Lord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
(7 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 1 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. Clause 3 covers specific restrictions that apply to collaboration agreements between police, fire and ambulance services—the emergency services—and we welcome government Amendment 2, which adds having an adverse effect on public safety to the existing restriction, if collaboration would result in an adverse effect on efficiency and effectiveness. While I am in a generous mood—it will not last—we also welcome the Government responding to the issues raised in Committee by my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, around variations in existing agreements and replacement of those agreements with a new agreement, which is government Amendment 3.
We of course support innovative arrangements that are appropriate to the area and develop organically; there are examples across the country where this is happening. However, this is not unqualified support. In Yeovil, Somerset, for example, it has just been announced that the four-storey police station with cells is to be closed and police operations moved to the fire station, which is about a quarter of the size and has very limited parking. Whether the police vehicles or the fire appliances will have to use the nearby public car park is yet to be seen.
Amendment 1 places an additional restriction on collaboration agreements where the emergency service areas are not coterminous or where the boundaries of the police area do not coincide with the area covered by one or more fire and rescue service. The degree of complexity involved, were this not the case, would make such collaboration extremely difficult. On the first day of Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Scott of Bybrook, gave a good example of the issues:
“In Wiltshire, we would have loved to have joined both fire and police under our PCC. That would be the best use of public resources, not just financial, but people and assets as well. But we cannot do that now, because Wiltshire fire and rescue, earlier this year, joined with Dorset fire and rescue. Dorset police work with Cornwall and Devon. Wiltshire police work in collaboration on major crimes with Avon and Somerset and Gloucester. There are two PCCs—the whole thing is a muddle. The barrier is that there is no coterminosity between different public service authorities and this is, I think, probably getting worse”.—[Official Report, 14/9/16; col. 1469.]
For there to be effective collaboration to the degree envisaged by the Government, there needs to be coterminosity. I beg to move.
My Lords, Amendment 1, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, seeks to limit the duty to collaborate so that police bodies would be required to collaborate with fire and rescue services only where they share coterminous boundaries. I see no reason why collaboration should be limited by geographical borders. The Government require there to be coterminous boundaries where a change of governance for fire is proposed, as the core approach of those provisions is to introduce greater democratic accountability by giving a directly elected individual responsibility for both services, with a clear mandate from the electorate in their area. However, collaboration between two bodies does not invoke such issues. Further, the duty, as currently drafted, would ensure that areas where the services are not coterminous, such as Devon and Cornwall, can still maximise the benefits outside a governance change if there is no appetite to adjust boundaries locally.
As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, mentioned, existing examples of collaborative working between police forces show the benefits that closer working can provide, regardless of geographical proximity. For instance, Cheshire Police collaborates with Northamptonshire and Nottingham police forces on back-office functions, including payroll, accounting, purchasing and HR, via the Multi-Force Shared Service. West Midlands Police led the largest ever police and emergency service collaborative procurement exercise, which includes 26 territorial forces, two non-territorial forces and five fire and rescue services. Together, the services will buy 3,000 vehicles over the next two years, with forecasted savings of up to £7 million over the period of the contracts.
Government Amendments 2 and 3 respond to points raised in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, in respect of collaboration agreements. Amendment 2 explicitly provides that no relevant emergency service will be required to enter into a collaboration agreement where it would have an adverse effect on public safety. This has been the Government’s policy intention since conception of the Bill. Indeed, as I set out in Committee, the Government believe that the impact on public safety will be assessed by an emergency service whenever considering the effect of a proposed collaboration on its efficiency or effectiveness. None the less, for the avoidance of any doubt, this amendment makes it explicit in the Bill that no relevant emergency service will be required to enter into a collaboration agreement that would negatively impact public safety.
Amendment 3 clarifies the process for varying a collaboration agreement. We agree that parties to an agreement should also be able to straightforwardly vary terms of an existing agreement, where all parties are in agreement. Parties will also still be able to replace an existing agreement with a new agreement, again with the consent of the parties concerned.
I hope that, having heard my explanation, the noble Lord will be content to support the government amendments in this group and withdraw Amendment 1.
In my opening remarks, I welcomed the government amendments and suggested that we would support them. The examples that the noble Baroness gave of collaboration between police forces were to do with requisition and back-office functions. The real issues arise where there is collaboration on operational issues—for example, the sharing of buildings, and particularly where the Government want to encourage police and crime commissioners to take over the running of fire and rescue authorities, as we will hear later this afternoon. That is where the coterminosity issue is most stark. Therefore, while I accept that for requisition and back-office functions the forces do not need to be geographically co-located, real problems can arise on the operational front in these circumstances, and if the PCC has to take over. However, I will consider carefully what the noble Baroness has said and, at this stage, beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I support the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. The government amendments in this group do not go far enough—for example, in publishing the results of any consultation in full and on the process of the consultation itself, which we believe simply cannot be left in the hands of a police and crime commissioner. We also oppose in principle that police and crime commissioners should be allowed to take over fire and rescue authorities, for many of the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, gave this afternoon and in Committee, particularly, as we dealt with in Amendment 1, the issue around coterminosity. We also share the concerns about the employment implications of merging police services and fire and rescue services in a single employer model under a police and crime commissioner.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendment 19 in this group. The amendment would require that the Secretary of State cannot make an order to provide for the police and crime commissioner to be the fire and rescue authority under new Section 4A unless this has been agreed by all relevant local authorities. This amendment is supported by the Local Government Association.
In Committee, the Minister seemed to want to have her cake and eat it—to use a topical phrase. When these issues were discussed, she said at one point that,
“the Government are not mandating the transfer of fire and rescue authorities to police and crime commissioners. These provisions are locally enabling and acknowledge that local leaders are best placed to assess what would work … in their areas”.
But then later she said:
“Where there is clear merit in a transfer taking place that could benefit local communities, it would be wrong to allow vested local interests to stand in the way”.—[Official Report, 14/9/16; col. 1520.]
Local authority councillors are democratically elected to represent local people. One of their responsibilities is the fire and rescue service. Police and crime commissioners have been democratically elected to oversee policing, based on a manifesto that covers only policing. I believe that the Minister was right to say that local leaders are best placed to assess what would work best in their areas, and wrong to describe as “vested local interests” the democratically elected local authority councillors who do not agree with their police and crime commissioner about the PCC taking over local fire and rescue services. Our amendment is in line with the Minister’s initial comment in Committee, rather than her later comment.
My Lords, the Government came into office with a clear manifesto commitment to enable fire and police services to work more closely together and to develop the role of our elected and accountable police and crime commissioners. The provisions in Part 1 of the Bill, including those in Clause 6, give legislative effect to that commitment.
It is clear that better joint working can strengthen our emergency services, deliver significant savings to taxpayers and, most importantly, enable the emergency services to better protect the public. While there are many excellent examples of collaboration between the emergency services across the country—I draw noble Lords’ attention to the excellent overview of such collaboration recently published by the Emergency Services Collaboration Working Group—the picture of collaboration remains patchy and more needs to be done to make collaborative working the norm. The directly accountable leadership of PCCs can play a critical role in this by securing better commissioning and delivery of emergency services at a local level. This is not about a merger or a police takeover; nor is it an erosion of the brand identity of the fire service. By overseeing both services, PCCs can strengthen the services by maximising the opportunities for innovative collaboration between policing and fire, and ensure that best practice is shared.
It has been said many times before, but I should stress again, that the provisions in Clause 6 providing for PCCs to take on responsibility for fire and rescue are totally locally enabling. A one-size-fits-all approach would clearly be inappropriate and it should be up to local communities to have a say in how their services are provided. PCCs will be able to take on responsibility for fire and rescue only where a strong local case is made that it is in the best interests of either efficiency, economy or effectiveness, on the one hand, or public safety, on the other, and where they have consulted the relevant local authorities and the public. Removing the provisions from the Bill that enable PCCs to take on governance of fire and rescue denies PCCs the opportunity to drive forward local reform. In a number of areas—for example, Essex, Northamptonshire and Hertfordshire—we know that PCCs are already working closely with their fire and rescue authorities to consider the local case.
Requiring there to be local agreement before a transfer of governance can take place, as proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, would introduce unnecessary and unjustifiable barriers that serve to inhibit positive collaboration taking place at a local level. If there are valid reasons for a local authority’s opposition to a PCC’s proposal, these will be identified in the independent assessment process and the Home Secretary will approve a transfer only where a case has been made that it is in the interests of local communities. It would not be right to let parochial local interests—to take up what the noble Lord said—get in the way of reform where there is a clear benefit to the public.
In Committee, I was clear that the Government’s intention is for the process by which a PCC brings forward a business case for the transfer of responsibility for fire to be as robust and transparent as possible. It is important that this process commands the confidence of all parties and that local views are properly taken into account. To provide even greater assurances on this point, the Government have put forward a number of amendments which strengthen the consultation and transparency duties on PCCs. These amendments respond to a number of helpful and important points raised by noble Lords during the earlier stages of the Bill.
First, Amendment 9 will replace the existing duty on PCCs to seek the views of people in their police area with a duty that requires them to consult them. This strengthening of the duty makes explicit the Government’s expectation that PCCs will take local views into account when developing their business case and responds to concerns that the existing duty to seek views is not strong enough. In addition, Amendment 10 places an explicit duty on PCCs to consult with persons representing the views of employees and of members of the police force who may be affected by their proposal. I would expect this to include trade unions and staff associations such as the FBU, Unison and the Police Federation.
Amendment 16 will additionally require the PCC to submit a summary of the responses to such consultation to the Home Secretary to inform her decision on the proposal where the PCC does not have local agreement. It remains appropriate that it is for the PCC to determine the manner in which they should consult local authorities, the public and employee representatives, and Amendment 13 makes that clear. In the interests of transparency, Amendments 11, 15 and 17 will also require the PCC to publish the outcomes of their local consultation and the Secretary of State to publish the independent assessment that she secures of a PCC’s business case, where they do not have the agreement of the relevant local councils.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, tabled further amendments to these provisions, which seek to further prescribe the process by which a PCC consults on his or her proposal and the requirements on the Home Secretary to publish an independent assessment. As I have already set out, I am very keen, like the noble Lord, to make sure that the process by which a PCC seeks to take on the responsibilities of a fire and rescue authority is as robust and transparent as possible. However, I hope the noble Lord would agree that many of the points that he has raised are properly a matter for guidance rather than for primary legislation. The circumstances of each local consultation will be different, so we should not unduly fetter local flexibility to put in place proportionate arrangements that recognise the nature of each local business case. The amendments, while well intentioned, risk cutting across the local accountability of PCCs and risk Whitehall dictating matters that should rightly be left to local leaders.
In response to the noble Lord’s important concerns, however, I can be very clear about the Government’s expectation that the PCC’s consultation will be undertaken in an appropriate manner and be of an appropriate duration to allow local people to express their views and for the PCC to have them taken into account. Further, we would expect the PCC’s response to the consultation to cover the matters that the noble Lord has listed in Amendment 12. The Home Office will work closely with the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners and the Association of Police and Crime Chief Executives to ensure that their guidance on the development of PCC business cases incorporates these points. However, I should stress again that it is for the PCC to determine locally how to achieve such outcomes based on the nature of the case, its complexity and its understanding of the best ways to engage with local communities.
Furthermore, government Amendment 17 will ensure that the independent assessment is published as soon as is practicable after the Home Secretary has made a determination. In practice, this will ensure that all parties have sufficient time to consider the findings before an order is made. Adding in what amounts to a statutory one-month pause in the process in every case again strikes me as unduly complicating the procedure for making these orders and risks increasing local uncertainty as the process is drawn out. I might add that having received the independent assessment, there is no assumption that the Home Secretary would necessarily approve a PCC’s proposal. She will base her decision on the evidence presented. I hope that noble Lords will agree that the government amendments set out a clear expectation that there should be a comprehensive consultation, that the process will be transparent, and that local views will be properly taken into account.
I also indicated in Committee that I would give further consideration to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, regarding public safety. As I set out during that debate, public safety is a core function of the emergency services and we consider that any assessment of the impact of a proposed transfer of governance on effectiveness would include an assessment of its impact on public safety. None the less, I am content to make provision on the face of the Bill that puts this matter beyond any doubt. Government Amendments 5, 6 and 35 explicitly provide that the Secretary of State may not make an order transferring responsibility for fire and rescue to a PCC or implementing the single employer model under either a PCC or a combined authority mayor where it would adversely affect public safety.
I shall deal with the other government amendments in this group. As the Bill is currently drafted, when a PCC implements the single employer model and so delegates fire functions to a single chief officer, schemes that may be made by the Secretary of State transferring property, rights and liabilities from an FRA or the PCC-style FRA to that chief officer are one way only. On the terms and conditions for police and fire and rescue personnel, when staff are transferred from an FRA to the PCC, and under the single employer model from the PCC to the chief officer, they would be covered by the principles of the Cabinet Office code of practice entitled Statement of Practice of Staff Transfers in the Public Sector, taking into account the considerations associated with bringing two workforces closer together. For example, we propose that under the single employer model, complaints, conduct and death and serious injury matters for both the police and the fire service are treated on a consistent basis. PCCs will need to consider how to best reflect a more closely aligned workforce locally when preparing their business case, including consultation with the relevant unions where necessary, as I said previously.
On the question whether the proposals will take firefighters, emergency fire control staff and fire support staff out of national pay and conditions, pensions and other arrangements, the terms and conditions of firefighters and control staff are negotiated on a UK-wide basis via the National Joint Council for Local Authority Fire and Rescue Services. The NJC has no statutory basis and it is for PCC FRAs to decide whether to remain members. PCC-style FRAs will also have the same ability as FRAs to negotiate changes to terms and conditions at local level, while remaining members of the NJC, but PCCs would need to approach the NJC if they wished to become members.
Before the Minister sits down, could she clarify something? She described the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, as unnecessary interference in what should be a locally determined matter—the nature of the consultation process. However, when it comes to deciding whether the police and crime commissioner should take over the fire and rescue authority, against the wishes of the democratically elected local councillors, that is not seen as an unnecessary interference in local decisions.
I hope I have outlined clearly that the Home Secretary would take a view on this issue and on all representations that have been received when making her decision.
My Lords, I shall also speak to the other amendments in this group. These amendments, taken together, are designed to allow police and crime commissioners to attend and speak at committees or sub-committees appointed by local authorities wholly or partly for the purposes of discharging the functions of a fire and rescue authority but not to allow police and crime commissioners to vote at those meetings.
Local authority councillors are democratically elected to represent local people on a range of issues, including fire and rescue services. Police and crime commissioners have been democratically elected to represent local people in overseeing the police force for which they are responsible. They have no democratic mandate to vote on issues relating to fire and rescue services, as the noble Lord, Lord Bach, said so persuasively in Committee, at col. 1489. If the police and crime commissioner has persuasive points, the committee that he is present and speaking at will be persuaded, and if his points are not persuasive, he should not be allowed to use a vote to push those views through. The “real influence” that the Minister referred to in Committee, at col. 1544, should come from the strength of the police and crime commissioner’s arguments, not from having a vote to back them up. I beg to move.
My Lords, Clause 7 enables police and crime commissioners to request to be represented on fire and rescue authorities within their police areas where they do not take responsibility for the governance of the fire and rescue service. This is what we have described as the representation model. Where a fire and rescue authority accepts such a request, we have set out that PCCs will be treated as if they were a member of the authority for the purposes of bringing agenda items, receiving papers and so on, and have full voting rights to ensure that they can take part in the business of the fire and rescue authority in a meaningful and effective way.
The noble Lord’s amendments seek to remove these provisions, which would be a great shame, as we want the PCC’s representation to be meaningful and on an equal footing with existing members of the FRA. To deny PCCs the ability to vote would reduce their scope for influence and I fear that opportunities for fostering greater collaboration would be missed. As my noble friend Lady Williams explained in Committee, in response to a group of similar amendments, we want police and crime commissioners and fire and rescue authorities to consider the representation model as a viable option for promoting greater collaboration between the two services. These amendments would hinder that.
The amendments would also remove the necessity for a fire and rescue authority to publish its decision and reasoning in considering the PCC’s request for membership. I am concerned that to do so would remove transparency and accountability from the process. These provisions enable PCCs to seek representation where they wish to do so, while respecting local fire governance arrangements. The final decision on representation rests with the fire and rescue authority, although we fully expect that in the majority of instances the fire and rescue authority would accept the PCC’s request and, if it did not, its reasons should be made clear to both the PCC and the public. This ensures that the process is fully transparent and open to effective scrutiny.
The provisions in the Bill allow for the representation model to be considered as an opportunity to foster greater collaboration outside of pursuing other governance models. I hope I have been able to persuade the noble Lord of the merits of the approach taken in the Bill and that he will be content to withdraw his amendment.
I am grateful to the Minister. I am still struggling to understand why a police and crime commissioner, who is elected on the basis of a manifesto to do with policing, should have full voting rights on a fire and rescue authority. I am not sure that “It would be a great shame” is a particularly powerful argument against my proposal. The Minister said that the police and crime commissioner should be on an equal footing with other members of the fire and rescue authority but did not actually say why. Yes, the final decision rests with the fire and rescue authority but, given the fact that this is in legislation, it would be difficult, certainly following the Minister’s remarks, for fire and rescue authorities to resist a move by a police and crime commissioner to take those voting rights. Greater collaboration surely does not necessarily depend on the police and crime commissioner having a vote on the fire and rescue authority. None the less, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I hope it is not going to be another letter because, from my dim and distant memory of local government officers’ political restrictions, I recall that up to a certain level of officer, you are free to canvass and engage in political activity. You are also free to stand for elected office in an authority other than your own. I think I may have to write, now that the noble Lord is heading for the door, on the matter of elected office for local authority officials because that will be looked at in the regulations.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for listening to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, and to the issues raised by my noble friend Lady Hamwee. She cannot be in her place today, but she has asked me to pass on her thanks for the amendments that the Government have brought forward in this group.
My Lords, in moving Amendment 46 I will speak also to the other amendment in the group, Amendment 47. Both are in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. This is a straight rerun of the amendments we had in Committee in relation to police super-complaints, which bodies can make them and the authorised persons who can ask the Secretary of State to add or remove bodies from the list of bodies that can make them. In Committee, we argued that the Secretary of State should be required to consult on the regulations that designate which bodies can make super-complaints. These regulations will contain the criteria that will be applied to decide which bodies can bring police super-complaints. New Section 29B, inserted by Clause 25, requires the Secretary of State to consult when she makes or revokes a designation but does not require her to consult on the criteria that she applies in deciding whether to make or revoke a designation. That is the intended effect of Amendment 46.
Amendment 47 relates to the “authorised persons” who can ask the Secretary of State to make or revoke a designation under new Section 29B(2)(b) of the Police Reform Act 2002. Contrary to what the Minister took as our intention in Committee, Amendment 47 sets out a list of bodies that the Secretary of State should specify as authorised persons who can ask the Secretary of State to make or revoke a designated body under new subsection (2)(a), not a list of designated bodies that can make police super-complaints.
Just to be clear, there will be two lists of bodies in relation to police super-complaints. There are authorised persons, who are bodies who can ask the Secretary of State to designate or remove a body from the list of those able to make police super-complaints, and there are bodies that are designated as being able to bring police super-complaints. We believe that the list of authorised persons should include the Law Society, the National Council for Voluntary Organisations and Citizens Advice, and others that should be listed in the Bill. I beg to move Amendment 46.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, these matters were discussed in Committee. I am very supportive of Amendments 46 and 47. As we have heard, designated bodies will get the power to make super-complaints to Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, and these complaints can be made where, in the opinion of the designated body, a feature of policing may be harming the public and needs looking at. It is based on a system that works in the private sector and this is the first time it will be used in the public sector. Only designated bodies will be able to make super-complaints, and the process for designating these bodies will be set out in regulations.
When the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, responds to this debate, it would be helpful if she said something about the timescale for the consultation processes, and when she expects these regulations to be laid before Parliament and come into force. I should also say that I am happy for the negative procedure to be used in respect of the regulations; perhaps the noble Baroness could bring that fact to the attention of the noble Lord, Lord Hyde of Ashton, who is of the opinion that I would never agree to the negative procedure being used for regulations in this House.
The proposals in this section of the Bill are a welcome move and will be a positive benefit to organisations and individuals that have legitimate concerns to raise. We are supportive of them and of these amendments.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for the opportunity to address the misunderstanding over Amendment 47, which was previously tabled in Committee. However, I am again going to have to disappoint the noble Lord as the Government cannot support either of these amendments. The Bill provides for the delegation of the ability to authorise those who can be designated bodies for the purposes of the new super-complaints system.
I welcome the noble Lord’s suggestions of who should perform this function but I do not agree that this task can be performed by bodies that might themselves want to raise super-complaints, or by multiple agencies. For the system to have legitimacy, we need to avoid a conflict of interest in this role. That is why the Bill creates this distinct role, as we do not consider it appropriate that HM Inspectorate of Constabulary designates the bodies that can come to it with super-complaints.
All three bodies put forward by the noble Lord could potentially add significant value as designated bodies, should they wish to apply. It would be a shame if, for example, Citizens Advice were precluded from raising issues through the super-complaints system. In the interests of a smooth and speedy process, I suggest that this role should be undertaken by an individual or single body, not by a committee.
The critical point here is that the criteria for designation are clear and unambiguous so that authorisation is a simple and objective process. That is why we will consult widely on the criteria in due course, and I encourage all those who have an interest to feed in their views. The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, asked about timing: it will be in the coming months.
Having consulted to establish clear criteria, we believe it is unnecessary to subsequently consult on any list of bodies deemed to have met the criteria, as required by the noble Lord’s Amendment 46. This risks slowing the whole system down, delaying designation and further delaying the point at which bodies can submit super-complaints to HMIC.
I reiterate the Government’s commitment to consulting widely on the criteria. As part of that process, we would welcome the input of noble Lords on bodies or organisations that may be suitable for designation or for the role as the authorised person. I hope the noble Lord, having considered the Government’s arguments, will feel free to withdraw his amendment.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for his support for these amendments and for the explanation given by the Minister. Obviously I am disappointed that she felt she could not support them. Clearly there would have to be a distinction between the role of authorised persons and the role of designated bodies. The suggestions we made were on the basis that these organisations had vast knowledge of the voluntary bodies and third party organisations that work in their areas. There would have to be a distinction if they were appointed as authorised persons, and they would not be able to be designated bodies themselves, but that is something that the Government could make a decision on.
I am grateful for the reassurance around the consultation that will take place over the criteria that will be used in order to decide which bodies should be designated. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I rise to support the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill of Bengarve. I should declare three interests. First, I was a police officer for more than 30 years, retiring with an exemplary record in 2007 as a deputy assistant commissioner, the equivalent of a deputy chief constable outside London. Secondly, I was a victim of phone hacking. Thirdly, I was party to a judicial review of the Metropolitan Police Service in 2011. This review concluded that the police had failed in their duty to protect my and others’ Article 8 rights to a private and family life under the Human Rights Act, because they had failed to tell us that we were the targets of phone hacking by the press. I was a senior police officer in the Metropolitan Police at the time of the phone hacking. The noble Lord, Lord Prescott, another party to the judicial review, was the Deputy Prime Minister at the time his phone was hacked.
To take up the point of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, I accept the question of proportionality but the difference here is that the Government promised the victims of phone hacking that Leveson 2 would take place. The former Prime Minister promised that this inquiry would take place and that, I am afraid, rather trumps the noble Viscount’s arguments around proportionality. The inquiry was set up to explore and resolve a number of areas but, in the interests of brevity, as no doubt these points will be covered by other noble Lords, I will focus on just one element.
I discovered that I had been the subject of interest to the private detective employed by News International to carry out phone hacking, Glen Mulcaire, when I was told through my solicitors by the Guardian in 2011. My solicitors contacted the Metropolitan Police, who said that there was no record of my having been the victim of phone hacking. The Guardian sources insisted that I was and the Metropolitan Police eventually admitted that I had been involved as a target. They subsequently disclosed pages from Mulcaire’s notebook which had my name, details of my then partner, our home address and phone numbers and other personal details and that these documents were in their possession and had been in their possession since before 2006. The police also subsequently disclosed an internal memo which indicated that “Commander Paddick” was a target of phone hacking. I was a commander from 2000 to 2003, when I was promoted.
My point is that the Metropolitan Police knew that there was widespread phone hacking and did nothing to investigate it or to warn the victims that their phones were being hacked, even when one of those victims was the Deputy Prime Minister and another was one of its own senior police officers, who was working in the same building as the detectives who had uncovered the scandal. At around the same time, it appears that members of the press whose phones were being hacked by rival newspapers were warned that their phones were being hacked.
There has been no satisfactory explanation of why the police behaved in this way—we need to know why. Leveson 2 should be initiated to find that out. I say that there has been no satisfactory explanation of the police conduct because it has been suggested that the initial investigation, where the Royal Family had been among the victims and which had been carried out by the Counter Terrorism Command as a result, had other priorities. We can imagine that the counterterrorism branch did have other priorities. If that was the reason for not taking the matter further, there was no reason why the police could not have informed other victims to take precautions against using their mobile phones and that no further action would be taken. Indeed, that was the conclusion reached by the judge who heard the judicial review.
Once the royal connection had been dealt with, the case could, and should, have been transferred to the Specialist Crime Directorate of the Metropolitan Police, the most appropriate department at Scotland Yard to investigate such matters, where a scandal of such proportions could have been given the resources required to investigate matters properly. Instead, it was only after the Guardian discovered the extent of the scandal that the Metropolitan Police acknowledged that an investigation was needed and applied the resources required. We have not got to the bottom of the relationship between the Metropolitan Police and the media at that time. That is why we need the inquiry proposed by this amendment.
If a public inquiry is needed and the Government have promised one, it should take place. The sudden deployment of a wholly unnecessary consultation is, or appears to be, a device to give cover to the Government reneging yet again on a promise made regarding the phone hacking issue. If I am wrong and the Government decide after all to recommit to Leveson 2, I am sure this House will simply agree to the later removal of the amendment. In the meantime, it is our insurance policy against the Government letting us down again, and we on these Benches will support it if the noble Baroness divides the House.
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lords who tabled this amendment. I listened to the explanation of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, the chronology of which I understand, but which may be difficult for others to understand. I totally accept the passion with which he spoke on that issue. I support the amendment but make it clear that I am one of the few Members of the House who gave evidence to Leveson in person and on oath. I support the amendment precisely because it fulfils the previous government commitment. As I was the commissioner at the time the first phone hacking case appeared to arise, which concerned the royal household and to which the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, referred, it would not be appropriate for me to say in this House that I do not accept any further scrutiny of the Metropolitan Police or other police forces over this matter. Therefore, I very much support the idea that Leveson 2, in whatever form, or whether it is through this amendment, should be introduced.
However, given that I gave evidence to the inquiry, I need to make it clear that I shall be very surprised—at this point, I move towards the position adopted by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham—if a new inquiry uncovers anything involving major corruption in recent years. To that end, I ask the House’s indulgence to allow me to read one paragraph—paragraph 49—of my statement to Leveson, which I made in 2012, which set out my position on the question. It refers to the Met and only to events post-2000. Therefore, it does not refer to Morgan or Hillsborough as that was the question I was being asked: what had I done since I had been the deputy commissioner and the commissioner? It was submitted in spring 2012 and says:
“Whilst I therefore accept that current enquiries may reveal that a small number of relatively junior officers took bribes from the press, I do not believe that corruption in monetary terms lies at the heart of any major problem in the relationship between the”,
Metropolitan Police Service and the press. We can now say that a number of junior police officers were convicted, and rightly so. I continued:
“I believe that where that problem may have become significant is that a very small number of relatively senior officers … became too close to journalists, not I believe for financial gain but for the enhancement of their reputation and for the sheer enjoyment of being in a position to share and divulge confidences. It is a siren song. I also believe that they based this behaviour on how they saw politicians”,
behaving with the press,
“and that they lost sight of their professional obligations. The MPS did not have adequate defences against this behaviour and in previous decades would probably not have needed it”.
In short, what will be revealed by such an inquiry, which I still say is necessary, is behaviour that was wrong, reprehensible and unprofessional, but largely not criminal.
My Lords, the Government are committed to ensuring that those working for the police have the confidence to come forward to report concerns of malpractice and misconduct within the service. Clause 27 inserts new Part 2B and new Schedule 3A into the Police Reform Act 2002. This will provide the Independent Police Complaints Commission with a new power to carry out independent whistleblowing investigations. It gives police officers and staff a new route to raise their concerns directly with the IPCC. As a result, it will give police officers and staff a greater level of assurance around discretion and objectivity by strengthening the protections for whistleblowers, including anonymity.
Amendments 49 and 50 respond to points raised in Committee by the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Kennedy. The amendments will provide greater clarity about when a whistleblowing investigation can be considered by the IPCC. The amendments modify the definition of a whistleblower in two ways. The first modification is to enable whistleblowers to raise concerns about matters which occurred before they joined the police. The second modification will remove the need for the IPCC to consider whether to start a new whistleblowing investigation where it is already conducting an investigation under Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002, or where there is an ongoing whistleblowing investigation.
There will also be no requirement for the IPCC to consider whether to open a new investigation when the concern raised is already being dealt with as a super-complaint. These modifications will provide further clarity on the definition of a whistleblower, ensuring that the new Part 2B provisions will not interfere with the progress of these existing investigations. This will also support the IPCC to effectively implement its duties under the new provisions.
Amendments 51, 55, 63, 64 and 69 are technical amendments to ensure that, as with concerns which involve conduct matters, where the IPCC identifies a concern as relating to a “death or serious injury” matter as defined in Part 2 of the 2002 Act, the matter must be handled under that part. In such circumstances, the whistleblower’s identity will continue to be protected by modifications to Schedule 3 to the 2002 Act specified in regulations. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister and to the Government for listening to the concerns we raised around whistleblowing in Committee. We certainly support the government amendments in this group.
My Lords, there was a very useful debate in Committee on whistleblowing. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and I raised a number of issues; we are very grateful that the Government have listened and tabled these amendments and we are very supportive of them.
My Lords, Amendment 59 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I, too, thank the Government for the change that they have made regarding the word “Independent”. This amendment tries to ensure that that is not simply a cosmetic change and that the new body will be even more independent.
The amendment would change the current position where a member of the Independent Police Complaints Commission cannot be someone who holds or who has held office as a constable in any part of the United Kingdom or someone who has worked under the direction or control of a chief officer or equivalent office in Scotland or Northern Ireland. The current legislation specifically excludes anyone making decisions on casework or investigations, for obvious reasons. The public are not reassured about the independence of the police complaints investigation body if those making such decisions are either former police officers or those who have worked for the police.
The amendment would prevent other members of the new body being serving or former police officers or those who formerly worked for the police. In Committee the Minister said:
“We do not think that there should be statutory restrictions on those who are members of the office—in effect, the board of the reformed organisation. The core functions of the office are set out clearly in the Bill and include ensuring the good governance and financial management of the organisation. These functions are quite distinct from the functions of the director-general. The director-general, as the single executive head, will be solely accountable for all casework and investigation decisions, not the board. It is not right that a suitably qualified individual could not be appointed to a corporate governance role as a member of the board simply because he or she once worked as a police civilian, perhaps for just a short period many years previously”.—[Official Report, 26/10/16; col. 258.]
There is very little trust or confidence in the IPCC among many who bring complaints against the police and many others, including me, because we do not believe it is independent enough. How will having members of the board of the new body—the rebranded body—who are former employees of the police service improve that trust and confidence? It certainly does not do it for me. Although the Minister says that the director-general will be solely accountable for all casework and investigation decisions, in practice he will not be making all those decisions—unless he works 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Even if the board members are there to ensure good governance and financial management, their decisions could be crucial to the effective investigation of serious complaints by deciding the way the rebranded organisation operates, its structure and so forth, and the way resources are apportioned.
The Government keep saying how important it is to bring people with different skills and experience into the police service. If the police service is in such desperate need of new blood, because the Government believe it does not have enough talent of its own, why are the Government so keen for those from the police service to be part of the new body that will be investigating the most serious complaints against the police? Barring those previously employed by the police service from holding crucial positions within the rebranded Office for Police Conduct—with or without “Independent” stuck on the front of it—would be a small price to pay for providing reassurance that it is truly independent. I beg to move.
My Lords, the Independent Office for Police Conduct will have a vital role in securing and maintaining public confidence in the reformed police complaints system. That is why the Bill provides for an absolute bar on the new single executive head of the organisation—the director-general —ever having worked for the police. The Government do not believe it is appropriate for the Bill to impose further statutory restrictions on membership of the office beyond the post of director-general.
The corporate structure of the IOPC is radically different from the existing commission model. The new board—the office—will have a majority of independent non-executive members, and its functions are set out clearly in the Bill. These include ensuring good corporate governance and financial management. Importantly, the board’s functions do not include responsibility for investigations and casework decisions, for which the director-general alone will be accountable. This is in contrast to the current position, where commissioners undertake such investigative functions.
If a highly suitable individual applies for a non-executive role, perhaps as a finance expert, it would be wrong to reject them automatically simply because many years previously they worked for a short period as a police civilian, perhaps in a relatively junior role. To ensure that the organisation can deliver high-quality and timely investigations—the predominant driver of confidence—the director-general will wish to ensure that the organisation has a diverse mix of people. As part of this, the director-general may wish to employ a number of people who have valuable policing experience, as the IPCC does now.
Under the new model, investigations and casework decisions will be undertaken by employees, all of whom will be working in a single line management chain reporting to the director-general. The Government fully expect the director-general to decide that certain employee roles, including some senior operational and public-facing positions, should not be filled by those with a police background, but those decisions should be a matter for the director-general.
We recognise that confidence is also driven by the perception of the organisation as impartial and independent from the police. That is why the Bill provides the director-general with an explicit power to determine the functions and roles that are not open to former police officers. This means that the director- general can go further than the current legislation, which requires only that a minimum of six people cannot have worked for the police—namely, the chair and a minimum of five other members of the commission. The Bill also strengthens existing arrangements in relation to transparency by setting out a requirement on the director-general to publish a statement of policy on the exercise of these particular powers of recruitment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her explanation. I of course acknowledge the Government’s intention in drafting the legislation as they have. If we were starting with a completely new body with no previous track record, I would be more willing to agree with the Minister. However, this is all about public confidence and perception, and the fact is that under the previous legislation the Independent Police Complaints Commission had six commissioners, all of whom were barred by law from having been employed by the police or having held the office of constable, and now there will be only one. In theory, the rest of the new body could be formed of previous police officers. Now, I understand that that is not likely, but there is the potential for those critics of the police complaints system to point out that there has been a reduction in the number of people statutorily barred from serving on the new body—it has gone down to one.
I accept that there is an explicit power for the director-general to designate certain posts that should not be open to former police officers, but, as I say, this is all about perception. While we are grateful that “Independent” has been shunted on to the front of the description of the new body, we feel that this change—reducing the number of people who are barred statutorily from holding positions in the body—will undermine public confidence in that independence. However, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am sorry that I missed the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, opening this discussion, but I was somewhere else and I came here as soon as I could. My concern over this is with the concept of volunteers. As the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, says, there is a range of defensive systems here, including the truncheon itself, but I am concerned about giving volunteers Tasers. If you give a volunteer a Taser, all the volunteer has to do once it has gone off is to say that they do not want to be a volunteer anymore and disappear into the distance. Then you have nothing unless you have a criminal inquiry into what happened. My sense is that this set of clauses needs a lot more specificity.
My view is that the police could bring in some designated persons as firearms officers: they could recruit people from the Army and deploy them only to be firearms officers, which would be a logical and a budget-saving thing to do. The idea that we have to have fully trained constables standing outside embassies has always struck me as odd when we could recruit them much more cheaply. But with all those cases, you have a financial arrangement between the chief constable and that person, and they can therefore be disciplined and so on. Obviously if you shoot somebody, you have a criminal inquiry, but that is not the point here. We need to take this piece of the Bill and look at it again, to make sure we have the different types of defensive and offensive weapons, and the people who can use them, categorised. At the moment it feels that we will be opening a door we might find very difficult to close subsequently.
My Lords, I start by agreeing wholeheartedly with the noble Lord, Lord Blair, that this seems too broad in what it could allow. As the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, says, it could result in volunteers being equipped with revolvers. I also have the same concerns that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, has about a self-defence weapon being used in an aggressive as opposed to a defensive way.
We support the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark. My noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendment 107 in the group, which says that Clause 38 should not stand part of the Bill and seeks to achieve the same end as Amendment 106, which is to prevent police community support officer volunteers from being provided with CS spray or any other firearm that the Secretary of State might authorise by regulation in the future. My understanding, contrary to that of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, is that special constables can be equipped with CS spray at the moment, and will continue to be, so I do not think that the changes in the Bill will have the effect he suggests.
The only remarks that I would add to those already made by noble Lords are that police volunteers carry out excellent work and are a valuable addition to the police family. However, with reservations already being expressed about whether paid police community support officers should be using force, and in the absence of any paid PCSO having been authorised to use CS spray by any chief constable anywhere in the United Kingdom—if I remember the debate in Committee correctly—changing the law to allow chief constables to give CS spray to volunteer PCSOs seems both unnecessary and unreasonable.
Secondly, as alluded to by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, if chief constables need additional volunteers who can exercise the use of force, including with CS spray, because they do not have the resources any more to pay full-time police officers, whatever the rights and wrongs of that, there is a route open to them, which is to recruit more special constables, who have all the powers of a regular police officer and who are paid only expenses. We on these Benches will support the Labour amendment on this issue.
My Lords, these amendments return us to an issue that was debated at length in both the other place and in Committee in this House, namely whether it is ever right for designated members of police staff, or the new category of designated volunteers, to carry CS or PAVA sprays for defensive purposes—I stress the point that this is for defensive purposes.
I should point out to the House that, although most of our debates have been about whether it is right for volunteers to carry defensive sprays, Amendment 106 as drafted would also prevent chief officers equipping their existing paid staff, such as PCSOs, with such sprays. I assume this is not intention of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, but it would be helpful if he could clarify this when winding up.
When we debated this issue in Committee, a number of noble Lords expressed the view that the use of force is somehow incompatible with the PCSO role, and even more so for volunteers. For example, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said that the appropriate route for an individual who wishes,
“to volunteer to get involved in the use of force in the exercise of police powers”,
is,
“to become a special constable”.—[Official Report, 26/10/16; col. 267.]
I think he said that again today. However, it is important to put on record that, given the long-standing tradition of policing by consent, I would hope that no one who wishes to help with the policing of their community, as a police officer or a member of staff, whether paid or as a volunteer, does so with a view to using force against their fellow citizens. There are of course myriad roles which police officers, staff and volunteers perform regularly that do not involve the use of force.
Indeed, as we have discussed, the primary role of a PCSO across England and Wales is to engage with members of the public and to carry out low-level interventions such as dealing with anti-social behaviour. However, as was discussed in the House of Commons earlier this month, it is a sad fact of life that both police officers and PCSOs are assaulted and injured on duty. For example, in 2015-16, 270 assaults were reported by PCSOs in England and Wales, and those figures do not include the British Transport Police. It should be noted that this figure includes only assaults that officers report to their health and safety or human resource teams. In some cases, officers will choose not to report cases, as it is usually not compulsory to do so. Therefore, in reality, this figure is likely to be much higher.
We must therefore ensure that chief police officers are able to use their operational experience to make judgments as to the necessary level of defensive equipment and self-defence training that they make available to their officers and PCSOs. The only other option for chief police officers would be to withdraw their PCSOs from areas where there was a threat to their safety, potentially making disorder more likely if members of the community were unable to engage with a familiar face in uniform.
The situation is in essence no different from that of special constables, who are themselves volunteers. They have all the powers of a police officer, and a significant number are trained in the use of defensive sprays. I also point out that a small proportion of specials are trained in the use of public order tactics, so the use of force by appropriately trained police volunteers is not a new idea.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has tabled Amendment 107, which would remove Clause 38 from the Bill. The change to Section 54 of the Firearms Act 1968 made by Clause 38(2) is consequential on the provisions in Clause 37 enabling designated volunteers to be given access to defensive sprays. It therefore follows that if Amendment 106 were agreed to, Clause 38(2) would be unnecessary. However, Clause 38(3) deals with a separate point, making it explicit that special constables are members of a police force for the purposes of the Firearms Act 1968 and therefore do not require a certificate or authorisation under the 1968 Act when equipped with a defensive spray. Accordingly, the amendment goes wider than I believe the noble Lord intends.
A question was asked about the most appropriate route for an individual who wishes to perform front-line policing to join the specials. I think I have already addressed that point but I add that there might be reasons why an individual who wants to volunteer to help to make his or her community safer chooses not to join the specials. These reforms will enable those who wish to help to keep their communities safe to do so even where they are unable to meet the requirements for being a special—the time commitment, for example, or they may be in an occupation where they are prevented from being a special, such as being a Border Force officer, but still have skills or experience that could be of value.
My noble friend Lord Hailsham asked about the order-making power in Clause 37(6) enabling the Home Secretary to make regulations that would allow police staff and volunteers to use a firearm. The power is primarily intended as a form of future-proofing. Should, for example, a new form of defensive spray that uses substances other than CS come on to the market—
My Lords, the amendment in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee asks that Clause 46 not stand part of the Bill. Clause 46 gives power to the Secretary of State to make regulations that specify the ranks that may be held by police officers other than chief officers of police.
We have been here before—in 1993—with the Sheehy review into police responsibilities and rewards. Among other recommendations of that review was the abolition of the ranks of chief inspector and chief superintendent. After an expensive process of offering chief inspectors early retirement, that decision was reversed, leaving the police service with a deficit of suitably qualified and experienced chief inspectors. One consequence was that overnight—or, perhaps I should say, over the weekend—I went from being a uniformed chief inspector with no experience as a detective to being a detective chief inspector in charge of CID at Notting Hill.
Another recommendation of that report was to abolish the rank of chief superintendent. Instead, in the Metropolitan Police, we had grade 1 and grade 2 superintendents, one in charge and the other a deputy. They were both called “superintendent”, they both wore the same badge of rank, but one was more senior than the other. Such nonsense did not last long, and the rank of chief superintendent was subsequently reinstated. More recently, some police forces have decided significantly to reduce or not appoint officers to particular ranks, as suits the local circumstances of each force.
History has shown us, and present practice continues to demonstrate, that we do not need the Secretary of State to designate which ranks may be held by members of police forces; it is far better to allow chief constables to decide for themselves which ranks they need and which they do not. By all means let the Secretary of State or the College of Policing issue guidance to chief officers as to factors they should take into account when deciding which ranks to have. But, please, let us not make the same, very expensive—in terms of both money and loss of experience—mistake again. I beg to move.
My Lords, policing needs a greater say in how it structures its own organisations. It was the College of Policing’s leadership review that initially recommended a review of rank structure. It recognised that the rank structure as set out in the Police Act 1996 and the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 was not serving the needs of all forces. To support this police-led reform, Clause 46 will give the college the power to recommend regulations setting out what the rank structure should be. Chief Constable Francis Habgood, who is leading the review of the rank structure, is working with the National Police Chiefs’ Council to develop proposals that will work across all forces.
Having some commonality across forces is essential. The public have the right to expect the same high standards of service from every force and there needs to be clarity for the public around the exercise of significant police powers that can impact on civil liberties. Indeed, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and other legislation, expressly requires certain decisions to be taken by an officer of a specified minimum rank, very often an inspector or superintendent. I note that the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, on pre-charge anonymity specified that an application to a court to waive anonymity has to be made by an officer of at least the rank of inspector. Such key protections for the citizen cannot operate meaningfully without a national rank structure. Furthermore, the Government are committed to a national pay framework for police officers, where again there must be consistency across forces. A consistent rank structure also makes interforce collaboration easier, which is a critical consideration given the many complex challenges facing modern policing that require forces to work together.
This is not to say that every force must have officers of every rank. The Metropolitan Police has, for example, recently announced that it is to do away with the rank of chief inspector and it is open to other forces to follow suit. As I said in Committee, the Government make no presumption about the rank structure that may be proposed by the College of Policing in future. I believe that we should let the work of Chief Constable Francis Habgood continue and not constrain police leaders in how forces should be organised. Parliament will have the opportunity to examine the proposals for changes to the rank structure once the College of Policing has made its recommendations, as these will need to be set out in regulations which will be subject to the affirmative procedure.
I agree that decisions are best taken locally wherever possible, but there are circumstances where we need a clear national framework. This is one such case, albeit one where the reforms provided for in Clause 46 will afford chief officers a measure of local flexibility. With those words, I hope that the noble Lord feels content to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that explanation which, unless I have got completely the wrong end of the stick, seems to me to be completely contradictory. The noble Baroness says that there needs to be commonality across police forces, yet then gives the example of how the Metropolitan police service is not going to appoint anybody to the rank of chief inspector.
The noble Baroness says that it is necessary to have a clear national framework—we have a clear national framework in existing legislation, which specifies the ranks. So I really do not see why we need the Secretary of State to be given the power to make regulations about what ranks there should and should not be. For example, were the Secretary of State, by regulation, to say that there must be officers of the rank of chief inspector, where would that leave the Metropolitan Police if it has decided not to have any chief inspectors, as it apparently has?
The noble Baroness also talked about how it was important for the public for there to be commonality across all forces. If the Commissioner of the Met can decide not to appoint somebody to a rank that the Home Secretary has, in regulations, said that there should be, there will not be commonality across the country. I accept what the noble Baroness says in terms of the need for a national structure—which currently exists. What does not need to be done is for that system to be changed; what is needed is for chief constables to be given guidance as to which ranks they need, which will vary from force to force. The Metropolitan Police, in its chief officer ranks, for example, has a completely different rank structure to other forces. Yet, the Government do not seem to want to change that. Commanders do not exist anywhere other than in the Metropolitan Police and the City of London Police. Deputy assistant commissioners do not exist in any other force. So there is not commonality now and there is no move by the Government to enforce commonality across the country when it comes to chief officer ranks.
I find the Minister’s explanation incomprehensible. However, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group from the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond—including the one that she did not put forward. My name is attached to some of them but they came in quite a hurry in the last 24 hours and I think I missed some of them as they went through. I am sure that neither the noble Baroness nor I will press an amendment at this stage of the evening. However, I hope that I may be able to persuade the Minister to table an amendment at Third Reading.
I accept that the use of police bail has hitherto been seriously underregulated. I further accept that it has been used far too frequently and without the supervision of more senior officers. I agree with the tenor of this set of proposals. I also accept that in a number of cases police bail has been used in a sloppy, unthinking and unfortunate way. However, it is a well-known dictum that hard cases make bad law—and what is being proposed here is simply bad law. The argument put forward by those supporting this proposal is that the number of police bail cases will reduce. I absolutely agree; they will reduce. But police bail will be used in the most difficult cases because, without it, you cannot impose conditions on the suspect you are releasing. There are times when you need to require that the defendant does not approach the alleged victim—including children. There are times when you will want to impose residential or reporting requirements or the surrender of passports. These are the cases in which police bail will be used.
A drop in the overall number of police bail cases will not reduce this number of serious cases. As the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, suggested, these serious cases are the very cases that require, for example, forensic examination or the interrogation of computer databases. This will be done by third parties outside the police service. When all that has been done, these cases will require detailed consultation with the Crown Prosecution Service, which is also outside the police service. These bodies will handle only these sorts of cases, so they will already have a heavy workload to set against limited resources.
These cases will be investigated specifically by experienced detectives, who will deal only with these kinds of cases and will themselves have a high case load, in which each case will have a police bail clock ticking. We are talking about putting a huge amount of pressure on a system without the resources that would be necessary to complete these cases in 28 days. These cases—79% of the total—just will not be completed in 28 days, which will necessitate a return to the police station for a review by a superintendent, which will be a bureaucratic and unnecessary procedure for a suspect and his or her legal advisers. Furthermore, the 28-day limit will set up false hopes for victims—who will be told about it—that their case will be resolved within 28 days. Those hopes will be dashed.
It is fair to say that the noble Baroness and I have scarcely had time to confer over this matter, although I used the same joke in my speech about the fact that some people do not like experts. However, I know from my own correspondence and from a letter I have seen from the Minister to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, which has already been discussed, that the Minister herself knows that all the police professional bodies— the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the Police Superintendents’ Association and the Police Federation—have advised in the strongest terms that the provisions may simply be unworkable. So has the College of Policing, which the Minister praised for its work during the debate on the last amendment. If the College of Policing is saying that this is unworkable, why are we proceeding with it? I just suggest that, if possible, the Minister might listen to this and table a government amendment at Third Reading to raise the provision to 56 days. Even if that does not happen—that is the main thing we want to happen—the idea that the inspector’s police bail can only be 28 days, not 27 or seven, is simply absurd. It is simple: what if the 28th day is Christmas Day? The Government should bring forward that amendment: in the inspector’s bail there should be the same phrase of “up to 28 days”, not “28 days”, as that will cause major mayhem.
My first point is: why not listen to the people who really know how the system will work in serious cases? There are many serious cases where it is simply impossible to persuade the forensic companies and the people who understand the nature of digital records to provide this information in time for 28 days, and for it to have been discussed by the Crown Prosecution Service. This is bad legislation, and I urge that it be reconsidered at Third Reading.
My Lords, I support what the noble Lord, Lord Blair, and my noble friend have said on this subject. My noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendment 115 in this group; I will not say that it is a compromise, but it is another option.
As my noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond said today and as I raised in Committee, academics, practitioners and the College of Policing all claim that an initial 28-day limit on police bail is impractical, and a government impact assessment, which allegedly takes into account the academic research, says that a 28-day initial limit is workable. I say “allegedly” because, as the noble Lord, Lord Blair, just said, the academic research and the impact assessment come to different conclusions about the workability of an initial 28-day limit. Our amendment effectively suggests that the Government give the new 28-day limit a trial period of two years and then allow Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary to assess whether the new provision is working effectively or not; that is, whether the academics, the practitioners and the College of Policing are right, or the Home Office civil servants are right. Of course, we support much stricter limits on police bail, but they must not impede police effectiveness.
I point out that Amendment 115 would work if it was 56 days as well. In other words, you could have a two-year experiment with 56 days as well as a two-year experiment with 28 days.
My Lords, I declare my interest as the police and crime commissioner for Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland and say in passing what a pleasure it was to host the Minister in Leicestershire the other day. I know that this matter was briefly raised with her, but neither I nor the chief constable talked about it for long. It was a great pleasure to have her there, and her visit went down very well.
There is a need to reform the present system of pre-charge bail. We all know of cases—of course, none in Leicestershire that I know of—where individuals, to put it mildly, have been carelessly treated by the present system. I personally know of one recent case where the delay has been truly shocking. However, the more the principle is right, the more vital it is that the practical way of putting it into effect is correct too. It is important that the change should work, without causing serious difficulties—the kind of difficulties that both the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, and the noble Lord, Lord Blair, mentioned—and unnecessary disruption for the police.
Before the Minister sits down—and with the leave of the House, as one would normally intervene to seek clarification from the Minister—I wish to correct what she said about people on these Benches accepting the 28-day limit. That is not the case.