Policing and Crime Bill

Baroness Howe of Idlicote Excerpts

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 16th November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise to support the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. I was sent the same briefing as him, so he has largely said the same as I was going to say. I just remind the Committee that I sit as a magistrate in central London and I deal, not with issues of this seriousness, but certainly with issues of harassment and others of that nature. There is one other factor that I want to add, on what I understand the legal position to be, which I took from the CPS website. If the police want to apply for anonymity for a victim and believe that they have proper grounds to do that, they can apply to a magistrates’ court but, indeed, I believe police officers can give that anonymity if they believe that there is a proper case for it. They have to reapply for anonymity when a trial happens, either at the magistrates’ court or at the Crown Court.

As the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, said so clearly, many of the police who were contacted about this issue simply did not know what the law was and they gave wrong advice to the young woman who was asking for advice. This is very worrying and is very likely to discourage other young women from coming forward. That is really the importance of this amendment.

[Baroness Howe of Idlicote (CB)]

My Lords, it certainly seems extraordinary that there is no policy for legislation determining whether to disclose the identity of a victim of serious sexual crime to the alleged stranger perpetrator. It seems to me that, while nothing is gained by disclosure in the police station, it could be very damaging to the victim. It is relatively easy, in today’s society, for anybody with access to the internet to trace and find the whereabouts of any person, just by having their name.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wigley]

My Lords, Amendment 228D stands in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. This amendment increases the range of offences for which the Attorney-General has the power to refer a relevant lenient sentence to the Court of Appeal for review. The offences covered by the amendment are stalking, which my colleagues in the other place have been involved in seeking legislation on over the past two or three years—I am glad to see positive movement on this—multiple breaches of restraining orders, coercive control, incitement to support a terrorist organisation and the possession of indecent images of children. Those are the categories we refer to in the amendment.

The Criminal Justice Act 1988 gave the Attorney-General the power to refer unduly lenient sentences to the Court of Appeal. The power was rightly restricted to certain serious offences, but since that time new legislation has been enacted for other grave matters. The time is right to reflect those changes and to address the concerns about individual cases of leniency by adding these new offences to the relevant schedule to the 1988 Act. The changes are not retrospective but would give the Attorney-General the power to refer such lenient cases in the future.

There have been a number of sentences in individual cases in the recent past involving the offences I have listed in the amendment which have been widely reported and have indeed caused public concern. Subsection (a) of the proposed new clause refers to stalking, which is dealt with in Section 4A of the Act,

“involving fear of violence or serious alarm or distress”,

and would have been relevant, had it been enacted, to the sentence of only three years for the stalker of Emily Maitlis. This seemed to be very lenient given that the behaviour had gone on for more than 20 years and despite many previous convictions. The stalker of Claire Waxman, again with numerous convictions, got three years and was back in the community after 18 months. Longer sentences would not only be just, they would also allow for longer perpetrator treatment while in custody.

Stalking victims constantly complain that restraining orders do not work because they are not enforced. The perpetrator in the Claire Waxman case breached them many times and other women currently working with Voice 4 Victims say the same. Sometimes, for whatever reason, it appears that the police do not investigate, while in other cases the courts hand out fines or warnings, yet the maximum sentence for a breach is five years. The ability to refer multiple breaches for re-examination by the Court of Appeal would facilitate the raising of the threshold.

Coercive control in a domestic situation became law in 2015. The behaviour causes massive damage to predominantly female victims and can last for years. Women may be controlled financially or in terms of their movements by being confined to their homes, and harassed and bullied. Too few prosecutions have been brought to court so far. The ability of the Attorney-General to refer individual cases will help to highlight the serious nature of such unacceptable behaviour.

Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000 involves inciting support for a proscribed organisation. Earlier this year, the hate preacher Anjem Choudary was given three and a half years despite the fact that the court heard that he had encouraged at least 100 young people to turn to ISIS. He could be out in 20 months or less.

The inclusion of the possession of indecent images of children follows an extraordinary case this summer where a male offender was given a suspended sentence in spite of having thousands of images on his devices, including 400 category A images, which are the most vile. His defence argued for a non-custodial sentence on the grounds that he wanted to start a family.

This amendment, which has been drafted by Voice 4 Victims, would update the Attorney-General’s powers and increase public confidence in the sentencing process. I beg to move.

[Baroness Howe of Idlicote]

My Lords, I want to add a few words of support for this amendment. Four years ago I was fully in support of the creation of the offence of stalking, which involves putting a person in fear of violence, serious alarm or distress. Although the maximum sentence is five years, there have been a number of disturbing and unduly lenient court sentences for perpetrators who had been stalking their victims for a decade or more.

I recently met Claire Waxman who has been referred to and who had been hounded by a relentless stalker for 13 years. Her case highlighted the struggle that stalking victims face in the criminal justice system. It was one of the key cases given as evidence in the stalking law reform and it took over a decade for her perpetrator to receive a substantial custodial sentence. In those years, Claire said, “I felt completely failed by the justice system for allowing my long-term stalker to receive suspended sentences or very short jail sentences. These sentences served little purpose as he continued his criminal behaviour each time. I strongly believe had we been able to refer this case to the Attorney-General for the Court of Appeal, he may have received the right sentence earlier on, saving me from years of unnecessary harm and distress”. I very much hope that the Government will see a way to support this amendment fully.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede]

My Lords, I also support this amendment, to which I have put my name.

As I mentioned in an earlier debate, I sit as a magistrate in central London for crime, youth and family matters. I have been a magistrate for just over 10 years and have seen a big change in the nature of crime which we deal with in London. While there is a decreasing overall amount of crime brought to courts in London, there is a rising proportion of crime related to domestic abuse. We all receive specialist training on that matter—we have specialist courts and are very careful about the way we deal with those matters in court. It is an ever increasing proportion of our workload, so I have given out many restraining orders and have also dealt with many breaches of restraining orders. When one gives a warning to somebody who has been given a restraining order, one can never really be too stark in explaining to the offender just how serious it is. Many times you get the impression that they do not appreciate the seriousness of their activities.

Even when a defendant has been acquitted and found not guilty, you can still put in place a restraining order if you believe it is suitable, and you still have to give a suitable warning for that restraining order being put in place. The amendment deals only with people who have been convicted, but restraining orders can be put in place when people are acquitted as well.

The purpose of this amendment is as a backstop to provide the ability to have higher sentences where the courts have put in place unduly lenient sentences. The maximum is five years, but very often there needs to be a facility and an ability to increase sentences if they are felt to be unduly lenient.