Subsection (3) repeals the list of standard powers of PCSOs. In future, the powers that PCSOs and community support volunteers have will be a decision for each chief officer. Subsection (4) introduces for the first time a list, set out in Schedule 10, of core powers that can be exercised only by a sworn constable. The list includes powers of arrest and stop and search, and those under terrorism legislation—for example, the power to apply for a search warrant under Schedule 5 to the Terrorism Act 2000 as part of a terrorism investigation. It also includes two powers that were previously available to investigating and detention officers—namely, the power to make a fresh arrest and the power to conduct an intimate search when a medical professional is not available. Following the public consultation last year, we judged these powers to be particularly intrusive and that their use should therefore be restricted to police officers.
Noble Lords may wonder why the list of core powers does not include the power to make entry to premises by force, which was also consulted on as a power that should be restricted to constables only. The 2002 Act currently provides that designated individuals can exercise a power to force entry only in the company and under the supervision of a constable, or for the purpose of saving life or limb or preventing serious damage to property. Therefore, even with the extended designation possible under these provisions, no designated staff member or volunteer would be able to force entry except in the two circumstances described. However, importantly, they would be able to assist or accompany an officer executing a search, or to exercise a power to enter where force was not necessary—for example, as part of an alcohol licensing inspection.
The changes also provide the Secretary of State, in practice the Home Secretary, with a power to make regulations to add to the list of core powers and duties of constables: that is, those powers that may not be designated to staff or volunteers. Any such regulations would be subject to the affirmative procedure, so they will require the scrutiny and approval of both Houses.
The clause provides that, where the person is designated as a PCSO or a community support volunteer, they may be given any of the powers or duties set out in Schedule 8, which are powers currently available to PCSOs in lieu of police officer powers—specifically, the power to make an arrest. These powers include requiring a suspect’s name and address, or detaining a suspect to await the arrival of a police officer, which PCSOs can use in circumstances where a police officer might make an arrest.
Subsection (5) enables a chief officer to limit the extent of, or impose conditions on, use of the powers of his or her designated staff and volunteers. For example, if a volunteer were based in a particular locality, their designation could be restricted to that locality and its surrounding area. Subsection (6) also prevents designated staff and volunteers being authorised to use a firearm or Taser in carrying out their designated role. As we have discussed in relation to Amendment 167, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, there is one exception to this rule. PCSOs and other designated police staff, and their new volunteer counterparts, can continue to carry and, where necessary, use CS or PAVA spray, which are classified as prohibited firearms. The clause also includes a future-proofing provision to allow the Secretary of State to make regulations, subject to the affirmative procedure, bringing new self-defence devices within the scope of this exemption.
These are important changes that will give significant additional flexibility to chief officers in the way that they deploy their workforce and volunteers. I hope that noble Lords will not press their opposition to Clause 37 standing part of the Bill.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 168, 171 and 173 are minor and technical amendments to update and clarify the arrangements for designated staff and volunteers to use their powers. I do not wish to detain your Lordships unnecessarily, but, if required, I can talk further about each amendment. For now, I beg to move Amendment 168.
“( ) In the case of a relevant offence that is an offence under a listed byelaw (see sub-paragraphs (4)(e) and (6)), the power to impose a requirement under sub-paragraph (1) is exercisable only in a place to which the byelaw relates.”
“( ) In Schedule 6 to the Police Act 1996 (appeals to Police Appeals Tribunals), in paragraph 10(aa) (as inserted by section (Appeals to Police Appeals Tribunals)), after paragraph (iii) insert—“(iiia) a person designated as a community support volunteer or a policing support volunteer under section 38 of the Police Reform Act 2002,”.”
“(g) in that subsection, in the definition of “relevant section 38 designation”—(i) for “designated civilian employee” substitute “designated person”;(ii) for “employee” substitute “person”.”
Baroness Harris of Richmond (LD)
My Lords, before I speak to Amendment 174 perhaps I may remind Members of the Committee of my interests around policing in the register. This amendment seeks to insert the rank of superintendent, and indeed to prescribe it, in legislation. The reason for doing so is to track around the leadership review which the College of Policing has been asked to undertake. It has been looking in part at the ranks structure but has come up against the National Police Chiefs’ Council. It cannot agree to the changes in the ranks structure within policing that the college recommends.
I understand that it had been proposed to introduce a new structure. It was to be a sort of mirror of best practice and management within both the private and public sectors, thus operational level, supervisory level, middle management, senior management and executive level. The NPCC does not rule out the possibility of moving to this model in the future but feels that policing is facing more important issues at the moment than looking at changes in the ranks. It also says that there is no compelling evidence to support them. My contention is that there most definitely is, that it is imperative to modernise the ranks structure now, and that this Bill provides the ideal opportunity to do so.
Baroness Henig (Lab)
I support the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, in the strongest possible terms. In doing so, I declare my interests as recorded in the Register of Lords’ Interests.
In my long police experience, both in Lancashire and nationally, superintendents and chief superintendents have been the indispensable filling in the police sandwich. Powers from the chief constable and his or her team are delegated down to them, and in turn they take command of and lead the ranks below them. They are the ones who head up important basic command units. They sit on council community safety panels and a range of other local bodies. They establish important relationships with borough council clerks and with council leaders. They were during my time as a police authority chair, and I am sure they still are, the most essential of all the ranks—the indefatigable heads of department, the middle managers just below senior rank, the leaders of the future and the officers with years of constructive practical experience. They are the ones who authorise a range of practical policing strategies in districts, who largely deal with the queries of local Members of Parliament and of councillors, and whose experience is essential to the force. Policing could not be delivered effectively without them.
So why should the rank not be prescribed in legislation, given the centrality of their role? A force would struggle without superintendents—they would have to be reinvented. Indeed, I seem to remember that in the early 1990s the Sheehy report recommendations included the abolition of the rank of chief superintendent. That abolition did not last very long—the rank was reinstated a decade or so later, and I was not in the least surprised. In the light of that experience, I support the amendment that the rank of superintendent should be listed alongside that of constable.
Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)
My Lords, I have not read the speeches of the two noble Baronesses. I am about to make a speech on an amendment that I am about to move. I can only say that it completely dovetails with what has just been said. I am not entirely certain that the superintendent is the most important rank in the police service, but I probably have a special interest in some of that. However, I absolutely subscribe to the point of view that superintendents are the workhorses of governance and practice and I support this amendment.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I support to an extent the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond and the noble Baroness, Lady Henig. Clearly, superintendents, as my noble friend articulated at length, play an essential role, which is recognised extensively in legislation.
Also in this group, I and my noble friend Lady Hamwee intend to oppose the proposition that Clause 46 stand part of the Bill. Clause 46 allows the Secretary of State by regulations to specify the ranks that may be held by members of police forces other than chief officers of police. A great deal of concern has been expressed in the public domain recently about the cost of, and the perks given to, chief officers of police. One would have thought that if the Government were going to legislate, that is an area that they might have turned their attention to. As the noble Lord, Lord Blair of Boughton, mentioned, we have been here before with the Sheehy report the last time that the Conservative Party was alone in government.
From memory, it was a decision of the Sheehy report and the Government to abolish the rank of chief inspector. At some stage before that was fully implemented, the decision was rescinded. The police service paid off a lot of chief inspectors to get them to retire because it had been told that the rank was going to be abolished, but it never was. That led to the mass recruitment of chief inspectors to fill the gap that had been left because the police service had pensioned off early a lot of the chief inspectors that it then needed.
My point, which the Minister has made continually over the issue of volunteers, is that it should be left to individual chief officers to decide. In the case of police volunteers, the flexibility should be available to chief officers to use them however they want and to give them whatever powers they wish. Surely exactly the same argument applies here: it should be left to individual chief constables to promote officers to particular ranks—or not—depending on local need.
While I accept that, especially in legislation, the superintendent has a particular and pivotal role, similar arguments could be made for police sergeants as custody officers and so forth, or for police inspectors who are often operational team leaders. One could go through and make a case—perhaps not as compelling as that put forward on behalf of the superintendent—for each and every particular rank to continue to exist, given different scenarios in different police forces.
I appreciate that the legislation simply gives the power to the Secretary of State through regulations to specify the ranks but I would argue, for the reasons I set out, both that that is unnecessary and that it limits the flexibility of chief officers in designing a police rank structure that suits their local needs.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)
Amendment 174, in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, and my noble friend Lady Henig, is in the clause dealing with police ranks. It amends Clause 46 to require the rank of superintendent as well as that of constable to be retained. We heard from both the noble Baroness and my noble friend who put their names to the amendment about the important role that the officers holding this rank play. That was confirmed by the noble Lords, Lord Blair and Lord Paddick, in their contributions.
I very much agreed with the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, when she spoke about the holders of these ranks being senior officers taking senior operational roles. They are held by people with the ability to undertake those important strategic roles and it is accepted that they have departmental and functional responsibilities.
My noble friend Lady Henig also spoke about the importance of the role these officers play across the piece in all departments. I also recall the Sheehy report, and the abolition of chief superintendents being very controversial at the time. As my noble friend said, they were then quietly brought back a few years later. We have heard from a number of speakers who are former serving officers as well as Members of this House who served as chairs of police organisations, and know much more than I do about police operations. They have all reached the same conclusion, so I suggest that the Minister should reflect on what has been said. I hope that she will give a very warm response.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, for this amendment, which gives me the opportunity to pay tribute to our police superintendents. The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, talked about constables but I think he meant superintendents.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
It is late at night and I am just making sure we are on the same page. The noble Baroness, Lady Henig, called them the “filling in the sandwich”.
In the current policing structure, superintendents play an incredibly important role. They set strategy, they are responsible for day-to-day operational policy and in difficult situations they have to show leadership, manage serious risks and make critical decisions during ongoing operations. These are crucial functions that will continue to be a feature of senior ranks in policing. However, there is a lack of flexibility—a word we have used a lot tonight; the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, just used it—in the way that ranks are effectively stipulated in primary legislation. That is why Clause 46 will allow the College of Policing to recommend a new rank structure to the Home Secretary to be set out in regulations.
In June last year, the College of Policing published the findings of its leadership review, which included a recommendation to review the rank and grading structures in policing. In its report, the college said that flatter structures can enable organisations to be more responsive and communicate more effectively. The police-led review of the rank structure is being developed by the chief constable of Thames Valley Police, Francis Habgood, working with the National Police Chiefs’ Council to ensure that proposals will be effective for all forces. The intention is to support policing based on greater levels of practitioner autonomy and expertise. Francis Habgood has developed a proposal for a five management level-model that will sit on top of the existing rank structure and will be based on competence, contribution and skills.
Baroness Harris of Richmond
I thank all noble Lords who spoke on this amendment. I thank the Minister, who gave me time earlier to put my views, and her team. I hope that the Home Office will continue to put pressure on the College of Policing to embed these reforms urgently. It cannot wait much longer just because the NPCC does not like it. Balancing the history, legal powers and organisational role of superintendents, I still feel it is important to enshrine the rank in legislation. I am disappointed by the Minister’s response, although I understand it. I will look again at what she said and may come back on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Earl Attlee
“Power to make regulations to ensure that senior appointees have international policing experience
(1) The Police Act 1996 is amended as follows.(2) After section 50B (inserted by section 46) insert—“50C Regulations for police forces: requirement for senior appointees to have international policing experience(1) The Secretary of State may make regulations by statutory instrument to provide that in each police force only one of the top five most senior officers are promoted or appointed without international policing experience.(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), an officer would be regarded as having “international policing experience” if he or she—(a) had served in a policing operation for more than five months with a UK police rank lower than inspector in a country outside North America, Europe or Australasia;(b) had served in a policing operation under United Nations auspices for more than five months with a UK police rank lower than inspector; or(c) had served in a policing operation under United Nations, NATO or African Union auspices for more than eleven months.(3) Before making any regulations under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must consult the College of Policing.(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument make provision that is consequential on, or incidental or supplemental to, regulations under subsection (1).(5) The power conferred by subsection (4) includes power to—(a) repeal, revoke or otherwise amend legislation that (in relation to members of police forces in England and Wales) makes provision with respect to ranks that are not specified in regulations under subsection (1);(b) make other amendments of legislation that are consequential on regulations under subsection (1).(6) Regulations under this section may include transitional, transitory or saving provision. (7) Regulations under this section may make different provision for different cases or circumstances.(8) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.””
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 176 I will speak also to our Amendments 177 and 178. These amendments all concern the quality and experience of senior officers.
Amendment 176 seeks to ensure that it would be unusual for a senior police officer not to have some international policing experience. There are two drivers for this. The main one is that the UK has done some great work with international policing missions. I recall visiting policing missions in the Balkans, where UK secondees were doing first-class work, although a lot of them were from the Royal Ulster Constabulary, for reasons that the Committee will understand. The rapid establishment of justice and the rule of law, JROL, in a post-conflict situation is extremely important—initially, I suggest, much more important than democracy and elections. I hope the Minister can show that we are still doing some useful international policing work somewhere in the world.
A difficulty with my amendment is that there are not always vacancies in international policing operations, for a variety of reasons, which is why I have broadened the qualifying roles. However, there are problems. In the past, particularly when we were carrying out policing operations in the Balkans, I detected reluctance on the part of policing authorities to authorise secondments to international policing operations, for parochial reasons. In other words, they saw no direct benefit to their policing operations—the Committee will understand that. In addition, our high-flying police officers know what they need to have on their CVs in order to secure a post at chief officer rank, and I do not believe it includes international policing operations. Although a relatively junior rank-and-file police officer can do a very good job in an international policing operation, we do not necessarily send out our very best people to those operations.
The other driver is that it is desirable that very senior police officers have broad policing experience, and not just in the UK. I am convinced that a senior police officer with some international experience would be a much better one, rather like politicians who have done something other than the standard route to Westminster: school, university, research assistant, local government. I have realistic aspirations for this amendment and the others, and there may be practical difficulties. But if the principle was implemented in some way, I would envisage high-flying police officers gaining their international experience at an early point in their careers. Police authorities and the College of Policing would know that it would have to be offered as part of the offer to recruits. It may be that they take on a big international policing job later on in their career.
My next amendment seeks to put quite tough limits on internal promotion or appointment to very senior positions within a force. I am more than content with the principle of PCCs, but at Second Reading we heard that there might be an unintended consequence of less promotion from outside a particular police force. The inherent risks of this are an unwillingness of the senior officers in a force to grasp unpleasant issues, sycophancy in order to gain promotion and, possibly, corruption. It would also tend to make it much more difficult to get wider experience, because positions in other forces would tend to go to internal candidates. An extremely unfortunate end result could be that the best-quality high-flyers might decide not to pursue a career in the police service at all, because they would realise that they would be unfairly competing with weaker, internal candidates. Can my noble friend say whether she has detected any change in recent years in the number of applications for very senior police posts?
My final amendment, Amendment 178, deals with leadership. First, I make it clear to the Committee that I do not regard myself as an expert on the matter of leadership or even an expert on measuring it. I regard leadership as the capability to get others to do things that they would rather not do or, perhaps sometimes, to desist from doing things that they want to do. It is not to be confused with management. For instance, a superior who relocates his or her centre of operations to an office rather more central for the majority of the team is exercising good management. If this relocation is to the superior’s personal disadvantage, there is an element of good leadership.
However, it is largely an acquired skill—that of being selfless. Leadership is not charisma, although the two often come together. There is innate leadership, and there may well be genetic factors at play, but I have no doubt at all that environmental and economic factors from the moment of birth are very significant. The good news is that there are methods of objectively measuring leadership, both acquired and innate.
Since at least the last war, our Armed Forces have had objective tests of leadership for selection for a commission. Several well-developed tools are used, but the command task is interesting. Candidates are tasked with the practical task of crossing an obstacle course with a range of 45-gallon oil drums, scaffolding planks and ropes. The directing staff know all the possible plans for achieving the objective, but only a few will work. What is being carefully measured is not the ability to select the correct plan but the ability to effectively lead the team even though the directing staff know that the plan selected will not actually work. How long will members of the team follow the task leader with such a plan? Most importantly, how willing are other members of the team to make a helpful suggestion, and how skilful is the task leader at taking up good suggestions while still maintaining command and control?
I am not suggesting that the Armed Forces have perfect selection procedures. They do not; sadly, I have come across several pretty poor officers. As I understand it, though, the UK police do not select for promotion to any rank taking into consideration an objective measurement of leadership. I am also led to believe that the pool of talent is no longer being properly managed, and I hope that other more experienced members of the Committee will cover that point. I am therefore never surprised at the things that go wrong with UK policing. Your Lordships have only to think of the aftermath of Hillsborough or Operation Midland.
All the amendments in this group seek to head off problems that will only get worse if not addressed. I look forward to the noble Lord, Lord Blair, moving his amendment. In the meantime, I beg to move.
Lord Dear (CB)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 176, 177, 178 and, tangentially, 178A. I am pleased to support the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, in his amendments. I want to underpin much of what he has said and, to use his words again, to identify what I think is a growing law of unintended consequences that has flowed over the last five or six years in policing. To many of our minds, there is a growing shortage of leaders as opposed to managers, which the noble Earl has already alluded to. I might take that a little further and say that in my view there is some sign that the quality is diminishing among the senior ranks, and those who are putting themselves forward for senior ranks, within the British police.
It might be helpful if I go very quickly through the history of selection for the British police service, without taking too much of your Lordships’ time at this hour of the evening. Prior to 1948—there was a Police Act around that time—there was a superabundance of police forces in this country, many of them very small and most of them not talking to each other. The powers that they could exercise in neighbouring forces were severely limited or indeed non-existent. The words “parish pump” come to mind. This did not matter too much in those days because society was largely static; the great mobility of motorways, railways and that sort of thing had not yet come, so it was more or less okay for the time.
However, by the middle of the 1960s, following the royal commission of 1962, things had begun to change. There was a huge wave of amalgamations, which helped to fashion police forces in such a way that the parish pump largely disappeared, forces were largely aware of what was happening alongside them, co-operation began to grow and the whole policing scene changed for the better.
Underpinning all that was the establishment in 1948 of the Police Staff College. It started off originally in temporary accommodation at Ryton-on-Dunsmore in Coventry but moved fairly quickly in 1960 or thereabouts to Bramshill House in Hampshire. I venture to suggest, having been there as a student and on the staff, that it was probably the Bramshill staff college experience that helped to co-ordinate and make a cohesive whole of the police service in a way that nothing had done before. It brought together officers of various ranks on various courses, opened their eyes and broadened their horizons. It broke down, if you like, the old fetter of local training that was still going on in those days.
Lord Blair of Boughton
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and to the noble Lord, Lord Dear. My response to the situation is quite close to that of the noble Lord, Lord Dear—to be honest, I am quite surprised at how close it is. It is complete dismay. My dismay is that these amendments have been tabled by four Back-Benchers when they should be the responsibility of the Home Office. Police leadership is in crisis not because of the men and women who are doing it now but because the structures and processes just outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Dear, have just been let go.
I will deal first with my response to the noble Earl’s amendments. I do not think that the international policing aspect works. It does not work, first, for the reason mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Dear, that officers tend to go when they have already retired. The second reason is that many police officials across the world are effectively judicial officials and Governments absolutely hold tight to themselves that their nationals should perform those jobs. There is no embedding. The third reason, which is about United Nations or other peacekeeping arrangements, is that the UN, or whatever body, insists that officers should be armed. In our time only the RUC—now the PSNI—would release those officers. In the Metropolitan Police only 7% or 8% of its officers are armed. It will not send those away to police somewhere else under any circumstances. With the greatest respect to the noble Earl, I do not support that position.
On Amendment 177, about experience in different police forces, I absolutely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Dear, who was an inspector of constabulary. At the time, I was the staff officer to the Chief Inspector of Constabulary and he, on behalf of the Home Secretary, controlled who was appointed to where in this sense: you had to have passed the strategic command course, you were then recommended on the decisions of the inspectors as to what calibre of officer you were, and sometimes you were specifically told by the Home Office that you were not to apply for a job because it was too small for you.
The best people were being sent to the best jobs. I really have expertise in this particular point because I administered that system for two years, as the noble Lord, Lord Dear will know. It was very brutal but it was very accurate. We have lost the rule that you could not do the top three jobs in any police force. You were not allowed to do that; you could not be an assistant, a deputy and a chief constable in the same force; you could not be the parish pump. You just would not get on to the list. Somehow, somewhere during the coalition, that disappeared.
The noble Earl’s amendment is about leadership. Somehow, we managed to sell the Police Staff College at Bramshill without replacing it. It is not a royal yacht, it is not just a generally good idea to have one; it was the absolute essential of what made the United Kingdom police service the envy of the world in the selection of its chief officers. We have lost it. Nobody knows where it has gone. Bramshill is sold. Why is the Home Office not bringing this matter forward rather than two, three or four Back-Benchers at 10 pm?
I now move to Amendment 178A, which is tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Condon, who will speak in a moment. I had the pleasure of talking to the Minister this afternoon about this amendment, and I am very grateful to her. I really hope that the Official Opposition and the Liberal Democrats will look at this amendment and perhaps by the time we get to Report we will have some coalescence around this position.
I am sorry to bring the Committee back to this, but I need to return to my speech at Second Reading, which went back to a debate during the passage of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill when it was suddenly discovered in this House that there was no longer a requirement for any senior police officer to have policing experience. It had disappeared somewhere in a lacuna in the different legal processes. The four noble Lords who had been commissioners of police were sitting and standing open-mouthed at the discovery that this had happened behind their backs without anybody noticing.
As the noble Lord, Lord Dear, said earlier, we are returning to the pre-Second World War situation. Most of us have seen “The Mousetrap”, where the chap reaches for the telephone and says, “I’ll ring the chief constable. He was in my regiment”. We stopped that after 1945 and said that it would be a good idea if senior police officers had police experience. I accept the ideas of deregulation and devolution, but somehow this Government, and, to be fair, particularly this political party, seem to be of the view that policing is unlike anything else and that it is not important for senior police officers to have had experience of doing middle-ranking work as the superintendents whom the noble Baronesses, Lady Henig and Lady Harris, reported on. I do not understand that. You would not do that in the armed services, law, medicine or accountancy.
This amendment would put back into statute that it would be a good idea—just a simple, good idea—if the beginning point was that it was likely to be useful if somebody had served in a senior police rank before they applied for a higher one. The amendment makes two separate provisions. It allows the exception that the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act put together which allows a foreign officer to do it if he or she has the right experience, and it certainly allows for the kind of transfer, if this is to be the case, in which fire officers become involved via the PCC, but it states that the Secretary of State on the advice of Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary should agree that. The opening position is that you cannot be promoted to the senior ranks of the police service without having been at a middle or more senior rank beforehand unless the Secretary of State says so.
If something like this is not enshrined in law, I have to agree that the rather dismal predictions of the noble Lord, Lord Dear, will come true. This Government and their predecessor have created a thing called Police First, which is about bringing bright young men and women into the police service at the rank of superintendent. What is the point of coming in at the rank of superintendent if you can come in at the rank of chief constable? Why would you bother? What is this about? Why is it not the position of the Government, the Opposition and the Liberal Democrats that it is simply a good idea that policing should be like any other profession and that experience is a useful thing to have? That is the simple part of my amendment, to which I hope the noble Lord, Lord Condon, will speak in a moment.
Lord Condon (CB)
My Lords, in view of the time, I am not going to repeat the points made so far. Suffice it to say that I agree totally with what the noble Lords, Lord Dear and Lord Blair, said on these issues. I might put the emphasis slightly differently—in some parts more strongly and less strongly in others—but in the round I agree with all they said.
I go straight to the amendments. On the first amendment, tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, I agree that overseas experience is desirable—it is nice, it is to be welcomed. As commissioner, I spent one Christmas visiting my officers in Sarajevo and elsewhere in that region, and I was very proud of the work that they were doing. I had a wonderful detective sergeant who was in command of more than 400 international police officers, many of them of chief officer rank. In the merits of a local situation, she was selected as a British detective sergeant to command those 400 overseas officers, and she did it magnificently. So I do not underestimate the merits, experience and legacy of working overseas—but it is too narrow an issue to be prescriptive as of today in relation to chief officer posts. It is a laudable aspiration, but let us not make it a prescriptive requirement of being a chief officer.
On the second amendment, on the parochial point about not being promoted from within the one force, I raised that point at Second Reading, as a very serious unintended consequence of police and crime commissioners. One of its great strengths and merits is its very parochialism and local focus—but that is an enormous downside with regard to the selection of chief officers. A couple of months ago, I tabled a Written Question that was answered by the Home Office Minister. I asked how many chief constable promotions over the last year came from an outside force and how many were internal promotions. As the noble Lord, Lord Dear, said, those internal promotions only a few years ago would not have been technically possible; they would not have been allowed by the Home Office or the inspectorate. The answer was that the overwhelming majority of all the appointments of chief constable over the last few years have been internal. Very few have been external appointments—and so good, aspiring, young police officers will not seek to apply any more for those posts.
The movement between forces has now virtually stopped. There is an acceptance that police and crime commissioners will appoint only their sitting deputies and will not consider other candidates. The Government, the inspectorate and the Home Office must find some remedial mechanism which interdicts that process, encourages movement and ensures that the best people are promoted. I do not really mind what the mechanism is, but we need to face up to the challenge and the mischief that is currently happening—we are shrinking the gene pool of talent at the very top levels of policing.
On the final amendment from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, I support broadly what he is aspiring to do, which is to have clearer ideas and objective measurement of leadership. That must only be a good thing.
The motivation for all the amendments in this group—three from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Dear, and one from the noble Lord, Lord Blair, and me—is to ensure the best possible senior police leadership with appropriate skills and experience. We are where we are—we will not be able to unpick what has happened quickly. My support for the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Blair, is about facing up to where we are. There is a growing acceptance that outstanding candidates no longer need to start their police careers as constables or to progress through all the police ranks before serving in the most senior ranks.
The noble Lord, Lord Blair, and I, in our amendment, provide for the possibility of an outstanding external candidate with no police experience being considered for the roles of commissioner, chief constable, or Director of the National Crime Agency, if the Secretary of State is so minded, but after he or she has taken advice from Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary about the candidates who are available and willing to be considered, as well as any external candidates. But being commissioner or chief constable is about more than being an able leader or an able administrator. It is also about very specific command and control within policing. It is about life and death authority over the use of complex legal powers and authorities, which become more and more important as terrorism becomes more of a threat in Europe. It is about setting professional standards of integrity and performance, based on very detailed understanding of police culture, capabilities and weaknesses. While an able General, Admiral or former Permanent Under-Secretary, for example, can bring enormous leadership and administrative skills, they will be at a disadvantage initially in not understanding or knowing some of the cultural, professional and technical issues that face policing.
I acknowledge that we are where we are. The gene pool of police leadership should and must be improved. Ideally, it would be through taking some of the best from history, recognising where we are now, and moving forward in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Dear, indicated. But, in improving it, we should not do so in a way that trivialises relevant police experience or demoralises able men and women who have already embarked on police careers. Some have very recently come in as direct entrants at superintendent level and have aspirations and expectations to rise to the most senior posts in the service. I hope that the Minister will acknowledge that while room and encouragement should be given for exceptional candidates without a policing background to be brought into top police posts, more effort should now be put into developing, as soon as possible, able men and women who see policing as a career that occupies much of their professional life, building on the current schemes for direct entry at various levels up to and including that of superintendent.
I am approaching almost my 50th anniversary of being around policing. I am very proud to have been a police officer. Like the noble Lords, Lord Dear and Lord Blair, I am a product of the system that was described. Some people crassly call for leadership to be helicoptered in from almost anywhere. This is not about education. I am an Oxford graduate, as is the noble Lord, Lord Blair, and the noble Lord, Lord Dear, is a Cambridge graduate. The current commissioner is an Oxford graduate. As I say, this is not about education. If it is about performance, past police leaders have outperformed on courses such as those of the Royal College of Defence Studies and the Cabinet Office Top Management Programme, on which I was sent by Prime Minister Thatcher. So there is a legacy of police leaders competing with, and outperforming, their peers and contemporaries in the military, in public service and the private sector.
However, this issue is not about that. In some cases, I fear that it becomes almost a pernicious class argument. As the noble Lord, Lord Dear, hinted, I worry that we are going back to the good old, bad old days—the pre-war thinking that not enough commissioners or chief constables have spent enough time in some of the best public schools. It is so sad when the argument boils down to that. This is really about trying to get the best leadership in policing, I hope that the Government, the Home Office and the Chief Inspector of Constabulary will put their heads together to help us find a way through this, because the direction in which we are going will not enhance police leadership; it will weaken it.
Lord Rogan (UUP)
My Lords, the PSNI has a requirement that before potential chief constables are appointed, they have to serve—I think for one or two years—in a force other than one in Northern Ireland. Perhaps that requirement could be introduced in the rest of the UK.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I shall try to be brief. I am getting wind-up signals already. As regards Amendments 176, 177 and 178, the opportunities for international police experience are very limited. Therefore, to mandate it would be to disadvantage many able candidates for promotion. Something desperately needs to be done to stop people being promoted just from within the most senior ranks within the force because the police and crime commissioner knows the candidates and does not know candidates from outside forces. As the noble Lord, Lord Blair, and others have said, it used to be a rule that, if you wanted to be the chief constable, you could not have been the assistant chief constable and the deputy chief constable in that same force. That rule needs to be brought back.
I say to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, that the difference between leadership and management is that management is about getting people to do what you want them to do and leadership is about getting them to want to do what you want them to do. The latter approach is essential in policing because in most circumstances you are not with the officer when the officer is in contact with the public.
As regards what the noble Lord, Lord Dear, said, the three-day extended interview, the strategic command course and the strategic leadership course were good models and produced good candidates. Something needs to be done to rectify that situation.
I was slightly disappointed that the first I knew of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Blair of Boughton, was when I saw it in the Marshalled List. If he had sought our help, we would have supported his amendment. I hope that we can work together on it between now and the next stage of the Bill. The noble Lord may recall that when we had discussions about direct entry at superintendent level, I went further than him and the noble Lord, Lord Condon, in terms of the need for police experience.
The Minister can learn from the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Blair, as commissioner. Within weeks of him becoming commissioner, the bombing on the London Underground and on the bus in Russell Square happened. Do the Government want to put somebody who has no experience of policing, or even somebody who has had experience in another country and who does not know the capacity and the powers of the British police service or the laws that apply in this country, in a situation where within weeks they could face that sort of disaster?
Lord Rosser
I do not know whether I should have been declaring an interest throughout today’s proceedings but it is a bit of a shock to find that throughout them I have been clutching a pen on which is written: “Metropolitan Police Forensics—New Scotland Yard”, so I had better declare it now.
This has been an illuminating debate for me on some of the issues that confront the police over training, appointments and leadership under the present arrangements and organisational structure. If the noble Lord, Lord Blair of Boughton, wishes to discuss his amendment, I will be more than happy to do so. I can say only that I thought that we would find a significant conflict between the two sets of amendments, but now that I have listened to the debate, that does not appear to be the case. Perhaps the ideal would be if the noble Lords, Lord Dear, Lord Blair of Boughton and Lord Condon, produced an amendment with which all three of them could associate themselves if they wish to pursue the matter through to the next stage. Obviously, they will want to hear the Government’s response before seeking to make any decisions on that point. However I will leave it at that, and I certainly await with interest what the Minister has to say on behalf of the Government.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I almost hesitate to stand up given that I am surrounded by experts in this field—and I did not go to Oxbridge either. All noble Lords have said in different ways this evening that choosing our police leaders is of the utmost importance for the future of policing, and as the noble Lord, Lord Condon, said, we need to think about it now. We fully support initiatives to ensure that police leaders are drawn from different backgrounds. That is why the Government asked the College of Policing to carry out a leadership review for policing in 2014. We wanted to look at how we could open up policing to fresh perspectives, including by expanding external recruitment to the senior ranks in policing. The review also examined how we could encourage officers to gain experience outside policing before returning later in life and how we could open up senior ranks to candidates from different backgrounds.
The review, which was published in June 2015, was a landmark for policing, setting the agenda for change and for police workforce reform. Its impact is already being felt across policing, from the new qualifications and apprenticeships for those at the start of their careers to opening up police leadership through direct entry and senior secondments, as some noble Lords pointed out.
The review recommended that national standards for recruitment and promotion into all roles, ranks and grades should be established and that all vacancies are advertised nationally. Building on the qualities for professional policing which have been defined in the College of Policing’s new competency and values framework will help to ensure that there are clear and consistent standards for each rank. Advertising roles nationally will open recruitment and make it easier for officers and staff to apply for roles in other force areas—noble Lords mentioned that that does not happen as much as it should. The college has statutory powers to recommend that the Home Secretary makes regulations on a range of issues, including the qualifications for appointment and the promotion of police officers, thus ensuring that these are implemented across England and Wales.
As part of implementing the leadership review, the college is exploring how to improve the diversity of top teams by increasing the pool of candidates for chief officer posts and supporting police and crime commissioners in their selection processes and recruitment campaigns. They are also identifying development packages for those who are appointed from overseas or, as a result of the provisions in Part 1 of the Bill, from the fire service. To support this work, the college has led for policing by undertaking a survey of PCCs, as well as of chief constables and other senior police officers, to understand the issues around senior appointments and developing the talent pool.
It should be the norm that police leaders have a breadth of experience and that they have access to other professions and fields to harness new skills that they can apply in policing. We strongly believe that it is possible to learn from policing overseas, and that is why we have already given the College of Policing the power to approve overseas police forces from which senior police officers are eligible to be appointed as a chief constable in England and Wales or as the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. These are set out in the Appointment of Chief Officers of Police (Overseas Police Forces) Regulations 2014 and include forces from Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States.
We support the work of Chief Constable Andy Marsh, the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s lead on international policing, in establishing the Joint International Policing Hub to act as the single, recognised gateway for international policing assistance for domestic and global partners.
The amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Attlee seek to open up recruitment to the senior ranks in policing. As I have set out, the Government are very supportive of initiatives to achieve this. However, we believe that this should be led by the College of Policing, as the professional body for policing, and that it already has the necessary powers to achieve this.
We deploy police officers overseas to pursue matters of interest to the UK and share our expertise. For example, we sent officers to France to work alongside the French police in dealing with football fans at the Euros.
The noble Lord, Lord Blair, clearly comes at this issue from a different perspective. Amendment 178A in his name seeks to enshrine in statute a presumption that all those who are appointed to chief officer rank must previously have served as a senior officer in a UK police force.
When we introduced police and crime commissioners in 2012, we wanted people to have a say in policing in their local community. We gave PCCs the power to appoint the chief constable because we recognised that this appointment was crucial to implementing the PCC’s policing and crime plan. PCCs understand what the local issues are and are best placed to understand the leadership requirements of their force. It should not be for the Home Secretary to give prior approval as to who is eligible to apply for each and every chief officer post that is advertised. That would not be practical or desirable. However, today I gave the noble Lord, Lord Blair, an undertaking—and I offer it to other noble Lords; I have such a field of expertise around me that I shall open it up—to have further discussions on this area. I would welcome them and would be very happy for them to take place before Report.
The College of Policing has the power to set standards for all police ranks and can introduce new measures as recruitment at senior ranks is opened up further. It has shown how successful it is at this with the introduction of the direct entry programme and the fact that talented people from other sectors are now working in policing. The college is now working to compare the skills, abilities and knowledge needed to be a chief constable with those of chief fire officers to develop a rigorous assessment and development package for those who are interested in the top jobs in policing as a result of the reforms in Part 1 of the Bill.
As I have indicated, the Government want the best people leading policing. We believe the best way to achieve that is to have open recruitment from a wide talent pool, national standards set by the professional body and local decision-making that reflects the needs of the force and the local community. I realise that we have gone past 10 pm, but I hope that the noble Earl will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, this debate has exceeded all my expectations. There have been few times in your Lordships’ House when I have tabled an amendment that has been as effective. I will read what my noble friend the Minister has said with great care, but I suspect that I will not be surprised.
On one condition, I will not only withdraw my amendment but will not return to the issue—although other noble Lords may want to return to their issues. The condition is this: the Minister has an excellent Bill team manager—I know that because he has worked with me and with the Chief Whip—and I would like him to cut out this debate from Hansard and put it in the Policing Minister’s red box and the Home Secretary’s red box. The speeches from the noble Lords, Lord Dear, Lord Blair, and Lord Condon, were very serious and said that we are going in the wrong direction on this problem—that will come to bite us eventually. I believe that the Home Secretary needs to do something about this, and to listen to the warnings from the noble Lord, Lord Dear. I thank all noble Lords who contributed to this debate and beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Blair of Boughton
“Eligibility for senior police posts
(1) The Police Act 1996 is amended as follows.(2) After section 50B (inserted by section 46) insert—“50C Eligibility for senior police postsSubject to section 140 of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (appointment of chief officers of police)—(a) an application may not be considered from any individual applying for the post of—(i) Assistant or Deputy Chief Constable in any police service;(ii) Commander or Deputy Assistant Commissioner in the Metropolitan Police Service; or(iii) Commander or Assistant Commissioner in the City of London Police;without previous experience in the police service in the United Kingdom at the rank of Superintendent or above, unless prior approval has been given by the Secretary of State, following advice from Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary;(b) an application may not be considered from any individual applying for the post of—(i) Chief Constable in any police service;(ii) Assistant Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner or Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service;(iii) Commissioner of the City of London Police; or(iv) Director or Deputy Director of the National Crime Agency;without experience in the United Kingdom’s police service in a rank no lower than two ranks below that to which the application is being made unless prior approval has been given by the Secretary of State, following advice from Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary.””
Lord Blair of Boughton
My Lords, I should say to the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser, that the reason I did not consult either of them was that I never expected that we would reach this clause on this day. It was only on Friday that I discovered, through the excellent Bill team, that we were going to reach this point. I would like the opportunity to talk through with Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Government whether we can move forward.
Peel said something very interesting—that,
“this should not be an occupation for gentlemen”.
It took me 30 years to understand what that remark meant. It meant an extraordinary Victorian experiment, because that was the period in which you bought commissions, you bought livings and you bought places in the Civil Service. Peel was saying that the police service should be a meritocracy.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
Does the noble Lord wish to withdraw his amendment?
Baroness Henig
Baroness Henig
My Lords, I am very conscious of the lateness of the hour and I will try to be brief. I am particularly grateful for being allowed to move the amendment now because next Wednesday I have some important responsibilities; I am captaining the House of Lords bridge team against the House of Commons, and that is why I cannot be here next week. Again, I am grateful that we are able to take the amendment tonight.
I should say at the outset that I have worked alongside and observed the activities of members of the Police Federation for more than 25 years at both the local and national level. I would say that this experience has given me some expertise in Police Federation matters, but of course expertise currently is not something to boast about or perhaps even to lay claim to.
I am sure that we all know that the chief objective of the federation is to represent the interests of its members, and in my experience the Police Federation does this extremely well at both the local and the national level. Indeed, that support network is very necessary. Police officers do a difficult and often dangerous job. They need and deserve the security of knowing that the Police Federation will always be there to defend them if or when things go wrong, particularly legally, but every now and again in relation to terms of service and powers, and politically as well.
It is of course true that the Police Federation should not operate exclusively on behalf of its members. We the public need to have confidence in police officers, so it is important that members and particularly officers of the federation, in carrying out their functions, maintain high standards of conduct and of transparency. Here I have to observe that their conduct has often left something to be desired. I have myself seen at first hand evidence of bullying and of loutish behaviour. I have seen intimidation and ways of operating that manifestly do not command confidence in the integrity of federation officers. I am not alone. There can be no doubt that in recent years their collective actions and attitudes have on occasion grated on successive Governments, and they have alarmed middle England and the devoted readers of the Daily Mail. In the wake of the fiasco surrounding the clash of who said what and did what in Plebgate, the federation itself resolved to carry through a raft of root-and-branch reforms, It asked Sir David Normington to carry out an examination of the structure of the Police Federation and of its objectives. In his resulting report, Sir David proposed among other changes that in fulfilling its statutory responsibilities for the welfare and efficiency of its members, the Police Federation should,
“act in the public interest”.
The Government are taking on board this recommendation but have modified it somewhat to stipulate that the Police Federation must act to “protect the public interest”. I believe this to be a massive overreaction and a serious mistake.
This is for two principal reasons. The first is that I do not know what “protecting the public interest” means. I have served as a local magistrate for 20 years and I know the importance of having laws that are clearly worded and fully understandable to the general public. Opaque words lead to bad law. I have therefore spent some time asking a number of my legal friends, some of them in this House, what they think is meant by “the public interest”. My learned friends cannot tell me. They do not agree and there is no accepted understanding of the phrase, and indeed there is some disagreement on what it might mean. So what precisely are we asking the Police Federation to do? They and we need clarity, so I would like the Minister to spell out to me, and more importantly to the legal profession, what she believes is meant by “protecting the public interest” as it applies to the Police Federation.
My second concern is that in representing its members, which the Police Federation has a prime duty to do, it could easily be drawn into doing the opposite of protecting the public interest. There may be officers whose cases, once the evidence is heard, could undermine trust and confidence in the police and could suggest that they have behaved in ways that have not protected the public interest, either deliberately or inadvertently. Should the federation not represent such officers? It is not difficult to foresee a conflict between the federation’s duty to look after the interests of its members and the obligation to protect the public interest, however it is defined. My strong view is that the federation is first and foremost a staff association, although I accept that it is a body that needs to act in a way which commands the trust and confidence of the public. So while it certainly should maintain high standards of conduct and high levels of transparency, fear of breaching this clause about protecting the public interest should not be able to inhibit the federation from representing the interests of its members. I believe that that might well be a consequence. It sounds grand to bestow on the federation a public purpose, which some of the more grandiose officers in the federation actually rather like, but to my mind it is a hollow aspiration. It is just words that sound good but have no agreed or clear meaning. I therefore believe that the words in proposed new subsection (1A)(a) in Clause 48 should be removed. I beg to move.
Baroness Harris of Richmond
My Lords, in drafting this amendment, the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, and I spent many happy hours trying to determine what exactly the “public interest” is, as she has said. It can mean a whole lot of different things to different people and its interpretation is interesting in the context in which it is presented in the Bill.
As we have heard, the Police Federation has followed the recommendation—I emphasise “recommendation” —of Sir David Normington’s review into how to improve itself. It decided that it would establish an independent reference group. At Second Reading I gave your Lordships a full account of how that independent reference group, which I chaired, had been treated. After we were set up as a fully functioning group in January this year, the Police Federation decided it did not want to use us to help it realise its stated purpose of reforming. This was in spite of the membership of that group having within it people with more than 100 years’ experience of working with the police, a very senior and highly respected retired civil servant and the first woman to run a fire authority—so not all of us were politicians, to whom the present chair of the Police Federation was vehemently opposed anyway. Yet all of us were committed to helping the Police Federation improve its image. We were, effectively, sacked in May this year, having been unable to do anything meaningful to help.
I am quizzical about just where the “public interest” fits into this scenario. It is bandied about, as the noble Baroness suggested, but nobody can actually pin down what it means. Is the Police Federation in denial of its obligations to the public interest by behaving in the way it has? If so, what is the meaning of the phrase now? Will the public be pleased at how the organisation has conducted itself—in their interest—or will they be as puzzled as we were about the behaviour of the management of the Police Federation arbitrarily to interpret that interest in this particular way? The phrase needs removing from the Bill unless the Minister can convince me that it is at all meaningful. I would be grateful if she could give me some examples.
Lord Wasserman (Con)
My Lords, I very much welcome the amendment. It deals with an issue I raised in the Second Reading debate on the Bill in your Lordships’ House. As I said at that time, and repeat for the sake of maintaining the highest standards of conduct and transparency, I was, until a few months ago, an unpaid adviser to the Police Federation of England and Wales and had been acting in that capacity for the best part of the previous three years.
I hope that I also made clear in that debate that the line I was about to take in respect of Clause 48 had not been prompted by the Police Federation. Indeed, it was not even supported by the leadership of that organisation. That position has not changed. My views on Clause 48 and, in particular, on the four words which this amendment seeks to omit, remain as they were in July—that is, mine and mine alone. Indeed, it is a cause of some regret that not even my noble friends on the Front Bench are likely to agree with me.
I say that this is a cause of some regret because my views stem directly from my experience as an official in the Home Office—an official doing very much the same job as those who prepared the Bill. The rule in the Home Office at that time was that, when preparing legislation, every effort had to be made to avoid giving hostages to fortune, or making rods for one’s own back—or any number of similar clichés. In practice, this meant that one’s seniors and betters were constantly on the lookout for words which they could strike out of draft legislation because they were not absolutely necessary. Every word in every Bill, we were taught, could be used by clever, rapacious lawyers as a stick with which to beat the Government—or at least a stick to beat other clever and rapacious lawyers. For this reason, every word in a piece of draft legislation, particularly primary legislation, had to be justified as being absolutely necessary and not amenable to misinterpretation or exploitation for purposes other than those directly related to the main purpose of the legislation in question.
I regard the words “protect the public interest” in Clause 48, as the noble Baronesses who spoke before me said, as precisely the kind of words that are amenable to misinterpretation and exploitation. They certainly are not necessary to achieve the purposes of this particular part of the Bill. I therefore regard them as prime candidates for omission.
The same problems do not arise with the words in the other two paragraphs. I believe that it is very sensible to place a duty on the federation to maintain high standards of conduct and transparency. Everyone understands what those words mean. More importantly, I believe that they are quite sufficient by themselves to achieve the Government’s aims for the federation. In fact, they are probably more than enough.
All of us who take an interest in policing know very well why the previous Home Secretary felt moved to introduce these words into the Bill. I for one strongly supported her doing so. But the words “protect the public interest” are quite different. The federation is at bottom a staff association and its job is to represent its members. It is clearly in the public interest that it should do so effectively—that is why it was established. And it is clearly in its own interest that it should act, as Sir David Normington said, to maintain exemplary standards of conduct, integrity and professionalism and to retain public confidence.
To require the federation to act to “protect the public interest” is quite another matter. I fear that these words are tantamount to giving the federation a licence to interfere in policing matters well beyond its expertise. For example, I see the federation deciding that it is in the public interest that it should monitor and make recommendations on the type of equipment and systems which police forces purchase and deploy; on the leadership qualities of candidates for chief constable rank and other operational matters; or on issues of police governance such as the size and composition of police and crime panels.
Of course, individual members of the federation will have views on all these matters and on many more besides. But what we would be doing by including the words “support the public interest” in this Bill is to give the leaders of the federation grounds for spending their money on studying these matters and publicly advocating for changes in them. Indeed, I believe that these words would permit the federation to extend its remit almost indefinitely and to employ clever, rapacious lawyers to justify this on the grounds that it has a statutory duty to protect the public interest.
The federation has more than enough on its plate in carrying out its core mission. Placing on the federation a duty to “support the public interest” may sound good, as the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, said, but it does not pass the test of being essential to the purposes of the Bill. In fact, I believe that it falls squarely into the category of words which could come back to bite the Government in very unpleasant ways.
That is why I strongly support this amendment and urge the Minister to agree with me that omitting these four words would in no way weaken the motivation of the federation to operate in the public interest but would minimise the opportunity for it to make trouble for itself and others in due course.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have given notice of our intention to oppose the proposition that Clause 48 stand part. The reason is that all officers of the federation hold public office. They are therefore all subject to the Nolan principles—the seven principles of public life. Can the Minister explain what is to be added by the clause, over and above the Nolan principles?
Lord Rosser
I will briefly make two points. I have a great deal of sympathy with the amendment that has been moved by my noble friend Lady Henig. I do not necessarily share the interpretation of the words “protect the public interest” that the noble Lord, Lord Wasserman, attached to them. I think that probably, under some of its other responsibilities to its members, the Police Federation would be entitled to pursue at least some of the issues to which he made reference.
Do the Government interpret this wording of “protect the public interest” to mean that the federation must put the interests of the public before the interests of the members of the police forces it is there to represent? Secondly, does this wording mean that legal proceedings or some other action can be taken against the Police Federation by someone who believes that it has not protected the public interest? If so, who can take such legal proceedings or such other action?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, for her explanation of this amendment to Clause 48, which amends the 1996 Act to require the Police Federation, in fulfilling its core purpose, to protect the public interest and maintain high standards of conduct and of transparency —as the noble Baroness said. There was a discussion the other day about what the public interest is. I understood that, in a different context, it was not what the public were interested in but something quite different.
In the spring of 2013, the Police Federation commissioned a review to consider whether any changes were required to its operation or structure to ensure that it continued to promote the public good as well as the interests and welfare of its members. The panel’s final report, Police Federation Independent Review, known widely as the Normington review, was published in January 2014 and made 36 recommendations to improve trust, accountability, professionalism and member services. Recommendation 1 was the adoption of a revised core purpose that reflects the Police Federation’s commitment to act in the public interest. The Police Federation accepted the review’s recommendations in their entirety and has already publicly adopted a revised core purpose on a non-statutory basis. The Normington review was clear that a reformed federation would act in the interests of both its members and the public.
Clause 48 focuses on how the Police Federation discharges its representative role—namely by considering the public interest in its actions, in the same way that the police uphold the public interest in all their actions, whether that is fighting crime on the front line or representing colleagues as a member of the federation. The clause does not conflict with the Police Federation’s representative purpose and will not, for example, require it to act against the interests of its members. The ambition here is to ensure that the federation does not operate against the public interest. Indeed, the Police Federation itself, acting in line with the recommendations of Sir David Normington and his review, asked the Government to enshrine its revised core purposes in legislation. That is exactly what this clause achieves.
Sadly, as the Normington review highlighted, a culture of “narrow self-interest” has permeated the federation in recent years—one of “distrust and division”, as he described it. The Government wish to support the federation in proving that it can serve its members and respect the public interest in providing a representative voice for police officers, with professionalism and integrity.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, made a point about changing the purpose of the Police Federation as set out in the Police Act 1996. Clause 48, as worded, is clear that the federation must protect the public interest and maintain high standards of conduct and transparency in fulfilling that purpose. The Police Act 1996 sets out what the federation should do and Clause 48 sets out how it must deliver that.
The noble Lord also asked what happens when the public interest and the interests of the police diverge. The Normington review was clear that a reformed federation would act in the interests of both its members and the public. Section 59 of the Police Act 1996 provides that the purpose of the Police Federation is to represent members of the police forces in England and Wales in all matters affecting their welfare and efficiency.
Could the federation be challenged in the courts? It could, on the basis that it was not fulfilling its purpose as set out in Section 9(1) of the Police Act 1996 in a way that protected the public interest, but it may already be challenged on the basis that it was not fulfilling its existing purpose.
I hope I have provided some explanation and that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Lord Paddick
I do not think the Minister answered my question about what the clause adds over and above what is within the Nolan principles.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
The Nolan principles underpin every single aspect of involvement in public life. Obviously, this is specific to the police in a certain context, but I think the two should go hand in hand. Obviously, there are different aspects to the police compared with other public professions, but anyone who is in public office needs to sign up to the Nolan principles. This is an aspect that applies to the police.
Baroness Henig
I thank all noble Lords who have spoken at this late hour. Although it is late, this is an important debate. I listened very carefully to the Minister but she did not actually answer the question. She did not tell the Committee what the words actually mean. I have to say again that if it is not clear what a phrase means, it is not going to be good law and it is going to lead to an awful lot of disagreement in years to come. If four lawyers in a room cannot agree what “protect the public interest” means, that is a recipe for problems. The Minister did not explain what it meant. There was a lot of vagueness and phraseology but nothing clear or precise.
Obviously, at this point in the evening I will withdraw the amendment but I want to think about this a bit more. Some of us might want to return to this at a later stage because it really is not in the public interest to put something in a Bill the meaning of which people cannot agree on. That cannot be a good thing to do. But at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Policing and Crime Bill
Wednesday 2nd November 2016
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 55-III(a) Amendments for Committee, supplementary to the third marshalled list (PDF, 64KB) - (1 Nov 2016)
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)
My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lady Henig I wish to move the amendment tabled in her name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond. Clause 51 concerns pre-charge bail and the powers for someone to be released who has been arrested other than at a police station. Amendments 180 and 182 are practical and proportionate and support policing based on greater practitioner autonomy and expertise, which we believe falls in line with the empowerment drive by the Home Office and the College of Policing. Both amendments would reduce the level of the decision-making process from the rank of inspector to sergeant.
Police custody sergeants are well-trained practitioners who have responsibility for the care and treatment of suspects on a 24-hour basis. They make key decisions in line with PACE and other codes of practice. They have the necessary expertise to be able to adjust for a suspect to be released without bail and to apply conditions only where absolutely necessary and proportionate to protect the suspect, victim, witnesses and the wider public.
Amendment 184 concerns the rank of senior officers who can confirm that an investigation either by the SFO or FCA is under way and the applicable bail period. The amendment reduces the rank required of those who can be authorised with these powers from superintendent to inspector. The rank of inspector is a management rank and officers at this level would already be involved in exercising authorising powers and balancing the needs of the suspect. Officers holding this rank are numerous in the police service and are on duty on a 24-hour basis. It should also be noted that there has been a reduction in the number of officers holding the rank of superintendent, with a fall of 28% since 2010.
Officers with the rank of superintendent can take responsibility for any pre-charge reviews beyond the first review and oversee the application process for magistrates’ courts. They can also review any decision made by an inspector that is challenged by a suspect or their legal representative.
This group of amendments seeks to set out powers and responsibilities that are commensurate with the rank held and the practicalities of what is needed in particular situations. I beg to move.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)
My Lords, as we discussed at Second Reading, the purpose of the Government’s reforms to pre-charge bail is to end up with fewer people on bail for shorter periods of time. Part of the way we will do that is to raise the initial decision to impose bail from the custody officer who currently makes that decision—a sergeant—and to require an inspector to make it. At present, the College of Policing’s guidance suggests that an inspector should make a decision to extend bail beyond the initial period. The Bill would instead require a superintendent to make that decision.
The clear implication of these amendments is that the authorisation for pre-charge bail that the Government seek to set is too high, and that instead the current levels are in fact adequate and appropriate. As my right honourable friend the Prime Minister said when she described these reforms as Home Secretary at Second Reading in the House of Commons,
“it is apparent that a significant number of individuals have spent an inordinate amount of time on bail only to end up not being charged or, if charged, found not guilty. Of course, the police and prosecution need time to assemble and test the evidence, particularly in complex cases, before coming to a charging decision, but we need to recognise the stress caused when people are under investigation for prolonged periods, and the disruption to their lives where they are subject to onerous bail conditions … To address the legitimate concerns that have been raised about the current arrangements, the Bill introduces a number of safeguards”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/3/16; col. 45.]
As well as setting clear times for the review of pre-charge bail, which we will debate shortly, the increased levels of accountability set out in the Bill, which these amendments seek to reverse, are an important safeguard against the misuse of pre-charge bail. The measures in the Bill significantly enhance the human rights protections for those accused of an offence, including setting a presumption that release pre-charge should be without bail and that bail should be considered regularly by the police—and after three months, by the courts—to ensure that bail is necessary and proportionate and that the investigation is progressed with appropriate speed and urgency.
In proposing these amendments, the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, on her behalf suggest that requiring the involvement of inspectors and superintendents is disproportionate, and that there is insufficient capacity within police forces for these officers to carry out their existing duties and to make the bail authorisation decisions required by the Bill. We do not consider that the evidence supports this argument.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response to this short debate. Neither my noble friend Lady Henig nor the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, were able to be here today, so I was happy to propose the amendments on their behalf. I will reflect on the points made, read the debate and talk to my noble friend. I am happy to withdraw the amendment at this stage, but my noble friend may want to return to it on Report.
Lord Marlesford
“Lack of evidence to charge
In section 37 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (duties of custody officer before charge), after subsection (6) insert—“(6A) If a person is—(a) released without being charged under subsection (2), or(b) informed, after being questioned under caution, that no further action will be taken against the person,the custody officer shall, as soon as is reasonably practicable, write to the person to inform him that he has been released, or that no further action has been taken against him, on the grounds that there is a lack of evidence to charge him.(6B) In the letter referred to in subsection (6A), and any other written record of the decision to release the person without charge under subsection (2) or to take no further action against the person, the custody officer must use the words “lack of evidence” to describe the grounds on which the decision to release the person, or to take no further action against the person, was taken.””
Lord Marlesford (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 181 seeks to right, or at least to mitigate, what I see as a wrong. In recent months, we have on many days heard, read or seen reports of individuals being investigated for crimes, particularly sex crimes. There is huge publicity, especially when one of those persons is already a public figure, which must be agony for those concerned.
Sometimes the investigation leads to prosecution and conviction, and then any sympathy one might have had is likely to evaporate or at least diminish. But sometimes it leads to an announcement by the police that there will be no prosecution, and that may be after many months. The phrase used to explain the decision is “insufficient evidence”. That is a most tendentious phrase. It implies “no smoke without fire” and is rather similar to the old Scottish “not proven” verdict.
The decision to investigate allegations must always be made by the police, but sometimes investigations come to nothing. There can then be a long period, perhaps a very long period, of waiting, and then there is the announcement of “insufficient evidence”. The essence of our system of justice is that criminal cases are tried on the facts, with a jury, with a verdict either of guilty or not guilty. That is how it should be. It is not a matter of mere semantics to object to the phrase which I have quoted. That is why I seek to change the wording in circumstances where the decision is made that there is not the evidence to prosecute from “insufficient evidence” to the much more neutral phrase “lack of evidence”. I beg to move.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, I support what my noble friend Lord Marlesford has said. He has identified something that has gone seriously wrong in recent years. The phrase “insufficient evidence” suggests the existence of some evidence. In some instances that will, of course, be right, but in other cases it will not be right—for example, in recent cases which will, doubtless, be in your Lordships’ minds. My noble friend has put forward a phrase which ought to be acceptable to the Government, but if it is not—and I am no wordsmith—perhaps I might suggest some alternatives. It would be proper to say, for example, “wrong to commence criminal proceedings” or “criminal proceedings are not justified”. Other phrases may occur to your Lordships.
What we must not do is to allow the police to come forward with a reason which implies the existence of a fire unsupported by sufficient smoke. That is not a fair state of affairs. My noble friend on the Front Bench may say that this is not a matter for statute. If the Committee is of that view, then advice could be given by ACPO to its members, but I think my noble friend has identified a real point which I hope your Lordships will support, by argument and debate.
Lord Dear (CB)
My Lords, I support what both noble Lords have said, the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, in particular. I am sure I am right in saying that there is a growing sense of disquiet throughout society, which has swung away from the rampant interest that one saw in recent years in pursuing sex offenders, in particular—the Jimmy Savile case comes to mind immediately—towards beginning to say, “Wait a minute, it has gone too far”. I believe that it has gone too far. We live in a world where reputations can be traduced almost within seconds, given the spread of social media—I think the phrase now used is “going viral”. That can happen and, worldwide, a reputation is in tatters in a way that was not at risk of happening before.
One has only to look at Members of this House, never mind anyone outside—and outside is in many ways more important than our own membership of your Lordships’ House. Lord Bramall comes to mind. The son of the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Carey, has recently been in the newspapers for reasons I found totally disquieting. So have Sir Cliff Richard, Lord Brittan, Sir Edward Heath and Bishop Bell, who has been the subject of many of our debates recently. I will not take up your Lordships’ time except to say that I support what is being said. Whether we should do it by advice, as has recently been said, I do not know, but the Government should take note of this growing tide of disquiet at what is going on. I hesitate to say, and I am sad to say, that the police are front runners in causing this situation. Something should be done and this amendment is a step in that direction. I support it.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford. I might go a little further than the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and say that “lack of evidence” is probably exactly the phrase that should be used and it should be made compulsory. Saying that there is a lack of evidence could quite easily mean a complete lack of credible evidence, whereas “insufficient evidence” could imply that there was some credible evidence in cases where there was none. “Lack of evidence” is exactly the right phrase and I look forward to the Minister’s response as to how this can be made compulsory.
Baroness Boothroyd (CB)
My Lords, I support this very splendid amendment that has been moved by the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, and spoken to by your Lordships warmly and welcomingly. In many cases, the people we are speaking about here—and I say this in front of many people here who have given great service to the police—have been harassed by the police. On many occasions, they have been pilloried by the press. We were just talking about the press in an earlier debate. Often they do not spoil a good story with the facts. The relations of persons who have been questioned under caution with their immediate relationships have been spoiled and bruised. Their relationships with friends have been harmed. At the end of the day they deserve to be more precisely dealt with. We need precise wording here and more direction—they deserve nothing less. I like the wording of “lack of evidence” and I ask the Minister to either accept this or look at it again, and I say to the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, that if he puts this to the House for a decision I shall be in the Lobby in support of him.
Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)
My Lords, there is a serious risk of agreement breaking out. I will make one point, if I may, as the only Scottish lawyer, I think, in the Committee. It is important to remember that the verdict of not proven occurs after trial and trial takes place only if there is a reasonable prospect of conviction and, of course, it is in the public interest. So the standard is slightly different but that does not in any way undermine my support for what the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, said. There is absolutely no doubt that inferences can be drawn from “insufficient evidence”. Indeed, the way in which the language is sometimes placed in a paragraph or a sentence goes a long way to suggesting that that may have been the conclusion of the prosecuting authorities but the police may feel rather differently. From that point of view, it seems to me that “lack of evidence” provides a pithy and succinct way of dealing with an issue that is all too common, particularly in relation to public figures.
Lord Wilson of Tillyorn (CB)
My Lords, I have not spoken before on this Bill but I will speak very briefly in support of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford. There is no need to name names. All of us in your Lordships’ House know of people who have been mistreated over the past months in the way that their cases have been dealt with and summed up by the police. The reputations of some very distinguished people have been damaged as a result. If those people have been treated in that way, there must be many others who have been treated similarly.
I confess to some doubts about whether legislation is the right way to deal with this. It seems a very large sledgehammer for what should be a small nut but it has been a terribly resistant nut and perhaps we have to use legislation. One would have thought that something like Standing Orders would be sufficient. But if this amendment is put to your Lordships’ House, I would support it.
Lord Elystan-Morgan (CB)
My Lords, I feel very privileged to add my humble voice to the very distinguished voices that have already spoken on this matter. Many, many years ago, in what was then the old Wales and Chester Circuit, a verdict was returned by a jury in south Wales: “just a little bit guilty”. That was in a trial so not dealing with exactly the same issue that is now before the Committee. We must be very careful not to have a wording that suggests that there may be just a little bit of evidence and no more. I am not exactly sure how that should be worded but I am sure that it is not beyond the wit of draftsmen to bring it about. Whether it should be by way of statute or some administrative provision, I leave to the good judgment of those concerned.
Lord Inglewood (Con)
My Lords, I intervene briefly to say that I, too, support the principle behind my noble friend Lord Marlesford’s amendment. It seems to me that if the principle is that you should be innocent until proved guilty, you should be proved guilty on the evidence and not by innuendo.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, Amendment 181 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, would insert a new clause into the Bill concerning the procedures to be followed where a suspect is released without charge or informed after being questioned under caution that no further action will be taken against them. In considering the noble Lord’s amendment, I wanted to listen carefully to his reasoning for this proposed new clause, and I think that he has made a compelling case today. The noble Lords, Lord Dear and Lord Paddick, have extensive experience as senior police officers and the House should also take note of their support. I am not sure whether this should be addressed through an amendment to the Bill—I accept that point. There may be some other mechanism to address it, but the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, has made a compelling case and I thank him for that.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, Amendment 181, tabled by my noble friend Lord Marlesford would require a custody officer to do two things once a decision has been made that no further action is to be taken against a suspect because the test for mounting a prosecution, set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors, has not been met. First, the custody officer would need to notify the person in writing that no further action is to be taken. Secondly, the written notice must use the phrase “lack of evidence” to describe the reasoning behind the decision.
The Government agree with my noble friend that written notification should be given in all cases. We consulted on this in late 2014 and Clauses 65 and 66 would require a written notification to be given to any person arrested on suspicion of a criminal offence, where the police or Crown Prosecution Service subsequently decide not to charge. This applies whether or not the person is on bail following the reforms set out in Part 4 of the Bill. My noble friend’s amendment would go one stage further and require the written notification of no further action in those cases where a person is interviewed under caution on suspicion of an offence but not arrested. We know from anecdotal evidence that, since the amendment of PACE Code G in 2012, more cases are being dealt with by the police without arresting the suspect, which may have created a gap in police practice that my noble friend’s amendment identifies. In order to give this issue appropriate consideration, I would like to take it away and consider it further before Report.
The second limb of my noble friend’s amendment would require that the written notice and any other record used the phrase “lack of evidence”, rather than the customary “insufficient evidence” used at present. It may assist the Committee if I remind noble Lords of the evidential test required by the Code for Crown Prosecutors. Paragraph 4.4 of the code states:
“Prosecutors must be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction against each suspect on each charge. They must consider what the defence case may be, and how it is likely to affect the prospects of conviction. A case which does not pass the evidential stage must not proceed, no matter how serious or sensitive it may be”.
The absence of “sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction” could easily be characterised as a “lack of evidence” or as the presence of “insufficient evidence”. We could debate for some time the precise difference between the two phrases, which must be very small.
Noble Lords have said that there has been some comment in the media, in the light of recent high-profile cases, that the dropping of cases due to “insufficient evidence” could leave an outside observer thinking that there must have been something there. This reflects the reality of policing: that there has to be sufficient evidence to justify an arrest—that is, reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence has been committed. However, the investigative process in such cases will often end up with insufficient evidence, or, to use my noble friend’s phrase, a “lack of evidence”, that could still mean there was some evidence, but not sufficient to charge.
The Code for Crown Prosecutors is issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions under Section 10 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985. The current version, dating from January 2013, is the seventh edition of the code, and every version since 1986 has stated essentially the same requirement for,
“sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction”.
I say to my noble friend and other noble Lords that “insufficient evidence” seems to reflect the wording of the code test rather better and that it is the opinion of the Crown Prosecution Service that the current phrasing has been used for more than 30 years and works well in practice.
While I recognise that the amendment would not change the test itself, to change the way that decisions made under the code are communicated, even to the small degree proposed by my noble friend, could create confusion, as there would be a tendency to ask which test should now be applied and whether it means the same thing. It could also invite doubt in the minds of prosecutors, judges, defence lawyers and others as to the reliability of decisions made against different tests.
I also point out to noble Lords that there are two tests in the Code for Crown Prosecutors that must be met before charges are brought. It is perfectly possible for there to be sufficient evidence to meet the first test, but for it none the less to be contrary to the public interest to charge, for example, where a case is to be disposed of out of court by way of a conditional caution.
While Clauses 65 and 66 set a requirement to notify a suspect that they will not be charged, that notice would need to be given in both scenarios; that is, where there was insufficient evidence and where the evidence was sufficient but charges were not in the public interest. However, under my noble friend’s amendment, a suspect would need to be told in all cases that they were not being charged due to a lack of evidence, even though there must be sufficient evidence to charge to get to the point of considering the public interest test.
I can say to my noble friend that the Government are sympathetic to his aim of giving greater certainty to those who are investigated but against whom charges are not brought. We are minded to achieve this by non-statutory means so that prosecutors retain the necessary flexibility in cases where a decision is taken on public interest grounds.
On the issue of written notification of a decision not to charge, the Government consider that Clauses 65 and 66 already require such notification in all cases where an arrest has taken place. However, I would like to give further consideration to the issue of those interviewed under caution without being arrested. I hope that my noble friend will recognise that the precise wording of that notification is an issue best dealt with by non-statutory means and that, having heard my statement, he will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Marlesford
My Lords, I am most grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed with knowledge and experience far greater than mine. I was very gratified that there was so much support for what I had to say. I thank the Minister for what she said. She has gone a long way to accepting what I intend. I am happy to leave it to her to come back to us and tell us exactly what it is proposed to do.
The rather Socratic justification which she gave for the terminology is okay in esoteric circles, but we are concerned with what the people as a whole see, and we are back to the old cliché that justice must be seen to be done. When she says that the difference between my phrase and “insufficient evidence” is very small, I remind her that it was said that at one moment Christendom was divided by an iota.
Having said all that, I am most grateful to my noble friend for her sympathetic approach to what I have said, and I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, in moving Amendment 183, which is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond, I will speak to the other amendments in the group, Amendments 186 and 187. My noble friend is unable to be in her place this afternoon.
Amendment 183 seeks to make the initial period beyond which police bail under Section 30A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 must then be authorised by a superintendent 56 days instead of 28, as proposed in the Bill. The impact assessment published by the Government on 26 May 2016 alongside the Bill indicates that the 28-day limit is a reasonable one and that the impact on police resources would not be arduous. However, academic research carried out by Professor Anthea Hucklesby of the School of Law at the University of Leeds suggests that an initial limit of 60 days would be necessary to avoid considerable adverse impact on the police service.
That research forms the basis of an article by Professor Michael Zander, the acknowledged expert on the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, in vol. 180 of Criminal Law and Justice Weekly entitled, “Not a Good Idea to Ignore the Evidence”. I have spoken to Professor Zander about this issue. In the article, he agrees with Professor Hucklesby’s conclusion that:
“A time-limit of 60 days would be proportionate for both suspects and the police. This would allow cases involving routine forensic analysis, which officers in my study consistently reported took an average of six weeks, to be completed”.
Professor Zander goes on to say that the Home Office has had this research for “over a year” and that the findings,
“have now been confirmed by the College of Policing’s bail report, Pre-charge Bail—an Exploratory Study, September 2016”.
My noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond tells me that the Police Superintendents’ Association of England and Wales believes that the 28-day limit could have a considerable detrimental effect on the impact of impending changes on inspectors, superintendents and magistrates’ courts.
I do not wish to detain the Committee with the detailed reasoning behind the conclusions of the academics, the College of Policing and the Police Superintendents’ Association. Suffice to say, we have no doubt excellent number-crunchers in the Home Office on the one hand saying the 28-day limit is doable, and the rest of the world on the other hand claiming that it is not. Of course we support limits on police bail, and we generally welcome the provisions in the Bill in this respect, for the reasons the Minister outlined in response to the first group of amendments. But can the Minister explain how the academics and the practitioners are lined up against the Government on the initial time limit? Amendments 186 and 187 are consequential on the main amendment. I beg to move.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, Amendment 183, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, would delete “28” and insert “56”, which would increase the period of pre-trial bail from 28 to 56 days. I think we all agree that bail at any point should be as short as possible, although the point that the noble Lord made needs to be considered carefully by your Lordships’ Committee. There seems little point in bringing people back to the police station, only for them to be rebailed because other work has not actually happened. People may be waiting for forensics or other things to be done, so the noble Lord has a good point. If Professor Zander and other academics suggest that this will not be effective, I hope that when the Minister responds she can answer that point. It seems pointless to bring people back just to be sent away again, given the cost of the bureaucracy for the police, the solicitors and the suspect. If she can respond to the points made, that would be very helpful.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, this group of amendments would greatly reduce the effect of the Government’s reforms to pre-charge bail by increasing the length of the initial period of bail from 28 to 56 days. As I have said, the purpose of these reforms is to end up with fewer people on bail for shorter periods of time, and thereby significantly enhance the human rights protections of those who have not even been charged with an offence, let alone convicted. As such, requiring each and every person granted bail to be given bail for eight whole weeks would significantly dilute the reforms—reforms that the Liberal Democrats supported strongly when they were proposed by the coalition Government.
The noble Lord said that the intention behind these amendments is to reduce the administrative burden on the police in operating the reformed pre-charge bail system. Although I do not deny that the new system will cause additional work for the police compared to the current position, this is inevitable given that we are reforming a system currently lacking appropriate safeguards. I would also say that the Government do not look at the extra work required as an administrative burden; we see it as requiring an appropriate level of intrusive supervision to ensure that pre-charge bail is used appropriately and that investigations are progressed diligently and swiftly. That goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, about people having to return time and again to police stations.
I would also say that the figure of 28 days set out in the Bill was not arrived at by chance; we considered carefully the initial period of bail in drawing up our proposals, seeking to balance the administrative burden on the police with the need to put an end to the practice of people being bailed for months or even years at a time with no external scrutiny.
When we consulted publicly in December 2014 on the proposals, with the full agreement of the Liberal Democrats, who formed part of the coalition Government at the time, we received some 300 responses, two-thirds of which favoured the tightening of pre-charge bail and introduction of judicial oversight. Of the 135 respondents who expressed a preference, 58% favoured the model set out in the Bill, with an initial bail period of 28 days, extendable to three months by a senior officer. There was also strong support for an initial bail period of 28 days from groups as disparate as the Society of Editors, the Birmingham Law Society and the Magistrates’ Association. The Committee might also be interested to know that the Howard League for Penal Reform, a well-respected group of campaigners in this area, argued that pre-charge bail should be limited to a single period of 14 days without conditions.
I also draw the Committee’s attention to the bail principles published by the College of Policing in October 2013, which stated that:
“In the first instance, unless there are exceptional circumstances, the bail period should be no more than 28 days”.
With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, there is clearly backing for the human rights improvements that would be brought about by a 28-day initial bail period from across the spectrum of public and professional opinion.
I also point out that, as set out in the impact assessment accompanying the Bill, almost one-third of bail cases—29%—are currently resolved within 28 days. We cannot therefore see how it would be either sensible or appropriate in those cases for the police to have a choice of either keeping those individuals on bail for a further four weeks or having to issue paperwork to terminate suspects’ bail and call them in for charging.
I also draw the Committee’s attention to the other major change these reforms will make: that there will be a presumption in favour of release without bail, with bail being used only where it is both necessary and proportionate. This change in particular will allow the police to release many suspects without the administrative overhead that bail entails. It would also remove much of the stigma and inconvenience of bail from those released in this way. Because of this change, the police resources tied up administering straightforward cases will be freed up to concentrate on those cases where bail is truly necessary.
I have set out why the Government consider that the 28-day initial bail period is an appropriate first period, during which a significant proportion of cases will be resolved. The Government consider it crucial that the unfairness of keeping a person under investigation in “legal limbo” is addressed, as it cannot be right that they can spend months or even years on pre-charge bail with no judicial oversight, as happens at present.
As set out in the coalition Government’s response to the consultation, published in March 2015, the negative effects for individuals on bail and their families include emotional or mental trauma and financial implications. I also draw to your Lordships’ attention to the fact that, at the end of the coalition, in their 2015 general election manifesto, the Liberal Democrats included a proposal to place limits on the duration and conditions of pre-charge bail. Therefore, it strikes me as odd to hear the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asking to extend the initial bail period from 28 to 56 days. I recognise his laudable aim to reduce the administrative burden on the police, but extending the initial period to 56 days will, as I have said, either leave a large number of suspects on bail for no reason or require the police to do further work to call them in. For that reason, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
Before the noble Baroness sits down, can she comment on some of the academic research around this, which both I and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, referred to? I think that we are all in agreement that no one wants anybody to go on bail for a day longer than absolutely necessary but it seems a bit odd that, if all the services that the police need to investigate their cases are taking more than 28 days—maybe up to six weeks—we have bail for 28 days. They could bring people back into the police station just to send them away again because the necessary information is not available.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I draw the noble Lord’s attention to the comments that I made about the presumption against pre-charge bail, which I think is compelling in the Government’s attempt to reform the system. There will be presumption in favour of release without bail—in other words, do not bail someone unless there is a good reason to put them on bail, which in many ways would free up the system. Bail should be used only where it is both necessary and proportionate. The fact that almost one-third of people are released within 28 days anyway is, I think, compelling evidence for the arguments that the Government are making.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am very grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, on this matter. As he just said, there is agreement on all sides that we need to protect the human rights of those people arrested and bailed by the police. But there needs to be a balance between the protection of human rights and the practical impact on the police, particularly in the light of the significant cuts in police numbers, the even greater cuts in the number of detectives, who would be mainly involved in investigating these matters—and trying to do so within a 28-day limit—and the reduction in the number of police superintendents, who would have to authorise a further extension. The noble Baroness said that 28 days was not arrived at by chance and that people should not be on bail for years. The amendment suggests 56 days, not years. It is just a proportionate increase to the maximum limit proposed in the Bill.
It is unfortunate that the noble Baroness appears to be trying to argue this on party lines, talking about what the Liberal Democrats did in coalition. Unlike other political parties, the Liberal Democrats like to base their decisions and legislation on the evidence. The evidence from academics that I put forward, which the noble Baroness has not addressed, points in the opposite direction to the Home Office impact assessment. The noble Baroness failed to answer when I asked why there was a difference between the Government’s view and the findings of academic research and representations from the Superintendents’ Association. She quoted from a 2013 College of Policing report. I quoted from a 2016 College of Policing report, which Professor Zander said backs up Professor Hucklesby’s conclusion that 60 days is a far more appropriate period and strikes the right balance between the human rights of those bailed and the practical issues facing the police. Clearly, we will return to this at other stages on the Bill but, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
“Scrutiny of investigatory capabilities
(1) Police and crime plans produced under Chapter 3 of Part 1 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 must include an annual assessment of the capability of the police to investigate crimes within the 28-day pre-charge bail time limit.(2) The assessment must consider any—(a) changes to the number of suspects released without bail,(b) resource constraints, including in respect of the number of staff,(c) safeguarding requirements of victims, witnesses and suspects, and(d) issues around multiagency work.”
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, Amendment 187A is very opportune and I hope that the Government will be pleased to see it. It stands in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Rosser and would insert a new clause in the Bill with regard to pre-charge bail. The new clause would place a requirement on police and crime plans to include an annual assessment of the capability of the police to investigate crimes within the 28-day period. Proposed new subsection (2) in the amendment states that the assessment must consider the points as listed, which are,
“changes to the number of suspects released without bail … resource constraints … safeguarding requirements … and … issues around multi agency work”.
This list is not exhaustive but all these sorts of things could come into play if the police were able to deal with people on bail within the 28-day period. An annual assessment is a valuable tool in helping to ensure that targets are met and in identifying problems.
The second amendment in this group would give a power to the Secretary of State to make by regulation a requirement for agencies,
“to cooperate promptly with police”.
As we said in a previous debate, in seeking to meet the 28-day target, the police need to be confident that other agencies are working to deliver information to them. The amendment would give the Secretary of State the power to require agencies by regulation to assist the police within the 28-day limit. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, has explained, these amendments seek to test the ability of police forces to complete investigations within the initial 28-day pre-charge bail time limit.
Amendment 187ZA would require police and crime commissioners to make an annual assessment of their force’s capability of investigating crimes within this initial pre-charge bail time limit. The Government consider that requiring such an annual assessment will only add an unnecessary bureaucratic burden on PCCs and forces. First, the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 requires PCCs to produce new police and crime plans only in the year of an election, so the amendment does not build on an existing process; it requires PCCs to produce something entirely new.
The Government acknowledge that the reforms to pre-charge bail will create a new system and that forces will need to build capacity at first and incorporate changes within their business processes. However, the changes will encourage and enable police forces to resolve cases within a time limit, resulting in a more efficient system for the long term.
Although bail will be limited initially to a period of 28 days, it is important to remember that the Bill’s provisions will enable an extension to a total of three months, which can be authorised by a senior police officer in complex cases. Furthermore, the police will also be able to apply to the courts for an extension beyond three months, which will have to be approved by a magistrate. While the police will, of course, aim to resolve cases in fewer than 28 days, they will be able to extend the bail period where it is necessary to do so. The requirement for senior scrutiny of extensions will avoid the issue of the past, where bail has been extended for months, or even years, without scrutiny outside the investigation team.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
Before the noble Baroness sits down, in her response to Amendment 187ZA she talked about external scrutiny of the police. Can she say a bit more about that? Is she saying that she expects that external scrutiny to look specifically at the issues here in a broad-brush review? If so, where will they get the data from? I assume that they will be collected by the police.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, there will be a number of sources of data within the police, and the annual monitoring by HMIC’s PEEL inspection programme, which considers all the police’s effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy, will form part of that external scrutiny.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
The noble Baroness can check this and come back to me, but I would expect then that the data would actually be collected.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
As the noble Lord says, I will go away and give him more detail on that, either before Report or on Report.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
I thank the noble Baroness for that response, and at this time I am happy to withdraw the amendment.
“( ) Where an offence under this section is committed by a person released without charge and on bail under Part 4 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the offence is to be treated as having been committed in England and Wales (whether or not the conduct constituting the offence took place there).( ) Where an offence under this section is committed by a person released without charge and on bail under Part 5 of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/1341 (N.I.12)), the offence is to be treated as having been committed in Northern Ireland (whether or not the conduct constituting the offence took place there).”
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)
My Lords, these amendments principally relate to the cross-border enforcement provisions in Chapter 7 of Part 4. Those provisions strengthen the existing cross-border powers of arrest contained in Part 10 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. In particular, these provisions close a gap in the cross-border arrest powers to ensure that a person who commits an offence in one UK jurisdiction can be arrested without a warrant by an officer from the jurisdiction in which the person is found. The provisions in new Section 137A of the 1994 Act include a number of safeguards, one of which is that the arresting officer has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the suspect has committed a specified offence in another jurisdiction—that is, an offence specified in regulations.
In the interests of greater clarity and to ensure that the police are able to exercise these powers as soon as possible after Royal Assent, Amendments 201B, 201C, 201G and 201T insert a list of “specified offences” in the 1994 Act, instead of setting out the offences in regulations. As a consequence of this new approach, Amendments 201D to 201F modify the regulation-making power in new Section 137B of the 1994 Act so that it becomes a power to add an offence to or remove an offence from the list of offences for the time being specified in new Schedule 7A to the 1994 Act. This revised power is necessary to ensure that the list of relevant offences can be kept up to date; for example, to take account of new offences being created or reductions in the maximum penalty for a specified offence such that it is no longer in the interests of justice for it to remain on the list. As befitting a Henry VIII power, the regulations continue to be subject to the affirmative procedure.
The list of relevant offences specified in new Schedule 7A to the 1994 Act includes that in Clause 67: namely, the offence of breach of pre-charge bail conditions relating to travel. The related Amendment 187A to that clause clarifies that if a travel-related breach of pre-charge bail conditions is committed anywhere in the United Kingdom, it will be regarded as having been committed in either England and Wales or Northern Ireland, depending on where the bail was granted. This will ensure that the breach can be prosecuted in the relevant UK courts and will also make sure that the cross-border powers set out in Clauses 105 to 107 are available to enforce the offence.
Amendments 201H to 201S relate to the rights of persons arrested under new Section 137A of the 1994 Act. New Section 137D of the 1994 Act applies certain existing statutory rights to persons arrested under the new power of arrest—for example, in respect of the information to be given to the arrestee—but includes a power to disapply or modify the specified enactments. Again, in the interests of greater clarity, new Schedule 7B to the 1994 Act, which is inserted by Amendment 201U, sets out the necessary modifications in the 1994 Act. As a consequence of this change of approach, the regulation-making power is retained but modified so that it becomes a power to add, remove, alter and disapply statutory rights. Amendment 233A makes a consequential change to the extent clause.
I trust noble Lords will agree that this revised approach will provide greater clarity as to how the new cross-border arrest powers will operate. I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I hope that this amendment can be dealt with very quickly. It takes us to the provisions for live links with people in detention and, in particular, the definition of a “vulnerable adult”. When I read the definition, I was unsure whether the phrase,
“may have difficulty understanding the purpose of an authorisation”,
extended to understanding its implications or outcome. It seemed to me that the word “understanding” was rather narrow.
I was asked yesterday by the Bill team whether I could explain what I was getting at. Once I had a look at the drafting, I realised that I had put the words in the wrong place, and I apologise to the Committee for that. However, I was assured that the wording in the Bill extends to understanding the implications or outcome of a decision, and I am moving the amendment simply in the hope that the Minister can confirm that from the Dispatch Box. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I thank the noble Baroness for her comments. Amendment 188A would amend Clause 73 to alter the definition of a “vulnerable adult” in new Section 45ZA of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. That new section would enable a superintendent to authorise the extension of pre-charge detention using a live link, rather than being physically present in the police station. In the case of a vulnerable adult, consent to the use of a live link must be given in the presence of an appropriate adult, and the amendment seeks to alter the definition of a vulnerable adult for those purposes.
I understand that the noble Baroness is seeking an assurance that the definition provided for in the Bill would include a person who had difficulty understanding the implications or outcome of a decision by a superintendent to authorise the extension of pre-charge detention from 24 to 36 hours. I am happy to provide such an assurance and, on that basis, I hope that she will be happy to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Walmsley
“(6) Subject to section 136A, in this section “place of safety” means residential accommodation provided by a local social services authority under Part III of the National Assistance Act 1948, a hospital as defined by this Act, an independent hospital or care home for mentally disordered persons or any other suitable place.””
Baroness Walmsley (LD)
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 190 and 191, which are grouped with Amendment 189. We now come to the part of the Bill that deals with the Mental Health Act 1983. Amendment 189 would ensure that no one, regardless of their age, was taken to a police cell under an emergency section of the Mental Health Act. Amendment 190 defines a place of safety, and that does not include a police cell.
The Bill makes some very welcome changes to provisions under the Mental Health Act. It bans the use of police cells for children and young people in crisis; it seeks to reduce the use of police cells as places of safety for adults; and it reduces the length of time that a person can be detained from 72 to 24 hours. These are big, important and very welcome improvements. However, the Bill leaves the door open for police cells to continue to be used for adults in crisis. That should not be continued, and it does not need to happen. We have seen in places such as Hertfordshire and Merseyside, where no police cells have been used for people in crisis in the last year, that with careful planning and co-operation it is entirely possible for people to be supported in health-based places of safety instead of being taken to police cells. I commend the large reduction in the use of police cells that many other police forces have made over the last year across England and Wales.
The limited change to the use of police cells in the Bill is based on an assumption that 4% of people detained under Section 136 need to be taken to a police cell due to “exceptional circumstances”. However, these circumstances have not been defined. Clearly, we need further information on the exact situations in which the Government envisage a police cell being an appropriate place for someone in crisis. I do not believe that anyone in crisis should be taken to a cell. That is not a place of safety for someone in crisis. When someone has a mental illness, everything that a public authority does to and for them should help them recover. Putting them in a cell does not achieve this. Indeed, it often achieves the exact opposite. One patient told the charity Mind that, “Being put in a police cell where hardly anyone is trained in mental health issues is not good. To be locked up and isolated made me think I was worthless. All I wanted was to talk”.
Baroness Howe of Idlicote (CB)
My Lords, I have added my name to amendments in this group. I will speak specifically to Amendment 190, which we have already heard a fair amount about. It seeks to prohibit anyone detained under Sections 135 and 136 of the Mental Health Act being taken to a police cell. Regardless of their age, no one should be made to feel like a criminal simply for being unwell.
I will focus on the emotional impact that being detained in a cell has on people in crisis and question some of the assumptions about the need for the use of police cells for mental health provision. Those who are picked up by the police under the Mental Health Act are detained because there is a real risk of harm to themselves or others. However, they have committed no crime. These are people in need of health support and are detained so that a mental health assessment can take place.
When in a mental health crisis, one is likely to feel frightened, overwhelmed and extremely distressed. One’s behaviour may seem aggressive and threatening to others. That is part of mental illness. Nevertheless, such people still need support and compassion. Health-based places of safety need to be equipped to manage someone’s challenging behaviour, and some areas are able to do this already. We heard about Merseyside from the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley,
The experience of being held in police cells is distressing, and often it is the most vulnerable who end up in a cell; yet being held in a prison cell and treated like a criminal can only make matters worse. The Government’s impact assessment on the Bill details the experiences of some of those who have been detained in police cells. Many speak of feeling cold and hungry, being left alone, strip-searched and having their personal possessions removed. Indeed, in one case the light fittings were removed from the cell to prevent self-harming, leaving the person, who was experiencing a mental health crisis, completely in the dark.
Clearly the use of police cells is never appropriate for people with mental health crises and we need to challenge the assumption that sometimes they are. I hope these amendments, so ably moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, will persuade the Minister that the use of police cells when dealing with people with a mental health crisis is no longer acceptable and that she will therefore accept the amendments.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, my name is on the amendments in this group. My noble friend mentioned the importance of ensuring parity between physical and mental health services, and we will continue to raise that until parity is achieved. She also mentioned stereotyped assumptions as to links between mental health and criminal offending and racial stigma in mental health matters.
It occurs to me that the arrangements for using police stations as a “place of safety”—like others, I put that term in quotation marks—must be very difficult for police officers. They are not health professionals who can deal with physical health problems or mental health problems. We should not expect them to respond to a situation for which, however well intentioned, they are not qualified.
My noble friend also mentioned the question of funding. Inevitably, the reliance on increasingly stretched local authorities is an issue. Given that a place of safety includes residential accommodation provided by local social services, we need to recognise the importance of local authorities’ funding for new places of safety. The Government’s investment in that is a positive step. As with so many issues, this is not something that can be put in one pigeonhole and left there.
Lord Bradley (Lab)
My Lords, this group of amendments addresses the crucial relationship between mental health and the criminal justice system. I make it clear at the outset that I support the objective of banning the use of police cells as a place of safety for adults. My comments are in the context of my own independent report published in 2009, which reviewed people with mental health problems and learning disabilities in the criminal justice system.
In the report I made over 80 recommendations for change, at least two of which are relevant to this debate. First, I recommended the establishment of multidisciplinary liaison and diversion teams composed of people with a variety of skills, including psychiatric nurses, learning disability nurses, drug and alcohol workers and many others, all working alongside the police in police stations to identify and assess vulnerable people and to support the custody staff at the first point of contact with the criminal justice system. This programme is being rolled out nationally. Currently, 55% of the country is covered. Additional money from the Treasury was allocated in July of this year to enable 75% of the country to be covered by 2018-19, with a view to 100% coverage by 2020-21.
Alongside this, and now properly integrated with liaison and diversion teams, is street triage. That is where the police and NHS staff work together in their local communities. It works best where there is a dedicated vehicle and they sit together, often with their separate laptops—we hope to link technology at some point—so that they can immediately assess the needs of vulnerable persons and stop them hitting against the criminal justice system. These are often the people who may be sectioned under Section 136 of the Mental Health Act, and this is where the second recommendation in my report is relevant today. I said then that, “All partner organisations”—by which I meant principally the police and the NHS,
“involved in the use of Section 136 of the Mental Health Act 2007 should work together to develop an agreed protocol on its use. Discussions should immediately commence to identify suitable local mental health facilities as the place of safety, ensuring that the police station is no longer used for this purpose”.
The recommendation was accepted by the then Labour Government and each subsequent Government—we are on to the fourth now—have committed to this objective.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
My Lords, as has been said, the Bill bans the use of police cells for those aged under 18 in a mental health crisis, and for those aged 18 and over it states that they may be held in a police station,
“only in circumstances specified in the regulations”,
made by the Secretary of State. As I understand it, in 2015-16, 43 children and some 2,100 adults in a mental health crisis and covered by Sections 135 and 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 ended up in police cells rather than at an appropriate health-based place of safety.
Amendment 190 in the group provides that no person of any age in this situation should be held at a police station as a place of safety, and that is an objective with which no doubt there is widespread agreement. The question that has to be asked, though, is what would happen if the provision in line with this amendment was introduced relatively soon and there were still insufficient non-police-cell appropriate places of safety available and police cells could no longer be used. What would happen to the vulnerable people concerned in those circumstances?
The Bill’s objective in relation to children not being kept in police cells is clearly considered to be achievable by the Government, no doubt because, as I understand it, we are talking about fewer than 50 children. However, the figure for adults appears to be some 50 times higher. Can the Government say how the figure of 2,100 adults in police cells in 2015-16, or whatever alternative figure they have, compares with the total number of adults in a mental health crisis who were placed in an appropriate health-based place of safety? I believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, mentioned the figure of some 28,000. Can the Government also say how quickly they estimate that the terms of Amendment 190 could be met through the provision of the necessary additional places of safety, what the costs would be, and within what timescale they currently intend to meet the objective of this amendment, since I assume that this is a Government objective too?
Why are there wide variations, as has been said, in the current extent of the use of police cells for people in a mental health crisis, and why do some areas appear not to need to use police cells at all in this situation, but others do? Is it due to poor management, the inadequate provision of suitable health-based places of safety, or a lack of suitably qualified staff? Can the Government also set out in what circumstances they expect to specify that an adult can be kept in a police station as a place of safety under the regulations that can be made by the Secretary of State under Clause 79(6) of the Bill? Finally, along with my noble friend Lord Bradley, I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to the proposal put forward by my noble friend in relation to a fresh and independent review.
Lord Thurlow (CB)
My Lords, I rise to support the amendments tabled in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Walmsley and Lady Hamwee, and my noble friend Lady Howe. They mark important steps across the board to bring the treatment of mental ill-health in line with our 21st-century understanding of that arena. I have, perhaps regrettably, close personal experience of dealing with and attempting to cope with people suffering a mental health crisis. I bring to bear that experience as well as the advice offered by the Mental Health Alliance and specifically the charity Mind, both of which have been referred to, in my endorsement of these amendments.
The amendments regarding the use of police cells and homes as supposed places of safety—neither are appropriate, I agree—and concerning the period of detention in those places awaiting a mental health assessment are most important. I acknowledge the positive steps that this Bill in its original form recommended in both of these areas, but they do not go far enough. Perhaps I may reflect for a moment on who it is that these clauses are designed to protect. It is the vulnerable, the needy and those less able to help themselves. We have a special duty to those people in our society. These amendments are an important step of progress in improving their treatment at the hands of the police in times of crisis. That said, I am not criticising the police. I have seen at close quarters the awkward circumstances of the police having to enforce the rules. I admire the sensitivity and empathy I have seen displayed.
When a person is in a mental health crisis there is a very high risk of private anxiety, emotions of distress, confusion, aggression and perhaps threatening behaviour. What is required is probably support and compassion. Confinement in a cell is bound to add to this distress. Surroundings matter.
As we have heard, the Government have begun to dedicate funds to mental health services, improving the provision of suitable places of safety and achieving parity of esteem between mental and physical health. These are important steps and this work must continue. We must step up to this challenge on the behalf of those affected. This disadvantaged group, unlike most in our society, seldom makes its own case for better care. The reality is, of course, that they cannot—they are confused and they are not organised—but we can. They rely on us, and on the charities and other groups that work with them.
We must be sure to try our best to legislate so that the trend continues and relevant investment goes toward providing for those in need. The amendments tabled by the noble Baroness would do exactly that. This is legislation that will help bring the Mental Health Act 1983 into the 21st century. If we think for a minute, that Act was enacted more than 30 years ago. The quantum leaps of progress in medical understanding of mental health issues have been huge. Yet, the Act on the statute book is more than 30 years old. We must take every opportunity we can to improve the terms of the Act wherever we can.
I thank the noble Baronesses for their work in tabling the amendments and request that the Minister accepts them.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I thank noble Lords for this important debate. As the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, explained, these amendments seek to restrict, in different ways, the premises that can be used as a place of safety for persons detained under Sections 135 or 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983.
Of course it is important that people detained at a time of crisis be taken to the most appropriate place of safety for their medical needs. That principle is behind these amendments and also represents the Government’s position. Where we differ is on how this should be achieved in terms of the full range of options that should be available to professionals. Amendments 189 and 190 to Clause 79 would completely prohibit the use of police stations as places of safety. The Bill provides that police stations cannot be used as places of safety in the case of children or young people aged under 18. The issue for the Committee is whether this prohibition would also apply to adults.
The noble Baroness and other noble Lords who have spoken are concerned that a police station should never be an appropriate place for a person of any age to be taken at a time of such distress. The Government accept that police stations have been used to detain people under Section 136 far too often. Although much progress has certainly been made to address this, including a 54% reduction between 2014-15 and 2015-16, there is no doubt that police cells are still used inappropriately in some areas.
This will be addressed through regulations governing the circumstances in which a police station can be used for an adult. We have heard from experts that there are occasions when the behaviour of adult detainees can be too violent to be safely managed in a health setting. I expect the regulations to also set out the expected standards of care to be provided to any adult taken to a police station. These decisions will be determined on a case-by-case basis, but I stress that the emphasis is on the exceptional nature of such situations, with health-based places of safety used for the vast majority of cases. The Government have engaged experts and other interested parties in the development of those regulations. I expect to be in a position to say more about our approach ahead of Report.
Baroness Walmsley
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply. I have a few points to make in response but want first to apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, for not mentioning his excellent report. I congratulate him and the Government on the recommendations in the report that have been achieved on the ground. The street diversion teams are particularly good and would certainly come into play were a person found to be violent and in danger of hurting themselves or somebody else. The teams have had a fantastic effect and I look forward to their being rolled out universally.
It has been suggested that the amendment is a little premature and that we do not yet have the infrastructure in place to enable us to have a complete ban on the use of police cells. As with every other Bill, it would be perfectly possible for the Government to accept such a measure and then delay its implementation until such time as the review suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, had taken place and the extra beds had been put in place. That would not be an impediment to the Government accepting my amendment.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked what would happen if no health-based place of safety was available, the implication being that only use of a police cell was possible. Every local authority has hundreds of care homes and the lucky ones have nursing homes, too. Not all beds are occupied all the time; indeed, a recent report in the media cited instances where the contract with the family concerned stated that after the person in question had died, the family would have to carry on paying for two, three or four weeks while the home found another occupant for that room. That means that vacant rooms will be available. Some of them would be perfectly suitable for some patients, because they are acceptable and legal places of safety. If Hertfordshire and Merseyside can do it in those circumstances, then why not everywhere else?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
Is the noble Baroness suggesting that mental health patients are able to go to care homes as places of safety?
Baroness Walmsley
I beg the Minister’s pardon. I should have said that there are care homes in every local authority where staff are specially trained to deal with people with mental health problems.
If Merseyside and Hertfordshire can do it, why not everywhere? Do they not have any patients who are in exceptional circumstances? I am sure they do.
On funding, the Minister suggested that the LGA was incorrect in briefing us that none of the money was going to local authorities. That is where my statement came from, and it should know.
On Amendment 191, about use of the home, it is important that somebody in a mental health crisis be able to see someone who is trained to assess and treat them as soon as possible, and as soon as would happen if they had a physical problem. They will not get that in their home. I do not believe that those choosing to take them home would be in a position to assess whether that home was really safe. Even members of the family would not know whether the home was safe, so getting their agreement is no guarantee that the home is a real place of safety. Many mental health patients have said that they would find it a serious intrusion on their privacy if the police brought them home and stood guard over them while they were there. I accept that it would be for only a short period, but to have a policeman outside the door would have a great effect on how they felt they were seen. As the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, said, they already feel stigmatised by a link being made between mental health and criminality, which there really is not. We should therefore pursue these issues on Report. Of course, this is Committee stage, so for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Walmsley
Baroness Walmsley
My Lords, the amendment would ensure that people are really only detained under the Mental Health Act for up to 24 hours. To achieve that, the clock needs to start when the decision is made to detain someone and not when they arrive at the place of safety. If the Government want people to be detained only for up to 24 hours, Amendment 192 is needed. This is the only way to ensure that we are not detaining people for longer than 24 hours during what is often a distressing and alienating experience for people in crisis. They may be detained on the street in one of the special vehicles that have been mentioned or in another public place. They may be kept in a police car until a suitable destination is found. Wherever it is, distress will ensue for the person concerned.
We need to look at the position in parallel with that of a person with a physical illness who calls an ambulance. When ambulance services are assessed, the clock starts ticking from the moment the ambulance is called and not from the moment the patient is picked up. This is a matter of parity between physical and mental health.
When discussing these parts of the Bill, it is crucial that we remember that people detained under the Mental Health Act have not committed any crime. They are unwell and require health support. That is why I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I support the amendment. From the point of view of the person detained the detention starts at the point described by my noble friend Lady Walmsley. It is not a question of that being some sort of limbo; that must be how it feels. If a person is on the way to a place of safety, they are being detained, held and controlled as much as they would be when they reached their destination.
Viscount Hailsham
My Lords, I have great sympathy with the points just made. The clock should start ticking when a person is taken into custody and not when he or she arrives at the place of safety.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, the amendment would provide for the permitted period of detention of a person detained under Section 135 of the Mental Health Act 1983 to commence at the point at which they were removed to, rather than the point at which they arrived at, a place of safety.
The Government wholeheartedly support the aim of minimising the period during which a person is detained under either Section 135 or Section 136 of the 1983 Act. That is why Clause 80 reduces the maximum detention period from 72 hours to 24 hours.
I also agree that every effort should be made to minimise the time taken to remove and transport a detained person to a place of safety. However, I put it to the noble Baroness that securing that outcome cannot best be achieved through legislation. Indeed, the amendment could well have unintended consequences which were detrimental to the best interest of detained persons.
I fear that the practical effect of the amendment would be to penalise those in need of care and the professionals assessing them in circumstances where the detained person needed to be removed from an isolated location, or if it was difficult to remove that person. For example, if someone needs to be removed from a place that is isolated or difficult to access, it may take some time for professionals to be able to get that person to a place of safety. We do not want the police or mental health practitioners to have one eye on the clock in such circumstances.
There is a balance to be struck between taking positive action to keep periods of detention as short as is reasonably possible and giving mental health professionals sufficient time for the necessary arrangements to be made for mental health assessments to be conducted during the 24-hour window provided for in the Bill. We believe that the combination of reducing, by two-thirds, the period of detention and starting the detention clock only when the detained person arrives at the place of safety—which is, incidentally, how the time limits work now—achieves that balance.
In practice, the vast majority of detained persons will be assessed well within 24 hours of their removal, but the legislation needs to allow not just for the generality of cases, where a person can be taken quickly to a place of safety, but also for that small minority of exceptional cases where this may not be possible. I hope that, on reflection, the noble Baroness is persuaded that the approach taken in the Bill is in the best interests of those suffering a mental health crisis and in need of immediate care. I accordingly invite her to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Walmsley
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply. Obviously, I will consider what she has said very carefully in case there are any unintended consequences, but I confess that up to this point I am not quite convinced. Once a person has been taken into custody they are under the control of the police, their liberty has been taken from them, and I cannot imagine anywhere in this country that you could not get to within 24 hours. Because we are in Committee I will certainly withdraw my amendment and I will think carefully about whether we need to ask for further consideration of this on Report. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Walmsley
“Detention under the Mental Health Act 1983: access to an appropriate adult
(1) A person detained in a place of safety under section 135 or 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 shall have the right to have access to an appropriate adult.(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), “appropriate adult” means—(a) a relative, guardian or other person responsible for the detained person’s care;(b) someone experienced in dealing with mentally disordered or mentally vulnerable people but who is not a police officer or employed by the police; or(c) some other responsible adult aged 18 or over who is not a police officer or employed by the police.”
Baroness Walmsley
Amendment 193 would ensure that people detained under Section 135 or Section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 have access to an appropriate adult. Such access is key to providing people in crisis access to advice while under emergency detention. It is a uniquely distressing and confusing time, as we have heard, and one where independent advice from someone with knowledge and skill who can handle the situation calmly is crucial.
At the moment detained people only have the police, who were involved in detaining them, and the person doing their mental health assessment as their key contacts. Clearly, neither of these can be seen as impartial to their situation. The person doing their assessment, although qualified, is going to be deciding what happens to them next, and so cannot really be described as impartial. There is a huge gap here, since people under most other sections of the Mental Health Act have the right to access an independent mental health advocate. People who are under arrest also have the right to access an appropriate adult. The National Appropriate Adult Network says about people detained or questioned by police:
“While both children and mentally vulnerable adults are required to have an Appropriate Adult under the PACE Codes of Practice, there is only statutory provision for children. As a result many people aged over 17 who are mentally vulnerable do not get the support that they are entitled to. This includes people with mental ill health, learning disabilities and autistic spectrum disorders”.
I recognise the concern of local authorities that they are strapped for cash, but I feel that making this provision statutory will put pressure on the Government to provide the necessary resources. The JCHR shares my concerns about this gap, as we read in its third report of the 2016-17 Session. It wrote to Mike Penning MP, then Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice. He replied on 1 July 2016 to the effect that persons detained under Sections 135 and 136 were only there in order to allow for a mental health assessment and he was keen,
“that we do not inadvertently build unintended and unnecessary delay and bureaucracy into this process or as a consequence of having to await the arrival of a formal advocate or independent representative”.
He also pointed out that the person could request the presence of a legal adviser or a relative or friend. This did not satisfy the JCHR and it does not satisfy me.
The JCHR said:
“We believe that additional safeguards are required to ensure that a person detained in a place of safety under s 135 or 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 should have access to an ‘appropriate adult’, particularly in circumstances where they are detained in their own home”.
It drafted an amendment very similar to my Amendment 193, which I think it proposes to bring forward on Report, unless the noble Baroness can satisfy us all this evening. Given the state a person is likely to be in when they are detained, I believe it would be a breach of their human rights not to allow them the right to access an appropriate adult. I beg to move.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, it is absolutely right that people detained under Sections 135 or 136 should have the help and support they need to understand what is happening to them, and the current arrangements already allow for that. Detention under Sections 135 and 136 is for a short period of time and for the specific purpose of assessing the need for care and treatment, and making the necessary arrangements for its provision.
This amendment calls for each person detained to have access to an appropriate adult; an issue which was also raised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its report on the Bill. It is true that appropriate adults provide an incredibly valuable service, providing support and advocacy for children and vulnerable adults detained in police stations, usually when they are under arrest in connection with a criminal offence. Appropriate adults are not currently required to be provided by the police to support people detained under the Mental Health Act, nor are they trained to meet their particular needs. We must be cautious of the potentially stigmatising effects of conflating the support services provided to people suspected of an offence with those needed by people detained in connection with their mental ill health.
In the majority of cases under Sections 135 or 136, the person will be taken to health-based places of safety, where appropriate adults do not operate, rather than to police stations. In 2015-16 police stations were used in only 7% of Section 136 cases in England and Wales. The provisions in the Bill mean that police stations will be used even less than they are now; in fact, quite rarely, I expect— we hope, not at all. These rare cases require particular attention and I expect that the regulations on the use of police stations as places of safety for adults will give very clear direction about the level of support that will need to be in place.
I recognise that this amendment is about all people who are detained under Sections 135 or 136, regardless of which place of safety they are taken to. It is about supporting them, informing them and speaking for them if necessary. The Government are clear that the mental health professionals involved in the detention and assessment process are best placed to do this. Also, mandating the attendance of an appropriate adult, or some other person with a similar role, could very easily cause avoidable delays in getting on with the mental health assessment that is the proper purpose of a detention under Sections 135 or 136. Given that the Bill reduces the maximum period of detention from 72 hours to 24, it seems unhelpful to then introduce additional requirements that would, in all likelihood, impinge on that reduced period of time.
Guidance is now being developed on the changes the Bill makes to the 1983 Act. It will make clear the expectations on healthcare staff—those whom people detained under Sections 135 and 136 will encounter—to ensure that detainees have the support and advice they need while awaiting and undergoing an assessment. The Government are engaging with a wide range of experts to draw up this guidance. Current practices and the needs of people experiencing a mental health crisis will be carefully considered.
I hope I have been able to persuade the noble Baroness that mandating access to an appropriate adult is inappropriate in the context of a short Section 135 or Section 136 detention, and that, having had this opportunity to debate the issue, she will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and my name is on the amendment. I will make two points. First, the Government’s argument is that using the term “appropriate adult” causes some sort of stigma. I cannot speak for the committee or my noble friend whose amendment it is, but you can call that person what you like—it is the job that needs to be done, and that is what the amendment is driving at. Secondly, I wish to draw attention to the provision of subsection (1) of the proposed new clause, which is,
“the right to have access”.
Rights should be in legislation.
Baroness Walmsley
I agree with my noble friend on that point and on all the points she made. I thank the Minister for her comments, which I will of course consider between now and Report. I do not agree with her that the person formally doing the mental health assessment can be regarded as the appropriate adult, for the reason that I gave in my opening remarks; that is, that person is in control of what happens next to the person being assessed. It is important that the person has a right—they may not choose to use it—to consult somebody else about whether that is the right thing for them and how they feel about it.
Of course, the Minister is right that the number of people detained in police stations in these circumstances is going down very rapidly. If my Amendment 189 was accepted, it would become zero very quickly. In those few cases—many fewer now—where a person is in that situation, I still think that they should have a right to choose if they feel the need to have somebody else there to advise them. However, this is Committee so I will withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Walmsley
“Disallowing use of Tasers by police officers on psychiatric wards
A police officer may not use a Taser or electroshock weapon during a deployment on a psychiatric ward.”
Baroness Walmsley
My Lords, Amendment 194 would ban the use of Tasers in psychiatric wards. It must be remembered that a Taser is a firearm and when they were first introduced they were restricted for use by trained firearms officers only. How could it possibly be justified to use a firearm on a person going through a mental health crisis and whose liberty has been removed, especially when you do so in a health-based setting where staff are supposed to be trained in the behaviour management of people suffering a mental health crisis? Could it be that the increased use of Tasers in these settings is an indicator of the shortage of properly trained staff in them?
A Guardian freedom of information request on the police response to calls for help from staff at psychiatric units spotlighted the pressures on an overburdened system. The staggering 617 emergency 999 calls by one London trust in the past 12 months indicate a service in crisis. What we are seeing is the health service relying on a forensic solution to meet clinical need, because we have lost more than 4,000 mental health nurses in recent years. This is a health issue as well as a Home Office issue.
It is also a human rights issue. The United Nations Committee Against Torture has stated that Taser X26 weapons provoke extreme pain, constitute a form of torture and in certain cases can also cause death, as shown by several reliable studies and certain cases that have happened after their use. While termed non-lethal, there have been at least 10 known deaths associated with the use of Tasers in the past 10 years, yet Tasers have been used against patients detained in secure psychiatric settings over that same period. But this scandal has come to public attention only recently, due probably to the imbalance of power between those who use them and those upon whom they are used. I would like to know why the CQC and/or the IPCC have not reported on this before.
Viscount Hailsham
My Lords, I hope the Committee does not accept this amendment. Of course, I have every sympathy with the generality of the points made by the noble Baroness, but I hope she will forgive me if I observe that many of the arguments that she has advanced are advanced in general against the use of Tasers, not with particular regard to the use on psychiatric wards. Your Lordships need to keep in mind that some people held on psychiatric wards can be prone to extreme violence. I am not prepared to say that there are no circumstances in which a Taser might not be appropriate in self-defence of the people with responsibility for the persons on the ward or in defence of third parties. That is an extreme position to take and I ask the Committee not to take it.
Furthermore, if the Committee was to accept this amendment it would create an offence on the part of the officer or nurse who used a Taser, who would be guilty of an assault, whereas the circumstances that arose in any ordinary context would justify the use. That strikes me as a very rum thing to do indeed. I hope that we will rely on the ordinary law, which is that a Taser should be used only in wholly exceptional circumstances in appropriate self-defence or in defence of a third party, and we should not try to prohibit its use in very specific circumstances of the kind identified by the noble Baroness.
Lord Dear
My Lords, I echo the words that we have just heard. I have considerable sympathy with the emotions and reasoning behind the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley. I make no comment about staffing in psychiatric wards—I have no knowledge of that—but as I speak against this amendment, we should remember that the Taser was introduced as an intermediate stage. It is intermediate between the use of batons, pepper sprays, CS gas and so on the one hand and firearms on the other. A Taser is not a firearm. It is something akin to it—it looks rather like one—but it is not a firearm within the definition of the Act. It does a different thing altogether. There is a violent interaction; of that, there can be no doubt. It brings immediate incapacity and some discomfort when it is fired but, as is sometimes said, in fact it knocks down the individual completely. That has to be the object of the exercise.
Perhaps I can give the Committee a circumstance which has already been alluded to. On a psychiatric ward a patient, for whatever reason, has become exceedingly violent and probably caused serious injury. They may even have caused death. The police are called; what are they going to do? If this amendment is passed into law, the police cannot use a Taser. They will use either the original, which is the pepper spray and so on, or a firearm. We need to remember that the use of a firearm in those extreme circumstances is justified in law, because there is a threat to life. By taking the Taser out we will in effect open the door, in extremis, to somebody being shot with a real lethal barrelled weapon.
I am all for looking at practice directions and reviewing the use of Tasers. Mission creep has been mentioned and perhaps there is mission creep—I do not know that and have not looked at the figures. However, to have something as extreme and prescriptive as this amendment within statute will certainly expose patients in psychiatric wards to the risk of death rather than anything else. In speaking against this, I am all for looking closely at the use of Tasers and for counselling officers using or thinking of using them to exercise extreme caution, but I would not go so far as the amendment stands.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, my name is attached to Amendment 194 and to a further amendment in this group, Amendment 201SB. As far as Amendment 194 is concerned, as has been said, it provides that a police officer may not use a Taser or electroshock weapon during deployment on a psychiatric ward. The purpose of adding my name to this amendment is to raise concerns that have been expressed to us about what is, in effect, a police response to what one might have thought was a clinical emergency but which has the potential effect of appearing to criminalise highly vulnerable people. I accept, though, that there could be very exceptional circumstances where a police officer might have to use a Taser during deployment on a psychiatric ward.
In response to this debate, perhaps the Government could provide figures on the extent of the use of Tasers or other devices by the police on psychiatric wards over the last 12-month period for which figures are available, and on the varying extent to which the trusts concerned called in the police and why there are such variations. The noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, clearly has similar information to that which I have been given. I have been told that there are trusts which call in the police literally hundreds of times a year. It would be helpful if the Government could say in response whether they accept that that is true and why they think it happens. If the police are called in on frequent occasions, is the heart of the problem that results in them being called in in that way either inadequate numbers of staff on duty to cope with situations that arise, or is it due in any way to inadequate or insufficient training of staff?
The second amendment which I have in this group calls for a review of Tasers, including in places of custody, and the extent to which there is or is not a disproportionate use of Tasers against black and minority ethnic groups. Once again, this concern has been raised with us—hence the amendment—and it was highlighted following an incident which led to the death of a former well-known footballer. I simply ask: what procedures exist to ensure that there is transparency and scrutiny over the use of Tasers? What information is kept of the details of those against whom Tasers are deployed, including age, gender and ethnicity? What requirement is there for the use of Tasers to be reported immediately and to whom?
Like the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, I have just seen the letter sent yesterday to Charles Walker MP from the Minister of State for Policing and the Fire Service on the use of Tasers in mental health settings. No doubt in her response the Minister will seek to place on record in Hansard the thrust of the terms of that letter and the circular that has been sent to police and crime commissioners, chief constables and the chairs of local mental health crisis care concordat partnerships in England. Nevertheless, I hope that the Government will seek to respond to my questions insofar as they can, bearing in mind that the circular states that at present there are no reliable data on the frequency or scale of any Taser use in mental health settings.
Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)
My Lords, I find myself in total agreement with the words expressed by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Lord, Lord Dear. When I first saw this amendment I could see what it was trying to achieve: a laudable objective, based on the fact that many mental health units are incapable of dealing effectively with some of the patients they have on their wards, and that the police are called to deal with incidents in an unacceptable number of instances. Quite frankly, I suspect that whatever is going on in some of those mental health settings, they are not finding all the appropriate ways of dealing with and de-escalating violence which one would expect their specialist training to deliver. The number of times that the police are called is of concern.
However, when I saw the amendment I thought it was a silly—fatuous was the word that first came to mind—response to what was proposed. The point is that if there is a very serious incident and a major crime of violence is being committed, the police have to be called. It is then a question of what the most appropriate response is. A few months ago, a mental health nurse was murdered by a patient in a Croydon mental health unit. Is the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, suggesting that it would have been inappropriate in the circumstances in which the police were called to that unit not to have found ways of restraining the patient concerned, given that it was necessary to deal with them? Then there was a mental health nursing assistant who was murdered by a patient in Gloucester in 2014, because the patient had returned from authorised leave with a 10-inch kitchen knife. These are serious incidents that require an appropriate and proportional response. What does the noble Baroness think should have been done in those incidents? The situation was that they had got out of hand in both instances and individuals died, presumably as a consequence of the mental health unit not being able to manage the incident. The effect of Amendment 194 would be that had there been a police officer equipped with a Taser in the immediate vicinity, he could not have discharged it. The noble Baroness may think that something other than a Taser should be used.
The argument about where Tasers sit in the spectrum of potential uses of force by the police is one which will no doubt continue. But although there have been instances where someone has died perhaps as a consequence of repeated Taser use, it is also the case that people have died because of the use of other forms of force. Hitting somebody across the side of the head with a baton is also potentially likely to cause death. Indeed, it may be better for the patient or individual concerned to be tasered.
The noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, talked grandly about the UN saying that these were weapons of torture. The UN definition of the term “torture” is:
“any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official”.
I fail to see how that UN definition of torture could be applied to the circumstances we are talking about of an emergency in a mental health ward where the police have been called. I understand that the use of the word “torture” related to the particular way in which Tasers—I think we are supposed to call them conductive electric devices or something equally opaque—were issued in a particular unit of the Portuguese police force. I have no idea under what circumstances that particular unit of the Portuguese police force was planning to use Tasers, but I assume that the use of the word by the UN was very specific, bearing in mind its definition of torture.
If we pass this amendment, the only alternative when the police have been called because of a major incident—an assault, somebody at the risk of losing their life or somebody already having lost their life and a danger to others—when a Taser cannot be used would be the use of a real firearm, which would be likely to kill the individual concerned, or a baton, which can be just as damaging, particularly in restricted and difficult circumstances. I do not think that makes any sense at all.
Lord Paddick
I was trained in how to deal with these sorts of situations before Tasers were invented. Batons and firearms are not the only alternatives. Using shields, either those specially produced in order to deal with these situations or even NATO-type shields, particularly in the confined space you find on a mental health ward, is an alternative to the batons and guns which the noble Lord seems to suggest are the only alternatives to a Taser.
Lord Harris of Haringey
I, of course, defer to the extensive knowledge of the noble Lord, who was born many decades before the Taser was invented. He is right that of course there are alternative methods, but pinning somebody against a wall and pushing them hard and repeatedly with a NATO shield is also a fairly violent response. We are not talking about nice situations; we are talking about a situation where something major in terms of an intervention is needed to save somebody’s life. Under those circumstances, I think a blanket proscription which says you must not use a Taser is a mistake.
There are also questions about why this amendment refers simply to mental health wards. There are violent incidents every night in accident and emergency departments. Are we saying that we would permit the use of a Taser in an incident in an accident and emergency department, but if exactly the same incident occurred in a mental health ward that would not be the case? The noble Baroness may actually be saying that Tasers should not be used at all. That is fine—it is a perfectly legitimate argument, and there is a debate to be had, but it seems a strange anomaly to make a distinction between one type of hospital ward and another.
The issue that has to be addressed is why so many incidents get out of hand in mental health wards. If that can be resolved—and I suspect it will mean staffing and may mean improved training and a lot of de-escalation—concern about the sheer number of times the police are called out to incidents of this sort would be diminished. The fact is that that is the problem, and that is the problem that must be addressed. A blanket ban on Tasers does not solve that problem; it just creates other problems, which is unsatisfactory.
The noble Baroness also referred to the overuse of Tasers elsewhere in the community, the probable discrimination and the fact that black people are more likely to be tasered than others. That is a real concern. I am aware that in London, at least, the mayor’s office requires that on every single occasion that a Taser is drawn, an individual is red-dotted when a Taser is pointed at them or a Taser is discharged, the circumstances are recorded and it is reported to the Mayor’s Office for Policing And Crime. I assume that the Minister has those figures to hand. It would be very interesting to know—it is quite a substantial number of cases. It is also interesting that often the mere act of red-dotting an individual—pointing the Taser at them—is enough to de-escalate the situation without discharge. It would be interesting to know whether those statistics tell us in how many instances Tasers were used in a mental health ward. I assume that the detail that is collected would enable that; I hope it does. It is certainly important that whenever a Taser or any other force is used, it should be properly recorded together with the circumstances and the ethnicity of the person against whom it was used. I understand that that is included in guidelines which are emerging from the College of Policing. I strongly welcome them because that will enable us to have a baseline to be able to see what is happening and to deal with issues where there is discrimination or overuse of force under whatever circumstances. By “overuse of force”, I do not mean just Tasers; I mean all forms of force.
Lord Berkeley of Knighton (CB)
My Lords, I do not think any noble Lord wishes to see Tasers used in hospital settings except under the most extreme circumstances. However, I am very persuaded by what I have heard from other noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Dear. I would like to put the position slightly from the point of view of the patient. When I was a young man, I had quite a lot of experience of psychiatric wards—not, I hasten to add, as an inmate—and they can be terrifying places of extreme violence.
This amendment would mean that police officers could not use a Taser. I can foresee circumstances where somebody gets hold of a kitchen knife, for example, and is in a volatile state—the kind of volatile state that people who have not seen this kind of mania find hard to imagine. It is truly terrifying. We have to give some credit to people who are managing the situation. Given the information we have just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Harris, I would like to think that the police are acting responsibly, so we have to assume that somebody assesses the situation and decrees that it is so dangerous that the best way of not harming the mental patient any further is to use a Taser. I really cannot see how we could stop the police having that possibility at their disposal.
My concern is very much from the point of view of the patient, but there are occasions when a Taser just might be in the best interests of the patient.
Lord Ouseley (CB)
My Lords, as a signatory to this amendment, I certainly do not think that it is as crazy as it seems. I certainly support the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley. She has very eloquently put forward the reasons why the amendment should be supported. I never felt that the amendment would be accepted, for the very reasons that noble Lords have given in speaking against it—and I understand why they said what they said. It is almost out of desperation that an amendment like this appears. Noble Lords have already mentioned the issue that has led to it: the desperation among people working with black and minority communities in such situations. The noble Lord, Lord Harris, mentioned the Care Quality Commission overseeing the way in which the police are involved in such settings and the way in which the Taser has become not just a weapon to stun—which might be necessary in such dangerous situations—but a weapon that has led to fatalities. Those organisations such as Black Mental Health UK that have been raising these issues for the last few years are concerned that no one seems to be listening.
Mental health is in crisis, and you cannot see this amendment in isolation from the other amendments that have been put forward, many of them by the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, today. That package of improvements, alongside the improvements that are set out in the Bill, would hopefully get us to a stage that might minimise the need for Tasers to be used in the desperate situations that occur and require intervention. With the number of call-outs that are being made to the police, out of the desperation of staff who cannot cope, the police service is almost becoming an auxiliary to the mental health services in some areas. Part of what has to happen is that we address the deficiencies that exist, including in the quality and number of staff. An amendment such as this brings attention to the problem and brings our concerns to the fore about how we care for desperate people who require health professionals and as far as possible provide them with the care, protection and safety that they need—staff as well as patients. If we had got that right, we would not have put down an amendment such as this, which is one of sheer desperation.
Other amendments are important to improve the service to get us to the point where we would not have to say this. If we had before us all the information that has been asked for by Members tonight, it would enable us to see exactly what the scale of the problem is—rather than it being sensationalised in a way that may not actually be the case—and would guide us towards a sensible situation. As a last resort and in an emergency, police officers called to and deployed in such situations may have to use a Taser. It should not, because of creep, become something that causes as much concern as it does, but the reality of the use of Tasers in everyday policing and of the discrimination that is inflicted on black and minority-ethnic communities means that this is a real concern which we must address.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, although I have sympathy for everything that has been said in this debate, I support those noble Lords who oppose Amendment 194. We need to consider the position of a police officer who has to deal with an exceptionally violent situation. If this amendment were agreed, the police officer would have to get much closer to someone who is extremely violent. We have technology that we can use and strict controls on how it is used, and we should not deny the police the ability to use Tasers in these circumstances.
Lord Paddick
In her response, could the noble Baroness tell the Committee whether there is any information on the effectiveness of the Tasers used in those situations? Anecdotally and from my own experience, the mental state of some people means that Tasers have no impact. Perhaps she may be able to help the Committee on that point as well.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I start by thanking all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. Although there have been opposing views on the amendment, it has provided a very balanced set of points. This group of amendments includes two proposed new clauses about police use of Tasers. As the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, explained, her amendment seeks to bar the use by police officers of a Taser or other electroshock device in psychiatric wards.
Any use of force by police officers in psychiatric wards, or in any other setting, must be appropriate and proportionate—the noble Lords, Lord Harris and Lord Dear, the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and my noble friend Lord Attlee made that point and gave some very good examples this evening. The use of force must be necessary and conducted as safely as possible. Therefore, it is right that if police officers need to attend and use force, they should be expected to account for their actions, as the noble Lord, Lord Harris, said.
It remains the Government’s position that the deployment of police officers to mental health settings, and the tactics used, should remain an operational matter for the police force in question. Tasers are an important tactical option for police officers. Unfortunately, some of the most extreme behaviour can occur in mental health settings and can escalate to the point where it can be met only with force—as dictated by the high degree of urgency and grave threat to staff and other patients. I am talking about cases where other de-escalation tactics have probably been tried and have failed. Again, the noble Lords, Lord Harris and Lord Dear, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, made those points.
A blanket ban on the use of Tasers on psychiatric wards, as proposed by this amendment, would remove this valuable police tactic and therefore potentially reduce the safety of officers, hospital staff and indeed patients. In some extreme cases, it could leave officers with no choice but to use another, potentially more dangerous option as the only means to resolve a violent situation and keep others safe. The same noble Lords made these points. Police officers themselves have made it clear that they would not want their options constrained by a blanket ban on Tasers. Officers have a range of tactics and equipment available, and a Taser is but one of them. In deciding which tactic to use, an officer will assess which is likely to be most effective and proportionate.
The Government accept that more can and should be done to ensure that all uses of force, including of Tasers, are necessary and proportionate. For this reason, the former Home Secretary asked former chief constable David Shaw to lead an in-depth review of the publication of use-of-force data, including data on where force is being used, such as in a hospital setting, to ensure that the use of these sensitive powers is transparent. With the agreement of fellow chief officers, Chief Constable Shaw recommended that every time the police use a significant level of force on an individual, such as the use of Tasers, a range of core data must be recorded. This includes ethnicity, age and location, so that we will be able to identify every time force is used in a hospital or mental health setting. The data will enable thorough scrutiny of proportionality and effectiveness.
That brings in the point that I think the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, made about force seeming to be used more in some places than in others. All forces have worked to implement this new recording system, and I anticipate that the collected data will form part of the 2017-18 Home Office annual data return. I can tell noble Lords that in 2015 there were 10,329 uses of Tasers by police. Actual firings of the device—this is an important point—accounted for 17%. Non-discharges —where the Taser is drawn, aimed, arced or red-dotted—accounted for 81% of Taser use. Red-dotting accounted for 51%—the most common use.
All forces have worked to implement this new recording system and, as I said, it should be in force in 2017-18. The Government have also taken further steps to ensure greater scrutiny of the use of Tasers in mental health settings at local level, where operational decisions are made. Charles Walker MP raised some valuable points on this matter during consideration of the Bill in the House of Commons.
Both Home Office and Department of Health Ministers have in the past few days written to police and crime commissioners, chief constables and the chairs of local mental health crisis care concordat partnerships to ask them to work together to ensure that sufficient local joint scrutiny arrangements are in place. As local leaders with overall responsibility for policing and mental health crisis care, they have been tasked with ensuring that mechanisms are in place in their areas for the joint identification and scrutiny of any use of Tasers in a mental health setting.
I expect this additional scrutiny to lead to all relevant policing and health partners working closely to look at the full circumstances surrounding police officers being called to attend, the specific circumstances of any use of Tasers, and the lessons they can learn for the future.
As I have said, the Government and police believe that a blanket ban on the use of Tasers in psychiatric settings risks the safety of the police, hospital staff and patients. That said, I agree that more should be done to ensure that any use of Tasers in such circumstances is open to effective scrutiny. That is an important point.
The amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, goes rather wider in seeking a review of all police use of Tasers—not just in mental health settings. As I just explained, the Government are committed to ensuring that the police use their powers and tools proportionately and are keen that all use of force by the police—including Tasers—be recorded and published.
The benefits of the planned new data collection system will be to enable the police and others to review practice in certain locations, against certain groups, and so on. This will enable deeper examination of the reasons for the use of force and inform adjustments needed to guidance, policy and authorised professional practice, if any. We have asked the police and others to ensure that this happens and, on that basis, I hope the noble Baroness feels able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Walmsley
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply and the noble Lords, Lord Ouseley and Lord Rosser, and my noble friend Lord Paddick for their support. I am sorry that I have been unable to take the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, or the noble Lords, Lord Dear and Lord Harris, along with me. I must say that I felt that in his enthusiasm in making his case, the noble Lord used somewhat unparliamentary language. In 16 years in your Lordships’ House, I have never been called silly before. The amendment was certainly not regarded as silly by the mental health patients who have approached us about the issue.
The noble Baroness mentioned that use should be appropriate, but we have had to move the amendment to highlight the issue today because it seems that “appropriate” has become a lot more frequent. We have heard some figures about the number of times that the police have been called in. At least the noble Lord, Lord Harris, was able at the end of his remarks to agree with me that part of the problem is undoubtedly the lack of sufficient properly trained staff in mental health wards, which needs to be addressed.
We will think carefully about what has been said on all sides of the argument between now and Report, but, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Walmsley
“Child sexual exploitation: duty to refer
(1) Where the police have a reasonable belief that a child has been sexually exploited or subject to other forms of child abuse, the police must refer the child to a named mental health service. (2) The Secretary of State must by regulations define “named mental health service” for the purpose of this section.”
Baroness Walmsley
The amendment is intended to ensure that children who have been abused or sexually exploited are made known to mental health services in their area. It is beyond the scope of the Bill to mandate what happens next, but it is inconceivable that services to which the child is referred should not provide the necessary assessment and therapeutic services.
However, we know that many thousands of children who have been abused sexually and otherwise have not received any help, despite the fact that up to 90% of children who have been sexually abused develop mental health problems before they are 18. Recent NSPCC and Children’s Society research has highlighted that abused children are not routinely getting access to the mental health and therapeutic support they need. They found that traumatic experience of abuse on its own rarely triggers therapeutic support, with abused children reaching high clinical thresholds for services only when they have severe mental health issues and are at crisis point.
Evidence from the Children’s Society report, Access Denied, said that despite abuse being a major risk factor for mental health issues, less than half of mental health trusts identify children who have experienced sexual exploitation in referral and initial assessment forms, and only 11% of trusts fast-track access to CAMHS for this group. Only 14% of local transformation plans for children’s mental health contained an adequate needs assessment for children who have been abused or neglected, and one-third of plans do not mention services to meet the needs of such children at all. Identifying young people who experience sexual exploitation and their needs in the first place can be a particular challenge.
Since I entered your Lordships’ House 16 years ago, I have attended many presentations and seminars, but one sticks in my mind from my very first months here. It was with the NSPCC, highlighting the lack of therapeutic help for abused children. Here we are, 16 years later, talking about the same thing, despite all the efforts of my right honourable friend Norman Lamb MP to get more funding for CAMHS.
This morning, I attended the 30th birthday party of ChildLine, and I was discussing the amendment with Esther Rantzen. She, of course, supports it, but she made another relevant point, which was that although ChildLine often refers children to the police—with their permission—it is rarely the other way round. The point is that if the police are having difficulty getting a child to disclose to them about suspected sexual abuse, they should put them in touch with ChildLine, which will not only help them to disclose safely, in the way they should, but will support them through the proceedings that may follow.
The phone number of ChildLine should be on the wall of every police station: 0800 1111. Perhaps this would also remind police to refer children to their local mental health services for an assessment. They know they should, but they do not always do it. That was admitted this morning on Radio 4’s “Today” programme, when Sarah Champion MP, a great champion for abused children, and a senior police officer, discussed this very thing. Although it was accepted that the police’s attitude to abused children has improved enormously, it was admitted that there is still some way to go.
There is an opportunity through the Bill to pursue the recommendations set out in Future in Mind: that sexually abused or exploited children receive a comprehensive specialist initial assessment and a referral to appropriate services, which can provide evidence-based interventions according to their need. Where victims of child sexual exploitation come into contact with the police or a local authority, the Bill provides an ideal opportunity to state in law that the police must refer them for a psychological assessment, and then we must rely on providers to give them the support they need to recover.
These children are going to cost the NHS a great deal of money unless we act promptly. A report from Public Health Wales this week found that people who have been abused in childhood are three times as likely to contract a serious illness later in life. The Government must see the amendment as prevention of a great deal of expenditure later, and accept it tonight. I call on them to do so and beg to move.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I rise very briefly to support my noble friend Lady Walmsley’s amendment, to which I have added my name. It seems absolute common sense that, if the police are investigating an allegation that a child has been sexually exploited, the needs of the child should be paramount and that referral to appropriate support for the child should be compulsory in those circumstances. I feel that I really need say no more than that.
Baroness Benjamin (LD)
My Lords, I too rise to support my noble friend Lady Walmsley. We were both on the Barnardo’s inquiry led by Sarah Champion. When we spoke to abused children, both boys and girls, they all said that they wanted to be treated with respect by the police. I second my noble friend on all the issues that she has brought up and I support her in every way. I hope that the Government will have common sense and show that childhood lasts a lifetime and those children’s needs will be looked after, making sure that they do not suffer long-term in the future.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, I am slightly surprised in fact that it is necessary for the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, to move this particular amendment, but the fact that she has moved it means, I assume, that it is necessary. It should be—in the same way as it is incumbent on other professionals—that when the police see an issue that requires the safeguarding and protection of a child, they should take the appropriate action, which, in this particular case, would mean the sort of referral envisaged by this amendment. So on this occasion I wholeheartedly support the noble Baroness.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, Amendment 195, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, and also in the name of my noble friend Lord Rosser and others, would ensure that child victims of sexual abuse receive the mental health support that they need and would address the fundamental problem that, as things stand, victims too often have poor access to the support that they need. The Bill makes welcome provisions in the area of mental health—including by ending the detention under the Mental Health Act 1983 of young people in police cells—but it could go further, in particular, in recognising the mental health needs of children who have been victims of child sexual exploitation.
NSPCC research shows that children who have been abused are more likely to experience depression, anxiety and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder as well as self-harming and suicide. The cases of 30 children supported by the Children’s Society were analysed in its report Old Enough to Know Better?—a third of the cases noted that the young people needed mental health services because of concerns about their well-being, including self-harming episodes, suicide attempts or even episodes of psychosis that required in-patient admissions. The remaining cases also referred to the young people feeling low, depressed, anxious, fearful, or having flashbacks of their abuse. I think that the Government should accept this amendment from the noble Baroness this evening.
Amendment 221 in this group is in the name of my noble friend Lord Rosser. It would place in the Bill a duty for police forces to disclose information about children who are victims of sexual exploitation or other forms of abuse to the relevant health service commissioners. This is an important requirement to ensure that victims of exploitation can have access to the health services that they need.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, for their explanation of the amendments. We appreciate that their intention is to ensure that the proper provision is made for vulnerable or traumatised children. We absolutely agree that we must ensure that such children never fall through the gaps between services, but I put it to the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, that the overriding determinant of referral for health services must be clinical need. Not all children and young people who have been abused or exploited will develop a mental health problem, and intervening unnecessarily or inappropriately can in itself be harmful.
All that said, it is essential that healthcare practitioners who work with abused children and young people should have the capacity and capability to provide evidence-based treatment where needed. This will be addressed through the emerging workforce strategy, which is being put in place to deliver the key proposals in the Department of Health report on children’s mental health. The Department of Health is also introducing routine procedures so that sensitive inquiries are made to establish whether a child undergoing a mental health assessment has experienced neglect, violence or abuse. This will be an important step towards establishing a child’s or young person’s need for support. The important thing is that children and young people get the right care at the right time, based on their needs, not on a non-clinician’s view of their potential needs based on their experiences.
On amendment 221, it is worth adding that individuals, including children where appropriate, need to consent to receive treatment. Where a person indicates that they would like to avail themselves of any referral, consent can be sought for relevant personal details to be passed to the health provider, which is the proper course of action. It would be likely to be inappropriate, and in breach of data protection, automatically to pass on personal details and potentially sensitive information, even to a health provider. It may be helpful for noble Lords to know that NHS England published a Commissioning Framework for Adult and Paediatric Sexual Assault Referral Centres (SARC) Services in August 2015, which outlines the core services in SARCs and referral pathways to other services. They are now being rolled out throughout England.
On the basis of my remarks, I hope that the noble Baroness feels content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Walmsley
My Lords, I thank the Minister, though I hardly know where to start. I know that I want to keep my remarks short, as those here for the dinner-hour debate are waiting.
The Minister suggested that not all young people who have been abused require therapeutic help. Bearing in mind the figures that I gave at the beginning of my speech, we will not really know which 10% will not develop mental health problems unless we get them properly assessed. I may have used the wrong word—“refer”—in my amendment, but the point I am trying to make is that the police must ensure that the appropriate mental health commissioners in the area are made aware that a child may need therapeutic help and that an assessment should be done by a qualified person to find out whether they do. That is absolutely essential.
The fact is, we know that it is not always happening and that is why, as the noble Lord, Lord Harris, accepted, I felt it necessary to raise this, and I am not the only one. As I say, ChildLine also very much feels that this would be helpful.
Given the effect on the rest of the lives of these children, as my noble friend Lady Benjamin mentioned, a little bit of over-referral would not necessarily be a bad thing, because it will soon come out in the wash. If they do not need any help, it will soon be found out and the help will stop if it is not needed. The National Health Service is not going to give a whole lot of help to people who do not need it—it does not have the money. But the fact is that most of them do need it and it is not happening. After 16 years, I cannot believe that we are still here.
I will of course consider what the Minister has said and make further inquiries between now and Report stage in case it is not necessary, although I think it is. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Policing and Crime Bill
Wednesday 2nd November 2016
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 55-III(a) Amendments for Committee, supplementary to the third marshalled list (PDF, 64KB) - (1 Nov 2016)
“( ) a designated NCA officer who is authorised by the Director General of the National Crime Agency (whether generally or specifically) to exercise the powers of a law enforcement officer under this Chapter, or”
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)
My Lords, government Amendments 196, 199, 200 and 201 are essentially consequential on the provisions in Clause 138 which enable the director-general of the National Crime Agency to designate NCA officers with the powers of general customs officials. The amendments clarify that NCA officers so designated are able to exercise the new maritime enforcement powers in the same way as NCA officers designated with the powers of a constable. As a result, these important new powers will be available to NCA officers investigating customs matters such as the smuggling of drugs and firearms. I beg to move.
Lord Rosser
“( ) The Secretary of State must, before making regulations under subsection (3)(g), consult such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”
Lord Rosser (Lab)
We have two amendments in this group to which I wish to speak. Clause 82 relates to the application of the maritime enforcement power and the designation of those law enforcement officers who may exercise that power. Clause 82(3) lists a number of persons who are law enforcement officers for the purposes of Chapter 5, while subsection (3)(g) designates as a law enforcement officer,
“a person of a description specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State”,
thus creating an unspecified category of person who can be designated as a law enforcement officer, but it leaves that further designation to secondary legislation. Why is this provision in Clause 82(3)(g) needed? What kind of currently unspecified category of person is the Government of the view may need to be designated as a law enforcement officer but cannot be so designated clearly and specifically on the face of the Bill?
The purpose of the first amendment in the group is to make sure that the Secretary of State will at least be required to consult prior to making such a regulation designating an as-yet unspecified person as a law enforcement officer who can exercise the maritime enforcement power. The second amendment is similar and refers to Clause 94, which also relates to the application of the maritime enforcement power and the designation of those law enforcement officers who may exercise the power. Subsection (3) lists a number of persons who are law enforcement officers for the purposes of Chapter 6. However, subsection (3)(e) designates as a law enforcement officer,
“a person of a description specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State”.
Again, why is this provision in Clause 94(3)(e) needed? What kind of currently unspecified category of person is the Government of the view may be needed to be designated as a law enforcement officer but cannot be so designated clearly and specifically on the face of the Bill? Clause 94 also has application in Scotland, but as currently worded contains no requirement for the Secretary of State to consult, for example, Scottish Parliament Ministers. Perhaps the Government could comment on that. The purpose of our second amendment in the group is again to make sure that the Secretary of State would at least be required to consult prior to making a regulation designating an as-yet unspecified person as a law enforcement officer who can exercise the maritime law enforcement power.
Perhaps I may also raise a question about the application of the maritime law enforcement powers by law enforcement officers or indeed by the Secretary of State. Clause 82 creates maritime enforcement powers in relation to, among other things, foreign ships in any waters, and Clause 86 gives law enforcement officers the power to,
“require the ship to be taken to a port in England and Wales or elsewhere and detained there”.
Why is the reference to “or elsewhere” included, which could cover anywhere else in the world? This power could presumably be used in cases involving foreign ships that are discovered, for example, within our territorial waters to contain or are suspected of containing refugees and others in need of international protection who may be in breach of immigration law. Those in need of international protection have a right not to be returned to situations in which they face a real risk of persecution or other ill treatment, and to have their claims for protection fairly determined before they can be returned. On the face of it, the power to which I have just referred could be used to override those rights. Will the Minister say why my analysis of how these powers could be used is incorrect, as I hope it is? I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, my noble friend and I have four amendments in the group. With regard to Amendment 196A, the Minister will not be surprised that we always support consultation—well, almost always. I wondered whether “persons” in the amendment, which would follow on from persons who are “law enforcement officers” as provided for in the clause, means human persons and corporate and other bodies, as I would expect. I was a bit surprised during the passage of—I think—the Investigatory Powers Bill that there had to be a definition of “person” at one point. I assume that the sweeping-up provision in Clause 82(3)(g) is to allow for, for instance, the organisation that came to my mind, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency. Even if that is not intended, perhaps I can ask about it and whether it should have powers. Is that in the Government’s mind?
Our four amendments are to Clause 92. Clause 92(1) provides for the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice for law enforcement officers arresting a person under the powers given by the Bill. Clause 92(2) provides that the code must provide guidance as to the information to be given to the person being arrested. We think the code should be wider than this.
Perhaps the most important amendment is the one that would add criteria to be considered by the law enforcement officers before they arrive at a decision to proceed with an arrest. Clearly, this is not something that would be done lightly, but there must be some scope, whether in this code of practice or elsewhere, as to when these very considerable powers should be thought appropriate to exercise. The amendment to Clause 92(1) is similar, in that it would require officers to think before doing, if I can put it that way, as well as thinking when doing.
Our third amendment would provide in Clause 92(8) that regulations requiring an affirmative resolution should apply in the case of a revision of the code, not just the initial code. We would also remove Clause 92(9). Those two amendments would go together and make the same point. We think that this is a sufficiently serious matter that affirmative resolutions would be appropriate.
Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)
My Lords, I rise notionally to support my noble friend Lord Rosser and his amendment, but first I record that I have recently completed for the Mayor of London a review of London’s preparedness to withstand a major terrorist incident. As part of that review I looked at the policing of the River Thames. I became aware of a lacuna—or at least what I understood to be a lacuna—that appeared to exist in the legislation, which these clauses fill and deal with by making it possible for police to stop and search boats on the River Thames. I was therefore delighted to see it. My recommendations on that were couched in those terms.
However, it appears that it is possible for anyone to sail up the River Thames without having any licence or even permit, which seems an extraordinary gap. While we were tidying up some of these matters, I would have thought it useful to tidy up precisely that one. Given that one is expected to have a licence to drive a car, with the car being required to be of a certain standard, it is surprising that there is no such requirement for sending a boat up the Thames.
I come to the specific question that I wanted to ask the Minister—she can answer the first one if she wishes. An hour and three-quarters ago, I received an email from Nigel—I suppose that I am taking a leaf out of the book of my right honourable friend the leader of the Opposition here. Nigel said:
“I’m an old retired police officer”—
so he must have been there with Brian—
“and I may be out of date but back in 1967 when I joined The Met, one bit of legislation they kept drumming into us was Sec 66 of The Metropolitan Police Act and it read police may stop, search and detain any vehicle, vessel, boat, cart or carriage in or upon which anything stolen or unlawfully may be found”.
At what point in the various reorganisations of London government and policing legislation was Section 66 of the Metropolitan Police Act repealed or changed? It may still be there, in which case what does this provision add to it? The Minister may not have that information immediately available in her brief, so I would be quite happy to receive a note at a later stage.
Lord Paddick
Section 66 of the Metropolitan Police Act was repealed on the basis of the powers to stop and search under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. The earlier powers were superseded, so it was decided that Section 66 was no longer necessary.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
Well, my Lords, it just shows how marvellous this House is. We have experts who can always answer the questions for us, which is an enormous help.
As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, explained, Amendments 196A and 200A relate to the power, by regulations, to add to the list of law enforcement officers who may exercise the new maritime enforcement powers in Chapters 5 and 6 of Part 4 of the Bill. Clause 82(3) defines “law enforcement officers” in England and Wales for the purpose of exercising the maritime powers. This includes provision for the Secretary of State to specify in regulations other categories of person who may be allowed to exercise these powers. Clause 94(3) makes equivalent provision for Scotland. The proposed amendments would require the Secretary of State to consult prior to making such regulations.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, mentioned foreign ports. Ports in foreign countries are included. Maritime powers can be exercised in international and foreign waters all over the globe. It is a practical and operational necessity that those exercising such powers should be able lawfully to divert a ship to a port and detain it there where the operation in question takes place hundreds or thousands of miles away from England and Wales. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Rosser—
Lord Rosser
My concern was that “or elsewhere” might be used in cases involving foreign ships which are discovered within our territorial waters to contain, or are suspected to contain, refugees and others in need of international protection who might be in breach of immigration law but who nevertheless have certain rights which, on the face of it, could be overridden if there was a power to divert ships to a port elsewhere—indeed, anywhere in the world. It could mean them being sent back to a place where they would be in danger. It would also mean that they would not have had the right to have their claim for protection fairly determined before they could be returned. The question I was asking is, was my interpretation of the apparent power in the Bill for a law enforcement officer or the Secretary of State to be able to do that correct? If it was not correct—and I said I hoped it was not correct—will the Government explain to me why my analysis was not right?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, inspiration has appeared from over my left shoulder. The maritime provisions of the Bill are strictly intended to enable enforcement officers to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute offences under the law of England and Wales. Any decision to divert a foreign ship that is not in UK territorial waters to a foreign port will require the authority of the Secretary of State. These powers are not intended to be used in a way which is contrary to the Human Rights Act, the 1951 refugee convention or the 1967 protocol.
I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, that the Home Secretary will consult appropriately before making any such regulations. Such consultation will certainly include any person or body to be specified in the regulations and, in relation to any regulations to be made under Clause 94, the Scottish Government. Indeed, there is an implied duty to consult the Scottish Government and more in Clause 94(6), which requires Scottish Ministers to consent to any regulations under Clause 94(3)(e), which makes devolved provision. Having stated our intention to consult on any such regulations, I hope the noble Lord will agree that it is not necessary to set this out in the Bill.
Amendments 196C, 196D, 197 and 198 relate to Clause 92, which imposes an obligation on the Secretary of State to provide a code of practice for law enforcement officers who use the power of arrest conferred by Clause 88. This code must provide guidance on the information—for example, procedural rights to be given to a person at the time of their arrest. Amendments 196C and 196D seek to amend Clause 92 to extend the scope of the code of practice so that it also addresses the matters which a law enforcement officer must have regard to when considering making an arrest under the maritime powers. We believe that the proper focus of the code is on the information that should be provided to a suspect at the point of arrest, including in relation to their procedural rights. Importantly, the provisions in the Bill in respect of the code of practice closely mirror those in the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and it would be confusing to law enforcement officers to adopt a different approach here.
The power of arrest, like other powers under the maritime provisions, is clearly set out in the Bill. For example, Clause 88 is clear that the power of arrest may be exercised where an enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence under the law of England and Wales has been, or is being, committed. It will be down to the knowledge, experience and professionalism of the officers concerned as to whether the use of the power is both necessary and appropriate for the purpose of preventing, detecting, investigating and prosecuting offences. The priority for enforcement officers who have apprehended a person on a vessel at sea will be to bring them back to the UK, where they will be processed under PACE in the usual way.
Amendments 197 and 198 relate to the parliamentary procedure for bringing codes of practice into force. The Bill makes provision to bring a new code of practice into law through the affirmative procedure. However, Clause 92(9) provides a choice of procedure for any subsequent revisions to the code. This enables the right level of scrutiny to be provided, proportionate to the revisions being made to the code. For minor or consequential changes the affirmative procedure would, we believe, be disproportionate. Insisting on the affirmative procedure in all cases could cause unnecessary delays in revising the code, with the result that the code would remain out of date in operational terms for longer than necessary. Amendments 197 and 198 would remove this choice, requiring both the first draft of a new code of practice and any revisions to go through the affirmative procedure.
The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee recommended in its report on the Bill of 13 July that when using Clause 92(9), the Minister should be,
“bound by the views of the House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee”.
This is similar to the procedure used for revisions to codes of practice for the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. My noble friend’s letter of 7 September to the noble Baroness, Lady Fookes, chair of the Delegated Powers Committee, accepted that recommendation, so the choice of procedure provided by Clause 92(9) will be exercised with reference to the views of the Home Affairs Select Committee. We believe that this will provide the best approach to ensuring that the appropriate level of scrutiny is provided for any changes to the code.
I hope I have been able to satisfy noble Lords that these amendments are not necessary and that accordingly the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Rosser
I certainly will withdraw the amendment. Unless I was not paying as much attention as I should have been—and I accept that that is a genuine possibility, and I mean that—I am not sure that I got an answer to the question: what kind of current unspecified category of persons do the Government believe may need to be designated as a law enforcement officer that cannot be so designated clearly and specifically now in the Bill? That related to both Clause 82(3)(g) and Clause 94(3)(e).
The only other point I would ask for clarification on, which comes back to the question I raised about how the powers could, on the face of it, be used to override the rights of those in need of international protection, is whether in giving the Government’s response the Minister said that it was not intended that the powers be used to override the rights of those in need of international protection, or that they would not be used in that way. The latter is rather firmer than a statement of intent.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
On the noble Lord’s first point, these powers are necessary to enable the categories of law enforcement officer who may exercise these maritime enforcement powers to be extended in the light of changing operational requirements. For example, both the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990 and the Modern Slavery Act 2015 confer powers on Armed Forces personnel and there may be an operational case for extending the powers in this Bill to such personnel in future.
Lord Rosser
Is there any clarification—or perhaps the Minister could write to me subsequently—of what was said in relation to the apparent ability to override the rights of those in need of international protection through the facility to divert a ship to a port elsewhere, or indeed anywhere in the world? Was the response that it was not intended that that power should be used to override those rights, or was it a clear statement that it would not be used to override those rights?
Lord Rosser
I thank the Minister very much indeed. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
“Exercise of maritime enforcement powers
(1) The maritime enforcement powers may be exercised only in the event that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence has been committed which is—
(a) an indictable offence under the law of England and Wales; and(b) included in a list of offences specified by the Secretary of State in regulations made by statutory instrument.(2) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (1) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”
Lord Paddick
My Lords, Amendment 196B is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. As we have just been discussing, Chapter 5 of the Bill gives extensive powers to law enforcement officers in relation to maritime enforcement—not just in British territorial waters and not just British vessels but far more extensively—including the power in Clause 86(1) to stop, board, divert and detain the ship,
“if a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that … an offence under the law of England and Wales is being, or has been, committed”.
The amendment seeks to probe whether the powers are intended to apply if a law enforcement officer suspects that any offence whatever has been committed. For example, if two crew members are involved in a fight, could these powers then be used,
“to stop, board, divert and detain”,
the ship? That would appear rather disproportionate. While two crew members having a fight might not be considered a good example, stranger things have happened at sea, apparently. The amendment works on the basis that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery. It takes its wording from proposed new Section 137B by restricting enforcement powers to “indictable” offences only, and only those offences specified in regulations by the Secretary of State. I beg to move.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has explained, Amendment 196B seeks to limit the exercise of the new maritime enforcement powers by the police to suspected offences which are “indictable” and specified in the regulations made by the Secretary of State. He indicated that the intention is to limit the use of these powers to serious crimes, so as to ensure a proportionate response to crime that takes place in the maritime context. I do not believe it necessary to limit these powers in this way.
In other contexts the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has argued that we should put our trust in the operational judgment of chief officers. This is one such area where we should adopt that principle. We should trust in the operational judgment of the police to determine when it is appropriate to commit resources to investigate an offence on a vessel at sea. It is perhaps highly unlikely that resources would be committed to interdicting a vessel for the purposes of investigating a minor summary-only offence, but we should not rule out the possibility that the police would want to exercise these powers in relation to an either-way offence. We do not impose restrictions on the categories of offences that the police can investigate where they take place on other modes of transportation, so I am unclear why we should treat maritime vessels any differently. For these reasons, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful to the Minister. The reason why this should apply in the case of these maritime powers is that the potential impact of diverting a cargo vessel in the English Channel, for example, is quite significant. While I may have suggested in other contexts that the number of ranks in each police force should be left to the judgment of chief officers, I do not think that the chief constable of whichever force it is will be making the decision as to whether to divert a ship; it will be an officer of relatively junior rank. The Minister also says that the Government should not be restricting the powers to particular offences, in which case I would ask her to explain why proposed new Section 137B does exactly that. But at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
““designated NCA officer” means a National Crime Agency officer who is either or both of the following—(a) an officer designated under section 10 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 as having the powers and privileges of a constable;(b) an officer designated under that section as having the powers of a general customs official;”
“( ) a designated NCA officer who is authorised by the Director General of the National Crime Agency (whether generally or specifically) to exercise the powers of a law enforcement officer under this Chapter, or”
““designated NCA officer” means a National Crime Agency officer who is either or both of the following—(a) an officer designated under section 10 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 as having the powers and privileges of a constable who is entitled to exercise the powers and privileges of a Scottish constable (see paragraph 11(3) to (5) of Schedule 5 to that Act);(b) an officer designated under that section as having the powers of a general customs official;”
Earl Attlee
“General regulation of construction, use etc
In section 44 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (authorisation of use on roads of special vehicles not complying with regulations under section 41), after subsection (3) insert—“(4) Any order made under this section must—(a) make provision for the notification by an abnormal load haulier to the relevant Chief Constable to be able to be made by data sentence transfer as well as hard copy, e-mail or fax, and(b) make it clear that the relevant Chief Constable to be notified cannot insist on a notification being made using a particular piece of software.””
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, the Committee will recognise that there are legal limits regarding the size and weight of heavy good vehicles operating in the UK. What therefore happens if industry needs to move an abnormally heavy or wide load which, without undue risk or expense, cannot be subdivided into smaller compliant loads? The Secretary of State can make an order under Section 44 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 relaxing all or some of the requirements in the construction and use regulations. Since time immemorial this has been done by an SI known as a special types general order—STGO. STGOs cover the majority of industry’s requirements, and I have an interest that I will come to in a moment.
The Committee will not be surprised to hear that STGO has significant provisions for notification of most proposed movements under STGO to the relevant police, highways and bridge authorities. DfT started extensive work on the current STGO in the early 1990s. STGO is drafted so that notifications have to be made in writing, not by telephone. At the time, realistically the only way of making a notification was by letter or fax. It was only much later that notifications started to be made by email, and online activity was in its infancy. STGOs were drafted taking into account the available technology at the time. There were numerous difficulties. Faxes could get lost, and it was difficult to ensure that all authorities were actually faxed. There are a very large number of relevant bridge and highways authorities, and not all are obvious.
A few years ago, to address these problems and others, Cascade Software developed software called AbHaulier to help operators plan their routes and make notifications. I should state that I have no previous involvement with Cascade, other than receiving a briefing at a trade association meeting. The Highways Agency, now Highways England, developed its own system called Electronic Service Delivery for Abnormal Loads—ESDAL. This system allows operators to plan their route and then make all the necessary notifications. I will not weary the Committee with a full description of the functionality of either system.
It is here that I should declare my interest as I own and operate a tank transporter, used under STGO, in conjunction with the REME Museum. Nowadays, I use ESDAL to make all my notifications. While the system still has some glitches, it is pretty good. For a repeat movement, I can now make a notification for an 80-mile journey in about seven minutes. I would like to comment on the ESDAL helpline and its staff. It is really very good and a credit to Highways England and the previous Labour Government who must have agreed to the expenditure. There is debate within industry about which system is better, and I suspect that there are pros and cons for each.
However, apparently Merseyside Police is insisting that operators cannot email notifications and that they have to either use ESDAL or post—I should point out that there is no prospect of me ever having to make a notification to Merseyside Police. This means that hauliers cannot use the Cascade AbHaulier system.
Not only do ESDAL and other systems generate email notifications in the prescribed format but ESDAL has additional functionality for the notifiable authorities, including the police. For instance, in the case of Merseyside Police, rather than manually sorting through a large number of email notifications, only a small proportion of which are of interest and concern, it can now use ESDAL to set filters so it can properly prioritise its activity. I understand from the Minister’s officials that the labour savings in this one force alone are considerable, and of course there are many forces. However, some in the industry claim that ESDAL is slow and takes more time for operators, which costs them money. However, I am deeply concerned that the Merseyside Police action is ultra vires, and might also have an adverse effect on competition and innovation, because it would put Cascade and any other software house in a weak position.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)
I think the noble Earl raises an interesting point—I feel that I have learned something. I am not convinced that the amendment should be in the Bill; it is the sort of thing that should be sorted out in guidance or in a letter to the various police forces. If the noble Earl is right, it should be sorted out quite simply.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)
My Lords, I begin by declaring that I am not the owner of a tank-carrying vehicle and I therefore hope that I speak from a neutral point of view.
I am grateful to my noble friend for his explanation about abnormal loads and, in particular, the electronic service delivery for abnormal loads, or ESDAL. It is a government-funded portal built for this purpose and free to use. However, some hauliers prefer to use other methods of transmission, as he pointed out, such as fax, email, hard copy or proprietary software.
The decision on which methods to accept lies with individual chief constables. As my noble friend is aware, the provisions for use of abnormal loads are laid out in the Road Vehicles (Authorisation of Special Types) (General) Order 2003, to which he referred. Schedule 5 to the order, which deals with notices to police states:
“The Notice must be in a form acceptable to the recipient and should be agreed by both parties.”
Commercial software owners and hauliers may argue that a chief constable is not complying with the 2003 order if he or she limits the methods for accepting the notification and the haulier does not agree. However, the order makes it clear that the form of notification must be acceptable to the recipient and there is very good reason for that requirement. Obliging chief constables to accept notification in all the forms proposed in the amendment could have negative practical and resource implications for the police. Moreover, as a matter of principle, it would not be appropriate to intervene in operational matters in this way.
I also suggest to my noble friend that this is not an appropriate matter for primary legislation, given that the Secretary of State already has the power to amend the detailed provisions laid out in Schedule 5 to the 2003 order.
Notices to road and bridge authorities are covered separately in Schedule 9 to the 2003 order. Again, it does not specify the form the notice should or could take, but states that it must be acceptable to the authority to which it is to be given and should be agreed by both parties. So a bridge or highway authority would not be obliged to accept email notification generated by ESDAL if it was not reasonably acceptable to it.
My noble friend asks about the consequences of an operator notifying a police force by a means which is not accepted by the recipient. It is a condition of an operator obtaining authority to transport an abnormal load that it notifies the police in accordance with Schedule 5. If it provides notification in a form which it has been informed is not acceptable to the recipient, it would be difficult for it to claim to have met the conditions set out in the 2003 order.
If an operator has not met these conditions, it will not be authorised to use on the road a vehicle that does not,
“comply in all respects with the standard construction and use requirements”.
On that basis, if it were to proceed with an abnormal load movement on a road, it would be committing an offence under the Road Traffic Act 1988. I know that my noble friend will have hoped for a rather different response, but I hope that, having had this opportunity to debate this issue, he will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
Before the noble Baroness sits down—and I should say that I am not the owner of a tank either—I do not see why it can be said that an electronic means of communication in the 21st century is an unreasonable way of giving this type of notice. Something like this cannot be beyond the wit of man to sort out. If we are just going to rely on the post it really is not a very efficient way of doing things.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
What I have said is that the order specifies that the notice must be in a form that is acceptable to the recipient. If the recipient—Merseyside Police, for example—insists that it is an online application, then that is the form in which it is acceptable. But it should be agreed by both parties—in other words, it is not “must” but “should”.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
Are we saying that it would be acceptable if they insisted on receiving only a letter? That seems ridiculous in the 21st century.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
No, an online application may be acceptable, an email may be acceptable, pigeon post may be acceptable—but it has to be acceptable to the recipient.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, my first question for my noble friend the Minister is, why is an email not acceptable?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, it has to be acceptable to the recipient—an email may not be acceptable to the recipient. The order says that it should be acceptable to the recipient.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, it rather seems as if my noble friend cannot explain to the Committee why it is acceptable for the police to say that they will not accept an email notification. It is an extremely reliable system of communication with a good audit record. I think some inspiration might be coming from the Front Bench so I shall sit down.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I think what is coming from my left is probably what I was going to say anyway, which is that it is entirely a matter for Merseyside Police, for example, on which method it accepts. It is an operational decision for the chief constable.
Earl Attlee
I thank the Minister for that reply but she seems to be struggling on the point of why a police force can say that it will not take an email. I think that Ministers need to be rather careful about teasing noble Lords when they declare an interest; it is vital that we can declare an interest in an issue without being teased by Ministers. This is the second time on this Bill that I have been teased by Ministers regarding declaring an interest.
I want to make it clear to the Committee that I tried to avoid even tabling this amendment, because I knew that it would involve a lot of work within both the Department for Transport and the Home Office. Unfortunately, I could not encourage the Government to deal with this matter offline. That is why I had to table an amendment and speak to it in your Lordships’ House.
The Minister said that the police force can determine what the form should be—how the notification is laid out and whether the width and the weight are described. It does not say in the STGO what the means should be, only the form—what it looks like when it comes out of the fax machine or in the email—but not the means. I am not convinced that the system is watertight.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I cannot say that I have followed every detail of this, but the noble Earl seems to be complaining that the Minister is not the recipient. He is putting the burden on the shoulders of the Minister, but she has explained that it is a matter for the recipient as to what form will be acceptable. Is the question not whether the Minister will accept that it should be email but that the regulations should be reconsidered as to whether they say something different?
Earl Attlee
The noble Baroness is absolutely right: the underlying problem that I tried to explain in my poor way is that the STGO is out of date and does not take into consideration modern means of communication. It does not mention email and certainly does not consider doing things online. It is completely silent on that. Sadly, it seems that the Government want to wash their hands of this and allow bodies such as Merseyside Police to try to become more efficient but without giving them the tools to do so, and leaving them vulnerable to all sorts of legal difficulties and upsetting operators. I have done the best I can with this issue. I do not intend to return to it. It sounds as if industry will have to battle it out itself.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I apologise to my noble friend. I was attempting to be self-deprecating rather than teasing him. I hope that he did not get that impression.
“(A1) In section 137A, “specified offence” has the meaning given by this section.(A2) An offence committed in England and Wales is a specified offence if it is—(a) an offence (including an offence under the common law) that is punishable by virtue of any statutory provision with imprisonment or another form of detention for a term of 10 years or with a greater punishment,(b) an offence specified in Part 1 of Schedule 7A,(c) an offence of attempting or conspiring to commit, or of inciting the commission of, an offence mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), or(d) an offence under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (encouraging or assisting crime) in relation to an offence mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b).(A3) An offence committed in Scotland is a specified offence if it is—(a) an offence (including an offence under the common law) that is punishable by virtue of any statutory provision with imprisonment or another form of detention for a term of 10 years or with a greater punishment,(b) an offence specified in Part 2 of Schedule 7A, or(c) an offence of attempting or conspiring to commit, or of inciting the commission of, an offence mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b).(A4) An offence committed in Northern Ireland is a specified offence if it is—(a) an offence (including an offence under the common law) that is punishable by virtue of any statutory provision with imprisonment or another form of detention for a term of 10 years or with a greater punishment,(b) an offence specified in Part 3 of Schedule 7A,(c) an offence of attempting or conspiring to commit, or of inciting the commission of, an offence mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), or(d) an offence under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (encouraging or assisting crime) in relation to an offence mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b).”
“(6) In this section—(a) a description of an offence in subsection (A2)(a) or (b) or (A4)(a) or (b) includes such an offence committed by aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring;(b) a description of an offence in subsection (A3)(a) or (b) includes such an offence committed by involvement art and part or by aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring;(c) “statutory provision” means any provision of—(i) an Act or subordinate legislation within the meaning of the Interpretation Act 1978;(ii) an Act of the Scottish Parliament or an instrument made under such an Act;(iii) a Measure or Act of the National Assembly for Wales or an instrument made under such a Measure or Act;(iv) Northern Ireland legislation or an instrument made under Northern Ireland legislation.”
“(ca) section 31 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (separation of children and young persons from adults in police stations, courts etc);”
“(c) section 51 of that Act (duty to consider child’s well-being);(d) section 52 of that Act (duties in relation to children in custody).”
“(ca) article 9 of the Criminal Justice (Children) (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 (S.I. 1998/1504 (N.I.9)) (separation of child in police detention from adults charged with offences);”
“(a) amend this section so as to add to the provisions that for the time being apply as mentioned in subsection (2), (3) or (4),(b) amend this section so as to remove any of those provisions that were added by virtue of paragraph (a),(c) amend Schedule 7B so as to alter the modifications for the time being made by that Schedule, including by adding a modification or removing one,(d) amend Schedule 7B so as to provide that any of the provisions that for the time being apply as mentioned in subsection (2), (3) or (4) do not apply in cases or circumstances set out in the Schedule.”
“( ) The Secretary of State may not make regulations under subsection (5) unless the Scottish Ministers and the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland consent to the making of the regulations.”
“(2) After Schedule 7 to that Act insert, as Schedule 7A to that Act, the Schedule set out in Schedule 14A to this Act.(3) After Schedule 7A to that Act (as inserted by subsection (2) above) insert, as Schedule 7B to that Act, the Schedule set out in Schedule 14B to this Act.”
“Power to remove disguises
In section 60AA(6) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (powers to require removal of disguises) leave out “that is not practicable,” and insert “it is not practicable for an authorisation or direction to be given in writing, it shall be”.”
Lord Dear (CB)
My Lords, it is with some trepidation that I drag your Lordships’ attention from the interesting subjects of tank transporters, pigeon post and emails.
Amendment 201SA stands in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Donoughue and Lord Campbell of Pittenweem. The noble Lord, Lord Donoughue, has asked me to say that he is not able to speak to the amendment due to the lateness of the hour but he would have done so, as would the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu.
The amendment concerns Section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, which gives the police powers in some circumstances to require the removal of facial disguises. An authorisation is required under that section. The authorisation is strictly time limited, and is specific in many ways, particularly as regards location and time. It gives a power to uniformed police to require the removal of, among other things, masks, balaclavas and scarves if it is suspected that the purpose of wearing those disguises is wholly or mainly to conceal identity. The authorisation gives the police the power to seize those balaclavas et cetera, and provides that any person who fails to remove them when required commits an offence. A police inspector can authorise the removal of those articles if he or she reasonably believes, first, that offences are likely to be committed and, secondly, that the authority to remove them is expedient. It follows from that that one is dealing with demonstrations and prospective incidents of disorder which are foreseen or advertised to the police. The authorisation has to be in writing, has to be signed by the inspector and has to specify all the grounds—locality, period of time and so on—before it is valid. That brings me to the wording of Amendment 201SA, which seeks to remove “that is not practicable” and insert the words printed in the Marshalled List.
Somebody listening to me or reading the amendment may wonder whether it is splitting hairs. In a sense, it is, but there is a reason for that. As I said, the law as it stands deals with anticipated demonstrations—those that are pre-advertised in one way or another. The police know that such a demonstration is going to take place and can take pre-emptive action by issuing an authority in writing. However, there is a problem—and it has been a problem for some years now. It is what is often called, in popular parlance, “flash demos”. These are demonstrations of which the police have had no prior knowledge and which have erupted suddenly and spontaneously—a sort of “hit and run”, if you like. There is no doubt that in some cases the people who organise those flash demos—if I may continue to use that phrase—are working on the presumption that they can organise them because of the growth of communication by social media, which makes it much easier. They also know full well that if the police have no prior knowledge, the numbers of police officers available to deal with that intended disorder are likely to be very few. Those police officers on the street, faced with that sudden eruption of violence or disorder, will be faced with a dilemma. Quite simply, in their terms, if they effect an arrest, those two officers—or one officer or whatever—will go off the scene and then nobody is left to deal with the disorder. So one sees a degree of deliberation behind all this.
The point of the amendment is that there is some confusion at the moment in the minds of the police about whether the Act allows the permission to be written ex post facto—in other words, the police officer at the scene faced with the demonstration will usually use the radio to ask an inspector at the base station for permission—and whether or not it is correct within the existing law for the inspector to give the permission and write it when the officer is already dealing with the situation with which he is confronted.
I think that my amendment has full support; I hope that it has. Certainly there is full support for that change from the police service at the top level. From the police’s point of view, it will clarify their position, give them a degree of certainty and enable a much speedier response to deal with disorder, either impending or actual. I hope that I can say with some certainty that there is support from all around the House. On that point, we shall learn more in a moment. There have been some discussions with officials, who, without any commitment at all, have indicated a sympathy to discuss this further. I ask the Minister to recognise that and, in the light of whatever is said in this Chamber tonight, to consider taking this issue away and bringing back an amendment at a later stage. On those grounds, I beg to move.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Dear, has raised a potentially important issue, and I think he is right to put it in the terms that he has. Particularly with the growth of social media and the very rapid organisation of demonstrations, there may be an issue here that needs to be addressed. Indeed, if the Minister, having thought about it, agrees to take it back and bring forward a proper amendment which addresses all these points at the next level—which I think is the noble Lord’s preferred course of action—there are a number of other issues that perhaps would usefully be addressed at the same time.
We have to be more explicit about what constitutes a disguise and the circumstances in which it happens. You could have a situation in which what would appear to a police officer on the scene as being a disguise might turn out to be a veil worn for religious purposes; or it might turn out to be the fact that it is extraordinarily inclement weather and no sensible people would go out without a scarf wrapped around their face; or it might be that they wear face masks—I have seen this; it is quite common particularly among Japanese tourists, although I am not sure that it is unique—allegedly to protect themselves from the notorious levels of air pollution in our capital city. All I am saying is that the definition of “disguise” that may have seemed to work in the 1994 Act may need to be reviewed and looked at in the context of whether it continues to make sense. There have to be some safeguards with regards to the way in which decisions are taken and recorded, which ensure that the power is not used in any way which could be deemed discriminatory, as that would be extremely unfortunate. I am sure that that is not the intention, but it is important that safeguards are built into this. While the process by which this happens should be able to respond quickly to the sorts of situations that the noble Lord, Lord Dear, outlined, it should also be amenable to ensuring that the power is not misused or used in a way which in retrospect turns out to be highly inappropriate.
The noble Lord, Lord Dear, has identified an issue that should be addressed, but it needs to be developed quite carefully to avoid some potential pitfalls in the future.
Lord Dear
My Lords, can I just put on the record what Section 60AA(2) of the 1994 Act says? To the best of my knowledge, it has not raised any problems in law so far. It says:
“This subsection confers power on any constable in uniform … to require any person to remove any item which the constable reasonably believes”—
those words are a well-known test in law—
“that person is wearing wholly or mainly for the purpose of concealing his identity”.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
Briefly, I agree with my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey, that the noble Lord, Lord Dear, has raised an important issue. However, it needs careful consideration for the reasons that my noble friend outlined. I therefore hope that the Minister will agree that the Government will take this away and have a look at this issue. We all want to make sure that the police have the appropriate power, but equally, of course, we should ensure that the proper safeguards are built in so that unintended consequences, which no one would want to occur, do not cause problems as well.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I did not intend to speak on this matter but the issues the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, raised, particularly around religious dress, need to be considered very carefully. I bear in mind the scenario that the noble Lord, Lord Dear, presented us with where constables on the street, faced with individuals who they interpret as deliberately trying to conceal their identity, are radioing an inspector for authority who is not at the scene and cannot make that assessment himself or herself. That is potentially difficult. I am not a lawyer and I may have misread it, but my reading of the existing legislation was that it allows for a scenario where written authority could be given contemporaneously with the actions of the officers on the ground. Can the Minister therefore help the House by saying whether the Government think that the amendment is necessary? However, I absolutely accept that flash mobs and spontaneous public disorder are becoming an increasing problem, as we saw in the riots in London only a few years ago, which were driven by social media.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is right that the permission in writing can be given after the event, but we now find that that is not an ideal situation. On what the noble Lord, Lord Dear, proposes, both national policing leads and others would welcome a clarification on this matter. The noble Lord, Lord Dear, answered the question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, for me, but I will repeat it, as it is important. With regard to removing face coverings for religious reasons, for example, the Act states that when an authorisation is in place, a constable can require a person to remove a face covering only if the constable reasonably believes that the person is wearing the item,
“wholly or mainly for the purpose of concealing his”,
or her “identity”. Of course, it is for individuals to ensure the fair and proportionate use of their powers.
If the noble Lord is content to withdraw his amendment—it sounds as though he is—I will give the matter further sympathetic consideration in advance of Report.
“SCHEDULE 14ASCHEDULE TO BE INSERTED AS SCHEDULE 7A TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC ORDER ACT 1994“OFFENCES SPECIFIED FOR THE PURPOSES OF SECTION 137APART 1OFFENCES UNDER THE LAW OF ENGLAND AND WALES1_ Any of the following offences at common law—(a) false imprisonment;(b) kidnapping;(c) indecent exposure; (d) cheating in relation to the public revenue. 2_ An offence under any of the following provisions of the Offences against the Person Act 1861—(a) section 20 (inflicting bodily injury);(b) section 24 (administering poison etc with intent);(c) section 27 (exposing child whereby life is endangered etc);(d) section 31 (setting spring-guns etc with intent);(e) section 37 (assaulting an officer etc on account of his preserving wreck);(f) section 47 (assault occasioning actual bodily harm).3_(1) An offence under any of the following provisions of the Sexual Offences Act 1956—(a) section 10 (incest by a man);(b) section 11 (incest by a woman);(c) section 30 (man living on the earnings of prostitution);(d) section 31 (woman exercising control over a prostitute);(e) section 33A (keeping a brothel used for prostitution)._(2) An offence under section 12 of that Act (buggery), other than an offence committed by a person where the other person involved in the conduct constituting the offence consented to it and was aged 16 or over._(3) An offence under section 13 of that Act (indecency between men), where the offence was committed by a man aged 21 or over and the other person involved in the conduct constituting the offence was under the age of 16.4_ An offence under section 4 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 (assisting offenders).5_ An offence under section 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 1967 (living on the earnings of male prostitution).6_ An offence under any of the following provisions of the Firearms Act 1968—(a) section 1(1) (possession etc of firearms or ammunition without certificate);(b) section 2(1) (possession etc of shot gun without certificate);(c) section 3(1) (manufacturing, selling etc firearms or ammunition by way of trade or business without being registered as a firearms dealer).7_ An offence under section 106A of the Taxes Management Act 1970 (fraudulent evasion of income tax).8_(1) An offence under section 50(2) or (3) of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (improper importation of goods), other than an offence mentioned in subsection (5B) of that section._(2) An offence under section 68(2) of that Act (exportation of prohibited or restricted goods)._(3) An offence under section 170 of that Act (fraudulent evasion of duty etc), other than an offence mentioned in subsection (4B) of that section.9_ An offence under section 4 of the Aviation Security Act 1982 (offences in relation to certain dangerous articles).10_ An offence under section 127 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (ill-treatment of patients).11_ An offence under either of the following provisions of the Child Abduction Act 1984—(a) section 1 (abduction of child by parent etc);(b) section 2 (abduction of child by other persons).12_ An offence under section 1 of the Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 1985 (prohibition of female circumcision).13_ An offence under either of the following provisions of the Public Order Act 1986—(a) section 2 (violent disorder); (b) section 3 (affray). 14_ An offence under section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (possession of indecent photograph of a child).15_ An offence under section 2 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (unauthorised access with intent to commit or facilitate commission of further offences).16_ An offence under section 72(1), (3) or (8) of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 (fraudulent evasion of VAT etc).17_ An offence under either of the following provisions of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997—(a) section 4 (putting people in fear of violence);(b) section 4A (stalking involving fear of violence or serious alarm or distress).18_ An offence under section 29(1)(a) or (b) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (certain racially or religiously aggravated assaults).19_ An offence under section 38B of the Terrorism Act 2000 (information about acts of terrorism).20_ An offence under section 3 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2000 (sexual activity with a person aged under 18 in abuse of a position of trust).21_ An offence under section 35 of the Tax Credits Act 2002 (tax credit fraud).22_(1) An offence under any of the following provisions of the Sexual Offences Act 2003—(a) section 13 (child sex offences committed by children or young persons);(b) section 16 (abuse of position of trust: sexual activity with a child);(c) section 17 (abuse of position of trust: causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity);(d) section 18 (abuse of position of trust: sexual activity in the presence of a child);(e) section 19 (abuse of position of trust: causing a child to watch a sexual act);(f) section 40 (care workers: sexual activity in the presence of a person with a mental disorder);(g) section 41 (care workers: causing a person with a mental disorder to watch a sexual act);(h) section 52 (causing or inciting prostitution for gain);(i) section 53 (controlling prostitution for gain)._(2) An offence under section 25 or 26 of that Act (family child sex offences) where the offence is committed by a person under the age of 18._(3) An offence under section 47 of that Act (paying for sexual services of a child), where the offence is committed against a person aged 16 or over.23_ An offence under either of the following provisions of the Terrorism Act 2006—(a) section 1 (encouragement of terrorism);(b) section 2 (dissemination of terrorist publications).24_ An offence under section 45 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (participating in activities of organised crime group).25_ An offence under section 67 of the Policing and Crime Act 2016 (breach of pre-charge bail conditions relating to travel).PART 2OFFENCES UNDER THE LAW OF SCOTLAND26_ Any of the following offences at common law—(a) culpable homicide;(b) treason;(c) rape;(d) assault, where the assault results in serious injury or endangers life; (e) assault with intent to rape or ravish; (f) indecent assault;(g) abduction with intent to rape;(h) public indecency;(i) clandestine injury to women;(j) lewd, indecent or libidinous behaviour or practices;(k) sodomy, other than an offence committed by a person where the other person involved in the conduct constituting the offence consented to it and was aged 16 or over;(l) abduction;(m) mobbing;(n) fire-raising;(o) robbery;(p) fraud;(q) extortion;(r) embezzlement;(s) theft;(t) threats;(u) attempting to pervert the course of justice.27_ An offence under any of the following provisions of the Firearms Act 1968—(a) section 1(1) (possession etc of firearms or ammunition without certificate);(b) section 2(1) (possession etc of shot gun without certificate);(c) section 3(1) (manufacturing, selling etc firearms or ammunition by way of trade or business without being registered as a firearms dealer).28_ An offence under section 106A of the Taxes Management Act 1970 (fraudulent evasion of income tax).29_(1) An offence under section 50(2) or (3) of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (improper importation of goods), other than an offence mentioned in subsection (5B) of that section._(2) An offence under section 68(2) of that Act (exportation of prohibited or restricted goods)._(3) An offence under section 170 of that Act (fraudulent evasion of duty etc), other than an offence mentioned in subsection (4B) of that section.30_ An offence under section 4 of the Aviation Security Act 1982 (offences in relation to certain dangerous articles).31_ An offence under either of the following provisions of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982—(a) section 51(2) (publication etc of obscene material);(b) section 52 (taking, distributing etc indecent photographs of children).32_ An offence under section 6 of the Child Abduction Act 1984 (parent etc. taking or sending a child out of the United Kingdom).33_ An offence under section 1 of the Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 1985 (prohibition of female circumcision).34_ An offence under section 2 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (unauthorised access with intent to commit or facilitate commission of further offences).35_ An offence under section 72(1), (3) or (8) of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 (fraudulent evasion of VAT etc).36_ An offence under any of the following provisions of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995—(a) section 7 (procuring prostitution etc);(b) section 8(3) (unlawful detention of women and girls); (c) section 10 (parents etc encouraging girls under 16 to engage in prostitution etc); (d) section 11(1)(b) (males soliciting etc for immoral purposes).37_ An offence under section 38B of the Terrorism Act 2000 (information about acts of terrorism).38_ An offence under section 35 of the Tax Credits Act 2002 (tax credit fraud).39_ An offence under section 313 of the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 (persons providing care services: sexual offences).40_ An offence under either of the following provisions of the Terrorism Act 2006—(a) section 1 (encouragement of terrorism);(b) section 2 (dissemination of terrorist publications).41_ Any of the following offences under the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009—(a) section 8 (sexual exposure);(b) section 9 (voyeurism);(c) section 11 (administering a substance for sexual purposes);(d) section 32 (causing an older child to be present during a sexual activity);(e) section 33 (causing an older child to look at a sexual image);(f) section 34(1) (communicating indecently with an older child);(g) section 34(2) (causing an older child to see or hear an indecent communication);(h) section 35 (sexual exposure to an older child);(i) section 36 (voyeurism towards an older child);(j) section 42 (sexual abuse of trust);(k) section 46 (sexual abuse of trust of a mentally disordered person).42_ An offence under either of the following provisions of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010—(a) section 38 (threatening or abusive behaviour);(b) section 39 (stalking).43_ An offence under section 2 of the Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016 (disclosing etc an intimate photograph or film).PART 3OFFENCES UNDER THE LAW OF NORTHERN IRELAND44_ Any of the following offences at common law—(a) false imprisonment;(b) kidnapping;(c) riot;(d) affray;(e) indecent exposure;(f) cheating in relation to the public revenue.45_ An offence under any of the following provisions of the Offences against the Person Act 1861—(a) section 20 (inflicting bodily injury);(b) section 24 (administering poison etc with intent);(c) section 27 (exposing child whereby life is endangered etc);(d) section 31 (setting spring-guns etc with intent);(e) section 37 (assaulting an officer etc on account of his preserving wreck);(f) section 47 (assault occasioning actual bodily harm).46_ An offence under section 11 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 (indecency between men), where the offence was committed by a man aged 21 or over and the other person involved in the conduct constituting the offence was under the age of 16. 47_ An offence under either of the following provisions of the Punishment of Incest Act 1908—(a) section 1 (incest by a man);(b) section 2 (incest by a woman).48_ An offence under section 4 of the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967 (assisting offenders).49_ An offence under section 106A of the Taxes Management Act 1970 (fraudulent evasion of income tax).50_(1) An offence under section 50(2) or (3) of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (improper importation of goods), other than an offence mentioned in subsection (5B) of that section._(2) An offence under section 68(2) of that Act (exportation of prohibited or restricted goods)._(3) An offence under section 170 of that Act (fraudulent evasion of duty etc), other than an offence mentioned in subsection (4B) of that section.51_ An offence under section 4 of the Aviation Security Act 1982 (offences in relation to certain dangerous articles).52_ An offence under Article 8 of the Homosexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 1982 (S.I. 1982/1536 (N.I. 19)) (living on the earnings of male prostitution).53_ An offence under section 1 of the Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 1985 (prohibition of female circumcision).54_ An offence under either of the following provisions of the Child Abduction (Northern Ireland) Order 1985 (S.I. 1985/1638(N.I. 17))—(a) Article 3 (abduction of child by parent etc);(b) Article 4 (abduction of child by other persons).55_ An offence under Article 121 of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986 (S.I. 1986/595 (N.I. 4)) (ill-treatment of patients).56_ An offence under Article 15 of the Criminal Justice (Evidence, Etc.) (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 (S.I. 1988/1847 (N.I. 17)) (possession of indecent photograph of a child).57_ An offence under section 2 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (unauthorised access with intent to commit or facilitate commission of further offences).58_ An offence under section 72(1), (3) or (8) of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 (fraudulent evasion of VAT etc).59_ An offence under Article 6 of the Protection from Harassment (Northern Ireland) Order 1997 (S.I. 1997/1180 (N.I. 9)) (putting people in fear of violence).60_ An offence under section 38B of the Terrorism Act 2000 (information about acts of terrorism).61_ An offence under section 3 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2000 (sexual activity with a person aged under 18 in abuse of a position of trust).62_ An offence under section 35 of the Tax Credits Act 2002 (tax credit fraud).63_ An offence under section 53 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (controlling prostitution for gain).64_ An offence under any of the following provisions of the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 2004 (S.I. 2004/702 (N.I.3))—(a) Article 3(1)(b) (possession etc of firearms other than handguns without certificate);(b) Article 3(2) (possession etc of ammunition without certificate); (c) Article 24(1) (manufacturing, selling etc firearms or ammunition by way of trade or business without being registered as a firearms dealer).65_ An offence under either of the following provisions of the Terrorism Act 2006— (a) section 1 (encouragement of terrorism);(b) section 2 (dissemination of terrorist publications).66_(1) An offence under any of the following provisions of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/1769 (N.I. 2))—(a) Article 20 (child sex offences committed by children or young persons);(b) Article 23 (abuse of position of trust: sexual activity with a child);(c) Article 24 (abuse of position of trust: causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity);(d) Article 25 (abuse of position of trust: sexual activity in the presence of a child);(e) Article 51 (care workers: sexual activity with a person with a mental disorder);(f) Article 53 (care workers: sexual activity in the presence of a person with a mental disorder);(g) Article 62 (causing or inciting prostitution for gain);(h) Article 63 (controlling prostitution for gain);(i) Article 64 (keeping a brothel used for prostitution)._(2) An offence under Article 32 or 33 of that Order (family child sex offences) where the offence is committed by a person under the age of 18._(3) An offence under Article 37 of that Order (paying for sexual services of a child), where the offence is committed against a person aged 16 or over.67_ An offence under section 67 of the Policing and Crime Act 2016 (breach of pre-charge bail conditions relating to travel).””
“SCHEDULE 14BSCHEDULE TO BE INSERTED AS SCHEDULE 7B TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC ORDER ACT 1994“RIGHTS OF PERSONS ARRESTED UNDER SECTION 137A: MODIFICATIONSPART 1ARRESTS IN RESPECT OF OFFENCES COMMITTED IN ENGLAND AND WALES1_(1) This Part sets out the modifications mentioned in section 137D(2), that is, modifications of the provisions which apply in relation to persons arrested under section 137A in respect of a specified offence committed in England and Wales._(2) Except as expressly provided by this Part, a reference to a constable in any of those provisions is to be read as a reference to a constable of the arresting force._(3) In this Part, references to the arresting force and the investigating force have the same meaning as in section 137C (see subsection (8) of that section).2_(1) Section 56 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (right to have someone informed when arrested) is modified as follows._(2) Subsection (1) is to be read as if (instead of referring to the case where a person has been arrested and is being held in custody in a police station or other premises) it referred to the case where a person has been arrested under section 137A and is being detained under section 137C._(3) Subsection (2)(a) does not apply._(4) Subsection (2)(b) is to be read as if (instead of referring to an officer of at least the rank of inspector) it referred—(a) in relation to delay during the period of 24 hours beginning with the time of the arrest under section 137A, to an officer of the investigating force of at least the rank of inspector; (b) in relation to delay during any remaining period for which the person may be detained under section 137C, to an officer of the investigating force of a rank above that of inspector._(5) Subsection (3) does not apply._(6) The reference in subsection (5)(a) to an indictable offence is to be read as a reference to an offence that is an indictable offence under the law of England and Wales._(7) Subsection (5A)(a) is to be read as if (instead of referring to the person detained for the indictable offence) it referred to the person detained under section 137C._(8) Subsection (6)(b) is to be read as if (instead of referring to a person’s custody record) it referred to the record made by the arresting force in relation to the person’s arrest under section137A and detention under section 137C._(9) Subsection (8) is to be read as if (instead of referring to a person detained at a police station or other premises) it referred to a person detained under section 137C.3_(1) Section 58 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (access to legal advice) is modified as follows._(2) Subsection (1) is to be read as if (instead of referring to a person held in custody in a police station or other premises) it referred to a person detained under section 137C._(3) Subsections (2) and (9)(b) are to be read as if (instead of referring to a person’s custody record) they referred to the record made by the arresting force in relation to the person’s arrest under section 137A and detention under section 137C._(4) Subsections (3) and (5) do not apply._(5) Subsection (6)(a) does not apply._(6) The reference in subsection (6)(b) to an officer of at least the rank of superintendent is to be read as a reference to an officer of at least that rank in the investigating force._(7) The reference in subsection (8)(a) to an indictable offence is to be read as a reference to an indictable offence under the law of England and Wales._(8) Subsection (8A)(a) is to be read as if (instead of referring to the person detained for the indictable offence) it referred to the person detained under section 137C.4_(1) Section 34 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (attendance at court of parent of child or young person charged with an offence, etc) is modified as follows._(2) Subsection (2) is to be read as if (instead of referring to the case where a child or young person is in police detention) it referred to the case where a child or young person is being detained under section 137C._(3) Subsection (3) is to be read as if (in addition to the information mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c)) it also mentioned the information set out in section 137D(1)(a) and (b)._(4) The reference in subsection (9) to a child’s or young person’s rights under section 56 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is to be read as a reference to that section as modified by this Schedule.PART 2ARRESTS IN RESPECT OF OFFENCES COMMITTED IN SCOTLAND5_(1) This Part sets out the modifications mentioned in section 137D(3), that is, modifications of the provisions which apply in relation to persons arrested under section 137A in respect of a specified offence committed in Scotland. _(2) Except as expressly provided by this Part, a reference to a constable in any of those provisions is to be read as a reference to a constable of the arresting force._(3) A reference to a person in police custody in any of those provisions is to be read as a reference to a person detained under section 137C._(4) In this Part, references to the arresting force and the investigating force have the same meaning as in section 137C (see subsection (8) of that section).6_(1) Section 38 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016 (right to have intimation sent to other person) is modified as follows._(2) Subsection (6) applies as if (instead of the provision made by that subsection) it defined “an appropriate constable” as being—(a) in relation to delay during the period of 24 hours beginning with the time of the arrest under section 137A, an officer of the investigating force of at least the rank of inspector;(b) in relation to delay during any remaining period for which a person may be detained under section 137C, an officer of the investigating force of a rank above that of inspector.7_(1) Section 40 of that Act (right of under 18s to have access to another person) is modified as follows._(2) Subsection (5) applies as if (instead of the provision made by that subsection) it provided for a decision to refuse or restrict access to a person under subsection (1) or (2) to be taken only by—(a) in the case of a decision to refuse or restrict access during the period of 24 hours beginning with the time of the arrest under section 137A, an officer of the investigating force of at least the rank of inspector;(b) in the case of a decision to refuse or restrict access during any remaining period for which a person may be detained under section 137C, an officer of the investigating force of a rank above that of inspector.8_(1) Section 41 of that Act (social work involvement in relation to under 18s) is modified as follows._(2) Subsection (6) applies as if (instead of the provision made by that subsection) it provided for a decision to refuse or restrict access to a person under subsection (4)(b) to be taken only by—(a) in the case of a decision to refuse or restrict access during the period of 24 hours beginning with the time of the arrest under section 137A, an officer of the investigating force of at least the rank of inspector;(b) in the case of a decision to refuse or restrict access during any remaining period for which a person may be detained under section 137C, an officer of the investigating force of a rank above that of inspector.9_(1) Section 42 of that Act (support for vulnerable persons) is modified as follows._(2) Subsection (5)(b)(ii) is to be read as if (instead of referring to a person appointed as a member of police staff under section 26(1) of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012) it referred to a person who performs a function which is equivalent to a function performed at a police station in Scotland by a person appointed as a member of police staff under section 26(1) of that Act.10_(1) Section 43 of that Act (right to have intimation sent to solicitor) is modified as follows._(2) Subsection (1) is to be read as if the list of matters of which a person has a right to have intimation sent to a solicitor— (a) did not include paragraph (d), but(b) did include the matters mentioned in section 137D(1)(a) and (b).11_(1) Section 44 of that Act (right to consultation with solicitor) is modified as follows._(2) Subsection (3) applies as if (instead of the provision made by that subsection) it provided for a decision to delay the exercise of the right under subsection (1) to be taken only by—(a) in the case of a delay during the period of 24 hours beginning with the time of the arrest under section 137A, an officer of the investigating force of at least the rank of inspector;(b) in the case of a delay during any remaining period for which a person may be detained under section 137C, an officer of the investigating force of a rank above that of inspector.12_(1) Section 51 of that Act (duty to consider child’s wellbeing) is modified as follows._(2) Subsection (1) is to be read as if it did not include paragraphs (a), (c) and (d).PART 3ARRESTS IN RESPECT OF OFFENCES COMMITTED IN NORTHERN IRELAND13_(1) This Part sets out the modifications mentioned in section 137D(4), that is, modifications of the provisions which apply in relation to persons arrested under section 137A in respect of a specified offence committed in Northern Ireland._(2) Except as expressly provided by this Part, a reference to a constable in any of those provisions is to be read as a reference to a constable of the arresting force._(3) In this Part, references to the arresting force and the investigating force have the same meaning as in section 137C (see subsection (8) of that section).14_(1) Article 57 of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (right to have someone informed when arrested) is modified as follows._(2) Paragraph (1) is to be read as if (instead of referring to the case where a person has been arrested and is being held in custody in a police station or other premises) it referred to the case where a person has been arrested under section 137A and is being detained under section 137C._(3) Paragraph (2)(a) does not apply._(4) Paragraph (2)(b) is to be read as if (instead of referring to an officer of at least the rank of inspector) it referred—(a) in relation to delay during the period of 24 hours beginning with the time of the arrest under section 137A, to an officer of the investigating force of at least the rank of inspector;(b) in relation to delay during any remaining period for which the person may be detained under section 137C, to an officer of the investigating force of a rank above that of inspector._(5) Paragraph (3) does not apply._(6) The reference in paragraph (5)(a) to an indictable offence is to be read as a reference to an offence that is an indictable offence under the law of Northern Ireland._(7) Paragraph (5A)(a) is to be read as if (instead of referring to the person detained for the indictable offence) it referred to the person detained under section 137C._(8) Paragraph (6)(b) is to be read as if (instead of referring to a person’s custody record) it referred to the record made by the arresting force in relation to the person’s arrest under section 137A and detention under section 137C. _(9) Paragraph (8) is to be read as if (instead of referring to a person detained at a police station or other premises) it referred to a person detained under section 137C.15_(1) Article 59 of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (access to legal advice) is modified as follows._(2) Paragraph (1) is to be read as if (instead of referring to a person held in custody in a police station or other premises) it referred to a person detained under section 137C._(3) Paragraphs (2) and (9)(b) are to be read as if (instead of referring to a person’s custody record) they referred to the record made by the arresting force in relation to the person’s arrest under section 137A and detention under section 137C._(4) Paragraphs (3) and (5) do not apply._(5) Paragraph (6)(a) does not apply._(6) The reference in paragraph (6)(b) to an officer of at least the rank of superintendent is to be read as a reference to an officer of at least that rank in the investigating force._(7) The reference in paragraph (8)(a) to an indictable offence is to be read as a reference to an indictable offence under the law of Northern Ireland._(8) Paragraph (8A)(a) is to be read as if (instead of referring to the person detained for the indictable offence) it referred to the person detained under section 137C.16_(1) Article 10 of the Criminal Justice (Children) (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 (duty to inform person responsible for welfare of child in police detention) is modified as follows._(2) Paragraph (1) is to be read as if (instead of referring to the case where a child is in police detention) it referred to the case where a child is being detained under section 137C._(3) That paragraph is also to be read as if (in addition to the information mentioned in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c)) it also mentioned the information set out in section 137D(1)(a) and (b)._(4) The reference in paragraph (6) to a child’s rights under Article 57 of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 is to be read as a reference to that Article as modified by this Schedule.””
Lord Harris of Haringey
I do not intend to hold things up, nor am I necessarily expecting that the Minister will be able to respond—I had not given notice of this—but I hope that she might be able to respond well in advance of Report.
Clause 109 relates to the eligibility of deputy police and crime commissioners for election. Noble Lords may recall that on day 1 in Committee I raised the complexities of the position of the proposed deputy mayor for fire, but I then referred to the complexity of the position of the deputy mayor for policing and crime, it being a politically restricted post. As I understand it, deputy police and crime commissioners are politically restricted posts, yet here we have a very sensible clause which I believe creates an arrangement whereby deputy police and crime commissioners can stand for election. If deputy police and crime commissioners are politically restricted, we are now creating a situation that goes against that provision by saying that they can stand for election.
Between now and Report—perhaps in good time before Report—can the Minister tell us, first, what the rationale is for deputy police and crime commissioners, let alone deputy mayors for policing and crime, to be politically restricted under certain circumstances; and, secondly, whether this restriction is still necessary and, given that this clause assumes that it is possible for deputy police and crime commissioners to stand for election, whether the original idea that deputy police and crime commissioners should not be politically restricted can be adjusted? I think that this issue needs to be tidied up. It is certainly a matter that I intend to return to on Report unless we succeed in clarifying it before then.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, it seems like ages ago but I remember the debate and I remember what I thought at the time, although I cannot for the life of me think of an answer for the noble Lord at such a late hour. However, I said that we would reflect on the points that he raised because at the time—on day 1 of Committee, as the noble Lord said—they seemed very pertinent, and we will respond ahead of Report. I hope that he is happy with that.
Lord Rosser
“Police and crime commissioners: parity of funding at inquests
(1) When the police force for which a police and crime commissioner is responsible is an interested person for the purposes of an inquest into—(a) the death of a member of an individual family, or(b) the deaths of members of a group of families,under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, the Commissioner has the duties set out in this section.(2) The police and crime commissioner must make recommendations to the Secretary of State as to whether the individual family or the group of families at the inquest require financial support to ensure parity of legal representation between parties to the inquest.(3) If a police and crime commissioner makes a recommendation under subsection (2) then the Secretary of State must provide financial assistance to the individual family or the group of families to ensure parity of funding between the individual family or the group of families and the other party to the inquest. (4) The individual family or the group of families may use funding authorised under this section solely for the purpose of funding legal representation at the inquest.(5) In this section, “interested person” has the same meaning as in section 47 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.”
Lord Rosser
My Lords, this amendment and its associated new clause seek to establish the principle of parity of legal funding for bereaved families at inquests involving the police, the lack of which and the associated injustice was highlighted by the sorry saga of the Hillsborough hearings and the extent to which the scales were weighted against the families of those who had lost their lives. But Hillsborough was not a one-off—it was simply that the proceedings received a lot of publicity. Many bereaved families can and do face a similar situation when they go to an inquest and find themselves in an adversarial and aggressive environment where they are not in a position to match the spending of the police or other parts of the public sector in what they spend on their own legal representation. At times, the families feel that they are being made to look like the perpetrators responsible for what happened, rather than the victims.
The public sector is in a position to spend taxpayers’ money on hiring the best lawyers to defend its reputation. Bereaved families have to find their own money, sometimes even to the extent of remortgaging their house, to have any sort of legal representation to mount a challenge. Public money should pay to establish the truth, and that surely means parity of arms. If the argument is that an inquest will get at the truth anyway, irrespective of the extent and quality of legal representation, why do the police and the public sector turn up at such inquests with their own array of lawyers?
Margaret Aspinall, who was the chair of the Hillsborough Family Support Group, has told of the lengths to which she and other members of the group had to go to raise money for the legal fund. It is surely not right, and surely not justice, when bereaved families trying to find out the truth, and who have not done anything wrong, find that taxpayers’ money is being used by the other side to paint a very different picture of events in a bid to destroy their credibility.
It might also help if we had inquisitorial rather than adversarial inquests. In the case of Hillsborough, the Lord Chief Justice made a specific ruling when he quashed the original inquest: he hoped that, given that the police had tainted the evidence, the new inquest would not degenerate into an adversarial battle. However, that is precisely what happened, and the lies and innuendo about Liverpool supporters at the match were repeated by a lawyer being financed at public expense and presumably acting under instructions from the public body involved.
I hope that the Government will be able to respond in a more helpful way than they did when this matter was debated during the Bill’s passage through the Commons. If there is to continue to be an adversarial battle at inquests involving the police, we should at least ensure that bereaved families have the same ability as the public sector to get their points and questions across and, in the light of what can currently happen, to defend themselves and the loved ones they have lost from attack, and, if necessary, to challenge the very way proceedings are being conducted. This is a bigger issue than simply Hillsborough: it relates to the situation that all too often happens to too many families, but without the same publicity as Hillsborough. We surely need to act now to change a process and procedure that appears at times to be geared more to trying to grind down bereaved families than to enabling them to get at the truth and obtain justice. I beg to move.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I rise briefly to support the amendment to which I have added my name. I declare an interest: I gave evidence for the de Menezes family at the inquest into the death of Jean Charles de Menezes, whom noble Lords will remember was shot by accident by the police, suspecting him to be a suicide bomber. Sadly, I experienced the adversarial nature of inquests at first hand. Indeed, during the lunch break on the day that I gave evidence, the coroner had to warn the legal team for the Metropolitan Police and basically tell them to “cool it”.
A very adversarial system operates at the moment, whereas it should be an inquiry after the truth. Having experienced it first hand, I can say that it is absolutely necessary for the families of the bereaved to be as well represented as the police where there has been a death at the hands of the police, or a death in police custody, to use the technical term. For those reasons, I support the amendment.
Lord Harris of Haringey
I speak to my amendment in this group, which is similar except in terms of who ends up paying. I tabled this amendment very much for the reasons mentioned by my noble friend Lord Rosser and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—the nature of inquests and the importance of creating a level playing field to enable the coroner to get to the truth of what has happened in cases of tragic death. The cases that I have been involved with relate to deaths in custody. For a number of years, I was chair of the Independent Advisory Panel on Deaths in Custody, which was concerned with not only police custody and deaths following police contact, but with deaths in prison and in secure mental hospitals. On a number of occasions, I spent time with the families of those who had died, as far as they were concerned, at the hands of the state.
I remember one family very movingly describing the experience of the inquest. They wanted to know what had happened to their loved one. They were not necessarily looking to apportion blame or for someone’s head on a platter. They just wanted to know the facts. They were confronted with a complicated legal system, with everybody else being fully represented—at public expense. They were having to fight for legal representation through the legal aid system.
I do not know how many noble Lords have been in a coroner’s court when such matters have been discussed. They are not always the easiest of environments. I remember one person describing that there was one small area for everyone to wait—counsel, witnesses and the bereaved families themselves. There were not sufficient chairs in the waiting room for everyone concerned. They described walking down the corridor and hearing behind them the trundle of wheeled suitcases filled with legal papers being dragged by highly paid legal officials, employed by the state to argue and create confusion around what had happened to their loved one. For that reason, we should consider the proper operation of the inquest to enable the truth to be obtained.
What concerns me about the present system is that when this issue was raised in the past, we were told that families were eligible for legal aid. But it is not as simple as that because there are strict criteria on the income that people can have in order to obtain legal aid. Of course, when a case relates to a family, it is not related to an individual, so before eligibility for legal aid can be established, the financial means of every single member of the family has to be assessed, whether or not they are actively engaged in the process. That can be long and drawn-out, extremely intrusive and not helpful. The reality is that the legal aid pot is tiny, and it becomes increasingly difficult to deal with cases humanely.
The purpose of my amendment is slightly different from that of my noble friend Lord Rosser. Yes, there should be parity of funding, but rather than an off-the-top call on the legal aid fund—therefore diminishing the amount of aid available to people who need it for criminal cases, for example—the agency that had custody of the individual at the time of their death should provide the funding. The agency will almost certainly be paying a substantial number of legal costs. In the case of a death in a police custody suite, it is probable that several police officers were involved, all of whom may be legally represented separately at the expense of the state. The police force itself may be represented separately, and at the expense of the state. Then there is the bereaved family, who may be quite traumatised by what has happened and facing extreme difficulties because they do not know what to do. If it were not for charities like INQUEST, with which I have worked over the years, which provides support for such families and has a panel of lawyers to assist them, many families would essentially go unrepresented at inquests. Yet it is important that those families have the right to challenge the evidence being presented to make sure that they are satisfied that as far as possible, the truth has been obtained at the inquest.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I believe that we all sympathise with the intention of the amendment. These new clauses draw on the experience of the Hillsborough families, and their fight for justice has been a long time coming. As noble Lords will be aware, the Hillsborough families received public funding for their legal costs at the fresh inquest. That was a bespoke scheme. We need to ensure that any similar action we take in the future is appropriate and proportionate. It is for these reasons that the former Home Secretary commissioned Bishop James Jones to compile a report on the experiences of the Hillsborough families, and the Government believe that it is appropriate that we should wait for his report before considering these issues further.
In relation to the funding of former police officers, this was a decision taken by the police and crime commissioner taking into account relevant case law and guidance on this subject. Separately, the former Home Secretary took a decision to provide a special grant to the South Yorkshire PCC in order to assist with the legal costs incurred as a result of the former officers’ legal fees. In arriving at this decision, the former Home Secretary put the concerns and interests of the families at the forefront of her thinking, together with the principle of justice and the continuation of the inquests.
Additionally, in taking her decision on providing a special grant, the former Home Secretary was clear that it was important that justice should not only be done, but be seen to be done. It would have been wrong to leave police and other witnesses vulnerable to claims that justice had not been done because they lacked proper legal representation. The decision was taken specifically in the context of the Hillsborough inquests and should not be seen as setting a wider precedent.
In the light of these issues, it would be premature at this stage to commit to any further legislation, should it be required, before we have received Bishop Jones’s report and seen its recommendations. Without prejudice to our consideration of Bishop Jones’s conclusions and recommendations, it is important that I put on record that these amendments would place a significant financial burden on the Secretary of State or, in the case of Amendment 203, on PCCs. The cost of the legal representation for the 103 families at the fresh inquest into Hillsborough amounted to £63.6 million. Clearly, the Hillsborough inquests were an exceptional case, but it does at least provide an indication of the level of financial commitment these amendments imply. It is right that your Lordships’ House takes this into consideration fully. On Amendment 202, it is also unclear to me why a PCC has a role in making a recommendation to the Secretary of State when the financial implications of that decision fall solely on the Secretary of State.
There are other technical issues with these amendments. For example, how would a PCC be in a position to know the funding available to other interested persons, which can include other public bodies? A PCC has no powers to inquire into the legal costs of the ambulance service or a health trust, for example.
The reference in the amendments to “parity of funding” also requires careful consideration. There will be significant differences between the legal advice required by a police officer or former police officer who could potentially face criminal charges and the family of a victim who are seeking justice. Does parity mean the cost, or the number of solicitors and counsel, or the level of their qualifications, with, for example, both legal teams headed up by a QC?
On Amendment 203, it is not clear to me whether a PCC has discretion to consider the merits of the representations he or she receives, or whether the PCC is bound to provide funding by virtue of the fact that representations have been received.
I accept that these are all detail points, which, while they will need to be addressed, are secondary. As I have said, the Government are firmly of the view that we should wait for Bishop Jones’s report and then determine, in the light of it, the most appropriate way forward. On the understanding that this issue is firmly on the Government’s agenda, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, before my noble friend responds, could we first have clarity as to the scope and terms of reference of Bishop Jones’s inquiry and whether it will look not at circumstances where large numbers of families are potentially involved, but at situations where there is one bereft family who are perhaps traumatised by what has happened and then face the full panoply of all this legal representation?
I note that the noble Baroness said very carefully that the former Home Secretary, in agreeing the funding in respect of the Hillsborough inquests, said that she was not setting a precedent. I appreciate that that is what one would do under such circumstances, but Hillsborough was a unique tragedy. I am not trying to gauge the size of tragedies and their impact, but the fact that for every person who died in Hillsborough their families were bereaved, shocked, appalled and in a terrible state does not alter the fact that individual families, perhaps whose 16 year-old son has died in a police cell or whatever else it might be, are suffering just as much as any of the Hillsborough families. Whether parity is the right word, as raised by the Minister, is a genuine question. It is quite complicated. However, what is important is the principle that it should be possible for families to seek representation of their choice and for it to be funded. I appreciate that they would be seeking to get to the bottom of what had happened, whereas police officers, who might be subject to criminal charges, would have a different set of objectives, but I hope that the Government, when they have fully considered this, will take on board the principle that those families should have the right to representation.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the Government will see and respond to Bishop Jones’s review in due course. He is considering the terms of reference for his review with the families and intends to publish them shortly.
The noble Lord spoke of the suffering. He is absolutely right: it is not just the suffering of one person but the suffering of everybody associated with them, so I do not undermine the noble Lord’s point at all; in fact, I share his view. Let us see what Bishop Jones says and the Government will respond in due course.
Lord Rosser
I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this debate and the Minister for her response. I shall not pretend that the response was a tremendous shock, since it was not dissimilar to those given previously. I am not quite sure how the report by the bishop will necessarily address the issue of what could happen at inquests generally where the police are represented, as opposed to the rather special circumstances of Hillsborough. The point that I was trying to make—obviously to no avail—is that this issue is not about Hillsborough; it goes way beyond that to looking at inquests generally where the police are represented, where there is a distinct inequality of arms and the consequences that arise from that. I was disappointed to hear again the issue of the money being raised as a key point. Some might think that if spending that amount of money enabled us at long last to get at the truth over Hillsborough then maybe it was not money badly spent, but clearly the Government have a different view about that.
On the arguments about the technicalities of the amendments and on whether the wording is appropriate or a bit vague in certain areas, if the Government wanted to be serious about doing something they would not put that argument forward. They would say that there were issues with the amendments that my noble friend Lord Harris and I had put down, but that they accepted the principle of what we were trying to achieve and would come back on Report with an amendment of their own, or alternatively that they would have discussions about the appropriate wording. But that has not been the Government’s response.
Although I do not want to pretend that I am somehow shocked at the Government’s reply, since it is consistent with what has been said previously, I am disappointed with it, since I have not heard any guarantees that the report from the bishop will address the wider issue of inquests generally where the police are represented as opposed to what happened at Hillsborough. There was nothing in the Minister’s response to indicate that it would do that. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment. Obviously, we will have to consider whether to bring it back on Report.
Policing and Crime Bill
Wednesday 9th November 2016
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 55-IV Fourth marshalled list for Committee (PDF, 263KB) - (7 Nov 2016)
“(a) either the conditions in subsection (2AA) are met or the condition in subsection (2AB) is met, and(b) if an additional condition is specified in regulations under subsection (2AC), that condition is also met.(2AA) The conditions in this subsection are that—(a) the firearm’s chamber or, if the firearm has more than one chamber, each of its chambers is either—(i) a chamber that the firearm had when it was manufactured, or(ii) a replacement for such a chamber that is identical to it in all material respects;(b) the firearm’s chamber or (as the case may be) each of the firearm’s chambers is designed for use with a cartridge of a description specified in regulations made by statutory instrument by the Secretary of State (whether or not it is also capable of being used with other cartridges).(2AB) The condition in this subsection is that the firearm’s ignition system is of a description specified in regulations made by statutory instrument by the Secretary of State.(2AC) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument specify either of the following conditions for the purposes of subsection (2A)(b)—(a) a condition that a number of years specified in the regulations has elapsed since the date on which the firearm was manufactured;(b) a condition that the firearm was manufactured before a date specified in the regulations.”
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)
My Lords, Great Britain has some of the toughest gun control laws in the world. However, as matters stand, the Firearms Act 1968 exempts antique firearms held as a “curiosity or ornament” from the scope of firearms legislation, which means they can be held without a firearms certificate. The problem with the current situation is that “antique” is not defined and it is this ambiguity that Clause 112 is designed to address. The law as currently constituted places too much emphasis on how the firearm is possessed—as a curio or ornament—and not on the characteristics and definitions of what constitutes an antique firearm. To resolve these difficulties we propose to define an antique firearm by reference to functionality and will do this in two ways: first, if its chamber is capable of being used only with a cartridge of a specified description and, secondly, if its ignition system is of a specified description.
However, concerns have been raised that instead of bringing the desired certainty to this area of firearms legislation, our definition could create further uncertainty about the status of old firearms because it would be difficult, if not impossible, to rule out the possibility that some antique firearms may be capable of being used with cartridges other than those for which they were originally designed. This would mean that a significant proportion of antique firearms currently regarded as exempt would not be covered by the new definition and in consequence could become prohibited. The amendment therefore sets out that antique firearms should be defined by reference to the chamber they had when manufactured, or an identical replacement chamber, which will allow them to be subject to the exemption. If the chambering has been altered in any way to accommodate ammunition which would otherwise be a loose or imprecise fit, then the firearm will not be subject to the exemption. A firearm may still also achieve antique status based on its ignition system.
The amendment also creates a further regulation-making power to enable the Secretary of State to specify a number of years since the date of manufacture which must have elapsed for a firearm to be antique, or that the firearm must have been manufactured before a specified date. This will guard against modern reproductions benefiting from antique firearms’ exemption from the controls in the legislation. I beg to move.
Earl Attlee
“(3A) Subsection (1)(b) does not apply if the weapon is transferred by means of inheritance.”
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, I will also speak to Amendments 203G and 203H. The Committee is pressed for time so I shall try to avoid wearying it with too much detail. At Second Reading I raised the issue of deactivated firearms covered by Clause 114 and declared my interest as an owner of one deactivated firearm. Unfortunately, despite the best efforts of Vicky Ford MEP and our Home Office officials, the EU is understandably hell bent on a knee-jerk reaction to the tragic events in Paris. The EU proposals are technically weak and difficult to understand, partially because of the technical terms used. I understand that a significant proportion of the briefing against Ms Ford’s position has come from the Liege proof master. Apparently that official is now being investigated regarding serious criminal matters involving firearms. If these EU provisions come into effect they will have a very serious impact on collectors, the trade in deactivated firearms and the film industry throughout the EU, which could be badly affected because it will be harder to make action films safely.
The Minister has no shortage of expert advice available to her and I am grateful to her for making her officials available to brief me. She has an excellent lead technical official in the Home Office, to whom I pay tribute, as well as access to the London and Birmingham proof masters. As a result, for many years we have had an excellent regime for deactivating firearms.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)
My Lords, Clause 114 concerns defectively deactivated weapons. As we have heard, we have some of the toughest firearms laws in the world, and I am very pleased about that.
In this grouping the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, has given notice of his intention to oppose Clause 114 standing part of the Bill, although he did not speak to that. However, I do not agree with his opposition to the clause. I think that we would want deactivated weapons to be sold or gifted to people only when they met the highest standards available. If people want to sell these weapons within the EU, they should be certified to the appropriate standard. That is the answer to the problem—not to delete the whole clause.
However, the noble Earl’s amendments raise important points that need to be considered carefully and responded to by the Government. My general position on firearms is that our legislation has had a positive effect and we should always keep matters under review, with a view to seeing where updates or amendments can be made, so that we never relax our tough approach. Having said that, I see the point the noble Earl is making—if you inherit a weapon, potentially an offence can be committed. We need to look at that, although I am not sure that we should do as he suggests.
The noble Earl also made the important point about transferrals to a body corporate, which can be used as a way of getting round legislation. I am not sure what effect the last amendment in the group would have, but he has raised some very important points and I look forward to hearing what the Minister says.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, when the Minister introduces Amendment 203K, which is about extending the period for considering an application for the renewal of a certificate, can she say whether this is being proposed because there are problems generally or in particular forces? In other words, are there just a few difficulties or is this a widespread issue, in that the police do not find eight weeks sufficient? I raise this because of the concern that 16 weeks might easily become the norm, given the opportunity to extend.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for outlining his amendments. As he suggests, I will first explain the government amendments in this group.
Amendments 203J and 203K respond to amendments tabled by Geoffrey Clifton-Brown at Commons Report stage. They seek to make two improvements in the operation of the licensing arrangements under the Firearms Act of 1968. Amendment 203J would remove some of the unnecessary administrative requirements that currently apply to the possession of expanding ammunition.
Expanding ammunition is designed to expand predictably on impact and was prohibited initially in relation to pistols in 1992. In 1997 the ban was extended to all such ammunition, even though it is in universal use for pest control and is required for deer-stalking under the Deer Act and Deer (Scotland) Act.
The current legislation does allow for expanding ammunition to be possessed, in order to carry out specific activities such as the lawful shooting of deer, estate management, the humane killing of animals or the shooting of animals for the protection of other animals or humans. However, the legislation also requires that the individual possess a suitably conditioned firearm certificate for these activities.
The amendment would allow for the possession, purchase, acquisition, sale or transfer of expanding ammunition for rifles where the individual is in possession of a valid firearm certificate or a visitors firearm permit. The effect is—and I hope this goes some way toward answering the noble Baroness’s question—that the police will no longer have to include additional conditions on a certificate or permit, thereby removing some of the administrative burden that the current regime places on them.
Amendment 203K is intended to address the issues that currently arise with an application for the renewal of a firearms certificate that has been made prior to the expiry of the certificate but has not been determined by the police in time. Police forces have developed two different approaches in these cases. The first is to allow the applicant to remain in possession of the firearm, shotgun or ammunition, which means the applicant is in breach of Section 1 or Section 2 of the 1968 Act until the application has been processed. The second is to issue a temporary permit using the power in Section 7 of the Act.
I am sure noble Lords will agree that it is not appropriate for certificate holders to be at risk of arrest and prosecution for an offence under Section 1 or Section 2 because the police have failed to process applications in time. Equally, it is not appropriate for the police to issue temporary permits to individuals whose substantive applications may subsequently be refused. The issuing of such permits also places an increased administrative burden on the police.
Amendment 203K will bring greater clarity in such circumstances by automatically extending the validity of firearm and shotgun certificates past their expiry date for a limited period of up to eight weeks. This will apply only where an application for renewal has been received by the police at least eight weeks prior to the date of expiry of the certificate.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked whether the problems were widespread or localised to particular forces. There were different levels of performance across different forces, and performance varies across some forces, meaning that some are better that others—so this is force-led.
Amendments 234A and 234B are consequential amendments to the extent clause.
I trust the Committee will agree that the two new clauses make sensible changes to the firearms regime and in doing so reduce the administrative burdens on the police without compromising public safety.
As my noble friend explained, his amendments relate to Clause 114, which strengthens the controls on deactivated firearms and thereby enhances public protection. I was pleased to meet my noble friend to discuss his concerns about this clause and I know that he has had a useful follow-up meeting, as he explained, with officials and one of the proof houses.
My noble friend has pointed to some of the difficulties that have been identified with the EU deactivation standards. The UK has some of the toughest gun laws in the world and some of the most robust deactivation standards in Europe. The need for consistent, robust deactivation across member states has been the driving force for EU implementing regulation.
While the new EU deactivation specifications have been introduced, we have recognised that we need to strengthen deactivation measures for certain firearms. We now require additional measures that will align the EU standards with the exacting standards for deactivated weapons already in place in the UK. We have agreed this position with the European Commission. Moreover, the Commission has set up a small group of technical experts to help interpret and, if necessary, revise the standards, and the UK is represented on this group.
Some noble Lords may argue that, following the referendum result, we should drop this provision from the Bill. However, on leaving the EU we will still want to ensure that individuals comply with the relevant deactivation standards that we have in place. To that end, I am ready to explore future-proofing the definition of a defectively deactivated weapon as used in the clause.
I hope I have been able to reassure my noble friend that the offence in Clause 114 is necessary to strengthen our firearms controls, and that, having aired this important issue, he will be content to withdraw his amendment and support Clause 114 standing part of the Bill—and the Government’s amendments in this group.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
I should have said in my earlier contribution that of course we fully support the government amendments in this group. However, I saw that they will cover only England, Scotland and Wales, and not Northern Ireland. Is that because Northern Ireland already has other provisions? The other parts of the Bill will of course cover all parts of the United Kingdom.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I did know the answer to that but I have forgotten it. Rather than give the noble Lord the wrong answer, I will double-check that and write to him and the Committee in due course.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister’s response, and in particular for her final words, when she agreed to have a look at how we future-proof the arrangements. I hope that that will mean that in due course a Government will future-proof it, and then we will be able to do what we want. In the meantime, we can comply with our EU obligations, which of course we have to comply with. Although Brexit means Brexit, we have to comply at the moment. We will get a good solution—we are in a good place on this, and of course there is no question that I will oppose Clause 114. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
“Controls on ammunition which expands on impact
(1) The Firearms Act 1968 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).(2) In section 5 (weapons subject to general prohibition), in subsection (1A), for paragraph (f) substitute—“(f) any ammunition which is designed to be used with a pistol and incorporates a missile designed or adapted to expand on impact;”.(3) In section 5A (exemptions from requirement of authority under section 5), in subsection (8)(a), after “which”, in the first place it occurs, insert “is designed to be used with a pistol and”.(4) In consequence of the amendment made by subsection (2), omit section 9 of the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1997.”
“Limited extension of firearm certificates etc
(1) After section 28A of the Firearms Act 1968 (certificates: supplementary) insert—“28B Certificates: limited extension(1) This section applies where—(a) an application is made for the renewal of a certificate on or before the day which falls 8 weeks before the day at the end of which the certificate is due to expire, but(b) the chief officer of police does not determine whether or not to grant the application before the certificate is due to expire.(2) The certificate continues in force by virtue of this subsection until whichever of the following events occurs first—(a) the chief officer determines whether or not to grant the application;(b) the extension period ends.(3) In subsection (2), “the extension period” means the period of 8 weeks beginning with the day after the day at the end of which the certificate was due to expire.(4) If the event mentioned in subsection (2)(a) occurs first, and the chief officer grants the application, any period for which the certificate continued in force under subsection (2) is to be treated for the purposes of section 28A(1) as part of the period for which the renewed certificate is in force.(5) This section does not apply in relation to the renewal of a certificate granted or last renewed in Northern Ireland.”(2) In consequence of the amendment made by subsection (1), in section 28A of that Act (certificates: supplementary), after subsection (1) insert—“(1A) Subsection (1) is subject to the provision made by section 28B for circumstances in which a certificate may continue in force after the period of five years from the date when it was granted or last renewed.””
Lord Rosser
Lord Rosser (Lab)
My Lords, I will at least attempt to be concise. The Bill deals with relatively narrow issues around Home Office licensing fees for firearms, but I will also talk about police licence fees for guns. These amendments seek to ensure that the full costs of licensing are recovered. In the previous Parliament we argued for full cost recovery in the light of a current taxpayer subsidy for gun ownership of some £17 million a year. The police have estimated that the cost of licensing a firearm is nearly four times the fee charged. A higher fee was introduced just prior to the last general election following negotiations with the British Association for Shooting and Conservation—rather than following an independent review—but it was still less than half the cost of licensing a firearm based on the police figures. These amendments require the Secretary of State to set the cost of a licence fee for prohibited weapons, pistol clubs and museums at full cost to the taxpayer, but we expect the Government to extend this requirement of full cost recovery to Section 1 firearms and the police.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, I support the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, to which my noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have added our names. My argument is quite simple: when we were discussing the Immigration Act, the Government proposed a philosophy of full cost recovery for visa applications and the Immigration Service generally. On 18 March this year, they increased the fees for visa applications, in some cases by 25%. Family and spouse visas are now £1,195, adult dependent relative visas are £2,676, and settlement applications have increased to £1,875. British citizen naturalisation certificates are now £1,156 for adults and £936 for children.
There is currently a government consultation on immigration appeal fees, which proposes an even greater increase to ensure full cost recovery. The consultation suggests a fee for an appeal on the papers to the First-tier Tribunal should increase from £80 to £490, and from £140 to £800 for an oral hearing. If the Minister is not going to agree with these amendments to ensure full cost recovery for the issuing of firearms certificates, will she explain why a different approach is being taken to the principle of full cost recovery when it comes to immigration? In particular, can she refute the obvious allegation that the Government are discriminating against foreign nationals as set against those who go hunting with guns for sport?
Earl Attlee
My Lords, I have some sympathy for the position articulated by noble Lords opposite. However, it needs to be remembered that shooters have to buy their guns, ammunition and facilities and that they pay value added tax at 20%. There is actually huge government revenue from the shooting fraternity, as 20% of everything they spend on shooting comes back to the Government. I can see the noble Lord, Lord Harris, getting very excited. It must be a very powerful argument. I have expressed sympathy for the noble Lords’ position but I give a note of caution: we should not forget the tax revenues from shooting.
Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)
My Lords, the noble Earl has goaded me into intervening in this debate, which I would otherwise not have done. It is a specious argument to say that because gun owners have to pay VAT, which we all have to pay on most goods and services except that very narrow range which is specifically exempted, they are therefore making their contribution to the costs. My noble friend Lord Rosser and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, have pulled their punches on this issue. What is actually happening is that the Government have selected one hobby and decided to subsidise it. I would like the Government to explain what other hobbies they intend to subsidise in exactly the same way. If noble Lords opposite, or anybody else, choose to argue that gun ownership is not a hobby then presumably they intend to use the guns for some perhaps less than satisfactory purpose. Again, I wonder why the Government choose to subsidise that activity as opposed to any other.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, I can give the noble Lord an example. I collect classic military and commercial vehicles but there is no road fund tax on them. They are zero rated; that is a subsidy from the Government to people who collect such vehicles. My point is that owners and shooters of firearms pay tax like everyone else. If they did not have their guns, they would not be paying any value added tax on them. It is a simple little point that we should not forget.
Lord Harris of Haringey
Presumably the noble Earl pays VAT on those purchases.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the Government agree that fees for firearms licences should be set on a cost-recovery basis. We have already increased the fees for civilian firearms and shotgun certificates issued by the police in line with this objective. Clause 115 addresses firearms licences issued by the Home Office and the Scottish Government. They therefore concern fees for licences to possess non-civilian prohibited weapons, and for shooting clubs and museums. Currently, most of these types of licence do not attract a fee. Where a fee is charged, it is set at a level well below the cost of administering an application.
Amendments 204 to 206 would require the Government to set all fees at a level that would achieve full cost recovery. The administration of these licences, including assistance from the police, costs the taxpayer an estimated £700,000 a year. The Government agree that licence holders, not the taxpayer, should pay for this service. Clause 115 therefore provides a power for the Home Secretary to set fees for these licences. As the then policing Minister, Mike Penning, explained when similar amendments were debated in the House of Commons, we intend that the fees should be set at a level that will achieve full cost recovery. We will then set out the proposed fees in a public consultation, which we intend to publish shortly.
The consultation will invite views on the implementation of these measures and we welcome responses. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked when the Section 5 fees are planned to be introduced. It will be in April 2017, subject to the planned consultation. I do not want to pre-empt the outcome of the consultation. However, there might be good reasons not to set fees at full cost recovery levels, either for a transitional period or for certain categories of licence holder. We will consider the responses to the consultation on these matters before deciding on the level that should be set. In doing so, we will be guided by the principle to which I referred above: that the costs of licensing should fall to the licence holder rather than to the taxpayer.
Amendment 207 relates to the fees charged by the police for shotgun and civilian firearms certificates and for registered firearms dealer licences. In 2015, we increased fees for those certificates substantially. This was the first increase in the licence fee since 2001. The increase reflected the fact that the cost of the licences had fallen far below the cost to the police of their administration. Fees increased between 23% and 76%, depending on the type of certificate.
When we consulted on the fee levels for certificates issued by the police, we were clear that the cost of licences should reflect the full cost of licensing once a new online licensing system was in place. Work is under way to secure that system. In the meantime we are committed to undertaking an annual review of the fees. There will be a comprehensive review of police licensing fees in five years’ time. I hope that the noble Lord will be reassured that it is indeed this Government’s intention that firearms fees should reflect the full cost of licensing and that on this basis he will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, what consultation was there before the Government implemented full cost recovery for immigration visas with those groups that represent immigrants or those who might be applying for visas?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
May I write to the noble Lord on that? I do not have the answer on timing to hand. I apologise.
Lord Rosser
I seek clarification of one or two points. Did the Minister say that as far as Home Office licence holders are concerned, they will be paying the full cost of licensing from April of next year? As far as the police are concerned, there was no real commitment at all. I asked when the new online system would be introduced. I do not think that I got an answer. I asked whether the full costs of licensing would be charged from the day the new online system came in. I do not think that I got an answer. I also asked by how much the Government considered the fees for police licences would have to be increased to cover the full costs of licensing. I believe that the Minister referred to a review of police licences and costs in five years’ time. Is this suggesting that the new online system will not be coming in for five years? If the Minister is unable to give me a firm date as to when that online system will be operational, can she give a commitment that in the meantime those fees will be raised to cover the full costs and that we shall not be in a situation in which the police, who are already short of money, are in fact subsidising gun ownership in this country with money desperately needed for main police activities? Could I please have some answers? If they are not available now, I shall as always accept a subsequent letter responding to these questions.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, in terms of the online system, the current fees are intended to cover the cost of the licencing once the online system is introduced. The police, supported by the Government, are currently developing the online system. An implementation date has not yet been determined. We plan to introduce the Section 5 fees and the increased fees for museums and clubs in April 2017, subject to the planned consultation. The level of fees will therefore be determined subject to that consultation. There is no suggestion that the new online system will take five years to implement. There will be an annual review of licence fees. I hope that I have not completely confused the noble Lord.
Lord Rosser
I do not know that the Minister has completely confused me. She has said that we do not know when the new online system is coming in, which presumably means that it has not reached the testing stage at which the Government know that it will actually deliver, yet the Government are adamant that it will not take five years. If the Government know that it will not take five years, they must be in a position to say now when they expect the system to come in. They can also say why in the meantime they will not increase the fees as far as the police licences are concerned to cover the full cost to the police. Not doing so means that the police, who are short of financial resources, are subsidising gun ownership.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the noble Lord is right in that the taxpayer should not subsidise gun ownership. The new fees will be subject to consultation, although that was not the question he asked. He asked whether it will take five years to implement the online system. I will write to him on how long we think implementation of the online system will take, if that is okay.
Lord Rosser
I thank the Minister for her response and other noble Lords, in particular the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and my noble friend Lord Harris, who participated in this short debate. I am grateful to the Minister for saying that she will write to me on this, because the question of when the Government are gearing up to introduce the online system is crucial. I sense it will not be within the next few months—to put it bluntly, the Government do not know when it is coming in. They are not even prepared to give an estimate of the timescale, unless that will be in the letter that is to be sent. We will need to reflect further on this in the face, apparently, of a government stance that means they are quite happy, if the online system does not come in very shortly, to see the police subsidising gun ownership in this country, at a time when the police themselves are desperately short of financial resources. However, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Harris of Haringey
“Firearms: revocation of firearms certificate
(1) The Firearms Act 1968 is amended as follows.(2) After section 4 (conversion of weapons) insert—“4A Revocation of firearms certificateAny person who has through negligence lost a firearm or through negligence enabled a firearm to be stolen shall have all firearms certificates in their name revoked and shall be banned from holding a firearms certificate for the rest of their life.””
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, this amendment in my name raises the issue of people who, through negligence, have allowed their firearm to be lost or stolen. This seems to me something that should be taken much more seriously than it is at present. I do not want to bore the House with too many statistics, but roughly half of all recent terrorist plots that have been disrupted have involved situations in which those alleged to be the perpetrators have sought to obtain firearms.
In an average year, 800 registered firearms are lost or stolen. That means there is a seepage of firearms, most likely into the illegal economy. Whether those firearms are obtained by criminals or terrorists seems almost irrelevant. These are firearms that in many instances could kill or harm people, and certainly terrify them. In those circumstances, if an owner has negligently allowed their firearm to be lost or stolen, it seems there should be significant consequences. That is why this amendment proposes not only that they should they have all firearms certificates in their name revoked but that they should be banned from holding a firearms certificate for the rest of their life.
Those who might argue that that is a draconian penalty just need to think about what an unlicensed, stolen firearm in the hands of a criminal or a terrorist might do to somebody else’s life. This seems a punishment that fits the crime. I hope the Minister will accept that this is a serious matter and agree to take this away and tidy up whatever inadequacies there are in my drafting of the amendment, because it seems a no-brainer that we should take firm action against those who, through their negligence, allow dangerous firearms to get into the illegal economy. I beg to move.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, although perhaps not quite in the terms he suggested. This is a very serious problem. Any firearm that is lost or stolen will almost inevitably find its way into the hands of criminals, whether terrorists or not. It is an extremely serious problem. Because we have world-class controls on firearms, stealing firearms is one of the few ways in which criminals or terrorists can arm themselves. Clearly, there would have to be some investigation to establish whether negligence was involved or not. I understand that, at the moment, when a firearms licence is up for renewal the police will consider what the security arrangements are to store firearms and, indeed, whether any firearms have been lost or stolen by that certificate holder. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Harris, that this is not taken seriously enough at the moment, that there are very serious potential consequences and that this definitely needs further consideration.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, while I am grateful to the noble Lord for moving this amendment, I am curious about what he means by “negligence”. He talked about the problem of firearms being stolen. If a gun owner has properly kept his firearms in the storage facilities that have already been approved by the police and a burglar comes in and successfully and quite quickly gets into the gun cabinet and steals the firearms, has the firearms owner been negligent or not?
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, part of the process of enacting this would be to make quite clear what qualifies as negligence. In my view, this should not apply if the gun owner has followed all the prescribed procedures, which should be quite onerous. In my understanding, gun owners are extremely careful, particularly about the storage of their weapons. I am concerned about guns that are left in the boot of a car, not necessarily in very adequate containers, or even on the back seat of a car or in circumstances where the gun owner has not locked them away in the approved fashion. Those are certainly cases where this should apply, and I hope that the threat of this action being taken would mean that all gun owners became much more responsible and acted in the way the noble Earl has suggested.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Harris, has explained, Amendment 208 would provide that:
“Any person who has through negligence lost a firearm or through negligence enabled a firearm to be stolen shall have all firearms certificates in their name revoked and shall be banned from holding a firearms certificate for the rest of their life”.
As the noble Lord indicated, this was one of the recommendations in his report for the Mayor of London on London’s preparedness to respond to a major terrorist incident, which was published last week.
It is clear that the loss or theft of firearms presents a potential risk to public safety. However, the number of firearms and shotguns that are lost remains extremely small. Any loss or theft is, of course, a cause for concern and it is right that we must take appropriate action in the case of owners who lose or enable the theft of a firearm or shotgun through negligence. I therefore considered carefully the noble Lord’s proposed amendment to the Firearms Act 1968.
When a firearm or shotgun certificate is issued, conditions are automatically included requiring the certificate holder to store their firearms securely to prevent, so far as reasonably practicable, access to the firearms by an unauthorised person. The condition also applies in circumstances where the firearm or shotgun has been removed from secure storage for cleaning, repair or testing or during transit. In these circumstances, all reasonable precautions must be taken to ensure the safe custody of the firearm. A condition is also placed on the certificate requiring the holder to notify the police within seven days of the theft, loss or destruction of a firearm or shotgun. It is an offence not to comply with these conditions, and the maximum penalty for that offence can be up to six months in prison, a fine or both.
Section 38 of the 1968 Act provides for a firearm certificate to be revoked if the chief officer of police is satisfied that the holder is,
“otherwise unfitted to be entrusted with a firearm”,
or can no longer be permitted to have a firearm in their possession without danger to the public’s safety or to the peace. Section 30C makes similar provision for the revocation of shotgun certificates. In the year ending March 2016, the police revoked just under 400 firearms certificates and almost 1,350 shotgun certificates. I assure the noble Lord that when the loss or theft of a firearm or shotgun is reported to the police, the matter is taken very seriously. In such cases the chief officer should consider whether to prosecute the certificate holder for breach of a condition on their certificate, and whether the certificate should be revoked under Sections 30A or 30C of the 1968 Act.
Noble Lords may also be reassured to know that the police intend to set minimum standards in respect of the investigation of lost or stolen firearms. This will provide a consistent national approach to the call-taking, initial response, investigation, assessment of risk and consideration of firearms licensing issues such as revocation. If a person whose certificate has been revoked applies for a new certificate at a later date, the chief officer will consider all the circumstances of the application and, if the reasons for the previous revocation can be determined, in some circumstances a user certificate might be granted. In cases where a firearms offence has been committed, the courts will consider the sentencing options available under the 1968 Act. Depending on the sentence handed down by a court, a lifetime ban may automatically be imposed on a certificate holder. Generally, persons who are sentenced to three years or more are never allowed to possess a firearm again.
The 1968 Act provides for a five-year ban where someone has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of three months or more but less than three years. Persons who are subject to a suspended sentence of three months or more are also not allowed to possess firearms, including antique firearms, for five years. The amendment could therefore lead to a situation whereby an individual who has been imprisoned for less than three years does not receive a lifetime ban while an individual whose firearm has been lost or stolen receives a ban for life. While I fully agree that we must have robust firearms laws to preserve and maintain public safety, including safeguards to help to prevent their misuse, I am sure noble Lords will agree that our laws must be proportionate.
The inclusion on certificates of conditions governing safe storage means that firearms and shotgun certificate holders understand their responsibilities in respect of keeping their weapons secure. I am also satisfied that police forces already have the powers they need to revoke firearms or shotgun certificates in cases where the owner has lost or enabled the theft of a weapon through negligence. I hope that, having aired this important issue, the noble Lord will feel that he can withdraw his amendment.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, I do not know if my noble friend the Minister has satisfied the noble Lord, Lord Harris—
Earl Attlee
He does look satisfied; he always does. If he chose to come back with this at a later stage, and I hope he does not, he would need to consider disassembly. In the case of a bolt-action hunting rifle for taking deer, for example, if someone lost the rifle but kept the bolt then the rifle would not be much use. He will have to pay a bit of attention to that issue if he wants to bring this back.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who contributed to this debate, and in particular to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, for raising complications about bolt-action and dealing with deer and so on—which, as he knows, are way beyond my understanding and experience of firearms matters.
I am particularly grateful to the Minister for her response, but I was concerned—and no doubt it was just a slip in the way she responded, and I might have misheard her—when she said that it was a very small number of firearms that disappear and go missing each year. In my view, 800 firearms going missing or being stolen each year is a significant number and a significant problem.
I am grateful to her also for outlining the various options available to deal with breaches of conditions and so on. I am partially reassured, but it would be interesting to know how robust and satisfactory the systems are for ensuring that, if a firearms certificate were revoked in one police force area and the same individual were to apply for a certificate in another firearms area, the information would automatically be available to the chief constable when they considered it. I rather suspect, given my experience of the way in which these matters are communicated, that there is no guarantee that the information would be available. I would be interested if the Minister would look into this matter—perhaps not today—and respond to it. I will consider very carefully what she said in her response, but, certainly for today, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“Possession of pyrotechnic articles at musical events
(1) It is an offence for a person to have a pyrotechnic article in his or her possession at any time when the person is—(a) at a place in England where a qualifying musical event is being held, or(b) at any other place in England that is being used by a person responsible for the organisation of a qualifying musical event for the purpose of—(i) regulating entry to, or departure from, the event, or(ii) providing sleeping or other facilities for those attending the event.(2) Subsection (1) does not apply—(a) to a person who is responsible for the organisation of the event, or(b) to a person who has the article in his or her possession with the consent of a person responsible for the organisation of the event.(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks (or, in relation to offences committed before section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 comes into force, 3 months), or to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale, or to both.(4) In this section, “pyrotechnic article” means an article that contains explosive substances, or an explosive mixture of substances, designed to produce heat, light, sound, gas or smoke, or a combination of such effects, through self-sustained exothermic chemical reactions, other than—(a) a match, or(b) an article specified, or of a description specified, in regulations made by statutory instrument by the Secretary of State.(5) In this section, “qualifying musical event” means an event at which one or more live musical performances take place and which is specified, or of a description specified, in regulations made by statutory instrument by the Secretary of State.(6) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, Amendment 209 provides for a new offence of possession of pyrotechnic articles at live musical events in England. The amendment is in response to one tabled by Nigel Adams on Report in the House of Commons. The misuse of fireworks, flares and smoke bombs at festivals and other live musical events by members of the public is an increasing and deeply concerning problem. Fireworks and other pyrotechnic articles covered by the amendment are dangerous when misused. Fireworks can burn at in excess of 2,200 degrees centigrade; flares can reach temperatures of 1,600 degrees centigrade and can burn for as long as an hour. Smoke bombs also burn at high temperatures, and in enclosed or crowded spaces the thick smoke that they release can cause breathing difficulties, particularly for asthma sufferers.
In the 1980s, it was recognised that the misuse of pyrotechnic articles in crowded football stadia posed a specific public order risk. As a result, the Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc.) Act 1985 provides for an offence of possession of fireworks and flares at a football match. However, current firework and explosives legislation does not provide the police or prosecutors with an appropriate offence to tackle the possession of pyrotechnic articles at music festivals. While the majority of festival organisers have their own rules banning festivalgoers from bringing fireworks and other pyrotechnic articles on to festival premises, no statutory regulation exists. There is no offence for the use of a firework, flare or smoke bomb in a crowd on private property unless it can be proved that it was used with the intent to cause injury or that its use was likely to endanger life or seriously damage property.
Amendment 209 therefore makes it an offence for a person to be in possession of a pyrotechnic article at a qualifying musical event in England. The offence has been so constructed as to apply also where a person is in possession of such articles at a point of entry into, or exit from, the place where a qualifying musical event is taking place, or at a campsite provided for those who are attending the event.
A qualifying musical event will be defined in regulations, subject to the negative procedure. The amendment itself provides that such musical events must involve live musical performances and, in defining a qualifying event, we will want to further target the offence at those events where there is evidence of harm being caused by the misuse of fireworks, flares or smoke bombs. The maximum penalty for the offence is three months’ imprisonment, which is the same as that applicable to the existing football-related offence.
The effect of Amendment 234 is that the offence extends to England and Wales. As I indicated, it applies to England only. However, we are considering further its territorial application in consultation with the Welsh Government. Amendment 245 makes a consequential amendment to the Long Title.
This offence will help prevent the harm that can come from the misuse of such dangerous articles and allow everyone to enjoy live music events safely. I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am grateful to officials for explaining the origin of the amendment to me. They commented that the Government’s view is that we should not extend the criminal law unless there is a well-founded case for doing so. I agree with that, but I have instinctive concerns about this proposal. First, what consultation has there been with the entertainment industry? This must be a matter of widespread interest. I cannot say that I go to musical events usually held in the open air—I go to rather staider events—but a lot of people will feel that they are being targeted by the measure. What consideration has been given to, first, whether there should not be a focus on the venue organiser rather than the individual, as this seems to be a matter of crowd control? Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, is there no other way than creating a new specific offence? If fireworks and flares are dangerous—I accept that they are—is this not about the misuse of fireworks rather than the place or event where they may be misused? As for it being a musical event, which is to be determined by regulations, that seems to raise all sorts of problems.
I appreciate that this comes from legislation about football matches, although the 1985 Act cited by the Minister seems a little narrower, unless I have misunderstood it, because the places where the person is found to be in possession are very closely defined, including an area,
“from which the event may be directly viewed”.
When looking up that section, I came across a petition to Parliament to legalise the use of pyrotechnics at football grounds. I could not find its date, but it was rejected on the basis that it was,
“a matter for individual Local Authorities”.
That confused me even more, but I wonder what relation that point has to the amendment.
I am sorry to throw a number of questions at the Minister, but I am sure that the Government considered them before proposing the amendment.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, I am not sure whether the thrust of the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, was to broaden or narrow the scope—
Lord Harris of Haringey
As ever, it was a quest for information. I also have a quest for information. It seems to me unduly restrictive to apply the clause simply to musical events. What about theatrical or other events which draw large crowds? The danger of either panic or direct harm from fireworks or similar things in such large, crowded places seems quite high. There is this careful definition of,
“sleeping or other facilities for those attending”,
a musical event. Surely concerns about someone possessing a pyrotechnic article in a general campsite or some other facility are just as great.
It would therefore be helpful to understand. The purpose is clear and valuable in terms of musical events and festivals but I wonder why similar consideration has not been given to other events where there will be large gatherings of people.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, this new clause is in general most welcome and I am happy to support it from these Benches. It seeks to ban the possession of fireworks, smoke bombs and flares by those attending live musical events. As we have heard, these are extremely dangerous and can burn at more than 2,000 degrees, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chisholm, outlined. There have been a number of injuries, and perhaps we may hear more about that when she responds.
I was surprised to learn that while these items are banned at football matches, it is not the case at musical events. A valid point has been made about widening the ban to other events. That should be considered, too, rather than just picking one area of a problem that may be more widespread. If I am correct, the amendment does not stop the organisers of the event using these articles but just protects the people attending, and prevents people putting them in their bags and setting them off recklessly in the crowd.
The other amendments are consequential. I am generally supportive of them but the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made valid points that require a response from the Government.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I thank noble Lords who have taken part in this short debate and hope that I can answer their questions.
On the point regarding consultation, the proposed new offence is supported by the music industry. The national policing lead for festivals, Assistant Chief Constable Andy Battle of West Yorkshire Police, who is in charge of dealing with these sorts of events countrywide, has also welcomed the proposed legislation. Therefore, we have indeed consulted. In fact, organisers have already made it clear that fireworks should not be brought into festivals but feel that an offence is needed to provide better and greater deference to this understanding and to concentrate people’s minds.
Why does this apply only to music events? The data gathered by the crowd management organisation Showsec on behalf of Live Nation recorded 255 incidents involving pyrotechnic articles at live music events in 2014. This covered seven music festivals and other, smaller venues. This new offence is being created to target the specific problem of pyrotechnics at live music events. There is no evidence to suggest that pyrotechnic articles are a problem at other kinds of events, with the exception of football stadiums, which are covered under sporting events control.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, also asked about extending the ban outside the event. Extending the offence to include travel to a music event or festival would not only widen the scope of the offence considerably but put it at odds with current legislation on the possession of fireworks and flares. There are also practical considerations regarding how such an extension could be enforced. Police officers would need reasonable grounds to believe that individuals were travelling to a musical event with pyrotechnic articles in order to search them. In our view, this would be an onerous demand on police time. The national policing lead for music festivals, Andy Battle of West Yorkshire Police, agreed that any provision around travel would not be helpful and be problematic to enforce.
A noble Lord asked why fireworks could be included in the general celebration of the event by the organisers. We accept that pyrotechnic articles are often used as part of a performance, and we would not want to restrict that. The new offence will maintain the distinction between pyrotechnics authorised for use as part of a festival or event and those misused by the public. I hope that that has covered everything.
Baroness Hamwee
I did not express myself very well. I was not concerned about travel to the event. I was comparing the amendment with Section 2A of the Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc.) Act 1985, under which the offence applies when a person,
“is in any area of a designated sports ground from which the event may be directly viewed”.
I was comparing the two matters. That probably highlights the fact that musical events are different.
After hearing the response, I cannot help thinking that this is a matter of how people may use or misuse fireworks and flares in a much more general way. Does the noble Baroness know whether the regulations will address the definition of a qualifying musical event, or will they actually list particular events? She referred to the national policing lead for musical events; I had not realised there was such a post. By definition, that officer will not have given comments about events that are not musical events. If the noble Baroness has no further information—I appreciate that she may not, as we are becoming quite detailed—perhaps it is a matter for another day. But they are not invalid questions.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I might have inspiration from over my left shoulder. The offence will apply to a campsite adjacent to a festival and the regulation-making power will include a generic definition of a live musical event.
Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe (Lab)
My Lords, I beg to move that the clause do not stand part of the Bill and, in short, that it be deleted. If carried, the clause means that the definition of alcohol will be extended to cover all forms in which it might be presented. Specifically, it will cover powdered alcohol and vaporised alcohol, and it follows that they will then become regulated for sale in the UK under the Licensing Act 2003.
Yesterday we had a short debate on the action the Government are taking to address reports of increasing violence in prisons. The Minister replying referred to the White Paper, Prison Safety and Reform, in which there is a section on reducing the supply of and demand for illicit items. If I had been able to get into the debate yesterday, I would have asked the Minister to explain to the House how permitting for the first time in the UK the sale of powdered and vaporised alcohol will help to reduce the problems in prisons. I would be grateful if the Minister endeavoured to respond to that point. How can this change be justified against the background of the Government’s announcement last week that no-fly zones are to be imposed over jails in England and Wales to stop drones being used to smuggle drugs into prison grounds? It is against a background of numerous initiatives costing £1.3 billion that we are trying to tackle rising violence, drug use and other problems in prisons.
The Home Office may have consulted the drinks industry on this change, but did it consult its own Ministry of Justice, which is responsible for prisons, and the health authorities on how they view the proposals? I have tabled a whole range of Written Questions asking the Government about this topic and they have answered a fair number recently. I particularly asked if they would define the benefits of this change to the public. I have had no reply, so I should be grateful if the Minister told the House today what benefit the Government see from authorising the sale of powdered and vaporised alcohol.
Powdered alcohol has been around in some countries for quite a while—not vaping alcohol, which is a new development to which I will come back shortly. The production and marketing of powdered alcohol started to take off in the USA about two years ago—March 2015—when its sale was authorised by the federal bureau on drugs and drinks. This has been controversial in the States. Powdered alcohol can be consumed with fruit juices, water and other soft drinks. It can be mixed with other alcoholic drinks to double or treble their strength. It can be taken to and consumed in places where ordinary liquid alcoholic drinks cannot because they are prohibited, such as sporting and musical events, public places and on public transport. Powdered alcohol can be taken there because it cannot be detected. It can be baked, put into ice cream, and so on. A whole range of things can be done with it.
There has been an outcry in the States about the attempt to market and sell it. Opposition has grown over the months, and I understand that 27 states have banned its sale. The opposition has been such that there have been disputes about its legality, and the main producer of the main powdered alcohol—Palcohol—is having to take a different stance entirely to the one it adopted previously. It is interesting to note, too, that this year, Russia is banning the sale of powdered alcohol. Yet here we are in the UK contemplating legitimising its sale. It is true that it is not yet on sale here but as I pointed out to the Home Office, websites are already set up waiting to sell it online as soon as it is legalised for sale.
As the Home Office has conceded, alcohol in vaping form is already here. It is true that it is being presented as a novelty item, but how long will it remain as such? Indeed, is it being used as a novelty item? I do not think it will stay like that for long. The cigarette manufacturers are already moving big time into vaping. The CEO of Philip Morris, which has the big selling brand, Marlboro, and commands 30% of the market outside the USA, selling 847 billion cigarettes last year alone, said that he is on a mission to get millions more people vaping. He says he can see the day when Philip Morris stops selling cigarettes entirely, and will be totally into vaping.
So a big change is taking place—we will have a vaping future. Of course, it will not just be nicotine. Last week, I went to one of my local vaping shops in Battersea, which has 50 different vaping items on sale. As yet, they do not have alcohol, but when I talked to them about the possibility, they said, “Yes please, could you tell us when we can get our hands on it?”. The items they are already selling come from all different parts of the world, in all different concoctions. There must be a question from a health point of view about what people will be vaping and the effect over time on their health—even from what is currently available for sale.
Make no mistake: when we look at the future of vaping, what we are seeing is just the start of a major development and we should be aware of it—if indeed the Government intend to proceed with this measure. I hope they are prepared to think again. The truth is that powdered ethyl alcohol and vaping alcohol are mind and mood-altering substances little different to class C prohibited drugs, while those classified in the recently passed Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 will in due course cause the same kind of problems as the substances which have been previously been banned, if not more, particularly if vaping takes off on a big scale.
The Government should withdraw Clause 117 and to help them, I oppose its standing part of the Bill. To help them clarify the legal position—which is ostensibly their concern and why they are taking this action—I suggest they have a look at class C prohibited drugs and the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 to see whether these substances should be so classified. If not, they should simply and straightforwardly be banned.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I rise to pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, and his persistent campaign against powdered alcohol and vaping. I accept what he says about these things being mind-altering substances, but surely that is because they contain alcohol, which is an accepted mind-altering substance—no more, no less than that. I understand the concern about the way you take the alcohol. Vaping, I understand, gives a very instant hit, unlike drinking alcohol, where you get a delayed reaction. However, have we not learned lessons from the past about prohibition and, in particular, prohibition of alcohol, not being an effective way of dealing with these issues? On these Benches, we would say it is far better to regulate, license and control the use of these new substances, rather than trying to ban them.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
My Lords, my name is on this amendment and we are coming on to a whole series of amendments relating to alcohol. With all due respect, I do not agree that alcohol in these alternative forms should be looked at in the same way as alcoholic drinks consumed in a social context.
The great difficulty for us and the country already is the size of the problem. In 2014 there were 8,697 alcohol-related deaths. That was an increase on the previous year and alcohol-related harms are already estimated to cost the country £21 billion a year. We know that around 9% of adult men and 4% of adult women are not taking alcohol for social consumption, but because they have alcohol dependence. Sadly, only around 7% of them are accessing any kind of treatment, so we have a huge problem. When we look at the amount of alcohol-fuelled crime and at what victims have said, over half of all victims of violence felt that the offender was under the influence of alcohol, and that is without ways of boosting the potency of the alcohol that they might be taking.
When we look at young people in particular and alcohol-related harms among those aged under 25 from 2002 to 2010, alcohol-related hospital admissions increased by 57% in young men and by 76% in girls and young women. We have a massive, looming problem of alcohol addiction and harms. The consequences of that may be handed down to the next generation, given that we know that among 15 and 16 year-olds, 11% had sex under the influence of alcohol and almost one in 10 boys and one in eight girls had unsafe sex while under the influence of alcohol. Of course, unsafe sex leads to pregnancy.
It is also important to look at children who were excluded from school, because almost half of those were regular drinkers. This is nothing to do with people’s freedom to consume alcohol socially. This is pure alcohol harm. I do not see how a school will be able to differentiate powdered alcohol from sugar or any other substance, such as sherbet that a child has in their pocket. I do not see how prison services or others will be able to differentiate alcohol vaping devices from the other types of nicotine-related vaping devices or how they will be able to have any control over the consumption of these. I have a real concern, and the reason I put my name to this amendment is that these kinds of products fuel alcohol addiction and do nothing to enhance social interaction within our society; they specifically fuel dependence and all the harms that go along with dependence. I have yet to be convinced of any benefit whatever, given that other countries that have major problems with alcohol consumption have decided that these products are too dangerous. I suggest that we should follow their lead and not risk taking these substances which we will be unable to detect or police. By allowing them for sale, they can be used to spike drinks and increase the cost to the country of alcohol-induced harms.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, Clause 117 amends the definition of alcohol in Section 191 of the Licensing Act 2003. The current definition of alcohol covers:
“Spirits, wine, beer, cider or any other fermented, distilled or spirituous liquor.”
The clause adds the words “in any state” to this definition. The purpose of this is to ensure that all alcohol, no matter in which form it is sold, is covered by the requirements of the 2003 Act.
In recent years novel products have appeared for sale in licensed premises, such as vaporised alcohol, which is designed to be inhaled either directly from the air or via an inhalation device. To our knowledge, those who have sold this form of alcohol have done so under a premises licence and there have not been problems.
However, in America there is a suggestion that a new product—powdered alcohol— may come on to the market in the near future. We wish to put it beyond doubt that alcohol, whatever form it takes, may be sold only in accordance with a licence under the 2003 Act. It is important that we make this legislative change before powdered alcohol comes on to the market. This clause will ensure that any form of alcohol sold to the public is properly regulated with relevant safeguards in place.
The current system of alcohol licensing, as provided for in the 2003 Act, seeks to promote four licensing objectives. These are: the prevention of crime and disorder; public safety; the prevention of public nuisance; and the protection of children from harm. The 2003 Act also contains a number of criminal offences, including selling alcohol to a child under the age of 18 and selling alcohol without a licence.
This amendment to the definition of alcohol will ensure that the four licensing objectives continue to be met despite innovations in alcohol products, and that the public, especially children, continue to be protected from irresponsible sales of alcohol. The clause will mean that there is no legal ambiguity over whether new forms of alcohol are covered by the Act and need an alcohol licence to be sold.
I recognise the concerns of the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. All we know about powdered alcohol is that it is alcohol in a powdered form. There is no evidence on whether it is more harmful than liquid alcohol, and we do not know whether it could be used in more harmful ways. The Government share the noble Lord’s concern that children may be attracted to this product. These are legitimate concerns. However, removing this clause from the Bill will expose an ambiguity in the law that could be exploited by those who seek to argue that these novel forms of alcohol may be sold without a licence. The Government have not sought to ban powdered alcohol because the licensing system contains safeguards to prevent the sale of alcohol to children and to protect the public from irresponsible sales of alcohol.
Powdered alcohol was authorised for sale in the USA in March 2015, although as far as the Government are aware, it is not yet on sale in the USA or elsewhere, including online. A number of states in the USA have banned powdered alcohol amid concerns about underage drinking. If powdered alcohol does come on to the market, the Government will monitor what happens in the USA and the UK, and keep our position under review. We are currently aware of only one company developing this product. It is designed to be mixed with water or a mixer such as orange juice or Coke to make a drink of the normal strength, for example, a single shot of vodka. While the licensed trade and licensing authorities are currently treating vaporised alcohol in the same way as liquid alcohol, the Government wish to ensure that there is no doubt about the legal position.
In considering this change to the definition of alcohol, the Home Office consulted key partners at two workshops held last summer. One included representatives from the Local Government Association, the Institute of Licensing, the police and PCCs, as well as licensing officers from seven licensing authorities. The second workshop included industry partners such as the British Beer and Pub Association, the Association of Convenience Stores, the Wine and Spirit Trade Association and the Association of Licensed Multiple Retailers. In these workshops there was agreement that the legal position of new forms of alcohol should be put beyond doubt. The police and local authorities were keen that licensing and enforcement decisions should be clear, while the industry representatives were keen to see clarity in the law so that alcohol licences continue to operate effectively and efficiently. In conclusion, removing the clause from the Bill would have the opposite effect to the one the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, seeks.
He asked about prisons. It may be helpful to mention that the legislative change does not affect the use of alcohol in prisons, which is prohibited. He asked what consultation we have carried out with health authorities. Home Office officials have discussed powdered alcohol with the Department of Health and Public Health England. No one has raised specific concerns about the potential harm of powdered alcohol and there is no evidence to suggest that this form of alcohol is more harmful than liquid alcohol. However, we will keep this under review if the product enters the market.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
Does the noble Baroness agree that the question is not whether the form of alcohol—that is, powder or liquid—is more dangerous; it is the quantity of the chemical C2H5OH that is the problem? The higher the concentration, the greater the harm, so an ordinary drink spiked with powdered alcohol will be much more harmful than the drink itself because it is a question of dose-related harms.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I cannot disagree with the noble Baroness’s comments about the powdered form of alcohol. However, this obviously depends on what one compares the powder to. Some fairly lethal drinks are available. I am thinking of things such as absinthe, which was banned for years in this country. Every form of alcohol has the potential to do harm. As the relevant product is not yet on the market in this country, we will keep the situation under review.
Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have contributed to the debate. I am particularly grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for her support. As noble Lords might expect, I am disappointed with the Minister’s response. Alcohol in its present form is very badly regulated in a number of areas. A Health Minister is present who knows about the major problems we experience with alcohol. We need to look constantly at the Licensing Act 2003 to try to improve the situation.
Alcohol will be presented in quite a different form from anything we have experienced previously. Make no mistake—it will come. The Home Office seems to be way behind on this all the time. There is a manufacturer of this form of alcohol in Japan, where it is available, and a Dutch producer. I believe that some has been produced in Germany as well, so it is coming on to the market. The existing Licensing Act will not be able to hinder this product’s portability. That is what has changed. You can hide it and move it anywhere, whereas beer in a bottle or glass is visible. That is the distinction and that is why this new form of alcohol is so different. When we see the difficulties in places such as prisons, and the steps we are taking to reduce violence in them and stop illicit drugs going into prisons, to say that the Government will meet what is primarily the drinks industry’s requirement to have the legal position clarified, in which it has a vested interest, is the wrong way to go.
There is a solution to this problem. My proposal would not legalise this product. We could ban it. We could also for the first time consider classifying it as a class C drug. That would frighten the drinks industry to death. We could also classify alcohol in this form under the Psychoactive Substances Act. I suggest that the Minister takes the measure away and reconsiders it in those terms.
Policing and Crime Bill
Wednesday 9th November 2016
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 55-IV Fourth marshalled list for Committee (PDF, 263KB) - (7 Nov 2016)
“and for this purpose the conditions of the licence are modified if any of them is altered or omitted or any new condition is added.”
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)
My Lords, these amendments relate to alcohol licensing. In particular, they introduce two new provisions into the Bill which reform the late-night levy and place cumulative impact policies on a statutory footing.
Amendments 209D and 214D relate to the late night levy, which was introduced in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 and under which licensing authorities are able to charge a levy to those who are licensed to sell alcohol late at night in their areas, as a means of raising a contribution towards the costs of policing the late-night economy. The licensed trade plays an important part in our economy, and the Government’s Modern Crime Prevention Strategy makes it clear that we want to create a night-time economy that people may enjoy safely, without the fear of becoming a victim of crime; that in turn will help businesses to thrive. It is right that businesses which benefit from the late-night economy should pay towards its management when it is creating an additional burden on policing in that area. However, to date, only seven licensing authorities have implemented a late-night levy; that is fewer than anticipated when the levy was introduced in 2012.
Licensing authorities, the police and the licensed trade feel that the levy in its current form is inflexible. Currently, licensing authorities must apply the levy to the whole licensing authority area, and businesses which are not in night-time economy areas feel they are being unfairly charged. These amendments will allow licensing authorities to specify the geographical area, or several separate areas, where they will charge a levy because the night-time economy places a burden on policing, and they will be able to decide whether to include premises licensed to sell late-night refreshment in their levy. The provision of late-night refreshment is defined in the Licensing Act 2003 as hot food and drink sold to the public between 11 pm and 5 am. Such premises are often linked to alcohol-fuelled crime and disorder; for example, fast-food shops are often premises at which late-night drinkers congregate.
PCCs have told us that they would like a formal role in relation to the levy, and we think this is appropriate as 70% of the revenue raised must go to them. The amendment will allow a PCC to request that a licensing authority formally propose a levy, thereby triggering a consultation on whether to implement one in its area. It will need to set out its reasons for doing so with reference to the cost of policing incurred as a result of the night-time economy.
Finally, Amendment 214D requires licensing authorities to publish information about how the revenue raised from the levy is spent. Some licensing authorities do this already, but one of the key concerns of the licensed trade is that there is a lack of transparency about this.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, I welcome the Minister to her place and thank her for the manner in which she introduced the amendments. I rise to raise the concerns of the committee to which my noble friend referred—the ad hoc post-legislative scrutiny committee on the Licensing Act 2003.
I am still relatively new to your Lordships’ House and finding my way around its rules and procedures, and my question is simple: is it normal procedure for the House to constitute, in this case, an ad hoc post-legislative scrutiny committee of 12 very keen noble Lords for an Act passed over 12 years ago? They are performing their duty with great vigour and energy, and—apart from me—with a notable degree of expertise, which I am benefiting from hugely. I also place on the record how well served we are by the clerk and his team in our work in this regard.
Bearing in mind that the committee was constituted only in June, we began our work then with a view to conducting post-legislative scrutiny of the 2003 Act and to reporting within quite a challenging timeframe of some nine months. For clarification, why have the Government, as the Executive, undertaken a separate exercise of their own at this stage to review in the Bill the operation of some items with a view to revising them—in this case, the alcohol-related provisions of the 2003 Act? It is clearly a source of some concern to its members that the ad hoc committee has not had a chance to hear all the evidence, or to reach any conclusions on the recommendations that it would wish to report to the House in due course in March.
I do not intend to take up time this afternoon looking at the merits of the arguments that the Minister has rehearsed but I would like to ask a question on the consultation, as a number of concerns have been raised about Home Office consultations and the evidence that we have heard. Can the Minister explain how wide the consultation has been on the provisions in this little group of amendments and how many responses have been received? Is it possible for the House, and indeed the committee, to have access to those responses? At this stage, I would like to focus more on the procedures and processes being followed rather than the merits, with which we are occupying ourselves on a weekly basis between now and the end of March.
I would like to go further than the Minister has said in the letter that I received, and which was brought to the attention of the committee at 9 am today. In my noble friend’s words, the Government will take into consideration the recommendations and conclusions of the committee in due course, and they and the Home Office will consider carefully what additional changes, if any, should be made to the Act and through connected legislation. Perhaps I may press the Minister this afternoon. I would like to obtain a commitment from my noble friend not to implement any of what will become the Policing and Crime Act before the committee has reported to the House—and therefore not before the end of March. That commitment would be welcome and it would be a matter for the House to take note of. I am sure it is one on which the Government would wish to be held accountable.
I repeat that we are in the middle of what we take to be very important work. An important task has been set for us by the House to scrutinise the provisions of the 2003 Act. We are still receiving evidence and have not yet reached a position on which we will form a view. This is also the first occasion I have sat on such a committee, let alone had the honour and privilege to chair one, so I would like to be clear whether this is the normal procedure for a Government to follow in these circumstances.
I also alert the Government to the fact that while we do not wish to quote any of the evidence—it is there as a matter of record on the committee’s website—it is true that some of the evidence we have received, both written and oral, conflicts with the position that the Government have set out to the Committee this afternoon. I would certainly welcome a concession from the Minister that it would be sensible to wait until such time as the committee has had the chance to hear and consider all the oral and written evidence received, and that we will be able in due course to reach our conclusions and recommendations—and that only then will the Government, if necessary, proceed to implement this policy. A commitment from the Minister that the Government will keep an open mind and revise the policy as set out in these amendments would be most welcome.
Baroness Henig (Lab)
I rise to support the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, and to put on record how excellently she is chairing this committee. I am possibly one of the “keen” members of this body, as she put it to the Committee. We are reviewing the Licensing Act and looking at a whole range of issues; clearly, it is not just the issues in this set of amendments. We are looking at how the whole Act has operated in the 11 or 12 years since it was brought in. Members of this House will remember the high hopes that people had of this Act and the things that were said about it. It is therefore obviously timely that the Act should be reviewed, which is what the members of the committee are presently engaged in.
As the noble Baroness said, the committee has taken a lot of evidence, written and oral, covering among other things the slow introduction of late-night levies, which the Minister mentioned, and the effect of cumulative impact assessment. I say to the Minister that not much of the evidence we have presently accumulated in fact supports what the Government are putting forward in these amendments. I find it rather unsettling that we are engaged in this exercise on behalf of the House of Lords and then the Government suddenly come forward with amendments which cut across the review. It has rather unsettled the committee because it introduces elements that we did not realise were ongoing.
The Minister said that there was evidence supporting these changes. I do not want to go into detail at this stage or to quote selectively, which could be misleading at this stage and could give a partial view of the issues at stake. It is right that the committee should be allowed to conclude its review, come to a considered decision and present its report and proposals for change—if any—to the Government. All that should happen before any of these changes are brought forward. I listened with great care to what the Minister said and appreciate that she said that these changes would not be brought in before we made our recommendations. However, I hope that this is not just the Government going through the motions of letting the committee do its work and then coming forward with the amendments that they have set their heart on anyway. I hope that the Government will look carefully at what we propose—perhaps even to the extent of modifying their approach if the evidence justifies it.
The evidence in these cases should be paramount. It might well suggest that these amendments will not achieve their objective. In fact, I would go so far as to suggest that that may well be the case. It might suggest that, despite the Government’s impatience to get on with these matters, what they are doing may not be as effective as some other way of proceeding. That surely is the job we have been asked to do—and which I hope we will in fact carry out. So my hope is that our review will help the Government in the longer term. That is what we are trying to do. In a way, by coming forward with these amendments the Government are pre-empting our efforts to get a good outcome from the review of the Act. That is why I seriously hope that the Government will not just stay these amendments but listen carefully to what the review comes forward with, before deciding how to move forward.
Baroness Grender (LD)
My Lords, I, too, back the words of our able chair on this Select Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering. I support what she has said and I note from the letter which we, as members of the committee, received only at 9 am today that the Leader of the House said:
“I am, however, pleased to hear that members of the committee are likely to be bringing their live insights into the policy to bear when the amendments are considered”—
so I would hate to let her down. I would therefore like to address in particular the issue of the late-night levy, which, as the Minister said, was introduced in 2011 and has had only seven local authorities take it up—seven, out of all the possibilities. There must be a reason for that. Of all of those, I shall examine Cheltenham, where the council withdrew the late-night levy. It did so because it raised less than 39% of the projected first-year income of £199,000.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I had assumed when I saw these amendments that there must be quite a degree of urgency to the matter, given that they were being introduced at quite a late stage in the Bill. I had not appreciated that the House had set up a Select Committee to look at the issue. I can well understand that a lot of points will have been raised. I remember the debates about the 70:30 split. I remember debates about whether that was the correct split: whether it should be 50:50 between the police and the local authority or indeed 70:30 in favour of the local authority. I am pretty certain that I moved some of those amendments.
The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, is being mild in her request to the Government not to implement these changes before the committee reports. Any amendments must pre-empt the committee’s decisions. Given the degree of confusion to which my noble friend referred and which I well accept, to have further changes to the regime on the statute book but not commenced cannot make the matter any easier for any of those involved. The proper approach would be for the Government not at this stage to proceed with the amendments unless there is a degree of considerable urgency—and I have not picked up that that is the case.
Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe (Lab)
My Lords, briefly, I am also one of the members of the Select Committee under the great guidance and wisdom of our chairman. I share the views that have been expressed and I shall not repeat them. Why was this particular area selected from the document on modernising the police? Why have a host of other amendments not been tabled to pick up the other recommendations that the police want to see implemented? There is almost enough here for a package rather than picking out individual bits. Why were other recommendations not acted on?
Lord Rosser (Lab)
The issue of the cumulative impact assessments was one that we pursued when the matter was discussed in the Commons. It is for the Government to say why they brought the amendments forward now. But, unless I am misreading the position, at least some of these amendments have some support. Unless I have misread the briefing from the Local Government Association, it supports Amendment 209C, which seeks to ensure that licensing authorities give regard to cumulative impact assessments, and Amendment 209D on late-night levy requirements.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this short debate. First, to answer my noble friend Lady McIntosh on whether there was any public consultation, in the summer of 2015 the Home Office held workshops with key partners. One workshop included the Local Government Association, the Institute of Licensing, licensing officers from several local authorities and representatives of the national policing lead on alcohol and the PCC lead on alcohol. The second workshop included industry partners such as the British Beer and Pub Association, the Association of Convenience Stores, the Wine and Spirit Trade Association and the Association of Licensed Multiple Retailers. A survey was sent to all licensing authorities. The Home Office received 32 responses, including one from the PCC working group on alcohol. There is no trade body that represents late-night refreshment providers.
We have heard today from many members of the committee. All I can do is reiterate what I said in my speech: we shall of course look carefully at the findings of the committee before coming to any final conclusions and before implementing the provisions. We will wait for the Select Committee’s report next March. As I said, these reforms were announced in the Government’s Modern Crime Prevention Strategy that was published this March, some two months before the Select Committee was established. The Government are keen to take the opportunity afforded by the Bill to legislate on these matters so that they can be enacted as soon as possible. But that does not change the fact that we shall wait for the findings of the Select Committee.
The 70:30 split was mentioned. This can be amended by secondary legislation, so there is no need to make provision in the Bill. As I have said, we will consider any recommendation the Select Committee may make on this issue.
The Government believe it is right to proceed with these amendments now, as alcohol provisions were included in the Bill on its introduction to the Commons in February—so this is an appropriate vehicle to legislate on the new measures. As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said, the Opposition tabled amendments on cumulative impact policies in the Commons and these government amendments respond, in part, to those Commons amendments.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering
I am most grateful to the Minister for her reply, but can I just press her on the semantics? Could she give the House and the committee a commitment that the Government will look at our recommendations and consider revising the wording of the amendments that she has put before the Committee today if they conflict with the recommendations and conclusions that the committee reaches?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I cannot go further than I already have in saying that we will of course look very carefully at the findings of the committee before coming to any final conclusions. That is as far as I can go. Everything else is rather hypothetical at the moment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, perhaps the noble Baroness can assist this Committee with the timing. I imagine that the Select Committee will probably be required to report in February, but this Bill is likely to have concluded its passage before then. As a result, I am unclear how recommendations from the committee can affect the content of the Bill, but she may have information about the relative timings that could help this Committee.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
We will not pre-empt what the committee is going to say, so we have to wait until we hear from it.
Baroness Grender
The Minister has said we cannot deal in hypotheticals, and yet we are about to accept some amendments which may well, in the light of the conclusions of our committee, be hypothetical. It seems to me that the most sensible solution is to not currently have amendments in this area, because those very amendments may be hypothetical.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I think I explained that the reason we proceeded with the amendments was because the alcohol provisions were included in the Bill on the Commons introduction in February, so this is an appropriate vehicle to legislate on the new measures. That is why we have brought them forward now. This was discussed in the Commons, and these government amendments respond, in part, to the ones that were tabled in the Commons.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering
Can my noble friend confirm that these amendments were not discussed in the Commons? I do not believe that their content was discussed. Just for the sake of greater clarity, all we are asking is that these amendments be stayed until such time as we have concluded our report. In the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, we are trying to help the Government. We want to have good laws and legislation that works, but clearly, at the moment, late night levies appear not to be working.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
We want good legislation as well of course and, as I think I said, we will look carefully at the findings of the committee before coming to any final conclusions. I think that is really as far as I can go.
“Cumulative impact assessments
(1) The Licensing Act 2003 is amended as follows.(2) In section 5 (statement of licensing policy), after subsection (6C) insert—“(6D) In determining or revising its policy, a licensing authority must have regard to any cumulative impact assessments published by it under section 5A.(6E) A licensing statement must—(a) summarise any cumulative impact assessments published by the licensing authority under section 5A, and(b) explain how the licensing authority has discharged its duty under subsection (6D).”(3) After section 5 of the Licensing Act 2003 (statement of licensing policy) insert—“5A Cumulative impact assessments(1) A licensing authority may publish a document (“a cumulative impact assessment”) stating that the licensing authority considers that the number of relevant authorisations in respect of premises in one or more parts of its area described in the assessment is such that it is likely that it would be inconsistent with the authority’s duty under section 4(1) to grant any further relevant authorisations in respect of premises in that part or those parts.(2) A cumulative impact assessment must set out the evidence for the authority’s opinion as set out in the assessment in accordance with subsection (1).(3) For the purposes of this section, “relevant authorisations” means—(a) premises licences;(b) club premises certificates.(4) A cumulative impact assessment may relate to all relevant authorisations or only to relevant authorisations of a kind described in the assessment.(5) Before publishing a cumulative impact assessment, the licensing authority must consult the persons mentioned in section 5(3).(6) For the purposes of the consultation, the licensing authority must provide the persons mentioned in section 5(3) with the following information—(a) the reasons why it is considering publishing a cumulative impact assessment;(b) a general indication of the part or parts of its area which it is considering describing in the assessment;(c) whether it considers that the assessment will relate to all relevant authorisations or only to relevant authorisations of a particular kind.(7) Where a licensing authority publishes a cumulative impact assessment, it must, before the end of each relevant period, consider whether it remains of the opinion stated in the assessment.(8) Before deciding whether it remains of that opinion, the licensing authority must consult the persons mentioned in section 5(3).(9) If the licensing authority is no longer of that opinion—(a) it must publish a statement to that effect, and (b) the duties in section 5(6D) and (6E) and subsection (7) of this section cease to apply in relation to the assessment.(10) If the licensing authority remains of that opinion, it must revise the cumulative impact assessment so that it—(a) includes a statement to that effect, and(b) sets out the evidence as to why the authority remains of that opinion.(11) A licensing authority must publish any revision of a cumulative impact assessment.(12) In subsection (7), “relevant period” means the period of three years beginning with the publication of the cumulative impact assessment or a revision of the cumulative impact assessment.””
“Late night levy requirements
(1) Section 125 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (late night levy requirement) is amended as follows.(2) For subsections (1) and (2) substitute—“(1) In this Chapter, “a late night levy requirement” means a requirement to pay a late night levy in accordance with this Chapter.(2) A licensing authority may decide that a late night levy requirement is to apply in its area or in a part of its area in respect of—(a) relevant late night alcohol authorisations relating to premises in the area or the part, or(b) relevant late night alcohol authorisations and relevant late night refreshment authorisations relating to premises in the area or the part.(2A) Accordingly, references in this Chapter to a late night authorisation to which a late night levy requirement relates are references to any relevant late night alcohol authorisation or relevant late night refreshment authorisation in respect of which the late night levy requirement applies.(2B) A licensing authority may decide under subsection (2) that different late night levy requirements are to apply in different parts of its area.”(3) In subsection (3)(a), after “supply of alcohol” insert “or late night refreshment”.(4) Omit subsection (4).(5) Schedule (Late night levy requirements) makes further amendments of Chapter 2 of Part 2 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (late night levy).”
Baroness Deech
“General duties of licensing authorities
(1) Section 4 of the Licensing Act 2003 (general duties of licensing authorities) is amended as follows.(2) After subsection (2)(d) insert—“(e) compliance with the provisions of the Equality Act 2010.””
Baroness Deech (CB)
Amendment 210 is in my name and the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Thomas, Lady Pitkeathley and Lady Campbell—all former members of the Lords Select Committee on equality and disability, which reported in March this year. The report found many areas of transport, employment, education, communication and law enforcement failing in their impact on disabled people. We made recommendations that were carefully crafted to be cost neutral, or very inexpensive, and that would ensure a fair deal for the growing number of disabled people. Very few of our recommendations involved changing the law, but this is one of them. It is a simple, economic and transformative amendment, central to our recommendations, which would go a long way to adjusting our living environment to the needs of disabled and elderly people.
Licensing authorities have a duty, under Section 4 of the Licensing Act 2003, to promote, in their duties of inspection and licensing,
“the prevention of crime and disorder … public safety … the prevention of public nuisance; and … the protection of children from harm”.
Amendment 210 would add a fifth enforceable duty, namely compliance with the Equality Act. In taking evidence from disabled people and those involved with them, the Select Committee uncovered a weakness in enforcing existing duties, and at the same time found a way to improve life for disabled people and all of us as we get older. In their response to our report, the Government said that since the Equality Act already applied to businesses and employers, no more was needed, and that they were holding discussions with the hospitality industry to promote increased accessibility for disabled people. It is true that equality law applies across the board, but the issue is enforcement where equality is being denied. Sadly, it is clear that mere guidance and good will do not do the trick.
With this amendment, licensing authorities could require, for example, old and existing buildings to be made accessible. When they are out inspecting and find disabled facilities not being provided as they should be, they could review the licence. They could issue a warning or, in the last resort, remove a licence from an entertainment premises that refused customers because of their disability—or indeed sexuality or race—or charged extra to disabled visitors. At the moment, the licensing authority can only remind owners of premises of their duties under the Equality Act, and they have no teeth. Where the situation is not remedied, this amendment would shift the enforcement burden away from the individual disabled person or the person discriminated against—who, under existing law, have to take legal action on their own—to the local authority. It is self-financing. The functioning of this amendment would not depend on taxpayers’ money.
This extra condition in the Licensing Act would give local authorities in every sphere the power to say, “We are not going to licence you unless we see the premises are fit, or as fit as they can be, for disabled persons’ use”. The Select Committee learned that the National Association of Licensing and Enforcement officers would support this. Businesses that already comply would have nothing to fear from it. Indeed, some already behave as we would all wish. For example, Newham Council denied planning permission unless all new stations in Newham were step-free. By way of contrast, the committee heard evidence that new shared spaces and pedestrianised shopping areas were designed sometimes without regard to accessibility by disabled people. It is no answer to say, as Ministers tend to, that guidance to the authorities is all that is required. Guidance is no substitute for enforceability.
The United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities carried out an inquiry into the condition of the UK’s disability programmes and reported on 6 October. The United Nations committee condemned the lack of cumulative assessments of the impact of cuts and other recent policies affecting disabled persons. It called on the UK to ensure that in the implementation of legislation, policies and programmes, special attention is paid to the most vulnerable disabled people and it requires the UK to report back on the steps taken to comply with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. That report is not out of date, it is bang up to date. Amendment 210 would not only go a long way to achieving the aims of the Lords Select Committee but would assist the Government in making a decent response to the United Nations committee and avoiding international opprobrium. I beg to move.
Baroness Thomas of Winchester (LD)
My Lords, my name is also on Amendment 210 which, as the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, has said, is one of the recommendations of our committee. I am particularly speaking about how the amendment would apply to existing, rather than new, premises. Before I go any further, I should say something about the Select Committee on the Licensing Act. I do understand what is being said but my mind goes back to the words of a pop song of the 1960s:
“Catch a falling star and put it in your pocket
Save it for a rainy day”.
This might be, “Catch a passing Bill and put it in your pocket”. That is an important point: maybe some Members do not quite appreciate how difficult it is to get Bills into the legislative programme.
The vague terms used by the then Secretary of State for Education and Minister for Women and Equalities in her evidence to the committee about spreading good practice rather than legislating in this area simply will not do, as it does not work. The licensing solicitor at Sheffield Council, Marie-Claire Frankie, was clear when she gave evidence to our committee:
“What could strengthen the licensing authority and give them the ability to enforce it is to make a fifth objective related to equality”.
She said specifically that a friendly word in somebody’s ear at the premises, even if followed up by a letter from the local authority, just did not work. She went on:
“For old and existing premises that transferred over before the Licensing Act, there is not anything that we can go back and revoke licences on or anything that we can add conditions on. Because of the licensing objectives, there is no way of getting it before a committee because they are not breaching crime and disorder; they are not committing public nuisance; they are not publicly unsafe; and they are not endangering children. If there was an additional objective relating to equality, there would be a mechanism to get it before a committee, to enable the local authority and the licensing authority to do something”.
We are talking only about reasonable adjustments, not a mandatory lift, say, if a small club, restaurant, pub or other entertainment venue is entirely upstairs. No one wants premises closed down, but what those of us who are disabled want is as much accessibility as possible, and we do not want to have to go to court to get such access. I hope the Government will accept the amendment.
Baroness Campbell of Surbiton (CB)
My Lords, I am also very pleased to add my name to Amendment 210 in the name of my noble friend Lady Deech, who I must say not only ably chaired the Select Committee on how disabled people are faring under the Equality Act but has become a passionate leader for access.
There is a recurring theme in responses to calls for statutory enforcement of disabled people’s access rights, which is that guidance and awareness is much better. This is clearly exemplified in the recent rejection of my amendment to the Bus Services Bill and the lacklustre response to the Select Committee’s report on how disabled people are doing under the Equality Act, as my noble friend Lady Deech has powerfully said. If guidance works so well, why, 21 years after the passing of disability discrimination legislation, are disabled people still denied access to so many pubs, clubs, restaurants and entertainment venues because they are inaccessible? Is it because we cannot enjoy ourselves? I do not think so. I believe there are two major reasons.
First, many service providers who operate from licensed premises are either unaware of their duties under the Equality Act or think they can ignore them with impunity—from the local publican to the London club owner. To most, it is a remote piece of legislation, and only a few understand its relevance. It does not touch the general day-to-day running of the business, so little thought is given to disabled people’s access needs unless these are brought to their attention, usually by a very frustrated and angry disabled person who cannot get in. However, if their licence to trade from those premises was in jeopardy of being withdrawn on the grounds of inaccessibility, the importance of the duty would be so much clearer and change would happen.
Secondly, disabled people, as has been said already, have borne the sole burden of enforcing their rights to social inclusion for years. These are the people least likely to have the resources to challenge a barrier-ridden society, especially when access to justice has become so difficult. So, venues and facilities are likely to remain inaccessible. Our Select Committee received a lot of evidence from witnesses illustrating this. In fact, while waiting to speak today I have received 21 tweets from disabled people telling me of pubs, restaurants and facilities in their area that they cannot get into— 21 tweets in just over an hour.
The Government need to back a more proactive enforcement stance. Compliance with the Equality Act should be added to the objectives of the Licensing Act to ensure that it is followed. When the Select Committee visited a local centre for independent living in Tower Hamlets, I was struck by the similarities of people’s experiences and frustrations with my own 25 years ago, when I was actively campaigning for the Disability Discrimination Act. They told me about the general reluctance to make reasonable adjustments, and the excuses are the same now as they were then: “no money”, “burden on business”, “more advice and guidance needed”. You name it, disabled people have heard it, year on year. Two weeks ago I was having a similar exchange with the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, over my amendment to require accessibility policies as a condition of granting a bus operator’s licence. Today is Groundhog Day, this time over empowering local authorities to withdraw a licence to trade or impose conditions if the Equality Act is ignored. This would not add duties—they are already in place—but it would help to enforce them. What is offered? More guidance. The status quo prevails.
No wonder disabled people are worn down and cynical. No wonder the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities believes the Government are failing in their duty to progress disability equality. This is not my idea of “a society that works for everyone”. I really hope the Government will break the mould today and seriously consider Amendment 210.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 214A, which I believe is in the same group. I had rather assumed that the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, was going to speak to his amendment, and I am quite happy to wait and let him do so now, as he is in the Chamber.
Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe (Lab)
My Lords, that is very kind of the noble Lord; I apologise for not being in my place. I shall speak to my Amendment 211. In doing so, I declare my interest as a patron of the British Liver Trust and several other charities related to health issues that arise from alcohol abuse. In particular, as I said earlier, I declare my membership of the House’s Select Committee on the Licensing Act 2003. One of the questions that we have posed in our call for evidence is:
“Are the existing four licensing objectives the right ones for licensing authorities to promote? Should the protection of health and wellbeing be an additional objective?”.
We have received a lot of evidence on this and continue to do so in the oral hearings that we are currently running, and I do not want to trespass much on the committee’s continuing review.
I know it could be argued in light of what happened in the debate relating to the previous amendments that maybe this should be left until the committee’s deliberations come out. Alternatively, the Government might argue that as Scotland already has a fifth objective relating to health and well-being, we might wait and see what develops with the Scottish position. However, given that I have seen the Government decide that they can put an amendment through and then stay their hand until such time as they receive the report from us, I think I am perfectly in order to move this amendment today and, I hope, persuade them that there is a case for it to be adopted. Maybe then we could wait until spring to see what comes out of the Select Committee’s review; and if the recommendation in its report is in accord with what I am putting before the House we could then implement it.
There are more pressing reasons why this needs addressing, even more than the earlier amendment about the conduct of affairs relating to alcohol at night. First, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, enumerated this morning a range of the problems that we continue to have with alcohol. However, the second and more pressing issue is that the topic on which this amendment has been brought forward is not a new one; I brought forward a Private Member’s Bill on it about two years ago, supported by the Local Government Association. We can go back quite some time to 2010, when the then Government were looking at the difficulties that had arisen then. They had recognised a problem with the 2003 Act. They then consulted on the addition of a specific prevention of health harm objective in the 2010 Rebalancing the Licensing Act consultation. Some 38% of the respondents were supportive, 37%—primarily the drinks industry—were against, and 25% were neutral. The Government decided not to legislate at the time but did not really explain why. They simply stated that they saw,
“merit in the proposal to make the prevention of health harm a material consideration in the Licensing Act 2003. We … will consider the best way to do so in the future”.
So we have been at this now since around 2010.
The reason why this is now becoming more imperative is that as time has gone by, while I concede that in many respects we are getting evidence that the 2003 Act has worked quite well in certain areas—we have seen less alcohol being drunk than was the case in 2003, though whether that is related directly to the Act is questionable, and there are fewer violent incidents and less crime associated with alcohol than perhaps was the case originally—on the other side of the coin we have seen a dramatic increase in the deleterious effects of alcohol on the health of the nation. We saw about 400,000 people being admitted to hospital in 2003 with health difficulties related to alcohol but the figure is now in the order of 1.2 million and is getting worse. The charity I am associated with, the British Liver Trust, is seeing an increasing number of people dying from liver disease, mostly associated with alcohol consumption and abuse, with increasingly a number of younger people being affected in that way. We now have 9 million adults drinking at levels that increase the risk of harm to their health, while 1.6 million adults show signs of full alcohol dependency. Alcohol is now the third biggest risk factor for illness and death.
I am speaking entirely personally here, not representing anything of the Select Committee’s view, but I believe that in many respects the 2003 Act is now out of date. It was designed in 2003 primarily to deal with the on trade, relating to pubs, clubs and fixed premises, where people in the 1990s and at the turn of the century drank. However, we have seen a complete shift over the last 10 or 12 years in the growth of the number of licences being granted—almost like confetti, in my view—to supermarkets, mini markets, small shops and even petrol stations. Almost everywhere you go now, you will find alcohol on sale. In a sense, alcohol has become an ordinary commodity. In supermarkets it is being sold no differently from soap powder or a tin of beans. It has become normalised in our community and has changed the culture. This needs to be examined to see whether it is moving in the right direction, in the same way as I argued earlier when noble Lords proceeded to pass the legislation regarding “will do” on introducing powdered alcohol into the community. Anything goes, we move towards liberalisation, and it gets worse in health terms.
In my opinion, the 2003 Act does not adequately deal with what is happening on the off side of the licensing trade. We now see big developments taking place online that were never envisaged when this legislation was laid before us. Amazon has a most amazing array of products. Noble Lords who like drinking a lot and cheaply should go on Amazon and see just what is on offer to them. It can be delivered in hours on any day of the week, any week of the year. It is available very cheaply right through the year. Before long, no doubt, we will have Uber doing similar deliveries as quickly as possible. In no way is that touched by the Licensing Act; it is a different world entirely.
People will argue that you cannot do anything with the existing Licensing Act because it relates solely to premises—“What does that have to do with health?”, “How do you prove it is damaging health?”, and so on. In my view, there are changes ahead. Most of the major supermarkets, apart I think from Morrisons, have plans to increase the number of convenience or metro mini markets around the country, moving away from big premises to smaller ones. They have plans to extend these around the country and I am certain, sure as night follows day, that they will all have a licence to sell alcohol. If we go in there and queue to pay at the till, we will find that alcohol is piled up to the ceiling all around us, not just in our full view but in the view of children. This is changing an attitude generally so that the commodity of alcohol is normalised and just becomes part of our way of life, but it is damaging health and we are doing nothing about it.
There is an opportunity, I believe, if we are prepared to consider what I am putting before us, to explore ways in which we could at least start to pull it back a little bit. That does not mean to say that we stop issuing licences, but we should attach conditions to those licences that would stop alcohol being sold at the front of the supermarket in everybody’s face. Asda managers have tried to do it voluntarily, but when they saw that their competitors were not doing it, they said, “Well, why the hell should we bother?”, and they went back to putting it at the front. The voluntary approach is not working.
We now have demands from the police, from the police commissioners, from the health authorities, from the BMA and from almost anybody you can mention who has an interest in the health side that a change is needed. It should not be attached solely to the way in which we have run the Act up to now based on the premise that we should look to do something on a cumulative basis. If there are far too many people selling alcohol in a particular area, there should not be further licences; or if further licences are given, there should be more stringent conditions that would be related to the changes in the health of the area affected. They are doing it in Scotland and they are making progress; it is high time that the UK should do the same.
Sarah Wollaston, the chair of the Health Select Committee in the Commons, is in full agreement on this, and wanted to table amendments herself for this change, so there is some good support in the Commons for it. If the wording is wrong, I offer the Minister my willingness to talk about a change in the wording to a form that would be more acceptable. If the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, is responding, I make a further suggestion, particularly because she comes from Manchester. That city will be the first test-bed area, where it will not only be responsible for health and care and well-being but have total control over its funding. I suggest we consider whether, in conjunction with Manchester, we might run an experiment in the north-west to see what we can do. Manchester would be up for it, and all the responsible bodies would welcome it. Accordingly, I would be happy to consider drafting an amendment to the Bill. We could then review the provision after, perhaps, two years.
I am open to a conversation on this, but we must do something. We cannot just leave it as it is, making all the excuses under the sun, saying that it is too difficult, and listening to the drinks industry—which, understandably, says, “We can’t do it; we shouldn’t do it; we don’t want to go near it”. For the sake of the health of the nation, and for the sake of the harmed, cash-strapped National Health Service, which has great problems ahead of it, alcohol is one of the major problems that we have to tackle. We should do it forthwith, without delay.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
My Lords, during the Second World War, Archbishop William Temple once said:
“Whenever I travel on the underground I always intend to buy a ticket, but the fact that there is a ticket collector at the other end just clinches it”.
The reason why I strongly support Amendment 210, moved so powerfully already, is that it just clinches something that ought not to need an amendment of that kind. What it clinches is the need for licensing authorities to perform their duty by complying with the terms of the Equality Act 2010.
The noble Baroness, Lady Howe of Idlicote, when she was deputy chair of the Equal Opportunities Commission, and the noble Lord, Lord Low, with regard to the Disability Rights Commission, will both remember how those two commissions carried out strategic law enforcement functions effectively. The problem at present is that the Equality and Human Rights Commission, which has far too broad a mandate, especially in terms of human rights—it lacks needed resources and having priorities determined—is not carrying out the kind of duty in the way that was done by the previous equality bodies. It is not giving effective, strategic law enforcement. Therefore, there is no use relying on the admirable Equality Act 2010 by itself if it is not going to be translated into practical action.
Lord Wigley (PC)
My Lords, I apologise that I have not been able to take part in earlier discussions on this Bill. When you are a member of a party with one representative here, it is a little difficult at times. I am very keen to support Amendment 210, which relates to a matter very close to my heart. I declare my interest as a vice-president of Mencap.
In 1981, I was fortunate enough to introduce legislation—there are some Members in the Chamber now who were in the other place at that time—that became the Disabled Persons Act 1981. That provided for access to places for disabled people—buildings, places of entertainment, et cetera—that required a provision to be made. However, as the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, has said, the trouble is that there is no comeback. There were not enough teeth in that Act and there have not been enough teeth in successive pieces of legislation over the 35 years that have gone on since then. There needs to be the sort of provision built in here to ensure that what is agreed as public policy actually does take place. I press the Minister to seriously consider accepting this or bringing in equal provisions to ensure that this happens.
Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe
My Lords, I now speak to Amendment 212, which is on placing child protection as a statutory consultee for statements of licencing policy. The background is that, if we come back to the Licensing Act 2003, this is a modest attempt to add another objective. We have the protection of children from harm as one of the existing four.
Despite the existence of this objective, and the fact that Section 13(4)(f) of the Act recognises child protection as the body responsible for this objective, Section 5(3) does not include child protection as a statutory consultee in respect of statements of licensing policies—SLPs, as we know them. Every local authority is required to produce SLPs outlining how it aims to uphold the licensing objectives in its specific area. SLPs are important local documents and should be taken into account in all licensing decisions. As such, they are important in the way in which child protection issues relate to licensing, and should be highlighted and acted upon.
Under the present arrangements, statutory consultees are,
“(a) the chief officer of police for the licensing authority’s area, (b) the fire and rescue authority for that area, (c) such persons as the licensing authority considers to be representative of holders of premises licences issued by the authority, (d) such persons as the licensing authority considers to be representative holders of club premises certificates issued by that authority, (e) such persons as the licensing authority considers to be representative of holders of personal licences issued by that authority, and (f) such other persons as the licensing authority considers to be representative of businesses and residents in its area”.
The fact that no child protection body is included in that list of statutory consultees is a clear legislative gap, one that could easily be closed by this modest amendment. The greatly increased focus on safeguarding within licensing as a result of the Rotherham child sexual exploitation case suggests that there is now a pressing need for this.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, this is a fascinating group of amendments, full of variety and suggestions of all kinds to the Minister. My amendment is no different: it adds yet another suggestion to her, which I am sure she will consider carefully.
I speak to Amendment 214A. The primary measurable success of reforms such as the Live Music Act 2012 and entertainment deregulation is that they have reduced costs and complexity for small-scale events, as well as tidying up primary legislation and how it interacts with guidance. I hope it is common ground that that is welcome.
However, despite these positive changes, the 2% dip in the music industry’s overall GVA performance in 2015, as reported in UK Music’s annual Measuring Music report, is attributable to a decline in concert revenue from grass-roots music venues. They provide an important mechanism for talent development and a means for artists to cultivate skills and access audiences. There are myriad examples of major stars who have had their beginnings in such grass-roots venues.
In 2015, there were 5.6 million visits to UK small venues, generating £231 million in spend in the process. More widely, the number of operating grass-roots music venues has declined by 35% in the past decade in London. However, the problem is not unique to the capital, with venues in Birmingham, Manchester, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Bristol, Plymouth, Newport and Swindon—to mention just a few—having either closed or had considerable threats of closure placed on their businesses in recent years.
Although not the sole cause of venue closures, restrictive licensing laws are often cited as a contributing factor. The existing licensing objectives under Section 4(2) of the Licensing Act 2003 reinforce perceptions that entertainment regulated under the Act is something to be controlled rather than enabled. The Act does nothing specifically to encourage cultural participation and enjoyment, for instance. This is a missed opportunity, given the importance of the Act in making events and activities happen. The lack of a positive licensing objective to support provision for entertainment can maintain prejudices between licensing authorities and licensees about their respective motivations. This is unhelpful in creating a licensing environment that works for live music. It is time for a change of approach.
As the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, and my noble friend Lady Grender reminded us, the House of Lords is currently conducting a post-legislative scrutiny inquiry into the operation of the Licensing Act 2003. UK Music, the umbrella body for the commercial music industry, argued during the inquiry that consideration should be given to the introduction of a new licensing objective,
“the promotion of cultural activity and inclusion”.
This would sit alongside the other licensing objectives and assist local authorities when discharging their functions.
The amendment would introduce a fifth licensing objective to address,
“the promotion of cultural activity and inclusion”.
It would sit alongside existing objectives and assist licensing authorities when discharging functions. Simple licensing conditions can lead to additional cost to the venue and result in less profit per event. Less profit means that a venue’s ability to attract quality acts will be reduced, and therefore fewer events will take place.
Research conducted by the Music Venue Trust, reported by the Mayor of London’s music venues task force, demonstrated that one London venue had more than 70 separate conditions on its licence. Another had its capacity set at the same level as before the smoking ban, despite the risk of fire now being reduced. We have been made aware that conditions related to music are still featuring on some small venue licences, despite the fact that they should be benefiting from the recent entertainment exemptions. There is clearly an argument to be had about the extent to which the spirit of the law and the decisions made by Parliament to deregulate are filtering down to licensing authorities.
Fundamentally,
“the promotion of cultural activity and inclusion”,
is necessary, as licensing authorities rely on the existing objectives, which are also supported by other pieces of legislation, when assessing complaints and applications. Despite music’s social, cultural and economic benefits, the Licensing Act’s existing objectives specifically make regulation of live music for larger venues a public order issue associated with nuisance, crime and disorder, public safety and protection from harm. That failure to have a licence for music could lead to criminal sanctions and penalties, such as large fines or terms of imprisonment, can reinforce negative perceptions in licensing authorities.
It is of course right that current licensing objectives relating to public safety, protecting children from harm, and the prevention of crime and disorder and public nuisance are given full consideration, but without a positive objective when responding to applications or complaints relating to entertainment, licensing authorities are not encouraged to acknowledge the economic, cultural and social benefits of these activities to local communities.
The recent revocation of iconic London nightclub Fabric’s premises licence has been well documented, with more than 150,000 people signing a petition seeking the intervention of the Mayor of London. I would not want to speculate that a fifth licensing objective along the lines for which I am arguing would have resulted in a different outcome in this instance, but I am certain that if it was in place, Islington Council would have had to be more mindful of the strength of feeling about Fabric and justify its decision in terms of the venue’s impact on public enjoyment as well.
Other countries and cities across the world are also looking at what they can do to preserve their venues by positive action. Put simply, a new licensing objective for,
“the promotion of cultural activity and inclusion”,
would not open the floodgates but provide a suitable test for licensing authorities to judge an application or appeal by assessing the wider public benefit that an event or venue may create, and help to prevent further unnecessary closure of our culturally important music venues.
At the very least, if the Minister cannot accept the amendment, I hope she will follow her previous practice in being prepared to speak to proponents of it and listen to the evidence that they put forward about the impact of licensing laws on grass-roots music venues. Her ministerial colleagues have been very helpful in amending planning guidance in this respect, which has helped somewhat in change of use for premises near live music venues. I hope that Ministers, having shown themselves sympathetic to grass-roots music venues, will continue in that vein and meet UK Music and the Music Venues Trust to discuss the issues further.
The Earl of Clancarty (CB)
My Lords, in particular, I support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, Amendment 214A. He does not define cultural activity, but it would clearly include, at least in part, the night-time economy. There has in recent years been a perfect storm of circumstance for our night-time economy. Rising rents and business rates, property developments, noise complaints, complaints about anti-social behaviour and more have conspired to devastate our night-time cultural landscape. London alone has, in the past five years, lost 50% of its clubs and more than 40% of its music venues, but the same problems are afflicting towns and cities everywhere in the UK, and some cities abroad.
Having said that, closures often hinge on a single concern, which might have been avoided given a wider, more constructive approach. This problem has implications at many levels. As an economy, we will suffer in the long term, as the night-time economy is hugely important to the country. In 2014, it was worth up to £26.3 billion. It is part of what makes London, in particular, an international cultural city. Under the amendment, licensing authorities would see it as part of their remit to address head-on the problems facing their local communities in this provision. We risk parts of our towns and cities becoming night-time dead areas, which is not good for their safety or social fabric. We risk taking the heart out of many of our cities.
The closure of live music venues does not reflect decreasing demand from the public. Witness the protest against the closure of Passing Clouds, a live music and community venue in Dalston, earlier in the year. Events manager Gudrun Getz said that,
“property developers are seeking to cash in on the huge popularity of Dalston which we ourselves were instrumental in helping to establish”.
She also says that there is,
“a huge … fear in the community at the moment that we are going to lose all of our space and there will be nowhere for musicians to play”.
This would of course be a terrible loss for London and elsewhere in the country.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering
My Lords, I congratulate noble Lords who have tabled and so eloquently moved and spoken to the amendments before the Committee.
Speaking in a personal capacity, I seek guidance from the Minister, who now has a wish list of an additional three or more objectives that could be included in the amendments. In her response, can she explain what original criteria were used to establish the original objectives, as set out in the Licensing Act 2003? More particularly, what is the distinction from what has been achieved by a piece of legislation from an earlier Conservative Administration, of which I am extremely proud, the Disability Discrimination Act? How is that different from Amendment 210?
I was struck by the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Thomas, about catching a falling star. I revert to the earlier theme of why this falling star has been snatched when we have a history over the past 10 or 15 years—possibly even 18 or 20—of every 18 months considering a police and crime or justice Bill that could have neatly included some of these amendments, certainly those that we looked at earlier. As well as “catch a falling star”, one could also say, “pick’n’mix” or “liquorice allsorts”. My favourite would be Mackintosh’s Quality Street but, sadly, there is no relation.
I conclude by paying tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, who chaired the earlier ad hoc committee with such distinction. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)
My Lords, we have moved on to another part of the Bill. I should declare that I am an elected councillor in the London Borough of Lewisham and a vice-president of the Local Government Association. I do not serve on the licensing committee of Lewisham Council; I have enough to do on the planning committee. However, many years ago, I was a member of the licensing committee of Southwark Council. In those days, we considered only music and dance licences. One still had to apply to the magistrates’ court for a late-night alcohol licence. That has all changed and these matters are now under the control of the licensing committee.
This has been an interesting debate on four important amendments, all of which I support. The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and other noble Lords made very valid points in respect of licensing authorities’ compliance with the provisions of the Equality Act. This is an issue of enforcement, rather than advice and guidance. Being able to remind licence holders of their duty is not good enough because it has not worked as effectively as it should. We should force licensed premises to be able to be used by disabled people.
My noble friend Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe spoke about the need for a duty to promote health and well-being. Local authorities have such general duties but for there to be a specific requirement in respect of licensed premises is a new initiative. He made important points about the changes to availability of alcohol and consumption patterns. They have certainly changed. My noble friend was clear and we can all think back on how many pubs have closed while alcohol is more available in convenience stores and supermarkets. Things have changed in the past 20 years. He also made important points on the duty of authorities to look after young people and protect them from harm.
As regards the promotion of cultural activity and inclusion, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has an impressive record in this House of standing up for live music and other cultural activities. He is right to stand up for grass-roots music venues, which have launched many a career in the entertainment industry. I agree with the noble Lord that music and other activities should be helped and supported where possible through the licensing system, rather than just regulated. I recall a debate on a different subject in the Moses Room, when we talked about a range of regulations that sometimes affect people going about their lawful business and allowing them to busk and so on. Decisions on this are being taken by officials of local authorities, rather than elected members, which is worrying. It is a slightly different but similar point. I also agree with what the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, said about the industry.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 210, 211 and 214A in this group seek to add to the list of licensing objectives under the Licensing Act 2003. In answer to my noble friend Lady McIntosh’s question, there are currently four such objectives. These are: the prevention of crime and disorder; public safety; the prevention of public nuisance; and the protection of children from harm. The promotion of the licensing objectives is of paramount importance when authorities make licensing decisions, and each one carries equal weight.
Amendment 210 seeks to add,
“compliance with the provisions of the Equality Act 2010”,
to the list of licensing objectives. As we have heard, the amendment flows from a recommendation made by the Equality Act 2010 and the Disability Committee, which reported in March. I was pleased to be able to respond in our debate on that. All four noble Baronesses who put their name to this amendment served on that committee.
The committee recommended that the Licensing Act 2003 be amended to make failure to comply with the Equality Act 2010 a ground for refusing a licence. In their response published in July, the Government argued that, as employers and businesses were already under a duty to comply with the statutory obligations imposed by the Equality Act not to discriminate against staff or customers, the Act offered sufficient protection. Accordingly, it would be inappropriate for the 2003 Act to duplicate the requirements of the 2010 Act, just as it would be inappropriate to make express reference to other legislation—such as the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 or the Noise Act 1996—all of which places requirements and responsibilities on licensing authorities and licensees.
Moreover, if we were to apply the logic of Amendment 122 more broadly, we should also be amending the Gambling Act, and indeed many other statutes, to place analogous obligations on those undertaking other forms of regulated activity. To single out the operators of businesses licensed under the 2003 Act could be taken as downgrading the obligations on all other businesses to similarly comply with the requirements of the Equality Act. I am sure that noble Lords would not wish to give that impression.
This is not to say that those running licensed premises should not be doing more to facilitate access by disabled people. Earlier this year the Minister for Disabled People held a round table event with disabled people and the hospitality industry to lead to a better understanding by service providers and businesses and a commitment from them to improve access and attitudes. Organisations represented at the round table made pledges to improve accessibility to their premises and improve their customer service for disabled people. For example, the British Beer and Pub Association pledged to update and promote its guidance on accessibility in pubs. This gives pubs advice on easy changes they can make to improve their service to disabled customers. These are very practical steps which will help to improve the day-to-day experiences of disabled people.
Amendment 211, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, seeks to add an additional licensing objective,
“to promote the health and wellbeing of the locality and local area”.
The Government are not unsympathetic to those who believe that there should be a greater role for public health within the licensing system, and we of course acknowledge the health harms attributable to alcohol. However, decisions under the Licensing Act have to be proportionate and made on a case-by-case basis. Unless it can be demonstrated that an application for a new licence is likely to undermine one or more of the licensing objectives, the licensing authority must grant the licence. The Government believe that any new licensing objective would need to be capable of standing alongside the existing objectives and function in the same way. Any new objective must therefore enable licensing authorities to determine whether it is appropriate to grant or refuse new applications, review licences and attach conditions or revoke licences.
Previous work has shown that it is difficult to establish direct causal links between alcohol-related health harms such as chronic liver disease and particular premises. Difficulties also remain with putting in place the necessary processes to enable the collection of such evidence—without which decisions based on health grounds would be unlikely to stand up to challenge. Work to date has established that the types of health data that are more readily accessible and most suited to use in a licensing context tend to relate to acute harms such as violent assaults and alcohol-related injuries. These harms, as well as most factors affecting well-being, such as crime levels and the welfare of children, can already be addressed through the existing licensing objectives, as demonstrated by the achievements of areas such as the Kensington area of Liverpool, Newcastle and Middlesbrough.
The Government will therefore continue working with Public Health England to facilitate access to local health data to inform decision-making within the current framework and to help public health teams play a role within licensing. Public Health England has also been testing a support package to assist with the development of local data collection and analysis based on lessons learned from the evidence-based work carried out in 2014-15. I assure the noble Lord that the Government continue to look at this matter seriously and will consider the findings of Public Health England.
Amendment 214A seeks to add,
“the promotion of cultural activity and inclusion”,
to the licensing objectives. This would require licensing authorities to consider the character of licensable activities, rather than purely protect against the potential harm caused by licensable activity. The existing licensing objectives seek to reduce harm that can be evidenced, and licence conditions which are intended to reduce the level of harm can be easily understood—for example, a requirement to restrict noise levels to prevent public nuisance.
It would be difficult to replicate this for “cultural activity and inclusion”, since this is quite a subjective matter and may be interpreted in different ways. For example, would a festival of Hindi films or Irish dance be considered good or bad in terms of cultural activity and inclusion? Making this a licensing objective could place licensing authorities in a censorious position, whereby licensees organising events might be obliged to explain what additional cultural value their entertainment might generate, and the licensing authorities would be required to evaluate that information.
The final amendment in this group, Amendment 212, seeks to add child protection bodies to the list of statutory consultees for statements of licensing policy. Each licensing authority is required to publish a statement of licensing policy and to revise it at least every five years. The statement sets out the general approach to making licensing decisions and managing the evening and night-time economy in the area.
Section 5(3) of the 2003 Act sets out a list of organisations and individuals who must be consulted when the statement is reviewed. The list includes the police, the fire and rescue authority and the public health body, but it is not intended to be exhaustive and therefore does not include all the responsible authorities. The 2003 Act does not prevent licensing authorities from consulting other bodies or persons as they see appropriate.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I am not quite sure that the Minister has answered anything to do with Amendment 214A.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I did. It may be that it was so dull a response that the noble Lord did not catch it. Shall I put it in writing and send it to him?
Baroness Deech
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords who supported our Amendment 210, but clearly I am disappointed with the Government’s answer, which has not moved from the response issued several months ago, before the change of Administration. I thought that we were convinced: given that this Government have a target of halving the unemployment rate of disabled people and that the Prime Minister said in her first statement on taking office that this Government should work for everyone and allow everyone to reach their potential, surely they must move on this.
I have not heard a single argument to undermine the thrust of Amendment 210. The background is that disabled people gave evidence that the Disability Discrimination Act was a much better tool than the Equality Act, because the latter puts all the protective characteristics together and thus, although well-meaning, does not give sufficient weight to the needs of disabled people, who need a bit more than just equality.
Moreover, I take issue with the Minister’s saying that the amendment would simply duplicate the Equality Act. It does no such thing. First, it shifts the burden of enforcement away from the individual who is discriminated against to the local authority. That is the main aim. A pledge, I am sorry to say, is insufficient. If the entertainment industry gives a pledge, or if we all pledge to pay tax or obey immigration law, I do not think any Government would say, “A pledge, that’s just fine”. As has been proven, there are areas where one needs the teeth of the law. I appeal to the Minister: this Government should not appear hard-hearted. The Select Committee is offering them a way to respond to the United Nations’ inquiry which has so severely criticised this country’s approach to the needs of disabled people.
I have heard no reason why Amendment 210 should not pass. I cannot believe that the Licensing Act 2003 Committee, thorough though it is, will unearth any more than the Select Committee on equality and disability did. Once more, I appeal to the Government to accept the amendment and if they do not, I will emulate the advice given by the noble Baroness, Lady Thomas, and pursue this star all the way to the other end of the rainbow.
Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe
My Lords, when I was speaking, the Minister was nodding so much that I thought she was agreeing with everything. I now realise she was trying to fend off her cold, but I was pleased to hear that the Government are not unsympathetic to the health objective in Amendment 211, and I am aware of the difficulties of putting this in place; it is not easy. I am also aware of the work being done by Public Health England and others in association with the Home Office. I look forward to that materialising and hope it will be presented to the Select Committee.
I did not get an answer to my point about Manchester, to which I thought she was nodding. May I speak to her separately about that away from the Chamber, when we might try to explore using that new initiative for something quite different? I will look carefully at what she had to say on the children’s amendment and decide what further action, if any, I can take.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I may have blinked and missed the extended response I am sure the Minister gave. However, as I recall, it was simply that we do not need another licensing objective. Will she consider more carefully the question of whether other things could be done to encourage licensing authorities to take cultural matters into consideration in licensing, and in particular offer to meet those with an interest in this area, such as UK Music and the Music Venue Trust?
Lord Beecham
“Premises licence under Gambling Act 2005: gaming machines
(1) After section 172 of the Gambling Act 2005 insert—“172A Gaming machines: conditions on availability and use(1) The conditions which a licensing authority may attach to a premises licence under section 169 include a condition—(a) that no gaming machines for which the maximum charge for use is more than £10 may be made available for use on the premises, or(b) that the number of gaming machines of that description which may be made available on the premises must not exceed the number specified in the licence.(2) The conditions which a licensing authority may attach to a premises licence under section 169 also include conditions relating to the use of gaming machines; in particular, the conditions may include—(a) a condition that a person may not use a gaming machine unless he establishes his identity by the means and in the manner specified in the licence;(b) a condition that each payment for the use of a gaming machine must be made by the means specified in the licence and must be processed or approved by a person who, when the payment is made, is on the premises where the machine is situated and is acting in the course of the business carried on there. (3) The number of machines which may be specified for the purposes of subsection (1)(b) must be lower than the number of machines which is at that time authorised under section 172(8); but where the number of machines so authorised is subsequently varied—(a) the number of machines specified (or treated as specified) for the purposes of subsection (1)(b) is to be treated as varied by the same amount, and(b) the licence is to have effect accordingly.(4) A condition of the kind set out in subsection (2) may apply to gaming machines generally or only to gaming machines of a description specified in the condition.(5) In deciding whether to attach a condition of the kind set out in subsection (1) or (2), or whether to exercise the power under section 187 or 202 to add, remove or amend a condition of that kind, a licensing authority may give particular weight to the impact of the following on the promotion of the licensing objectives—(a) the number of other premises in the locality where the premises concerned are situated in which gaming machines are available for use,(b) the levels of crime and disorder in that locality,(c) the extent of social or economic deprivation in that locality, and(d) the proximity of the premises concerned to places habitually attended by children or other vulnerable persons.(6) In the case of a betting premises licence in respect of premises in Scotland other than a track, the licensing authority may add, remove or amend a condition of the kind set out in subsection (1) only if the licence was issued before 23 May 2016 (the day on which section 52 of the Scotland Act 2016 came into force).”(2) In section 172 of the Gambling Act 2005 (gaming machines), after subsection (11) insert—“(12) Subsections (8) and (10)(a) are subject to section 172A.”.”
Lord Beecham (Lab)
My Lords, this amendment stands in my name and that of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans and the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord James of Blackheath. There are also two slightly different amendments in the group in my name and that of the right reverend Prelate.
Fixed-odds betting terminals are gambling machines housed up to four at a time in betting shops in high streets and other streets, especially in poorer areas. Here people have been able to wager up to £100 on a machine every 20 seconds. While this has now been reduced to £50, unless the gambler in question has opened an account with the gambling company, if different machines are used it is still possible to stake as much as that in such a short time. Moreover, Ladbrokes alone revealed in its last half-year report that it had given away £3.7 million in free plays on fixed-odds betting terminals in just six months, nearly twice as much as for over-the-counter betting, clearly using this device to promote this particularly addictive form of gambling.
These terminals were authorised, I regret to say, by the Labour Government in 2005 and, by 2013, there were more than 33,000 machines, generating profits to bookmakers of £1.5 billion a year. Ladbrokes alone declared a profit of more than £1,022 per machine per week. In January 2014, my right honourable friend Ed Miliband sought to promote legislation giving councils the power to reduce the number of machines in shops, and increase the time between bets. At this point I should refer to my interest as a councillor in Newcastle and an honorary vice-president of the Local Government Association. Despite expressions of sympathy and concern at the time by David Cameron, a Labour Motion on the issue was defeated by 314 votes to 282 in the Commons. During the debate, the then Minister, Helen Grant, said that the Government were waiting for the findings of a study into how the machines were used and the real impact on players before deciding whether action was needed. We are approaching the third anniversary of that statement.
There are now 35,000 machines, with a concentration in less well-off areas, to the extent that the 55 poorest boroughs have, in proportion to population, four times as many as the best-off 115. Newham, whose council is in the forefront of calling for action and is one of the most deprived boroughs in the country, has no fewer than 87 shops with these terminals. Together with 92 other councils, Newham applied two years ago to secure, under the Sustainable Communities Act, the power to license gaming premises of this kind. I understand that the Government are woefully behind schedule with a determination of that appeal, indicative perhaps of their failure to address problems occasioned by this form of gambling. Perhaps the Minister could inform us, if not today then in writing, when they will publish their decision on that application—these applications arise under legislation enacted by the coalition Government.
In addition to the economic impact on households that can least afford it, there are other troubling issues associated with this essentially exploitative industry. Betting shops take up prominent space in high streets and, even more troublingly, in addition to the impact on the finances, health and well-being of their customers and their families, they have led to a significant increase in crime. The number of times police were called to incidents in betting shops rose by 51% in 2014 from the previous year. In Newham, police are called out, on average, once every day in the year.
I raised the issue of crime in these shops in an Oral Question on 5 September, pointing out that betting shops accounted for 97% of all police calls to gambling establishments and, even more alarming, for 40% of serious crimes against all businesses. I pointed out that no fewer than 7,000 machines a year in these premises are destroyed by gamblers, and that violent assaults on staff are increasing.
In that context, it is telling that in some shops with fixed-odds terminals the staff member—it is usually only one person now in many of these shops—is not permitted to leave what is called his or her “cage” until 6.30 pm. They are confined to that space. That is supposed to enhance their security. Your Lordships may think it is a peculiar way of doing so, and an unsatisfactory one.
It is significant that, as I have been informed today, Ladbrokes is now purchasing chairs to go into these shops weighing 35 kilogrammes, making them too heavy to be used by customers to damage the premises or injure the staff. To some extent it is recognising in that particular and rather—one might have thought—peculiar way that there is a risk of violent crime on the premises.
The Lord Bishop of Salisbury
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for moving the amendment. I stand in place of my colleague the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, who is unable to be here today, in support of Amendment 214, which would grant new powers to local licensing authorities in regulating gaming machines on gambling premises. As the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has already made clear, there is a strong case for measures that will help local authorities tackle gambling-related crime to be included in the Policing and Crime Bill.
The figures on the rise of gambling-related crime are startling. From 2014 to 2015 there was a 50% increase in the number of incidents on gambling premises that required police assistance. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans recently submitted a freedom of information request to the Metropolitan Police which found that there had been a 68% increase in the number of violent criminal offences at London betting shops between 2011-12 and 2015-16. It has recently been reported that around 40% of commercial robberies in London target betting shops.
There is likely to be a range of factors driving this increase in violence. Opportunism arising from the single staffing of betting shops is surely one of them. Another is the increasing reliance of high-street betting shops on fixed-odds betting terminals, or FOBTs. As a report from Landman Economics put it:
“It seems clear that violent behaviour in betting shops is on the increase and an increased proliferation of FOBTs—with increased numbers of players incurring losses from gambling on B2 machines—is a likely reason for this trend”.
There are countless recorded examples of so-called “FOBT rage”, in which customers destroy machines or assault staff after losing large sums of money. What is more, we know that a great number of these incidents go unreported by betting shops.
It is not just violent crime that is increasingly associated with FOBTs. In 2015, 633 instances of suspected money laundering were reported to the Gambling Commission by betting shop staff, and there is no way of knowing the full extent of the problem. Several local councils, including Hounslow, have also raised concerns that the anonymous nature of FOBTs lends itself to underage gambling. These concerns have led several local authorities to call on Her Majesty’s Government to grant them greater powers when it comes to imposing conditions on a gambling premises licence. This amendment therefore comes with the support of the Local Government Association, as well as with endorsements from the councils of Westminster, Brighton and Hove, Brent and Leeds.
The current licensing arrangements allow licensing authorities to impose a range of conditions on betting premises in order to ensure that the licensing objectives of preventing crime and protecting the vulnerable are upheld. However, licensing authorities are prevented from imposing conditions that affect the number or operational method of the gaming machines permitted under the licence.
Given that FOBTs now contribute well over 50% of the profits of high-street betting shops, that restriction seems like an outdated anomaly. Amendment 214 would either allow licensing authorities to limit the number of FOBTs permitted on a premises or allow them to impose conditions on the method of operation for gaming machines more generally—for example, by requiring account-based play or by requiring customers to confirm their identification with staff prior to play. By removing the possibility of anonymous play, not only would conditions such as these prevent money laundering and underage gambling but they would be likely to reduce the number of violent and aggressive incidents towards staff, while facilitating more effective implementation of self-exclusion.
Amendment 214 would also make it clear that licensing authorities do not have to assess licensing applications in isolation but can take into account the cumulative impact of a range of local factors in making a decision, whether they be social deprivation, local crime rates, the proximity of local schools or addiction treatment centres, or the presence of a betting shop cluster. Currently the legislation is not clear on this point, so the amendment would also provide licensing authorities with clarity and confidence about the options open to them. If Her Majesty’s Government are not willing to accept an amendment in primary legislation on this matter, I hope that they will issue clear guidance, particularly on the potential for licensing authorities to use cumulative impact assessments, through the Gambling Commission.
I should emphasise to the Committee that the amendment is not an attack on the gambling industry; it seeks only to give licensing authorities the tools they require to better enforce the existing licensing objectives. Licensing authorities would not be able to impose these conditions on a whim. They would have to show that conditions were proportionate and reasonable in protecting the licensing objectives. These new powers would make a real difference, not just in reducing crime but in protecting the vulnerable, and I hope that Her Majesty’s Government will consider them carefully.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, having put my name to this amendment, I support Amendments 214—and 214CA in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham—and endorse the argument so eloquently put forward both by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Salisbury and by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham.
We on these Benches have long advocated a reduction in the stakes of fixed-odds betting terminals—FOBTs—and the Government’s review is a welcome step, but it should not delay other forms of action to address the social harm caused by these machines. For years, local authorities of all political persuasions have implored the Government to allow them to tackle the blight on communities caused by FOBTs.
As we know, FOBTs can swallow £100 every 20 seconds, and bookmakers open multiple shops in deprived areas to facilitate as many machines as possible. There are double the number of betting shops in the 55 most deprived boroughs in England as in the 115 most affluent. This clustering of outlets significantly contributes to crime and anti-social behaviour, as both the right reverend Prelate and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, mentioned.
That is why I and my colleagues back Newham and its 92 local authority supporters, representing 23 million people across the country, who have been calling for the dangerously high FOBT stakes to be reduced to £2, in line with other high street gaming machines. We hope that this will be the outcome of the belatedly announced triennial review.
FOBTs are highly addictive gaming machines, as we have heard, found in bookmakers across the country. The machines allow users to place bets of up to £100 every 20 seconds on electronic casino games. In 2015 gamblers lost £1.7 billion on FOBTs, and, as we heard from the right reverend Prelate, FOBTs now account for more than half of betting shop profits.
As we know from evidence from, for example, charities seeking to help people with gambling addiction, these machines are directly harming the young and vulnerable in our society, whom we have a duty to protect. Those who can least afford it are often losing vast sums of money. This is driving them towards mental health problems. We have even seen young men taking their own lives because of their addiction to these machines.
The impact of such losses—again, as we have heard—is leading to increased crime on Britain’s high streets. In a recent evidence session of the FOBT all-party group, Sir Robin Wales, the Mayor of Newham, noted that in Newham Borough there is one police call-out to a bookmaker per day, most commonly associated with a FOBT-related incident. In 2013 one of Newham’s 84 betting shops reported 112 incidents of anti-social behaviour to enforcement teams.
To date, the measures introduced to regulate these machines have been ineffective at best. Last year the Government introduced the Gaming Machine (Circumstances of Use) (Amendment) Regulations, which were implemented on 6 April. They require FOBT customers to authorise stakes of £50 or more via account-based play or over-the-counter staff authorisation. However, a study by Landman Economics in April 2016 demonstrated that the DCMS, in its evaluation of the impact of the regulations, was unable to determine whether the regulations on the £50 stake had in fact led to an increase in player control, let alone a reduction in the number of problem gamblers. Further, the bookmakers’ own industry code of conduct was found, in a report by the Responsible Gambling Trust, to be ineffective.
Calls for the regulation of these machines have been widespread, from parliamentarians, faith groups and mental health campaigners. Apart from the questions of lowering the stakes and reducing the spin rate, do the Government accept that local authorities have inadequate planning and licensing powers to address high-stake machine gambling on their high streets, to protect the most vulnerable, to tackle crime and to address the damage to local economies?
The Prime Minister, Theresa May, raised the issue back in 2005 of the harm caused by FOBTs. More than a decade later, she finally, as Prime Minister, has the power to take action. She has the opportunity now to protect the most vulnerable from exploitation by controlling high-stakes gambling on our high streets. These amendments would be extremely valuable additions to available regulation of FOBTs. I urge the Government to accept them.
Baroness Howe of Idlicote (CB)
My Lords, I support Amendment 214, in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, who sadly, as we know, is not able to be with us today. Noble Lords will no doubt be aware that I have spoken in previous debates outlining my concerns about category B2 gaming machines—or FOBTs, as they are more commonly known. The right reverend Prelate’s amendment is a good step in the right direction and I hope the Government will feel moved to support it.
There are clear associations between problem gambling and FOBTs that cannot be ignored. A study conducted by Orford et al showed that 26% of the days spent playing on FOBTs were attributable to problem gamblers and 23% of all time spent on FOBT machines was attributable to problem gamblers. Likewise, according to GamCare’s 2014-15 statistics, 26% of the calls to GamCare in 2014-15 were made for help with issues associated with FOBTs. Problem gambling and FOBTs go together hand-in-hand, and we have a duty to do more to help those who are struggling and the communities blighted by to the proliferation of betting shops.
On top of this, betting shops with FOBTs have also been associated with anti-social and criminal activity on local high streets, which has also been mentioned. A 68% increase in violent criminal offences at betting shops between 2011-12 and 2015-16, identified in an FoI request made by the right reverend Prelate to the Metropolitan Police is simply not good enough. We must do more both to protect employees, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, seeks to do with Amendment 214CA, and to safeguard communities. Those stories which make national headlines—punters smashing up machines in betting shops after losing significant amounts of money—only scratch the surface of what is experienced by employees and communities on a daily basis.
In approaching this amendment, which is about the licensing regime for FOBTs, it is important to say a word about the history of the licensing of betting shops. In 2001, the then Government’s Gambling Review Report concluded that the system at the time—of considering likely demand for gambling provision when issuing premises licences—had the effect of stifling competition and allowing larger firms to monopolise control of the gambling market. The subsequent Gambling Act 2005, which came into effect on 1 September 2007, abolished the so-called demand test, replacing it with an “aim to permit” clause. This effectively placed local authorities in a situation where, on receipt of an application, their starting point had to be to look for a reason not to grant it, rather than to consider a reason to grant the application. The burden shifted to consideration of commercial interest first, rather than consideration of the impact on the consumer and the community.
Indeed, in evidence supplied to the Commons Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee for its 2012 report, The Gambling Act 2005: A Bet Worth Taking?, the London Borough of Haringey said there now seemed to be,
“almost no restriction on how many gambling premises”,
could operate in an area. Local authorities need help, therefore I particularly welcome Amendment 214, which would add a new Section 172A to the Gambling Act 2005. Proposed new subsection (5) would allow licensing authorities to take account of factors beyond simple commercial interest, such as proximity to schools, addiction centres or even existing betting shops.
With betting shops allowed four FOBT machines in one shop, there is clearly an advantage to opening several shops in an area to maximise revenue. Bookmakers made £1.7 billon on gaming machines between October 2014 and September 2015, of which category B2 machines —FOBTs—accounted for 99.7%. I reference page 1 of Ladbrokes’ own 2014 annual report, which has been mentioned. In Ladbrokes’ own words:
“Gaming machines and self service betting terminals drive growth”.
Proposed new Sections 172A(1) and 172A(2) provide sensible solutions by allowing licensing authorities to impose conditions on gambling premises, permitting them to have as few as zero FOBTs. They also allow licensing authorities to impose conditions requiring customer identification prior to play in an effort to address FOBT-related crime. The situation with FOBTs has been allowed to get out of hand and it is time the Government took a firmer grasp of it. Reducing the prevalence of harmful machines is a good thing and will make an important difference, but we can and should do even more, and I welcome the recent call for evidence issued by the Government on aspects of the gambling industry, including FOBTs.
I am also encouraged by the focus on reviewing stakes, which for B2 machines are far too high. Making machines less dangerous by reducing the B2 stake from £100 to £2, as the Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, sought to do, should be our priority. I certainly will continue to advocate for such a change.
I strongly endorse Amendment 214, which represents a tangible opportunity for positive change which can be implemented now to help problem gamblers and their families, as well as communities and employees. I very much hope the Minister will support the amendment, as I, and clearly many Members in this Chamber, do.
Lord James of Blackheath (Con)
My Lords, in speaking to Amendment 214 I should declare two interests. First, I ran a chain of casinos in the Mediterranean at an earlier stage of my life, and I am therefore very familiar with the function of a roulette wheel. Secondly, I was chairman of the Jockey Club’s racing interests in the UK, so I was heavily dependent upon the profits coming from the bookmakers’ levy.
The Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, was tabled several months ago and I am sorry that it has not gone further. In many ways, it is, as an entity, better than this amendment, and the Minister should give serious consideration to incorporating it into the Bill.
The points I need to make relate to the deep suspicions I raised at Second Reading about the honesty of the electronic roulette wheel in the FOBTs in reflecting the function of a roulette wheel, as I know it to be. I have probably done more analysis on this than anyone alive today, and I would like to do a lot more. I suspect two things are wrong with the wheels at present. First, they do not fulfil either of the two functions which I require as a standard for any honest roulette wheel. An honest wheel should result in 28 different numbers occurring in any sequence of 40 spins—that statistic is astonishingly accurate—and every number on the wheel should come up within a maximum of 121 spins. I have tested these theories over thousands and thousands of spins. For example, I tested the latter over sequences as high as 4,400 and found that there were 44 occasions on which each number came up a minimum of once, which confirms that theory.
As for the former theory, I cannot remember the name but I think it was the Gambling Commission that set up the original licensing arrangements for casinos years ago. It was an extraordinary commission because it went to the extent of installing a roulette wheel in its meeting room and having two croupiers spinning it all day long to observe what happened. As a result, it laid down very strict rules for roulette wheels. I can see no reason whatever why bookmakers should not accept the validity of the same rules for their electronic machines as for the metal and wood wheels in casinos. As things are, they produce very different results.
As a result of my criticisms, two days after our last debate I got a very angry letter from the bookmakers’ association. It said that I was a liar telling an untruth, was wholly wrong and was being offensive. I said, “I may be offensive but can you prove that I am wrong on the matters of fact? I want you to prove to me that you have a 28-number cycle in every 40 spins and that your whole wheel comes up in 121 spins. If you can’t prove that, then you are in fact dishonest in what you present as a functioning electronic roulette wheel”.
I do not believe they can do that but I would like the support of Parliament for this: I want them to give me a 5,000-number sequence for every electronic computer programme that they are running—and they have lots of them, as we have heard. They have so many different terminals that they cannot allow one programme to run so as to establish a pattern, because you could adapt the pattern from one and go and bet on it. You might be able to switch it down to your advantage and they will not do that. If they have six different betting shops, they will have six different programmes and I want those programmes to be subject to audit. I would like to audit them by matching with my own matrix, which I have developed. If they can give me 5,000-spin sequences certified by an accountant or a lawyer, it will take me six hours to say whether they have an honest wheel or not. I will do that for free for the whole industry, if it wants. If your Lordships think it sounds as though I need to get a life, you are probably right but I am obsessed with these numbers and I would love to do it.
In this case, I am so certain that it is wrong that after the previous debate I went on a betting shop crawl in Chichester, my nearest local town. I went round each of the main betting shops in it and sat down to watch what was happening on the electronic wheel. The first one that I watched was simply frightening. The man who had switched the machine on appeared to have £100 in folding money, well concealed in his pocket. He was pulling it out one £20 note at a time and feeding it in to charge it up. He had decided to bet on five numbers: 32, 15, 19, four and 21. These are the five numbers adjacent and to the immediate right of zero on the wheel. Effectively he should have had a six to one chance, as it is five numbers out of 37, but of course he was having to put a £1 chip on each of the five numbers. If he won, he got only £1 back for it and lost £4, so he was actually betting at 5.2 to one against in real odds. He would have had to have six successive win spins in a row just to break even on his £100—an impossible characteristic—yet the man was sitting down to give away £100, without any possible benefit coming to him.
The betting shop quickly moved in and asked me what I was doing. I said that I was doing social studies and I was told, “You don’t do them here—get out”. So I went off to the next betting shop and lasted about five minutes there as well. Eventually I went to six shops. What I found was a horrendous change that has occurred since the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, brought his excellent Bill in. The spin cycle we were worrying about then was running at, I think, two minutes; it has now gone to 10 seconds. This is so fast that you cannot even think what your name is, let alone what you are betting on. At 10 seconds a spin, it is simply draining a man of money without any way of him knowing what he is doing. My great proposal to your Lordships today is: whatever we do with this clause or with the Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, we should write in a demand to go back to a minimum of two or three minutes, or whatever it was to be. Any betting shop which does not do that should be summarily closed and will not be allowed to open until they have demonstrated the accuracy of their data in the form that I have dictated. They would be closed until further notice.
However, what I think is happening is that the bookmakers read our Hansard and decided to make a firm commitment to a betting cycle which would be better than the figure they were allowing. They have therefore decided to cut it to 10 seconds now, so that they will have more to negotiate and give away when the crunch comes. Let us put it in now and start closing them. We should get some authority in to stop this nonsense. Wherever there is a 10-second cycle going on in a betting shop, close it down now. We should do it urgently and make an example of them. I rest my case.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, I shall take a slightly different approach from that of the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde, and just say—I am sorry, I meant the noble Lord, Lord James of Blackheath; I am reading the wrong name on the annunciator. I do apologise. I do not know how the Minister can sit here hour after hour and hear the overwhelming evidence of the damage that these machines are causing and not do anything about it. This is an opportunity to do something about it. The Minister should grab it with both hands.
Lord Rosser
I thank the noble Lord, Lord James of Blackheath, for his contribution. I do not go into betting shops, but he has confirmed that I have only a marginally smaller chance of winning than those who do. My noble friend Lord Beecham and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Salisbury in particular have already set out the background to and concerns behind this group of amendments: concerns about the increase in reported criminal offences linked to betting shops, which has coincided with the proliferation of fixed-odds betting terminals. These criminal offences relate both to violence towards staff and to damage to property arising from losses incurred from gambling on these terminals.
There is a link between the use of fixed-odds betting terminals and their anonymity for user and money laundering, with one major firm fined some £800,000 by the Gambling Commission this summer over inadequate protection against money laundering. At present, licensing authorities can lay down a series of conditions on betting premises to help ensure that the licensing objectives of preventing crime and protecting the vulnerable are delivered and maintained. However, licensing authorities cannot limit the number of machines below the maximum of four per betting premise, and neither can they lay down requirements for the operation of gaming machines including fixed-odds betting terminals.
This group of amendments would, among other things, achieve these objectives by allowing licensing authorities to place conditions which could limit the number of fixed-odds betting terminals permitted under a gambling premises licence. Fixed-odds betting terminals now contribute, as I understand it, well over 50% of the profits of high street betting shops. These amendments would also allow licensing authorities to place conditions on gambling premises which would restrict the operation of gaming machines including fixed-odds betting terminals to people who have established their identity with the gambling premises concerned. This would assist in addressing money laundering and also help to reduce the incidence of violent disorders, including aggression towards staff, and the risk of under-age gambling. In both instances the licensing authority would have to show why these conditions were necessary to ensure that the licensing objectives to which I have already referred were delivered.
A further amendment in this group would also mean that licensing authorities did not have to determine each licence application in isolation. Instead, the amendment would make it clear that such authorities could take account of the cumulative impact on a range of local factors in making a decision—factors such as social deprivation and local crime rates, the creation of a betting shop cluster and the proximity of local schools or centres for other groups of vulnerable people. Such a provision in the relevant amendment in this group would better enable licensing authorities to protect areas that they considered at real risk of gambling harm.
The purpose of these amendments—as has already been said, Amendment 214, the main amendment, has the support of the Local Government Association—is to give local authorities a much-needed wider range of measures to enforce the existing licensing objectives. I hope that the Government will respond favourably. Surely local authorities are in the best position to know what is and is not needed in their own community. They should now have the necessary powers to deliver the existing licensing objectives.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and the right reverend Prelate explained, these amendments would have the effect of devolving power over licence conditions for gaming premises and gaming machines to local authorities. The number of gaming machines authorised under a gambling premises licence is regulated by the Gambling Act 2005. Licensing authorities do not currently have the power to change this limit, and cannot impose licence conditions on gaming machines that relate to stakes or prizes. However, they do have licensing powers in respect of gambling premises. These include powers to reject an application for a licence and powers to impose other conditions, for example around opening hours. They can also review and revoke licences. The Department for Communities and Local Government also brought in new planning laws last year that ensure that applications to change, for example, a disused shop into a bookmaker’s office will need planning consent.
In looking to introduce this new clause, the right reverend Prelate is seeking to limit the number of fixed-odds betting terminals in bookmakers and casinos. The Government understand the concern that such gaming machines could fuel problem gambling and are committed to reducing the risks of potential harms associated with such machines. Indeed, last year, we introduced new regulations to ensure that players staking over £50 on these machines either had to open an account or had to interact with staff. Evaluation shows that there has been a significant decrease in players staking above £50. The Gambling Commission also introduced new social responsibility requirements last year, including measures that force customers to make an active choice on whether to set time and money limits while playing these machines.
In addition, the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, is seeking to enable licensing authorities to impose minimum staffing levels on premises with such machines. The noble Lord may have in mind a number of tragic incidents in high street bookmakers over the last few years. The Association of British Bookmakers’ Safe Bet Alliance provides specific guidance on staffing security in bookmakers, which was drafted with the input of the Metropolitan Police. Members of the Association of British Bookmakers operate single staffing only when a risk assessment has been undertaken.
Sections 167 and 168 of the Gambling Act 2005 empower the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport to set mandatory and default conditions on premises licences via secondary legislation, which could include a condition setting staffing levels. This would be the preferred route to make such a change. In addition, I must emphasise that the Government believe that the appropriate mechanism for reviewing stakes and prizes, and gaming machine numbers, is the review announced on 24 October by the Minister responsible for gambling, which will consider these issues in a more holistic and comprehensive context.
My noble friend Lord James mentioned statistics about roulette wheels. I have to say that I got slightly lost in all the various numbers, which is not surprising considering that I was unable to add the 45 minutes when it came to the lunchtime break—but I certainly take his point and I listened with interest.
The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, talked about the Sustainable Communities Act. The Government are engaging with the LGA on this issue. The review announced on 24 October is the right mechanism to consider all these issues, and the Government invite Newham Council to take part in that review.
The Government are alive to the concerns about the dangers posed by fixed-odds betting terminals. As I have set out, we have already taken steps to tighten the controls on these machines and have set out our plans for the review of gaming machines, gambling advertising and social responsibility, which will include stakes on fixed-odds betting terminals. I am sure that the right reverend Prelate, the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and other noble Lords will want to contribute to that review, and I encourage them to do so. The review will include a close look at the issue of B2 gaming machines—more commonly known as fixed-odds betting terminals—and specific concerns about the harm that they cause, be that to the player or the community in which they are located. The call for evidence period will close on 4 December, following which the Government will consider proposals based on robust evidence provided to assist in our decisions.
Given that this process is in train, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Beecham
I thank the noble Baroness for her reply, so far as it goes, which I fear is not very far at all. If the Government are relying on the industry to come forward with proposals, many of us would be somewhat sceptical about a satisfactory result emerging.
I am not, as some of your Lordships will be aware, an enthusiast for secondary legislation but it seems to me that it would be sensible for the Government to take the power, at least, to regulate in some of the areas we have discussed, even if they do not want to incorporate the specific details of the amendments we have been discussing today in primary legislation. It would be a wasted opportunity, it seems to me, if, as I suspect, the gaming industry will not come up with satisfactory answers to the many questions which have been raised today, to then expect a further Bill to come forward. The legislative timetable, many of us will imagine, will be dominated by things of a rather more international flavour for the next few years, whereas, giving the power to regulate on issues of the kind we have identified here would be a much simpler parliamentary process and one which is quite appropriate.
I do not think that many of us in your Lordships’ House have any great confidence in the gaming industry’s willingness to address the problems that have been identified across the House this afternoon. While at this point I will obviously not be asking the House to divide, this is a matter that I hope the Government will consider in a constructive way before Report. I would be tempted, and will discuss this with other of your Lordships, to embody in resolutions on Report a power to deal with matters as I have suggested by way of secondary legislation, but it would be better if the Government took that step. No doubt the noble Baroness will be willing to discuss this with interested Members before Report, but as matters stand I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Moynihan
“National anti-doping provisions
(1) Subsections (2) and (3) apply to—(a) all persons participating in sport in the United Kingdom who are members of a governing body of sport or an affiliate organisation or licensee of a governing body of sport, including national governing bodies of sport, regional governing bodies, sports associations, clubs, teams, associations or leagues (a “relevant body”);(b) all persons participating in such capacity in sporting events, competitions or other activities in the United Kingdom which are organised, convened, authorised or recognised by a relevant body;(c) any other person participating in sport in the United Kingdom who, by virtue of a contractual arrangement or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of a relevant body for the purposes of preventing doping; and(d) any other person in the United Kingdom whether or not such a person is a citizen of, or resident in, the United Kingdom.(2) An athlete is guilty of an offence if he or she—(a) knowingly takes anywhere in the world a prohibited substance with the intention of enhancing his or her performance in any sports competition where there is a reward on offer, whether monetary or in terms of prestige, promotion or protection from relegation; or where that is one of his or her intentions; or(b) has been banned or suspended from participation in any sporting activity, or has been or is a member of any organisation which has been banned or suspended from participation in any sporting activity anywhere in the world, at any time either before or after the day on which this Act is passed; and(i) participates in any sports competition in the United Kingdom where there is a reward on offer, whether monetary or in terms of prestige, promotion or protection from relegation; and(ii) does not have a prohibited substance certificate dated not more than 14 days earlier than the date of the sports competition at the commencement of the sports competition. (3) In subsection (2) “prohibited substance certificate” means a certificate from a medical practitioner in the United Kingdom appointed by the General Medical Council for the purpose of testing athletes for prohibited substances, confirming that in the practitioner's opinion—(a) the athlete does not have any prohibited substance in his or her body, and(b) the athlete’s body does not retain any advantage in sporting performance by reason of the athlete having taken a prohibited substance at any time either before or after the day on which this Act is passed.(4) A person in the United Kingdom is guilty of an offence if he or she, with the intention of enhancing the performance of an athlete, encourages, assists or hides awareness of an athlete taking a prohibited substance with the intention of enhancing the athlete’s performance, or with that being one of the athlete’s intentions.(5) A medical professional commits an offence if, in the United Kingdom, he or she prescribes a prohibited substance to an athlete and believes, or ought reasonably to believe, that the substance will be used by the athlete with the intention of enhancing his or her performance, or if the professional fails to report any approach for a prohibited substance by such an athlete to the General Medical Council.(6) A member of an organising committee is guilty of an offence if he or she has not taken all reasonable steps to ensure that all athletes permitted to compete in a World or European Championship which he or she is involved in organising, convening, or authorising—(a) have not taken a prohibited substance with the intention of enhancing their performance; and(b) have not been banned or suspended from participation in any sporting activity, or been a member of any organisation which has been banned or suspended from participation in any sporting activity anywhere in the world, during the two years prior to the World or European Championship.(7) In subsection (6), “organising committee” means a Committee established in the United Kingdom on behalf of any international federation of sport, which is recognised by the International Olympic Committee.(8) For the purposes of this section a “prohibited substance” is as defined by the World Anti-Doping Agency or such other agency as shall be designated by the Secretary of State for this purpose.(9) Any person guilty of an offence under subsection (2), (4) (5) or (6) or shall be liable—(a) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or both; or(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or both.(10) In order to assist with the prevention of offences under subsections (2), (4) (5) or (6), UK Anti-Doping shall discuss the following issues with the World Anti-Doping Agency annually—(a) the effectiveness of Annex I of the International Standard for Testing and Investigations (athlete whereabouts requirements) and its harmonisation with the European Convention on Human Rights;(b) the effectiveness of the international work of the World Anti-Doping Agency; and(c) progress on the development of a United Kingdom roll-out of athlete biological passports.(11) UK Anti-Doping shall submit the results of the annual discussions under subsection (7) to the Secretary of State, who shall— (a) lay before both Houses of Parliament an annual report documenting—(i) whether the athlete whereabouts requirements are effective in combating doping in the United Kingdom and are in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights, and(ii) the performance of the World Anti-Doping Agency in general in relation to its effectiveness in preventing offences under subsections (2), (4) (5) or (6); and(b) determine whether the Government should remain a member of and continue to support the World Anti-Doping Agency, in the light of that effectiveness.”
Lord Moynihan (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 214B is the product of some 30 years of discussions I have had with successive Governments, numerous reviews and ministerial answers, during which time many countries have now overtaken us and introduced legislation to criminalise the worst effects of doping in sport. So at least I am confident that the Minister will not be seeking more time to consider this very important subject.
I thank Her Majesty’s Opposition for the work they did in another place. My amendment follows the amendments tabled by Christina Rees, the Labour MP for Neath, who was supported on 24 April this year by Shadow Home Secretary Andy Burnham who said:
“People need to be able to trust that what they are seeing on the pitch, on the track or in the pool is real endeavour and not artificially enhanced. If you are using performance-enhancing drugs, you are not just cheating the other athletes but you are perpetrating a fraud against the paying public. For that reason, there is a clear case for it to be a criminal offence. We must send the strongest possible message that it will not be tolerated in sport”.
The amendments tabled today have also been actively discussed in informal conversations with the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, from the Cross Benches and the noble Lords, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, Lord Addington, and others, who have campaigned for many years on this subject. I am grateful to them for the interest they have shown and to colleagues on my side of the House for their expressed support. The Government should be in no doubt of the depth of support for these measures, both in the press and the country as a whole, not least in the wake of the banning of the Russian athletics team from the Rio Olympic Games this year.
The effect of the amendment is set out in proposed subsection (2). It seeks to deal with nothing less than fraud in sport. Those athletes who knowingly take performance-enhancing drugs from the World Anti-Doping Agency’s prohibited list with the intention of enhancing his or her performance to the detriment of the clean athlete—thus potentially denying the clean athlete selection, the prestige of winning or financial gain for professional athletes—would, if the amendment is passed, be guilty of a crime under the legislation.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, has explained the purpose of this amendment and the extent of its provisions. It is a very timely amendment: the Olympic Games in Rio were overshadowed by doping scandals. Russia was banned from the Paralympics, but did not receive a blanket ban from the main Olympics, despite the state-sponsored doping that had been exposed.
Now, a recent report from the World Anti-Doping Agency independent observers has highlighted failings in the anti-doping checks and procedures at Rio, which the report indicates put an almost unmanageable strain on drug testing during the Olympics. The result was that on Sundays, up to half of all drug tests did not take place because athletes could not be found at the athletes’ village or competition venues due to lack of support, training and information given to chaperones, whose job it was to notify athletes of testing.
Apart from management failings, the report also blamed the failings on budget and operational cutbacks. About 500 fewer drug tests were carried out at Rio than were planned, albeit failing a drugs test at the Games themselves suggests a competitor or their aides who are not particularly conversant with the ways of covering up the taking of drugs. In addition, more than a third of athletes competing in Rio were not subject to drugs testing before the Games in 2016, and of these, nearly 200 were competing in one of the 10 high- risk sports. Despite this report, the International Olympic Committee stated a day later that the report showed that it had been a successful Olympic Games with a successful anti-doping programme.
Doping issues are not, of course, confined to the Olympic Games. The Tour de France has not exactly been immune from them, and neither has tennis or football in this country, to give just three other examples. I suspect that most of us, including, not least, myself, just do not appreciate the full extent and breadth of prohibited substance-taking across different sports.
Prohibited substances, as the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, has said, are taken to gain an advantage in sport over fellow competitors. They are taken to produce a false result which is not determined purely and solely by the skill and unaided effort of each competitor. That false result will at the very least be influenced—and at the worst determined—by the taking of a substance that improves performance unrelated to the skill or effort of the competitor concerned. It is a form of fraud. It is cheating—cheating not just fellow competitors but the public who paid to come watch the sporting event in the belief that they would see a fair competition with competitors competing on a level playing field.
The purpose of the amendment is, through a series of measures—including the creation, as in some other countries, of a criminal offence carrying, in exceptional circumstances, a custodial sentence—to throttle the deliberate and intentional use of drugs in sport by any person in this country or by any person in this country who,
“knowingly takes anywhere in the world a prohibited substance with the intention of enhancing his or her performance”;
or by any person, deliberately and intentionally, among other things, providing or administering to an athlete prohibited substances with a view to enhancing the performance of that athlete. The amendment also lays a responsibility on an organising committee.
The amendment would also require the Secretary of State to submit an annual report to Parliament which would include documenting the performance of the World Anti-Doping Agency in general in its effectiveness in preventing the offences provided for in the amendment, together with a requirement on the Secretary of State to determine whether the Government should remain a member of and continue to support the World Anti-Doping Agency.
The events before and during the Rio Olympics and the ever-increasing range of sports apparently affected by the use of prohibited substances suggest that doping in sport, including state-sponsored doping, is still not being taken sufficiently seriously by those at the most senior level who are in a position to stamp it out. The amendment is intended to toughen up our approach in this country to the serious problem of doping, including by people from this country competing, or assisting those competing, elsewhere in the world. We most certainly support it and hope that it will find favour with the Government.
Baroness Wheatcroft (Con)
I support the amendment. I cannot claim to be an expert on sport, but my noble friend Lord Moynihan most certainly is. His sporting legacy to this country is extraordinary, not least the performance of our team in the London Olympics, which was engineered by his work as chairman of the British Olympic Association, but also the extraordinary performance of our team in Rio. At first glance, the amendment appeared to be radical but, having heard the argument, I understand that we are lagging behind on this important front. That is not the right position for this great sporting nation to be in.
Beyond that, I fear that by not taking strong action against the use of drugs in sport, we are sending the wrong message to our youngsters, who look on sport as a career opportunity and wonderful thing, and to those who play sport as their great heroes. If people are banned from sport for a year or two and then come back, that seems to be acceptable. A prison sentence would be in a different league. That would send a message to our youngsters that this is something that they should not tolerate, and certainly not toy with. That is a very important message for this House to send. I support the amendment.
Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)
My Lords, I, too, support the amendment. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, I do not claim to be an expert in or have anything much to do with sport under most circumstances, but the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, is extremely important. This is about the confidence of the public and the importance to them of feeling that the sporting events they watch or participate in are genuine and not distorted in the way described. It therefore sends a powerful signal and if it indeed brings us back into line with other countries around the world, it is an extremely important thing for us to be doing.
My question—the noble Lord may have answered it in his remarks but if so I did not catch it—is: how broad are the sporting activities which the amendment covers? He talked about international sporting events, and we all have memories of what happened in the recent Olympics, in particular with the Russian team. However, as I understand it, the amendment covers all competitive organised sporting events where they are subject to a governing body. I should be grateful for that clarification and the extent to which it extends right the way through, because the governing bodies of the sports of which I have some knowledge are increasingly seeking not only to arrange the high-profile events but to encourage more people to participate at a lower level in local, regional or county events. It may be less likely that performance-enhancing drugs are used in those environments. However, I assume that this legislation is intended to pick up on those issues as well. It would be helpful if we had that clarity because it is important for people to have confidence in all sporting activities in this country, not just those at the highest level.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Moynihan for raising the important issue of tackling doping in sport.
This has been a difficult year for sport and those fighting doping—namely, the World Anti-Doping Agency, the International Olympic Committee and the International Paralympic Committee. We must recognise that these are global issues that cannot be solved by legislative action in any one country, although we must play our part. We are not complacent and continue to do all we can to protect the integrity of sport in this country, particularly where there is strong evidence that calls for government intervention.
As my noble friend mentioned, the Sunday Times allegations against UK Anti-Doping were disappointing to read. UK Anti-Doping immediately launched an independent investigation, the outcome of which recommended a number of actions to be implemented, all of which have been accepted by that organisation. Such action reflects the tough stance that the Government and UK Anti-Doping take on doping in the fight to provide a level playing field for our athletes to compete on.
My noble friend raises a valid point in saying that those athletes who dope are defrauding our clean athletes. We recognise that the desire to dope can be driven financially, and financial penalties are likely to be as damaging to those who cheat as a ban would be. However, the Government believe that rather than tackling this through legislation, it should be a matter for sports bodies. We recognise that a sanction in this regard could well act as a strong deterrent to doping cheats who represent the UK or compete in our events.
The UK Government and UK Anti-Doping have a reputation for taking a tough, measured stance on doping. To maintain that, we need to ensure that there is a strong evidence base before any consideration or commitment is given to taking forward any possible legislative options. In order to have that evidence base, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport is currently conducting a cross-government review of the existing anti-doping legislative framework and assessing whether stronger criminal sanctions are required. The relevant government departments and agencies, such as the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice, the National Crime Agency and the Serious Fraud Office, are contributing to the review. We expect the outcome of the review to be published before the end of the year.
In conclusion, I ask my noble friend to be patient for a little longer. The Government are very much alive to the issues he raised and are actively examining what more needs to be done. In fact, the Minister for Sport and Tourism, during a debate on 6 July on doping and the Olympics, said:
“The review is currently under way and, should it become clear that stronger criminal sanctions are needed, we will not hesitate to act”.—[Official Report, Commons, 6/7/16; col. 365WH.]
I hope, therefore, that my noble friend will be happy to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Moynihan
My Lords, I thank all those who have participated in the debate and shall comment briefly on the questions and points that have been raised.
First, the interpretation by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, of the reach of the amendment is correct and is set out in proposed new subsection (1). There is a real problem in the perception, for example among athletes and in the world of rugby, that the time to bulk out is when they are at university age or college age so that they can move on to the professional ranks. There are serious issues of doping in sport at that age, and I believe very strongly that when this is passed, as I hope it will be at some stage in the parliamentary process, it will be a very strong deterrent to those young people not to take performance-enhancing drugs.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, in a strong and comprehensive speech, focused on Rio. I would reflect on this one point about testing at the Olympic Games. If you test positive at the Olympic Games, you come into the category of the dopey dopers, because the chances are that if you are on drugs at that point, you will get caught. If you want to knowingly cheat fellow athletes out of selection, you take drugs now—in the winter months—and go to countries of the world were testing is non-existent and where you can be pretty sure you can spend four or six weeks enhancing your performance doing six circuits a day as opposed to a normal person’s three, and then retain the benefit of that muscle bank as you move into the summer season, having lost any trace of the drugs in your system. Indeed, you can take a range of drugs that act as a curtain in front of a play, reducing the chance that you will be caught as you move into the season. The huge amount of money that the World Anti-Doping Agency put into testing at the Olympic Games is effectively to catch the dopey dopers, not those who spend a lot of time and effort to enhance their performance during the winter months, and thus cheat fellow athletes out of selection.
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, for her overgenerous words. She was an outstanding member of the advisory board that helped to design and implement the work that the British Olympic Association did to ensure the success of London 2012—so she is being overmodest in saying that her knowledge of the world of sport is not as great as she might like. It is outstandingly good.
I am also grateful to the Minister. I absolutely agree with her starting point that the World Anti-Doping Agency needs to work in tandem with individual countries, working closely together to put in place an effective legislative framework to deal with this issue. However, it is not correct to say that leaving it completely to the World Anti-Doping Agency and to the sporting bodies will solve this problem. It patently is not solving the problem, which is the reason why so many countries are now legislating. Although they need to legislate in harmony, reflecting their own national interest, they have to legislate together, which is exactly what they are doing. In framing the legislation today, I have taken the example of the Germans, the Italians and the Dutch, who have focused on the fact that it is not just the athlete but the entourage who need to be criminalised. The deterrent effect in those countries of putting legislation on to the statute books has already been very effective.
Finally, on the end-of-year review, I said at the outset that I have been working on this since the Copenhagen declaration exactly 30 years ago, since when there have been so many reviews that it would take me a while to go through them all on Google. However, I always welcome further research and reflections from the Government. I note that they talk about the end of the year, which seems to be very close to our consideration of this legislation on Report. I therefore urge the Minister to see whether the review can be completed in time for Report so that we can take it into consideration. Even if it cannot, I would very much hope that, on Report, we can reflect on what my noble friend the Minister has said, as well as on the speeches made today from both sides of the House. We can then see whether we should send a legislative framework down to the Commons, so that in the new year, which is the likely date, Members can take into account the review to which the Minister alluded and, if necessary, amend the legislation at that point. We can consider any further amendments.
I believe there is widespread support for this provision both inside and outside the House and across parties. I very much hope this work will continue between now and Report, with further consideration on Report. In the light of that, and with my thanks to the Minister for her speech, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Berridge
“Prescribed limit of alcohol
(1) In section 11(2) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (interpretation of sections 4 to 10), the definition of “the prescribed limit” is amended as follows.(2) For paragraph (a) substitute—“(a) 22 microgrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of breath,”.(3) For paragraph (b) substitute—“(b) 50 milligrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood, or”.(4) For paragraph (c) substitute—“(c) “67 milligrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of urine,”.”
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 214C, I shall speak also to Amendment 214CB, both of which relate to drink-driving law. Let us imagine a world where you can pop to your GP and get a prescription for cocaine. If you want to lose weight, you not only have the choice of the 5:2 or the Atkins diet, but amphetamines are also prescribed by your doctor. On television there are advertisements of the health benefits of smoking cigarettes. Welcome to the United Kingdom in 1956, the year in which we set the level of alcohol you can have in your body and still drive legally. The law in England and Wales has remained unchanged since then. I hope these brief examples show how the greater understanding of the effect of drugs in the human body has changed laws in these areas and that we are well overdue a change to the drink-drive law.
I note at the outset that our law applies to all drivers: HGVs, taxis and bus drivers. For everyone, it is 80 milligrams in 100 millilitres of blood. Although for many years deaths and injuries caused by drink-driving have fallen, this is due to strong enforcement and other factors. In 1956, most cars did not even have brake discs, let alone servo-assisted brakes. You did not have to wear a seatbelt and airbags were still the stuff of fantasies. Your Lordships just have to cast your mind back to the series “Heartbeat”, and think of what the emergency services looked like then—the arched top of the ambulance, the canvas stretchers, the siren. There were no air ambulances, no fire crews cutting open the roof of your car, no fluids at the scene, no heart surgery by cracking open the chest at the roadside and there were no breathalysers at the roadside either.
We have much to be thankful for today. The police do a great job of enforcement, but they want the limit changed and it is high time we listened to them. Changing human behaviour, which changes in the law can bring about, is much more effective and cheaper in terms of human lives—most importantly—as well as financially, than relying on enforcing the law.
All other European countries have the lower limit outlined in Amendment 214C of 50 milligrams or below. All other common-law jurisdictions that I can find have done so as well. England and Wales stands alone. Scotland has changed the law to 50 milligrams and, as of 1 January of next year, Northern Ireland will have as well.
I have not owned a car for 10 years. I am an occasional driver and I am thankful that I have no direct personal experience of drink-driving accidents affecting my family. I am looking at this evidence as a lawyer and I am concerned that deaths from drink-driving have been static since 2010. We need something to prompt a further decline.
I note briefly three pieces of evidence that illustrate that these amendments are part of the answer. First, on reviewing all the available evidence, NICE in 2010 concluded:
“There is sufficiently strong evidence to indicate that lowering the BAC limit changes the drink-driving behaviour of all drivers at all BAC levels”.
The arguments here do not only revolve around those drivers who would fall within the new limit—those between 50 milligrams and 80 milligrams. This change is about all drivers and reducing drink-driving at all levels.
I have to stop here to note that only last night two teenagers lost their lives in Aldershot and a serving soldier has been arrested on suspicion of drunk-driving. This is about affecting the behaviour of all drivers in relation to alcohol. On the specific limit that is outlined in the amendment of 50 milligrams, the NICE report quotes a scientific review that states:
“Lowering the BAC level from 0.8 to 0.5 is effective”.
Secondly, on that specific reduction to 50 milligrams, which is something that Switzerland did in 2005, there was then a reduction in the number of those injured in alcohol-related crashes, according to the Swiss Council on Accident Prevention.
Thirdly and finally, 13% of all those who were breathalysed in 2014 in the UK following any road traffic collision were between the 50 milligram limit in the amendment and the current 80 milligram limit. In 40% of fatal accidents, the driver has alcohol in their system below the current legal limit of 80 milligrams. Around 240 families each year lose someone due to drink-driving.
We know that alcohol affects people’s driving. We have to think of how many collisions would be avoided completely if we reduced the limit. There is a roll call of organisations that are supporting the lowering the limit. These include the RAC, the RAC Foundation, the AA, Brake, the Institute of Advanced Motorists, the Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety, the Police Federation, the Royal College of Emergency Medicine, the College of Paramedics, the Fire Brigades Union, the British Medical Association, the Royal College of General Practitioners, the Royal Society for Public Health, the Alcohol Health Alliance and the Institute of Alcohol Studies. In fact, I not aware of a single similar organisation that is against reducing the drink-driving limit after 60 years.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, on tabling such a moderate amendment. I would have pushed for a much stronger lower limit. It is absolutely irresponsible for anybody to get into a car once they have had a drink. Here in Britain we have one of the highest limits in Europe. Some EU nations have completely banned drinking alcohol before getting into a car. Personally, that is what I would like to see.
The new limit would be equivalent to a pint of beer or a large glass of wine for a man and half a pint of beer or a small glass of wine for a woman. I argue that even that relatively small amount of alcohol affects your ability to drive. It reduces one’s inhibitions and perhaps one’s ability to speak clearly. If you drink that amount and then get into a car, you are making that car a dangerous weapon. I do not understand why it is acceptable to get into a car and then be likely to, or have the possibility, to injure or even kill somebody. Drink-driving led to 240 fatalities and more than 1,000 serious injuries in 2014, the last year for which we have figures. It is unreasonable to accept this number of deaths and injuries in our society. We should aim for zero deaths. The reason that so many drivers do not get killed any more is simply because of better medical practices. Help is given to them sooner and so they are more likely to kill or injure people outside their vehicle—pedestrians and cyclists.
We accept road deaths far too easily. I talk to people who say, “It just happens”, but it should not happen. Every death costs society over £2 million. That means every taxpayer pays for you getting into your car and going off and killing somebody. The £2 million cost is for social services, emergency services and medical services. We allow this ridiculous sum to happen on a regular basis.
We have not had the results of the Scottish trial yet, but Police Scotland said that in the nine months after the drink-drive limit was reduced in December 2014, the number of offences fell by 12.5%. That means people have been saved—they have not died or been seriously injured. There is also evidence that it has changed social attitudes. A December 2015 survey suggested that 82% of Scots now believe that drinking any alcohol before driving is unacceptable. That is the sort of thing that we should expect here in England as well. It is time to update this ridiculous figure, which allows somebody who has drunk far too much to be competent to get into a vehicle and be dangerous on our roads.
Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, for bringing this amendment. I have long form on this one. I first chaired an EU sub-committee in 2001 that recommended we should fall in line with what was happening in Europe and go down to 50. I moved a Private Member’s Bill—this year or last year, I forget—that ended up going through Committee stage and everything. It cleared the Lords so your Lordships, I hope, have not changed your minds and are still in favour of this—as on the previous occasion when an amendment was tabled. However, there was no shift from the Government.
The noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, raised a very interesting point about how we come here with evidence and everybody seeks the change, yet the change does not take place and the deaths continue. She mentioned that there has been a plateau in the number of deaths. There was a decline from 2000 to 2010 but there has been little shift, other than last year when it went marginally up. When I concluded my last contribution on this I forecast—I cannot remember the number—the number of deaths that would take place over 2015, 2016 and 2017. In fact, I think I probably underforecast because of the rise last year.
The simple reason for that is that the Government do not have any initiatives of any importance that are going to change the course of events. It is bits and tiny pieces here and there when we should be looking at the policy that has been proven to work in Scotland. We ended up with the Minister last time saying he would have conversations in Scotland. The Minister for Transport at the other end also said that he would have conversations in Scotland and look at the evidence there, but I have had no further reports from the people I know on the outturn of those conversations and I do not even know if they have been held.
Perhaps the Minister will be kind enough to advise us on what is coming out of Scotland. The initial evidence there was certainly compelling enough to indicate that the change was working and that it had effected a cultural change—people were not even driving the following day. One of the problems you get with drink-driving is that people still drive the following morning when they are intoxicated. That had changed in Scotland to a fair extent. I hope it is being maintained.
I hope the Government are taking this seriously and that at some stage we are going to get a lower limit—even Malta, the last remaining European country with a higher limit, is committed to fall in line down to 50; we alone remain. Ireland has changed. Northern Ireland is changing. Wales wants to change. Yet England alone holds out, wanting to be convinced. The evidence of the deaths is there and it is time we did something about it.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, I wonder whether the Committee will permit me to speak even though I did not hear the start of my noble friend’s speech—for which I sincerely apologise to the Committee.
I am disappointed that some time ago I tabled a Written Question, to be answered by my noble friend Lord Ahmad for the Department for Transport, asking when we expected to get useful statistics from the experience of Scotland. Although noble Lords have pointed to positive changes in compliance in Scotland, we really need to see from Scotland figures relating to the number of drivers who are far in excess of the legal limit. The statistics for England are very interesting—I found them compelling when I had to answer on this issue at the Dispatch Box. If the Minister cannot tell me now, perhaps she can write to the Committee, but I should like to know when we will get useful statistics from the Scottish experience. That will be very important in informing the Government’s decision on whether we should go to 50 or remain at 80. It is the persistent, unregulated drinkers who have very serious accidents—but without the statistics from Scotland I think we would be making a premature decision.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb
What does the noble Earl mean by “serious accidents”? People are being killed and seriously injured by those who have had a drink. A lot of the time those accidents are caused by people who have had far too much to drink but sometimes they are caused by people who have had a small amount to drink—but their faculties and ability to drive are lessened. So it is not just a question of drinking a lot; it is a question of drinking at all.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, I absolutely agree with the noble Baroness. Any alcohol whatever will to some extent cause a reduction in driving capability and increase the risk of having an accident. I am saying that we need to be careful and take advantage of a full range of statistics from the Scottish experience. I was disappointed with the Department for Transport because it could not tell me at what point it thought it would get useful statistics from Scotland.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am generally supportive of the amendments put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge. From my recollection of what she said, there was evidence of people involved in accidents who were not above the current legal limit but were above the proposed limit, and therefore there was some evidence that reducing the drink-driving limit would be beneficial. Am I wrong?
Baroness Berridge
If I remember correctly from the statistics provided by the Minister at the meeting, 3% of the fatalities are occurring within the 50 to 80 milligram limit. So there will be fewer deaths and correspondingly fewer injuries if we reduce the limit. There is then the added effect—and thus, one hopes, an exponential benefit—of changing everybody’s behaviour in relation to alcohol.
Lord Paddick
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for that explanation. To some extent, although it does not provide evidence of the Scottish experience, it shows that reducing the limit could have an effect by reducing the number of accidents that cause fatalities.
There are a couple of things that I am concerned about. One is the extent to which a change in the law would have a deterrent effect in the absence of increased enforcement by officers involved in roads policing. We know how much police forces have had to reduce their budgets and reduce the number of officers. My experience is certainly that roads policing is one of the first areas on the list when it comes to reductions. Does the Minister have any information about the deterrent effect of roads policing in relation to drink-driving that we need to consider in addition to the reduction in the drink-driving limit?
The other thing that I am concerned about is the increasing amount of drug-driving—that is, people who drive under the influence of illegal drugs—with a potentially even worse impact on their ability to drive than if they had taken a drink. I wonder whether a lower alcohol limit would cause people to move to taking drugs rather than alcohol for fear of being detected as being above the new alcohol limit, with such a change therefore having a negative impact or an unintended consequence. I would be very grateful if the Minister had any information on whether that has been the effect in Scotland.
Lord Harris of Haringey
I sometimes wonder about the priorities of this House and of government in considering these sorts of issues. I think most of those who know me recognise that I am fairly hawkish on counterterrorism, but the number of people in this country who have died as a consequence of terrorist acts since 2005 is less than the number of people who die in a single year because of drunk-driving between the limits that are currently against the law and those proposed by the noble Baroness.
Let us go back over all the legislation since the current limit was introduced—the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, took us back to what it was like in those times when we were all much younger—and consider how many pieces of legislation, full Bills, have been brought forward by the Home Office to deal with the threat from terrorism. It is usually about one a year, sometimes more—full Bills containing lots of new offences. Yet there is clear evidence that these new limits would reduce the number of deaths, they are fairly straightforward to administer and yet we keep waiting and putting off the decision. That seems to me an issue that we should all address, and we should be conscious that sometimes we have double standards. I will continue to argue for stronger counterterrorism, but it is rather striking that we do not resolve something like this, which would make a real difference, and would stop the wrecking not only of the lives of the families of those who have died but also of the lives of those who cause the deaths.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, Amendment 214C, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and my noble friend Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, reduces the legal alcohol limits in England and Wales to match the limits introduced by the Scottish Government on 5 December 2014.
My noble friend Lord Harris made a particularly powerful point in respect of deaths caused through drink-driving. I am very supportive of this amendment, as I think we need tough laws on drinking and driving that are effectively enforced.
I also think that it would be quite good to have the same limit across the whole of Great Britain, and ideally the whole of the United Kingdom. This would make it much easier to understand for everyone concerned. I am also not against having a lower limit for commercial drivers and novices.
There is clear evidence that a reduction in the drink-drive limits would save lives. No one has said that is not the case. We have the highest limits in Europe. Only Malta has the same drink-drive limit we have in this country. The limit introduced by the Scottish Government is the same one that is in force in Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Switzerland. So the case is powerful. In none of these countries is there a problem with the limit being effective.
The second amendment in the group, again in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, and my noble friend Lord Brooke, seeks to create a lower limit for novice and professional drivers. Again, I think that this is something we should consider. Many countries have this. That is certainly the case in many of the countries I read out, including Ireland and North Ireland. I think that it is important, if you are a professional or a novice driver, to have a lower limit.
I passed my driving test 36 years ago. I remember getting my first car—you are let loose and you are in there on your own. If you think about it, you are not very experienced at that point. Therefore it would be a good to enforce a lower limit. The fact is that our limits are comparatively high. I hope the Minister will respond to the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge. It is very good, and I hope that we will get a positive response from the Government. If not, I hope that the noble Baroness will bring it back on Report. I assure her that if she wants to test the opinion of the House at that point, we will support her.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I know that these amendments relate to concerns around the Government’s approach to drink-driving limits, particularly in light of changes in the law in Scotland and Northern Ireland, and, more recently, with a proposed change in Malta to lower the drink-drive limit. First, I emphasise that tackling drink-driving is a priority for the Government and that, together with the police, we continue to take robust enforcement action against this reckless behaviour.
Other countries may have a lower alcohol limit, but they do not necessarily have a better record on reducing drink-drive casualties. While it is difficult to make direct comparisons, some stark contrasts clearly exist between ourselves and our European neighbours. Estonia, for example, with a population of 1.3 million, has a limit of 20 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood and carries out 10 times more breath tests than we do in Great Britain. Yet 160 people died there in 2014 as a result of drink-driving. That rate is 30 times greater per head than in Britain. Closer to home, we can look at France. With a similar population to us, it suffers nearly four times the drink-drive fatalities that we do. Even taking into account those cases that fall between its limit and ours, we perform significantly better.
In many of these countries a first drink-drive offence gets you a fine and some penalty points. Indeed, in Northern Ireland they intend to bring in a fixed penalty notice regime. They will hand out penalty points to those offenders found to be over the new limit but under the old one. There is no appetite amongst the public or road safety groups in England and Wales to reduce the penalties and not disqualify offenders who flout the law. Nor would we wish to create in the minds of potential offenders the thought that they might get only a fine and penalty points and so encourage them to drink and drive.
In England and Wales, the success we have had in tackling drink-driving has been down to the severe penalties, rigorously enforced and backed up with hard-hitting campaigns, which now make this behaviour utterly socially unacceptable. Our roads continue to be amongst the safest in the world because we crack down on those who break the law. Last year we made it a requirement for those convicted of drink-driving offences to undertake medical tests to ensure they are not still dependent on alcohol before they are allowed to drive again.
The same legislation, the Deregulation Act 2015, also made an important change to drink-driving laws by removing the so-called “statutory option”, which allowed drivers who provided a breath test that was slightly in excess of the prescribed limit to demand a blood or urine test back at the station. By removing this provision, individuals have been denied the chance to sober up and so drop below the prescribed limit while waiting for a blood or urine sample to be taken.
Yes, there is always more to be done, but harmonisation with other countries with a poorer record of tackling drink-driving is not a reason in itself to lower the limit.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
In this debate no one has said that we want to lower the penalties—just to lower the limits. We have a good record in this country, and I give credit to our police service for that. The noble Baroness’s amendment is asking only to reduce the limits. She did not talk about penalties or enforcement, and, of course, as my noble friend Lord Harris said, if we looked at the number of deaths caused under the limit enforced now and above the proposed limit, we could save more lives.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, the arguments proposed by noble Lords are ones we have heard for many years. The arguments have not changed. Why, therefore, did the party opposite not lower the limit when they were in government? The reason is that it is a tricky issue.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb
My Lords, we are not talking about the past but about now. We have an opportunity to do something now: to save lives and prevent serious injuries. I do not understand this reluctance to face facts. As the noble Lord said—is he a friend?
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb
As my noble friend said, we are not talking about comparing ourselves with other countries, and nor are we arguing for any other changes. We are not talking about drug-driving but specifically about drink-driving and the damage it does to innocent lives.
Lord Harris of Haringey
Since we are having open season during this intervention in the Minister’s speech, could we also deal with why other countries’ records are worse although they have tighter limits? This debate is not about behaviour in France, or in Estonia, and I do not want to get into a pre-Brexit rant about the behaviour of foreigners, or anything like that. If those countries felt that the problem was so bad that they needed to take even tougher measures, that is a matter for them. We are talking about proposals that would save lives in this country at the present time. That is what these amendments are about.
Earl Attlee
I hope the Minister will finish by saying that when we get the statistics from Scotland she will study them carefully and possibly review the policy. But claiming that lowering the limit will reduce fatalities is an assertion, and it is not necessarily the case. We need to wait for the evidence, particularly relating to fatalities caused by those people who are far over the limit. I do hope the Minister will say something useful about how she will take full account of the statistics we will shortly get from Scotland.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, we are in Committee and we can do what we like. The noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, put the argument very clearly in relation to the number of deaths that occur as a result of people who have more drink in their blood than the limit she is proposing but less than the current limit. If those deaths could be prevented that would be a net gain.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, I understand the argument but the difficulty is that those offences could just be caused by people making a stupid mistake and I am not sure that lowering the limit would solve the problem.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, can I intervene on myself? I totally understand what noble Lords are saying. I am not trying to compare us to other countries but to demonstrate that where there is a combination of factors, such as enforcement and type of penalty regime, different results are thrown up. It is not just the drink-drive limit that has an effect, albeit that we have, of course, reduced ours—our enforcement is also very strong. I hope I have made it clear that it is not just the limit that is important but other factors, too. I am now going to provide a bit more detail, which noble Lords will be relieved to hear.
The Department for Transport collects coroners’ data. Of drivers killed on the road, over 72% have little or no alcohol in their systems—and I am talking here about 0 to 9 milligrams of alcohol, which must be less than a sip of a glass of red wine. So, the vast majority of drivers killed on the road have no or little alcohol in their system; I will leave noble Lords to conclude why. Just over 3% have a blood alcohol content between 20 and 50 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, while a similar proportion, just under 3%, were found to have between 50 and 80 milligrams. However, the proportion of drivers killed jumps significantly to 17% for those with above 80 milligrams in their systems. This is the evidence that shows us where the risk lies and therefore where we should target our efforts. But I emphasise that statistic about drivers killed on the road who have virtually no alcohol in their system—perhaps their deaths are a result of being elderly or less able to react to what is happening around them, but noble Lords will reach their own conclusions.
We do not, however, tolerate drug-impaired driving, which I think the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked about. That is why we introduced the new drug-driving offence in March 2015, setting specified limits for 17 drugs. The police are having success in taking these dangerous drivers off our roads and we are on target to convict over 7,000 drug drivers in 2016 compared to 879 in 2014. Indeed, 20% of drug-drivers convicted between 2009 and 2014 had previous drink-driving convictions. Our evaluation of the new drug-driving law has also highlighted just how dangerous these drivers are: 63% of those convicted in 2015 under the new Section 5A law had a previous conviction; 22% were serial offenders with more than 11 offences to their name. It means that we will be taking more than 1,500 drug- driving offenders who are also serial offenders off our roads this year.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
The Minister said that the statistics on what is happening in Scotland will be available shortly. Is she telling the Committee that the UK Government will evaluate them when they become available?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the UK Government will look at them with great interest. There may be compelling evidence that comes out of them. Basically, the Government will look at them when they come out.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, it seems that we will have to wait a very long time for these statistics, until summer next year. It is possible that I am wrong in my position and that the statistics will tell us so. Is there nothing that can be done to speed up the production of the statistics? Perhaps the Minister would like to write to me on that point rather than answering straightaway.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, we do not really have any jurisdiction to tell Scotland what to do about getting the statistics. I hope that they will be ready as soon as possible.
Baroness Berridge
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, for putting their names to the amendment—and for noble Lords making the most of the generous rules in Committee for debating this issue. I agree with my noble friend the Minister that changing the law will not change anything if we do not then support it with a campaign to make people aware. Clearly, we now have a cross-border issue anyway. We need to make people aware that there is a difference in the law as they drive over the border from Cumbria or Northumberland into Scotland.
I agree with my noble friend that it is clear from the statistics that risk increases exponentially over the 80 milligram limit. However, that is not to say that under that limit there is not a risk with which we need to deal. To say that we are just targeting the most dangerous individuals does not give any reassurance to an affected family member. We need to look at this again.
My noble friend outlined the figures from coroners about drivers killed on the roads. Because of the complex factors that I outlined on the law, enforcement and the safety of vehicles, 60% of the people who are now injured or killed are not the driver of the vehicle concerned. People should be able to walk or cycle down the street and not be concerned that there are people with an amount of alcohol in their blood that affects their safety. That is why we do not look at the limit over which risk rises exponentially for train drivers and airline pilots. We say that they cannot drink. Why, then, do we have a different attitude on the roads? That is not sustainable.
As a lawyer, I do take into account the argument of my noble friend Lord Attlee who asks whether we can prove beyond reasonable doubt that taking this limit down from 80 to 50 will definitely save lives. I cannot prove this to an absolute certainty, but on at least the balance of probabilities. Reducing the limit from 80 to 50 in Switzerland—and the Swiss are known for being compliant people—produced evidence of a reduction in injuries and deaths. There is evidence out there to say that if we reduced the limit along with maintaining compliance, telling people and promoting messages, we would, with very little effort, stand an incredibly good chance of reducing the number of deaths on our roads.
This is an amendment for which the Police Federation are asking. The police are our enforcement. I commend their enforcement as well as the amazing medical care that is all part of this picture. However, we now need to play our role. Therefore, I hope that my noble friend the Minster will go away and reflect. Although the Chamber is not well populated and we have not heard from the often influential Cross-Benchers on this matter, the feeling in this Committee is that this is something that we could do and that at this stage we have enough evidence to change the law. Now is the right time of year.
I thank my noble friend the Minister. I hope that we shall hear of a change of position but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“SCHEDULE 15ALATE NIGHT LEVY REQUIREMENTS1 Chapter 2 of Part 2 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (late night levy) is amended as follows.2 (1) Section 126 (“relevant late night authorisation” and related definitions) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (2)—(a) for ““Relevant late night authorisation”” substitute ““Relevant late night alcohol authorisation”;(b) after “licensing authority” insert “, a late night levy requirement”;(c) at the end of paragraph (b) insert “(whether or not it also authorises the provision of late night refreshment at a time or times during such a period)”.(3) After subsection (2) insert—“(2A) “Relevant late night refreshment authorisation”, in relation to a licensing authority, a late night levy requirement and a levy year, means a premises licence which— (a) is granted by the authority, (b) authorises the provision of late night refreshment at a time or times during the late night supply period on one or more days in the related payment year, and(c) does not also authorise the supply of alcohol at a time or times during any such period.”(4) After subsection (3) insert—“(3A) Where a licensing authority decides under section 125(2) to apply a late night levy requirement in respect of both relevant late night alcohol authorisations and relevant late night refreshment authorisations, the licensing authority may determine under section 132(1)—(a) a single late night levy period that is to apply in respect of both kinds of authorisations, or(b) two late night levy periods, one of which to is to apply in respect of relevant late night alcohol authorisations and the other of which is to apply in respect of relevant late night refreshment authorisations.”(5) In subsection (5), for “The late night supply period” substitute “A late night supply period”.(6) In subsection (8)—(a) for “the late night levy requirement” substitute “a late night levy requirement”;(b) omit “in its area”.3 (1) Section 127 (liability to pay late night levy) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (1)—(a) for “the late night levy requirement” substitute “a late night levy requirement”;(b) after “the area” insert “or part of the area”;(c) for “a relevant late night authorisation” substitute “a late night authorisation to which the requirement relates”.(3) In subsection (2), for “a relevant late night authorisation” substitute “a late night authorisation to which the requirement relates”.(4) After subsection (2) insert—“(2A) In addition, if the requirement relates to a late night authorisation that is a relevant late night refreshment authorisation, the holder of the authorisation is not liable to pay the late night levy for a levy year if only hot drinks are supplied (or held out for supply) in reliance on the authorisation during the levy year.”(5) In subsection (3), for “in its area” substitute “in relation to the late night levy requirement”.4 (1) Section 128 (amount of late night levy) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (1) after “For” insert “any levy requirement and”.(3) In subsection (2), for “a relevant late night authorisation” substitute “a late night authorisation to which a late night levy requirement relates”.(4) In subsection (3)—(a) after “in relation to” insert “a late night levy requirement and”;(b) for “in its area” substitute “in relation to the late night levy requirement”.(5) In subsection (4)—(a) for “the late night levy” substitute “a late night levy”;(b) after “the same” insert “, in respect of all late night levy requirements”; (c) for “the levy” substitute “a levy”;(d) omit “for the levy year”. 5 (1) Section 129 (payment and administration of the levy) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (1), in the closing words, for “the late night levy” substitute “a late night levy”.(3) In subsection (2)—(a) for “the levy” substitute “a levy”;(b) for “relevant late night authorisations” substitute “a late night authorisation to which a late night levy requirement relates”.(4) In subsection (4)—(a) in paragraph (a), for “a relevant late night authorisation” substitute “a late night authorisation to which a late night levy requirement relates”;(b) in paragraph (b), for “a relevant late night authorisation” substitute “a late night authorisation to which a late night levy requirement relates”;(c) in paragraph (c), for “the relevant late night authorisation” substitute “a relevant late night alcohol authorisation to which a late night levy requirement relates”;(d) in the closing words, for “the levy year” substitute “the levy year in question”.(5) In subsection (5), for “the late night levy” substitute “a late night levy”.(6) In subsection (6), in the closing words, for “the late night levy” (in both places where it occurs) substitute “a late night levy”.6 (1) Section 130 (net amount of levy payments) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (1), after “In this Chapter” insert “, in relation to a late night levy requirement,”.(3) In subsection (3), for “the late night levy requirement” substitute “a late night levy requirement”.(4) In subsection (5), in the opening words, at the beginning insert “In relation to a late night levy requirement,”.7 (1) Section 131 (application of net amount of levy payments) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (1), at the beginning insert “In relation to a late night levy requirement,”.(3) After subsection (4) insert—“(4A) The licensing authority must publish information as to how it applies the remainder of the net amount mentioned in subsection (2)(b).(4B) The information must be published at least once in each calendar year during which any part of the remainder is applied.(4C) It is for the licensing authority to determine the manner in which the information is published.”(4) In subsection (6)(b), for “in respect of the levy” substitute “in respect of a levy”.8 (1) Section 132 (introduction of late night levy requirement) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (1)—(a) in the opening words, for “the late night levy requirement” substitute “a late night levy requirement”;(b) in those words, omit “in its area”;(c) in paragraph (b)—(i) in sub-paragraph (i), after “period” insert “or periods (as to which see section 126(3A))”;(ii) in sub-paragraph (ii), omit “in its area”; (iii) in sub-paragraph (iii), omit “in its area”.9 (1) Section 133 (amendment of late night levy requirement) is amended as follows. (2) In subsection (1)— (a) in the opening words, for the words from the beginning to “section 125,” substitute “Where, in consequence of a decision by a licensing authority under section 125, a late night levy requirement applies,”(b) in paragraph (a), omit “in the area”;(c) in paragraph (c), for “in the area” substitute “in relation to the late night levy requirement”.(3) After subsection (1) insert—“(1A) Where the late night levy requirement is in respect of both relevant late night alcohol authorisations and relevant late night refreshment authorisations, the power conferred by subsection (1)(b) includes—(a) where a single late night levy period applies, power to decide that two late night levy periods are to apply instead;(b) where two late night levy periods apply, power to decide that a single late night levy period is to apply instead.”(4) In subsection (4)—(a) in paragraph (b), omit “in the area of a licensing authority”;(b) in that paragraph, after “relevant decision” insert “by a licensing authority”;(c) in the closing words, omit “in its area”.10 (1) Section 134 (introduction or variation of late night levy requirement: procedure) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (1)—(a) in paragraph (a), for “the late night levy requirement” substitute “a late night levy requirement”;(b) in that paragraph, omit “in the area of the licensing authority”;(c) in paragraph (b), for “the late night levy requirement” substitute “a late night levy requirement”;(d) in that paragraph omit “in the area of the licensing authority”.(3) In subsection (2)—(a) in paragraph (a)(iii), for “relevant late night authorisations” substitute “late night authorisations to which the levy requirement in question relates or would relate”;(b) in paragraph (c)(i), for “so as to cease to be a relevant late night authorisation before the beginning of the first levy year” substitute “so that it is not a late night authorisation to which the levy requirement relates at the beginning of the first levy year”.(4) In subsection (3)—(a) for “the late night levy requirement” substitute “a late night levy requirement”;(b) omit “to the area of a licensing authority”.(5) In subsection (4)—(a) for “the late night levy requirement” substitute “a late night levy requirement”;(b) omit “in its area”.(6) Omit subsection (5).11 (1) Section 135 (permitted exemption and reduction categories) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (1)— (a) in paragraph (a), for “relevant late night authorisations” substitute “relevant late night alcohol authorisations or relevant late night refreshment authorisations”;(b) in that paragraph, for “the requirement to pay the late night levy is not to apply” substitute “no requirement to pay a late night levy is to apply”; (c) in paragraph (b), for “relevant late night authorisations” substitute “relevant late night alcohol authorisations or relevant late night refreshment authorisations”;(d) in that paragraph, for “the levy” substitute “a levy”.(3) In subsection (2), omit “in its area”.(4) In subsection (4)—(a) in paragraph (a), for “the levy” substitute “a levy”;(b) in paragraph (b), for “the levy” substitute “a levy”;(c) in the closing words—(i) for “the late night levy” substitute “a late night levy”;(ii) after “the same” insert “, in respect of all late night levy requirements,”;(iii) for “relevant late night authorisations” substitute “relevant late night alcohol authorisations or relevant late night refreshment authorisations”;(iv) omit “for a levy year”.12 After section 136 insert—“136A Late night levy: requests by relevant local policing bodies(1) The relevant local policing body in relation to a licensing authority may request the licensing authority to make a proposal for a decision under section 125(2) that a late night levy requirement of a kind described in the request is to apply.(2) In deciding whether to make a request, the relevant local policing body must consider the matters mentioned in section 125(3).(3) A request must be accompanied by any evidence the relevant local policing body has in support of its request.(4) In deciding how to respond to the request, the licensing authority must consider the matters mentioned in section 125(3).(5) The licensing authority must publish—(a) the request, including the evidence accompanying it, and(b) its response to the request.(6) The response must include reasons, including an explanation of the outcome of the authority’s consideration of the matters mentioned in section 125(3).(7) It is for the licensing authority to determine the manner in which it publishes the request and its response under subsection (4).”13 (1) Section 137 (interpretation) is amended as follows.(2) For ““the late night levy requirement” substitute ““a late night levy requirement”.(3) At the appropriate place insert—““late night refreshment” has the same meaning as in the Licensing Act 2003 (see Schedule 2 to that Act);”.(4) In the definition of ““levy year”—(a) for “the late night levy requirement” substitute “a late night levy requirement”;(b) omit “in the area of the authority”.(5) In the definition of ““payment year”, for “a relevant late night authorisation” substitute “a late night authorisation to which a late night levy requirement relates”.”
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, Clause 140 provides for a requirement to produce a nationality document in the case where,
“an individual has been arrested on suspicion of the commission of an offence”,
and,
“an immigration officer or constable”,
gives,
“the individual a notice requiring the production of a nationality document”.
This amendment comes from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member. The committee regarded Article 14—the anti-discrimination article—as being engaged. The organisation Liberty has argued that if these powers,
“are to operate in a similar fashion to powers in the Immigration Bill”,
which a number of us will recall,
“immigration checks would become a routine aspect of every police engagement with a suspect. It is difficult to think how suspicion”,
which is required,
“will be generated if this is not the intended model, short of the police making assumptions about an individual’s status on the basis of appearance or accent”.
The committee noted the risk in this provision that requirements to confirm nationality could have a differential impact on BAME UK citizens. As our report says:
“We also questioned whether a person asked to produce a passport or other nationality document should instead be entitled to supply documentation sufficient to demonstrate an entitlement to such a document”,
since not everyone has a passport. We contacted the then Minister for the subject, who told the committee in the summer:
“Before deciding to issue a notice requiring a nationality document to be produced, as a matter of operational best practice, officers should check whether or not there is an immigration interest with Home Office Immigration Enforcement. If, having undertaken these checks, it is confirmed that the individual is not a UK national (or it is suspected the person may not be), it is a proportionate response to require the production of a document in order to properly establish identity. Should a UK national not possess a passport but are able to produce evidence (documentary or otherwise) that they are entitled to one under the terms of published guidance, it is reasonable that officers should take that into account. We”—
the Government—
“do not consider it necessary that such eventualities are set out on the face of the Bill, but will instead issue guidance to officers in that regard”.
The Joint Committee made the following point:
“If the Government accepts that alternative documentation may be required in circumstances where an individual does not possess a passport or driving licence, it is not clear why this fact should not be stated on the face of the Bill”.
This is a safeguard, after all, and something more than operational guidance would be appropriate. I beg to move.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness and the other members of the Joint Committee on Human Rights for their consideration of the Bill. It is accepted that there may be situations where a UK national does not possess a passport and should be able to produce other documentary evidence to satisfy an officer that they are entitled to one under the terms of published government guidance.
The Government’s view is that this matter can properly be addressed through guidance, but in the light of the Joint Committee’s recommendation, I am content to take this amendment away and consider it further in advance of Report. I trust that, on that basis, the noble Baroness would be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, four minutes has achieved more than I might have expected. I realise that perhaps, in reading the content of the report fairly quickly, I might not have sufficiently stressed the risks of discrimination with which we were particularly concerned. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Sharkey
“Posthumous pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences
(1) A person who has been convicted of, or cautioned for, an offence specified in subsection (3) and who has died before this section comes into force is pardoned for the offence if two conditions are met.(2) Those conditions are that—(a) the other person involved in the conduct constituting the offence consented to it and was aged 16 or over, and (b) any such conduct at the time this section comes into force would not be an offence under section 71 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sexual activity in a public lavatory).(3) The offences to which subsection (1) applies are—(a) an offence under section 12 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (buggery) or under section 13 of that Act (gross indecency between men);(b) an offence under any of the following provisions (which made provision similar to section 12 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956)—(i) 25 Hen. 8 c. 6 (1533) (an Act for the punishment of the vice of buggery);(ii) 2 & 3 Edw. 6 c. 29 (1548) (an Act against sodomy);(iii) 5 Eliz. 1 c. 17 (1562) (an Act for the punishment of the vice of buggery);(iv) section 15 of 9 Geo. 4 c. 31 (1828) (an Act for consolidating and amending the law relating to offences against the person); (v) section 61 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861;(c) an offence under section 11 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 (which made provision similar to section 13 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956).(4) The references in subsection (3) to offences under particular provisions are to be read as including offences under—(a) section 45 of the Naval Discipline Act 1866,(b) section 41 of the Army Act 1881,(c) section 41 of the Air Force Act 1917,(d) section 70 of the Army Act 1955,(e) section 70 of the Air Force Act 1955, or(f) section 42 of the Naval Discipline Act 1957,which are such offences by virtue of the provisions mentioned in subsection (3).(5) The reference in subsection (2)(b) to an offence under section 71 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 is to be read as including a reference to an offence under section 42 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 which is such an offence by virtue of section 71 of that Act of 2003.(6) The following provisions of section 101 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 apply for the purposes of this section and section (Sections (Posthumous pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences) and (Other pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences): supplementary))(1) (so far as relating to this section) as they apply for the purposes of Chapter 4 of Part 5 of that Act—(a) in subsection (1), the definitions of “caution”, “conviction”, and “sentence” (and the related definition of “service disciplinary proceedings”);(b) subsections (2) and (5) to (7).”
Lord Sharkey (LD)
My Lords, I shall also speak to Amendment 214F. Both amendments are in my name and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, and the noble Lords, Lord Lexden and Lord Black of Brentwood. These amendments each do one simple thing. Amendment 214E grants posthumous pardons to those men, now deceased, who were convicted under the dreadful Labouchere amendment and other homophobic legislation, for acts that would now not be crimes. Amendment 214F provides that a pardon is granted to those living who were similarly convicted and who have, or will have, obtained a disregard under the Protection of Freedoms Act. I am very glad to say that the Government have said they will support these amendments and I thank the Minister for her help and encouragement.
If these amendments pass, it will be the culmination of a long campaign to put right a historic injustice. Some 65,000 men were convicted under the Labouchere amendment and other anti-gay statutes. Of these, 16,000 are still alive and 49,000 are dead. When we passed the Protection of Freedoms Act in 2012 we made provisions for the living 16,000 to have their convictions disregarded. That is, for all practical purposes, the convictions would no longer have any effect. That was a great step forward. We recognised a terrible injustice and did something to make amends and to put things right. At the time it seemed to me that the 49,000 men convicted but now dead deserved exactly the same treatment. It seemed a straightforward argument. The disregard for the living acknowledged a wrong and offered a partial remedy. Simple justice suggested that we do the same for the dead. We should acknowledge the wrong done to them and should provide some comfort to their relatives, their friends and their memory.
I tried, with other noble Lords, notably the noble Lords, Lord Black of Brentwood, Lord Lexden and Lord Faulkner of Worcester, to amend the Protection of Freedoms Act to do exactly that—to extend the disregard posthumously. I tried via the LASPO Bill in March 2012 and via the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill once in July 2014 and again that October. During this process the Government’s position began to shift. The initial and rather blunt refusal to take action became a willingness to discuss and, eventually, a willingness to help. I was encouraged to persevere and to promote a posthumous pardon for Alan Turing. There was a feeling that, if Turing were pardoned, it would be morally impossible not to extend that pardon to all those others similarly convicted but now dead. So it would prove, if these amendments now pass. If they do, we will finally be putting right a cruel and unjust historic wrong—a wrong that has wrecked the lives of thousands of gay men. I urge your Lordships to support these amendments and I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I intervene on the noble Lord to say that not only do the Government support this amendment, we strongly support it. I thought that might be helpful to the debate in Committee.
Lord Lexden (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure and, indeed, an honour to support the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Sharkey. They represent the culmination of work done over several years by my noble friend to secure as much redress as is practicable for victims of grave injustice, including those who are no longer alive—gay men who suffered great wrong simply for giving expression to the love that for far too long dared not speak its name but has thankfully found its full and authentic voice in our times. My noble friend kept the issue before successive Ministers and their officials. It is in part due to the polite but enduring pressure that he applied that commitment to action was included in the Conservative Party manifesto at the last general election. As my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford has already made clear, these amendments will be accepted by the Government. It is a day of great importance for gay people, a view shared by my noble friend Lord Black of Brentwood, who has also put his name to these amendments but has had to leave the Chamber.
I turn to Amendments 214H to 214L, 235A and 239C in my name. My amendments have two aims. The first is to extend the pardons for iniquitous former offences, now abolished, that will be available to living and deceased persons in England and Wales to their counterparts in Northern Ireland. The second aim is to extend the disregard scheme now in operation in England and Wales to Northern Ireland, where at present it does not exist. The first of the amendments relating to pardons, Amendment 214H, includes provision for legislation that is specific to Northern Ireland. Through this amendment and the two that follow, pardons could be granted in the same manner as in England and Wales.
Because there is no disregard scheme, the foundation on which pardons will rest in Northern Ireland, Amendment 214L, is vital. It will insert a new clause in the Bill that would make a number of amendments to the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, changing the scope of Chapter 4 of Part 5. As a result, application could be made to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to have a conviction or caution in respect of an abolished offence in Northern Ireland disregarded. Since justice and policing are now transferred matters in Northern Ireland, the responsibility for designing and implementing a disregard scheme would in practice be expected to rest with the Northern Ireland Executive. Exactly how the system would work may need further consideration; it must clearly be fully acceptable in all its details to the Executive.
The impetus for the extension to Northern Ireland of the arrangements proposed in England and Wales has come from Northern Ireland itself. I am merely the spokesman and agent of courageous campaigners for full gay rights in the Province who are working to achieve complete equality with the rest of the UK. No one has done more to create support for the amendments I have put forward than Councillor Jeffrey Dudgeon MBE, who in 1981 paved the way for the decriminalisation of homosexuality in Northern Ireland through a successful case at the European Court of Human Rights.
The five main parties in the Northern Ireland Assembly have all pledged support for the principles embodied in the amendments. I am in the fortunate position of being able to tell your Lordships’ House that yesterday the Minister of Justice in Northern Ireland, Claire Sugden, announced that a legislative consent Motion would shortly be introduced in the Assembly enabling these amendments, after any revision that may be needed, to become law in Northern Ireland.
Lord Cashman (Lab)
My Lords, I support the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, extending the provisions to Northern Ireland, and I shall speak to the amendments in my name. I congratulate the noble Lord on the success he has had with these amendments in relation to the announcement from the Justice Minister Claire Sugden. The noble Lord’s record on seeking to achieve equal rights in Northern Ireland, not least on equal access to marriage, is unblemished and should be celebrated because at its very heart is the concept that we should have equality and access to equal rights across the United Kingdom, not based on where we live.
I will quote from two organisations in Northern Ireland. A Northern Ireland-based LGBT organisation replied to the announcement that the measure would go before the Northern Ireland Assembly by saying:
“This is the first time that the Northern Ireland Assembly has made positive moves in respect of LGB&T legislation and we are hopeful that with cross-party support the pardons will be applicable to convictions made against … men living in Northern Ireland”.
I also join the noble Lord in celebrating the work and success of LGBT people and their allies and NGOs in Northern Ireland. Quite rightly, this is their success; and not the least of them is Councillor Jeff Dudgeon MBE, who has been a pioneer, affecting so positively the lives of so many across the United Kingdom and beyond.
Before I speak specifically to my two amendments—214S and 214R—I need to pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, for his exemplary work over the years in pressing the case for equality, even when some have not wanted to listen to the arguments, noble and right though they are. My only difference with him on my amendments are on two major elements. My Amendment 214S differs from the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and others in two key respects. First, it would grant a pardon to any person convicted of or cautioned for a now abolished offence, providing that they meet certain conditions, regardless of whether they are living or dead.
I disagree with the need to create two different systems for pardoning people in respect of these offences—one for the living and one for the dead. I cannot honestly see the logic of saying to a living person, “You must apply to have your conviction or caution disregarded to be eligible for a pardon,” while at the same time saying, “If you have died, you will get a pardon automatically”. That is not logical, and I am afraid that it appears to confuse the purpose of a pardon and the purpose of the disregard scheme. My amendment makes it abundantly clear that any person, subject to the specified conditions, who suffered a conviction or caution under these offences is pardoned. For those living with an historic conviction or caution, the disregard scheme is available to address any negative consequences caused by a police or other record.
The second way in which my amendment differs from that of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and others, is that it would extend pardons to those convicted or cautioned under Section 32 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 and its corresponding earlier provisions in the Vagrancy Act 1898. Let me be absolutely clear: this would not grant a pardon to any person convicted or cautioned for soliciting. My amendment makes it clear that anyone convicted or cautioned for any conduct that would now constitute the offence of soliciting under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 would not be pardoned; nor would a pardon extend to a person whose conviction or caution was the result of conduct involving any other person under 16. What my amendment would do is grant pardons for all those persons who were convicted or cautioned for what was once called “importuning for immoral purposes”. The immoral purposes, in many cases, amounted to nothing more, as the Home Office report Setting the Boundaries recognised in 2000, than one man chatting up another man. That report recommended the repeal of the offence, and that was carried through.
On a personal note, I lived through that campaign of hate and fear. I was a 16 year-old gay man when the age of consent was set at 21 and homosexual acts in private were decriminalised. I still had no protection as a young gay man who wanted to exercise his attraction and his love for others. I, too, suffered the threat of coming out of a bar or a pub in places such as Earl’s Court, where a lot of homosexual and bisexual men gathered. We felt safe together, but coming out of such a pub or a club and looking at another man and smiling at him could have possibly got me arrested for soliciting for an immoral purpose.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, I rise briefly to support the general thrust of these amendments because the underlying legislation and the policy behind it was so fatally flawed. I am just sad that it took me and many others so long to realise that the whole policy was 100% flawed and caused unnecessary problems.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, this has been an important debate and I am pleased to be able to respond on behalf of the Opposition.
I can support all the amendments in this group as far as they go, although some go further than others. I was particularly pleased to see the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, which extend posthumous pardons to Northern Ireland. However, further rights need to be won for LGBT people and women in Northern Ireland, as well as on the mainland. We must return to them at a later date.
I join my noble friend Lord Cashman in paying tribute to the noble Lords, Lord Lexden and Lord Sharkey, for their tireless campaigning. I also pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Cashman for his tireless campaigning to deliver equality for LGBT people. There has been tremendous progress in the past 20 years in particular, and my noble friend has been there, standing up, making the case and challenging prejudice, hate and injustice. We are all grateful to him. The most comprehensive amendments in the group are those in the name of my noble friend and they have my full support. I very much agree with him that granting a pardon to any person convicted of or cautioned for a now-abolished offence, providing they meet certain conditions, and regardless of whether they are living or dead, is the way to proceed. His amendments go further in that they extend pardons to those convicted or cautioned under Section 32 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 or the Vagrancy Act.
My noble friend made it clear that nothing in his amendments would grant a pardon to any person convicted or cautioned for soliciting. Nor would the amendments grant a pardon to anyone convicted or cautioned in respect of conduct involving a person under the age of 16. My noble friend gave an important illustration of the effect of Section 32 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, and I agree that it is important to right this wrong for both those who are living and those who are dead. Treat them equally. This is the right thing to do. No one would be pardoned for anything that is still an offence. I hope your Lordships’ House will accept my noble friend’s amendments.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I am pleased to be able, on behalf of the Government, to warmly welcome Amendments 214E, 214F, 214G, 239A and 246, and I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, on bringing them forward, as well as the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, who spoke so movingly.
As the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, explained, these amendments broadly do two things. First, they confer an automatic pardon on deceased individuals convicted of certain consensual gay sexual offences that would not be offences today. Secondly, they confer a pardon on those persons still living who have a conviction for such an offence that has been disregarded under the terms of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. It is important to note that for the pardon to apply, the conduct in question must have been consensual and involved another person aged 16 or over, which is the current age of consent. The conduct must also not involve an offence of sexual activity in a public lavatory, which is still illegal today.
This historic step is momentous in righting wrongs suffered by thousands of gay and bisexual men. It is a tragedy that people were criminalised over a shamefully long time for something that society regards today as normal sexual activity. It is time to right the wrongs of the past and I am pleased to support the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, in putting forward these amendments.
It is important that we link the pardons for the living to the disregard process so that the necessary checks can be carried out to identify whether the individual in question engaged in activity that constitutes an offence today. Since the disregard scheme under the Protection of Freedoms Act came into force, eight disregard applications that concerned non-consensual activity have been rejected. It is therefore crucial that a pardon for the living should only follow a successful disregard application. This mitigates the risk of individuals claiming to be cleared of offences that are still crimes today. It takes into account and protects the rights of victims and ensures that children and vulnerable people are safeguarded from potential risks. This is extremely important and an objective with which I am sure noble Lords would agree. It is for these reasons that the Government cannot commend to the Committee Amendment 214S in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Cashman.
The amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Lexden seek to make corresponding provision for Northern Ireland. The Committee will be aware of the established convention that the UK Parliament legislates on devolved matters in Northern Ireland only with the consent of the Northern Ireland Assembly. Subject to observing that convention, the Government are ready to look favourably at amendments at a later stage of the Bill along the lines proposed by my noble friend.
I understand that on Monday of this week, the Ministry of Justice tabled an amendment to a legislative consent Motion before the Northern Ireland Assembly seeking its consent to the UK Parliament legislating on this matter. If the proposed legislative consent Motion can make sufficient progress over the next two to three weeks, I would anticipate that the Government will be able to work with my noble friend to come to an agreement before the Bill leaves this House. I should add that the Scottish Government have separately announced their intention to bring forward legislation in the Scottish Parliament.
I turn to Amendment 214R, which is again in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Cashman. The amendment seeks to extend the disregard scheme to include convictions for the soliciting offence in the now-repealed Section 32 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. Under the current disregard scheme, for the now-repealed offences of buggery and gross indecency between men, it is a relatively straightforward matter to establish whether the relevant statutory conditions are met; namely that the other person involved in the conduct consented and was aged 16 or over, and the conduct would not now constitute the offence of sexual activity in a public lavatory. In contrast, the soliciting offence in Section 32 of the 1956 Act covered a broad range of behaviours and, as such, it is not a straightforward matter to formulate additional conditions to ensure that behaviour which would still constitute an offence today cannot be the subject of a disregard. It is likely that any such conditions would entail more than simply establishing facts—for example, whether the other person was aged 16 or over—and require a shift to making judgments as to whether an activity would be captured by a range of different offences today. This creates some practical challenges in accessing records in sufficient detail to make that judgment.
Lord Cashman
I have listened with great interest and have two points to make. First, a pardon does not remove a conviction from a record. The criminal activity remains on the record, so any employer making a heightened check can find what the conviction was for. I see no way in which, if we issued a pardon, it would put anyone at risk. Secondly, if there is a victim in any of these cases, and if we have managed to weed it out in the discharge process in relation to gross indecency and buggery, we should have the wit and wherewithal to approach this and find out how to apply exactly the same provisions and the same terms to the immoral purposes Section 32. Will the Minister commit at least to sitting down with me and the likes of Paul Johnson, from the University of York, and Stonewall, who have had great input into this, so that instead of protracting discussion of the problem, we can seek the solution?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
The noble Lord reminds me of a conversation that we had the other day. I quite happily undertake to meet him, Paul Johnson and other members of Stonewall to discuss this further. I was going on to say that, despite the challenges, I am ready to consider Amendment 214R further ahead of Report.
I conclude by congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, but I also signal my happiness at finishing the work started by the coalition Government in recommending a pardon for Alan Turing. As a Mancunian, the situation he faced, and the fact that he ultimately took his own life, has saddened me for many years. Legislating in this Bill will speed up the delivery of a similar pardon for the thousands of gay and bisexual men convicted of now-abolished sexual offences. I look forward to the day—perhaps in a little over a month’s time—when this Bill is enacted and these provisions come into force. That will be a day we will all be able to celebrate. I commend the noble Lords’ amendments to the House.
Lord Sharkey
My Lords, I thank all those noble Lords who have spoken in favour of Amendments 214E and 214F, and all noble Lords who have spoken in this brief debate. I also want to claim some fellowship as a Mancunian with the Minister. Wigan is only 17 miles from Manchester, and while I was at the University of Manchester as a mathematics undergraduate, I was taught by a man called Robin Gandy who was the only doctoral student that Alan Turing ever had. Robin Gandy was full of stories about Alan Turing and I knew these from a very early age.
In closing, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Lexden, Lord Black of Brentwood and Lord Faulkner of Worcester, who have been supporters of these amendments in their current form and in all their previous forms. It is also appropriate to thank my noble friend Lord McNally and the noble Lords, Lord Bates, Lord Faulks, and their officials for listening to the case we have made and for helping to arrive at a solution.
“Other pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences
(1) This section applies to a person who has been convicted of, or cautioned for, an offence mentioned in section 92(1) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and who is living at the time this section comes into force.(2) If, at the time this section comes into force, the person’s conviction or caution has become a disregarded conviction or caution under Chapter 4 of Part 5 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, the person is pardoned for the offence.(3) If, at any time after this section comes into force, the person’s conviction or caution becomes a disregarded conviction or caution under Chapter 4 of Part 5 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, the person is also pardoned for the offence at that time.(4) Expressions used in this section or section (Sections (Posthumous pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences) and (Other pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences): supplementary))(1) (so far as relating to this section) and in Chapter 4 of Part 5 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 have the same meaning in this section or (as the case may be) section (Sections (Posthumous pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences) and (Other pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences): supplementary))(1) as in that Chapter (see section 101 of that Act).”
“Sections (Posthumous pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences) and (Other pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences): supplementary
(1) A pardon under section (Posthumous pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences) or (Other pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences) does not—(a) affect any conviction, caution or sentence, or(b) give rise to any right, entitlement or liability.(2) Nothing in this section or in section (Posthumous pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences) or (Other pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences) affects the prerogative of mercy.”
Lord Lexden
“Posthumous pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences: Northern Ireland
(1) A person who has been convicted of, or cautioned for, an offence specified in subsection (3) and who has died before this section comes into force is pardoned for the offence if two conditions are met.(2) Those conditions are that—(a) the other person involved in the conduct constituting the offence consented to it and was aged 16 or over, and(b) any such conduct at the time this section comes into force would not be an offence under section 75 of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (sexual activity in a public lavatory).(3) The offences to which subsection (1) applies are—(a) an offence under section 11 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 (gross indecency between men),(b) an offence under section 61 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (buggery),(c) an offence under either of the following provisions (which made provision similar to section 61 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861—(i) 10 Cha.1 Sess.2 c.20 (1634) (An Act for the punishment of the vice of Buggery);(ii) section 18 of 10 Geo. 4 c.34 (1829) (An Act for consolidating and amending the Statutes in Ireland relating to Offences against the Person), or(d) an offence under Article 19 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 (buggery).(4) The references in subsection (3) to offences under particular provisions are to be read as including offences under—(a) section 45 of the Naval Discipline Act 1866,(b) section 41 of the Army Act 1881,(c) section 41 of the Air Force Act 1917,(d) section 70 of the Army Act 1955,(e) section 70 of the Air Force Act 1955, or(f) section 42 of the Naval Discipline Act 1957,which are such offences by virtue of the provisions mentioned in subsection (3).(5) The reference in subsection (2)(b) to an offence under section 75 of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 is to be read as including a reference to an offence under section 42 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 which is such an offence by virtue of section 71 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (corresponding offence of “sexual activity in a public lavatory” in England and Wales).(6) The following provisions of section 101 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 apply for the purposes of this section and section (Sections (Posthumous pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences: Northern Ireland)and (Other pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences: Northern Ireland): supplementary)(1) (so far as relating to this section) as they apply for the purposes of Chapter 4 of Part 5 of that Act—(a) in subsection (1), the definitions of “caution”, “conviction”, and “sentence” (and the related definition of “service disciplinary proceedings”);(b) subsections (2) and (5) to (7).”
Lord Lexden
My Lords, I am grateful for the support that has been expressed by—for this purpose—my noble friend Lord Cashman and my noble friend the Minister. I shall not press the amendments, with a view to returning to the matter on Report.
Lord Paddick
“Vagrancy Act 1824
In section 8 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 (abolition of offence of loitering etc with intent) at end insert—“(2) A person who has been convicted of, or cautioned for, an offence under those provisions is pardoned for the offence.(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) it is irrelevant whether the person has died before subsection (2) comes into force.(4) A pardon under this section does not give rise to any right, entitlement or liability.””
Lord Paddick
My Lords, with the leave of the House, I cannot let the opportunity go past without congratulating my noble friend Lord Sharkey on what is a phenomenal achievement. I am very grateful to the Government for the support that they have finally given to his amendment.
I turn to another contentious issue. Amendment 214Q stands in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. As we have just discussed, with government support my noble friend Lord Sharkey has moved amendments—and we have just passed those amendments—to grant pardons to those convicted of offences that only gay men could commit and that are no longer on the statute book because they were considered discriminatory. These offences are symbolic to the gay community and it is striving to ensure equality in law and in society as a whole.
There is another offence that is symbolic to another minority, which is no longer an offence on the statute book and is considered by many to be another example of what amounts to an historic injustice. Parliament repealed the offence because it was accepted that it was being used in a discriminatory manner by the police; it is the offence of being a suspected person loitering with the intent to commit what was originally an indictable, and later, an arrestable offence. Although the term “sus” has recently been more widely used to describe the use of police “stop and search” powers, it was originally confined to the criminal offence of being a suspected person under Section 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824. The offence required the evidence of two witnesses, usually two police officers patrolling together. The usual evidence was of a suspected person being seen to try three car door handles, in an attempt to steal the car or from it, or the suspect putting his shoulder to the doors of three homes, with the intention of committing burglary.
The difficulty with the offence was the absence in almost every case of any corroboration, either from witnesses other than police officers, or any physical or forensic evidence. Both the police officers and, usually, young black men, who were almost exclusively the target under sus, knew that it was the word of two police officers against a young black man with no other witnesses or evidence or any other corroboration. This allowed unscrupulous police officers to invent evidence against those who had, at least on that occasion, done nothing wrong.
Of course, some will say that a miscarriage of justice did not occur on every occasion of someone being convicted of being a suspected person and, of course, I cannot say that that was the case. However, I can say—I hope that Members of this House agree with this—that thousands of innocent young black men were convicted, which caused huge pain and distress, destroying the trust and confidence between the community and the police.
I was a police officer—a bobby on the beat, a patrol officer—at the height of the use of that aspect of Section 4 of the Vagrancy Act. In 1975 and 1976, the year I joined the Metropolitan Police, more than 40% of those arrested for sus were black people, when at the time black people accounted for only 2% of the population. It was because by the end of the 1970s you were 15 times more likely to be arrested for sus if you were black than if you were white, far more than the disproportionality in stop and search, that in 1980 the Home Affairs Select Committee recommended the repeal of the legislation. It also threatened to introduce a Private Member’s Bill if the Government did not take action, but the Government did.
There was a great deal of concern, even among police officers at the time—me included—over the use of the offence, in that we knew about the claims of the black community that it was used as a tool to oppress black people. If there was evidence of another offence—for example, attempted theft of or from a motor vehicle or attempted burglary—not only were these offences less likely to be open to question but the penalties were more severe. In other words, if there had been substantive evidence, physical or forensic evidence, which in those days would have been simply fingerprints, then the much safer, more acceptable and far less contentious route was to arrest and charge for the substantive offence rather than sus.
My second comment is anecdotal. I was at Highbury Corner Magistrates’ Court with someone I had arrested. The stipendiary magistrate, Toby Springer, would want to hear from the arresting officer in every case except for those of being drunk and incapable. The case just before me was an arrest made by a colleague for whom I had respect for his honesty and professionalism. He had arrested someone for sus, and the young black man who had been arrested pleaded guilty to the offence and was fined. Downstairs in the cells, where the young man had to pay his fine before being released, I spoke to my colleague, and I remember this very distinctly. I said to him that he had restored my faith in sus because here was a trusted colleague with someone who had pleaded guilty in court to the offence, so the criticisms made by the black community, at least in some cases of sus, were clearly unjustified. He told me what had happened. He and a colleague had turned a street corner and the person he had arrested looked at the police officers and ran away. The officers ran after the youth and caught him. The youth was given the ultimatum, “Do you want attempted burglary or sus?”. The youth said, “Sus”. Presumably realising that the odds were stacked against him, he then went through the whole process admitting to something that he had never done.
Sus is another example of an offence that should never have been on the statute book, or at least an offence that was designed to deal with soldiers coming home from the Napoleonic wars and making a nuisance of themselves should not still have been on the statute book 150 years later. Not every part of Section 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824 was repealed by the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, but those other offences are, and should be, a debate for another time.
Bearing in mind how long it has taken my noble friend Lord Sharkey to achieve what he has achieved for the gay community through his long campaign for justice, and in the absence of the equivalent of an Alan Turing figure regularly to hand in the case of sus, I am not expecting instant agreement from the Government. However, I ask the Minister to think carefully about what has been a symbolic offence for the black community. It has created huge pain and distress for decades. To pardon those convicted under this legislation—repealed because of its acknowledged discriminatory application and potential for misuse—would be of immeasurable importance to the black community.
Not only did sus damage relations between the black community and the police, it damaged relationships between the generations in the black community. The first generation of migrants from the Caribbean had great faith in the police and when their sons were arrested they did not believe their tales of the police acting improperly in inventing evidence against them. It drove divisions between generations as well as between police and the subsequent generations. Granting pardons to those convicted of being suspected persons loitering with intent to commit an indictable or arrestable offence would be a huge step forward in healing the pain caused and the damage done to the trust and confidence the black community as a whole had in the police. It would also be a much-needed catalyst to dramatically improve those damaged relations as we work to create safer communities for all. I beg to move.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
I have one question for the Minister when she responds to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Does she have any idea of the number of people affected by this?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has explained, Amendment 214Q seeks to confer a pardon on persons living and deceased who were convicted under Section 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824. The noble Lord has explained that Section 4 was used to persecute young black men and this amendment deals with a separate matter to the one that we have just debated. It is, however, also the case that Section 4 was used to prosecute some gay and bisexual men, so there is a read-across to the earlier debate.
In relation to consensual activity between men over the age of consent, Section 101 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 makes it clear that the disregard scheme covers not only the offences of buggery and gross indecency but attempts to commit such an offence, and an attempt to commit such an offence includes conduct covered by Section 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824. Someone with such a conviction may also apply for that conviction to be disregarded and, if successful, will also receive a pardon under the terms of the new clauses in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey.
As to other conduct unrelated to homosexuality, the Government do not believe that it is appropriate to introduce a pardon for those convicted of an offence just because that offence has now been repealed and the behaviour in question is no longer regarded as criminal. Pardoning is exceptional by nature. The persecution of gay and bisexual men through the criminal law was a clear historical wrong that we should undoubtedly right through a pardon. There is a special and compelling moral case to try to redress wrongs done to gay and bisexual men in the context of the Government’s commitment to equality. The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, would, like the pardon for Alan Turing, remove a real and particular stigma that is suffered by the living and still attaches to the recently deceased.
The circumstances the noble Lord has described are quite different and, without looking at the facts of individual cases, it is impossible to know whether the conduct in question would still be an offence today.
In terms of the numbers, I was looking for inspiration but we have no data, I am afraid. On that note, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
Does the Minister mean that she has no data here or no data at all?
Lord Paddick
My Lords, from the Minister’s response I do not think she has quite grasped the essence of what this amendment is about or the misuse that has been made of this legislation. The Home Affairs Select Committee put pressure on the Government to repeal that particular part of Section 4 of the Vagrancy Act. It is a very wide piece of legislation, criminalising all sorts of activity, much of which is still on the statute book. This is specifically about being a person suspected of loitering with intent to commit an indictable offence, the evidence of which I described when I moved the amendment.
I will of course look very carefully at what the Minister has said but I do not believe that it will give me sufficient grounds not to return to this matter on Report. However, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(1) After Part 4 of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2015 (c.2 (N.I.)) insert—“Part 4APROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF FORCED MARRIAGE24A Anonymity of victims of forced marriageSchedule 3A (anonymity of victims of forces marriage) has effect.”(2) Insert, as Schedule 3A to that Act, the following Schedule—“SCHEDULE 3AANONYMITY OF VICTIMS OF FORCED MARRIAGEProhibition on the identification of victims in publications1_(1) This paragraph applies where an allegation has been made that an offence of forced marriage has been committed against a person._(2) No matter likely to lead members of the public to identify the person, as the person against whom the offence is alleged to have been committed, may be included in any publication during the person’s lifetime._(3) In any criminal proceedings before a court, the court may direct that the restriction imposed by sub-paragraph (2) is not to apply (whether at all or to the extent specified in the direction) if the court is satisfied that either of the following conditions is met._(4) The first condition is that the conduct of a person’s defence at a trial of an offence of forced marriage would be substantially prejudiced if the direction were not given._(5) The second condition is that—(a) the effect of sub-paragraph (2) is to impose a substantial and unreasonable restriction on the reporting of the proceedings, and(b) it is in the public interest to remove or relax the restriction._(6) A direction under sub-paragraph (3) does not affect the operation of sub-paragraph (2) at any time before the direction is given._(7) In this paragraph, “the court” means a magistrates’ court, a county court or the Crown Court.Penalty for breaching prohibition imposed by paragraph 1(2)2_(1) If anything is included in a publication in contravention of the prohibition imposed by paragraph 1(2), each of the persons responsible for the publication is guilty of an offence. _(2) A person guilty of an offence under this paragraph is liable, on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale._(3) The persons responsible for a publication are as follows—
Type of publication | Persons responsible |
Newspaper or other periodical | Any person who is a proprietor, editor or publisher of the newspaper or periodical. |
Relevant programme | Any person who— (a) is a body corporate engaged in providing the programme service in which the programme is included, or (b) has functions in relation to the programme corresponding to those of an editor of a newspaper. |
Any other kind of publication | Any person who publishes the publication. |
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, Clause 143 provides for lifelong anonymity for all alleged or proven victims of forced marriage in England and Wales, from the point of investigation onwards. At the request of the Minister of Justice in Northern Ireland, Amendments 215, 237 and 241 now extend this protection to cover victims in Northern Ireland.
We know that forced marriage can be hidden, and this measure will help to ensure that victims have the confidence to come forward so that they get the support they need and so that perpetrators are brought to justice. The protection mirrors the anonymity we introduced last year for victims of female genital mutilation. It will mean that the anonymity of victims of forced marriage can be protected from the time an allegation is made and that the publication or broadcast of any information likely to result in their being identified to the public is prohibited. Breach of the prohibition will be an offence punishable by a level 5—that is, £5,000—fine.
I will respond to Amendment 219CA once the Committee has had the opportunity to hear from my noble friend Lady Berridge. For now, I beg to move.
Baroness Berridge
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 219CA. This lengthy amendment, which at the outset I accept will need recrafting on Report, seeks to deal with a simple problem that has cropped up in our law. It has done so accidentally, I think, but if not sorted out it will cause injustice. Although it is late, a short description of the law and the problem is necessary by way of background.
Successive Governments have sought to tackle forced marriage, beginning with the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 and with further criminalisation in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. To make these remedies effective, the law incorporated—for the first time, I believe—a definition of marriage that included marriages that were not at that time valid under UK law. I quote from the Crown Prosecution Service guidelines on the definition of “marriage”. It states that,
“‘marriage’ means any religious or civil ceremony … recognised by the customs of the parties to it, or the laws of any country in which it is carried out, as constituting a binding agreement, whether or not it would be legally binding according to the law of England and Wales”.
So a relationship that UK law does not currently define as marriage can now, for very good reason, count in our criminal courts and some of our civil courts, for forced marriage purposes, as a marriage. However, this leaves a gap.
A party to a forced marriage that is not valid under UK law cannot use that conviction as evidence of the marriage in the family courts to gain financial remedies. If you have entered into a marriage under duress—a forced marriage that is valid under UK law—that can be the subject of a crime or a civil protection order. You can then, because it is valid under UK law, go to the family courts and say, “I was forced into this marriage under duress”. It is then voidable and it can be annulled. This opens the door to financial relief and the distribution of the matrimonial property.
If under duress in our law you are forced into a religious marriage, it is valid for the purposes of our law in the criminal courts for a criminal offence under the civil protection forced marriage regime, but you are not then entitled to then take that conviction to the Family Court to obtain matrimonial remedy. This is a very different situation from the marriages valid under UK law, as I have outlined, for which you can get an annulment or, of course, a divorce. So if our law has accepted this small number of relationships as marriage for the purpose of the law on forced marriage, why can they not be used for other purposes, such as gaining financial remedy? Not allowing them to be used in this way is a real injustice to those victims of forced marriage who come forward to the Crown Courts but are left with the doors of the Family Courts shut to them in terms of matrimonial property.
I am not seeking for the law to see this small number of relationships as marriages for all purposes or to foist this on a person who, even after there is a conviction for forced marriage, wishes it to be viewed for all other purposes as the religious marriage it was but under duress. Surely, however, that person, in a forced marriage under duress that was a religious marriage, should have a choice—leave it as a religious marriage or take the conviction and be allowed to claim financial remedy under the Matrimonial Courts Act and other such remedies as he or she may on occasion need.
Many of those who have spoken to me on this issue are practising barristers and solicitors. There are many women who, some practitioners believe, do not come forward after years in a forced marriage that is valid only as a religious marriage under our law, as they know that our law leaves them without means to claim matrimonial property. They know they risk the only recourse being welfare benefits, particularly if their children are now adults and they have no claim for maintenance based on caring for the children. Their view is that many of these women would come forward to the Crown Court but are reluctant to do so because they do not want to leave themselves financially vulnerable and unable to access financial remedies. We have an anomaly created by the entry of a different definition of marriage into our law.
Surely it would be just for these people and for the taxpayer to allow someone who is the victim of a forced marriage of this nature to claim, if they wish, the matrimonial property as well. By analogy, we do not retry domestic violence convictions in our Family Courts after the Crown Courts convict a husband or wife. The conviction is accepted as evidence and used by the Family Courts. Why can a forced marriage conviction not also be used in such a simple procedural way to unlock the discretion to redistribute the property and bring justice and consistency in this regard across all our courts—civil, family and criminal?
I hope that my noble friend the Minister might have time to meet with the interested groups that are concerned about this problem in our law. I raised this matter at the time with the anti-social behaviour Bill, and it has come back because there are concerns around the gap we have left for victims of forced marriages that are religious marriages which are not fully accepted under our law. The amendment is a pre-emptive strike to try to avoid this injustice happening and potentially encourage a larger number of women to come forward because they will not risk their property rights, and they will be able to claim the matrimonial property as well as get a conviction in the Crown Court. I beg to move.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chisholm, told the Committee, this clause confers lifelong anonymity on the victims of forced marriage in England and Wales. The first amendment, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, extends that provision to cover Northern Ireland as well. I understand that this is at the request of the Justice Department in Northern Ireland. That is welcome, and we on these Benches support these amendments. Amendment 215 is the main amendment, while Amendments 237 and 241 are consequential and would bring the provision into effect.
Amendment 219CA is in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge. She makes a powerful case to right an injustice that leaves the victim unable to seek redress. That is not right, and the Government should come forward to correct this. I will be interested to hear what the Minister will say in her response to this amendment. She made a persuasive argument; I hope that we will get a positive response from the noble Baroness, Lady Chisholm, and that the Government can deal with it, either now or on Report.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, we on these Benches very much support the noble Baroness’s amendment. She has obviously been working at this for some time—I see from her face that she has—and her explanation is clear and obviously based on the experiences of which she is aware. So we give her our support.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Berridge for explaining the purpose of her amendment. The Government are mindful that forced religious marriage may be a deliberate attempt to avoid financial consequences in the event of the break-up of the marriage. The existing position is that the financial orders provided for in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 are available only where a marriage is capable of legal recognition in England and Wales and where it is being brought to an end—or where judicial separation is ordered. However, where a marriage is not capable of legal recognition, parties have the same recourse to the court as unmarried cohabiting couples on the breakdown of the relationship. This applies to the division of any property and to financial provision for any children the couple have.
For those in a marriage that has no legal validity, the pressure from families and communities to stay together is no less strong because of the fact that the marriage has no legal consequences. It does not make it any easier for an individual to escape an abusive relationship, and we share my noble friend’s concern that it leaves women in particular vulnerable to hardship when the relationship breaks up, since there is no recourse to the court for the financial orders available to divorcing couples. The Government take this issue very seriously, and it is central to the independent sharia law review launched by the current Prime Minister in May this year. The Government will wish to consider the issue further in light of the findings from the review.
None the less, the law governing marriage, divorce and matrimonial property is complex, nuanced and finely balanced, reflecting as it does the wide range of personal circumstances in which people find themselves. The amendment would introduce a disparity with unmarried cohabitants and with those who are in unregistered marriages that are not forced. There is no evidence at this stage that the amendment—
Lord Harris of Haringey
I understand the point the Minister is making about consent, difficult precedents, cohabitation and so on. But we are talking about a specific circumstance here, which is about coercion. These are not proper arrangements, because somebody has been forced into marriage against their will. That is the context we are talking about. We are not talking about a sort of touchy-feely cohabitation relationship which then breaks down, but about somebody who has been forced into an arrangement of this sort, which is totally inappropriate and wrong in law.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I was not suggesting that, just that there are difficulties—other reasons why it could be more difficult to bring in. That is not to say that we are not keen to look further at this issue. However, because we want to consider the findings of the sharia law review, I ask my noble friend to withdraw her amendment so that we have a chance to do that.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
What is the timescale for the review that the Minister mentioned?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
That is up to the review and we do not know yet.
Baroness Berridge
I am grateful for the support from noble Lords. The first point I want to make is that the disparity has been created by the law. A different definition of marriage was introduced into the civil protection order in order to deal with a real problem. My complaint is not that that should not have happened but that it created the disparity of treatment that my noble friend outlined because it was introduced without all of the consequences being thought through.
The law is about forced marriage—we did not call it “forced cohabitation”. In addition, it does not cover every arrangement that people are forced into: the CPS definition that I outlined says that you have to fall into a religious arrangement that is a binding agreement. By calling the arrangement “forced marriage” we gave those people coming to the criminal courts—at great risk—the expectation that their arrangement would, for that purpose, be treated in our law as a marriage. But we did not go on and fulfil our obligations to ensure that they were safeguarded financially and received the anonymity that they need to come forward. I am grateful that my noble friend has said that we will consider this further and I hope that there will be a meeting with interested parties.
I also want to state that I am very disappointed with this debate. I specifically did not put this into the sharia review, because it is about religious marriages. The law does not say that coercion and force come under that umbrella but suddenly we have entered that realm. This is about religious marriages, and I have come across instances of these issues in all kinds of religious settings. We need to be incredibly careful, on a day like today when British Muslims are upset by the news, about putting something that is about legal rights, technicalities and procedure under that banner. I was so careful to ensure that this could not be badged like this and I am disappointed that that is what has happened and that it has not been considered along with other issues. This is much wider than that. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Policing and Crime Bill
Wednesday 16th November 2016
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 55-V Fifth marshalled list for Committee (PDF, 129KB) - (14 Nov 2016)
“Meaning of “private” and “sexual”
(1) Section 35 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 (meaning of “private” and “sexual”) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (3)(a) after “exposed genitals” insert “, breasts, buttocks”.(3) Omit subsection (4).(4) Omit subsection (5).”
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, with the consent of my noble friends Lord Paddick, Lady Hamwee and Lady Grender, and at their request, I rise to move and speak to Amendments 216 to 219 in this group. It was intended that my name should be added to Amendments 216 to 219A, but there has been a disconnect between intention and implementation, for which I apologise. Nevertheless, I support these amendments.
No one now disputes the need for the law to outlaw revenge porn. Disclosing private sexual photographs or films, usually acquired during a relationship, and publishing them on the internet with intent to cause distress to a former partner, is nasty and hurtful behaviour. To the victims it causes untold pain, embarrassment and humiliation. It is an appalling violation of privacy and a gross breach of trust.
Sections 33 to 35 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 came into force in April of that year, and there were 200-plus prosecutions in the first year. To that extent, the criminalisation of revenge porn has been a success. However, responses to BBC freedom of information requests showed that out of 1,160 reported instances between April and December 2015, no action was taken in no less than 61% of cases, and many of the victims were children, some as young as 11. Many cases were not prosecuted because of insufficient evidence or because the victim did not proceed with the complaint, but of course that does not mean that the incidents did not occur. We are seeing an ever-increasing use of the internet to hurt people, often hiding behind anonymity or disguised identity. It is reasonable to assume that revenge porn will continue to be posted on the internet, despite its criminalisation.
Especially worrying is the persistent and, I suspect, increasing prevalence of the practice known as sexting, particularly among children and young people. In addition to pursuing offenders through the criminal law, we must ensure that we increase public awareness and that police forces take these offences seriously—consistently seriously across the country—and develop a social culture which treats this behaviour as beyond the pale. An NSPCC study in 2012 estimated that between 15% and 40% of young people had been involved in sexting; that much of that was under pressure, whether peer pressure or personal pressure from people with whom they were involved in a relationship; and that many images were shared with others by those who received them without the consent of their subjects. There is no evidence that with the increasing use of social media by young people, that number has decreased. Of course, there is a strong link between sexting and revenge porn.
These amendments are designed to tighten up the law. They also to a large extent bring the law into line with the equivalent legislation in Scotland, the Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016, where the wider provisions have worked well. Proposed subsections (1) and (2) of Amendment 216 would extend the scope of the disclosure offence to bring photographs and films of breasts and buttocks within the range of sexual images and therefore within scope of the offence in the same way as such images of the victim’s exposed genitals or pubic area. That is in the Scottish legislation and it is quite clear from the evidence we have seen that such images are likely to cause distress, particularly to young girls, in the same way and to the same extent as the images presently within the scope of the Act. Of course, disclosure of such images would be an offence only if the threshold criteria were met: that the image was private, that it was disclosed without consent, and that it was disclosed with the intention of causing distress. There is no reason for the legislation to restrict the images that are not to be disclosed in the way that it currently does.
In the second part of the amendment, proposed subsections (3) and (4) would remove Sections 35(4) and (5), which are the current exception in the legislation for photographs or films that are created by altering originals or combining them with other photographs or films in such a way as to bring them within the statutory definition of “private” and “sexual”, so doctoring films and images to make them offensive. We do not accept the need or the justification for that exception. If a photograph or film as finished and published has the effect of a private and sexual image and is disclosed without the consent of the subject and with the relevant intent, I suggest that is ample reason to bring it within the section rather than to except it from it.
The first two subsections of Amendment 217 would amend Section 33 of the 2015 Act to extend the disclosure offence to bring threats to disclose private sexual photographs and films within the scope of the offence, as well as actual disclosure. There can be no reason to exclude threats to disclose from the legislation and, although it is true that the actual disclosure is what causes much of the harm, a threatened disclosure by the holder of sexual images of a victim can be used to put real and painful pressure on the victim, usually a previous partner, causing very real distress. That is why the amendment would bring threatened disclosures into scope.
Secondly, proposed subsection (3) would broaden the category of the unnecessary emotional consequences for the victim necessary to sustain a conviction so as to include “fear or alarm” as well as “distress” as an alternative form of consequence. That extension is particularly relevant in the context of threatened rather than actual disclosure.
Thirdly, the amendment by the proposed subsection (3) would also make proof of recklessness regarding the distress, fear or alarm likely to be caused sufficient to found a conviction as an alternative to proof of intention. Again, this is in the Scottish legislation. In this context, reckless disclosure means disclosure that is deliberate but that is made entirely without regard to the distress, fear or alarm that it is likely to cause to the victim. The perpetrator knows he is making the disclosure. He should not escape criminal liability just because the prosecution cannot prove that he positively intended its obvious consequences. We suggest that he should be equally criminally liable if he turns a blind eye to those consequences. It is right that intention should be supplemented by guilt in respect of disclosure that is reckless as to the likelihood of the harm it will cause. The deletion of Section 33(8) that is proposed by subsection (5) is also necessary to achieve that end.
Lastly, the proposed subsection (4) in the amendment would introduce a clear and explicit ban on promoting, soliciting or profiting from photographs or films that are themselves in breach of the Act. I apologise that, as drafted, the use of the words,
“reasonably believed to have been disclosed without consent”,
is perhaps inappropriate; I am not sure that reasonable belief is correctly used there. I suspect the proposed new clause would better read if it were expressed as, “disclosed without consent in the knowledge or belief that they had been so disclosed”, and we would redraft subsection (4) in that regard before Report.
Amendment 218 would introduce a provision for compensation for victims of offences under these provisions. It is plainly right that these revenge porn offences should give rise to a power to award compensation, but I would add to that self-evident assertion two particular points. First, this offence is unlikely to give rise to civil proceedings— victims will generally be unwilling to go through civil cases because of the embarrassment that could cause, and they will rarely have the means to do so.
Secondly, there will be many cases of revenge porn offences where the perpetrator is gainfully employed and will have the means to pay compensation ordered by the court for the hurt he has caused. We suggest that a power to award compensation, to include compensation for anxiety as well as for direct financial loss, is therefore an important part of a judge’s power to deal with an offender and publicly to recognise the harm caused by the offender directly to the victim.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, I have a great deal of sympathy with what the noble Lord is saying. What troubles me slightly is the quantum of the compensation and, more particularly, whether there is any appeal on it. I think these offences are triable either way. In the magistrates’ court, is there an appeal to the Crown Court on the quantum contemplated? If the case is tried on indictment, where lies appeal from the compensation ordered by the Crown Court?
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, it is quite plain that there ought to be an appeal. I have not looked at the provisions and perhaps I can clear that up before Report. It is also quite clear that the appeal from the magistrates’ court on compensation would go to the Crown Court and from the Crown Court to the Court of Appeal, where the standard for an appeal is high but one would expect the judges to get it right. The noble Lord knows well that these issues of compensation are very much in the discretion of the trial judge, taking into account both the harm caused and the ability of the offender to pay the compensation. It is a perfectly good question and I undertake to look at it before Report.
Finally, Amendment 219 would simply add these offences to the list of sexual offences in respect of which a victim is entitled to anonymity. It is right that there should be anonymity for victims of revenge porn offences because these fall squarely within the category of sexual offences that are entitled to such anonymity. I think this is relatively uncontroversial. I beg to move.
Viscount Hailsham
My Lords, I give qualified support to what has just been said by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I have a great deal of sympathy with the underlying argument which he has advanced. There is no doubt, and it is increasingly the case, that people are using private intimate photographs and films for the purpose of blackmail or revenge. Given that we have a Bill where we can extend the existing law, I see absolutely no reason why we should not extend the substantive offence of disclosure to one of intent as well. That is a perfectly sensible amendment and I would support it if given the opportunity.
Regarding extending the definition of the “damage” from distress to the enlarged category which the noble Lord spoke of, my feeling is that the word “distress” probably encompasses what he has in mind. However, I have no objection to the extension in the sense that it does at least remove any doubt that may exist and is certainly not harmful. I suspect it is not necessary but I am not against it.
I made a point about compensation when I intervened on the noble Lord and I will not repeat it at any length. In principle, I am in favour of a compensation provision, but I worry about compensation at large without any kind of regulation of the amount: that can mean injustice. I am far from clear on whether the Crown Court has an appellate role in respect of compensation awarded at the magistrates’ court, and I would be grateful if the Minister could help the Committee on this. I am even more in doubt as to whether the Court of Appeal would have a role in considering an award made at the Crown Court. Will my noble friend give some thought to this, maybe returning at some later stage? If there is no effective appeal, I have two suggestions. One is that we should impose an arbitrary cap—a ceiling—on the amount that could be awarded. That would prevent any obvious injustice. Secondly, and differently, we should consider restricting the claim for compensation to a claim made in civil proceedings, where the procedure is more clearly established.
Amendment 219 is about anonymity. I took the opportunity to look at the substantive Act and was struck by the very large number of examples which are covered by anonymity. I can see no reason of principle, and rather a lot of advantage, in accepting the amendment put forward by the noble Lord to extend anonymity to this category of case.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I have some comments on Amendments 216 and 217 for consideration by the Committee. On Amendment 216, I am doubtful that Section 35 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 needs amendment to add the words “breasts” and “buttocks”. The reason for that is that Section 35(3) already defines a photograph or a film as sexual if,
“it shows something that a reasonable person would consider to be sexual because of its nature”,
or if the,
“content, taken as a whole, is such that a reasonable person would consider it to be sexual”.
The reason why I anticipate that the 2015 Act does not make a photograph of a breast or a buttock necessarily sexual is that it is very easy to think of circumstances in which such a photograph is not sexual by reason of its context. It may be a photograph of your child in a swimming pool with their breast exposed; it may be a photograph of a breast-feeding mother. It may be a beach shot of my family that shows someone in the background wearing a thong. It all depends on the context—and if the context is sexual, the Act already covers it.
Subsection (4) of the proposed new clause in Amendment 217 would create a new criminal offence of promoting, soliciting or profiting from “private photographs and films”. I have no difficulty, of course, with the idea that that should be a criminal offence. I point out that that subsection, however, does not use the word “sexual”. I assume that that is a drafting error; it talks about profiting from “private photographs and films”, but I think it should say “private sexual photographs and films”. Otherwise, it has a very different scope—which I see from the nodding on the Liberal Democrat Benches was not intended.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is plainly right on that—it needs amendment.
Lord Pannick
I am grateful. My only other point on Amendment 217 is one that I think the noble Lord, Lord Marks, accepted in his helpful opening speech. The offence in subsection (4) is committed if the defendant reasonably believes that the photographs or films were “disclosed without consent”. That would be anomalous since the primary offence—the offence committed by the person who discloses private sexual photographs or films—rightly requires the prosecution to prove that the disclosure was without the consent of the individual.
Baroness Grender (LD)
My Lords, I support the amendments in this group. I am delighted to see the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, in his place, as the Minister who announced the changes in the legislation when some of us were campaigning to get it transformed. It was a very proud moment when he announced it—quite late in the evening, as I recall—and we had watching in the Gallery a whole row of ladies, plus one man, who had broken their anonymity and shared with us the appalling experiences that each of them had been through as a result of revenge porn.
I am very proud that, even with the limited amendments that we managed to get through to the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, we are now as a nation a little further ahead than most others in trying to deal with a very difficult issue. But there are so many more who are not caught in the current legislation. While in 2015-16 we know that 206 individuals were prosecuted under the new law, a survey by “Good Morning Britain” revealed that police forces in England and Wales had dealt with a total of 2,130 cases. There is quite a difference between these numbers in terms of what is going forward to prosecution, and we have already heard what some of the difficulties in that area are likely to be.
It is also critical that we as parliamentarians stay ahead of the speed of change in attitudes and behaviour that smartphones and social media bring in their wake. In the US, a McAfee study revealed that 36% of people had sent or intended to send an intimate picture. As legislators, we have to understand that, whatever our attitude to and opinion of that, we need to create laws that foresee the way that society is changing. These amendments therefore necessarily go further and we must credit the Women’s Equality Party for its part in doing some of the drafting, which resulted in us trying to amend this in the other place.
I particularly want to address the issue of anonymity. When we ran this campaign a year ago, some women stepped forward and were prepared to be named when they recounted what they had gone through. But part of the problem was that many victims were too scared to put their names out there. This happened to one lady whom we dealt with—because her name was out there and she was campaigning against this, it ensured that she got far more coverage on some of the websites that she was deliberately trying to avoid. It has now been accepted in current legislation by this Government that victims of forced marriage are given that anonymity; I see this as being a very similar area.
I will conclude here. I think that we are aware that in this area there are issues of suicide, self-harm and damaged reputation. As we talk now there are hundreds, perhaps thousands, of young men and women who are sharing intimate images that, frankly, will have a devastating impact on their future. It is up to us, through some of these amendments, to be ahead of the law at every stage.
Lord Faulks (Con)
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Grender, for mentioning my small part in the acceptance of revenge porn as part of the list of criminal offences that the Government accepted ought to enter the calendar of criminal offences. The Government looked carefully at this and, in many ways, some of the conduct that was embraced within so-called revenge porn was probably covered by existing criminal offences. However, it was accepted that such was the need to identify specifically this sort of behaviour that it was appropriate to include it as part of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015.
While I entirely accept what lies behind these amendments and the evil that they are directed against, I think that one has to bear in mind that we have had only a very short time for this legislation to bed down. I am glad that there have been prosecutions; it appears that there was a need and the prosecuting authorities have acted accordingly. But I am not sure that I am, at the moment, satisfied that there is a need to go further in terms of definition. For example, Amendment 217 talks about threats to disclose. The Minister will no doubt correct me, but all these areas are probably covered by existing criminal law—for example, blackmail, threatening behaviour, theft or other offences. A threat may be something substantial but it may be something very trivial and we do not want to have relatively trivial matters embraced in what is often a very serious offence.
As to Amendment 218, of course, on the face of it, it seems attractive that there should be some compensation. I am a little concerned, however, about a judge in a criminal case having to assess anxiety and the degree of anxiety in terms of the appropriate quantum of damages. How is he or she going to do that? Will there be evidence from somebody expressing how affected they were, and the degree of the affection—whether, for example, it caused them to go to a doctor? There is a slight danger that we could lose sight of what is really important—a criminal offence, rather than whether there should be compensation.
Quite apart from the questions of appeal raised by my noble friend Lord Hailsham, there is some work to be done on this. On the question of appeal, surely there would be an appeal from the magistrates’ court to the Crown Court as of right, and to the court of criminal appeal in appropriate, and possibly restrictive, circumstances. It may be that in due course there would be some informal tariff, perhaps involving the Sentencing Council—but I would not like it to be thought that the criminal prosecution of matters should be used as some proxy for obtaining compensation.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
My Lords, I will be brief. These amendments cover a serious and disturbing issue that has received considerable publicity in recent months. The purpose of the amendments, as I understand it, is to tighten and extend the reach and scope of the law in respect of disclosure of private sexual photographs and films without consent and with malicious intent. They include new clauses on compensation and anonymity for victims. At this stage we will listen with interest to the Government’s response, including the extent to which they consider that the law as it stands is sufficient—or, alternatively, needed—to deal with any or all of the issues addressed in the amendments.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford)
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has explained, this group of amendments all relate to what is commonly referred to as revenge porn, as provided for in Section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. Amendments 216 and 217 seek to extend significantly the scope of the offence, but the Government consider that the offence is working well. I am pleased to see my noble friend Lord Faulks in his seat; as he said, there have been more than 60 convictions for the offence since it came into force in April last year.
The offence is deliberately tightly drafted to target those individuals who have disclosed private and sexual images without consent, and with the intention of causing distress to the individual depicted. We are not persuaded that a sufficiently strong case has been made for broadening the scope of the offence, as proposed by the two amendments.
The general effect of Amendment 216 would be to significantly extend the range of material that could be considered private and sexual for the purpose of the offence. Currently, the offence is drafted to capture material that is sufficiently sexually explicit that its dissemination would be likely to cause real distress to those depicted. The offence also provides that images that are photoshopped—for example, so that a non-sexual image of an individual becomes sexual—should not be covered by the offence. This is because the disclosure of such an image, though still distressing, does not have the potential to cause the same degree of harm as the disclosure of an undoctored photograph showing images of the kind referred to in Section 35(3) of the 2015 Act. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made some interesting observations to that end. To alter the definition of “sexual” as proposed in Amendment 216 would, in our view, unjustifiably extend the scope of the offence.
Regarding the extension of the offence proposed by Amendment 217, we see no need to capture those who threaten to post such images. The offence, rightly, deals only with the act of actually disclosing private and sexual images, as it is the disclosure of the images that causes the harm which criminalising this behaviour seeks to prevent. As my noble friend Lord Faulks says, threats to disclose could, depending on the circumstances, be captured by existing offences that tackle harassment, malicious communications or, of course, blackmail. It is also difficult to see what would be gained by including an intention to cause fear or alarm to the victim, as distress is sufficiently broad a term for these purposes. Amendment 217 also seeks to make it possible for the offence to be committed recklessly as well as intentionally. The offence is targeted at those who deliberately seek to cause distress to victims through the dissemination of private and sexual material. This malicious intent—the revenge element of revenge porn, so to speak—is a key feature of the offence and we believe it would be wrong to dilute this by applying the offence to conduct that is the result of recklessness rather than a deliberately malicious act. Similarly, the proposal to extend the offence to those who,
“knowingly promote, solicit or profit”,
in relation to revenge porn material would shift the emphasis from those who disclose the relevant images with malicious intent, the mischief which this offence is intended to address.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I will be very brief in response. We will, of course, consider the Minister’s reply in detail between now and Report.
On the question of appeal and the cap on compensation, I am anxious that victims are not directed to civil proceedings as a result of the difficulties I foresee here. Rather than imposing a formal cap, I am far more sympathetic to the idea of requiring either the Sentencing Council or the Judicial College to introduce sentencing guidelines for compensation for these offences. I am not, at the moment, convinced by the Minister’s response that current compensation-awarding powers necessarily cover the kind of distress and hurt caused by these offences and I cannot see why a specific power should be otiose.
On the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the extension of the offence in respect of the type of depictions and images that can be shown would bring this Bill in line with Scottish legislation, as I said. The threshold criteria, according to which images must be private, published without consent, and with intent to cause to distress, answers the point that a distinction should be drawn between the precise nature of the image: if images meet those criteria, the fact that it is not the pubic area but only breasts and buttocks that are shown should still be enough to make them sexual. I am not convinced by the alternative catch-all provision, although I see the force of the point.
The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, made a point about threats to disclose information already being criminalised under certain laws. He mentioned blackmail and theft and the Minister mentioned harassment. The problem with blackmail is that it involves unwarranted demands with menaces, but there is no suggestion here that the mischief at which the amended offence would be aimed is a demand; it is the desire to hurt. I am really not sure that that is covered by any existing offence. Hurt can be caused by the threat of disclosure just as it can be caused by an actual disclosure, and I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, for his support on that point.
As to doctored photographs and images, the point about the distress that they cause is that the people who see them do not know that they have been doctored —they are seen as images of the subject. That is how hurt is caused and that is why it is important to cover such photographs and films.
On anonymity, there is no reason why a victim should have to go through the hoops of satisfying a judge that it is required when generally in sexual offence cases it is given as a right. It is also particularly important that those victims who are considering whether to complain of an offence and take the matter to court are guaranteed anonymity as this is an important part of persuading them to come forward with a complaint that then gets prosecuted. The Minister did not answer that point at all.
With your Lordships’ leave, I beg to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
“Pre-charge anonymity
(1) After a person is accused of a sexual offence, no matter likely to lead members of the public to identify them as the person against whom the accusation is made shall either be published in England and Wales in a written publication available to the public, or be broadcast in England and Wales, up until that person is charged with the offence, except where a judge is satisfied that it is in the public interest to remove the restriction in respect of that person.(2) In subsection (1), “matter” includes but is not limited to—(a) a still or moving picture or image of that person; or(b) the name and address of that person.(3) In subsection (2)(a), “picture” includes a likeness however produced.”
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 219A is tabled in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. This amendment is designed simply to protect the identity of those accused of sexual offences in a similar way that the identities of the alleged victims of sexual offences are currently protected. The significant difference here is that the identity of the accused would be protected only until the point of charge, and if the police believe that the public interest demands it, the police can apply to a court to have that ban lifted so that the identity of the accused can be put into the public domain before charge. There needs to be a balance between the rights of the accused and the rights of the victims of sexual offences. This amendment is designed to allow us to establish where that balance should be.
We will all be acutely aware of the impact that sexual offences can have on the victims or survivors, but until recently the voice of those who have been falsely accused of such offences has not been heard. Some noble Lords will have heard about the impact that such accusations have had on the widow of Lord Brittan, Sir Cliff Richard and Paul Gambaccini when they came to speak to Members of the House about their experiences. I introduced that event but did not hear their personal accounts. Since then I have been contacted by others—the families of those whom none of us has ever heard of—who have been similarly devastated by allegations of a sexual nature being made, those allegations being made public, and then the police realising that there was no credible evidence to support the allegations. The emotional first-hand accounts of the pain and suffering of those falsely accused are powerful, but I have tried to stand aside from such emotions and to deal with this matter objectively.
It is important that I declare a number of interests in terms of my experiences over the years. During my professional career of more than 30 years as a police officer, I have dealt with, supported and campaigned for justice for those who have been the victims of male violence in general and of sexual offences in particular. I was one of the most senior police officers at New Scotland Yard when the incoming commissioner, Sir Ian, now the noble Lord, Lord Blair of Boughton, asked me to carry out a review of how the victims of rape were dealt with by the Metropolitan Police. Having been the co-author of a book that significantly changed the way the police investigated rape offences for the better, the commissioner wanted to ensure that the Metropolitan Police was among the best in the world at dealing with rape allegations. I carried out an in-depth review with academics and survivor groups, and produced hard-hitting recommendations on how the police should improve the way they support victims of rape. I worked together with the then assistant commissioner, Tim Godwin, to establish further Havens, places in the National Health Service where the survivors of sexual offences could go to receive the physical and psychological support they needed, where forensic samples could be preserved, and where they could be put in contact with the police if they wanted to pursue the case through the criminal justice system.
One of the first engagements I had with a group from outside the House following my introduction three years ago was with representatives of the End Violence Against Women Coalition, a UK-wide coalition of more than 70 women’s organisations and others working to end violence against women and girls in all its forms. The point I want to make is that I am passionate about working to end violence against women and girls, ensuring that the survivors of male violence are supported and the perpetrators brought to justice if the survivor wants to pursue the matter.
I know from personal experience about male violence and no one is more committed to ensuring that the criminal justice system does more to protect and support survivors, as well as ensuring that the perpetrators are successfully brought to justice in a way that respects survivors and encourages them to come forward. But this cannot be justice for victims at any cost. The protection of the rights of survivors cannot be at the unnecessary and unreasonable denial of the rights of the accused.
Many sexual offences are different in nature from other criminal offences. In most cases of criminal wrongdoing, there is objective and physical evidence of that wrongdoing. If someone is accused of murder, there is almost always a body. If someone is accused of child cruelty, there is a child who has been harmed. In many sexual offences cases, particularly where the offence is historical, very often there is no objective, independent physical evidence. The allegation can be made and the complainant can be credible, but the complainant may be mistaken or, albeit rarely, malicious. One has only to look at those parts of the report produced for the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police by Sir Richard Henriques, which was made public last week, to realise how the police can be taken in. The police must treat every allegation made to them seriously, but they must believe the person making the allegation as far as the initial investigation and care and support for that person are concerned. They must treat the allegations as true as far as their interaction with that individual is concerned, unless and until they establish that there is no credible evidence to support the allegation. However, until they do establish that there is credible evidence that they can put before a court, they should not do anything to identify the accused, unless there are exceptional circumstances. That is what this amendment seeks to achieve.
Lord Campbell-Savours (Lab)
My Lords, the House is indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who has huge experience in this area. I open my remarks by telling a true story. A woman rifles through the dustbin of a reputable consultant, finds a used condom, smears the contents on herself and makes a false allegation of rape. Because the accused has no right to anonymity, he is suspended as a consultant psychiatrist, hauled before the GMC, shunned by his friends, attacked on the internet, loses £100,000, part of which was income, and is then discredited in his own community. Should we not be looking at the law on anonymity for men, as there are many cases of reputations that have been destroyed where prosecutions have been dropped?
I have raised this issue on many occasions over the last 15 years of my membership of this House. To be frank, I got absolutely nowhere. The problem is not in this House, but in the Commons. There are women in the Commons who feel strongly that transparency in the legal and investigatory processes helps to secure a high rate of successful prosecutions. I understand all that. The facts as the law stands speak for themselves: a 31% increase in recorded rapes in 2015 alone; gross underreporting of the crime; one in five women under 60 reporting sexual violence; abuse in the process, as in the recent Evans case; and the disturbing trend—I understand, although I am not a lawyer—of jury vilification, where juries return a verdict of not guilty despite a belief that the defendant is guilty of the violation. The jury, in effect, is nullifying a law it believes is immoral or wrongly applied to the defendant whose fate it is charged with deciding. Finally, there is a low rate of successful prosecutions. That is the background; it is the tension in the Commons that leads to opposition to the change of the law in this area.
These concerns and more stand at the heart of the anonymity debate. Women want early identification so as to counteract their concerns. As Maria Eagle put it in the Commons:
“Rape is often a serial crime and it is often only after many crimes that a perpetrator is brought to court. Previous victims often come forward at that point. That can be essential to the securing of a conviction”.—[Official Report, Commons, 8/7/10; col. 567.]
That is the case in defence of the present arrangements.
There is, however, an appalling price to pay for the denial of anonymity. Lives are being destroyed. The new drivers behind the argument for reform are those whose lives have been ruined by pre-charge publicity: Cliff Richard, Paul Gambaccini and Leon Brittan—as we mentioned—and the many others who have written to me over the years detailing what has happened in their lives. It has meant the loss of livelihood, the loss of friendships, marriages collapsed and families destroyed by the unjustifiable publicity. Even when their names are cleared, they take to their graves an element of residual public prejudice and suspicion. The benefits of transparency have to be carefully weighed against the destruction of people’s lives, which on occasions has even led to suicide. There has to be reform.
We are then told by those who oppose anonymity that you cannot single out the crime of rape from other offences pre-charge. Again, as Maria Eagle put it in the House of Commons:
“In fact, people accused of sexual crimes should not be treated any differently from other defendants. If the Under-Secretary”—
who was across the Dispatch Box at the time—
“singles out rape from all other sexual offences … That will impinge on victims’ capacity to come forward … which will in turn impinge on the conviction rate”.—[Official Report, Commons, 8/7/10; col. 567.]
I cannot, however, understand how singling out rape pre-charge deters reporting by victims when, once a person is charged, goes to court and is placed on public trial, the world is made aware of the nature of the crime that they are alleged to have committed. In a particular case, a man is not tried for previous rapes, as I understand it, but only the rape or rapes that is or are the subject of the prosecution. Surely if, during a trial, further rape cases come to light, and if the evidence is there, further prosecutions can be brought.
We are then told that police guidelines protect the accused prior to charge from adverse humiliating publicity. However, as Mr Blunt, the Minister, said at the Dispatch Box in the other House on behalf of the Government in July 2010:
“It appears to be widely assumed that there is a self-regulation scheme in place that clearly prohibits the reporting of anybody accused of a crime but not yet charged with it. On close examination, however, the 2004 interpretative note does not provide complete reassurance. Nowhere does it contain an outright general prohibition on the reporting of pre-charge allegations. In fact, in the main, no mention is made of the distinction between pre and post-charge reporting at all”.—[Official Report, Commons, 8/7/10; col. 557.]
That is the point that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, so forcefully put in his contribution. In other words, there is potentially no redress for those accused who are innocent.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, I strongly support the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and his very reasonable amendment. The Committee is very lucky to have his expertise. Unfortunately, I have limited experience in the area of PACE and police investigations, so I am unable to offer the Committee my own solution. However, I have no difficulty in seeing that something is seriously wrong and needs urgent attention, and I intend to support the noble Lord vigorously.
Throughout the passage of the Bill, the Minister has never hesitated to rely on the principle of operational independence for the police, but it is a principle that I think is often taken too far and seems to me to be an excuse for doing nothing. Interestingly, when the then Home Secretary, my right honourable friend the Prime Minister, wanted to curb the use of stop and search powers, operational independence did not seem to be a problem.
In public life, some people are important, some are powerful, some are senior and some are all three. Fortunately, I am none of these, so there is no risk to me of being subject to a sensational and false allegation, because no one would be the slightest bit interested.
It is not often that the Metropolitan Police has to investigate someone who is far more senior than the commissioner himself. When such a situation arises, no one—as far as I am aware—is suggesting that an investigation should not take place; far from it. In fact, in recent years we have seen Cabinet Ministers investigated and prosecuted. As far as I know, during Operation Midland Ministers and the Government did absolutely nothing and let the police follow the evidence, and rightly so. We would not expect anything else, and we do not want to repeat the mistakes of the past.
Nevertheless, if the Metropolitan Police decides to investigate someone as senior as the noble and gallant Lord, Field Marshall Lord Bramall, KG—Knight of the Garter—one would expect the commissioner to keep himself very closely informed indeed, not least because it could have adverse effect with our overseas opponents. It also could cause very serious reputational damage to the Metropolitan Police if the operation turned out to be flawed.
The Committee will be aware that Lord Bramall was Chief of the Defence Staff at the height of the Cold War. Our Security Service, over many years, would have formally and informally taken all the necessary steps to ensure that he could be trusted with large amounts of highly classified material. Our “Four Eyes” partners would also have relied on that confidence, but the exceptionally overt Operation Midland investigation could well have called into question the reliability of our vetting procedures.
Lord Bramall would have known everything when he was Chief of the Defence Staff. For instance, in the event of a mass armoured attack on the north German plain, would we have used tactical nuclear weapons? He would have known. What serious weaknesses did we have that our opponents were unaware of? He would have known. What weaknesses did our opponents have that we knew about but they did not? He would have known. If there was any problem with Lord Bramall along the lines alleged, it would have been of strategic significance. It would have been unbelievably serious.
At Question Time last week, the Minister referred to the Henriques report. The report was initiated and the terms of reference were set by the commissioner. Apparently, this means he can also determine what is published and what is not. Therefore, my first question to the Minister is: does the report and its terms of reference cover the failure of the commissioner to terminate the Operation Midland inquiry into Lord Bramall as soon as possible after it became obvious that there was not one shred of incriminating evidence? Secondly, has my noble friend read the report? Will the Home Secretary initiate an inquiry on her own terms, so that she can determine what will be published?
I am extremely unhappy about the procedure for obtaining search warrants, although my advice is that the magistrate concerned probably did the right thing by granting one in the Bramall case. What is the point of involving the judiciary if magistrates grant a warrant in such circumstances as Lord Bramall’s case? What questions were asked of the police requesting the warrant in such an improbable case? For instance, were they asked whether the Security Service had been consulted and whether the sanity of Nick had been checked by a medically qualified person? If the complaint turned out to be fiction and baseless, would a criminal prosecution of Nick be inevitable because that should be the remedy for a malicious and baseless complaint? It would also be interesting to know whether the commissioner asked these questions. It now seems that it may be better to allow a senior police officer to authorise a search rather than relying upon the judiciary. At least there is some mechanism for holding senior officers to account, eventually.
If this totally flawed inquiry can be inflicted upon a retired officer of stratospheric seniority with apparent impunity, what is to protect the ordinary man in the street? It seems to me that the judiciary dish out search warrants like sweets, despite how distressing it must be for an innocent person, whatever their status. So far as I can see, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police had the power to terminate this inquiry at an early stage, but chose not to do so for presentational reasons. He could have written a sincere letter of apology to Lord Bramall, but chose not to, presumably on legal advice. Luckily, Lord Bramall has not passed away too soon; it is a pity the same cannot be said for Lord Brittan or, indeed, Lady Bramall.
Both these failings seem to me to indicate a lack of capacity to take an unpalatable course of action. It is not unusual for retired Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police to be offered a seat in your Lordships’ House, but your Lordships’ House is overfull with active Members. We already have far too many Peers, and we already have several retired senior and very senior police officers who are already meeting the needs of the House exceptionally well, not least the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. It is not clear to me why we would need another retired commissioner, and one who appears to be unable to write a sincere letter of apology to a Field Marshal who has had his reputation traduced solely because he is such a senior officer and a great public servant. If the police use their powers carelessly, it is our duty to constrain them.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, the Committee will be very grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Campbell-Savours, for bringing forward this amendment on what is undoubtedly an important issue. I am sure the Committee shares their sense of outrage—I certainly do—at the treatment of Sir Cliff Richard and others who were wrongly and unfairly accused of sexual offences, but I am not persuaded that this amendment is the answer to the problem. A prohibition on publicising an accusation of a sexual offence raises many difficulties.
The first is that publicity can lead others to come forward with supporting evidence that helps to make the case against the person who is rightly accused. Sometimes this is evidence that the person accused has treated them in the same way. They have not previously come forward because they are fearful that no one would take them seriously. It is only hearing that an allegation is being taken seriously that gives them the confidence to come forward.
Lord Campbell-Savours
Surely they can come forward during the course of the trial.
Lord Pannick
The problem is that they come forward during the course of the trial only if there is one. By reason of the publicity, they are encouraged to come forward and present evidence that helps to persuade the prosecuting authorities that the matter should proceed to a trial. That is the difficulty. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, says that justice should not be achieved at any cost. He is right, but to impede convicting the guilty is a very high cost indeed. That is the first problem.
The second problem is that the amendment would prevent the person accused from publicising the allegation against him in order to express his outrage or possibly to seek alibi witnesses. There are cases in which publicity has been sought by the person wrongly accused and this helps to exonerate that person. I appreciate that this amendment would allow the person accused to seek permission from the judge to publicise the matter in the public interest. But if I am wrongly accused of a sexual offence, I should not need to persuade a judge that it is in the public interest for me to be able to publicise the fact. I am entitled to publicise the matter because it is in my interests.
The third problem is common to restrictions on open justice. You can prevent publication of the name of the person concerned, but you cannot prevent people in the know from gossiping. The consequence is that a larger group of people know the name of the person concerned. Those who do not know inevitably speculate. This amendment or any variation of it would not prevent the press from publicising—and they would—that a famous footballer, a well-known pop star or a senior politician has been accused of a sexual offence. It would not prevent the press from publicising details as long as this does not identify the specific politician, pop star or footballer concerned.
Earl Attlee
I am sure that the noble Lord is right. Would that not let other victims know that their allegations would be taken seriously?
Lord Pannick
No. They would not know who the individual was. This of course is very unfair on famous footballers, well-known pop stars and senior politicians who are not the subject of the accusation. Can they issue a press release to say that they are not the person concerned? That is the third problem.
The fourth problem is that the amendment does not address the difficult question of what is meant by being accused. As drafted, the prohibition on publicity would apply whether or not it is the police making the accusation. It seems to suggest that any accusation of a sexual offence would prevent publicity, but how far does this go?
Fifthly, the amendment fails adequately to address when the prohibition on publicity comes to an end. As drafted, the prohibition on publicity ends when the person concerned is charged with an offence. But let us suppose that the police decide not to bring charges and the person concerned is exonerated. Under this amendment, it seems that no publicity is allowed even at that stage—the person concerned cannot tell the world that he has been vindicated and the press still cannot report that a false allegation has been made.
Lord Campbell-Savours
The noble Lord has listed a number of objections. He is an eminent lawyer. How would he solve the problem in a way that enables people to protect their reputations when they are innocent?
Lord Pannick
The way that people protect their reputations is that we all have to emphasise the importance of the presumption of innocence. It is quite wrong that people such as the doctor to whom the noble Lord referred are subjected to serious detriment simply because an allegation has been made. That is the basis of English law: you are innocent until you are convicted. That is the principle and I do not accept that the nature of the problem justifies an amendment of this sort, which would lead to all the problems I have sought to identify.
Viscount Hailsham
My Lords, notwithstanding the very eloquent speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I am in favour of this amendment, subject to one or two points I am going to make. If the noble Lord will forgive me, most of his points are drafting points, which could be dealt with by way of further discussion and a further amendment. I take the point that there are defects in this amendment but in my view, the principle that the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Campbell-Savours, are aiming at is correct and the arguments that have been advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, are not correct.
I have two reservations. First, I note that one of the principal mischiefs that this amendment should capture is not dealt with at all: communication by police officers to the press, often for money. I know perfectly well that that is covered by existing legislation and I have no doubt that communication by a police officer giving private information regarding accusations is contrary to the disciplinary code, but if we are moving an amendment of this kind, we should seek to catch the very serious mischief of police officers giving private information to the press.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, is the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, saying that the practice of police officers giving information to the press after a person is accused by them of an offence is not covered by the amendment as drawn? I should have thought it was.
Viscount Hailsham
I really do not think so because it is a question of publication. What is meant by “publication”? It is, I think, different from communication. I think “communication” is a private communication—made, for example, by a police officer to a journalist—and “publication” is a more overt act which happens via the press, the television or whatever. I think they are different. Perhaps that matter could be considered by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.
The second point concerns gossip. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is quite right about this. There will be gossip. Among the great mischiefs are social media and foreign communications, where there is an awful lot of identification. That is a form of gossip that is simply not touched by this amendment and probably cannot be. That is a defect, which I acknowledge even though I support the broad thrust of the amendment.
On the broad thrust, I find the arguments advanced by the noble Lords, Lord Campbell-Savours and Lord Paddick, very persuasive. Harvey Proctor was an old colleague of mine in the House of Commons. We all know that he lost his job and his home, and his reputation has been irreparably damaged by what happened. The publicity regarding Sir Edward Heath is simply absurd but it will taint his long-term reputation. I was PPS to Lord Brittan when he was Chief Secretary to the Treasury. His last days were darkened by the allegations against him, which were wholly groundless. There is therefore a serious mischief that the Committee should seek to address.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has made some important points here but, if he will forgive my saying so, he seems to ignore the principle of proportionality, which should come into play. If we are right in supposing that this is a very serious mischief, we should be cautious about allowing drafting points to stand in the way of confronting it. The question of witnesses coming forward is a proper point. There is no doubt that on occasion, publicity enables witnesses to come forward; that is absolutely true. Surely, though, the proviso in the amendment that would enable the police to go to a judge for the authority to disclose the fact of the accusation addresses that point. Maybe it could be improved upon but the concept of allowing the prohibition to be lifted by a judge is surely a sensible one.
The point the noble Lord makes about the accused person being prohibited from receiving exoneration is a perfectly good one and has substance, but actually it is a drafting point and it would take the noble Lord and myself but a few moments to add the necessary words to the amendment to cover it. I ask the Committee to stand back, look at the extent of the mischief and ask itself whether the drafting objections that have been put forward are sufficiently weighty to stand in the way of our doing justice.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, many speakers with much more experience than me might wonder why someone who has amendments later in today’s Committee on the rights of and support for victims might wish to speak in support of this amendment. I have experience of cases involving two teachers and very contrasting approaches by the police, both pre-charge and post-charge. The first involved a head teacher who happened to live in the area of his school. A pupil had made a very serious allegation and there was much publicity. Not only did the head teacher and his family have to leave the village but he became seriously ill; in fact he died within two years of the incident going public. It quickly became apparent that this was a fallacious allegation by the pupil, and the police dropped the case. The problem is people. The matter had been all over the local press and radio, and this man’s career was utterly traduced. There is no doubt that it led to the downfall in his health and his subsequent death.
The other case is that of a friend of mine who was abused at his boarding school aged about eight years old. After some decades he finally managed to pluck up the courage to talk to the police, and then the police guidelines were followed. Until after charging there was no advertising at all about the case. At that moment two other pupils from other decades came forward, thus supporting and helping the police and the CPS when they brought their case. Importantly for the initial complainant, they went through only one moment when the entire matter was made public. Had it gone public before then, there would have been repeated incidences in the press and very difficult times until it came to trial.
This is about justice. It is absolutely right that there should be justice where a complaint has been made and no charge follows. However, there is also an issue for the victims and the lives they have to lead if false publicity is given and nothing then follows; they also have to live through substantial amounts of publicity. I do not have the knowledge that the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, does, but I support the amendment. If it needs redrafting to finesse it, that is absolutely right—provided that there is the chance at an appropriate moment, and it seems to me that charging is that moment.
Lord Faulks
My Lords, we know that this is an issue on which it is very difficult to find a satisfactory compromise. I am also conscious of not taking drafting points which might serve to divert us from the central issue. However, I am a bit concerned about this proviso. I understand that it is a sensible idea to have one, so that a judge can be satisfied that it is in the public interest to remove the restriction in respect of a person. If that is to be meaningful, will the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, explain to the Committee in what circumstances he envisages an application being made and who will make it? How is the public interest going to be defined? Whose interest is the public interest? Reference was made to a case where there was corroborating or forensic evidence being circumstances in which a judge would be satisfied. However, many of these claims may concern young people who did not know they could complain. Many years have gone past; there is no forensic evidence. As far as they know, there may be no corroborating evidence. Are they to come within that exception? How is the judge to assess this? If this is to be a meaningful exception to change the law, we need to set out with some precision the sorts of factors that ought to be taken into account.
Lord Beith (LD)
My Lords, I have great respect for both my noble friend Lord Paddick and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. On this occasion, it is with the former, rather than the latter, that I agree, although one takes on either of them with a measure of reluctance and trepidation. I was partly struck to say something in this debate when the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, asserted that to impose obstacles to convicting the guilty is a very high cost. We actually pay this cost throughout our criminal justice system. It would be a lot easier to convict some people that we and the police think are guilty if we did not have to prove that they actually are, to the satisfaction of a jury, or if various procedures, such as disclosure, did not have to operate—the prosecution must disclose any evidence it comes across that might support the innocence of the accused. Many of these things make it more difficult to convict people, but they are part of the protection for the innocent and uphold the principle that someone has to be proven to have committed an offence.
Much of the argument about whether the kind of prohibition which my noble friend has advanced—and I agree this should be done—revolves around whether people who have had similar experiences of the accused will come forward. There are several points at which, if this clause were in operation, they would still be able to do so: between charge and trial or between the various stages of a trial process, for example between committal and trial. I am not an expert in this, but it appears that in most of the cases where this has happened it has been at that stage, rather than at the stage of initial accusation, except perhaps in some of the most notorious cases, which have been referred to this afternoon, where injustice has been done by publicity.
As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, correctly pointed out, the proviso has to be precisely worded. The point of the proviso is that anonymity might be broken if the police and prosecuting authority consider that they would like to go to trial and the evidence is not quite strong enough for them to do so but there is some knowledge that it is likely that people will come forward. A case where there is substantial evidence that does not quite meet the Crown Prosecution Service’s normal criteria, yet there is reason to believe that there may be others, might be just the circumstances in which an earlier breach of anonymity would be justified.
The weakest point put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was the one about gossip and speculation. The whole process is attended by the risk of these. If the name of an accused person cannot be disclosed prior to charge, there may be those who seek to gossip about it. That is something we should try to deal with in whatever way we can. But of course the same applies to the anonymity of the victim. Most of us have read newspaper stories which speculate and hint at who the victim might be in such a case. We cannot use that as a reason not to afford protection to the victim, and we should not use it as a reason not to afford protection to the accused at a stage in the process when it is unreasonable to visit a punishment more severe than applies in many other criminal offences, arising out of the publicity and shame and loss of office and other consequences that have attended some of the cases that we have heard about.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, produced several convincing examples of drafting that might be improved in this Bill, but that is what it was—the principle needs to be addressed, and it is not adequately satisfied by guidelines. Even though the better the guidelines the better the situation, guidelines fall short of the value of a firm principle enshrined in law, which the criminal justice system can itself uphold.
Lord Judge (CB)
My Lords, I introduce what I want to say by suggesting that we need to question certainties that anybody advances in this debate. I went to, was well informed by and was deeply sympathetic to, the meeting arranged by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, where we heard the overwhelmingly poignant stories of Mr Gambaccini, Lady Brittan and Sir Cliff Richard, and I thought, “That’s a certainty, isn’t it?”. But then I remembered an experience that I had when I was a young member of the Bar, of a client in the Midlands arrested for murder. If he was arrested, it meant that there were reasonable grounds for suspicion—and there were. It was quite a notorious case, and the publicity given to his arrest meant that two people came forward who were quite unconnected with him and were able to establish an alibi for him. Another man was subsequently convicted for the murder, so this man was totally innocent. If those people had not come forward, he would have remained in custody pending trial. They might have come forward by trial, but he would have been in custody for many months before his trial began—and, if they had come forward then, the argument would have been, “How can they be so sure that they were together or they saw him in this particular place on this particular night?”.
So there are certainties both ways. I want to contribute to the debate by making two separate and additional points to the ones that have been discussed—perhaps one to meet a point raised in discussion. It is said that rape and sexual crime is particularly awful, and there is usually plenty of other evidence when other crimes are concerned. Well, with murder, the allegation that a mother has killed her children is not the kind of allegation that can be trivialised. There are cases in which mothers alleged to have killed their children have not done so. Noble Lords are all familiar with the phrase “cot death”, although it summarises a much more complex idea. There the question is whether the children were murdered at all, or whether they died from natural causes. It is a terrible allegation to have to face. Do we say, “Ah, well, it does not matter if they have publicity”?
Then there is terrorism. Half the time with terrorism, if the police did not act before the bomb went off, on the knowledge that they have, we would be blown up. So terrorist offences usually consist of conspiracies and offences contrary to various terrorism Acts which never came to fruition. The whole case depends on demonstrating that there was going to be a bomb, or whatever, and it never happened. We have to be careful about the sorts of cases that we are thinking about. I suspect that causing death by dangerous driving is a dreadfully serious allegation to the public mind—and certainly, if it is said to be accompanied by drink, of course it is a dreadfully serious allegation, because it is a dreadfully serious crime.
I ask noble Lords to pause. I understand that sexual crime now seems to be at the forefront of public concern, but let us not just dismiss those other crimes as really not so important, so we do not really need to preserve the anonymity of the accused for them because it does not really matter so much. We need to have a clear principle about this. I think that we should have a principle that either says yes or no to publicity or anonymity at various different stages. But I do not, I regret to say, share the view that sexual crimes should be treated as entirely one-off, on their own, and separate.
There is one more point that I want to add to the discussion. We are working on the basis that the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, are drafting points—I do not share the criticism made of him. But drafting points matter in this context. Let us pause to consider what arrest means, if we are saying that “don’t disclose anonymity” stands on arrest but, once the charge happens, the anonymity goes. Pitch the time where you like—arrest means that there are reasonable grounds for suspicion. It means that you are incarcerated; it means that you have lost your liberty and that, lawfully, you have lost your liberty, and that it is justified because there are reasonable grounds for suspicion. I have concerns about a blanket prohibition imposing silence on the media in circumstances where somebody’s liberty has been taken from him or her, even if for a short time. That is not how we work in this country. We do not want people locked up for any time at all without anybody being able to say so. Those are considerations that I suggest should be added to the thought that we give to the issues in this debate.
Lord Lexden (Con)
My Lords, much gratitude is due to the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Campbell-Savours, for introducing and seconding this amendment, drawing on their long experience of work and reflection in relation to a very important issue. I shall return briefly to a question that has come up naturally in the course of our discussion—the simple question of whether the presumption of innocence until proved guilty is still in practical, effective existence where allegations of sexual abuse are concerned. Last week’s Henriques report showed that during Operation Midland innocent people were treated as if they were guilty, even though there was no serious evidence against them. A recent detailed study by the Oxford University Centre for Criminology concluded that there has been a cultural shift towards believing allegations of abuse and the presumption is now in favour of believing those who present themselves as victims. The study documents in great detail the immense harm done to very large numbers of ordinary, innocent people who had unfounded allegations made against them. In any walk of life, a person whose name appears publicly in relation to a mere allegation of abuse can expect to suffer much hardship. This wholly unsatisfactory state of affairs extends from state to Church, from the living to the dead.
As I have mentioned on previous occasions in your Lordships’ House, grave damage has been inflicted on the reputation of one of the greatest 20th century bishops of the Church of England, George Bell, after a completely secret and internal investigation of a single, uncorroborated complaint, made many decades after his death. At least the injustice done as a result of Operation Midland has been the subject of a thorough authoritative inquiry. In June, the Church announced an independent review of the case involving Bishop Bell. Four and a half months later, we still await the name of the review’s chairman and his or her terms of reference. There is no right reverend Prelate in the Chamber at the moment but I hope that these comments will be noted by the Lords Spiritual.
The authorities of Church as well as state must recognise that we need not just to halt but to reverse the trend that has eroded the presumption of innocence. We need another cultural shift, a decisive, morally responsible one that will stop the ruin of innocent lives and reputations. This amendment, I believe, would help us to achieve that shift.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I support the amendment, although there should of course be amendments to the drafting. I accept the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about anonymity acting to the detriment of the accused without his consent. I suggest that consideration be given to redrafting the amendment to permit the accused to waive the right to anonymity. On reconsideration, I should add that I consider my earlier intervention on the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, to be ill advised: the amendment does not in fact cover communication privately by police officers and I accept that it should.
There has been widespread discussion in the press of the independent review by Sir Richard Henriques into the failure of Operation Midland, the reliance placed on accounts given by, in particular, one unreliable witness and baseless allegations that had been made. Those allegations were, as has been said, permitted to do untold harm to the reputations of a number of prominent men who had given their lives to public service.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, reminded us that Sir Richard makes the case for increased anonymity, but his recommendation is that there should be anonymity only pre-arrest. He draws back from recommending anonymity at all stages prior to charge. His reasoning, in paragraph 1.67 of his report, is as follows:
“I consider it most unlikely that a Government will protect the anonymity of suspects pre-charge. To do so would enrage the popular press whose circulation would suffer”.
If that is the reasoning behind his conclusion, I disagree. He goes on to say:
“Present arrangements, however, have caused the most dreadful unhappiness and distress to numerous suspects, their families, friends and supporters”.
In that, Sir Richard is plainly right.
The question of when anonymity should be lost is one of balance. For my part, I do not believe that protection ought to be lost at the date of arrest, when the arrest can be made—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, points out—on reasonable suspicion only. I accept that the consideration that comes into play is whether, as he suggests, anonymity should apply only to sexual offences, rather than more widely. In my view, the particular position relating to sexual offences justifies the difference when we weigh the balance. He is of course right to say that what needs to come into the balance is the risk of injustice flowing from anonymity, just as there may be—indeed, we know there is—a risk of injustice flowing from the exposure that comes from the lack of anonymity.
As we all know, suspicion—even reasonable suspicion sufficient to ground an arrest—can turn out to be entirely misplaced. There may be a reasonable and truthful explanation for the circumstances that give rise to the suspicion justifying an arrest. While those circumstances may demand that explanation, an arrest can legitimately take place before the suspect has had a chance to give the full explanation required. When a suspect is charged, however, it is on the basis of a different test and different circumstances. First, the police must have the evidence that they believe will sustain a prosecution and conviction, if not refuted. Secondly, the suspect will generally have had a full opportunity to give a considered explanation of the circumstances, if there is one. Public exposure damages a suspect’s family life, his privacy and his reputation—for we are talking about men predominantly. The damage is largely irreversible, even where allegations are later withdrawn or found to be baseless. Death has sometimes made the damage and injustice total.
When striking a balance between the right of a suspect to be protected from that damage and the right of the public to know, the balance tips, in my view, in favour of the public’s right to know at the point of charge, not at the point of arrest. I am not persuaded by the argument that pre-charge anonymity will prevent other victims coming forward altogether. It may be that there will be a delay in such victims coming forward and they will do so after charge, rather than after arrest. That gives some opportunity for witnesses to come forward—as in the case of the murder client of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, which of course could happen in the case of a sexual offence client as well. There is delay to the stage at which anonymity is lost, but it is not lost for ever and there is no reason to suppose that others will not come forward at that stage. My noble friend Lady Brinton’s point, that there should be protection also for the victims from early disclosure until it is established by charge that there is going to be a case, is an important one. I agree with my noble friend Lord Beith that the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on gossip and speculation, applies wherever there is going to be anonymity at any stage. The argument that we have to address is at what stage anonymity should be lost.
The only reasonable point that can be made against this amendment is that there may be cases where further witnesses might come forward with legitimate and admissible similar fact evidence which might justify the charge where otherwise no charge would be brought. However, for my part, I have concluded that such cases will be rare and that most can be met by the proviso included—though perhaps to be redrafted—in the amendment. It is a question of balance but, in my view, the possibility of similar fact evidence being lost and justice thereby being thwarted is of lesser weight than the inevitable damage caused by premature exposure of an innocent suspect’s identity.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, as we have seen from this debate, this issue raises strong feelings. I will say before I go any further that the overwhelming majority of those who have spoken so far will not be in agreement with what I have to say. It has not been our policy, as my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours in effect said, to support anonymity for rape suspects before they are charged or indeed those suspected of other sexual offences. There are almost no cases, at least as I understand it, where suspects are specifically granted anonymity in this way in our legal system. I appreciate that the amendment enables a judge to remove the restriction on identifying the person concerned where they are satisfied that doing so would be in the public interest. But we have yet to be convinced that this test will not in reality lead to fewer prosecutions and fewer victims of sexual assault coming forward than is the case even now. Granting anonymity specifically for those suspected of sexual offences could imply that a person making a complaint in respect of such an offence was not to be believed in the same way as someone making a complaint involving another individual in relation to any other kind of offence, such as child cruelty.
During the passage of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, one reason we gave for not changing the law was precisely to avoid giving the impression that there is a presumption of doubt about the credibility of the complainant in sex offence cases, as well as the fact that naming a suspect in such cases can lead to other victims coming forward—as it did, for example, in the cases of Rolf Harris and Stuart Hall, and the case for a credible and successful prosecution was enhanced as a result. Many of Jimmy Savile’s victims said they thought they were the only ones, and doubted whether anyone would have believed them if they had come forward, bearing in mind the celebrity status of the offender. The position, and their approach, changed somewhat when they found out, through the absence of pre-charge anonymity, that they were not the only ones.
In the light of what has been said in the debate, perhaps it is worth stating that the victims of sexual offences have, of course, also had their lives darkened—not least when the sexual offences were committed by well- known public figures. Of course, the victims themselves rarely are well-known public figures.
I understand that the coalition floated plans to introduce anonymity for rape suspects in 2010, but after carrying out an assessment they concluded there was insufficient evidence to justify a change, and that a change would be likely to have a negative impact on justice for rape overall.
The argument is made that without anonymity, those suspected of sexual offences would suffer shame and harm to their reputation—usually as a result of how the media choose to report such cases even if the person has not been, and never is, charged with any offence. That may be quite true in some cases—more so if the police mishandle their investigation in the way highlighted in the report on the Metropolitan Police released a week or so ago. This argument would also apply, presumably, if someone were accused of murder, serious assault, child cruelty, major fraud or other forms of serious dishonesty and corruption—as we saw with the naming in the media of an alleged suspect, who had not committed the offence, in a particularly unpleasant murder case in Bristol a few years ago. The police have discretion over the naming of suspects, and should do so only when they have good reason to suspect that doing so might produce corroborating evidence that would increase the likelihood of a successful prosecution.
As for the concerns sometimes expressed about false allegations, I believe I am right in saying that the Crown Prosecution Service has found that the number of false allegations is no higher for sexual offences than for any other type of crime. Many would argue that the real problem is still the reluctance of victims to report rape and other sexual offences, and the reasons for that. It has been suggested—although I cannot vouch for this as the correct figure—that perhaps only 15% of rapes are ever reported to the police. Young people and children are targeted more than most by those who commit such offences, who are often repeat offenders. The report on child sexual abuse in Rotherham found that when offenders discovered, over time, that they could act with impunity and were unlikely to be challenged, they simply increased the scale and level of violence in their offending.
We understand why the approach called for in the amendment is being pursued. We do not argue that no case can be made for the amendment, but rather that the case that can and should be made against it is stronger and more powerful. Unless firm evidence can be produced that the terms of the amendment would not result in more perpetrators of sexual offences escaping prosecution because others who may have been the subject of similar assaults do not come forward—because they are unaware that the individual is being investigated, and instead feel that if they did come forward they would be on their own—the amendment cannot be supported.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in the debate. The variety of views on this subject speak to me of just how difficult an issue it is. I also particularly thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, the only woman apart from myself to speak in the debate. This is a very sensitive issue, and many noble Lords have talked about getting the balance right. We think that the Government have got the balance right, and I will explain why.
I shall start with the report by Richard Henriques on the Metropolitan Police Service’s handing of its investigations into allegations of sexual offences by persons of public prominence. That is a further element contributing to the debate. In answer to the point made by my noble friend Lord Attlee, I have been fully briefed on that report. It was commissioned by the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, and as I said to this House the other day, the report—including its publication—is a matter for him and for the force. The commissioner has made a public apology to Lord Bramall, to Lady Brittan and to Harvey Proctor for the impact that Operation Midland had on their lives.
At the outset, let me say that the Government fully understand the anguish felt by those who have had their reputation traduced in the media following unfounded allegations made against them. The notion that someone is innocent until proven guilty is central to our justice system and to the rule of law, so the Government have every sympathy for the underlying aim behind the amendment. I will not go into what should be redrafted, but will talk about the amendment as it stands.
The Government also start from the position that there should, in general, be a presumption of anonymity before the point of charge. I believe that there is also a general acceptance that there will none the less be exceptional circumstances in which the public interest means that a suspect should be named. If there is a divide between noble Lords and myself on this issue, it is not therefore one of principle but is about how best to give effect to the shared policy position. For the Government’s part, we are not persuaded that legislation is the right way forward at this time.
One of the principal arguments put forward in support of retaining the public interest exception is that, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, there will be circumstances in which the police need to publicise a person’s identity to allow further witnesses to a known offence to come forward, or further unknown offences by the same person to come to light. As he also said, witnesses can come forward at a trial only if there is, in fact, a trial. He also made the further point that the accused could themselves create their own publicity around an event.
As the current Prime Minister said in response to the previous Home Affairs Select Committee on this issue,
“While we are clear that transparency and consistency should be at the heart of the criminal justice system, … we recognise that there is a difficult balance to strike in some criminal investigations between the operational advantages of naming suspects and respecting suspects’ right to privacy”.
As noble Lords will know, the issue of anonymity in relation to sexual offences has been debated in this House over many years. Anonymity for complainants in rape cases was introduced in 1976. It was subsequently extended to sexual offences generally. Anonymity for defendants who have been charged with an offence was introduced at the same time, but abolished in 1988. Defendant anonymity was subject to exhaustive consideration before and during the passage of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said, in 2010 the then coalition Government published independent research relevant to defendant anonymity in rape cases, which found,
“insufficient reliable empirical evidence on which to base an informed decision on the value of providing anonymity to rape defendants. Evidence is lacking in a number of key areas, in particular, whether the inability to publicise a person’s identity will prevent further witnesses to a known offence from coming forward, or further unknown offences by the same person from coming to light”.—[Official Report, Commons, 12/11/10; col. 27WS].
The coalition Government declined to proceed with introducing defendant anonymity in rape cases unless the evidence justifying it was “clear and sound”. In the absence of any finding to that effect, they reached the conclusion that the proposal did not stand on its merits and would not be proceeded with further.
While the amendment before us would confer anonymity on suspects rather than defendants, I note the preceding history to highlight the challenges we face in coming to an equitable view on this sensitive issue. There are powerful arguments against conferring anonymity on either suspects or defendants of sexual offences simply as a quid pro quo for that enjoyed by complainants. However, I also recognise that those whose identity is made public, be they persons of public prominence or not, may suffer unjustifiable reputational damage. Noble Lords have given many examples of those individuals. While we may personally empathise in individual cases, this should not blind us to the bigger picture and the very significant reasons that underpin the current regime.
As I have said, it is a fundamental tenet of our justice system that everyone is innocent until proven guilty. There must never be an assumption that being charged or arrested for an offence indicates that a person is guilty of a crime. Introducing a statutory scheme for pre-charge anonymity for sexual offences could be seen to undermine that principle. Indeed, while it is true that a suspect who is not further proceeded against in respect of a sexual offence may nevertheless suffer reputational damage, the same may be true of any other serious offence, such as murder, theft or fraud, as noble Lords have said. As with these other offences, it is absolutely right and proper for the police to have operational independence in deciding whether to name a suspect.
The police are guided in making such decisions by the College of Policing’s authorised professional practice material Guidance on Relationships with the Media. The current guidance makes clear that decisions should be made only on a case-by-case basis and the police should not release the names of those who are arrested or suspected of a crime unless there are clearly identified circumstances to justify it. These would include incidences, for example, where there is a threat to life or to assist the police in the detection or prevention of crime.
The College of Policing is currently developing new authorised professional practice on media relations and has recently undertaken a consultation as part of its development. The consultation closed in July and the college expects to publish its response to the consultation in the new year. It would not be right, therefore, for the Government to pre-empt the outcome and we will await the conclusion of the college’s review. However, the Government firmly believe that non-statutory guidance, rather than primary legislation, is the appropriate vehicle for guiding the police in these operational decisions. It is vital that the police are able to exercise their own judgment and act swiftly in the circumstances where releasing the name of a suspect may prevent further harm, for example.
I must emphasise that public reporting of a suspect’s name is unusual, but in certain circumstances the police authorise release so that any other potential victims of a suspect are encouraged to come forward. The introduction of a statutory scheme would hamper the police’s ability to act in this way. We know that such identification can help other victims to recognise that they are not the only ones who have suffered sexual abuse—as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, rightly articulated—and this might encourage them to overcome their reluctance to come forward. Victims must feel that they are able to come forward and report abuse to the police as well as get the support that they need. We have seen recently an increase in the number of offences recorded. That is thought to be the result of increased willingness to report among victims and action taken by police forces to improve their approach to investigating sexual abuse. As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said, convictions for this offence are still woefully low.
In March this year, the chief executive of the College of Policing, Alex Marshall, wrote to all chief officers and PCCs following a number of high-profile cases concerning non-recent child abuse which had focused public attention on the police approach to victims, both at the point of reporting and in investigating the crime. Mr Marshall’s letter put on record that:
“In cases involving sexual offences, substantial efforts have been made to improve the confidence of victims to come forward and report crimes to the police. It is important that progress is not lost”.
I cannot emphasise this point enough. We must not undermine victims’ confidence in our response to sexual offences. Agreeing this amendment could send a message to sexual offence victims that they are less likely to be believed than victims of any other crime. This would be an undeniably retrograde step.
As has been highlighted in the debate we have had today, there are two issues in relation to this matter. The first is the right of the police to name individuals and the second relates to cases in the media where those being investigated, but who have not been charged, have been named. A number of these cases highlighted in the media have been as a result of information being provided not by the police but from other sources. The guidance from the college to the police does not interfere with the rights of the media to publish information obtained from another source, for example, where such information is provided by a victim of crime or a witness to the crime. The press is self-regulated and develops its own codes of practice. Any reporting which breaches an individual’s right to privacy would need to be demonstrably in the public interest. The Government are committed to an independent press, free from government interference. The majority of the press are members of the Independent Press Standards Organisation and are held to account via the Editors’ Code of Practice. The code stipulates:
“Everyone is entitled to respect for his or her private and family life, home, health and correspondence, including digital communications”.
As noble Lords will be aware, we already have a number of remedies in our justice system to redress the balance where individuals feel they have been treated unfairly—
Lord Campbell-Savours
May I ask the Minister a simple question? She used the phrase,
“demonstrably in the public interest”.
What was demonstrably in the public interest in the naming of Sir Cliff Richard for an offence he did not commit, and Leon Brittan, Ted Heath and Paul Gambaccini? What was demonstrably in the public interest in those cases?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I will not talk about individual cases, and noble Lords would not expect me to do so. I am talking about the code of practice for the press. I have also just talked about the guidance from the College of Policing. We are committed to an independent press. Noble Lords will already be aware that we have a number of remedies in our justice system to redress the balance where individuals feel they have been treated unfairly by the media and others. This includes resolution through the courts.
In conclusion, and for the reasons I have outlined, I am satisfied that there is an operational need for the police to be able to determine whether to name an individual ahead of charge and that adequate provisions already exist in current legislation and practice to safeguard those accused of a crime without the need for legislating for pre-charge anonymity. I hope that at the end of this rather long debate the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister and to all noble Lords who have participated in this debate. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, for supporting this amendment.
I have to make it clear to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, that this amendment is not an attack on the Metropolitan Police. It operates in what some might find a very strange way but there are reasons the commissioner is distanced from the operational decisions made by his officers, although I will not go into them now. The police have always had the problem that when things go wrong they are held back from apologising by their own lawyers, for reasons which will be apparent to the lawyers in the Chamber.
On what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, I agree with my noble friends that these are drafting issues. I said that the reason for this amendment was to allow a debate. The wording is actually a copy and paste of the protections provided to the victims of sexual offences; no doubt many of the noble Lord’s criticisms could therefore be directed at the current legislation. I will not go over what he said as criticisms have been made by other noble Lords and I do not want to carry on in that vein.
I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, for saying that, in principle, he felt this was correct. It is interesting that he said that the unauthorised disclosure of information by police officers should be addressed, particularly in light of the fact that the Government want to put a stop to part two of the Leveson inquiry, which is supposed to look at the relationship between the police and the press. The Government seem determined not to allow it to go ahead so maybe we should sidestep it and include this issue in the amendment, which we will no doubt return to on Report.
In response to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, I gave an exact example of an exceptional circumstance where such an exemption might take place and I do not want to detain the Committee by repeating it. However, perhaps “in the interests of justice” might be a better phrase to use than “in the public interest”.
Lord Faulks
I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. Perhaps he could help the Committee with this: the amendment would change the moment when anonymity is lost from arrest to charge. As the decision an officer takes about whether to charge is a very difficult one, does the noble Lord not think that there might be a temptation on the part of the police to charge rather earlier than they should—or at all—because then anonymity would be lost and they might be able to get more evidence? That would be a distortion of proper police practice.
Lord Paddick
I am quite surprised that that argument is being put forward. The noble Lord will know that in serious cases such as sexual offences the police cannot charge on their own account but have to have the agreement of the Crown Prosecution Service. I am sure that the noble Lord is not suggesting that the Crown Prosecution Service would be tempted to charge somebody in the absence of available evidence—the police would argue that the contrary is the case.
I take my life in my hands in addressing the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. In answer to his question, yes, it is important, and my noble friend Lord Marks has come up with the solution of including in the amendment the proposal that the identity of the accused should not be put into the public domain without his consent. That would cover the example that the noble and learned Lord gave of alibi witnesses being sought.
We are not saying that sexual offences are more serious than murder or terrorism. We are saying that there are many sexual offences and that particularly when it comes to historic offences there are questions of consent—perhaps—or there is no evidence at all and it is one person’s word against the other. That is not the case with murder or terrorism. Even when there is conspiracy to commit a terrorist act, evidence is gathered, whether, for example, from emails or through security services bugging rooms in which these people are operating. For those offences, there is some tangible evidence and that is what makes sexual offences different in a real sense. That is not to say that they are more serious—they might be so in terms of the reputational damage done to the individuals concerned but not in terms of the offence.
As a police officer who exercised the power of arrest on hundreds of occasions, I am not as confident that the level of reasonable cause to suspect that leads the police to arrest somebody is as high as the noble and learned Lord suggested. Yes, liberty is taken away, and somebody should not be deprived of their liberty without anybody knowing about it. However, if we put it into the amendment that the identity of the person should not be released without their consent, that issue would be addressed. Presumably it could also be given by the lawyer in particular circumstances.
I am very interested in what the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, said about the presumption of innocence and what he referred to as a cultural shift away from it. Everybody agrees that the presumption of innocence is at the heart of our criminal justice system, but, in practice, it is not being reflected in the minds of the public or the editors of certain newspapers. We have to deal with that reality and not some theoretical construct, and regrettably that is where we are going as far as the presumption of innocence is concerned in the minds of many members of the public.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, cited Stuart Hall as an example of a case in which more people came forward as a result of an arrest, but Stuart Hall was arrested and charged on the same day. In the case of Jimmy Savile, people did come forward to the police and were not believed; that was not because he was given anonymity but because there was something fundamentally wrong with the culture of the police at the time and they did not believe vulnerable victims. That is the issue that needs to be addressed.
We also have to ask ourselves about publicising cases which inevitably collapse. What impact does that have on victims of sexual offences who may be afraid that their genuine concerns will also result in a collapsed case? That is no doubt what is happening at the moment with the man who made these allegations and is known only as Nick. I am sure there are tabloid newspapers trying to identify that individual in order to give him negative publicity.
In response to the Minister, this is a difficult and sensitive issue. It is a question of balance and we have heard from noble Lords who have spoken in the debate that the majority feel that it is not right at the present time. The noble Baroness said that legislation is not the way forward at this time, but times have changed, as the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, said. People’s attitude towards those accused of sexual offences has changed so we need to look at this again, which is why I have brought forward the amendment and why we are having this discussion.
As I said in my opening remarks, everything needs to be done to encourage any victim of a sexual offence to come forward and report it to the police. Systems need to be in place within policing so that if allegations are made in different parts of the country against a long-distance lorry driver, for example, they are then matched up in order to reinforce the situation. But in saying that the College of Policing is doing a review when guidance is already in place which says that the presumption should be against identifying the accused, how on earth does that square, for example, with the way Sir Cliff Richard was treated by South Yorkshire Police? How does that follow College of Policing guidance, and how is a review of that guidance going to change police practice in the future?
On guidance to editors or the code of practice for the press, I have to question whether the noble Baroness reads the press and the attitude taken by its members and how a coach and horses is driven through the guidance to editors on an almost daily basis. This is why guidance is proven not to work. In marginal cases there may be some loss in terms of people not coming forward after someone has been arrested if no publicity is given, but people come forward predominantly when someone is charged and there is some certainty that a court case will happen, not at the point of arrest. That is why we will return to this on Report, but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“Evidence about complainant’s sexual history
(1) The Secretary of State shall within six months of the day on which this section comes into force, publish a report on the operation of section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (restriction on evidence or questions about complainant's sexual history).(2) The report shall, in particular, include information regarding—(a) the number of applications made for leave in accordance with subsection 41(2) of the Act;(b) the number of such applications granted;(c) the number of such applications refused;(d) the number of prosecutions not proceeded with because of the victim’s concerns as to an application for leave;and to the extent numerical information is not available, as full information as possible regarding such matters.(3) The report shall include any proposals for the amendment or repeal of section 41 of the Act.”
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I rise to move this amendment tabled in the names of my noble friends Lord Paddick, Lady Ludford and myself. The appeal in the Ched Evans case has raised fears that complainants will be deterred from reporting rape because they might be cross-examined about their sexual history under Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. Those fears are real and if they are justified that would suggest that a change to Section 41 is necessary. I say at the outset that this is surprising because ever since Section 41 was passed, it has been assumed that it is very restrictive and that evidence of a complainant’s previous sexual history may be adduced or cross-examination allowed only in very unusual circumstances.
In 2001 in R v A (No 2), reported in 2002 on page 45 of 1 Appeal Cases, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Steyn, said,
“my view is that the 1999 Act deals sensibly and fairly with questioning and evidence about the complainant’s sexual experience with other men. Such matters are almost always irrelevant to the issue whether the complainant consented to sexual intercourse on the occasion alleged … or to her credibility”.
Section 41(3) of the 1999 Act provides that evidence or proposed cross-examination must relate to sexual behaviour that is so similar to the defendant’s account of the incident in issue that the similarity cannot be explained as a coincidence.
Viscount Hailsham
My Lords, I will be very brief. I find myself in agreement with much that has been said this evening by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, but on this occasion I must state a thorough disagreement. I speak as somebody who has been at the criminal Bar, off and on, for 40 years.
Section 41 of the Act imposes substantial restrictions on the ability of defence counsel to adduce evidence of previous sexual conduct, or to start on a process of cross-examination as to that. I am sure the noble Lord has reminded himself of the terms of the restrictions in Section 41, which are set out conveniently in Archbold. I have taken the liberty of bringing a photocopy of that to this Committee. The restrictions are considerable, but in my opinion—based on a long period at the Bar—there are a very limited number of circumstances when it is necessary, to secure justice, that the defence counsel brings forward instances from the complainant’s past sexual life and has the right to ask questions about that. As it is set about by the restrictions of the judge’s discretion—which is set out in statute—I see no reason to depart from the existing legislation.
I am sure the noble Lord has consulted Archbold, Blackstone’s and Cross on Evidence. I would urge your Lordships in this Committee who have any doubt about this matter to look at those authoritative textbooks, where they will find satisfactory examples of instances when the courts have allowed such evidence and cross-examination.
The noble Lord is effectively calling for a review and it is very difficult, as a matter of principle, to stand against a review. I am sure it does not have to be in legislation. But it is calling for a review, and if enough of your Lordships’ Committee want one, so be it. However, in my view, the existing legislation is right and I very much hope there is no departure from it.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for raising the important issue of the protection of complainants of rape and sexual offences from being questioned about their sexual history. It is vital that victims have confidence to report crimes as terrible as rape and in the criminal justice system’s process of bringing offenders to justice. Our message to those who are willing, but currently worried about reporting such offences, is that they are encouraged to do so. As my noble friend Lord Hailsham says, Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 provides that questions about a complainant’s sexual history are not allowed in rape and sexual offences trials. This is except where a strict set of criteria are met, so they are rare. The legislative bar on adducing evidence of a complainant’s sexual history is high and decided by judges on a case-by-case basis. The case that has prompted concerns about how the protective bar is operating has made no change to that.
We are aware of the recent concern about the admissibility of a complainant’s previous sexual history, and wider perceptions about the law. We accept that the concern should be looked at and we intend to deal with it. We have committed to looking at how the law is working in practice and will do so as expeditiously as possible, to understand whether any further action needs to be taken.
The noble Lord also asked whether anything has followed on from the 2006 Home Office study. The evaluation in 2006 made recommendations to ensure that the intention of the legislation would be fulfilled. There was no finding of a need to change the legislation substantially at that point.
With that brief explanation, I hope the noble Lord feels happy to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
Can the Minister be clear from the Dispatch Box as to whether she has announced the review?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, we have carefully considered the concerns that have been raised about the provision and we will then determine how best to look at how it is working in practice before deciding whether any further action needs to be taken. We are going to do it as soon as possible.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, the noble Lord ought to be cross-examining himself because he has just secured a concession by excellent advocacy, which I failed to do—or I did, but not in such clear terms. In view of that, I will withdraw the amendment.
I disagree with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, on only one point, which was his assertion that I disagreed with him because I said, when speaking to this amendment, that there may be those rare cases where a dispassionate observer might think the exclusion of a relevant account could lead to injustice and unfair convictions. The point here, and the point we seek to have reviewed, is whether, as a result of the Ched Evans case, there might be cases where the restrictive nature of Section 41 has been or may be watered down. We need to look at how it is operating. It is very important that rape gets reported and that the legislation in place is certainly as restrictive as we always thought Section 41 was and as the textbooks say it is. The public concern is that this case seems to have weakened that protection; I am sure the review will take that point on board. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Cox
“Registration of religious marriages
(1) The celebrant of a religious marriage ceremony must—(a) take all reasonable steps to ensure that the marriage accords with the law relating to marriages in England and Wales; and(b) register the marriage as a legal marriage in accordance with the requirements of the Marriage Act 1949.(2) A person who fails to fulfil the requirements of subsection (1) commits an offence.(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years.”
Baroness Cox
My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 219C in my name and those of the noble Baronesses, Lady Buscombe and Lady Massey, and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I am most grateful to them for their support.
At the outset, I emphasise two points. First, this is a probing amendment, seeking to highlight serious concerns and to explore possible solutions. Secondly, this is in no way—as has been indicated by some—an anti-Muslim or Islamophobic initiative. It is motivated by deep concern for many women suffering in this country in ways which are utterly unacceptable, and it has strong support from leading Muslim women scholars, such as the internationally renowned Canadian Raheel Raza and many Muslim women in this country.
The amendment provides an obligation on the celebrant of a religious marriage to ensure that it is also legally registered. The maximum penalty for failing to do so would be three years in prison. This may seem a severe provision. However, when I hear from women who have suffered horrendously from the religious marriages which are not legally registered, I believe there is an urgent need for effective measures to remedy the situation. The amendment does not identify any specific faith tradition, yet it does have specific relevance for Muslim women who are adversely affected by the discriminatory rulings of many sharia councils. As Theresa May explained when speaking as Home Secretary,
“there is evidence of women being ‘divorced’ under Sharia law and left in penury, wives who are forced to return to abusive relationships because Sharia councils say a husband has a right to ‘chastise’, and Sharia councils giving the testimony of a woman only half the weight of the testimony of a man”.
I do not say this happens in every case, but I will highlight two concerns which cause profound distress to many women, some of whom have come to see me to share their pain. The first is the issue of divorce. Under many applications of sharia law, a husband does not have to undertake the same process as a wife when seeking an Islamic divorce. He merely has to say, “I divorce you”, three times, without having to give any reasons or justification to any person or authority. The wife, however, must meet various conditions and usually has to pay a fee.
Just two weeks ago, a Muslim lady came to me in tears after the breakdown of her own Islamic marriage. Although a religious ceremony had taken place, the marriage had never been officially registered and was therefore not valid in the eyes of civil law. She was denied access to her children, ostracised by her community and felt so lonely, broken and ashamed that she had attempted to commit suicide. Another lady, who had suffered years of abuse from her husband, showed me a piece of paper she had received through the post. It simply read, “I divorce you”, three times. No consent from her was needed, her opinion was not sought and the imam confirmed the divorce. To use her words, and I will never forget the yearning in her voice, “I felt that plain piece of paper was a mockery of my human rights”.
Baroness Buscombe (Con)
My Lords, I speak in support of the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, and begin by paying tribute to her amazing record of courage and tenacity in confronting some of the most difficult issues in society, including and in particular the rights of women and equality of their rights under the law.
It is important that I repeat what the noble Baroness said concerning context. The amendment does not identify any specific faith tradition, yet it does have relevance for Muslim women who are adversely affected by the discriminatory rulings of sharia councils. The amendment seeks in principle to ensure that all women have access to full rights under the law to confront those many situations referenced so eloquently by the noble Baroness—situations which isolate and separate women and subject them to living in appalling circumstances here in the UK. We have been turning a blind eye to this discrimination for many years, even though the evidence is out there. This has been chiefly because we would be called racist or intolerant of different cultures. In fact, we have been acquiescing in the disrespect, outright abuse and denial of equal access to our rule of law and it is time to put that right.
In addition to the arguments put by the noble Baroness, I have two key points. The first relates to current inquiries into sharia law and the second concerns references to and comparisons with religions other than Islam. On the first, there are currently two inquiries, one of which is by the Home Affairs Select Committee. I have to ask: where has this committee been on this issue for the last 40-plus years? That we have more than 80 sharia councils across the UK meting out a system of justice that can choose to ignore our rule of law is extraordinary, although I assume that most MPs, if they are active in their constituencies, must have known and know what is going on, or at least have their suspicions, and yet have preferred to promote the rights of women in other parts of the world and in conflict zones. Why, when so much that is wrong is happening here in the UK? In contrast, in Pakistan, family law has been regulated according to its rule of law since 1960 and is not sharia-based. I ask my noble friend the Minister: how many sharia councils exist across Europe? I am told none, so can my noble friend confirm that there are no other sharia councils across Europe other than here in the UK? It would be helpful to have that confirmed.
The second inquiry, referred to as a review of sharia councils, launched by the Home Office, while welcome in principle as a step forward, has drawn criticism from various quarters, including Muslim women, mainly on the grounds that its focus is upon the application of sharia law and is seeking examples of “best practice”. In other words, its focus is on how sharia is applied and how that application might be incompatible with our public law, not whether sharia itself is incompatible with our public law—a subtle-sounding but fundamental difference. In essence, by accepting sharia law in principle, we are and have been accepting that one body of people living in the UK may ignore the rule of law where it believes it conflicts with its views and beliefs, particularly with regard to the treatment of women. I am not quite sure why we need this review to work that simple fact out.
In addition, there is genuine concern about the make-up of the review panel. Why, it is asked, are there two Muslim religious advisers and no non-Muslim expert on Islam, nor experts on human rights? It is interesting to note that the chairman of the inquiry, a Muslim academic, Mona Siddiqui, makes the following clear in her book My Way:
“For a lot of women from Islam even just making their voice heard is a big jihad”—
meaning struggle—
“It means they’ve gone against so many moral codes”.
This recognition of the difficulty among Muslims of speaking out gives me hope that evidence to the inquiry will not just be accepted at face value. However, I am less encouraged by Ms Siddiqui’s admission that if she had had any daughters, she would have been more conservative with them than she is with her sons. That is a worrying bias.
I hope my noble friend the Minister will not feel constrained in her response to the amendment by deferring to either of the inquiries, particularly given that, while the latter was announced in May of this year, for some extraordinary reason it is not due to complete its deliberations until next year.
My second key point in support of the amendment relates to the often-used erroneous references to other religious practices when seeking to defend the existence of sharia councils, in particular Beth Din. Jewish couples who wish to complement a civil marriage with a religious one, or couples undergoing a civil divorce who wish to complement this with a Jewish law divorce, can ask Beth Din to oversee this. I have been assured by several experts that in neither circumstance can Beth Din override our public law. I understand that the same applies for the Quaker religion and Quaker ceremonies, in that all religious ceremonies must be ratified by our public law. Anything else is subordinate and any arbitral awards remain subject to English law.
In her otherwise excellent article in the Evening Standard on 3 November, Rosamund Urwin, in highlighting this issue, said of sharia law that its rulings,
“are sometimes at odds with the spirit of British law”.
With respect, I beg to differ: sharia law breaks our law.
Take the existence here of polygamy, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, referred. If my husband, who happens to be a Christian, committed bigamy—never mind polygamy—he would be in prison. What are we doing allowing this absurd situation to continue here in the United Kingdom? How can we have the nerve to try to tell others across the world how to live their lives when we let these illegal, disgraceful practices happen here? We are, in effect, legitimising violence against women.
This important amendment is about equal rights and equal treatment under the law—our rule of law. There is absolutely no point in talking about, or spending yet more taxpayers’ money on, efforts and projects to improve integration, social cohesion or social mobility. It will not happen as long as we stand by and allow these practices that subjugate women’s rights to continue.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I welcome this amendment and congratulate my noble friend Lady Cox both on her persistence in raising these issues and on her courage. I have had the privilege of travelling with my noble friend to some out-of-the-way places such as North Korea; but—perhaps more importantly in the context of this debate—before my daughter went up to university, I told her that the person she should travel with, and get to know a little of, if ever she wanted to think about going into public or political life, was my noble friend Lady Cox. She therefore accompanied my noble friend to Nagorno-Karabakh—a war zone—and I hope that she will one day be a chip off my noble friend’s block.
The House might not be aware of it, but my noble friend has arrived back today from Nigeria, which is not such a bad place to start, because we know that my noble friend travels to dangerous places to see things for herself. In Nigeria, look how Boko Haram—words that mean “eradicate western education”—treats young women. Look at what happened in Chibok. Look at the seizure of those girls. Look at the denial of education for young girls, such as those who were seized in Chibok, and then ask yourself some serious questions, as the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, has rightly done in her remarks a few moments ago. Look at the nature of sharia law, and ask, “Is that something we would want to have operating as a parallel law system in the United Kingdom?”. It is a system, after all, that says that a woman’s evidence in a court of law is worth only half that of a man. That is surely intolerable in our society and we should resist it with every means available to us.
I attended a meeting organised by my noble friend Lady Cox a few weeks ago and became interested in this issue as a result of that meeting, which was held here in your Lordships’ House and was addressed by some formidable Muslim women and others. They highlighted the risks of having parallel systems of law in the same jurisdiction, a situation that put at risk the equality of Muslim women and failed to protect them. The principle of equality before the law should always be a central pillar of our democracy, yet we know from countless testimonies—such as those I heard that evening and others alluded to today by my noble friend—that many Muslim women in Britain are not experiencing the legal rights by which they should be protected. We heard that in the context of things such as polygamy a few moments ago. They are not treated equally; they are not living freely, and they are inhibited from getting the help they really need.
Take, for example, the story of A’aisha—a pseudonym, of course—from the West Midlands. Upon the breakdown of her own Islamic marriage, she discovered that she was not entitled to the same rights afforded to other British divorcees. Like so many others, she had wrongly assumed that, because her religious wedding ceremony had taken place in the UK, it did not need to be accompanied by a civil marriage in order for it to be recognised under English law. As my noble friend Lady Cox has already said, this amendment seeks to protect women such as A’aisha, and to help those who might be duped into believing that they were married under the law of the land, only to find upon divorce that they have few rights in respect of finance or property. It is intolerable that women should be treated in this way.
I recognise, as my noble friend has said, that this is a probing amendment. It may well indeed need tweaking and improving, but I trust it will promote a positive response from the Front Bench. I hope that when the Minister replies, we might at least start to think about how we can bring forward more comprehensive measures to address effectively concerns such as those raised by my noble friend Lady Cox and the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, in your Lordships’ House this evening.
Baroness Deech (CB)
My Lords, I did not put my name to this amendment because there were enough people already, but I used to teach family law, including the law of marriage. In this country, it is very easy to get married in a registry office or in a properly registered religious place. You can get married in a hotel if you want to or you can have a civil partnership. There are all sorts of official unions that you can make very easily, but the worst of all possible worlds is to be duped into believing that you are married in a religious ceremony and then find that you are not, because you lose any protection that English law gives you, while at the same time, stereotypically, your husband—if he is really your husband—can abandon you or take another wife.
This is not just a question of running parallel systems of law: it is about the protection of women and the need to preserve transparency and regularity in people’s marital status. All that is necessary is for more mosques to become registered as proper places of marriage, just in the way that synagogues are, and all would be resolved. I see no arguments against this amendment at all. It is overdue.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)
My Lords, I have listened carefully to the arguments made by the noble Baronesses, Lady Cox and Lady Deech, my noble friend Lady Buscombe—who made an excellent speech—and the noble Lord, Lord Alton. As has been said, the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, has done so much to raise in this House the problem of marriages that are not legally binding and that therefore do not carry the legal rights and responsibilities of a legally binding marriage. I recognise that she has spoken to many women in this situation and has sensitively presented their evidence to your Lordships this evening and on other occasions. There is particular cause for concern if one or both of the parties is unaware of their lack of rights or coerced into a marriage.
There is a strong tradition of religious marriages in England and Wales, with a long-established right that couples are able, in their place of worship, to enter into a marriage that is legally contracted, provided that the requirements of the law are met. Some people, for religious or other reasons, have preferred to enter into a marriage that is not capable of legal recognition. To make it illegal to conduct, or enter into, religious marriages that are not legally contracted is likely to be an overly complex solution and one that restricts personal choice. It is also unclear how many unregistered religious marriages would take place in breach of any change in legislation, since, by their nature, public notice of these marriages would not be given. I am sure that noble Lords appreciate the complexity of legislating in people’s private and religious lives.
We are conscious that there are complex issues behind religious marriages that are not legally valid, including where people use a religious ceremony to give recognition to an additional spouse, and so we do not consider that any one approach to Muslim or other faith communities can work in isolation. Of course, we are also aware of concerns that some women can be put under pressure to use the services of religious councils, including sharia councils, to arrange matters on the break-up of the relationship and that these women are not always treated equally when recommendations are made.
One of the issues that the noble Baroness highlighted was that of child custody, a matter raised by women to whom she has spoken. In fact, it is not the case that women have few or no rights in this matter, although they may well not be aware of their rights. In England and Wales, where there is any dispute between parents about arrangements for their children, either parent may apply to the family court for one or more types of order under the Children Act 1989. Most commonly, this will be a child arrangements order determining who a child is to live with or spend time with, and where and when this is to happen, referred to respectively as custody and access in many other jurisdictions. These proceedings are free-standing. This means that a parent is entitled to make an application to the court at any time, simply by virtue of being the parent of the child concerned and regardless of the status of their relationship with the other parent. There is no distinction for this purpose between legally married parents, unmarried parents, parents in a religious marriage that is not legally binding, parents who are otherwise cohabiting or, indeed, parents who are living apart.
On the issue of polygamy, noble Lords will be aware that polygamous marriages cannot be legally contracted in the UK. Attempting to enter into a polygamous marriage under the law of England and Wales is a criminal offence which carries a maximum sentence of seven years in prison. Nor is it possible for anyone domiciled in the United Kingdom to enter into a polygamous marriage abroad. Where a polygamous marriage is contracted within the law outside the United Kingdom between parties neither of whom is domiciled in the United Kingdom, it will be recognised by the court. The Government continue to support the law preventing polygamous marriages from being entered into in England and Wales.
The Law Commission has also given initial consideration to the issue of religious marriages that are not legally valid. It published its scoping study in December last year setting out the parameters of a potential review of the law concerning how and where people can marry in England and Wales, following consultation with a wide range of religious organisations and other interested parties. The scoping study concluded that this was one of a number of issues that might be ameliorated through a fairer and more coherent framework for marriage. The Law Commission also considered that offences relating to the celebration of marriage should be reviewed. It would not make sense for the Government to introduce a new criminal offence, such as that proposed by this amendment, without evidence of the scale and nature of the problem and without consideration of how the new offence would fit within existing marriage law.
The Government are carefully considering the Law Commission report and will respond in due course. We will also wish to consider the issue of unregistered religious marriages in light of the findings of the independent sharia review, launched in May by the current Prime Minister. The Government share the noble Baroness’s concerns and take them very seriously indeed. These concerns are central to the independent sharia review and involve the equalities, justice and faith and integration agendas across government. I thank the noble Baroness for raising again this important issue and the very real consequences for people’s lives.
My noble friend Lady Buscombe asked how many sharia councils there are across Europe. I do not have a number; I will have to go away, look into it further and write to my noble friend. I trust that the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, will understand the need to wait for the Government’s response to the Law Commission report and the sharia review and, on that basis, will withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Cox
My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate and those who have supported this amendment and made some very powerful additional arguments. I thank the Minister for the sympathy that is there in her response, but I feel some concern over the apparent lack of a sense of urgency about the need to address the real suffering that is going on at the present time. To wait for the outcomes of the reviews leaves these women in a terrible situation. The gap, the chasm, between the de facto realities and the de jure realities is one into which these women are falling and suffering in ways that should not be allowed in our country today. These issues are urgent: women are suffering on a large scale. I intend to take this debate back to my colleagues, with whom I am sharing these concerns, to consider the most appropriate ways forward. I am very grateful for what has been said tonight; we can learn from it ways to proceed to help the women suffering in these appalling situations. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
“Information relating to the online abuse of children
(1) Section 11 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (information for public etc) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (2), at end insert “subject to subsection (2A).”(3) After subsection (2) insert—“(2A) “specified information” shall include but not be limited to information that relates to the online abuse of or offences against children—(a) that take place through social media, online channels including messaging services and electronic communications;(b) that are repeated by sharing through social media, online communications including messaging services and electronic communications;(c) that are orchestrated, planned or organised through social media, online channels including messaging services and electronic communications;(d) that are recorded and uploaded online (for personal use or for distribution or sharing with others) howsoever; or(e) for the purpose of which the internet is used as a means of exploitation or contact.””
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 219D, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Rosser, would be an important step in enabling police and crime commissioners to tackle online abuse of children. Only once local police forces begin systematically collecting these data can we know the prevalence of the issue. Only once the prevalence of the abuse is known can commissioners begin to tackle it and to provide adequate resources and appropriate services. Digital technology has fuelled an explosion in these crimes over the last two decades, including children being forced to commit sexual acts online and children being groomed online for the purpose of abuse and exploitation in the real world. The impact of these horrendous crimes can be devastating, and children can be repeatedly revictimised as images of their sexual abuse are viewed online by offenders all over the world.
At a national level, progress on tackling these crimes has been made, such as the Child Abuse Image Database. The centralised expertise of the National Crime Agency also plays a key role in keeping children safe in the most severe cases, but we remain concerned about the ability of police forces to respond adequately to online offences committed against children at a local level. The recent HMIC child protection report found that there is a huge local variation in the response to these offences, including delays of up to 12 months in forensically examining devices. Such delays can have serious implications for the safeguarding of children, including children not being promptly identified and safeguarded and reoffending taking place while a device is still being analysed.
An NSPCC freedom of information request found that police use of cyberflags to monitor online sexual crimes against children is worryingly patchy. A small number of forces said they were not using this or did not know about mandatory cyberflags. It is imperative that this failure to cyberflag offences is addressed. Requiring local forces to collect these data, in addition to the data collection outlined in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, could help address this variation and help to build a local picture of prevalence.
In June, Operation Lattise, Police Scotland’s first national operation to crack down on online child sexual abuse, brought the scale of the problem into sharp focus and demonstrated what can be achieved when there is a focused response. Running for six weeks, the operation resulted in 77 people being arrested and charged as a result of 134 investigations. This led to more than 30 million indecent images of children being recovered.
As police and crime commissioners develop their local plans, the Government must ensure that the police focus their attention on this area, and this amendment would help to do that. I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, no one would suggest that the issues to which the noble Lord has referred are not hugely important, but I shall make a point which may not be wholly popular. There is a limit to what legislation can do when—to me and I think to my noble friend Lord Paddick, with whom I have consulted very briefly—it is a matter of culture and practice.
I believe that police and crime commissioners have made a start on sharing information. I suspect there is a long way to go and that most of them would say that there is a long way to go, but to provide that everything that is good practice—I am probably arguing against an amendment that I have already proposed on a different issue, and more that I will propose—and that culture and practice can always be enshrined in legislation, which requires the issue to go up to the Home Office and then come down again, is something that I would not go so far as to say I am instinctively against, but I feel instinctively needs to be questioned.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for bringing this forward and drawing attention to what is a very important issue. Exploitation of, and offences against, children, whether online or offline, are appalling and this Government are committed to tackling such criminality very robustly. The internet has opened up a wealth of opportunities for young people, but it has also exposed them to new dangers.
The Government are committed to improving the safety of children online and have a strong track record of working with the internet industry and the charitable sector to achieve it. However, we also recognise that our understanding of the scale and nature of the problem is far from complete, and in many ways we almost feel that we are running to stand still.
Our starting principle is that what is illegal offline is illegal online and criminal offences typically apply in both environments. However, recognising that the picture is less clear in relation to offending online, the annual data requirement on forces includes a requirement to flag offences where the reporting officer believes, on the balance of probability, that the offence was committed, in full or in part, through a computer, computer network or computer-enabled device. This online flag has been mandatory since April 2015, and all 43 forces in England and Wales have provided data since then.
The NCA’s annual strategic assessment of child sexual exploitation and abuse, published in August, found that the visibility of the threat was improving, but that there remained significant intelligence gaps in relation to the overall scale and prevalence of the threat. The NCA works continually to improve our understanding of the threat. I reassure the noble Lord and the noble Baroness that our response to the threat is rightly robust and includes law enforcement agencies taking action against online offenders, developing new capabilities to find and safeguard victims and working with the internet industry to remove illegal images.
For example, all UK police forces and the NCA are now connected to the Child Abuse Image Database—otherwise known as CAID—which reduces the time taken to undertake investigations and identify the victims. A new victim identification suite has been established by the NCA with access to CAID. In 2015-16, UK authorities identified over 450 victims from abuse images, more than double the number of any previous year and, in a recent case, the Child Exploitation and Online Protection command of the NCA was able to use CAID to review one of its largest ever seizures within six weeks. Based on the case size, before CAID this would have taken a minimum of six months to review.
In 2015-16, the NCA received £10 million of additional investment for further specialist teams to tackle online sexual exploitation. This enabled a near doubling of its investigative capacity to tackle child sexual exploitation. An NCA and GCHQ joint operational cell has also been established to target the most technologically sophisticated offenders. In 2015, 2,861 individuals were prosecuted for offences involving indecent images of children—a 27% increase on the previous year.
I hope I have persuaded the noble Lord that we are working to improve our understanding and our response to the threat and that he will withdraw his amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, to add to what I said before, I think that there is a very important role for the Home Office, working in conjunction with the police and many others, on the consistency of the data, to which this amendment refers but perhaps a bit obliquely. It seems to be an issue that comes up time and time again. Yesterday a report was published by ECPAT and Missing People on young people going missing from care and one of the recommendations was about achieving consistency of data.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
It might please the noble Baroness to know that I have become the Minister for data and therefore anything that she can feed into the job that I will be doing will be most appreciated.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, as the Minister said, understanding the overall scale, complexity and prevalence of the threat is crucial. I am pleased to learn what the department and the police are doing. It is important we understand this.
I accept the point about data that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made. I also accept her point on legislation. This is such a complex problem. We do not quite know what we have here, as unfortunately new things are developing all the time, so it is worth trying to explore and make sure that our legislation is correct.
However, I am very happy at this stage to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
“Offence of abduction of a vulnerable child aged 16 or 17
(1) A person shall be guilty of an offence if, knowingly and without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, he or she—(a) takes a child to whom this section applies away from the responsible person;(b) keeps such a child away from the responsible person; or(c) induces, assists or incites such a child to run away or stay away from the responsible person or from a child’s place of residence.(2) This section applies in relation to a child aged 16 or 17 who is—(a) a child in need within the meaning of section 17 of the Children Act 1989 (provision of services for children in need, their families and others);(b) a child looked after under section 20 of the Children Act 1989 (provision of accommodation for children: general);(c) a child housed alone under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996 (homelessness: England); or(d) a child who is suffering or is likely to suffer significant harm subject to section 47(1)(b) of the Children Act 1989 (local authority’s duty to investigate).(3) In this section “the responsible person” is—(a) a person with a parental responsibility as defined in the Children Act 1989;(b) a person who for the time being has care of a vulnerable child aged 16 or 17 by virtue of a care order, an emergency protection order, or protection under section 46 of the Children Act 1989 (removal and accommodation of children by police in cases of emergency); or(c) any other person as defined in regulations for the purposes of this section.(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both; or (b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years.(5) No prosecution for an offence under this section shall be instituted except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.”
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, young people aged 16 and 17 are still children although they are legally able to consent to sexual activity, get married and undertake a number of other matters and be deemed responsible for their behaviour. Amendment 220, in the name of my noble friend Lord Rosser and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bristol, seeks to put a new clause in the Bill to create a new offence of the abduction of a vulnerable child. Most 16 and 17 year-olds are not well protected, with a tiny minority subject to the protection of the Children Act or in police protection. Children of this age can get themselves into all sorts of problems and can be targeted by adults who seek to exploit their vulnerability. The amendment seeks to create a specific offence.
Amendment 222 would require police forces to collect annually the number of child abduction notices issued, the number breached and the number of sexual risk orders and sexual harm prevention orders issued following such a breach. This information would have to be laid before Parliament in the form of a report. This would provide valuable data to both Parliament and the Government so we can see what is happening and make specific policy and legislative changes with relevant information to hand, if deemed necessary. I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I can sum up my comments really as, “as above”. The points I made on the previous amendments are relevant, although the report I have just mentioned called Heading Back to Harm is particularly relevant here. There are so many associated issues that I would prefer the focus to be on practice—I will add it to my point about data—including trust in authority. In some situations, lack of trust in authority is a big component in young people who have been rescued going missing again. I do not underestimate the importance of the issues at the heart of this. Can the Minister give the Committee any information about the success of child abduction warning notices, where they apply, now, before we seek an extension?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, Amendment 220 would create a new offence of abduction of a vulnerable child aged 16 or 17. The offence would be in addition to the existing offence in Section 49 of the Children Act 1989, which already makes it an offence to abduct a child in care, including those aged 16 and 17. The new offence would also be in addition to Section 2 of the Child Abduction Act 1984, which makes it an offence to abduct any child under the age of 16. The new offence would extend only to children aged 16 and 17 who are considered to be vulnerable and therefore in need of additional protection.
The criteria for being considered vulnerable are set out in subsection (2) of the new clause and cover a range of circumstances defined in the Children Act 1989 and Housing Act 1996. These criteria potentially encompass a wide range of individuals and raise concerns that they would have very wide effect. For example, as drafted, the offence would cover all disabled young people of that age. The children it extends to are often in need of services such as housing and education but are not necessarily in need of special protection, as opposed to others of that age.
The Government completely share the objective of the noble Lord and the noble Baroness of ensuring that young people are protected from sexual exploitation and other abuse. That is why, in March last year, we introduced new civil orders to protect the vulnerable and disrupt offending at the earliest opportunity. We believe that providing the right powers to the police is the way forward. Our priority is to prevent offending, so making better use of these orders is a more precisely targeted response than creating a new criminal offence.
As noble Lords will be aware, a similar new clause was tabled in the House of Commons and there have been amendments to previous Bills on this issue. We remain unpersuaded that the proposed new abduction offence is the way forward. Young people aged 16 and 17 are generally deemed capable of living independently of their parents and of exercising their free will, notably on sexual matters. As noble Lords have said, we therefore need to achieve the right balance between additional protection for young people in this age group and recognition of relevant rights and responsibilities. Creating a new offence would raise difficult issues about where we draw the line, and it would not help young people who are older than this age group but are also very vulnerable.
That is why we believe that sexual risk orders provide appropriate powers for the police. I do not have the figures or any information on how the child abduction warning list is working; it might be in my pack. I apologise—I am getting quite tired at this stage of the day. I will write to the noble Baroness. The preventive civil orders are relatively new and we will therefore keep under review whether they fully address the kind of predatory behaviour to which the amendment refers.
Turning to Amendment 222, it is very important that we get the right balance in national reporting of data. This Government have already introduced a new mandatory requirement for all forces to collect data on child sexual abuse and child sexual exploitation offences as part of the police annual data requirement, and from next April we will be expanding that requirement to include non-crime incidents related to CSE as well. This means that for the first time, we will have all child sexual abuse and exploitation-related crimes and incidents recorded by the police. This will allow for all sexual offences against children to be identified; for example, it was previously not possible to identify obscene publication offences that are specifically related to victims aged under 18.
We are working closely with the police to monitor and review the use of the new sexual risk orders, as well as child abduction warning notices, in order to ensure they are effective in protecting children who are at risk of sexual harm. I think that is precisely the noble Baroness’s point. As child abduction warning notices are part of an administrative process, the police do not regularly record the number issued. This means that, in practice, this amendment would place a significant and disproportionate new burden on the police manually to interrogate their systems.
We agree on the need to do all we can to disrupt predatory behaviour before it causes lasting harm to children and young people. The Government remain unpersuaded that the approach proposed in these amendments is the right way forward. In order better to understand the issues raised and to create an evidence base for the use of existing powers—that is the important thing here—we have set up a working group that will monitor the use of sexual risk orders so that we can fully evaluate whether there are gaps in police powers to disrupt at the earliest opportunity. I expect this group to report to Ministers in the autumn of next year, and we will consider its findings very carefully.
I hope the noble Lord will feel content to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that helpful and detailed response. These are serious matters, and we want to make sure that we have the right legislation and mechanisms to deal with them. I will read her comments tomorrow, but I am very happy to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Brinton
My Lords, 11 years ago, my life, and the lives of a number of my colleagues, friends and supporters, was turned upside down when we became the target of somebody who began by politically harassing us and then moved into criminal damage and on to stalking. It took more than three years before the case came to a satisfactory conclusion, when he pleaded guilty to five offences and asked for 68 other crimes to be taken into consideration. Eight and a half years on from his court hearing, I still find it difficult to talk about it, not least because when I arrived in court I was placed, along with the only other victim who had decided to come, within an arm’s length of the dock. It was the first time that I had seen the man since the police had charged him, although I had believed for some time before that it was him, and clearly I was right.
That unfortunate experience in my life pales into insignificance compared with the experience of many victims of domestic violence, stalking and coercive control, but it was my experience of harassment and stalking that made me join the parliamentary inquiry into stalking in 2011 and led to the amendments to the Protection of Freedoms Bill in 2012. In the House of Lords, when we were considering the Commons amendments, I cited the then Home Secretary, who had said that the amendments put forward by the Government,
“will widen the … offence to incorporate behaviour that causes the victim serious alarm or distress that has a substantial effect on his or her day-to-day life”.
When she addressed the Commons, she said that the legislation would be kept,
“under review. The last thing we want to do is to find that the legislation is being misinterpreted”.
She set out examples which were,
“to send a message to people that that is all they are”.—[Official Report, Commons, 19/3/12; cols. 546-47.]
At the time of the debate in your Lordships’ House, I and other noble Lords asked for strong evidence that the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice would ensure that the softer elements that are essential to provide victim support were put in place, such as training throughout the criminal justice system to recognise the needs of victims, not just for the police but in court, where assistants might place people, as happened in my case, in some of the situations that cause extreme difficulties for victims. I know that noble Lords who are lawyers are not surprised by delays, but there are many things that happen day-to-day in the criminal justice system that cause victims real distress. There seems often not be very much joining up of agencies, let alone police forces. The requests for training that we made in 2012 seem not to have been applied across the board. There is some good but patchy training—and it is not consistent.
The result of that is that many victims of these serious and intrusive crimes feel that their victimisation continues as the case progresses through the criminal justice system. That is despite progress in the victim personal statements scheme that arrived in 2001, witness care units, the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime, the victims’ fund, Victim Support and the restorative justice service. A number of sources, including the organisation Victim’s Voice Survey, made it clear that all these were having little positive impact on victims, who seem to be routinely failed and face revictimisation by the whole of the criminal justice system.
The hour is late and I will not go into much evidence, but there is plenty of it from these surveys and the number of cases highlighted to show the gap between these policies and the day-to-day administration of practice. Currently, some victims’ rights, though not all, are covered by entitlements in the victims’ code, which was designed to make the system more responsive and easier to navigate. The problem is that this is not legally enforceable. It is a code, not statutory guidance. It places discretionary accountability on the agencies. Victim feedback strongly suggests that agencies often fail to apply the code. Agencies which should be guided by it are aware that a failure to provide the service does not make a service provider liable in any legal proceedings.
The complaints and right to appeal process within the code is lengthy and very difficult to navigate. There is clear evidence the victims are deterred from engaging in the complaints procedures because of their complexity. This misses any opportunity to identify ongoing issues that victims are facing and to improve services.
The original victims’ code was clearly a well-intentioned document, but there was widespread agreement, including from the current Government, that it was not delivering all that had been hoped. The new code is similar to the original but makes it all the more difficult to see where improvement to services for victims might come from. There seems to be widespread failure to adhere to the guidance that the code offers, with lack of information and support for victims continuing to be a critical concern.
I should like to give an illustration. During the passage of the Protection of Freedoms Bill I spoke about Claire Waxman, who had at that point been the victim of stalking for considerably more than one decade. She reported that when, after 18 months of harassment, she first went to her local police force, the officer she met laughed at her and told her that she was making a fuss and should be flattered by the attention. She described how, in incident after incident, paperwork was missing for court and the CPS was ill-equipped to cross-examine the stalker in court because it had no idea what the case was about, as the prosecutor had received the files only a few minutes prior to the trial.
On one occasion she received a knock on the door at 10 pm from a uniformed police officer. He informed her that she was due in court the next day as a witness in the ongoing case. The court date had been moved and they realised very late at night that she had not been notified of this change. She was so shocked to be told that she was due in court the following morning that she had no time to prepare herself, or even to inform her work. However, she said that it showed her how much of an afterthought victims really are in this process.
That is a brief illustration of the evidence provided to a group of Peers at a seminar we held in October. A victims’ rights Bill introduced in the House of Commons last October by Sir Keir Starmer has all-party support. Many of the amendments that we are laying before your Lordships now are incorporated into the Private Member’s Bill. These amendments would create a balanced and fair justice system for all who participate, and should restore public confidence in the criminal justice system.
There is one other key point that I want to make. Many of the problems that victims face are due to inefficiencies in the system. If these alone were remedied, there would be a considerable saving to the costs of running the court system. I speak today for victims, but there is a much more important element here that would save the public purse an enormous sum.
We outline a statutory framework for victims’ rights. In summary, we believe that the right to information at every stage of the justice process should be natural, as should the right not to be discriminated against or prejudiced from accessing justice. There should be the natural right not to be subjected to any unnecessary delay and to challenge decisions that impact directly on the victim’s personal safety. There should be a revision of offences that can be appealed on the grounds of leniency. There is a separate amendment later on the non-disclosure of victims’ names to perpetrators in cases of serious sexual offences, where the perpetrator has targeted a stranger. There should be the right to attend and make representations to any pre-court hearing to determine the nature of the court proceedings.
I end on two incidents that were addressed at the hearing, which also set the context of why this is not just about inefficiencies in court. Alleged suspects have many rights once they are brought into a police station. They are entitled to meals, blankets, breaks, tea, coffee, doctors and, where necessary, alcohol and drug workers. All the victims at the seminar that day, when asked whether they had even an offer of tea or coffee when making their formal statements, reported that they had not.
Another incident was more about the police force involved absolutely abrogating its responsibility. A woman who was initially slapped by her husband, who had a history of domestic violence, was thrown on to the bed. He then violently raped her. Their eight year-old son came to the door and he assaulted him to get him out of the way. When the local police came to investigate, they decided that it had to be referred to three different branches of the police: to the CID for the initial slap; to the Sapphire unit for the rape; and to safeguarding for the child’s issue. The victim in this case—the mother of the child—had to make three separate statements and be kept updated with three separate sets of proceedings, and each time relive the experience.
While the victims’ code as it stands has the best of intentions, it is not good enough and we need to strengthen it. I beg to move.
Lord Rosser
I will be very brief, not only because of the lateness of the hour but because the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has already been through the case for these amendments.
The noble Baroness said that a victims’ rights Bill was introduced in the House of Commons last year by the then shadow Home Office Minister, Sir Keir Starmer, and it had all-party support. Currently, as we know, victims’ rights are for the most part covered by entitlements in the victims’ code and affected by various other initiatives in recent years. But that code is not legally enforceable and feedback from victims suggests, as has already been said, that agencies often fail to apply the code, perhaps because they are aware that a failure to provide the service does not make a service provider liable to any legal proceedings. Lack of information and support to victims are major areas of concern, with victims prioritising the right to information, protection, treatment and support as the highest priorities.
The purpose of these amendments is to place victims’ rights in a statutory framework, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has already referred to a number of those rights that are covered. The amendments also place a duty on the Secretary of State to publish and implement a strategy to provide training for all relevant professionals and agencies on the impact of crime on victims.
In essence, these amendments lay down what support should be offered to victims, how that support is managed, what training is necessary to put this into place and how complaints can be pursued. I, too, hope that the Government will feel able to give a favourable response.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, we on these Benches support our noble friend Lady Brinton. I do not want to detain the Committee so will make just a couple of comments. When discussing matters such as trafficking and slavery, I often hear that these issues are where domestic violence was 20 years ago. It is very concerning to hear about the treatment of women—and men—who have suffered domestic violence in the way that my noble friend has described. That is not progress over the past 20 years.
There is another argument for my noble friend’s various amendments, which I do not think she mentioned; that is, obtaining the best evidence from victims who are also witnesses. These are very sensitive issues and one hears of very good practice by some police forces and some members of the judiciary. It is a question of spreading that good practice. There is an awful lot raised in these amendments, including the very delicate issue of ticketing for the judiciary dealing with certain cases. This is not the moment to go into that but the implications of the amendments need to be taken on board over a very wide area of practice. The Committee should be grateful to my noble friend and the noble Lord for ensuring that they are raised. It is a pity that, coming to the end of Committee, we are not able to do them the justice that we would all like to do them.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and other noble Lords who have spoken, for raising the important issue of victims’ rights.
It is crucial that the needs of victims of crime are given proper consideration at every stage of the criminal justice process. We published a revised Code of Practice for Victims of Crime, which came into force in November 2015. As a result, victims of all criminal offences, not just victims of more serious offences, are entitled to support under the code. The code provides victims with a range of entitlements, including information about their case, interpretation and translation, and for them to be treated in a respectful and professional manner without discrimination of any kind. Furthermore, the code requires police and other service providers to have a complaints procedure. If victims are dissatisfied with the outcome, they are able to refer their complaints to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman via their Member of Parliament.
It is essential that victims receive the best possible support to help them cope with and recover from what they have been through. We have a raft of arrangements in place which ensure that victims have access to a wide range of emotional, practical and specialist support determined by and tailored to their needs; wherever possible, this support is accessible locally. We are committed to ensuring that victims get the support they need and have protected the overall level of funding for victims across the spending review period, with over £95 million being provided in 2016-17 to fund crucial support services, including £7 million for the provision of support for victims of child sexual abuse, in recognition of increasing demand. Of the £95 million, we allocated over £67 million in grant funding to police and crime commissioners, who are using that funding to commission local services. The Justice Secretary has recently agreed to extend grant funding to all the nationally funded organisations for 2017-18 while we consider the current mixed model of commissioning national and local services.
We recognise the importance of training for professionals who work with victims. Organisations are responsible for ensuring the highest-quality training for their staff to ensure that victims receive the best possible service and support. However, we also recognise that more can be done. That is why we are working to place victims and witnesses at the heart of a justice system that works for everyone. We recently announced the national rollout of pre-trial cross-examination in 2017 to improve the support available for vulnerable witnesses. We are also investing close to £1 billion to reform and digitise our courts and tribunals. This will improve the experience for all court and tribunal users, including vulnerable victims and witnesses. Furthermore, we have committed to introduce further measures to strengthen the rights of victims of crime. It is important that we take the time to get this right, and we will announce our plans in due course.
Finally, the proposal for homicide reviews is also unnecessary. If the family of a victim has concerns about a closed homicide case, this can be looked at again under the Crown Prosecution Service’s recent guidance, Reviewing Previously Finalised Cases, to determine whether or not a review should be conducted.
Having had this opportunity to debate these important issues, and in the knowledge that the Government will be bringing forward proposals to strengthen the rights of victims, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Brinton
I thank the Minister for her reply, and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and my noble friend Lady Hamwee for their contributions. I am pleased that the Government will be looking at this but the difficulty is that much of what we have heard from the Minister does not address the soft issues that face the day-to-day running of any case in the criminal justice system, which are causing many of the problems. I wonder if the Minister would be prepared to meet over the next few weeks to talk through some of these issues. I see she is nodding. I am very grateful. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Brinton
“Ethnicity monitoring in the youth criminal justice system
All youth criminal justice agencies using the 16+1 ethnicity code must replace the code with the 18+1 ethnicity code based on the 2011 Census.”
Baroness Brinton
My Lords, Amendments 228A and 228B would introduce ethnic monitoring into the youth criminal justice system for Gypsy, Traveller and Roma children and young people.
The case for the amendments is simple. Young Gypsies and Travellers are widely acknowledged as being hugely overrepresented across the entire youth justice system. They have some of the very worst experiences in custody and considerably greater care needs. Yet the youth justice system still uses ethnic monitoring systems based on the 2001 census and therefore Gypsies and Travellers do not appear in the official data. I will touch briefly on why ethnic monitoring is important, particularly in education and in addressing the specific needs of Gypsies and Travellers.
The Government have rightly placed great emphasis on the need to improve the education provided for prisoners, particularly those in the youth justice system. Yet the lack of official data means that the educational needs of young Gypsies and Travellers are ignored without even being addressed. The lack of targeted education interventions is particularly acute in the youth criminal justice system. The Irish Chaplaincy’s research, Voices Unheard, found that 52% of young Irish Travellers required basic educational intervention. In fact, despite investigations from the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman and reports such as Children in Custody consistently revealing that Gypsies and Travellers have lower levels of literacy and are far less likely to understand written English, few to no steps have been taken to address this inequality.
Unfortunately, Gypsies and Travellers continue to experience marginalisation and discrimination in everyday life. Naturally, this negative experience means that they are more likely to distrust authority and far less likely to request help when they need it in prison. Low literacy and being fearful of requesting help directly contribute to Gypsies and Travellers having worse experiences in custody. They find it harder, primarily due to literacy issues, to make applications, to get a prison job or to be involved in purposeful activity while serving their sentences. This is not because of idleness or out of personal choice but because they cannot navigate the system.
There is a real willingness among Gypsies and Travellers to seek education in prison. A Children in Custody report found that 89% of Gypsy, Traveller and Roma young people thought that education in secure training centres would help them when they left. That is compared to just 66% of young people. That desire to learn can be confirmed with organisations such as the Traveller Movement and the Irish Chaplaincy, which regularly work with Gypsy and Traveller children.
However, these children are being failed because they are not seen as a priority. Without official data, the various facilities do not feel any pressure to address the unjustifiable differences in the outcomes for Gypsy and Traveller young people in prison compared with other young people because the absence of data means that these differences in outcomes cannot be fully revealed.
The latest Children in Custody report also revealed that Gypsies, Travellers and Roma in both young offender institutions and secure training centres were significantly more likely to consider themselves to have a disability. In addition, Gypsy, Traveller and Roma children in secure training centres were far more likely to report having unmet health needs. The health and education needs of Gypsy and Traveller children are simply not being addressed in the current system.
Official, reliable and consistent data are integral to ensuring that these children’s needs are being met. There is nothing like having to answer specific questions on a particular group to focus the minds of those delivering a service. The inclusion of Gypsies and Travellers in ethnicity monitoring in youth justice is integral to highlighting and addressing differences in outcomes and, most importantly, in ensuring that these children are provided with a better chance of successful resettlement. I beg to move.
Lord Alton of Liverpool
My Lords, I add my support to the powerful arguments that have been put before the Committee today by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, in her excellent speech. Her amendment would include Gypsy and Irish Travellers in the ethnic monitoring systems used in youth justice. The argument for ethnic inclusion was put best by the then Commission for Racial Equality, which likened having an equality policy without ethnic monitoring to,
“aiming for good financial management without keeping financial records”.
Evidence has long suggested that Gypsies and Travellers suffer worse health outcomes, and are at more risk of suicide, than other ethnic groups. Research suggests that they are three times more likely to suffer from anxiety and over twice as likely to be depressed. This is consistent with findings by HM Inspectorate of Prisons, which has found similarly high levels of mental health issues experienced by Travellers and Gypsies in prison, with them also being twice as likely to experience mental health problems compared to other prisoners. As is common with most ethnic minorities, Gypsies and Travellers find it difficult to open up to people outside their community and are therefore far less likely to report issues to prison staff. These findings underline why ethnic monitoring is urgently needed in the youth justice system, as the noble Baroness has explained.
The Gypsy and Traveller groups that have developed in adult prisons as a consequence of ethnic monitoring have made an enormous difference to Gypsies’ and Travellers’ experiences inside those prisons. These act as a safe space where they can talk about how they are coping in prison and, more importantly, receive support from their own community. A Traveller forum in HM Prison Chelmsford, supported by the Brentwood Ursulines, is testament to this. The forum meetings are now attended by around 40 Gypsies and Travellers and acts a platform for Gypsies and Travellers to speak openly about the challenges that they face.
The forum has also helped to improve the literacy of Gypsies and Travellers. In order to secure a prison job, you are required to pass level 2 literacy, a threshold that many Gypsies and Travellers in prison are, sadly, unable to meet. As is often the case with people who struggle with reading and writing, they fear stigmatisation and ridicule if they admit they cannot read and write. This prevents many Gypsies and Travellers from engaging in education programmes. It is the ultimate Catch-22, a finding that is confirmed by the Irish Chaplaincy’s Traveller Equality Project.
Happily, however, I can report that as a consequence of the forum’s work many of those Gypsies and Travellers have started to take part in the Shannon Trust’s Turning Pages project, which assists prisoners who wish to learn how to read. This has had some significant outcomes, including the possibility of securing jobs. Equally importantly, the forum has also greatly improved the relations between the Gypsy and Traveller prisoners and the prison staff who attend the meetings, and address issues that have been raised. Without the introduction of ethnic monitoring, it is hard to imagine how some of those things would have been achieved.
Baroness Whitaker (Lab)
My Lords, I add my support to the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, to which my noble friend Lord Rosser has added his name. She has hit eloquently on an important omission in our capacity to deal with young offenders.
When I and members of the Gypsy and Traveller communities first lobbied for an extension of the census categories to include Gypsies and Travellers, before the increase in our Roma population, we did so because important areas of discrimination, resulting in significantly poorer life chances, were undocumented and a minority ethnic population of very long standing was simply unrecognised in many sets of official statistics. When we eventually achieved this in 2011 we thought that at last the public services would begin to understand more about the significantly worse outcomes in health, education, employment, housing and experience of the criminal justice system endured by many from these communities.
It remains disappointing that the Youth Justice Board has not taken advantage of the opportunity of the 2011 census categories to map more accurately what happens to young Gypsy, Traveller and Roma people. I am grateful for useful meetings with the noble Lord, Lord McNally, as chair of the Youth Justice Board, and his officials on the subject. His acknowledgment that the current system is not robust was welcome and I appreciate his commitment to improvement in data gathering. However, the fact remains that records still do not consistently capture more of the reality of who the young people who go through our criminal justice system are.
There are, of course, some external obstacles. Many young people from the Gypsy and Traveller communities are fearful of admitting their ethnicity because of the bullying and exclusion which has been meted out to them in the past. But trust can be developed if the information is shown to be helpful.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said, it would be very important to be able to correlate the probable overrepresentation of these young people with literacy levels and mental health status—also referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Alton. Their experience of education and accommodation has often been deeply unsatisfactory, but we cannot begin to make these links and to do something about it until we have the data tools.
As has been said, we know that both HM Inspectorate of Prisons and the lead chief constable for Gypsy, Traveller and Roma issues have called for the change the amendment would provide. The excellent Irish Chaplaincy's Traveller Equality Project has really positive evidence of good practice to justify the use of up-to-date information in the adult prison estate.
I hope, therefore, that the Minister will see the point too and accept this amendment.
Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)
My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of Amendments 228A and 228B in the name of my noble friend Lady Brinton. The arguments for ethnic monitoring are well versed and I will touch upon them briefly. As has already been said, without ethnic monitoring it is very difficult for public services to identify, and therefore address, any inequalities which vulnerable groups may be experiencing. As the noble Lord, Lord Alton, has said, whenever there have been research or studies into the experiences of Gypsies, Travellers and Roma in custodial institutions—in either the youth or adult estates—these communities are almost always shown to have worse experiences and greater care needs.
Voices Unheard: A Study of Irish Travellers in Prison found that over 20% of Traveller young offenders were identified as having mental health issues. This is an alarming number and needs a co-ordinated effort in order to be addressed. However, as we know, without ethnic monitoring and consistent data it is unlikely that such an intervention would take place. As the report’s author, Dr Conn Mac Gabhann—I hope I have pronounced that correctly—said in an interview on this issue recently:
“While ethnic monitoring will not solve all the problems Gypsy and Traveller children face in the youth criminal justice system, it will be an important step in helping us to highlight the problems and issues they face and ensure these issues become a target to be tackled”.
I have little more to add to the very powerful speeches of my noble friend Lady Brinton, the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker. They have covered the ground extremely well. I hope the Government can support these amendments and ensure that the issues affecting young Gypsies and Travellers in the youth justice system can finally be addressed.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, I have sympathy for the noble Baroness’s amendment regarding collection of ethnic minority data. I would like to pick up on the point about education. So long as we are not properly educating the Traveller community it will continue to be exceptionally difficult for it to engage exclusively in legitimate economic activity.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, I will add a few brief comments to what has been said, without seeking to repeat the arguments which have already been made. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, may have been quoting from a letter, dated 2 November, which the deputy chief constable of the Cheshire Constabulary, who is the NPCC lead for Gypsy, Roma and Traveller issues, wrote to Elizabeth Truss at the Ministry of Justice. In this, she drew attention to the amendments to the Bill which we are discussing tonight. I will give a further quotation from the letter. She says:
“It is my firm belief that the lack of robust and reliable data on the Gypsy and Traveller population is a major barrier to developing a coherent understanding of these communities and their social, economic, education and welfare needs. Updating the ethnicity monitoring systems in youth justice to include Gypsies and Irish Travellers would be an integral step in helping us to address the disproportionate number of Gypsy, Roma and Traveller children in both Secure Training Centres and Youth Offender Institutions”.
She concludes her letter to Elizabeth Truss by saying that:
“I hope you and your Department are able to support the amendments”.
I hope that when the Minister replies she may be able to tell us what Elizabeth Truss’s response is to that request from the NPCC lead for Gypsy, Roma and Traveller issues to support the amendments that we are discussing this evening.
I have also got a copy of a letter which the chairman of the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales sent very recently to Kate Green MP, in response to a letter that she had written to him about the collection of data on the number of Gypsy and Traveller young people in the justice system. He says in his reply that:
“The YJB currently records the ethnicity of young people in the youth justice system using the 2001 census categories, which does not include Gypsy, Traveller or Romany (GTR) as a category. Consideration has been given to changing information systems to capture the number of GTR young people but it is too costly at present to make the required changes to existing local and central case management systems to make this possible. This position will be reviewed as new IT systems are developed and implemented”.
I am not sure that that statement holds out a great deal of hope. Perhaps in her reply the Minister could say something about what the costs would be of making the required changes to the existing local and central case management systems to achieve the objective being sought, so that we can all form a view of whether that is too costly or not.
I also ask the Government to respond to one other thing. Since the position will, apparently, be reviewed as new IT systems are developed and implemented, are we talking about new systems that will be developed and implemented within the next six months, the next six years or the next 60 years? Once again, the letter does not make that clear. It is interesting that the letter from the chairman of the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales then goes on to assert that,
“it is not the case that no data exists in this area”.
He then refers to the fact that:
“The YJB and HM Inspectorate of Prisons publish an annual report, Children in Custody, based on surveys of children in Young Offender Institutions (YOIs) and Secure Training Centres (STCs)”.
That is an interesting observation since, as I understand it, certainly on at least one previous occasion the relevant Minister has expressed the view that, as not all young people return a completed survey, they cannot determine the actual number of GRT young people held in YOIs and STCs, or even know if the sample is representative. That would suggest that on previous occasions the Government have not regarded the data contained in Children in Custody—in those annual reports—as necessarily being particularly reliable or particularly helpful.
Like others, I very much hope that the Government will be able to give a helpful response to this amendment. If the argument is going to be all about the cost of doing it, we will really need to ask the Government for a full breakdown of those costs and when they expect to rectify the situation so that we can all form an assessment of the validity or otherwise of that particular argument.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for raising the issue, and all noble Lords who have taken part.
The Government acknowledge that it is of great importance that ethnicity classifications of children and young people in the youth justice system are robust and accurate. Noble Lords will recall that the Prime Minister announced in August an audit of public services to reveal racial disparities and to help to end the injustices that many people experience. At present, youth custodial establishments and youth justice agencies, such as youth offending teams and the Youth Justice Board, are not required by legislation to use a particular system of ethnic monitoring; these amendments would change that.
In 2011, the National Offender Management Service adopted the 18+1 system on the centralised operational database used in prisons and young offender institutions for the management of offenders, following the change of classifications for ethnicity within the national census. However, it is the case that the new classification is not consistently used by secure children’s homes, secure training centres and youth offending teams. In principle, we agree with the aim of using the 18+1 classification, and the Government are ready to examine whether and how this could be done consistently across youth justice agencies and custodial establishments. I should point out, however, that such a change can be delivered through administrative means rather than through legislation. We feel that such an approach is preferable, given that to enshrine the 18+1 code in legislation would inhibit future flexibility in the event that the Office for National Statistics were to decide to change the 18+1 code system and introduce a new system of ethnicity classifications.
Although we support working towards consistency in terms of the data that we are recording, I hope that the noble Baroness would recognise that the universal adoption of the 18+1 code would require youth justice agencies to make a significant number of technical changes to a range of data systems, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, mentioned. This is because many existing IT and data collection systems are designed only to accommodate the 16+1 classification. For this reason, we believe the impact on agencies and custodial establishments must be explored and analysed and appropriate approaches identified.
I do not have costings at the moment, and will have to get back to the noble Lord on that point—although, interestingly enough, inspiration has appeared over my left shoulder. However, I am not sure that it is going to be that helpful. I have no information on the cost of the necessary IT changes. Clearly, they would need to be identified and factored into the work that would need to be done as youth justice agencies moved to the 18+1 system. I shall make inquiries as to whether further information is available and write to noble Lords. I am afraid that I do not have much more to add.
In conclusion, the noble Baroness has highlighted a valid issue. We support the broad aim of these amendments and will consider further the practical implications of embedding the 18+1 code system throughout the youth justice system. I hope that, on this basis, the noble Baroness would be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Brinton
I thank all those who have contributed to this debate on this very important issue, including the noble Lord, Lord Alton, the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser—and particularly the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for highlighting in detail the issues that I felt that I did not have time to go into on what is happening with the IT system. I put it on record, too, that the noble Lord, Lord Ouseley, the noble Baroness, Lady Young of Old Scone, and the noble Lord, Lord Judd, wanted to speak in this debate but, because the date has moved on, were unable to be in their places.
I thank the Minister for her comments, although I was slightly startled by her opening statement about this new system of ethnicity. It is new only to the youth justice system. It is in use absolutely everywhere else. I am not intending to suggest that the Minister was saying anything else, but that is the whole problem—that there is a particular section of the criminal justice system that is not using the same databases as everybody else. We know from the example that the Minister quoted of the W3 Gypsy or Traveller code being added to P-NOMIS that the Irish chaplaincy has reported that many prisons are holding Traveller groups, appointing Traveller reps and holding Traveller history months—and, what is more, there is an increase in uptake of education by more than 10% among Traveller prisoners. That is a sign of real success. Surely young Gypsy and Traveller children who are in the system early on deserve that support the moment they come into the system. I hope that we can keep the doors open to discuss the matter as a matter of urgency. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Wigley
“Victims and witnesses of serious crime: disclosure
(1) A police force or police officer may not disclose the identity of a victim or witness of a serious sexual or violent offence to the person accused of the offence, if it is reasonable to assume that such a disclosure would put the victim or witness at risk of further harm. (2) In determining whether disclosure is reasonable for the purposes of subsection (1), a police force or police officer must take into account the—(a) previous convictions,(b) mental health, and(c) access to new technology or social media,of the person accused of the offence.(3) This section applies whether or not the person accused of the offence has been charged with the offence.”
Lord Wigley (PC)
My Lords, Amendment 228C stands in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and the noble Baroness, Lady Howe of Idlicote. I apologise, as I have before, that I have had to dip in and out of the debates on this Bill, for reasons I think noble Lords will understand.
This amendment concerns the victims and witnesses of serious crime and its purpose is to prevent the disclosure of a victim’s identity to the accused when there has been a serious sexual assault and the accused is a stranger. The need for this amendment is best illustrated if I briefly recall a disturbing incident. About 30 months ago, a person, whom I shall call “M”, was followed by a stranger off a bus and subsequently attacked. There was an attempted rape and threats to kill her if she did not stop screaming. Fortunately, two off-duty police officers heard the screams and arrested the attacker. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, will recall that M gave harrowing evidence to a seminar that she chaired last month. M told Peers that, later at the police station, she was horrified to learn that her full name had been given to the assailant. He did plead guilty and was handed down a seven-year sentence but, understandably, M is now terrified that, on release, her assailant will find her and attack again. She contacted Voice4Victims, who worked out that he will be released on parole in July next year. M has changed her name, moved home and deleted her name from the electoral register, but she still fears that, by using the internet and social media, he will trace her.
She is not alone: other women have reported similar experiences. One woman reported dropping a case of sexual assault after learning that the attacker had been given her name. Another reported, “I am still scared every day that the guy who did this will be released and he has all my details”. That was also a case of attempted rape. She said that it would have been much safer for her if she just had not reported the attack. M has contacted the police and the Met have responded, saying:
“There is no specific policy or legislation which covers the issue of providing the name of a victim of rape to the suspect. Instead it is an operational decision taken by the officer in the case on a case-by-case basis”.
This came from the office of Commander Christine Jones. M has written to the police heads in all 32 London boroughs. What emerged is that there is no uniform policy at police stations. Most confirmed that, yes, they did disclose. Some said that they did not and that it was a matter for the court. Most were unsure. This situation is not satisfactory and is putting vulnerable female victims at risk. It is not a matter of the right of the accused knowing the accuser. As they are strangers, the use of initials or a single letter would be enough. At court, special measures can and are applied for, but by then it may be too late.
The amendment makes it clear beyond doubt that disclosure puts victims at risk—anonymity does not. The clause, which was drafted for me by Voice4Victims, stipulates that disclosure is prevented if it is reasonable to assume that disclosure would put the victim at further risk of harm. In determining the concept of “reasonable”, the police would take into account previous convictions, mental health issues and, indeed, access to IT. This should mean that in practice names are never given to perpetrators.
I hope that the Minister will recognise the serious circumstances which have led me to table this amendment. I hope that the Government will accept it today, but if for any reason there are technical difficulties with it, I would ask that they bring their own amendment at a later stage, so that this serious matter is properly addressed and victims are not caused additional and unnecessary distress, and potentially serious consequences, because of the current uncertainty as to the requirements of the law. I beg to move.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, I rise to support the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. I was sent the same briefing as him, so he has largely said the same as I was going to say. I just remind the Committee that I sit as a magistrate in central London and I deal, not with issues of this seriousness, but certainly with issues of harassment and others of that nature. There is one other factor that I want to add, on what I understand the legal position to be, which I took from the CPS website. If the police want to apply for anonymity for a victim and believe that they have proper grounds to do that, they can apply to a magistrates’ court but, indeed, I believe police officers can give that anonymity if they believe that there is a proper case for it. They have to reapply for anonymity when a trial happens, either at the magistrates’ court or at the Crown Court.
As the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, said so clearly, many of the police who were contacted about this issue simply did not know what the law was and they gave wrong advice to the young woman who was asking for advice. This is very worrying and is very likely to discourage other young women from coming forward. That is really the importance of this amendment.
Baroness Howe of Idlicote (CB)
My Lords, it certainly seems extraordinary that there is no policy for legislation determining whether to disclose the identity of a victim of serious sexual crime to the alleged stranger perpetrator. It seems to me that, while nothing is gained by disclosure in the police station, it could be very damaging to the victim. It is relatively easy, in today’s society, for anybody with access to the internet to trace and find the whereabouts of any person, just by having their name.
Baroness Cohen of Pimlico (Lab)
I too support the amendment. M, as referred to in my noble friend’s speech, is a family connection—a very capable young woman, as can be seen from the fact that she wrote right round the Metropolitan Police to discover that there was indeed no policy about whether victims’ details were handed over. It was done quite routinely, on admittance, as it were, in a case in which two off-duty police officers had actually rescued her. This seems a most peculiar omission.
I should also point out that the new clause as drafted does not just cover rape or attempted rape, but stranger danger of other sorts. Many years ago I was the victim of an attempted mugging. I got the number of the chap’s motor bike, reported it to the police and offered to give evidence. In fact he was convicted, but the police kindly said that they did not need to invite me, because he had pleaded guilty to that and a multitude of other offences. But he had issued the traditional snarling claim that he knew where I lived and would come and get me if I spoke up.
At that time it was possible to feel fairly secure and confident, having a Jewish name—Cohen—that was extremely common in London, that if I removed my name from the London telephone book, probably nobody would find me. This is not the case any more. M is a young woman with her career to make, and necessarily has a Facebook presence. He can find her if he needs to—and this is a case in which there is considerable doubt about the chap’s mental capacity.
There are lots of cases like this that are not rape; there is also assault. As a lawyer, I am conscious that the proposed new clause may be too broadly drafted. I ask the Government to get parliamentary counsel on to it to ensure that it can be adopted. If not, I will return to the issue on Report, no doubt with the support of others. This seems to me an anomaly caused by just a lack of process and anybody thinking about it, and which renders ridiculous our attempts to protect victims of stranger danger.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, Amendment 228C in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Wigley and Lord Ponsonby, and the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, seeks to insert a new clause into the Bill. As we have heard, its aim is to provide additional protection for victims or witnesses of a serious sexual offence, using the test of whether it is reasonable to assume that a disclosure of the person’s identity,
“would put the victim or witness at risk of further harm”.
It is right to include the rights of victims and witnesses in primary legislation where possible, and this is what the amendment seeks to do. Both victims and witnesses of serious offences can be very traumatised by what has happened to them or what they have witnessed. The disclosure of the name of the victim or witness to the person alleged to have committed the offence could put them at risk of further harm, as we have heard, or of fear of further harm. That, in itself, can cause additional stress and trauma for the victim or witness. Therefore, this amendment would place a specific duty on the police, when considering releasing the names of victims or witnesses to the accused person, to take into account the matters listed in new subsections (2) and (3) of the proposed new clause. That would be a sensible and welcome move, and I hope the noble Baroness will respond positively to the amendment.
I fully endorse the comments of all those who have spoken to the amendment. I was particularly surprised to hear my noble friends Lord Ponsonby and Lady Cohen say that the police have no idea what the policy is in this area. I am amazed by that. I certainly fully endorse the amendment.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, explained, this amendment seeks to grant victims or witnesses of sexual or violent crime anonymity in cases where it is reasonable to assume that disclosure would put them at risk of further harm. The noble Lord has indicated that he is particularly concerned with cases of so-called “stranger rape”.
I say from the outset that I agree wholeheartedly that the criminal justice system must support and protect victims and witnesses, particularly victims of sexual offences who are especially vulnerable. There are already a number of means whereby those at risk of further harm can be safeguarded and I will briefly itemise these in a moment but, before doing so, I must point to a central difficulty with the noble Lord’s amendment. The overarching principle of our criminal justice system is that the defendant must be given a fair trial. This is clearly stated in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Fundamental to this is the right of the accused to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. I am sure the noble Lord accepts that the accused cannot be expected to defend himself properly at trial if he does not even know who is accusing him of the alleged crime. This amendment would fundamentally undermine that cornerstone of our justice system.
That is not to say that there should not be crucial safeguards in place for victims and witnesses who have had the grave misfortune to experience violent or sexual crimes. As I have indicated, there are already multiple mechanisms the police and courts can employ to protect victims. Where necessary for the purpose of the investigation, the police can seek to detain the accused for up to 96 hours pending charge and seek to have him or her remanded in custody post-charge. If it is not possible to bring charges within the time limits on pre-charge detention, the suspect can be bailed subject to conditions which prohibit contact with the victim.
There are also established provisions in legislation for witness protection programmes and the provision of special measures during criminal proceedings; for example, a complainant can give evidence via a live link or behind a screen.
There is already provision for anonymity of complainants or witnesses, to be used as an exceptional measure of last practicable resort. A witness anonymity order can be granted by the court if it is satisfied that their identification would adversely affect the quality of evidence given by them, or their level of co-operation with the prosecution. The Director of Public Prosecution’s guidance on witness anonymity is clear that where the prosecution cannot present its case in a way that allows the defendant to defend themselves, it is under a duty to stop the case, no matter how serious the allegations may be. Hence, this must be very carefully considered when deciding whether to grant victim or witness anonymity—fair, equal and open justice for all must be the imperative.
While I have every sympathy for the noble Lord’s objective of protecting vulnerable victims and witnesses, I hope he will accept that the blanket approach provided for in his amendment is fundamentally at odds with our system of justice and the right of the accused to a fair trial. It is important to remember that the accused is just that: accused. He or she is not convicted, and is presumed innocent until proved guilty. This amendment arguably assumes guilt and undermines the protections and safeguards against miscarriages of justice of which this country is justly proud. Moreover, there are already a number of mechanisms available by which victims and witnesses can be supported through the criminal justice process. Given these points, I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Wigley
My Lords, I have listened carefully to the Minister’s response but I find her interpretation very strange indeed. I mentioned that the policy in fact varies from area to area within London, and that some police stations do operate the policy I am advocating of not giving out names. If this is a basic question of human rights, as was suggested, it seems to raise a fairly fundamental question about police stations following public policy or not.
With regard to giving the defendant a fair crack of the whip in the courts, what difference does it make if he knows the name of the victim or not, particularly in circumstances where he previously did not? If he did know it, giving him this information will not matter because he already has it. But if he did not, it is clear that he will be being given information that may well be prejudicial to the well-being of the victim in the fullness of time, and it will not do all that much to defend his circumstances in court.
I am very grateful to the noble Lords and Baronesses who have contributed to this debate, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Howe of Idlicote and Lady Cohen of Pimlico. The cases they made were very strong indeed. I am also grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, from the Opposition Front Bench. I do not believed that the response we have had answers the questions raised. I entirely accept that the wording of this amendment may be deficient but I ask, in all seriousness, that the Government look at this between now and Report. If they see, as do my colleagues and I, that there is a case for a change in law, I ask that they consider bringing forward their own amendment which meets the points raised while avoiding the deficiencies that have been pointed out. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Wigley
“Reviews of sentencing
The Secretary of State must by order under section 35 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (scope of Part IV) specify that the following additional offences may be reviewed under Part IV (reviews of sentencing) of that Act—(a) offences under section 4A (stalking involving fear of violence or serious alarm or distress) or 5 (restraining orders on conviction) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997,(b) offences under section 76 (controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship) of the Serious Crime Act 2015,(c) offences under section 12 (support for a proscribed organisation) of the Terrorism Act 2000, and(d) offences under section 160 (possession of indecent photograph of child) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.”
Lord Wigley
My Lords, Amendment 228D stands in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. This amendment increases the range of offences for which the Attorney-General has the power to refer a relevant lenient sentence to the Court of Appeal for review. The offences covered by the amendment are stalking, which my colleagues in the other place have been involved in seeking legislation on over the past two or three years—I am glad to see positive movement on this—multiple breaches of restraining orders, coercive control, incitement to support a terrorist organisation and the possession of indecent images of children. Those are the categories we refer to in the amendment.
The Criminal Justice Act 1988 gave the Attorney-General the power to refer unduly lenient sentences to the Court of Appeal. The power was rightly restricted to certain serious offences, but since that time new legislation has been enacted for other grave matters. The time is right to reflect those changes and to address the concerns about individual cases of leniency by adding these new offences to the relevant schedule to the 1988 Act. The changes are not retrospective but would give the Attorney-General the power to refer such lenient cases in the future.
There have been a number of sentences in individual cases in the recent past involving the offences I have listed in the amendment which have been widely reported and have indeed caused public concern. Subsection (a) of the proposed new clause refers to stalking, which is dealt with in Section 4A of the Act,
“involving fear of violence or serious alarm or distress”,
and would have been relevant, had it been enacted, to the sentence of only three years for the stalker of Emily Maitlis. This seemed to be very lenient given that the behaviour had gone on for more than 20 years and despite many previous convictions. The stalker of Claire Waxman, again with numerous convictions, got three years and was back in the community after 18 months. Longer sentences would not only be just, they would also allow for longer perpetrator treatment while in custody.
Stalking victims constantly complain that restraining orders do not work because they are not enforced. The perpetrator in the Claire Waxman case breached them many times and other women currently working with Voice 4 Victims say the same. Sometimes, for whatever reason, it appears that the police do not investigate, while in other cases the courts hand out fines or warnings, yet the maximum sentence for a breach is five years. The ability to refer multiple breaches for re-examination by the Court of Appeal would facilitate the raising of the threshold.
Coercive control in a domestic situation became law in 2015. The behaviour causes massive damage to predominantly female victims and can last for years. Women may be controlled financially or in terms of their movements by being confined to their homes, and harassed and bullied. Too few prosecutions have been brought to court so far. The ability of the Attorney-General to refer individual cases will help to highlight the serious nature of such unacceptable behaviour.
Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000 involves inciting support for a proscribed organisation. Earlier this year, the hate preacher Anjem Choudary was given three and a half years despite the fact that the court heard that he had encouraged at least 100 young people to turn to ISIS. He could be out in 20 months or less.
The inclusion of the possession of indecent images of children follows an extraordinary case this summer where a male offender was given a suspended sentence in spite of having thousands of images on his devices, including 400 category A images, which are the most vile. His defence argued for a non-custodial sentence on the grounds that he wanted to start a family.
This amendment, which has been drafted by Voice 4 Victims, would update the Attorney-General’s powers and increase public confidence in the sentencing process. I beg to move.
Baroness Howe of Idlicote
My Lords, I want to add a few words of support for this amendment. Four years ago I was fully in support of the creation of the offence of stalking, which involves putting a person in fear of violence, serious alarm or distress. Although the maximum sentence is five years, there have been a number of disturbing and unduly lenient court sentences for perpetrators who had been stalking their victims for a decade or more.
I recently met Claire Waxman who has been referred to and who had been hounded by a relentless stalker for 13 years. Her case highlighted the struggle that stalking victims face in the criminal justice system. It was one of the key cases given as evidence in the stalking law reform and it took over a decade for her perpetrator to receive a substantial custodial sentence. In those years, Claire said, “I felt completely failed by the justice system for allowing my long-term stalker to receive suspended sentences or very short jail sentences. These sentences served little purpose as he continued his criminal behaviour each time. I strongly believe had we been able to refer this case to the Attorney-General for the Court of Appeal, he may have received the right sentence earlier on, saving me from years of unnecessary harm and distress”. I very much hope that the Government will see a way to support this amendment fully.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede
My Lords, I also support this amendment, to which I have put my name.
As I mentioned in an earlier debate, I sit as a magistrate in central London for crime, youth and family matters. I have been a magistrate for just over 10 years and have seen a big change in the nature of crime which we deal with in London. While there is a decreasing overall amount of crime brought to courts in London, there is a rising proportion of crime related to domestic abuse. We all receive specialist training on that matter—we have specialist courts and are very careful about the way we deal with those matters in court. It is an ever increasing proportion of our workload, so I have given out many restraining orders and have also dealt with many breaches of restraining orders. When one gives a warning to somebody who has been given a restraining order, one can never really be too stark in explaining to the offender just how serious it is. Many times you get the impression that they do not appreciate the seriousness of their activities.
Even when a defendant has been acquitted and found not guilty, you can still put in place a restraining order if you believe it is suitable, and you still have to give a suitable warning for that restraining order being put in place. The amendment deals only with people who have been convicted, but restraining orders can be put in place when people are acquitted as well.
The purpose of this amendment is as a backstop to provide the ability to have higher sentences where the courts have put in place unduly lenient sentences. The maximum is five years, but very often there needs to be a facility and an ability to increase sentences if they are felt to be unduly lenient.
Baroness Brinton
My Lords, one of the major concerns is that stalking is not used as a charge often enough. It is still too easy to charge with the offence of harassment, rather than stalking. We really need to make sure that the criminal justice system recognises and understands stalking—that was the law reform in 2012 that we worked hard to achieve. However, it is also important to recognise that some cases of stalking are consistently appalling and are also coercive behaviour.
The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, referred to the case of Emily Maitlis’s stalker who had previous convictions, including breaches of restraining orders in 2008, 2010, 2013, 2014 and earlier this year. I am sorry to say that that is not uncommon behaviour with stalkers and there needs to be the facility for the courts to apply for more serious custodial sentences where orders are consistently breached—not least the way that the stalking and coercive behaviour continues. One of the problems we have heard time and again from victims of domestic violence, stalking and coercive behaviour is the way other courts are used—the civil courts or family courts that do not recognise restraining orders that have been held elsewhere. We heard of information, which had not been passed to the family courts, of one former stalker who had been trying to get in front of his ex-partner through the family courts. It is very necessary to have this limited use but essential tool available for the judiciary.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the Government recognise and agree with the noble Lord’s desire to see the unduly lenient sentence scheme extended to enable reviews of sentences for a wider range of offences. The scheme is a valuable way of ensuring that sentences for serious crimes can be challenged when they are considered to be unduly lenient. The Government have a manifesto commitment to extend the scope of the scheme and on 4 October my right honourable friend the Home Secretary announced an extension to cover many terrorism offences—including those under Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000—that are covered by the noble Lord’s amendment. The extension can be done very straightforwardly by order.
The noble Lord’s amendment seeks to use primary legislation to require the Lord Chancellor to exercise the order-making power she has under Section 35 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to add offences to the scheme. This would add additional complexity to the legislative framework around the scheme and would curtail the Lord Chancellor’s discretion to amend the scheme as provided by the 1988 Act. Under the current provisions, the Lord Chancellor can amend the scope of the scheme by order and the Government can consider more broadly what offences or types of offences are most appropriate for inclusion at any time, as we have announced we will do with terrorism offences. With the reassurance that the Government intend to honour their manifesto commitment, I hope that the noble Lord will feel happy to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Wigley
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for that response and the recognition that there is a need to act on this. I ask for her confirmation that the statutory instrument system available to the Minister to take the action I referred to is applicable in all the cases listed in the amendment. If she wants to intervene, she can by all means do so.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I was just going to ask whether I could confirm that in writing, because I would not want to give misinformation at the Dispatch Box.
Lord Wigley
That is fair enough. I accept that. I do not expect any Minister necessarily to carry all the details on their fingertips, but it would be helpful if we had a response on that before Report so that, if it is necessary to take this matter further on Report, there is an opportunity to do so.
The Minister heard the comments made by the noble Baronesses, Lady Howe of Idlicote and Lady Brinton, and by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, on this matter. The feeling is generally shared that there needs to be action, and it is shared by the Government. The question is how it can be done and, perhaps more importantly, when it will be done. If these order-making facilities are available to the Minister, why have they not been used? If they are to be used, when will they be used? If there was a definitive statement in those terms we would be a little happier in withdrawing the amendment. There is an opportunity to come back on Report. I hope that between now and then these angles will be covered, either in correspondence or by other means, so we can be assured that action is not only promised but will be taken in a short timescale to put this right. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“Coroners’ investigations into deaths: meaning of “state detention”
(1) Section 48 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (interpretation of Part 1: general) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (1), in the definition of “state detention”, after “subsection (2)” insert “(read with subsection (2A))”.(3) In subsection (2), at the beginning insert “Subject to subsection (2A),”.(4) After subsection (2) insert—“(2A) But a person is not in state detention at any time when he or she is deprived of liberty under section 4A(3) or (5) or 4B of the Mental Capacity Act 2005.””
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
My Lords, I thank the Minister and her officials for their time and help over the issue of this amendment. I declare my interest as independent chair of the National Mental Capacity Forum, and it is in that role that I have heard repeatedly about a problem relating to people who die when subject to deprivation of liberty safeguards. This new clause amends the meaning of state detention in Section 48 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 to correct the problem that I will now explain. I want to explain first how the amendment works and then some of the background as to why it really is needed.
The amendment removes the duty on coroners to conduct an inquest in all cases where the deceased had an authorisation for the deprivation of their liberty in place either under deprivation of liberty safeguards or a Court of Protection order or because the deprivation of liberty was otherwise authorised by the Mental Capacity Act 2005.
Subsections (2) and (3) of the new clause amend Section 48 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 to provide a new definition of state detention. To do this, there is a new subsection inserted into the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 to provide that a person is not considered to be under state detention for the purposes of that Act when they are deprived of their liberty under the relevant sections of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. This covers the deprivation of liberty safeguards, which can be from a Court of Protection order, from a DoLS authorisation or, where the deprivation of liberty was urgently required, pending a decision by the Court of Protection on the authority to restrict the person’s liberty. The second amendment makes a consequential change to the Long Title of the Bill.
Let me explain why this new clause is needed. After the Cheshire West judgment, the number of DoLS applications has risen enormously. This was the subject of a debate in this House on 16 March 2015. Prior to the Cheshire West judgment, in 2012-13, there were 11,887 DoLS. In 2014-15, 122,775 individuals had an active DoLS application either granted or in process. That is more than a tenfold increase in the number of DoLS. Some of these people were seriously ill and some died. In 2015, there were 7,183 such deaths. The vast majority of those were expected, anticipated and accepted by the family and those responsible for care. These were not deaths that came as a surprise to anyone. When that family was then told that the death must be referred to the coroner for an inquest they were often shocked and worried, as if there were some sort of accusation against them or others. They could not progress with their grieving and arrange the funeral, as they then had to wait for the inquest.
In 2015 the average time for inquests was 20 weeks, although coroners tried very hard to ensure that deaths under DoLS, when clearly of natural causes, were dealt with more quickly. To put the numbers in context, of the more than 7,000 deaths under DoLS, 6,760—or 94%—were found at inquests to be natural.
The distress to the bereaved has become a common cause of complaint to the Department of Health. In addition, it is not a good use of coroners, who should be investigating deaths where there is any suspicion whatever. Indeed, I remind the House that the Ministry of Justice’s Guide to Coroner Services states:
“Registrars of births and deaths, doctors or the police must report deaths to a coroner in certain circumstances. These include where it appears that: no doctor saw the deceased during his or her last illness; although a doctor attended the deceased during the last illness, the doctor is not able or available, for any reason, to certify the death; the cause of death is unknown; the death occurred during an operation or before recovery from the effects of an anaesthetic; the death occurred at work or was due to industrial disease or poisoning; the death was sudden and unexplained; the death was unnatural”—
so that includes all suspected suicides—
“the death was due to violence or neglect; the death was in other suspicious circumstances; or the death occurred in prison, police custody or another type of state detention”.
The Ministry of Justice document goes on to say:
“If you believe that a death of this kind has not been reported to the coroner, you may report it yourself”.
In other words, relatives who have any concern can themselves report to the coroner. It goes on to say:
“You should do this as soon as possible and before the funeral. The coroner will then inform you of the action he or she proposes to take”.
Nothing in the amendment removes the obligations to inform the coroner if there is any suspicion whatever around a death. The amendment is to remove the mandatory requirement to hold an inquest where the deceased was deprived of their liberty under all relevant sections of the Mental Capacity Act—or, indeed, where the deprivation of liberty was to provide care to them.
Under the Mental Capacity Act a person who lacks capacity may be detained in circumstances which amount to deprivation of liberty. No detention amounting to deprivation of liberty may be permitted without lawful authorisation, because it would otherwise constitute false imprisonment. The Mental Capacity Act provide safeguards known as DoLS and Court of Protection orders to be made depriving a person of liberty for their care. It also allows for the deprivation of liberty of a person for the purpose of giving life-sustaining treatment only where a decision of the court is pending.
I want to address a concern that has been raised with me in relation to anyone who dies under the care of a mental health trust. A suicide or an unexpected or a sudden death must always be referred to the coroner, but I would expect there to be a routine review of any death in a mental health trust or similar organisation. Such a review should be available to the Care Quality Commission inspectors and I would expect the inspectors to ask about the number of deaths that had occurred in people subject to a deprivation of liberty safeguard application or authorisation. They should look in depth at the quality of the review of care that had taken place. Additionally, anyone who has concerns at any stage should raise those concerns, whether through whistleblowing or through the complaints process.
Complaints and how they are handled also form part of CQC inspections and I believe that such searching questions are far more likely to detect poor care than relying on a referral to the coroner, who is only looking at one instance and cannot see how care is delivered across a whole organisation. The recent incidents of poor care of those with learning difficulties that have come to light are certainly alerting inspectors that they must be more rigorous in their inquiries than before. To summarise, I hope that this amendment will correct an anomaly that has caused more than 6,500 bereaved families unnecessary distress in the last year alone. I beg to move.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for this amendment. The Government are pleased to be able to offer our support for this amendment, which will minimise the stress on bereaved families at a very difficult time for them. The amendment will fully address the concerns that no family, having watched and comforted their loved one through his or her final days, should then be unnecessarily subject to the anxiety and confusion of having their death investigated by a coroner. I thank the noble Baroness for raising the profile of this important issue and for her valuable input, which the Government very much welcome and support. I commend her amendment to the Committee.
Lord Wigley
“Digital crime review
(1) The Secretary of State has a duty to provide for a review of legislation which contains powers to prosecute individuals who may have been involved in the commission of digital crime, in order to consolidate such powers in a single statute.(2) In conducting the review under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must have regard to the statutes and measures that the Secretary of State deems appropriate, including but not limited to—(a) section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988;(b) sections 2, 2A, 4 and 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997;(c) sections 16, 20, 39 and 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861;(d) sections 10, 13 and 55 of the Data Protection Act 1998;(e) section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1998;(f) sections 30(1),(3),(5),(6) and 78(5) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000;(g) the Computer Misuse Act 1990;(h) the Contempt of Court Act 1981;(i) the Human Rights Act 1998;(j) sections 4, 4A, 5, 16(b) and 18 of the Public Order Act 1986;(k) sections 46 and 145 of the Serious Organised Crime Act 2005;(l) section 48 of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006;(m) sections 32 to 37 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2014; (n) the Protection of Children Act 1978;(o) the Obscene Publications Act 1959;(p) sections 28 to 32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998;(q) sections 145 and 146 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003;(r) sections 127 to 131 of the Communications Act 2003;(s) section 4 of the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014;(t) section 5 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992;(u) the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015;(v) sections 33(5) and 29(6) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012;(w) section 2 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971;(x) sections 4, 8, 10 and 62 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003;(y) section 43 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001;(z) section 127 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980;(za) section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961;(zb) section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008;(zc) section 21 of the Theft Act 1968;(zd) section 51(2) of the Criminal Law Act 1977.(3) The Secretary of State has a duty to determine for the review any other statute under which persons have been prosecuted for a crime falling under subsection (1).(4) In conducting the review under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must consult with any person or body the Secretary of State deems appropriate, including but not limited to—(a) the police;(b) the Crown Prosecution Service;(c) the judiciary; and(d) relevant community organisations.”
Lord Wigley
My Lords, I will speak also to Amendments 231 and 231A in this group; all are also in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and the noble Baroness, Lady Howe. The amendments address issues related to digital crime review, surveillance and monitoring offences, and digital crime training and education. I am grateful to Harry Fletcher of the Digital-Trust for his assistance in drafting these amendments. First, they consolidate the numerous statutes that have been enacted over the last 30 years, a period that covers the huge expansion of illegal digital activity. Secondly, they aim to update the law to address the most recent online behaviour. Thirdly, they attempt to ensure that police officers are properly trained in respect of digital crime.
The growth in online crime has been truly immense. Two years ago the head of the College of Policing said on Radio 4 that half of all crime reported to front-line officers had a digital element. By now, it represents a majority of crime. More than 30 separate Acts of Parliament cover various aspects of this category of crime, from the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 to the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014. Inevitably, such a plethora of law lacks clarity and is confusing for the police in undertaking their responsibilities.
The Computer Misuse Act 1990 was originally intended to deal with hacking, unauthorised access, stealing data and circulating viruses. Yet between 1990 and 2006 there was on average just one conviction per month. Parliamentary Answers show that between 2007 and 2013 there was a slight improvement—the number of guilty outcomes increased to 1.5 each month across England and Wales. My amendments would place a duty on the Secretary of State to review and consolidate the existing legislation. In doing so, the Minister would of course consult the police and other relevant bodies.
Many online activities may not be covered by current statutes, however. The amendments clarify the situation. For example, use of a digital device to repeatedly locate, listen to or watch a person without legitimate purpose becomes a specified offence. Similarly, installing spyware without the user’s agreement would be an offence, as would taking multiple images of a person, unless it is in the public interest.
In a very timely report, published on 3 November, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary warned that some forces risk being overwhelmed by the volume of digital evidence being collected. It said that there was a significant shortfall in digital skills in the police and unacceptable delays in fulfilling basic tasks such as getting data off mobile phones. It also noted that some forces were not capable of dealing with the amount of digital evidence being gathered, especially in cases such as harassment, sexting and serious domestic abuse. This is a worrying state of affairs and supports the urgent need for comprehensive digital training for all police officers.
I now turn to the extent and type of digital crime. According to the Digital-Trust, digital abuse is rising steeply as a result of five identifiable factors. First, there is the increased use of technology at work and for social interaction and entertainment. Secondly, ever-increasing technological complexity results in increased risks. Thirdly, technology has become too intricate for victims to recognise the threats and know how to respond. Fourthly, surveillance technology has been consumerised and is available to abusers. Finally, the volume and speed of change makes it difficult for individuals, organisations and, indeed, the criminal justice system to react in a timely fashion.
Many types of behaviour are seen in digital abuse, including, first, unwanted communications by phone, text, emails, electronic messaging and social media; secondly, intimidation, including the posting of threats of physical violence and humiliating victims by posting explicit photographs; thirdly, grooming, using online information to groom a victim financially or sexually; and fourthly, surveillance, illegally accessing accounts or using computer technology to monitor movements, conversations and contacts. The phenomenal growth of online crime threatens to overwhelm those who may be expected to move against the perpetrators. There is a pressing need to step up action, and the authorities need the law to facilitate and support the initiatives which are now urgently needed. I beg to move.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede
My Lords, I rise to support the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, who has made almost all the points I was going to make. I am very conscious that there has been a large and ongoing investment by government to address the changing nature of digital crime. Metropolitan Police officers now routinely wear body cameras, we have large investments in data collection and the presentation of data in courts, and the CPS is grappling with the changing nature of crime. This is a massive amount of investment, and a massive amount of data has to be handled to go through the court process properly.
I want to make a point that is slightly different from the one made by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. In my experience, digital is also changing the nature of crime in the domestic context. I have seen films of police officers going into houses where there is a domestic dispute. The situation is very stark and is seen immediately. I suggest that digital makes it much more likely that there is an early guilty plea in such cases. The whole context of crime is changing—not just digital crime but the way more traditional crimes are perceived and the likely conviction rates of those crimes. I support the amendment.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, for his explanation of these amendments, which call for a review of the criminal law in relation to digital crime. The Government of course share the noble Lord’s concern about online crime, especially where new technologies, which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby referred to, are used to abuse, harass or intimidate people.
Amendment 230 seeks to codify the existing criminal law in relation to digital and cybercrime into a single statute. I share the noble Lord’s concerns about online crime, but I do not believe a single statute for digital and cybercrime would be helpful or a good use of resources. Indeed, I am not persuaded that the existing criminal law in this area is defective. As the Committee will be aware, any action that is illegal when committed offline is also illegal if committed online. Current legislation, some of which was passed before the digital age, has shown itself to be flexible and capable of catching and punishing offenders whether their crimes are committed by digital means or otherwise. The majority of the statutes and offences listed in Amendment 230 relate to offences that can be carried out by non-digital and digital means.
Producing a single statute, containing,
“powers to prosecute individuals who may have been involved in the commission of digital crime”,
as Amendment 230 suggests, would add further complications to the criminal law by creating new overlapping offences, reproducing and duplicating many existing laws. Furthermore, many existing offences would need to be retained for non-digital offending, so we would end up with parallel offences for crimes committed online and offline.
However, while I am not convinced of the need for a review as suggested here, I assure the noble Lord that where specific gaps in legislation are identified, or where new behaviours that should be criminalised are brought to light, we will continue to take action. The Government’s record has shown that we will and do legislate when we need to, such as passing the Serious Crime Act 2016, which further strengthened the Computer Misuse Act 1990.
Amendment 231 would require the Home Office to ensure funding is made available to every police force to train their officers in how to investigate digital crime and abuse. Mainstream cybercrime training is already available to police officers and while I have sympathy with the underlying objective of the noble Lord’s amendment, I do not believe that legislation is necessary to require police forces to provide such training. Furthermore, subsection (2) of the proposed new clause, requiring all police forces to record complaints of digital crime and abuse and their outcomes, is unnecessary as I can assure the noble Lord that work in this area is already under way.
From 2015, police-recorded crime data collection also includes a mandatory online flag that allows police forces to record online instances of crimes, including stalking and harassment, whether the crime took place wholly online or just had an online element to it. The Office for National Statistics published these data, for the first time, as experimental statistics in July. We welcome the continuing improvement in the statistics on reported fraud and cybercrime that better reflect the extent of the problem. Having an accurate picture is vital to informing the most appropriate response to these crimes. It is important that police forces be able to respond to changing technologies, and we recognise the need to support forces to invest in the capabilities they need. However, the training of police officers is an operational matter and critically, it is the police themselves who can best determine what their training needs are.
Amendment 231A seeks to create an array of new offences relating to digital surveillance and monitoring, presumably to address issues such as online harassment and stalking. The Government are absolutely clear that abusive and threatening behaviour is totally unacceptable in any form, online or offline. Existing legislation in the form of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 includes the offences of stalking, harassment and putting people in fear of violence, and applies to offences committed online.
In 2015-16, almost 13,000 prosecutions were commenced for harassment and stalking offences—a rise of 864 offences from 2014-15 and the highest volume ever recorded. The Government have strengthened the law on stalking: an insidious crime that can involve a wide range of behaviours, which may include the misuse of digital equipment, spyware and social media. There is no exhaustive list of behaviours relating to stalking, but recognising the ongoing pattern of fixated, obsessive behaviour is really important in tackling stalking.
New stalking offences were introduced in 2012. They are stopping people living in fear and preventing escalation to more serious violence. In 2015-16, more than 1,100 prosecutions were commenced under the new stalking legislation. Our recent consultation on the introduction of a new civil stalking protection order demonstrates our determination to support victims of stalking at an earlier stage and address the behaviour of perpetrators before it becomes entrenched. This draws on our successful roll-out of other civil orders, such as FGM protection orders, domestic violence protection orders and sexual risk orders.
I am sorry to have gone on somewhat, but I hope the noble Lord recognises that the Government keep the criminal law in this area under review and that police forces are alive to the need to have the capabilities to tackle such crime. I hope the noble Lord will feel happy to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Wigley
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for his support. I know the interest that the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, has taken in these matters. She had to leave before this debate but she has been one of the leading people in questions of cybercrime and associated matters.
At this time of night, I hate to be fractious with the Minister but I am afraid that what came over was complacency. There is an avalanche of cybercrime and associated dangers flooding the country. The police and other authorities do not have adequate resources, training or back-up to handle it. Unless action is taken to a much greater extent than it is now, this will overwhelm us. I urge the Minister, although she cannot agree with my amendment, to take back to the department the very serious worry that is represented by these amendments, to see what can be done to speed up action and provide more resources to enable those who have the responsibility of bringing perpetrators to justice to do that and not feel that they are fighting a losing battle. However, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, these are technical and consequential amendments to the Extent clause and I beg to move.
“( ) Section (Anonymity of victims of forced marriage: Northern Ireland) extends to Northern Ireland only.”
“( ) The power under section 60(4) of the UK Borders Act 2007 may be exercised so as to extend to any of the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man any amendment made by or under this Act of any part of that Act (with or without modification).”
“( ) sections (Posthumous pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences), (Other pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences) and (Sections (Posthumous pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences) and (Other pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences): supplementary);”
“( ) section (Anonymity of victims of forced marriage: Northern Ireland);”
Policing and Crime Bill
Wednesday 30th November 2016
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 72-I(Rev)(a) Amendments for Report, supplementary to the revised marshalled list (PDF, 62KB) - (30 Nov 2016)
17:29 - Division on Amendment 48 - Ayes: 246 / Noes: 196 - Amendment 48 agreed.
18:36 - Division on Amendment 106 - Ayes: 179 / Noes: 184 - Amendment 106 disagreed.
Lord Paddick
“( ) Section 2 does not require a police body to enter into a collaboration agreement with a fire and rescue body unless—(a) the relevant emergency services are services for the same area, or(b) the police area is the same as the area of more than one fire and rescue authority taken together.”
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 1 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. Clause 3 covers specific restrictions that apply to collaboration agreements between police, fire and ambulance services—the emergency services—and we welcome government Amendment 2, which adds having an adverse effect on public safety to the existing restriction, if collaboration would result in an adverse effect on efficiency and effectiveness. While I am in a generous mood—it will not last—we also welcome the Government responding to the issues raised in Committee by my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, around variations in existing agreements and replacement of those agreements with a new agreement, which is government Amendment 3.
We of course support innovative arrangements that are appropriate to the area and develop organically; there are examples across the country where this is happening. However, this is not unqualified support. In Yeovil, Somerset, for example, it has just been announced that the four-storey police station with cells is to be closed and police operations moved to the fire station, which is about a quarter of the size and has very limited parking. Whether the police vehicles or the fire appliances will have to use the nearby public car park is yet to be seen.
Amendment 1 places an additional restriction on collaboration agreements where the emergency service areas are not coterminous or where the boundaries of the police area do not coincide with the area covered by one or more fire and rescue service. The degree of complexity involved, were this not the case, would make such collaboration extremely difficult. On the first day of Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Scott of Bybrook, gave a good example of the issues:
“In Wiltshire, we would have loved to have joined both fire and police under our PCC. That would be the best use of public resources, not just financial, but people and assets as well. But we cannot do that now, because Wiltshire fire and rescue, earlier this year, joined with Dorset fire and rescue. Dorset police work with Cornwall and Devon. Wiltshire police work in collaboration on major crimes with Avon and Somerset and Gloucester. There are two PCCs—the whole thing is a muddle. The barrier is that there is no coterminosity between different public service authorities and this is, I think, probably getting worse”.—[Official Report, 14/9/16; col. 1469.]
For there to be effective collaboration to the degree envisaged by the Government, there needs to be coterminosity. I beg to move.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 1, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, seeks to limit the duty to collaborate so that police bodies would be required to collaborate with fire and rescue services only where they share coterminous boundaries. I see no reason why collaboration should be limited by geographical borders. The Government require there to be coterminous boundaries where a change of governance for fire is proposed, as the core approach of those provisions is to introduce greater democratic accountability by giving a directly elected individual responsibility for both services, with a clear mandate from the electorate in their area. However, collaboration between two bodies does not invoke such issues. Further, the duty, as currently drafted, would ensure that areas where the services are not coterminous, such as Devon and Cornwall, can still maximise the benefits outside a governance change if there is no appetite to adjust boundaries locally.
As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, mentioned, existing examples of collaborative working between police forces show the benefits that closer working can provide, regardless of geographical proximity. For instance, Cheshire Police collaborates with Northamptonshire and Nottingham police forces on back-office functions, including payroll, accounting, purchasing and HR, via the Multi-Force Shared Service. West Midlands Police led the largest ever police and emergency service collaborative procurement exercise, which includes 26 territorial forces, two non-territorial forces and five fire and rescue services. Together, the services will buy 3,000 vehicles over the next two years, with forecasted savings of up to £7 million over the period of the contracts.
Government Amendments 2 and 3 respond to points raised in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, in respect of collaboration agreements. Amendment 2 explicitly provides that no relevant emergency service will be required to enter into a collaboration agreement where it would have an adverse effect on public safety. This has been the Government’s policy intention since conception of the Bill. Indeed, as I set out in Committee, the Government believe that the impact on public safety will be assessed by an emergency service whenever considering the effect of a proposed collaboration on its efficiency or effectiveness. None the less, for the avoidance of any doubt, this amendment makes it explicit in the Bill that no relevant emergency service will be required to enter into a collaboration agreement that would negatively impact public safety.
Amendment 3 clarifies the process for varying a collaboration agreement. We agree that parties to an agreement should also be able to straightforwardly vary terms of an existing agreement, where all parties are in agreement. Parties will also still be able to replace an existing agreement with a new agreement, again with the consent of the parties concerned.
I hope that, having heard my explanation, the noble Lord will be content to support the government amendments in this group and withdraw Amendment 1.
Lord Paddick
In my opening remarks, I welcomed the government amendments and suggested that we would support them. The examples that the noble Baroness gave of collaboration between police forces were to do with requisition and back-office functions. The real issues arise where there is collaboration on operational issues—for example, the sharing of buildings, and particularly where the Government want to encourage police and crime commissioners to take over the running of fire and rescue authorities, as we will hear later this afternoon. That is where the coterminosity issue is most stark. Therefore, while I accept that for requisition and back-office functions the forces do not need to be geographically co-located, real problems can arise on the operational front in these circumstances, and if the PCC has to take over. However, I will consider carefully what the noble Baroness has said and, at this stage, beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“(8) A collaboration agreement may be—(a) varied with the agreement of all of the parties to the agreement, or(b) replaced by a subsequent collaboration agreement.”
Lord Rosser
Lord Rosser (Lab)
My Lords, I will speak also to our other amendments in this group: Amendments 12, 14 and 18. First, I acknowledge that the Government have moved, through amendments of their own, to improve the very weak and, frankly, in parts non-existent consultation arrangements provided for in the Bill, where a police and crime commissioner seeks to become the fire and rescue authority. We welcome that there is now a requirement to consult with those representing employees affected by the proposals.
However, the Government have not gone far enough to ensure that consultation is meaningful and that gaps do not exist through which a maverick PCC could seek unjustifiably to restrict or curtail the process—and neither are all the considerations covered that a PCC should be required to address if they wish to become the fire and rescue authority. Accordingly, we have put down Amendments 12, 14 and 18 to government Amendments 11, 13 and 17, and we regard our amendments as being part of a single group.
Government Amendment 11 places a requirement on a police and crime commissioner to,
“publish, in such manner as the commissioner thinks appropriate, the commissioner’s response to the representations made or views expressed in response to those consultations”.
In reality, that means that the commissioner could publish very little about the nature of the representations made and views expressed to him or her under the consultation—perhaps not least by those with strong reservations about the PCC becoming the fire and rescue authority. In being required only to publish a response, the commissioner could be very brief and not actually respond to the specific points and arguments made under the consultation.
Our amendments provide for the commissioner to publish, among other things, copies of each representation made and a summary of views expressed under the consultation on the proposal to become the fire and rescue authority. The amendments also provide for the commissioner to set out why the benefits claimed by becoming the fire and rescue authority cannot be achieved by other forms of collaboration, bearing in mind the emphasis placed in the Bill on improving collaboration between services, which we support.
The government amendments provide that consultation on a proposal from the police and crime commissioner also to be the fire and rescue authority should be carried out in such manner as the relevant police and crime commissioner thinks appropriate. Our amendments seek to be a bit more specific, since there may well be very differing views among police and crime commissioners on what constitutes an appropriate manner in which to consult. Presumably there must be some minimum requirements, and our amendments provide for a period lasting not less than 56 days and a requirement before the start of consultation to produce a draft public proposal, a schedule of public meetings and an invitation to make written submissions.
The government amendments provide for the Secretary of State to publish the independent assessment of a proposal from a PCC to become the fire and rescue authority. Our amendment provides, in addition to what the government amendment says, that it should be published at least one month before an order under Section 4A is made, to make sure that it is published a reasonable period of time before the order is made rather than very close to or even after the order is made.
Of course, I hope that the Government will accept the amendments to which I have referred. However, in the event that that is not their intention, I very much hope that the Government, having heard the points I have made and the concerns that lie behind them, and thus the amendments we have put down, might be prepared to reflect further on this matter and consider whether they could at least come some of the way to addressing some, if not all, of the concerns we have raised by putting down further amendments of their own.
We still have Amendment 4, which seeks to delete the clause that enables a police and crime commissioner to be the fire and rescue authority. I want to make it clear that our opposition to this enabling power in the Bill still stands. I do not wish to detain the House longer than necessary by repeating in detail all the points that we made in Committee and that have led us to our view—but those points still stand. Included among them is the fact that fire and rescue service boundaries are not always in line with PCC areas, and the provision for PCCs to become the fire and rescue authorities assumes that the police organisational structure is, and will be in the future, the most appropriate for the fire and rescue service when already evidence exists that that is not considered to be the case in at least some areas. In our view, the emphasis should be on closer collaboration, which is provided for in the Bill, and not on potentially hostile takeovers.
However, what I want to raise in a bit more detail is the potential impact on fire and rescue service personnel and members of a police force if the PCC becomes the fire and rescue authority and, in particular, the implications if the single-employer model is introduced. I have been told—as opposed to knowing it for a fact myself—that the Staffordshire police and crime commissioner has already prepared a business case, at least in draft, for becoming the fire and rescue authority. As I understand it, that involves adopting the single-employer model and harmonising terms and conditions of service. Apparently, the target date for the takeover of responsibility for the relevant fire and rescue service in this case is April next year—namely, in just over four months’ time. If that is the target date, it immediately raises questions about the consultation process that is likely to be adopted—concerns which I have already sought to express in more generalised terms in what I have said so far.
The terms and conditions of service for firefighters are covered by a national agreement; national bargaining applies. Those terms and conditions are set out in what I believe is referred to as the Grey Book, and they cover not just issues relating to pay and hours but disciplinary arrangements and procedures, as well as pensions. What assurances can the Government give—either now or subsequently in correspondence—that, single-employer model or not, the terms and conditions for firefighters will continue to be determined through the current bargaining procedures and that they will continue to be national terms and conditions, including in a situation where the PCC is also the fire and rescue authority?
When the coalition Government presented their Bill providing for the introduction of police and crime commissioners, the key argument they advanced was that nobody knew who was on the then police authorities, what their responsibilities were or how to contact them. The Government argued that PCCs would be visible, accessible and accountable in a way that did not apply to police authorities. If the intention now is that PCCs who become the fire and rescue authority should be able, if they choose, to move away from national terms and conditions of employment under a single-employer model, that is not a power, role or responsibility which, as I recollect it, the Government cited when making their case for the introduction of PCCs.
I hope that the Minister, as well as giving what I hope will be a helpful response to the three amendments to which I referred earlier, will be able to clarify the position in relation to a PCC who becomes the fire and rescue authority—and, in particular, where they propose to set up a single-employer model, what the position will be in relation to the national conditions of service that currently apply for both firefighters and members of the police force.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I support the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. The government amendments in this group do not go far enough—for example, in publishing the results of any consultation in full and on the process of the consultation itself, which we believe simply cannot be left in the hands of a police and crime commissioner. We also oppose in principle that police and crime commissioners should be allowed to take over fire and rescue authorities, for many of the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, gave this afternoon and in Committee, particularly, as we dealt with in Amendment 1, the issue around coterminosity. We also share the concerns about the employment implications of merging police services and fire and rescue services in a single employer model under a police and crime commissioner.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendment 19 in this group. The amendment would require that the Secretary of State cannot make an order to provide for the police and crime commissioner to be the fire and rescue authority under new Section 4A unless this has been agreed by all relevant local authorities. This amendment is supported by the Local Government Association.
In Committee, the Minister seemed to want to have her cake and eat it—to use a topical phrase. When these issues were discussed, she said at one point that,
“the Government are not mandating the transfer of fire and rescue authorities to police and crime commissioners. These provisions are locally enabling and acknowledge that local leaders are best placed to assess what would work … in their areas”.
But then later she said:
“Where there is clear merit in a transfer taking place that could benefit local communities, it would be wrong to allow vested local interests to stand in the way”.—[Official Report, 14/9/16; col. 1520.]
Local authority councillors are democratically elected to represent local people. One of their responsibilities is the fire and rescue service. Police and crime commissioners have been democratically elected to oversee policing, based on a manifesto that covers only policing. I believe that the Minister was right to say that local leaders are best placed to assess what would work best in their areas, and wrong to describe as “vested local interests” the democratically elected local authority councillors who do not agree with their police and crime commissioner about the PCC taking over local fire and rescue services. Our amendment is in line with the Minister’s initial comment in Committee, rather than her later comment.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)
My Lords, the Government came into office with a clear manifesto commitment to enable fire and police services to work more closely together and to develop the role of our elected and accountable police and crime commissioners. The provisions in Part 1 of the Bill, including those in Clause 6, give legislative effect to that commitment.
It is clear that better joint working can strengthen our emergency services, deliver significant savings to taxpayers and, most importantly, enable the emergency services to better protect the public. While there are many excellent examples of collaboration between the emergency services across the country—I draw noble Lords’ attention to the excellent overview of such collaboration recently published by the Emergency Services Collaboration Working Group—the picture of collaboration remains patchy and more needs to be done to make collaborative working the norm. The directly accountable leadership of PCCs can play a critical role in this by securing better commissioning and delivery of emergency services at a local level. This is not about a merger or a police takeover; nor is it an erosion of the brand identity of the fire service. By overseeing both services, PCCs can strengthen the services by maximising the opportunities for innovative collaboration between policing and fire, and ensure that best practice is shared.
It has been said many times before, but I should stress again, that the provisions in Clause 6 providing for PCCs to take on responsibility for fire and rescue are totally locally enabling. A one-size-fits-all approach would clearly be inappropriate and it should be up to local communities to have a say in how their services are provided. PCCs will be able to take on responsibility for fire and rescue only where a strong local case is made that it is in the best interests of either efficiency, economy or effectiveness, on the one hand, or public safety, on the other, and where they have consulted the relevant local authorities and the public. Removing the provisions from the Bill that enable PCCs to take on governance of fire and rescue denies PCCs the opportunity to drive forward local reform. In a number of areas—for example, Essex, Northamptonshire and Hertfordshire—we know that PCCs are already working closely with their fire and rescue authorities to consider the local case.
Requiring there to be local agreement before a transfer of governance can take place, as proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, would introduce unnecessary and unjustifiable barriers that serve to inhibit positive collaboration taking place at a local level. If there are valid reasons for a local authority’s opposition to a PCC’s proposal, these will be identified in the independent assessment process and the Home Secretary will approve a transfer only where a case has been made that it is in the interests of local communities. It would not be right to let parochial local interests—to take up what the noble Lord said—get in the way of reform where there is a clear benefit to the public.
In Committee, I was clear that the Government’s intention is for the process by which a PCC brings forward a business case for the transfer of responsibility for fire to be as robust and transparent as possible. It is important that this process commands the confidence of all parties and that local views are properly taken into account. To provide even greater assurances on this point, the Government have put forward a number of amendments which strengthen the consultation and transparency duties on PCCs. These amendments respond to a number of helpful and important points raised by noble Lords during the earlier stages of the Bill.
First, Amendment 9 will replace the existing duty on PCCs to seek the views of people in their police area with a duty that requires them to consult them. This strengthening of the duty makes explicit the Government’s expectation that PCCs will take local views into account when developing their business case and responds to concerns that the existing duty to seek views is not strong enough. In addition, Amendment 10 places an explicit duty on PCCs to consult with persons representing the views of employees and of members of the police force who may be affected by their proposal. I would expect this to include trade unions and staff associations such as the FBU, Unison and the Police Federation.
Amendment 16 will additionally require the PCC to submit a summary of the responses to such consultation to the Home Secretary to inform her decision on the proposal where the PCC does not have local agreement. It remains appropriate that it is for the PCC to determine the manner in which they should consult local authorities, the public and employee representatives, and Amendment 13 makes that clear. In the interests of transparency, Amendments 11, 15 and 17 will also require the PCC to publish the outcomes of their local consultation and the Secretary of State to publish the independent assessment that she secures of a PCC’s business case, where they do not have the agreement of the relevant local councils.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, tabled further amendments to these provisions, which seek to further prescribe the process by which a PCC consults on his or her proposal and the requirements on the Home Secretary to publish an independent assessment. As I have already set out, I am very keen, like the noble Lord, to make sure that the process by which a PCC seeks to take on the responsibilities of a fire and rescue authority is as robust and transparent as possible. However, I hope the noble Lord would agree that many of the points that he has raised are properly a matter for guidance rather than for primary legislation. The circumstances of each local consultation will be different, so we should not unduly fetter local flexibility to put in place proportionate arrangements that recognise the nature of each local business case. The amendments, while well intentioned, risk cutting across the local accountability of PCCs and risk Whitehall dictating matters that should rightly be left to local leaders.
In response to the noble Lord’s important concerns, however, I can be very clear about the Government’s expectation that the PCC’s consultation will be undertaken in an appropriate manner and be of an appropriate duration to allow local people to express their views and for the PCC to have them taken into account. Further, we would expect the PCC’s response to the consultation to cover the matters that the noble Lord has listed in Amendment 12. The Home Office will work closely with the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners and the Association of Police and Crime Chief Executives to ensure that their guidance on the development of PCC business cases incorporates these points. However, I should stress again that it is for the PCC to determine locally how to achieve such outcomes based on the nature of the case, its complexity and its understanding of the best ways to engage with local communities.
Furthermore, government Amendment 17 will ensure that the independent assessment is published as soon as is practicable after the Home Secretary has made a determination. In practice, this will ensure that all parties have sufficient time to consider the findings before an order is made. Adding in what amounts to a statutory one-month pause in the process in every case again strikes me as unduly complicating the procedure for making these orders and risks increasing local uncertainty as the process is drawn out. I might add that having received the independent assessment, there is no assumption that the Home Secretary would necessarily approve a PCC’s proposal. She will base her decision on the evidence presented. I hope that noble Lords will agree that the government amendments set out a clear expectation that there should be a comprehensive consultation, that the process will be transparent, and that local views will be properly taken into account.
I also indicated in Committee that I would give further consideration to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, regarding public safety. As I set out during that debate, public safety is a core function of the emergency services and we consider that any assessment of the impact of a proposed transfer of governance on effectiveness would include an assessment of its impact on public safety. None the less, I am content to make provision on the face of the Bill that puts this matter beyond any doubt. Government Amendments 5, 6 and 35 explicitly provide that the Secretary of State may not make an order transferring responsibility for fire and rescue to a PCC or implementing the single employer model under either a PCC or a combined authority mayor where it would adversely affect public safety.
I shall deal with the other government amendments in this group. As the Bill is currently drafted, when a PCC implements the single employer model and so delegates fire functions to a single chief officer, schemes that may be made by the Secretary of State transferring property, rights and liabilities from an FRA or the PCC-style FRA to that chief officer are one way only. On the terms and conditions for police and fire and rescue personnel, when staff are transferred from an FRA to the PCC, and under the single employer model from the PCC to the chief officer, they would be covered by the principles of the Cabinet Office code of practice entitled Statement of Practice of Staff Transfers in the Public Sector, taking into account the considerations associated with bringing two workforces closer together. For example, we propose that under the single employer model, complaints, conduct and death and serious injury matters for both the police and the fire service are treated on a consistent basis. PCCs will need to consider how to best reflect a more closely aligned workforce locally when preparing their business case, including consultation with the relevant unions where necessary, as I said previously.
On the question whether the proposals will take firefighters, emergency fire control staff and fire support staff out of national pay and conditions, pensions and other arrangements, the terms and conditions of firefighters and control staff are negotiated on a UK-wide basis via the National Joint Council for Local Authority Fire and Rescue Services. The NJC has no statutory basis and it is for PCC FRAs to decide whether to remain members. PCC-style FRAs will also have the same ability as FRAs to negotiate changes to terms and conditions at local level, while remaining members of the NJC, but PCCs would need to approach the NJC if they wished to become members.
Lord Paddick
Before the Minister sits down, could she clarify something? She described the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, as unnecessary interference in what should be a locally determined matter—the nature of the consultation process. However, when it comes to deciding whether the police and crime commissioner should take over the fire and rescue authority, against the wishes of the democratically elected local councillors, that is not seen as an unnecessary interference in local decisions.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I hope I have outlined clearly that the Home Secretary would take a view on this issue and on all representations that have been received when making her decision.
Lord Rosser
I, likewise, ask the Minister for some clarification of what she has just said. Am I right in saying that under the single employer model and the harmonising of conditions—if there is to be such—we could end up with different rates of pay, different conditions of service and different disciplinary procedures for firefighters and members of police forces in different PCC areas: that there could no longer be national rates and national conditions of service? That is what I have read into the Minister’s response, because it depends on whether a PCC decides to continue to have conditions of employment determined by the national bargaining body, or whether the police and crime commissioner who has become the fire and rescue authority decides he or she wants to bargain with their own employees in the fire and rescue service and, presumably, the police service, if it is harmonising conditions. Is that a fair interpretation of what the Minister said?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
Before Third Reading I will write to the noble Lord and to all noble Lords who have taken part in the debate, and distribute that response to the House. What I said was the terms and conditions of firefighters and the control staff are negotiated on a UK-wide basis via the National Joint Council, but the NJC has no statutory basis and it is for the PCC-style FRAs to decide whether to remain members. I will write to the noble Lord before Third Reading to outline more detail on what that might look like.
Lord Rosser
I take it that the noble Baroness is going to write, and I am very grateful to her for saying that, if necessary, that means we could come back to this issue on Third Reading. I also ask, genuinely for clarification, and I am sorry I did not pick up the Minister’s response on Amendments 12, 14 and 18 first time, but on Amendment 12, which sets out a number of requirements relating to consultation over what documents should be published and why the benefits could not be achieved through other forms of collaboration, did I hear correctly the Minister say that those requirements would be included in guidance? I do not know whether that will be guidance or regulations.
Lord Rosser
So what I have laid down in Amendment 12 will be included in guidance.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I agreed that the matters that the noble Lord listed would be covered in guidance.
Lord Rosser
As I understood it, the Minister did not extend that to the items I covered in Amendments 14 and 18. I am seeking to clarify, not to pursue the argument again, that that statement of what would be covered in guidance relates to what I have in Amendment 12. As I understood what the Minister said, that did not extend to Amendments 14 and 18. I am simply trying to clarify what was said.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I certainly gave that commitment on Amendment 12. I now have all my pages completely out of kilter, but I do not think I gave that commitment on—was it Amendment 14?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
Amendment 18 is a matter for the Home Secretary.
Lord Rosser
Am I also right—I am genuinely seeking clarification—that what the Minister helpfully said on Amendment 12 did not apply to Amendment 14?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
Unfortunately, I cannot find Amendment 14 here, but we have undertaken to work with the Association of PCCs to address in guidance the issues raised by the noble Lord in Amendment 12. Amendment 18 is a matter for the Home Secretary.
Lord Rosser
I would be more than happy if the Minister wishes to write to me to confirm. I am genuinely seeking clarification, rather than trying to reopen the debate.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
The issues raised in Amendments 12 and 14 will be addressed in guidance.
Lord Rosser
So there is an issue of a period over which consultation shall last. The other matters will be covered in guidance. Is that guidance that will go through this House in the form of regulations, or is this guidance that we will not see until it is published?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I think that this may be one area of detail that I could discuss and correspond with the noble Lord over between now and Third Reading. He and I can meet before Third Reading.
Lord Rosser
That is a helpful response and I take it in the spirit in which it was said. I hope that the Minister will accept, bearing in mind that she has indicated—I do not want to make things difficult—that it appears to apply to Amendments 12 and 14. To put it bluntly, if that does not prove to be the case we can come back at Third Reading.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
Yes, and I hope that it would never be interpreted that I will not follow through on something I say at the Dispatch Box, because I most certainly will meet the noble Lord and discuss the finer detail of the guidance before Third Reading.
Lord Rosser
I assure the Minister that she is about the last person that I would ever suggest would appear at the Dispatch Box and make a statement that she did not mean or which was misleading.
In light of what has been said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“(5A) The Secretary of State may not make an order under this section in a case within subsection (5)(a) if the Secretary of State thinks that the order would have an adverse effect on public safety.”
“(5A) The Secretary of State may not make an order under this section in a case within subsection (5)(a) if the Secretary of State thinks that the order would have an adverse effect on public safety.”
(b) from that chief constable to the fire and rescue authority to which the order applies.”
“(c) consult each of the following about the proposal—(i) persons appearing to the commissioner to represent employees who may be affected by the proposal;(ii) persons appearing to the commissioner to represent members of a police force who may be so affected”
“(d) publish, in such manner as the commissioner thinks appropriate, the commissioner’s response to the representations made or views expressed in response to those consultations.”
“(2) Each consultation under sub-paragraph (1) is to be carried out in such manner as the relevant police and crime commissioner thinks appropriate.”
“(ca) a summary of the views expressed about the proposal by persons consulted under paragraph 3(1)(c),”
“(4) The Secretary of State must publish the independent assessment—(a) as soon as is reasonably practicable after making a determination in response to the proposal, and(b) in such manner as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate.”
“(5C) A police and crime plan which the police and crime commissioner is required to prepare may be prepared jointly by the commissioner and the fire and rescue authority.(5D) If the police and crime commissioner and the fire and rescue authority prepare a joint police and crime plan, the plan must also set out the fire and rescue authority’s priorities and objectives, for the period of the plan, in connection with the discharge of the authority’s functions.(5E) Subsection (5B)(b) does not apply to a joint police and crime plan.”
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I shall also speak to the other amendments in this group. These amendments, taken together, are designed to allow police and crime commissioners to attend and speak at committees or sub-committees appointed by local authorities wholly or partly for the purposes of discharging the functions of a fire and rescue authority but not to allow police and crime commissioners to vote at those meetings.
Local authority councillors are democratically elected to represent local people on a range of issues, including fire and rescue services. Police and crime commissioners have been democratically elected to represent local people in overseeing the police force for which they are responsible. They have no democratic mandate to vote on issues relating to fire and rescue services, as the noble Lord, Lord Bach, said so persuasively in Committee, at col. 1489. If the police and crime commissioner has persuasive points, the committee that he is present and speaking at will be persuaded, and if his points are not persuasive, he should not be allowed to use a vote to push those views through. The “real influence” that the Minister referred to in Committee, at col. 1544, should come from the strength of the police and crime commissioner’s arguments, not from having a vote to back them up. I beg to move.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, Clause 7 enables police and crime commissioners to request to be represented on fire and rescue authorities within their police areas where they do not take responsibility for the governance of the fire and rescue service. This is what we have described as the representation model. Where a fire and rescue authority accepts such a request, we have set out that PCCs will be treated as if they were a member of the authority for the purposes of bringing agenda items, receiving papers and so on, and have full voting rights to ensure that they can take part in the business of the fire and rescue authority in a meaningful and effective way.
The noble Lord’s amendments seek to remove these provisions, which would be a great shame, as we want the PCC’s representation to be meaningful and on an equal footing with existing members of the FRA. To deny PCCs the ability to vote would reduce their scope for influence and I fear that opportunities for fostering greater collaboration would be missed. As my noble friend Lady Williams explained in Committee, in response to a group of similar amendments, we want police and crime commissioners and fire and rescue authorities to consider the representation model as a viable option for promoting greater collaboration between the two services. These amendments would hinder that.
The amendments would also remove the necessity for a fire and rescue authority to publish its decision and reasoning in considering the PCC’s request for membership. I am concerned that to do so would remove transparency and accountability from the process. These provisions enable PCCs to seek representation where they wish to do so, while respecting local fire governance arrangements. The final decision on representation rests with the fire and rescue authority, although we fully expect that in the majority of instances the fire and rescue authority would accept the PCC’s request and, if it did not, its reasons should be made clear to both the PCC and the public. This ensures that the process is fully transparent and open to effective scrutiny.
The provisions in the Bill allow for the representation model to be considered as an opportunity to foster greater collaboration outside of pursuing other governance models. I hope I have been able to persuade the noble Lord of the merits of the approach taken in the Bill and that he will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful to the Minister. I am still struggling to understand why a police and crime commissioner, who is elected on the basis of a manifesto to do with policing, should have full voting rights on a fire and rescue authority. I am not sure that “It would be a great shame” is a particularly powerful argument against my proposal. The Minister said that the police and crime commissioner should be on an equal footing with other members of the fire and rescue authority but did not actually say why. Yes, the final decision rests with the fire and rescue authority but, given the fact that this is in legislation, it would be difficult, certainly following the Minister’s remarks, for fire and rescue authorities to resist a move by a police and crime commissioner to take those voting rights. Greater collaboration surely does not necessarily depend on the police and crime commissioner having a vote on the fire and rescue authority. None the less, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“(2A) Before making the request the mayor must publish, in such manner as the mayor thinks appropriate, the mayor’s response to the representations made or views expressed in response to any consultations on the proposal.”
“(5A) The Secretary of State must publish the independent assessment—(a) as soon as is reasonably practicable after making a determination in response to the proposal, and(b) in such manner as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate.”
“(6A) The Secretary of State may not make an order under section 107EA(2) in a case within subsection (6)(a) of this section if the Secretary of State thinks that the order would have an adverse effect on public safety.”
“( ) from the chief constable to the combined authority,”
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the government amendments in this group respond to some very well-made points in Committee about the provisions in the Bill establishing the office of the London fire commissioner.
Amendments 37, 156, 195 and 205 will ensure that no locally elected councillor will have to resign their council position if they are appointed as deputy mayor for fire or deputy mayor for policing and crime in London. In Committee the noble Lord, Lord Harris, made a compelling case for this change with reference to two London borough councillors who had had to resign their council positions when appointed to the position of deputy mayor for police and crime because, when appointed, they were treated as an employee of the Greater London Authority and therefore became politically restricted. I have listened to the case made by the noble Lord and agree that no locally elected councillor should be placed in a situation where they would have to give up their seat to become the deputy mayor for fire or the deputy mayor for policing and crime.
Amendments 38 to 40 are drafting amendments which correct erroneous references to the assembly’s fire and emergency “panel” rather than “committee”. I am again grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Harris, for spotting them. Finally, Amendments 41 and 42 respond to one tabled in Committee by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, relating to the functions of the fire and emergency committee. These amendments will ensure that there is appropriate scrutiny of the actions and decisions of the deputy mayor for fire, and allow the committee to investigate and prepare reports about any other matters the assembly considers to be of importance to fire and rescue services in London. I beg to move.
Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for responding to the points I made in Committee and introducing these amendments. I suspect that this is a refinement and clarification of the law which is of interest to a tiny handful of citizens of the United Kingdom. None the less, the anomaly created was slightly strange.
However, at the risk of prolonging this only a moment, I seek a little clarification. The amendments, as I understand them, would enable a deputy mayor in these circumstances to be an elected councillor. Does that also remove the restriction on those individuals placed by the Local Government Officers (Political Restrictions) Regulations 1990, which among other things do not allow such a person to hold office in a political party or to canvass for one? It might be a boon to anyone in this position if they were allowed to be elected and stand for election but not to canvass on their own behalf.
It is difficult to disentangle what are three interlocking Acts of Parliament, not all of which seem in the public references to have been updated by subsequent legislation. It seems to me that the Local Government Officers (Political Restrictions) Regulations 1990 might still apply to these individuals, even though the specific issue of election to a local authority has been removed. Having said that, I am sure that the Minister will be able to clarify it entirely to my satisfaction and I am very grateful to her and her officials for responding to this allegedly minor issue.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I hope it is not going to be another letter because, from my dim and distant memory of local government officers’ political restrictions, I recall that up to a certain level of officer, you are free to canvass and engage in political activity. You are also free to stand for elected office in an authority other than your own. I think I may have to write, now that the noble Lord is heading for the door, on the matter of elected office for local authority officials because that will be looked at in the regulations.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I thank the Minister for listening to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, and to the issues raised by my noble friend Lady Hamwee. She cannot be in her place today, but she has asked me to pass on her thanks for the amendments that the Government have brought forward in this group.
(e) any other matters which the Assembly considers to be of importance to fire and rescue services in Greater London.”
“(3A) The Assembly may investigate, and prepare reports about, the actions and decisions of the Deputy Mayor for Fire.”
“Fire Safety inspections
(1) The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (S.I. 2005/1541) is amended as follows.(2) In article 2 (interpretation), in the definition of “fire inspector”—(a) after “inspector”” insert “, in relation to Wales,”;(b) for “section 28” substitute “section 28(1)”.(3) In article 27 (powers of inspectors), after paragraph (4) insert—“(5) This article applies to a person authorised by the Secretary of State under article 25(1)(e) in relation to premises in England as it applies to an inspector; and article 32(2)(d) to (f), with the necessary modifications, applies accordingly.”(4) In article 28 (exercise on behalf of fire inspectors etc of their powers by officers of fire brigades)—(a) in paragraph (1)—(i) omit “, or any other person authorised by the Secretary of State under article 25(e),”;(ii) for “and (3)” substitute “to (4)”;(b) after paragraph (1) insert—“(1A) The powers conferred by article 27 on an authorised person (by virtue of paragraph (5) of that article) are also exercisable by an employee of a fire and rescue authority in England when authorised in writing by such an authorised person for the purpose of reporting to him or her on any matter falling within the authorised person’s functions under this Order; and articles 27(2) to (4) and 32(2)(d) to (f), with the necessary modifications, apply accordingly.”;(c) in paragraph (2), for “, or other person authorised by the Secretary of State,” substitute “or authorised person”;(d) after paragraph (2) insert—“(3) In this article, “authorised person” means a person authorised by the Secretary of State under article 25(1)(e) in relation to premises in England.””
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, Amendments 44, 45 and 105 are essentially technical amendments to ensure that the strengthened powers of an inspector of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and the powers of an inspector of fire and rescue authorities in England, as provided for in the Bill, work as intended.
Both inspectors have powers to obtain information and to access premises of the relevant organisation which they are inspecting and of persons providing services for that organisation. The amendments ensure that any person providing services or carrying out any of the activities of either organisation by virtue of an enactment, including where there is no contractual agreement, come within the inspection framework. This would, for example, cover police or ambulance staff who are undertaking fire functions as part of a local agreement—an approach which is growing across many police forces and fire and rescue authorities. These amendments will ensure that both police and English fire and rescue inspectors have sufficient powers covering all individuals who are fulfilling an activity which needs to be inspected. The powers to access premises and require information are long-standing and widely used, with established safeguards that will apply to these amendments.
Amendment 43 concerns the enforcement of fire safety in Crown-owned or Crown-occupied premises for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005. Presently, the 2005 order defines an enforcement authority with reference to inspectors under Section 28 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004. In the light of the fire inspection provisions in the Bill, it is now desirable to break the link between the inspection of fire and rescue authorities by an English inspector appointed under the amended Section 28 of the 2004 Act and enforcement of fire safety in Crown-owned and Crown-occupied premises under the 2005 order.
We do not consider it appropriate for those charged with responsibility for inspecting the efficiency and effectiveness of fire and rescue authorities in England under Section 28 of the 2004 Act, as amended, to have any powers in relation to enforcing fire safety provisions in Crown-owned or Crown-occupied premises for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the 2005 order. The skill set is entirely different, with fire safety enforcement officers requiring a high level of technical competence in building construction and fire safety management.
However, to deliver this objective we need to amend the 2005 order to ensure that any persons authorised, under Article 25(1)(e) of the 2005 order, by the Secretary of State to enforce the provisions of the 2005 order in Crown-owned and Crown-occupied premises are able to access the powers of enforcement that are necessary to enable them to perform their function effectively.
Without this amendment, any persons subsequently authorised to enforce the provisions in Crown-owned or Crown-occupied premises who were not also appointed as English fire inspectors or assistant inspectors would not, in law, be able to perform their function. I beg to move.
“(e) any other person who is, by virtue of any enactment, carrying out any of the activities of a fire and rescue authority in England.”
(iii) any other person who is, by virtue of any enactment, carrying out any of the activities of a fire and rescue authority in England,”
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, in moving Amendment 46 I will speak also to the other amendment in the group, Amendment 47. Both are in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. This is a straight rerun of the amendments we had in Committee in relation to police super-complaints, which bodies can make them and the authorised persons who can ask the Secretary of State to add or remove bodies from the list of bodies that can make them. In Committee, we argued that the Secretary of State should be required to consult on the regulations that designate which bodies can make super-complaints. These regulations will contain the criteria that will be applied to decide which bodies can bring police super-complaints. New Section 29B, inserted by Clause 25, requires the Secretary of State to consult when she makes or revokes a designation but does not require her to consult on the criteria that she applies in deciding whether to make or revoke a designation. That is the intended effect of Amendment 46.
Amendment 47 relates to the “authorised persons” who can ask the Secretary of State to make or revoke a designation under new Section 29B(2)(b) of the Police Reform Act 2002. Contrary to what the Minister took as our intention in Committee, Amendment 47 sets out a list of bodies that the Secretary of State should specify as authorised persons who can ask the Secretary of State to make or revoke a designated body under new subsection (2)(a), not a list of designated bodies that can make police super-complaints.
Just to be clear, there will be two lists of bodies in relation to police super-complaints. There are authorised persons, who are bodies who can ask the Secretary of State to designate or remove a body from the list of those able to make police super-complaints, and there are bodies that are designated as being able to bring police super-complaints. We believe that the list of authorised persons should include the Law Society, the National Council for Voluntary Organisations and Citizens Advice, and others that should be listed in the Bill. I beg to move Amendment 46.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, these matters were discussed in Committee. I am very supportive of Amendments 46 and 47. As we have heard, designated bodies will get the power to make super-complaints to Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, and these complaints can be made where, in the opinion of the designated body, a feature of policing may be harming the public and needs looking at. It is based on a system that works in the private sector and this is the first time it will be used in the public sector. Only designated bodies will be able to make super-complaints, and the process for designating these bodies will be set out in regulations.
When the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, responds to this debate, it would be helpful if she said something about the timescale for the consultation processes, and when she expects these regulations to be laid before Parliament and come into force. I should also say that I am happy for the negative procedure to be used in respect of the regulations; perhaps the noble Baroness could bring that fact to the attention of the noble Lord, Lord Hyde of Ashton, who is of the opinion that I would never agree to the negative procedure being used for regulations in this House.
The proposals in this section of the Bill are a welcome move and will be a positive benefit to organisations and individuals that have legitimate concerns to raise. We are supportive of them and of these amendments.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for the opportunity to address the misunderstanding over Amendment 47, which was previously tabled in Committee. However, I am again going to have to disappoint the noble Lord as the Government cannot support either of these amendments. The Bill provides for the delegation of the ability to authorise those who can be designated bodies for the purposes of the new super-complaints system.
I welcome the noble Lord’s suggestions of who should perform this function but I do not agree that this task can be performed by bodies that might themselves want to raise super-complaints, or by multiple agencies. For the system to have legitimacy, we need to avoid a conflict of interest in this role. That is why the Bill creates this distinct role, as we do not consider it appropriate that HM Inspectorate of Constabulary designates the bodies that can come to it with super-complaints.
All three bodies put forward by the noble Lord could potentially add significant value as designated bodies, should they wish to apply. It would be a shame if, for example, Citizens Advice were precluded from raising issues through the super-complaints system. In the interests of a smooth and speedy process, I suggest that this role should be undertaken by an individual or single body, not by a committee.
The critical point here is that the criteria for designation are clear and unambiguous so that authorisation is a simple and objective process. That is why we will consult widely on the criteria in due course, and I encourage all those who have an interest to feed in their views. The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, asked about timing: it will be in the coming months.
Having consulted to establish clear criteria, we believe it is unnecessary to subsequently consult on any list of bodies deemed to have met the criteria, as required by the noble Lord’s Amendment 46. This risks slowing the whole system down, delaying designation and further delaying the point at which bodies can submit super-complaints to HMIC.
I reiterate the Government’s commitment to consulting widely on the criteria. As part of that process, we would welcome the input of noble Lords on bodies or organisations that may be suitable for designation or for the role as the authorised person. I hope the noble Lord, having considered the Government’s arguments, will feel free to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for his support for these amendments and for the explanation given by the Minister. Obviously I am disappointed that she felt she could not support them. Clearly there would have to be a distinction between the role of authorised persons and the role of designated bodies. The suggestions we made were on the basis that these organisations had vast knowledge of the voluntary bodies and third party organisations that work in their areas. There would have to be a distinction if they were appointed as authorised persons, and they would not be able to be designated bodies themselves, but that is something that the Government could make a decision on.
I am grateful for the reassurance around the consultation that will take place over the criteria that will be used in order to decide which bodies should be designated. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“Inquiry into complaints alleging corrupt relationships between police and newspaper organisations
(1) Within one month of the condition in subsection (3) being satisfied, the Prime Minister must commission an independent inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 into the operation of the police complaints system in respect of allegations of corrupt relationships between the police and newspaper organisations.(2) The inquiry’s terms of reference must include, but are not to be limited to—(a) how adequately police forces have investigated complaints about police officers in dealing with people working within, or connected to, newspaper organisations; (b) the thoroughness of any reviews by police forces into complaints of the type specified in paragraph (a);(c) in those cases where a complaint of the type referred to in paragraph (a) led to a criminal investigation, the conduct of prosecuting authorities in investigating the allegation;(d) whether and to what extent, if any, police officers took illegal payment to suppress investigations of complaints of relationships between police officers and people working within, or connected to, newspaper organisations;(e) the implications of paragraphs (a) to (d) for the relationships between newspaper organisations and the police, prosecuting authorities, and relevant regulatory bodies, and recommended actions in that respect.(3) The condition in this subsection is that the Attorney-General determines that the inquiry, if conducted effectively and fairly, would not be likely to prejudice any ongoing relevant criminal investigations or court proceedings cases.(4) The Attorney-General must consider and reach a decision on the matter specified in subsection (3) within one month of this section coming into force, and if necessary must reconsider the matter each month until the Attorney-General is able to make a determination as set out in subsection (3).”
Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve (CB)
My Lords, this amendment is also in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. The second part of the Leveson inquiry was promised by the former Prime Minister in order to investigate allegations of collusion—above all, corrupt collusion—between the press and the police. An undertaking was made to victims of press and police corruption, including those who had lost loved ones at Hillsborough and were then smeared, among many other victims.
The noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, when he was Leader of the House, read out the former Prime Minister’s Statement on this matter to this House on 29 November 2012—almost exactly four years ago. He said:
“When I set up this inquiry, I also said there would be a second part, to investigate wrongdoing in the press and the police, including the conduct of the first police investigation. This second stage cannot go ahead until the current criminal proceedings have concluded, but we remain committed to the inquiry as it was first established”.—[Official Report, 29/11/12; col. 338.]
But there has been a shift, and the Government are apparently no longer so committed to Leveson part 2 happening once the criminal proceedings are finished. The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, answered a Written Question on Leveson 2 on 15 June this year. She wrote:
“Criminal proceedings connected to the subject matter of the Leveson inquiry, including the appeals process, have not yet completed. We have always been clear that these cases must conclude before we consider part 2 of the inquiry”.
So now it is just to be considered, not undertaken.
This is not what was promised to the Hillsborough families or to other victims of press and police collusion or corruption. In the light of the conviction of Mazher Mahmood, the findings of the Hillsborough Independent Panel, the finding that News of the World executives lied to a Select Committee and the apparent continuation of what we might, kindly, call business as usual at some larger newspaper corporations, I do not think we can say that we are sure that the need for Leveson 2 has diminished. The Hillsborough Family Support Group worked with the shadow Home Secretary, Mr Andy Burnham, to table an amendment to the Bill on Report in the Commons which would have recommitted the Government to going through with Leveson 2. It is that amendment that I have agreed to move today.
The Government could have begun proceedings for Leveson 2 weeks ago, when the relevant trials had finished. Doing so would help draw a line under Hillsborough, Orgreave, Daniel Morgan and countless other scandals involving both the police and the press.
I do not think this is a trivial matter. A commitment was made to Leveson 2; the victims want it; the public want it; and, for democracy to function well, we all need it. The Government should get on with what they promised in 2011 and 2012 and begin Leveson 2 now. I beg to move.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, despite the eminence of the noble Baroness, I hope the Government will be robust in resisting the amendment. I have one general principle about it. Over a long time in Parliament, I have been involved directly and indirectly with a very large number of inquiries; I have participated in some. There is a proportionality rule: is the likely outcome of the inquiry and the chances of its recommendations being implemented sufficient to justify the cost of setting it up and the bureaucracy involved? In the majority of cases in which I have been involved, the answer to that question is no, and I strongly suspect that this time the answer is no again.
All of us who have been in public life know full well that there has always been collusion between the police and journalists—certainly ever since I was first in the House of Commons, nearly 40 years ago. It is lamentable, but it has been the case. I doubt that anything else that will be turned up in this inquiry would justify the initial cost.
I have one further point. It is absolutely right that police officers who take money for supplying confidential information—that is, are bribed—should be the subject of criminal procedure. But that is also, in the generality of cases, true of the journalists. What we are dealing with when a journalist pays a police officer is a criminal conspiracy to do an unlawful thing.
Occasionally, there will be instances where the public interest is genuinely involved. But one thing I have noted in recent months and years is the unwillingness of juries to convict journalists for doing this, because quite specious claims of public interest are always invoked. In general, it is public curiosity, not interest, which justifies the process. I very much doubt that we will get juries to see the rightness of what I have been saying, so there may have to be another way forward.
I very much hope that the press industry—editors in particular—recognises the impropriety in the generality of cases of journalists paying police officers for information. The fact that juries will not convict for these purposes is neither here nor there. I would hope that senior journalists would incorporate into the contracts of employment with their journalists a prohibition on doing what I have just described, and that editors and proprietors would be willing to enforce that prohibition.
Reverting to my first point, I am sorry, but I cannot support the noble Baroness’s very eloquent submission to your Lordships’ House.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I rise to support the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill of Bengarve. I should declare three interests. First, I was a police officer for more than 30 years, retiring with an exemplary record in 2007 as a deputy assistant commissioner, the equivalent of a deputy chief constable outside London. Secondly, I was a victim of phone hacking. Thirdly, I was party to a judicial review of the Metropolitan Police Service in 2011. This review concluded that the police had failed in their duty to protect my and others’ Article 8 rights to a private and family life under the Human Rights Act, because they had failed to tell us that we were the targets of phone hacking by the press. I was a senior police officer in the Metropolitan Police at the time of the phone hacking. The noble Lord, Lord Prescott, another party to the judicial review, was the Deputy Prime Minister at the time his phone was hacked.
To take up the point of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, I accept the question of proportionality but the difference here is that the Government promised the victims of phone hacking that Leveson 2 would take place. The former Prime Minister promised that this inquiry would take place and that, I am afraid, rather trumps the noble Viscount’s arguments around proportionality. The inquiry was set up to explore and resolve a number of areas but, in the interests of brevity, as no doubt these points will be covered by other noble Lords, I will focus on just one element.
I discovered that I had been the subject of interest to the private detective employed by News International to carry out phone hacking, Glen Mulcaire, when I was told through my solicitors by the Guardian in 2011. My solicitors contacted the Metropolitan Police, who said that there was no record of my having been the victim of phone hacking. The Guardian sources insisted that I was and the Metropolitan Police eventually admitted that I had been involved as a target. They subsequently disclosed pages from Mulcaire’s notebook which had my name, details of my then partner, our home address and phone numbers and other personal details and that these documents were in their possession and had been in their possession since before 2006. The police also subsequently disclosed an internal memo which indicated that “Commander Paddick” was a target of phone hacking. I was a commander from 2000 to 2003, when I was promoted.
My point is that the Metropolitan Police knew that there was widespread phone hacking and did nothing to investigate it or to warn the victims that their phones were being hacked, even when one of those victims was the Deputy Prime Minister and another was one of its own senior police officers, who was working in the same building as the detectives who had uncovered the scandal. At around the same time, it appears that members of the press whose phones were being hacked by rival newspapers were warned that their phones were being hacked.
There has been no satisfactory explanation of why the police behaved in this way—we need to know why. Leveson 2 should be initiated to find that out. I say that there has been no satisfactory explanation of the police conduct because it has been suggested that the initial investigation, where the Royal Family had been among the victims and which had been carried out by the Counter Terrorism Command as a result, had other priorities. We can imagine that the counterterrorism branch did have other priorities. If that was the reason for not taking the matter further, there was no reason why the police could not have informed other victims to take precautions against using their mobile phones and that no further action would be taken. Indeed, that was the conclusion reached by the judge who heard the judicial review.
Once the royal connection had been dealt with, the case could, and should, have been transferred to the Specialist Crime Directorate of the Metropolitan Police, the most appropriate department at Scotland Yard to investigate such matters, where a scandal of such proportions could have been given the resources required to investigate matters properly. Instead, it was only after the Guardian discovered the extent of the scandal that the Metropolitan Police acknowledged that an investigation was needed and applied the resources required. We have not got to the bottom of the relationship between the Metropolitan Police and the media at that time. That is why we need the inquiry proposed by this amendment.
If a public inquiry is needed and the Government have promised one, it should take place. The sudden deployment of a wholly unnecessary consultation is, or appears to be, a device to give cover to the Government reneging yet again on a promise made regarding the phone hacking issue. If I am wrong and the Government decide after all to recommit to Leveson 2, I am sure this House will simply agree to the later removal of the amendment. In the meantime, it is our insurance policy against the Government letting us down again, and we on these Benches will support it if the noble Baroness divides the House.
Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lords who tabled this amendment. I listened to the explanation of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, the chronology of which I understand, but which may be difficult for others to understand. I totally accept the passion with which he spoke on that issue. I support the amendment but make it clear that I am one of the few Members of the House who gave evidence to Leveson in person and on oath. I support the amendment precisely because it fulfils the previous government commitment. As I was the commissioner at the time the first phone hacking case appeared to arise, which concerned the royal household and to which the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, referred, it would not be appropriate for me to say in this House that I do not accept any further scrutiny of the Metropolitan Police or other police forces over this matter. Therefore, I very much support the idea that Leveson 2, in whatever form, or whether it is through this amendment, should be introduced.
However, given that I gave evidence to the inquiry, I need to make it clear that I shall be very surprised—at this point, I move towards the position adopted by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham—if a new inquiry uncovers anything involving major corruption in recent years. To that end, I ask the House’s indulgence to allow me to read one paragraph—paragraph 49—of my statement to Leveson, which I made in 2012, which set out my position on the question. It refers to the Met and only to events post-2000. Therefore, it does not refer to Morgan or Hillsborough as that was the question I was being asked: what had I done since I had been the deputy commissioner and the commissioner? It was submitted in spring 2012 and says:
“Whilst I therefore accept that current enquiries may reveal that a small number of relatively junior officers took bribes from the press, I do not believe that corruption in monetary terms lies at the heart of any major problem in the relationship between the”,
Metropolitan Police Service and the press. We can now say that a number of junior police officers were convicted, and rightly so. I continued:
“I believe that where that problem may have become significant is that a very small number of relatively senior officers … became too close to journalists, not I believe for financial gain but for the enhancement of their reputation and for the sheer enjoyment of being in a position to share and divulge confidences. It is a siren song. I also believe that they based this behaviour on how they saw politicians”,
behaving with the press,
“and that they lost sight of their professional obligations. The MPS did not have adequate defences against this behaviour and in previous decades would probably not have needed it”.
In short, what will be revealed by such an inquiry, which I still say is necessary, is behaviour that was wrong, reprehensible and unprofessional, but largely not criminal.
Lord Deben (Con)
My Lords, many of us wish that we were not having this debate at all. I will ask three questions of the noble Baroness who will reply. The first is: will she not agree that there is a promise, and that it is a serious thing not to carry that promise through? That is particularly true given the circumstances in which we live, where large numbers of people have ceased to believe in the integrity, the impartiality and, if I may use a non-word, the upstandingness of those in authority. Therefore when a promise has been made, to renege on it is always harmful but particularly harmful at this time, when not only in this country but elsewhere there is clearly a fundamental feeling among large numbers of people that they have not been dealt with properly by those who are in power, have authority and are able to change the lives of others. Therefore, first, there is the promise.
Secondly, there is the need. Will my noble friend explain why it is not necessary to clear the reputation of the police, and particularly the Metropolitan Police, given that so much has been said about them and so much is thought about them? As somebody who lives much of the time in London, I have to say that the Metropolitan Police’s reputation is not good, has not been good for some time, and needs to be improved. Therefore one has to ask why this would not be a valuable way to ensure that that happened. The noble Lord, Lord Blair, said precisely that—there is a need for that.
There is also a need for the press to face up to the fact that it, too, has perhaps the worst reputation in this country that it has had, certainly in my lifetime, which is getting embarrassingly long. This is a very unhappy time, when we think of the purveying of hate that has been on the front pages of so many newspapers, and the attacks on our institutions and their independence, which we have seen latterly. We therefore have to say to ourselves that this is an opportunity for the press, too, to clear that part of its name which is clearable. For my noble friend Lord Hailsham to stand up today and say that he expects the press kindly to arrange in future that it will sign up to not doing bad things suggests that he has not followed the news over the past months. This is not the mood of a press that is largely owned outside this country, by people who have little commitment to this country, and now has standards wholly different from those which perhaps we might have expected.
My third question to my noble friend Lady Williams is as follows. If the noble Baroness’s amendment is not agreed—or, more importantly, if it is not accepted—and if there is no alternative that we see as satisfactorily meeting the very powerful statement that she made, does my noble friend not agree that the public will think that we have not taken these steps due to the power of the press and our closeness to the constabulary, which leads me back to my first point? That is extremely dangerous at any time and particularly dangerous at the moment. The amendment attacks neither the press nor the police; it suggests that perhaps this is the moment to clear both of unfair allegations and to reveal real allegations, which seems to me a not unreasonable position to take. I hope that my noble friend will enable me to support her in the Lobbies by giving me an alternative to this amendment that meets those obligations.
Lord Clinton-Davis (Lab)
I speak following the very courageous and relevant speech that we have just heard. I do not think that there can be any possible objection to strengthening the law, which is what is proposed. There can be no dispute at all that corrupt relationships between the police and newspapers are highly damaging to both, and they are unacceptable to the public, who must be able to trust both. In a democratic society, which I hope we are, it is absolutely vital that there should be trust in both, and the amendment simply seeks to bolster that position. I can see no objection at all to the purpose of the amendment. I ask anybody here to say what damage it could do to the law. In fact, I think that strengthening the law in this way is absolutely vital, and there should be no question about that.
For many years I practised in the criminal courts. I came across decent police officers who did not bend the truth at all, but I also came across certain police officers who were quite prepared to do exactly that, and in our society that is absolutely unacceptable. I hope that the Minister will appreciate how strongly those of us who have experience in this field feel about this.
I am pretty old now but I still attend this House, although some, including my wife, have some reservations about that. But I was particularly concerned about this issue. Everything which concerns the police is relevant to a democratic society. In my view, it is an absolute necessity as far as this is concerned. There is a gap at the moment, or there may be, that ought to be cured. Many people who have experience in this area recognise that. There should be no question about it.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, I will not detain the House for too long. As has been said, the amendment would require the Prime Minister to commission an independent inquiry into the operation of the police complaints system in respect of allegations of corrupt relationships between the police and newspaper organisations. It also provides that the inquiry would proceed only once the Attorney-General has determined that the inquiry, if conducted effectively and fairly, would not be likely to prejudice any ongoing relevant criminal investigations or court proceedings cases.
As has already been pointed out, in November 2012 the then Prime Minister reminded the victims of press intrusion that when he set up the Leveson inquiry he had also said that there would be a second stage to investigate wrongdoing in the press and the police, and that the Government remained committed to the inquiry as it was first established. However, real doubts about the Government’s willingness to honour that promise have arisen—hence this amendment. Those doubts have been increased by the Government’s recent decision to consult, including on whether to stick by the promises previously given by the then Prime Minister that there would be a Leveson stage 2.
Police and press relations is a significant area still to be addressed. Briefings by the police in the immediate aftermath of the Hillsborough tragedy had a profound adverse impact on the families who had lost loved ones, and on the thousands who had been at the match and returned home in a state of some trauma, only to read a few days later that the police were blaming them for the deaths of their friends and family. The media were also manipulated in the case of the Shrewsbury 24, and part 1 of the Leveson inquiry found unhealthy links between senior Met police officers and newspaper executives—links which led to resignations. There is also, on occasion, an issue around the nature of relationships between the police and the press at a more local level, where sometimes prior information appears to have been provided about a particular person to be arrested or a particular search carried out.
Honouring a repeated undertaking given by a Government through a Prime Minister, to victims in particular, and with all-party support, is the issue that this amendment seeks to address. If, having heard the Government’s response, the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, decides to seek the opinion of the House, we shall be voting in favour of the amendment.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, for explaining the purpose behind her amendment. I also thank the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Blair, who spoke of their own experiences around this issue. As the noble Baroness explained, Amendment 48 would require the Prime Minister to proceed with what is colloquially referred to as the Leveson 2 inquiry into the relationships between the police and the media.
It is of course vital that the police take seriously their role, both in maintaining their own reputation and integrity and in protecting the community that they are meant to serve. However, given the extent of the criminal investigations related to this issue that have taken place since the Leveson inquiry was established—as the noble Lord, Lord Blair, referred to —and given the implementation of the recommendations following part 1, including reforms within the police and the press, the Government must now consider whether proceeding with part 2 of the inquiry is appropriate, proportionate and in the public interest. The Government are therefore seeking the views of the public and interested parties, including those who have been the victims of press abuse, through the public consultation that commenced on 1 November. The consultation seeks views on whether proceeding with part 2 of the Leveson inquiry is still appropriate, proportionate and in the public interest. As the last of the relevant criminal cases has recently concluded, the Government believe that it is now time to take stock and seek views on the various options. Submissions received from this consultation will consequently help to inform the Government’s thinking. The consultation closes on 10 January. Given the ongoing consultation, I respectfully suggest to the noble Baroness that this is not an appropriate matter for further legislation.
The Government will reach a view on the way forward having regard to the views expressed in response to the consultation. If we conclude that the inquiry should go ahead in its current or a modified form, the Inquiries Act already provides the mechanism for this, so again this amendment is unnecessary.
Noble Lords will also want to take into consideration the fact that part 1 of the Leveson inquiry cost £5.4 million. We can expect part 2 of the inquiry, should it go ahead with its current terms of reference, to cost a similar amount, so this amendment has very real financial implications, as my noble friend Lord Hailsham said.
My noble friend Lord Deben talked about three issues—the promise, the necessity, and the power of the press and its closeness to the constabulary. In terms of the promise, the Government delivered the cross-party agreement by establishing the Press Recognition Panel by royal charter, and legislating for the incentives in the Crime and Courts Act 2013. The time is now right to consult further on these specific areas of part 2 of the inquiry and Section 40, given the time that has elapsed since the Leveson inquiry was set up and the changes that have taken place. It would not be fair to the victims of press intrusion to take a decision based on facts and a situation from five years ago without reflecting on the position today, to make sure that we get the right result and that there are the right protections. We will need to see what comes out of the consultation, as I have said, but ultimately, it is for the Government to take decisions on both matters.
Parliament will clearly need to be involved if the proposed way forward were to repeal Section 40, but we need to wait and see the responses to the consultation. On part 2 of the inquiry, we will of course consult the chair of the inquiry, Sir Brian Leveson, before any decision is made on the future of the process.
In conclusion—
Lord Clinton-Davis
Will the Minister indicate how long she envisages the inquiry will take and how many witnesses will come forward?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
The consultation finishes on 10 January. In terms of anything going forward, we will of course be informed and guided by the consultation and I would not at this point wish to put a timescale on the inquiry.
Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve
I thank the Minister for her reply. She suggests that we have yet to consider whether it is appropriate, proportionate or in the public interest to proceed with this amendment and that we should await the outcome of the consultation. That outcome is nicely timed to be rather too late for this legislation, where the proposed new clause fits very well. It has nothing to do with the commencement of Section 40 of the other legislation, so that one we can set aside. But this one is really a matter of honour for the Government. These were commitments made in public and there were real and identifiable victims, and while of course cost is an issue and the Government would perhaps wish to think about how to contain them, surely it is useful that some of the criminal cases that have been tried have actually done the work of finding out what happened in certain cases. The cost issue is not the same as it might have seemed in advance because some of that has already been sorted. I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, the Government are committed to ensuring that those working for the police have the confidence to come forward to report concerns of malpractice and misconduct within the service. Clause 27 inserts new Part 2B and new Schedule 3A into the Police Reform Act 2002. This will provide the Independent Police Complaints Commission with a new power to carry out independent whistleblowing investigations. It gives police officers and staff a new route to raise their concerns directly with the IPCC. As a result, it will give police officers and staff a greater level of assurance around discretion and objectivity by strengthening the protections for whistleblowers, including anonymity.
Amendments 49 and 50 respond to points raised in Committee by the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Kennedy. The amendments will provide greater clarity about when a whistleblowing investigation can be considered by the IPCC. The amendments modify the definition of a whistleblower in two ways. The first modification is to enable whistleblowers to raise concerns about matters which occurred before they joined the police. The second modification will remove the need for the IPCC to consider whether to start a new whistleblowing investigation where it is already conducting an investigation under Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002, or where there is an ongoing whistleblowing investigation.
There will also be no requirement for the IPCC to consider whether to open a new investigation when the concern raised is already being dealt with as a super-complaint. These modifications will provide further clarity on the definition of a whistleblower, ensuring that the new Part 2B provisions will not interfere with the progress of these existing investigations. This will also support the IPCC to effectively implement its duties under the new provisions.
Amendments 51, 55, 63, 64 and 69 are technical amendments to ensure that, as with concerns which involve conduct matters, where the IPCC identifies a concern as relating to a “death or serious injury” matter as defined in Part 2 of the 2002 Act, the matter must be handled under that part. In such circumstances, the whistleblower’s identity will continue to be protected by modifications to Schedule 3 to the 2002 Act specified in regulations. I beg to move.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister and to the Government for listening to the concerns we raised around whistleblowing in Committee. We certainly support the government amendments in this group.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, there was a very useful debate in Committee on whistleblowing. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and I raised a number of issues; we are very grateful that the Government have listened and tabled these amendments and we are very supportive of them.
“(3A) For the purposes of this Part, a person is a “whistle-blower” if—(a) the person is, or was at any time, under the direction and control of a chief officer of police,(b) the person raises a concern that is about a police force or a person serving with the police,(c) the matter to which the concern relates is not—(i) about the conditions of service of persons serving with the police, or(ii) a matter that is, or could be, the subject of a complaint by the person under Part 2, and (d) at the time the Commission first becomes aware of the concern, the matter to which it relates is not—(i) under investigation under the direction of the Commission in accordance with paragraph 18 of Schedule 3,(ii) under investigation by the Commission in accordance with paragraph 19 of that Schedule,(iii) being dealt with as a complaint under section 29A under regulations under section 29C (regulations about super-complaints), or(iv) under investigation under this Part.”
“29FA Special provision for “DSI matters”(1) Before deciding whether to carry out an investigation under section 29D(2), the Commission must consider whether the concern is about a death or serious injury matter (“a DSI matter”) for the purposes of Part 2 (see section 12(2A)).(2) If the Commission determines that the concern is about a DSI matter for the purposes of Part 2—(a) it may not carry out an investigation under section 29D(2), and(b) it must notify the appropriate authority in relation to the DSI matter.(3) Where the appropriate authority in relation to the DSI matter is notified under subsection (2), it must record the matter under paragraph 14A of Schedule 3 to this Act as a DSI matter.(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision modifying Schedule 3 in relation to a DSI matter that, in accordance with subsection (3), is recorded under paragraph 14A of that Schedule but only for the purpose of making provision for the protection of the anonymity of whistle-blowers.(5) In this section, references to the appropriate authority in relation to a DSI matter have the same meaning as in Part 2 (see section 29).”
“Procedure where DSI matter is revealed during investigation
4A_(1) If, during the course of an investigation under section 29D(2), it appears to the person in charge that the matter may be a DSI matter, the person must make a submission to that effect to the Commission._(2) If, after considering the submission, the Commission determines the matter is a DSI matter, it must—(a) notify the appropriate authority in relation to the DSI matter, and(b) send to it a copy of the submission under sub-paragraph (1). _(3) Where the appropriate authority in relation to the DSI matter is notified under sub-paragraph (2), it must record the matter under paragraph 14A of Schedule 3 to this Act as a DSI matter._(4) Where a matter is, in accordance with sub-paragraph (3), recorded under paragraph 14A of Schedule 3 as a DSI matter—(a) the person in charge of the investigation under section 29D(2) must (subject to any determination made by the Commission under paragraph 15(5B) of Schedule 3) continue the investigation as if appointed or designated to investigate the DSI matter, and(b) the other provisions of Schedule 3 apply in relation to that matter accordingly (subject to regulations under sub-paragraph (5))._(5) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision modifying Schedule 3 in relation to an investigation that, in accordance with sub-paragraph (3), is recorded under paragraph 14A of that Schedule as a DSI matter but only for the purpose of making provision for the protection of the anonymity of whistle-blowers._(6) In this paragraph, references to the appropriate authority in relation to a DSI matter have the same meaning as in Part 2 (see section 29).”
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, I hope that this, too, will be good news for your Lordships. This Government’s policing reforms have strengthened the role of the Independent Police Complaints Commission to ensure that it can fulfil its crucial function as a strong police watchdog. The Bill will further enhance the IPCC’s powers and independence. It is important that the organisation can carry out its enhanced role efficiently and effectively and the Bill therefore also provides for the reform of the IPCC’s corporate structure and for it to be renamed the Office for Police Conduct.
In Committee the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, tabled an amendment to include “Independent” in the new name. A number of noble Lords spoke in support of that amendment, highlighting the value of the word in securing public confidence that the organisation is not part of the police. My noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford agreed to reflect on the points that noble Lords made so well in the debate.
The Government remain of the view that the reformed IPCC needs to command public trust, and demonstrate its impartiality and independence, through the quality of its work. The IPCC is independent, and the reformed organisation will continue to be independent. However, the Government also recognise the argument that although the legislation provides for the organisation’s independence from the police, it is important to signal this in its title as well. These amendments therefore provide for “Independent” to be included in the reformed IPCC’s new name, with the effect that it will be called the Independent Office for Police Conduct. I beg to move.
Lord Bach (Lab)
My Lords, the Government, particularly the Ministers, deserve real congratulation on making this amendment. I think all Members of the House, wherever they sit, will be really pleased that this has happened. It will certainly, in a small way, make my life as a police and crime commissioner easier. Having “Independent” in the name of the new body will make it easier to explain how the complaints system works. I congratulate the Government and I am very happy to support the amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
I, too, thank the Government and the Minister for listening. A number of Members, including noble Lords who had been senior police officers, made the point about how important this is to enable police officers to do their job. I am very pleased that the Government have listened.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, Amendment 59 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I, too, thank the Government for the change that they have made regarding the word “Independent”. This amendment tries to ensure that that is not simply a cosmetic change and that the new body will be even more independent.
The amendment would change the current position where a member of the Independent Police Complaints Commission cannot be someone who holds or who has held office as a constable in any part of the United Kingdom or someone who has worked under the direction or control of a chief officer or equivalent office in Scotland or Northern Ireland. The current legislation specifically excludes anyone making decisions on casework or investigations, for obvious reasons. The public are not reassured about the independence of the police complaints investigation body if those making such decisions are either former police officers or those who have worked for the police.
The amendment would prevent other members of the new body being serving or former police officers or those who formerly worked for the police. In Committee the Minister said:
“We do not think that there should be statutory restrictions on those who are members of the office—in effect, the board of the reformed organisation. The core functions of the office are set out clearly in the Bill and include ensuring the good governance and financial management of the organisation. These functions are quite distinct from the functions of the director-general. The director-general, as the single executive head, will be solely accountable for all casework and investigation decisions, not the board. It is not right that a suitably qualified individual could not be appointed to a corporate governance role as a member of the board simply because he or she once worked as a police civilian, perhaps for just a short period many years previously”.—[Official Report, 26/10/16; col. 258.]
There is very little trust or confidence in the IPCC among many who bring complaints against the police and many others, including me, because we do not believe it is independent enough. How will having members of the board of the new body—the rebranded body—who are former employees of the police service improve that trust and confidence? It certainly does not do it for me. Although the Minister says that the director-general will be solely accountable for all casework and investigation decisions, in practice he will not be making all those decisions—unless he works 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Even if the board members are there to ensure good governance and financial management, their decisions could be crucial to the effective investigation of serious complaints by deciding the way the rebranded organisation operates, its structure and so forth, and the way resources are apportioned.
The Government keep saying how important it is to bring people with different skills and experience into the police service. If the police service is in such desperate need of new blood, because the Government believe it does not have enough talent of its own, why are the Government so keen for those from the police service to be part of the new body that will be investigating the most serious complaints against the police? Barring those previously employed by the police service from holding crucial positions within the rebranded Office for Police Conduct—with or without “Independent” stuck on the front of it—would be a small price to pay for providing reassurance that it is truly independent. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the Independent Office for Police Conduct will have a vital role in securing and maintaining public confidence in the reformed police complaints system. That is why the Bill provides for an absolute bar on the new single executive head of the organisation—the director-general —ever having worked for the police. The Government do not believe it is appropriate for the Bill to impose further statutory restrictions on membership of the office beyond the post of director-general.
The corporate structure of the IOPC is radically different from the existing commission model. The new board—the office—will have a majority of independent non-executive members, and its functions are set out clearly in the Bill. These include ensuring good corporate governance and financial management. Importantly, the board’s functions do not include responsibility for investigations and casework decisions, for which the director-general alone will be accountable. This is in contrast to the current position, where commissioners undertake such investigative functions.
If a highly suitable individual applies for a non-executive role, perhaps as a finance expert, it would be wrong to reject them automatically simply because many years previously they worked for a short period as a police civilian, perhaps in a relatively junior role. To ensure that the organisation can deliver high-quality and timely investigations—the predominant driver of confidence—the director-general will wish to ensure that the organisation has a diverse mix of people. As part of this, the director-general may wish to employ a number of people who have valuable policing experience, as the IPCC does now.
Under the new model, investigations and casework decisions will be undertaken by employees, all of whom will be working in a single line management chain reporting to the director-general. The Government fully expect the director-general to decide that certain employee roles, including some senior operational and public-facing positions, should not be filled by those with a police background, but those decisions should be a matter for the director-general.
We recognise that confidence is also driven by the perception of the organisation as impartial and independent from the police. That is why the Bill provides the director-general with an explicit power to determine the functions and roles that are not open to former police officers. This means that the director- general can go further than the current legislation, which requires only that a minimum of six people cannot have worked for the police—namely, the chair and a minimum of five other members of the commission. The Bill also strengthens existing arrangements in relation to transparency by setting out a requirement on the director-general to publish a statement of policy on the exercise of these particular powers of recruitment.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her explanation. I of course acknowledge the Government’s intention in drafting the legislation as they have. If we were starting with a completely new body with no previous track record, I would be more willing to agree with the Minister. However, this is all about public confidence and perception, and the fact is that under the previous legislation the Independent Police Complaints Commission had six commissioners, all of whom were barred by law from having been employed by the police or having held the office of constable, and now there will be only one. In theory, the rest of the new body could be formed of previous police officers. Now, I understand that that is not likely, but there is the potential for those critics of the police complaints system to point out that there has been a reduction in the number of people statutorily barred from serving on the new body—it has gone down to one.
I accept that there is an explicit power for the director-general to designate certain posts that should not be open to former police officers, but, as I say, this is all about perception. While we are grateful that “Independent” has been shunted on to the front of the description of the new body, we feel that this change—reducing the number of people who are barred statutorily from holding positions in the body—will undermine public confidence in that independence. However, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“44A(1) Section 29FA (special provision for “DSI matters”) (as inserted by this Act) is amended as follows.(2) For “Commission”, in each place, substitute “director-general”.(3) In subsection (2), for “it”, in both places, substitute “the director-general”.”
“( ) In paragraph 4A(1)—(a) for “it appears to the person in charge” substitute “the director-general determines”;(b) for “the person must make a submission to that effect to the Commission” substitute “the director-general must proceed under sub-paragraph (2)”.( ) For paragraph 4A(2) substitute—“( ) The director-general must—(a) prepare a record of the determination,(b) notify the appropriate authority in relation to the DSI matter, and (c) send to it a copy of the determination prepared under paragraph (a).””
Baroness Jolly
“Forces maintained otherwise than by local policing bodies
After section 26(3)(b) of the Police Reform Act 2002 (forces maintained otherwise than by local policing bodies) insert—“(c) the Royal Military Police;(d) the Royal Air Force Police; and(e) the Royal Navy Police.””
Baroness Jolly (LD)
My Lords, the purpose of this amendment is to enable service men and women to make complaints about their service police to the IPCC rather than to the service police—the Royal Military Police, the Royal Air Force Police or the Royal Navy Police. I submitted this amendment after a really interesting and valuable meeting that I had with the Minister and her officials, which helped my thinking and allows me to ask for clarification about the service police and the IPCC. I am grateful to her for her time.
The Minister and I discussed the issues of the competence, culture and trust of or in the service police and the capacity of the IPCC to take over some of its functions. I remind noble Lords that Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary—HMIC—recommended that oversight of the Royal Military Police, the Royal Air Force Police and the Royal Navy Police should be brought within the competence of the IPCC. I understand that, at the moment, the IPCC is undergoing some change and is not able or willing to look at meeting the amendment’s desired outcome in the immediate future. I also understand that the service police are aware of their shortcomings and are working to address them.
Can the Minister give some indication of the Government’s current thinking about the future, and about which milestones might indicate progress? If there are any recent pronouncements from the MoD on this issue, that would also be helpful. Our service men and women deserve a process for complaints against their service police that is modern, run professionally, fit for purpose and future-proofed. I hope that the Minister can help, and I beg to move.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, I would like to reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, that the Government and the service police are fully supportive of the need for independent oversight of the service police. There is already statutory independent oversight of the complaints made against the service police, where those complaints are made through the service complaints process. That process is overseen by the independent Service Complaints Ombudsman and is available to all serving personnel. Veterans and other civilians are not able to use that process and rely solely on the service police complaints procedures, which do not currently have independent oversight. However, I should mention that, since the recommendation in Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary’s 2014 report, the service police forces have adopted a tri-service investigations protocol, which supplements their existing complaints procedure and provides for another force to investigate certain complaints where there could be a conflict of interest or allegations of criminal activity.
There is clearly further work to do on a mechanism for introducing independent oversight into complaints made against the service police. There are a number of options for doing this, including oversight by an existing body or setting up a separate new body to provide it, but a number of logistical and jurisdictional issues need to be addressed. For example, incidents requiring investigation might arise in any part of the UK or indeed anywhere in the world, including dangerous operational theatres, and clearly we would want our oversight arrangements to cater for those occasions.
The Government are therefore considering interim arrangements that will introduce independent oversight of complaints against the service police from veterans and non-service personnel, this being the gap which currently exists. We expect to be able to announce further information about this shortly. The Government remain committed to implementing a single mechanism that will provide for the independent oversight of all complaints against the service police. This aspiration is shared by each of the service police provost marshals, and we intend to update the House on progress in the first half of next year.
On a broader note, I should mention that each of the service police forces has done much in recent years to forge a culture within its organisation that aims to promote faith in its integrity and professionalism within the Armed Forces, military community and beyond. They have each implemented codes of conduct that highlight the expectations placed upon service police personnel both on and off duty. These are akin to those produced by the College of Policing and support the single service’s values and standards and leadership codes, which apply to all service personnel. In addition, all members of the service police are now required to swear an oath which declares that they will always act with fairness, integrity, diligence and impartiality. The Government are determined to ensure that, in both the short term and the long term, there can be independent scrutiny of any instances where those values are called into question. On this basis, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Jolly
My Lords, I thank the Minister for the clarification and for the meeting. I look forward to recommendations coming out very soon, as she said. In the meantime, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(iv) any other person who is, by virtue of any enactment, carrying out any of the activities of a police force,”
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, Amendment 106, which is tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Rosser, would delete the provision that would allow police civilian staff and volunteers to use CS spray or PAVA spray. We had an interesting, if somewhat confusing, debate on this subject in Committee. I think this is a step too far and that the public will be rightly concerned about who is authorised to use these incapacitating sprays.
PCSOs have specific duties and have performed them very well. I pay tribute to them and the work they do. This provision enables civilian staff and volunteers to be designated as PCSOs to use these weapons, which can kill and have unfortunately done so. Equipping volunteers and staff with such weapons, giving them some limited training and authorising them to use those weapons against members of the public is a huge leap and one we need to be very careful about. I do not believe that the Government have made a convincing case about why it is necessary to take this route.
We have heard very little in these debates about special constables, who have the powers of police officers and undertake extensive training. Surely greater recruitment and use of special constables would be a better option if the Government want more officers on the street supporting the full-time police service. I will listen carefully to the debate and, in particular, to the response from the Minister. I beg to move.
Viscount Hailsham
I propose to be brief. This amendment, as has been very fairly pointed out by the noble Lord, removes the substance of new subsection (9B) of the Firearms Act. It is therefore relevant to look at the new subsection to see the extent to which it is acceptable. I am content with one bit of it, welcome another bit of it and remain very concerned about a third bit of it, and I shall deal with each rather briefly.
Lord Hope of Craighead
Before the noble Viscount sits down, can he be a bit more specific about what he has in mind as a self-defence device? If you have a weapon which is capable of inflicting injury, it all depends on the mind of the user. I understand the point he is making, but I am not quite sure that one could have such a category.
Viscount Hailsham
I think one can. I think a Taser is a self-defence device. I know there is a dispute about that and that many take the view that it is unduly dangerous, but I take the view that it is self-defence. I take the view that pepper spray and things of that kind are self-defence. I take the view that a revolver is not. It is that sort of distinction.
Lord Blair of Boughton
My Lords, I am sorry that I missed the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, opening this discussion, but I was somewhere else and I came here as soon as I could. My concern over this is with the concept of volunteers. As the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, says, there is a range of defensive systems here, including the truncheon itself, but I am concerned about giving volunteers Tasers. If you give a volunteer a Taser, all the volunteer has to do once it has gone off is to say that they do not want to be a volunteer anymore and disappear into the distance. Then you have nothing unless you have a criminal inquiry into what happened. My sense is that this set of clauses needs a lot more specificity.
My view is that the police could bring in some designated persons as firearms officers: they could recruit people from the Army and deploy them only to be firearms officers, which would be a logical and a budget-saving thing to do. The idea that we have to have fully trained constables standing outside embassies has always struck me as odd when we could recruit them much more cheaply. But with all those cases, you have a financial arrangement between the chief constable and that person, and they can therefore be disciplined and so on. Obviously if you shoot somebody, you have a criminal inquiry, but that is not the point here. We need to take this piece of the Bill and look at it again, to make sure we have the different types of defensive and offensive weapons, and the people who can use them, categorised. At the moment it feels that we will be opening a door we might find very difficult to close subsequently.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I start by agreeing wholeheartedly with the noble Lord, Lord Blair, that this seems too broad in what it could allow. As the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, says, it could result in volunteers being equipped with revolvers. I also have the same concerns that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, has about a self-defence weapon being used in an aggressive as opposed to a defensive way.
We support the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark. My noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendment 107 in the group, which says that Clause 38 should not stand part of the Bill and seeks to achieve the same end as Amendment 106, which is to prevent police community support officer volunteers from being provided with CS spray or any other firearm that the Secretary of State might authorise by regulation in the future. My understanding, contrary to that of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, is that special constables can be equipped with CS spray at the moment, and will continue to be, so I do not think that the changes in the Bill will have the effect he suggests.
The only remarks that I would add to those already made by noble Lords are that police volunteers carry out excellent work and are a valuable addition to the police family. However, with reservations already being expressed about whether paid police community support officers should be using force, and in the absence of any paid PCSO having been authorised to use CS spray by any chief constable anywhere in the United Kingdom—if I remember the debate in Committee correctly—changing the law to allow chief constables to give CS spray to volunteer PCSOs seems both unnecessary and unreasonable.
Secondly, as alluded to by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, if chief constables need additional volunteers who can exercise the use of force, including with CS spray, because they do not have the resources any more to pay full-time police officers, whatever the rights and wrongs of that, there is a route open to them, which is to recruit more special constables, who have all the powers of a regular police officer and who are paid only expenses. We on these Benches will support the Labour amendment on this issue.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, these amendments return us to an issue that was debated at length in both the other place and in Committee in this House, namely whether it is ever right for designated members of police staff, or the new category of designated volunteers, to carry CS or PAVA sprays for defensive purposes—I stress the point that this is for defensive purposes.
I should point out to the House that, although most of our debates have been about whether it is right for volunteers to carry defensive sprays, Amendment 106 as drafted would also prevent chief officers equipping their existing paid staff, such as PCSOs, with such sprays. I assume this is not intention of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, but it would be helpful if he could clarify this when winding up.
When we debated this issue in Committee, a number of noble Lords expressed the view that the use of force is somehow incompatible with the PCSO role, and even more so for volunteers. For example, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said that the appropriate route for an individual who wishes,
“to volunteer to get involved in the use of force in the exercise of police powers”,
is,
“to become a special constable”.—[Official Report, 26/10/16; col. 267.]
I think he said that again today. However, it is important to put on record that, given the long-standing tradition of policing by consent, I would hope that no one who wishes to help with the policing of their community, as a police officer or a member of staff, whether paid or as a volunteer, does so with a view to using force against their fellow citizens. There are of course myriad roles which police officers, staff and volunteers perform regularly that do not involve the use of force.
Indeed, as we have discussed, the primary role of a PCSO across England and Wales is to engage with members of the public and to carry out low-level interventions such as dealing with anti-social behaviour. However, as was discussed in the House of Commons earlier this month, it is a sad fact of life that both police officers and PCSOs are assaulted and injured on duty. For example, in 2015-16, 270 assaults were reported by PCSOs in England and Wales, and those figures do not include the British Transport Police. It should be noted that this figure includes only assaults that officers report to their health and safety or human resource teams. In some cases, officers will choose not to report cases, as it is usually not compulsory to do so. Therefore, in reality, this figure is likely to be much higher.
We must therefore ensure that chief police officers are able to use their operational experience to make judgments as to the necessary level of defensive equipment and self-defence training that they make available to their officers and PCSOs. The only other option for chief police officers would be to withdraw their PCSOs from areas where there was a threat to their safety, potentially making disorder more likely if members of the community were unable to engage with a familiar face in uniform.
The situation is in essence no different from that of special constables, who are themselves volunteers. They have all the powers of a police officer, and a significant number are trained in the use of defensive sprays. I also point out that a small proportion of specials are trained in the use of public order tactics, so the use of force by appropriately trained police volunteers is not a new idea.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has tabled Amendment 107, which would remove Clause 38 from the Bill. The change to Section 54 of the Firearms Act 1968 made by Clause 38(2) is consequential on the provisions in Clause 37 enabling designated volunteers to be given access to defensive sprays. It therefore follows that if Amendment 106 were agreed to, Clause 38(2) would be unnecessary. However, Clause 38(3) deals with a separate point, making it explicit that special constables are members of a police force for the purposes of the Firearms Act 1968 and therefore do not require a certificate or authorisation under the 1968 Act when equipped with a defensive spray. Accordingly, the amendment goes wider than I believe the noble Lord intends.
A question was asked about the most appropriate route for an individual who wishes to perform front-line policing to join the specials. I think I have already addressed that point but I add that there might be reasons why an individual who wants to volunteer to help to make his or her community safer chooses not to join the specials. These reforms will enable those who wish to help to keep their communities safe to do so even where they are unable to meet the requirements for being a special—the time commitment, for example, or they may be in an occupation where they are prevented from being a special, such as being a Border Force officer, but still have skills or experience that could be of value.
My noble friend Lord Hailsham asked about the order-making power in Clause 37(6) enabling the Home Secretary to make regulations that would allow police staff and volunteers to use a firearm. The power is primarily intended as a form of future-proofing. Should, for example, a new form of defensive spray that uses substances other than CS come on to the market—
Viscount Hailsham
I do not want to press my noble friend too hard on this as she may want to indulge in correspondence on the matter. However, the Explanatory Notes state, with reference to sub-paragraphs (b) and (c):
“This enables the issue of appropriate self-defence devices in future, once such a device has been tested and authorised”.
What is there in the Bill that confines the weapon to be authorised to a self-defensive device? It is open-ended, so it includes offensive weapons.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My noble friend is right that it would theoretically be possible to use the power to enable a firearm in that way. However, the power is subject to the affirmative procedure, as he has said, so it would require the unlikely agreement of the Home Secretary, both Houses of Parliament and at least one chief constable to decide that a staff member or volunteer should be given a gun. I leave it to my noble friend, with his vast experience, to judge whether that would be likely to happen. I take the point that he was making but I want to point out the hoops that would have to be jumped through for that to be achieved.
The noble Lord, Lord Blair, talked about the order-making power for defensive weapons. There is no such thing in the Firearms Act as a “defensive weapon”. It is not the nature of the weapon that is important but how it is used; a baton or a truncheon could be used offensively while a pistol could be used defensively. The consultation was clear that only police officers should use pistols or Tasers, and we think the Bill delivers that.
I shall finish with a quote from Chief Constable David Jones, the national policing lead for Citizens in Policing. He says:
“This is a very positive development … The proposals will open up new opportunities for people to use statutory powers who would like to be part of the volunteering police family but who are unable to commit to the rigorous and intensive selection and training requirements associated with the special constabulary. The proposals will empower Chief Constables to have a much more flexible resource platform … Chief Officers are best positioned to decide how to police their local area most effectively through the empowerment of their workforce, through their understanding and knowledge of the needs of their local communities”.
As I have said at previous stages of the Bill, no chief officer has yet made a decision to designate their staff with the power to carry and use a defensive spray. However, we believe that if a chief officer, using their professional judgment and experience, were to reach the view that it was necessary to issue such sprays to their PCSOs, after they have been well-trained in their use, they should be able to do so irrespective of whether those PCSOs are employees of the force or volunteers. On that basis, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, to withdraw his amendment and perhaps to address the question that I first put to him.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. A number of points have been raised. I say to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, that my concern all along has been the placing of these weapons in the hands of people without sufficient training.
I agree very much with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Blair. We have to be very careful about the extension of these powers. As we have heard, so far no chief constable has empowered their present PCSOs to have these powers. The power is there already for PCSOs to be designated but no one has decided to do that yet.
The Government have not made a convincing case for the further extension of these powers. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, this is a broad power that we are now taking on board. I concur with his remarks about the fantastic contribution made by volunteers to the police service.
In response to the Minister, Clause 37 grants the extension of powers to police civilian staff and police volunteers. This extension is to those other staff who are not PCSOs but are volunteers or other designated staff. I do not see why, if they have not yet been tested on designated PCSOs, they should be extended at this stage. On that basis, I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, the amendment in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee asks that Clause 46 not stand part of the Bill. Clause 46 gives power to the Secretary of State to make regulations that specify the ranks that may be held by police officers other than chief officers of police.
We have been here before—in 1993—with the Sheehy review into police responsibilities and rewards. Among other recommendations of that review was the abolition of the ranks of chief inspector and chief superintendent. After an expensive process of offering chief inspectors early retirement, that decision was reversed, leaving the police service with a deficit of suitably qualified and experienced chief inspectors. One consequence was that overnight—or, perhaps I should say, over the weekend—I went from being a uniformed chief inspector with no experience as a detective to being a detective chief inspector in charge of CID at Notting Hill.
Another recommendation of that report was to abolish the rank of chief superintendent. Instead, in the Metropolitan Police, we had grade 1 and grade 2 superintendents, one in charge and the other a deputy. They were both called “superintendent”, they both wore the same badge of rank, but one was more senior than the other. Such nonsense did not last long, and the rank of chief superintendent was subsequently reinstated. More recently, some police forces have decided significantly to reduce or not appoint officers to particular ranks, as suits the local circumstances of each force.
History has shown us, and present practice continues to demonstrate, that we do not need the Secretary of State to designate which ranks may be held by members of police forces; it is far better to allow chief constables to decide for themselves which ranks they need and which they do not. By all means let the Secretary of State or the College of Policing issue guidance to chief officers as to factors they should take into account when deciding which ranks to have. But, please, let us not make the same, very expensive—in terms of both money and loss of experience—mistake again. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, policing needs a greater say in how it structures its own organisations. It was the College of Policing’s leadership review that initially recommended a review of rank structure. It recognised that the rank structure as set out in the Police Act 1996 and the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 was not serving the needs of all forces. To support this police-led reform, Clause 46 will give the college the power to recommend regulations setting out what the rank structure should be. Chief Constable Francis Habgood, who is leading the review of the rank structure, is working with the National Police Chiefs’ Council to develop proposals that will work across all forces.
Having some commonality across forces is essential. The public have the right to expect the same high standards of service from every force and there needs to be clarity for the public around the exercise of significant police powers that can impact on civil liberties. Indeed, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and other legislation, expressly requires certain decisions to be taken by an officer of a specified minimum rank, very often an inspector or superintendent. I note that the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, on pre-charge anonymity specified that an application to a court to waive anonymity has to be made by an officer of at least the rank of inspector. Such key protections for the citizen cannot operate meaningfully without a national rank structure. Furthermore, the Government are committed to a national pay framework for police officers, where again there must be consistency across forces. A consistent rank structure also makes interforce collaboration easier, which is a critical consideration given the many complex challenges facing modern policing that require forces to work together.
This is not to say that every force must have officers of every rank. The Metropolitan Police has, for example, recently announced that it is to do away with the rank of chief inspector and it is open to other forces to follow suit. As I said in Committee, the Government make no presumption about the rank structure that may be proposed by the College of Policing in future. I believe that we should let the work of Chief Constable Francis Habgood continue and not constrain police leaders in how forces should be organised. Parliament will have the opportunity to examine the proposals for changes to the rank structure once the College of Policing has made its recommendations, as these will need to be set out in regulations which will be subject to the affirmative procedure.
I agree that decisions are best taken locally wherever possible, but there are circumstances where we need a clear national framework. This is one such case, albeit one where the reforms provided for in Clause 46 will afford chief officers a measure of local flexibility. With those words, I hope that the noble Lord feels content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that explanation which, unless I have got completely the wrong end of the stick, seems to me to be completely contradictory. The noble Baroness says that there needs to be commonality across police forces, yet then gives the example of how the Metropolitan police service is not going to appoint anybody to the rank of chief inspector.
The noble Baroness says that it is necessary to have a clear national framework—we have a clear national framework in existing legislation, which specifies the ranks. So I really do not see why we need the Secretary of State to be given the power to make regulations about what ranks there should and should not be. For example, were the Secretary of State, by regulation, to say that there must be officers of the rank of chief inspector, where would that leave the Metropolitan Police if it has decided not to have any chief inspectors, as it apparently has?
The noble Baroness also talked about how it was important for the public for there to be commonality across all forces. If the Commissioner of the Met can decide not to appoint somebody to a rank that the Home Secretary has, in regulations, said that there should be, there will not be commonality across the country. I accept what the noble Baroness says in terms of the need for a national structure—which currently exists. What does not need to be done is for that system to be changed; what is needed is for chief constables to be given guidance as to which ranks they need, which will vary from force to force. The Metropolitan Police, in its chief officer ranks, for example, has a completely different rank structure to other forces. Yet, the Government do not seem to want to change that. Commanders do not exist anywhere other than in the Metropolitan Police and the City of London Police. Deputy assistant commissioners do not exist in any other force. So there is not commonality now and there is no move by the Government to enforce commonality across the country when it comes to chief officer ranks.
I find the Minister’s explanation incomprehensible. However, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Stedman-Scott) (Con)
My Lords, if Amendments 108A or 108B are agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 109 by reason of pre-emption.
Clause 61: Limit on period of bail under section 30A
Amendment 108A
Baroness Harris of Richmond (LD)
My Lords, before I move my amendments, some of which are also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blair, I remind your Lordships of my policing interests, which are addressed in the register. Through these amendments —108A, 108B, 109, 112A, 112B, 113, 113A, 113B and 114—which all address the same issue, I seek to encourage the Government to accept the arguments put forward in Committee to extend the time limit for the duration of bail from 28 days to not exceeding 56 days.
The Police Superintendents’ Association of England and Wales, through its vice-president, Chief Super- intendent Paul Griffiths, has persuaded me that its professional opinion and that of the College of Policing and, without doubt, the academic work undertaken by professors Hucklesby and Zander, ought properly to be taken into account in this matter. Notwithstanding the helpful, but discouraging, letter from the Minister, for which I thank her, I believe that their concerns are rather more convincing than those of a senior civil servant in her department, however well intentioned.
Lord Blair of Boughton
My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group from the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond—including the one that she did not put forward. My name is attached to some of them but they came in quite a hurry in the last 24 hours and I think I missed some of them as they went through. I am sure that neither the noble Baroness nor I will press an amendment at this stage of the evening. However, I hope that I may be able to persuade the Minister to table an amendment at Third Reading.
I accept that the use of police bail has hitherto been seriously underregulated. I further accept that it has been used far too frequently and without the supervision of more senior officers. I agree with the tenor of this set of proposals. I also accept that in a number of cases police bail has been used in a sloppy, unthinking and unfortunate way. However, it is a well-known dictum that hard cases make bad law—and what is being proposed here is simply bad law. The argument put forward by those supporting this proposal is that the number of police bail cases will reduce. I absolutely agree; they will reduce. But police bail will be used in the most difficult cases because, without it, you cannot impose conditions on the suspect you are releasing. There are times when you need to require that the defendant does not approach the alleged victim—including children. There are times when you will want to impose residential or reporting requirements or the surrender of passports. These are the cases in which police bail will be used.
A drop in the overall number of police bail cases will not reduce this number of serious cases. As the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, suggested, these serious cases are the very cases that require, for example, forensic examination or the interrogation of computer databases. This will be done by third parties outside the police service. When all that has been done, these cases will require detailed consultation with the Crown Prosecution Service, which is also outside the police service. These bodies will handle only these sorts of cases, so they will already have a heavy workload to set against limited resources.
These cases will be investigated specifically by experienced detectives, who will deal only with these kinds of cases and will themselves have a high case load, in which each case will have a police bail clock ticking. We are talking about putting a huge amount of pressure on a system without the resources that would be necessary to complete these cases in 28 days. These cases—79% of the total—just will not be completed in 28 days, which will necessitate a return to the police station for a review by a superintendent, which will be a bureaucratic and unnecessary procedure for a suspect and his or her legal advisers. Furthermore, the 28-day limit will set up false hopes for victims—who will be told about it—that their case will be resolved within 28 days. Those hopes will be dashed.
It is fair to say that the noble Baroness and I have scarcely had time to confer over this matter, although I used the same joke in my speech about the fact that some people do not like experts. However, I know from my own correspondence and from a letter I have seen from the Minister to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, which has already been discussed, that the Minister herself knows that all the police professional bodies— the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the Police Superintendents’ Association and the Police Federation—have advised in the strongest terms that the provisions may simply be unworkable. So has the College of Policing, which the Minister praised for its work during the debate on the last amendment. If the College of Policing is saying that this is unworkable, why are we proceeding with it? I just suggest that, if possible, the Minister might listen to this and table a government amendment at Third Reading to raise the provision to 56 days. Even if that does not happen—that is the main thing we want to happen—the idea that the inspector’s police bail can only be 28 days, not 27 or seven, is simply absurd. It is simple: what if the 28th day is Christmas Day? The Government should bring forward that amendment: in the inspector’s bail there should be the same phrase of “up to 28 days”, not “28 days”, as that will cause major mayhem.
My first point is: why not listen to the people who really know how the system will work in serious cases? There are many serious cases where it is simply impossible to persuade the forensic companies and the people who understand the nature of digital records to provide this information in time for 28 days, and for it to have been discussed by the Crown Prosecution Service. This is bad legislation, and I urge that it be reconsidered at Third Reading.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I support what the noble Lord, Lord Blair, and my noble friend have said on this subject. My noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendment 115 in this group; I will not say that it is a compromise, but it is another option.
As my noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond said today and as I raised in Committee, academics, practitioners and the College of Policing all claim that an initial 28-day limit on police bail is impractical, and a government impact assessment, which allegedly takes into account the academic research, says that a 28-day initial limit is workable. I say “allegedly” because, as the noble Lord, Lord Blair, just said, the academic research and the impact assessment come to different conclusions about the workability of an initial 28-day limit. Our amendment effectively suggests that the Government give the new 28-day limit a trial period of two years and then allow Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary to assess whether the new provision is working effectively or not; that is, whether the academics, the practitioners and the College of Policing are right, or the Home Office civil servants are right. Of course, we support much stricter limits on police bail, but they must not impede police effectiveness.
Lord Blair of Boughton
I point out that Amendment 115 would work if it was 56 days as well. In other words, you could have a two-year experiment with 56 days as well as a two-year experiment with 28 days.
Lord Bach
My Lords, I declare my interest as the police and crime commissioner for Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland and say in passing what a pleasure it was to host the Minister in Leicestershire the other day. I know that this matter was briefly raised with her, but neither I nor the chief constable talked about it for long. It was a great pleasure to have her there, and her visit went down very well.
There is a need to reform the present system of pre-charge bail. We all know of cases—of course, none in Leicestershire that I know of—where individuals, to put it mildly, have been carelessly treated by the present system. I personally know of one recent case where the delay has been truly shocking. However, the more the principle is right, the more vital it is that the practical way of putting it into effect is correct too. It is important that the change should work, without causing serious difficulties—the kind of difficulties that both the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, and the noble Lord, Lord Blair, mentioned—and unnecessary disruption for the police.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, we can all understand what the Government are trying to achieve with this set of clauses. There have been a number of instances where police bail has been erroneously applied, extended far too long, and the results have been unfortunate for the individuals concerned. The question is whether the solution that the Government have come forward with will work. Every other speech so far has highlighted some of the problems that would arise. The Government are also in danger of contradicting their own objectives in other areas. We heard a lot from the previous Home Secretary, who is now in a more exalted position, about the work that had been done to reduce the bureaucracy within the police force. However, we can say now with certainty that this measure will deliver more bureaucracy and waste more time.
I understand that at any one time there are about 80,000 cases where people are on police bail. Because of problems within the forensic services and problems with the CPS, most of those will probably take longer than 28 days to resolve. The Government are saying, “We know there are these problems over here”—I will not suggest that the problems in the forensic service are anything to do with the decisions of the Government in the last Parliament, but they may well have had an impact. The issues around the Crown Prosecution Service and its ability to review and make decisions on cases are also well known. Therefore a significant proportion of those 80,000 cases will have to go for review.
The Government have two choices at this point. They can say, “Ah, yes. Those cases which come up for review will not be time-consuming”. If that is the case and it is a box-ticking exercise—“Superintendent, please sign this form” and that is it—it is of no value whatever. The reality has to be that if you put a break in the system at a certain point, it has to be a real break that takes a proper amount of time. A submission has to be prepared for the superintendent; the superintendent must have time to consider it; and, of course, if one is brought in to answer police bail and have it renewed, that also involves time for the witnesses concerned.
Either this provision is a complete red herring and will not do anything—in which case one has to ask why we are doing it, because it will not solve the problem—or it will impose a significant burden. I would have thought that a possible sensible solution would be for the Government to bring forward an amendment not necessarily to change the system but so that after two years there will be a review of how well it is working, and for the intervening two years to be spent trying to resolve the problem of the length of time it takes to get forensic evidence and the length of time it takes for the Crown Prosecution Service to do its job.
I have some examples of cases that have necessarily taken a significant amount of time. I know I am sometimes criticised for being too London-centric, so these are from Cumbria. One example concerns an individual who was arrested for stalking—a serious offence of harassment. This person was arrested on 15 August and bailed until 24 October but then had to be rebailed to 18 November, which, as noble Lords will notice, is a period substantially longer than the 28 days required in the Bill. That was because the individual’s mobile phone and computer had to be examined by the high-tech crime unit. The phone was analysed in that period but the computer sat in a queue because there were even more egregious and serious cases to be dealt with.
That is not uncommon. Indeed, I have three or four more examples from Cumbria Constabulary alone and I am sure that, if I sought them, I could obtain plenty of others. The number of such delays will increase the more there is a reliance on evidence that requires the analysis of a mobile phone or a computer because there are simply not enough resources available to the police to deal with the analysis. There is another example where the bail lasted for 55 days while awaiting the forensic analysis of a breath test. There may be some internal procedural issues relating to when the laboratories deal with samples but, again, it is a practical issue not in the control of the police. Surely, if we are to resolve the general difficulty, we have to address why these delays are occurring—and occurring outside the hands of the police.
I hope the Government will take this issue away and look at it again. I think we all accept that the worst cases need to be resolved and that things need to improve to make sure that people do not hang around on police bail unnecessarily for lengthy periods. At the same time, imposing an arbitrary limit or process which will either be a complete mirage or fiction, or where a substantial input of resources will be required for something that cannot be achieved because the resources are not available in the forensic services or the CPS, is simply ridiculous.
Lord Elystan-Morgan (CB)
My Lords, I whole- heartedly support the amendment. It seems to me that the arguments that have been adduced are utterly overwhelming. The current situation is restrictive, and unnecessarily so. I was greatly impressed by what one might call the testimony of my noble friend Lord Blair, who speaks with an abundance of authority and experience on this matter. It is a nonsense to cling to the present restrictions, which are wholly unjustified. Everything that I saw in the 25 or so years that I served as a judge and a recorder supports that.
Lord Berkeley of Knighton (CB)
My Lords, listening to this debate, I found myself wondering, like the noble Lord, Lord Harris, exactly what the Government were hoping to achieve. To be generous, I imagine that they were trying to assist with the rights of the defendant as well as help the police. I can understand if that was the aim but, from what we have heard, neither of those objectives will be secured in this way. Therefore, I hope that the noble Baroness will be able to give a positive reply and that perhaps the Government will put forward their own amendments, as my noble friend Lord Blair suggested.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, in moving Amendment 108A, has made a compelling case. No one wants anybody to be on pre-charge bail any longer than is absolutely necessary. Her amendments seek to take account of the realities on the ground in local police forces, and the Government should accept them and the flexibility that they offer to police forces. She gave detailed figures to support her argument, and my noble friends Lord Bach and Lord Harris of Haringey spoke about the realities on the ground and the risk of a significant burden on police forces.
We should of course set the number of days that an individual can be on pre-charge bail before the matter is reconsidered at a maximum that is necessary, reasonable and proportionate. There should not be a target date, which in the majority of cases will not be met. The noble Baroness suggests in her Amendment 109 that 56 rather than 28 days is a more realistic target to work towards. There appears to be little to be gained from bringing people back only to be rebailed because the inquiries have not been completed—often, as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Blair, and my noble friend Lord Harris, because other agencies have not completed their work on behalf of the police within 28 days.
Amendment 115, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, would place a duty on the Secretary of State to commission, two years after the passing of this Bill, a report on the impact of the 28 days. That strikes me as a very wise thing to do and I hope that the Government will accept it. We want to ensure that Parliament and Government are informed with proper data before coming to a decision.
Amendment 116 in this group, which has not yet been referred to, is in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford. It responds to the case made by the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, who is not in his place at the moment. The Government listened to that case and I welcome the fact that they have put forward an amendment today.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I hope that what I say will assuage some of the concerns expressed by noble Lords—through Amendments 109, 113 and 114—about the proposed 28-day period of bail being too short.
In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, pointed to research conducted by Professor Hucklesby and Professor Zander to justify extending the initial period of pre-charge bail from 28 to 56 days. I point out from the outset that, as part of our reforms, there is a presumption that a suspect who has been arrested will be released without bail—that is, there is a presumption against bail. As the noble Lord, Lord Blair, rightly said, even though he does not agree with the Government’s position, bail has been overused and not used correctly. Over time, there has been a sloppy use of bail, if I may paraphrase what he said. Therefore, in a sense, we start from that position.
In reaching our view, we took full account of the research findings referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. As I said in Committee, the 28-day period set out in the Bill was not arrived at by chance; we carefully considered the initial period of bail, taking into account the research in drawing up our proposals. We acknowledge that the research concludes that many cases will not be dealt with within 28 days. That is why the system allows for extensions in such cases, but only where such extensions can be justified. We consider that the involvement of superintendents at this stage would enable them to review the cases under investigation within their force and to chase any cases where required. I stress again that a central feature of these reforms is that there is a presumption that a suspect who has been arrested will be released without bail—where there is no bail, no 28-day or any other limit is in operation.
Lord Paddick
Before the Minister sits down—and with the leave of the House, as one would normally intervene to seek clarification from the Minister—I wish to correct what she said about people on these Benches accepting the 28-day limit. That is not the case.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
Perhaps I worded it clumsily, but what I was trying to say is that it would be a sunset provision and reviewed after two years.
Lord Harris of Haringey
Before the Minister sits down, will she address the question of whether or not, as part of their response to this, the Government will take some action to support the improvement of forensic services and the speed at which forensic cases are dealt with? What steps are the Government going to take to improve the resources available to the CPS so that it might deal with cases more quickly? That is a major reason why the 28-day period would be under pressure.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
The noble Lord makes a very good point, and there are in fact other reasons outside the police’s control why 28 days might prove difficult. It is for that reason that we will not only keep it under review but look at any blockages to the 28 days being fulfilled that are outside the police’s control.
Baroness Harris of Richmond
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response and all noble Lords who spoke in support of the amendments. I guarantee to the Government that the exercise of this will be far more burdensome than they expect and that we will come back to this. These ideas will haunt the Government, because—
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, may I be completely rude and intervene on the noble Baroness? I completely forgot to speak to government Amendment 116. Will she indulge me, while I outline that amendment very briefly?
Amendment 116 responds to a point raised by my noble friend Lord Marlesford in Committee, and to which the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, alluded, when he argued that written notification should be given in all cases where the police decide to take no further action. Amendment 116 complements Clauses 65 and 66, ensuring that notification of a decision to take no further action is always given, whatever the circumstances of a case. I commend the government amendment to the House and apologise for interrupting the noble Baroness.
Baroness Harris of Richmond
My Lords, it is quite all right.
I want to take up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Blair. Have the Government taken into account what will happen if the 28-day period falls over Diwali, Christmas Day, Easter Sunday, the Sabbath, Ramadan, Eid or other religious festivals? This will cause real concern as there is no flexibility to respect these dates.
What about medical appointments, pre-arranged holidays, job interviews, caring responsibilities, academic examinations, funerals? The list is endless. There may be a case for a breach of human rights; certainly it could cause a corrosive relationship between the police and the public because of the length of time and the lack of flexibility. I hope that the Government will look again very closely at what many noble Lords have been proposing. At this stage there does not seem much point in dividing the House, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“(3A) This subsection applies where the custody officer believes that a decision as to whether to charge the person with the relevant offence would be made before the end of the applicable bail period in relation to the person.”
“PACE: duty to notify person interviewed that not to be prosecuted
After section 60A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 insert—“60B Notification of decision not to prosecute person interviewed(1) This section applies where—(a) a person suspected of the commission of a criminal offence is interviewed by a police officer but is not arrested for the offence, and(b) the police officer in charge of investigating the offence determines that—(i) there is not sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence, or(ii) there is sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence but the person should not be charged with an offence or given a caution in respect of an offence.(2) A police officer must give the person notice in writing that the person is not to be prosecuted.(3) Subsection (2) does not prevent the prosecution of the person for an offence if new evidence comes to light after the notice was given.(4) In this section “caution” includes—(a) a conditional caution within the meaning of Part 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003;(b) a youth conditional caution within the meaning of Chapter 1 of Part 4 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998;(c) a youth caution under section 66ZA of that Act.””
Baroness Walmsley
“136A Prohibition on using police stations as places of safety(1) A person may not, in the exercise of a power to which this section applies, be removed to, kept at or taken to a police station as a place of safety.(2) The powers to which this section applies are—(a) the power to remove a person to a place of safety under a warrant issued under section 135(1);(b) the power to take a person to a place of safety under section 135(3A);(c) the power to remove a person to, or to keep a person at, a place of safety under section 136(1);(d) the power to take a person to a place of safety under section 136(3).(3) In this section “person” means a person of any age.(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument appoint a date on which this section comes into force.(5) In this section “place of safety” means residential accommodation provided by a local social services authority under Part III of the National Assistance Act 1948, a hospital as defined by this Act, an independent hospital or care home for mentally disordered persons or any other suitable place.”
Baroness Walmsley
My Lords, we now move to issues relating to the interaction between the police and people with mental health problems. This amendment would ban the use of police cells for adults detained under Sections 135 and 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 in the same way as this Bill now bans it for children under 18.
I am very encouraged by the 53% reduction in the use of police cells as places of safety during 2015-16. The police, mental health services, local authorities and voluntary sector partners deserve our congratulations on that. However, that still left 2,100 people taken to police cells—a situation that will have led inevitably to exacerbation of their mental health crisis. I listened very carefully to what the Minister said in response to a similar amendment that we discussed in Committee. I thank the Minister for the meeting that we had at the Home Office to discuss it. I am encouraged by the clearly expressed intention of the Government eventually to reduce the use of police cells to zero, and I hope that the Minister will feel able to accept this modified amendment, which takes account of her concerns.
We got rid of discriminatory mental health legislation only a few years ago, and we are on a journey towards parity of esteem between physical and mental health. The Mental Health Act 1983 is now over 30 years old, and we need further to update how we treat people with mental health problems and enshrine that in statute. At least two police forces have now managed to reach the desirable target of zero use, which proves that use of police cells can be avoided even in exceptional circumstances, so we are not asking for something that has been shown to be impossible; we are asking for something that has been shown to be possible. But we appreciate that it requires the provision of more health-based places of safety, more training, better regulation, better partnership working and more diversionary strategies such as street triage.
That is why subsection (4) of the new clause, which my amendment would insert into the Bill, makes provision for delayed implementation until such time as the Secretary of State is convinced that everything is in place to ensure that there is no longer any need to take people in mental health crisis to a police cell for their assessment to be done. I appreciate that this was not strictly necessary, as implementation is dealt with elsewhere in the Bill, but I included it to make clear what I am asking for. I suggest that an implementation date of April 2019 is quite achievable.
When you are in a crisis, you need compassion and understanding and, with the best will in the world, the police are not the people to give that. That is why the police themselves are keen that the objective of my amendment is achieved as soon as possible. A mental health crisis is a mental health car crash. Nobody who broke their leg in a road accident would expect to be taken to a police station for triage; they would be taken to a health-based place of safety for their needs to be assessed and treated—in other words, an A&E department in hospital. We cannot say that we have achieved parity of esteem between physical and mental health if we continue to treat mental health emergencies in a different way from the way we treat physical emergencies. People detained in this way are not criminals and yet they are treated as such and feel distressed and confused, making it even more difficult to help them get well.
Baroness Howe of Idlicote (CB)
My Lords, I would like to support Amendment 117, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, which would eradicate the practice of police cells being used as a place for safety for people in crisis. It is an important amendment, both because people who are experiencing a mental health crisis and being detained under the Mental Health Act have committed no crime and because, for those in such a distressed state, being linked into health support is critical.
People who are picked up by the police under the Mental Health Act are detained because of a real risk of harm to themselves or others. Regardless of their age, no one should be made to feel like a criminal simply for being unwell; these people are in need of help and support. They are detained in order that a mental health assessment can be made and for any further treatment and care to be put in place. When you are in a mental health crisis, you are likely to feel overwhelmed and extremely distressed. Your behaviour may seem aggressive and threatening to others, but nevertheless you still need support and compassion. In fact, the people who display the most challenging behaviour are often the most vulnerable—those most in need of health support.
Health-based places of safety need to be equipped to manage someone’s challenging behaviour, and areas such as Merseyside and Hertfordshire are able to do this, where police cells have not been used at all for the past year. This amendment acknowledges that achieving a total ban on the use of police cells in some areas is not yet possible, so it gives the Secretary of State the power to determine a date for implementation. This is important because it sends the message loud and clear that all parties agree that people who are extremely unwell should never be taken to a cell. The amendment will be a lever to ensure that health-based places of safety are invested in and that staff are trained to manage challenging behaviour.
Police cells are clearly never appropriate for people in crisis, and we need to challenge the assumption that sometimes they are. We have already come some way in improving the lives of those with mental health problems, so ending the outdated practice of taking someone in crisis to a police cell is an obvious, achievable and important next step. I hope that the Minister can accept the excellent amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley.
Baroness Meacher (CB)
My Lords, first I must apologise that I was not involved in the earlier stages of this Bill due to a family health problem. However, I want to speak briefly but very strongly in support of Amendment 117, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley.
This House was responsible for ensuring that parity of esteem between mental and physical illness is enshrined in law—a point already referred to by the noble Baroness. This was rightly heralded as an important advance which, over time, should transform attitudes to mental illness and change the treatment of those suffering from mental health problems. Is it conceivable that we would send a patient with a severe physical illness, perhaps cancer or a heart problem, to a police cell because no suitable bed was available locally? Of course not. We would all regard that as utterly inhuman.
But to send a patient in a mental health crisis to a police cell is even more inhuman than doing that to someone who is capable of understanding what is going on. The patient will probably be frightened enough by their own thoughts and the voices going on in their head. They may not understand what is happening to them. Handcuffs and strange people in uniform will be even more terrifying to such patients than they would be to a physically ill person. I do not know the figures, but I do know about the extreme distress that these situations generate and I have no doubt that a good proportion of those who survive—not everyone does—will end up with post-traumatic stress disorder.
I draw on my experience of mental health services over many years and my supervision of investigations into deaths in custody during my years with the Police Complaints Authority. I want to refer to a couple of cases from that time that come to mind in the context of this amendment. A young man of about 20 years old was detained under Section 136 with no mental health professional available to him. The plan was to take him to a police cell. The police had been warned that the young man could be violent, so a firearms officer was made available, which is perfectly reasonable. The patient had delusions that the people around him were all dead and that he was the only one who was alive. He said to the police officers, “You are dead”, who took this comment to be a threat to life. The firearms officer took out his pistol and shot the young man, who died.
The other case I want to refer to involved a very unwell man taken, again I am pretty sure under Section 136, to a police station, where he was restrained on the floor. We do not know what terrible thoughts the patient had in his mind, but the more he was restrained the more he struggled to get free, and understandably the more force was used by the officers to control him. The patient died on that floor. These patients would probably have recovered reasonably well over a period of a few weeks and might have lived full lives for many decades. We can imagine the feelings of their relatives.
The police officers suffered terribly during the lengthy investigations. I have to confess that those investigations were always lengthy and I am sure that they still are. They did not know whether they would be found guilty of murder or manslaughter. That is an appalling thing to happen to a young man who had gone to work that day assuming that he would do his duty as always, but without the mental health skills he needed to deal with the challenges confronting him. This situation is not fair either to patients or to police officers.
Along with other Peers, I very much welcome the ban in this Bill on the use of police cells for those aged under 18 and the plan to reduce their use for adults. Without Amendment 117, my fear is that it could be many years before the aspiration to end the use of police cells as so-called places of safety is actually achieved. The noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, has been sensitive to the resource pressures, which I certainly understand, in proposing that April 2019 should be the date by which this aspiration must be achieved. This is a modest amendment that simply reinforces the direction of travel of the Government, which I applaud. I hope that the Minister will give it the serious consideration it deserves and bring forward an amendment at Third Reading.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, I do not wish to repeat all that has been said, but I would like to raise one or two points. The first refers to the statistics on the use of Section 136 of the Mental Health Act in 2015 and 2016 to which the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, has already referred. They show some surprising discrepancies between police force areas on Section 136 cases. For example, Hertfordshire and Merseyside are the two police force areas in which there has been zero use of police cells under Section 136. However, in Lincolnshire, police cells were used under the Section 136 powers on 173 occasions during 2015-16, in the context of a total usage under Section 136 on just 368 occasions. That is a staggeringly high percentage. Equally, one could go through the whole list and point to considerable discrepancies. Surprisingly, although one might have thought that the figure for the Metropolitan Police would be pretty high, the number of occasions in 2015-16 on which people were placed in police cells under the powers in Section 136 was apparently 17, in the context of a total figure of 3,693.
I cannot understand why we have these discrepancies, and I would appreciate it if the Minister commented on that. Is it really about suitable places being available in these areas, or a lack of co-ordination or willpower, or a lack of priority being given to avoiding the need to use police cells? Some response from the Government on that point would be extremely helpful, and extremely interesting.
I want to refer to the letter of 25 November 2016 that the noble Baroness, Lady Chisholm of Owlpen, sent to the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, to which the latter has already referred. It would be helpful—to me, at least—to have some clarification of what parts of the letter mean. It states:
“It is … our intention that the regulations make clear that certain situations, in and of themselves, do not justify use of a police station, for example, because there is no health based place of safety available at that time. Our expectation, which will be reinforced in the guidance that will support the regulations, is that there should be local plans in place to deal with this and other contingencies”.
What does the reference to,
“local plans in place to deal with this and other contingencies”,
mean? Does that mean that places have to be provided, or something else? The letter continues:
“A police station will only be used as a place of safety if it is considered to be the best and safest way to manage a particular individual in the interests of all concerned”.
But what happens if no health-based place of safety is available at that time? Does the sentence I quoted mean that in that situation, if no such place of safety is available, a police cell can be used? Other references in the letter suggest that that would not be the case, and that, in effect, a police cell could be used only when the individual was considered to be a danger to themselves or to others. Again, it would be very helpful to have some clarification.
I may not have heard the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, properly—I am afraid I am all too good at that—but I thought, and I may be doing her a disservice, that she said that the Government had indicated that they intend to reduce to zero the use of police cells. If so, may I have confirmation of that, because I do not think the letter of 25 November 2016 says that? Of course, the statement:
“A police station will only be used as a place of safety if it is considered to be the best and safest way to manage a particular individual in the interests of all concerned”,
still leaves open the possibility of using a police cell, and would not be consistent with the Government’s intention, if it is their intention, in the long term—one hopes in rather less than the long term—to reduce to zero the use of police cells.
I would like to raise two or three other points related to treating people in a situation of mental health crisis. Clause 80 would reduce the permitted period of detention in any place of safety—not just police cells—from 72 hours to 24 hours. Of course, one could argue that 24 hours is still quite a lengthy period for individuals to be detained prior to an assessment of their mental health, wherever they are detained. The proposals do provide for a further 12-hour extension of that detention period. As has already been pointed out, individuals with urgent mental health needs have just as much right to acute and emergency health care as anyone else. If any other forms of emergency health care were provided within a window of only 24 to 36 hours, it would probably provoke some highly adverse comment. Did the Government consider bringing the time limit down further, to 12 hours, say, with the possibility of extending detention by up to a further 12 hours on the authority of, for example, the registered medical practitioner responsible for the person in question’s examination under the Mental Health Act?
I want also to refer to the position—or lack of it—of independent mental health advocates. As I understand it, subject to other powers in the Mental Health Act, they are available to provide independent advocacy and advice to individuals such as those liable to psychiatric detention, or those who have received community treatment orders. Among other important functions, independent mental health advocates help individuals to obtain information about their detention or treatment, and support them in understanding what is happening to them. But as I understand it, individuals detained under Sections 135 and 136 of the Mental Health Act do not have a right to an independent mental health advocate. Surely, detention in any place of safety is a feature of the mental health regime, and one in which independent advocacy, advice and assistance are desirable, if not required. Why is it that individuals convicted of no crime but detained for their own safety can have no access to the independent advocacy and assistance to which they would be entitled during other mental health interventions but not under Sections 135 and 136? A related point is that the PACE codes of practice lay down a requirement to have access to an appropriate adult, but on too many occasions, this does not happen as the code of practice indicates it should.
Finally, for the purposes of the police and criminal evidence arrangements, a police intervention under Sections 135 and 136 is treated as an arrest, and any police involvement in taking a person to a place of safety generates information held by police as to that person’s mental health history, including the recording of a police intervention by way of Sections 135 or 136. The Disclosure and Barring Service provides a system whereby an individual’s criminal record may be checked and, where relevant, disclosed to prospective employers. Ordinary DBS checks result in cautions and convictions being revealed, where permitted, but under enhanced DBS checks, other information held by the police as to their involvement with that individual may be disclosed as well, where the officer responsible reasonably believes it to be relevant and that it ought to be disclosed. Police will hold information as to any arrest they conduct and any involvement they have in taking a person to a place of safety under Section 135 or Section 136. The mere fact of police intervention in response to a person’s mental health crisis is therefore liable to be disclosed. It could therefore have quite significant adverse consequences when it comes to seeking employment.
I understand that since August last year new guidelines have been enforced, requiring constables to disclose as part of such checks only records they reasonably believe to be relevant. There is guidance given relating to Section 135 that indicates that the fact of detention under Sections 135(1) and 136 of the Mental Health Act is unlikely in itself to be sufficient to justify disclosure. Sections 135 and 136 provide the police with powers to remove a person to a place of safety when the person is believed to be suffering from a mental disorder and in need of care or control. Such a detention under the Mental Health Act does not constitute a criminal investigation and should therefore be treated with great caution when considering relevance for disclosure. But, of course, police officers are not mental health professionals. There is nothing to require them to seek the advice of such professionals before making a decision as to the relevance of a person’s mental health.
There is surely a real danger that the police will continue to disclose mental health records. Where a person is processed through the criminal justice system, information relevant to criminal matters may be disclosed as part of an enhanced EBS check. However, the disclosure of an individual’s medical history is an entirely different matter. Will the Government impose a ban on the disclosure of Sections 135 and 136 detentions under criminal records checks? I hope the response to the points I have raised, if not available tonight, might be available subsequently.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, for giving your Lordships’ House a further opportunity to debate the continued use of police stations as places of safety for adults. I think we all agree on the importance of taking someone experiencing a mental health crisis to a place of safety that will best meet their particular needs. We can also agree that, almost always, that should not be a police station, irrespective of the person’s age. But where we have not previously quite agreed is on removing outright the option of using a police station for an adult in those very rare cases where it is the judgment of the police officer on the scene that a police station is the safest place—at least initially—not just for the patient but for the public, health professionals or anyone else at risk from the extreme behaviour of the individual.
Let me make it plain that while the Government’s position is that it would be wrong and potentially very dangerous to ban outright the use of police stations as places of safety for adults, we have no intention of leaving police officers without support in making the judgment that a particular situation is of such severity that this would be the correct response. The regulation-making powers in Clause 79 will be used to set out factors relevant to the decision on whether circumstances merit the use of a police station. We envisage that these will cover a range of issues, such as how dangerous an individual’s behaviour is and how serious a risk of harm to themselves or others they represent. We will also look to include provisions to give the officer the opportunity to consult with mental health professionals if it is safe and practicable to do so.
Equally importantly, if the decision is made to use a police station, we must make sure that the individual receives all the appropriate healthcare and treatment they need while they are there. This, too, will be covered in the planned regulations. The regulations will further provide for a regular review of the individual’s condition so that they can be moved to a more appropriate place of safety if the circumstances change—for example, if their behaviour has moderated and the move is in their best interest and can be achieved without delaying the mental health assessment.
I expect that, once these provisions come into force, we will see a further substantial reduction in the use of police stations as a place of safety for adults. But it would be wrong, in our view, to assume that we can reach a point over the next few years when we can say with absolute certainty that there will never be circumstances where the use of a police station as a place of safety for an adult is an appropriate option because their extreme behaviour cannot safely be managed in an alternative place of safety. That being the case, we do not believe that the proposed new clause is an appropriate way forward. However, I want to reach the position whereby police stations are used as a place of safety only in specific, “exceptional” circumstances —and, when they are used, the person taken there must be given the right medical care.
Lots of points were raised during the debate. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked why there were discrepancies in the use of police cells across police forces. There is a range of reasons why this happens. It may include different policies on accepting violent behaviour, but it is also about the fact that, as the noble Lord pointed out, in London, for instance, they are not used as widely as they are in Lincolnshire, which has seen a high rise in the use of police cells. Often that is because Lincolnshire is more rural and there are not so many places of safety available, whereas there are more in London. So there are several reasons why that could be the case.
Lord Rosser
Most people regard Dorset as quite rural, but the number of Section 136 detentions in police cells it had was just 10 out of a total of 429 uses of Section 136. Does that not rather knock on the head the argument that it is something to do with how rural an area is?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I was pointing that out as just one of the reasons why it might be—but we have to remember that, as we know, mental health is going through a huge change at the moment. As I said in a debate on Monday, I am afraid that we are going from a very low base. We have to be aware that it will take time for these places of safety to be there to ensure that we have an increased number of beds or places of safety for these people to be taken. That is part of the reason for the discrepancy.
To go back to further points raised on mental health, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, raised an issue related to the respective changes to police powers under Sections 135 and 136 of the Mental Health Act. The noble Lord suggested that the maximum detention period should be reduced further to 12 hours. We are confident that the Bill reduces the maximum detention period by the appropriate amount—from 72 hours to 24 hours. The Government have seen evidence that the average assessment under Section 136 is conducted in under 11 hours. Furthermore, we fully support the target set by the Royal College of Psychiatrists for assessments to commence within three hours. However, there are some cases when it is not possible, due to the condition of the person detained, to conduct a meaningful assessment within 12 hours: for example, if they are intoxicated through alcohol or drugs.
The noble Lord also mentioned duties on police to consult with mental health professionals, with detainees having a right to an independent mental health advocate. The second issue concerned access to independent advice. Clause 78 requires police officers to seek advice from certain specific healthcare professionals, if practical, before making a decision to exercise their powers under Section 136. This is about supporting police officers to make the best possible decisions when they encounter a person who may be experiencing a mental crisis. This provision builds on existing good practice of police forces and local NHS services working together collaboratively, including through street triage schemes. The “if practical to do so” condition will avoid tying the hands of an officer if, in their judgment, they need to use the powers quickly to secure an individual’s safety.
On detainees’ access to advice, for example from a mental health advocate or an appropriate adult, the guidance supporting the implementation of these provisions will set out the expected support to be provided to any person detained at a place of safety under Section 135 or Section 136. Such support can, in our view, most appropriately be provided by health staff already present, rather than another person in a bespoke role, which would introduce delays and jeopardise professionals’ ability to conduct the assessment within 24 hours.
The noble Lord asked whether a person’s detention is disclosable if they subsequently apply for a disclosure and barring service check. In 2015 the Home Office published revised statutory guidance on enhanced DBS checks in relation to Section 135 and Section 136 detentions. The guidance now emphasises that the use of these powers in and of itself is unlikely to be sufficient to justify disclosure. The police are now directed to specifically factor in the behaviour of the detained person at the time, and how long they were detained. The Government’s position is that we cannot wholly rule out the possibility that there will continue to be circumstances in the future when a person’s behaviour is so extreme that it can safely be managed, at least initially, only in a police station. We are not legislating for some future point when that position will cease to be the case, which is what the amendment suggests.
I hope that, with all the things I have set out, and given our clear shared objective of doing what is in the best interests of all concerned, including their safety, I hope that the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Walmsley
My Lords, I thank those who supported my amendment. I was fascinated by the treatise of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, on other aspects of Sections 135 and Section 136. He is, of course, absolutely right that there is no correlation at all between the use of police cells and the rurality or urbanisation of the area concerned: absolutely none. I have always known that Merseyside is a very special place—because that is where I come from—but apparently in Merseyside there are no “exceptional circumstances”, whereas there are in other places. I cannot understand the Government’s determination to insist that there will be exceptional circumstances in other places if there are none in Hertfordshire and Merseyside.
It is quite clear that the Government are not going to move on this. However, I have to say that I welcome, of course, what the noble Baroness said about regulations. We will have to keep a very careful eye on how these work and whether they achieve our joint objective of bringing the numbers down as low as possible. I very much hope that that is exactly what will happen over the next few years. The hour being what it is, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Walmsley
“Child sexual exploitation: duty to refer
(1) Where the police have a reasonable belief that a child under the age of 18 has been a victim of a sexual offence or other forms of child abuse, the police must refer the child for a mental health assessment by an appropriately trained professional.(2) The Secretary of State must by regulations made by statutory instrument define the meaning of an “appropriately trained professional”.(3) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”
Baroness Walmsley
My Lords, Amendment 118 places a duty on police forces to refer children under 18 who are the victims of a sexual offence or other forms of child abuse for a mental health assessment by an appropriately trained professional. It mandates a currently poorly used referral pathway. I listened carefully to the Minister’s response in Committee and have changed the amendment that I bring forward today. I wish to stress that this amendment does not mean that all these children will need a CAMHS intervention or will have a diagnosable mental health condition. It is designed not only to support children who are the victims of these awful crimes but to inform commissioning decision-makers about the magnitude of the problem, so as to ensure that the right services are in place. We cannot rely on the numbers that reach the clinical threshold for intervention, because these thresholds are far too high, given the shortage of child and adolescent mental health services.
The amendment is deliberately not prescriptive as to who “an appropriately trained professional” would be, leaving this to regulations and local flexibility. This person could be a nurse, school councillor, trained social worker, councillor in a sexual assault referral centre or another appropriate local professional. The amendment strikes the right balance between local and national responsibilities. It introduces a national requirement for a referral pathway and assessment, but it does not set out the how and where, which will be up to local areas to determine. This is responsive to the level of need of these children and the evidence we have that they are not receiving the therapeutic support they need for their recovery.
As I said at the outset, the amendment would not mean that all victims of a sexual offence or other forms of child abuse would meet the clinical thresholds. Some may, but some may need other types of support—for example, school or community-based child sexual exploitation support groups, family support services, or support for parents and children to equip them to understand the emotional impact of abuse. The amendment would deliver the recommendation in Future in Mind, which the Government are committed to implementing in full, that,
“those who have been sexually abused and/or exploited receive a comprehensive assessment and referral to the services that they need, including specialist mental health services”.
The evidence for the amendment is compelling. In the past year the Children’s Society has calculated that more than 40,000 crimes of a sexual nature were reported against children. Each of these 40,000 is a child suffering the effects of horrific crimes, which come with a multitude of long-term effects that need to be addressed. We have only to read the recent media accounts of many footballers who were abused as children to understand the lifelong effects of these terrible experiences. They destroy lives and careers. Analysis by the Children’s Society of referral pathways for vulnerable groups found that less than half of mental health trusts identify children who have experienced sexual exploitation in referral and initial assessment forms. The NSPCC review of local transformation plans found that only one-third of these plans mentioned provision of services to meet the needs of these children. Yet while these figures are appalling, the experiences of the victims themselves show the need for the amendment even more.
Last week the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and I attended a meeting organised by the NSPCC and the Children’s Society and I want to share with noble Lords the account of Sarah—not her real name—who told her story. I record my thanks to her for sharing her experiences and her powerful message as to why this amendment is needed. Sarah was abused from a very young age by a member of her extended family and this had a long-term impact on her life. As her understanding of consensual relationships developed, Sarah realised that what she had experienced was abuse and as a teenager she suffered from clinical depression and was extremely suicidal. She was later referred to counselling and gradually came to terms with what had happened to her. The abuse had a long-term impact on her mental health, including eating disorders, drug abuse, PTSD and abusive relationships. At the meeting Sarah told us that the support she received was invaluable for her recovery. She thought that the amendment would support young people who had experienced sexual exploitation and help them recover more quickly by ensuring a direct referral from the police.
The amendment will also contribute to parity of physical and mental health. Recently, nine ex-Health Secretaries wrote to the Health Secretary to encourage the Government to,
“make good the promise to achieve genuine equality”,
between physical and mental health. Parity of esteem was enshrined in law by the Health and Social Care Act 2012, yet examples of this being enacted in policy are still rare. We know that nine out of 10 children who have experienced abuse at an early age will develop a mental illness by the time they are 18. Without assessment, how can we know which 10% will not need help? Issues faced include post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, self-harm, depression and, as we have heard, suicide attempts.
This is not a novel idea. There are numerous examples of where preventive public health initiatives have been set up in response to data on the prevalence of certain conditions affecting the physical health of a population. For example, cervical screening is now offered to all women over the age of 25. My first job out of university in the late 1960s was scanning the cervical smears of women with symptoms, so I know how effective screening is at picking up early cancer and pre-cancerous cells so that the patient can be treated early. The current rate of cervical cancer is 12 cases per 100,000 women—0.012%. Since its introduction, the screening programme has led to a decrease in the number of cervical cancer cases by about 7% each year, and it is estimated that up to 5,000 cases of cervical cancer are prevented annually because of cervical screening. That is a terrific record but the prevalence of cervical cancer is a great deal less than nine out of 10.
Viscount Hailsham
My Lords, I hope we do not go down this road. It seems a thoroughly bad idea. Of course there is a good case for voluntary provision. There may be many cases where assessment is highly desirable but this is coercive. It imposes an obligation on the police officer to do what is set out in the amendment.
Baroness Walmsley
I would like to make it clear that it would be only with the consent of the child, so it would be consensual as far as they were concerned.
Viscount Hailsham
That is not what it says in the amendment. Had it been so, I would not object, but we are talking about a piece of legislation, and it is coercive. If the police officer has to do it, presumably the child has to co-operate. You are not dealing just with young children, either. You are dealing with people up to the age of 18 and I would have thought that there were a substantial number of cases where the child would not want to be assessed and would find it pretty traumatic if he or she was. While there may be a strong case for putting in place a voluntary system for doing it, there is absolutely no case for making it coercive. I really hope that the House will not think of pursuing such a policy.
Baroness Howe of Idlicote
My Lords, I think I will leave aside the contribution of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. I do not really agree with what he said. My name is on this amendment and I support it because it would create a clear and explicit referral pathway for child victims of a sexual offence or other forms of child abuse for an assessment of their mental health needs.
As we have heard, the amendment would deliver on the Government’s own commitment in Future in Mind and work to put in place policies that go a step towards creating parity between physical and mental health. The Government say that they want to develop:
“A better offer for the most vulnerable children and young people”,
including by ensuring that,
“those who have been sexually abused and/or exploited receive a comprehensive assessment and referral to the services that they need, including specialist mental health services”.
The amendment would deliver on that ambition.
It is important to recognise that the Government have made welcome steps in this area, in particular through their investment of £1.4 billion over the course of this Parliament in children’s and young people’s mental health services. However, there is evidence to show that this is not yet reaching the most vulnerable. According to research from the Education Policy Institute, in the first year of funding, of the expected £250 million only £143 million was released—and of that, only £75 million was distributed to clinical commissioning groups. For 2016-17, £119 million has been allocated to clinical commissioning groups—but this has not been ring-fenced, risking that it will be spent on other priorities.
It is clear from the evidence available and what we have heard today that these young people are at extremely high risk of developing a mental health condition. Lifelong difficulties can result in drug and alcohol abuse, mental ill-health, homelessness, gang affiliation and/or disability if the underlying trauma of their experiences is not met with swift and appropriate intervention. Research has found that up to 90% of children who have experienced abuse will develop a mental illness by the time they are 18. In the spirit of parity between physical and mental health to which we all aspire, in a comparable physical situation people would be screened and have regular check-ups, yet we do not offer the most vulnerable children the same opportunity to receive the help they so vitally need.
National policy is increasingly focused on the social determinants of long-term health. Evidence has shown that adverse childhood experiences are a key risk factor for poor outcomes such as worse health, coming into contact with the criminal justice system and worse employment and educational outcomes over the life course. Children who are victims of a sexual offence are often left without support for their mental health difficulties, which are likely to develop into more entrenched mental health conditions later in life, because they do not meet the thresholds for clinical interventions or because a suitably trained professional does not properly assess their mental health needs.
This amendment would provide national consistency, as we know that the situation across the country is inconsistent and young people are not always getting the holistic assessment they need to meet their needs. Thresholds for mental health clinical interventions are inconsistent across the country and referral routes into CAMHS are varied, with some areas not allowing the local voluntary sector to refer directly. Some sexual assault referral centres refer children for mental health support, but others do not.
In her response in Committee, the Minister mentioned the commissioning framework for adult and paediatric sexual assault referral centre—SARC—services, published in August 2015. However, case-tracking evidence from the Havens in London found that, of the 24 children under 13 who were reviewed, only three were referred to CAMHS and that, of the 56 young people aged 13 to 17 who had their cases reviewed as part of the study, only five were referred. It was acknowledged in the same report:
“Few children are referred to CAMHS from the Havens, most likely as interventions are generally at the forensic examination stage and it is difficult to determine longer term emotional support needs at this … stage”.
It is therefore necessary to ensure that other agencies have a duty to refer for a mental health assessment, in order to guarantee that a young person’s holistic mental health needs are assessed after their traumatic experience.
Alongside providing national consistency, this amendment would introduce a referral for an assessment and enable better understanding of the level of support that needs to be provided both by CAMHS and outside CAMHS. This will lead not only to better responses and referral routes for young people but a greater understanding to inform commissioning at local level, so I hope that the Minister will be able to accept this amendment.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, I accept the principle in the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, in cases of persistent abuse but I am afraid that I am with my noble friend Lord Hogg. There is—
Earl Attlee
I meant the noble Viscount. I absolutely accept the point made by my noble friend. There is no flexibility in the amendment. After a fleeting grope of a 17 year-old at a Tube station, someone would still be caught by this in totally inappropriate circumstances. So, although I accept the need in serious cases, I am afraid that I cannot advise my noble friend the Minister to accept this amendment because of the lack of flexibility.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
I am conscious of the late hour and that the next business should be coming on, so I will be very brief. From our Benches, we certainly endorse the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, who, along with the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, has spoken in great detail on it. I do not intend to speak for much longer than that—but what is being highlighted here is very important. I will make one point: the amendment is not suggesting that all young people need is CAMHS; they need a holistic approach, so that their mental health needs can be properly assessed. It is not quite as stark as the noble Viscount or the noble Earl suggested. We certainly support the amendment on these Benches and I will leave it at that.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I applaud the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, on her intention to ensure that children who have been abused have the proper provision following that abuse, mainly because they are often traumatised by their experiences. I share her desire to ensure that such children receive the support they need, including for their mental and physical health, but I must reiterate my strong belief that the overriding determinant of referral for health services must be clinical need.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
With no coercion, as the noble Viscount says. The important thing is that all children and young people, not just those who are victims of sexual offences, get the right care at the right time, based on their needs—not on a non-clinician’s view of their potential needs, based on their experiences. Furthermore, the amendment makes no reference to obtaining consent.
I think that my noble friend Lord Hailsham referred to that. Individuals, including children or their parents or carers, as appropriate, need to consent to receive treatment. Where a person indicates that they would like to avail themselves of any referral, consent can be sought for the relevant personal details to be passed to the health provider. This is the proper course of action, rather than automatically passing personal details and potentially sensitive information about sexual abuse to a third party, even when that third party is a healthcare provider. We know there is more that can be done to meet the health needs of children and we are taking concrete steps to do that.
The Government wholeheartedly agree that mental health services should be available to children and young people who need them. We are investing significant funding to that end—but, as I have indicated, it would be wholly inappropriate for referrals to mental health services to be the responsibility of police officers rather than appropriately trained practitioners. I stand ready to meet the noble Baroness and other noble Lords who have put their name to this amendment to discuss these issues further, but I hope that at this stage the noble Baroness will agree to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Walmsley
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for their support. I reassure the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, that there is nothing coercive about this. I think there is a misunderstanding because a health issue is being debated in a criminal justice Bill. The reason there is no need to mention anything to do with consent in the amendment is that it is quite unnecessary. Any professional who would be doing the assessment has a professional duty to engage with any patient only with that patient’s consent. Indeed, it would be self-defeating even to try to do an assessment because it would not be effective, so it is totally unnecessary to mention consent in that situation. It is perfectly normal that consent is an absolute given in health issues among all health professionals.
I say to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, that it is not inflexible either because it should not be for a policeman to decide whether a young person has been affected mentally by the situation. It is coercive if you count coercing the police to do the right thing and share the information, but it is not coercive in relation to the children. The police have to share the information, and it is then for the qualified person doing the assessment to decide what level of help—or no help at all—is needed by that child. That is perfectly straightforward and I see no reason why it should not be done.
The fact is that the police sometimes refer children for mental health assessments, but very rarely. Sometimes children go through a lot of barriers before they get to the assessment, and they disengage. They say, “I can’t do with having to tell my story over and over again to a whole series of people”. What should happen is a referral from a police officer directly to the people who can assess—with the child’s consent, of course—as their professional duty, whether that child needs any help at whatever level.
Clearly, I am not going to convince the Minister, but I should like to keep talking to her about this. Indeed, we have a meeting in the diary for next Monday about this very thing, so I would like to do that. Because of that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Walmsley
“Disallowing use of Tasers by police officers on psychiatric wards
(1) A police officer may not use a Taser or electroshock weapon during a deployment on a psychiatric ward save in exceptional circumstances.(2) Any use of a Taser or electroshock weapon on a psychiatric ward is required to be referred to the Independent Police Complaints Commission in such manner as the Commission specifies and not later than the end of the day following the day on which the Taser or electroshock weapon was used.(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument define “exceptional circumstances”.(4) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (3) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
Baroness Walmsley
My Lords, this is another thing on which I did not succeed in convincing the Government in Committee, but I listened very carefully to what the Government said and have made some changes.
I had been seeking to ban the use of Tasers by police in psychiatric wards, but since the Government feel that their use may sometimes be necessary, my amendment asks the Government to specify very clearly in regulations the exceptional circumstances under which Tasers should be used. Bearing in mind that the use of such a weapon is a very serious issue and has sometimes led to the death of the person who has been tasered, my amendment asks that any use of such a weapon in a psychiatric ward should automatically be referred to the Independent Police Complaints Commission as a matter of course in just the same way as a death in custody is reported and investigated. By that means we would find out in considerable detail what led to such a severe intervention, and that information can be helpful to the police and mental health providers in improving the way they deal with people in great distress who may well have turned to some kind of violence or aggression. The hour is late, and that is all I wish to say. I beg to move.
Viscount Hailsham
My Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness that the hour is late, and therefore I shall be brief. I was here for the debate in Committee on this subject and I was wholly persuaded by the Minister about the undesirability of this amendment. I know full well that Tasers can be very injurious and I know that they are dangerous, but I also know from considerable personal experience that people in psychiatric wards can be extremely dangerous, volatile and violent.
I speak as somebody who was for some years Minister for the special hospitals. There were three mental hospitals in my constituency. I was the Minister for Police for a time and, relatively recently, I was on the monitoring board of a local prison. I know they are different, but in prisons you see many people who ought to be in psychiatric hospitals. The truth is that sometimes there is no choice: people get possession of a weapon and threaten their nurses or pose a very real threat to the other residents on the ward. What is a police officer to do if summoned and faced with a person with a knife? The truth is that in exceptional cases—which I will come to in a moment—a Taser may be necessary. I am certainly not going to go down the road of prohibiting that by statute.
What does “exceptional circumstances” actually mean? I can tell the noble Baroness: when there is a reasonably founded belief that it is necessary in self-defence or in defence of a third party. If I was the Secretary of State and put that into a statutory instrument, so what? Ultimately, it has to be decided by the court. If you look at this amendment and reflect on its consequences for one moment, the police officer is guilty of assault unless he can bring forward the defence. But who is responsible for bringing forward the defence? Does he have to prove that his acts fall within the exceptional circumstances or does the prosecution have to negate their existence? I suspect the latter, but it is extremely difficult for a police officer in those circumstances. It is a legal minefield and good news for lawyers—which is not something I am advocating in this case. It is a thoroughly bad amendment and I hope we hear no more of it.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, I will briefly support the noble Viscount. I would not want to put a police officer in the very difficult position of having to decide whether to get involved in close engagement with someone who is very dangerous or use a conventional firearm, with all the difficulties that that entails.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, this amendment brings us back to the use of Tasers. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, for taking on board the points raised when we debated this issue in Committee and coming back with a revised amendment. My noble friends Lord Hailsham and Lord Attlee have given us a flavour of what we discussed then.
Any use of force by police officers in psychiatric wards on patients—or on any member of the public in any setting for that matter—must be appropriate, proportionate, necessary and conducted as safely as possible. When police officers need to attend and use force, they must be able to account for their actions. As the noble Lords, Lord Dear and Lord Rosser, and my noble friend Lord Hailsham indicated in Committee, a blanket ban on the use of Tasers in psychiatric wards would remove this valuable police tactic when they are dealing with potentially very violent situations.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I do not usually take interventions on Report, although I will acquiesce to the noble Baroness because she did not speak for very long.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I welcome the fact that the noble Baroness now accepts that there will be exceptional circumstances. My noble friend Lord Hailsham has very clearly outlined what exceptional circumstances would be, and I explained in Committee that it was when all other options for restraint had failed, particularly when the person has perhaps had to be kept at length from the police officer—in other words when going near the person would create a danger for other people.
The Taser was introduced to be used at that intermediate stage. It is to be used where de-escalation at the lower end has already been tried but has failed, and where the officer deems that other options—ranging from the use of lethal force, as my noble friend said, at the higher end—will not resolve the immediate threat in the safest and most proportionate way.
With regard to recording incidents, as the noble Baroness pointed out, each officer who deploys a Taser is required to complete a Taser evaluation form on every occasion where the device is used. The form should be completed prior to the end of each tour of duty, but in any case within 24 hours of the use. The police forces’ lead Taser officer is responsible for reviewing, collating and recording all Taser evaluation forms.
In Committee I explained that new police data were being collected on the use of force by officers, including force used in a hospital setting, to further improve the existing system of recording and reporting. Police forces are working to implement this new recording system and we expect data to be published as part of the Home Office’s annual data return in summer 2018 to ensure that the use of Tasers is absolutely transparent.
I put it to the noble Baroness that effective scrutiny of the use of Tasers is a better way forward than seeking to legislate. No officer will use a Taser lightly and will seek to argue that there were indeed exceptional circumstances. I have already pointed to the anomaly that this amendment would create in respect of the use of lethal force—no one wants to see that happen—if a safer tactic was unavailable. I hope the noble Baroness will feel happy to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Walmsley
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply. Anyone hearing what has been said in the House tonight would think that I was asking for a ban on the use of Tasers. If noble Lords read my amendment carefully, they will realise that that is not what it would do. It accepts what the Government said in Committee, and during meetings that we had at the Home Office, that there may be exceptional circumstances. That is why I am no longer asking for a ban; I make that absolutely clear to noble Lords who have spoken.
However, it is a very serious matter for a police officer to use a Taser, as the Minister herself has said, in which case I think it would be helpful to the police if the Secretary of State were to specify clearly what is meant by “exceptional circumstances”. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, has tried this evening to give a very simple account of what that means, and indeed the Minister has done the same. If it is that simple, why can it not be done? I think it would help the police.
I am aware that, following discussion in another place of an amendment similar to this one, a lot more information is now to be collected about the use of Tasers. I think that is a very good thing, and I look forward to seeing what we can learn from it. However, in this amendment I seek to be helpful to the police and to protect them by making very clear what they can and cannot do, and under what circumstances. But clearly the Government are not going to accept that, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Policing and Crime Bill
Wednesday 7th December 2016
(8 years ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 72-II(Rev) Revised second marshalled list for Report (PDF, 324KB) - (6 Dec 2016)
16:32 - Division on Amendment 157 - Ayes: 243 / Noes: 208 - Amendment 157 agreed.
18:25 - Division on Amendment 173 - Ayes: 135 / Noes: 177 - Amendment 173 disagreed.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)
My Lords, Section 32 of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 limits police jurisdiction throughout Northern Ireland and its adjacent UK waters within the seaward limits of the territorial sea in the same manner as Section 30 of the Police Act 1996 applies in England and Wales. However, within these limits, the police do not have powers suitable for the maritime context.
The new clauses proposed in this group comprise a new Chapter 6A of Part 4 of the Bill, making provision for the police and other law enforcement in Northern Ireland to have powers corresponding to those conferred on law enforcement in England and Wales and in Scotland by virtue of Chapters 5 and 6 of Part 4. In particular, new Chapter 6A provides Northern Ireland law enforcement with maritime-specific powers, such as to stop, board, detain and divert ships for the purpose of preventing, detecting or investigating an offence under the law of Northern Ireland. Unlike the provisions in Chapters 5 and 6 of Part 4, and at the request of the Northern Ireland Department of Justice, the powers are, however, limited to ships in the territorial waters of Northern Ireland and do not extend to international or foreign waters.
There are particular policing accountability and oversight arrangements in Northern Ireland, and it has not been possible for the Department of Justice to secure the necessary agreement with relevant stakeholders within the time available for the exercise of powers by law enforcement officers from England, Wales or Scotland in Northern Ireland waters in hot-pursuit situations. Again at the request of the Minister of Justice in Northern Ireland, these amendments would remove the hot-pursuit provisions that relate to law enforcement officers from outside Northern Ireland entering Northern Ireland waters. The Northern Ireland Assembly agreed the necessary legislative consent Motion in respect of these provisions on 28 November.
I note that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has an amendment in this group and I propose to respond to it when winding up. For now, I beg to move.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, as the Minister has just said, my noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendment 122A in this group. It concerns Chapter 5, which is headed “Police Powers: Maritime Enforcement in Connection with English and Welsh Offences”.
The Bill gives extensive powers to the police in connection with preventing, detecting, investigating or prosecuting offences under the law of England and Wales in relation to a UK ship in England and Wales waters or international waters, a ship without nationality in England and Wales waters or international waters, a foreign ship in England and Wales waters or international waters, or a ship registered under the law of a relevant territory in England and Wales waters or international waters. That seems to me to cover any ship anywhere in the world, although there are restrictions if the UK ship is in foreign waters or if it is a foreign ship in England and Wales waters, when either the Secretary of State’s permission or, in some cases, that of the foreign state to which the ship is registered is required. In one place the Bill talks about “England and Wales waters” and in another it uses the words,
“within the territorial sea adjacent to England and Wales”.
I am not sure why there is different wording in different parts. Perhaps the Minister can explain.
The powers are to stop, board, divert and detain, to search and obtain information, and to arrest and seize. Officers who can exercise these powers include special constables, port constables, customs officials and anyone else the Secretary of State specifies in regulations, subject only to the negative procedure. This gives extensive powers to a whole range of law enforcement officers without restriction in relation to the exercise of the powers relating to a UK ship in England and Wales waters on the basis that the law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to suspect—the same low level of suspicion required to make an arrest or to carry out a stop and search in the street—that an offence under the law of England and Wales is being or has been committed, or there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship itself is being used in the commission of an offence.
Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)
My Lords, it is an unusual pleasure for me to agree completely with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has again argued for the maritime enforcement powers in the Bill to be restricted to the enforcement of serious offences. As I indicated in Committee, we do not believe it is necessary to limit these powers in this way. The Government believe that we should trust the operational judgment of the police to determine when it is appropriate and proportionate to exercise their powers at sea. For example, we do not believe that the police would commit resources to interdict a vessel in international waters where there had been a theft of an item of, say, confectionery from a gift shop—which, incidentally, would be an indictable offence.
However, a police officer on, let us say, a UK-registered ferry should be able to act when the vessel is in international waters where a person commits a common assault on another person, or where a person exhibits threatening or abusive behaviour. In both cases, we are talking about summary-only offences and in both cases the noble Lord’s amendment would prevent the police acting, even though the law of the land applied and the actions of those individuals might none the less be triable in the courts of England and Wales. We do not impose restrictions on the categories of offences the police can investigate where they take place on other modes of transportation, so, again, I am unclear why we should treat maritime vessels any differently.
Lord Paddick
Can the Minister explain what happens at the moment if a summary-only offence is committed, for example, on a cross-channel ferry? How would that offence be dealt with?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I think that I will have to get back to the noble Lord on that point.
Lord Blair of Boughton
This is about the difference between a bus, a train and a ship. The ability to stop a ship and push it into harbour is a completely different level of activity from saying, “We’re going to stop the train at Reading because somebody has been assaulted”. I have listened to the argument made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and I completely agree with him. It cannot be right that a single police officer can decide to turn around a cargo ship or a cruise ship in the Irish Sea for a summary offence. I accept that, as the Minister said, there are complications around theft, with the theft of some sweets from a shop being an indictable offence in some circumstances, but we have to make a definition somewhere. This is about being utterly reasonable, and I do not think that the Government are being reasonable here.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
The police are professionals and they must have operational discretion as to when to exercise their powers. I know that a ship at sea is not a bus, which can just move into the side of the road, but a serious offence could have been committed. The police should be able to know when they need to exercise their powers. In answer to the noble Lord’s question, there are currently no powers to take effective enforcement action in such circumstances, other than in relation to modern slavery and drug offences.
Viscount Slim (CB)
My Lords, I am rather disappointed about the police in this situation. Certainly in my life, junior NCOs have taken charge of situations similar to this and had to make decisions. There must be somewhere within the constabulary either a lack of training or a lack of selection of their junior leaders.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am glad that I brought back this amendment, if only to hear the noble Lord, Lord Blair, call me utterly reasonable. As for the Minister’s faith in the ability of an off-duty police officer who becomes involved in a brawl on a cruise ship to make completely the right operational decision not to divert the vessel into port, that goes beyond my own experience and that of the noble Lord, Lord Blair, of the way in which it would be natural for some off-duty police officers to behave in such circumstances. Clearly, I am not going to press this to a Division, but I think the House recognises the considerable discomfort that both the noble Lord, Lord Blair, and I have over the legislation as proposed.
“CHAPTER 6APOLICE POWERS: MARITIME ENFORCEMENT: NORTHERN IRISH OFFENCESApplication of maritime enforcement powers: general
(1) A law enforcement officer may, for the purpose of preventing, detecting or investigating an offence under the law of Northern Ireland, exercise any of the maritime enforcement powers in relation to—(a) a United Kingdom ship in Northern Ireland waters,(b) a ship without nationality in Northern Ireland waters,(c) a foreign ship in Northern Ireland waters, or(d) a ship, registered under the law of a relevant territory, in Northern Ireland waters.(2) In this Chapter, “the maritime enforcement powers” are the powers set out in—(a) section (Power to stop, board, divert and detain) (power to stop, board, divert and detain);(b) section (Power to search and obtain information) (power to search and obtain information);(c) section (Power of arrest and seizure) (power of arrest and seizure).(3) The following persons are “law enforcement officers” for the purpose of this Chapter—(a) a constable who is a member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland or the Police Service of Northern Ireland Reserve,(b) a person appointed as a special constable in Northern Ireland by virtue of provision incorporating section 79 of the Harbours, Docks, and Piers Clauses Act 1847,(c) a designated customs official within the meaning of Part 1 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 (see section 14(6) of that Act),(d) a designated NCA officer who is authorised by the Director General of the National Crime Agency (whether generally or specifically) to exercise the powers of a law enforcement officer under this Chapter, or(e) a person of a description specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State. (4) Regulations under subsection (3)(e) are to be made by statutory instrument.(5) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (3)(e) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.(6) Regulations under subsection (3)(e) may not make devolved provision except with the consent of the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland.(7) For the purposes of subsection (6), regulations under subsection (3)(e) make devolved provision if and to the extent that—(a) the effect of the regulations is to confer functions under this Chapter on a person of a description specified in the regulations,(b) it would be within the legislative competence of the Northern Ireland Assembly to confer those functions on persons of that description in an Act of the Northern Ireland Assembly, and(c) the consent of the Secretary of State would not be required under section 8 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 in relation to a Bill conferring such functions.(8) This section is subject to section (Restriction on exercise of maritime enforcement powers) (which makes provision about when the authority of the Secretary of State is required before the maritime enforcement powers are exercised in reliance on this section).”
“Restriction on exercise of maritime enforcement powers
(1) The authority of the Secretary of State is required before a law enforcement officer exercises any of the maritime enforcement powers, in reliance on section (Application of maritime enforcement powers: general)(1), in relation to a foreign ship, or a ship registered under the law of a relevant territory, within the territorial sea adjacent to Northern Ireland.(2) The Secretary of State may give authority under subsection (1) in relation to a foreign ship only if—(a) the home state has requested the assistance of the United Kingdom for the purpose of preventing, detecting or investigating an offence under the law of Northern Ireland,(b) the home state has authorised the United Kingdom to act for that purpose, or(c) the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (Cmnd 8941) otherwise permits the exercise of the powers in relation to the ship.”
“Power to stop, board, divert and detain
(1) This section applies if a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that—(a) an offence under the law of Northern Ireland is being, or has been, committed on a ship in relation to which the powers conferred by this section are exercisable by virtue of section (Application of maritime enforcement powers: general), or(b) a ship in relation to which those powers are so exercisable is otherwise being used in connection with the commission of an offence under that law.(2) The law enforcement officer may—(a) stop the ship;(b) board the ship;(c) require the ship to be taken to a port in Northern Ireland.(3) The law enforcement officer may require the master of the ship, or any member of its crew, to take such action as is necessary for the purposes of subsection (2)(c).(4) A law enforcement officer must give notice in writing to the master of any ship detained under this section. (5) The notice must state that the ship is to be detained until the notice is withdrawn by the giving of a further notice in writing signed by a law enforcement officer.”
“Power to search and obtain information
(1) This section applies if a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that there is evidence relating to an offence under the law of Northern Ireland (other than items subject to legal privilege) on a ship in relation to which the powers conferred by this section are exercisable by virtue of section (Application of maritime enforcement powers: general).(2) The law enforcement officer may search—(a) the ship;(b) anyone found on the ship;(c) anything found on the ship (including cargo).(3) The law enforcement officer may require a person found on the ship to give information about himself or herself.(4) The power to search conferred by subsection (2) is a power to search only to the extent that it is reasonably required for the purpose of discovering evidence of the kind mentioned in subsection (1).(5) The power to search a person conferred by subsection (2) does not authorise a law enforcement officer to require the person to remove any clothing in public other than an outer coat, jacket or gloves.(6) In exercising a power conferred by subsection (2) or (3), a law enforcement officer may (amongst other things)—(a) open any containers;(b) require the production of documents, books or records relating to the ship or anything on it, other than anything that the law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe to be an item subject to legal privilege;(c) make photographs or copies of anything the production of which the law enforcement officer has power to require.(7) The power in subsection (6)(b) to require the production of documents, books or records includes, in relation to documents, books or records kept in electronic form, power to require the provision of the documents, books or records in a form in which they are legible and can be taken away.(8) The power of a law enforcement officer under subsection (2)(b) or (c) or (3) may be exercised on the ship or elsewhere.”
“Power of arrest and seizure
(1) This section applies if a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence under the law of Northern Ireland has been, or is being, committed on a ship in relation to which the powers conferred by this section are exercisable by virtue of section (Application of maritime enforcement powers: general).(2) The law enforcement officer may arrest without warrant anyone whom the officer has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be guilty of the offence.(3) The law enforcement officer may seize and retain anything found on the ship which appears to the officer to be evidence of the offence, other than anything that the officer has reasonable grounds to believe to be an item subject to legal privilege.(4) The power of a law enforcement officer under subsection (2) or (3) may be exercised on the ship or elsewhere.”
“Maritime enforcement powers: supplementary: protective searches
(1) This section applies where a power conferred by section (Power to stop, board, divert and detain) is exercised in relation to a ship.(2) A law enforcement officer may search any person found on the ship for anything which the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person might use to—(a) cause physical injury,(b) cause damage to property, or(c) endanger the safety of any ship.(3) The power under subsection (2) may be exercised on board the ship or elsewhere.(4) A law enforcement officer searching a person under subsection (2) may seize and retain anything found if the law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person might use it for a purpose mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c) of that subsection.(5) Anything seized under subsection (4) may be retained only for so long as there are reasonable grounds to believe that it might be used as mentioned in that subsection.(6) The power to search a person conferred by subsection (2) does not authorise a law enforcement officer to require the person to remove any clothing in public, other than an outer coat, jacket or gloves.”
“Maritime enforcement powers: other supplementary provision
(1) A law enforcement officer may—(a) be accompanied by other persons, and(b) take equipment or materials,to assist the officer in the exercise of powers under this Chapter.(2) A law enforcement officer may use reasonable force, if necessary, in the performance of functions under this Chapter.(3) A person accompanying a law enforcement officer under subsection (1) may perform any of the officer’s functions under this Chapter, but only under the officer’s supervision.(4) A law enforcement officer must produce evidence of the officer’s authority if asked to do so.(5) The powers conferred by this Chapter do not affect any other powers that a law enforcement officer may have.”
“Maritime enforcement powers: offences
(1) A person commits an offence if the person—(a) intentionally obstructs a law enforcement officer in the performance of functions under this Chapter, or(b) fails without reasonable excuse to comply with a requirement imposed by a law enforcement officer in the performance of those functions.(2) A person who provides information in response to a requirement imposed by a law enforcement officer in the performance of functions under this Chapter commits an offence if—(a) the information is false in a material particular, and the person either knows it is or is reckless as to whether it is, or(b) the person intentionally fails to disclose any material particular.(3) A law enforcement officer may arrest without warrant anyone whom the officer has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be guilty of an offence under this section.(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.”
“Interpretation
(1) In this Chapter—“designated NCA officer” means a National Crime Agency officer who is either or both of the following—(a) an officer designated under section 10 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 as having the powers and privileges of a constable who is entitled to exercise the powers and privileges of a Northern Ireland constable (see paragraph 11(6) of Schedule 5 to that Act);(b) an officer designated under that section as having the powers of a general customs official;“foreign ship” means a ship which—(a) is registered in a State other than the United Kingdom, or(b) is not so registered but is entitled to fly the flag of a State other than the United Kingdom;“home state”, in relation to a foreign ship, means—(a) the State in which the ship is registered, or(b) the State whose flag the ship is otherwise entitled to fly;“items subject to legal privilege” has the same meaning as in the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/1341 (N.I. 12)) (see article 12 of that Order);“law enforcement officer” has the meaning given by section 104A(3);“maritime enforcement powers” has the meaning given by section 104A(2);“Northern Ireland waters” means the sea and other waters within the seaward limits of the territorial sea adjacent to Northern Ireland;“relevant territory” means—(a) the Isle of Man;(b) any of the Channel Islands;(c) a British overseas territory;“ship” includes every description of vessel (including a hovercraft) used in navigation;“ship without nationality” means a ship which—(a) is not registered in, or otherwise entitled to fly the flag of, any State or relevant territory, or(b) sails under the flags of two or more States or relevant territories, or under the flags of a State and relevant territory, using them according to convenience;“United Kingdom ship” means a ship which—(a) is registered under Part 2 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995,(b) is a Government ship within the meaning of that Act,(c) is not registered in any State or relevant territory but is wholly owned by persons each of whom has a United Kingdom connection, or(d) is registered under an Order in Council under section 1 of the Hovercraft Act 1968.(2) For the purposes of paragraph (c) of the definition of “United Kingdom ship” in subsection (1), a person has a “United Kingdom connection” if the person is—(a) a British citizen, a British overseas territories citizen or a British Overseas citizen,(b) an individual who is habitually resident in the United Kingdom, or(c) a body corporate which is established under the law of a part of the United Kingdom and has its principal place of business in the United Kingdom. (3) References in this Chapter to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea include references to any modifications of that Convention agreed after the passing of this Act that have entered into force in relation to the United Kingdom.”
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, Chapter 7 of Part 4 of the Bill closes a gap in cross-border powers by providing for urgent cross-border powers of arrest by police and other law enforcement officers across the three UK jurisdictions. Amendments 138 and 140 extend these powers so that they are exercisable by immigration officers and officers of Revenue and Customs, as well as National Crime Agency officers and designated customs officials who have the powers of Revenue and Customs officers. Amendment 137 provides that the powers are exercisable by British Transport Police officers in respect of offences wherever committed in the UK.
Amendment 149 inserts a new clause to provide that all the cross-border powers of arrest will be exercisable by Revenue and Customs officers in relation to any of the functions of HMRC or Revenue and Customs officers. This means that the powers will be available in relation to both tax and customs matters, rather than being confined to tax matters as they are now. The amendments also clarify the meaning of key terms as they apply to the exercise of the cross-border powers by Revenue and Customs officers and immigration officers. These amendments further enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement across the UK, ensuring that criminals are not able to evade the law simply by crossing an internal border. I beg to move.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
I just raise one question on these amendments, although I readily accept that, perhaps if I had read everything sent to me, I would not be asking such questions. As the Minister said, this talks about an extension of powers to immigration officers, Revenue and Customs officers, the British Transport Police and others. Should these provisions have been included earlier in the Bill and it has just been realised that they were not there, hence these amendments being brought forward, or is this some completely new power? If so, what has been happening up to now? What have been the consequences of not having these powers? How detrimental has that been?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
No, this is just closing the gap that we realised was there earlier on. It is not new.
“(9) In subsection (8), in the definition of “investigating force”, the reference to a police force includes a reference to—(a) the National Crime Agency;(b) any of the following (to the extent that their functions relate to the investigation of offences)—(i) officers of Revenue and Customs;(ii) immigration officers;(iii) designated customs officials within the meaning of Part 1 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 (see section 14(6) of that Act).(10) In the application of this section in a case where the investigating force is a police force mentioned in subsection (9)(a) or (b)—(a) the reference to a constable in subsections (4)(b) and (5)(b), and the reference to a constable in the investigating force in subsection (7)(a), is to be read as a reference to a National Crime Agency officer designated under section 9 or 10 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 (“a designated NCA officer”), an officer of Revenue and Customs, an immigration officer or a designated customs official (as the case may be);(b) any reference to an officer of at least, or above, the rank of inspector in the investigating force is to be read as a reference to a designated NCA officer, an officer of Revenue and Customs, an immigration officer or a designated customs official (as the case may be) of at least, or above, the equivalent grade.”
“(5A) Regulations under subsection (5) may include consequential provision, including provision amending any statutory provision; and, for that purpose, statutory provision has the same meaning as in section 137B (see subsection (10)(c) of that section).”
“(8) In the application of Schedule 7B in a case where the investigating force is a police force mentioned in section 137C(9)(a) or (b), any reference to an officer of at least, or above, a particular rank in the investigating force is to be read as a reference to a designated NCA officer, an officer of Revenue and Customs, an immigration officer or a designated customs official (as the case may be) of at least, or above, the equivalent grade.””
“Cross-border enforcement: officers of Revenue and Customs
In section 87 of the Finance Act 2007 (cross-border exercise of powers: officers of Revenue and Customs), in subsection (4) for “only in the exercise of a function relating to tax (including duties and tax credits)” substitute “in the exercise of any function of the Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs or of officers of Revenue and Customs, within the meaning of the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 (see section 51(2) to (2B) of that Act)”.”
“Powers to require removal of disguises: oral authorisation
In section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (powers to require removal of disguises), for subsection (6) substitute—“(6) Subject to subsection (6A), an authorisation under subsection (3)—(a) shall be in writing and signed by the officer giving it; and(b) shall specify—(i) the grounds on which it is given;(ii) the locality in which the powers conferred by this section are exercisable; and(iii) the period during which those powers are exercisable.(6A) An authorisation under subsection (3) need not be given in writing where it is not practicable to do so but any oral authorisation—(a) must state the matters which would otherwise have to be specified under subsection (6), and(b) must be recorded in writing as soon as it is practicable to do so.(6B) A direction under subsection (4) shall be given in writing or, where that is not practicable, recorded in writing as soon as it is practicable to do so.””
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, these amendments respond to an amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Dear, in Committee, which concerned the authorisation process for the exercise by a constable of the power to require the removal of a disguise. Section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 is an important preventive tool, enabling the police to remove disguises in instances where they believe offences may be committed. As an intrusive power, quite rightly this requires prior authorisation from an officer of the rank of inspector or above.
However, as the noble Lord, Lord Dear, explained in Committee, the spontaneous arising or escalation of public order incidents does not always permit sufficient time for this approval to come in written form. Amendment 150 ensures that oral authorisation is permitted where it is the only practicable course of action. This authorisation must then be put in writing as soon as is practicable. Amendment 204 makes a consequential amendment to the Long Title of the Bill.
These amendments have been the subject of extensive discussions between officials and the relevant national policing leads, as well as between MPs and the former Policing Minister, Mike Penning. They will give greater clarity and flexibility to the police in the operational use of this power. I beg to move.
Lord Dear (CB)
My Lords, I support the amendment. I remind the House that I tabled much the same amendment in Committee. I suggested then that the Minister might take the amendment back, consider it and bring it back on Report—which, of course, has been done. So I record my thanks to the Minister and the officials at the Home Office for their support.
Some misgivings were expressed in Committee that face veils—religious coverings—would be caught in this legislation. I would like to make it clear—as I think is now accepted—that the only change in this amendment is to allow authorisation for the police to use existing powers to be given orally and recorded in writing later. I hope that the fears concerning religious coverings have been allayed and I am very pleased to support the amendment.
Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)
My Lords, my name was on the original amendment but I was unable to take part in Committee because of prior commitments. The noble Lord, Lord Dear, deserves more than praise for the very rational way in which he introduced this issue. The result is an entirely practical one, which is entirely consistent with the maintenance of good order and allowing the police to exercise necessary functions, sometimes in very difficult circumstances. Therefore, I too am happy to support the amendment.
“( ) After subsection (2) insert—“(2A) In the application of section 137C where a person is arrested under section 137A by an officer of Revenue and Customs in respect of a specified offence that is being investigated by an officer of Revenue and Customs—(a) subsection (2)(b) is to be read as if (instead of requiring the detention to be authorised by both an officer of at least the rank of inspector in the arresting force and an officer of at least the rank of inspector in the investigating force) it required the detention to be authorised by an officer of Revenue and Customs of at least the grade equivalent to the rank of inspector;(b) subsection (2)(c) is to be read as if (instead of requiring the detention to be authorised by both an officer of a rank above that of inspector in the arresting force and an officer of a rank above that of inspector in the investigating force) it required the detention to be authorised by an officer of Revenue and Customs of a grade above that equivalent to the rank of inspector;(c) subsection (3) is omitted;(d) in subsections (4) and (5), the reference to an officer of the investigating force is to be read as a reference to an officer of Revenue and Customs;(e) in subsection (6), the reference to an appropriate officer in the investigating force is to be read as a reference to an appropriate officer of Revenue and Customs (as defined by subsection (7));(f) subsection (6)(a) is omitted;(g) in subsection (7)(b), the reference to an officer of at least the rank of inspector is to be read as a reference to an officer of Revenue and Customs of at least the equivalent grade;(h) in subsection (7)(c), the reference to an officer of a rank above that of inspector is to be read as a reference to an officer of Revenue and Customs of above the equivalent grade;(i) subsections (8) to (10) are omitted.(2B) Where section 137C applies in accordance with subsection (2A), Schedule 7B applies with the following modifications—(a) any reference to a constable in the arresting force is to be read as a reference to an officer of Revenue and Customs;(b) any reference to an officer of at least, or above, a particular rank in the investigating force is to be read as a reference to an officer of Revenue and Customs of at least, or above, the equivalent grade;(c) any reference to the arresting force or to the investigating force (otherwise than in relation to a description of officer in the force) is to be read as a reference to officers of Revenue and Customs;(d) instead of the modification made by paragraph 9, section 42 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016 is to be read as if the references in subsections (1)(c)(ii) and (3)(b) to the police were references to officers of Revenue and Customs;(e) the Schedule is to be read as if it also provided for references in the provisions applied by section 137D(2)(d), (3)(d) and (4)(d) to a police station to include references to an office of Revenue and Customs.(2C) In the application of section 137C where a person is arrested under section 137A by an officer of Revenue and Customs in respect of a specified offence other than one that is being investigated by an officer of Revenue and Customs— (a) any reference to an officer of at least, or above, the rank of inspector in the arresting force is to be read as a reference to an officer of Revenue and Customs of at least, or above, the equivalent grade;(b) the reference in subsection (6)(a) to the arresting force is to be read as a reference to any officer of Revenue and Customs.(2D) Where section 137C applies in accordance with subsection (2C), Schedule 7B applies with the following modifications—(a) any reference to a constable in the arresting force is to be read as a reference to an officer of Revenue and Customs;(b) any reference to the arresting force (otherwise than in relation to a description of officer in the force) is to be read as a reference to officers of Revenue and Customs;(c) instead of the modification made by paragraph 9, section 42 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016 is to be read as if the references in subsections (1)(c)(ii) and (3)(b) to the police were references to officers of Revenue and Customs;(d) the Schedule is to be read as if it also provided for references in the provisions applied by section 137D(2)(d), (3)(d) and (4)(d) to a police station to include references to an office of Revenue and Customs.””
“(1) In Schedule 21 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013 (powers of immigration officers), Part 2 (modification of applied enactments) is amended as follows.(2) In paragraph 41, for “Paragraphs 42 and 43” substitute “Paragraphs 42 to 43”.(3) After paragraph 42 insert—“42A(1) This paragraph has effect in relation to the application of section 137C of the 1994 Act where a person is arrested under section 137A by an immigration officer in respect of a specified offence that is being investigated by an immigration officer._(2) Subsection (2)(b) is to be read as if (instead of requiring the detention to be authorised by both an officer of at least the rank of inspector in the arresting force and an officer of at least the rank of inspector in the investigating force) it required the detention to be authorised by an immigration officer of at least the grade equivalent to the rank of inspector._(3) Subsection (2)(c) is to be read as if (instead of requiring the detention to be authorised by both an officer of a rank above that of inspector in the arresting force and an officer of a rank above that of inspector in the investigating force) it required the detention to be authorised by an immigration officer of a grade above that equivalent to the rank of inspector._(4) Subsection (3) is omitted._(5) In subsections (4) and (5), the reference to an officer of the investigating force is to be read as a reference to an officer of Revenue and Customs._(6) In subsection (6), the reference to an appropriate officer in the investigating force is to be read as a reference to an appropriate immigration officer (as defined by subsection (7))._(7) Subsection (6)(a) is omitted._(8) In subsection (7)—(a) in paragraph (b), the reference to an officer of at least the rank of inspector is a reference to an immigration officer of at least the equivalent grade; (b) in paragraph (c), the reference to an officer of a rank above that of inspector is to be read as a reference to an immigration officer of above the equivalent grade._(9) Subsections (8) to (10) are omitted.42B(1) Where section 137C applies in accordance with paragraph 42A, Schedule 7B applies with the following modifications._(2) Any reference to a constable in the arresting force is to be read as a reference to an immigration officer._(3) Any reference to an officer of at least, or above, the rank of inspector in the investigating force is to be read as a reference to an immigration officer who is at least, or above, the equivalent grade._(4) Any reference to the arresting force or to the investigating force (otherwise than in relation to a description of officer in the force) is to be read as a reference to immigration officers._(5) Instead of the modification made by paragraph 9, section 42 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016 is to be read as if the references in subsections (1)(c)(ii) and (3)(b) to the police were references to immigration officers.42C(1) This paragraph has effect in relation to the application of section 137C of the 1994 Act where a person is arrested under section 137A by an immigration officer in respect of a specified offence other than one that is being investigated by an immigration officer._(2) Any reference to an officer of at least, or above, the rank of inspector in the arresting force is to be read as a reference to an immigration officer of at least, or above, the equivalent grade._(3) The reference in subsection (6)(a) to the arresting force is to be read as a reference to any immigration officer.42D(1) Where section 137C applies in accordance with paragraph 42C, Schedule 7B applies with the following modifications._(2) Any reference to a constable in the arresting force is to be read as a reference to an immigration officer._(3) Any reference to the arresting force (otherwise than in relation to a description of officer in the force) is to be read as a reference to immigration officers._(4) Instead of the modification made by paragraph 9, section 42 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016 is to be read as if the references in subsections (1)(c)(ii) and (3)(b) to the police were references to immigration officers.””
“Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime as member of local authority
(1) Section 1 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 (disqualification and political restriction of certain local authority officers and staff) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (9) (references to a person holding a politically restricted post under a local authority include every member of the staff of an elected local policing body) omit “, except for a deputy police and crime commissioner”. (3) After that subsection insert—“(10) The reference in subsection (9) to every member of the staff of an elected local policing body does not include a deputy police and crime commissioner.(11) For the purposes of subsection (1) only, the reference in subsection (9) to every member of the staff of an elected local policing body does not include the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime appointed under section 19(1)(a) of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011.””
Lord Rosser
“Police and crime commissioners: parity of funding at inquests
(1) Where the police force for which a police and crime commissioner is responsible is an interested person for the purposes of an inquest into—(a) the death of a member of an individual family, or(b) the deaths of members of a group of families,under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, the commissioner has the duties set out in this section.(2) The police and crime commissioner must make recommendations to the Secretary of State as to whether the individual family or the group of families at the inquest require financial support to ensure parity of legal representation between parties to the inquest.(3) If a police and crime commissioner makes a recommendation for financial support under subsection (2), then the Secretary of State must provide financial assistance to the individual family or the group of families to ensure parity of funding between the individual family or the group of families and the other party to the inquest.(4) The individual family or the group of families may use funding authorised under this section solely for the purpose of funding legal representation at the inquest.(5) In this section, “interested person” has the same meaning as in section 47 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.”
Lord Rosser
My Lords, the purpose of this amendment and its associated new clause is to establish the principle of parity of legal funding for bereaved families at inquests involving the police. Of course, we debated this in Committee.
The lack of such funding and the associated injustice was highlighted by the somewhat sorry saga of the Hillsborough hearings, and the extent to which the scales were weighted against the families of those who had lost their lives. Publicity was given to the issue because of the high-profile nature of the Hillsborough tragedy and the steps that were taken in its aftermath to pin the blame for what had happened on supporters at the game, perhaps in an attempt to cover up where responsibility really lay, and which emerged only years later.
The other week, according to the media, the coroner dealing with the first pre-inquest hearing into the 21 victims of the 1974 Birmingham pub bombings backed applications for their bereaved families to get legal funding for proper representation. He commended the application, said he did not have the power to authorise funds and commented that for those families who wanted to be legally represented, there was a compelling case for proper legal representation. However, inquests at which the police are legally represented are not confined to major tragedies such as Hillsborough; numerically, they are more likely to cover the death of a member of an individual family.
Many bereaved families can find themselves in an adversarial and aggressive environment when they go to an inquest. They are not in a position to match the spending of the police or other parts of the public sector when it comes to their own legal representation. Bereaved families have to try, if possible, to find their own money to have any sort of legal representation. Public money should pay to establish the truth. It is surely not right, and surely not justice, when bereaved families trying to find out the truth—and who have done nothing wrong—find that taxpayers’ money is used by the other side, sometimes to paint a very different picture of events in a bid to destroy their credibility.
In the case of Hillsborough, the Lord Chief Justice made a specific ruling when he quashed the original inquest. He said he hoped that given that the police had tainted the evidence, the new inquest would not degenerate into an adversarial battle. However, that is precisely what happened. If there is to continue to be an adversarial battle at inquests involving the police, we should at least ensure that bereaved families have the same ability as the public sector to get their points and questions across—and frankly, in the light of what can currently happen, to defend themselves and their lost loved ones from attack and, if necessary, to challenge the very way in which proceedings are conducted. This is a bigger issue than simply Hillsborough, since it relates to the situation that all too often happens to many families but without the same publicity as Hillsborough.
In response in Committee, the Government accepted that all would sympathise with the intention of the amendment. They went on to say that the former Home Secretary had commissioned Bishop James Jones to compile a report on the experiences of the Hillsborough families, and that we should wait for his report before considering the issues further. Clearly, the coroner at the pre-inquest hearing into the 21 victims of the 1974 Birmingham pub bombings did not feel it necessary to wait for the Jones report before expressing his views on the application for funding for proper legal representation.
The Government were asked in Committee for clarity on the scope and terms of reference of Bishop Jones’s inquiry and whether it would look not only at the circumstances where large numbers of families are potentially involved but at situations where one bereaved family may be traumatised by what has happened to the victim, and faces the full panoply of legal representation by a police force that is an interested person for the purposes of an inquest into the death of a member of an individual family. The Government replied that they would see and respond to Bishop Jones’s review in due course, but added that he was still considering the terms of reference for his Hillsborough review with the families and intended to publish them shortly. That suggests that the outcome of the review is some way away and will be much orientated to Hillsborough, rather than to the issue of funding at inquests generally where the police are represented.
In Committee, the Government also said that the amendment would place a significant financial burden on the Secretary of State. That may not necessarily be the case since the requirement for parity of funding, where the police are represented at taxpayers’ expense, may lead to a harder look at the level and extent of representation required by a police force at an inquest, or indeed whether in some cases such legal representation is really needed at all. In any case, the lack of the terms of this amendment did not prevent the significant amount of funding that finally had to be provided in relation to Hillsborough—which I think the Government said amounted to £63.6 million. So even without this amendment, because of the way in which the situation was handled, that was apparently the amount that they ended up paying out.
The Government also raised what they themselves described as technical issues with the amendment, but accepted that those were detailed points and secondary—an acknowledgement, I suggest, that they could be addressed if necessary. We surely do not need further delay for the outcome of an inquiry where the terms of reference have apparently not even been finalised, where there is little likelihood of a speedy report and where the Government’s commitment is only to consider the review in due course. Despite the Government saying in Committee that all would sympathise with the intention of the amendment, there is no commitment even in principle to address the issue of inequality in funding for bereaved families at any time, yet alone within a credible and realistic timescale that shows that this is a matter of some priority. I suggest that we need to act now to change a process and procedure that appears at times to be geared more to trying to grind down bereaved families than to enabling them to get at the truth and obtain a feeling that justice has been done. I beg to move.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, I regret to say that I cannot support this proposed new clause, although I have a great deal of sympathy with the thinking behind it. I am quite sure that we should move to a situation where, in appropriate cases, there could be parity of funding. Where I differ from the noble Lord is in the suggestion in the proposed new clause that it should be the police commissioner who makes the recommendation. In my view, it should be the coroner. The truth is that we are dealing with a judicial process, and clearly some people will want to be represented, but whether or not what they have to contribute is relevant is something that only the person in charge of the judicial process can really determine, and that is the coroner. He alone can have a clear view of the issues and the relevance of the participation of the relevant parties. Also, we are really in the process of people making applications for funding that may themselves be resisted. There has to be a process whereby those submissions can be determined. It seems to me that that has to be the coroner.
I point out just two other considerations. I can conceive of circumstances in inquests where the police commissioner has a conflict of interest—either that he or she may be the subject of criticism in the course of the inquest, or that he or she might seek to take regulatory action against chief officers as a result of the inquest. That is a potential conflict of interest that we need to reflect upon.
Lastly, we need to entrust this process to an independent figure. The elected police commissioner is not an independent judicial figure; indeed, as he or she comes to the end of their elected term they may have every sort of personal reason to bump large wads of cash to people coming along to apply for it. It is not a happy situation. If the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, were to come forward with a proposal to the effect that the coroner should be in a position to make these recommendations, I would be happy to support it subject to any contrary argument. But as to the proposal that the police commissioner should trigger the recommendation, I absolutely cannot support it.
Lord Blair of Boughton
I support the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, on that point. However, given that this is Report, I ask the Minister to bring back a government amendment that says that it is the coroner. We should not lose this opportunity. I support the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, in saying that we ought to have a process in which there is an equality of arms between the two sides. As I understand it, however—I stand to be corrected—the House can do that only if the Government bring forward an amendment on Third Reading which says what the noble Lord’s amendment does, but that it is not the police and crime commissioner; it is the coroner. I completely agree.
Lord Dear
My Lords, I can be very brief and agree entirely with the last two speakers. The sentiment behind the amendment is admirable, but the way it plays out needs regulation. I too strongly support the Government taking this away and bringing it back with the coroner in pride of place.
Lord Hunt of Chesterton (Lab)
My Lords, I support the amendment tabled by my noble friend. I speak as a scientist. I tabled a Question some eight or nine years ago about when there are scientific questions in a legal case and lots of money is spent by the Crown on some prosecution and little or zero money is available for the defence. It would be more appropriate, as in many civil cases, to have some sharing between the two sides of the nature of the scientific study and the interpretation of the data. When that does not happen—for example, it did not in the case of R v Sion Jenkins—you get serious miscarriages of justice and lots of money being spent: £10 million, I think, in that case. This amendment is very important.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)
My Lords, many years ago the “Marchioness” inquiry had to have a second coroner’s inquest. The parents of the people who had sadly lost their lives came to me and asked for legal aid, because there was no legal aid generally speaking in that situation. It was possible for me to authorise a fixed payment. In other words, I would decide how long their matter should last. Having had regard to the submissions made, I was able to fix an amount that defrayed the cost of the second inquest for the parents, which was extremely satisfactory.
A police force may be an interested party without being represented, but where it is represented, money should be available to the people affected on the other side. I agree that a judicial officer should decide that. The obvious judicial officer in this case is the coroner, who is already fixed with the ideas and matters likely to be litigated in the inquest. Therefore, if the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, was to go for the coroner instead of the elected police commissioner, that would be worth putting on the statute book now, subject to any argument we may yet hear from the Government. It is true that a considerable inquiry is already initiated, but it is primarily related to what happened at Hillsborough, which was a very special case. This is a much more general proposition. There is a good deal to be said for it. If the police want to save public money they should reduce their representation.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I support the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, taking into account the contributions that have subsequently been made. I will reinforce some of the points I made in Committee and some of the points the noble Lord made.
Hillsborough was not unique. A more recent case I was a participant in was the inquest of Jean Charles de Menezes. Noble Lords will remember that Jean Charles de Menezes was accidentally killed by armed officers in 2005, having wrongly been identified as one of the suspects who had attempted to carry out a suicide bombing. I gave evidence for the family. I experienced first-hand the tactics deployed by some police counsel at inquests—a search for the truth turns into a bruising adversarial encounter. As I said in Committee, the coroner had to warn the police counsel over the aggressive tactics he was using in cross-examination.
As far as the family of the deceased is concerned, I do not believe there can be any argument. It cannot be right that the police can employ as large and as eminent a legal team as their considerable budgets will allow to represent them while the families of those who die at the hands of the police struggle to raise the funds to be represented at all, nor should it fall to public interest lawyers to have to provide pro bono representation. If the Government are looking for a low-cost or no-cost option, perhaps the police could be forced to divide whatever budget they decide to deploy at an inquest equally with the family of the deceased. Any death at the hands of the police is a tragedy, and it is as important for the police as it is for the family to ensure that the true facts emerge in order to reassure the public that the police have acted fairly and reasonably and to enable the police to counter those with a political agenda, who often accuse them of a cover-up and of having given a misleading account of what happened. Spending public money on establishing beyond doubt what happened when someone died at the hands of the police is worth every penny, and I believe the police themselves should fund both legal teams to the same extent.
I accept what the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said about the issues with this amendment, and I accept what the noble Lords, Lord Blair of Boughton and Lord Dear, have said on this issue. Having served in your Lordships’ House for only three years, I do not know whether I should dare say that my understanding is that, as we are on Report, it is only the Government who could bring forward an alternative amendment at Third Reading. If we are, as we should be, trying to establish the principle of equality of arms in an inquest situation, if this is the only amendment we can divide on and if the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, decides to divide the House, we will support him.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
I think that if the Government agree that the matter can be reconsidered at Third Reading, it does not need to be a government amendment.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)
My Lords, I do not doubt the sincerity of the intentions behind this amendment. The new clause comes directly from the experiences of the Hillsborough families, and anyone who has heard of their long fight for justice cannot fail to be moved. I entirely accept, however, that the issue raised by the amendment is of general application.
As noble Lords will be aware from the debate in Committee, the Government’s position on this amendment is that we should wait for the report commissioned from Bishop James Jones on the experiences of the Hillsborough families. In commissioning the work, the then Home Secretary asked Bishop Jones,
“to ensure that the full perspective of those most affected by the Hillsborough disaster is not lost”.—[Official Report, Commons, 27/4/16; col. 1436.]
The families will have numerous experiences, including views on legal representation, and this will be reflected in Bishop Jones’s report, which he aims to publish next spring.
I entirely accept noble Lords’ points about the coroner, and we will bring them to the attention of Bishop Jones, but I reiterate that it is appropriate that the Government have the opportunity to consider his conclusions and recommendations fully before deciding what action to take. It would therefore be premature to proceed with the amendment at this stage.
It must be right that any consideration of this amendment takes account of the financial implications. The cost of the legal representation for the 103 Hillsborough families at the fresh inquests amounted to £63.6 million. Clearly, the Hillsborough inquests were an exceptional case, but they provide at least an indication of the level of financial commitment such an amendment could imply. While it is the case that the Hillsborough families received public funding for their legal costs at the fresh inquest, it was a bespoke scheme, instituted due to the exceptional nature of the events that took place 27 years ago.
Recognising the exceptional nature of the Hillsborough inquests, it is also right that we look at other data. We cannot say for certain in how many inquests the police are named as an interested person. However, we know from the Independent Police Complaints Commission report Deaths During or Following Police Contact: Statistics for England and Wales 2015/16 that in the last financial year, 200 persons died following contact with the police. All of those deaths would have been subject to an inquest. Of course, the financial implications of this amendment are but one of the matters noble Lords will wish to take into consideration, but we cannot be blind to the impact on the public purse.
However, I come back to my core objection to this amendment: that this is neither the time nor the place to pursue this matter. As I have said, the Government are firmly of the view that we should wait for Bishop Jones’s report and then determine, in the light of that, the most appropriate way forward. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, will accept that this is the proper way to proceed and agree—
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
Before the Minister sits down, I would like to be quite clear. Is she rejecting the wise advice from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern? Is she saying that this is not a point of principle but a point of public expenditure?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I am not disagreeing with anything that noble Lords have said. I have said that, in the light of the review by Bishop Jones, this is not the time to press the amendment. I hope, on that note, that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Rosser
I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate and will just make one or two comments on what the Minister had to say in reply. What is recorded in Hansard is that,
“the former Home Secretary commissioned Bishop James Jones to compile a report on the experiences of the Hillsborough families”.
It does not say there that he has been asked to compile a report on the much wider issue raised in this amendment. As far as the timescale is concerned, I can only repeat what the Government said in Committee not so long ago, on 2 November, which is that Bishop Jones has only reached the stage where:
“He is considering the terms of reference for his review with the families”—
presumably the Hillsborough families—
“and intends to publish them shortly”.
He must be some way from that, if it is going to be a detailed report looking at the situation as a whole, rather than just the Hillsborough situation. Certainly, if there is a suggestion that he is going to publish something within a very few months, it would suggest very much that it is going to be concentrated on what happened at Hillsborough and the experience of the Hillsborough families, and not on the much wider issue covered in this amendment of representation for bereaved families at inquests generally where the police are legally represented. The issue of costs has been raised by the Government, which must raise some further doubts. I refer again to what the Government said on 2 November, which is that the Government wish to,
“put on record that these amendments would place a significant financial burden on the Secretary of State … The cost of the legal representation for the 103 families at the fresh inquest into Hillsborough amounted to £63.6 million”.—[Official Report, 2/11/16; cols. 757-59.]
The Government incurred that cost without the terms of this amendment being in operation. But it is quite clear that cost is a major consideration as far as the Government are concerned, rather than the fundamental issue of principle—parity of funding—which is addressed in the amendment. We also of course have not had any commitment from the Government in principle to what is in this amendment, and there is a reference as well to it being considered in due course.
I will come on to the comments that were made. Because there has been no indication that we can bring this back at Third Reading, I believe that we are no longer in a position where we can come back then with an amendment to our amendment. But if the issue is that this should be decided by a coroner or through some sort of judicial decision, rather than by the police and crime commissioner, and if the Government were prepared to give a commitment to bring along an amendment of that nature, I am quite sure that we would support it. The issue for us is not whether it is the police and crime commissioner making the recommendation. The gut issue here is parity of support for bereaved families at inquests where the police are legally represented. Since I do not think I have had a sufficient response from the Government, I beg leave—
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
Before the noble Lord sits down, I draw attention to the fact that if in due course this amendment were passed in a form that specified the coroner, there would still be the question of the date on which it would come into force. It would certainly be possible for the Government, if they thought it right, to wait for Bishop Jones’s report before bringing it into force. On the other hand, as we know, there are occasions on which, if the Government think they have good reason, they sometimes do not bring things that they have an option to postpone into effect at all. So it would certainly be possible to make it clear that that is what could happen here.
I hope the Government will agree that the noble Lord can bring this back without agreeing a commitment as to what should happen. It would be extremely wise for this House to have the chance to consider the amendment with the coroner in instead of the police and crime commissioner, and I hope my noble friend’s discretion is sufficient to allow her to say that the Government would not object to the amendment being brought back. Ultimately it is the House rather than any party that decides whether or not an amendment can be brought back, but I hope we would not need to go into that kind of procedure here if the Government were kind enough to say that if the amendment came forward in the shape that I am suggesting, and which the noble Lord has made clear he would be happy with, it could be considered. That would not mean a commitment by the Government to accept such an amendment, but at least it could be considered at Third Reading.
Lord Rosser
I can only invite the Minister to say whether the Government will indicate that they accept that I can bring this matter back at Third Reading. Having heard the views of the House, I would certainly wish to do so in the kind of terms that the House has indicated might make the amendment more acceptable. But I do not think I can do that if I am not going to get any indication from the Minister that the Government will accept that I can bring it back at Third Reading. I think I am seeing her shake her head, which I take it means that the Government will not accept it and indeed are not prepared to say anything that would enable me to bring it back. I believe that I have understood the Minister correctly, and in the light of that I really have no option but to seek to test the opinion of the House.
(a) is designed to discharge only a small plastic missile (whether or not it is also capable of discharging any other kind of missile), and(b) is not capable of discharging a missile (of any kind) with kinetic energy at the muzzle of the weapon that exceeds the permitted level.”
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the government amendments in this group seek to improve the provisions in Part 6 of the Bill relating to firearms. Amendments 159 to 162 make four improvements to the definition of airsoft weapons, which are non-lethal and pose a low risk to public safety. These weapons are legitimately used to discharge pellets manufactured with plastics and are considered as safe for mock skirmishing activities. Amendment 159 responds to concerns raised with us that the current definition is too restrictive and has no realistic prospect of applying to many airsoft weapons, because those weapons could be used to discharge missiles other than these pellets. It amends the definition to refer to the original design of the weapon to discharge only a small plastic missile as defined in the exemption. However, as the then Firearms Consultative Committee found in 2002, airsoft darts, which have higher penetrative qualities, pose a higher risk of causing serious injury than pellets discharged at the same kinetic energy level. Amendment 160 sets out that only weapons designed to discharge small spherical plastic missiles will be considered to be airsoft weapons.
The amendments also take account of new evidence from forensic tests undertaken during the summer on the lethality of airsoft weapons which were used to discharge pellets of up to 8 millimetres in diameter at the maximum permitted kinetic energy levels. Amendment 161 therefore increases the maximum allowable diameter from the current maximum of 6 millimetres to 8 millimetres, in line with the forensic evidence. Amendment 162 makes a technical amendment to the definition of automatic fire airsoft weapons in relation to the permitted kinetic energy level of such weapons, to be consistent with Amendment 159. The Government are committed to legislation that has a proportionate impact. These amendments will allow legitimate businesses in the airsoft industry to continue operating while setting clear standards of compliance required to protect public safety.
Amendments 163 to 165 to Clause 112 amend the definition of an antique firearm in order to cover air weapons as well as weapons that use an ignition system. As currently drafted, the clause confers a new regulation-making power to specify antique firearms by reference to the obsolete cartridge that they are chambered to discharge, or their ignition system. The intention is to place existing guidance on antique firearms on a statutory footing to clarify the law on antique firearms and prevent abuse by criminals. Currently, it is not possible to include air weapons within the definition of an antique firearm as they do not have an ignition system.
Amendments 163 and 165 will ensure that the definition can cover any type of firearm by reference to its propulsion system which, technically, can apply to air weapons as well as ignition firearms. Amendment 164 limits this extension of the definition to England and Wales only, given that the regulation of air weapons is a devolved matter in Scotland.
I hope that Amendments 166 and 167 address the legitimate concern raised by my noble friend Lord Attlee in Committee about the potential impact of EU deactivation standards for deactivated weapons on collectors and the film industry, and the need for the UK to be able to retain more robust controls.
Clause 114 amends the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988 to make it an offence to make a “defectively deactivated” weapon available for sale or as a gift, or to sell such a weapon or to give it as a gift, other than to a person or persons who are outside the European Union. This gives effect to the European Commission implementing regulation on deactivation standards, which came into force on 8 April 2016 to set the standard for deactivating firearms across the European Union. As currently drafted, the clause retains the link to the EU standards in primary legislation. Amendments 166 and 167 remove this and instead provide for the standards to be specified by the Secretary of State. While we remain members of the EU we are required to abide by the EU standards, but these amendments provide the flexibility to set our own higher standards in the future.
In these circumstances, the Government recognise that it would be inappropriate for our museums to be subject to the new offence when transferring or receiving firearms deactivated to previous standards. It is not our intention for museums licensed to hold firearms to incur additional costs in relation to already deactivated weapons to comply with new deactivation standards which are not directed at them. The risk that museums may have to destroy weapons which are part of our cultural heritage would be an unacceptable result of these provisions. Amendments 168 and 169 therefore provide for the exemption of museums licensed by the Home Office in relation to firearms to be able to transfer or receive weapons which were deactivated to UK standards before the EU directive came into force and until the Secretary of State sets new standards.
Amendment 169A responds to an amendment tabled by Geoffrey Clifton-Brown at Commons Report stage. It amends the law relating to the legitimate practice of lending and borrowing a rifle or shotgun for the purposes of hunting animals, shooting game or vermin, and shooting at artificial targets on private premises. Current legislation permits a firearm certificate holder to lend a rifle or shotgun to a non-certificate holder only if the occupier—or, where the relevant firearm is a rifle, the occupier’s servant—is present on private land of which they are the occupier. The amendment allows a certificate holder to lend a firearm or shotgun on private premises, where they have the permission, in writing, of a person with the right to invite guests on to the premises for the purposes that I have already referred to. The effect of this amendment is that both certificate holders with the right to invite guests on to premises for shooting purposes, and other certificate holders with the written authorisation of such a person, will be able to lend a firearm to a non-certificate holder. The certificate holder providing the written authorisation will be able to set restrictions on either the lending certificate holder or the borrower if they wish.
Finally, Amendments 170 and 171 extend the application of the offence of possession of pyrotechnic articles at live music events to Wales as well as England. This follows consultation with the Welsh Government, who agree that this new offence does not relate to devolved matters.
There is also Amendment 169B in this group, but I will wait to hear what the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has to say before responding. In the meantime, I beg to move.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, I support these amendments, and I am particularly grateful for Amendments 166 to 169 and for the Minister’s explanation. The Minister has done everything she possibly can to meet my concerns. Unfortunately, however, she has to react to EU legislation, and the current regime will still have serious effects on collectors and businesses. But there is nothing we can do about it—it is a matter for the EU. In Committee I mentioned the Minister’s excellent officials, and I hope that she will encourage them to engage at EU level to try to get the EU to see that it ought to adopt our system of deactivation, which has worked so well for so many years. However, I am grateful to the Minister.
Baroness Mallalieu (Lab)
My Lords, I too thank the Minister for introducing Amendment 169A on the lending of a firearm by someone who has a certificate. I am well aware that this has caused a great deal of confusion and uncertainty, and I very much hope that this clear amendment will receive publicity in both the farming and the sporting press, which will mean that that confusion goes. I declare an interest as president of the Countryside Alliance.
Lord Rosser
Before speaking to my Amendment 169B, I would like further clarification of government Amendment 169A and the extent to which the provisions are new or simply reiterate the existing position. I am grateful for the Minister’s letter to me of 6 December, but the fact that I raise further points indicates that I do not necessarily feel that I have found the answers within that letter. I make these points simply to ascertain the answers to the questions I raise, nothing more than that.
On the face of it, this amendment appears to say that it is acceptable for a 17 year-old who does not hold a certificate to borrow a rifle or a shotgun on private premises from a lender who is aged 18 and may have had a certificate under the Act for presumably a very short period of time. It will be helpful to know if that is an accurate interpretation or whether it shows a misunderstanding on my part. If it is basically correct, what checks have to be carried out on the 17 year-old—or on any other person—to make sure that they are a suitable person to borrow a rifle or a shotgun when they themselves do not hold a certificate under the Act? How will it be known whether they have, for example, a criminal record containing offences of violence or even illegal possession of a weapon? What check will there be on that, and who will undertake it before such a person is allowed to borrow a weapon? Will it be acceptable for a person with a criminal record to be able to borrow a rifle or a shotgun under the terms of this amendment or is that precluded anyway under the lender’s certificate, to which reference is made in the amendment?
The amendment states that the borrower must be in the presence of the lender during the period for which the rifle or shotgun is borrowed. As a serious question, is that literally the case, including—to put it bluntly—if they want to go to the toilet? Does,
“in the presence of the lender”,
mean that the borrower must at all times be within the sight of the lender? What will be the penalties if a rifle or shotgun is lent and the conditions referred to in the amendment are not adhered to, and if those conditions are breached, is there any statutory requirement to report such a breach to the police or any other authority?
I would be grateful for responses to those questions, and if they cannot be provided today, obviously it will be perfectly acceptable for them to be given in correspondence subsequently. It may be that I have so misunderstood the situation that there is a one-sentence answer to the points I have raised anyway.
On my amendment, which we discussed in Committee, the issue we raised was that the cost to the police of firearms licencing was much greater than the income coming in from the licence, which effectively meant that the issuing of such licences was being subsidised. The Government spoke in terms of being able to look at this issue following the introduction of the police’s online system for handling applications for civilian firearm and shotgun certificates. In Committee, I asked when the online system would be introduced, whether it would lead to the police recovering the full costs of their role in administering applications and whether the fees would be increased in the interim to cover the costs now being incurred. The Minister very kindly undertook to write to me and I thank her for the letter which I subsequently received. The letter states that the fees have now been set at a level that will enable the police to recover the costs of firearms licensing once an online system is in place. Therefore, I ask the Minister to confirm for the record in Hansard that, once the online system is in place, there will be no further subsidising by the taxpayer of the cost to the police of firearms licensing and that the fees will be set at a level that will enable the police to recover the full costs of their role in administering applications.
Viscount Hailsham
My Lords, I would like to make a declaration of interest, in that I hold a shotgun certificate and a firearm certificate, and to that extent I may be supposed to have a personal interest. Moreover, I have a declaration of personal responsibility to make too, in that after the Hungerford shooting way back at the end of the 1980s I was the Minister in the Home Office—subject, of course, to Douglas Hurd, now Lord Hurd of Westwell—responsible for the carriage of the firearms Act in 1988. I also have a long-standing interest in the law relating to firearms.
I am broadly in favour of Amendment 169A. Indeed, it is a response to my former Parliamentary Private Secretary, Mr Geoffrey Clifton-Brown—and all credit to him for tabling it in the House of Commons. However, I have one reservation about proposed new subsection (1)(b) in the amendment, which states,
“in the case of a rifle, the borrower is aged 17 or over”.
Contrary to what the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said, I think that that threshold is far too high. I look back to my youth when I used to use a .22 carbine, shooting on the lawn under the very close supervision of my father, who was, I think, a fairly respectable Member of this House. We felt that there was nothing improper about that so long as the supervision was close. I think that the age 17 threshold is too high. Personally, I would rather see a lower one—14 or something close to it. I agree that there should be supervision but I do not agree with the threshold.
I am very much against Amendment 169B, which concerns the full recovery of costs. I think we need to keep in mind the basic proposition that if you give powers to officials, on occasion they will be abused. That is one of the great rules of politics. Therefore, one needs to watch very carefully the powers you give officials.
In Lincolnshire, the chief officer pursues a sensible firearms policy. However, I am conscious that there are forces not too distant from Lincolnshire in which the firearms officers are fairly aggressive, driving up the cost. You should have a restriction of the reasonable cost, not the full cost, because it is possible for chief officers and firearms officers, through an overaggressive use of their investigatory and inspection powers, to drive the cost up, either because they want to deter firearms use or simply because they have a fairly aggressive approach. Therefore, my strong preference is that the limit be confined to a reasonable cost and not the full cost.
In acknowledging my own failings in 1987, I will go a little wider. There are three areas relating to the possession of firearms to which I hope my noble friend will give consideration in the future—or perhaps even in this Bill. First, what happens when your guest leaves by accident his or her gun in your house? This has happened to me. One of my guests, a Member of your Lordships’ House, was shooting with me in Scotland and he managed to leave his shotgun accidently when he went a long way south, 200 or 300 miles away. The gun was in the gun cabinet and perfectly locked up, but the estate owner was not certificated to hold it. I asked myself whether I should take it down to him. I was not certificated to transport it. What does one do? I am not going to tell you what I did for obvious enforcement reasons, but it is a dilemma. What is the law where a gun is accidently left behind but is secure in a gun case? We need to have provision to cover such a situation.
Secondly, and rather similarly, if you go shooting some distance from your home you take your gun in the car. You travel along the motorway—no doubt with your wife or your partner—and when you stop at a service station, for obvious reasons, you leave your gun, generally speaking, in the car, with your wife in the car looking after it. However, in the normal run of events, she is not certificated. In my case I have taken precautions in that regard, but your wife or partner in the car is in possession of a gun for which she is not certificated. That is potentially an offence.
My final point—I am sorry to trespass on your Lordships’ patience—relates to the keys of gun cases. Some of your Lordships may know of the unfortunate case where a lady admitted to a police officer that she knew where the keys to the gun case were, and she was done for being in possession of the gun. That is a complete nonsense. I did not tackle these problems when I was the Minister in charge of this issue, but I like to think that my noble friend will be more sensible than I was.
In the old days, enforcement of gun laws was fairly relaxed. The chief officer would know that so and so was a reliable citizen. However, that is not the case now—probably rightly—and what I have described can give rise to serious sanctions and penalties. That alarms me. I like to think that my noble friend on the Front Bench will reflect on my shortcomings as the Minister responsible for the 1987 Act and perhaps remedy the deficiencies.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I support Amendment 169B in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Kennedy of Southwark.
I accept the point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, about reasonable cost as opposed to full cost recovery—or, at least, I could accept it if it was an approach the Government took across the board. However, in Committee I drew a parallel with the Immigration Act, where the Government proposed a philosophy of full cost recovery for visa applications and for the Immigration Service generally. I asked the Minister then, if she was not going to agree with amendments tabled to ensure full cost recovery for the issuing of firearm certificates, to explain why a different approach is being taken to the principle of full cost recovery when it comes to immigration. In particular, I asked her to refute the obvious allegation that the Government are discriminating against foreign nationals as against those who go hunting with guns for sport. I cannot recall the Minister specifically responding to that question; perhaps she could address it today.
Having apparently agreed in Committee to the principle of full cost recovery for firearms certificates, the Minister went on to say that there was a public consultation on these issues and that,
“there might be good reasons not to set fees at full cost recovery levels, either for a transitional period or for certain categories of licence holder”.—[Official Report, 9/11/16; col. 1163.]
There are very good reasons why visa applications and the like should not be set at full cost recovery levels, yet the Government appear determined that they should be, without any public consultation or a transitional period. Can the Minister explain why foreign nationals are being treated differently from those who possess firearms?
I asked the Minister in Committee what consultation there had been with groups that represent immigrants or those who might apply for visas before the Government implemented full cost recovery for immigration visas. Can the Minister please answer that question for the record, as she was unable to do so in Committee?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, perhaps I may first deal with some of the questions that have arisen out of Amendment 169A. Both the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and my noble friend Lord Hailsham asked about the age threshold of 17—the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, probably thought that it was too low and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, thought it too high. The age of 17 or over for borrowing rifles reflects the current position under Section 16 of the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988—which the noble Viscount may have taken through Parliament himself.
The noble Viscount asked about firearms accidentally left in someone’s house. I understood that if you held a firearms licence yourself, it was okay for someone to leave something in your house, but I am not certain on that point so I will write to him.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked whether the provisions were new. The answer is both yes and no, because they amend current legislation. After careful consideration, we have decided to clarify and align the existing provisions for the borrowing of a rifle or shotgun to practise the hunting of animals and the shooting of game or vermin on private land. He also asked whether individuals with a qualifying criminal record are prohibited from possessing a firearm under Section 21 of the 1968 Act. It is for the lender to satisfy himself or herself that a borrower does not have a relevant criminal record when he or she is lending them a firearm.
The lender would have to be present. If the borrower needed to go to the toilet, for example, they would have to leave the certificate-holder with the weapon while they went to the loo.
I will just respond to Amendment 169B from the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. The Government agreed that fees for firearm certificates should be set on a cost recovery basis. I am happy to confirm, as I did in my letter to the noble Lord, that the cost of these certificates is expected to reflect the full cost of licensing once a new, more cost-effective online licensing system is in place. We already increased the fees for civilian firearm certificates in line with this objective, and Clause 117 allows us to set fees for licences issued by the Home Office and the Scottish Government. As I think I said in Committee, this will save the taxpayer around £700,000 a year.
Viscount Hailsham
My noble friend was good enough to say she would write to me and I am grateful. Would she include in her letter a response on what I would summarise as the service station point, and the point about when one’s wife or partner knows the whereabouts of the key to the gun safe?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I certainly will. I would be very careful before going to my noble friend’s house, given the guns and their placement in various cars and things. I hope Viscountess Hailsham will be careful, too. I will certainly write to my noble friend on all those points.
Lord Rosser
I am sure the Minister’s response was clear but I did not hear it properly: did she say that the Policing Minister would write on a particular issue concerning firearms? If so, could she repeat that as I am afraid I did not pick it up?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I just pointed out that we are both frustrated about this matter and that the Policing Minister will write to the national policing lead for firearms for an update on progress.
“(aa) is spherical, and”
“(2DA) In its application to Scotland, subsection (2C) does not apply in relation to a firearm that is an air weapon.”
(4A) The Secretary of State must publish a document setting out the technical specifications that apply for the purposes of subsection (4)(c) (“the technical specifications document”).(4B) The technical specifications document may set out different technical specifications for different kinds of weapon.(4C) The Secretary of State—(a) may from time to time revise the technical specifications document, and(b) where it is revised—(i) must publish the document as revised, and(ii) specify in it the date on which any changes to the technical specifications that apply for the purposes of subsection (4)(c) take effect.”
“(5A) In the case of a weapon rendered incapable as mentioned in subsection (4)(b) before 8 April 2016, subsection (1)(a) or (b) does not apply if the weapon is made available for sale or as a gift, or (as the case may be) sold or given, by or on behalf of a museum in respect of which a museum firearms licence is in force to another museum in respect of which such a licence is in force.”
“(6A) In this section, “museum firearms licence” means a licence granted under the Schedule to the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988.”
“Authorised lending and possession of firearms for hunting etc
(1) After section 11 of the Firearms Act 1968 insert—“11A Authorised lending and possession of firearms for hunting etc(1) A person (“the borrower”) may, without holding a certificate under this Act, borrow a rifle or shot gun from another person on private premises (“the lender”) and have the rifle or shot gun in his or her possession on those premises if—(a) the four conditions set out in subsections (2) to (5) are met, and(b) in the case of a rifle, the borrower is aged 17 or over.(2) The first condition is that the borrowing and possession of the rifle or shot gun are for either or both of the following purposes—(a) hunting animals or shooting game or vermin;(b) shooting at artificial targets. (3) The second condition is that the lender—(a) is aged 18 or over,(b) holds a certificate under this Act in respect of the rifle or shot gun, and(c) is either—(i) a person who has a right to allow others to enter the premises for the purposes of hunting animals or shooting game or vermin, or(ii) a person who is authorised in writing by a person mentioned in sub-paragraph (i) to lend the rifle or shot gun on the premises (whether generally or to persons specified in the authorisation who include the borrower).(4) The third condition is that the borrower’s possession and use of the rifle or shot gun complies with any conditions as to those matters specified in the lender’s certificate under this Act.(5) The fourth condition is that, during the period for which the rifle or shot gun is borrowed, the borrower is in the presence of the lender or—(a) where a rifle is borrowed, a person who, although not the lender, is aged 18 or over, holds a certificate under this Act in respect of that rifle and is a person described in subsection (3)(c)(i) or (ii);(b) where a shot gun is borrowed, a person who, although not the lender, is aged 18 or over, holds a certificate under this Act in respect of that shot gun or another shot gun and is a person described in subsection (3)(c)(i) or (ii).(6) Where a rifle is borrowed on any premises in reliance on subsection (1), the borrower may, without holding a firearm certificate, purchase or acquire ammunition on the premises, and have the ammunition in his or her possession on those premises for the period for which the firearm is borrowed, if—(a) the ammunition is for use with the firearm,(b) the lender’s firearm certificate authorises the lender to have in his or her possession during that period ammunition of a quantity not less than that purchased or acquired by, and in the possession of, the borrower, and(c) the borrower’s possession and use of the ammunition complies with any conditions as to those matters specified in the certificate.”(2) In consequence of the amendment made by subsection (1), omit the following—(a) section 11(5) of the Firearms Act 1968;(b) section 16 of the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988.”
“( ) In that Act, after section 191(1)(i) insert—“(j) powdered or vaping alcohol.”( ) In the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, in Schedule 2 (controlled drugs), Part III (class C drugs), after paragraph 1(e) insert—“(f) powdered or vaping alcohol.””
Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe (Lab)
My Lords, in Committee I endeavoured to remove the Government’s redefinition of “alcohol” in the Licensing Act 2003 to cover alcohol “in any state”. I was worried that that covered powdered and vaping alcohol and I sought to remove them from the redefinition. The Minister argued that we really needed to establish the legal status of powdered and vaping alcohol and that if my amendment was accepted, it would have left us still in an unclear position about the legal status of those products, and we needed clarity. I accepted her argument and suggested that the difficulty might be overcome if we decided to class powdered or vaping alcohol as class C substances under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 or prohibit their production, supply, import or export by an amendment to the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016. Either course of action would resolve the legal status and leave beyond any doubt where these two substances stood. Accordingly, I asked the Minister to remove Clause 117, which sought to cover alcohol in all forms, but she was not prepared to do that at that stage.
Today I have returned to the subject and have tabled an amendment which would no longer allow powdered or vaping alcohol to be classed under the 2003 Act; instead, they would fall under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. I will not repeat all the arguments I made at Second Reading and in Committee, in the light of what has been happening in America, where the number of states that have banned these substances has gone up from the 26 I mentioned when we discussed this subject previously to 32. Of particular interest is that they have now been banned in California. Governor Jerry Brown signed a Bill into law on 28 September. Of course, this is a state which on 8 November voted to legalise recreational marijuana. So California is prepared to legalise marijuana but will not permit powdered alcohol to be sold in the way that our Government will permit, if this clause remains.
How have we got to this position? As I understand it, there was a consultation in the summer in which the Home Office spoke primarily to representatives of the drinks industry, it pondered what it should do with these technological developments as they come along, and it was decided that it was better that they should be legalised for sale. For all the reasons I have advanced previously—you can take powdered alcohol anywhere, you can mix it with existing drinks, you can take it into prisons very easily, and so on—I urge the Government to think again before they move forward in this way. I ask the Minister to consider accepting the solution that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and I are offering. It is straightforward and very much in line with what is happening in the States and elsewhere.
Given all the problems we have with liquid alcohol and with drugs in prison, it is quite wrong to be legalising the sale of these substances. I believe the public would share that view. If they knew what we were debating today, they would be absolutely outraged that we are about to legalise these substances so that in due course people can be vaping alcohol and using the powder. In the hope that I have been as reasonable as I could be in trying to see the Minister’s point of view and have endeavoured to help her as best I can, I beg to move.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
My Lords, it might help the House if I explain why the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, and I view this as quite such a dangerous substance and why it is quite different from alcohol in a liquid form, which one drinks. The reason is that powdered alcohol can be snorted, as can vaping alcohol. The problem is that it is then absorbed through the sinuses, directly through the blood-brain barrier, so that you get an immediate hit. You can get a very high hit in the brain with a very low blood-alcohol level because it has a direct route. If you drink a drink, as many of your Lordships probably will this evening, you will absorb it through the gut and it will go through the liver, where an enzyme called alcohol dehydrogenase partly metabolises it—it burns it up. It then goes into your bloodstream and then to your brain, so the amount getting to your brain will be reflected in a peripheral blood sample, which is where blood-alcohol levels are measured for driving and so on.
However, this powdered or vaping mechanism completely bypasses that. The problem is also that it is extremely difficult to detect, but the rapid high is much higher and faster than one would get even with a schnapps-type drink that might be downed quickly. That effect is particularly dangerous. In an important study done in the US, more than 1,800 undergraduate students were interviewed and 23% indicated that they would use the product if available. Of those, 62%—that is, just about two-thirds—also indicated a likelihood of misusing the product; that misuse was higher among Caucasian students and those who were already hazardous drinkers, who were significantly more likely to use it. We have tabled this amendment because we think this formulation is particularly dangerous and acts like a dangerous drug.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)
My Lords, as this is the first time I have spoken on Report, I should quickly declare that I am an elected councillor in the London Borough of Lewisham and a vice-president of the Local Government Association.
The question of powdered or vaping alcohol was discussed in Committee, as my noble friend Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe mentioned, and his amendment would now classify it under the Misuse of Drugs Act. I must confess that I had never heard of powdered or vaporised alcohol before we debated this in Committee on 9 November. I have now of course heard that this alcohol can be put into fruit juice and other soft drinks; apparently, it can be baked and put into a whole range of products. I also thought that vaping was an alternative to smoking and had no idea that you can now apparently vape alcohol. I think we all agree that alcohol is a mood-altering substance, so I hope that the Minister can respond to these important issues. I take entirely the medical evidence given by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, on how these products can get into your body and how quickly they can react. It is important that we look at this carefully and, if it needs to be regulated properly, at how that can be done.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, I remind the House that Clause 120 amends the definition of alcohol in Section 191 of the Licensing Act 2003. The current definition of alcohol covers spirits, wine, beer, cider or any other fermented, distilled or spirituous liqueur. The clause adds “(in any state)” to the definition; the purpose of this is to ensure that all alcohol, no matter in which form it is sold, is covered by the requirements of the 2003 Act.
Amendment 171A seeks to exempt powdered and vaporised alcohol from the 2003 Act and instead to control it as a class C drug under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. Controlling powdered and vaporised alcohol as a class C drug would, in effect, prohibit the possession, production and distribution of these forms of alcohol.
Alcohol is a legal substance and the Government’s approach is to minimise the harm caused by alcohol by regulating its sale and supply. The 2003 Act seeks to reduce harm through promotion of the licensing objectives. These are: the prevention of crime and disorder; public safety; the prevention of public nuisance; and the protection of children from harm. The 2003 Act also contains a number of criminal offences, including selling alcohol to a child under the age of 18 and selling alcohol without a licence.
The Government believe that the focus on the four licensing objectives provides sufficient safeguards for the sale of alcohol. It would be contradictory and disproportionate to regulate the sale of liquid alcohol but make alcohol illegal when it is provided in another form, such as powder or vapour. The classification of harmful drugs in the 1971 Act is predicated on an assessment of their respective harms and in accordance with recommendations made by the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs. The 1971 Act places a duty on the Secretary of State to consult the advisory council before bringing a substance within the controls provided for in that Act.
Quite apart from questions over the merits or otherwise of controlling powdered and vaping alcohol in this way, the absence of such a consultation having been carried out means it would be inappropriate to amend the 1971 Act in the manner proposed by this amendment. The Government are not aware of any evidence that the harms posed by powdered and vaporised alcohol are such that it is necessary to consider controlling it as an illegal drug. Powdered and vaporised alcohol are not substances of which the misuse is having or capable of having harmful effects sufficient to constitute a social problem, as is the test under the 1971 Act. Unless and until there is evidence to suggest that these forms of alcohol are meeting that test, I believe that a regulatory approach is the appropriate one.
Clause 120 will ensure that the four licensing objectives continue to be met despite innovations in alcohol products and that the public, especially children, continue to be protected from irresponsible sales of alcohol. On that basis, I would ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
Before the noble Baroness sits down, will she undertake to ask the ACMD to put this issue on its agenda and keep a watchful eye on it in the future? I declare an interest in that I was a member of the ACMD when khat was being looked at.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I thank the noble Baroness for that question. Home Office officials have discussed powdered alcohol with the Department of Health and Public Health England and are very much keeping it under review. They may well have to do things at a later date but, for now, they are just keeping a watchful eye on it.
Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for her support and expertise, and to my noble friend Lord Kennedy for weighing in from my Front Bench with support for the amendment. As noble Lords might expect, I am disappointed with the Minister’s response. The Government have consulted —they consulted the drinks industry—but if they had consulted over a wider area, and particularly the committee to which the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, referred, I think they might have got an entirely different view in reaching their judgment on this classification.
I know quite a lot about the four objectives that govern the Licensing Act and, quite frankly, they are totally inappropriate in trying to deal with this. They were drawn up in the context of liquid alcohol, and there was a list of all the forms in which it is produced, but this is quite different. This is a move in an entirely different direction. I feel that, rather than take a serious look at this, the Government are simply applying the existing legislation as best they can, but they will not be able to implement it.
I will take the Minister’s arguments away, have a look at them and decide whether to come back again at Third Reading. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones
“General duties of licensing authorities
(1) Section 4 of the Licensing Act 2003 (general duties of licensing authorities) is amended as follows.(2) After subsection (2)(d) insert—“(e) the provision of social or cultural activities.””
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 172 would create a fifth licensing objective that licensing authorities must promote when discharging their functions. It would secure the provision of social or cultural activities as a general duty. It follows the similar Amendment 214A from Committee.
There is a very strong case to be made that activities such as live music should be completely deregulated from the Licensing Act. Other legislation, such as the Environmental Protection Act 1990, the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, and the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003 contain a great many of the protections in law that form the basis for conditions relating to live music that may be imposed by the Licensing Act on a premises licence. The Licensing Act therefore presents a tier of legislative duplication that is in many respects unnecessary, given that live events can be controlled by other means.
Despite this compelling argument, the Government have not been minded to deregulate further than audience sizes of 500—a level that builds on the Live Music Act I took through Parliament. In the meantime, there has been a continuing decline in live music venues. As the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, rightly said in Committee:
“There has in recent years been a perfect storm of circumstance for our night-time economy. Rising rents and business rates, property developments, noise complaints, complaints about anti-social behaviour and more have conspired to devastate our night-time cultural landscape”.—[Official Report, 9/11/16; col. 1212.]
In these circumstances we need to amend licensing objectives in particular to help these venues survive. Current objectives relate to crime and disorder, public safety, public nuisance and protection of children. Mark Davyd of the Music Venue Trust said:
“Licensing is just one of many areas of the legal framework around grassroots music venues that is contributing to their rapid decline”.
As the chief operating officer of Live Nation said:
“Unfortunately not all local authorities are like-minded and their interpretations of the Licensing Act are not always helpful, or consistent, which is frustrating and creates obstacles for venue operators at all levels”.
The amendment is designed to introduce a new objective in the local authority decision-making process that would take account of the positive cultural impact of staging an event. At present, authorities are not obliged to consider the wider benefits of music and entertainment in the community, and instead focus on the negative impact of applications. The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said in Committee, that,
“music and other activities should be helped and supported where possible through the licensing system, rather than just regulated”.—[Official Report, 9/11/16; col. 1214.]
A proportionate approach from licensing authorities would be welcome when they handle applications or complaints relating to entertainment. That the four existing licensing objectives are completely predicated on preventive measures does nothing to help struggling venues that are already being hit by high business rates and new planning developments. Amendment 172 is therefore required to support the social or cultural impacts of an activity regulated by the Licensing Act.
I have of course read the Minister’s response of 9 November and taken account of what she said. Her argument was that it would be difficult to replicate the evidence of harm in the same way as for licence conditions that seek to protect against and reduce harm—a rather circular argument. She went on to say that a licensing objective of promoting cultural activity and inclusion is,
“quite a subjective matter and may be interpreted in different ways … Making this a licensing objective could place licensing authorities in a censorious position, whereby licensees organising events might be obliged to explain what additional cultural value their entertainment might generate, and the licensing authorities would be required to evaluate that information”.—[Official Report, 9/11/16; col. 1216.]
This amendment is substantially different from the Committee stage amendment in two crucial respects. First, it is no longer limited to cultural matters and makes a much broader point about other activities that have social benefits that may need to be supported by a positive objective in the Licensing Act, too. This would deal with a legitimate criticism of the original amendment —that it would result in all premises having to provide cultural activities. That was not the intention of the original draft, but I accept that it could have led to it.
Secondly, the amendment relates to provision rather than the original amendment’s attempt at “promotion”. The specific call for promotion was regarded by the Minister as putting licensing authorities in a potentially censorious and subjective position, as I just mentioned. I should point out, however, that the current objectives, particularly the prevention of nuisance, are already interpreted subjectively and censoriously.
As is stands, the cultural activities of, say, a grass-roots music venue are not considered at all. Once gone, these venues will not come back into our towns and cities. There is a delicate balance that should be achieved by local authorities. Having this fifth objective might just be critical to a decision that will lead to their remaining open. The Minister’s response in Committee was fairly cursory, and I look forward to a more detailed and substantive response to the amendment at this stage. I beg to move.
The Earl of Clancarty (CB)
My Lords, I support Amendment 172, which has been excellently introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. There needs to be a shift from authorities viewing our nightlife economy as something to be restricted to viewing it as something to be encouraged. Indeed, provision should be made. If London, to take just one example of cities across the UK, has lost 40% of its music venues in the past five years—not, it cannot be overemphasised, through lack of demand—there is something seriously awry with how our local communities are developing.
The licensing authorities need a better understanding of this landscape and to act constructively to counter this. As the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said, in her reply in Committee the Minister said that cultural activity is “quite a subjective matter”. However, there is nothing in the amendment submitted in Committee or in this amendment about which cultural events should take place. The amendment is not in any way prescriptive; nor is there any sense of a limit to be placed on cultural events or of their particular value socially or culturally. The Minister talked of “a censorious position”, but the fact is that there is already, to a significant degree, an implicit censoriousness—one might say a tunnel vision—in the treatment of our clubs and music venues by licensing authorities, and the amendment would address that.
In evidence given yesterday to the Select Committee on the Licensing Act 2003, Mark Davyd, chief executive of the Music Venue Trust, said, “We want to see grass-roots music venues acknowledged and respected alongside theatres and art centres as spaces that are vital to the health, wealth and happiness of the UK”. That is a laudable aim. It also means that comparable criteria for operation should be applied to all those venues, but that kind of parity can be achieved only if all these cultural activities are perceived in a positive sense and as being connected through the wider landscape. There needs to be a mechanism that achieves that. The licensing authority is, or should be, the meeting place of all the different stakeholders; it is the logical place for that to happen. I hope the Minister will look favourably on the amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, we debated this issue in Committee. Many years ago, I was a member of the licensing committee of Southwark Council, although nowadays I am on Lewisham Council and am a member of its planning committee. I am very supportive of this amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty.
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has a track record of standing up for live music, buskers and grass-roots music venues, and we should all be very grateful to him. We need to help and support the music and entertainment industries, and this amendment will go some way to doing that, as the noble Lord said. The night-time economy is very important and needs to be supported. Clubs, music venues and similar types of establishment bring billions of pounds to the UK economy every year. I very much welcome the appointment of the night tsar by the Mayor of London Sadiq Khan. He clearly recognises the importance of the night-time economy to the economy of London as a whole and is working to ensure that the economy works for industry and residents. It may well be that, as we get new metro mayors around England in the next few months, we find that they will follow his example and do the same to support the night-time economy in their cities.
I also recall our debate in the Moses Room some months ago when we looked at the activities of some local authorities and how they applied legislation. It seemed to me that some people have gone well beyond their powers there. However, I support the amendment and hope that the noble Baroness can give a positive response when she replies.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, Amendment 172 seeks to add,
“the provision of social or cultural activities”
to the list of licensing objectives. This would require licensing authorities to make licensing decisions based on this objective, such as placing conditions on licences with regard to the provision of social or cultural activities.
As I explained in Committee, the existing licensing objectives, as provided for in Section 4 of the Licensing Act 2003, seek to reduce harm, which can be evidenced. Licence conditions intended to reduce the level of harm can be easily understood—for example, a requirement to restrict noise levels. Requiring licensing authorities to consider the provision of social or cultural activities would run in contradiction to the other licensing objectives, all of which are aimed at harm reduction.
Importantly, the 2003 Act provides that when a licensing authority receives a compliant application for a premises licence or club premises certificate, it must grant the authorisation unless it receives “relevant representations”. In effect, this means there is a presumption that licensing authorities will grant a licence in respect to an application, with appropriate conditions, unless there are strong concerns in terms of the licensing objectives.
I respect the noble Lord’s intentions with regard to grass-roots music venues and cultural participation, and share his desire to see a vibrant music industry, but I do not feel it is appropriate to use the 2003 Act to pursue that goal. On that basis, I hope the noble Lord will be content to withdraw this amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones
I thank the Minister for her response and the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, for his contribution. One of the key points that he made, and which we are making with this amendment, is that of course local authorities have to make judgments currently. That runs, to use phraseology used by the Minister herself, directly counter to the arguments that are being made by the Government. She talks about evidence of harm, as if somehow under the current objectives it is all cut and dried and the evidence is absolutely clear-cut, but the fact is that judgments are made by local authorities. I am sure that when the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, was a councillor in Southwark, he had a very enlightened approach to these matters, but these things are a matter of interpretation, and how you treat the evidence of harm is a subjective matter. In many cases, strong concerns might be disregarded because there are other, supervening objectives that a local authority thinks are important, or it may give more time for remedy.
There are all sorts of aspects, so to regard the current set of objectives as somehow pristine and able to be interpreted with huge clarity by local authorities, in contrast to this confused, woolly cultural objective, is only to confuse the issue. It is really a way of saying that the status quo is fine. But the status quo is not fine, and local authorities need some further guidance on these matters. I am not going to push this amendment further at this stage, but I hope there is a way in which further guidance or some other nudge towards a better solution for our night-time and grass-roots music venues is achievable. I am sure from the nods that I am receiving from the Government Front Bench that there is some sympathy for that approach. Now I am getting completely the reverse—clearly I had lulled myself into a false sense of security, which is always a big mistake in this House.
I hope the drip-drip of the fairly incessant rhythm—perhaps that is the right phraseology to use in connection with live music venues—of the campaign to ensure that we keep our live music venues has some effect. I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, that the night-time tsar in London is a fantastic new development, and I hope that other combined authorities will follow what London is doing in that respect.
I believe the Home Office also has responsibility in this area to help to preserve our venues, rather than simply stonewalling and saying, “We’ve got a very fine Licensing Act as it is and we don’t need any further objectives”. When we come to our next debate, I am sure the Government will make the same argument but they may find a rather different response when it comes to a vote. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Deech
“General duties of licensing authorities (No.2)
(1) Section 4 of the Licensing Act 2003 (general duties of licensing authorities) is amended as follows.(2) After subsection (2)(d) insert—“(e) securing accessibility for disabled persons.””
Baroness Deech (CB)
My Lords, I am sorry to say that the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell, whose name is also on this amendment, is unwell. Her eloquence will be sorely missed this evening.
These five words which the amendment would insert would provide a simple and effective improvement in life for disabled people, and would fulfil one of the key recommendations of the Lords Select Committee on the Equality Act 2010 and Disability, which I have had the privilege of sharing. This amendment is a narrowed-down version of Amendment 210 in Committee. It is supported by the Access Association and the Equality and Human Rights Commission. It originated with a suggestion put to the Select Committee by a spokesperson for the National Association of Licensing Enforcement Officers, who has also written in support. The Select Committee on the Licensing Act 2003 has no objection to it.
It is not just about disability; it is about all of us as we get older. It is about mainstreaming accessibility into everyday life. The ability—indeed, the right—to participate in various everyday areas of life can depend on the ability to access public spaces and buildings. Moreover, under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the UK bound itself to ensure that disabled people enjoy the rights to equal access set out in its Article 9. The Government have been criticised by the inquiry set up under that convention. Here is a way to show that that criticism is unjustified.
One-quarter of the disability discrimination-related inquiries to an Equality and Human Rights Commission helpline relate to failures to make reasonable adjustments. That is a big problem, and it is clear that some service providers do not understand what they have to do. If the amendment were passed, applicants for licences would have to include consideration of the requirements of disabled people from the outset in the application process. Accessibility could then be included in the licence conditions and would become just a regular objective.
In the debate in Committee, the Minister was against this on two grounds. The first was that it duplicated existing requirements in the Equality Act, which puts duties on employers and businesses to make reasonable adjustments for disabled people. I cannot agree. The amendment would make those reasonable adjustments an anticipatory duty—that is the important aspect—not a burden on disabled people after they find they are excluded. The duty would be anticipatory and it would shift the burden off the shoulders of disabled people to the local authorities. Moreover, the existing duties of licensing authorities in Section 4 of the Licensing Act refer to,
“the prevention of crime and disorder … public safety … the prevention of public nuisance; and … the protection of children from harm”.
The amendment is about the prevention of harm to disabled people. Duplication is clearly not a problem as there are scores of other statutes referring to health and safety, children and nuisance.
The amendment would not require extra activity by licensees or the regulation of activity. It is only about planning in advance for access. It would mean that businesses and premises, knowing that inspection was coming, would turn their minds to accessibility in advance of being found wanting. It would end the scenario of a disabled person turning up at, say, a restaurant and finding it inaccessible, with no remedy in hand, and the humiliation and embarrassment that follow. The local authority would be able to impose conditions on the licence. The ultimate sanction, but an exceptional one, would be a refusal to extend the licence or grant it until those adjustments were made. This is of course in a framework of what is reasonable.
The amendment is narrower and more focused than its earlier incarnation. Disabled people know that mere guidance to owners of premises does not work. The Equality and Human Rights Commission has explained that it is unable to monitor compliance. This is the chance for the Government to show their commitment to narrowing the disabled unemployment gap. It would be in line with the Prime Minister’s policy of allowing everyone to go as far as their talents will permit. The Government should not speak with forked tongue on this policy. It would add not to the burden of licensing authorities but only to their objectives. It is disabled persons who bear the burden at the moment, and they are harmed by the existing barriers to access. Licensing is about preventing harm.
The second argument from the Government against the amendment was that it was singling out businesses and premises for compliance with the Equality Act. However, businesses and premises are being asked not to do anything extra but simply to put their minds to accessibility. This is not a party political matter; it is about common sense backing up compassion. It is about self-interest as we all get older. It is about legal requirements that already exist. It is about decency. I cannot imagine that it will be opposed in any quarter. This House should be seen to stand up for people who need it. This fits entirely with the mission on most sides of the House. I beg to move.
Lord Shinkwin (Con)
My Lords, I support Amendment 173. I will not rehearse the arguments about the details of the amendment so persuasively set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and by the ad hoc Select Committee of your Lordships’ House that she so ably chaired. Its excellent report on the Equality Act 2010 and its impact on disabled people bears testimony, if any were needed, to the proud and noble tradition of your Lordships’ House of fighting against disability discrimination and for equality.
I was proud to serve on the National Disability Council, which was set up to advise on the implementation of the Conservative Government’s 1995 Disability Discrimination Act, otherwise known as the DDA. Central to that Act was the concept of the duty to make reasonable adjustments to enable disabled people to access goods, facilities and services. As the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, has said, the nature of that duty was anticipatory. The onus was not on the disabled person so much as on the provider to anticipate reasonable adjustments. That anticipatory principle is sacrosanct. To ignore it would be to go backwards, with all the political consequences that would involve.
Baroness Thomas of Winchester (LD)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the powerful speech of the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin. As the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, has said, this amendment is more focused than the one we tabled in Committee, but it is essentially about the same issue: giving the licensing authority a few more teeth by way of the licensing objectives to ensure that disabled people can access as many licensed premises as possible.
We are not being unreasonable. The key phrase for what a licensee should do to allow disabled people to access their premises is still only to make a “reasonable adjustment”. A licensed premises which, for example, is entirely upstairs with no lift available would still not be caught by this addition to the objectives. I dare say the Reform Club would not be either, because it is up a flight of stairs, as many of us who cannot access that premises know.
Crucially, the amendment would transfer the onus to the licensing authority from disabled people themselves. If a disabled person cannot get into a pub, club, or restaurant, or any other licensed premises, why should they have to take action themselves which might mean taking the licence holder to court? Our lives are hard enough now without having to enforce the law too. This is a golden opportunity to do what many organisations think should have happened years ago—to have licensing officers who are able to take action beyond writing a licensee a letter or having a word in their ear.
Does this mean extra work for the licensing authority? No, because we are told that it visits licensed premises all the time. Are we putting an unfair burden on licensees? No, because we are talking about only a reasonable adjustment, not an unreasonable one. The whole point is to take the burden off the shoulders of the disabled person who, under present circumstances, is made to feel guilty for making a fuss, or even for not being able to join a group of friends for a drink or a meal. It happens all the time.
I believe the tide will turn one day when there are even more disabled people out and about than there are now. This is a perfect opportunity to act now.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
We support the amendment from these Benches. I congratulate those who tabled it on their persistence and on taking forward the work of a Select Committee to seek to translate it into legislation. That is an example of how this House can work so effectively.
As others have said on many occasions, we should not have to legislate, but it seems that we do in order to change attitudes. Sometimes we have to make something enforceable before people come to understand that the subject is actually a right. The amendment has been described as anticipatory. Unfortunately one often sees that it is too easy for someone who infringes a rule not to take the sanction seriously. It can be regarded as an operating cost. If you are caught out and have to pay a penalty it is tough, but it is part of the costs of the business.
The value of the amendment is that bringing the issue into the licensing process will concentrate minds at the right point. I slightly take issue with my noble friend Lady Thomas, who talked about teeth. I say that it is about a mindset—so minds rather than teeth —but I think that is the only difference between us.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, said, it is about mainstreaming the issue, making sure that everyone approaches it with the right objectives in mind. It is very harsh—almost offensive—to expect the objectives of the amendment to be met by individuals who find themselves unable to get into a set of premises, to use that as the example, not having known beforehand that there would be a problem, and to put the burden on them, in retrospect, to take it up—and we know that these rights are difficult to enforce, because individual rights are not easily enforced.
The Minister said in Committee that it would be inappropriate for licensing conditions to refer to specific legislation, because there is already an obligation to comply with that legislation. The new formulation is very neat. The current objective is shorthand, in just the same way as the other four licensing objectives are shorthand—one of them is for protection of children, safety is another. Indeed, the Minister gave examples of that in Committee. There would not be a call for the amendment if guidance worked and if good practice, which is no doubt observed by the good practitioners, was observed by those who have made the amendment necessary. We are very enthusiastic in support of the amendment, although it is sad to have to be enthusiastic for it.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
I support the amendment not because I am disabled but because like most of our population I am getting older. Although I can still run for a bus, there is going to be a time when I shall not be able to. So this is not only for disabled people—it is for us all. It is for the whole population, and I think that we have been incredibly flabby as a nation in not putting this into practice before. I was astonished to find that there was this let-out and gap in our legislation and that people can still exclude and discriminate against an important section of society. If we do not all support this amendment today, I think that we are being thoroughly wet and flabby and not living up to the ideals of an enlightened society.
Lord Foster of Bishop Auckland (Lab)
My Lords, I support the amendment. I was a member of the ad hoc Select Committee so ably chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, along with others who have already spoken. It was a great learning experience. In my long lifetime, if not as long as some in this House, I have always been struck by the immense progress that we have made over the years. But when you get into the detail, you are absolutely appalled that the rest of society imposes on our many colleagues with disabilities that they shall not enjoy that which we all take for granted. Imagine if we were not able to go into a restaurant or a pub—I am a teetotaller, but I spent half my life in pubs and bars trying to find Labour Members when I was Labour Chief Whip. It is appalling that we expect disabled people to put up with second best.
The Act put through in 1995 by the noble Lord, Lord Hague, is one of which the Tory Party is rightly very proud. I ask the Government to live up to that Act and agree to the amendment.
Lord Low of Dalston (CB)
My Lords, I want to deal briefly with the argument that the amendment is not necessary because it simply duplicates what is already in the law. Licensed premises, including entertainment venues such as pubs, clubs and restaurants, are obliged under the Equality Act 2010 to make reasonable adjustments for disabled customers. It is intended to be an anticipatory duty; it falls on service providers to make the reasonable adjustments and take the appropriate action ahead of any disabled person coming along and asking to be allowed to avail themselves of the service. However, the Equality Act duty is widely disregarded, placing the onus on the individual to enforce the duty, when enforcement is extremely difficult for the individual on account of its cost and complexity.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, Amendment 173, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, adds to the general duties of licensing authorities a duty of securing accessibility for disabled persons. The noble Baroness raises an important issue; we debated the matter under another amendment, which sought to add in the provisions of the Equality Act in Committee.
It is right to say that people running licensed premises should do much more to ensure that the premises are accessible by disabled people, so that they can go out with their friends and family and enjoy themselves on those premises. It is right that disabled people are able to get access to those premises. When the Minister responds to the debate we may hear that there are general duties under the Equality Act 2010 in force already and that adding a specific amendment does not add anything to the statutory requirements already in force, as noble Lords have said. I hope that we can get a very careful explanation of why that is the case. The Government have a general duty to ensure that the law is properly applied, so I hope that they will use this opportunity to say clearly how they can ensure that that actually happens.
The problem often is whether licensed premises owners fully understand what their obligations are—or, if they do understand, whether they do anything to make those reasonable adjustments. We need to have a very careful explanation from the Minister in response to the debate, because we have the whole issue of the guidance, what review mechanisms are in place, and how the Government are going to ensure that the mainstream access to buildings to which the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, referred actually happens.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Deech and Lady Thomas of Winchester, not only for their powerful speeches in this debate but for taking the time to speak with me over the past few weeks on the subject of this amendment. I also commend my noble friend Lord Shinkwin for the sheer quality of his speech and everyone who has spoken in this debate for their persistence in seeking to secure the rights of disabled people.
I am very sympathetic to the issues that have been raised on this matter. Licensed premises such as pubs, restaurants, theatres and cinemas are places where many of us choose to socialise and are therefore an important part of our daily lives. Too many of these venues are difficult for disabled people to access. The same is true of other, non-licensed businesses, too. The issue before us is whether we should use the regulatory framework provided for in the Licensing Act 2003 as a mechanism to enforce the provisions of a quite separate piece of legislation.
The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and others have answered this question in the affirmative, arguing that it should not be left to disabled people denied access to licensed premises to have to fight on their own to secure their rights. The contrary argument, which I set out in Committee, is that this amendment is seeking to skew the regulatory regime in the 2003 Act and use it for a purpose for which it was never intended. The amendment potentially puts us on to a slippery slope. If we can use the 2003 Act to enforce the obligations placed on businesses by other enactments, where does this stop? Are licensing authorities then to be charged with, for example, ensuring that pubs and restaurants are paying the minimum wage or complying with other aspects of employment law?
While it could be argued that the particular challenges faced by disabled people make this amendment a special case, we should not seek to downplay the fact that there will be a cost to business. I accept that the amendment does not place any new direct obligations on licensed premises as a class of business, as they are already subject to the requirement to make reasonable adjustments. However, if we are expecting licensing authorities to act as an enforcement agency in this regard, there will unavoidably be a cost to them in discharging this new function. As the cost of the licensing system properly falls on licensees rather than the council tax payer, consequently any increase in costs for licensing authorities will need to be passed on through increased licensing fees. We must take this into account when considering the amendment.
I have heard the powerful voices expressed in the debate here today. I cannot ignore the strength of feeling in your Lordships’ House. I believe that there is scope for compromise around possible amendments to the Licensing Act, which would work with the grain of the existing licensing regime. I cannot say more at this stage, as there is further work to do to scope such a possible compromise, but nor can I give the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, any undertaking today that I will be able to bring forward a government amendment at Third Reading. I hope, however, that the noble Baroness will agree to move forward on the basis of the preliminary discussions that we have had earlier this afternoon and, if not, perhaps we should come to a decision on her amendment today.
Baroness Deech
My Lords, I know that the Minister is sympathetic, but I still find the arguments unpersuasive. The Licensing Act is already used to enforce other Acts, for example, about children. If there is a cost to business, or a cost that is going to be passed on, are we to say that we can never make improvements for disabled people because it might cost somebody something? That simply will not do. I believe the Minister is suggesting that any amendment that the Government may bring forward would not remove the burden from disabled people but require them to make representations, make phone calls and use the internet to fill in forms and so on—when we know very well that even if you are able, trying to deal with local authorities on this sort of thing can be a nightmare. I am simply saying that access for disabled people—and, as the noble Baroness said, for the elderly, which is all of us eventually if not already—should be mainstreamed.
All parties in this House, some more than others, claim to have as their raison d’être improving the life of the disadvantaged and the vulnerable. To refuse to do this when presented with a straightforward, effective amendment is incomprehensible to me and goes against what I believe this House stands for. The amendment would make adjustments anticipatory and remove the onus from disabled persons. I do not believe that any compromise that the Minister might offer, well-disposed though she is—I know that she spent a lot of time on this—would meet that bill. Given the mission of this House, I do not think that we should talk the talk; I think that we should walk the walk. On that note, I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Beecham
“Premises licence under Gambling Act 2005: gaming machines
After section 172 of the Gambling Act 2005 insert—“172A Gaming machines: staffing condition on availability and use A licensing authority, when exercising its power under section 169 to attach conditions to a premises licence, must include a condition, in respect of a licence for premises in which gaming machines are being used, that there must be at least two members of staff present on the premises while the premises are open.””
Lord Beecham (Lab)
My Lords, I refer to my interests as a Newcastle City councillor and vice-president of the Local Government Association, inasmuch as parts of the amendments to which I shall refer would impact on local government.
I wish to speak to the two amendments in this group in my name and those of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bristol and the noble Baroness, Lady Howe. Fixed-odds betting terminals, even after a reduction from £100 to £50 on the amount that can be wagered every 20 seconds, are a source of large profits and social and economic damage. The 35,000 machines to be found in betting premises are concentrated in poorer areas of the country, where they divert money from the local economy and are the scene of 40% of all serious crimes against businesses. As I pointed out in Committee, police callouts to attend incidents at these premises increased by 51% in 2014 from the previous year. Seven thousand machines a year are destroyed and assaults on staff are increasing. The London Borough of Newham, with no fewer than 87 of these shops, sees police being called out on average once every day to premises harbouring these machines. The Local Government Association backs Newham’s campaign for more control over this growing industry.
The Campaign for Fairer Gambling commissioned a report on these machines which referred to the claim of the Association of British Bookmakers that increased regulation would cause a substantial loss of jobs in the betting sector. But whereas the £1 billion that is spent in fixed-odds betting terminals supports 7,000 jobs in the gaming industry, that diversion from other forms of consumer spending destroys 13,000 jobs in the wider economy. If the industry continues to grow to double its size in the next 10 years, the net cost to the economy will be the loss of 11,000 jobs, with the total annual wage bill affected by a loss of £650 million at today’s prices compared with the level obtaining in 2013, on which the comparative figures are based.
The report also deals with the tax revenue flowing from the use of these machines. This year it is estimated that the duty received by the Revenue will be £78 million, but the amount of income tax and VAT lost will be £90 million. By 2023-24, the net annual loss will be £50 million. These figures do not, of course, reflect the indirect cost to the taxpayer of the consequences of the social damage arising from gambling—for example, in family breakdown or costs to the National Health Service, let alone the crime to which I have alluded.
BACTA, the body representing the manufacturers, suppliers and operators of 310,000 amusement machines —not those in betting offices or casinos—has come up with 12 proposals which it is submitting to the consultation being undertaken by DCMS. Interestingly, these include a new machine with a maximum stake of £10 instead of the current permitted stake of £50; a suggested jackpot limit of £125; and a high-percentage payout of 90% on the money staked, bringing the industry closer to the concept of amusement arcades rather than high-risk and expensive gambling.
All of this suggests that greater control of the industry, as envisaged in Amendment 173C, in the name of the right reverend Prelate, is required. In addition to the impact of the industry on society, however, there is also, quite literally, the impact on staff. In Committee I referred to the revealing fact that in many shops, where it is now usual to have only one employee, staff are housed in what is described as a cage, which they are permitted to leave only after 6.30 pm. Tellingly, Ladbrokes is now purchasing chairs weighing as much as 35 kilograms for customers—too heavy, it is assumed, for a disappointed customer, or indeed a criminal, to use in an assault on staff or to do damage to the premises. That is an indication of the seriousness of those issues.
Amendment 173B, in my name, prescribes that at all material times, at least two members of staff must be on the premises to deter violent behaviour and, if need be, to seek assistance. The noble Baroness, Lady Chisholm, replying to the debate in Committee, referred to the power conferred on the Secretary of State to set conditions by way of secondary legislation—under existing primary legislation—including staffing levels, and indicated the Government’s awareness of,
“the dangers posed by fixed-odds betting terminals”.—[Official Report, 9/11/16; col. 1232.]
She repeated this at a meeting she kindly organised and said that the Government would consider proposals emerging from the review they launched on 24 October, in which the call for evidence closed two days ago. Can the Minister indicate when the Government expect to release the results of the consultation and their response to it? Of course, I do not expect her to give an indication at this stage of what that outcome will be.
However, I hope that the Government will not be swayed by the self-interested testimony of the industry or, for that matter, by the views enunciated in an article for ConservativeHome—described as “the home of conservatism”—by Christopher Snowdon, who rejoices in the title of head of lifestyle economics at the Institute of Economic Affairs and who in a recent article dismissed concerns about this industry and the terminals, concluding that they,
“might not be to everybody’s taste but they have a place in the modern industry and existing regulation and taxation is more than adequate, if not excessive, for a gambling product that is only available in licensed, adult-only establishments”.
The evidence contradicts that bland assertion of acceptance of this side of the gaming industry pretty comprehensively. One can only hope that, unlike the appointment of Brexit Ministers, the Prime Minister will not be tempted to appoint Mr Snowdon to be involved in the review or to advise the Government. I look forward to the Minister giving assurances that the Government recognise the need to change the regime under which this industry, which blights too many high streets and too many lives, operates, and that they will act quickly after receiving and considering the review report. I beg to move.
The Lord Bishop of Bristol
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 173C, 196A and 200A in my name and I support Amendment 173B, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. I am grateful for the way in which he introduced this group of amendments.
Members of your Lordships’ House will be only too aware that the House has rehearsed the arguments around betting shops, and in particular fixed-odds betting terminals, numerous times in the past year, and there seems to be little need to repeat them here in detail. We know that violent crime is on the increase in betting premises—up 68% in London over the past five years—and it seems very likely that the increasing reliance of betting shops on FOBTs is a key reason for this trend. I read just last night that of the 523 serious robberies committed in commercial premises in 2015, 200 took place in betting shops. Given the increasing threat of violence—which the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has spoken well about—that betting shop staff face from organised thieves as well as angry, frustrated or opportunistic customers, the amendments in this group are an entirely reasonable attempt to help bring the situation back under some kind of control.
My amendment, which was first proposed in Committee by my right reverend friend the Bishop of St Albans, would give licensing authorities greater scope to impose conditions on the use of gaming machines in betting premises, with the aim of enabling those authorities to better enforce the licensing objectives of preventing crime and protecting the vulnerable. It would also clarify the ability of licensing authorities to undertake a cumulative impact assessment, as well as taking other risk factors into account. Given that fixed-odds betting terminals now make up 56% of the profits of a high street betting shop, it seems obvious to me, at least, that licensing authorities should be able to impose conditions on the use of these machines in areas where this is a high risk of gambling-related harm.
This amendment is, of course, limited in scope. Even if licensing authorities could impose conditions on the use of gaming machines, there would be limited opportunities to do so in practice. The “aim to permit” licensing framework of the Gambling Act 2005 is so heavily skewed in favour of the betting industry that licensing authorities have great difficulty imposing any conditions whatever on betting premises, the threat of judicial review deterring all but the boldest local authorities from taking significant measures to combat gambling harm through conditions. That is why I support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, which would make minimum two-person staffing a mandatory condition of a betting premises licence. Although, as the Minister pointed out in Committee, licensing authorities can in theory impose conditions requiring two-person staffing levels, in reality the practice is much more difficult. Under the current licensing framework, only a mandatory condition can ensure adequate protection for staff.
In Committee the Minister suggested that amendments such as these should be properly considered in the round as part of the Government’s review of stakes, prizes and licensing arrangements. I entirely agree, so I hope the Minister can reassure the House that the suggestions in these amendments will be thoroughly considered as part of the Government’s review.
First and foremost, can the Minister reassure me that the Government will look at how the Gambling Commission might widen the scope of the conditions a licensing authority might impose in relation to gaming machines? Will they look in particular at the potential for licensing authorities to impose conditions that restrict the ability of customers to engage in anonymous fixed-odds betting terminal gaming—which would be possible without changes to primary legislation? I know that the betting industry is planning to trial new methods of identification, including biometric identification. If those trials prove successful, licensing authorities should be able to require the use of such methods in areas that are particularly vulnerable to gambling-related harm.
Secondly, will the Government encourage the Gambling Commission to issue guidance on the potential for licensing authorities to undertake cumulative impact assessments, as is currently possible with alcohol licensing? The latest research shows that people living near a betting shop cluster are at greater risk of gambling-related harm, and licensing authorities should be able to reflect that in policy-making.
Finally, will the Government look at the way in which the current “aim to permit” licensing framework inhibits the ability of licensing authorities to tackle gambling-related harm through the use of conditions? Colleagues have spoken to licensing authorities, which feel that they simply have no chance of imposing meaningful conditions when confronted by a betting industry armed to the teeth with eminent QCs. If the Government are serious about giving meaningful power to local decision-makers, they need to review this framework as a matter of course; otherwise, amendments to mandatory conditions, such as that proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, will be the only way to make effective progress on reducing crime or protecting staff.
Baroness Howe of Idlicote (CB)
My Lords, I am very pleased to speak in support of Amendments 173B and 173C in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bristol. I have added my name to both.
Beginning with Amendment 173C, I support the proposal to devolve more powers to local authorities so that they can determine, going forward, the number of fixed-odds betting terminals in their area. As has been said before, fixed-odds betting terminals present a very distinct challenge that results from the unique way in which they combine high stakes with a very high speed of play, such that it is possible to lose £18,000 in an hour.
Rather than repeat the statistics that I cited in our debate on these amendments in Committee, I want to highlight a study specifically of the play of people with loyalty cards. This is particularly interesting because those with loyalty cards tend to gamble regularly, and the research demonstrated that 37% of such users manifest problem gambling behaviours. Are we as a society really happy to countenance accepting a form of entertainment in relation to which regular engagement exposes nearly 40% of those partaking to serious risks?
A study published in 2016 on addictive behaviours in 72 homeless adults in Westminster identified elevated rates of problem gambling in the group, with 82.4% of those reporting problem gambling stating that their gambling preceded their homelessness. The authors of the report said that,
“our homeless participants identified Fixed Odds Betting Terminals as the most problematic form of gambling”.
In responding to the debate on these amendments in Committee, the Minister was keen to highlight the success of the Gaming Machine (Circumstances of Use) (Amendment) Regulations 2015, which require gamblers wishing to bet more than £50 on B2 FOBTs to do so either through a verified account or via over-the-counter authorisation. However, an assessment by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport revealed that only a limited number of stakes—between 8% and 11%—were being placed through verified accounts and that people placing bets with staff occurred in only around 1% of the sessions. Thus the uptake for stakes being placed through verified accounts and OTC authorisation was incredibly low and suggests that the Government’s attempt to track players has been unsuccessful.
In addition, the DCMS evaluation report noted that from 2014 to 2015 there had been a £6.2 billion reduction in bets over £50 but a £5.1 billion increase in stakes of between £40 and £50. This suggests that the intervention is simply changing the way that players play and is not seriously curbing problem gambling connected to FOBTs. The fact that increasing numbers of people are betting just under £50 every 20 seconds is deeply disturbing.
On Amendment 173B, I note that in her response to the debate in Committee the Minister said:
“The Association of British Bookmakers’ Safe Bet Alliance provides specific guidance on staffing security in bookmakers, which was drafted with the input of the Metropolitan Police. Members of the Association of British Bookmakers operate single staffing only when a risk assessment has been undertaken”.—[Official Report, 9/11/16; col. 1231.]
The implication of what she said seemed to be that this was satisfactory. However, given the extensive evidence of gamblers vandalising FOBT machines after losing apparently considerable sums of money, given also that betting shop staff recall having felt intimidated and scared when individuals have lost money on FOBT machines, given too that betting shops accounted for more than 200 of the 523 serious robberies against commercial properties in London in 2015, given that the Association of British Bookmakers has a very strong incentive not to allow its main source of income to be seen as a catalyst for public disorder, and, lastly, given that, although the Metropolitan Police can provide advice, it does not make law, it seems to me that we should not conclude that the current arrangements are satisfactory.
The Prime Minister has said that she wants to make Britain a country that “works for everyone”, as has already been mentioned. Although FOBTs are certainly working well for betting shops, they are not working well for other people—especially those in deprived communities, where a large number of FOBTs are located.
In conclusion, I emphasise two things. First, although I strongly support the proposal to give local authorities powers to limit the number of FOBTs, thereby providing the opportunity to limit the number of these dangerous machines, is it not far more important to make FOBTs less dangerous? To this end, I am very committed to the Bill introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, in the previous Session, which proposed reducing the maximum stake per spin from £100 to £2. That is the big issue, and I very much hope that the Government will adopt this solution in their gambling review.
Secondly, I hope that the Minister will accept these amendments today, but if she says that we must await the outcome of the review on this matter, I hope that what I have said at this stage and previously will be taken into account as part of the review process. Finally, can she say when she expects the results of the gambling review to be published?
Lord Rosser
We certainly support the objectives of these amendments. As there was in Committee, there have been plenty of examples of the damage that is currently being done through these terminals and of the problems that we now face.
When the matter was discussed in Committee, the Government said that they understood the concern that such gaming machines could fuel problem gambling and that they were committed to reducing the risks of potential harms associated with such machines. They did not express any enthusiasm for adopting the amendments in Committee and, as has already been mentioned, they said that there was already a review under way which had been announced on 24 October. One assumes that the Government will be looking for the review to make recommendations which will enable them to implement the commitment they said they had in Committee to,
“reducing the risks of potential harms associated with such machines”.—[Official Report, 9/11/16; col. 1231].
Perhaps the Minister could indicate that that is how they are looking at this review and expect it to produce recommendations which will enable them to stick to the commitment that they enunciated when the matter was discussed in Committee.
As has already been called for—and I would do the same—it would be helpful if the Government could indicate now what the timescale is. They said in Committee that the call for evidence period would close on 4 December, which has now passed. I shall not ask the Government on 7 December what their conclusions are from the call for evidence but it would be helpful to know by when they will have come to conclusions. They said in Committee that, following the close of the period of the call for evidence, they would consider proposals based on robust evidence provided to assist in their decisions.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has explained, these amendments would have the effect of devolving power over licence conditions for gambling premises and gaming machines to local authorities. Such conditions would, among other things, enable licensing authorities to impose minimum staffing levels on premises with such machines. I thank the noble Lord and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bristol for again bringing this important matter to your Lordships’ attention. Let me emphasise that the Government are alive to the concerns about the dangers that fixed-odds betting terminals can pose.
It is worth reiterating that, as we speak, the Government are holding a review into the regulation of gaming machines, gambling advertising and the effectiveness of social responsibility measures on gaming machines, with a specific look at potential harm caused to players and communities. As part of this, we are liaising closely with the Local Government Association, among others, and we have received submissions related to the devolution and/or creation of additional powers for local authorities which we will of course consider alongside other proposals and evidence received.
I emphasise in particular that, as part of the review, the Government and the regulator, the Gambling Commission, are carrying out a thorough process which will look at all aspects of gaming machine regulation, including categorisation, maximum stakes and prizes, location, number and the impact that they have on players and communities in relation to problem gambling and crime among other things. All of these factors are potentially relevant and interrelated, and all should be considered together when looking at whether changes could or should be made to current gambling entitlements. We believe that the correct mechanism for looking at these issues is in collaboration with the regulator, the Gambling Commission, drawing on the best evidence available and subject to open consultation.
In addition, before we take any decision on this issue, we would want to ensure that the following risks were properly considered and consulted on. Any local authority which sought to exercise a power to change the number of fixed-odds betting terminals allowed on licensed betting premises would be likely to find its decision the subject of legal challenge. If these legal challenges are considered robust enough, we may be in a position of devolving a power that could not be effectively deployed. Local authorities have had a number of high-profile legal challenges from bookmakers on planning matters and may be reticent about utilising additional powers if it led to costly and protracted legal cases. We would therefore want to consult with the Local Government Association and local authorities on this issue. Again, I reiterate that the current review process is the appropriate mechanism to assess this, rather than immediately launching into these amendments to the Gambling Act.
We are also mindful of the possibility that piecemeal reform could give rise to unanticipated consequences. For example, if a local authority decides to reduce the number of fixed-odds machines, it may have the effect of encouraging operators to seek to open additional premises, furthering the problem of clustering.
We have already taken steps to tighten the controls on these machines and we have set out our plans for the review of gaming machines, gambling advertising and social responsibility which will include a close look at the issues related to fixed-odds betting terminals. I emphasise that we are taking this very seriously and that the review is looking into all these issues. When the review was announced on 24 October, it was stated:
“The review will be considering robust evidence on the appropriate maximum stakes and prizes for gaming machines across all premises licensed under the Gambling Act 2005; the number and location of gaming machines across all licensed premises; and social responsibility measures to protect players from gambling-related harm (including whether there is evidence on the impacts of gambling advertising and whether the right rules are in place to protect children and vulnerable people).
The review will include a close look at the issue of B2 gaming machines … and specific concerns about the harm they cause, be that to the player or the communities in which they are located.
In launching this review I want to ensure that legislation strikes the right balance between allowing the industry to grow and contribute to the economy while ensuring consumers and communities are protected, including those who are just about managing”.—[Official Report, Commons, 24/10/16; col. 1WS]
On the timetable for the review, as noble Lords know, the call for evidence closed on 4 December. An enormous amount of evidence was generated and there was a great deal of interest from the general public as well as from a variety of interest groups, local authorities, trade bodies and industries, and we will be looking in depth at the evidence that was submitted before considering proposals, which we hope to announce next year.
Given that this process is in train and that we are taking it extremely seriously, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her reply. At one stage I thought about asking her how much I should stake on the change that she seemed to be sympathetic towards.
However, I am slightly disconcerted by the latter part of the noble Baroness’s speech, when she referred to concerns about legal challenge. If there are such concerns, I hope the Minister will indicate that the Government would—assuming they want to make a change—enact the necessary legislation to pre-empt the legal challenge which might arise under the system as it currently stands.
With respect, I question one of the assumptions which is often made, and to which I referred in moving the amendment, about the contribution made to the economy. If the study to which I referred is correct, there is a net loss to the economy from the current operation of the industry in respect of fixed-odds betting—I am not talking about other elements of gambling. I invite the Minister to ensure that proper consideration is given to that aspect. The industry will undoubtedly talk up the economic benefits, but according to the report that I cited that seems not to be the case and it is misleading to make that claim.
However, it is clear that the Minister is at least sympathetic to the amendment. Although I will not seek to divide the House, I hope for a positive response as part of the process that the Government have already initiated. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Berridge
“Prescribed limit of alcohol
(1) In section 11(2) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (interpretation of sections 4 to 10), the definition of “the prescribed limit” is amended as follows.(2) For paragraph (a) substitute—“(a) 22 microgrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of breath,”.(3) For paragraph (b) substitute—“(b) 50 milligrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood, or”.(4) For paragraph (c) substitute—“(c) “67 milligrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of urine,”.”
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 175. Amendments 174 and 175, in outline, seek to reduce the legal limit for alcohol in the blood for drink-driving and introduce changes for younger or probationary drivers. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for their assistance and for putting their name to the amendments. I thank the Minister for all her interest and efforts regarding this matter. I thank her particularly for arranging a meeting yesterday for interested Peers with the Minister, Andrew Jones, who has responsibility in this area.
I shall not seek to repeat in full the arguments made in Committee, save to mention that the number of deaths from drink-related accidents has remained static for five years, at 240 a year, and that 2.9% of those accidents fall within the 80 milligram to 50 milligram range to which the amendment relates. I know that the Minister has explained that there is a group of persistent offenders, but the 2.9% of accidents that fall between 50 milligrams and 80 milligrams are within the low-hanging fruit area that could be avoided if there was a reduction in the limit allowed in the blood.
Before I mention two additional areas for consideration since Committee, I want to outline how I see the debate on this issue. Both sides, whether it is those moving the amendment and all the organisations, such as the RAC and RoSPA which support it, or the Government, base their arguments and conclusions on evidence—they have come to different conclusions and interpretations on the evidence. For instance, a PHE study recently published in The Lancet said that 40 milligrams in the blood increases the risk of an accident. I therefore hope that I have misunderstood Her Majesty’s Government in saying that theirs is the only evidence-based position. It is not conducive, particularly in today’s climate, to conduct debates in a polemic way rather than seeking to accept that both sides are acting on evidence and coming to different conclusions.
Of the two additional matters to have arisen since Committee, the first relates to disparity and the second is conceptual. On disparity, the amendment relates to the law and the specific offence of having too much alcohol in the blood. That is an offence in and of itself under our law. There is now a different limit in Scotland and in Northern Ireland. That offence often stands in conjunction with, and is pertinent evidence for, the more serious offences in our law of causing death by dangerous driving or causing death by careless driving, the latter being a more recent change to our law. It is important to remember the context of those offences. They were introduced because it was very difficult to persuade juries to convict for manslaughter. Juries cannot relate to walking down the street with a knife or a gun, but they can relate to being in a car, failing to drive properly and causing an accident. That is the background to those offences.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb
My Lords, I support both Amendments 174 and 175. I rise slightly wearily because I do not know, after the calm, clear and patient explanation from the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, of why this is necessary and it is illogical not to do it, that I can find any more reasons to give to the Government for making this change. However, I will try.
We heard from Mr Grayling in the Daily Mail today—he was Secretary of State for Transport this morning, but I am not sure if he still is—that the Government are,
“not interested in penalising drivers who have had ‘a glass of wine at the pub’.”
Nor are we. Drinking is a perfectly acceptable way to spend your time, but I object when the person who has had a drink gets into a car, which then becomes a dangerous weapon. We hear again and again that any alcohol in your blood can impair your faculties and behaviour. Drinking and driving is just not something that we ought to accept in civilised society.
We heard that the number of deaths has plateaued at 240 a year since 2010. From the available evidence, there are estimates that 25 people die unnecessarily a year, and we could reduce that number still by bringing down the limit of blood alcohol content. Yet it seems to me that we accept 25 deaths a year. Why on earth do we think it is okay for 25 people to die on the roads? That does not even include the people injured from crashes. Some 8,000 people a year are injured from crashes, so if we accept that 25 lives would be saved, we must also accept that quite a lot of injuries would be prevented as well.
Lowering the limit would be a deterrent. We do not need to wait for Scotland. Multiple countries and multiple reviews show that lowering the limit has a deterrent effect. It is in fact the biggest deterrent, and it is cheap and easy to do. It is something we ought to do quickly. Martin Luther King said that,
“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere”.
It is an injustice when we accept that deaths on the road are something we do not want to deal with because we do not want to stop people drinking and getting in their cars afterwards. Personally, I think that is unacceptable.
Baroness Hollins (CB)
My Lords, I will speak briefly to the evidence. An analysis was done in Switzerland comparing both novice and experienced drivers who had been fatally or seriously injured, and whether they had been drinking alcohol. The analysis compared two time periods, before and after reducing the legal limits, for 2011 to 2013 and 2014-15. In between-time, the limits in Switzerland were reduced to 20 milligrams for novices and 50 milligrams for others. The study found a larger reduction of serious alcohol-related accidents in both groups of drivers than of accidents without alcohol between the two time periods.
Early trends from Scotland with respect to the impact on fatal accidents of reducing the drink-driving blood alcohol levels to the same levels in December 2014 are also very promising. In 2010, the North report published by the Government reviewed drink and drug-driving laws, and modelled that a lower limit of 50 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood would save a significant number of lives. Applying those models to Scotland suggested that between three and 17 fewer deaths per year could be expected. The good news is that there seems to be a trend of that happening. In 2015, the first full year in which the reduced limit was in place, there were 24 fewer fatal accidents, a 13% reduction, and 98 fewer accidents involving serious injury—a 5% reduction.
As the noble Baroness said, it is difficult to attribute causation conclusively. However, is there really any reason why the results found in other countries should not also apply here? I strongly support a reduction in these limits to the same levels that apply in other UK jurisdictions. We must not forget that in May this year, your Lordships’ House also voted to support this reduction, anticipating that this could save as many as 100 lives a year. The measure is supported by a significant majority of the public.
Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe
My Lords, I am pleased to add my support to the two amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge. As she did, I express gratitude to the Minister for arranging the meeting we had with Andrew Jones, and for producing an evidence-based specialist to give us his views—which were very interesting but not totally conclusive. The House previously adopted a Private Member’s Bill opting to go down to 50 milligrams and got that through earlier in the year. We have not moved any further forward and the conversations yesterday did not seem to indicate much change in prospect. So where can we make some progress? Where is progress needed?
The man who spoke to us yesterday, Paul Williams, said that we really need to focus—I am sure the Minister will say this—on the hardened drinkers and drivers who persist and will not take any notice no matter what we do in changing the limit. He said that in his opinion people fall into two categories: they are either entirely selfish, which is what he was talking about with mainly males who do this; or they are sick. Yet if we look at the number of accidents on the roads where there is a link to alcohol, the disproportionate bulk is among young people. This is where Amendment 175 needs closer attention in future.
Young people are killing themselves on the roads for a whole variety of reasons. Some of them are drinking as well. It was quite disturbing to hear yesterday the Secretary of State say that it is perfectly all right for drivers to drink a glass of wine. For adults, maybe, yes, but it is quite unacceptable for young people—the ones suffering most in these accidents—to hear that. A lot of the accidents arise through their inexperience but they have almost been given encouragement to drink by the Secretary of State. I hope the Minister will take that message back. There is a problem here about younger people that must be focused on.
The Minister suggested that we should look at his report produced in December last year on improving safety on roads. I always take the advice of the Front Bench and looked at that last night, particularly the sections relating to young people. One area he mentioned in the course of the discussion was that young people will be permitted to drive on motorways with an experienced driver with dual controls. That is a good thing and it is in the report.
The other point the report makes is that £2 million is going to be spent on learner and probationary drivers, trying to get better-quality performances from them and to help them in a whole range of ways. I do not know why the Government are going to spend £2 million on this. The Department for Transport has had two previous reviews undertaken by the Transport Research Laboratory—the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, probably knows more about this than I do—focusing on the problems we have with younger drivers and deaths and accidents. It has come up with a range of suggestions, many of which have not been implemented, which might lead to a reduction in the number of people killed. In particular, it has said that we should try early on to get younger people not to drink. It has opted for 50. Amendment 175, which is modest and tries to address the big problem with young people, should not be so lightly dismissed in the way I rather sensed yesterday that we were being dismissed. We were told that there would be a continuing review but no specific review on Scotland. I hope I misunderstood the Minister and she will be able to say to the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, that there will be a formal review of that. I particularly hope that she will say something more about young drivers.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, I oppose these amendments. I attended the meeting yesterday with my noble friend Lady Berridge and other noble Lords. We all agree that any alcohol in the blood will adversely affect someone’s driving. There is no doubt about that. As regards Amendment 175 about young drivers, this is not a matter for my noble friend the Minister in the Home Office but I was very disappointed that the Government wimped out on graduated driving licences, but of course that is another matter.
I am far from convinced that the experiment of lowering the blood alcohol level in Scotland will have the desired effect. I worry that it may even have a negative effect. We will have to wait and see. Next year we will get the statistics from Scotland and have them analysed carefully and we will know for certain which side of this debate is right and which is wrong. If I am wrong, I will be perfectly happy to say, “I was wrong”. The wise course of action will be to wait and see and get those results from Scotland and, if necessary, put pressure on the Government to make sure that those results are analysed skilfully and quickly.
I will say a word about the rural economy. If this change is the right change in terms of road safety, we should do it. In this ongoing debate, I have not heard any new arguments in the past few years. If the Opposition want to support these amendments, they will have to explain what has changed. The party opposite, when in government, had at least two excellent Ministers for Road Safety and the very same arguments that have been presented today were presented to those Ministers but they did not make the change. If the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, supports the amendment, I would love to know what has made his party change its position.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, in response to similar amendments in Committee, the Minister pointed out that reduced drink-drive limits in other countries did not necessarily result in fewer drink-drive-related deaths. She went on to highlight the importance of penalties, which are harsh in the UK: enforcement, although this is likely to be less with the cuts in recent years to roads policing in the light of cuts to police budgets generally; and hard-hitting campaigns that have successfully made drink-driving socially unacceptable in a way that it is not in other countries. But these are not alternatives to a reduction in the drink-drive limit; they would still apply.
Reducing the opportunities to evade prosecution and carrying out medical tests to ensure that offenders are not dependent on alcohol before they get their licences back are also very good steps. However, the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, made some very powerful points. She said that the number of drink-drive-related deaths had been static over recent years. My understanding is that the overall number of deaths on the roads has been reducing over the years because of improved safety. If it is true that the number of drink-drive related deaths is not reducing in line with that, it is an increasing problem, not a static one.
A wide range of organisations—motoring organisations, the police and others—supports a reduction in drink-drive limits. Although I found the arguments around the different limits in Scotland and in England and Wales a little complex—rather like a whodunit—clearly there is an anomaly there. The plain and simple issue is that current drink-drive limits enable people to take the risk of having a drink and driving. The proposed limits would deter people from drinking anything before they got into a car. Surely that would be safer. On balance, and having discussed this with our transport spokesperson, we support the amendments.
Viscount Simon (Lab)
My Lords, I will mention just a couple of things. First, in the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act all those years ago I got an amendment through on the evidence on roadside breath-testing, which will get the readings there and then, rather than two hours or so later at the police station. I would love to see this kit eventually approved by the Home Office. It has not been approved yet. Secondly, we are talking about having a glass of wine or whatever. I am teetotal so I would not have the slightest idea but I have been told that the glasses of wine in most restaurants and pubs have got bigger. Therefore, the chance of going above the limit has also increased.
Lord Rosser
Unfortunately, I was not able to get to the meeting that was organised yesterday but, bearing in mind that previously the Government’s stance has been not to go down the road of these amendments, it would be of some use if the Minister made it clear whether or not, in the light of what has been said in the debate, they are going to take any note of what does or does not emerge from what has happened in Scotland, which has already reduced the limit, and whether the Government themselves are going to initiate some sort of investigation into what the impact has been in Scotland. I think the Government’s argument has been that any change should be based on hard evidence. That is one obvious source of hard evidence. It would be a bit disappointing if there was any indication by the Government that they are not actually going to pay very much notice to what does or does not happen in Scotland as a result of the reduction in the limit.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Berridge for explaining the reasoning behind these amendments. I thank her and other noble Lords who came to the meeting yesterday and the one that I held—it seems like a few weeks ago, but it was probably about one week ago. I thank them for being so engaged in this issue.
Amendments 174 and 175 look to lower the drink-driving limit in England and Wales from 80 milligrams to 50 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood, and further to 20 milligrams for novice and probationary drivers. In responding to these amendments, I start by posing a question: what does the number 80 mean to noble Lords or, indeed, anyone who enjoys a drink? Can any noble Lord in this Chamber effortlessly equate it to pints of beer or glasses of wine, taking into account metabolic rate, age, weight and what one has eaten for lunch? I suggest that it is unlikely. Instead, I would like to think that noble Lords in the Chamber today are sensible enough to drink very little, or indeed nothing at all, before driving. Noble Lords and most of society are part of the silent, self-regulating majority that makes our roads in Britain among the safest in the world.
However, the evidence shows that it is precisely such individuals that these amendments would affect. Those unlikely to commit a drink-driving offence in the first place would be put off drinking at all. Meanwhile, no evidence exists to support the notion that reducing the limit would have any deterrent effect whatever on the most dangerous group of individuals. The noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, alluded to the sick and selfish types—the high-level frequent offenders who flout the current limit and would pay little regard to a new one.
The fact is that the pattern of alcohol levels in drivers is practically the same in most countries, irrespective of their limits, and our police resources are not limitless. If we stretch enforcement activity over a wider cohort of drivers, we will effectively lower the chance of the most dangerous being caught and taken off our roads. I therefore suggest that a lower limit is likely to be counterproductive. Evidence showed that this is exactly what happened in the Republic of Ireland, where the death rate on the roads increased by about 17% when the limit was reduced several years ago. The number of drink-drive arrests stayed pretty much the same. Instead, it is the view of the Government that we must prioritise the targeting of the selfish, dangerous minority who cannot be deterred by a change in the law which they are, in any event, totally disregarding.
The drink-driving limit for England and Wales strikes an important balance between safety and personal freedom. By retaining the present limit, we are not criminalising those who drink a small amount a long time before driving; we are pursuing the most dangerous individuals. Meanwhile, our advice remains unchanged: do not take the risk by driving after you have had a drink. I think we all share a common objective of wanting to see a reduction in the number of people killed and injured on our roads as a result of drink-driving. However, I put it to your Lordships that the most effective way to achieve this is not through these amendments but through the continued robust enforcement of the current law.
In response to my noble friend Lady Berridge and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, we will review any new evidence that may emerge, including in relation to the change in the law in Scotland. We will naturally be interested in any reports produced by the Scottish Government or Police Scotland, or any other independent research. For the reasons I have set out, we remain unpersuaded of the case for changing the current drink-driving limit. We will, however, continue to look with interest at any new data or information emerging from Scotland. On that basis, I hope that my noble friend will withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Berridge
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who supported this amendment and particularly to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for pointing out that this is an increasing problem, proportionately, within the number of deaths on our roads. I was not surprised to hear my noble friend the Minister refer to the enforcement point on which the Government rely in this matter. We must pay tribute to our police but the Police Federation supports a reduction in the alcohol limit. If that were the main solution and there would be no effect from this amendment, I do not think that the police would be asking for a reduction in the limit.
I was disappointed that my noble friend did not take on board the point that 60% of these accidents involve young people—I think that it rises to 80% in rural areas. These are not the selfish and dangerous drivers. Interpretation of the evidence is that this provision would have an effect, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, outlined. We will always be left with a rump of people who disregard the law completely but the NICE study on this outlined that changing the limit down to 50 milligrams, or any change, would affect behaviour across the board.
I have to join with other noble Lords in saying that I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for outlining that the advice is still, “Don’t take the risk—don’t drink and drive”, because it was not what was outlined in the Daily Mail today, where the message was actually quite disturbing. I am also disturbed that my noble friend has not been able to outline any other action to try to reduce this trajectory of deaths, which has flat-lined at 240 a year for five years. No other solution is being put forward by the Government to say what they will do to trigger a decline in those deaths.
Lord Moynihan
“National anti-doping provisions
(1) Subsections (2) and (3) apply to—(a) all persons participating in sport in the United Kingdom who are members of a governing body of sport or an affiliate organisation or licensee of a governing body of sport, including national governing bodies of sport, regional governing bodies, sports associations, clubs, teams, associations or leagues (a “relevant body”);(b) all persons participating in such capacity in sporting events, competitions or other activities in the United Kingdom which are organised, convened, authorised or recognised by a relevant body;(c) any other person participating in sport in the United Kingdom who, by virtue of a contractual arrangement or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of a relevant body for the purposes of preventing doping; and(d) any other person in the United Kingdom whether or not such a person is a citizen of, or resident in, the United Kingdom.(2) An athlete is guilty of an offence if he or she—(a) knowingly takes anywhere in the world a prohibited substance with the intention of enhancing his or her performance in any sports competition where there is a reward on offer, whether monetary or in terms of prestige, promotion or protection from relegation; or where that is one of his or her intentions; or(b) has been banned or suspended from participation in any sporting activity, or has been or is a member of any organisation which has been banned or suspended from participation in any sporting activity anywhere in the world, at any time either before or after the day on which this Act is passed; and(i) participates in any sports competition in the United Kingdom where there is a reward on offer, whether monetary or in terms of prestige, promotion or protection from relegation; and(ii) does not have a prohibited substance certificate dated not more than 14 days earlier than the date of the sports competition at the commencement of the sports competition.(3) In subsection (2) “prohibited substance certificate” means a certificate from a medical practitioner in the United Kingdom appointed by the General Medical Council for the purpose of testing athletes for prohibited substances, confirming that in the practitioner’s opinion—(a) the athlete does not have any prohibited substance in his or her body, and(b) the athlete’s body does not retain any advantage in sporting performance by reason of the athlete having taken a prohibited substance at any time either before or after the day on which this Act is passed.(4) A person in the United Kingdom is guilty of an offence if he or she, with the intention of enhancing the performance of an athlete, encourages, assists or hides awareness of an athlete taking a prohibited substance with the intention of enhancing the athlete’s performance, or with that being one of the athlete’s intentions.(5) A medical professional commits an offence if, in the United Kingdom, he or she prescribes a prohibited substance to an athlete and believes, or ought reasonably to believe, that the substance will be used by the athlete with the intention of enhancing his or her performance, or if the professional fails to report any approach for a prohibited substance by such an athlete to the General Medical Council.(6) A member of an organising committee is guilty of an offence if he or she has not taken all reasonable steps to ensure that all athletes permitted to compete in a World or European Championship which he or she is involved in organising, convening, or authorising—(a) have not taken a prohibited substance with the intention of enhancing their performance; and(b) have not been banned or suspended from participation in any sporting activity, or been a member of any organisation which has been banned or suspended from participation in any sporting activity anywhere in the world, during the two years prior to the World or European Championship.(7) In subsection (6), “organising committee” means a Committee established in the United Kingdom on behalf of any international federation of sport, which is recognised by the International Olympic Committee.(8) For the purposes of this section a “prohibited substance” is as defined by the World Anti-Doping Agency or such other agency as shall be designated by the Secretary of State for this purpose.(9) Any person guilty of an offence under subsection (2), (4), (5) or (6) or shall be liable—(a) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or both; or(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or both.(10) In order to assist with the prevention of offences under subsections (2), (4), (5) or (6), UK Anti-Doping shall discuss the following issues with the World Anti-Doping Agency annually—(a) the effectiveness of Annex I of the International Standard for Testing and Investigations (athlete whereabouts requirements) and its harmonisation with the European Convention on Human Rights;(b) the effectiveness of the international work of the World Anti-Doping Agency; and(c) progress on the development of a United Kingdom roll-out of athlete biological passports.(11) UK Anti-Doping shall submit the results of the annual discussions under subsection (10) to the Secretary of State, who shall—(a) lay before both Houses of Parliament an annual report documenting— (i) whether the athlete whereabouts requirements are effective in combating doping in the United Kingdom and are in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights, and(ii) the performance of the World Anti-Doping Agency in general in relation to its effectiveness in preventing offences under subsection (2), (4), (5) or (6); and(b) determine whether the Government should remain a member of and continue to support the World Anti-Doping Agency, in the light of that effectiveness.”
Lord Moynihan (Con)
My Lords, when athletes choose to cross the doping line, they enter a dark and amoral underworld devoid of honesty, moral scruples and conscience. They are guilty of fraud, yet there is no sport-specific legislation in this country—unlike many other countries—to address fraud in sport. Indeed, there is no legal provision in this country’s sport for the governance of and obligations on governing bodies of sport. There is no effective provision for the prevention of match-fixing, bribery and corruption. There is no mandatory responsibility on local authorities to provide for sporting facilities, and there are no national anti-doping provisions.
My Amendment 176 addresses those who knowingly defraud a clean athlete from selection or recognition in their professional career. In any other walk of life, that is a criminal act because it is fraud. Such fraud is criminal, yet there is no sports law in the United Kingdom and no effective remedy for fraud in sport—no way of tackling the stain on the integrity of sport. As I have said before, and outlined in my petition with the support of the Sunday Times, there is no redemption for the clean athlete denied selection or winnings by a competitor who knowingly cheats. What is worse, the cheat with the chance of a long-lasting benefit derived from an enchilada of performance-enhancing drugs knowingly shreds the dreams of clean athletes with every needle they inject.
That is why, saddened by the failure of international sports bodies, to which I will return, many countries—including New Zealand, Austria, Italy, France, Sweden, Mexico and China—have either criminalised the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sport or enacted legislation which criminalises those who traffic in these drugs. Germany is the most recent country to introduce legislation, proclaiming,
“a declaration of war on cheaters”.
Under its law, athletes found guilty of doping face fines or prison terms of up to three years. Those involved in supplying athletes with performance-enhancing substances could face jail terms of up to 10 years. Yet we in the UK have delayed and failed to introduce long overdue sport-specific legislation.
Even the last director-general of the World Anti-Doping Agency reflected:
“I want to pose the question: should doping be a criminal matter? It is in Italy, and we think—some of us—that the real deterrent that cheating athletes fear is the fear of going to prison. Not the fear of being stood down from their sport for a year, two years, four years but a fear of going to prison”.
He is right. Over many years, British Olympic athletes have taken the firm and uncompromising stance that those guilty of cheating should never again be selected to represent their country.
I have referred to the fact that the World Anti-Doping Agency has lost credibility, and I fear that it has. When the news of the endemic doping in Russia and the widespread doping in athletics was broken by the Sunday Times and the German state broadcaster ARD, the president of WADA said that WADA was “pleased” that the relationships with Russia,
“have survived much of the adverse publicity caused by the ARD television programs”.
He further said that he,
“values the relationship with Minister Mutko”,
and would be grateful if the Russian commissar who was reporting to him,
“will inform him that there is no intention in WADA to do anything to affect that relationship”.
These relationships have no place in the corridors of what are meant to be independent organisations overseeing doping in sport. WADA has lost credibility, and that credibility will be restored only when its leaders are truly and wholly independent and not relying on those same countries for votes to enhance their careers, for example, in the International Olympic Committee.
My amendment introduces national anti-doping provisions and, as I said in Committee, criminalises doping by setting a very high legal bar whereby an athlete has knowingly to take the prohibited substance with the clear intention of enhancing his or her performance, or with that being one of the intentions. It is also a criminal offence if a person belonging to the entourage of the athlete—for example, managers, agents, coaches, doctors—or those promoting logistical support for the athlete’s career encourage, assist or hide awareness of the relevant athlete taking a prohibited substance with the intention of enhancing such athlete’s performance, or with that being one of the intentions, to the detriment of a clean athlete and, potentially, their earning power and their career.
That was the first and most important point that I set out in the proposed amendment. It is not intended to apply to those athletes who, undoubtedly by error or mistake, take a prohibited substance. It is very specific to those athletes who knowingly cheat by taking performance-enhancing drugs in order to deny a clean athlete selection or a career.
The second part of the amendment came out of an investigation undertaken by the Sunday Times with regard to a Dr Bonar. Dr Bonar was highlighted at that time as being beyond the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom anti-doping agency. UKAD itself called for the powers to ensure that, instead of just being able to apply sanctions to those doctors affiliated to governing bodies of sport, they could be used against any doctor who knowingly assisted an athlete who cheated—not just 1% or 2% of the doctors in this country but doctors such as Dr Bonar, who was engaged in activities set out clearly by the Sunday Times.
The third point the amendment covers is the fact that if you put a time limit on the effect of a drug in terms of the ban you have to face, the issue of how long the drug benefits the athlete is not taken into account whatever. The key issue is that it is the athlete’s body that potentially retains an advantage in sporting performance long beyond, say, a two, three or four-year ban. For example, if a young person is knowingly engaged in cheating at age 16, 17 or 18 and takes growth hormones—or if I had and turned out to be six feet tall, there is little possibility that I would have suddenly shrunk back to 5’6” when I was 30 or 35; I would have had a lasting benefit from those drugs. It is important that that distinction is clear, and any athlete who has faced a ban would need to satisfy the medical profession—an independent doctor appointed by the GMC—that they have no long-lasting benefit beyond the time of their ban.
The amendment proposes that a member of an organising committee of a world or European championship would be guilty of an offence if they did not take all reasonable steps to ensure that the athletes they are entering for the world athletics championships, for example, next year in London, were clean. They could do that by working with the World Anti-Doping Agency.
I have been very grateful to the Opposition, not least in the other place, who have consistently supported taking action of the form that I have outlined. I think I can do no better than quote the shadow Home Secretary, Andy Burnham—I mentioned this at an earlier stage but I think it is worthy of repetition—who stated:
“People need to be able to trust that what they are seeing on the pitch, on the track or in the pool is real endeavour and not artificially enhanced. If you are using performance-enhancing drugs, you are not just cheating the other athletes but you are perpetrating a fraud against the paying public. For that reason, there is a clear case for it to be a criminal offence. We must send the strongest possible message that it will not be tolerated in sport”—
This is a message which is being considered in detail by many other parliaments in the world, leading to legislation to criminalise the worst excesses—and only the worst excesses—of doping in sport.
I conclude by setting out very briefly who the victims are, because there are those who argue that this is a victimless crime. It is not. The first group of victims are the drug cheats themselves, those young athletes who, pushed to the limits by their ambition and their desire for success and its accompanying financial rewards, are driven to the most desperate of measures and the most dangerous of misjudgments. They not only pay for their use of unregulated, uncontrolled and often untested and unsafe drugs with the heart-breaking penalty of a one-, two- or four-year ban; it is, and has been, far worse. Doping can cost them their very lives. There should be no mistake or misunderstanding: doping in sport is dangerous and the cost of gaining a small competitive advantage can be tragically and prohibitively high. That is, of course, the nightmare scenario, and death by doping is at the far end of the spectrum. But while athletes remain tempted by the huge short-term gains from doping—for example, heightened oxygen-carrying capacity from the use of EPO—there will always be terrible risks. The public never see this most distressing side of doping, and the athlete who dopes either does not know about or chooses to ignore the long-term health problems from such drug use, including greatly increased risks of heart attack or stroke.
The second group of victims are the clean athletes, and it is they whose rights are most at risk of being trampled over by the absence of criminalisation on the statute book. The secret drugs cheats have already callously and deliberately sought to gain selection over another athlete by taking banned performance-enhancing drugs, thereby greatly wronging and defrauding the athlete who has made the decision to stay clean and to live and train by the rules that govern sport. Honest would-be champions suffer when the chance to fulfil their ambitions is stolen from them, when Olympic medals are snatched from their grasp and when they are robbed not just of sporting glory but of all the associated commercial awards. They are cheated out of medals, recognition, sponsorship and everything that comes with being a top sports man or woman. Those innocent athletes—foot soldiers in the fight against doping—make the sacrifices they do in good faith because they believe wholeheartedly in the importance of clean sport. We do not know if a drug cheat can ever be considered clean again; but banned athletes can still train, and, even clean, they can maintain their strength, as I outlined earlier, through doping.
The third group of victims are the legions of loyal sports fans. Sporting events can mobilise the interests and emotions of millions around the globe. From the world of sport emerge national heroes, national institutions, national treasures—legends and heroes are created from sport, particularly Olympic sport, which has a unique place in the hearts and minds of the public. Fans are understandably let down when the athletes whose feats of athleticism they celebrate are exposed as drug cheats and their achievements nullified. Fans expect the Olympic Games to operate on a higher level than any other sporting event, and while it may be vulnerable to legal challenge, there is a certain sense of natural justice in the concept of criminalisation for drug cheats.
Fourthly, the victims are the Olympic Games themselves. Despite their immense success as the biggest sporting event on the planet, the Olympics still epitomise all that is good about sport and encapsulate a distillation of its very essence. The joy found in effort is taken to a new level as athletes stretch themselves to the limits of human physical ability in their quest for “citius, altius, fortius”, breaking records as they go. But the Olympic dream vanishes rapidly if the achievements won by that effort are found to be chemically enhanced and available from the nearest steroid shot.
The final victim of the drugs cheat is sport itself. I firmly believe, and have all my life, that sport is a force for good—a cultural phenomenon that transcends pure entertainment. In its purest form it is a triumph of the human spirit. It is not too far-fetched to say that the timeless and essential qualities of self-discipline, selflessness, fortitude and endurance that the best of sport inspires serve to make the world a better place. The narrative sport adds to our lives is enriching. Sporting metaphors and analogies crowd the modern lexicon. It is not for nothing that we speak of good and bad sportsmanship. The enduring, influential, pervasive power of sport in all cultures should not be underestimated.
Yet, the power of sport is undermined by cheating. It is undermined by those who defraud fellow athletes out of a living and out of selection. Its values are then tarnished, its universal language of fairness, honesty and respect silenced. That is why I believe it is so important that we follow the examples of not just one or two but many countries of the world in recognising that we now need finally to criminalise the worst excesses of doping in sport. I beg to move.
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
The noble Lord speaks with passion and from great knowledge of this matter. I defer to that. I am nervous about intervening because we are in the presence of a former captain of the Olympic team, the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem. I support the intention behind the amendment, but I wonder whether something has not gone wrong in the drafting. The problem arises because the last word in subsection (2)(a) of the proposed new clause is “or”, which means the language in paragraphs (a) and (b) is not cumulative, but alternative.
Proposed new subsection (2)(a) defines the offence of taking a prohibited substance. Proposed new subsection (2)(b) never mentions prohibited substances. Its scope looks astonishingly wide. It says that if an individual,
“has been banned or suspended from participation in any sporting activity, or has been or is a member of any organisation which has been banned or suspended from participation in any sporting activity anywhere in the world, at any time”,
he is committing an offence. Change sports and assume we are talking about football. A footballer who is red-carded is banned for playing for a few matches. In the terms of proposed new subsection (2)(b)(ii) he would be required for the rest of his career to present at least every fortnight a certificate saying he was free of any banned substance. Proposed new subsection (2)(b) does not talk about drugs at all. It says that if a club or sporting organisation was banned for corruption, its financial affairs, a betting offence or any kind of offence, that club, all its players and all those who had played for it in the past would be required to obtain this certificate every two weeks. The same would apply to individuals banned for reasons that had nothing to do with drugs.
I support the intention behind the amendment, but I do not think the wording is quite right.
Lord Addington (LD)
My Lords, I too support the noble Lord’s intention. I have a less subtle criticism of the wording. It refers to “prestige”, “promotion” and “relegation”. The noble Lord has stated very clearly that he is going for the elite. However, promotion and relegation run the whole way through all our sport. I am sure that the noble Lord was not worrying about the eastern counties division north rugby, shall we say, but it would be caught by this at the moment.
It should not be down to a Back-Bencher, even one as distinguished as the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, to be doing this. It should be taken on by the Government. There is a will to do this correctly with the Government. When the Minister replies to the noble Lord, I hope that she will let us know what the Government are doing. That is what is required. We can thank the noble Lord for opening this up. It is down to the Government to take coherent action to make sure this is happening, I hope, with other nations. As the noble Lord pointed out, they are taking their own action. If we can act together, we will be able to do more.
I applaud what the noble Lord is trying to do. I say for a fact that he has probably made far fewer mistakes than I would if I had tried to do this. Indeed, that is a fairly safe bet. I think he has missed on this, but to open up the argument and get into it he has done us a service. We have to make sure we take some action soon. Whatever else has gone before has not worked. “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” clearly does not apply here.
Lord Campbell of Pittenweem
My Lords, I shall not endeavour to emulate the comprehensive approach of the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan. I will permit myself one observation: if he had been allowed a growth hormone, it is unlikely he would have been the cox of a successful, gold-medal winning Olympic eight for Great Britain. He may think that, all things considered, at least from a sporting point of view, he did the better out of the bargain.
I too am sympathetic to the purpose of the amendment. I propose to put it into historical context, perhaps from the rather narrow prism of my sport, athletics. It is almost certainly the case that the last clean Olympic Games of the modern series were the Games held in Rome in 1960. By 1964 there was anecdotal evidence, from which inferences could be drawn, that in eastern Europe there was systematic doping of track and field athletes. It became increasingly clear that that was at its height under the East German Government. As an effort to attract some privilege and prestige, it was clear that athletes in East Germany who sought to achieve the highest levels were not able to do so unless they succumbed to the programme of doping.
That had long-term effects. There is at least one noted case of a female swimmer who was subject to anabolic steroids to such an extent that her female characteristics were so badly damaged that, to regularise herself and her role in society, she transitioned from female to male. That is a clear illustration not only of the power of doping, but equally that the ingestion of drugs for performance-enhancing purposes can bring with it quite extraordinary personality and other penalties.
I am talking about anabolic steroids, which were the drugs of preference in the times I describe, but more sophisticated performance-enhancing methods are available. There are those who argue that we are engaged in a battle between the chemists in the laboratories and the investigators, with the chemists, often having greater resources and no inhibitions, having the opportunity to create circumstances which make it very difficult for the investigators to get to the truth of what is going on.
In my own sport, professionalism has now replaced the sham amateurism of the 1960s, but with that has come the opportunity for quite substantial rewards. I do not regret being an amateur, nor do I have any regret for those who are now professionals. If you are as good a professional athlete as you might be a barrister, then why should you not take full advantage of those qualities? However, as a result of that professionalism, the rewards have become quite extraordinary, far beyond the riches of Croesus that were imagined but never achieved in my time.
I shall make one confession: I suppose I broke the amateur rules once because at North Berwick at an August bank holiday meeting I was given £5 more than my legitimate expenses, and it is perhaps a measure of the time that I thought that was actually a pretty good deal. I was so heavily handicapped in the 100 yards that the local boy won by a street and a half. As I walked out, there was a notice which said “No betting allowed”, and a man took a swing at me, saying, “You weren’t trying”, so I suppose even in those days of what we thought was purity, there were other considerations.
I shall return to the main thrust of what I am trying to say. It is this—and here I echo what the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, said—a two-year ban or a four-year ban is as nothing because if they did amount to something, there would not be so many repeat offenders. People are allowed back into international sport who take the same risk and are found to have been in breach yet again. There is an issue here because the courts have traditionally been reluctant to accept the notion that the authorities can impose lifetime bans because, now that sport is professional, that has an impact on the patrimonial interest of the individual. On one view, it is preventing the individual following what is essentially his or her occupation.
The noble Lord catalogued a series of adverse consequences. Let me put a slight gloss on that and add some of my own, albeit they are expressed in a manner similar to his. The first is the damage to health and personality, to which I have already referred. The second is the undermining of the integrity of sport in a way which is almost incomprehensible. The third, as he made clear, is the unfairness to other athletes who are competing without performance-enhancing assistance. The fourth, which I do not think he mentioned, is that a culture grows up in which young, promising athletes are led to believe that the only way in which they can achieve the highest pinnacle of success is to indulge in drugs of this kind. From my membership of the Court of Arbitration for Sport I know of at least one case where it was perfectly clear beyond any question that it was not the young person but the young person’s ambitious parent. If you take these consequences, or features, of what we are talking about and add them to the comprehensive account given by the noble Lord, it seems to me that the case for my noble friend’s plea that this is something for our Government to begin to take seriously and to produce proposals to deal with is overwhelming.
Lord Rosser
The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, referred to Her Majesty’s Opposition. I make it clear to him that he continues to have our full support in his objectives and in the amendment that he has tabled. There is certainly no change on that score. As he said, prohibited substances are taken to gain an advantage in sport over fellow competitors. They are taken to produce a false result that is not determined purely and solely by the unaided skill and effort of each competitor but one that will, at the very least, be influenced or, at worst, determined by the taking of a substance which improves performance and creates one unrelated to the skill or effort of the competitor concerned. It is a form of fraud. It is cheating not just fellow competitors but the public, who pay to come to watch the sporting event in the belief that they will see a fair competition with competitors competing on a level playing field. As the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, pointed out, in recent years many countries have criminalised the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sport or enacted legislation that criminalises the trafficking of such drugs.
I am curtailing what I had intended to say, but I want to refer briefly to the Government’s response in Committee. The Minister said that,
“the Government believe that rather than tackling this through legislation, it should be a matter for sports bodies”.
That statement appears to indicate that the Government would never favour making a criminal offence, as provided for in this amendment. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, said in Committee, one cannot say that leaving this to sports bodies has exactly been a staggering success up to now. It is precisely because it has not been a staggering success that we have the problem we do. As the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, pointed out, a number of other nations have legislated. As he also pointed out, he has taken the example of the Germans, the Italians and the Dutch, who have focused on the fact—this is crucial—that it is not just the athlete but the entourage who need to be criminalised. It is the entourage we have to make sure we—to put it bluntly—get at because they are at the heart of the problem at least as much as the athlete. The noble Lord also indicated that the deterrent effect in those countries of putting legislation on the statute book has already been effective.
That is why I come back to the response that we got from the Government in Committee. We got a clear statement that,
“the Government believe that rather than tackling this through legislation, it should be a matter for sports bodies”.
Having said that, the Minister went on to say:
“In order to have that evidence base, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport is currently conducting a cross-government review of the existing anti-doping legislative framework and assessing whether stronger criminal sanctions are required”.—[Official Report, 9/11/16; col. 1240.]
If you want to give a clear indication of the direction in which you wish to go, how can you say at one moment that the Government believe that, rather than tackling this through legislation, it should be a matter for sports bodies and then, a little later in the same speech, say that a review is taking place to assess whether stronger criminal sanctions are required and that the review is expected to be published before the end of the year?
In giving their response, I hope that the Government will at least clarify whether they believe this is a matter that should be left to sports bodies or whether they accept that there may well be a need for criminal sanctions and going down the road of criminal offences, which is a key part of the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, has tabled. There is not much point in talking about a review if the Government have already made up their mind—as one could interpret from the speech in Committee—that this is a matter for the sports bodies and not the law. I hope, however, that the Government will make clear that they accept that criminal sanctions and the creation of new criminal offences may well be needed to address this problem, as the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, said in his comments on his amendment.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, it is a great honour to be in the presence of two such world-renowned athletes. Their Lordships look so well that it has certainly given me great inspiration to go back to the gym as soon as possible.
I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Moynihan for again raising the important issue of tackling doping in sport. As the House will be aware, the Government are reviewing the issue of criminalisation. The review is now in its final stages and we hope we will soon be in a position to publish. In finalising the report, we will naturally want to take into account the views expressed by noble Lords in this debate.
Anti-doping is a technical area and it is important to stress here that undertaking a review requires a comprehensive evidence base before considering any possible legislative options. The Government are very much alive to the issues and are actively examining what more can be done to enhance our national approach to doping, including the possibility of criminal sanctions, to uphold the highest standards of integrity in sport. We recognise that the desire to dope can be driven financially, and financial penalties are likely to be as damaging to those who cheat as a ban. Until now the Government’s view has been that, rather than through legislation, this should be a matter for sports bodies to sanction. The central question for the current review, however, is whether this approach still holds good.
It is important to underline that serious doping is already covered under existing domestic criminal legislation. Under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and the Medicines Act 1968, the trafficking and supply of many doping substances is a criminal offence, carrying a penalty of up to 14 years’ imprisonment. Tough sanctions are also already in place via the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code. The code includes automatic four-year bans for drug cheats and support staff who are found guilty of doping. Such a ban forms a significant part of an athlete’s relatively short career, and it would also mean they would miss an Olympic Games cycle.
The Sports Minister, Tracey Crouch, is member of the foundation board of the World Anti-Doping Agency and attended its November meeting, where there was acknowledgement from foundation board members that the current code would be subject to further revision in the near future. There was also a call to revisit the discussion around athletes convicted of doping offences being banned from the Olympic Games.
The Government remain committed to tackling doping in sport and we will continue to work with UK Anti-Doping and our sport stakeholders to ensure that our athletes can compete in a clean sport environment. If the evidence is clear that stronger sanctions are needed, we will take action. There is a process in train—indeed, nearing completion—to ascertain whether the evidence points in the direction advocated by my noble friend. I therefore respectfully suggest to him that until we have completed the review, it would be premature to legislate on this matter in the manner proposed in this amendment. My noble friend has suggested that the Government instead pursue a different course by taking a power to implement the review’s findings through regulations. This is a tempting offer, but I still believe that would be putting the cart before the horse, and the House and the Delegated Powers Committee would rightly chastise the Government for legislating on an important area of public policy through a wide-ranging delegated power.
I recognise that my noble friend has been pursuing this issue for a great many years. I think he suggested that the leadership of WADA is conflicted and that independence is needed. At the most recent meeting of the World Anti-Doping Agency governing foundation board, approval was given for a review of WADA’s governance. Furthermore, there will also be a review on non-compliance sanctions. As a regulator, WADA needs teeth, and we are supportive of such an approach. I understand my noble friend’s frustration; none the less I hope he will bear with us for a little while longer. The Minister for Sport, Tracey Crouch, would be very pleased to meet my noble friend next week. In the meantime, I hope he will agree to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Moynihan
I am grateful to all noble Lords who took part in this debate. I hope it is not too mischievous to point out that over the last 30 years—I think it is about 30 years since I was Minister for Sport and had the first review of this matter—we have had a whole range of reviews. I welcome that Tracey Crouch announced a further review nearly a year ago, but it is unfortunate that the timing of its publication may be a matter of a couple of days after Third Reading of the Bill and thus preclude the opportunity for us to consider it and reflect it in the legislation.
I will very briefly respond to questions or comments that were made in the debate. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, I accept that improvements could be made to the wording of the amendment. I had hoped that my noble friend the Minister would have accepted that we were heading in the right direction, and taken it away with me and the likes of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, to improve the wording before we got to the next stage, but sadly that was not to be this evening.
I stand second to none in recognising that over many decades the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, has not only been a pioneer but led the campaign to criminalise the worst excesses of doping, and his speech bore testimony to that. He said some very kind things, along with a slightly naughty reference to the benefit that I had from not taking growth hormones—diuretics would have been more appropriate for me, to keep my weight down in the coxswain seat. However, he is wrong on one point: very sadly I did not return from Moscow with a gold medal, but with a silver medal. I have subsequently learned that many of the athletes competing in that regatta were not only on drugs but subsequently sued the German Government for the damage to their health. They won and retained their gold medals. Such is the policy pursued by the International Olympic Committee on 20th-century gold medallists.
I echo what the noble Lord, Lord Addington, who was concerned about the wider application, said. Again, that could have been covered in an improvement to the amendment, but I recognise the point that he made. However, the amendment did not find favour with the Government at this stage and we may not have that opportunity.
I hold out hope that many of the points that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, made will continue to reflect the position of his party. He has personally given a lot of support on this and shown interest in it during the passage of the Bill, and I am very grateful to him, as I am to the noble Lords on the Front Bench opposite, both of whom have been regularly in touch with me on the subject. It is a pity that the Government have focused on the review as the cornerstone of the reason why we should not be moving ahead now. I genuinely believe we have an outstanding set of Ministers in the DCMS. Karen Bradley and Tracey Crouch in particular have done a lot of very good work in this direction, and I do not think I would be speaking out of turn to say that I have heard them on a number of occasions at least put forward the benefits of considering the criminalisation of doping in sport. I hope therefore that the Government will be open-minded in their review on returning to this subject. There is a momentum, both internationally and nationally, towards legislation on this subject, and that momentum needs to continue. Thanks to the noble Lords who participated in a series of debates, it is continuing in the right direction in your Lordships’ House.
In closing my remarks, I very much hope that that the Minister will convey to her colleagues what she has said about the importance of the review and that they will seriously take it on board. In addition, I hope that an early opportunity will be found for your Lordships’ House to consider the findings of that review and to discuss this in more detail, including the possibility of finding an opportunity to legislate—if that is the wish of your Lordships—at a future stage. However, I recognise that we need to look at the review, take it into account and wait on its publication. With something of a heavy heart, after campaigning for this for some 30 years, ever since the first summit in Copenhagen, when I was Minister in 1987, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“(5A) If on a review under subsection (4) the Minister decides to uphold the Treasury’s decision to impose the penalty and its amount, or to uphold the Treasury’s decision to impose the penalty but to substitute a different amount, the person may appeal (on any ground) to the Upper Tribunal.(5B) On an appeal under subsection (5A), the Upper Tribunal may quash the Minister’s decision and if it does so may—(a) quash the Treasury’s decision to impose the penalty;(b) uphold that decision but substitute a different amount for the amount determined by the Treasury (or, in a case where the Minister substituted a different amount, by the Minister).”
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, financial sanctions are an important foreign policy and national security tool. Their effective implementation and enforcement are vital to their success. In order to ensure that financial sanctions enforcement is appropriately targeted and proportionate, it is important that a range of alternative enforcement options are available, such as the monetary penalties provided for in Part 8 of the Bill.
The permitted maximum penalty is set at the level of £1 million or 50% of the value of the breach. This level is considered to be adequate to disgorge profits made from financial sanctions evasion and provide a sufficient incentive to improve future compliance in cases where prosecution is not warranted.
In its current form, the Bill states that a decision to impose a civil monetary penalty will be made by the Treasury, and the person upon whom a monetary penalty is imposed has the right to request a review of the decision by a Minister in person. The Minister may uphold the decision and the amount of the penalty, uphold the decision but change the amount of the penalty, or cancel the decision. The Bill does not currently provide the individual with any right of appeal, although both the decision of the Treasury and that of the reviewing Minister are within the scope of a judicial review application. Following further consideration, however, we have concluded that it would be appropriate to provide for a right of appeal to the Upper Tribunal, and Amendment 177 amends the Bill accordingly. Such an appeal route will ensure that there can be a full-merits hearing on points of law and fact, whereas a judicial review hearing in the High Court can examine only points of law.
Amendments 178 and 179 address a separate point. Clause 141 permits the Treasury to extend temporary sanctions regimes and temporary designations to the Crown dependencies and the British Overseas Territories, to ensure that financial sanctions take effect in these territories “without delay”, as required by the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. However, we have always been clear that the power will not be used in respect of any territory that takes its own measures to apply financial sanctions without delay. In recent weeks the Government of Jersey have taken their own legislative steps to implement sanctions without delay. That being the case, the Government of Jersey have requested that reference to them be omitted from Clause 141. Amendments 178 and 179 give effect to that request. Of course if any other Crown dependency or overseas territory takes similar steps to Jersey, the power in the clause will not be used in relation to that territory. However, as the other territories have not yet done so, it is prudent to retain them in scope for the time being. I beg to move.
Policing and Crime Bill
Monday 12th December 2016
(8 years ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 72-III(a) Amendment for Report, supplementary to the third marshalled list (PDF, 54KB) - (9 Dec 2016)
19:05 - Division on Amendment 187 - Ayes: 113 / Noes: 236 - Amendment 187 disagreed.
19:40 - Division on Amendment 187A - Ayes: 160 / Noes: 149 - Amendment 187A agreed.
20:25 - Division on Amendment 188 - Ayes: 136 / Noes: 130 - Amendment 188 agreed.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I often feel when I have the first amendment after Questions that I should explain to Members of the House that it may not be the showstopper that they will be expecting later in the afternoon. Also in this group are government Amendments 180 and 181, which also relate to the requirement to state nationality. I thank the Government for their amendments. I will leave the Minister to decide whether I am insufficiently grateful or was simply asleep on the job when we debated this previously.
Amendment 179A deals with the new section to the UK Borders Act introduced by Clause 144. The requirement to state nationality is not a casual inquiry. It will be a criminal offence not to give nationality in the circumstances set out and it will carry sanctions of a fine and imprisonment. We propose in this amendment that the requirement should be made only if the immigration officer or police officer concerned reasonably suspects the individual not to be British. Amendment 179B contains a similar amendment to the requirement to produce a nationality document. We regard this as appropriate if one is to have these provisions at all and believe they should reflect the Immigration Act of earlier this year in which provisions about searching a person or premises for a driving licence require,
“reasonable grounds for believing that a person … is not lawfully resident in the United Kingdom”.
Inserting a requirement of reasonableness seems entirely appropriate.
Government Amendment 180, which responds to an amendment proposed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member, seems a little narrower than that proposal, which referred to,
“alternative documents sufficient that such a document would normally be issued by the relevant authorities”.
Our Amendment 180A takes what amounts to documents that enable the establishment of nationality a little further than what would normally be sufficient to establish it. It occurred to us, for instance, that when a person’s country is in a state of conflict it may not be possible to follow through to the establishment in the way that the government amendment requires. In other words, it would not be possible to fulfil the requirement.
Amendment 181 with regard to pilot schemes is welcome. Can the Minister tell the House where the pilots will take place, how long they will last and, especially, what is “effectiveness”, which is referred to in the amendment? The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has commented on this amendment, which it calls “a sub-delegation of power”—which is one for the real aficionados of constitutional niceties—and said that it,
“would expect to be given a compelling justification for any such power of sub-delegation, why it is needed and how it is intended to be exercised”.
It very delicately made the point, about which I will not be so delicate:
“The scope … is potentially significant and could … allow the obligations … to be targeted on different classes of persons”.
As the Minister will be aware, we are concerned about the possibility of discrimination in the application of the provision.
The DPRRC went on to say that,
“‘piloting’ generally means that powers are being conferred to apply new statutory provisions unevenly and temporarily on an experimental basis. For this reason, we usually expect certain standards to be met in relation to pilot schemes”,
which it sets out as:
“the intended purpose of the pilot regulations”;
use of the affirmative procedure; a requirement on the Secretary of State to “consult interested parties”; to,
“provide on the face of the Bill for the maximum duration of any pilot regulations”;
and to require the Secretary of State to report on their “outcome and effectiveness” and lay the report before Parliament. The committee makes recommendations to that effect. The Minister will obviously be aware of the DPRRC’s report. I hope she will respond to each of those items.
Amendment 181A reflects our concern that it will be only too easy for the clauses to allow for racial and ethnic discrimination. It would not be the first time that assumptions have been made by law enforcement officers. The Home Office under the previous Home Secretary was particularly aware of the importance of stop-and-search powers not being applied in a discriminatory fashion and disproportionately. Our amendment would require an assessment in this regard. Amendment 181B would require a report on that assessment—not just on possible discrimination, but on effectiveness.
Amendment 181BA is on the same theme. We were concerned—I was going to say on these Benches, but it was not only on these Benches—during the passage of the Immigration Bill about what I have heard badged as the “offence of driving while black”: in other words, somebody subject to discrimination who is required to produce a driving licence or documents to prove he is entitled to drive. We suggest in this amendment, admittedly in deliberately quite short order, that the review should focus on the application of the provisions in the relevant clauses in this Bill and the sections in the Immigration Act, the effects of which focus in particular on ethnicity and nationality.
The Minister may regret putting the pilot scheme into the Bill rather than just announcing it, having all these questions asked of her, but we welcome the careful approach she has signified. We are keen to follow it through, as I hope our amendments and my remarks indicate. I beg to move.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)
My Lords, on looking at Amendment 179A and Amendment 179B in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, your Lordships might think that they are not necessary. They insert only the word “reasonably” in both cases. I would not agree with that. They are very important additions in the context of this part of the Bill, which concerns the circumstances whereby an individual may be required by an immigration officer or a police officer to state their nationality.
The words “reasonably” or “reasonable” are often used in a legal context. Your Lordships can find the word “reasonable” in this part of the Bill. I refer noble Lords to page 163, where at line 28 we have “without reasonable excuse”, at line 31 “not a reasonable excuse”, and at line 35 “reasonable cause”.
These uses of “reasonable” place obligations on the person being arrested for an offence. It is right that in the same part of the Bill the same obligation to act reasonably should be placed on the immigration officer or police officer when requiring someone who has been arrested to state their nationality. They must have some reasonable suspicion that the individual may not be a British citizen. Acting in the way that any prudent person in a similar situation would act is a proper duty to be placed on officers when in that situation.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)
My Lords, as we have heard, this group of amendments relates to the provisions in Clauses 144 and 145, which confer powers on police and immigration officers to require a suspected foreign national to state their nationality after arrest and to produce nationality documents where required. Following the debate in Committee, government Amendments 180, 181 and 194A seek to address concerns raised then by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the Joint Committee on Human Rights. The noble Baroness has tabled a number of amendments of her own, designed to push the Government a little further, but before I respond to these I shall explain the government amendments.
Amendment 180 concerns the situation where a UK national does not possess a passport and is otherwise suspected to be a foreign national. As recommended by the JCHR, this amendment clarifies that officers are able to take into account alternative documentary evidence which would establish an arrested person’s entitlement to a British passport. Supplementary guidance will also be provided to make it clear to officers what specific evidence would normally be sufficient to establish nationality and can therefore be taken into account in that assessment. Given this, I do not believe that Amendment 180A, which seeks a similar end, is necessary.
Amendment 181 will enable us to pilot these provisions on a limited basis to ensure that police processes are robust and that there are no adverse consequences for black and ethnic minority British nationals. Following the pilot and in advance of the rollout of these provisions, we will lay a report before Parliament on the outcome and effectiveness of the pilot. Among other things, the report will include a full equality impact assessment. Given this undertaking, I hope that the noble Baroness will agree that Amendments 181A and 181B are also unnecessary. The noble Baroness wanted to know where the pilots will take place. Subject to agreement with the police, one pilot will take place in Hampshire and the other has yet to be agreed.
Amendments 179A and 179B seek to make it clear that an officer may impose the requirements in Clauses 144 and 145 only when it is reasonable to do so. However, it is already the case that officers may only ever act on reasonable grounds when exercising their powers. Accordingly, I put it to the noble Baroness that there is no need to write this into the Bill. Moreover, in respect of the offences in these clauses there is, in each case, a reasonable excuse defence.
Finally, Amendment 181BA seeks to provide for a post-legislative review of not just the provisions in Clauses 144 and 145 but also the powers conferred by the Immigration Act 2016 to search for and seize driving licences held by an illegal migrant. There is an established procedure for post-legislative review of all legislation, which takes place three to five years following Royal Assent. Consequently we do not need to make express statutory provision for this.
While this is not the occasion to reopen the debates on last Session’s Immigration Bill, I shall just make a couple of observations about the new powers in relation to driving licences. During the debates last Session on these powers, my noble friend Lord Bates made a number of commitments addressing the concerns then raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, including a commitment to pilot the power to search for a driving licence in one or two police areas. The pilot will test the operational details so that any impacts can be identified by the pilot scheme and addressed. My noble friend also committed to issuing guidance to police and immigration officers on the operation of these powers and to a public consultation on that draft guidance before implementation. The consultation will raise awareness of these powers and provide an important gateway through which communities will be able to consider and comment on, among other things, appropriate safeguards.
It is also unnecessary to set up an ad hoc independent review every time we wish to scrutinise police forces’ use of specific powers; Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary exists for this purpose. The inspectorate independently assesses police forces and policing activity in the public interest. The PEEL inspection programme —an annual, all-force inspection which assess forces’ efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy—considers both the extent to which forces use their powers effectively and the extent to which forces treat the people they serve with fairness and respect. In addition, the Home Secretary has the power to commission HMIC to inspect and report on any particular issue if she feels that it requires greater scrutiny than it has received in the course of rolling inspection programmes.
HMIC has a strong track record in shining a light on police use of intrusive powers and has not pulled any punches in its reports on stop and search. It is largely due to HMIC’s findings that the previous Home Secretary announced increased scrutiny of road traffic stops through their incorporation into the best use of the stop and search scheme. We are therefore confident that the necessary systems to provide effective scrutiny of these powers are already in place. The clear statutory safeguards against the misuse of this power, the commitment to a pilot and a public consultation and the role of HMIC mean that this amendment is unnecessary.
The noble Baroness also asked about the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s recommendation. As this is essentially a commencement power, we are not persuaded that the regulation should be subject to a parliamentary procedure. However, I assure the House that we will set out in the regulations the duration of any pilot, and I have already undertaken to lay a report before Parliament on the outcome and effectiveness of the pilot before we commence these provisions more widely.
I trust that this rather lengthy explanation of the government amendments will provide the necessary reassurance to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and that she will therefore be content to withdraw her amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
Before the Minister sits down, will she address the point I made earlier about page 163 where “reasonable” is used a number of times in respect of suspects but not of police officers. Why is that distinction there? If the Minister would like to write to me, that is fine, but I think it is odd that there is that distinction.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I will write to the noble Lord to clarify that point.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. When the noble Baroness writes, perhaps she can also explain this about what the Government did in the Immigration Act 2016. For this purpose, I simply refer to Section 43, which introduces a new paragraph in Schedule 2 to the 1971 Act providing for power to be exercised only if the authorised officer has “reasonable grounds” for believing that, in this case, the driving licence is on the premises. The very fact that that terminology is used in legislation which we passed a mere few months ago must raise the question of why it is not included in the comparable clause in this Bill. I know that the noble Baroness cannot answer this at the moment, but I hope that as well as writing, she might be able to discuss this with officials. It is an intrinsically important point, but also a technical one, as to why it should not be included in this Bill. Perhaps we can come back to this at Third Reading. I am not of course expecting her to do anything other than nod sympathetically, as she is doing.
The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee will no doubt consider the Government’s response, but I note that on the question of the affirmative procedure, the Minister said that she did not think that these regulations should be subject to parliamentary procedure. The committee also suggested, or would require, that the Secretary of State should consult interested parties before making the regulations. I am not sure—I might have missed it—whether she referred to the maximum duration of pilots. I accept that there will be post-legislative reviews, and that everything has to be kept under review, but it is the importance of the subject matter which led us to raise the point about requiring an ad hoc review.
I do not know whether the Minister has any information as to whether the pilots and guidance under the Immigration Act are going to be introduced in tandem with, and in the same areas as and so on, the pilots under this Bill. Does she have any information about that?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I think that is still under discussion at the moment with various authorities.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, we will see, but I am glad to note the Home Office’s acceptance of the importance of the issue, which I never had in doubt. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“Pilot schemes
(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument provide for any provision of sections 144 and 145 to come into force for a period of time to be specified in or under the regulations for the purpose of assessing the effectiveness of the provision.(2) Regulations under subsection (1) may make different provision for different purposes or different areas.(3) More than one set of regulations may be made under subsection (1).(4) Provision included in regulations under subsection (1) does not affect the provision that may be included in relation to sections 144 and 145 in regulations under section 160 (commencement).”
Lord Lexden
“( ) Except in relation to service disciplinary proceedings, this section applies only in relation to persons convicted or cautioned in England and Wales.”
Lord Lexden (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to the amendments in this group in my name and the names of my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford and the noble Lord, Lord Cashman. The support of my noble friend the Minister signifies that these amendments have been accepted by the Government, and I thank her for all that she and her officials have done to bring about their acceptance. I am indebted to my noble friend for her constant understanding and kindness.
I am also delighted to have the support of the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, a strong and constant ally in helping to secure the benefits that gay people in Northern Ireland will obtain as a result of our amendments. His work has been widely noted and appreciated by those who campaigned tenaciously to achieve in the Province all the rights that gay people enjoy elsewhere in our country. The need for equality throughout the United Kingdom on this issue of human rights was strongly supported in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, from the Opposition Front Bench, and I thank him most warmly.
This Bill now incorporates amendments proposed in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and accepted by your Lordships’ House. They will have the effect of making available in England and Wales pardons to those who were cautioned or convicted under cruel and discriminatory laws, now repealed, that bore so heavily and so unfairly for so long on homosexual and bisexual men. They will make reparation, to the extent that it is possible and practicable, to those still living and remove a terrible stain from the reputations of those who are no longer alive, for the comfort of their families.
Naturally, gay people in Northern Ireland felt that their part of our country should not be excluded from such an important measure of belated justice. I was glad to act as their representative and spokesman in Committee by bringing forward amendments designed to extend to Northern Ireland what has now been agreed for England and Wales. I had the great good fortune to be able to draw on the wide legal knowledge and accomplished drafting skills of Professor Paul Johnson of York University, who produced the amendments discussed in Committee. It is his work, refined and extended by leading officials of the Home Office, that will now confer on gay people in Northern Ireland the equal rights arising from this major reform, which they want and deserve.
Laws are not now normally enacted at Westminster, in this and many other areas of policy that have been devolved to Northern Ireland, without the approval of its Assembly, expressed through the adoption of a legislative consent Motion. In Committee, I referred to the strong hope that such a Motion would be passed by the Assembly, and it was duly passed on 28 November. Its smooth passage, preceded by the rapid and successful completion of discussions in the Northern Ireland Executive, owes much to the new, young Minister of Justice in Northern Ireland, Claire Sugden.
My gay friends in Northern Ireland detect a more relaxed, modern and progressive mood among young people in particular. The Minister gave expression to it at Stormont last week when she said that,
“giving permission for Westminster to pass these provisions for Northern Ireland offers an immediate opportunity for the criminal justice system … to right the wrongs of the past”.
She went on to stress the need to,
“ensure that the criminal law in Northern Ireland offers equality of treatment for gay and bisexual men in Northern Ireland, as it would do in England and Wales”.
These are most encouraging and heartening words.
The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, paved the way for the granting of pardons for offences that should never have defaced the statute book in England and Wales by securing the creation, in 2012, of what is known as a disregard scheme, under which application can be made to have such offences wiped from the record. These amendments will authorise the introduction of such a disregard scheme in Northern Ireland. Individuals will be able to apply to the Justice Department to have their convictions for discredited former offences disregarded on criminal records. All successful applications will be followed automatically by the granting of pardons. Automatic pardons will also be given in posthumous cases.
Very importantly, the amendments confer power on the Northern Ireland Justice Department to add further discredited offences to the disregard scheme by means of regulations. Similar provision is to be made for England and Wales under amendments in this group to be moved by my ally, the noble Lord, Lord Cashman.
The arrangements to be introduced in Northern Ireland under these amendments will differ from those in England and Wales, at least initially, in one respect: disregards and pardons will be available for past offences committed by those who were at the time at least 17 years of age, not 16 as in England and Wales. This is because until recently Northern Ireland had 17 as its age of consent. Claire Sugden made plain that she is very open to further discussion of this point in the Northern Ireland Assembly.
I have one further matter to raise relating to Clause 148(4), which provides that posthumous pardons will be made available to those convicted of certain abolished offences under service law. As it stands, however, Clause 148(4) makes posthumous pardons available only to those convicted as far back as the Naval Discipline Act 1866. This is inadequate because, like the equivalent civil law provisions that extend back nearly five centuries to the Henrician statute of 1533, service law criminalised consensual same-sex sexual acts between members of the Armed Forces long before 1866. Between now and Third Reading the Government may wish to consider incorporating these earlier provisions, and equivalent ones in respect of the Army, into Clause 148(4) to ensure that those convicted of service disciplinary offences prior to 1866 are eligible to receive a posthumous pardon in the same way as those convicted after that date. This point has been brought to our attention by the omniscient Professor Johnson.
I conclude with the words of Councillor Jeffrey Dudgeon, whose case at the European Court of Human Rights in 1981 led to the decriminalising of homosexuality in Northern Ireland. He has said that these amendments,
“will right a wrong for a small but very significant group of living people, and also bring satisfaction and comfort to a greater number of relatives and friends of those who died with their reputations scarred by cruel convictions”.
I beg to move.
Lord Cashman (Lab)
My Lords, I am extremely pleased to speak to the amendments by the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, to which I have proudly added my name, and to the other amendments in this group in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Williams.
My ally, the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, has put the case eloquently and exhaustively for these measures of pardon and disregards to be extended to Northern Ireland, ensuring that the wrongs so often visited upon gay and bisexual men can now be righted, atoned for and, indeed, corrected. He is right to quote Councillor Jeffrey Dudgeon, who, along with so many others, has shown courage and leadership in fighting for LGBT equality in Northern Ireland and elsewhere, as indeed has the noble Lord. I congratulate him on the work that he has carried out exhaustively and with fortitude. I, too, record my thanks to Professor Paul Johnson of York University, who has been invaluable in shaping our approach, and who, with Paul Twocock at Stonewall, has guided me with patience and great wisdom.
I hope noble Lords will allow me a short moment of reflection. When I campaigned against Section 28 of the Local Government Act in 1988 and subsequently co-founded and chaired Stonewall from 1989, I never imagined that we would achieve equality for LGBT people in my lifetime, nor that I would be in your Lordships’ House to bring together arguably the last pieces of the legislative jigsaw of legal equality for lesbian, gay and bisexual people. I know that we still have much more to do for the trans community, and we will. Yet I remind myself that what we achieve now is not achieved by us but was made possible by a thousand generations of LGBT people and our heterosexual allies who stood up and fought for equality, often giving up their livelihoods, their freedom and, in some instances, their lives. Moments like these make me feel truly humbled as I recognise their sacrifices over hundreds of years.
In Committee, I moved an amendment to include an offence that was missed from the disregard scheme set up to allow gay and bisexual men who were unjustly convicted under old sexual offences laws to have that crime wiped from their criminal record. The offence, Section 32 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, titled “Solicitation by men”, also referred to importuning for immoral purposes and was used right up until repeal in 2003 to arrest men for the simple act of chatting one another up in the street or suggesting that they should return to their home. Arrests were often made in police stings, where plain-clothes police officers encouraged gay or bisexual men to approach them. It was a key tool used by the police and the criminal justice system to create the climate of fear that hung over gay and bisexual men trying to meet each other right up to the early 1990s.
Currently, men convicted under this Section 32 offence cannot have their offence deleted, so they still face having it registered whenever they have a criminal records check made for employment, volunteering or other purposes. When I spoke to this in Committee, the Minister responded to my proposal in an open and positive way, and I am pleased to say that through discussion with her and officials we have developed an holistic approach that not only ensures that safeguarding can be watertight but gives us an opportunity to include other offences that may have been used imaginatively and perniciously in the past to unjustly prosecute gay and bisexual men.
My amendment gives the Home Secretary the ability to lay down regulations, subject to affirmative action, to amend the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 to add in additional offences to the disregard scheme where it is shown that they were used in a persecutory way to regulate the lives and activities of gay and bisexual men in the past. We are taking this approach for two very good reasons.
First, Home Office officials will now need more time to do due diligence on the case law related to the Section 32 “Solicitation by men” offence to ensure that when it is included in the scheme convictions under the offence that would still be illegal today it cannot be open to being deleted from the record. Although there is plenty of evidence and case law demonstrating how Section 32 was used unjustly against gay men in particular, it had a wider scope and it is important that we ensure that anything that remains illegal today is excluded from the disregard scheme.
Secondly, there is also evidence that other more general offences were used to catch and prosecute gay and bisexual men, such as meeting up, kissing in public and other activities that would be totally legal today. The approach in the amendment will give Home Office officials the scope to investigate these other offences, and as evidence of unfair prosecutions arise the Home Secretary can extend the scope of the disregard scheme to ensure that every gay and bisexual man unjustly convicted in the past can have their criminal record deleted.
My amendment will also ensure that any regulation that provides for people still alive to have their offence deleted will also extend the pardon to people who are no longer alive. I am extremely pleased that the Minister is co-sponsoring this important amendment and consequential amendments. Although people who are still alive will still need to make an application to have their offence disregarded so that it can be checked against the conditions and then physically removed from the criminal record, the effect of a disregard is much more powerful than a pardon. In supporting the amendment I believe that the Government have the opportunity to send a message to the LGBT community in particular that the disregard scheme and the automatic pardon for people who have since died are all about atoning for the actions of past Governments. It is in effect an apology and a sincere attempt to right the wrongs of the past.
It also gives us the very important opportunity to raise awareness of the disregard scheme with people who could benefit from applying to have their old conviction or caution deleted from the record. I hope the Government will work with the LGBT media, Stonewall and other organisations to send the message out about who can benefit from applying and to make sure that the process is as straightforward as possible.
Taking the lead from the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, I wish to thank others who have contributed so valiantly to these amendments and to the cause of equality: the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, other noble Lords, and my noble friend Lord Kennedy for his comments in Committee. More importantly, a lesson I learned at a very early age is the importance of saying thank you where it matters most. I want to close by thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, personally for the work that she and her officials have put into the amendment. This is an opportunity to do that which is just, right and necessary; and I am proud that we are so doing.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, briefly, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Lexden and Lord Cashman, for introducing the amendments, and the noble Baroness for supporting them, and ask that she consider the matters still outstanding, to which the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, referred, concerning the Armed Forces. I am very grateful that the Government are also considering other offences mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, as a consequence of his amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, I very much support all the amendments in this group. We have made tremendous progress in recent years in seeking to redress the effects of homophobic legislation. Terrible injustices were suffered, and previous changes to the law and the amendments are intended to go some way to correct that and make amends. They have my full support and that of my party.
Of course, we need to go further in Northern Ireland, but this is an important step. I want to see the day when LGBT people living in Northern Ireland have exactly the same rights, protections and freedoms as LGBT people living in England, Scotland and Wales. We are a United Kingdom, albeit with devolved institutions, but LGBT people should have the right to get married in Northern Ireland; that must be urgently addressed by the Northern Ireland Assembly and the ministerial team led by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister in Stormont. It is wrong to keep using the petition of concern procedure to block progress in this matter. The UK Government must play their role in championing the rights of LGBT people in Northern Ireland by raising this issue at ministerial and official level. It is not enough for the Government to say that it is a matter for the devolved institution.
During Committee on the Bill on 9 November, I made clear my support for a range of amendments proposed by several Lords. I was clear that welcome progress was being made, but that the amendments proposed by my noble friend Lord Cashman were in my view the best ones before your Lordships’ House. They were not accepted by the Government, but discussions have taken place outside the Chamber, and the amendments proposed by my noble friend Lord Cashman and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, are very welcome. I thank the noble Baroness very much for listening and working with my noble friend on them.
I pay warm tribute to my noble friend Lord Cashman. We have been friends for many years. It is his tireless campaigning with others, including the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, that has got us to this point today, and we should be very grateful to them all.
Although it is not on the subject of the amendments, I will make one final point on equality in Northern Ireland in respect of women’s equality. The Northern Ireland Assembly, Ministers, led by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, and the political parties must get together to deliver equality for women living in Northern Ireland, so that they enjoy the same rights as women living in England, Scotland and Wales. Again, the UK Government have to play their role by raising that at ministerial level. Although that is a matter for another day, it is an important issue to which we must return. In conclusion, I confirm my full support for the amendments.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)
My Lords, I am so pleased to be able warmly to support the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and my noble friend, Lord Lexden. I also acknowledge the spirit of very positive co-operation that has led to the amendments. I recognise that they will continue to strengthen the efforts made by this Government to tackle the historical wrongs suffered by gay and bisexual men in England and Wales—and now Northern Ireland—who were criminalised over a long period for something that something that society today regards as normal sexual activity.
I shall deal first with Amendments 181D, 181E and 181F, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Cashman. As he explained, they will enable the Secretary of State to extend, by regulations, the list of offences eligible for a disregard under the provisions of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. The regulation-making power enables the necessary modifications to be made to Chapter 4 of Part 5 of the 2012 Act, and provides for corresponding provision for pardons to that contained in Clauses 148 and 149 of the Bill.
In Committee the noble Lord made the case for other offences being included in the disregard process, in particular the offence of solicitation by men which is in Section 32 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. As I indicated at that time, the Government are broadly sympathetic to this, but we need more time to work through the implications of adding offences to the disregard scheme, and in particular the conditions that need to be satisfied before a conviction could be disregarded. In recognition of the fact that we should not rush that consideration, Amendment 181D enables the Home Secretary to add other abolished offences to the disregard scheme by regulations, subject to the affirmative procedure. It is important that, in taking this forward, we are able to distinguish between activities that are now no longer illegal and those that are still illegal. This amendment also gives us scope to consider what other offences may be appropriate for inclusion, so it is to be welcomed as a signal of our continued commitment to address these historical wrongs.
As my noble friend Lord Lexden explained, the amendments in his name introduce a comparable disregard scheme in Northern Ireland to match that already in operation in England and Wales. They also introduce the same approach to statutory pardons as that contained in Clauses 148 to 150 of the Bill.
As I indicated in Committee, as these provisions relate to transferred matters in Northern Ireland, it is right that this House should respect the usual convention that the UK Parliament legislates in respect of such matters only with the consent of the Northern Ireland Assembly. I am pleased to say that the Assembly adopted the necessary legislative consent Motion on 28 November.
My noble friend Lord Lexden pointed out the important difference in the Northern Ireland disregard scheme; I thank him for explaining it to the House so that I shall not have to go through it again. I am pleased that we have been able to work fruitfully with the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and with my noble friend, and I commend their amendments to the House.
My noble friend Lord Lexden pointed out an apparent contrast in the approach taken in Clause 148 as between civilian and service offences. That clause confers posthumous pardons for convictions for buggery and certain other abolished offences tried in the civilian courts, which date back to the Henry VIII statute of 1533—whereas posthumous pardons for convictions for the equivalent offences under service law reach back only to 1866. My noble friend said that it was in fact the Navy Act 1661 which first criminalised buggery in the Armed Forces. While the intention behind Clause 148(4) is to capture only relevant service offences that could have been prosecuted in either civilian or service courts, my noble friend may have alighted on a very valid point. I therefore undertake to consider this matter further with a view to bringing back a suitable amendment at Third Reading.
Lord Lexden
My Lords, I must express most grateful thanks to all noble Lords who have taken part in the debate. Those who will benefit from these measures in Northern Ireland will derive great satisfaction from this part of our proceedings today. There is, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, emphasised, more to be done—but these measures will, I think, assist the new pattern of more tolerant, inclusive and peaceful life that is evolving in this important part of our country.
Lord Cashman
“Power to provide for disregards and pardons for additional abolished offences: England and Wales
(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument amend section 92 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (power of Secretary of State to disregard convictions or cautions) so as to add further offences to the list of offences specified in subsection (1) of that section.(2) An offence may be added to that list only if—(a) it was an offence under the law of England and Wales,(b) it has been repealed or, in the case of an offence at common law, abolished, and(c) either—(i) the offence expressly regulated homosexual activity, or(ii) although the offence did not expressly regulate homosexual activity, it appears to the Secretary of State that those responsible for investigating occurrences of the offence targeted occurrences involving, or connected with, homosexual activity.(3) Regulations under subsection (1) adding an offence may also amend section 92 so as to provide that, in relation to the offence, condition A is that it appears to the Secretary of State that matters specified in the amendment apply (in substitution for the matters specified in subsection (3)(a) and (b) of that section). (4) Regulations under subsection (1) may make consequential amendments of Chapter 4 of Part 5 of the 2012 Act.(5) Regulations under subsection (1) adding an offence must also provide for any person who has been convicted of, or cautioned for, the offence to be pardoned where—(a) the person has died before the regulations come into force or the person dies during the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which they come into force, and(b) the conditions specified in the regulations are met.(6) Those conditions must correspond to the matters that are specified in condition A in section 92 of the 2012 Act as it applies in relation to the offence (that is, the matters which must appear to the Secretary of State to apply in order for condition A to be met).(7) Subsection (5)(a) does not apply in relation to a person who dies during the period of 6 months if, before the person’s death, the person’s conviction of, or caution for, the offence becomes a disregarded conviction or caution under Chapter 4 of Part 5 of the 2012 Act (and, accordingly, the person is pardoned for the offence before death under section 149(3) of this Act).(8) The regulations must make provision which has a comparable effect in relation to the pardons provided for by the regulations and the offences to which those pardons relate as section 148(4) to (6) of this Act has in relation to the pardons provided for by section 148(1) to (3) and the offences to which they relate.(9) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.(10) In this section, “caution”, “conviction”, “disregarded caution” and “disregarded conviction” have the same meaning as in Chapter 4 of Part 5 of the 2012 Act (see section 101 of that Act).”
Lord Cashman
Lord Lexden
“Disregarding certain convictions etc for abolished offences: Northern Ireland
(1) After Chapter 4 of Part 5 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (disregarding certain convictions for buggery etc) insert—“CHAPTER 5DISREGARDING CERTAIN CONVICTIONS FOR BUGGERY ETC: NORTHERN IRELANDGeneral101A Power of Department of Justice to disregard certain convictions or cautions (1) A person who has in Northern Ireland been convicted of, or cautioned for, an offence under—(a) Article 19 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 (S.I. 2003/1247 (N.I. 13)) (buggery),(b) Article 7 of the Homosexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 1982 (S.I. 1982/1536 (N.I. 19)) (procuring others to commit homosexual acts),(c) section 61 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (buggery), or(d) section 11 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 (indecent acts between men),may apply to the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland for the conviction or caution to become a disregarded conviction or caution.(2) A conviction or caution becomes a disregarded conviction or caution when conditions A and B are met.(3) In relation to an offence under Article 7 of the Homosexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 1982, Condition A is that the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland decides that it appears that—(a) the conduct procured was conduct involving persons who consented to it and were aged 17 or over (whether or not that conduct occurred), and(b) the conduct procured would not now be an offence under Article 75 of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/1769 (N.I. 2)) (sexual activity in a public lavatory).(4) In relation to any other offence mentioned in subsection (1), Condition A is that the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland decides that it appears that—(a) the other person involved in the conduct constituting the offence consented to it and was aged 17 or over, and(b) any such conduct now would not be an offence under Article 75 of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/1769 (N.I. 2)).(5) Condition B is that—(a) the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland has given notice of the decision to the applicant under section 101C(4)(b), and(b) the period of 14 days beginning with the day on which the notice was given has ended.(6) Sections 101D to 101G explain the effect of a conviction or caution becoming a disregarded conviction or caution.101B Applications to the Department of Justice(1) An application under section 101A must be in writing.(2) It must state—(a) the name, address and date of birth of the applicant,(b) the name and address of the applicant at the time of the conviction or caution,(c) so far as known to the applicant, the time when and the place where the conviction was made or the caution given and, for a conviction, the case number, and(d) such other information as the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland may require.(3) It may include representations by the applicant or written evidence about the matters mentioned in condition A in section 101A.101C Procedure for decisions by the Department of Justice(1) In considering whether to make a decision of the kind mentioned in condition A in section 101A, the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland must, in particular, consider— (a) any representations or evidence included in the application, and(b) any available record of the investigation of the offence and of any proceedings relating to it that the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland considers to be relevant.(2) The Department of Justice in Northern Ireland may not hold an oral hearing for the purpose of deciding whether to make a decision of the kind mentioned in condition A in section 101A.(3) Subsection (4) applies if the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland—(a) decides that it appears as mentioned in condition A in section 101A, or(b) makes a different decision in relation to the matters mentioned in that condition.(4) The Department of Justice in Northern Ireland must—(a) record the decision in writing, and(b) give notice of it to the applicant.Effect of disregard101D Effect of disregard on police and other records(1) The Department of Justice in Northern Ireland must by notice direct the relevant data controller to delete details, contained in relevant official records, of a disregarded conviction or caution.(2) A notice under subsection (1) may be given at any time after condition A in section 101A is met but no deletion may have effect before condition B in that section is met.(3) Subject to that, the relevant data controller must delete the details as soon as reasonably practicable.(4) Having done so, the relevant data controller must give notice to the person who has the disregarded conviction or caution that the details of it have been deleted.(5) In this section—“delete”, in relation to such relevant official records as may be prescribed, means record with the details of the conviction or caution concerned—(a) the fact that it is a disregarded conviction or caution, and(b) the effect of it being such a conviction or caution,“the general names database” means the names database held by the Secretary of State for the use of constables,“the Northern Ireland names database” means the names database maintained by the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland for the purpose of recording convictions and cautions,“official records” means records containing information about persons convicted of, or cautioned for, offences and kept by any court, police force, government department or local or other public authority in Northern Ireland for the purposes of its functions,“prescribed” means prescribed by order of the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland,“relevant data controller” means—(a) in relation to the general names database or the Northern Ireland names database, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland,(b) in relation to other relevant official records, such persons as may be prescribed,“relevant official records” means—(a) the general names database,(b) the Northern Ireland names database, and(c) such other official records as may be prescribed. (6) An order under this section may make different provision for different purposes.(7) Any power to make an order under this section is exercisable by statutory rule for the purposes of the Statutory Rules (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 (S.I. 1979/1573 (N.I. 12)).(8) A statutory rule containing an order under this section is subject to negative resolution (within the meaning of section 41(6) of the Interpretation Act (Northern Ireland) 1954 (c. 33 (N.I))).101E Effect of disregard for disclosure and other purposes(1) A person who has a disregarded conviction or caution is to be treated for all purposes in law as if the person has not—(a) committed the offence,(b) been charged with, or prosecuted for, the offence,(c) been convicted of the offence,(d) been sentenced for the offence, or(e) been cautioned for the offence.(2) In particular—(a) no evidence is to be admissible in any proceedings before a judicial authority exercising its jurisdiction or functions in Northern Ireland to prove that the person has done, or undergone, anything within subsection (1)(a) to (e), and(b) the person is not, in any such proceedings, to be asked (and, if asked, is not to be required to answer) any question relating to the person’s past which cannot be answered without acknowledging or referring to the conviction or caution or any circumstances ancillary to it.(3) Where a question is put to a person, other than in such proceedings, seeking information with respect to the previous convictions, cautions, offences, conduct or circumstances of any person—(a) the question is to be treated as not relating to any disregarded conviction or caution, or any circumstances ancillary to it (and the answer to the question may be framed accordingly), and(b) the person questioned is not to be subjected to any liability or otherwise prejudiced in law by reason of any failure to acknowledge or disclose that conviction or caution or any circumstances ancillary to it in answering the question.(4) Any obligation imposed on any person by any enactment or rule of law or by the provisions of any agreement or arrangement to disclose any matters to any other person is not to extend to requiring the disclosure of a disregarded conviction or caution or any circumstances ancillary to it.(5) A disregarded conviction or caution, or any circumstances ancillary to it, is not a proper ground for—(a) dismissing or excluding a person from any office, profession, occupation or employment, or(b) prejudicing the person in any way in any office, profession, occupation or employment.(6) This section is subject to section 101F but otherwise applies despite any enactment or rule of law to the contrary.(7) See also section 101G (meaning of “proceedings before a judicial authority” and “circumstances ancillary to a conviction or caution”).101F Saving for Royal pardons etcNothing in section 101E affects any right of Her Majesty, by virtue of Her Royal prerogative or otherwise, to grant a free pardon, to quash any conviction or sentence, or to commute any sentence. 101G Section 101E: supplementary(1) In section 101E, “proceedings before a judicial authority” includes (in addition to proceedings before any of the ordinary courts of law) proceedings before any tribunal, body or person having power—(a) by virtue of any enactment, law, custom or practice,(b) under the rules governing any association, institution, profession, occupation or employment, or(c) under any provision of an agreement providing for arbitration with respect to questions arising under that agreement,to determine any question affecting the rights, privileges, obligations or liabilities of any person, or to receive evidence affecting the determination of any such question.(2) For the purposes of section 101E, circumstances ancillary to a conviction are any circumstances of—(a) the offence which was the subject of the conviction;(b) the conduct constituting the offence;(c) any process or proceedings preliminary to the conviction;(d) any sentence imposed in respect of the conviction;(e) any proceedings (whether by appeal or otherwise) for reviewing the conviction or any such sentence;(f) anything done in pursuance of, or undergone in compliance with, any such sentence.(3) For the purposes of section 101E, circumstances ancillary to a caution are any circumstances of—(a) the offence which was the subject of the caution;(b) the conduct constituting the offence;(c) any process preliminary to the caution (including consideration by any person of how to deal with the offence and the procedure for giving the caution);(d) any proceedings for the offence which take place before the caution is given;(e) anything which happens after the caution is given for the purposes of bringing any such proceedings to an end;(f) any judicial review proceedings relating to the caution.Appeals and other supplementary provision101H Appeal against refusal to disregard convictions or caution(1) The applicant may appeal to the High Court in Northern Ireland if—(a) the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland makes a decision of the kind mentioned in section 101C(3)(b), and(b) the High Court gives permission for an appeal against the decision.(2) On such an appeal, the High Court must make its decision only on the basis of the evidence that was available to the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland.(3) If the High Court decides that it appears as mentioned in condition A in section 101A, it must make an order to that effect.(4) Otherwise, it must dismiss the appeal.(5) A conviction or caution to which an order under subsection (3) relates becomes a disregarded conviction or caution when the period of 14 days beginning with the day on which the order was made has ended.(6) There is no appeal from a decision of the High Court under this section.101I Advisers(1) The Department of Justice in Northern Ireland may appoint persons to advise whether, in any case referred to them by the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland, the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland should decide as mentioned in condition A in section 101A.(2) The Department of Justice in Northern Ireland may disclose to a person so appointed such information (including anything within section 101C(1)(a) or (b)) as the Department of Justice considers relevant to the provision of such advice.(3) The Department of Justice in Northern Ireland may pay expenses and allowances to a person so appointed.101J Interpretation: Chapter 5(1) In this Chapter—“caution” means a caution or a warning given to a person in Northern Ireland in respect of an offence which, at the time the caution or warning is given, that person has admitted,“conviction” includes—(a) a conviction in respect of which an order has been made discharging the person concerned absolutely or conditionally, and(b) a finding in any criminal proceedings (including a finding linked with a finding of insanity) that a person has committed an offence or done the act or made the omission charged,“disregarded caution” is a caution which has become a disregarded caution by virtue of this Chapter,“disregarded conviction” is a conviction which has become a disregarded conviction by virtue of this Chapter,“document” includes information recorded in any form and, in relation to information recorded otherwise than in legible form, references to its provision or production include providing or producing a copy of the information in legible form,“information” includes documents,“notice” means notice in writing,“official records” has the meaning given by section 101D(5).(2) Paragraph (a) of the definition of “conviction” applies despite Article 6 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (S.I. 1996/3160 (N.I. 24)) (which deems a conviction of a person discharged not to be a conviction).(3) In this Chapter, a reference to an offence includes—(a) a reference to an attempt, conspiracy or incitement to commit that offence, and(b) a reference to aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of that offence.(4) In the case of an attempt, conspiracy or incitement, the references in this Chapter to the conduct constituting the offence are references to the conduct to which the attempt, conspiracy or incitement related (whether or not that conduct occurred).(5) For the purposes of subsections (3) and (4) an attempt to commit an offence includes conduct which—(a) consisted of frequenting with intent to commit the offence any river, canal, street, highway, place of public resort or other location mentioned in section 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824 (as it then had effect) in connection with frequenting by suspected persons or reputed thiefs, and(b) was itself an offence under that section.”(2) In Article 2 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 (S.I. 1978/1908 (N.I. 27) (interpretation), after paragraph (3) insert— “(3A) This Order does not apply to any disregarded conviction or caution within the meaning of Chapter 5 of Part 5 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.(3B) Accordingly, references in this Order to a conviction or caution do not include references to any such disregarded conviction or caution.”(3) In the heading of Chapter 4 of Part 5 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, at the end insert “: England and Wales”.(4) In section 92 of that Act, after subsection (5) insert—“(6) Except in relation to service disciplinary proceedings, this section applies only in relation to persons convicted or cautioned in England and Wales.””
“Posthumous pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences: Northern Ireland
(1) A person who has in Northern Ireland been convicted of, or cautioned for, an offence specified in subsection (2) and who has died before this section comes into force is pardoned for the offence if the conditions that apply under this section in relation to the offence are met.(2) The offences to which subsection (1) applies are—(a) an offence under Article 19 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 (S.I. 2003/1247 (N.I. 13)) (buggery);(b) an offence under Article 7 of the Homosexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 1982 (S.I. 1982/ 1536 (N.I. 19)) (procuring others to commit homosexual acts);(c) an offence under any of the following earlier provisions—(i) 10 Chas. 1 sess. 2 c. 20 (1634) (an Act for the punishment of the vice of buggery);(ii) section 18 of 10 Geo. 4 c. 34 (1829) (an Act for consolidating and amending the statutes in Ireland relating to offences against the person)(buggery);(iii) section 61 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (buggery);(iv) section 11 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 (gross indecency between men).(3) In relation to an offence under Article 7 of the Homosexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 1982, the conditions that apply are that—(a) the conduct procured was conduct involving persons who consented to it and were aged 17 or over (whether or not that conduct occurred), and(b) the conduct procured would not now be an offence under Article 75 of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/ 1769 (N.I. 2)) (sexual activity in a public lavatory).(4) In relation to any other offence mentioned in subsection (2), the conditions that apply are that—(a) the other person involved in the conduct constituting the offence consented to it and was aged 17 or over, and(b) any such conduct at the time this section comes into force would not be an offence under Article 75 of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/1769 (N.I. 2)) (sexual activity in a public lavatory).(5) The following provisions of section 101J of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 apply for the purposes of this section and section (Sections (Posthumous pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences: Northern Ireland) to (Power to provide for disregards and pardons for additional abolished offences: Northern Ireland): supplementary)(1) (so far as relating to this section) as they apply for the purposes of Chapter 5 of Part 5 of that Act— (a) in subsection (1), the definitions of “caution” and “conviction”;(b) subsections (2) to (5).”
“Other pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences: Northern Ireland
(1) This section applies to a person who has in Northern Ireland been convicted of, or cautioned for, an offence mentioned in section 101A(1) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and who is living at the time this section comes into force.(2) If, at any time after this section comes into force, the person’s conviction or caution becomes a disregarded conviction or caution under Chapter 5 of Part 5 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, the person is also pardoned for the offence at that time.(3) Expressions used in this section or section (Sections (Posthumous pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences: Northern Ireland) to (Power to provide for disregards and pardons for additional abolished offences: Northern Ireland): supplementary)(1) (so far as relating to this section) and in Chapter 5 of Part 5 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 have the same meaning in this section or (as the case may be) section (Sections (Posthumous pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences: Northern Ireland) to (Power to provide for disregards and pardons for additional abolished offences: Northern Ireland): supplementary)(1) as in that Chapter (see section 101J of that Act).”
“Power to provide for disregards and pardons for additional abolished offences: Northern Ireland
(1) The Department of Justice in Northern Ireland may by regulations amend section 101A of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (power of Department of Justice to disregard convictions or cautions) so as to add further offences to the list of offences specified in subsection (1) of that section.(2) An offence may be added to that list only if—(a) it was an offence under the law of Northern Ireland (or, in the case of an offence that applied before Northern Ireland became a separate legal jurisdiction, an offence under the law of Ireland),(b) it has been repealed or, in the case of an offence at common law, abolished, and(c) either—(i) the offence expressly regulated homosexual activity, or(ii) although the offence did not expressly regulate homosexual activity, it appears to the Department of Justice that those responsible for investigating occurrences of the offence targeted occurrences involving, or connected with, homosexual activity.(3) Regulations under subsection (1) adding an offence may also amend section 101A so as to provide that, in relation to the offence, condition A is that it appears to the Department of Justice that matters specified in the amendment apply (in substitution for the matters specified in subsection (4)(a) and (b) of that section).(4) Regulations under subsection (1) may make consequential amendments of Chapter 5 of Part 5 of the 2012 Act.(5) Regulations under subsection (1) adding an offence must also provide for any person who has been convicted of, or cautioned for, the offence to be pardoned where—(a) the person has died before the regulations come into force or the person dies during the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which they come into force, and (b) the conditions specified in the regulations are met.(6) Those conditions must correspond to the matters that are specified in condition A in section 101A of the 2012 Act as it applies in relation to the offence (that is, the matters which must appear to the Department of Justice to apply in order for condition A to be met).(7) Subsection (5)(a) does not apply in relation to a person who dies during the period of 6 months if, before the person’s death, the person’s conviction of, or caution for, the offence becomes a disregarded conviction or caution under Chapter 5 of Part 5 of the 2012 Act (and, accordingly, the person is pardoned for the offence before death under section (Other pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences: Northern Ireland)(2) of this Act).(8) The regulations must make provision which has a comparable effect in relation to the pardons provided for by the regulations and the offences to which those pardons relate as section (Pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences: Northern Ireland)(5) of this Act has in relation to the pardons provided for by section (Pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences: Northern Ireland)(1) to (4) and the offences to which they relate.(9) The power to make regulations under subsection (1) is exercisable by statutory rule for the purposes of the Statutory Rules (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 (S.I. 1979/ 1573)(N.I. 12)).(10) Regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the regulations has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, the Northern Ireland Assembly.(11) In this section, “caution”, “conviction”, “disregarded caution” and “disregarded conviction” have the same meaning as in Chapter 5 of Part 5 of the 2012 Act (see section 101J of that Act).”
“Sections (Posthumous pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences: Northern Ireland) to (Power to provide for disregards and pardons for additional abolished offences: Northern Ireland): supplementary
(1) A pardon under section (Posthumous pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences: Northern Ireland) or (Other pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences: Northern Ireland), or under regulations under section (Power to provide for disregards and pardons for additional abolished offences: Northern Ireland), does not—(a) affect any conviction, caution or sentence, or(b) give rise to any right, entitlement or liability.(2) Nothing in this section or in sections (Posthumous pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences: Northern Ireland) to (Power to provide for disregards and pardons for additional abolished offences: Northern Ireland) or regulations under section (Power to provide for disregards and pardons for additional abolished offences: Northern Ireland) affects the prerogative of mercy.”
Lord Paddick
“Vagrancy Act 1824
In section 8 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 (abolition of offence of loitering etc with intent) at end insert—“(2) A person who has been convicted of, or cautioned for, an offence under those provisions is pardoned for the offence. (3) For the purposes of subsection (2) it is irrelevant whether the person has died before subsection (2) comes into force.(4) A pardon under this section does not give rise to any right, entitlement or liability.””
Lord Paddick
My Lords, Amendment 181M is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I tried to make it clear in Committee that the specific offence of being a suspected person loitering with intent to commit an indictable and later an arrestable offence under that specific part of Section 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824 and how it was used against the black community is seen by the black community—and by many others, myself included—as as much of a clear historical wrong as the offences that we have just debated.
In Committee, the Minister suggested that, without looking at the facts of individual cases, it is impossible to know whether the conduct in question would still be an offence today. In Committee, I described exactly how, in circumstances where a person behaved in a way that would have amounted to an offence today, they would have been charged with a substantive offence—for example, attempted theft of or from a motor vehicle, or attempted burglary. I suggested that it was only when behaviour did not amount to an offence under other legislation that individuals would have been charged with an offence of being a suspected person under Section 4.
These offences are important and symbolic to the black community and how they have in the past been, and continue to be, discriminated against in the criminal justice system. I beg to move.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, this amendment in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, was debated in Committee. It is fair to say that it did not get a warm welcome from the Minister in responding to the debate. I was surprised to learn that the Government had no data at all on the number of people affected by the law before it was abolished. Clearly, the amendment is not going to be accepted by the Government tonight, but the noble Lord is right to keep raising the issue and I hope that it will keep being raised. It is only by doing so that we can explore what options are available to us, what happened in the past and whether it was right and whether, with hindsight, the offence should have been removed from the statute books many years before it actually was, as it was used in a way that discriminated against black people.
I hope that, when the Minister responds to this short debate, she can focus particularly on the amendment. In her response in Committee, the focus was as much on the previous debate, so I hope that it can focus particularly on the points voiced before us here today.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for explaining the amendment, which was of course also tabled in Committee, seeking to confer a pardon on persons, living and deceased, who were convicted under that part of Section 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824 which was repealed by Section 8 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981.
Section 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824 was originally a wide-ranging provision, and some of it is still in force today. The part with which the noble Lord’s amendment is concerned is the offence of being a suspected person, frequenting, in effect, any public place,
“with intent to commit felony”,
or, as it became, an arrestable offence. The noble Lord has illustrated from his own experience, and the Home Affairs Select Committee identified in 1980, that this so-called “sus” offence was used in a discriminatory and unfair way, particularly in relation to young black men. However, as the noble Lord has also acknowledged, not every conviction under this provision, certainly not going all the way back to 1824, was wrong or unfair. In fact, the Home Affairs Select Committee concluded:
“The most powerful argument against ‘sus’ is that it is a fundamentally unsatisfactory offence in principle”.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful to the Minister, who perhaps lulled me into a false sense of hope and optimism by saying that the Government are not “currently” minded to agree to this. We clearly do not want to go back more than 200 years—I think the law was aimed at dealing with soldiers returning from the Napoleonic wars and begging in the streets—but where it is a question of discrimination against the black community perhaps we can do some work and target any future consideration more accurately. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, for his support, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Marlesford
“Anonymity before charge
(1) Section 37 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (duties of custody officer before charge) is amended as follows.(2) After subsection (10) insert—“(11) Where a person is accused of an offence but has not yet been charged, or has been released without charge (with or without bail), no matter likely to lead members of the public to identify them as the person who has been arrested for an offence shall be published or otherwise disclosed in England and Wales, except where subsection (12) applies.(12) This subsection applies where a magistrates’ court is satisfied that it is in the public interest to publish or disclose information of the kind described in subsection (11), and the court makes an order to that effect.””
Lord Marlesford (Con)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 182 on anonymity before charge, I refer to an earlier amendment which I moved in Committee on 2 November. It proposed substituting “lack of evidence” for “insufficient evidence” when police communicate a decision not to charge. Eight noble Lords spoke in support and I have now had the Minister’s letter of 1 December saying that the Government agree to replace the phrase “insufficient evidence” with revised wording which will be incorporated in fresh guidance, to take effect by next spring. However I am afraid that their suggestion of the words,
“the case failed to reach the evidential test”,
does not quite hit the spot. Frankly, “no case to answer”, would be better but that is probably a discussion for another day.
I am glad that the Government listened to the Committee. I am grateful to the Minister for using her influence on the Home Office. I hope she will do so again, after this debate. The matter is really very simple. There have, particularly in recent years, been a number of instances when the police have released the names of suspects or publicly identified them at a very early stage in their investigations into allegations and complaints, particularly of sexual impropriety. A most notorious example was on 14 August 2014 when the Yorkshire police arranged for the BBC to film and broadcast their entry into the house of the pop star Sir Cliff Richard. Sir Cliff must have gone through hell before it was eventually accepted that he had no case to answer.
There are many other examples. We may remember the wholly inappropriate way in which, on 3 August 2015, a superintendent of the Wiltshire police posed for television cameras in front of Sir Edward Heath’s final residence in Salisbury, encouraging people to claim that the former Prime Minister had misbehaved with children. The superintendent was launching an investigation on which the Wiltshire police have now spent over £700,000 of taxpayers’ money, with the chief constable of Wiltshire apparently determined to continue his fishing expedition indefinitely.
The method of fishing adopted by Wiltshire police seems to vary between the utterly naive and the patently absurd. I have been told by a former member of the Downing Street staff that they were contacted by one of the investigating officers, who asked, first, whether they had noticed any untoward incidents at any time in the behaviour of the then Prime Minister and secondly, whether they had noticed any young men slipping in and out of No. 10 Downing Street. Surely the Wiltshire police and crime commissioner has a role in pointing out the opportunity-cost of this farce and guiding the chief constable on priorities in the use of limited police resources.
In Committee a number of noble Lords raised this issue of the police being free to name suspects and the Minister is on record as saying that,
“it is absolutely right and proper for the police to have operational independence in deciding whether to name a suspect”.—[Official Report, 16/11/16; col. 1466.]
My response to that is simple. Searching a house is an operational matter, on which the police must make a judgment. However, to search a house they have to obtain a magistrate’s warrant before they do so. Indeed, the centuries-old requirement for a search warrant forms part of the fundamental protection of our liberties, under both statute and convention, which has its roots in Magna Carta.
The impact of modern social media means that naming suspects is a powerful weapon; indeed, sometimes even a lethal one. I am not saying that it is never sensible for suspects to be named, sometimes even at a very early stage in an investigation. In sexual cases, or cases of fraud, for example, it may be necessary for there to be publicity that will encourage other victims of the alleged offenders to come forward. Indeed, the media have always had an important role in exposing allegations in the pursuit of justice. However, the media have to follow court directions restricting reporting—and they do so.
Hitherto it has been left to the police to make a judgment on whether to name a suspect. However, it has now been shown that all too often the police cannot be relied on to make the right judgment. In their recent decisions on naming suspects they have aroused much public resentment and indignation. This has resulted not only in often irreparable damage to the reputation of innocent persons but undermined confidence in, and therefore support for, the police.
History teaches us the need for vigilance in the defence of liberty. In September 1793, at the height of the reign of terror during the French Revolution, the so-called Committee of Public Safety passed the Law of Suspects, which meant that suspects, once named, could be put under the guillotine without any trial. This continued until July 1794, when Robespierre himself was guillotined. We are a million miles from that. But the road is the same and we must not take a single step along it. It is to halt and, indeed, remedy an unacceptable situation that I am advocating the urgent need for a check on the exercise of unsupervised police powers to publish the names of suspects. That is why in Amendment 182 I propose that the police should be required to obtain a magistrates’ warrant before publishing the name of a suspect who has not been charged. I realise that my amendment as drafted may not be the full answer, but I am anxious that the Government should address what has become a serious problem. I look forward to hearing the views of other noble Lords and, of course, of the Minister. I beg to move.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, we have Amendment 187 in this group but, before I address that amendment, I would like to speak briefly to Amendment 182. In Committee, some noble Lords asked why sexual offences should be a special case when it comes to pre-charge anonymity. Amendment 182 addresses that question by including all offences. However, there are three reasons why we cannot support this amendment. As I will set out shortly, not only do we believe that sexual offences are a special case, but the law acknowledges that they are a special case in which the normal principles of free speech and open justice are restricted. We believe that these are important principles that should be restricted only in those cases where there are specific reasons for doing so. In sexual offences cases alone, the identity of the complainant or victim is protected. For similar reasons, we believe that the identity of the accused should be protected up until the point of charge.
Secondly, in Committee, we also heard compelling reasons why the accused should be able to lift the ban on publicising his identity, if he wishes. The accused may wish to complain at the injustice of his case or appeal for alibi witnesses to come forward, for example. Amendment 182, as drafted, would not allow that.
The third reason is that we do not believe the magistrates’ court is the right place for such a decision to be made. We believe that such an important decision should be considered by a judge of a higher court.
Amendment 187 is substantially different from the amendment we moved in Committee in a number of respects. First, it is as close as possible to the wording of the legislation that currently protects complainants or victims in sexual offences cases. Secondly, it allows the accused to lift pre-charge anonymity at any stage if he wishes to do so. Thirdly, as well as specifying the minimum rank of police officer who can make an application, and the Crown Court as the appropriate court for hearing an initial application from the police for the ban to be lifted, it would specifically require the judge to have particular regard to the possibility that further witnesses might volunteer evidence relating to sexual offences committed by the accused. We believe that such cases will be rare and such applications will be exceptional, as I will explain.
We had a long debate on this issue in Committee, and I do not want to make my case again as it is a matter of record. However, I want to address the remarks made by other noble Lords in that debate, having had an opportunity to reflect on what they said. I will address head on, and at an early stage, the shocking picture that is emerging of allegations of historic child abuse at football clubs. Most of the initial allegations that attracted so much publicity, and gave rise to the unprecedented number of further allegations being made across the length and breadth of the country, involved the former football coach Barry Bennell. Bennell was convicted of sexual abuse offences in the United States in 1994, and convicted of further sexual offences in the United Kingdom in 1998, and again in 2015, for which he served terms of imprisonment. These are not cases where pre-charge anonymity would have had any adverse effect. Indeed, I suggest that these cases point to a change in culture where victims of sexual abuse are more willing to come forward. Therefore, they undermine to some extent an argument against pre-charge anonymity on the grounds that victims need to be given confidence to name people who have been accused but not yet charged.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made this point in Committee—that publicity can lead others to come forward with supporting evidence that helps to make the case against a person who is rightly accused. But what if somebody is not rightly accused? What if somebody like Nick comes forward and makes highly damaging and groundless allegations against individuals? Is it right that these allegations and the identity of the accused are put into the public domain? How do we safeguard against others coming forward with similarly damaging and groundless allegations, particularly when the details of the allegations are made public? There is a view that the law on similar fact evidence has gone too far and that this can result in convictions based on multiple uncorroborated allegations, all of which could be false. I am not legally qualified to comment, but surely a balance needs to be struck between shoring up uncorroborated allegations by trawling for others and protecting the reputation of the accused.
Lord Lamont of Lerwick (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 187. I do so with very great hesitation. I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for speaking before him. I feel great reticence, speaking on this as a non-lawyer. That may be key: I have got in early to speak before I can be corrected by all the lawyers. I have not entirely made up my mind. I am speaking to the amendment; I will listen very carefully to what the Minister says.
The reason I am speaking in the debate at all is because I feel I owe it to the memory of my friend Lord Brittan. He was also the friend of my noble friends Lord Howard and Lord Deben. I saw a lot of Lord Brittan in the final weeks of his life. I saw the tremendous suffering caused to him by being wrongly accused of a rape offence. The Henriques report concluded that the proceedings against Lord Brittan should have been ended much earlier. It catalogued a whole series of mistakes, in this case and in others. There was a total of some 43 errors.
It is the case of Lord Brittan that prompted me to intervene, but the last thing that I would argue, or that he would have wanted argued, is that this is about important people or public people. This is about everybody who might find themselves in this sort of situation.
I acknowledge, too, the argument that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to some extent refuted about why there should be an exception only for cases of a sexual nature. Personally, I would toy with the idea of going much wider than just offences of a sexual nature, as I believe Commissioner Hogan-Howe would also argue.
I have seen the letter sent by the End Violence Against Women coalition to Cliff Richard and Paul Gambaccini. It talks about the amendment proposing defendant anonymity. It is not. A defendant is a person who has been charged. Up to that point they are accused. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, referred to the ambiguity of the word “accused”. I was glad he did, because I wondered whether I was the only person who felt this as a lay man. It is not very clear to me but, as I understand it, “accused” might include interviewed under caution or arrested under bail. Is it really right that a person’s name should be released to the public and the press simply because they have been interviewed under caution when no further action is taken?
I remember particularly vividly a case which, while not a sexual case, made a big impact on me. It was the case of the teacher, Mr Jefferies, who lived in Bristol in a flat next to a poor girl who had been murdered. I do not know whether it was the police who released it or how his name came to be in the public domain, but I cannot imagine the suffering. I think Members of this House have had letters from Mr Jefferies about what he suffered and the damage to his reputation. People just assume that the damage to someone’s reputation will go away because charges do not follow but that is not reality. That is not what happens; there is always an element of the public who think, “No smoke without fire”, and there is permanent damage to an individual’s reputation, which can be absolutely life shattering.
Naming people before charging undermines the presumption of innocence at the heart of our system of justice. Usually, when people’s names are released it is seriously damaging to their reputation, even if they were not charged but just held for a period or their home was searched. The public are not always very rigorous in observing, in their own discussions or in what is written, the principle that one is innocent until proven guilty.
I also wonder, as a non-lawyer, about the effect on the trial itself. It is one thing to talk about the effect on the individual, but what about the effect on the trial of releasing someone’s name before it? How quickly will a jury be able to forget the evidence that has been put forward?
The argument that is made for pre-charge publicity is that it will bring forward further possible victims and allegations that can be followed up. Therefore, crimes can be pursued, but does that really have to be pre-charge? Such further evidence can also come forward after a person has been charged. We know that such situations can lead to false claims being made. I am not suggesting for one minute that false allegations of rape are common—they are not; I know that—but some of the evidence we have seen of historical sexual abuse has indicated that there have been cases where some people have come forward with allegation that are completely false. They may have seen the names of people on television and somehow convinced themselves. Sometimes it is people who are not very well who make these allegations.
It seems to me that the rights of the innocent are extremely important. I hope that, whatever arguments the Minister puts forward, she will not use the phrase “It is a question of finding the right balance” too much. The rights of the innocent are extremely important. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, quoted the old maxim, which I was going to quote myself, “Better that 10 guilty men go free than that one innocent person be convicted”. I have the greatest possible sympathy with the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I will listen to the Minister and then make up my mind, but regardless of whether I vote or do not vote for the amendment, I absolutely want to be convinced that something will be done about this situation. Nothing has been done about it and I cannot imagine that we will be happy if the amendment is rejected and nothing further is done. I remain convinced that there has been a lot of suffering and a lot of injustice done in the present situation.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, this is a very difficult issue. The speeches that your Lordships have heard from the noble Lords, Lord Marlesford, Lord Paddick and Lord Lamont, make a very powerful case. I cannot agree with it and I shall briefly attempt to explain why. The starting point is that we must all, of course, have enormous sympathy for Sir Cliff Richard, Paul Gambaccini, Lord Bramall, Harvey Proctor, the late Lord Brittan—and, of course, Lady Brittan—and the many others who have been wrongly accused of sex offences. They have been subjected to what is, on any view, an outrageously unfair procedure. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, that they have been caused irreparable harm by a combination of the absence of any credible evidence for the allegations, the length of time it has taken the police to investigate these matters and the contempt of the police and the public for the presumption of innocence, to which the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, averted. In a famous 1935 case, Lord Sankey, the Lord Chancellor, called the presumption of innocence the “golden thread” that runs through our criminal law. It is very regrettable that so many of us, and our newspapers, proceed on the opposite principle that there is no smoke without fire, even when the smoke is no more than the hot air blown out by deluded fantasists. On that, I entirely agree. There is simply no dispute about that.
The question is whether either of these amendments is a sensible way forward, and in my view they are not for three reasons. First, in the context of alleged sex offences, publicity can lead, and has led, to witnesses coming forward with supporting evidence that helps to convict a person who is rightly accused and—this is the way the world works—it may be that only on hearing that an allegation against a named person is being taken seriously by the authorities do potential witnesses who say that they suffered the same problems and attacks in the past have the confidence to come forward. The noble Lord, Lord Lamont, pointed out that these people can come forward after a charge is brought, but the problem is that if supporting witnesses do not come forward at an earlier stage, a charge may never be brought. The prosecution authorities may not proceed. Of course, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, rightly said, some of those who come forward will not be telling the truth. That is undoubtedly correct, but the legal process addresses that issue in a trial. It is not sufficient that these amendments would allow a judge to give permission to publicise the identity of the person who has been accused. I do not see how a judge will be able, in any particular case, to assess the likelihood of unknown witnesses coming forward.
The second reason why I am troubled by these amendments is that there is, sadly, still great reluctance by victims to report allegations of rape and sexual offences. There is no ban on publicising the names of persons suspected of other serious offences, such as murder or terrorism, and—the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, made this point in Committee—there is real concern that to give a special privilege to those accused of sexual offences could exacerbate the concern of many alleged victims that the law does not take sexual offences as seriously as it should, so making it even less likely that they will report the allegations. I do not think it is an answer for the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to point out that the law grants anonymity to the alleged victim in sexual offences cases. The alleged victim is granted anonymity because of concern that publicity would deter complainants from bringing forward their allegations, which is an entirely distinct argument.
The third reason is the one given in Committee by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, who I am pleased to see in his place. It is that under these amendments it would be unlawful to tell the public that a person suspected of a serious crime has been arrested and so has lost their liberty, albeit for a short period. I think the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, misunderstood this point, which was not that a person could be held incommunicado.
Prohibiting publication of who is accused and of what in this context would be wrong in principle. It would deflect attention away from the true mischief, which is the lack of respect for the presumption of innocence. Indeed, as the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, said from the Front Bench in opposing a similar amendment in Committee, at col. 1466, to enact an amendment of this sort conferring anonymity would serve only to undermine the presumption of innocence of those who are accused of sexual offences.
Lord Morris of Aberavon (Lab)
My Lords, I support Amendment 182 and am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, for moving it. Having spent over 50 years as a criminal lawyer, interspersed with ministerial office, I hope I have some knowledge of how the criminal law operates and of how the police operate too. I fully understand the concern that my Front Bench may express that it is important to send a strong message to potential and current victims. Of course that is important, but it is also important that a strong message goes from this House that we are concerned that justice is seen to be done to all, which is equally important. That was always a guiding light when, as attorney, I had to take decisions of this kind. The presumption was that every person is innocent until he is proved guilty. I venture to suggest that my experience in this field may not be unhelpful, as a prosecuting and defending practitioner, as a Crown Court recorder for more than 20 years and as Attorney-General, when I had to take personal decisions to prosecute and to ensure the balance was right and give appropriate instructions to those who actually prosecuted.
We have heard the expression this afternoon, “No smoke without fire”. It is an old adage. Cases in recent years have been totally unacceptable. The picture of the police superintendent standing outside the house of Sir Edward Heath and inviting persons to come forward reminded me of what might have happened in Nazi Germany. Leon Brittan did not know at all, and his family did not know until he was dead, that he had been exonerated. Lord Bramall, in very difficult circumstances, had every part of his house searched; Sir Cliff Richard, likewise. I would like to know in detail exactly the operational reasons for disclosure. Should they not be spelled out and should they not be supervised by someone? Why should they be the decision of any police officer who would like to disclose a name rather than having this supervised by a court?
Frequently we hear reports in the press that a white or black, middle-aged man has been arrested in south London, and in the usual kind of case that is more than adequate. I remember when Denis Healey, my former boss, was breathalysed on the way out of this House after attending a dinner. It was in every newspaper the following morning. Why was that? Did any money change hands for the disclosure of that suspected offence? Of course it took two or three weeks for him to be fully exonerated. This is what happens in real life, and I have often wondered, as a practitioner, why it is the same kind of solicitors that turn up at a particular station when somebody important or in the public eye is arrested. I wonder why. It needs investigation, clarification and supervision. I have tried to get the Law Commission to consider this problem. We should have all the arguments on both sides looked at properly, and those of us who are anxious would know what is the better solution. Because there is controversy in this House, its attitude and the attitude of Her Majesty’s Government is that they will not investigate. The problem will not go away. It offends my sense of justice to have anyone in the public eye given all this publicity when eventually it turns out that there is nothing in it. Any one of us might be put in this position, and people would come out of the woodwork to make allegations, as they tend to do.
Of course, if it is of help that a name is published, let us have it supervised by a judge. That is the basic control that is required. As the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, indicated earlier, if people are to be encouraged to come forward, why do they not come forward after a charge has been made? After a charge, everyone would know that a particular person is going to go before a court. Why should it be at the moment of arrest, when the evidence is only one-10th complete at that stage in many cases? I support the amendment.
Lord Deben (Con)
My Lords, as a non-lawyer, I hesitate to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but it seemed to me that he undermined his case right at the beginning when he said that there were allegations that were ridiculous and had no basis at all, yet the police announced these allegations to the world. I happen to know about this because, as I was seen at the funeral of my late friend and colleague, Leon Brittan, I was for some time followed by certain people claiming that they had evidence of his wickedness. They were silly enough to state that evidence, which was total nonsense. It was without any foundation. It could not have been true.
However, I do not want to talk about my friend. I want to talk about somebody whom I do not know at all, although I have met him: Lord Bramall. The allegation against Lord Bramall could have been proved to have been entirely wrong merely by looking at the date on which it was claimed, because at that point he was in a public place, at which it could not have been as alleged. The issue is not that we wish to restrict the opportunities of giving to others the chance to come forward. It is simply, narrowly, to say that somebody other than the police has to be involved before such an announcement is made in public.
There are too many examples of the police giving information to others in all sorts of circumstances. A relation of mine was in precisely such circumstances. What the police told the press was entirely proper and complimentary, but she did not want that to be given out. But the police did—they were clearly paid for it—and it resulted in a long and extremely congratulatory article. The issue was that the police decided that they would make that decision, when there was no reason for it. That was a happy example, but there are some terrible examples. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that we cannot live in a society in which there is no guard against those who give out such information before a charge has been laid.
All we are saying—the two amendments have different ways of doing this and it may be that neither is satisfactory—is that it should not be up to an individual policeman or an individual police force to make this kind of allegation before there is any charge. It should go to someone else. If I may say so to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, this someone else may not be able to judge whether allowing this will bring forward more witnesses, but what he or she is able to judge is whether it is a load of old rubbish. At least he or she can assess whether what is proposed as the basis for investigation has some foundation. That is why it is perfectly proper to say that a judge or a magistrate might take this role.
I therefore beg my friend—I can call him that because the noble Lord and I are usually on the same side—to recognise that it is too dangerous an insult to the British legal system for people to be seen as guilty when they are innocent on the say-so of an individual policeman. All I am asking is that it should be on the say-so, in the quietness and care of a proper circumstance, of someone whose future does not depend on the publicity, who can look at the evidence and say, “Really, officer, I don’t think there looks like being anything in that because of x, y and z. Perhaps you might find out more about it before you move in this way”. That is what we ask.
Lord Pannick
Before the noble Lord sits down, does he think it is in the interests of the potential defendant for a judge to determine that there really is something in the allegations, and therefore to authorise that publicity is appropriate? Is that not seriously damaging to the presumption of innocence?
Lord Deben
Not at all. The fact is that what the judge would be deciding is whether that name should be put forward at that point, and in most cases he would probably say no. I can think of very few cases when publishing the name in connection with an allegation would reduce the number of people coming forward if that name were later published at the point of an actual charge. It would therefore affect a limited number; in fact I do not believe there are any in this group. But if there were, I would want someone to be able to say, “In this particular case, it is so important that I will allow it to be done”.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill (LD)
My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I was not intending to take part in this debate. However, with his great skill as an advocate, he has persuaded me to support my noble friend Lord Paddick’s amendment. I want to try to explain why. The main reason is that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, with his usual brilliant, destructive analytical skill, has explained objections to the amendments but has not answered the fundamental question from the noble Lord, Lord Lamont: what safeguards does he propose to put in place of either or both these amendments? I am sure we will hear that from the Minister in her reply.
As a lifelong friend of Leon Brittan and his wife, during that one year while he was dying I witnessed the destruction of both of them through the callous misconduct of the police service, to which there was and is no effective remedy. The United States, which takes due process very seriously under its written constitution, has not abolished the grand jury. When the grand jury is investigating a federal crime, the one thing that is absolutely clear is that there must be no publicity for any of the evidence that it is investigating before deciding whether to recommend that the prosecution should be brought. The reason for that is the same reason that noble Lords have expressed today about the unsatisfactory nature of our legal system at present—it is the need to protect the innocent before the presumption of innocence has been applied at a trial.
Whether either of these amendments is acceptable or not, I believe that some kind of safeguard is needed—not just through guidance or a code of practice, but a binding legal rule that will protect people in the position of Lord and Lady Brittan from the kind of scurrilous allegations that were made, and the misconduct of the police in failing even to tell them before he died that they were satisfied there was no evidence against him. They allowed him to die not knowing that. There needs to be a prophylactic rule. If the Minister is against these amendments, I ask her to indicate in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, what the Government propose instead.
Lord Campbell-Savours (Lab)
My Lords, I have spoken about this issue on a number of occasions over the years, most recently in Committee on this Bill. I start where I left off on the last occasion, when I quoted the case of a woman who rifles through the dustbin of a reputable consultant, finds a used condom, smears the contents on herself and makes a false allegation of rape. As the accused has no right to anonymity, he is suspended as a consultant psychiatrist, hauled before the GMC, shunned by his friends, attacked on the internet, loses £100,000 that was part of his income, and is totally discredited in his own community. A life destroyed as indeed was the case made by Cliff Richard when he recently attended a meeting in the House.
I do not want to do a rerun of the speech I gave on a previous occasion. Suffice to say that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, on that occasion and on this occasion, as a former serving police officer, in my view—and I say to others to read what he said in Committee—made the case completely. My contribution on that occasion was a modest add-on, as indeed it will be today. It will be about the political background to this matter.
Over the years, the resistance has essentially been in the Commons, but the Commons membership has now changed. Anyone who knows procedure in the Commons will know the position there is very different from in here. One can table an amendment in here and have it heard; in the Commons that is not the case. It has to go through two obstacles. First, it might not be selected by Mr Speaker, because there is a selection of amendments in the Commons. Secondly, it might not be heard because of the procedural changes that were made at the beginning of this decade in the use of the guillotine and timetabling in the House of Commons. I am arguing tonight that we please give the Commons the opportunity to consider again this matter, which it has not been able to consider for some years.
What support do we have for the change? The fifth report of the Home Affairs Select Committee in 2003 unanimously said, in the Commons, that,
“we believe that sex crimes do fall ‘within an entirely different order’ to most other crimes. In our view, the stigma that attaches to sexual offences … is enormous and the accusation alone can be devastating. If the accused is never charged, there is no possibility of the individual being publicly vindicated by an acquittal”.
This all-party Select Committee in the House of Commons in 2003 went on to recommend unanimously,
“that the anonymity of the accused be protected only for a limited period between allegation and charge”.
Then in 2003 an amendment was moved by Lord Ackner, whom some Members may recall. I understand that he was a prominent Silk, much called on nationally for his services, and a judge. I want to read the wording of his amendment in 2003 on “Anonymity of defendant in rape etc. cases”:
“The defendant in rape etc. cases shall enjoy the same right to anonymity as is enjoyed by the complainant”.
In other words, he was arguing for anonymity not just at charge nor even to conviction but beyond, in the event that a person was not found guilty. I have the Division list here. When that matter was brought before this House, all those on the Conservative Benches—who I am told are being whipped today; I hope that is not the case—voted in favour of the Ackner amendment for anonymity through the whole process, which would mean that, if someone was not convicted, they would retain their anonymity and would be identified only in the event of a successful conviction.
My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer argued during the same Bill that pre-charge and accused persons should not be named. He supported ACPO guidance. That is one of the problems: the guidance does not work. That is why we are standing here today. If the current guidance worked, there would be no need for an amendment. It does not work. My noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, who is unfortunately—
Lord Campbell-Savours
Oh, she is here. What my noble friend said is very interesting, because she is one of the great lawyers on our side specialising in human rights. Perhaps I may draw attention to her view at the time on anonymity right through to conviction. She said:
“I strongly urge that this House does not consider allowing anonymity for anyone who is charged with rape. But the Government might look sensitively at the issue of whether someone should be covered with anonymity until the point of being charged … The reason that women will come forward when they see that a man has been charged with rape is because they are confident that they will not be so readily disbelieved if he is clearly doing it to other women”.—[Official Report, 2/6/03; col. 1085-6.]
It is quite clear that, at that time, my noble friend at least had some sympathy for the principle behind today’s amendment.
The former Prime Minister, David Cameron, told Parliament that he believed that,
“there was a case for saying that between arrest and charge there was a case for anonymity”.
“I think”, he went on to say,
“this does represent a good way forward”.—[Official Report, Commons, 2/6/10; col. 428.]
My right honourable friend Caroline Flint, speaking on behalf of the Labour Party in the House of Commons, said,
“the serial nature of the crime that we are talking about is important, because when a crime is reported and people hear the name of the person who has been charged, they feel confident to come forward and stand by the victims”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/6/10; col. 150.]
Even there, from a spokesman from the Labour Front Bench in the Commons, is an admission that, post-charge, people do come forward. I am not claiming that she would support me on this amendment, but I ask the House to judge her view on the basis of the record to which I just referred.
The Home Affairs Select Committee report in 2014 stated:
“We recommend that the … right to anonymity should also apply to the person accused of the crime, unless and until they are charged with an offence”.
In other words, for the second time the Home Affairs Select Committee of the House of Commons, only two years ago, made the same recommendation—again unanimous.
We then have Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, a practitioner in the field dealing with these matters. He too says he supports pre-charge anonymity.
Finally, there is the letter of 24 March last year from Theresa May, who is now the Prime Minister, to Keith Vaz, which says:
“The Government accepts the committee’s conclusion”—
that is, the report I just referred to, supporting pre-charge anonymity—
“that there should, in general, be a right to anonymity before the point of charge, but there will be circumstances in which the public interest means that an arrested suspect should be named”.
All these assurances are diluted by the guidance being given to police officers, because that guidance does not work. It is about time that we stood up in Parliament, recognised the deficiency in the way the law is operating and put on the statute book something that requires police officers to operate in a particular way. In this case, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, suggests in his amendment, they should at least be required to apply to a judge for permission to release a name.
The product of all this law as it currently exists, and the present arrangements, is that reputations are undermined, families are discredited—as I said in my contribution in Committee—there are suicides, public lives and reputations are destroyed, and individuals are sacked from their employment. I have a desk full of letters written over the last 15 years by men all over the country—many of them in prisons; we do not know what happened in those particular cases—objecting to the way the law works.
I implore the House: please give the House of Commons the opportunity to reconsider this matter. If I lose in the Commons, fair enough—but at least give the Commons the opportunity. It is in our hands. If we vote for the amendment tonight, the Commons will reconsider the matter.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (LD)
My Lords, I support what has just been said by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, and the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Paddick. I apologise for not having been here right at the beginning of the debate. Reflecting something said by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, I should state that although this issue affects a number of Members of your Lordships’ House, it affects multiples of ordinary people who are not Members of your Lordships’ House, who have been affected by regional publicity in such cases.
I am almost as dyed in the wool—indeed, dyed in the Welsh wool—a criminal lawyer as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, and I recall two criminal trials in which I appeared that particularly disturb me. In one, which I prosecuted, the defendant was, to my enormous surprise, convicted and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment, and had to wait a number of months before the Court of Appeal overturned the conviction on very good grounds. In the second, a case in which I defended, my client was convicted of a number of offences and subsequently, after I had been sacked as his counsel, deservedly won his appeal. Those are just examples of the many cases up and down the country in which local and regional publicity has been a powerful driver.
I want to make two points—they are of quality—which were not covered by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, either in his speech this afternoon or in the article he wrote on this subject, which I read a little time ago. The first relates to the quality of non-recent sexual offences. In relation to most offences on the criminal calendar, there is no doubt that a crime has been committed and the investigation is as to who committed that crime and whether that person interviewed was involved in that crime. In the case of non-recent sexual offences, it does not need me to persuade your Lordships’ House that there have been numerous allegations of offences which never occurred. The damage that can be done—wherein I move to my second point—when the police work on the assumption that the complainant, often called the victim, is telling the truth means that those cases are quite different. I am not making this up.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
The noble Lord ended his remarks by saying that a grave injustice is caused to those when you have publicity of the kind identified, and I entirely agree. It has been very well illustrated by what my noble friends Lord Lamont and Lord Deben said about Lord Bramall and Lord Brittan. I was Lord Brittan’s PPS in the other place and I know how deeply distressing the allegations were. That also applies to Harvey Proctor; the allegations against him were wholly grotesque and must be immensely damaging. So there really is an underlying mischief of a very serious kind. My noble friend Lord Marlesford and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, are much to be congratulated on bringing forward these amendments.
If I may say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, my former pair for a short period of time in the other place, he is absolutely right—the problem will not go away. That means that we have an opportunity to address it. It is a continuing problem for this reason: usually the information is disclosed by a police officer, usually for money. That is not going to go away unless we intervene by statute. The truth always is that, if you give power to officials or opportunities to officials, on occasion they will abuse it. The noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, rightly asked about the safeguards. Although I look forward very much to my noble friend’s contribution from the Front Bench, I do not think for one moment that there are effective safeguards outside statute.
I turn briefly to the amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord Marlesford, Amendment 182. I agree with one part of it very robustly. His is much more far-reaching than is the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, because it applies to all offences—and I think that he is right about that. Allegations of fraud can achieve very high publicity and be immensely damaging, so I have a great deal of sympathy with the scope of Amendment 182. Where I have greater doubt is with two other parts of the amendment. With respect to the accused person, there is no provision for him or her to consent to publicity as there is in the amendment proposed by the noble Lord. Secondly, I am uncomfortable about the concept of the magistrates’ court being the court in which representations as to public interest are to be determined. I am in favour very much of what the noble Lord says with regard to the judge of the Crown Court.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is a much more distinguished lawyer than I am ever going to be, but there are two points that I would make. First, he says that there may be occasions when an accused person will not be charged because witnesses will not come forward, absent publicity. There is truth in that, but then you have to look at the proportionality of the whole. Yes, there may be one or two such cases, but for an awful lot of cases great injustice will be done to people against whom allegations are made that are wholly unfounded. Finally, the noble Lord suggests that the judges in chambers will not be able to assess and determine the relevant arguments and whether there is a public interest in disclosure. There may be some force in that, but I think not much at the end of the day, because judges in chambers and Crown Court judges are pretty experienced about this sort of thing. They will have to consider quite frequently public interest immunity certificates which have very broad quality concerns attached to them. So in applying the principle of proportionality, the argument advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is wrong in that respect. I make one rider: I hope that the rules of the court which will doubtless be introduced if the amendment is passed will make provision for the person against whom the allegations are made to have the opportunity to make representations to the Crown Court judge.
With respect to my noble friend Lord Marlesford, I shall not support his amendment, should he seek your Lordships’ opinion—but, unless my noble friend Lady Williams surprises me with her argumentation, I shall support the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)
My Lords, I am glad I arrived in time to hear my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours praying me in aid of this amendment, because I do indeed support it. That may surprise many people, because I am ardently an exponent of justice for women and keen to see that the system is alert to the ways in which women often are failed by it. I have written about this for all my professional life of 40 years in the courts. I take this position and I have not changed, my noble friend will be happy to know.
At the time, back in 2003, the point that I was making in opposing Lord Ackner’s amendment was that Lord Ackner was taking issue with the fact that women got anonymity so why should not poor men charged with rape get anonymity? He suggested having equality. It was an argument that was, I am afraid, familiar to me from old judges: “You want equality, Ms Kennedy, we will give you equality”. It did not take account of the fact that the lives of women in society are so often different from those of men. With rape, particularly, women often just could not face coming before the courts to testify against the person who had raped and violated them. I do not have to rehearse in this House the whole baggage around rape: we know why women have been handicapped in coming forward and why the statistics are so low. We know the difficulty of dealing with things that happen in private, but we also know the ways in which women’s whole lives would be affected by the sense of dishonour attached to rape, and for many women this is still the case. Many more women are becoming brave and saying they do not need anonymity but it was given to women in the 1970s to try to redress the balance of law’s historical failure. It recognised something that I want to say very slowly to this House: treating as equal those who are not equal does not create equality.
We do justice by looking beyond the courtroom doors and knowing what really goes on in society. For that reason, we introduced anonymity into the system when that flew in the face of principle. We do not want anonymity in our courts. We want people to stand there and accuse, to face their accuser and to hear what the evidence is. We want justice to be open and for the public to hear it. But the decision was made to give anonymity to women to encourage them to come forward when these terrible events had happened to them. Lord Ackner advocated—and he found some friends in the House—that we had equality in 2003 and should treat everybody equally. But if we had equality, we would not still be hearing women arguing for equal pay and about domestic violence and violence towards women.
You cannot give total anonymity to an accused all the way through a trial because we know that there are cases where people come forward at the right point and say, “This happened to me, too”. If the Savile case and others have taught us anything it is precisely that. However, you do not solve one injustice by visiting another injustice on people. That is why I feel very strongly that the police should not disclose names until the point of charging. We have here a rather unpleasant alchemy of the police and media coming together. I have worked on many cases where a tip-off was given by police to the press who were then standing outside the police station to photograph people as they exited. It never comes to a charge, but the accusation has already been made. Why does that happen, you may ask yourself? In the old days it used to be because the police officer had been promised a drink or a case of whisky would be sent round at Christmas from the local newspaper or a more major national one. I am afraid it could take even more unpleasant forms than the drink at Christmas.
I remind the House that not long ago a woman called Rebekah Brooks—then Rebekah Wade—gave evidence to a Select Committee about the amount of money paid by her newspaper to police officers for precisely the kind of information we have been talking about, which blights people’s lives. From Cliff Richard to Paul Gambaccini, a whole set of people have suffered the consequences of this kind of publicity. The strength of this amendment is that it is not saying that the door is closed. Many women are assisted by the fact that other women will ultimately come forward because they hear that a charge has at last been brought against somebody. They are not standing alone and then they have courage. However, you also have to prevent other injustices. That is why you protect people by giving them the cover of anonymity until the point of charging. Then, and only then, should a name be put into the public domain.
How do we deal with police misbehaviour? I know there are noble Lords who do not think the police ever misbehave: they do. Happily, it does not happen as often as many people think but it is too often and police misbehaviour is behind most of this kind of publicity. If the standing order is not working and the principles are not being adhered to, how can you give teeth to preventing police officers doing this? The only way is if they face sacking or prosecution if they are discovered to have interfered with due process. We must have stronger responses to police misbehaviour of this kind.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)
My Lords, the issues raised by these amendments are extremely difficult. First, in view of all that has been said, it is difficult to distinguish, from this aspect, between sexual offences and other offences. There is much to be said for the view that if pre-charge publicity is to be outlawed, it should be so for all offences.
My second point relates to the safeguard, embodied in the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Marlesford and the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, of application to a magistrates’ court for an order. I think I am right in saying that in respect of both Lord Bramall and Sir Cliff Richard there must have been a warrant to search their homes. A warrant of that kind must have been based on some sort of evidence that was accepted by, I assume, a magistrate. There is, therefore, a question about whether it is a sufficient safeguard for a magistrate to give the order. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said, if a judge has said that there is enough to go forward, there is a slight difficulty in the clear way to a trial because a judge has already come to some point of view. However, that point of view is not that the accused is guilty; it is that there is sufficient difficulty in the evidence that in that judge’s judgment it would be right, in the interest of justice to all parties, for publicity to be allowed. There is a lot to be said for the view that publicity, up to the moment of charge, should not generally be allowed for sexual offences or others.
I have not found it easy to come to a conclusion about this and I have thought about it a fair amount. I have come to the conclusion that Amendment 182 is better but I would like to see a possible modification, in the light of what I have said, of the responsibility for allowing the matter. As I said, I think there were magistrates’ warrants for search in the two cases I mentioned: they turned out not to be particularly satisfactory.
Lord Judge (CB)
My Lords, I have been quoted on both sides, so I want to say something for myself. The most shocking aspect, to me, of the issues we are discussing was the BBC helicopter flying overhead while Sir Cliff Richard’s home was searched. There are many different aspects. Many of your Lordships have spoken today of your concerns about individuals you have known or individuals about whom you have known, who have been, in effect, traduced and brought low by publicity in the way in which we have been discussing. I do not support any such publicity, but I respectfully wonder whether we are addressing the wrong remedy in the wrong Act. For example, what is there to prevent a simple Act of Parliament that makes it a criminal offence for a police officer to disclose the name of any individual who is suspected of a crime, before he has been arrested? It should not be too difficult.
I do not want to repeat what I said last time, but the problem I invite noble Lords to consider is this. An arrest has to be justified. An arrest that is not based on reasonable grounds for suspicion is unlawful. Notice that I pick the moment of arrest—I am not talking about the allegation or the police officer telephoning the local press to say, “We are about to arrest the local schoolmaster”, or whatever it may be; nor am I addressing the issue in the context of sexual offences. The same story should apply to all offences.
An arrest must be lawful. Please can we bear in mind what the consequences of a lawful arrest are? You are detained. You are removed from your home, if that is where you are on arrest, or the street, the town or the city, or your office, or even when you are out having a drink with your friends. You are removed and you are not a volunteer: you have to go. If you resist arrest, you are committing an offence, and down to the police station you go, if that is where they take you. But you are completely in the hands of the arresting officer, and you go through a process. You remain detained, either while further investigations are made or until such time as further evidence emerges or it is decided that, after all, you can be allowed to go, for now, on bail. This is a process that nobody goes into voluntarily. Please can we remember that it is the first stage in the operation of the criminal justice process—and often, of course, culminates in a trial, conviction and sentence.
My concern about both these amendments is that they fail to address the problem that arrest is part of the criminal justice process. If they are adopted or if either one is adopted, we end up not with a situation that is incommunicado, if I may say so to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. We end up with a veil being drawn against any reporting of the fact that one of our fellow citizens has been arrested. I find that troublesome.
The idea of criminal justice being secret is abhorrent to all of us in this country; we do not want formal trials to be conducted in secret. This part of the process, I suggest, should not be seen as a private matter. The exercise of the power to arrest and the consequences of it are public matters. There are many hard cases we have heard about and there has been much abuse of the process, but these issues should be addressed in a different form of legislation.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I have been listening with a great deal of care to all that has been said. I have no doubt that Amendment 182 does not go quite far enough, in the sense that if there is to be the intervention of legal process before a court, it needs to be by a judge and not a magistrate. I am in the extremely unusual position of not knowing which way I am likely to vote. I find it very difficult. I am very attracted by what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, says: that prior to charge, no one who is being investigated should have the information disclosed. But I do think that one has to point out—as, indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, and other noble Lords pointed out—that sexual offences, particularly with celebrities, are a special case that sells newspapers. In one of the magistrates’ courts where I used to prosecute and defend as a very young barrister, the custody officer told me that it was £25 for the information to be provided. So one knows about it, and the police have, indeed, been criticised.
I happen to know someone prominent in a particular career—I will not say which—who is about to be charged with an offence committed at the age of 13 against a girl of seven. Everybody locally knows about it. For him, that is quite as awful as it would have been for Lord Bramall or Lord Brittan, save for the fact that this man is not likely to be dying. But this very personal thing—it may or may not be true—of someone in their forties or fifties accused of what he did at the age of 13, which has suddenly come out in relation to a girl of seven, is a shock.
The question that I pose to the Minister is this. If we do not do anything by way of legislation, what can we do to protect those who are innocent and have been vilified, and those who may be innocent, and the presumption of innocence, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has rightly pointed out, is there but is totally ignored by the media, and consequently largely ignored by the public? The approach that “there is no smoke without fire” is attractive, and if the press say something—well, it may be true. If we do not do anything, how do we stop an injustice? With huge hesitation, therefore, I am likely to support the argument of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, rather than my very close friend, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge.
Lord Blunkett (Lab)
My Lords, I will not detain the House for long. I was the Home Secretary back in 2003 when, as has been referred to this afternoon, many of these issues were debated, and I was responsible for the justice system at that time. We struggled with it then and we struggle with it today. I commend the debate and the very substantial arguments that have been made on both sides. I am struggling to know which way to vote on Amendment 182. My instincts are to vote with the Government but to require an answer to the question that the noble Baroness has just put. It is made more difficult now, in 2016 and going into 2017, than it was 14 years ago. The reason for that is social media.
I take the point very strongly that the arrest is part of the process. Arrest prior to charge is extraordinarily difficult to deal with, if someone’s name is out on social media but they then cannot make statements that can be reported in the mainstream press, to actually indicate at least some side of the story that they are intent on putting. With the best intentions, we may take the wrong decision—as usual, for the right reasons—and end up with people who we seek to protect not being able, in the present era of social media, to protect themselves. I look forward to the Minister pulling together the very difficult arguments at the end of this debate.
Lord Faulks (Con)
My Lords, I will not delay the House long, either. We have rightly concentrated on the rights of the innocent; they are fundamental to our system. But I will address your Lordships very briefly on the position of victims. Victims’ groups complain, not without justification, that in the past they have not always been taken seriously by the police or prosecuting authorities. Victims need to be encouraged to come forward. We should not underestimate the courage it takes to report offences of the sort we are concerned with to the police. You may not be believed. You may have to face—so you think—the ordeal of being cross-examined by men in wigs who suggest that you have lied. You may feel very alone, particularly if you have been abused by someone in authority.
Noble Lords will have seen the footballers coming forward many years after the event, and the courage that it took and the incredible upset that it caused them in a macho culture to admit what had happened so many years ago. I take the example given by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, of someone in a care home. They come to the police many years later. Their evidence is the first of any sort of being abused in a care home by somebody who runs the care home. After they have given their account, the man who is running the care home denies vociferously that he abused this character. There is a suggestion that he may have come forward for financial motive. But what if others come forward? The first complainant may feel that he cannot go through with the matter at all unless some of the other people, whom he knows very well have been abused, do so.
In Committee, I raised the point with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that I was concerned that his amendment might result in the police charging rather earlier than they would otherwise have done because they want to flush out potential corroborative witnesses; and that that might be inappropriate. I did not suggest there was any lack of bona fides on the part of the police; this is a very difficult decision to make. However, I suggest that there is that real risk, even with CPS involvement. It is most important that people are encouraged to come forward to give evidence in appropriate cases.
Of course, safeguards have been mentioned, whether in the magistrates’ court or the High Court, but this is a police operational matter. Despite judges’ ability to deal with many difficult things, it is not the right case for them to consider. I suggest that if there is a need for a tightening of the guidelines or for further offences that deal with police behaviour, so be it. But, focusing on the victim, I am for the moment not satisfied that there needs to be a change in the law.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I will address a couple of points briefly. First, I will address the difference between Amendments 182 and 187 on the central question of whether it is right to extend pre-charge anonymity to all offences or to sexual offences only. I completely appreciate the logic of the position adopted by the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. However, I believe that there is a distinction to be drawn between sexual offences on the one hand and other offences on the other.
I believe that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, was right about this. It seems to me that a particular stigma attaches to accusations of sexual offences, which is generally more difficult to rebut where such accusations are made than where an accusation is made of another offence against the person or of offences against property. It is often far more difficult in sexual offence cases to clear conclusively and for ever the name of a suspect who is not charged than it is in the case of other offences. As the noble and learned Baroness pointed out, there is also the interest of the press in sexual offence cases. I suggest that that is why so much publicity has been given to sexual offences, particularly historical offences, in this debate and in your Lordships’ House generally.
A further point is that the nature of the evidence in sexual offences tends to be historical and tends to involve pitting the word of the claimant against the word of the victim. In those circumstances, the no smoke without fire rubric gains currency. I see this as a question of balance in which the balance in the all-offences case mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, comes down against pre-charge anonymity, whereas it comes down in favour of it in respect of sexual offences. It is a case of the robustness and security that we as a society allow to the presumption of innocence.
The second question I wish to address is that of the stage at which anonymity should cease. I entirely take the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, that the arrest is part of the criminal process and therefore that there is, generally speaking, a public right to know because the liberty of the subject is being taken away at that early stage. However, I cannot get away from the central point that arrest can be effected by a police officer on reasonable suspicion only. That reasonable suspicion frequently arises when the suspect has been given no chance to offer a full explanation which, if he were offered that opportunity, might dispel the suspicion altogether—whereas, to justify a charge, it has to be shown that there is evidence which would, if it were accepted at a trial, lead to a conviction by a court of law. I believe that that distinction is important, and that again the balance is against lifting anonymity at arrest and keeping it therefore at charge.
I then come to the question of witnesses coming forward. I completely appreciate the concern that exists around the House and outside it that witnesses should not be deterred from coming forward. But I also agree with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, that in most cases, if evidence from further witnesses is available, it will come forward after charge, so that forbidding pre-charge publicity will delay further evidence rather than prevent it coming to light altogether. There is nevertheless a concern, raised by the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Pannick, about the possibility of pre-charge anonymity preventing genuine witnesses—notably other victims—coming forward with allegations that might lead to a suspect being charged when he would otherwise escape justice altogether. That is why the detail of the proviso inserted in the amendment of my noble friend Lord Paddick addresses this point precisely, and it is very different from the amendment that was presented in Committee.
Under this amendment a judge is entitled to say that he is,
“satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to remove or vary a restriction provided for”,
and to,
“direct that the restriction shall be lifted or shall be limited to such extent and on such terms as the judge considers the interests of justice require”.
The amendment further states:
“In considering an application … the judge shall have particular regard to the possibility that further witnesses might volunteer evidence relating to sexual offences allegedly committed by the person”.
I believe that that is the best we can do in striking a balance between encouraging witnesses to come forward and enabling them to know about allegations in appropriate cases, and protecting suspects from unjust publicity that causes the dreadful consequences of which we have all heard.
It is all a question of balance and I appreciate that it is a very difficult balance to strike. But I suggest to your Lordships’ House that the amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord Paddick strikes that balance accurately and should be supported.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
My Lords, I note that the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, concluded his comments by saying that it is a matter of balance. I would concur with that view, but the balance concerned depends on which side of the fence you feel you might fall. I do not intend to detain the House for too long, since we have already had a number of Members expressing a desire to hear from the Minister. Nevertheless, I do intend to set out our position.
We do not support either of these amendments. Amendment 182 provides for pre-charge anonymity in all cases, including sexual offences, except where a magistrates’ court decides otherwise. Amendment 187 provides for pre-charge anonymity where a person has been accused of committing a sexual offence unless a judge decides otherwise. I am not a lawyer, and it may well be that my lack of knowledge of the law will be displayed in what I have got to say. But at present, as I understand it, there is an assumption of anonymity before the point of charge, except where the police decide to use their discretion in cases where they believe that disclosure of the identity of the person suspected but not charged is likely, for example, to lead to further evidence coming forward which will enable a stronger case to be made, which will enhance the likelihood of a successful prosecution.
We had a lengthy debate in Committee on the issue of pre-charge anonymity. We on this side acknowledged that a case could be made for going down this road. However, we also referred to the reality that there is evidence—for example, in sexual offence cases, where disclosing the name of the person alleged to have committed such offences has led to other victims coming forward and to a stronger case being able to be made against the accused to secure a successful prosecution. We have evidence that victims of sexual offences are often reluctant to come forward because of feelings that they will not be believed if it is their word alone against that of the alleged perpetrator. This is particularly so where that individual is a well-known and respected—at least, respected at that time—figure. We know too that there are sometimes feelings of shame about such offences, or feelings that such offences have to be tolerated, and a desire not to talk about it. These are feelings that are being expressed now with respect to the rapidly emerging scandal of sexual offences against young people in the football world—people are coming forward now that they know they are not alone.
We know too that the reporting of and convictions for sexual abuse cases are very low. Perhaps we should be spending some time considering why that is the case. We also need to take into account the fact that victims of sexual abuse—innocent people in spades—have had their lives darkened, including when the sexual offences were committed by well-known public figures. Of course, the victims themselves are rarely well-known public figures. During the passage of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, one reason we gave for not changing the law was precisely to avoid giving the impression that there is a presumption of doubt about the credibility of the complainant in sexual offence cases. I am afraid I do not wholeheartedly agree with what I think the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, was saying. Frankly, granting anonymity specifically for those suspected of sexual offences could imply that a person making a complaint in respect of such an offence was not to be believed in the same way as someone making a complaint involving another individual in relation to any other kind of serious offence, such as murder, fraud or, yes, child cruelty.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I am not a lawyer. When the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, say this is a very difficult issue, I know that this is a very difficult issue. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for retabling the amendment on pre-charge anonymity for those accused of sexual offences and to my noble friend Lord Marlesford for his amendment, which proposes pre-charge anonymity for a person accused of any crime. I know this is a subject which we have debated frequently and in which noble Lords have a great deal of interest, and we have the legal experts of the land here to assist us.
Like other noble Lords have said, I will not repeat all the points I gave in my responses to the amendment in Committee, save to say that the Government fully understand the anguish felt by those who have had their reputation questioned and tarnished following unfounded allegations made against them. My noble friend Lord Lamont very articulately outlined the names of some of them, although I will not go into individual cases. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, indicated in our earlier debate, such anguish will arise whether the unfounded allegation was in relation to allegations of sexual offences, which is the premise of the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, or with regard to other offences, which is the reasoning behind my noble friend’s amendment.
However, I reiterate that the notion that someone is innocent until proven guilty, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, says, is absolutely central to our justice system and the rule of law. There must never be an assumption that being charged or arrested for any offence indicates that a person is guilty of a crime, so the Government have every sympathy for the underlying aims behind both of these amendments. As noble Lords will know, the Government also start from the position that there should, in general, be a presumption of anonymity before the point of charge and believe that there is also a general acceptance that there will none the less be exceptional circumstances in which the public interest means a suspect should be named. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, articulated that. The Government’s position remains that we are not persuaded that legislation is the right way forward at this time.
As with any offence, it is absolutely right and proper for the police to have operational independence in deciding whether to name a suspect, and the Government firmly believe that non-statutory guidance, rather than primary legislation, is the appropriate vehicle for guiding the police in these operational decisions. It is absolutely vital that the police are able to exercise their own judgment and act swiftly in circumstances where releasing the name of a suspect may, for example, prevent further harm. The introduction of a statutory scheme would hamper the police’s ability to act in this way. We know that such identification can help other victims to recognise that they are not the only ones who have suffered, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said. This is particularly the case with regard to sexual abuse allegations, where the ability of the police to name an individual accused of such an offence might give encouragement to other victims to overcome their reluctance to come forward—and many of them are very reluctant. Victims must feel that they can report the abuse to the police as well as get the support they need.
We have seen recently the significant effect of increased willingness by victims to report what happened to them in the shocking scale and nature of allegations of non-recent child sexual abuse in football. I am sure the whole House will want to join me in paying tribute to the bravery that some ex-footballers have shown in coming forward publicly after so much time in what must have been terribly difficult personal circumstances. Their courage has clearly given confidence to many others to come forward. But had the legislation put forward by these amendments been in place today, the media in this country could have been prevented from reporting the claims of some of these alleged victims. Of course, as with any allegation, it is now for the police to take forward and investigate in order to establish the facts and, where appropriate, to bring prosecutions.
A question was asked—I cannot remember by which noble Lord—about whether the police should believe all victims. The police should always focus on the credibility of the allegation rather than on the credibility of the witness. As I have just outlined in the case of allegations in football, I cannot emphasise strongly enough that we must not undermine victims’—
Lord Carlile of Berriew
I do not quite understand how the shocking cohort of football cases relates to the issue in these amendments. These football cases have not followed a specific arrest or arrests. Indeed, the three convictions of Barry Bennell in 1994, 1998 and, I think, 2002, did not produce a cohort of reporting; media publicity of the issue, not of an arrest, produced it. So what does it have to do with this issue?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I am trying to illustrate that alleged victims’ willingness to come forward is now more common because they feel that they can come forward and they are more likely to be believed. There are not huge numbers of convictions in sexual abuse trials, and to go back to the position where anonymity was granted would be a retrograde step.
Lord Paddick
Can the Minister clarify that? I think she just said that there is a low conviction rate in trials involving sexual offences. That is not accurate. In rape cases, for example, the conviction rate at trial is more or less over 50% and more or less in line with the conviction rate in other offences.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
Many cases do not come to trial. I was trying to illustrate the reluctance of people to come forward. People are still reluctant to do so, and the Government do not want to create an environment in which we go back to the practices of times gone by, which is why we have so many allegations of historic sex offences.
Noble Lords asked about safeguards, and of course, as my noble friend Lord Faulks said, we have the magistrates’ court and the High Court. We have College of Policing guidance, which states that the police should not routinely release information about suspects before charge. However, it also makes clear that there are limited circumstances in which the release of such information can be justified.
Lord Campbell-Savours
Will the Minister address the issue that was raised by most of the speakers, on the position of people who commit suicide, whose families break up, whose reputations are destroyed or whose careers end, or who are destroyed in their communities, only because the Government of the day—of both major parties—have insisted on pursuing this arrangement, which is clearly not in the public interest? Will the noble Baroness address the agony of the people involved? The fact that some of them are prominent is not so important. Hundreds—there may well be thousands; we do not know—of people out there suffer similarly.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I think I addressed that right at the beginning of my speech, when I said that the Government completely acknowledge the pain that some people have gone through in the course of the last few years—and in the course of history—due to being wrongly accused of crimes which they did not commit. I absolutely acknowledge that point. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said that it is an incredibly difficult issue, and I recognise that.
I was going to say something else. The College of Policing is currently developing—
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
The Minister acknowledges that there is a problem and that there have been cases of monstrous injustice to individuals. Several of us have asked whether the Government will go forward, not backwards, with some alternative to either of these amendments. Can she tell us precisely what she proposes to do, with revised guidance, codes of practice or anything else, so that we can be satisfied that the Government will solve the problem?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I was just about to say—I do not know whether the noble Lord will be satisfied by it—that the College of Policing is currently developing authorised professional practice on media relations, and its guidance makes it clear that decisions should be made only on a case-by-case basis when it comes to the releasing of names. I am not sure that I have satisfied noble Lords but I have tried to explain how we have tried to achieve balance in the protection of anonymity for persons who are accused pre-charge.
Lord Morris of Aberavon
I wonder whether the Minister is going to deal with this difficult issue with its complicated argument by referring it to the Law Commission so we can have an independent view that may not be forthcoming from the College of Policing.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I think that I have explained that the Government feel that we currently have the balance right and that we should preserve that presumption of anonymity—so I will not be doing what the noble and learned Lord suggests. I hope that my noble friend will withdraw his amendment and that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, will not press his.
Lord Marlesford
My Lords, there are two differences between my amendment and that of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. The first is that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, suggests that a judge should arbitrate on the question of anonymity. The second is that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, restricts his anonymity to sexual offences of various sorts. I give way at once on the question of who should deal with the anonymity. It is probably too complicated and difficult to be done by a magistrate and the point made by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern about warrants probably not being justified in two of the cases we mentioned is a good one. On that I would certainly be ready to change my amendment.
On the question of whether it should apply widely or merely narrowly to sexual offences, I will give three examples of why it should apply widely. First, I was struck by the recommendation of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, on the benefit of it being wider. Secondly, my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern was attracted by that. So, too, were my noble friend Lord Hailsham and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. I will just give three examples of why that should be the case.
My noble friend Lord Lamont mentioned the case of Mr Jefferies of Bristol, whose whole life was traduced and ruined. It was nothing to do with sex; it was to do with a case of murder. If ever there was an example of somebody who should not have been named in the way that he was, it would be him. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, mentioned care homes. Abuse in care homes, even in children’s homes, can be of a non-sexual nature. It can be malicious or psychopathic. There have been many cases also of accusations of abuse of the elderly in care homes. So I do not see the justification for saying that anonymity—whether or not we have it—should be confined only to sexual offences. If there is to be anonymity, it should be for all offences—but clearly the procedures and rules are inadequate at present and should be modified and considered.
I am afraid that I would not regard the College of Policing as the obvious candidate to rewrite this book. I would have much preferred something more serious. But I would be happy to withdraw my amendment on the basis that the Minister will come back with something rather more substantial on the need for reform—something not to be put forward in detail but to be expressed as an intention at Third Reading. I would not vote for the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, merely because I think it is quite wrong to limit it to only sexual affairs. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
“Disclosure of private sexual photographs and films without consent
(1) The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 is amended as follows.(2) In section 33 (disclosing private sexual photographs and films with intent to cause distress)—(a) in subsection (1), after “disclose” insert “or threaten to disclose”;(b) in paragraph (b) of subsection (1), after “distress” insert “or recklessness as to such distress being caused”;(c) after subsection (1) insert—“(1A) It is also an offence to promote, solicit or profit from a private and sexual photograph or film that has been disclosed without the consent of an individual who appears in the photograph or film, knowing or believing that the same has been disclosed without such consent and with the intent to cause that individual distress, or recklessness as to such distress being caused.”;(d) omit subsection (8).(3) In section 35, omit subsections (4) and (5).”
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I will speak also to Amendment 184 in this group. I will also mention the fact that my noble friend Lord Paddick will be dividing the House on Amendment 187—that would happen after the debate on Amendments 183 and 184.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I will not move Amendments 183 and 184.
Lord Wigley
“Victims and witnesses: disclosure
(1) A police force, police officer or Crown Prosecutor may not disclose the name of a victim or witness of a serious sexual assault or violent offence to the person accused of the offence if— (a) the parties are strangers to one another,(b) non-disclosure would not impact on the completion of a fair trial, and(c) it is reasonable to assume that such a disclosure would put the victim or witness at risk of further harm.(2) This section applies whether or not the person accused of the offence has been charged with the offence.”
Lord Wigley (PC)
My Lords, I realise that the House wants to move to a vote on the very important and significant debate we have just had. I do not know whether there is a mechanism whereby I could come back to Amendment 185 at Third Reading so that we do not lose this debate because this, also, is a very important question with regard to the anonymity or otherwise of people involved in rape cases. I would be grateful for some guidance on this matter.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I am afraid that if the noble Lord wants to press this amendment he has to press it now. We cannot go back to it again because we have to go in order.
Lord Wigley
I will speak as rapidly as I can and I am sorry that this is going to detain the House. Amendment 185 is in my name and those of the noble Baronesses, Lady Howe of Idlicote, Lady Brinton and Lady Cohen of Pimlico. I thank them for their support.
I do not apologise in the slightest for returning to a matter that I raised in Committee, since most of the countercase put by the Government in Committee triggered dismay and incredulity among those involved in cases such as those I highlighted then. To the extent that there was any validity in the Government’s countercase, I have adjusted the wording of the amendment to respond constructively. The impact of this new clause would be to prohibit the police in England and Wales from disclosing the name of the victim of rape or attempted rape to the alleged perpetrator—
The Deputy Speaker (The Countess of Mar) (CB)
My Lords, I would be grateful if noble Lords could be quiet because I cannot hear what the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, is saying. It is important for proceedings that I can hear and understand what he says.
Lord Wigley
I am grateful. I have rarely had that trouble in the past. As I was saying, it is the question of disclosing the name of a victim of rape or attempted rape to the alleged perpetrator where both are strangers to each other and where disclosure could potentially put the victim at further risk of harm from the accused. This is necessary because in this day and age any individual with basic IT skills, armed with the name and location of the victim, could easily obtain the full address. It is difficult to imagine circumstances where the victim would not be either at risk or feel, understandably, at risk. I remind the House that it is estimated that 10% of all rapes and attempted rapes are committed by strangers. This means that there are some 9,000 reported attacks each year. In other words, 9,000 women are being put at risk each year if their names are disclosed. There will be thousands more who never report it because of fear, shame or lack of confidence in the police and judicial system. The feelings of a victim were courageously described only last Thursday by Michelle Thomson MP in another place.
The amendment was tabled following the harrowing experiences of Victim M, to which I referred in Committee and shall now summarise briefly. I am grateful to Voice 4 Victims for providing this information. I pay tribute to them for the support they give such victims and for their determined campaigning on this and associated issues.
Victim M was followed by a stranger, attacked, suffered an attempted rape and was told to stop screaming or she would be killed. Two off-duty police officers heard her screams and arrested the man. Subsequently, M learned that the police had, in fact, given her full name to the man. This has had a devastating impact on M. She is terrified that he will find her and attack her again. He is expected to be released from serving half his seven-year sentence in July next year. M has changed her name, moved flat twice and removed herself from the electoral register to prevent him finding her.
The amendment moved in Committee was later withdrawn. Since then, Voice 4 Victims has consulted a range of experts. The clause has been redrafted to take on board those comments, especially those emanating from the police. The police have been very supportive. They themselves believe that clarification of the law is needed. From these comments it is generally agreed that a name should never be given if three conditions are met: the parties are strangers; disclosure might conceivably put the victim at risk; and non-disclosure would not undermine the completion of a fair trial, a point raised by the Minister in Committee.
After disclosure in her case, M contacted a number of police forces. Their policies on disclosure were totally inconsistent. The responses varied greatly, with no fewer than five distinct approaches followed by the police: the name being given during the interview on arrest; at the point of charge; if the case goes to court; disclosed in a statement given to the alleged perpetrator’s defence team; or not given until the case is in court, where it is a matter for the judge to decide.
M is to be commended for the comprehensive manner in which she followed up to discover such a wide and inconsistent pattern of behaviour by the police. She received a letter from Commander Jones of the Metropolitan Police, who said:
“There is no specific policy or legislation which covers the issue of providing the name of a victim of rape to the suspect. Instead it is an operational decision taken by the officer in the case on a case-by-case basis. In the case of a stranger rape, it would be very rare for the suspect to be informed at the point of arrest. For a domestic or acquaintance case, this would be more common”.
This view was reinforced by Neil Smith of the Metropolitan Police’s sexual offences, exploitation and child abuse command in the Guardian newspaper on 27 October this year.
M made contact with other victims. They have similar experiences. Victim A said, “Once he had my name he found me and messaged me on Facebook. He lives maybe a couple of hours away, so when I next moved and changed jobs I also changed my name by deed poll”. Victim B said, “I was 23. He was about 50. If he googled my name, I couldn’t think of every website it might bring up. I could kind of imagine what he might do”. Victim C said, “He was arrested a couple of days later and at that point would have been told my full name. I did not realise he was told my name then. The fact he knows my name and details is something I have always hated and part of what makes me regret ever going to the police”. I ask the House, in particular the Minister and her advisers, to note that last sentence and to ponder its far-reaching implications on whether this situation leads to people not going to the police when there has been a rape or an attempted rape. This theme is repeated by Victim D, who responded to M by saying, “Your message sums up the reasons I felt I didn’t want to go to the police. I didn’t want my life ruined by my name being released and people finding out. I suffered severe depression and was suicidal for years. Thank you for working to fix this problem”.
Baroness Howe of Idlicote (CB)
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 185 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, for all the reasons he has explained so eloquently, even though pushed to deliver them very quickly. I shall be much briefer.
If someone has been sexually assaulted by a complete stranger and has then reported the details to the police, it is clearly important that when the police then interview potential suspects they do not under any circumstances, whether the potential offender has been charged or not, disclose the identity of the victim to such suspects. In the past, perhaps, this would not have been so vital, but today if the attack has been carried out by a sexual predator, the availability of the internet, Facebook and all the other many ways of identifying where a victim lives will inevitably mean that the attacker can continue to harass their victim via all or any of these means. Indeed, I am sure noble Lords will have read many harrowing stories of just such instances—we have heard one or two of them already—where the named victim has ultimately been forced to leave the area and resettle in a completely different, new part of the country, changing their names too.
The noble Lord’s amendment is vital. I very much hope that the Minister will be able to accept it in its entirety.
Viscount Hailsham
My Lords, I am conscious that your Lordships want to vote on Amendment 187, so I shall be brief, but I have to say that this proposal is, to my way of thinking, one of the most unjust that I have heard in your Lordships’ House for some time. It is worth identifying what it says. I shall come to the proviso in a moment, but what it says that somebody who is accused of rape is not to know the name of the accuser—the complainant. For that matter, somebody who is accused of actual bodily harm or grievous bodily harm is not to know the name of the accuser or of the witnesses. I ask rhetorically: how on earth can a defendant or his representatives prepare his case for trial without knowing the name of the accuser or the witnesses? After all, they may not have been there. They may be notorious liars. There may be lots of other reasons to distrust their integrity.
The substantive clause here precludes the police from giving the name of the victim or the witnesses to the accused person. That is curiously reminiscent of the procedure underlying lettres de cachet in pre-revolutionary France, as described in A Tale of Two Cities. Let us look at the proviso, because it needs a bit of probing. The proviso in subsection 1(b) of the proposed new clause is so far as,
“non-disclosure would not impact on … a new trial”.
Who is to judge whether it impacts on a fair trial? I can tell noble Lords from the language of the proposed new clause that it is to be the police or the Crown Prosecution Service. So the police or the Crown Prosecution Service, who are party to the procedure, who are making the allegations, will judge whether it is fair to disclose the identity of the victim or the witness. How can that possibly be fair? What procedure is there in the proposed new clause for the accused person to challenge that determination? There is none at all.
We are told, “Ah, the judge will let it in”, but the judge cannot when there is an absolute prohibition. There is no procedure here whereby the decision of the police officer or the Crown Prosecution Service can be challenged. Probing a little further, what about police statements? I am sure my noble friend knows full well that police statements have to be served on the defendant prior to trial so that they can prepare and understand their case. If the identity of the witness or the victim has to be redacted out of the statements, what possible purpose is there in serving the statements at all? One merely has to identify these things to see that this would be struck down, certainly by the courts. It is a clear contravention of the provisions in the convention now in domestic law in favour of a fair trial.
Incidentally, on proposed new subsection 1(c), regarding the protection of people, bail conditions can do that. There may be a case for strengthening bail conditions but there is absolutely no case for introducing a measure that will do a profound injustice in our courts. I hope my noble friend the Minister will give a robust response to this.
Lord Carlile of Berriew
Before the noble Viscount sits down, is the point not that the complainant may say that the person who allegedly assaulted him or her is a stranger but may have an oblique motive for so saying? How is the defendant therefore able to defend himself or herself without being able to know who the accuser is? It is a palpable injustice which was not covered, I regret, by the passionate speech by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, which omitted that crucial point.
Viscount Hailsham
I could not agree more with the noble Lord. I agree with him as I agreed with him on the previous debate. We are dealing here with the possibility of profound injustice and we should guard against it.
Baroness Cohen of Pimlico (Lab)
My Lords, my name is also attached to this amendment, but I would not normally have spoken given that the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, were such distinguished proponents of it. At the moment there is a choice of injustices. Perhaps we should have provided—and I should be glad to provide at Third Reading—a clause saying that a judge may decide whether the name should be disclosed. This is, however, also a modern offence. In the old days it might not have mattered very much if you disclosed only the name of the accuser. These days, the perpetrator has no trouble at all, because of the spread of social media, and these cases are more frequent.
One reads of cases all the time and I want to disentangle this from the issue of rape. It is not entirely about rape. It is about being knifed in the street or pushed under a Tube train by a perfect stranger, as I am sure we have all read about, and being terrified thereafter in case he or she comes and does it again. Therefore, I would be very grateful if the Minister would understand the strength of feeling and the injustice being done. If we can put in a clause at Third Reading offering the possibility of review by a judge if necessary, I would be glad to do so.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, has explained, this amendment is designed to strengthen the protection for the victims and witnesses of a sexual or violent assault by a stranger. I sympathise with this objective but, as I indicated in Committee, there are difficulties. I am grateful to the noble Lord for taking on board the points I made in response to his earlier amendment on this issue. He has now come forward with a substantially revised amendment. I fear, however, that this serves only to highlight again the challenges of legislating in this area.
It is vital that the criminal justice system supports and protects victims and witnesses, particularly victims of sexual offences, who are especially vulnerable. As I stated in Committee, there are already a number of means whereby those at risk of further harm, or who are deemed to be intimidated, can be safeguarded. I shall not repeat these measures now, other than to say that there is a wide range of options available for their protection. To intimidate a witness is a very serious criminal offence.
Of course, the right to a fair trial is a cornerstone of our criminal justice system. The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, has rightly acknowledged this in the revised amendment before us today. However, to say that the identity of a victim or a witness may be withheld from the defendant except where to do so would compromise the defendant’s right to a fair trial is almost always a contradiction in terms. As my noble friend Lord Hailsham said, fundamental to a fair trial is the right of the accused to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The accused cannot be expected to prepare a proper defence if he does not know who is accusing him of the alleged crime, and without that there can be no fair trial.
In exceptional circumstances, there is already provision for anonymity of victims or witnesses from the accused, through a witness anonymity order. A number of conditions must be met for this to apply, including that it would protect the safety of the witness or another person, that it is in the interests of justice for the witness to testify and the witness would not testify if the order were not made, and that it would be consistent with the defendant receiving a fair trial. It is an exceptional measure of last resort. This means that in the minority of cases where those accused of violent or sexual assault are strangers, the court can decide to grant victim or witness anonymity, provided these other conditions are met.
Lord Wigley
On that very point, if the court determines at that stage whether or not to release information, surely there is every case to get consistency prior to that. I quoted five cases, I think it was, of different responses by the police in different parts of London. The absence of any consistent approach to this underlines that there is a serious problem. If the Government were willing to review how the mechanism of referring to the courts, which the Minister mentioned, can be brought in in a way that avoids the variety of ad hoc responses by the police, that might be one way forward. I would be very grateful if the Minister would consider that.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
The problem is that, as I said earlier, it is an exceptional measure of last resort. This means that, in the minority of cases where those accused of violent or sexual assault are strangers, the court can decide to grant victims and witnesses anonymity, provided that the conditions are met.
While I cannot for these reasons support the noble Lord’s amendment, he has raised an important point about the consistency of practice both across and within police forces about the disclosure of the address and telephone number of a victim. Crown Prosecution Service policy on prosecuting cases of rape clearly states that addresses of victims and witnesses should not be disclosed to the defendant during court proceedings. The same is true of victims’ or witnesses’ telephone numbers or email addresses. However, we do not know how aware the police are of this policy, so we will explore with the College of Policing whether it would be appropriate for additional guidance to be given to police forces to ensure that this practice is universally followed.
Baroness Cohen of Pimlico
Before the Minister sits down, I say that in the case with which the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, and I are most familiar, the police disclosed the victim’s name quite automatically to the perpetrator about 20 minutes after they had arrested him on the evidence of two policemen. It is all very well to say that you can wait to have a court make a decision, but a policeman made a decision at the earliest possible stage, and that is the issue that the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, and I are attempting to address.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I am sure the noble Baroness will understand that I cannot go into individual cases. CPS policy on prosecuting cases of rape clearly states that witnesses’ addresses should not be disclosed to the defendant unless already known. The CPS does not disclose the addresses, email addresses or phone numbers of victims or witnesses in any case unless already known. That is why we are looking at ways to ensure that this approach is similarly applied by police forces.
While the amendment is well intentioned, for the reasons I have given, I do not consider that it will help advance the noble Lord’s cause. He has alighted upon an important issue regarding the consistency of practice adopted by criminal justice agencies in relation to the disclosure of a vulnerable victim’s address or other contact details, and I am ready to explore further how this might best be addressed. On that basis, I hope the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Wigley
My Lords, I am grateful. I realise that the House wants to move forward rapidly. I was grateful for the contributions made by the noble Viscount and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to the contra argument with regard to the rights of the defendant. Of course I recognise that they are important. The question seems to revolve around the inconsistency of the police response, which the Minister has accepted needs to be looked into, and whether, while it was reasonable to withhold addresses and telephone numbers in the past, it might now be necessary to withhold the name because of the ease of getting addresses from information available on computer-based systems these days. If the Government are prepared to review those aspects of the question, we will feel that we have made some progress on this issue. If the Minister can indicate that the Government are willing to look at those aspects, I will be prepared to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
We realise that certain aspects need to be addressed, which is why I said that I am ready to explore further how this might best be addressed.
Lord Wigley
I am grateful to the Minister. On the basis of that assurance that there will be an investigation into those aspects of the question, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Berridge
“Forced marriage: financial protection for victims
In Part 10 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (forced marriage), after section 122A (inserted by section 151 of this Act) insert—(1) Where subsection (4) applies to a person, that person shall be treated as if he or she has been married, or is married, for the purposes of any provision or enactment, whether in statute or common law, relating to—(a) immigration;(b) pensions; or(c) financial provision or remedies, including for the purposes of Part II of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (financial relief for parties to marriage and children of family).(2) In circumstances where a person who has been married and a person who is married would be treated differently, the person to whom subsection (4) applies may decide which marital status applies to them.(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), the person to whom subsection (4) applies may decide that a different marital status applies to them in different circumstances.(4) This subsection applies where— (a) the court has granted a forced marriage protection order under Part IVA of the Family Law Act 1996 in respect of a person, or(b) an offence under section 120, 121 or 122 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 has been committed against a person.””
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, I am mindful that the House wishes to move on this evening, and I am grateful to the Minister for her assurances dealing with the matters that I raised in my speech. I previously indicated to the Clerk of the Parliaments that I would speak to the amendment, but I will not move it this evening.
Amendment 187
Lord Paddick
“Pre-charge anonymity
(1) The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 is amended as follows.(2) After section 1 insert—“1A Anonymity of suspects prior to charge(1) Where an allegation has been made that an offence to which this Act applies has been committed by a person but the person has not been charged with that offence, neither the name nor address, and no still or moving picture of that person, nor any other matter shall (without that person's consent) during that person’s lifetime—(a) be published in England and Wales in a written publication available to the public; or(b) be included in a relevant programme for reception in England and Wales,if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the person by whom the offence is alleged to have been committed.(2) Subsection (1) is subject to any direction given under section 3.”(3) In section 3—(a) in subsection (1) for “to which this Act applies” substitute “to which section 1 of this Act applies”;(b) after subsection (4) insert—“(4A) A police officer of the rank of inspector or above may apply to a judge of the Crown Court for a direction under this subsection and if the judge is satified that it is in the interests of justice to remove or vary a restriction provided for in section 1A, the judge shall direct that the restriction shall be lifted or shall be limited to such extent and on such terms as the judge considers the interests of justice require.(4B) In considering an application under subsection (1), the judge shall have particular regard to the possibility that further witnesses might volunteer evidence relating to sexual offences allegedly committed by the person.”(4) In section 5—(a) in subsection (1) after “section 1” insert “or section 1A”;(b) in subsection (2) after “committed” insert “or the person by whom an offence is alleged to have been committed and to whom section 1A applies”.”
Lord Paddick
My Lords, in the absence of any credible alternative, I wish to test the opinion of the House.
“Sentencing for stalking offences
(1) In section 4A(5)(a) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (stalking involving fear of violence or serious alarm or distress), for the words “five years” substitute “ten years”.(2) At the end of section 32(4)(b) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (racially or religiously aggravated harassment etc) insert “save in the case of an offence under section 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, in which case the person shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years.””
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 187A, I declare an interest as a trustee of Paladin, the National Stalking Advocacy Service. It is four years since a stalking law was introduced, following an amendment that I tabled in this House which was the culmination of terrific work by the independent parliamentary inquiry, whose adviser was the excellent Laura Richards and which included the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Howe of Idlicote. It was strongly supported by colleagues in the House of Commons, notably Yvette Cooper and Stella Creasy. I pay tribute to the Government for the progress made since 2012, the introduction of the offence of coercive control and last week’s announcement of stalking orders.
Stalking destroys lives. Some 40% of the victims of domestic homicide have been stalked, including Jane Clough and Holli Gazzard, and the punishment must fit the crime. When I tabled the original amendment, it was always the intention that the maximum sentence be 10 years. However, due to the two tiers in the Protection from Harassment Act, the higher test mirrored Section 4 harassment and became five years by default. Experience now tells us that this is not enough.
My amendment mirrors a 10-minute rule Bill introduced by Alex Chalk, the Conservative MP for Cheltenham, and supported by MPs from all parties, including Richard Graham, the MP for Gloucester, whose constituent, Dr Eleanor Aston, was stalked for eight years by a former patient, Raymond Knight. When he was sentenced to five years—the maximum sentence—the judge stated that he would like to have given Knight a longer sentence as he was a serious risk to Dr Aston. This case is not unique; I could cite numerous other examples, including Kristine Carlson and Katie Price. Extending the maximum penalty would set the tone, allow for greater flexibility and make it clear that stalking is a serious offence. An increased maximum sentence is necessary for the most serious cases, particularly where there is repeat offending. At present a defendant who pleads guilty to this most serious offence, even if it is a repeat offence against the same victim, will serve a maximum of 20 months. This is insufficient to protect the victim.
Sadly, too few cases still result in a stalking charge, and, when they do, the sentencing does not reflect the serious nature of the crime. This was highlighted as a cause for concern when we were meeting Home Office lawyers to discuss the drafting of the stalking legislation in 2012 and given the proposed maximum sentence of five years. Training is important. So, too, are sentencing guidelines. The maximum penalty should reflect the serious impact that this psychological crime has on the victim.
Stalking is a long-term pattern of behaviour. It is persistent and intrusive, and it engenders fear, alarm or distress. It results in long-term psychological harm and can escalate to violence and murder. Stalking is about fixation and obsession. It is clear that when people fixate and stalk, they are psychologically unstable. A significant minority are psychotic, and some may suffer from undiagnosed personality disorders. Currently, stalkers are not routinely assessed, and they should be. More robust sentences would allow for a robust mental health assessment which informs diagnosis, treatment and management.
The Minster may well say that the Sentencing Council is undertaking a review and that it would be precipitate to pre-empt that review. The Sentencing Council reviews sentences within the framework set by Parliament, so it is for us to act and then for the Sentencing Council to build its guideline around the maximum tariff.
Of course, it is true that, alongside the stalking, there may be other offences—for example, assault or arson—that can be charged. But in a significant number of cases, stalking is the only offence, a very grave offence, which can lead to the victim being a prisoner in their own home, developing post-traumatic stress disorder, losing their job, losing their relationship, losing their mental health and ultimately losing their life. It is a serious offence and must be treated as such.
Paladin’s research shows that victims feel unsafe due to short sentences. Preventive orders do not lead victims to feel safe because it is the very nature of the stalking offence that means such boundaries are prone to being breached. In the most serious cases, the only time a victim truly receives any respite is when his or her stalker is behind bars. Victims continue to live in fear and are terrorised and terrified when the stalker comes out. It is clear that short sentences do not allow for any form of diagnosis, treatment or management, so the behaviour continues in a revolving-door fashion. This is costly to victims and to the criminal justice system.
It is important to highlight the fact that stalking occurs over an extended period of time. Often, stalkers are prosecuted only for breaching restraining orders. The maximum sentence for criminal damage, burglary and offence against property is 10 years. These offences are acute and one-offs. Allowing judges greater flexibility on sentences will acknowledge the repetitive nature of stalking, which can span multiple years, offences and breaches.
Some victims have felt helpless due to the long-term, insidious and persistent nature of this crime—as in the case of Helen Pearson, who was almost killed by Joe Willis and attempted suicide twice. The escalation to murder should be clearly understood. These cases are called “murders in slow motion” for a reason, and we have an opportunity to intervene earlier and prevent them. It is one of the few crimes where early intervention can prevent serious psychological damage, violence and murder. That is precisely why we need to increase the maximum sentence.
My amendment would give judges the greater flexibility they require in sentencing to allow the sentence to fit the crime and thus better protect the victim whose life is being torn apart. I beg to move.
Viscount Hailsham
My Lords, I very much hope that your Lordships do not support this amendment. My reasons are both general and particular. As to my general reason, I am very cautious about any inflation in sentencing. Our prisons are already grossly overcrowded. When I was Prisons Minister at the back end of the 1980s, we had a prison population of some 44,000. We now have a prison population of just short of 85,000, and that makes for gross overcrowding. Until very recently, I was on the monitoring board of a local prison. As a member of the Bar, I go to prisons, and the facilities in prisons are overstretched almost beyond imagining. In this respect, the POA is right. I am very anxious that we should not do anything that tends to make courts increase the overall level of sentences. In the past five years, the average sentence has increased from 12.3 months to 16.4 months, and conditions in prisons are dire.
That takes me to the second point, and I shall be very brief. Five years—the existing maximum—is a long sentence, even when one takes into account the fact that the offender will not serve the whole of it. Being shut up in custodial circumstances in most of our prisons is a deeply unpleasant experience. If the offender is rational, then five years is a perfectly good deterrent. If the offender is not rational, then increasing the sentence will make no difference whatever to his conduct. All we are doing is to drive up the overall level of sentences, and that is thoroughly undesirable.
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)
My Lords, I recognise the point that the noble Viscount has made about the general increase in the level of sentencing, which has caused me considerable concern for quite some time. However, there is force in the point that the noble Baroness made about repeat offences. The people who commit this kind of offence tend to be victims of an obsession. There must be a risk that a number of these perpetrators will do it again, and if the first sentence is ineffective as a deterrent a judge is really inhibited in visiting the appropriate penalty on a repeat offender, particularly if it is even a further repetition, if he is restricted to the levels that presently exist. For that reason, among the others that the noble Baroness mentioned, I would be inclined to support her amendment.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I strongly support the amendment. While I accept what the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said about overcrowding, we need to differentiate between many offences that do not deserve a custodial sentence, and in fact would be more effectively dealt with by a non-custodial sentence, and those that really need long custodial sentences, for the very reasons that the noble and learned Lord has just articulated. These are offences where, particularly in the case of repeat offences, a longer custodial sentence is needed. That is why we will support the noble Baroness should she decide to divide the House.
Lord Rosser
I will be brief. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has indicated on behalf of the Liberal Democrats, if, having heard the Government’s reply, my noble friend Lady Royall decides to test the opinion of the House, we too shall be supporting her amendment in the Division Lobby.
I will not go through all her points but my noble friend has referred, as have others, to the issue of repeat offences. She referred to why the maximum sentence is five years at present. She referred to the level of cross-party support that there has been on this issue, and to the relationship of the maximum sentence for this offence with other offences that have a maximum of 10 years. She also made reference to the stalking orders and the Government’s announcement there, which was welcome, but of course it does not address the issue of what the appropriate maximum length of the sentence is. My noble friend also stressed that stalking costs lives in certain circumstances, and causes psychological harm. I think she has made an extremely powerful case. As I said, if she decides, having heard the Government’s response, to test the opinion of the House, we shall be with her in the Division Lobby.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I pay tribute to the work that the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, carries out as a trustee of Paladin to support and give a voice to victims of stalking.
Obviously it would be wrong of me as a Minister to comment on individual cases, particularly on sentences imposed in those cases. However, I want to express my sympathy for the victims of these crimes, which can have significant effects on their lives. It is important to consider the evidence of how sentencers are using the range of penalties available to them today. It is very rare that sentences are given that are near to the current maximum. In 2015 only three people received sentences of over three years for the Section 4A offence, and the average custodial sentence was 14.1 months. The evidence therefore suggests that judges are finding their current sentencing powers for this offence sufficient.
We must also bear in mind that, in addition to this specific stalking offence, this type of offending can be charged under other offences such as assault, criminal damage and grievous bodily harm with intent. When an offender is convicted for one of those offences, they will face a maximum penalty of 10 years for criminal damage or life imprisonment for GBH with intent.
I reassure noble Lords that the Government are taking steps to ensure that stalking is dealt with seriously. As the noble Baroness acknowledged, last Wednesday we announced plans to introduce a new stalking protection order aimed at ensuring that pre-charge options are available to the police to protect victims of stranger-stalking to the same level as victims of domestic violence and abuse. Breaches of these orders will be a criminal offence carrying a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment.
Alongside the work of government, the independent Sentencing Council is currently considering sentencing guidelines for intimidatory offences, including the stalking offence covered by the noble Baroness’s amendment. The council aims for its definitive guidelines to come into force in early 2018, following a consultation on the draft guidelines early next year. I encourage the noble Baroness and others to respond to the consultation.
We are also looking at the wider picture of how stalking offences are dealt with and prosecuted. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate are currently carrying out a joint inspection on the effectiveness of the police and CPS response to cases involving stalking and harassment, and to examine the service received by victims.
In setting maximum penalties, we must also consider the penalties available for other, related offences. These include the other offences under Sections 2 and 4 of the Protection from Harassment Act, which can cover similar offending behaviour. We should consider carefully the potential impacts of creating such a large difference between the maximum penalties for the Section 4 and 4A offences, as the amendment proposes. Other relevant offences include assault occasioning actual bodily harm or grievous bodily harm, for which the statutory maximum penalty is five years’ imprisonment. To increase the maximum penalty for stalking offences causing fear of violence would mean that the penalty for causing fear of violence would be higher than that for causing the violence itself.
We recognise that it is often the case that raising the maximum penalty appears to be a straightforward solution to a problem. I do not think it is a straightforward solution in this case. It may be necessary in due course but, before moving to raise the maximum, we should give careful consideration to the implications for other related offences and avoid creating anomalies in the criminal law.
However, I recognise the strength of feeling about this issue and the harm that can be caused by the most serious stalking cases. The Government will therefore review the operation of the Section 4A stalking offence and related offences. We will consider the maximum custodial sentences available to the court and, in addition, consider mental health sentences to consider how best to identify and address the underlying issues that are present in the most serious cases. The review will supplement the work being done by the Home Office to prevent stalking by looking at the ultimate sanctions available for those who continue to commit offences. I hope this review will also provide further material for the Sentencing Council to draw on as it produces sentencing guidelines for stalking and related offences. Given this commitment to review the operation of Section 4A, I hope the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon
My Lords, I am grateful for that response from the Minister and for the contributions from other noble Lords. Of course I hear what the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, says. I too loathe prisons; I recognise that they are overflowing and that the conditions inside many of them are abhorrent. However, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that many people who are sentenced to prison should not be there, but that does not mean to say that the people who in my view should be in prison should not be there. So I do not agree with the noble Viscount.
It is true that other crimes can be taken into account but I am referring to one specific crime, stalking, and I think we should take that specific crime seriously. It should not always have to be taken into account along with other crimes.
The Minister pointed out the potential differences between sentences; as she says, actual bodily harm has a maximum of five years. However, I believe that is because the harm that is caused does not have to be really serious; typically, it is bruising. What we are talking about here is something that blights people’s lives and those of their families year after year.
I am grateful for the offer from the Minister for a review but, as I mentioned in my speech, this is something that I and many others, including the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, cared about four years ago when we argued that the maximum sentence should be 10 years. The last four years have shown us that a five-year maximum is not enough, and I therefore wish to test the opinion of the House.
“Evidence about complainant’s sexual history
(1) The Secretary of State shall within six months of the day on which this section comes into force, publish a report on the operation of section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (restriction on evidence or questions about complainant’s sexual history).(2) The report shall, in particular, include information regarding—(a) the number of applications made for leave in accordance with subsection 41(2) of the Act;(b) the number of such applications granted;(c) the number of such applications refused;(d) the number of prosecutions not proceeded with because of the victim’s concerns as to an application for leave;and to the extent numerical information is not available, as full information as possible regarding such matters.(3) The report may include proposals for the amendment or repeal of section 41 of the Act.”
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I move the amendment on behalf of my noble friends Lord Paddick and Lady Hamwee. We debated an exactly similar amendment in Committee. It arises from the Ched Evans case and concerns the restriction on the admission in cross-examination of evidence about a complainant’s sexual history in sexual offences cases. The amendment arose from our concern to ensure that the restriction on the admissibility of such evidence in cross-examination was as strong as we had always believed it to be under Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
At the end of that debate, the Minister said that the Government had carefully considered the concerns that had been raised about the provision; that they would determine how best to look at how it was working in practice before deciding whether any further action needed to be taken; and that they would do that as soon as possible. A trenchant question from the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, elicited the answer that that was indeed a promise of a review, which is what we had been seeking.
The reason for tabling the amendment again on Report is to ask the Minister to elaborate further on the review that she has in mind. We are interested to ask what timescale is proposed for the review; who will carry it out, and how; what the terms of reference will be; and how evidence for the review will be collated. I hope that she will be able to respond on those questions at this stage and I beg to move.
Viscount Hailsham
My Lords, I shall be very brief. I have no objection to my noble friend answering the questions posed by the noble Lord; it is obviously right that she should. My objection lies to proposed new subsection (3), because I do not think that the existing law needs any change. If one looks at the primary legislation, one sees that the ability of defence counsel to ask questions or call evidence is hedged about by judicial restriction and can be exercised only relatively rarely. I have been in court many times when this has happened, and there is no sense that the legislation is being abused, that evidence is being adduced unnecessarily or that cross-examination is being done wrongly.
At the end of the day, I believe that the law is right as it stands. Although I have no objection to a review and no objection to the questions put by the noble Lord, I do not think we need to change the law—and I am therefore bound to say that subsection (3) of the proposed new clause poses problems as far as I am concerned.
Lord Hope of Craighead
My Lords, I will add just a footnote to what the noble Viscount said. Some years ago, there was a challenge to Section 41 of the 1999 Act on the ground that it was incompatible with the convention right to a fair trial. I sat upstairs in a committee room as a Law Lord with the Appellate Committee. We were very careful to restrict the ability of counsel to explore these matters, as far as we possibly could consistent with the right to a fair trial. I am glad to hear that, from the noble Viscount’s experience, the system is working very well. On the other hand, when we were framing our restrictive view as to how the section should be applied, we were looking to the future; we did not have the benefit of experience. Like the noble Viscount, I have no objection to a review, which I suppose might serve some useful purpose by informing everyone as to whether the system is really working as the Law Lords expected it should.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, raises the important issue of the protection of complainants of rape and sexual offences from being questioned about their sexual history. As I previously made clear, it is vital that victims have the confidence to report crimes as terrible as rape, and that they have confidence that the criminal justice process will bring offenders to justice. Our message to those who are willing but currently worried about reporting such offences is that they should feel confident about doing so.
When we first debated the issue, I assured noble Lords that we would look at how Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 was working in practice. As the noble Lord asked, perhaps I may provide a bit more detail. The Justice Secretary and the Attorney-General have advised me that this will include examining the original policy intent of Section 41, its implementation and how it is operating in practice.
I can confirm that this work will be led by officials in the Ministry of Justice and the Attorney-General’s Office. They will consider carefully the concerns that have been raised and seek views from the judiciary, practitioners and victims’ groups. This work will be completed in the first half of next year.
We have already made clear our commitment to carry out this work and, in our view, there is no benefit in making it a statutory requirement. In the light of the detail that I have provided, I hope that the noble Lord will feel happy to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for the further detail that she has given on the review. I quite accept her position that there is no need for a statutory requirement for it, so I propose to withdraw my amendment. However, in response to the speeches of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, I make clear to the House, for those who may not be familiar with it, that concerns have arisen in the light of the decision of the Court of Appeal in the Ched Evans case, in which the admission of such evidence in cross-examination was permitted in a case in which many thought that it would be excluded. It is for that reason that this has become a matter of additional concern, and for that reason that we are extremely grateful that the review is to be carried out. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
“( ) The Secretary of State shall, within twelve months of the passing of this Act, undertake a consultation with regard to senior coroners’ duties to conduct inquests into the death of persons deprived of liberty under section 4A(3) or (5) or 4B of the Mental Capacity Act 2005.”
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, this amendment is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Paddick. In Committee the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, proposed an amendment which is now in the Bill as Clause 155. Our amendment is not to challenge the clause but to ask for clarification. I have two questions. It became clear after the clause was agreed that the issue is more contentious than I had appreciated. It is about ending the automatic requirement for an inquest for those detained in the circumstances that are the subject of the provision. It is not about there being no right to an inquest; the noble Baroness made that entirely clear.
However, there seems to be a wider issue about the application and impact of deprivation of liberty safeguards—DoLS is the acronym. I was asked, as other noble Lords no doubt were, by Liberty to table an amendment to remove the clause. I said: “No: that is not only inappropriate but our procedures would not allow it”—but it seems right to ask two questions.
The Government are aware of the first question. The Liberty briefing suggested that cost saving was at the heart of the amendment to the legislation. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, described the emotional stress for families, and I do not think she came anywhere close to cost savings. I would be grateful if the Government could tell us what cost saving is likely to be achieved by the change, or otherwise allay that fear. The second question, as is obvious from the amendment, is: what consultation did the Government undertake before the amendment that they supported on the previous occasion? I beg to move.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness. Lady Hamwee, for speaking to me beforehand; we have had some discussion. I would like to go straight to answering both those questions, from my perspective, as I was the person who tabled the original amendment. I must declare my interest, as I now chair the National Mental Capacity Forum. I took over and started to do that in September of last year.
In terms of consultation, when I was listening to the voice of the person who had been on the receiving end of the Mental Capacity Act it was very evident very quickly that the automatic requirement for an inquest was causing an enormous amount of distress to families. It was also through that process that Ann Coffey MP consulted widely in her constituency and further afield—and coroners have been asked. So this was not brought forward lightly.
There was also consultation with the adviser to the Care Quality Commission, who feels strongly that DoLS are a useful process for safeguarding people who are particularly vulnerable. He was very supportive of the process following the judgment of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, which clearly laid out the acid tests under which DoLS should be applied.
As for cost savings, I see there being absolutely none. Actually, there is a possibility that costs might go up. Although unnecessary inquests will not, I hope, happen, so coroners will not be taken away from inquests that really do need to happen by the bureaucratic process of the unnecessary inquests, of which there were almost 7,000 last year, that find that death was due to natural causes, it is possible—indeed, I hope that this will happen—that more people will be inclined to make a deprivation of liberty safeguards application if there is a doubt about whether somebody is being deprived of liberty, because the deterrent of knowing how much distress would be caused to people, including families, will be removed.
Care home, clinical and hospital staff find it very distressing to say, “We’re going to go through this process of applying for a deprivation of liberty safeguards authorisation—and, secondarily, by the way, that means that there will automatically be a coroner’s inquest”. For those who culturally need a burial very rapidly after somebody has died, that causes profound upset—as it does to other families. As one coroner’s officer said, to me, “Sadly, sometimes the first time the families realise there has to be an inquest is when I have to pick up the phone to tell them, and they are deeply distressed”.
I suggest that by putting this measure in place we are removing a barrier to the deprivation of liberty safeguards, which are a way of protecting the rights of the most vulnerable person, because there is an inspection process. It must be necessary, proportionate and in the person’s best interests, and the person has a power to appeal to the Court of Protection against a deprivation of liberty safeguard. So people have far greater rights than somebody who ought to have a deprivation of liberty safeguard authorisation in place but where no application is being made. So I hope that this will increase the rights of the most vulnerable as well.
The process of scrutiny is that the Care Quality Commission has to be notified when a standard DoLS is in place. It will know whether a place has unusually many or unusually few DoLS applications, and will look in depth at the quality, the atmosphere and the culture around the way that care is given there. With all due respect to coroners, I think that the CQC is far more likely to detect where things are going wrong than a coroner’s inquest on a single case. But I reiterate that if a family have any concerns whatever, irrespective of whether there was a DoLS in place, they can ask for a coroner to look at a case when somebody has died. If they are suspicious, they can ask the question.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for raising this important issue. The Government take seriously their responsibilities to the very vulnerable group of people in society whom this amendment concerns. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for her deep knowledge of this issue, and for the words that she has spoken this evening.
Coroners in England and Wales play a critical role in investigating the deaths of persons where there is a suspicion that death may have resulted from violence or unnatural causes, or indeed where the cause of death is unknown. Coroners will continue to have this duty with regard to persons who have been deprived of their liberty as authorised under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. There is no restriction on when or by whom deaths can be reported to a coroner. Indeed, the registrar of deaths has a duty to report deaths to the coroner where he or she considers that the coroner’s duty to investigate may apply.
The Government recognise that there is a need to improve the scrutiny of deaths that are not investigated by a coroner. The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 contains provisions to introduce medical examiners who will contact the deceased’s family and those involved in the deceased person’s care to identify any concerns as part of a reformed death certification process.
We consulted on our proposals earlier this year and aim to publish our response to the consultation in the new year. This will of course be particularly relevant to vulnerable people in hospitals and care homes, regardless of whether they are being deprived of their liberty. Medical examiners will not just be responsible for scrutinising individual deaths not investigated by the coroner but will have a role in analysing data on deaths across their area. They will identify patterns and contribute to lessons that will reduce avoidable deaths. They will also have a duty to report to coroners deaths for which a coroner’s investigation may be required.
The effect of Clause 155 will be that the death of anyone subject to a deprivation of liberty safeguards authorisation, or an appropriate Court of Protection order, will no longer trigger an automatic coroner’s investigation. We supported this change in the law in the light of views expressed by the then chief coroner, his honour Peter Thornton QC, in his 2015-16 annual report. He called for immediate action to remove deprivation of liberty safeguards cases from the definition of “in state detention”—a point that, just prior to his recent retirement, he reiterated to the Minister for Victims, Youth and Family Justice.
The issue here is not simply one of the resources needed to undertake these inquests. The then chief coroner had addressed this to some extent through his 2014 guidance, revised in 2016, which set out a streamlined process. But, as he has said, these inquests “serve no good purpose”. It cannot be right that more than 20% of inquests undertaken each year are unnecessary, with all that that implies in terms of added anguish for bereaved families.
I thank the noble Baroness for raising the profile of this important issue, but I hope that she will accept that the Government’s recently completed consultation on reforming the death certification process will, when its proposals are implemented, complement and support the work of our coroners who investigate suspicious deaths.
I think that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked who we consulted in the consultation. The Ministry of Justice consulted the former and current chief coroner. Having said that, we consider that this removes any further need for further consultation on the coroner’s statutory duties, and I hope that the noble Baroness will therefore be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
I thank the Minister, but I cannot restrain myself from observing that her answer has been that there has been a consultation and that the Government will publish their response to it next year. I say that as nicely as I can, because clearly a lot of work has gone on with regard to this—and I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, as well, for filling out the information that she gave pretty comprehensibly to the House on the last occasion. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Brinton
“Police observance of the Victims’ Code: enforcement
(1) The Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 is amended as follows.(2) In section 5(1B) omit from “by” to “sections 35”.(3) After section 5(1B) insert—“(1BA) Subsection (1C) applies if a written complaint is made to the Commissioner by a member of the public who claims that—(a) a police officer;(b) a police service employee other than a police officer; or(c) another person determined under section (1BC);has failed to perform a Code duty owed by him to the member of the public. (1BB) For the purposes of subsection (1BA) a Code duty is a duty imposed by a code of practice issued under section 32 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (code of practice for victims).(1BC) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument amend the categories of person identified in subsection (1BA) as the Secretary of State thinks fit.”(4) In section 5(4A), after “(1A)” insert “or (1BA)”.(5) In section 6(3), at beginning insert “Except as provided in subsection (3A)”.(6) After section 6(3) insert—“(3A) Subsection (3) shall apply in relation to a complaint under section 5(1BA) as if for “a member of the House of Commons” there were substituted “the Commissioner”.”(7) In section 7(1A), after “5(1A)” insert “or 5(1BA)”.(8) In section 8(1A), after “5(1A)” insert “or 5(1BA)”.(9) After section 10(2A) insert—“(2B) In any case where the Commissioner conducts an investigation pursuant to a complaint under section 5(1BA) of this Act, he shall send a report of the results of the investigation to—(a) the person to whom the complaint relates,(b) the principal officer of the department or authority concerned and to any other person who is alleged in the relevant complaint to have taken or authorised the action complained of, and(c) the Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses appointed under section 48 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (commissioner for victims and witnesses).”(10) After section 10(3B) insert—“(3C) If, after conducting an investigation pursuant to a complaint under section 5(1BA) of this Act, it appears to the Commissioner that—(a) the person to whom the complaint relates has failed to perform a Code duty owed by him to the person aggrieved, and(b) the failure has not been, or will not be, remedied, the Commissioner shall lay before each House of Parliament a special report upon the case.(3D) If the Commissioner lays a special report before each House of Parliament pursuant to subsection (3C) the Commissioner may also send a copy of the report to any person as the Commissioner thinks appropriate.(3E) For the purposes of subsection (3C) “Code duty” has the meaning given by section 5(1BB) of this Act.”(11) In section 10(5)(d), for “or (2A)” substitute “, (2A) or (2B)”.(12) In section 12(1), after paragraph (b) of the definition of “person aggrieved”, insert—“(c) in relation to a complaint under section 5(1BA) of this Act, means the person to whom the duty referred to in section 5 (1BA) of this Act is or is alleged to be owed;”.”
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I thank the Minister for meeting me and others to discuss this group of amendments about support for victims. I was pleased that she said that the Government would bring proposals forward to strengthen victims’ rights; I was slightly less pleased that it was “in due course”. We have heard an awful lot tonight about an awful lot of reviews in future, and I am mindful of the amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, after which we were also told that there would be future reviews on stalking law. Much of the difficulty that faces victims navigating the criminal justice system is because nobody is taking hold of the evidence that we have about what is and is not working.
There has been a substantial amount of legislation over the last few years, with the victim personal statement scheme in 2001, witness care units, the code of practice for victims of crime from April 2006, the victims’ fund, victim support, restorative justice, and of course the creation of the Victims’ Commissioner. In January 2015, the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, said in her first Victims’ Commissioner report:
“I raised concerns about the process, the process was almost worse than the actual journey of being a victim”.
Her report noted that justice agencies failed to demonstrate “compassion, empathy and patience” when handling complaints from victims. She said that,
“victims feel ignored, unimportant and confused when raising concerns about their treatment”.
The report took into account the experiences of over 200 victims and assessed the performance of all criminal justice agencies listed in the victims’ code, and the review found that inadequate attention was paid to the “personal touch” that was needed.
The Government responded thereafter, and there has sadly been very little progress—and the Public Accounts Committee published earlier this year a report that noted that the,
“system is bedevilled by long standing poor performance including delays and inefficiencies, and costs are being shunted from one part of the system to another … The criminal justice system is not good enough at supporting victims and witnesses …Timely access to justice is too dependent on where victims and witnesses live … The Ministry has been too slow to recognise where the system is under stress, and to take action to deal with it … There is insufficient focus on victims, who face a postcode lottery in their access to justice due to the significant variations in performance in different areas of the country”.
So “due course” is just not good enough; we need to move forward and need it urgently. The core of the problem is that victims’ rights are currently not covered by entitlements in the victims’ code, originally designed in 2015 to make the system more responsive and easier to navigate. It is just not legally enforceable and places discretionary accountability on to the agencies, and victim feedback strongly suggests that agencies often fail to apply the code. Agencies that should be guided by the code are aware that a failure to provide the service does not make the service provider liable to any legal proceedings.
Lord Rosser
I will be brief, but my name is attached to most of the amendments which we are now addressing. A victims’ rights Bill was introduced in the other place last year by the then shadow Home Office Minister, Sir Keir Starmer, and it had all-party support. As the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has said, victims’ rights are largely covered by entitlements in the victims’ code and affected by various other initiatives in recent years. However, the key thing is that the code is not legally enforceable and feedback from victims suggests that it is not applied by the relevant agencies. Maybe that is because they are aware that a failure to provide the service does not make a service provider liable to any legal proceedings. Lack of information and support to victims are the major areas of concern, with victims prioritising the right to information, protection, treatment and support as the highest priorities. These amendments place victims’ rights in a statutory framework and place a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to publish and implement a strategy to provide training for all relevant professionals and agencies on the impact of crime on victims. In essence, these amendments lay down what support should be offered to victims, how that support is managed, what training is necessary to put it into place and how complaints can be pursued. These amendments have our support.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I hope that my noble friend will understand that, given the further business to which the House has to attend tonight, I will confine myself to saying that we on these Benches enthusiastically support her amendments.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for meeting with me, and for tabling these amendments again so that this House has a further opportunity to debate the important issue of victims’ rights.
Some of the amendments seek to place aspects of the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime on a statutory basis. This is a statutory code, provided for by the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, and as such all criminal justice agencies are required to provide the services victims are entitled to under it. Many of the entitlements for victims included in the proposed amendments are already in the code. Some are for all victims of crime, while others are enhanced entitlements for the most vulnerable victims of crimes such as stalking and domestic and sexual abuse. Placing them on a statutory footing separately will not ensure compliance, nor guarantee that those entitlements are delivered effectively. The effect would merely be symbolic, and make amendment and updating of entitlements more difficult.
As I said before, we recognise the importance of training for professionals who work with victims. Under the police educational framework and national curriculum, police officers and staff receive training on the code throughout their careers. Officers and staff can receive training on the code at various stages of their careers. This training is supported by a new online package launched by the College of Policing. All Crown Prosecution Service staff who attend court have been given face-to-face training on the new Speaking to Witnesses at Court guidance and on how to interact with victims and witnesses at court without undermining the fairness of the trial. This is supported by a comprehensive package of e-learning, which barristers who appear for the CPS in court are expected to complete.
We also appreciate that more can be done in relation to certain categories of crime. That is why, for example, the College of Policing, as part of reviewing its guidance on stalking and harassment investigations, is looking at whether police officers fully understand the offences and are receiving appropriate training. It is also why Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate are carrying out a joint inspection to assess the effectiveness of police forces and the CPS in dealing with cases involving stalking and harassment, and to examine the service received by victims. The CPS is developing a training package for its prosecutors to improve the quality of charging and review decisions in stalking and harassment cases.
There has also been a concerted effort to improve the response of the police in domestic abuse cases. In its most recent national thematic inspection of the police response to domestic abuse, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary found improvements in police attitudes towards victims and front-line officers’ understanding of the importance of dealing with victims in a supportive way. Since 2014, every police force has published a domestic abuse improvement plan, new guidance has been published by the College of Policing, new training has been successfully piloted and for the first time, police are now collecting data against a national standard on all domestic abuse recorded crimes. A joint police and CPS witness care review is looking to identify clear performance measures which would include timeliness of communication of information to witnesses as set out in the code. In addition, Her Majesty’s Courts & Tribunals Service is undergoing an audit by the Government Internal Audit Agency on the effectiveness of arrangements in place for victims and witnesses, against requirements in the victims’ code and the witness charter. Results are expected in the first quarter of 2017.
In order to determine what is required to strengthen further the rights of victims of crime, we are looking at available information about compliance with the victims’ code, and considering how it might be improved and monitored. We are also looking carefully at the range of proposals that have been made by the Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses and others. We are focused on making sure we get this work right, and ensuring that any future reform proposals are evidence-based, and an effective and proportionate approach.
Finally, in relation to Amendment 188, which seeks to provide a direct route of complaint for victims to the Parliamentary Ombudsman, I should add that on 5 December the Cabinet Office published a draft public service ombudsman Bill. The Bill will improve access to the ombudsman’s services by allowing for all complaints to be made with or without the help of a representative and in a variety of formats to meet the digital age. When the Bill is brought before your Lordships’ House, it will provide a further opportunity for noble Lords to test whether the measures I have set out are delivering the improvements to the experience of victims in their interaction with the criminal justice system that we all want to see.
I hope that, having further debated these issues and received greater detail of the work that is being undertaken both by the Government and by the criminal justice agencies, the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Brinton
I thank the Minister for her response, but sadly, many of the concerns I have raised were not particularly well articulated. There is no doubt that there is an entitlement to victims to have support. The fundamental problem is that there is no duty on the agencies to deliver it. The Minister said that police receive training when they first start their careers, and they can receive training later on. The problem is that, in practice, it does not happen consistently. The experience of victims, as outlined both tonight and at earlier stages of the Bill, demonstrates that it is still woefully inadequate in some parts of the country. The College of Policing clearly has an important role, but there are real concerns that there is a focus on the domestic abuse improvement plan without understanding that stalking and coercive control are key issues as well.
I accept the points the Minister has made about the draft public services ombudsman Bill, but there is more in Amendment 188 than is covered in that draft Bill. I believe that I have noble Lords’ support, and I would like to test the opinion of the House.
Baroness Brinton
“Police etc. provision for victims’ entitlement: framework
(1) The Victims’ Code provided for under section 32 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (code of practice for victims) shall include, but not be limited to, the entitlement of victims of crime to receive accurate and timely information from—(a) the police; and (b) such other agencies of the criminal justice system concerned with the detection and prosecution of the relevant crime and with the support of victims of crime as the Secretary of State deems fit.(2) The police must ensure provision to victims of—(a) adequate notice of all relevant court and other legal proceedings,(b) information about decisions by and discussions between the police and other agencies of the criminal justice system relating to the person convicted of the crime concerned (“the perpetrator”),(c) information about any prison sentence previously served by the perpetrator,(d) information about relevant changes to the perpetrator’s circumstances whilst on parole or in custody,(e) information about any crimes committed by the perpetrator outside the United Kingdom where the victim of the crime concerned is a British national,(f) access, where required, to adequate interpretation and translation services, and(g) information about the direct contact details of the criminal justice agencies and individuals involved in the court or other legal proceedings concerned.(3) During criminal justice proceedings, the police and other relevant agencies and authorities of the criminal justice system must ensure that victims of crime—(a) are not subjected to unnecessary delay by any other party to the proceedings;(b) are treated with dignity and respect by all parties involved; and(c) do not experience discriminatory behaviour from any other party to the proceedings.(4) Children and vulnerable adults must be able to give evidence to a court from a secure location away from that court or from behind a protective screen.(5) The investigating police force concerned must ensure the safety and protection of victims of crime during proceedings, including but not restricted to—(a) a presumption that victims of crime may remain domiciled at their home with adequate police protection if required; and(b) ensuring that the victim and those accompanying them are provided with access to a discrete waiting area during the relevant court proceedings.(6) All victims of crime shall have access to an appropriate person to liaise with relevant agencies on their behalf and to inform them about and explain the progress, outcomes and impact of their case.(7) Witnesses under the age of 18 shall have access to a trained communications expert, to be known as a Registered Intermediary, to help them understand as necessary what is happening in the criminal proceedings.(8) Victims of crime shall have access to transcripts of any relevant legal proceedings at no cost to themselves.(9) Victims of crime shall have the right to attend and make representations to a pre-court hearing to determine the nature of the court proceedings.(10) The Secretary of State must take steps to ensure that victims of crime—(a) have access to financial compensation from public funds for any detriment arising from the criminal case concerned;(b) are given the right to approve or refuse the payment of any compensation order made by a court against a person convicted of a crime against them; (c) have reimbursed to them, from public funds, any expenses incurred by them in attending in court and in any related legal process, whether in the United Kingdom or overseas;(d) have available to them legal advice where considered necessary by a judge in court proceedings; and(e) are not required to disclose personal data in legal proceedings which puts their safety at risk unless specifically ordered to do so by a judge.”
“Police etc. training on treatment of victims: strategy
(1) The Secretary of State shall publish and implement a strategy for providing training on the impact of crime on victims and victims’ rights for staff of the following organisations—(a) the police,(b) the Crown Prosecution Service, and(c) any other public agency or authority that the Secretary of State deems appropriate.(2) The Secretary of State shall also by regulations made by statutory instrument make provision for judges, barristers and solicitors involved in criminal cases involving stalking, coercive control or sexual and domestic violence to undertake specialist training.(3) The Secretary of State shall publish an agreed timetable for the delivery and completion of the training required by this section.”
“Training on treatment of victims: duty to report
(1) The Secretary of State shall have a duty to collect, codify and publish data in respect of—(a) the training of the police and Crown Prosecutors on the subjects of stalking, coercive control and the victims’ code, and(b) instances of non-compliance with the victims’ code by all statutory agencies, and the effectiveness of all complaints procedures involving allegations of a failure to comply with the victims’ code.(2) The Secretary of State shall publish the data in an annual report which shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament.(3) The first report under subsection (2) shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament within a year of the day on which this section comes into force.”
“Statutory duty on elected local policing bodies
(1) An elected local policing body must assess—(a) the needs of victims in each elected local policing body’s police area, and(b) the adequacy and effectiveness of the available victims’ services in that area.(2) An elected local policing body must—(a) prepare and consult upon an Area Victims’ Plan for its police area,(b) having taken account of any responses to its consultation and any Quality Standard, publish the plan in such a manner as sets out clearly how the identified victim needs will be met by the available victims’ services, and(c) submit its Area Victims’ Plan to the Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses on an annual basis.(3) In this section—“elected local policing body” and “police area” have the same meaning as in Part 1 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, “Quality Standard” means the standard published under section 49(1)(f) of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004.”
“Duties of the Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses
(1) Section 49 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (general functions of Commissioner) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (1), after paragraph (c) insert—“(d) assess the adequacy of each elected local policing body’s Area Victims’ Plans submitted to the Commissioner under section (Statutory duty on elected local policing bodies) of the Policing and Crime Act 2016;(e) make to elected local policing bodies such recommendations about submitted Area Victims’ Plans as the Commissioner considers necessary and appropriate;(f) prepare a statement of standards (the “Quality Standard”) in relation to the provision of victims’ services;(g) publish the Quality Standard in such manner as the Commissioner considers appropriate;(h) review the Quality Standard at intervals of not more than five years;(i) in preparing or reviewing the Quality Standard, consult the public, and for that purpose, publish drafts of the standard if he deems it necessary to do so;(j) assess the steps taken to support victims and witnesses in giving evidence;(k) make such recommendations in relation to that assessment as he considers necessary and appropriate;(l) issue guidance and standards for the establishment and conduct of homicide reviews under section (establishment and conduct of homicide reviews) of the Policing and Crime Act 2016.”.”
“Establishment and conduct of homicide reviews
(1) In this section “homicide review” means a review of the circumstances in which a person aged 16 or over has, or appears to have, died as the result of a homicide where—(a) no one has been charged with the homicide, or(b) the person or persons charged have been acquitted.(2) The Secretary of State may in a particular case direct a police force or other specified person or body or a person or body within subsection (5) to establish, or to participate in, a homicide review.(3) It is the duty of any person or body within subsection (5) establishing or participating in a homicide review (whether or not held pursuant to a direction under subsection (2)) to have regard to any guidance and standards issued by the Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses as to the establishment and conduct of such reviews.(4) Any reference in subsection (2) to the Secretary of State shall, in relation to persons and bodies within subsection (5)(b), be construed as a reference to the Police Service of Northern Ireland or Department of Justice in Northern Ireland as may be appropriate.(5) The persons and bodies within this subsection are—(a) in relation to England and Wales—(i) chief officers of police for police areas in England and Wales;(ii) local authorities;(iii) the National Health Service Commissioning Board; (iv) clinical commissioning groups established under section 14D of the National Health Service Act 2006;(v) providers of probation services;(vi) Local Health Boards established under section 11 of the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006;(vii) NHS trusts established under section 25 of the National Health Service Act 2006 or section 18 of the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006;(b) in relation to Northern Ireland—(i) the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland;(ii) the Probation Board for Northern Ireland;(iii) Health and Social Services Boards established under Article 16 of the Health and Personal Social Services (Northern Ireland) Order 1972 (SI 1972/1265 (NI 14));(iv) Health and Social Services trusts established under Article 10 of the Health and Personal Social Services (Northern Ireland) Order 1991 (SI 1991/194 (NI 1)).(6) In subsection (5)(a) “local authority” means—(a) in relation to England, the council of a district, county or London borough, the Common Council of the City of London and the Council of the Isles of Scilly;(b) in relation to Wales, the council of a county or county borough.”
“( ) section (Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime as member of local authority);”
“( ) sections 82(2) to (5), 84 to 90 and 93;( ) sections 94(2) to (7), 96 to 102 and 104;”
“(1A) Chapter 6A of Part 4 comes into force on such day as the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland appoints by order, and the power conferred by this subsection is exercisable by statutory rule for the purposes of the Statutory Rules (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 (S.I. 1979/1573) (N.I.12)).”
“(2A) Sections (Disregarding convictions etc of certain abolished offences: Northern Ireland), (Posthumous pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences: Northern Ireland), (Other pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences: Northern Ireland), and (Sections (Posthumous pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences: Northern Ireland) to (Power to provide for disregards and pardons for additional abolished offences: Northern Ireland): supplementary) come into force on such day as the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland appoints by order, and the power conferred by this subsection is exercisable by statutory rule for the purposes of the Statutory Rules (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 (S.I. 1979/1573)(N.I. 12)).”
Lord Paddick
“( ) section (Inquiry into complaints alleging corrupt relationships between police and newspaper organisations);”
“(7A) The Department of Justice in Northern Ireland may by order make such transitional, transitory or saving provision as it considers appropriate in connection with the coming into force of any provision of Chapter 6A of Part 4, and the power conferred by this subsection is exercisable by statutory rule for the purposes of the Statutory Rules (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 (S.I. 1979/ 1573) (N.I.12)).”
“(8A) The Department of Justice in Northern Ireland may by order make such transitional, transitory or saving provision as the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland considers appropriate in connection with the coming into force of sections (Disregarding convictions etc of certain abolished offences: Northern Ireland), (Posthumous pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences: Northern Ireland), (Other pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences: Northern Ireland), and (Sections (Posthumous pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences: Northern Ireland) to (Power to provide for disregards and pardons for additional abolished offences: Northern Ireland): supplementary).”
Policing and Crime Bill
Monday 19th December 2016
(8 years ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 84-I Marshalled list for Third Reading (PDF, 68KB) - (16 Dec 2016)
Lord Taylor of Holbeach (Con)
My Lords, I have it in command from Her Majesty the Queen to acquaint the House that Her Majesty, having been informed of the purport of the Policing and Crime Bill, has consented to place her interests, so far as they are affected by the Bill, at the disposal of Parliament for the purposes of the Bill.
Clause 161: Requirement to state nationality
Amendment 1
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, Amendments 1 and 2 deal with the same issue and are amendments to clauses requiring people to state their nationality when an immigration officer or constable suspects that an individual may not be a British citizen. Underlying our amendments is a concern that these powers may be exercised on the part of law enforcement officers in a discriminatory fashion. Suspecting that someone “may” not be British is a low hurdle.
At the previous stage, the Minister said that,
“it is already the case that officers may only ever act on reasonable grounds when exercising their powers”.—[Official Report, 12/12/16; col. 1012.]
That sounds all well and good, but if that is the case then why, in closely comparable provisions in Section 43 of the Immigration Act of this year, is there the formula:
“if the officer has reasonable grounds for believing”?
That formula is used in the case of requiring someone to provide a driving licence if he is suspected, or, as I say, if there are reasonable grounds for believing him to be not entitled to drive in the UK. Belief, as in the Immigration Act, is, as I understand it, in itself a higher hurdle than “suspicion”, but earlier this year it was considered that the formula which I have quoted was appropriate—both belief and reasonableness.
I was grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, during the previous stage. He made a substantive point about the term “reasonable”. Given the constraints of Third Reading, my amendments today are based on what might be called a technical point: that there is, as a matter of legal construction, a lower test to be applied under the Bill than under the Immigration Act. Two provisions which mean the same thing should be expressed in such a way as to indicate that. If they are expressed differently, there must be an implication—I hesitate to say this, given other noble Lords who are sitting around the Chamber—that they do not mean quite the same thing. To be told that we should base the point about reasonableness on what I think comes from the relevant PACE code does not, I am afraid, satisfy me. I probably took the Minister by surprise by making this point at the previous stage, but I hope that she may be able to answer the point, or better still to agree to the amendment.
This amendment also enables me to refer to a commitment given during the passage of the Immigration Bill, when we discussed the provision to which I have just referred. My noble friend Lord Paddick and the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence of Clarendon, were very much involved with this issue and meetings were held with the then Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Bates. I think that he was as concerned at the possible misapplication of the provision as we were, and we had quite a long meeting to discuss it. He offered this in debate:
“I would … like to make sure, when the consultation document is published”,
on that provision and the piloting of it, “that we reconvene”, and that the noble Baroness and my noble friend should,
“meet with officials again … to get the noble Lord’s and the noble Baroness’s perspective on that. How the pilot scheme will be framed will also be looked at. Again, we would value the noble Lord’s and the noble Baroness’s perspective. We will make sure that that happens before they are brought forward and placed in the Library, and before the pilot commences”.—[Official Report, 15/3/16; col. 1772.]
At the last stage, we heard that the provisions under the Immigration Act on the production of drivers’ licences were to be piloted. It was not known at that time whether that would be a pilot in conjunction with the pilot which is provided for in this Bill. I hope the Minister can give us assurances about wide consultation, including about where the pilots should take place. She was able to tell the House that one pilot would be in Hampshire, which everyone to whom I have mentioned it has reacted by saying that it is not a very helpful place to show whether the provisions might be used in a discriminatory fashion. That is a substantive point and I hope the Minister can assist on it, but at this late stage of the Bill I base the amendments on the technical point of comparison with the Immigration Act. I beg to move.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)
My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, these amendments were discussed on Report a few days ago. Amendments 1 and 2 add the world “reasonably” to this section of the Bill requiring someone to confirm their nationality. In that discussion, I made the point that in this section of the Bill the wording “without reasonable excuse” is used in respect of suspects in new Section 43B(1) and again in new Section 46C(1), and on that page there is also “for a reasonable cause”. That is different from the provisions for police and immigration officers. I asked the noble Baroness, Lady Chisholm, to write to me, and I think she was going to, but I have not yet had the letter. It is on its way. That is good to know. When she replies, I hope she will shed some light on why the Government do not need the same provision for both groups in this part of the Bill.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)
My Lords, these amendments again seek to provide in the Bill that a police or immigration officer exercising the powers in Clauses 161 and 162 to require a suspected foreign national to state their nationality and provide their nationality documents on request must act reasonably.
I am grateful for the opportunity to clarify the Government’s position. On Report, the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, suggested that the drafting of these clauses seemed inconsistent, given that, on the one hand, there was no express requirement on an officer to exercise the powers reasonably but, on the other hand, the defence operated only where the accused had a reasonable excuse. There is no inconsistency here. The reasonable excuse defence is a necessary safeguard which allows a suspected foreign national to offer legitimate reasons to an officer and, if necessary, a court, for their non-compliance. This might include, for example, circumstances where a document may have been destroyed with reasonable cause—a scenario which is also catered for elsewhere in immigration legislation. The requirement for officers to act reasonably in the first instance is, in the Government’s view, a quite different point.
I acknowledge that there are some variations in the drafting of the large number of existing Acts which set out UK immigration law. It is also accepted that certain actions in the Immigration Act 2016 explicitly require those exercising coercive powers to act reasonably. However, it is not the case that, in the absence of an explicit reference to that effect, officers are able, through that omission, to act unreasonably. This language is not universally applied, or required, nor is it used elsewhere in legislation which deals with the seizure or retention of nationality documents.
In exercising the powers conferred by Clauses 161 and 162, police and immigration officers must act in accordance with public law principles, which include acting reasonably, or they may be challenged in the courts by means of judicial review. I also note that the wording of these clauses is consistent with that used elsewhere in immigration legislation—for example, Section 17 of the asylum and immigration Act 2004, which uses the same language for similar purposes. Section 17 deals with the retention of documents that come into the possession of the Secretary of State or an immigration officer in the course of exercising an immigration function.
Finally, I should add that operational guidance in respect of these new powers will make it clear to officers the circumstances under which these powers may be exercised. In the light of this further assurance that these powers may be exercised only when an officer has a reasonable suspicion that an arrested person may not be a British citizen, I hope that the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.
However, I will just add a couple of things: of course we are very happy to continue to engage with the noble Baroness as our plans for pilots develop; she is also right that Hampshire was one of the places that was suggested for the pilot.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
Before the noble Baroness sits down, did I hear her correctly say that these powers can be exercised only when an officer has a reasonable suspicion? If that is the case, then I do not see why it should not be in the Act and this amendment accepted.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
We take the view that the police should always act in a reasonable way.
Baroness Hamwee
I think that encompasses our arguments.
With regard to the pilots, I am grateful for the noble Baroness’s assurances, but had there been consultation on the choice of Hampshire, she might have had some useful input.
I do not know whether the noble Baroness is in a position to tell us whether there is a distinction between an immigration officer or constable “suspecting” under these clauses in the Bill and an officer having “reasonable grounds for believing”. Are these different tests? It seems to me that suspecting and having reasonable grounds for believing are not the same, but I think she is telling us that they are. Does she have anything that she is able to add?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I am slightly muddled by what the noble Baroness is saying. Could she explain that a bit more?
Baroness Hamwee
I take the point that different formulae are used in different parts of immigration law, but the Immigration Act to which I have referred provides for an officer to have “reasonable grounds for believing” something, while under this Bill, he simply has to “suspect” something. “Reasonable grounds for believing” seems to me to be a much tougher test than simply suspecting. The noble Baroness may have something she can share with the House on that.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
Suspecting and believing are slightly different words, obviously. Perhaps I had better write to the noble Baroness with more clarification.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I wonder whether this is something that we can add to the discussion or consultation on the pilots. If one is going to pilot two provisions in the same place, carried out by the same officers and prompted no doubt by the same observations, it would be quite interesting to have them either able or not able to require documents from the same people, but not able to do so because in one case the ground applies and in the other it does not. I realise we are getting into very fine detail, but it will be very real detail in the application. It is not the noble Baroness’s fault, but I can see that we are not going to be able to make further progress on this today. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“(4) The list of offences in subsection (3) is to be read as if it also included the corresponding service offences and, for that purpose, the corresponding service offences are—(a) an offence under an enactment set out in subsection (4A) which is such an offence by virtue of any of the enactments mentioned in subsection (3);(b) an offence under section 32 of 13 Chas. 2 c. 9 (1661) (An Act for the regulation and better government of the navy);(c) an offence under section 29 of 22 Geo. 2 c. 33 (1749) (An Act for amending and consolidating the laws relating to the navy);(d) an offence of sodomy mentioned in, and punishable under, section 38 of the Naval Discipline Act 1860, section 38 of the Naval Discipline Act 1861, section 41 of the Naval Discipline Act 1864 or section 45 of the Naval Discipline Act 1866.(4A) The enactments referred to in subsection (4)(a) are—(a) section 45 of the Naval Discipline Act 1866;(b) section 41 of the Army Act 1881;(c) section 41 of the Air Force Act 1917;(d) section 70 of the Army Act 1955;(e) section 70 of the Air Force Act 1955;(f) section 42 of the Naval Discipline Act 1957.”
The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)
My Lords, I shall not keep the House long with these amendments. Noble Lords will recall that on Report my noble friend Lord Lexden questioned why the list of service disciplinary offences in what is now Clause 166 did not include all historic enactments criminalising buggery in the Armed Forces. I would like to thank my noble friend for bringing this matter to the Government’s attention. Having examined it further, we agree that the list of naval offences should reach back to the Navy Act 1661. I should stress that the various enactments cited in Amendments 3 to 6 include offences which would still be covered by the criminal law today, notably bestiality. Accordingly, it is important to emphasise again that these posthumous pardons would be granted to a person convicted of an offence only where their actions would not be illegal under current law.
We are aware that that there may be parallel offences that applied to Army personnel which predate the Army Act 1881. In the time available since Report we have not been able to identify all the relevant statutes, but we are continuing to research this issue. If there are further offences to be added to the list, we will explore the best means of achieving this.
The other amendments in this group are minor technical and consequential ones. I beg to move.
“(6A) The definition of “service disciplinary proceedings” in section 101(1) of the 2012 Act applies in accordance with subsection (6) with the modification that it also includes any proceedings (whether in England and Wales or elsewhere) under—(a) 13 Chas. 2 c. 9 (1661) (An Act for the regulation and better government of the navy),(b) 22 Geo. 2 c. 33 (1749) (An Act for amending and consolidating the laws relating to the navy), or(c) the Naval Discipline Act 1860, the Naval Discipline Act 1861 or the Naval Discipline Act 1864.”
“( ) The powers conferred on the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland by subsections (2), (4), (10) and (12) are exercisable by statutory rule for the purposes of the Statutory Rules (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 (S.I. 1979/ 1573 (N.I. 12)).”
Lord Rosser
“(1A) Material published under sub-paragraph (1)(d) must include— (a) copies of each document provided by the commissioner;(b) copies of each representation made for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1);(c) a summary of the views expressed to the commissioner for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1);(d) the commissioner’s response to those representations and views;(e) the commissioner’s representation of why the benefits of a proposal under paragraph 1 cannot be achieved by other forms of collaboration.(1B) The consultation period must last for at least 56 days.(1C) Before the start of the consultation period the commissioner must—(a) produce a draft public proposal for the purposes of paragraph 1;(b) schedule public meetings with reasonable publicity;(c) invite written submissions.”
Lord Rosser (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 12 is in essence the same as our Amendments 12 and 14 on Report, which we withdrew in the light of the Minister’s response. In accordance with that response, I have since received a letter from the Minister that covers guidance on a PCC’s business case and consultation arrangements, and on the terms and conditions of fire personnel transferring to PCC fire and rescue authorities and to chief officers under the single-employer model.
My purpose in tabling this amendment at Third Reading is to ask the Minister to cover the content of her letter to me in her response today so that it is on the record in Hansard. The letter said that government Amendment 11 on Report meant that,
“the PCC would always be required to publish a response to their consultation, regardless of whether they have local agreement or not”,
and, crucially, that,
“the guidance will fully reflect the issues covered by your amendments 12 and 14”,
on Report, which are now reiterated in Amendment 12, which we are now discussing at Third Reading. The letter also said:
“Whilst this guidance will be owned and issued by APACE”—
the Association of Policing and Crime Chief Executives—
“Home Office officials are part of an advisory group that has been set up to steer the development of the guidance and are working closely with the authors to ensure that it reflects Government’s expectations”.
In other words, the guidance reflecting the Government’s expectations will fully reflect issues covered by our Amendments 12 and 14 on Report, which are repeated now in Amendment 12, which we are now discussing at Third Reading.
If the Minister can place on record in Hansard the key parts of the letter that she sent me following Report, then from my perspective that would achieve the purpose of this amendment. In particular, confirmation of the points that I have just made, and which are referred to in the letter, about the guidance fully reflecting the issues covered by my Amendments 12 and 14 on Report, and the fact that the guidance will reflect the Government’s expectations, would be extremely helpful.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am glad that the noble Lord has dealt with the matter as he has and has sought to have the points put on record. I wonder whether, in replying, the Minister can confirm that in paragraph 3(d), the requirement on the commissioner to publish,
“in such manner as the commissioner thinks appropriate”,
is consistent with the description that the noble Lord has just given—and that, within statute, one cannot think something “appropriate” without it also being “reasonable”.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has explained his amendment and the reasoning behind it. I am very happy to repeat the assurances that I laid out in my letter so that they now appear in Hansard.
I recognise the important principles behind the amendment and I agree that it is imperative that PCCs afford sufficient time during the consultation process to allow people properly to express their views and to provide sufficient material for them to form a proper opinion. However, it would not be appropriate to prescribe how PCCs should go about their consultation in the Bill; nor would it be appropriate for the Home Office to issue guidance on such matters. PCCs are locally accountable, and it would not be appropriate for Whitehall to dictate matters or fetter local flexibility.
I hope that the noble Lord would therefore agree with me that the points he has raised are properly a matter for guidance rather than for primary legislation—I think that was clear from what he said. As I set out on Report, the circumstances of each local consultation will be different, so we should not unduly fetter local flexibility to put in place proportionate arrangements that recognise the nature of each local business case. The amendment, while well intentioned, risks cutting across the local accountability of PCCs and risks Whitehall dictating matters that should rightly be left to local leaders.
In response to the noble Lord’s important concerns, I can, however, be very clear about the Government’s expectation that the PCC’s consultation will be undertaken in an appropriate manner and of an appropriate duration to allow local people to express their views and for the PCC to have taken them into account. There is plenty of case law relating to consultations of the kind that PCCs will be undertaking on their local business cases, and to discharge their formal statutory duty, PCCs will need to have regard to proper principles of consultation. We would expect PCCs to secure local legal advice prior to commencing a local consultation to ensure that their plans comply with the legal requirements set down by existing case law. On the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, about consistency, I reiterate what I said privately: I think there is consistency.
To further strengthen the advice available to PCCs, we are also working with the Association of Policing and Crime Chief Executives to ensure that its practice guidance on fire governance business cases covers the points that the noble Lord has listed in his amendment today and his previous Amendments 12 and 14. This includes comprehensive guidance on the duty to consult, the manner in which consultation should be carried out, its duration, and what arrangements PCCs should make to publish their response to the consultation.
The Government expect the guidance to address the matters to be covered in the PCC’s business case. By its nature, this must set out the PCC’s assessment of why he or she considers that it would either be in the interests of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, or in the interests of public safety, for a Section 4A order to be made. If the PCC’s proposal is based on the first limb of this test, it would follow that the business case needs to address why other forms of collaboration, outside of a governance transfer, cannot deliver the same benefits in terms of improved economy, efficiency and effectiveness.
The guidance is currently being drafted by a working group that includes representations from fire and rescue authorities and the Local Government Association. The Association of Policing and Crime Chief Executives is aiming to publish the first version in January 2017, shortly after Royal Assent. The document will continue to be updated to reflect the lessons learned from the first PCCs to develop and consult on their proposals. As it will be sector guidance, it will not be subject to any parliamentary procedure but, as I have just explained, it will be in line with the Government’s expectations. I commit also to sharing a copy of the guidance once it is finalised.
I hope that in light of these further assurances the noble Lord will feel content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Rosser
I thank the Minister for her reply. I take it from what she has said that the guidance will reflect the Government’s expectations, which are that the guidance will fully reflect the issues covered by our Amendments 12 and 14 on Report and our Amendment 12 at Third Reading. Will the Minister confirm that once again?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I apologise for being slightly distracted by the last thing the noble Lord said, so could he repeat it?
Lord Rosser
I understand that the Minister confirmed, as stated in the letter that she sent to me, that the guidance will reflect the Government’s expectations and included in those expectations are that the guidance will fully reflect the issues covered by our Amendments 12 and 14 on Report and now repeated in Amendment 12, which we are discussing, at Third Reading. If the Minister will confirm that that is the correct interpretation, I would be very grateful.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I did just say, but perhaps not very clearly, that it will be both in line with the Government’s expectations and with the points made in the noble Lord’s Amendments 12 and 14—now Amendment 12. I am happy to reissue that reassurance.
While I am on my feet I wonder whether the noble Lord will indulge me because there is one aspect in the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on reasonableness that I did not address. PCCs would be expected to act reasonably when determining how to consult locally on their proposal and we would expect them to have regard to relevant case law and to practise the guidance issued by the Association of Policing and Crime Chief Executives. If there is a view that the PCC has acted unreasonably when determining what appropriate local arrangements should be, there would be an option to challenge the decision via the local consultation process or ultimately through legal challenge.
Lord Rosser
I thank the Minister for repeating that reassurance. We have taken this matter as far as we can, and in light of her reply, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“( ) In paragraph 28ZA (recommendations by the Commission or a local policing body)(as inserted by this Act), in sub-paragraph (3)(b), after “submission” insert “or completion”.”
Lord Rosser
Lord Rosser
The House agreed to Amendment 157 on Report on the parity of funding at inquests, which does not appear to be covered by the existing Long Title. Accordingly, this amendment is to cover Amendment 157, and comes within the Third Reading principal purposes as tidying up the Bill. I trust the Government will feel able to accept the amendment in the light of the decision of this House on Amendment 157 on Report.
My name is also attached to Amendment 16 in this group. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, cannot be in the House today, but the House agreed to Amendments 188 to 193 on Report on support for victims and victims’ rights, which do not appear to be covered by the existing Long Title. Once again, this amendment to the Long Title is to cover Amendments 188 to 193 and comes within the Third Reading principal purposes as tidying up the Bill. I trust that the Government will feel able to accept the amendment in the light of the House’s decision on those amendments on Report. I beg to move.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 15 is a tidying amendment to the Long Title and consequential to stalking offences. When I moved the amendment that was adopted by this House last week, I regret that I was not aware that it was encompassed by the Long Title, so I apologise for any inconvenience caused. I take this opportunity to say that I very much hope that the Prime Minister will look at this amendment. She has been terrific on violence against women and girls and, if she had a look at it personally, she might agree to accept it.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, as these amendments are purely consequential on various non-government amendments added to the Bill on Report, the Government will not oppose them. We are reflecting on the debates on the amendments put forward on Report by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Royall and Lady Brinton, and we will set out our position when those amendments are considered by the House of Commons on 10 January.
Lord Rosser
Baroness Williams of Trafford
In moving that the Bill do now pass, I shall not detain the House for long. I have felt the Bill to be a very constructive process, and in particular I thank the noble Lords, Lord Rosser, Lord Kennedy and Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, as well as the genius of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. If I ever need representation, I know where to go, as long as I have a lot of money! I particularly thank the officials, because they are not just from the Home Office; there are officials on the Bill from the Department for Transport, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport and the Ministries of Justice and Defence and the Department of Health. Last but not least, I thank my noble friend Lady Chisholm, without whom I could not have got through the Bill in such a cheerful manner. She has kept me upright sometimes late into the night and has worked so seamlessly with me. It has been an absolute joy. I wish her well. I know that she is not retiring—she is just taking life a bit more sensibly—but I shall desperately miss her by my side in the next Bill that I do.
Lord Rosser
I shall be very brief, but I take this opportunity to thank the Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Chisholm of Owlpen, for the courteous and open way in which they have listened to and sought to address, within government policy constraints, the issues raised during the passage of the Bill. I seem to have received a deluge of letters, for which I am genuinely very grateful, but it rather tests the statement that somebody, somewhere is waiting for a letter—that may no longer be the case in this instance. Actually, the number of letters that we have received in the light of the debates that have taken place is a reflection that the issues have been raised, considered and responded to, and I am very grateful for that. I thank the members of the Bill team for their help. I also thank all my noble friends, especially my noble friend Lord Kennedy of Southwark, and other Members of this House who have contributed to the debates. We too wish the noble Baroness, Lady Chisholm of Owlpen, a very successful time, presumably on the Back Benches, from where I am sure she will continue to make her views known.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, I too thank the noble Baronesses—the Ministers—for the way in which they have conducted proceedings on the Bill, and the members of the Bill team for the help and co-operation that we have received from them. My next offer of thanks is rather controversial and probably not in accordance with protocol but I also thank the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Kennedy, for the way in which we have discussed matters, which has helped the Bill’s passage
Commonwealth Development Corporation Bill
Tuesday 10th January 2017
(7 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Commons Consideration of Lords Amendments as at 10 January 2017 - (10 Jan 2017)
16:21 - The House divided: - Ayes: 246 / Noes: 293 - Question accordingly negatived.
16:35 - The House divided: - Ayes: 244 / Noes: 299 - Question accordingly negatived.
Kate Osamor (Edmonton) (Lab/Co-op)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Mrs Eleanor Laing)
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 2—Condition for exercise of power to increase limit: report and business case—
“After section 15 of the Commonwealth Development Corporation Act 1999 (limit on government assistance), insert—
“15A Condition for exercise of power to increase limit: business case and strategic plan
(1) The Secretary of State may only lay a draft of regulations under section 15(4) before the House of Commons if the Secretary of State has also laid before the House of Commons the documents specified in subsections (2) and (3).
(2) The document specified in this subsection is a business case for the proposed use of the new investment enabled by the proposed increase in the limit in force which includes information on—
(a) the expected market demand,
(b) the proposed sectors,
(c) the proposed locations, and
(d) the prospective development returns.
(3) The document specified in this subsection is a strategic plan for the development of the activities of the CDC in consequence of the proposed increase in the limit in force.””
This new clause would require any draft regulations to increase the limit on government assistance under section 15(4) to be preceded by the laying before the House of Commons of a detailed business case for the proposed additional investment and a strategic plan in relation to the additional investment.
New clause 3—Condition for exercise of power to increase limit: poverty reduction purposes for spending outside LDCs—
“After section 15 of the Commonwealth Development Corporation Act 1999 (limit on government assistance), insert—
“15A Condition for exercise of power to increase limit: poverty reduction purposes for spending outside LDCs
(1) The Secretary of State may only lay a draft of regulations under section 15(4) before the House of Commons if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the condition in subsection (2) or the condition in subsection (3) is met.
(2) The condition in this subsection is that any new investment enabled by the proposed increase in the limit in force is in a country which is classified as one of the least developed countries.
(3) The condition in this subsection is that the Secretary of State is satisfied that any new investment enabled by the proposed increase in the limit in force will have a significant impact on the reduction in poverty (within the meaning given in section 1(1) of the International Development Act 2002) in the country or countries concerned.
(4) In determining the classification of a country for the purposes of subsection (2), the Secretary of State shall use the latest analytical classification of the world’s economies prepared by the World Bank.””
This new clause would require any draft regulations to increase the limit on government assistance under section 15(4) to be for additional investment which is either in least developed countries or which makes a significant impact on poverty reduction in another country.
New clause 4—Condition for exercise of power to increase limit: independent assessment of aid impact—
“After section 15 of the Commonwealth Development Corporation Act 1999 (limit on government assistance), insert—
“15A Condition for exercise of power to increase limit: independent assessment of aid impact
(1) The Secretary of State may only lay a draft of regulations under section 15(4) before the House of Commons if the Secretary of State is satisfied that arrangements are in place for the independent assessment of the aid impact of new CDC investment which meet the conditions in this section.
(2) The first condition is that a framework agreement has been reached between CDC and the Independent Commission for Aid Impact for the Commission to carry out such an assessment on an annual basis.
(3) The second condition is that each annual assessment will be able to assess projects with a monetary value equivalent to at least 5 per cent of the total value of current investments in the year in question by the CDC.
(4) The third condition is that the Secretary of State is satisfied that the Independent Commission for Aid Impact has the additional resources required to carry out such annual assessments without impairing its capacity to undertake its other work.””
This new clause would require any proposal to increase the limit by secondary legislation to be contingent on an agreement being reached for an annual independent assessment of aid impact to be carried out by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact covering at least 5% of CDC’s investment portfolio at the time.
New clause 6—Condition for exercise of power to increase limit: review of poverty reduction impact and contribution to Sustainable Development Goals—
“After section 15 of the Commonwealth Development Corporation Act 1999 (limit on government assistance), insert—
“15A Condition for exercise of power to increase limit: poverty reduction
(1) The Secretary of State may only lay a draft of regulations under section 15(4) before the House of Commons if he has also laid before the House of Commons a review in accordance with subsection (2).
(2) A review under this subsection must provide the Secretary of State’s assessment of the extent to which the increase in the limit on the Crown’s assistance to the Corporation is likely to contribute to—
(a) a reduction in poverty, and
(b) achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.
(3) In this section—
“reduction in poverty” shall have the same meaning as in section 1(1) of the International Development Act 2002; and
“the Sustainable Development Goals” means the Goals adopted at the United Nations on 25 September 2015.””
This new clause would require any draft regulations to increase the limit on government assistance under section 15(4) to be preceded by a review, also to be laid before the House of Commons, of the extent to which the increase in the limit will contribute to a reduction in poverty, the aim of development assistance, and to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.
New clause 7—Condition for exercise of power to increase limit: prohibition on investment in certain sectors—
“After section 15 of the Commonwealth Development Corporation Act 1999 (limit on government assistance), insert—
“15A Condition for exercise of power to increase limit: prohibition on investment in certain sectors
(1) The Secretary of State may only lay a draft of regulations under section 15(4) before the House of Commons if he is satisfied that the condition in subsection (2) is met.
(2) That condition is that any new investment enabled by the proposed increase in the current limit at the time is not in any of the following sectors—
(a) education providers that charge the end user,
(b) healthcare providers that charge the end user,
(c) the real estate sector,
(d) mineral extraction,
(e) the palm oil sector,
(f) the fossil fuel sector.
(3) In this section—
“the current limit at the time” means—
(a) prior to the making of any regulations under section 15(4), £6,000 million,
(b) thereafter, the limit set in regulations made under section 15(4) then in force.””
This new clause would prohibit any new investment arising from any increase in the limit on government assistance under regulations under section 15(4) from being in the sectors specified in subsection (2).
New clause 8—Condition for exercise of power to increase limit: prohibition on use of tax havens—
“After section 15 of the Commonwealth Development Corporation Act 1999 (limit on government assistance), insert—
“15A Condition for exercise of power to increase limit: prohibition on use of tax havens
(1) The Secretary of State may only lay a draft of regulations under section 15(4) before the House of Commons if he is satisfied that the condition in subsection (2) is met.
(2) That condition is that any new investment enabled by the proposed increase in the current limit at the time is not in either—
(a) an investment entity, or
(b) a company
which uses, or seems to the Secretary of State likely to use, tax havens.
(3) In determining whether the condition in subsection (2) is met, the Secretary of State shall consider—
(a) information provided by the OECD on countries or territories which are considered to be tax havens, and
(b) such information as is available to the Secretary of State, whether supplied by the CDC or others, about the current location of funds of the potentially relevant entities for the purposes of subsection (2).
(4) In this section—
“the current limit at the time” means—
(a) prior to the making of any regulations under section 15(4), £6,000 million,
(b) thereafter, the limit set in regulations made under section 15(4) then in force.””
This new clause would prohibit any new investment arising from any increase in the limit on government assistance under regulations under section 15(4) from going to an investment vehicle or company which uses or seems likely to use tax havens.
New clause 9—Conditions for exercise of power to increase limit: countries, poverty reduction and SDGs—
“After section 15 of the Commonwealth Development Corporation Act 1999 (limit on government assistance), insert—
“15A Conditions for exercise of power to increase limit: countries, poverty reduction and SDGs
(1) The Secretary of State may only lay a draft of regulations under section 15(4) before the House of Commons if he is satisfied that the conditions in subsection (2), (4) and (5) are met.
(2) The condition in this subsection is that any new investment in a country enabled by the proposed increase in the current limit at the time is in a country which is classified as either—
(a) one of the least developed countries, or
(b) one of the other low income countries.
(3) In determining the classification of a country for the purposes of subsection (2), the Secretary of State shall use the latest analytical classification of the world’s economies prepared by the World Bank.
(4) The condition in this subsection is that the Secretary of State is satisfied that any new investment enabled by the proposed increase in the current limit at the time is likely to contribute to a reduction in poverty.
(5) The condition in this subsection is that the Secretary of State is satisfied that any new investment enabled by the proposed increase in the current limit at the time is likely to contribute to achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.
(6) In this section—
“the current limit at the time” means—
(a) prior to the making of any regulations under section 15(4), £6,000 million,
(b) thereafter, the limit set in regulations made under section 15(4) then in force;
“reduction in poverty” shall have the same meaning as in section 1(1) of the International Development Act 2002; and
“the Sustainable Development Goals” means the Goals adopted at the United Nations on 25 September 2015.””
This new clause would limit any new investment arising from any increase in the limit on government assistance under regulations under section 15(4) to the least developed countries and other low income countries and require the Secretary of State to be satisfied that such new investment contributed to the reduction of poverty and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.
New clause 10—Condition for exercise of power to increase limit: proportion of annual official development assistance—
“After section 15 of the Commonwealth Development Corporation Act 1999 (limit on government assistance), insert—
“15A Condition for exercise of power to increase limit: proportion of annual official development assistance
(1) The Secretary of State may only lay a draft of regulations under section 15(4) before the House of Commons if he is satisfied that the conditions in subsection (2) is met.
(2) The condition in this subsection is that the total value of any re-capitalisation of CDC enabled by the proposed increase in the current limit at the time will not, in any one calendar year, constitute more than 5% of total official development assistance.
(3) In this section—
“official development assistance” has the same meaning as in the most recent annual report laid before each House of Parliament in accordance with the provisions of section 1 of the International Development (Reporting and Transparency) Act 2006;
“the current limit at the time” means —
(a) prior to the making of any regulations under section 15(4), £6,000 million,
(b) thereafter, the limit set in regulations made under section 15(4) then in force.””
This new clause would limit any new investment arising from any increase in the limit on government assistance under regulations under section 15(4) to 5% of official development assistance in any one calendar year.
Amendment 2, in clause 1, page 1, line 4, leave out “£6,000 million” and insert
“the amount specified in subsection (1A)”.
This amendment paves the way for amendment 3.
Amendment 5, page 1, line 4, leave out “£6,000” and insert “£4,000”.
Amendment 3, page 1, line 4, at end, insert—
“(1A) After subsection (1), insert—
“(1A) The amount specified in this subsection is whichever is the lesser of the following amounts—
(a) £6,000 million,
(b) £1,500 million plus the amount determined in accordance with subsection (1B).
(1B) The Secretary of State shall determine the amount for the purposes of this subsection by estimating the amount which will constitute 4% of official development assistance in the relevant period determined in accordance with subsection (1C).
(1C) That period begins with the financial year in which the Secretary of State considers that the Crown’s assistance to the Corporation (determined in accordance with subsection (2)) will exceed £1,500 and ends at the end of the fourth subsequent financial year.
(1D) For the purposes of this section, “official development assistance” has the same meaning as in the most recent annual report laid before each House of Parliament in accordance with the provisions of section 1 of the International Development (Reporting and Transparency) Act 2006.””
This amendment would replace the proposed limit on government assistance under section 15 with a new amount, expressed as either £6 billion or the existing investment of £1.5 billion plus a sum not more than 4% of forecast official development assistance over a five year period, whichever is the lesser amount.
Amendment 6, page 1, line 5, leave out subsection (3).
This amendment removes the power of the Secretary of State to set a limit on government assistance above £6 billion up to £12 billion by means of secondary legislation.
Amendment 4, page 1, line 7, leave out “£12,000 million” and insert
“the amount specified in subsection (4A).
(4A) The amount specified in this subsection is whichever is the lesser of the following amounts—
(a) £12,000 million,
(b) the current limit at the time plus the amount determined in accordance with subsection (4B).
(4B) The Secretary of State shall determine the amount for the purposes of this subsection by estimating the amount which will constitute 4% of official development assistance in the relevant period determined in accordance with subsection (4C).
(4C) That period begins with the financial year in which the Secretary of State considers that the Crown’s assistance to the Corporation (determined in accordance with subsection (2)) will exceed the current limit at the time and ends at the end of the fourth subsequent financial year.
(4D) For the purposes of this section—
“the current limit at the time” means—
(a) prior to the making of any regulations under subsection (4), £6,000 million,
(b) thereafter, the limit set in regulations made under subsection (4) then in force;
“official development assistance” has the same meaning as in the most recent annual report laid before each House of Parliament in accordance with the provisions of section 1 of the International Development (Reporting and Transparency) Act 2006.”
The amendment would set a new limit on the power to make regulations to increase the limit on government assistance under section 15, expressed as either £12 billion or the current limit at the time plus 4% of official development assistance over a five year period, whichever is the lesser amount.
Amendment 1, page 1, line 8, at end insert—
“(4A) The Secretary of State may not exercise the power under subsection (4) to increase the limit by more than the amount that the Secretary of State estimates is required to meet the plans for investment by CDC in the ensuing three years.”
This amendment has the effect of restricting each increase in the limit by secondary legislation to an amount necessary to support additional investment by CDC over a three year period.
Kate Osamor
Labour Members are unswerving in our belief that the UK must continue to spend 0.7% of gross national income on overseas aid. It is imperative, however, that the Government deliver this aid in a way that is accountable, ensures value for money, and delivers on the UK’s development objectives.
Although we support the aims of the Bill—it has reached Report without amendment—we remain concerned about the lack of safeguards. In new clause 2, we ask that no increase in the limit be granted without a report or business case. New clauses 3 and 9 are at the heart of the work of the Department for International Development, which leads the UK’s work to end extreme poverty. We on the Front Bench ask the Government to make sure that the Minister is satisfied that any new investment enabled by a proposed increase in the limit will have a significant impact in reducing poverty.
The Department must be at the forefront of tackling global poverty reduction. It is vital that the bolstering of CDC’s resources does not mean a reduction in funds for emergency and humanitarian aid in places such as northern Nigeria, Yemen and Syria, and in other parts of the world that face grave humanitarian crises. Will the Minister commit to ring-fencing such funds so that those in the direst need of help are able to receive it? Long-term investment and the establishment of a sustainable economy in order to kick-start jobs and growth are, of course, crucial to any credible development programme, but a development programme should, at its core, be a coalition of long-term investment and short-term relief. The consequences of losing sight of the latter element would be grave indeed. Just as the UK has a duty to help to lay the foundations for secure, sustainable economies in the poorest areas, where investment is a risk that few are willing to take, the UK also has a duty to assist those who bear the full force of conflict, climate change and food insecurity.
As was laid out on Second Reading, transparency should be the driving force behind any shift in the focus of the aid budget. I now speak to new clauses 4 and 8. It is vital that taxpayers’ money is spent not only effectively, but as transparently as possible. To that end, it is incumbent on the Government to put in place mechanisms that ensure maximum visibility regarding where aid money is being spent, and that minimise public scepticism. We all know that transparency is something that DFID does very well indeed.
Richard Fuller (Bedford) (Con)
Before the hon. Lady moved on to the important issue of transparency, she was talking about balance. It is fair to make the point, is it not, that CDC’s proportion of our development budget for its type, as foreign direct investment, is lower, at 4%, than comparables such as the French FDI of 12% and the Dutch at 30%? For the sake of proportion, it is fair to say that even with that increase, the UK will still spend more on development aid than most of our European peers do, and the proportion of FDI will be smaller than it is for many of those peers.
Kate Osamor
The hon. Gentleman makes a valuable point, but the Bill still needs scrutiny. That is what I am laying out.
We all know that transparency is something that DFID does very well indeed. Its performance in the aid transparency index demonstrates an international gold standard in that regard. Historically, however, the same cannot be said for CDC. It is of the utmost importance that the proportion of the ODA budget that is channelled through CDC be subject to the same checks on outcomes and value for money to which DFID holds itself. New clause 4 lays down conditions that would guarantee transparent governance through an agreed framework reached with the Independent Commission for Aid Impact and CDC. Proper annual measurements of outcome would be a welcome addition to the Bill.
In relation to new clauses 1 and 8 and the issue of CDC use of separate financial centres where countries do not have sufficiently robust regulatory environments, now is the time to put on record the Government’s commitment to strengthening financial service centres in developing countries. The Opposition know that the importance of addressing and tackling CDC’s use of tax havens cannot be overstated. Although we heard assurances in Committee from Diana Noble, the chief executive of CDC, that using offshore financial centres ensures legal certainty and lessens risk for investors, far more than reassurance is needed to ensure transparency on that point. We need clear legislative safeguards, which is why the Front-Bench team will press new clause 1 to a vote. New clause 1 requires any proposal to increase the limit by secondary legislation to be accompanied by a thorough analysis of CDCs use of such centres. Where the countries in question do not have sufficiently robust regulatory environments, it is the UK’s job to ensure that those centres are made more robust.
Jeremy Lefroy (Stafford) (Con)
The hon. Lady makes some important points. Does she agree that the changes made to CDC five years ago, under which CDC was encouraged to make direct investments in developing countries—contrary to the preceding situation, in which it made investments in funds situated offshore—were a major step forward?
Kate Osamor
The hon. Gentleman makes a valid point, and I will touch on that in my speech. Regardless of any development, we must always be robust and we must be able to show taxpayers that we have a transparent and accountable system. That is at the forefront of our objections to the Bill.
I seek assurances from the Minister of State, the hon. Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart), that he will consider supporting the implementation of such safeguards. It is of course to be applauded that the whole ethos of CDC has been transformed since it was the subject of widespread controversy some years ago. It is testimony to the organisation’s willingness to change that it reacted to that criticism by becoming a more positive institution and implementing an overhaul of the systems that were in place. These efforts were praised in the most recent report by the National Audit Office, which assessed CDC’s progress in implementing the recommendations that the NAO made in a report in 2008. It was heartening to read in the follow-up report that CDC has proved successful in adapting its strategy in accordance with NAO’s earlier recommendations, including instituting frameworks to limit excessive pay and to refocus CDC’s priorities on the world’s very poorest nations, rather than investing in markets that already attract foreign investors.
Kate Osamor
No, I need to make some headway.
It was also encouraging to learn that CDC has not only met but exceeded the targets agreed with DFID relating to its financial performance and development impact, and has improved its procedures for documenting fraud and corruption. Although we on the Front Bench praise CDC for making those changes, we must not forget that the recent NAO report was by no means unequivocally positive, and that it highlighted significant areas for improvement. Allow me to quote directly from a passage in the report examining the efficiency of CDC’s methods of capturing its development impact:
“It remains a significant challenge for CDC to demonstrate its ultimate objective of creating jobs and making a lasting difference to people’s lives in some of the world’s poorest places. Given the Department’s plans to invest further in CDC, a clearer picture of actual development impact would help to demonstrate the value for money of the Department’s investment.”
That is quite some statement. According to the NAO, it is “a significant challenge” for CDC to demonstrate how effectively it does the very thing it was set up to do.
Fiona Bruce (Congleton) (Con)
The hon. Lady refers to a quote about the challenges of capturing impact. That is an ongoing challenge in all aid work. In terms of efficiency, which is what she is referring to, the NAO report concluded:
“Through tighter cost control, strengthened corporate governance and closer alignment with the Department’s objectives, CDC now has an efficient and economic operating model.”
Does the hon. Lady agree that that is a testament to the improvements that have been made to CDC’s work over the last few years?
Kate Osamor
I said in my opening remarks that CDC has improved, but the report says that it is still very hard to know and to demonstrate the impact of development, and work on that still needs to be done. The report is not totally scathing, but we must pick up such objections. If CDC was transparent, I am sure Labour Members would not have to stand up in the Chamber and say what we are now saying.
New clause 7, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), lays down conditions about investing only in certain sectors and about not investing in sectors that provide little or no development impact in ending poverty. These sectors include the fossil fuel sector, the primary education and healthcare sectors that charge at the point of contact, the building of real estate, mineral extraction and work in the palm oil sector. If DFID’s investment in CDC is to increase the level proposed in the Bill, this challenge must be urgently addressed and resolved.
In spite of CDC’s very welcome improvements, the NAO’s recommendations show that we should not forget that it remains very much a work in progress for this organisation to demonstrate transparently and robustly that it is achieving its objectives. With that in mind, we cannot regard the Bill as the end of the process. There is no room for complacency within CDC or DFID on the need to alter the organisation’s processes further to ensure and to demonstrate the delivery of its goals. Given the scale of the proposed increase in DFID funding—from a limit of £1.5 billion to one of £6 billion —and the resulting consequences both for the UK’s development programme and indeed for the developing countries it supports, it is right that the Bill is robustly challenged and meticulously scrutinised where it is found lacking, and that stringent precautions are appended to it where necessary.
New clause 10 lays out that any proposed increase in the current limit would not in any one calendar year constitute more than 5% of total official development assistance.
Wendy Morton (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)
I want to take the hon. Lady back to new clause 7—I tried to intervene earlier—when she listed the sectors that she feels should be excluded. Does she not agree, however, that by specifically mentioning
“education providers that charge the end user”
as an exception, she risks children in some of the most underprivileged communities not being able to access education? From some Select Committee work, we know that such means are the only way of getting education for many of these children.
Kate Osamor
The hon. Lady makes a valid point, but I am talking about private education, for which someone with no money would have to pay. I do not think we should support that in a developing country, because we do not do it in this country. If someone wants to pay to go to university, there are challenges in relation to that, but I am talking, ideally, about primary education.
Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)
New clause 7 is in my name, and I will speak about it in due course. Does my hon. Friend agree that there is an important choice for DFID to make? It previously invested significantly in promoting free healthcare and education—making it available to all people, and removing such user fees—so to allow the CDC to continue to invest in private, fee-paying education is a significant shift away from the work the Department did in the past.
Kate Osamor
My hon. Friend makes a valid point, with which I totally agree.
Kate Osamor
I now need to make some progress.
Labour Members remain positive about the Bill’s ability to achieve its aim of improving the quality of life of people in some of the least developed countries in the world, but we believe that this can be achieved to its fullest extent only if appropriate safeguards are put in place. We retain our right to withdraw our support for the Bill if it becomes clear that the Government have not made sufficient progress.
Mrs Flick Drummond (Portsmouth South) (Con)
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker—[Interruption.]
Madam Deputy Speaker
Order. It is the beginning of a new term after a long Christmas holiday, but may I remind Members that, if they want to speak, it is really easy—they just have to stand up?
Mrs Drummond
Sorry, Madam Deputy Speaker. I was expecting the Minister to respond to the first speaker, and I did not realise that I would be called next.
Stephen Doughty
I am listening with interest to the hon. Lady’s point, but does she not accept that there is a bit of a double standard? The Secretary of State issued a letter on 16 December to other DFID suppliers—institutions, non-governmental organisations and people in receipt of our aid money—making it very clear that they should not invest in tax havens, yet she seems unwilling to apply the same to the CDC, which is also in receipt of taxpayers’ funding. Is that not a double standard?
Mrs Drummond
No, because we are investing in very difficult areas where robust systems may not already be in place, plus the CDC has very clear guidelines about where the money is going, so we can track it much more easily than we can with other aid agencies.
Jeremy Lefroy
Does my hon. Friend agree that the issue is not so much about offshore centres being invested in by funds from a variety of jurisdictions, but about the tax paid in-country for activities undertaken in that country? In that respect, the investments made by the CDC are excellent and provide major tax revenues of billions of dollars a year for those country’s Treasuries.
Mrs Drummond
I thank my hon. Friend for his very clear explanation, which beefs up what I have said.
On the case for raising investment limits, amendments l, 3 and 6 and new clauses 2, 5 and 10 would hamper the CDC in the same way. We have already extensively debated the need to increase the limit, and we have had assurances from the Minister and the CDC that business cases for further capital will be clearly made. We will have the full strategy document this year, backed by an analysis from the CDC of the development impact. We will have both before any additional money goes through the CDC.
On the focus of spending, I agree with my hon. Friend the Minister that the question of which specific investments are made must be delegated to DFID and the CDC. That would give the Government oversight and ensure that sustainable development goals are at the heart of the investment. Putting countries or, indeed, limiting sectors in legislation would make delivering the development process cumbersome, and I believe that it would hobble the CDC.
Pauline Latham
Does my hon. Friend agree that supporting the CDC is absolutely vital if we are to achieve the global sustainable development goals by 2030? We need to mobilise the private sector to fill an annual financing gap of about $2.5 trillion every year.
Mrs Drummond
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. One reason that I am so passionate about the CDC is that we need to build the capacity of developing countries. In my first speech on this subject, I said give a man fish and he will eat it, but give him a fishing rod and he is set for life. That is exactly the philosophy behind the CDC that I am so keen on.
There are circumstances in which some relatively more developed countries are host to companies involved in much poorer ones. As with the misplaced fears about offshore financial centres, we should not close off any path to investment and development. New clauses 3, 4, 6 and 9 all fail in that respect. All the amendments before us share a fundamental weakness and a misunderstanding of the CDC’s role in the world. We put less of our development investment through the CDC than other countries do through their equivalent bodies, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Richard Fuller) mentioned earlier. We should be doing more through the CDC if we want to develop mature and robust market economies in the developing world, which is why I welcome the Bill.
Markets are transparent and flexible, and they empower people who take part in them. The aim of our development policy should always be to encourage self-sufficiency and the development of market economies. As I said in my first contribution on the Bill, the CDC is transparent, as the NAO report agreed. I champion the CDC’s philosophy of enabling people to build their own businesses, rather than handing out grants. It is an efficient and transparent model, and we should all give the Bill our wholehearted support and continue to be a major investor in improving the lives of our fellow citizens in developing countries.
Patrick Grady (Glasgow North) (SNP)
I will speak to amendment 3 and new clause 6, which are in my name, and I will offer support for the Labour party’s amendments that I have added my name to.
Nobody here is arguing that the CDC should not exist. We all recognise there is a role for development finance and private investment. As I noted on Second Reading, the Scottish Government have just set up their own investment mechanism in Malawi. But even if we wanted to change some of the deeper fundamentals, that is not in the scope of the Bill. The Government, probably deliberately, have presented a very narrow Bill with the aim of increasing the statutory limit of their investment. Therefore, by definition, that is what our amendments must focus on.
I hope that the Government will see—certainly in the amendments I have tabled and, I think, in the Labour ones—that we have tried to respond to and take on board some of their concerns about some of our amendments in Committee. It is up to the Government to respond and indicate how they will take our concerns on board. We all want to work constructively with the Government on the Bill. We want to recognise and maintain the consensus on the importance of aid, our commitment to 0.7% and the effective use of those resources.
Amendment 3, which is in my name, and amendments 2 and 4, which are contingent on it, gets to the heart of the technical aspect of the Bill: what the cap on investment in the CDC should be. The Government have been repeatedly asked for their reasons behind the figures of £6 billion and £12 billion in the Bill, and I am afraid that they have still come up short. The best we have heard is that this is roughly what they think is needed, or could be managed, over the coming years. In the lifetime of this Parliament, that could still equate to an additional £1.5 billion to £2 billion a year of investment from the official development assistance budget to the CDC. As we have repeatedly said, every penny invested in the CDC is a penny not invested in other mainstream, grassroots and not-for-profit development projects and support.
On Second Reading, I asked about the use of a formula to link the cap with overall ODA budgets, and I proposed such a formula in Committee. The Minister’s first concern about a formula was that it would blur the line between stock and flow. But the aid budget is a flow. It goes up and it can, theoretically, go down as well. I recognise that the CDC investment is a stock: once funds are transferred, that is where they stay and they remain part of the overall capital fund. However, the formula would ask the Government, each time they want to disburse funds to CDC, to calculate how those funds will relate to overall aid spending in the coming years.
The Minister’s second concern was that my formula in Committee effectively discounted the £1.5 billion already invested in the CDC. Amendment 3 and the contingent amendments take that into account. By my calculations, based on figures from the Library, this formula would still allow the Government to invest an extra £3 billion, or a total of £4.5 billion, in the CDC by 2021. Even if the Government will not accept the amendment and we cannot persuade enough of their Back Benchers to join us in the Lobby to support it, I hope that they will commit to recognising that the £6 billion figure currently stated in the legislation is a maximum and that any additional investment they intend to make will ultimately reflect the ebb and flow of overall ODA calculations in any given spending round.
Irrespective of the caps and limits, much concern has been expressed throughout the passage of the Bill over how some aspects of the CDC’s resources have been spent in the past and how they will continue to be spent in the future. That is what I seek to address with new clause 6, which is particularly important in the context of increasing—potentially quadrupling—the overall resources available to the CDC. I welcome the range of amendments in Committee and here today that attempt to place various conditions on the exercise of the power to increase the limit.
As I said at the start, owing to the scope of the Bill, my amendments and those of Labour Members must relate to the increase in the limit from £6 billion to £12 billion under the terms of section 15(4) of the Commonwealth Development Corporation Act 1999. Try as we might, it has not been possible to find a way to attach conditions to the investment of up to £6 billion. The Government have indicated that the timetable for using the statutory instrument powers would be some way in the distance, so it is not unreasonable to suggest that there should be some kind of conditionality and review process before those powers are used, especially given that we will apparently have so much time to prepare.
New clause 6 combines two conditions I called for in Committee: before the Government could increase the limit of their investment, the Secretary of State would be required to make an assessment of how an increased limit would contribute to a reduction in poverty, which is the statutory aim of ODA in the International Development Act 2002, and how that increase would help to meet the sustainable development goals. The Government have repeatedly argued that the CDC is doing both those things very effectively, in which case this is hardly an onerous request, but the new clause would have the effect of making it much clearer that this is the CDC’s overall purpose and that commercial gain, returns on investment and even raw figures on the number of jobs created are not an end in themselves, but only the means to the end of reducing poverty and building a more stable and secure world. Again, the responsibility is on the Government, if they will not accept our amendments, at least to acknowledge the concerns being expressed and to give commitments to show in any business case they publish for further investment how the key pillars of poverty reduction and the global sustainable development goals will be advanced.
I briefly speak in favour of, and indicate the Scottish National party’s support for, the range of thoughtful amendments tabled by the Labour shadow team and by the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), who serves on the Select Committee on International Development. I welcome the fact that there has been cross-party support for the amendments and suggest that the Government pay attention to that. There remains consensus in this House and across the country in support of the principle of aid, the 0.7% target and, of course, the effective use of that aid. Many of Labour’s amendments, as the hon. Member for Edmonton (Kate Osamor) said, simply ask DFID to hold the CDC to the same standards that the Government now demand of their external stakeholders. Their recent bilateral and multilateral development reviews were pretty much unilateral declarations of everything that was terrible and wasteful on the part of so many of their stakeholders and demanded that the highest standards of efficiency, impact and transparency be applied to them. It stands to reason that those standards should also be demanded of the CDC.
A Government who say they want to crack down on tax dodging should not be allowing an agency of which they are the sole stakeholder to be making use of offshore tax havens. A Government who want value for money and clear impact from their aid budget should not be afraid to ask for reporting on exactly those areas. My colleagues and I will be happy to join the Labour party, hon. Members from other Opposition parties, and any Conservative Member persuaded of the case in the Lobby in support of any amendments they wish to press.
I said on Second Reading that it was disappointing that the scope of the Bill was so narrow. The Government had the opportunity to widen the scope to strengthen the CDC’s effectiveness, transparency and accountability. They also had that opportunity with the substantial and, in some cases, creative amendments that have been proposed by Opposition Members from different parties. If Ministers continue to indicate an unwillingness to accept amendments—it is disappointing that they did not table any of their own to reflect the concerns raised by Members—they must give the strongest possible commitments now in response to the concerns we have raised. The Government must recognise, as the Labour Front Bench spokesperson said, that this is the beginning, and not the end, of a process.
Several hon. Members rose—
Richard Fuller
Thank you very much, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am taking absolutely to heart your suggestion that, this being the new year, we have to stand up to get the chance to speak.
I would like to start by thanking all the members of staff at the CDC for the work they do on behalf of British taxpayers and, more importantly, for the people who depend on the CDC for their employment in many of the most troubled and difficult countries in the world. Over the past few weeks, the CDC has been the subject of much ill-founded and hostile criticism, and that must make its job much, much harder, so it is important to put on record our support for the work they do in helping to achieve our country’s development goals.
I would also like to thank the Front-Bench spokesman for the Labour party, the hon. Member for Edmonton (Kate Osamor). She did a very good job in putting forward some points of scrutiny and in holding back on some of the wilder suggestions that might have been foisted on her in order to batter the Bill. The fact that historically there has been a cross-party consensus—given what she has said, it continues—on the valuable role of the CDC in achieving our development goals is important. It is a long-standing institution in our country; it is part of the British brand internationally, and she has done a great service today by focusing on the one amendment she wishes to press to a vote but pushing back on other ideas, which other Opposition Members might have asked her to press.
Pauline Latham
I am sure my hon. Friend is aware that the CDC last year upped its investment rate to $1.5 billion, which is the level projected for the next five years. Does that investment rate show that recapitalisation is not about some supposed new direction for the CDC but about allowing the good work it has done under its management to continue?
Richard Fuller
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We have to be clear what is being proposed today. The proposal is not to do more than is being done now, but to enable the CDC to continue to do what it is doing now. If we were to take some of the suggestions from the SNP and others, that might imply that that support should be reduced in the future, and that would be to the detriment of the countries affected and the British taxpayer.
Patrick Grady
ODA flows and gross national income can go up or down, so if, for some reason, GNI were to contract, and the ODA budget were to contract, surely it would make sense for the amount of overall capital investment in the CDC to contract so that more money was available for the traditional aid flows.
Richard Fuller
That is the hon. Gentleman’s point of view, but it is not my point of view, and I will come to the point about balance in a minute.
A general view of the amendments is that they seek to solve problems that do not exist, but that may exist. Statute is not the right way to approach such circumstances; that is a matter for oversight and scrutiny by the departmental Ministers and by us here in Parliament on behalf of our taxpayers—it is not about putting things into Bills. On that basis, I will oppose every amendment that has been proposed today.
There would be some validity to the amendments if there was a question about this aspect of foreign direct investment being unusually large. There might be something to them if the CDC had a poor investment record because it was losing shed loads of taxpayers’ money by making poor investments, if it was clearly ignoring development goals and was being held to account in reports for doing that, or if a problem in reporting oversight was evident and explained in various reports. However, not a single one of those conditions pertains to the circumstances of the CDC, so there is no a priori reason to put these amendments in place.
As I mentioned earlier, the proportion of our development budget that goes to our development finance institution—the CDC—is 4% if taken over five years, which is the usual investment period for a fund. That compares to PROPARCO of France, which has 12% of the development budget; DEG in Germany, which has 8% of the budget; and FMO in Holland, which is a very successful DFI, and which has 30% of the budget. So we are not unusually large—we are actually unusually small. In terms of such initiatives, we should be looking for a measured and slow increase in our ability to invest, so that we can play a fuller role. So I do not think that the point about that really holds.
The point about the poor investment record does not hold either. I have the numbers here, and the truth of the matter is that in terms of its annual return—this is a commercial return, and we have to understand that there are commercial returns for funds—the CDC was set a target of 3.5%, and it achieved 7.8% over the past five years. So there are not really grounds for saying that it is a poor performer in terms of its core function of investing on a commercial basis or that it is doing something untoward.
On the missing development goals, I understand that there is a bit of a laundry list of sectors that the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty) wishes to turn his nose up to. I have no idea whether the list in his new clause is a full list or whether it just contains things he does not like. One of my hon. Friends made a good point about why there are good reasons to support parts of them. We will hear from the hon. Gentleman in a minute, and I am sure he will make an excellent case for that laundry list. However, in the meantime, I would say that there is not really any evidence of the CDC missing its development goals. Even the National Audit Office report mentioned that the CDC had met the targets for its financial performance, which was point 11 in its summary. In point 12, it said that the
“CDC has exceeded the target for prospective development impact it agreed with the Department.”
So there is no basis in that respect for the amendments.
Are there concerns about reporting for CDC? There may be, but I have not heard them. I cannot point to something that says there are concerns. I do not think that we have heard concerns about reporting on Second Reading, in the evidence stages or today. There may be additional pieces of information we wish to have, and they are listed in some of the amendments, but no real concerns have been raised that these things have not been provided in the past and that we should therefore ensure that the CDC provides them. Therefore, on the issue of whether there is a problem at the CDC that the amendments are needed to correct, there is no justification for the amendments whatever.
We have to be clear about what the role of tax havens has been. The hon. Member for Edmonton was very fair in pointing out that the CDC’s chief executive had made it clear that the CDC does not use tax havens in its policies, and the chief executive explained where those are used and why they are used. I am perfectly happy to rest on the judgment of the CDC, on its governance structures and on the oversight by the Department to make sure that that continues. I do not need to put a statutory underpinning on that. I also do not see that there is a problem at the moment in terms of the CDC having wandered off from what it said it would do. If there was such a problem, I would say, “Okay, maybe it is time for statute,” but the hon. Lady has not presented—maybe others will—a recent concern where that has happened. Therefore, I cannot see a reason for supporting new clause 1, although I understand that she wants to put it to a vote. I think we broadly accept—from that point of view, having a discussion about this is perhaps valuable—that there should be a strong message from Parliament about the use of tax havens and about what is and is not appropriate. If that is her intention, that is a perfectly reasonable point for her to make.
The CDC is a valuable institution. It has support from both sides of the House. I look forward to having further discussion on the amendments and then supporting the Bill on Third Reading.
Stephen Twigg (Liverpool, West Derby) (Lab/Co-op)
In July last year, as part of our ongoing inquiry, the International Development Committee visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As part of that, we went to see a hydroelectric power plant in the Virunga national park, which has been part-funded by the CDC. It is reinvesting a proportion of its earnings into community development projects and protecting the environment. The plant is bringing electricity to a region in which only 15% of the population has previously had access to power, and it has the potential to generate millions of dollars each year and thousands of jobs for local communities. I cite that because such projects are impressive and demonstrate the positive impact that the CDC is already having.
Pauline Latham
As the hon. Gentleman knows, I was also on that visit, and that is probably one of the most impressive projects I have ever seen. It provides light to so many people in the DRC who so desperately need it. Those are just the sorts of projects we have talked about and said that the CDC should be investing in more, because they create jobs and make life better for so many more people.
Stephen Twigg
The hon. Lady is a highly valued member of the International Development Committee and I agree with her. The purpose of my remarks on Report this afternoon is to reinforce the point she made. Those are positive projects. We want to ensure that the high-quality we saw in that example in Congo becomes the norm for all the CDC’s investments, particularly as the limit is increased, which I will come to in a moment.
The private sector provides around nine out of every 10 jobs in developing countries. Its development and success is vital in helping countries to achieve sustainable and long-term development. I therefore believe it makes sense to increase the CDC’s investment threshold.
Poverty reduction must be at the heart of the Government’s development agenda, which must explicitly include the work of the CDC. In 2011, the predecessor International Development Committee produced a report, “The Future of CDC”, as the group approached its then cap of £1.5 billion, as set out in the Commonwealth Development Corporation Act 1999. The Committee’s report concluded that the CDC’s mandate should be changed to a specific focus on poverty alleviation. Given that job creation is one of the very best ways to reduce poverty, it is important that the Government have a development investment arm that will help poorer countries to create new and innovative jobs.
As has been said by Members on both sides of the House, the CDC made significant changes following the 2008 National Audit Office report and the 2011 International Development Committee report in line with recommendations to move towards a focus on the alleviation of poverty. As has also been said, those changes were reviewed recently by a further NAO report released just before Second Reading of the Bill in November 2016. The report was mostly positive, and noted that the 2012 to 2016 investment strategy shifted the CDC’s investment focus to poorer countries, which is welcome. The report noted that the CDC had exceeded the targets agreed with DFID relating to financial performance and development impact. However, it also said that the CDC should do more to measure the development impact of its investments. That would not only provide a better basis for investment decisions, but increase the transparency of the CDC.
Poverty alleviation is absolutely central if we are to make a success of the global goals—the sustainable development goals agreed in 2015. Africa needs to generate 15 million new jobs every year if it is to achieve its global goals. That can be achieved only by working with the private sector, including organisations such as CDC. CDC has helped to create nearly 25,000 jobs in Africa and south Asia directly, and it says it has helped to create more than 1 million jobs indirectly. The businesses in its portfolio support around 18 million jobs. I am therefore happy to see the increase in the threshold, but I have a number of concerns to which I should like the Minister to respond.
Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)
The hon. Gentleman will know that I respect not only his passion, but the balanced way in which he deals with CDC issues. Does he share my concern that we risk having a more prescriptive approach towards the CDC, which is a part-private sector organisation, than we have towards a range of non-governmental organisations that are beneficiaries of large-scale DFID programmes, which might be somewhat distorting? Although he makes valid points about the concerns, if we are to hamstring CDC in the way that one or two of the proposals would have us do, it would be an undesirable outcome for DFID.
Stephen Twigg
I am certainly not arguing for prescriptions to be applied to the CDC that would not be applied to other organisations funded by DFID. My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty) has made the valid point that, shortly before Christmas, the Secretary of State set out a number of conditions for suppliers to the Department, and that they should apply to the CDC. I am emphasising my support for the proposal to put poverty reduction at the heart of the CDC. All hon. Members would agree that that should be at the heart of the Government’s entire development and aid strategy, including DFID. I can plead not guilty to the charge that the right hon. Gentleman puts to me. I am not proposing in any sense to hamstring the CDC. I am certainly not proposing, and I do not believe the Opposition amendments seek, to impose any restriction on the CDC that would be out of step with the restrictions we apply to other bodies funded through overseas development assistance.
Stephen Doughty
My hon. Friend makes a strong point, which is very much the point. The proposals are about bringing the CDC more in line with DFID’s overall priority countries and sectors, and with the restrictions placed on other UK aid money.
Stephen Twigg
I agree with my hon. Friend. I have read what the Minister said in Committee—reassurance can be gained from it—but I look forward to hearing him again today. It is very important that we have a sense that, with a very substantial increase in the potential money going through the CDC, we will ensure that it is geared towards poverty reduction wherever it is invested. As my hon. Friend rightly points out, part of that is the question of which parts of the world and which countries the CDC will invest in. Investments in some countries can deliver a lot more jobs and poverty reduction than investments in others.
As I have said, I am happy with an increase in the investment threshold, but we must ensure that the money is spent wisely. The 2012 to 2016 investment plan has expired and we are yet to see the 2017 to 2021 investment plan. I suggest that it would have been beneficial for the Bill, the Government and the CDC if Parliament had seen the plans for the next four years of investment before it was asked to raise the investment threshold. The amendment from my hon. Friend the shadow Secretary of State would ensure that, if the Government introduce regulations further to increase the limit, they would have to be preceded by a detailed plan of investment from the CDC that could be scrutinised by Parliament. I welcome and support that amendment.
Wes Streeting (Ilford North) (Lab)
Successive Governments can be proud of the role played by DFID in improving lives and the economies of some of the world’s poorest countries but, in light of much of the public debate on international development spending, much of what my hon. Friend says on parliamentary scrutiny is correct in principle. Does he agree that that is absolutely essential for maintaining and building public confidence in international development spending?
Stephen Twigg
I absolutely agree with what my hon. Friend says, which chimes with my conclusion on the importance of scrutiny of both the CDC and the Government, including scrutiny by the House.
Mark Field
I have a lot of sympathy for what the hon. Gentleman says—in the context of the debate it would be useful to have an idea of the programmes that the CDC has in mind for the future. I hope that, when the Bill goes to another place, there is another opportunity to have one. However, does he recognise that, given the nature of the CDC’s expertise and experience, it might to an extent have slightly different goals from other NGOs who receive DFID money? In other words, given the CDC’s expertise, particularly its private sector expertise and experience, the absolute predominance of the alleviation of poverty could in some cases not entirely apply to everything it does.
Stephen Twigg
The focus and priority needs to be on poverty alleviation. At the beginning of my speech, I gave the example of a project we visited—the hon. Member for Mid Derbyshire (Pauline Latham) reinforced the point. That project undoubtedly delivered things beyond poverty reduction, but at the heart of that investment and its impact was the reduction of poverty. Keeping the reduction of poverty in mind is a useful lodestar for DFID when it approaches the work of the CDC. I would need some persuading that a project should be funded that did not have some connection to the alleviation and reduction of poverty.
Let me now turn to the issues of scrutiny that were referred to by my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford North (Wes Streeting). The recent NAO report, as was rightly said by the hon. Member for Bedford (Richard Fuller), revealed that the target development impact score is on average being met, but only on average. The CDC is making some investments that fall below the target. Some 23% of investments since 2013 have fallen below the target score based on their investment difficulty and propensity to generate employment. Given that the objective stated in the CDC’s current investment policy is to
“focus its investments into the geographies and sectors where there is the most potential for development impact”,
it is unclear why the CDC is investing in projects that achieve lower scores. So I say to the Minister that, along with a more robust approach to measuring development impact, I would like a minimum threshold for impact implemented in the new investment strategy.
As with all DFID spending—and, indeed, broader aid spending by other Government Departments—the International Development Committee will scrutinise very closely the CDC’s work in the months and years ahead. It is vital that we ensure the British taxpayer gets value for money for every pound spent on international development. As has been said on all sides of the House, the CDC has become more transparent following the Committee’s 2011 report and the NAO report in 2008, but more can still be done to ensure that money is being spent as well as possible. One way that could be achieved—I ask the Minister to explore this—is to allow the Independent Commission for Aid Impact to play a bigger role, for example carrying out a regular assessment of CDC investments, allowing scrutiny so we can really ensure full effectiveness and value for money of the programmes in which the CDC invests.
I think we can say that the CDC has been a world leader among development finance institutions in publishing details of its investments since 2012 under the International Aid Transparency Initiative. That is very welcome, but I suggest it would improve transparency further if it published similar details on its entire active investment portfolio, including those made prior to 2012. I ask the Minister to address that point when he responds to the debate. That would enable greater scrutiny of the CDC’s entire portfolio and hopefully provide assurance to the public that all the CDC investments are focused where they need to be: on the goal of poverty reduction.
In conclusion, I believe that the CDC has helped the UK to be a leader in global development, but as with any area of Government spending we need to ensure that every penny is going where it can have the greatest effect: the right places and the right people delivering value for money for the taxpayer. One way to achieve that is by regular scrutiny of the CDC, including by Parliament. I give a commitment that the International Development Committee will play its role in ensuring that we scrutinise and hold to account both the Department and the CDC as the additional money is allocated. Most importantly, as with all areas of development spending, we need to ensure that the ultimate goal is poverty alleviation and eradication, and that we never lose focus on that.
Paul Scully (Sutton and Cheam) (Con)
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am grateful for your generosity in allowing me to contribute for a short time.
The CDC has a really important discrete role in our international development portfolio. There are few organisations with the skills and abilities to manage such risk in the most difficult markets. Often, it will bring an economic frontier country, area or sector the opportunities leading towards a risk profile that more established and traditional investment vehicles can get involved in. That is to be welcomed. It supports more than 1,200 businesses in more than 70 developing countries to create jobs.
We discussed a number of issues in Committee, including the fact that investments are not necessarily direct. Amendments tabled both in Committee and on Report address whether that serves to divert resources from the least-developed countries. I would say that it is sometimes necessary to invest in opportunities in other countries as long as the outcomes go to the most needy and the least-developed countries. At the end of the day, that is what we are trying to do with our international development effort.
As many Members have said, it is important to concentrate on our core goals and the SDGs. In Committee, the Minister was explicit in saying he did not believe we needed more legislation. The International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Act 2015 already enshrines in legislation the need to focus on poverty reduction and the SDGs, and they are already enshrined in DFID’s own principles and processes, so I do not believe that we need to have yet more primary legislation.
On the limits referred to in relation to some of the amendments, we have to remember this is effectively an enabling Bill, which is why it is so short. It is not an immediate call to spend. It is not a case of saying, “Here’s £6 billion tomorrow and then we’re going to raise it further the day after.” The Bill simply seeks to bring the CDC in line with other organisations that have similar requests of Departments. In Committee, the Minister said that any requests for money would have to be subject to DFID’s strategy and have to have a robust business plan that was considered fully before any money was handed over. That can easily be done on a departmental level. I totally agree with my colleague and Chair of the International Development Committee, the hon. Member for Liverpool, West Derby (Stephen Twigg). As a new Member, I look forward to being able to scrutinise the work of CDC.
I note that the CDC has changed. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Richard Fuller) that some amendments address problems that may not occur or rehearse old problems from before 2010 when the then Secretary of State reorganised the CDC. I do not support amendments on problems that may or may not happen, or have happened in the past but have been largely sorted out. The CDC has moved from pre-2010 looking at low impact, high return investment programmes, to a far more proactive viewpoint to ensure we take into account the SDGs and poverty reduction. I will be scrutinising that along with my colleague the Chair of the Select Committee, but I will not be supporting the amendments, for the reasons I have set out. This can best be done at Department and Committee level through post and pre-decision scrutiny. In conclusion, I look forward to the Bill becoming an Act.
Stephen Doughty
I rise to speak in favour of new clause 7 and the other new clauses and amendments in my name and those of my right hon. and hon. Friends.
It is fantastic to see so great a consensus in the room around the 0.7% aid target and Britain’s role in international development—in contrast, perhaps, to the shriller debate in the media in recent weeks. It might surprise those hon. Members who have criticised my amendments that there is actually much agreement around the role of CDC; I believe it has a vital role to play—I made this clear in Committee, as I am sure the Minister would acknowledge—in the wider portfolio of our international development effort and in the spending of our official development assistance.
I would like to thank my fellow Co-operative party MPs and the shadow Front-Bench team, as well as other Members from across the House, for adding their names to many of my amendments. It shows the level of very reasonable concern around the many unanswered questions concerning the priorities and operations of CDC. Those questions need to be addressed before we can countenance such a large increase in the official development assistance resources it receives from DFID. I am not suggesting that CDC should not get any more resources—it has reached the cap of £1.5 billion set in 1999 and clearly needs some increase and headroom to expand its activities—but it is worth recognising that it has coped well by recycling resources within itself, partly thanks to some of the investment successes it has enjoyed.
Richard Fuller
Is not the level of investment now consistent with this increase? For CDC’s current level of activity to be maintained, it requires this level of increase, so cannot concerns about too rapid growth perhaps be overstated?
Stephen Doughty
I do not believe that that case has been made; there has been no justification at any point for the actual figures. To maintain CDC at its current level of activity, we need to realise that it has managed perfectly well with £1.5 billion since 1999 and has recycled it within its own budgets. If it was going up by £1.5 billion or £2 billion, I could understand it with a view to creating space for the next 10 years, but £6 billion and £12 billion seem to me to be well out of the appropriate range.
Wendy Morton
From my understanding of the Bill and on the basis of evidence given in Committee, I would like to read the quote that
“no money will go to CDC until a full business case is written in huge detail, which will be prepared in the summer of 2017.”––[Official Report, Commonwealth Development Corporation Public Bill Committee, 6 December 2016; c. 9.]
The suggestion that we are going to give a huge chunk of money to CDC straight away is perhaps creating an unfair impression.
Stephen Doughty
Clearly, the hon. Lady did not listen to what I was saying. I did not say that. I said that the Minister had acknowledged that it was not going to be spent in one year, which was the fear when this was initially proposed. What we are asking for in the amendments is just that clear business case. I hope that the Minister—he was nodding earlier—will be able to set out how that process and scrutiny of it will occur, which is only right. There was only limited scrutiny of the last amounts spent, which were quite significant.
Mr Gareth Thomas (Harrow West) (Lab/Co-op)
What my hon. Friend describes is, in civil service language, the ghastly phrase “absorptive capacity”. He will know that, unfortunately, the Department for International Development has allocated some funding into various World Bank trust funds that have not been fully spent with the originally envisaged timescale, suggesting that the Department is beginning to struggle to find suitable sources that can absorb its money as it wants. My hon. Friend is, in my view, right to worry aloud that this is a huge increase in money without any proven capacity to spend it.
Stephen Doughty
Indeed. My hon. Friend, one of the longest-serving Ministers at DFID, knows this only too well. He makes a very important point. I have spoken to other experts in the sector who suggest that to absorb that amount, even a doubling would be a struggle, so it certainly applies to the levels we are seeing. That is why it would be much more helpful if the Minister were clear about the schedule for this spending. What is his idea of the number of years over which this increase would be spent before we might require another Act to increase it even further?
We tabled some crucial amendments, as did SNP Members, in new clauses 3, 4 and 6 and my own new clause 9, emphasising the importance of focusing on the poorest, least developed and low-income countries and of ensuring that we remain coherent with the sustainable development goals—the global goals agreed by the UN—and focused on poverty eradication rather than other priorities.
Mr Ivan Lewis (Bury South) (Lab)
My hon. Friend is making an excellent case. Has not DFID led the world on the importance of aid transparency and a focus on poverty reduction? The problem at the heart of these proposals is that there is very little prospect of transparency of how these resources are spent. Equally, there is very little ability for the Government to guarantee that the resources will be deployed and focused on poverty reduction. Is that not a matter of major concern?
Stephen Doughty
I think it is, and that gets to the point. A lot of information is provided by CDC online, and it is important to acknowledge that much of it is helpful. We can get into individual projects and see the particular spending on those individual projects. However, it is not the same when it comes to the level of spending, which is what the NAO was looking at. It is important to be able to prove prospective development impact and show where it is going.
To take just one example, the NAO looked at the issue of funding going into the health sector in India, and tried to get clear information about where the money was being spent in a particular hospital group. It looked at whether it was going to the poorest or to middle-income patients. The NAO told us in its evidence that it was going to middle-income patients, which does not strike me as a correct use of CDC’s money. That is not to say that the investment is not good in and of itself—I am sure that enabling access to hospital for people in general is a good thing. The question is whether we should be spending our aid money on that. Surely we should be focusing on the poorest.
When we examine the figures in depth—they can be found in a House of Commons Library research paper—we see that although the proportion of CDC’s investments in the least developed countries has increased, it is still significantly lower than the proportion of its investments in middle-income countries. As for spending in individual countries, it is a fact that in India most of CDC’s money is being spent in what are known to be the richest states. The highest proportion of its investments goes to Maharashtra, which is where Mumbai is located. I am not saying that the individual investments there are not good, effective or useful; I am saying that it is a question of priorities. In Committee, it was helpful to hear the Minister speak of the possibility of a cap or restriction on funds that go to India and elsewhere in south Asia rather than to Africa. Giving evidence to the Committee, Professor Paul Collier said that he shared the concern that had been expressed about whether CDC was focusing enough resources on the poorest countries. New clause 9, for instance, relates to those issues.
The wider issue of spending routes that is raised in both the SNP’s amendment 3 and our new clause 10 is crucial. We are not suggesting that CDC should not be given more money, or that it should not have a chance to expand its operations and the autonomy that it enjoys, but we believe that those elements should be in proportion to other forms of official development assistance. It is important that we introduce safeguards. By 2019-20, 6% of United Kingdom official development assistance will be spent by other Government Departments. Money goes into the prosperity fund and other Government funds, and there is often far less scrutiny and oversight than there is in DFID. That worries me, and I know that it worries other Members on both sides of the House.
We need to achieve a fair balance. CDC has its role to play in the portfolio, but that must be proportionate to other ways in which we can spend the money. We must ensure that we are pulling all the levers of development, rather than just one at the expense of others. For that reason, I am inclined to support amendment 3 if it is pressed to a vote.
I want to say something about tax havens, although I shall not do so at length, because we discussed the issue a great deal in Committee and we have also discussed it today. I find it surprising—this relates to new clauses 1 and 8—that CDC continues to use tax havens such as the Cayman islands and Mauritius. A fair point has been made about the importance of stable financial arrangements for investments. In some countries it is clearly not possible to set up arrangements within the legal structures of those countries to ensure that the right fiduciary controls are in place. However, I do not understand why we are not setting up such vehicles in England and Wales, or in other jurisdictions. Why are so many of them in the Cayman islands and Mauritius?
Moreover—I have asked parliamentary questions about this—we are paying management fees to financial services organisations, in the Cayman islands and elsewhere, that also support the far less transparent activities of other corporations and individuals. I find it deeply worrying that, whether or not there is anything untoward about an individual CDC investment, we may be indirectly supporting the flourishing of the tax avoidance and evasion that exists in overseas territories.
Mr Gareth Thomas
Is my hon. Friend aware of comments made by the Secretary of State when she was a Treasury Minister about tax evasion and the need to limit the use of tax havens? Why does the Treasury seem to be concerned about the issue, and why is DFID suddenly not concerned about it? One would have thought that, when it came to such a crucial issue, there would be joined-up government.
Stephen Doughty
That was also a great surprise to me. I referred earlier to the letter that the Secretary of State sent to many of the other DFID contractors on 16 December. That letter was very clear about tax avoidance measures and tax havens. It contained a series of criteria, most of which I think are very reasonable, and which we should expect to be observed by organisations that are benefiting from our aid spending. My question is this: why are those criteria not being applied to CDC? The Secretary of State repeatedly refused to confirm that they would be. There seems to be one rule for one organisation and a different rule for others.
Eurodad research found that 118 out of 157 fund investments made by CDC went through jurisdictions that feature in the top 20 of the Tax Justice Network’s Financial Secrecy Index. That does not seem to me to be coherent with the other statements that are being made by the Government. Indeed, the will of the House has been shown by cross-party support for amendments to other Bills that would crack down on tax avoidance and evasion.
Lastly, I want to return to the issue of coherence, and I urge colleagues to support new clause 7. The hon. Member for Bedford (Richard Fuller) referred to this as some sort of laundry list and suggested I was creating hypothetical straw men that did not actually exist and was dealing with things that have happened in the past. That is not the case; I am talking about things that are happening now. It is a fact that, as data revealed to me since the Committee stage in parliamentary questions show, in 2015 alone CDC invested £56.9 million in private fee-paying education and £117.9 million in private fee-paying healthcare.
Tommy Sheppard (Edinburgh East) (SNP)
I shall speak in support of a number of the measures on the amendment paper, but first I want to make a couple of comments about the political context in which this debate is taking place. I turned on the television over the weekend to see on the tickertape at the bottom of the news channel screen the information that our Government had stopped funding a girl band in Africa. I was shocked by this—I did not realise we were funding girl bands or bands of any other kind in Africa or elsewhere—so I thought I would look into the matter a little more. Of course, on doing so, I discovered that that was not the story at all.
The story was loosely based on a project in Ethiopia called Girl Effect, which is a huge programme that is aimed at empowering young women throughout that country. It has 500 direct participants and more than 10,000 participants online, and it operates from 8,000 schools throughout the country. It is designed to use music and performing arts to give young women in that country confidence so that they can take part in Ethiopian political and social life. It is undeniably a good thing. It was set up by DFID in 2011, and every time that DFID has reviewed it, it has been given an A* rating. It is exactly the type of project that we should be supporting, but it is unusual and unconventional. It is not the same as handing out food to people who are starving, so the case needs to be made for it. We also need to be aware of how these things can be caricatured and used to argue against the provisions that we are talking about today.
That entire Girl Effect project was described in the Daily Mail as the British Government funding the equivalent of the Spice Girls. The implication was quite clear: millions of pounds of our taxpayers’ money was being used not to feed the poor, the starving or the illiterate, but to fund five young women and turn them into rich pop stars. That was not true. The reporting was a good example of what we might call fake news—I believe that that is the term used these days. It was connected to reality by the thinnest threads of truth, yet for many people reading the Daily Mail and the other papers that took up the story, or looking at the tickertape along the bottom of their screen, it created the impression that they were given.
Lots of people, including some in this Chamber who ran to the press to comment on that story, will use these caricatures to denigrate and oppose any foreign aid activity by this country. They use the ridiculous argument that we should be spending money at home before we spend it abroad, as though the poverty and inequality in this country, which we must tackle, was on a par with the hell in sub-Saharan Africa, where poverty, oppression and the daily grind are the normal way of existence for the mass of people in those countries. Knowing that those caricatures exist and that we need to be careful about how we present these arguments brings me to the new clauses and amendments before us today.
Andrew Bridgen (North West Leicestershire) (Con)
The hon. Gentleman makes a good case, but considering that a third of all Ethiopian girls do not go to school, would it not be better for female empowerment if the money were spent on giving them an education? Would that not be more empowering than promoting a pop group?
Tommy Sheppard
I do not want to have a big discussion about the project, but I will respond by saying that we should do both. Of course we should also try to put money into formal education, but the importance of that project was that it understood that digital communication was a much more effective way of reaching young people in Ethiopia than the bricks and mortar of a formal educational establishment. It also understood that music and lyrics can sometimes be better than formal texts at getting through to people, educating them and inspiring them with big ideas. That is true in this country as well. Those things have contributed to the social education of young women in Ethiopia. As I said, the Department for International Development itself said that the project was worth supporting.
The important point in all these debates is that we can win public support for foreign aid and rally the public behind the 0.7% contribution, provided that we are transparent about what we are doing, and that we demonstrate at every turn that the people who are getting the money are those who really need it. It is therefore important that those criteria are demonstrated through the work of CDC Group and others, and that evidence is produced.
I am not sure which amendments and new clauses will be pressed to a Division, but I will vote for whichever ones are, because they would all strengthen the Bill. In my 20 months in this Chamber, this is the first time that I have seen a Bill come back on Report without a single Government amendment. I find that surprising. I know that the Bill is concise and brief, but given the concerns that were expressed on Second Reading about the work of CDC Group, I would have thought that the Bill could have been tightened up a little. I hope that the Government will consider supporting some of the new clauses and amendments because they would make the Bill more efficacious in achieving its objectives.
New clause 6 states that before CDC Group gets a major uplift in funding, the case will have to be made that it is meeting the sustainable development goals and tackling poverty and inequality in the country in which the money is deployed. Let me put it another way. If a project was not tackling poverty or combating inequality, and not contributing to achieving the sustainable development goals, why on earth should we fund it? When it comes to prioritising when money is tight, we have to make sure that it is spent on what it is supposed to be spent on.
On Second Reading we discussed some of the—shall we say?—past mistakes in a number of CDC’s decisions. We talked about the shopping malls, luxury hotels and other inappropriate projects in which CDC Group invested, and we were assured—by the Minister of State, I think—that those things were in the past, that we had learned from them and that they would not be repeated in the future. Well, if that is the case, what is the difficulty in building such a provision into the Bill so that when CDC gets a budget uplift, it will have an obligation to demonstrate that what that uplift is spent on will contribute to meeting these goals and fulfilling these criteria? That is self-evidently a way of ensuring that we do not rely on hope by instead writing down what, as a matter of policy, we want.
Amendments 3 and 4, to which I have put my name, would link an uplift in CDC Group’s funds to the overall ODA budget. It is important to look at doing that; the formula that has been suggested is not onerous and is perfectly achievable. There is an idea abroad that what might be happening is the outsourcing or privatisation of our foreign aid activity, and that pre-eminence is given to a market approach. We will have problems if that impression is not countered, because the truth of the matter is that there is a role for spending public money to try to support the creation of a small business sector in developing countries, to invest in such sectors and to create jobs, but let us not kid ourselves. The vast bulk of our priority aid should be directed at people who need it in order to combat the malnutrition, illiteracy, poverty and starvation that are present throughout such countries. That cannot be done by setting up a small business; it needs to be done through direct state and NGO intervention. That is why we should make it clear that the vast bulk of our foreign aid effort will remain in that sphere.
Although CDC Group and the market have a contribution to make, particularly in countries that are some stages along the process of development, that will not be the primary way in which we do things. I commend amendments 3 and 4 to the House because if we were to agree to them, we would strengthen the Bill and demonstrate to people what our intentions really are: to ensure that the hard-earned taxes that they pay—people politically agree that a small slice should be deployed for foreign aid—are spent doing the things that they want to be done. Those things are combating poverty and inequality in the developing world, and making sure that we get to a more equal world society, which of course is in our long-term interest, too.
Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)
I am particularly pleased to follow the hon. Member for Edinburgh East (Tommy Sheppard). I am speaking today because of concerns brought to me by constituents, and only concerns brought to me by constituents. No NGOs have lobbied me. Constituents contacted me before Second Reading to express concern that, if the Bill were passed, we would run the real risk of aid money being spent inappropriately, and of our commitment to aid, of which we can all be proud, being undermined. I return to that concern, which I raised on Second Reading, and to what for me and my constituents are the core issues: directing the money to where it is needed most; scrutiny; and transparency.
On Second Reading, I quoted the recent NAO report on CDC. I know that has already been quoted today, but it bears listening to again. The report concluded:
“It remains a significant challenge for CDC to demonstrate its ultimate objective of creating jobs and making a lasting difference to people’s lives in some of the world’s poorest places. Given the Department’s plans to invest further in CDC, a clearer picture of actual development impact would help to demonstrate…value for money”.
We are not getting the actual development impact promised. We cannot see what the development proposals are for the future; we are being asked to trust. Perhaps the Lords will see that, but we cannot.
The Minister of State, Department for International Development (Rory Stewart)
I begin by thanking right hon. and hon. Members. This has been a very instructive process. The new clauses and amendments tabled reflect what was a really good Bill Committee stage. The Government have huge respect for the intelligence, focus and precision of these amendments, and we hope that Members will see that all the concerns that have been expressed are going to be addressed through the strategy that is produced.
Before I address the new clauses and amendments in turn, I pay tribute very strongly to the Members on both sides of the House who have demonstrated their support for international development. I pay particular tribute to the hon. Member for Edinburgh East (Tommy Sheppard), who gave an extremely powerful speech in support of international development and about the importance of standing up and having the courage to defend complex and innovative projects.
Mr Gareth Thomas
At the outset of his remarks, will the Minister explain why the legislation has preceded the strategy?
Rory Stewart
I shall deal with that when discussing the second set of amendments, which relate to that directly, but first I want to continue to pay tribute to other Members of Parliament, from both sides of the House, for their support for CDC. I was struck by the support of the hon. Member for Liverpool, West Derby (Stephen Twigg) for the Virunga project in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by the in-principle support of the hon. Member for Glasgow North (Patrick Grady), and particularly by the phrase produced by the hon. Member for Edmonton (Kate Osamor) that is absolutely right in guiding us as we go forward: we need to get the right balance between long-term investment and short-term need.
I should just recapitulate the extraordinary work that CDC has done and echo the thanks of the hon. Member for Bedford (Richard Fuller). It has been a really tough time. As Members of Parliament, we are used to being under full public scrutiny and attack. CDC works very hard and has delivered some high-quality projects, and this has been a very tough period for it.
Three types of amendments have been tabled. The first set basically says yes, we should be giving money to CDC, but we should be giving slightly less money to CDC; the second set says that there should be restrictions on the Government’s ability to give money to CDC; and the third set would restrict what CDC itself can do with the money. Essentially, the Government’s position is that these are all good points, but they are better dealt with through the governance mechanisms and the strategy than through statutory, primary legislation.
I shall deal first with amendments 1 to 5 and new clause 10, which essentially say yes, we should give money to CDC, but we should give less money to CDC. Why do we disagree with what was essentially the argument put forward by the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty)? First, because, with respect, I still believe that the hon. Member for Glasgow North is confusing the stock and the flow. The fact is that the money put into CDC will be recycled. For the sake of argument, if an investment was 10 to 12 years in length and CDC had $12 billion in the pot, it would be in a position to maintain the current rate of investment of around $1 billion a year—the money would come back and go bounce again at around $1 billion a year. It is not fair to compare what happens in a capital stock used for equity debt investment with the annual expenditure of a Department.
Secondly, there is the question of demand, which the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth referred to. The demand is almost limitless. It is calculated that $2.5 trillion is going to be required annually by 2030 to meet the sustainable development goals, which is why the relevant question is not the demand for the money but the question of the absorptive capacity, which the hon. Gentleman raised.
Thirdly, the Bill is enabling legislation that sets a ceiling—a maximum limit; it is not saying, “This is the amount of money we are going to give.” Fourthly, the design is for the money to go into patient, long-term investment. The three-year review proposed in one of the amendments simply will not work for investments that are intended to be, on average, 10 years in length.
Mr Ivan Lewis
If the Bill is passed and its consequences are added to the fact that more than 25% of DFID’s spending currently goes through other Government Departments, the result will be that more than 50% of our aid will no longer be spent through DFID. Does it not raise serious questions about the Government’s intentions for DFID to remain as a stand-alone Department with a place at the Cabinet table if more than 50% of its spending will be spent by CDC and other Departments? No other Government Department would come to the House and ask for more than 50% of its resources to be spent via other means.
Rory Stewart
There are two distinct points there: DFID’s spending and the proportion of the spending. The first thing to understand is that CDC is 100% owned by the Department for International Development, which is one reason why a number of these amendments are not appropriate. On the proportion of money spent, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Richard Fuller) eloquently pointed out, the small increase that we are talking about in terms of the annual amount that CDC will be able to invest will still be much smaller than comparable organisations in Holland, Germany and France. It will be about a third of the amount that the Overseas Private Investment Corporation can invest—OPIC is just one of the US’s development finance institutions that is able to invest—and only about a sixth of what the International Finance Corporation puts out a year. We are not talking—comparatively, globally—about a large amount of money. We are talking about something in the region of 8% at maximum—even if we hit the maximum of official development assistance—and the other 92% will continue to go in the normal way through non-governmental organisations and organisations such as UNICEF for the objectives that we pursue.
Stephen Doughty
It would be helpful if the Minister clarified the time period over which this increase, if it was granted, would be played out with CDC. The explanatory notes to the Bill say very clearly that the £6 billion is intended to be used in this spending review to accelerate CDC’s growth. Is that his view, and what about the £12 billion? Is that spread over a 10-year period, a 20-year period or a five-year period? Can he give us a ballpark figure?
Rory Stewart
Let me clarify this. The £6 billion represents an additional £4.5 billion, because CDC already has £1.5 billion. We anticipate that that would cover the next five-year period to enable CDC, at maximum—we do not expect it to draw down the maximum amount—to be able to make the kinds of levels of investment that it made last year. The next £6 billion—it is not an additional £12 billion, but an additional £6 billion—would apply to the next five-year period. We are looking at a steady state allocation, which might, at maximum, allow CDC to meet the kind of expenditure levels that it gets next year.
Let me move on now to new clauses 2, 5 and 6 and amendment 6. Essentially, these are a series of measures that restrict the power of the Government to give money to CDC. They do that either by saying that they should not be able to boost the amount of money that CDC has through delegated legislation, or through asking for a strategy to be put in place before the money is disbursed. Again, these measures are not appropriate. The role of Parliament as specified for CDC in the Overseas Resources Development Act 1948 and the Commonwealth Development Corporation Act 1999 quite correctly relates to two things: the setting up of this body and the creation of a cap on the amount of money that this body is given.
However, it is not normal for Parliament to get involved in the detailed implementation of specialist business cases. That is true in everything that the legislature does in its relationship to the Executive. The money allocated to our Department in general through the Budget, which this House votes on, is then delegated to civil servants and to the Government to determine how it is spent. The same will be true here, but the strategy that will come forward will reflect very closely the arguments that have been made at the Committee stage and on Report. We will continue to remain in very close touch with Members of Parliament, and we will be judged by our ability to deliver, through that strategy, something that will address those concerns—above all, through the development impact grid and the development impact assessments on the individual business cases, which will address these particular issues.
Mr Gareth Thomas
Will the Minister specifically comment on the use of tax havens by CDC, and will he and other Ministers in his Department echo previous statements by the Secretary of State and instruct CDC to desist from using tax havens for future investments?
Rory Stewart
That is an invitation to move on to the last group of amendments, which comprises new clauses 8, 9, 3 and 7, one of which relates to the issue of offshore financial centres. These are restrictions on what CDC itself can do. There is a suggestion that there should be an annual obligation on ICAI to produce reports on CDC. Then there are restrictions on the routes through which CDC can put its money, and there are attempts through the new clauses to restrict the sectors and the countries in which CDC can invest. Let me take them in turn.
On ICAI, we are very open to scrutiny. The CDC has been scrutinised by the International Development Committee, the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee. We expect it to be scrutinised in that way and to be scrutinised by ICAI. We welcome scrutiny from ICAI. However, we do not think it is for the Government to impose obligations on an independent regulator. It should be for ICAI to determine its priorities and where it thinks the problems are, and to be able to apply its scrutiny accordingly. It may determine that an annual scrutiny of 10-year investments does not make sense and decide to do it more frequently, but that should be for ICAI, not for statutory legislation of this House.
Rory Stewart
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Third time.
I would like to begin by reiterating my thanks and the tribute we owe to right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House for their shared belief in the importance of international development. At the absolute core of the Bill is our moral obligation to some of the very poorest and most vulnerable people in the world. I pay tribute to right hon. and hon. Members for the important points raised, which will be reflected in the new strategy as it comes forward.
I will briefly lay out once more why believe that this is a good Bill. At its core is our understanding that there is extreme poverty and suffering in the world and that economic development will play an important part in addressing it. There is enormous demand in the poorest countries of the world for well-paid jobs. It is one of the first things that any of us discover when we go to Africa and other developing regions. As the Chairman of the International Development Committee, the hon. Member for Halton (Derek Twigg) said, 90% of the growth and employment in the poorest countries of the world is currently driven by the private sector. As he also said, Africa requires 15 million more jobs a year. Every one of those well-paid jobs is an opportunity for a family to deliver the stuff we all care about—for parents to provide education for their children and the healthcare their families need. Above all, it is through the revenue these jobs generate for Governments that a long-term sustainable future can be maintained. That is what allows a Government to pay for their education and healthcare systems and, if there is an earthquake or some other natural disaster, to access the resources to address it. In the end, the only long-term sustainable path is through the generation of that economic development and growth.
Why CDC? We have chosen CDC because it brings together two important things: on the one hand, the rigour of the private sector and its ability to work out whether investments make sense—are there genuine markets for these goods; can these jobs really be sustained? —and, on the other hand, the values of the public sector. The latter are what ensure we go into the hardest countries in the world—for example, that we do renewable energy in Burundi or the Central African Republic or get into Sierra Leone when Ebola happens—and, above all, ensure that investments are not about short-term commercial returns but are patient, long-term investments of the kind that the commercial sector will often not deliver.
Why CDC? Well, having been established in 1948, it is the longest-serving, as well as the best, development finance institution in the world. It proved it in the 1960s, through its investments in Kenya, and, much more recently, since 2012, with its fantastic reforms, which we have talked about at all stages of the Bill, on salaries, transparency, offshore financial centres, the geography of investments and the sectors in which we invest, all of which is summed up in the development impact grid. That is what answers a lot of the points made in the discussion today, and that is what allows us to make sure that every investment focuses on the areas that generate the most jobs and on the countries where investment is most difficult, where the least capital is available and where GDP per capita is lowest.
We can see this in the real world: in the 17 million indirect jobs created by CDC; in its investments in places such as Burundi and the Central African Republic; in the hydroelectric investment in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo—not an easy place to invest in—which the Chairman of the International Development Committee referred to; and, actually, in the Globeleq investment, where CDC’s investment will help to generate 5,000 MW of power in Africa over the next decade. To put the latter in context, Africa managed only 6,000 MW over the previous decade, so that is almost the entire generation of Africa over the previous decade being driven by a single company supported by CDC. Moreover, there is value for money for the taxpayer because the money is recycled, and the need is absolutely there, as we can see from the fact that we need $2.5 trillion of investment by 2030.
In conclusion, our Department will do many other things besides CDC. Much of the money will continue to flow through NGOs such as Save the Children, CARE and Oxfam. Many of our investments will be with valued partners such as UNICEF. More than 90% of the money we will spend through overseas development assistance will continue to go to health, education and humanitarian assistance. Within that, not all the money in economic development will go through CDC. It will also go through our investments that will take place through support to Governments and technical assistance. However, that CDC investment, combining the rigour of the private sector, the focus on markets and the values of the public sector, reflects the values of the British public who care about poverty and show in their own philanthropic giving how much they care about some of the most vulnerable people in the world. We are showing our respect for the British people by pushing forward with a proven model that will provide the sustainable growth required to address some of the most vulnerable and poorest people in the world. This is our moral obligation.
Imran Hussain (Bradford East) (Lab)
I associate myself with the Minister’s comments in thanking right hon. and hon. Members of all parties who have participated in what I believe has been a very constructive debate—irrespective of whether the amendments and new clauses have been accepted. What they set out has been utilised in the best possible way, as hon. Members have used them to raise some very important points. I offer my thanks, too, to all the non-governmental organisations that supported us throughout the process, to those who came before us in Committee to present written and oral evidence and to staff in the Public Bill Office, whose assistance has been invaluable, as always.
I would like to thank my hon. Friends who have spoken with great concern and passion about the Bill, and I particularly mention my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), whose experience in the Department for International Development is widely respected and was visibly expressed in today’s debate. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Wirral South (Alison McGovern), who is no longer in her place, who also served outstandingly in Public Bill Committee. I do not want my hon. Friends’ valuable contributions to go unnoticed, and I include that of my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, West Derby (Stephen Twigg), the Chair of the International Development Committee, who always makes a passionate case and has an informed stance on the matters in hand.
Let me be clear that in today’s constructive debate no Member has opposed the principle or spirit of the CDC itself, and no one has criticised its role and mission statement. All Members, particularly Opposition Members, have made the point time and again that we must not lose sight of the CDC’s sole or founding principle, which is poverty alleviation. We have all accepted that, and we have had constructive debates in Committee and on Report. The amendments and new clauses that were tabled have had some support from across the House. Some were tabled as probing amendments, but some were amendments intended to strengthen the Bill.
Throughout the Bill’s passage, we outlined a number of concerns that we held over its provisions, including on the accountability and scrutiny of the investments made by the CDC, on the need of the CDC to focus its investments on efforts to alleviate poverty and on the necessity of a business case from the CDC. These concerns have been fundamental to our position on the Bill, and they are concerns about which we have sought strong assurances from the Government.
On accountability and scrutiny, we had concerns, as illustrated in our amendments, over the fact that the CDC’s investments are not independently assessed on a frequent and regular basis. The absence of such assessments undermines the credibility of the CDC and its investments, and it weakens public confidence that taxpayers’ money, through DFID, is being spent by the CDC on efforts to alleviate poverty and help the poorest in the world. It is vital for every pound, every penny, of development to be directed towards that goal, and strong, independent scrutiny of the development impact of the investments would assure us of that.
We have heard assurances from the Minister today and in Committee that he would welcome further independent assessment by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact. I feel that he has listened, and I am grateful to him for that. We have also been assured that the annual reports and accounts provided by the CDC contain ample information, and that the CDC will be held to account for any discrepancies by either the Public Accounts Committee or the International Development Committee. I am sure that they will make any such discrepancy the subject of inquiries, as they have in the past.
As I have said, it is vital for us to ensure that the CDC’s investments focus on the alleviation of poverty, which is DFID’s legal aim and purpose. Given past investments involving the construction of luxury hotels and shopping centres in well-developed areas, Labour Members were concerned about the possibility that the CDC would use its additional finance to return to such activity. However, the National Audit Office report, which was published just before the debate on Second Reading, makes it clear that that is no longer the case, following the important reforms set in motion by the right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell), who is not in the Chamber today.
The Minister has been kind enough to provide assurances in response to some of the concerns that have been expressed today, so we will not oppose the Bill’s Third Reading.
Jeremy Lefroy
Whether people live in the United Kingdom, Tanzania or Colombia, the most important route out of poverty is a good job or a good livelihood, and that is why I fundamentally support the work of the CDC. It has done excellent work throughout the world for nearly 70 years, and in recent years it has concentrated on the most needy countries, where there is the highest level of unemployment or the highest level of poverty. I welcome the fact that the Government are to invest more through the CDC in the coming years.
However, I think that today’s debate, and our debates in Committee and on other occasions, have made it clear that the CDC must be careful. It must invest in areas in which commercial investors would not normally invest; otherwise, it should be the commercial sector that invests in them. The CDC must invest in the areas that create the greatest number of jobs in return for the investment made. That will often involve agriculture, and it will often involve difficult investments, because it is not easy to invest in agriculture in remote areas. However, that is what the CDC is there for: it is not there for an easy life. I know that—given the management that it has had recently, and given the calibre of its staff—it is up to those challenges, and I welcome the Bill.
Patrick Grady
My I add my thanks to all the stakeholders and staff who have contributed to the Bill process? This is the first piece of legislation on which I have worked as an SNP spokesperson, so I am particularly grateful to the Clerk of Bills for his advice, to my staff and the SNP research team, and to the various non-governmental organisations that have provided input. I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Edinburgh East (Tommy Sheppard), for Coatbridge, Chryston and Bellshill (Philip Boswell) and for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Alan Brown) for their contributions during the Bill’s various stages. I also recognise the commitment and hard work of the CDC’s staff, and their positive engagement with the Opposition parties.
This is the first piece of DFID legislation in the current Parliament, but I wonder whether it will be the last. The Minister might be aware that I tabled a question to the Secretary of State about the applicability of the International Development (Reporting and Transparency) Act 2006 now that the millennium development goals it requires DFID to report on have been replaced by the sustainable development goals. The International Development Committee proposed a consolidating international development Act to bring together all the various pieces of legislation passed over recent years. Perhaps that is not such a bad idea, especially as the debate about the purpose of aid and development seems to be getting louder.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East said on Report, throughout the Christmas recess there seemed to be a drip-feed of very negative stories about aid spending, particularly in the gutter press. It is absolutely right that examples of waste and inefficiency are exposed and questions asked about value for money, but the answer is to improve transparency and efficiency, and to measure impact—especially over the longer term—and not simply to cut off the supply or take heavy-handed, but ultimately counter-productive, action.
The debate on the CDC Bill has catalysed a broader debate about the use and purpose of aid, and the Government can be assured in the coming months that the SNP will be happy to support the cross-party and public consensus on our moral duty to help people most in need around the world, and the symbolism and very real impact of meeting the 0.7% aid target. However, as we have just heard on Report, if the highest standards of transparency and effectiveness are to be demanded from DFID’s external stakeholders, they must equally be applied across Government and to their arm’s-length agencies, starting with the CDC in this Bill.
The Government did not accept amendments, but I join the Opposition Front-Bench team in welcoming the commitments the Government have given. We will, through the procedures of this House, hold them to account for those commitments. There is a consensus behind the need for continual improvement of the CDC, and we want to maintain that consensus.
The Government will see this legislation passed today—their majority in the House assures them of that—and it is unlikely, due to the nature of the Bill, that the House of Lords will have any opportunity to amend or delay its progress on to the statute book. So the Government are being given a significant responsibility today; they are asking for the power to quadruple the budget of an agency which has a long but chequered history. The CDC has had significant successes in its history, but significant concerns have been raised and remain. If its resource base is to be massively scaled up, so must be its accountability and the standards it is held to. I hope the Secretary of State and her Ministers will confirm that they are prepared for the CDC, the Department, and themselves as Ministers, to be held to those standards.
Sir Peter Bottomley (Worthing West) (Con)
I will say about three sentences.
It is both a moral and practical responsibility and an opportunity to aid other countries. Christian Aid was set up after the second world war to develop Europe, and its success over the next 20 years was fantastic. The same can apply to Africa and other parts of the world, and the CDC has the opportunity, through infrastructure and education, to achieve that.
We must reduce barriers and provide opportunities, and provide a welcome to other countries having the same aspirations and achievements we have had ourselves.
Stephen Doughty
I, too, want to place on record my thanks to the Clerk of Bills and all my colleagues on the Front and Back Benches who have taken part. We have heard excellent contributions from both sides of the House in what has been a very informative and useful process of scrutiny of this Bill through Second Reading, Committee and Report. Lords Amendments Time for conclusion of proceedings Nos. 24, 96, 134, 136 to 142, 159, 302, 305 and 307 90 minutes after the commencement of proceedings on consideration of Lords Amendments Nos. 1 to 23, 25 to 95, 97 to 133, 135, 143 to 158, 160 to 301, 303, 304 and 306 Three hours after the commencement of those proceedings
I was pleased to hear the Minister setting out a little more detail on the period over which we can expect the CDC to be drawing down moneys. His suggestion that it will be a five and 10-year period in two tranches is much more reassuring than some of the earlier suggestions. There will, however, be a temptation to draw that down at a faster rate because of changes in reporting how our aid is calculated and what proportion the CDC counts towards that. So while I take what the Minister said with great sincerity, I urge him to caution against those who would suggest dumping money, as it were, into the CDC as a way of artificially meeting the 0.7% target. He should only go there with a clear plan and business case, and a clear understanding of how that is going to contribute towards poverty eradication.
I am concerned that we are still not going far enough on tax havens. I listened to what the Minister said and will look with interest at that strategy and what practical steps are taken to see us moving resources out of those jurisdictions, and the secondary effects we can have there.
I wholeheartedly agree with the hon. Member for Stafford (Jeremy Lefroy) about the role that the CDC should play. It should not go for an easy life by going where commercial resources already go. There was some suggestion in the debate that we were almost the only source of funding for many of these investments, but that is patently not the case. In our development spending overall, and certainly in the case of the CDC, we ought to be acting as a catalyst for the very best in poverty eradication, for placing the very best focus on difficult sectors, areas and countries where others will not go, and for achieving the highest standards in sustainability and human rights. We ought to be acting as a catalyst in the world, not just going for an easy return and an easy life.
There is something that I still do not quite understand, and I hope that Ministers will reflect on this. The Secretary of State set out some good principles in her letter of 16 December on transparency, on open-book breakdowns of salaries, tenders and material costs, on due diligence in supply chains, on tax status and compliance, and on disclosures of conflicts of interest. I do not see why those principles cannot be applied equally to the CDC, just as they will be applied to other spenders of our aid spending. I urge Ministers to look carefully at this again. That is a reasonable set of requirements and it would be helpful if they could be applied to the CDC.
On the question of the countries that the CDC focuses on, there has been a shift. It is important to recognise that the CDC is investing more in the poorest countries, but it needs to go much further. I urge Ministers not to have any poverty of ambition in setting the framework and parameters for the CDC, particularly in relation to future disbursements, to ensure that the money goes to the poorest countries and not to middle-income countries that can often draw down other sources of funding and finance.
It was reassuring to hear many positive voices today making the case for our wider role in international development and for our 0.7% aid target. Indeed, it was good to hear the Prime Minister the other day rejecting the more shrill views from some on her own Benches and from the likes of the Daily Mail that we should scrap the aid target and that we should not be spending any international development money at all. She rejected that. This is not a zero sum game. It is not only morally wrong for us to ignore gross poverty, instability and insecurity, as the Minister said; it also fundamentally goes against our national interest and security and global security and stability. Those are good reasons why, with reasonable scrutiny and with reasonable questions being asked about all areas of our development spending, we must maintain our wider commitment to the poorest people and countries in the world.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.
Policing and Crime Bill (Programme) (No. 3)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),
That the following provisions shall apply to the Policing and Crime Bill for the purpose of supplementing the Order of 7 March 2016 in the last Session of Parliament (Policing and Crime Bill (Programme)) and the Order of 26 April 2016 in the last Session of Parliament (Policing and Crime Bill (Programme) (No. 2)):
Consideration of Lords Amendments
(1) Proceedings on consideration of Lords Amendments shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion three hours after their commencement at today’s sitting.
(2) The proceedings shall be taken in the order shown in the first column of the following Table.
(3) The proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the times specified in the second column of the Table.
Subsequent stages
(4) Any further Message from the Lords may be considered forthwith without any Question being put.
(5) The proceedings on any further Message from the Lords shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour after their commencement.—(Mark Spencer.)
Question agreed to.
Policing and Crime Bill
Tuesday 10th January 2017
(7 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Commons Consideration of Lords Amendments as at 10 January 2017 - (10 Jan 2017)
18:38 - divided: - Ayes: 299 / Noes: 196 - Question accordingly agreed to.
18:55 - The House having divided: - Ayes: 297 / Noes: 202 - Question accordingly agreed to.
19:13 - The House having divided: - Ayes: 298 / Noes: 198 - Question accordingly agreed to.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
I must draw the House’s attention to the fact that financial privilege is engaged by Lords amendments 24, 96, 159 and 302. I also remind the House that certain of the motions relating to the Lords amendments will be certified as relating exclusively to England or to England and Wales, or to England and to England and Wales, as set out on the selection paper. If the House divides on any certified motion, a double or triple majority will be required for the motion to be passed.
After Clause 26
Inquiry into complaints alleging corrupt relationships between police and newspaper organisations
The Minister for Policing and the Fire Service (Brandon Lewis)
I beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 24.
Mr Deputy Speaker
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Lords amendment 96, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 134, Government motion to disagree, and Government amendment (a) in lieu.
Lords amendment 136 to 142, and Government motions to disagree.
Lords amendment 159, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 302, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 305, Government motion to disagree, and Government amendment (a) in lieu.
Lords amendment 307, and Government motion to disagree.
Brandon Lewis
This first group of amendments includes 10 new clauses added to the Bill in the House of Lords against the advice of the Government. It covers four separate issues: part 2 of the Leveson inquiry; the funding of legal representation for bereaved families at inquests where the police are an interested person; the maximum sentence for the offence of stalking involving fear of violence or serious alarm or distress; and the rights and entitlements of victims of crime.
Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)
The consultation closed 17 minutes ago. The truth of the matter is that the Government promised that there would be one inquiry with two parts. As far as I can see, the Minister is effectively saying—nudge, nudge; wink, wink—“We are not going to proceed with part 2.” If that is the case, he should be straightforward and tell us so now.
Brandon Lewis
With great respect, the hon. Gentleman should look at Hansard when it is published. That is not what I said at all. I made it very clear that we have been seeking the views of the public and interested parties and that we have to look at what is appropriate, proportionate and in the public interest.
The consultation sought views on whether proceeding with part 2 of the Leveson inquiry is still appropriate, proportionate and in the public interest. As the last of the relevant criminal cases has only recently concluded, the Government believe that this is an appropriate time to take stock and seek views on the various options, as the then Home Secretary outlined 18 months ago. Submissions to the consultation will be important in helping to inform the Government’s thinking.
As hon. Members may also be aware, an application has been made to judicially review the consultation. Although I cannot comment on the current legal proceedings, the Government have committed not to take any final decisions relating to the consultation until the legal proceedings have concluded. Given the consultation and the ongoing related legal proceedings, I respectfully suggest to the House that this is not an appropriate matter for further legislation at this moment.
Sir Gerald Howarth (Aldershot) (Con)
I hope the Government will not be intimidated by a campaign the press are waging at the moment to try to deter them from implementing the Leveson recommendations. May I just tell the Minister that yesterday I submitted my monthly article for the Aldershot News & Mail, as I had been invited to do—[Interruption.] May I say to hon. Members on both sides that it is normally very good reading? The article was about press freedom. I received an e-mail yesterday evening saying that the paper was sorry that it would not be publishing it because it was “contradictory” to its stance on “a free press”. It is extraordinary that the Aldershot News & Mail, owned by the Daily Mirror group, feels it is so vulnerable that it cannot accept an article by me—my hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Jayawardena) is the other contributor. Leaving aside my criticism of the Aldershot News & Mail, with which I was pretty robust this morning, may I say to the Minister that this illustrates a real paranoia in the media about this issue and it is our responsibility, as parliamentarians, to be straightforward and recognise that what we are seeking to do is to protect not ourselves but ordinary people?
Brandon Lewis
As always, my hon. Friend makes an important point. However, let me make it clear again that the Government will make a decision on this once we have had a chance to review the outcome of the consultation and in the light of the legal proceedings, and not before the legal proceedings have concluded.
Bill Wiggin (North Herefordshire) (Con)
But will it not be awkward for the Government if they completely ignore the Press Recognition Panel’s submission? After all, independently overseeing press regulation was what it was set up to do, and it is unequivocally calling for section 40 to be implemented.
Brandon Lewis
As I say, the Government will review the consultation, and I know the Secretary of State will look carefully at that. We are committed to not making decisions until the completion of the judicial proceedings. Hon. Members will also be aware that the Speaker has certified this amendment as engaging financial privilege. Our view is that amendment 24 is, at this time, unnecessary, inappropriate and ill-timed.
The Government fully understand the reasoning behind Lords amendment 96, which seeks to provide public funding for legal representation for bereaved families at inquests. It may be almost seven months since this House lasted debated this issue on Report, but the Government’s position has not changed. Our view remains that we should await the report, expected this spring, from Bishop James Jones on the experiences of the Hillsborough families. The Opposition have argued that this issue goes beyond Hillsborough. I do not dispute that, but the experiences of the Hillsborough families will have significant relevance for other families facing different tragic circumstances, and the issue of legal representation at inquests will undoubtedly be one aspect of those experiences. Bishop James’s report will provide learning that could be of general application, so it is entirely right that we do not now seek to pre-empt his review, but instead consider this issue in the light of his conclusions. For that reason, I put it to the House that this amendment is premature. As with the other Lords amendments we are debating, we must take into account the potential significant financial implications of amendment 96. Of course, the resource implications of the amendment are just one consideration, but it cannot be ignored, and, again, the Speaker has also certified the amendment as engaging financial privilege.
Finally, Lords amendments 136 to 142 seek to make further provision in respect of victims’ rights and entitlements. These amendments ignore the extensive reforms and modernisation we are undertaking to transform our justice system, and to protect vulnerable victims and witnesses, and, where appropriate, spare them the ordeal of appearing in court, through an increased use of video link systems and by rolling out pre-recorded cross-examination. The amendments would result in an unstructured framework of rights and entitlements that is not founded on evidence of gaps or deficiencies in what already exists, or even of what victims of crime want and need. Some amendments are unnecessary because they duplicate existing provisions and practices, or are being acted on by the Government already.
Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)
When will the Green Paper considering the need for a victims’ law, which was first mooted in February last year, actually be published?
Brandon Lewis
We are committed to introducing measures to strengthen further the rights of victims, and it is important that we have taken the time to get this right. We will announce our plans in due course. It is important to be clear that Lords amendments 138 and 139 are, therefore, similarly unnecessary, as the training of all staff in the criminal justice system is taken very seriously.
On Lords amendment 141, on quality standards, the Victims’ Commissioner’s role already encompasses encouraging good practice in the treatment of victims and witnesses, and the operation of the victims code, which is a detailed set of victims’ entitlements. In addition, police and crime commissioners, who commission local victims’ services, enter into grant funding agreements with the Secretary of State for Justice to receive the funds to do so. Those agreements set out a range of minimum standards for the services provided. We are currently reviewing existing standards relevant to victims’ services to make sure that we have the best possible framework in place.
The amendments, individually and taken together, are un-costed, vague and duplicative. They could impose significant obligations and financial burdens on the criminal justice system.
On Lords amendment 142, it is not clear what the purpose of directing a homicide review would be. In any case, it is unnecessary. There is already a statutory requirement for a review to identify the lessons to be learned from the death in domestic homicide cases.
Putting aside the many difficulties we have with the detail of the amendments, the Government are already looking at what is required to strengthen further the rights of victims of crime. We are looking at the available information about compliance with the victims code and considering how it might be improved and monitored. We are focused on making sure that we get this work right. We will ensure that any future reform proposals are evidence-based, fully costed, effective and proportionate.
As I have indicated, the intention behind many of the Lords amendments is laudable. On Lords amendment 134, we are persuaded that the case has been well made for increasing the maximum sentence for the more serious stalking and harassment offences involving fear of violence. I congratulate my hon. Friends on the work they have done on that.
As for the other Lords amendments, as a responsible Government we do not want to adopt a scattergun approach to legislation. Nor can we afford to be free and easy with taxpayers’ money by incurring substantial new spending commitments without offering any indication as to where the additional resources are to come from.
Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)
What are the Government going to do about strengthening protection for victims, particularly when they have to give evidence in court? Very often elderly people are frightened to go and confront the person they have accused.
Brandon Lewis
I noticed that the hon. Gentleman was trying to intervene before I made that comment. Hopefully he will be satisfied that we are looking to strengthen victims’ rights, but we want to do so in a proper, proportionate and appropriate way.
Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)
Taking at face value the criticisms that the Minister levels with regard to the provisions for victims of crime, can he tell the House why the Government have not introduced amendments in lieu, instead of just asking us to disagree with the Lords amendments? After all, strengthening victims’ rights was in the Conservative manifesto at the most recent election; how much longer do we have to wait?
Brandon Lewis
As I said just a few moments ago, we do want to look at strengthening victims’ rights, but we want to make sure that we do so in a correct, appropriate and proportionate way. I want to do that work, and in due course we will come forward with those proposals and ensure that we are doing it properly. Taking into account the work we are doing, Lords amendments 24, 96 and 136 to 142 are at best premature and at worst confused, unfocused and unnecessary. As such, we argue that they should be rejected by this House.
Lyn Brown (West Ham) (Lab)
Happy new year to you, Mr Deputy Speaker, and to the Minister.
We support Lords amendments 24, 96 and 136 to 142, along with consequential amendments 159, 302 and 307, and we will vote to retain them in the Bill. We also supported the original amendment 134, with consequential amendment 305. We are glad to see that the Government have changed their position, so we will not oppose their amendment in lieu of Lords amendment 134.
I thank those in the other place who have worked to bring these issues to our attention, particularly Baroness O’Neill and Baroness Brinton. I congratulate my noble Friends Lord Rosser and Baroness Royall, whose determination and outstanding advocacy for the most vulnerable in our society has led to the Government accepting our amendments to the stalking code. Each of the substantive issues before us is deserving of a full debate in its own right, but we have only a short amount of time. I will deal with each in turn.
Lords amendment 24—Lords amendment 159 is consequential to it—is a new clause that requires the Government to commission an independent inquiry into the way in which the police handle complaints relating to allegations of corruption between the police and newspaper organisations. It is commonly known as the Leveson 2 amendment, because it is similar in scope to the proposed second part of the Leveson inquiry. As was announced by Judge Leveson on 14 September 2011, this is a proposed examination into
“whether the police received corrupt payments or were otherwise complicit in misconduct”
and into any failure of the police and others properly to investigate allegations relating to News International and other news organisations. In 2012, the then Prime Minister, the right hon. David Cameron, said:
“When I set up this inquiry, I also said that there would be a second part to investigate wrongdoing in the press and the police, including the conduct of the first police investigation.—[Official Report, 29 November 2012; Vol. 554, c. 446.]
Yet the Government’s consultation, which ends today, as we have heard, could be seen as a weakening of that commitment. That underlines the need for the clarity that this amendment would provide.
Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)
Is not the Government’s position extremely sensible? A succession of criminal trials have looked into this matter. They have proceeded in a proper judicial way, and most of the information that we need is already available. To go on inquiring, inquiring and inquiring is merely adding to the already £50 million cost that there has been to the taxpayer.
Mr Rees-Mogg
The hon. Lady is promoting me. The Prime Minister is Prime Minister to the sovereign, not to me.
Lyn Brown
I have heard some specious arguments in this place.
I hope that the Lords amendment is acceptable to Government Members and the Minister. It is explicit that the inquiry should not begin until the Attorney General determines that it would not be prejudicial to any ongoing relevant criminal investigations or court cases. To oppose the amendment is therefore tantamount to admitting that the Government are no longer committed to an investigation into corruption between news organisations and the police, and that they are not prepared to investigate how allegations of corruption are dealt with. If the Government block Lords amendment 24 today, the public really can have no option but to draw the conclusion that this Government have no commitment to asking the important and hard questions of our national institutions.
I now turn to Lords amendment 96, with consequential amendment 302, which was proposed in the other place by Lord Rosser. The purpose of the amendment is to establish the principle of parity of legal funding for bereaved families at inquests involving the police. Many hon. Members have championed this cause, including during the passage of the Bill. I pay particular tribute to the tireless campaigning and personal commitment of my right hon. Friend the Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham). Unequal funding at inquests and the injustice associated with that was highlighted by the sorry saga of the Hillsborough hearings. The scales of justice were weighted against the families of those who had lost their lives. Public money was used not to discover the truth, but instead to defend an untenable narrative perpetuated by South Yorkshire police. The coroner dealing with the first pre-inquest hearings into the 21 victims of the 1974 Birmingham pub bombings backed and commended applications for their bereaved families to get legal funding for proper representation, but did not have the power to authorise the funds.
Fees in major cases have attracted considerable public interest, but inquests at which the police are legally represented are not confined to major tragedies such as Hillsborough; far more common are inquests into the deaths of individuals who are little known. Many bereaved families can find themselves in an adversarial and aggressive environment when they go to an inquest. Many are not in a position to match the spending of the police or other parts of the public sector for their own legal representation. In fact, bereaved families have to try, if at all possible, to find their own money to have any sort of legal representation. Opposition Members believe that the overwhelming public interest lies in these inquiries discovering the truth. It follows that public money should be there to establish the truth, not just to protect public institutions, and that must mean equal funding.
In the other place, the Government accepted that many would sympathise with the intention of the amendment. When she was Home Secretary, the Prime Minister commissioned the former Bishop of Liverpool, James Jones, to compile a report on the experiences of the Hillsborough families. We are encouraged to wait for his report before considering the issues further, yet we already know that a system of unequal funding at inquests is wrong. Public funds are used to deny justice and hide the truth. The Government need to act now to change a process that appears to be geared more towards trying to grind down bereaved families than enabling them to get at the truth. The Government really should accept the amendment.
Mr Charles Walker (Broxbourne) (Con)
I urge Ministers to listen closely to the hon. Lady’s strong point. When someone dies while in the care of the state in a detained environment, people too often go up against the might of the state. That is simply not fair and it should not be tolerated.
Lyn Brown
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for making that point.
We also support Lords amendments 136 to 142, which were tabled by Baroness Brinton, along with consequential amendment 307. Those amendments are designed to improve the way in which the criminal justice system interacts with victims of crime, and they are based on the work of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer). I presume that the amendments will be acceptable to the Government because, as we have heard, they would enact the 2015 Conservative manifesto commitment to introduce a victims’ bill of rights. Let me remind the Minister of what that manifesto says:
“we will strengthen victims’ rights further, with a new Victims’ Law that will enshrine key rights for victims”.
I understand that the former Minister, the right hon. Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mike Penning), already committed to a Green Paper on this issue in a private meeting with the campaign group Voice 4 Victims in February last year, but we are yet to have sight of that. This Bill is the ideal opportunity to take the matter forward, so I encourage the Government, even at this late stage, to think again and not oppose the amendments.
The House will know that victims’ rights are protected in the victims code, which was introduced in 2005 by a Labour Government. We still support that code, but the rights included in it are not legally binding, and in the past few years it has become clear that a firmer legal basis is required to give distressed and vulnerable victims the protection that they need.
Liz Saville Roberts
Does the hon. Lady agree that if the 2012 European directive on victims’ rights were put on a statutory footing in England and Wales, we would be following the lead of that which happens in Scotland already?
Lyn Brown
The hon. Lady is absolutely right, but I think that talking about Europe might be too much of a red flag in this Chamber.
If the amendments are agreed to, they will create a statutory duty on elected police leadership to produce an area victims plan depending on local needs, and they will require the commissioner for victims and witnesses to assess the adequacy of such plans. Finally, the amendments will empower the Secretary of State to order a homicide review—basically, a cold case review—when nobody has been charged with a crime. Taken together, the measures would allow the victims code to be better enforced and ensure that our criminal justice system works better for the victims of crime. The Government will, I hope, offer their wholehearted support to these amendments.
Finally, I turn to Lords amendment 134, with consequential amendment 305, which was proposed by my noble Friend Baroness Royall. The amendment would increase the maximum penalty for those found guilty of stalking from five to 10 years. In cases where the offence is racially or religiously aggravated, the maximum penalty would be increased from seven to 14 years. We are delighted that the Government have chosen to accept our case, and I congratulate my noble Friend and all who have pursued the campaign.
Home Office data suggest that as many as one in five women and one in 10 men will be stalked at some point in their lives. Just because stalking is common, it does not mean that it is not a serious matter. Stalking destroys lives. It violates an individual’s right to privacy, and therefore destroys their personal freedoms. It causes fear, and rightly so, since too often it is a precursor to violent confrontation.
I know that sentencing guidelines and specific sentences are the responsibility of the Sentencing Council and judges respectively. However, extending the maximum penalty will allow for greater flexibility in the most serious cases and make it clear that stalking is a serious offence. The Labour party has provided the Government with the opportunity to give judges the necessary flexibility to hand out appropriate sentences to serious criminals. I am delighted that the Government have seen the need for that and responded appropriately.
Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)
I rise to support the Government’s amendment on stalking in lieu of Lords amendment 134. This is a momentous day, because the proposed measures, which would have the effect of significantly strengthening protections for victims of stalking, represent the culmination of a 16-month campaign. I truly hope that what began with a meeting with my GP constituent Dr Eleanor Aston in 2015 will end here today.
In doubling the maximum sentences for stalking, the Government’s proposals emphatically and decisively do two things. First, they recognise that stalking is not a minor offence. Instead, it is a horrible, violating, destructive crime that rips relationships apart, ruins careers and can cause lasting mental harm. All too often, it is the gateway to serious violence. Secondly, the Government’s amendments will ensure that courts have the tools that they need to deal with the most serious cases accordingly. Most crucially of all, it will give the courts powers truly to protect victims and to put their needs front and centre in the criminal justice system.
Let me be clear: when we talk about victims of stalking, we are not simply referring to the rich and famous: this campaign has made it crystal clear that ordinary men and women can fall victim to stalking just as readily and just as severely as those in the public eye.
Alex Chalk
That is very gracious of the hon. Lady, and I am grateful. The context for the proposals was the horrific seven-year ordeal suffered by my constituent at the hands of her former patient. I will not go through all the detail now, but I will set out some of it. He turned up at her surgery over 100 times. He posted foul items through the letterbox. He followed her on patient visits, slashed her tyres and sent threatening mail. He appeared at a children’s birthday party her daughter was attending. That caused her exceptional anxiety and fear. After serving a short prison sentence, he—in a pattern that is not uncommon with this type of offence—restarted his campaign. Dr Aston received packages at her surgery in Gloucester and at her home in Cheltenham. One was threatening and abusive, and made it clear that he knew where her children went to school. The second package simply said, “Guess who’s back”. When he was arrested again, the search on his computer revealed that the inquiry, “How long after a person disappears are they assumed dead?” The judge who sentenced Dr Aston’s stalker made it clear that he did not think he had the tools he needed, stating in open court that he had no doubt that the stalker was dangerous in the sense of posing a significant risk, but he went on:
“I am frustrated that the maximum sentence...is five years. I would, if I could, give you longer.”
Mr Jim Cunningham
I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way, but may I enlighten him? He was not in the House when the stalking legislation was introduced by the Labour Government as a result of a private Member’s Bill, against a lot of opposition from his party at the time.
Alex Chalk
I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, but the reality is that the Conservative-led coalition Government ensured that the measure was put on the statute book. However, in the spirit of being entirely conciliatory, I recognise that a lot of people have made efforts.
I close by saying that I am grateful to the many victims—typically, but not exclusively women—to whom I have spoken and who have shared their stories, as well as to the stalking charities, such as the Suzy Lamplugh Trust, the Network for Surviving Stalking, Protection Against Stalking, Paladin, the Hollie Gazzard Trust, the police and the University of Gloucestershire, which, incidentally, is a leader in research on stalking.
Finally, I want, above all, to pay tribute to my constituent Dr Aston. It was her ordeal that triggered this campaign. She has shown astonishing bravery, reliving her suffering again and again. I know that her greatest wish is that future victims can receive the full measure of justice. If these proposals are carried, that will be precisely the result. I commend the Government amendments to the House.
Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)
I had not intended to come along today, but it is a real pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk), who rightly spoke about the real progress that is being made with the Stalking (Sentencing) Bill. There is no need to have a sort of ping-pong about who has done more about domestic violence, sexual violence and stalking because, frankly, we should all be trying to do everything we can, and I do not care who does it as long as it gets done.
The legislation and the amendments before us —particularly on stalking—represent real legislative progress, but that will mean absolutely nothing if, in practice, the legislation is not realised. As somebody who has worked on the frontline, I am afraid to say that so often we make brilliant rules in this place—beautiful, fancy written rules, still on all the fancy goatskins—and it means absolutely naff all to victims because of issues to do with resources and how things are properly realised by the different agencies. That is why I wanted to talk about the victims code and the amendments to the victims’ Bill that was introduced by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer). I urge the Government to consider the amendments and to consider making a more robust framework for the victims code, which is a brilliant piece of regulation. I have no doubt that every single person in here is totally committed to making things better for victims. I do not sign up to the idea that you are baddies and we are goodies. We all come to this place because we want to make something better.
I was the victims’ champion for Birmingham and did a huge piece of work on the victims code and victims’ legislation alongside the Government’s Victims’ Commissioner, and I have to say that if Members can find me a victim who knows what the victims’ code is, I will give them some cash now. People do not realise that they have this many days to ask for something, and they do not realise that they can have a victim statement. Only 30% of people remembered even being asked for one. I ask hon. Members to think back to the day that the murderer of our friend and colleague Jo Cox was sentenced. The thing that we do not remember from that day is that man. The thing we remember is Brendan Cox standing and making the victim statement outside the court that he had made inside the court because he knew that he had the rights to do it. That is rare but it was so powerful in that case.
It is imperative that we look at the amendments that relate to the victims’ law and see how we can strengthen them, because I am telling you now—not you, Mr Speaker, of course, but everyone—that at the moment the victims code is a hope as far as victims of crime are concerned, and the Opposition amendments would definitely make it stronger, especially for victims of stalking and sexual violence. I ask the Government to think again.
I want to make a quick point about the amendments regarding the equality of arms in cases where the state is an actor. I speak for the victims of the Birmingham pub bombings, who are not just my constituents but my friends. We have a matter of weeks to answer their plight. Currently, the Chief Coroner agrees with them that they have not been provided with an equality of arms, so an adjournment has taken place before their inquest can be reopened. We have until February to right that wrong. At the moment, I see nothing that tells me that that will change. I ask Government Members to look at the amendments and think about how they would feel if it concerned the families in their constituency.
Brandon Lewis
With regard to the Birmingham situation, I am very happy to have a conversation with the hon. Lady outside the Chamber. I think that she may have slightly misunderstood what is happening, and I am happy to give a bit more detail about what is happening with the legal aid process.
Jess Phillips
I am only too aware that the Minister will almost certainly tell me that the legal aid, through the Legal Aid Agency, has been granted to two of the seven families of complainants. Although I am more than happy to meet the Minister outside of here, I am going to wager that I know a bit more about it than perhaps he does. I would be delighted to be proven wrong—in fact, the Home Office has heard our requests for Hillsborough-style funding—and, if I am, I will stand on every single platform I can to say that I was wrong and the Minister knew more than me. So I look forward to that!
I will conclude by saying that we all want something better and we all want victims to be treated better, and the hon. Member for Cheltenham has shown with passion how that can be realised. But unless we make sure our regulations are enacted, what we do in this place is slightly for nothing, so I ask the Government to look again at the amendments around victims’ rights.
Mr Charles Walker
In the last Parliament, I was totally politically incontinent—in and out of all sorts of Lobbies, voting with the Government, voting against the Government and voting with Labour. I have really tried to make sure that, in this Parliament, I was only in one Lobby—the Government Lobby. I have managed that loyally for the past 18 months, and I am just so disappointed that the Government are not willing to accept Lords amendment 96, because equality of representation is absolutely critical.
I spoke in this place in a previous Parliament about the terrible tragedy of deaths in custody—deaths in detained environments. Let us look specifically at deaths in police custody. If a person dies in police custody, there is obviously a coroner’s inquiry, but there is total inequality of representation at that inquiry. The family of the deceased are up against the state, the police and their legal representation. That legal representation is given to the police without question, and it is funded without question, whereas the families of the deceased, at a time of huge emotional turmoil, have their finances pored over with a fine-toothed comb—it is not just the finances of the parents, but the finances of siblings, aunts and uncles, and even cousins—to see whether the family can bear the cost of their legal representation. That is entirely unfair; it is not just.
The Lords amendment is very sensible in its scope, and I would hope, even at this late stage, that the Government—if for no other reason than to keep me out of a Lobby that I do not really want to be in—might consider accepting it, so that we can all finish the evening on a very happy and unified note.
Chris Bryant
I do not think that it is going to be a very unified note by the end of the day, and I think there was an element of irony in the contribution by the hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker).
I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) and my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley (Jess Phillips) for their campaign on stalking. The legislation has changed over the years, particularly since 1997, and it is good that this issue is now recognised for the terrible harm that is done to many victims.
I want to talk primarily—this is a bit of a smorgasbord debate—about the Leveson issues and amendment 24, which I wish was not necessary. However, it is necessary, and it has been put on the amendment paper only because their lordships and a large number of us in this House are distrustful of the Government’s intention in relation to what happened over Leveson.
I believe that it is necessary to have the full Leveson—that is not two Leveson inquiries, but one Leveson inquiry, some of which could be done before the criminal investigations were completed, and some of which could not be done until the criminal investigations were completed. That was always the promise. It was never, “We will think about having Leveson 2 once we have come to the end of the criminal investigations; it was always said from the very beginning that there would be one inquiry with two parts and that the second part would happen. In fact, the Prime Minister, in the quote given by my hon. Friend the Member for West Ham (Lyn Brown), said those words the day after Leveson 1 had been produced. So Ministers have absolutely no excuse for turning round now and saying, “Oh no, no, we never really intended to proceed with Leveson 2.”
Why does that matter? Why is it important? The truth is that we are talking about corruption in one of the organisations of the state that matters most to our constituents and to the rule of law in this country: the police. I am sure the vast majority of us agree, given the little bits and pieces that we have managed to glean from Leveson 1, that there was a time when the Metropolitan police, to all intents and purposes, were a partially owned subsidiary of News International. Metropolitan police staff went to work for News International. When they had finished working for News International, they went back to work for the Metropolitan police. There was a revolving door. On the very day that the police decided not to continue with the investigation into what had happened at the News of the World, the leading investigator was having dinner with Rebekah Brooks.
Sir Peter Bottomley (Worthing West) (Con)
Section 40 should not be introduced. To say to 90% of the local, regional and national press that they have to be forced into a group they do not want to join is bullying of the worst kind. If it were to happen in other countries, the Council of Europe would probably say it was interference in the free media.
William Hone, whose life is described in the book “The Laughter of Triumph”, defied criminal libel law. We should remember that our press basically got its freedom from that moment, when ordinary people on juries refused to convict because they said that the media ought to have the right to lampoon, to be rude and to investigate. I think that people ought to ask the question: what would be the effect of section 40? Would it increase investigative journalism? No, it would not. It would be a good idea if those backing IMPRESS and section 40 gave a list of successful and wrong defamation cases, including of leading politicians who denied they were drunk overseas and various other criminals who later turned out to be guilty of the things they were accused of by the media.
We rely on the media to find out the things few people know about and make them available to all. The whole effect of section 40 will be to chill the opportunity for the media to investigate and report. That is why I believe this House would be wrong to force the Government to bring in section 40. I hope that we do not and I hope that those in favour of it will find other ways to pursue their own aims.
Richard Graham (Gloucester) (Con)
I rise to support, as strongly as I possibly can, the Government’s amendment in lieu of Lords amendment 134. It recognises the force of the arguments laid out in the report by my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) and I last year, “Stalking: the Case for Extending the Maximum Sentence”. The report summarised the work of our researchers. Through them, we met victims, stalking charities, academics and police specialists. Everything we learned confirmed our initial instinct that there are a small number of very dangerous stalkers, such as my constituent Raymond Knight who pursued Cheltenham resident and Gloucester GP, Dr Eleanor Aston, to the point of nervous breakdown.
I pay tribute to the Government for accepting our report and its single recommendation of doubling the maximum sentence for stalking from five to 10 years, for amending the appropriate sections of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 on racial and religious aggravated harassment in line with the change to the maximum sentence for stalking, and for outlining in correspondence additional training that will be part of the measures to deal with the mental health issues of serious stalkers. I know the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice have worked closely on this together. I am grateful to both Ministers here today for their action.
I also want to thank Gloucestershire-based Baroness Royall in the Lords for her commitment and contribution, and all those who informed us and shared harrowing experiences, including a constituent and her family. I would like to quote from her 16-year-old daughter, who was so egregiously stalked. She told us that the stalker
“broke into my house one night…all the knives in the knife stand were gone…I was sure I was going to die.”
In this particular case, my constituent and her family prefer to remain anonymous, not least because my constituent has been moved by the police to a safe house far from her home and her own children.
I am extremely grateful to all those who informed us, educated us and motivated us. I suspect the work I have done with my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham means that the neighbouring constituencies of Cheltenham and Gloucester have not worked so closely since the creation of the Cheltenham & Gloucester building society —now, alas, long since gone. It is for a good cause that we come together in support of the Government’s change of law.
The Government’s amendment in lieu will give judges the flexibility they need. As Dr Aston has said, victims will be able to sleep more easily when the worst stalkers are sentenced and the stalkers themselves will better understand the seriousness of their crime and receive more help in resolving what is a severe obsession and mental health issue. Of course, as the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley (Jess Phillips) pointed out, that will not in itself stop stalking, but it shows that victims and judges are being heard, that MPs and ultimately the Government listen and that laws can be changed so that sentences better reflect the harm that a crime can inflict on innocent victims, most of whom, as in the instance that inspired my neighbour and me, are women. Ultimately, justice is only as good as the laws we adapt and the way in which they are implemented. In that context, I pay tribute to the Prime Minister, who made stalking a crime on the statute book when she was Home Secretary, and to the current Home Secretary, who has introduced protection orders against stalkers.
I will finish by returning to where this campaign started: the judge and the victim in Gloucester Crown court. I would like to thank Dr Ellie Aston for inspiring us, for being strong and for having faith; other victims for opening their hearts and sharing their stories; stalking charities, such as the Suzy Lamplugh Trust, the Network for Surviving Stalking, Protection Against Stalking and Paladin; and the Hollie Gazzard Trust, the police and the University of Gloucestershire, which happens to be a leader in research in this sad area. This part of the journey for justice for victims of stalking is now close to over. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley has reminded us that there will always be other issues to be raised and resolved, but today’s amendment in lieu deserves everyone’s support.
Sir Gerald Howarth
The whole House listened with great respect and interest to my hon. Friends the Members for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) and for Gloucester (Richard Graham), who have brought to the attention of the House and the country the appalling consequences of stalking. I join others in saluting their efforts to persuade the Government to recognise the gravity of the crime and in reaching this result tonight, which we can all applaud.
I thank the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) for mentioning my intervention on the Minister about section 40 and Lords amendment 24. I will not vote for the amendment tonight, because the Government have agreed to a consultation, and I think it right that that process run, but as I said to the Minister earlier, I hope that the Government will not be intimidated by the campaign by the newspapers that the hon. Gentleman referred to. The newspapers seem struck by an extraordinary sense of paranoia and a feeling of vulnerability, when we all know, from the many cases that have appeared, that they are in the driving seat and have power without a lot of responsibility.
Insufficient attention has been paid to the Leveson inquiry and the subsequent report, which was a detailed and considered piece of work. We should do what the then Prime Minister, David Cameron, said that Parliament should do. Since the Aldershot News & Mail was unwilling to publish my article today, perhaps I can give the House the benefit of it.
Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)
My hon. Friend should place a copy in the Library.
Sir Gerald Howarth
My hon. and learned Friend suggests that I put the article in the Library, but when he hears what I have to say, I think he might be better informed, if not wiser, for I cannot account for his wisdom—he is a great man.
Sir Gerald Howarth
He seriously is a very great man.
I wrote this:
“I believe in a free press but I also believe in a responsible press. Sadly, the newspapers are becoming increasingly paranoid about what they see as an attack on them and are refusing to accept the recommendation of the latest inquiry under Lord Justice Leveson that an independent regulator be established. Leveson was set up after an appalling series of intrusions into the private lives of people, which included phone hacking on an industrial scale.”
Milly Dowler’s body was found 200 yards from the boundary of my constituency in a case that really struck the public as appalling.
Richard Drax (South Dorset) (Con)
Phone hacking is brought up again and again by colleagues who, in my view, want to censor the press. Phone hacking is a criminal offence, for which people have gone to jail. There is no need for any further laws.
Sir Gerald Howarth
I have huge respect for my hon. and gallant Friend, but the fact is that the inquiry would not have taken place if phone hacking had not been discovered on what I have described as an industrial scale. People’s engagement with it was utterly immoral, and some went to prison, following legal action, which I think is fine.
My article continues:
“It is hard for those who have not experienced an assault by the media to appreciate the level of distress it causes. I know because some 30 years ago, together with my then colleague Neil Hamilton, I had to sue the BBC Panorama programme for libel—which we won”—
and had the director-general of the BBC fired—
“but at the risk of bankruptcy (and loss of our seats in Parliament) if we lost.”
For the record, our costs—Peter Carter and partners were our lawyers—were something in the region £273,000. So I say to my hon. Friend the Member for Worthing West (Sir Peter Bottomley) that it is all very well for those who have got money. They are able to access justice, but this is all about providing a remedy for those who do not have money and cannot afford to undertake that sort of action. I continue:
“Since 1945, there have been no less than 5 Royal Commissions and enquiries to secure a better and cheaper form of justice for those maligned by powerful media barons.”
Chris Bryant
It is worth bearing in mind that when it came to suing the Metropolitan police to try to ensure that it gave the media information about what had happened to me, my costs were £380,000. My costs for suing Rupert Murdoch were £480,000. In both cases, because it was an no-win, no-fee arrangement, I did not have to pay anything. However, those no-win, no-fee arrangements are no longer available in these cases.
Sir Gerald Howarth
I agree with the hon. Gentleman’s point.
I was mentioning the five royal commissions and inquiries since 1945. The article continues:
“Time and again, reports threatened new laws if the industry failed to sort itself out, time and again the industry failed. In his 1993 report, Sir David Calcutt, QC said of the then regulator, the Press Complaints Commission: ‘It is not...an effective regulator of the press...It is, in essence, a body set up by the industry, financed by the industry, dominated by the industry, and operating a code of practice devised by the industry and which is over-favourable to the industry’.
In 2012, Leveson recommended that newspapers should continue to be self-regulated and that the Government should have no power over what they publish. However, he also proposed a new press standards body created by the industry with a new code of conduct. The new self-regulatory body should be underpinned by a law to provide for a process to recognise the new body and ensure it meets certain requirements. It should also enshrine in law a legal duty to protect the freedom of the press and to ‘provide a fair, quick and inexpensive arbitration service to deal with any civil complaints about its members’ publications’. Ofcom should act in a verification role to ensure independence and effectiveness.”
There we have it. There is a proposal on the table that IPSO is perfectly at liberty to take up in respect of a cheap arbitration service. The other point is that it should not be dominated by former press people, but that is exactly what IPSO is all about. I am not specifically advocating IMPRESS, but I see no reason why IPSO should not be able to organise itself in such a way that it is compliant. Instead, it has set up a body dominated by former editors, which does not meet the Leveson conditions. The Government are right to consult, but I really do not believe that the newspapers have anything to fear from these proposals. I believe that they will be in the interests of the press but, above all, they will provide a remedy for those who cannot afford to seek a remedy. Surely our responsibility is to remedy injustice.
Mr Cox
My hon. Friend knows how much I return his respect, and he knows that I would normally regard him as an infallible guide to almost everything in the planet, but in this instance I think that suggesting that IPSO is dominated by press editors when its presiding spirit is Sir Alan Moses—Lord Justice Moses, a very fine judge who is vigorously and fiercely independent—is over-emphasising the point.
Sir Gerald Howarth
I am grateful for my hon. and learned Friend’s belief in my infallibility, and I assure him that he should not be misguided, because I am infallible in this instance as well. Let me respond to his point by saying that although there may be an eminent judge in the driving seat, the fact is that the membership is dominated by press and former press people. They are in the majority.
Sir Gerald Howarth
It is true. Seven of the 12 are former press people, and that does not meet the Leveson conditions. Let us just meet the Leveson conditions: then we shall all be happy.
Kevin Foster (Torbay) (Con)
It is a pleasure to speak in the debate, and, in particular, to follow some of the passionate speeches we have heard. I intended to focus on Lords amendments 136 to 142, but my thoughts have been drawn to comments that have been made about the press in the context of other amendments.
We have heard about the Aldershot News & Mail, but each week thousands of homes in Torbay receive a publication that reports on local news and local issues and gives the odd opinion on them. It is called “my weekly e-mail update”, and is subject only to libel laws, and to what I am happy to talk about and defend as the local Member of Parliament.
I think we should bear it in mind that we are living in a completely different era, when more and more of the media is moving online. There can be no such thing as a press regulator when there is no press—when websites can be based anywhere in the world and it is difficult to track them down even under our own libel laws, let alone regulate them. The era when people walked down to the newsagent each morning and again each evening to buy a local newspaper has pretty much come to an end. The fake news stories about which people talk—especially in connection with recent elections in the United States—were not put out by newspapers. They were not published by print media; they were published by various people online. There are websites that are effectively “clickbait”, featuring misleading headlines that people will merrily share or stories that do not really get to the nub. A story involving an hon. Member was recently circulated online. Anyone who knew the facts would know that it was flagrantly misleading, but that would not be clear to people who just read the headline online. Will that story be affected by press regulation? No. It is nothing to do with press regulation, because it is not printed material.
When we debate these matters, we must be aware that the era when only a press publication could circulate a story has disappeared. We should think about what we are doing when it comes to a special system that puts them at a disadvantage, given that, increasingly, they are no longer as dominant as they were. It is more likely that local newspapers will close than that they will find themselves being the arbiters of all opinion. Most constituents are more than able to use their own common sense and take many of the claims that they see both online and in the print media with a pinch of salt, but we have libel laws, and we need to remember that.
Chris Bryant
I have heard many times the argument that the libel laws are there, and that it is all very fine and dandy. The truth is, however, that the people of Hillsborough had no legal remedy whatsoever. They had no opportunity to respond to the lies—not libels, because the people concerned were dead—that were told about them for many, many years. That is why we need a proper press regulator that is independent of Government, independent of politics, and independent of the proprietors.
Kevin Foster
The fact is that someone who wanted to spread mistruths today would do it on the internet, and that would not be covered by either of the proposed systems of press regulation. We would probably now see a story of that type circulating on the internet, whereas in the 1980s the internet was something that a few universities used, and the worldwide web was something that United States military had developed for the purpose of its own communications in the event of world war three. It was not as we see it today. That shows why we need to be conscious of today’s position on the media and legislation. The industry, in many cases, particularly the local media, is struggling to survive and is in decline and we do not want to end up throwing out the baby with the bathwater because of the horrendous practices of one or two newspapers, in particular The Sun in that instance.
I wanted to talk mainly about amendments 136 to 142. I listened with interest to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley (Jess Phillips). She has a valid point when she says it is easy to put things that sound marvellous and fantastic on to goat skins, but the difference that makes on the ground is another matter. That is why I agree with the Government’s motion to disagree with the Lords amendments.
Some of the provisions of Lords amendment 137, for example, are relatively vague. “Adequate notice” is not defined. There is also the provision potentially making the police and other authorities liable for any “unnecessary delay”; how can the police be held liable if it is the defence that engages in delay? The judiciary have the role of preventing court cases from being unnecessarily delayed.
Jess Phillips
The whole point of these amendments is that all the actors in the criminal justice system—the courts, the CPS, the defence, or the police—have a responsibility. These provisions would make the monitoring of how well they are doing more robust. It does not matter who is to blame; what we want is the victim to be given the information.
Kevin Foster
The amendment talks about ensuring that victims of crime are “not subjected to unnecessary delay”; it does not talk about monitoring. I accept that if we were looking at having a system of guidance, for instance, proposing “must ensure” would be putting something on to the statute book. For me, ensuring victims of crime are supported through the court process would be more beneficial than these amendments. In addition, people now have police and crime commissioners whom they can hold to account for the work they do.
This is a large group of amendments and we could spend quite some time talking about it. I do not believe that adding these amendments to the Bill is the right way forward. We should look at having a properly consulted-on system that does not have unintended consequences. That is why I agree with the Government motion to disagree with the Lords amendments.
Bill Wiggin
I will not delay the House for long. I want to heap praise on the Secretary of State for not giving in to the pressure of the media moguls, and, although we are putting a consultation out, we are determined that no grass shall grow. I want her to be very clear that we truly appreciate what she has done.
Colleagues who are unhappy about amendment 24 ought to pay more attention to the brilliance of my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), who has put together a fantastic plan for dealing with this thorny issue. If they gave it their full attention, they would, like me, want to see section 40 implemented.
The Press Recognition Panel is completely independent, and given amendment 24 and the concerns being shown by their lordships—
Mr Rees-Mogg
I am so sorry to disagree with my hon. Friend, but the Press Recognition Panel is not independent; it is the creation, under a royal charter, ultimately of the Crown and therefore of the state.
Bill Wiggin
It is still independent because it does not choose who and what is the regulator; it determines only that the regulator is independent. It is perfectly acceptable. I know my hon. Friend is very keen to defend the press, but this whole instrument does exactly that.
My hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Sir Gerald Howarth) emphasised the point that the local press in particular would be very vulnerable if it was not regulated—[Interruption.] Yes, it would. The regulator will protect it from having to pay the costs. This is why colleagues should really study what my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset has put together. It is much, much better than they might originally have thought.
Mr Whittingdale
I had not intended to take part in the debate, but I want to say a few words about Lords amendment 24. A lot of the debate so far seems to have been about whether section 40 should be implemented, but that does not actually have anything to do with Lords amendment 24, which is specifically about whether there should be a further inquiry into the behaviour and performance of the police in relation to their dealings with news organisations.
Leveson 2, as it is now colloquially known, has been put on hold until the conclusion of all the criminal cases, and the amendment rightly recognises that it would be wholly wrong to have any kind of inquiry that could jeopardise criminal prosecutions. However, most of those prosecutions have now been concluded and it is worth looking at the outcomes of those prosecutions when deciding whether there is a case for proceeding. Operation Elveden, which was the police investigation into corrupt payments from newspaper organisations, overwhelmingly resulted in the acquittal of the journalists who had been charged with those offences. I think only two journalists were convicted; the vast majority were acquitted. We need to bear that in mind, because the suggestion that there was a massive corrupt relationship has not proven to be the case.
The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) talks about the importance of weeding out police corruption and of having confidence in an institution of the state. I completely agree with him on that. I want to refer briefly to the case made by the relatives of Daniel Morgan when considering whether there should be a further inquiry. I have every sympathy with the family of Daniel Morgan, who was murdered, because there was considerable evidence of police corruption. I can entirely understand their wish to have his killers brought to justice. A Home Office panel is examining that case at the moment, and we await its conclusion. It may well be that further action needs to be taken to deal with police corruption, and I shall wait to see what the panel concludes. Let us bear in mind that the Leveson inquiry was an inquiry into the culture, ethics and conduct of the press. It was not an inquiry into police corruption.
The main issue that has dominated the debate has been the implementation of section 40, which is not covered by this amendment. I share the views that have been extremely well expressed by my hon. Friends the Members for Worthing West (Sir Peter Bottomley) and for Torbay (Kevin Foster). However, the Secretary of State has set up a consultation. It concluded today, but it will take some considerable time before the results are made public. I believe that there has been a very substantial response to the consultation, so I do not expect the Government to be in a position to announce any conclusions about the implementation of section 40 or about whether there should be a further inquiry until that work has been done. I suspect that it will take several weeks, if not months. It seems entirely premature to table an amendment requiring the Government to commit now to a further inquiry when we have not even begun to assess the results of the consultation. For that reason, I strongly oppose Lords amendment 24.
James Berry (Kingston and Surbiton) (Con)
I support Government amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 134. Having heard the hard-hitting accounts of my hon. Friends the Members for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) and for Gloucester (Richard Graham) in their report on stalking, no one can be left in any doubt that the Government amendment should be carried.
Turning to Lords amendment 137, having represented the police and the prosecutorial authorities as a barrister, and having represented victims both as a barrister and as a Member of Parliament, I hope I can see the situation from both angles. I am entirely supportive of the victims code. Victims have generally been empowered since the code came into force as a result of steps taken by the previous Labour Government, and the beefing up carried out by the coalition Government and the Government of today.
My concern about Lords amendment 137 is that it would make the police and prosecutorial authorities responsible, and in some cases financially liable, for breaches of the victims code, even if they are not directly responsible. Under new subsection (3)(a), for instance, the police or the CPS could become responsible to a victim for delays caused not by them but by a third party, such as the defendant. Under new subsection (3)(b), the CPS could be held responsible if a defendant, or indeed another party over whom it has no control, treats a victim with a lack of “dignity and respect”. That often happens in the courtroom when a defendant gives evidence, or even through how a defendant instructs their lawyer to present their case, but that is a matter for the judge, not the prosecutor, to control.
New subsection (10) is even more concerning because it would require the Home Secretary to
“take steps to ensure that victims of crime…have access to financial compensation from public funds for any detriment arising from the criminal case concerned”.
That is not necessarily a detriment caused by the prosecuting authority, and there is no requirement of bad faith, recklessness or negligence on behalf of that authority. That is a big step both in principle and in practice. It is a big step in principle because it appears to impose a liability on one body for the actions of a third party over whom it may have no control, and it is a big step in practice because it exposes the police and prosecuting authorities to a significant financial burden at a time when we regularly have debates in this House on the need for greater funding for the police and the CPS. Paragraph 128 of the explanatory notes on the amendments explains that “potentially significant” financial burdens are attached.
Although I am an enthusiastic supporter of the victims code and the need to give victims the very best support, imposing a broadly defined liability—indeed, a financial liability—on the police and the CPS is not the right way to proceed without more thought about furthering the aims of the code. More thought is needed, and I am pleased that the Government will be introducing their own proposals to give effect to our manifesto commitment for a victims’ bill of rights. I am sure that that work will take account of the excellent work of the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) and his commission. I pay tribute to his work and to all the people involved, including a number of my constituents.
Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 24.
The House proceeded to a Division.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)
I must remind the House that the motion relates exclusively to England and Wales. A double majority is therefore required.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)
I must remind the House that the motion relates exclusively to England and Wales. A double majority is therefore required.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)
I must remind the House that the motion relates exclusively to England and Wales. A double majority is therefore required.
Brandon Lewis
I beg to move, That this House agrees with Lords amendment 1.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)
With this it will be convenient to take Lords amendments 2 to 23, 25 to 95, 97 to 133, 135, 143 to 158, 160 to 301, 303, 304 and 306.
Brandon Lewis
I am conscious that this group covers approaching 300 Lords amendments, even if many are of a technical nature, and I appreciate that hon. Members would no doubt like me to go through all 300, but time is short, so, tempting as it might be, I will confine my remarks to the most significant amendments, so that other hon. Members may have an opportunity to speak.
On Report, way back in April and June of last year, a number of my hon. Friends tabled amendments worthy of further consideration. The Lords amendments follow up on that work. My hon. Friend the Member for Cannock Chase (Amanda Milling) argued that when a police and crime commissioner took over the governance of a fire and rescue authority, the title of their office should be amended to reflect their new and expanded responsibilities. Lords amendment 215 provides that in such circumstances the legal title of the PCC will become police, fire and crime commissioner. My hon. Friend the Member for The Cotswolds (Geoffrey Clifton-Brown) proposed a number of sensible further improvements to our firearms licensing regime, and I am pleased to say that Lords amendments 111 to 113 give effect to three of his helpful suggestions.
My hon. Friend the Member for Selby and Ainsty (Nigel Adams) highlighted the dangers to music festival goers as a result of the irresponsible discharging of fireworks, flares and smoke bombs in the often confined space of a festival venue. Lords amendment 114 would tackle such reckless behaviour by making it an offence to possess a pyrotechnic article at a qualifying musical event. As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport indicated in April, we will ensure that this new offence is in force for this year’s festival season. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier) sought to strengthen police powers to require the removal of disguises where there was a threat to public order. Lords amendment 94 will enable the required authorisation by a senior officer for the exercise of such powers to be given orally where it is impractical to confer the authorisation in writing.
Other Lords amendments respond to points raised by Opposition Members. The hon. Member for West Ham (Lyn Brown) expressed concerns about PCCs taking on the governance of fire and rescue authorities. In response to similar concerns raised in the Lords, amendments 193 to 199, among others, strengthen the process by which a PCC brings forward a proposal for the creation of a PCC-style FRA to ensure that it is as robust and transparent as possible. She separately argued for a strengthening of the Licensing Act 2003 by putting cumulative impact assessments on a statutory footing. We agree, and Lords amendment 117 does just that.
Lords amendments 30 to 33 deliver on the commitment given by my predecessor on Report to amend the Bill to allow disciplinary action to be taken against former police officers outside the normal 12-month period following retirement or resignation in the most serious and exceptional cases. Lords amendments 36 to 42, among others, respond to representations from the Independent Police Complaints Commission and, indeed, from Opposition parties that the reformed organisation should retain the word “Independent” in its title. As a result of these amendments, the reformed IPCC will henceforth be known as the Independent Office for Police Conduct. This will help to reinforce public confidence that the reformed organisation will be fully independent of those it regulates.
On Report, the hon. Member for Stockport (Ann Coffey) argued that the current law requiring a coroner’s inquest in every case where a person dies under a deprivation of liberty safeguard, even where the death was from natural causes, caused unnecessary upset to bereaved families.
Dame Rosie Winterton (Doncaster Central) (Lab)
I wish to say how welcome amendment 135 is. As the Minister said, my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport (Ann Coffey) was particularly aware of the pressures this was placing not just on coroners but on social services. I am also extremely glad that my hon. Friend the Member for West Ham (Lyn Brown) on the Front Bench is, as I understand it, supporting the amendment as well.
Brandon Lewis
I thank the right hon. Lady for her remarks. Yes, we agree, and amendment 135 therefore removes the automatic requirement for a coroner’s investigation in such cases. There will be a continued duty on a coroner to investigate any death where there is a suspicion that it might have resulted from violence or unnatural causes or where the cause of death is unknown.
Last, but certainly not least, and importantly, Lords amendments 124 to 132 would right the wrongs suffered by gay and bisexual men who were for centuries persecuted under homophobic laws for conduct that society now regards as normal activity. These amendments will confer an automatic pardon on deceased individuals convicted of certain consensual gay sexual offences that would not be offences today, and on those persons still living who have a conviction for such an offence that has been disregarded under the terms of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.
The amendments will also enable the disregard scheme to be extended, by regulations, to cover other abolished offences used to target homosexual activity, including the offence of solicitation by men under section 32 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. These provisions will extend to Northern Ireland as well as to England and Wales, with the Scottish Government having separately announced its intention to bring forward legislation in the Scottish Parliament.
At this point, I want to take the opportunity to apologise unreservedly, on behalf of the Government, to all those men who will receive a pardon. The legislation under which they were convicted and cautioned was discriminatory and homophobic. I want to make sure that all who were criminalised in this way and had to suffer society’s opprobrium, and the many more who lived in fear of being so criminalised because they were being treated in a very different way from heterosexual couples, actually understand that we offer this full apology. Their treatment was entirely unfair. What happened to these men is a matter of the greatest regret, and it should be so to all of us. I am sure it is to Members across the House. For this, we are today deeply sorry.
This is an historic and momentous step, one of which we can all be justly proud. I pay particular tribute to the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for East Surrey (Mr Gyimah), who is the Minister responsible for prisons and probation, for the work he has done in government to make this happen. For his campaigning from the Back Benches, I would particularly like to mention, among others, the hon. Member for East Dunbartonshire (John Nicolson).
These Lords amendments improve and enhance the Bill, so I wholeheartedly commend them all to the House.
Ms Diane Abbott (Hackney North and Stoke Newington) (Lab)
I rise to speak to this large group of amendments. In moving on to making what I hope will be brief remarks, I have to say how disappointed I am that the Government were not willing to move on the question of parity of funding, which is an issue not just for groups of families involved in Hillsborough, but, as the hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker) pointed out, for individual families whose family members die in police custody. This relates to the previous group of amendments, but I wanted to make that point.
Some amendments in this group are welcome. We support the new emphasis on the independence of the new Office for Police Conduct, given the central role it will play in ensuring that the police are held to appropriately high standards. I am glad this has finally been recognised by the Government, and I pay tribute to the work of my noble Friend Lord Rosser.
We are also pleased that anonymity for victims of forced marriage will now be extended to Northern Ireland, following the request by the Northern Ireland Minister of Justice. There is also a number of sensible and straightforward improvements to the regulation of firearms, including a clarification of the laws around antique firearms, and alterations of the definition of airsoft guns that should improve public safety.
I also welcome the Government’s support for amendments to clause 28 that make it possible for investigations into the most serious misconduct to take place more than a year after the relevant officers have left the service. Credit is due in particular to my right hon. Friend the Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham) for his consistent arguments in favour of this reform. Families and communities who have been the victims of injustices in the past can be reassured that, in future, time need not run out on the service’s own disciplinary procedures.
Amendments 94 and 300 grant police officers the power to order a person to remove an item of clothing that is disguising their identity if a senior officer gives them oral permission to do so. This is obviously a practical measure, but we want some reassurance that this power will not be applied indiscriminately to Muslim women who are simply observing their religious beliefs, yet get caught up in the investigation of a crime. We would like the Government to consider ensuring that it is made absolutely clear in police training that the sole proper use of this power is to remove items of clothing that are purposely worn as a disguise. I ask the Government to look again at the language of the 1994 Act and to clarify to prevent such abuse.
The amended Bill also contains provisions for posthumous pardons for the victims of unjust laws that have subsequently been repealed. The Minister made a gracious reference to the work of the hon. Member for East Dunbartonshire (John Nicolson), who has tabled a private Member’s Bill on the issue. There is much to welcome in this set of amendments. My noble Friend Lord Kennedy, along with Lord Sharkey, Baroness Williams and others, played a key role in the debate. Lord Cashman made the amendments more comprehensive in scope by including the many men who had been unjustly targeted, and Lord Lexden supported the extension of the legislation to Northern Ireland. Those contributions would have enormously enriched any legislation on this topic.
Labour Members are pleased that the Government have apologised, and support the pardons for wrongfully convicted gay men who have now died. Placing an unnecessary bureaucratic burden on victims of injustice was clearly wrong. We also praise the expertise that has featured in the process and the debate. Although we believe that the Government could have gone further—especially in relation to the issue of pardons for people who were convicted under sexual offences legislation in the past purely because they were homosexual—we do not oppose their amendments.
Mindful of the fact that this is the last group of amendments we shall discuss before the Bill returns to the other place, I want to pay particular tribute to the expert views that have contributed to its progress. Many retired and serving police officers have made excellent contributions both here and in the other place, along with many learned members of the judiciary, and that has been reflected in the quality of the debate. It is important to note the expert nature of those contributions because in recent months some disdain has been expressed for expertise, although when it comes to police and criminal policy, expertise does not go amiss.
Nigel Adams (Selby and Ainsty) (Con)
I want to speak briefly about Lords amendment 114. Let me take this opportunity to thank the Minister, the current Secretary of State in her former guise as a Home Office Minister, and the Prime Minister in her previous role as Home Secretary for the work that they did with me in making the amendment possible. Provision for parity in law between people who let off fireworks, flares and smoke bombs at football matches and people who do so at music festivals is a step in the right direction. Every year hundreds of people are maimed and injured by flares, and I appreciate all the Government’s efforts. The amendment provides a good example for any Member who is thinking of trying to introduce a ten-minute rule Bill. It proves that laws can be changed in that way, as long as Members work closely with Ministers—and, in this case, Home Secretaries.
Brandon Lewis
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for thanking all who have been involved. He should be thanked as well, not just for the work that he did on his own account but for his work in bringing organisations together, so that they could act constructively to produce a workable provision.
Nigel Adams
I think it extremely important to work with industries when introducing new laws, to prevent any unintended consequences that might have a knock-on effect on them.
This is very positive news. During the next festival season, people will be able to go and enjoy themselves, and parents sending their kids off to festivals around the country will be safe in the knowledge that throwing flares is an offence. I hope that the amendment will discourage the lunatics from doing that next year, and, once again, I thank Ministers for all their work.
James Berry
I rise to support amendment 135, and I am delighted the Government have accepted Baroness Finlay’s amendment.
I am a barrister and have represented many bereaved families and public authorities at coroners’ inquests, but I had not expected this fairly niche area of legal practice to feature so prominently in my constituency casework after being elected as an MP. Shortly after I was elected, an incredibly dignified lady called Rosalind asked for my help because of inordinate delays in the west London coroner’s court in issuing her husband’s death certificate, which meant the insurance company was holding up funeral arrangements.
Policing and Crime Bill
Wednesday 18th January 2017
(7 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 91-I Marshalled list for consideration of Commons reasons and amendments (PDF, 109KB) - (17 Jan 2017)
Baroness Williams of Trafford
That this House do not insist on its Amendments 24 and 159, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 24A.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)
My Lords, as the House is aware, Amendment 24 would require the Prime Minister to proceed with what is commonly referred to as the Leveson 2 inquiry into the relationships between the police and the media. When the House last debated this issue at Report stage on 30 November, I drew the House’s attention to the likely financial implications of the new clause, given that part 1 of the Leveson inquiry cost in excess of £5 million. In disagreeing with Amendments 24 and 159, the House of Commons has done so on the basis of financial privilege. This was the second occasion on which the Commons has rejected—both times by a substantial majority—an amendment to the Bill on this issue. The Companion to the Standing Orders makes it clear that in such cases the Lords do not insist on their amendment.
To that extent, I therefore welcome Motion A1 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, but while Amendment 24B is clearly different in terms to Amendment 24, it none the less still seeks to bind Ministers’ hands and effectively compels the Government to proceed with part 2 of the Leveson inquiry. This is not how the Inquiries Act 2005 is intended to operate, and it is difficult to see why we should make special provision for one particular inquiry established under that Act. The 2005 Act already includes provision for changes to be made to the terms of reference of an inquiry and for the termination of an inquiry. Under the Act, the responsible Minister must consult the chair of the inquiry before changing the terms of reference or terminating the inquiry and must then notify Parliament.
In the same way as a Minister of the Crown is best placed to decide whether to establish an inquiry under the 2005 Act, we believe that the responsible Minister is also best placed to determine the public interest both for and against the continuation of an inquiry. Accordingly, we should not now be putting in place additional hurdles over and above those already set out in the 2005 Act.
I want to stress that, in putting forward Motion A, the Government’s case goes wider than simply one of cost. As I argued on Report, the Government are firmly of the view that, given the extent of the criminal investigations related to this issue that have taken place since the Leveson inquiry was established, and given the implementation of the recommendations following part 1, including reforms within the police and the press, it is appropriate that we now consider whether proceeding with part 2 of the inquiry is appropriate, proportionate and in the public interest.
It is for this reason that we launched a consultation on 1 November to help inform our further consideration of this issue. That consultation closed on 10 January, and it is estimated that we have received more than 140,000 individual responses as well as a petition estimated to contain more than 130,000 signatures. Noble Lords will be aware that an application has been made to judicially review the consultation. While I cannot comment on the ongoing legal proceedings, the Government have committed not to take any final decisions relating to the consultation until these legal proceedings have concluded.
Given the process that we have set in train for considering whether to proceed with Leveson part 2, and the fact that further legislation is not required should we decide to proceed with the inquiry, I put it to noble Lords that there are further good grounds for not continuing to press these amendments. As I have said, the elected House has already rejected an amendment on this issue on two separate occasions. I put it to noble Lords that we should not now send back to the Commons a revised amendment which would simply invite a further rejection. I beg to move.
Motion A1 (as an amendment to Motion A)
Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve
At end insert “and do propose Amendments 24B and 24C in lieu—
“Public inquiries into police conduct etc: requirement for approval for termination or changes
(1) A Minister of the Crown may not terminate, or change the terms of reference of, a relevant inquiry unless—
(a) each House of Parliament approves a proposal laid by the Minister for the termination or change, and
(b) the chair of the inquiry consents in writing.
(2) In subsection (1), “relevant inquiry” means an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 whose terms of reference include matters relating to police conduct connected with the press industry.”
“( ) section (Public inquiries into police conduct etc: requirement for approval for termination or changes),”
Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve (CB)
My Lords, we have been on this terrain a number of times. I understand the Minister’s objection that there should not be a charge on public funds. Therefore, these amendments do not propose any charge on public funds that has not already been agreed by Parliament. I therefore think that that reason does not now hold.
We know that the status quo is unacceptable and that the form of press regulation that we now have is unstable and needs to be clear in supporting freedom of speech and the future possibility of democratic debate. That is a wider question and I will not go into the details here.
However, there is a second procedural issue which the Minister needs to address. When Parliament has already reached agreement, as it has on this matter, surely it is not acceptable to have a retrospective consultation. Consultation should take place before Parliament determines a matter. In this case, the consultation is retrospective. For that reason, we should not leave matters as they are. I beg to move.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, I support the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill of Bengarve. If anybody is in any doubt about the need for Leveson 2, which was intended to be an inquiry into the potential for corrupt practice between the police and the press, let me say that, with the former Prime Minister, David Cameron, the then leader of the Opposition, Ed Miliband, and the former Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, I met with the family of Milly Dowler. The Sunday before that series of meetings took place, Mr Dowler received a phone call from Surrey Police to tell him that the News of the World had told Surrey Police at the time of Milly Dowler’s disappearance that it had hacked into Milly Dowler’s voicemail and retrieved information from it. Surrey Police did nothing at all to prosecute the News of the World over that issue, and it was only the day before that series of meetings that Surrey Police told Mr Dowler that it had known all along that the News of the World had hacked into Milly Dowler’s voicemail. This is the sort of matter that we have not got to the bottom of yet, and Leveson 2 should be held in order to establish what happened.
On financial privilege, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill of Bengarve. Parliament has already committed to the expenditure for Leveson 2; the amendment simply says that it is Parliament itself that should decide that that money should not be spent. The amendment would not involve additional money which has not previously been committed.
However, there is an issue with the wording of the amendment. Our reading of the amendment, if correct, suggests that as the chair of the inquiry, Lord Justice Leveson could override the view of both Houses of Parliament, in that if both Houses voted not to hold Leveson 2 but Lord Justice Leveson himself disagreed with that, the inquiry would still go ahead. We feel that that is a defect in the amendment. Clearly, there will be an opportunity for that to be corrected if we support the amendment today and it goes to the other end, but I hope that the noble Baroness will consider that carefully in considering whether we are on firm enough ground to divide the House on the amendment.
I cannot stress strongly enough from our side how important we think Leveson 2 is and how it needs to take place. We will take every opportunity we are offered to ensure that the Government hold the Leveson 2 inquiry.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
Like, I imagine, many other Members of this House, I have received an email from Margaret Aspinall in her capacity as chairwoman of the Hillsborough Family Support Group, asking me to support this amendment. I will not repeat the terms of the email, which I believe has been widely circulated, but it is an indication of the widespread and heartfelt concern that Leveson part 2 might not proceed.
The Leveson inquiry was set up with cross-party agreement and firm commitments from the then Conservative Prime Minister that Leveson part 2 would take place. Let us be clear: Leveson part 2 was in the agreed terms of reference of the Leveson inquiry. The words in the terms of reference for part 2 conclude with:
“In the light of these inquiries, to consider the implications for the relationships between newspaper organisations and the police, prosecuting authorities, and relevant regulatory bodies—and to recommend what actions, if any, should be taken”.
When the Lords amendment on Leveson part 2 was considered in the Commons last week, the Government said that,
“given the extent of the criminal investigations into phone hacking and other illegal practices by the press that have taken place since the Leveson inquiry was established, and given the implementation of the recommendations following part 1, including reforms within the police and the press, the Government must consider whether proceeding with part 2 of the inquiry is appropriate, proportionate and in the public interest”.—[Official Report, Commons, 10/1/17; col. 247.]
Those are words with which we are uncomfortable. They sound like the words of a Government who have already decided they do not wish to proceed with part 2 and are looking for their public consultation, which has now concluded, to give them a cloak of respectability for going back on previous firm pledges that part 2 of Leveson would take place.
The inquiries under the terms of reference of Leveson part 2 have not taken place, and thus neither have we had, nor, I would suggest, if this Government think they can get away with it, will we have the considered implications, in the light of those inquiries, for the relationships between newspaper organisations and the police, prosecuting authorities and relevant regulatory bodies with recommendations on what actions, if any, should be taken, called for and provided for under the terms of reference of Leveson part 2.
The Government appear in effect to have decided that they already know what would emerge from the Leveson part 2 inquiries and, likewise, what the recommendations would be without those inquiries taking place and recommendations being made. Frankly, it begins to look as though some powerful individuals and organisations behind the scenes know that they have something to hide and are determined to stop Leveson part 2 and, with it, the prospect of it all coming out into the open.
When the Lords amendment on Leveson part 2 was considered in the Commons, the Speaker certified it as engaging financial privilege, and that is the reason the Commons has given for disagreeing with it. Whether the amendment before us today would likewise be deemed as engaging financial privilege is not something on which I have any standing. However the amendment, which I saw for the first time only at a very late stage, does say that Leveson part 2 proceeds unless both Houses of Parliament and the chairman of the inquiry agree that it should not.
We are thus in a situation where, if both Houses decided that Leveson part 2 should not proceed—I sincerely hope they would not so decide—that decision would mean nothing if the chairman of the inquiry was not of the same view. I think that however strongly we may feel that Leveson part 2 should proceed, we are in difficult territory if basically we say that the view of the chairman of an inquiry that Leveson part 2 should proceed can override a decision by both Houses of Parliament that it should not proceed, particularly when at heart the issue is whether a clear and unambiguous promise made by a Conservative Prime Minister, with cross-party agreement, that Leveson part 2 would proceed can be tossed aside. That is the kind of issue that Parliament has to address and determine.
We feel very strongly that Leveson part 2 should proceed and that cross-party agreements and associated prime ministerial promises should be honoured and not ditched by this Government. We are unhappy with the wording of the amendment. However, whatever the outcome, we will continue to pursue all credible opportunities to ensure that the pressure is maintained and that Leveson part 2 takes place.
Baroness Hollins (CB)
My Lords, many victims of phone hacking, harassment and press intrusion are relying on part 2 of Leveson to proceed and to provide answers to suspicions of corruption between the press and public officials, including the police. Many noble Lords will have received correspondence from the Hillsborough Family Support Group and from Jacqui Hames. Those letters are quite concerning and show the need for further understanding of what happened and what went wrong so that we can appreciate whether adequate measures are in place to ensure that that kind of activity does not happen again.
My family has an interest in part 2 being carried through, as promised by our previous Prime Minister. Dozens of other families and individuals have been affected and also want answers. It does seem fair that we have the inquiry. The misinformation by some newspapers leading up to the close of the consultation may indeed have led to a very large number of formulaic responses. I hope that Her Majesty’s Government will have the wisdom and moral courage to stand up for what is right in this situation and to go through with part 2. I find it very difficult to believe that financial privilege is really the reason for the current caution in this matter. I support the amendment.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, I will speak briefly to the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill. On two occasions, this House has previously considered the subject of whether Leveson 2 should proceed and, on both, came down firmly in favour of it going ahead. Whether or not the noble Baroness decides to test the opinion of the House today, it is important that the Government be reminded that your Lordships’ House is not going to let the matter drop.
Some very pertinent questions remain unanswered. I draw the House’s attention to just one of the terms of reference for Leveson 2 and the important issues that remain unresolved. The sixth term of reference is:
“To inquire into the extent of corporate governance and management failures at News International and other newspaper organisations, and the role, if any, of politicians, public servants and others in relation to any failure to investigate wrongdoing at News International”.
It is essential that, in such a vital industry as the press, the extent and nature of corporate governance and management failures be established. This is underscored by the fact that many of the leading executives are still in post, have returned to their post or retain key roles in the industry. These include the chief executive of News UK, the editor-in-chief of Associated Newspapers and the director of legal affairs at the Telegraph, who had the equivalent post at Trinity Mirror during the phone hacking scandal and its cover-up.
The questions that need addressing are as follows. First, how did it come to be that phone hacking and the unlawful blagging of personal data persisted on such an industrial scale at certain titles for so long; in the case of News UK and Trinity Mirror for at least 10 years, and for several years after journalists at both companies were first questioned by the police under Operation Glade in early 2004? Secondly, how and why was phone hacking and the unlawful blagging of personal data covered up at some of the largest newspapers, in the face of emerging evidence that executives knew about the practice and some findings and admissions in the civil courts to that effect? Thirdly, is it appropriate that no executive has lost their job over the corporate governance and management failures that took place? Has there been a cover-up of the cover-up of wrongdoing?
I will not delay the House further as I suspect noble Lords would like to move on to other matters. Suffice it so say that there are several other topics that Leveson 2 is scheduled to examine and they are of equal importance to the one I have highlighted. Leveson 2 is needed to inquire into suspicious matters affecting our police, our newspapers and our politicians. Since the completion of part 1 of Lord Leveson’s inquiry, the case for part 2 has become even stronger.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I declare an interest as a regular adviser to the press on regulatory matters. It has not yet been mentioned today, but your Lordships may wish to take into account that, since Leveson was instituted, there have been large numbers of criminal trials and civil proceedings in which the conduct of the press and the police has been on trial. I am far from convinced that the time, expense and use of judicial resources that will be required by Leveson part 2 are therefore justified. However, your Lordships do not need to decide that issue today—it is the very matter under consultation by the Secretary of State. If the Secretary of State’s answer is unsatisfactory to noble Lords, this House and the other place are perfectly entitled to, and no doubt will, reconsider the matter.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, mentioned the unsatisfactory element of the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill: that it appears to give Lord Justice Leveson a veto over the views of Parliament. I hope that when considering the consultation issues, the Secretary of State will privately talk to Sir Brian Leveson and take his view as to whether he thinks, with all of his enormous experience, that Leveson 2 would be justified. I cannot support the Motion of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill (LD)
When I was young at the Bar there used to be a judge whose concurring judgments were commendably brief—he would simply say, “I agree”. I can say that about the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—I agree with him—and would add a few words. I declare an interest because I have given evidence in the consultation on why Section 40 is, in my view, arbitrary, discriminatory and contrary to freedom of speech and should not be brought into force. I have not given evidence on the other question in the consultation to which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred, upon which many views have been expressed. I agree with what the noble Lord said about that.
As I have said again and again in debates in this House, Parliament has not shown itself to be fair minded in the way it amended two Bills in order to create a scheme to bully the newspapers into entering a regulatory framework other than the one now being admirably well conducted by Lord Justice Moses—IPSO. Contrary to what the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, has said, we now have an effective system of voluntary press regulation and the state and politicians ought to give it breathing space. I wish to make that clear.
When I was young I began believing in the philosophy of John Stuart Mill. That is why I am a Liberal. I remain a Liberal today, and that is why I am sympathetic to the Government’s position.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I shall respond first to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. He is right to assert that Sir Brian Leveson will be consulted formally in due course in his role as the inquiry chair before any decision is taken. The noble Lord also made a point about the cost and other issues that have already been addressed. Lord Justice Leveson said:
“Before leaving the Ruling, I add one further comment … If the transparent way in which the Inquiry has been conducted, the Report and the response by government and the press (along with a new acceptable regulatory regime) addresses the public concern, at the conclusion of any trial or trials, consideration can be given by everyone to the value to be gained from a further inquiry into Part 2. That inquiry will involve yet more enormous cost (both to the public purse and the participants); it will trawl over material then more years out of date and is likely to take longer than the present Inquiry which has not over focussed on individual conduct”.
On the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, about Parliament voting on part 2 of the inquiry, in fact Parliament did not vote on part 2; the inquiry was established by Ministers under the powers of the 2005 Act. Parliament voted on Section 40, but in this Motion we are talking not about Section 40, but about Leveson 2.
On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about the Government already deciding to abandon part 2, as I hope I have explained, we have not made a decision on this; we want to take a view on it as part of the ongoing consultation. It is five years since the inquiry was established and since the scope of part 2 was set. We think a consultation is needed before a decision is made on whether proceeding with part 2 of the inquiry, on either its original or its amended terms of reference, is still in the public interest. In response to the point from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, as I said, we will consult with Sir Brian Leveson formally in his role as the inquiry chair before any decision is taken.
Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply and other noble Lords who have helped illuminate the issue we recur to. The noble Lord, Lord Lester, is perhaps a little optimistic in imagining that IPSO is a model of self-regulation. Perhaps he meant to say a model of self-interested regulation. The point is that Leveson provides not regulation, but an audit of the standard of self-regulation. As we all know, IPSO has refused to have its process audited. Its so-called independent review of what it did was to terms of reference that it provided and funded by itself. Just as we think a free market requires companies that are—
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
I am sorry for interrupting the noble Baroness, but is she aware that the independent review was conducted by a very senior former Permanent Secretary?
Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve
I am aware of that and know him. I admire him and what he did in Northern Ireland. He is an admirable person. I comment just on the terms of reference.
Self-regulation is something anybody would concede can reasonably be subject to audit. We allow companies in a free market to proceed as they wish, but they have to have their accounts audited. It is no different when we say that a free press should also be willing to subject itself to proper standards of audit. That, in a sense, is the area of debate. We should be very careful to keep self-regulation distinct from audit.
Quality matters, as does Leveson 2. We will return to this terrain and I do not think this is the end of the story, but I will withdraw the Motion because it has one or two deficiencies we need to deal with. It is not at all adequate to imagine that we can deal with these matters by having a consultation after a parliamentary decision. That is essentially the reason why I feel strongly that this is not the way to go; however, I beg leave to withdraw the Motion.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
That this House do not insist on its Amendments 96 and 302, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 96A.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, when we last debated what is now Amendment 96 on Report in December, I pointed to its potentially significant financial implications. The House of Commons has disagreed with the amendment on the basis of financial privilege. Given the normal conventions of your Lordships’ House, I trust that noble Lords will not insist on it.
However, let me assure noble Lords that this is by no means the end of the matter. While, in the usual way, the House of Commons has cited financial privilege as the only reason for disagreeing with the amendment, it has never been our contention that this is the sole ground for our believing that the new clause should not be added to the Bill. The Government’s view remains that the amendment is premature in that it pre-empts the outcome of the review by Bishop James Jones into the experience of the Hillsborough families and the Government’s subsequent consideration of Bishop Jones’s findings.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and others have argued that the issue goes wider than Hillsborough. We do not dispute that, but the experience of the Hillsborough families, which will include the issue of legal representation at the original and subsequent inquests, is highly relevant to the broader question and it is right therefore that we take Bishop Jones’s current review into account in deciding this question.
As noble Lords may have seen, the review’s terms of reference were published earlier today. They state:
“The Review and Report will cover the history of the Hillsborough families’ experiences throughout the whole period, ranging from the conduct of past police investigations, through their engagement with public authorities, to the current investigations”.
The report will therefore cover a wide range of issues, including, as I have said, the families’ experiences of the various legal proceedings. Bishop James Jones will present his final report to the Home Secretary, including any points of learning that he may choose to highlight for the Home Secretary’s consideration.
It is envisaged that Bishop Jones will complete his review and produce his report in the spring of this year. I can assure the House that the Government will then give very careful consideration to his conclusions and any points of learning contained in his report.
In the knowledge that this issue remains firmly on the Government’s agenda and that there will, I am sure, be opportunities to debate it further in the light of the report, I invite the House to agree to Motion B. I beg to move.
Lord Rosser
I accept that the Commons Speaker has also certified the Lords amendment on this issue of parity of funding as engaging financial privilege and that the Commons reason for disagreeing with the amendment is that it would involve a charge on public funds. I want nevertheless to raise one or two points with the Government in light of what the Minister has said.
During consideration of the amendment in the Commons last week, the Minister there referred to the report by Bishop James Jones and said:
“Our view remains that we should await the report, expected this spring, from Bishop James Jones on the experiences of the Hillsborough families. The Opposition have argued that this issue goes beyond Hillsborough. I do not dispute that, but the experiences of the Hillsborough families will have significant relevance for other families facing different tragic circumstances, and the issue of legal representation at inquests will undoubtedly be one aspect of those experiences. Bishop James’s report will provide learning that could be of general application, so it is entirely right that we do not now seek to pre-empt his review, but instead consider this issue in the light of his conclusions”.—[Official Report, Commons, 10/1/17; col. 249.]
Those words make it pretty clear that Bishop James Jones has not been asked to look at the general issue of representation and funding at inquests where the police are represented, which was the subject of the Lords amendment. He has been asked to look at the experiences of the Hillsborough families. The Minister in the Commons stated that the report would provide learning that could be of general application.
Will the Minister say quite clearly one way or the other whether the Government consider that the terms of reference which Bishop James Jones has been given require him also to look at the issue of representation and funding at inquests generally where the police are represented? Alternatively, if the Government consider the terms of reference to be ambiguous on this point, has Bishop James Jones now been asked by the Government to address in his review the issue of representation and funding for families generally and not confine himself to the experiences of the Hillsborough families? Bearing in mind the way the Government have used the existence of the Bishop James Jones review and the forthcoming report as an argument for not going down the road of the amendment that was passed in this House, which deals with the position at inquests generally, I think there will be some concern if, when the report comes out, it is clear that it relates only to the experiences of the Hillsborough families and that the issue of whether it should or could have wider implications for representation and funding for families at inquests generally has not been considered. I would be grateful for some very clear and specific answers from the Government to all the questions I have just asked.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, I will make some brief observations. When the Government come to consider the recommendations concerning funding at inquests, I hope they will agree to the concept of parity of funding, for all the reasons that have been ventilated on previous occasions. But I repeat what I have said to your Lordships’ House before about the triggering mechanism: I do not believe that the police and crime commissioner should be the trigger for that. The coroner should be the trigger for it. There are three very brief reasons for saying that.
First, the coroner is much better placed to form a view as to the relevance and importance of the representation in question. I do not see that the police and crime commissioner would necessarily have access to the relevant information. Secondly and differently, in some inquests, where the conduct of the police or, indeed, the police and crime commissioner could itself be in question, there is a danger of a conflict of interests. Thirdly, sometimes the integrity of the decision of the commissioner will be in question. What happens when the commissioner is facing an election in short order? He or she may well make a decision influenced by the electoral consequences of that decision. All these things seem to suggest very powerfully that the trigger should be the decision of the coroner, not of the police and crime commissioner.
Lord Faulks (Con)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, seemed to suggest that the Government are using the Bishop Jones report as some sort of excuse to not respond to what is suggested by the amendment. Of course, I will hear what my noble friend has to say, but as I understand the position, the question is being considered very seriously by the Government but it would be rather strange not to consider a report of this magnitude dealing with the best-known example of a series of inquests with improved legal representation before coming to the conclusion, to which they may or may not come, that a response to the amendment is appropriate.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I thank noble Lords who have made points on this Motion. My noble friend Lord Faulks is absolutely right that the whole point of establishing an inquiry or a review—one of such magnitude on an event that will be ever seared on people’s minds; that is, the horrors of Hillsborough—is to learn the lessons of that event so that they can be applied to similar cases in the future. The noble Lord, Lord Laming, is not in the Chamber, but I was reflecting on the lessons that local authorities learned from the terrible death of Victoria Climbié at the hands of her relatives. These reviews always have that wider learning that can be applied in the future. The terms of reference do not require Bishop Jones to look wider but the learning from the review will have wider application.
I understand the point made by my noble friend Lord Hailsham about the coroner. We talked at length both in Committee and on Report about an independent assessment of these matters. Of course, for me to respond about whether or not that is the right way would pre-empt the review so I will not go there. But I hope that noble Lords find those comments helpful.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
Moved by
That this House do not insist on its Amendments 134 and 305, and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 134A and 305A in lieu.
(1) In the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 —
(a) in section 4 (putting people in fear of violence), in subsection (4)(a), for “five years” substitute “ten years”;
(b) in section 4A (stalking involving fear of violence or serious alarm or distress), in subsection (5)(a), for “five years” substitute “ten years”.
(2) In the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, in section 32 (racially or religiously aggravated harassment etc), in subsection (4)(b) (which specifies the penalty on conviction on indictment for an offence under that section which consists of a racially or religiously aggravated offence under section 4 or 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997), for “seven years” substitute “14 years”.
(3) The amendments made by this section apply only in relation to an offence committed on or after the day on which this section comes into force.
(4) Where the course of conduct constituting an offence is found to have occurred over a period of 2 or more days, or at some time during a period of 2 or more days, the offence must be taken for the purposes of subsection (3) to have been committed on the last of those days.”
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the House will recall that Amendment 134 sought to increase the maximum penalty for the more serious stalking offence, where the behaviour of the offender puts a person in fear of violence, from the current five years to 10 years. The amendment would also increase the maximum penalty for the racially or religiously aggravated version of the offence from the current 10 years to 14 years. I would like to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, but she is not in her place so I thank her in her absence, for introducing that amendment and explaining her concerns about the current maximum penalties during the debate on this amendment on Report.
The Government have reflected carefully on that debate and wish to ensure that the criminal justice system deals with these offences properly. The Government continue to keep maximum penalties under review and are ready to increase them where there is evidence that they are not sufficient to protect victims. Current sentencing practice suggests that, in the majority of cases, the maximum penalty of five years is sufficient to deal with serious stalking. In a small number of the most serious cases, however, courts have sentenced near to the current maximum. For those most serious cases, we are persuaded that judges should be able to pass a higher sentence than the current five-year maximum. This would afford greater protection to victims and be commensurate with the serious harm caused by these cases. The Government therefore tabled Amendment 134A, to which the Commons agreed, which replicates with some fine tuning the provisions of the noble Baroness’s amendment.
However, we are going further. As I said during debate on Report, we are keen to retain consistency between penalties for related offences. The Commons amendment in lieu will also therefore increase the maximum penalty for the related Section 4 harassment offence of putting a person in fear of violence. In line with standard practice, Amendment 134A also provides that the increase in maximum penalties for these offences will apply only to crimes committed on or after the date of commencement. As the Commons amendment in lieu builds on Lords Amendment 134, I trust that in the absence of the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, the whole House will be content with the substitution. I therefore beg to move.
Viscount Hailsham
My Lords, I am sorry to say that I really disagree with my noble friend on this matter. There is absolutely no justification for increasing the maximum sentence, and I have two reasons for saying that. First, I do not believe that the increase will provide an additional deterrent. Either the person in question is rational, in which case a maximum sentence of five years is a sufficient deterrent, or they are not rational, in which case it will make precious little difference. I note my noble friend’s point that the judges have rarely sentenced at the higher end of the existing maximum. My other point is a general one. I am very concerned about overcrowding in prisons. There has been a tendency to increase the sentences imposed by the courts. The newspapers and Parliament are responsible for that in part, and I do not wish to see Parliament increasing the pressure on our prisons. This is a small contribution to that, and I am bound to say I am against it.
Lord Pearson of Rannoch (UKIP)
My Lords, I notice that in Amendment 134A the proposal is to increase the penalty from seven to 14 years for what is described as an offence,
“which consists of a racially or religiously aggravated offence under section 4 … of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997”.
Before we agree to this increase in the penalty, will the Minister enlighten us about what, particularly, a religiously motivated offence might be? Specifically—and I have asked this before in Written Questions and had unsatisfactory Answers from the Government—could such an offence be caused by a Christian preaching the supreme divinity of Christ and therefore denying the supremacy of Muhammad? Would various assembled Muslims be free to regard that as a religiously aggravated offence under this section?
Lord Rosser
I shall be very brief and say that, unlike, apparently, some noble Lords, we welcome the Commons Amendment.
Baroness Afshar (CB)
My Lords, I shall make a clarification. Muslims accept all religions that preceded Islam and accept all the texts that preceded it. Therefore, there would be no likelihood of such an event occurring.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, to address the point made by my noble friend Lord Hailsham about the maximum penalties and overcrowding in prisons, the prison population has remained relatively stable since 2010. The Justice Secretary is clear that she wants to see more early intervention and a reduction in reoffending. To that end, we have launched a White Paper outlining our plans to make prisons places of safety and reform, and we have announced a comprehensive review of our probation system.
On the point that the noble Lord, Lord Pearson of Rannoch, made, I fear I will disappoint him again. It is a matter for the court and the CPS to determine the points that he makes.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
That this House do not insist on its Amendments 136 to 142 and 307, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 136A.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the elected House has disagreed with these Lords amendments by a substantial majority of 100. In inviting this House not to insist on these amendments, the Government recognise that there are legitimate concerns about the operation of the victims’ code—I stress that—and that there is scope for improvement, but I put it to noble Lords that seeking to shoehorn these new clauses into the Bill when they have not had the benefit of detailed scrutiny either in this House or in the other place is not an appropriate way forward. This House rightly prides itself on its effective scrutiny of legislation. In the case of these amendments, however, we have had what amounts to, at best, a short Second Reading-style debate on the case for strengthening victims’ rights.
While the underlying objective of these amendments—namely, improving the experience of victims and witnesses in the criminal justice system—is one we can all wholeheartedly support, the Government continue to have serious concerns regarding their substance. I welcome the fact that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, now wishes to focus on just two amendments rather than on all seven new clauses added to the Bill on Report but, as with the others, we foresee a number of problems with Amendments 137 and 138. I thank her for meeting me yesterday, together with the noble Lords, Lord Paddick, Lord Rosser and Lord Tunnicliffe, but, as we discussed in relation to Amendment 137, the victims’ code—a statutory code of practice—includes a wide range of entitlements for victims of crime, including being entitled to receive information on their case. For example, under the code, victims should be informed about: the police investigation, such as if a suspect is arrested and charged and any bail conditions imposed; if a suspect is to be prosecuted or given an out-of-court disposal; the time, date, location and outcome of any court hearings; and any appeal by an offender against his or her conviction or sentence.
Baroness Brinton
Leave out from “136” to end and insert “and 139 to 142, and do insist on its Amendments 137, 138 and 307.”
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister and her predecessor, the noble Baroness, Lady Chisholm of Owlpen, for being available for meetings and discussions during the passage of the Bill. I am very grateful for their assistance.
I can think of no better way to start the debate on the victims’ code and support for victims than to pay tribute to Jill Saward, who died two weeks ago. I extend my sympathy to her husband Gavin and her family on her untimely death at the age of 51. Jill was the first person to waive her anonymity having been the victim of a brutal rape and sexual assault in 1986, and her photograph was all over the Sun newspaper just days after the incident, something that is perhaps pertinent to our debate earlier about Leveson 2. The judge in the case sought to justify giving the defendant who did not take part in the rape a longer sentence than those who did by saying that Jill’s trauma,
“had not been so great”.
Two years later she led the campaign for anonymity for victims from the moment of assault, but chose to waive her own right to anonymity and published her account, Rape: My Story, an incredible, hard-hitting and moving book.
She was a brilliant and dedicated campaigner as well as a wise counsellor. Until she died, most people never knew how many victims of assault, rape, stalking or domestic violence were contacted by her privately, and she supported them through their experience. I know that Jill provided considerable support for Claire Waxman, a survivor of repeated stalking and the founder of Voice4Victims, in her campaign to inform Ministers and parliamentarians of failings in the current system, which has resulted in the amendments that have been put before your Lordships’ House and another place.
In the Commons consideration of Lords amendments last week, the Minister said:
“These amendments ignore the extensive reforms and modernisation we are undertaking to transform our justice system … The amendments would result in an unstructured framework of rights and entitlements that is not founded on evidence of gaps or deficiencies … Some amendments are unnecessary because they duplicate existing provisions and practices, or are being acted on by the Government already … We are looking at the available information about compliance with the victims code and considering how it might be improved and monitored.”.—[Official Report, Commons, 10/1/17; cols. 249-50.]
The reason I raise this is that we feel very strongly because the Conservative manifesto 2015 said:
“We have already introduced a new Victims’ Code and taken steps to protect vulnerable witnesses and victims. Now we will strengthen victims’ rights further, with a new Victims’ Law that will enshrine key rights for victims”.
That is what the amendments we have set before your Lordships’ House today are intended to do. Apart from the fact that the Minister seemed to contradict himself somewhat during that debate, we are clear that, although the victims’ code gives victims entitlement to support, it does not ensure that that support is provided by the agencies. It is the lack of statutory duty for the agencies and the criminal justice system that is the problem.
The Code of Practice for Victims of Crime uses the words “should” and “may” repeatedly when talking about the services while, when it is talking about victims, it talks about entitlement. It is that gap that the amendments are intended to resolve. The results of that gap are all too evident. Do not take my word for it. The criminal justice joint inspection report, Meeting the Needs of Victims in the Criminal Justice System, states that,
“there were some excellent individual examples of good practice across criminal justice sectors”,
but that,
“there were unacceptable inconsistencies in the service provided to victims—depending on the type of offence, where they lived or the degree to which local policy support and reinforce service provision. Given that the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime … provides a standard which should transcend all these variables, there is clearly more work to do”.
Last year, the Public Accounts Committee published a report on the needs of victims and a victims’ law, stating:
“The … system is bedevilled by long standing poor performance including delays and inefficiencies, and costs are being shunted from one part of the system to another … The … system is not good enough at supporting victims and witnesses … Timely access to justice is too dependent on where victims and witnesses live … There is insufficient focus on victims, who face a postcode lottery in their access to justice due to the significant variations in performance”.
The Victims’ Commissioner, the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, in her report of January 2015, said that almost 75% of respondents to her survey of victims consulted during the review were unhappy with the response they received, and over 50% found the relevant agency’s complaints process difficult to use.
I am very grateful for the Minister’s statement that there is work to do on the victims’ code. Since the amendments started their passage through Parliament, Voice4Victims has been flooded with new issues raised by victims on the process failing them, not just the reason why those families and individuals were victims. Ivy, who was 45, was encouraged to report to the police ongoing sexual violence by her partner. She did so, but the officer said that he did not believe her. A second officer dismissed her claims and said that she was overreacting. Later, she was further violently assaulted by her partner, including suffering broken ribs and severe bruising. At the following multiagency meeting, she was told by the police that she was now assessed as being at high risk of being murdered. To cut a long story short, she had to move 170 miles away from her home. The victim had to move because the police could not guarantee her safety. Victims are being let down by the system.
I thank the Minister for the statement she made earlier. The key points to satisfy me not to call for a vote on my amendment are that we need to undertake a review within a timescale. I am grateful for the review that is to report back within 12 months. As important, I am grateful to the Minister for saying that she will ensure that any review will make sure that there is a statutory responsibility for the fulfilling of duties by the agencies and that appropriate training and services delivered are monitored. Victims—from Jill Saward, 30 years ago, who started the movement for victim support, right through to Ivy and the many others around her today—deserve better, and they deserve action soon. I beg to move.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I rise to support my noble friend Lady Brinton and associate those on our Benches with her remarks on Jill Saward. The Minister acknowledged in her remarks that there are legitimate concerns about the victims’ code, and that is why there was a Conservative Party manifesto commitment for a new victims’ law to ensure that the victims’ code is given effect. That is what my noble friend is trying to achieve through the amendment. We trust that the Government’s review will result in more effective protection for victims and more compliance by the police and the other agencies with the victims’ code. If the Minister can give that commitment, we will be prepared to accept the Government’s intention to ensure that the victims’ code is not simply a matter of words but will have some effect and that victims will be better cared for by those agencies in the criminal justice system.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, we, too, support the objectives behind the amendment that was moved so eloquently by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for the reasons that she herself set out. We also associate ourselves with the comments made by the noble Baroness about Jill Saward.
The issue is that the current victims’ code is not legally enforceable and there is clear evidence that it is not being applied and acted on by the relevant agencies to the extent that was clearly intended—to the detriment of the victims it was intended to help. The amendment provides for victims’ rights to be placed on a statutory footing and for the Secretary of State to address the issue of training for all relevant professionals and agencies on the impact of crime on victims.
I share the view that the Government, in the statement made by the Minister today, have been considerably more helpful and constructive in their response than they were during consideration of the Lords amendment in the Commons last week.
Finally, I, too, express my thanks to the Minister for her willingness to meet us. I hope that we have reached a stage at which there will be some accord on this issue.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I do not think that there was a lack of accord. In fact the whole way through these discussions I felt that we were seeking the same ends; it was just a matter of how we got there. I add my tribute to that of the noble Baroness to Jill Saward. I read about her the other day, and what she went through was absolutely heart-breaking as well as devastating while her father and then fiancé were downstairs. How she gathered the strength to not only waive her right to anonymity but help so many other people is quite inspiring and not something that everybody would feel able to do.
Following discussions today, yesterday and previously, we have reached a consensus on this and I hope that the words that I read out have given noble Lords confidence as we move forward to publishing this strategy within the next 12 months. I thank all noble Lords for their part in this debate.
Baroness Brinton
I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, and thank again the Minister for the words that she said from the Dispatch Box, which meet my concerns at the moment. I shall be interested to see the result of the review and consultation. If we feel that there is not strong enough legislation coming through afterwards, I suspect that more amendments will appear in further course. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the Motion.
Royal Assent
Tuesday 31st January 2017
(7 years, 11 months ago)
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