Lord Paddick
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Policing and Crime Bill
Lord Paddick ExcerptsWednesday 26th October 2016
(8 years ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 55-II(b) Amendments for Committee, supplementary to the second marshalled list (PDF, 62KB) - (26 Oct 2016)
Lord Rosser (Lab)
My Lords, the amendment requires the Secretary of State to make a statutory provision for the fire and rescue services in England to lead and co-ordinate the emergency service response to serious flooding.
Part 2 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 sets out the statutory core functions of fire and rescue authorities: fire safety, firefighting, and rescuing people and protecting them from harm in the event of road traffic accidents. The 2004 Act also gives the Secretary of State the power to give fire and rescue authorities functions relating to other emergencies, including outside the fire and rescue authority’s area. This is an order-making power and does not require primary legislation.
There is thus no statutory duty on the fire and rescue services for emergencies arising from flooding, yet flooding is on the increase. Government figures show that in 2007 there were 14,000 flooding calls; in 2011-12 there were 16,000; and in 2013-14 there were 18,000. I also sense that the extent of flooding is becoming more serious. The Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service said that on Boxing Day last year it deployed two-thirds of its available resources on flood response. The 2008 Pitt review into the 2007 floods said that a statutory duty would be beneficial and recommended that the Government should urgently put in place a fully funded national capability for flood rescue, with fire and rescue authorities playing a leading role underpinned as necessary by a statutory duty.
The case for a statutory duty on the fire and rescue services is now stronger than it was in 2008, with more and more flood calls but fewer staff, less equipment and fewer fire stations. In parts of the United Kingdom there is already a statutory duty on flooding, namely in Scotland since April 2013 and Northern Ireland since January 2012. A statutory duty would assist in adding to the resilience of fire and rescue services when faced with flooding, assist with strategic planning between fire and rescue services and local resilience forums, and underscore the need to resource fire and rescue services specifically for flooding.
The Government’s approach to date appears to be that there is no need for a statutory duty because the fire and rescue services will turn up as necessary anyway even though it is not a statutory core function. On the basis of that argument one might as well remove all the existing statutory core functions of the fire and rescue services on the basis that they will turn up anyway. The reality is that additions are made to statutory functions to reflect changing circumstances.
The fire service has been rescuing people from road traffic crashes for decades, but it was felt that a statutory duty was needed and the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 addressed that. The fire service had been providing fire protection for centuries, but a statutory duty was introduced in 1947. Now is surely the time to introduce a statutory duty on flooding to reflect and recognise the vastly increased role of the fire and rescue services in this area of emergency provision. The Government talk about the need to reform our emergency services and bring them up to date. Perhaps the Government need to do the same for the statutory functions of the fire and rescue services. I beg to move.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, while I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, on a statutory core function or a statutory duty on flooding for the fire and rescue service, we are a little concerned about the wording of his amendment which reads:
“The Secretary of State shall make provision for the fire and rescue services in England to lead and co-ordinate the emergency service response”.
It is accepted practice among all the emergency services that the police co-ordinate during the emergency phase of any emergency, whether flooding or anything else, partly because there is a duty on the police to investigate. For example, one can imagine a scenario where flooding is caused by a criminal act. It is generally accepted practice and has been for many years that the police service should lead and co-ordinate in every emergency situation. That is slightly different from what the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is saying in terms of the fire and rescue services having a statutory core function or duty but we do not believe that that should be to lead and co-ordinate in the case of flooding.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, if I say this at the beginning of the afternoon, I hope I will not have to repeat it, but I declare an interest as having been a member of the police service for 30 years. In moving Amendment 124, I will also speak to the other amendment in this group, Amendment 127.
Clause 12 allows a police and crime commissioner—or the Mayor’s Office for Policing And Crime in relation to the Metropolitan Police district, or the Common Council in relation to the City of London police area—to choose to take on direct responsibility for receiving and recording complaints against the police and keeping the complainant informed of progress.
The problem here is that this may further confuse the public about who they should complain to. People are already unsure whether they should complain to a local police station, to the IPCC or to a third party. This change will inevitably mean that in some parts of the country, the complaint needs to be made to the police and crime commissioner—the local policing authority, to use a generic term—who will then deal with the complaint and keep the complainant informed. In other cases, it will be the police service itself, depending on whether the local policing authority takes up the offer provided by the legislation to take on the handling of complaints.
The idea of giving local policing authorities responsibility for complaints against the police, as opposed to the chief officer, is a good one. It will introduce a further element of independence into the police complaints system, but allowing local policing authorities simply the option—and indeed allowing local policing authorities to be persuaded by their chief constable not to take responsibility away from her or him—appears to me to be a fudge. Indeed, the more a chief constable tries to persuade his or her PCC not to take away the responsibility, the more the PCC should resist such pressure, in my opinion. This amendment would require the local policing authority to take over these statutory responsibilities, to ensure independence and clarity for the public.
I turn to Amendment 127. Clause 22 inserts into Section 23 of the Police Reform Act 2002, titled “Regulations”, a new paragraph which gives local policing authorities the power,
“to delegate the exercise or performance of powers and duties conferred or imposed on them”,
in relation to the handling of complaints against police. In a subsequent subsection, which inserts new paragraphs into the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, the expression used is to “arrange” for another person,
“to exercise a function that the police and crime commissioner has”.
Although the Explanatory Notes give reassurance that liability remains at the top, Amendment 127 is intended to probe why there is a difference in the wording between the two different subsections and to ensure that the delegation of powers and duties does not include delegation of responsibility. I beg to move Amendment 124.
Lord Bach (Lab)
My Lords, I declare my interest as a police and crime commissioner, for Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland. I will say a few words about this very interesting amendment, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, neither to praise it nor to condemn it, but just to tell the Committee something that it is probably aware of anyway. I suspect I speak for other police and crime commissioners as well when I say that as we speak here, we are considering which way to go, given the possibilities that the Bill opens up for us in terms of complaints. It is very interesting that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, suggests that we should not have that option but should be compelled, as it were, to take all complaints at a low level and consider them. I am not so sure he is right—I do not know. I think there may in the end be a tendency among a number of police and crime commissioners, once the Bill is an Act and this legislation is law, to not take full responsibility for all complaints. I am not quite sure what the Government would like in this case: it may be that they really do not have a preference, and it would be interesting to hear from the Minister whether they do or not.
I have to tell the noble Lord that the chief constable in my patch has done absolutely nothing up until now to try and persuade me not to take the full gamut, but it may be different elsewhere. It is an interesting debate and I look forward very much to hearing what the Minister has to say. I suspect, if the Bill remains as it does up until it becomes an Act, then police and crime commissioners around the country will be doing different things.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I will correct this if I am wrong. While I am not guessing, I am assuming that, particularly where you have the model with a mayoral PCC as well, the mayoral precept will enable some of those mayoral functions. On the additional resources, I would like to write to the noble Lord before Report as I would not want to say something to the Committee now that simply was not true.
Amendment 127 to Clause 22 relates to the ability of PCCs to delegate their complaints-related function. The amendment seeks to clarify the difference in language in the subsections of the clause, and I am happy to do that.
The reason for the difference in language between the subsections is that it aims to replicate the language already used in the corresponding Acts. Although subsection (1) uses different language to that in subsections (2) to (4), the policy intention and result is the same. Local policing authorities should and will be able to delegate their complaints-related functions. Regardless of whether any complaints-related functions have been delegated, the local policing body will retain ultimate responsibility for the complaints performance in its area. This follows the same model as chief constables delegating their complaints responsibilities to more junior ranks, where the chief constable is still ultimately responsible for the outcome.
I hope that those comments have reassured noble Lords and that the noble Lord will feel happy to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation on Amendment 127, which is a probing amendment. I am not as enthusiastic about her response to Amendment 124, and I am grateful that we have the noble Lord, Lord Bach, here as a living, breathing police and crime commissioner who can bring his experience to this. I have to say that, bringing my experience as a police officer, I believe that there would be great benefit if there was one system that members of the public knew and could rely on. For example, it would be of great benefit to the public if the decision on whether complaints were investigated was taken out of the hands of the police.
The Minister said that the purpose of the new provision was to restore trust. If the purpose is to restore trust and a PCC decides not to take up the offer, what are the constituents in a PCC’s area to think about that? However, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I fear it will be like this for the rest of the afternoon. Amendment 124A is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, and I shall speak to the other amendment in the group, Amendment 124B.
Clause 14 amends Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002 in relation to keeping complainants—people who have complained about the police—informed of the progress of the investigation of their complaint. Subsection (3) substitutes the matters contained within it for those matters that subsection (3) of the 2002 Act required the complainant to be kept informed about. Basically, subsection (3) sets out what the complainant needs to be kept abreast of. One of the matters in the 2002 Act was to keep the complainant informed of,
“any provisional findings of the person carrying out the investigation”.
This requirement is no longer listed in the new subsection (3), and the amendment is to probe why it is no longer a requirement. Amendment 124B relates to the substitution of subsection (9) in Section 21 of the 2002 Act made by Clause 14(7), which again omits “any provisional findings” from the requirements in the 2002 Act. I beg to move.
Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)
My Lords, I understand absolutely the objective of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and I have a lot of sympathy with what he is trying to get at. However, perhaps there is also need to look at the extent to which the public who have been victims of crime are also kept informed of the progress of investigations into those crimes. In exactly the same principles that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has outlined in terms of complaints against police officers, ought they perhaps also be applied to people who have been victims of crime?
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am very grateful to noble Lords for their contribution to this short debate. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Blair of Boughton. It could be that giving “provisional findings”, which are not the ultimate findings, could create a false sense of expectation in the complainant and so forth. However, the question was around not whether that should be there but the reason for it being there. As the noble Lord, Lord Blair, said, there may be a sensible reason for taking it out in the new legislation, but I failed to hear a sensible reason for why it was formerly in primary legislation but will no longer be. Perhaps between now and Report we may be able to unearth that reason. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
“(aa) the complainant (who must be questioned as to whether he wishes the complaint to be recorded) does not indicate a wish that it not be recorded, or”
Lord Paddick
My Lords, Amendment 125 is tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I shall speak also to Amendment 126. In Schedule 5, Part 1 of Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2000 is amended after sub–paragraph (6) by inserting a new sub-paragraph (6A) in relation to when a complaint against police must be recorded. It states that a complaint must be recorded if,
“at any time the complainant indicates a wish for the complaint to be recorded”.
Our amendment adds a requirement that the complainant must be asked whether he wishes the complaint to be recorded and states that unless he positively indicates that he does not wish the complaint to be recorded, it must be recorded.
From a wealth of personal experience in this area, I know that it is very easy for a complainant to be misled, albeit unintentionally, about whether his complaint will be formally recorded or even to be dissuaded from having a legitimate complaint recorded. The current wording gives the police or the local policing body, if it takes over responsibility, the ability not to record a complaint unless the complainant specifically asks that it be recorded. If the police inspector at the front counter tells the complainant not to worry but to leave it to him as he will have a word with the officer concerned and there is no specific request that the complaint be recorded, it could result in a complaint not being recorded when the complainant believes that it has been. This amendment is designed to reduce the chance of that happening.
Amendment 126 relates to a different issue: the conduct of chief officers of police. Part 3 of Schedule 5 is intended to require the referral of all complaints and matters concerning the conduct of chief officers to the Independent Police Complaints Commission by inserting new paragraphs into Part 3 of Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002. They provide new powers to enable the Secretary of State to specify in regulations that the IPCC must independently investigate all complaints, recordable conduct matters, and deaths and serious injury matters which relate to the conduct of a chief officer or the Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police.
Assistant commissioners of the Metropolitan Police wear the same badge of rank as, and are considered to be at least the equivalent of, chief constables or chief officers. In fact, they are paid at the highest rate of chief officer, with the exception of the commissioner and deputy commissioner of the Met, a salary equivalent to that of the chief constables of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, Police Scotland, the West Midlands Police and Greater Manchester Police. The assistant commissioner of the City of London Police wears the insignia of, and is considered equivalent to, a deputy chief officer and is outside the scope of this provision and the amendment. Will the Minister explain why assistant commissioners of the Metropolitan Police are not included with the deputy commissioner of the Metropolitan Police as officers complaints about whom must be referred to the IPCC? Our amendments would add assistant commissioners of the Metropolitan Police to the list of compulsory referrals. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for explaining the purpose of the two amendments. The handling of complaints about the police must be customer-focused, simple to understand and transparent throughout. It is widely accepted that the current system is confusing, complicated and, in many cases, unclear. Through the reforms made in the Bill, we are ensuring that cases are dealt with quickly and effectively, for the benefit not just of the public but of officers who have done nothing wrong. Many forces already currently operate customer service teams through which all complaints about the force are filtered and whereby they try to resolve quality-of-service issues as soon as possible. The reforms in the Bill explicitly provide for that sort of model and try to make it as bureaucracy free and straightforward as appropriate.
The evidence is that this approach works. In Derbyshire in 2014-15, for example, 47% of issues raised about the force were handled outside of the formal complaints system. In Northumbria, where the triage team sits in the office of the police and crime commissioner, 36% of issues raised about the force in the first six months of 2014 were handled in this manner, with 92% of complainants happy with how their issue was handled—and this is increasing. The Government want to encourage forces and local policing bodies such as PCCs to adopt this more customer-focused approach and to resolve as many complaints as possible quickly, simply and to the complainant’s satisfaction through this route. Amendment 125 would require complainants explicitly to confirm that they were content for the force or PCC to seek a customer service solution to their issue outside of the formal complaints system. I put it to the noble Lord that this approach risks limiting what forces can achieve through informal resolution.
The Government believe that this confirmation process would lead to fewer issues being dealt with in this way and, contrary to the policy intent, increase the number dealt with in the formal system. We think it right that, unless the complainant has offered an alternative view or the complaint falls into one of the categories outlined in the legislation for why this form of resolution is inappropriate—I shall discuss the safeguards shortly—the force or PCC should first have the opportunity to draw on their experience to seek to resolve the matter through its own customer service processes. I reassure the noble Lord that the Bill includes extensive provisions to ensure the complainant is in control in this process and that forces can resolve issues outside of the complaints system only when it is appropriate to do so.
There is a clear expectation on PCCs, with their new explicit responsibility for oversight of the complaints system locally, as provided for in Clause 21, to ensure clear communication is provided to complainants about their rights when they make a complaint and how the process will work. This includes explaining that, if at any point a complainant wants his or her complaint to be recorded, it will be recorded. If the force pursues a customer service solution that falls short of the complainant’s view on what constitutes a satisfactory resolution, they can request that the complaint be recorded and handled formally. There is a statutory duty at the outset of a complaint to contact the complainant to understand how the complaint might be best resolved. Statutory guidance will also make clear that, 10 days after receipt of a complaint, it should be formally recorded, even if a customer service approach may have been proportionate. This is to ensure that this form of resolution is limited to only those issues that can be resolved quickly. Beyond that, if there is any indication that the complaint might result in disciplinary or criminal proceedings, or might meet the criteria for mandatory referral to the IPCC, it must be recorded.
Finally, there will also be a requirement on forces, to be detailed in regulations or secondary legislation, to keep some information on the issues they resolve outside of the formal complaints system—the name of the complainant, the issue, and how it was resolved. This will allow PCCs locally to scrutinise those data and HM Inspectorate of Constabulary to inspect the robustness of the decision-making of forces in deciding what is suitable for an informal resolution. Given these safeguards, we are satisfied that there is no need for an explicit requirement that the complainant must agree at the outset to an issue being resolved informally. Ultimately, the priority for most complainants is that their complaint is dealt with to their satisfaction and as quickly as possible.
I turn to Amendment 126. The complaints and discipline system is designed on the premise that, unless matters are of exceptional seriousness and sensitivity and are therefore referred to the IPCC, they should be dealt with—in accordance with the legislation—within the force’s chain of command. The exception is where there is no ultimate senior officer, such as would arise where a complaint is made against a chief constable. In these cases, most complaints are investigated by the IPCC but some may end up being investigated by chief constables of other forces. In his independent review of the police disciplinary system in England and Wales, Chip Chapman recommended that all such investigations should be undertaken by an independent body. The Government agree with this recommendation and that is why the Bill introduces a new regulation-making power that will require complaints regarding the conduct of chief officers to be referred to the IPCC to determine whether it should conduct an independent investigation or direct an investigation. However, although the rank of Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service is one of the highest ranks in England and Wales, there is no need to include it in the proposed measure because it can be reasonably expected that the commissioner or deputy commissioner will oversee any investigation. I hope that this clarifies the matter and that, on the basis of my explanation, the noble Lord will feel free to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. As far as Amendment 125 is concerned, I have no issue with a complainant being offered the option of informal resolution or a “customer service solution”—I never heard of that when I was in the police service; it shows how things have moved on—or a formal complaint. The problem we keep encountering in this House is the Government saying, “Well, it’s going to be be in statutory guidance and of course, in practice, if it’s a serious complaint or something that should be recorded, it will be recorded”. Unfortunately, the real world is not quite as ideal as the Minister makes out.
As far as Amendment 126 is concerned, I was with the noble Baroness until she said that matters needed to be referred to the IPCC where there was no ultimate senior officer. Quite clearly, in the case of the Deputy Commissioner of the Met, which is a specific rank for which any complaints have to be referred to the IPCC, there clearly is an ultimate senior officer: the Commissioner of the Met. Unfortunately, the explanation given by the noble Baroness does not help me to understand why the Deputy Commissioner of the Met is specifically mentioned.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
Perhaps I can explain a bit further. While new paragraph 5(1)(a) of Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002, inserted by Schedule 5 to the Bill, does cover the Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service, this is because, in the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012, the deputy commissioner is treated in the same way as the commissioner. The Secretary of State is responsible for appointing the investigator of any conduct matter relating to both the commissioner and deputy commissioner. There is no mechanism to allow investigations into the deputy commissioner to be conducted internally. I hope that I have not confused the noble Lord further; I am just seeking to clarify the position.
Lord Swinfen (Con)
Will my noble friend look at the practicality of the matter, which has been so well explained?
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am very grateful to those who have contributed to this short debate and to the Minister. As regards the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Blair, my reading of this is that it concerns complaints against the commissioner himself rather than vicarious liability responsibility—which, of course, the commissioner carries for all his officers. The clue lies in the fact that the legislation goes on to talk about “death or serious injury” matters—not that the commissioner is known for using physical violence against people.
Lord Bach
I am so sorry to interrupt again. I wonder whether there is a proper distinction between a complaint per se and a complaint that may be laid vicariously at the commissioner’s or chief constable’s door. Who will make that distinction when the complaint comes in? It will add to the existing bureaucracy and is another reason for listening very carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Blair, suggested a minute or two ago.
Lord Paddick
I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bach, and I will leave it to the Government to respond. The deputy commissioner of the Met was, at least at one stage, considered to be a first among equals among assistant commissioners. I will have to read the second part of the Minister’s explanation on that issue. As regards the other matter, again, I will want to read carefully what the Minister said—but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, in moving Amendment 126A, which is also in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, I will speak to Amendment 165A in this group.
Clause 18 deals with sensitive information received by the IPCC and restrictions on disclosing that information. It amends Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002 by inserting new Clause 21A, subsection (3) of which defines sensitive information as including,
“information obtained from a government department which, at the time it is provided to the Commission or the paragraph 18 investigator, is identified by the department as information the disclosure of which may, in the opinion of the relevant authority … cause damage to national security, international relations or the economic interests of the United Kingdom or any part of the United Kingdom”.
When this House recently considered the Investigatory Powers Bill, where matters were considered to be related to the economic interests of the United Kingdom it was made explicit that these were only where the economic interests were directly linked to national security. Amendment 126A would insert the wording,
“so far as those interests are also relevant to the interests of national security”,
to make it explicit in this Bill as well as in the Investigatory Powers Bill. Amendment 165A makes a similar change to the term “economic interests” in Clause 35, which amends Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996 in relation to the restriction on disclosure of sensitive information acquired by Her Majesty’s inspectors of constabulary. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, Clause 18 increases the protections afforded to any sensitive information that is obtained by the Independent Police Complaints Commission in the course of its investigations or by a police or National Crime Agency investigator conducting an investigation under the direction of the IPCC. Clause 18 ensures that where the IPCC or investigator receives “sensitive information” it must not disclose that information without the consent of the “relevant authority”, as defined in the clause. To assist the IPCC or investigator in fulfilling this requirement, Clause 18 places a duty on the person providing the information to make the IPCC or investigator aware that the information is sensitive and to provide enough detail to permit the identification of the appropriate “relevant authority”. Clause 35 does likewise in respect of sensitive information received by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary.
“Sensitive information” in this context means: first, that provided by or that which relates to the security and intelligence services; secondly, information derived from interception; and thirdly, information provided by a government department which may, if disclosed, cause damage to national security, international relations or the economic interests of the country or any part of it. In such instances, the government department must identify it as such when it provides the information to the IPCC or investigator. Amendments 126A and 165A seek to narrow the third part of this definition by carving out information which may cause damage to the economic interests of the UK or part of the UK, unless there is a national security link. In effect, this would mean that the IPCC, investigator or HMIC would not need the relevant authority’s consent to disclose certain economically sensitive information that could, if disclosed or handled inappropriately, have a negative economic impact on the country. The drafting approach taken in the Bill in relation to the definition of “sensitive information” is not new. The drafting simply replicates the existing definition in paragraph 19ZD of Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002, which these provisions replace.
I stress that the primary purpose of Clauses 18 and 35 is not to prevent sensitive information being provided for legitimate reasons, such as to the CPS in the event of criminal proceedings, but, rather, to protect that information and ensure that it is handled appropriately. Simply because a piece of information falls under the definition of “sensitive information” in Clauses 18 or 35, the relevant authority cannot unreasonably withhold its consent to its disclosure; it is a matter of public law that decisions made by the relevant authorities must be both reasonable and rational. The Government are simply closing a gap to provide additional certainty and reassurance around the handling of sensitive information, not to prevent any greater disclosure than is absolutely necessary.
I hope that that has clarified the matter for the noble Lord and that he is content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
I am very grateful to the Minister for that lengthy explanation, but it does not answer the question that I asked. The drafting may not be new but my understanding is that it is inconsistent with the Investigatory Powers Bill. We sought clarification and the Government agreed to put it on the face of the Bill that economic interests meant economic interests that are likely to impact on national security. It may be consistent with previous legislation but my understanding is that it is not consistent with the most recent legislation. That is the question that I hoped she would answer. I understand and accept everything that she has said; it is what is missing that is key.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
Perhaps I can provide further clarification, although I am not sure that it will clarify matters much better. Clause 18 talks about,
“the economic interests of the United Kingdom or any part of the United Kingdom”.
Clause 62 of the Investigatory Powers Bill says,
“in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom so far as those interests are also relevant to the interests of national security”.
There is a variation in the drafting of the two Bills because the provisions serve entirely different purposes. It is right that where authority is being sought to obtain communications data or to issue warrants for the purpose of the economic well-being of the UK, it should be done only where it is also relevant to the interests of national security. In Clause 18 of this Bill, the definition of “sensitive information” is intended to provide a safeguard to ensure that, whenever the IPCC handles particular types of information that originate from the security services or from government departments, it checks with the relevant authority before disclosing that information. The noble Lord does not look convinced but I hope that that has provided further clarification.
Lord Paddick
I need to improve my poker face skills. I am very grateful to the Minister for that explanation. I will read it to see whether I can get the answer to my question from what she has said, but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, in moving Amendment 128 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee I will speak also to the other amendments in the group—Amendments 129 and 130. These are probing amendments that relate to which bodies can be designated as being eligible to bring super-complaints against the police.
Bodies are to be designated by the Secretary of State through regulations. Clause 25 inserts a new Section 29B into Part 2A of the Police Reform Act 2002. Subsection (5) of new Section 29B states:
“The Secretary of State must, before making regulations under subsection (3) or (4), consult such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate”.
However, it does not require the Secretary of State to consult on subsection (1). Adding in reference to subsection (1) means that the Secretary of State would have to consult before making the regulations that designate which bodies should be capable of bringing super-complaints. Those regulations presumably will set out the criteria referred to in subsections (3) and (4). That means that there will be consultation on those as well.
Amendment 129 lists the three bodies—the Law Society of England and Wales, the National Council of Voluntary Organisations, and Citizens Advice—that, along with others as specified by the Secretary of State, would be made “authorised” persons for the purposes of subsection (2)(d). That gives them a role in designation, as they are likely to know the territory and issues involved, know their members and know which the good non-governmental organisations are, and so on.
Amendment 130 is intended to ensure that the first regulations made under subsections (1), (3) and (4) of new Section 29B are subject to the affirmative resolution process. I beg to move.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)
My Lords, this section of the Bill gives the power to designated bodies to make super-complaints to Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary. The complaints can be made where, in the opinion of those bodies, a feature of policing is harming the public and needs to be looked at.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, listed three organisations to make these super-complaints to be put on the face of the Bill. I have some sympathy with the amendments that have been put forward, but I understand that they are probing amendments. I hope that when the noble Baroness replies she can give us some indication of the organisations likely to be designated to make these complaints under the regulations. It is important that, when creating these new powers, we have some idea of what the organisations are likely to be. Are those listed in the amendment likely candidates to be designated when this comes into force, or are there others?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I do not have a timescale. I do not want to give the noble Lord false information, so it is only fair that I write to him.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am very grateful to noble Lords who have contributed to the debate, and for the response given by the Minister. I have a confession to make: I did not write the amendments. I am glad to see that everyone fell into the same trap I did. The intention of Amendment 128, whether or not it would be the effect, is for there to be consultation on the regulations, not each time an organisation is designated. It could be that it is a mistake in the drafting—I can say that because I did not draft them.
The organisations listed in Amendment 129 are suggestions as to who authorised persons should be under the Act, not who the designated bodies should be. The authorised persons are those who can make representations to the Secretary of State to have a particular body designated or removed from the list of designated bodies. That is what I believe I explained when I introduced the amendment. The list that includes the Law Society and so forth is not a list of bodies that we think should be designated, but a list of people who should be authorised persons who can then ask the Secretary of State to add or remove people from the list of designated bodies.
I will read again the view of the Delegated Powers Committee so far as Amendment 130 is concerned, but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 128.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. The second stage of Leveson is a very important stage of the investigation into the conduct of the police and the media. It is essential that it is carried out as soon as possible, bearing in mind that there may be outstanding criminal cases that need to be dealt with first.
It is understandable that a slightly one-sided picture has been given of the relationship between police and press. There are many entirely appropriate relationships between the media and press which are beneficial to the public interest. For example, appeals for witnesses to a serious crime can receive the wide publicity sometimes required only with the co-operation of the media and local press. There are searches for missing persons, where an appeal needs to be made nationally to try to identify where a vulnerable person might be. Clearly, there are examples of the opposite. Hillsborough is one. Another rather common example is where, sadly, the police brief the media casting doubt on the character of those who died at the hands of the police.
I am not saying that it is entirely a positive relationship but it is necessary for the police to have a relationship with the media. It is important to differentiate between positive and appropriate relationships and negative and entirely inappropriate ones, particularly, as happened with the phone hacking case, where there was at least the opportunity for critics of the police to suggest that their lack of enthusiasm initially to investigate phone hacking by the media might have had something to do with that too-close relationship. For those reasons, I support the amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, I, too, support the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Rosser. I agree with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I very much support the police. They do a fantastic job for us and put their lives on the line every day to keep us safe.
The noble Lord is right when he talks about the need for an appropriate relationship between the media and the police, and how important that is. Equally, as my noble friend Lord Rosser said, there are obviously times when things go wrong. Clearly what happened at Hillsborough was an absolute tragedy. Can you imagine losing a loved one on that day and then having to endure the abuse in the media which has clearly now been shown not to be true? We should pay tribute to the steely determination of the Hillsborough families to get justice for their loved ones. They not only lost them but saw their names dragged through the mud.
It is important that we get to the point where the Government can clarify that they will proceed with the second stage of Leveson. There are some nuances between the statement we had from the previous Prime Minister and what we had from this Dispatch Box more recently. That difference might just be a few words which mean nothing at all, but we need to be clear that this should go ahead and that the Government are determined that any prosecution dealing with this will proceed.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, in moving Amendment 132 I will speak also to our Amendments 135, 136 and 137 in this group and in support of Amendments 133 and 134, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.
Clause 27 relates to investigations by the IPCC of concerns raised by whistleblowers and inserts a new Part 2B into the Police Reform Act 2002. If we were asking for this clause to not stand part of the Bill, it would be a case of 2B or not 2B—but that is not what we are asking for. I am just checking to see whether noble Lords are awake. New Section 29D of the 2002 Act defines a whistleblower as a person who,
“raises a concern … about a police force or a person serving with the police”,
and who is,
“under the direction and control of a chief officer of police”,
at the time. However, it does not cover cases where the whistleblower is currently under the direction and control of a chief officer. One potential scenario is where the whistleblower is a witness to an incident that happened before he or she joined the police service, and wishes to draw the matter to the attention of the IPCC. Our Amendment 132 would legislate for that scenario.
I move on to Amendments 135, 136 and 137. New Section 29I of the 2002 Act allows the Secretary of State, by regulations, to set out the circumstances where the identity of the whistleblower may have to be disclosed. This may be done only for permitted disclosure purposes, one of which is,
“the institution or conduct of criminal proceedings”.
Our concern is that a whistleblower may not realise that his or her identity may be revealed if the investigation turns into a criminal one, and that the whistleblower should be informed at the outset that this might be the case, so that they can withdraw the concern if they are worried by that prospect. Amendment 135 addresses that issue.
New Section 29E of the 2002 Act sets out the actions of the IPCC if it chooses not to investigate, including making recommendations in the light of the concern. Subsections (4) and (5) allow the Secretary of State to make regulations in relation to such a scenario, including, in (5)(a), to,
“describe the kinds of recommendations that the Commission may make”.
Our Amendment 136 is aimed at ensuring that the IPCC is not restricted as to what recommendations it can make by adding that the Secretary of State,
“may not specify an exclusive list of recommendations”.
In new Section 29L of the 2002 Act, the Secretary of State is required to consult various bodies before making regulations about whistleblowers. We believe that organisations representing police officers and staff should be included in the list of groups who must be consulted. Our Amendment 137 makes this change. We also support, as I mentioned, Amendments 133 and 134, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. I beg to move Amendment 132.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, this section of the Bill deals with whistleblowing and investigations by the IPCC. It provides a new power for the IPCC to investigate matters raised by a police whistleblower without the matter having to be raised with the police force concerned, and provides further powers to protect the identity of the individual or individuals concerned. All the amendments in this group are in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, with the exception of Amendments 133 and 134 in the name of my noble friend Lord Rosser.
Amendment 132 seeks to provide as much clarity as possible and allows for the eventuality that the person making a complaint could still be under the direction and control of a chief officer of police. This amendment raises an interesting point, which was highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, when he presented his scenario to the House a few moments ago. I hope that when the Government respond they will be as clear possible in their reasoning if they do not think the amendment is necessary.
The amendments in the name of my noble friend seek to add clarity to this section of the Bill by making clear that these provisions cannot be used if the matter is subject to an ongoing investigation. Amendment 134 would allow for whistleblowing protections to be applied to police witnesses. These are good amendments that would strengthen what is proposed by the Government.
When reading and thinking about Amendment 135, I was not completely convinced that it was either necessary or should in fact be there. Having said that, I listened to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and I think that he persuaded me on those.
I am not sure what Amendment 136 adds to the Bill as it would not put in the Bill an exclusive or exhaustive list. Amendment 137 is completely correct: organisations representing police officers and staff must be consulted before regulations are made concerning this section of the Bill. It is not good enough to rely on the subsection that talks about other organisations that are deemed appropriate. Those organisations deserve to be in the Bill when it leaves this House.
Lord Paddick
I am very grateful to the Minister for her explanation and for admitting the concern of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary that support for whistleblowers at present is patchy. We welcome the changes that the legislation brings in terms of reassurance to whistleblowers. I am grateful that the noble Baroness has undertaken to take away our Amendment 132 to see whether anything can be done.
I am not sure that whistleblowers will be reassured by the noble Baroness’s response to Amendment 135, that the IPCC will do its best to keep their identity secret. Again, we are discussing whether something should be in the Bill or in statutory guidance, and if in statutory guidance it will be adhered to in the real world.
On Amendment 136, we understand that it is not the intention to restrict the recommendations that the IPCC can make in response to an issue of concern raised by a whistleblower that is not investigated by the IPCC. However, perhaps the Minister might consider putting in statutory guidance the fact that it is not the intention of the legislation to restrict the number or type of recommendations that the IPCC can make. I will reflect on what she said about Amendment 137, which appears to be a reasonable explanation. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 132.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the important amendments in this group relate to the circumstances in which disciplinary action may be taken against former police officers and former special constables.
Clause 28 will allow for the extension of the disciplinary regime to former officers where an allegation arose before they resigned or retired, or arose within a period of time following their resignation or retirement. The relevant period will be specified in regulations and we have made it clear that we intend to specify 12 months. On Report in the Commons, the then Policing Minister undertook to bring forward amendments which would set aside the 12-month time limit in exceptional circumstances. The government amendments in this group make good on that commitment.
I start by recognising, as the whole House does, that the vast majority of police officers and special constables conduct themselves with absolute integrity. They serve our communities with distinction and loyalty throughout their careers and, in doing so, demonstrate the values set out in the College of Policing’s Code of Ethics on standards of professional behaviour. Nevertheless, and regrettably, a small minority do not meet the high standards of professionalism that the public rightly expect. The public also expect those suspected of serious misconduct to be subject to formal disciplinary proceedings and that, where officers are in the wrong, they are held to account for their actions. Indeed, that is what both the public, and the majority of decent, dedicated and hard-working police officers in this country deserve.
The Bill already contains significant reforms to increase the accountability of former police officers. As I have indicated, the provisions in Clause 28, and the accompanying regulations, will ensure that where an allegation that could have led to dismissal had the officer still been serving comes to the attention of a force within 12 months of an officer’s resignation or retirement, or where an individual resigns while an investigation is ongoing, this can be investigated or continue to be investigated and that, where appropriate, disciplinary action can be taken to hold the officer to account for serious wrongdoing. Where a case is proven, the new police barred list will ensure that the individual concerned is prevented from future service in policing.
These are important steps, but we need to go further, particularly in the wake of high-profile cases where there is a perception that retired officers suspected of committing the most serious acts of gross misconduct have not been held to account where such acts cause serious harm to public trust and confidence in policing. In these cases, which can emerge long after individuals have left policing, there is more to be done to prevent the perception that officers who have left policing are able to evade accountability. We recognise the strength of feeling in relation to such cases and, in particular, the public concern that police officers who commit the most serious acts of wrongdoing should be held to account for their actions. The Government also recognise the importance of ensuring that the measures introduced are proportionate for policing as a whole and fair for individual officers.
The amendments that stand in my name achieve this important principle of accountability and do so in a way that is robust, fair and proportionate. In effect, these create the new exceptional circumstances test, which will be applied by the IPCC and, in due course, by the director general of the Office for Police Conduct, following the reforms to the IPCC. In our view it is right that the decision as to whether the exceptional circumstances test is met is taken by an organisation independent of government and free from any politicised decision-making. The IPCC carries out its role and functions in a way that is well established within the sector as the independent watchdog for policing.
It would be only in those cases where this test is met and the IPCC has determined that it would be reasonable and proportionate to do so that disciplinary proceedings could be instigated. In deciding whether the exceptional circumstances test is met, the IPCC will have to have regard to the seriousness of the alleged misconduct, inefficiency or ineffectiveness, the impact of the allegation on public confidence in the police and the public interest. We will set out in regulations the matters to be taken into account by the IPCC in making such a determination.
This will mean that disciplinary proceedings can be brought in relation to the most serious matters which are considered of an exceptional nature where serious and lasting harm has been caused to public confidence in policing as a result of the wrongdoing. As with the original provisions set out in Clause 28, the exceptional circumstances test will not operate retrospectively. As such, these provisions will apply only to those officers who are serving on or after the date that they come into force. Where there is a finding that the former officer would have been dismissed at a subsequent misconduct hearing, the individual will be barred from future service in police and other law-enforcement agencies.
Amendment 138 gives effect to these changes in respect of former police officers, Amendment 140 in respect of former special constables and Amendment 144 in respect of former MoD police officers. Amendments 139, 141 and 145 clarify that, in cases where the investigation or disciplinary proceedings concerning the former officer, special constable or member of the Ministry of Defence Police arise from a decision to reinvestigate a matter previously closed, this can lead to disciplinary proceedings only in cases which either meet the exceptional circumstances test or where the reinvestigation commences within the specified time limit. Amendments 160, 161 and 162 are consequential on the main amendments and the changes to the governance of the IPCC. They provide that, in future, these determinations will be made by the director general of the Office for Police Conduct.
Amendments 149, 150 and 151 clarify the operation of the police advisory list. The amendment makes it clear that the duty on chief officers and others to report officers to the College of Policing applies only in the case of officers who at the time of leaving the force are under active investigation. The amendments will mean that in circumstances where an officer was previously under investigation while serving but the investigation concluded with no disciplinary proceedings being brought and subsequently the officer leaves the force, the duty to report the officer to the college shall not apply. This eliminates potential ambiguity in the legislation and makes it clear that reports are required only when an individual is subject to an ongoing investigation.
Amendments 142 and 143, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, are directed at the same end as the key government amendments in this group. I hope that, having heard my explanation of the government amendments, the noble Lord is satisfied that they deliver a similar outcome. I commend the government amendments to the Committee and I beg to move Amendment 138.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, we broadly welcome the government amendments in this group and, subject to what the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, has to say on the Labour amendments, they seem to cover similar ground.
I have some questions, but I agree with the Minister that the overwhelming majority of police officers are honest, decent people who want only to do their best to protect and serve the public. However, if an officer has left the service and, within 12 months, an investigation takes place which, if the officer was still serving, could have resulted in that officer being sacked, what sanctions would be available against such an officer, other than their name being added to the banned list?
I understand that “exceptional circumstances”, in terms of the most serious acts of wrongdoing, needs to be defined by an independent body. We will come later on in our considerations to talk about the Independent Police Complaints Commission and whether it is truly independent. It is slightly concerning that one criterion that the IPCC would have to look at, in deciding what action to take, is the impact on public trust and confidence in the police, because it could take the decision that the impact of exposing serious misconduct through an investigation would have such a detrimental impact on that trust and confidence that it would use it as a reason not to investigate rather than an obligation to do so. So we have to be very careful about the grounds on which the IPCC should or should not consider something to be exceptional wrongdoing.
Clearly, many members of the public will be very concerned, or disappointed, that the legislation will not be retrospective, particularly with regard to those involved in the aftermath of the Hillsborough disaster. The concern is not with the rank and file officers in that case; the concern is with what happened in the aftermath, and the leadership exercised at Hillsborough. However, as I say, we are generally supportive of the government amendments.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, first, I associate myself with the comments made by the Minister and by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in paying tribute to the police and how they conduct themselves. They are a fantastic group of people, who protect us every day, and we are very lucky to have them looking after us.
As we have heard, this section of the Bill concerns disciplinary proceedings against former police officers and former special constables, and the amendments in this group are to both the relevant clauses and schedules. Generally, I am content with the government amendments, and supportive of them. My noble friend Lord Rosser tabled Amendments 142 and 143 before the Government tabled their amendments, and we are very happy with what the Government have proposed.
I accept entirely the point that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made about “exceptional circumstances” being defined by an appropriate body. Could the Minister give us some idea what the Government’s thinking is on that matter? Having said that, I support the government amendments.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords who have responded to both the government amendments and the other amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, talked about the ultimate sanction for someone who had retired. The ultimate sanction is that the officer is found to have committed gross misconduct at a public misconduct hearing, with the panel finding that the officer would have been dismissed, and, therefore, as a consequence, should be added to the police barred list. Inclusion on the police barred list would see the officer banned from any future service in policing and added to the published list for a period of five years. Perhaps the noble Lord was referring to a police officer in this situation who had retired anyway and had no intention of going back into the police. However, if I had served 40 years in an organisation, such a judgment would be a pretty awful outcome for my career. Therefore, although there would be no actual effect on the person’s life, the ultimate judgment of misconduct in public office would fulfil that purpose.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way but my understanding is that, in the past at least, it has been possible in exceptional circumstances for a disciplinary authority to reduce the pension, for example, of somebody who is dismissed or forced to resign from the police service. Will the noble Baroness write to me explaining whether that sort of sanction might be available?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I will certainly write to the noble Lord. I can envisage such a situation where somebody was sanctioned before they retired. In fact, I have the answer—the cavalry arrived in the nick of time. The measure will not directly impact an officer’s pension. However, if criminal activity is identified following an investigation and the officer is convicted, it will be open to the force, as now, to apply for some of the officer’s pension to be forfeited.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, was disappointed that the measure was not retrospective in circumstances such as Hillsborough. I think that most noble Lords would share that disappointment. However, we make laws in line with established principles. It is in line with established principles that new laws generally should not be retrospective. They will apply only to officers who are serving when the relevant provisions are commenced. These matters do not in any way affect criminal investigations and prosecutions which, as now, can be pursued at any stage. So, yes, it is disappointing, but it is in line with established practice.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, asked about the exceptional circumstances. I repeat that the IPCC will have regard to the seriousness of the alleged misconduct, the inefficiency or the ineffectiveness, the impact of the allegation on public confidence in the police and the public interest. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Blair and Lord Condon, for making the very important point about the necessity and proportionality of these measures.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, in moving Amendment 147A, which is also in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, I will speak to our other amendments in this group, Amendments 147B, 150A and 151A.
Schedule 8, which is to be inserted as part of Part 4A of the Police Act 1996, outlines the procedures with regard to the police barred list and a duty to report dismissals to the College of Policing, which is responsible for maintaining the list. Amendment 147A removes the requirement to report cases where a civilian police employee has been dismissed for reasons of efficiency or effectiveness. The amendment probes whether the barred list should be confined to wrongdoing such as dishonesty or the inappropriate use of violence rather than a person being deemed to be inefficient or ineffective.
Amendment 147B has a similar effect on the provisions in new Section 88A(6), which defines “dismissed”. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chisholm of Owlpen, just said, someone’s employment prospects could be fundamentally affected by being placed on the police barred list. Does she not think it slightly disproportionate to include people who are considered to be inefficient or ineffective on the barred list and thereby affect their employment prospects so fundamentally?
Amendment 150A has a similar effect on the requirement to report resignations and retirements in the face of an allegation of inefficiency or ineffectiveness. Amendment 151A allows someone reported as having resigned or retired in the face of an allegation to be able to appeal against the decision to report his resignation or retirement. I beg to move.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, I have listened carefully to the case put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for these amendments. The Government are clear that the provisions on the police barred and advisory lists should apply to police officers and civilian staff equally where individuals have been dismissed or face allegations that could lead to their dismissal for reasons of serious misconduct, incompetence or unsatisfactory performance.
The provisions for civilian staff use the language of “conduct, efficiency or effectiveness” to mirror the language in Sections 50 and 51 of the Police Act 1996, under which regulations concerning discipline for police officers are made. This is a catch-all term to encompass all circumstances that could lead to a dismissal, through the processes related to performance and conduct. The barred list provisions are designed to protect against those who have been dismissed from policing being recruited to another force or policing body having been found to have fallen so far below the standards expected of those working in policing that they have been dismissed.
Amendments 147A and 150A would remove grounds of effectiveness from the relevant categories of dismissal that could lead to a civilian member of staff being added to the barred list. It is my view that “efficiency and effectiveness” are inextricably linked; therefore, to remove one of these factors would seriously undermine the ability of these mechanisms to capture individuals who have been dismissed or who are under ongoing investigation for matters of competence or performance.
Dismissal in these cases would arise only following a prescribed and lengthy process to establish that the individual’s performance or competency has fallen well below the standards expected on a consistent basis or relate to a matter so severe that dismissal is justified. For example, the Police (Performance) Regulations 2012 define gross incompetence for officers as,
“a serious inability or serious failure”,
to perform the duties to a satisfactory standard or level.
As drafted, these amendments would create a disparity in the way that civilian staff are treated compared to their counterparts holding the office of constable with regard to what would be captured by, and the effect of, these provisions. In the Government’s view it would not be desirable to make such a distinction and create such a different approach to the information and individuals that would be captured by the barred and advisory lists for civilian staff versus police officers.
Amendments 147B and 151A seek to create a new right of appeal, specifically with regard to inclusion on either the police advisory or barred list. This is neither necessary nor desirable. Our approach is clear: if an individual has been dismissed from policing, they should be added to the barred list to prevent them rejoining another force or policing body at a later stage. It is important to note that new Sections 88F and 88L of the Police Act 1996, as inserted by Schedule 8, already provide for removal from the barred list and the advisory list. There is an existing route for appeal against dismissal via the Police Appeal Tribunal or employment tribunal. As a result, in the circumstances that a decision to dismiss an individual is overturned, this will result in the individual being removed from the barred list. This is explicitly provided for by Schedule 8.
As we see greater flexibility in roles, functions and powers exercised by civilian staff, as designated under the powers set out in Clause 37, it is important that the police barred list provisions adequately capture individuals who have been dismissed from the police service. This flexibility and application of policing powers must, in the view of the Government, be accompanied by appropriate safeguards, protections and accountability.
The police advisory list provisions are in place to ensure that adequate information is captured where an individual leaves a force while investigatory or disciplinary proceedings are ongoing. This list does not represent a statutory bar but creates a framework for capturing this information for future policing employers to take into account as part of the vetting process. To add an appeal route to this process would therefore undermine the ability of police forces and policing organisations to adequately subject incoming candidates to vetting procedures and take account of the fact that a candidate may be subject to an ongoing investigation or disciplinary process.
As with the barred list, the advisory list provisions contain safeguards so that an individual will remain on this list only while proceedings are ongoing. Where it is determined that no disciplinary proceedings will be brought or are withdrawn, or where disciplinary proceedings conclude without there being a finding that the individual would have been dismissed, the individual’s name and details must be removed from the advisory list.
Ultimately, the right of appeal against inclusion on the advisory list exists within a misconduct hearing, where it will be determined whether the individual should be dismissed and so be added to the barred list. Where dismissal is not the outcome, they will be removed when the process concludes.
Given that explanation, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her lengthy explanation of what the barred list and the advisory list are about. However, that is not what the amendments seek; the intention behind them is to suggest that it is disproportionate to include on the lists those who are accused of being inefficient or ineffective.
Although I accept some of the points that the noble Baroness has made, it just spurs us on to look at whether the amendments we have tabled for Committee need to be refined. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, bearing in mind what the Minister said about the impact that this provision might have on employment prospects—presumably generally and not re-employment in a police service—we question whether the inclusion of “efficiency or effectiveness” is over the top.
I understand the parallel with gross incompetency for police officers. I would be interested to hear whether, since its introduction, that provision has yet broken its duck in terms of a person having been dismissed for gross incompetency. More research is to be done and no doubt we will return to this issue at later stages of the Bill. However, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 147A.
Earl Attlee
The noble Lord makes a very good point. I hope that the Minister will also remind us why we are changing the name at all. Legislation could be used to change the function, composition or governance of the body, but I would like to be reminded why we are changing the name at all. The general public are used to the term “IPCC” and they know what it does —and now we are changing it.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I added my name to the three amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Condon, and say to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, that the IPCC has an uphill task because, necessarily, it has to rely to a large extent on former police officers as investigators. It does not do itself any favours by appointing, as it has done at least at some point in its history, a former staff officer to a Commissioner of the Met as its head of investigations—that hardly inspires confidence in those looking at it subjectively from the outside or conveys the message that it is completely independent.
Cynics might say that removing “Independent” from the title of the organisation is an outbreak of honesty in the Government. But that is not the direction that we should be moving in. This should not be seen simply as a cosmetic change; it needs to have some substance behind it. To call it the Office for Police Conduct, without “Independent” in there, is manna from heaven to those who want to criticise the new body as not being independent at all. For those reasons, I strongly support these amendments.
Baroness Jolly (LD)
My Lords, I will not detain the House long on this small but very important amendment. This is the first time I have spoken on the Bill. The interest is relatively niche and relates to the three service police forces and the 160,000 men and women who serve in our Armed Forces.
The aim of the amendment is to insert a clause that extends the remit of the IPCC to the service police forces. I am not alone in this desire. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary recommended that oversight of service police should be brought within the competence of the IPCC. In a report last year on the Royal Military Police, the Army’s investigative and policing branch, stated:
“There was insufficient public scrutiny of RMP investigations. The RMP does not report to the public, and investigations into RMP wrongdoing are carried out by an internal Professional Standards Department or the Provost Marshal of another service police force”
It added:
“The Provost Marshal acknowledged to HMIC that a strategic risk to the RMP is inadequate independent oversight of its own independence.”
Only last week, the RMP finally admitted to failings in a rape case in 2009, that of Anne-Marie Ellement, a member of the Royal Military Police, who claimed that two of her colleagues raped her. She took her own life in 2011. The MoD said, seven years after the rape case, that it was clear that mistakes were made and apologised to the family.
Had the IPPC’s remit covered service police forces there would have been another avenue to take the concern. This is a terrible case and I am sure the service police forces have taken a long hard look at themselves, but it is not the only case where they have been found wanting. Had there been the opportunity, an independent complaints commissioner could have intervened.
I feel sure that the Minister will refer to the chain of command—this is important to military discipline—and the fact that there is a Service Complaints Commissioner. There is, but the system was ineffective in this case. Our servicemen and women have rights and those rights are best upheld if this amendment is accepted.
I remind the Minister that in 2014, the Defence Select Committee called for a timescale to be set out to bring the service police under the auspices of the IPCC. Has such a timetable been agreed? If the answer is no, in the light of this week’s announcements, how much more likely it is that the MoD would review the situation?
Lack of accountability of the service police undermines the rule of law and makes it harder for them to undertake their function of policing by consent. This amendment gives the opportunity to bring the three police services into the same independent system of oversight as applies to the rest of us. If the Minister is not able to help this afternoon, will she agree to meet me to look at it further? I beg to move.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Jolly and myself. My noble friend has made a very strong case, not just because it was Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary’s recommendation that the three service police forces should come under the remit of the IPCC. Those responsible for the Royal Military Police have accepted that the organisation is at a strategic risk because it does not come under the remit of the IPCC. If the Government are not prepared to accept the amendment, it would be very interesting to hear from the Minister why not.
Lord Rosser
I will just add briefly to the comment made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, at the end of his speech. If the Government do not feel inclined to accept the amendment, there is a need—I am sure it will happen when the Government respond—to hear precisely what their reasons are for not going down that road. It has been said that no comparable body to the IPCC exists to deal with complaints about service police forces. A significant number of forces and agencies do fall within the jurisdiction of the IPCC, including, I understand, the Ministry of Defence Police. If the Government do not accept the amendment, like the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I wait to listen with interest to their reasons why not.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, Amendment 164A is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I will also speak to the other amendment in the group, Amendment 164B. Clause 35 addresses the powers of inspectors—that is, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary—to obtain information, to secure access to police premises, and other matters by substituting paragraphs 6A and 6B in Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996. New paragraph 6B talks about the powers of inspectors to obtain access to police premises and paragraph 6B(1)(a)(iii) talks about who can be served with a notice requiring them to allow access to premises, including,
“a person providing services, in pursuance of contractual arrangements (but without being employed by a chief officer of police of the police force or its local policing body)”.
The amendment deletes “but” and replaces it with “with or”, so it would cover a person who is employed by the police, as well as someone who is not. Amendment 164B makes a similar change to who can appeal against such a notice. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the amendment presumably aims to ensure that inspectors have comprehensive access to premises used for policing purposes, and that Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary is able to inspect the totality of policing in a landscape where functions are increasingly delivered by multiple agencies. The noble Lord nods; I thought that was probably the aim. The Government wholeheartedly agree with that aim, which is the purpose of this Bill’s inspection provisions.
The amendment does not actually further that aim. The current wording already ensures that inspectors have access to any premises used in the delivery of policing functions, whether they are occupied by the force itself, the local policing body, another emergency service acting in collaboration with the force or a private company carrying out the activities of a force under a contract. I put it to the noble Lord that these amendments would not, in practice, extend the categories of premises to which an inspector had access. Any premises occupied for the purposes of a police force by persons employed under contract by the chief officer are already captured in these provisions. That being the case, I think the noble Lord would agree that the amendments were unnecessary. I invite him to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. Clearly the amendment is not designed to extend the category of premises that HMIC would be able to access. It is about extending the category of person upon which a notice could be served. It appears to us that the wording in the Bill is restrictive and needs to be broadened. We are trying to broaden the category of person on which the notice can be served.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
It might be helpful to the noble Lord to hear that this is covered by government Amendment 166, which ensures that any other person who is,
“by virtue of any enactment … carrying out the activities of”,
a police force is subject to inspection.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful for that second explanation and will consider it carefully. In the interim, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
I support the amendment tabled in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and again express my concerns about this move to give police volunteers considerable powers, including authorising them to use incapacitant sprays. I share the concerns that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, expressed in terms of public confidence in volunteers being given these weapons.
If somebody wants to volunteer to get involved in the use of force in the exercise of police powers, as would be the case in using incapacitant sprays, there is an avenue open to them: volunteer to become a special constable. They then have all the powers of a regular police officer, undergo extensive training and wear uniform almost indistinguishable from a regular police officer. As a consequence, there is no need for this Bill to give other volunteers the powers in this clause. If they want to help the police service by volunteering for other activities that do not involve the use of force, then of course it is open to them to do so, but in that case they would not need the powers that this clause would give volunteers.
Again, this adds complexity to what is already a complex policing family. There is already confusion among some members of the public about the different powers available to police community support officers compared with police constables; for example, at the scenes of road traffic accidents, where police community support officers have to stand at the side of the road and wait for a police officer to turn up to take control of any resulting traffic congestion because they do not have the power to direct traffic. Having volunteer community support officers would add a further level of complexity and confusion in the eyes of the public. Not only do we consider this clause unnecessary, but we feel that it could add to confusion and further undermine what the police service is trying to achieve in very difficult circumstances in the face of significant cuts to its budget.
Baroness Redfern (Con)
My Lords, I support the powers of police civilian staff and police volunteers, who deliver extra support and complement our police officers. In Lincolnshire two years ago the first VPCSOs were recruited as an extra uniformed visible presence in local communities, supporting the work of regular PCSOs in providing reassurance and support to local people. The word “extra” is important as these officers were designed not to replace existing provision but to supplement it.
The VPCSO role is varied but includes: giving advice and reassurance to victims and witnesses of crime; supporting policing operations by providing reassurance to members of the community; working with police officers, PCSOs and other police staff on policing priorities; and working within the local policing team on minor incidents, crime inquiries and anti-social behaviour, with a commitment to at least four hours a week on patrol in their local area.
The force has developed a role profile for VPCSOs with eligibility requirements that are the same as for PCSOs, such as minimum age, residency, skills and qualities, health, and vetting. Applicants undertake a selection process that includes an interview to test that their personal qualities meet those required in the role profile. Induction and initial training is undertaken over five weekends, followed by a further two weekends’ consolidation a few weeks later once they have gained some experience.
From a pilot stage to a valued part of visible policing in Lincolnshire, this has been pioneered and funded entirely by the PCC and chief constable and has offered an innovative way to supplement local policing while enhancing the range of opportunities available to local residents who wish to volunteer and contribute to their community. It is also a possible route to becoming a regular officer. The important changes in the Policing and Crime Bill to allow VPSCOs to have powers will improve the flexibility and efficacy of the role. Most importantly, these officers offer an extra uniformed, visible presence, thus addressing many, many residents’ requests and supporting our valued police officers.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. It is of course very difficult not to stray into other amendments when talking about something in the round. I thank my noble friend Lady Redfern for laying out her experience of using volunteer police officers in Lincolnshire. It must be one of the first areas in the country to do that, so it was very useful to have that information in the round. In thinking about my noble friend Lord Deben’s point about the importance of the public knowing the difference between a volunteer and a special police constable, or indeed a fully trained officer, I asked myself whether I wondered, when my children were at school, what the difference was between the teaching assistant and the fully trained teacher. In fact, as long as they both contributed to my child’s education, I was not that much bothered—but it may be an issue for some people and I recognise the point that my noble friend makes.
Amendment 167 returns to an issue that was debated at length in the House of Commons: namely, whether it is ever right for designated members of police staff, or the new category of designated volunteers, to carry these particular sprays for defensive purposes. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has also given notice that he intends to oppose the question that Clause 38 should stand part of the Bill.
I hope that I can assist the Committee by first explaining what Clause 38 seeks to achieve. It makes necessary consequential amendments to the Firearms Act 1968 to ensure that police volunteers come within the definition of “civilian officers” for the purposes of that Act. The effect of this is that they do not then need a firearms certificate or authorisation under either Section 1 or Section 5 of the 1968 Act in order to carry a defensive spray. The clause simply puts community support volunteers and policing support volunteers in the same position in relation to defensive sprays that police officers and police civilian staff are currently in.
Clause 37(6) makes it clear that police staff and volunteers cannot use other weapons within the meaning of the Firearms Act 1968 unless the Secretary of State makes regulations under new Section 38(9B)(b) of the Police Reform Act 2002. Any such regulations would be subject to the affirmative procedure.
Lord Paddick
To clarify what the noble Baroness has just said, could the Secretary of State, by regulations, authorise police volunteers to carry guns, if they were so minded?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I will repeat that Clause 37(6) makes it clear that police staff and volunteers cannot use other weapons within the meaning of the Firearms Act 1968 unless the Secretary of State makes regulations under new Section 38(9B)(b). Yes, it does read like that—but, as the law currently covers this, it is only trained police officers within London who can be armed.
Lord Paddick
Yes, but I think the Minister has just agreed with me that, through regulations, the Secretary of State could allow police volunteers to be given guns without the need for a firearms certificate. That is slightly worrying.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I am pretty much as certain as I ever can be about anything that it is not the intention of the Bill to allow volunteers to carry guns—but I suspect that I need to provide some further clarification, and hopefully I will do that.
Lord Condon
Before the Minister finally sits down, I ask her to acknowledge and perhaps clarify this point. We are considering this very important crossover point from special constables being given these powers to volunteers having them in the context of what the Bill is also doing. It is enhancing the role of police and crime commissioners by giving them the ability to consider taking on the responsibility for fire and rescue services, and giving them the power to appoint the fire chief as the overall chief officer for policing and for fire. The Bill will create a model whereby, for example, a relatively young 32 year-old police and crime commissioner in an area can choose to appoint the fire chief as the overall chief officer of policing and fire in that area—admittedly, with the approval of the Secretary of State—and in that context a young, relatively inexperienced PCC with a chief officer who may not have a police background could take decisions on what volunteers could and could not do. The notion of them being given potentially lethal force is quite a big issue. I look forward to the Minister, as I am sure she will, giving us some reassurance about the notion of volunteers being able to have pepper sprays that in theory can kill people.
Lord Paddick
I do not want to prolong the agony, but another aspect of this is that members of the public should be reasonably sure about what level of force they are going to encounter from whom. As I say, special constables now are virtually indistinguishable from regular police officers; if a special constable decides to use a defensive spray, that will not come as a shock to the member of the public. In terms of the way that the member of the public interacts with a police officer or special constable, they may or may not use force against that individual on the basis of what they anticipate the reaction of that person to be, or the ability of the person to respond to it. When it comes to a volunteer police community support officer, who does all the wonderful things that the Minister said earlier, I think it is going to be a bit of a shock, and an unreasonable one, to expect such a volunteer to respond with an incapacitant spray.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, may I perhaps make a bit of progress on what I was already outlining? Much of what I am going to say answers the questions that noble Lords are asking.
The argument has been put forward that issuing PCSOs with defensive equipment is somehow incompatible with those officers’ primary role, which is to engage with members of the public in their communities. If we examine the way in which different forces equip their PCSOs, we can see that there are different approaches. Some forces equip their PCSOs with body armour and some do not, and the same is true of handcuffs, yet all forces use their PCSOs as the key point of engagement with their local communities. I was one of the people who was very sceptical about PCSOs, but they now have a lot of respect in communities across the country. If the prevailing security situation were such that a particular chief officer considered it necessary to issue their PCSOs with defensive sprays—I emphasise to noble Lords that none has to date—the Government consider that they should be able to, subject of course to the test of suitability, capability and training already set out in the Police Reform Act 2002.
It has also been argued that it is impractical to train volunteers in the use of defensive sprays, to which our response has two limbs. First, if an officer or volunteer has not been properly trained in the use of any power, the law simply does not allow a chief officer to designate that officer or volunteer with the power in question. Section 38(4) of the Police Reform Act 2002, as amended by Clause 37 of the Bill, already states that a chief officer cannot designate the person with a power unless they are satisfied that they are both suitable and capable of exercising the power and that they have received adequate training in the exercise and performance of the powers and duties to be conferred.
However, we do not consider that it is impractical to train volunteers in the use of defensive sprays. On 31 March this year, there were over 16,000 special constables in the 43 police forces in England and Wales and the British Transport Police, all of whom have the full powers of a police officer, performed on a volunteer basis for at least 12 hours per month.
I was grateful to listen to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, at Second Reading, on his strong support for members of the special constabulary, with whom he will definitely have worked during his career policing. As he said, special constables receive extensive training and have all the powers of a regular constable. Many of those specials patrol on a regular basis with their full-time colleagues and they carry identical equipment, including body armour, batons and defensive sprays—again, in exactly the way as their full-time colleagues. It is therefore patently not the case that it is impractical to train volunteers in the use of such equipment. Any volunteer who did not want to carry such a spray, could not undertake the training or was not suitable would not be designated by their chief to carry and use it, even if others in their force were so designated.
Lord Paddick
On a very similar point, the Minister just said that while chief constables have the power to issue incapacitant spray to PCSOs, no chief constable has done so to date. Why do the Government now feel it necessary to give chief constables the power to give incapacitant spray to volunteer community support officers?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
It is simply to give chief officers the flexibility to use their workforce and their volunteer force to the best end in fighting crime and reassuring communities. The noble Lord, Lord Harris, asks why, for example, a volunteer cannot simply become a special constable. There are many reasons why you might want to be a volunteer rather than a special constable. We are focused today on the deployment of PAVA and CS spray, but actually a volunteer could be a police volunteer. They could be a retired accountant, for example, or a retired lawyer, and may want to bring their skills to the police but may not want to volunteer for any more than that, or indeed become a special constable.