Policing and Crime Bill Debate

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Department: Home Office

Policing and Crime Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts
Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 12th December 2016

(7 years, 3 months ago)

Lords Chamber
Read Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 72-III(a) Amendment for Report, supplementary to the third marshalled list (PDF, 54KB) - (9 Dec 2016)
Viscount Hailsham Portrait Viscount Hailsham (Con)
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The noble Lord ended his remarks by saying that a grave injustice is caused to those when you have publicity of the kind identified, and I entirely agree. It has been very well illustrated by what my noble friends Lord Lamont and Lord Deben said about Lord Bramall and Lord Brittan. I was Lord Brittan’s PPS in the other place and I know how deeply distressing the allegations were. That also applies to Harvey Proctor; the allegations against him were wholly grotesque and must be immensely damaging. So there really is an underlying mischief of a very serious kind. My noble friend Lord Marlesford and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, are much to be congratulated on bringing forward these amendments.

If I may say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, my former pair for a short period of time in the other place, he is absolutely right—the problem will not go away. That means that we have an opportunity to address it. It is a continuing problem for this reason: usually the information is disclosed by a police officer, usually for money. That is not going to go away unless we intervene by statute. The truth always is that, if you give power to officials or opportunities to officials, on occasion they will abuse it. The noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, rightly asked about the safeguards. Although I look forward very much to my noble friend’s contribution from the Front Bench, I do not think for one moment that there are effective safeguards outside statute.

I turn briefly to the amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord Marlesford, Amendment 182. I agree with one part of it very robustly. His is much more far-reaching than is the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, because it applies to all offences—and I think that he is right about that. Allegations of fraud can achieve very high publicity and be immensely damaging, so I have a great deal of sympathy with the scope of Amendment 182. Where I have greater doubt is with two other parts of the amendment. With respect to the accused person, there is no provision for him or her to consent to publicity as there is in the amendment proposed by the noble Lord. Secondly, I am uncomfortable about the concept of the magistrates’ court being the court in which representations as to public interest are to be determined. I am in favour very much of what the noble Lord says with regard to the judge of the Crown Court.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is a much more distinguished lawyer than I am ever going to be, but there are two points that I would make. First, he says that there may be occasions when an accused person will not be charged because witnesses will not come forward, absent publicity. There is truth in that, but then you have to look at the proportionality of the whole. Yes, there may be one or two such cases, but for an awful lot of cases great injustice will be done to people against whom allegations are made that are wholly unfounded. Finally, the noble Lord suggests that the judges in chambers will not be able to assess and determine the relevant arguments and whether there is a public interest in disclosure. There may be some force in that, but I think not much at the end of the day, because judges in chambers and Crown Court judges are pretty experienced about this sort of thing. They will have to consider quite frequently public interest immunity certificates which have very broad quality concerns attached to them. So in applying the principle of proportionality, the argument advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is wrong in that respect. I make one rider: I hope that the rules of the court which will doubtless be introduced if the amendment is passed will make provision for the person against whom the allegations are made to have the opportunity to make representations to the Crown Court judge.

With respect to my noble friend Lord Marlesford, I shall not support his amendment, should he seek your Lordships’ opinion—but, unless my noble friend Lady Williams surprises me with her argumentation, I shall support the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Portrait Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)
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My Lords, I am glad I arrived in time to hear my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours praying me in aid of this amendment, because I do indeed support it. That may surprise many people, because I am ardently an exponent of justice for women and keen to see that the system is alert to the ways in which women often are failed by it. I have written about this for all my professional life of 40 years in the courts. I take this position and I have not changed, my noble friend will be happy to know.

At the time, back in 2003, the point that I was making in opposing Lord Ackner’s amendment was that Lord Ackner was taking issue with the fact that women got anonymity so why should not poor men charged with rape get anonymity? He suggested having equality. It was an argument that was, I am afraid, familiar to me from old judges: “You want equality, Ms Kennedy, we will give you equality”. It did not take account of the fact that the lives of women in society are so often different from those of men. With rape, particularly, women often just could not face coming before the courts to testify against the person who had raped and violated them. I do not have to rehearse in this House the whole baggage around rape: we know why women have been handicapped in coming forward and why the statistics are so low. We know the difficulty of dealing with things that happen in private, but we also know the ways in which women’s whole lives would be affected by the sense of dishonour attached to rape, and for many women this is still the case. Many more women are becoming brave and saying they do not need anonymity but it was given to women in the 1970s to try to redress the balance of law’s historical failure. It recognised something that I want to say very slowly to this House: treating as equal those who are not equal does not create equality.

We do justice by looking beyond the courtroom doors and knowing what really goes on in society. For that reason, we introduced anonymity into the system when that flew in the face of principle. We do not want anonymity in our courts. We want people to stand there and accuse, to face their accuser and to hear what the evidence is. We want justice to be open and for the public to hear it. But the decision was made to give anonymity to women to encourage them to come forward when these terrible events had happened to them. Lord Ackner advocated—and he found some friends in the House—that we had equality in 2003 and should treat everybody equally. But if we had equality, we would not still be hearing women arguing for equal pay and about domestic violence and violence towards women.

You cannot give total anonymity to an accused all the way through a trial because we know that there are cases where people come forward at the right point and say, “This happened to me, too”. If the Savile case and others have taught us anything it is precisely that. However, you do not solve one injustice by visiting another injustice on people. That is why I feel very strongly that the police should not disclose names until the point of charging. We have here a rather unpleasant alchemy of the police and media coming together. I have worked on many cases where a tip-off was given by police to the press who were then standing outside the police station to photograph people as they exited. It never comes to a charge, but the accusation has already been made. Why does that happen, you may ask yourself? In the old days it used to be because the police officer had been promised a drink or a case of whisky would be sent round at Christmas from the local newspaper or a more major national one. I am afraid it could take even more unpleasant forms than the drink at Christmas.

I remind the House that not long ago a woman called Rebekah Brooks—then Rebekah Wade—gave evidence to a Select Committee about the amount of money paid by her newspaper to police officers for precisely the kind of information we have been talking about, which blights people’s lives. From Cliff Richard to Paul Gambaccini, a whole set of people have suffered the consequences of this kind of publicity. The strength of this amendment is that it is not saying that the door is closed. Many women are assisted by the fact that other women will ultimately come forward because they hear that a charge has at last been brought against somebody. They are not standing alone and then they have courage. However, you also have to prevent other injustices. That is why you protect people by giving them the cover of anonymity until the point of charging. Then, and only then, should a name be put into the public domain.

How do we deal with police misbehaviour? I know there are noble Lords who do not think the police ever misbehave: they do. Happily, it does not happen as often as many people think but it is too often and police misbehaviour is behind most of this kind of publicity. If the standing order is not working and the principles are not being adhered to, how can you give teeth to preventing police officers doing this? The only way is if they face sacking or prosecution if they are discovered to have interfered with due process. We must have stronger responses to police misbehaviour of this kind.

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Baroness Howe of Idlicote Portrait Baroness Howe of Idlicote (CB)
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My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 185 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, for all the reasons he has explained so eloquently, even though pushed to deliver them very quickly. I shall be much briefer.

If someone has been sexually assaulted by a complete stranger and has then reported the details to the police, it is clearly important that when the police then interview potential suspects they do not under any circumstances, whether the potential offender has been charged or not, disclose the identity of the victim to such suspects. In the past, perhaps, this would not have been so vital, but today if the attack has been carried out by a sexual predator, the availability of the internet, Facebook and all the other many ways of identifying where a victim lives will inevitably mean that the attacker can continue to harass their victim via all or any of these means. Indeed, I am sure noble Lords will have read many harrowing stories of just such instances—we have heard one or two of them already—where the named victim has ultimately been forced to leave the area and resettle in a completely different, new part of the country, changing their names too.

The noble Lord’s amendment is vital. I very much hope that the Minister will be able to accept it in its entirety.

Viscount Hailsham Portrait Viscount Hailsham
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My Lords, I am conscious that your Lordships want to vote on Amendment 187, so I shall be brief, but I have to say that this proposal is, to my way of thinking, one of the most unjust that I have heard in your Lordships’ House for some time. It is worth identifying what it says. I shall come to the proviso in a moment, but what it says that somebody who is accused of rape is not to know the name of the accuser—the complainant. For that matter, somebody who is accused of actual bodily harm or grievous bodily harm is not to know the name of the accuser or of the witnesses. I ask rhetorically: how on earth can a defendant or his representatives prepare his case for trial without knowing the name of the accuser or the witnesses? After all, they may not have been there. They may be notorious liars. There may be lots of other reasons to distrust their integrity.

The substantive clause here precludes the police from giving the name of the victim or the witnesses to the accused person. That is curiously reminiscent of the procedure underlying lettres de cachet in pre-revolutionary France, as described in A Tale of Two Cities. Let us look at the proviso, because it needs a bit of probing. The proviso in subsection 1(b) of the proposed new clause is so far as,

“non-disclosure would not impact on … a new trial”.

Who is to judge whether it impacts on a fair trial? I can tell noble Lords from the language of the proposed new clause that it is to be the police or the Crown Prosecution Service. So the police or the Crown Prosecution Service, who are party to the procedure, who are making the allegations, will judge whether it is fair to disclose the identity of the victim or the witness. How can that possibly be fair? What procedure is there in the proposed new clause for the accused person to challenge that determination? There is none at all.

We are told, “Ah, the judge will let it in”, but the judge cannot when there is an absolute prohibition. There is no procedure here whereby the decision of the police officer or the Crown Prosecution Service can be challenged. Probing a little further, what about police statements? I am sure my noble friend knows full well that police statements have to be served on the defendant prior to trial so that they can prepare and understand their case. If the identity of the witness or the victim has to be redacted out of the statements, what possible purpose is there in serving the statements at all? One merely has to identify these things to see that this would be struck down, certainly by the courts. It is a clear contravention of the provisions in the convention now in domestic law in favour of a fair trial.

Incidentally, on proposed new subsection 1(c), regarding the protection of people, bail conditions can do that. There may be a case for strengthening bail conditions but there is absolutely no case for introducing a measure that will do a profound injustice in our courts. I hope my noble friend the Minister will give a robust response to this.

Lord Carlile of Berriew Portrait Lord Carlile of Berriew
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Before the noble Viscount sits down, is the point not that the complainant may say that the person who allegedly assaulted him or her is a stranger but may have an oblique motive for so saying? How is the defendant therefore able to defend himself or herself without being able to know who the accuser is? It is a palpable injustice which was not covered, I regret, by the passionate speech by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, which omitted that crucial point.

Viscount Hailsham Portrait Viscount Hailsham
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I could not agree more with the noble Lord. I agree with him as I agreed with him on the previous debate. We are dealing here with the possibility of profound injustice and we should guard against it.

Baroness Cohen of Pimlico Portrait Baroness Cohen of Pimlico (Lab)
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My Lords, my name is also attached to this amendment, but I would not normally have spoken given that the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, were such distinguished proponents of it. At the moment there is a choice of injustices. Perhaps we should have provided—and I should be glad to provide at Third Reading—a clause saying that a judge may decide whether the name should be disclosed. This is, however, also a modern offence. In the old days it might not have mattered very much if you disclosed only the name of the accuser. These days, the perpetrator has no trouble at all, because of the spread of social media, and these cases are more frequent.

One reads of cases all the time and I want to disentangle this from the issue of rape. It is not entirely about rape. It is about being knifed in the street or pushed under a Tube train by a perfect stranger, as I am sure we have all read about, and being terrified thereafter in case he or she comes and does it again. Therefore, I would be very grateful if the Minister would understand the strength of feeling and the injustice being done. If we can put in a clause at Third Reading offering the possibility of review by a judge if necessary, I would be glad to do so.

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Baroness Royall of Blaisdon Portrait Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)
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My Lords, in moving Amendment 187A, I declare an interest as a trustee of Paladin, the National Stalking Advocacy Service. It is four years since a stalking law was introduced, following an amendment that I tabled in this House which was the culmination of terrific work by the independent parliamentary inquiry, whose adviser was the excellent Laura Richards and which included the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Howe of Idlicote. It was strongly supported by colleagues in the House of Commons, notably Yvette Cooper and Stella Creasy. I pay tribute to the Government for the progress made since 2012, the introduction of the offence of coercive control and last week’s announcement of stalking orders.

Stalking destroys lives. Some 40% of the victims of domestic homicide have been stalked, including Jane Clough and Holli Gazzard, and the punishment must fit the crime. When I tabled the original amendment, it was always the intention that the maximum sentence be 10 years. However, due to the two tiers in the Protection from Harassment Act, the higher test mirrored Section 4 harassment and became five years by default. Experience now tells us that this is not enough.

My amendment mirrors a 10-minute rule Bill introduced by Alex Chalk, the Conservative MP for Cheltenham, and supported by MPs from all parties, including Richard Graham, the MP for Gloucester, whose constituent, Dr Eleanor Aston, was stalked for eight years by a former patient, Raymond Knight. When he was sentenced to five years—the maximum sentence—the judge stated that he would like to have given Knight a longer sentence as he was a serious risk to Dr Aston. This case is not unique; I could cite numerous other examples, including Kristine Carlson and Katie Price. Extending the maximum penalty would set the tone, allow for greater flexibility and make it clear that stalking is a serious offence. An increased maximum sentence is necessary for the most serious cases, particularly where there is repeat offending. At present a defendant who pleads guilty to this most serious offence, even if it is a repeat offence against the same victim, will serve a maximum of 20 months. This is insufficient to protect the victim.

Sadly, too few cases still result in a stalking charge, and, when they do, the sentencing does not reflect the serious nature of the crime. This was highlighted as a cause for concern when we were meeting Home Office lawyers to discuss the drafting of the stalking legislation in 2012 and given the proposed maximum sentence of five years. Training is important. So, too, are sentencing guidelines. The maximum penalty should reflect the serious impact that this psychological crime has on the victim.

Stalking is a long-term pattern of behaviour. It is persistent and intrusive, and it engenders fear, alarm or distress. It results in long-term psychological harm and can escalate to violence and murder. Stalking is about fixation and obsession. It is clear that when people fixate and stalk, they are psychologically unstable. A significant minority are psychotic, and some may suffer from undiagnosed personality disorders. Currently, stalkers are not routinely assessed, and they should be. More robust sentences would allow for a robust mental health assessment which informs diagnosis, treatment and management.

The Minster may well say that the Sentencing Council is undertaking a review and that it would be precipitate to pre-empt that review. The Sentencing Council reviews sentences within the framework set by Parliament, so it is for us to act and then for the Sentencing Council to build its guideline around the maximum tariff.

Of course, it is true that, alongside the stalking, there may be other offences—for example, assault or arson—that can be charged. But in a significant number of cases, stalking is the only offence, a very grave offence, which can lead to the victim being a prisoner in their own home, developing post-traumatic stress disorder, losing their job, losing their relationship, losing their mental health and ultimately losing their life. It is a serious offence and must be treated as such.

Paladin’s research shows that victims feel unsafe due to short sentences. Preventive orders do not lead victims to feel safe because it is the very nature of the stalking offence that means such boundaries are prone to being breached. In the most serious cases, the only time a victim truly receives any respite is when his or her stalker is behind bars. Victims continue to live in fear and are terrorised and terrified when the stalker comes out. It is clear that short sentences do not allow for any form of diagnosis, treatment or management, so the behaviour continues in a revolving-door fashion. This is costly to victims and to the criminal justice system.

It is important to highlight the fact that stalking occurs over an extended period of time. Often, stalkers are prosecuted only for breaching restraining orders. The maximum sentence for criminal damage, burglary and offence against property is 10 years. These offences are acute and one-offs. Allowing judges greater flexibility on sentences will acknowledge the repetitive nature of stalking, which can span multiple years, offences and breaches.

Some victims have felt helpless due to the long-term, insidious and persistent nature of this crime—as in the case of Helen Pearson, who was almost killed by Joe Willis and attempted suicide twice. The escalation to murder should be clearly understood. These cases are called “murders in slow motion” for a reason, and we have an opportunity to intervene earlier and prevent them. It is one of the few crimes where early intervention can prevent serious psychological damage, violence and murder. That is precisely why we need to increase the maximum sentence.

My amendment would give judges the greater flexibility they require in sentencing to allow the sentence to fit the crime and thus better protect the victim whose life is being torn apart. I beg to move.

Viscount Hailsham Portrait Viscount Hailsham
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My Lords, I very much hope that your Lordships do not support this amendment. My reasons are both general and particular. As to my general reason, I am very cautious about any inflation in sentencing. Our prisons are already grossly overcrowded. When I was Prisons Minister at the back end of the 1980s, we had a prison population of some 44,000. We now have a prison population of just short of 85,000, and that makes for gross overcrowding. Until very recently, I was on the monitoring board of a local prison. As a member of the Bar, I go to prisons, and the facilities in prisons are overstretched almost beyond imagining. In this respect, the POA is right. I am very anxious that we should not do anything that tends to make courts increase the overall level of sentences. In the past five years, the average sentence has increased from 12.3 months to 16.4 months, and conditions in prisons are dire.

That takes me to the second point, and I shall be very brief. Five years—the existing maximum—is a long sentence, even when one takes into account the fact that the offender will not serve the whole of it. Being shut up in custodial circumstances in most of our prisons is a deeply unpleasant experience. If the offender is rational, then five years is a perfectly good deterrent. If the offender is not rational, then increasing the sentence will make no difference whatever to his conduct. All we are doing is to drive up the overall level of sentences, and that is thoroughly undesirable.

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Viscount Hailsham Portrait Viscount Hailsham
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My Lords, I shall be very brief. I have no objection to my noble friend answering the questions posed by the noble Lord; it is obviously right that she should. My objection lies to proposed new subsection (3), because I do not think that the existing law needs any change. If one looks at the primary legislation, one sees that the ability of defence counsel to ask questions or call evidence is hedged about by judicial restriction and can be exercised only relatively rarely. I have been in court many times when this has happened, and there is no sense that the legislation is being abused, that evidence is being adduced unnecessarily or that cross-examination is being done wrongly.

At the end of the day, I believe that the law is right as it stands. Although I have no objection to a review and no objection to the questions put by the noble Lord, I do not think we need to change the law—and I am therefore bound to say that subsection (3) of the proposed new clause poses problems as far as I am concerned.

Lord Hope of Craighead Portrait Lord Hope of Craighead
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My Lords, I will add just a footnote to what the noble Viscount said. Some years ago, there was a challenge to Section 41 of the 1999 Act on the ground that it was incompatible with the convention right to a fair trial. I sat upstairs in a committee room as a Law Lord with the Appellate Committee. We were very careful to restrict the ability of counsel to explore these matters, as far as we possibly could consistent with the right to a fair trial. I am glad to hear that, from the noble Viscount’s experience, the system is working very well. On the other hand, when we were framing our restrictive view as to how the section should be applied, we were looking to the future; we did not have the benefit of experience. Like the noble Viscount, I have no objection to a review, which I suppose might serve some useful purpose by informing everyone as to whether the system is really working as the Law Lords expected it should.