Read Bill Ministerial Extracts
(3 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe reasoned amendment in the name of the Leader of the Opposition has been selected.
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
Two years ago, when this Government took office, we inherited an asylum system in chaos. The Conservative Government had ceded control of our borders to criminal gangs and, as a result, between January 2021 and June 2024, 110,000 people arrived here by small boat, while a further 175,000 claimed asylum by other routes. As numbers soared, so did the cost to the taxpayer. In just a single year, spending on asylum support was £4.7 billion, including £9 million spent daily on housing people in 400 asylum hotels.
In the last two years, this Government have begun the work of restoring order to our borders. That starts by taking the fight to the criminal gangs. In the last year, arrests of people smugglers were up 55%. Since taking office, we have disrupted organised immigration crime on 3,700 occasions—up by 46%. In partnership with French law enforcement, we have stopped 46,000 attempted channel crossings. We are now taking that partnership further with a new deal signed in April. This will fund increased patrols and intelligence operations, with a 53% increase in personnel on the French coast. The deal is already bearing fruit. In May, nearly two thirds of attempted small boat crossings were thwarted.
Meanwhile, we have rebuilt a shattered asylum system. Decision making ground to a halt under the last Government; now, decisions are at a 24-year high. As a result, removals are now at their highest level in nearly a decade—up 41% on the same period prior to our taking office. We have now deported and removed nearly 10,000 foreign criminals. That is 36% more than the last Government achieved.
We are also beginning to lighten the burden on local communities. This Government committed to ending the use of asylum hotels within this Parliament. Two years in, we have already emptied one in five, reducing the hotel population by 29% and cutting asylum costs by £1 billion.
Mr Jonathan Brash (Hartlepool) (Lab)
I can say absolutely wholeheartedly that the Home Secretary retains my complete support for seeing this legislation through in full. Does she not agree that, as we take this action forward, it is important not just that the hotels are reduced, but that the dispersal accommodation that has overburdened communities, like mine in Hartlepool, is also reduced?
I thank my hon. Friend for what he said. He is absolutely right: we need to reduce the pressure in local communities as much as possible. He knows that dispersal accommodation has been part of the asylum accommodation estate for many years, including under the previous Government. Of course, the best way to reduce the need for asylum accommodation—the use of large sites, dispersal accommodation and other sites—is to reduce the inflow of people coming to the country on small boats in the channel. Once we get to grips with those numbers, we will see the biggest decrease in asylum accommodation, no matter what form it takes, and that is the work that this Government are taking forward.
I congratulate the Home Secretary on not resiling at all from the tough stance that she is trying to take. Has she received any indication that after 20 July, a Labour Home Secretary—hopefully she herself—will be able to continue to develop this important work?
Oh, the right hon. Gentleman tempts me with some attractive bait, but I will resist the temptation! I am sure that once the events of 20 July have taken place, all these matters shall become clearer still.
This Government have taken some considerable steps forward, but we must do more: around 94,000 people remain in asylum accommodation at a total cost of £3.7 billion per year; while asylum claims fell by 12% last year, they remain close to historic highs; and with the criminal gangs still at work, people continue to die in the channel, with over 100 deaths since the start of 2024, including women and young children.
Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)
We always forget that people lose their lives in the channel—including last year, tragically, a young girl of four and a young man of 16 who had just tried to phone his parents. Does the Home Secretary agree that anyone with any humanitarian beliefs at all should be doing everything they can to stop cross-channel boats, and that it is incumbent on everyone that we do everything we can about that?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. It is really shocking that we no longer seem to give huge amounts of attention to the deaths that still occur in the channel; in fact, they barely make the news. Most people do not realise that so many still lose their lives when crossing on small boats in the channel. That is why there is a moral responsibility on all of us to think about how we deal with the particular challenge of small boats crossing the channel, how we play our part as a Government committed to our humanitarian responsibilities, and how we ensure that we finish off this trade once and for all. The only people who really benefit from this trade, and from the huge risks that people place themselves under, are the criminal gangs themselves. That money is going into the pockets of hardened criminals who would harm us in other ways, and we have got to put a stop to it.
This country has always provided sanctuary to those fleeing war and persecution, and I am proud of that fact, but we must accept that public consent for our asylum system is fraying, and unless we restore control, we will lose the British public’s support entirely. My goal as Home Secretary is to rebuild the public’s confidence, and thereby ensure that we can continue providing protection to those in need today and for generations to come. To do so, I believe we must restore fairness to our asylum system—fairness both to those who are fleeing war and persecution, and towards those communities already here who bear the burden of support.
On fairness, I understand that some 80 Labour Back Benchers have written to the right hon. Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham), asking him to review the Home Secretary’s plans for indefinite leave to remain. Are they likely to be disappointed or encouraged by his response?
Indefinite leave to remain, and the Government’s proposals on earned settlement, will be settled policy later this year when the Government respond to the earned settlement consultation, in which we have said that we are consulting on transitional arrangements. Those will be settled later this year, but as the hon. Gentleman knows, that is not the subject of the Bill.
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right: we have a proud tradition of welcoming those fleeing persecution, oppression and injustice. In my constituency, over a decade ago many Rohingya who were fleeing genocide made Bradford their home, and we welcomed them. Many of them were able to reunite with their families from refugee camps, who are now living with them in Bradford, and all of them are contributing very positively to Bradford and to this country. Under the Home Secretary’s changes, they would never have been able to reunite with their families, and they would not have done that. Does she think that is right and fair on them?
I remind my hon. Friend that, as he knows, we have paused family reunification, and the Government have said that we will bring forward further proposals for our approach to that. We need to ensure that we have more parity of treatment between those who are ultimately recognised as refugees and other migrants who come to this country—and indeed British citizens who may marry from abroad but are subject to different rules that do not apply to their refugee counterparts. I think there is a need to bring some coherence to the family reunification system, and to ensure that we have an approach that is fair to all the sorts of people who make claims for family reunification. That is not the subject of the Bill, but it is something on which the Government will soon bring forward additional policy proposals.
There is nothing fair about a system that is based on uncontrolled, unsafe and illegal routes into this country. The only people it serves are the people smugglers. Instead, a fair asylum system must be grounded in controlled, safe and legal asylum. For that reason, in the last few weeks I announced new routes for genuine refugees to build a new life here. These capped, safe and legal routes will soon allow communities, universities and businesses to sponsor refugees. The approach means that those in need of protection arrive with the consent of communities, and with the financial support of their sponsor and not the taxpayer. It is an approach to asylum that promotes integration within, and contribution to, this country.
Will the Home Secretary put on record thanks to communities like mine in Hornsey and Friern Barnet who have opened their doors for the Homes for Ukraine scheme? People have been deeply involved—through the synagogue, the mosque and the church—in community-based schemes that find accommodation locally, and have helped people into work who were already refugees—the UNHRC had decided they were refugees, so there was no question about their application—and that has been a really positive development for our communities.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. When people arrive through controlled, safe routes, when we have made a decision to allow people to enter, and when we are in control and not the people-smuggling gangs, the inherent openness, tolerance and generosity of the British people is unlocked. People are willing to welcome those who are in need and who come to this country at our invitation and through a system that has broad public support. Those are the principles that will underpin this Government’s approach to the asylum system.
Jayne Kirkham (Truro and Falmouth) (Lab/Co-op)
Even in rural areas like Cornwall, community schemes welcoming Syrian refugees are working very well. They show that community sponsorship schemes can work well across the country.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right—yes, they can and they do. That is the difference with a safe and legal route that has buy-in from communities across the country, and that is the basis on which we will build a system for the future.
It is great to hear my right hon. Friend supporting schemes like Homes for Ukraine. The reason we do not see Ukrainians crossing the channel on small boats is because, rightly, we have a safe and legal route. Why not expand those safe and legal routes to places like Sudan and Eritrea, because obviously if an asylum claim comes from those countries, at the very least they should be fast-tracked? That would help to clear up the backlog, so would she support that?
We have set out our proposals to open up a student refugee scheme and a community sponsorship scheme that will go live later in autumn this year, with the first arrivals coming in the autumn of the following year. Numbers on those schemes will grow. We will also make it possible for businesses to sponsor refugees to come to this country and provide them with work opportunities. I think that is the right way forward. It means that we will be able to accommodate different cohorts of refugees, where we believe we are able to offer a fresh start for people, and to make the best of the contribution that they are able to make to the country. I look forward to getting those routes open, and to welcoming the first arrivals.
In Canada, local communities have long sponsored refugees, and 70% of those sponsored refugees have found work within a year. Here the story is very different. In the first year after being granted asylum, just a quarter of refugees are in work. That leaves them unable to contribute and build a life here, relying instead on the support of British taxpayers. This autumn we will begin to take applications for our new community sponsored and study routes. The first refugees will arrive in autumn 2027, and while numbers will start relatively small, it is my intention that they grow in scale as we restore order to our asylum system by reducing the numbers arriving by unsafe, illegal routes. The Bill is focused on how we reduce the numbers arriving unsafely and illegally in this country, and on reducing the burden placed on local communities.
We have read reports recently that the Home Secretary’s important reforms to indefinite leave to remain are being watered down because of the views of the incoming Prime Minister. We have also read of the letter from 80 Labour MPs, many of whom are in the Chamber today, who oppose her plans today. My simple question is: what are we all doing here right now? Is there any guarantee that her reforms and the Bill will survive contact with the next Prime Minister, who will be assuming power without any scrutiny, without any transparency, and with absolutely no accountability as to what his plans are?
I have already answered the point about proposals around indefinite leave to remain; I remind the right hon. and learned Lady, and the House, that it has been settled Government policy to increase the qualifying period from five years to 10 years since last summer—since before I was Home Secretary. In our earned settlement consultation, we have set out a series of proposals that we are consulting on. We are seeking views on the appropriate transitional arrangements that should be applied to that cohort. That is not what we are debating today, but if there is one thing I am sure of, it is that those arrangements will be the subject of intense debate in the weeks and months to come.
For the benefit of the House and for clarification, does the Home Secretary intend to implement her proposed ILR changes via amendments to the Bill, or via the immigration rules in the autumn?
As the right hon. Gentleman well knows, the Bill is specifically about the changes we are making to our asylum system, to human rights laws, and to the approach that the Government want to take to asylum appeals. This is not a Bill about indefinite leave to remain. When we have settled policy later this year, those changes will be subject to the usual procedure for changes to immigration rules, which always take place with the scrutiny of this House.
Will the Home Secretary give way?
I will give way to the right hon. Lady, but I will make progress after that.
The Home Secretary referred earlier to immigrants coming here to live off the taxpayer. I put it to her that not only do a disproportionate number of immigrants find themselves in work, whether legal or illegal work, but the children of immigrants pay tax. She should remember that.
I say to the right hon. Lady, for whom I have the greatest respect, that it is not as if I am about to forget my own background, so I do not really need other people to remind me of my own history or background in my own country. We are talking about people smugglers, and about men, women and children—these days, primarily young men—getting on small boats in the channel and crossing into this country. They are not arriving in a safe and legal way. They are not migrants in the usual sense.
We wish to pivot to a system in which this country will live up to its responsibilities to help those in need across the world and fulfil our international obligations by taking people through safe and legal routes. We will be able to increase the numbers that we take on those routes, and that will be subject to debate in this Parliament. We will ensure that we are playing our full part, but in a controlled way that does not put tens of thousands of pounds per person in the hands of people smugglers. The right hon. Lady knows that that is the trade we are trying to break. We have been going after the gangmasters, and now we must make legal changes to change the calculus of those who seek to get on a boat in the north of France.
The Bill focuses on how we reduce the numbers arriving unsafely and illegally in this country and on reducing the burden placed on local communities. It is designed to be fair to genuine refugees and fair to British citizens. It will ensure that asylum claims are fair and fast, with legitimate claimants not stuck in limbo, and ensure the swift removal of those with no right to be here. It will ensure that human rights protections remain robust where they must be, but are also tightened where necessary to eradicate the abuse that has crept into our system. Finally, the measures in the Bill ensure that we support those in their hour of need while making it clear that, although this may be a right, it comes with responsibilities. When the recipients of public support are in a position to contribute to their costs, they should do so.
With those goals in mind, I will take the House through the detail of the Bill. It begins with measures to make asylum decisions fast and fair. Today, the backlog in appeals hearings is a major barrier to this. Although the Government have slashed the backlog in initial decisions, the vast majority of failed asylum seekers lodge an appeal. There are now more than 150,000 people waiting for an appeal decision, with average wait times of well over a year. We must be honest about the nature of the appeals queue.
A number of civil rights organisations are opposed to the changes to the appeals process, and the Bar Council has spoken out strongly against them. It has said that
“it is in the interests of justice that the persons who decide immigration appeals are legal qualified”.
Will the Minister listen to those criticisms, and the strength of feeling in this House, and remove these proposals so that we can ensure high-quality and legally sound dispute resolution for asylum appeals?
Well, I disagree with my hon. Friend, the Bar Council and other groups on this matter. In fact, I will shortly set out the many tribunals in which people make decisions of great import every single day without being required to be legally qualified professionals before they do so.
We must be honest about the nature of the appeals queue. Some are genuine appeals, but others have been made simply to delay a legitimate removal from this country. By placing themselves last in the long queue for a hearing, people delay the date of their removal, continue to receive taxpayer support and use the time to accrue rights that could strengthen their appeal. The best way to prevent this gaming of the system is to speed up decision making while ensuring that claims are heard fully and fairly.
Tony Vaughan (Folkestone and Hythe) (Lab)
Will the Home Secretary give way on that point?
I will in a moment. I will make a little more progress—I think I have been rather generous.
As many here will know, appeals are currently heard by judges in the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber. This model, which relies on judicial availability, simply does not have the capacity to meet the scale of demand, nor does it have the flexibility to respond to sudden surges in cases. Part 1 of the Bill will therefore establish a new independent immigration appeals authority, staffed by independent adjudicators, not judges. That will allow us to recruit from a far wider pool of candidates and therefore respond more rapidly to increasing and changing demand.
To those who say that such decisions can be taken only by a judge, I need point only to the complex and weighty decisions taken each and every day by those without law degrees, such as magistrates, parole board members, ombudsmen, planning inspectors and many others. A person does not have to be a judge to have good judgment.
Tony Vaughan
The Home Secretary refers to the “gaming of the system”, but will she clarify the basis on which she says that? Around half of Home Office initial asylum decisions are overturned on appeal, so there is a huge issue about the quality of Home Office decision making, as various National Audit Office reports have shown. It would be useful to know the proportion of appeals that are actually, in her words, abusive.
As my hon. and learned Friend will know, 50% of a 150,000 backlog is still 75,000 cases. He will also know that the multiple appeals made to delay and frustrate legitimate removal from the country are a real problem in the system. That is why our proposals include a single appeal route. With the new authority, we are seeking to change the totality of the behaviours that are designed to frustrate lawful, legitimate removal from this country.
Will the Home Secretary give way?
I will make more progress and I will come back to the right hon. Lady.
As anyone who knows these tribunals can attest, most immigration and asylum appeals turn on the facts. That requires careful, impartial and well-trained decision makers. Our adjudicators will be paid professionals who are trained to make robust, defensible decisions. Where specific legal expertise is required, we will have on hand a smaller cohort of legally trained adjudicators, who must have been a barrister or solicitor or have similar legal experience. Decisions taken in the new authority will be appealable to the upper tribunal, which will continue to sit before a judge. As today, the appeals will be only on a point of law; they will not be an opportunity to rehear full cases.
On the independent immigration appeals authority, I wonder whether hon. Members will be concerned, given the political nature of the decisions made here, that the Home Secretary’s proposals involve a blurring of the line between the Executive and the judiciary.
As the right hon. Lady will see, the authority will be fully independent, and the impartiality of this new authority is vital. As clause 1 makes clear, its decisions will be entirely independent of Government, with every Minister of the Crown compelled to uphold the independence of the authority. As is often the case with establishing a new body, the first chief executive and chief appeals officer will be appointed by the Home Secretary, but appointments thereafter will be made by the chair of the authority, as set out in clause 2. These will be made on merit and on the basis of fair and open competition.
The authority’s operations and performance will also be subject to external scrutiny, and it will be placed under the remit of the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration.
I will give way to my hon. Friend who has not asked a question yet.
Patricia Ferguson
Does my right hon. Friend think it would be more appropriate for the Lord Chancellor or the Judicial Appointments Commission to have input into the first of each of these appointments, to ensure their independence is guaranteed?
All such appointments will be subject to the usual public appointments principles, which will apply here as they do elsewhere. I am happy to discuss with Members, as the Bill passes through the House, whether there are any additional safeguards—
I have given way to my hon. Friend before; I will make progress and come back to him.
In the new system, a single, faster appeal route will be established, as addressed in clauses 11 and 12. Today, too many claimants make multiple claims at different stages of the process, including at the last possible moment, often to thwart their legitimate removal from this country. To give just one illustrative and eye-opening example, one case involved a convicted rapist who was due to be sent home after serving eight years in jail. Despite not challenging his deportation at first, he went on to make a series of late claims, including a judicial review on the eve of being removed from this country. Although we eventually managed to remove him, it took more than four years to get this criminal out of the country. For that reason, alongside the new authority, we will create a single appeal route. That will require claimants to raise all relevant matters up front.
Where late claims are raised, particularly in the run-up to removal, they will be dealt with through an expedited process. That means that genuine issues will still be considered, but tactical claims can no longer be used to frustrate a removal. As is already the case, claimants may access advice and legal representation, with legal aid available to those who are eligible. That advice and support are vital to ensure that appeals progress fairly, without delay or disruption.
In clause 21, in part 3 of the Bill, we are introducing further measures to ensure that decision making is fast and fair. Today, there are two separate types of protection: refugee status and humanitarian protection. Both carry near-identical entitlements and eligibility for settlement. That creates near-duplicate claims and unnecessary complexity, which slows down our asylum system. The Bill therefore replaces those two forms of protection with one form—the core protection model. That means that each claim will be assessed once, with one outcome. A right of appeal will be available only to those refused protection, not those who wish to seek protection under a different status. That is a clearer, simple process that will make no difference to those lodging genuine claims, but will cut inefficiency in the system and ensure that those with genuine appeals get a faster, fairer decision.
An effective asylum system is one in which claims are heard fast and fairly. Those who have a legitimate claim receive the protection they need, while those who do not are removed from this country, without turning the bureaucracy against us. That is what the measures in this Bill seek to achieve.
I will give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford East (Imran Hussain), if he still wants to come in. [Interruption.] No? I will give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh (Chris Murray) then.
Chris Murray
The Home Secretary is being very generous. The purpose of the Bill is to make the system more swift, but I am surprised to see that there is no component of mandatory reconsideration included in it. As we have seen in the Department for Work and Pensions, that has really made the system faster. We had a broadly similar system in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, which was replaced, and that did not make the system quicker. How will this situation be different from what we have had before?
I think my hon. Friend means mandatory reconsideration in the context of a case when an appeal is made.
To reassure my hon. Friend, before a case proceeds to appeal, we already have an internal process whereby we check whether we should still defend the claim at appeal stage. If the facts have changed or if there are issues with the original decision, we remove cases from the list of those proceeding to an appeal under the current system. We are doing something similar already. I do not want to create additional bureaucracy and ever-more complication, but that is part of the Home Office’s current process. We have removed cases from the appeals backlog where we know that they should be granted.
The case that the Home Secretary is making for this legislation is that the way in which appeals are being dealt with is unnecessarily slowing up and clogging up the system, because of the nature of the appeals being made. She has just argued that there is a quality control with the initial decisions that the Home Office is making. Looking at the figures, I see that that accounts for 40% of these appeals being overturned. Will she reflect again on the quality of initial Home Office decision making? Will bringing in a piece of legislation that will further complexify that decision-making process lead to better decisions being made the first time? For value for the public purse and the decency of how we treat refugees, surely that is where she should focus her efforts.
Actually, I think we need to focus our efforts in a number of areas. We need to ensure that we are improving the quality and speed of initial decisions, and we have been doing that. However, as my hon. Friend will know and as I have just set out, people make multiple claims, often at the last minute. I raised the example of a foreign national offender who it took us four years to remove from the country after he had served a sentence. That is because he kept putting in appeal after appeal after appeal after appeal. These reforms are designed to deal with that problem.
I am sure my hon. Friend will agree that we need to be able to look at the system in its totality, so we should absolutely look at the quality of initial decisions, but there is no silver bullet here. There is nothing that says, “As long as you fix that one thing, you are not going to have a problem anywhere else.” There will still be claims that are rightly refused both at the initial stage and at appeal stage, and it is imperative that we can remove people from this country as quickly as possible when they have no right to be here.
It is vital that we provide protection to those who are truly in need. Following the devastation of the second world war, this country led the world in promoting human rights to ensure that we learned from the horrors of the past. This Government will always be committed to that internationalist ideal and to the robust human rights laws that underpin it. However, we are also realists, so we admit where noble intentions have been misused and abused. Today, too often, we see well-meaning laws used not to defend a human right, but as a way to frustrate the removal of someone with no right to be in this country, including failed asylum seekers, visa abusers and even foreign criminals.
The British people have a natural sense of fairness. They believe that those who require protection should receive it, but no one should be able to abuse that protection. The abuse of human rights law does not just erode the public’s support for our immigration system; it erodes their support for the very idea of having such laws at all. For those who believe that these laws matter, it is essential that we reform them to end their abuse.
Clauses 17 to 20 reform the domestic application of article 8 of the European convention on human rights—the right to a family and private life. Article 8 is undoubtedly a vital protection, but it is a qualified right. That means that the rights of individuals must be weighed against the public interest. Over time, the balance between an individual’s family rights and the rights of the wider community has shifted. Without a clear definition from Parliament of how that balance should be struck, the interpretation of article 8 in our domestic courts has expanded beyond the original convention and what Strasbourg case law requires.
To understand how far the balance has shifted, consider just one example. In 2025, an Albanian man jailed for growing cannabis escaped deportation not because he had any right to be here, but because it was deemed unduly harsh on his partner to deport him. She was not his wife or life partner—instead, this relationship began only after a deportation order had been served. Why was the deportation deemed to be unduly harsh? The partner spoke no Albanian and had never visited the country before. While that is just one example, the expansion of article 8 is clear throughout the system. More than half of those who stayed in the UK for family reasons last year did not meet our own rules, relying instead on their article 8 rights, and 71% of those who stay in the UK because of article 8 rights arrived here illegally or overstayed their visa.
The Bill addresses both the definition of family life and the public interest test. Clause 19 tightly defines the public interest. It clarifies that judges must consider the economic impact on the taxpayer of allowing people to remain in the UK, including whether they are able to support their family, and that no weight should be given to an article 8 claim when someone is here illegally.
Clause 20 strengthens the public interest test so that foreign criminals can be removed more easily. It states that the more serious the offending, the greater the public interest in removing them from this country. It also specifically addresses those facing deportation who may be appealing on article 8 grounds. The Bill makes it clear that a deportation should go ahead outside of a limited number of truly exceptional circumstances, as set out in clause 20.
On the subject of deporting foreign criminals, the Government intend to table an amendment to the Bill in response to the widely reported case of the vile grooming gang leader Shabir Ahmed. Our amendment will provide the Home Secretary with a new power to disapply section 7 of the Immigration Act 1971 for serious criminals. That section provides protections for long-term UK residents, but it clearly should not act as a bar to removal in cases such as that of Shabir Ahmed. The threshold for the power will be tied to the power to deprive citizenship, which applies only in cases of exceptional severity. It is important to note that that does not guarantee his removal from this country, as the Conservatives know all too well from their own experience. The Foreign Secretary and I will continue to work on all avenues to pursue a deportation. I know that the thoughts of everyone here are with the victims and survivors of this vile criminal.
Let me return to the Bill as drafted and our reforms to the definition of family life in domestic law. Clause 18 tightens the definition of family life. For immigration purposes, a “family” will now normally mean relationships in the immediate family unit. That means a spouse or partner, a parent or a child under the age of 18, apart from in truly exceptional circumstances, such as an incapacitated adult who lives with and is entirely dependent on their sibling.
Clause 19 makes it clear that judges must consider when article 8 rights were established and, in particular, whether that happened after someone entered this country illegally or overstayed their visa. In clause 17, we clarify whose article 8 rights should be considered. This makes it clear that for someone overseas to come to the UK on article 8 grounds, a family life claim must be made by a UK-based sponsor, and cannot be made by family members overseas. That is because our obligations under the ECHR are, rightly, to those who are living in the UK.
In clause 19, as part of our reforms to article 8, we set out where it is unreasonable to expect a child to leave the UK when a member of their family is being removed. Specifically, it is if the child will not receive an education in the other country or will not be able to integrate into that country, or where relocation would have a very significant and long-lasting adverse effect on them. This brings us in line with case law in the European Court. We also set out the limited circumstances in which it may be reasonable to remove a parent where they do not have a genuine and subsisting relationship with the child. In doing so, we once again bring UK law in line with existing Strasbourg case law.
We do so with legitimate cause. As the interpretation of article 8 has widened, we have seen shocking examples of the abuse of parental relationships, including a paedophile who was allowed to stay in this country because his deportation to Pakistan was, under article 8, considered “unduly harsh” on his children. That was despite the fact that his contact with those very same children is restricted by law, in order to protect them from their father. The Home Office appealed the case and eventually won, but only after a lengthy legal battle necessitated by the lack of a clear definition in the law. This Bill rectifies that situation.
Jo White (Bassetlaw) (Lab)
Does my right hon. Friend agree that these agreements have come about through partnership working with our European partners, and that this has been a central part of the negotiations? There is a unity of purpose among other European countries that want to tighten their borders and prevent people abusing the system.
Order. I am sure the Home Secretary has seen the number of people in the Chamber, and will be bringing her remarks to a conclusion shortly.
I have been far too generous, Madam Deputy Speaker. I will plough on, but my hon. Friend is absolutely right: the way to make sure that the interpretation of international human rights law is in line with what the general public would expect and with the original intention of the drafters is to work with our international colleagues—not to rip up human rights law and give up on it, but to make sure it is fit for purpose.
Just as article 8 has been exploited by those facing legitimate removal from our country, so has our modern slavery system. Human trafficking is an abhorrent crime, and we will always provide the support victims need, especially vulnerable children. For that reason, the Bill strengthens a number of those protections, especially by placing child trafficking guardians on a statutory footing and making sure that modern slavery decisions about children are devolved to local authorities, so that those closest to the child—those best placed to make decisions about the support they need—make those decisions properly. We are also strengthening slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders, ensuring that law enforcement can restrict offenders’ movements and work. Clauses 44 to 49 raise the standards for businesses and public bodies. They must report on their actions to identify and tackle abuse in their supply chains, or face potential fines of up to £1 million.
However, we know that we must also address the growing misuse and abuse of those protections. In 2025, modern slavery claims by arrivals on small boats reached an all-time high. Over half now relate to alleged exploitation overseas, rather than here in the United Kingdom, and claims are increasingly being used to frustrate legitimate removals from this country. Last year, over a third of charter flight returns failed to go ahead because of a modern slavery referral lodged at the last minute. Foreign criminals have seen the opportunity—in recent years, last-minute claims have been made by a convicted rapist, a gangster jailed for possession of a firearm, and an attempted murderer. In every case, those claims successfully delayed their removal from this country.
For that reason, part 5 of the Bill introduces measures to address abuse in the system. In particular, we make it clear that anyone who poses a threat to public order or national security will not receive modern slavery protection and support. This includes any foreign national who has received a custodial sentence, including if that sentence was suspended. In clause 36, we make clear that delayed disclosures have a damaging effect on a person’s credibility unless there are good reasons. By doing so, we further reduce the incentive to make claims as late as possible.
Will my right hon. Friend give way?
I will not, because Madam Deputy Speaker wishes me to wind up quickly.
In clause 37, we close another significant loophole. As it stands, those whose claims turn out to be unfounded can continue to receive taxpayer-funded support for a 30-day recovery period. The Bill will ensure that we stop providing protection for those who we know do not need it.
This Government are committed to the protections provided by human rights law, but those protections must be applied fairly. That means ensuring that they are always given to those who are truly in need, and it means ending the abuse that runs contrary to their spirit and intention. The measures in the Bill are realistic and proportionate, and are designed to protect those who are genuinely deserving while bearing down on abuse that erodes public support for the very existence of such protections.
A fair asylum system is one in which claims are heard fast and fairly, and where protections are upheld for those who need them, but not for those who seek to abuse them. It is one in which we provide support, but expect that those who are in a position to contribute do so. Every day, we ask our constituents to bear the burden of funding our asylum system. As that asylum system has spiralled out of control, the weight on their shoulders has grown. That is not fair, and it was also never foreseen; the original drafters of the refugee convention could never have imagined that the British people would spend billions each year on asylum support. To continue their legacy—providing protection to those in need while retaining public support—we need to adapt to our new reality. We need a fair way of addressing the challenges of the world as it is.
To that end, part 4 of the Bill creates a new contributory principle within our asylum regime. It does so through clause 23, by introducing a power that requires those who have received taxpayer-funded support to pay back a portion when they can. This measure reflects a principle that most people would recognise as fair: once you are able to contribute, you should.
Refugees have immediate access to the labour market and housing, and many go on to work, build successful lives and contribute enormously to our society. Payments under our new system will be proportionate and made over time; no one will be asked to contribute more than they can afford, but payments will not be optional for those who can make them, and those who have received support but have been removed from the country will not be able to return until their debt is repaid. There are some to whom this will not apply, including children and anyone who came to this country via a safe and legal route. Clause 23 of the Bill introduces this new power; however, the precise design of the payment programme will be set out in draft regulations, which I will share with the House during the Bill’s passage through Parliament. There will be ample opportunity for full parliamentary scrutiny of these changes.
That brings me to the end of the Bill. It must be read in the light of the inheritance that this Government received—borders out of control, an asylum system in crisis, and a burden placed on the British people that was simply too great. This country has long provided support to those fleeing war and persecution, and proudly so, but the chaos that the Conservative party left behind has eroded public trust in our asylum system. This Government have already done much to restore order at our borders, but there is more to do. That is the goal of this Bill: to ensure that decisions and appeals are fast and fair; to provide protection to genuine refugees; to offer protections under human rights laws for those who are in genuine need, while closing loopholes that have too often been abused; and to ensure that the generosity of the British people is not forgotten, and that people can contribute when they are in a position to do so. This is a Bill that will provide fairness for genuine refugees, but also fairness for local communities, thereby making sure that we secure our asylum system for generations to come.
With the exception of the Front Benchers, we will be starting with an immediate seven-minute time limit. I call the shadow Home Secretary.
I beg to move an amendment, to leave out from “That” to the end of the Question and add:
“this House declines to give a Second Reading to the Immigration and Asylum Bill, while welcoming some of its provisions, because the Bill does not ensure all foreign criminals and illegal immigrants will be deported; does not end asylum for illegal immigrants; does not stop modern slavery claims suspending removal; does not stop illegal immigrants getting citizenship; does not make the changes the Government promised to reduce the numbers of people eligible for Indefinite Leave to Remain; because the Bill will allow sponsor human rights claims, which will enable people outside the UK to enter under human rights grounds; because measures in the Bill such as narrowing the ability to make Article 8 and modern slavery claims will not be effective while the UK remains in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998 remains in force; and because the provisions in the Bill are not capable of eliminating illegal immigration.”
The reasoned amendment, which stands in the names of the Leader of the Opposition, myself and my right hon. and hon. Friends, is to decline to give a Second Reading to the Bill on the grounds that it does not go far enough to combat illegal immigration or to ensure that all foreign criminals are deported.
First, I cannot help but notice the absence of the hon. Member for Dover and Deal (Mike Tapp), the immigration Minister, whom I was expecting to see in his place. Perhaps the Home Secretary has not yet forgiven him for openly defying her a few weeks ago, leading to her rather extraordinary public campaign to get him fired. No wonder she has so much trouble deporting illegal immigrants—she cannot even deport her own junior Minister from Marsham Street. [Interruption.] Does the Home Secretary deny that she tried to get him fired a couple of weeks ago, unsuccessfully? I notice that she makes no such denial.
At the beginning of her speech, the Home Secretary made a number of claims about statistics, one or two of which I would like to gently take issue with. She referred to small boat crossings. Since the election, 76,000 people have dangerously and illegally crossed the channel by small boat. That is more than under any other Prime Minister. Let us keep in mind that those crossings were undertaken mainly by young men, all of whom were leaving a safe country, France. Nobody needs to flee danger in France.
The Home Secretary also referred to removal numbers. Some 85% of those removals are voluntary, and only a tiny fraction are of people who arrived by small boat. In fact, since the election, removals of people illegally entering by small boat have amounted to only about 5% to 7% of small boat arrivals. Given that someone entering this country by small boat has a 95% chance of staying, and gets put up in taxpayer-funded accommodation, it is no wonder that crossings have occurred in record numbers. The only way of deterring these crossings is if almost everybody arriving gets deported when they arrive.
I observe that of the 80,000 people whose asylum claims were rejected at first instance in 2025, only 12,000 left or were removed. It is true that FNO removals are somewhat up, which I welcome, but if we look at the breakdown by nationality, it tells a rather different story. The numbers of foreign criminals deported to countries such as Albania, Romania, Lithuania and Poland are high when we compare them against the offender population. When we look at countries outside of Europe, the numbers are much lower. For example, Jamaica, Iraq, Nigeria and Somalia together have 1,150 offenders in prison—and many more out in the community—yet last year, only 110, or less than 10%, were removed. Yes, the removal of FNOs to countries in eastern Europe is going well, and I commend the Government on that, but when it comes to removing foreign criminals to countries outside Europe, such as Jamaica, Iraq, Nigeria and Somalia, the figures are very low. The reasons for that are some of the ones that the Home Secretary touched on earlier.
Max Wilkinson (Cheltenham) (LD)
I am reluctant to interrupt the shadow Home Secretary when he is in full flow, but he listed countries to which we are successfully deporting people; does he think that our membership of the ECHR has any impact on our ability to deport people to those countries?
Our membership of the ECHR has less effect on deportations to Europe, because it is hard to make an ECHR-based claim if the receiving country is in Europe. However, when it comes to deporting foreign criminals to countries outside of Europe, such as those I listed, there are frequent ECHR-based claims, as the Home Secretary said earlier. I will expand on that point later, but there is no question in my mind that ECHR-based claims are one of the reasons why it is difficult to deport foreign criminals to those countries I just listed. Human rights claims, combined with asylum claims and modern slavery claims, mean that dangerous criminals remain in this country.
I will give the hon. Gentleman a number. Under section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007, the Home Secretary is under a legal duty to deport a foreign national sentenced to more than a year in prison, yet 20,000 people who meet that criterion are at large in the community, and many of them continue to offend. They are still at large in the community because they make claims under the ECHR, modern slavery and asylum routes. Those 20,000 people are a risk to my constituents and to his, and I take exception to some of the Home Secretary’s high-fiving at the beginning of her speech.
Let me touch on the proposal for so-called safe and legal routes, or refugee sponsorship. The numbers that we are talking about would be in addition to the number of asylum claims that we are already processing. Last year saw the highest number of asylum claims in history. From memory, it was somewhere in the region of 109,000. This year, the number will only be a little lower. Adding to that when we already have record numbers of asylum claims strikes me as irresponsible. The Home Secretary said that there would be a cap, but she did not specify what it would be; I would be interested to hear that. She also asserted that the people coming in by these routes would not be a burden on the general taxpayer, because their sponsor would look after them. She neglected to mention that that support has to last only for the first year. Thereafter, the taxpayer could have to pick up the tab. I must say that I do not support the creation of these schemes until we have illegal immigration and asylum claims down essentially to zero.
The argument that the creation of safe and legal routes will somehow stop small boats is absurd, because unless we give access to this country to everybody who wants to come—to everybody congregating in northern France, waiting to get on a dinghy—the ones who do not come in on that scheme will still try to cross on small boats. The idea that safe and legal routes will stop the boats on their own is absurd.
Richard Tice (Boston and Skegness) (Reform)
Does the shadow Minister agree that rising numbers of asylum claims, and rising numbers of approvals of said asylum claims, are essentially acting as a magnet for others? Essentially, that amounts to an amnesty for asylum claimants.
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. For many nationalities that cross the English channel by small boat—Afghan, Iranian, Iraqi, Eritrean and Sudanese, to name just six or seven—the asylum grant rate is well over 90%. In some cases, it is very close to 100%, which means that crossing by small boat is tantamount to an automatic right to stay here, even though those illegal immigrants—and they are illegal immigrants—are leaving a safe country. They are not fleeing danger; they were in France already. I agree that that creates a massive pull factor.
I know the shadow Minister is an intelligent man who thinks a lot about these things. Has he considered for a moment why there are so many refugees globally, and why there are 70 million people without a home to call their own? Has he considered the effects of wars, environmental disaster and human rights abuses on populations around the world? Should there not be an international effort to try to help those people, as well as to deal with the problems at home? Does putting up barbed wire all around the world solve the problem, or create an even worse situation globally?
I agree that the situation in countries such as Afghanistan creates large movements of people—that is correct—and fixing problems at source is clearly the best thing to do. However, I do not think transferring potentially tens of millions of people—he gave the number just then of 60 million or 70 million—into the west is the right solution to this problem. Those people who are displaced are probably better helped close to their country of origin. Transporting people en masse into this country is not the solution. When we have illegal migration under control, by which I mean at zero, there is a case for a limited safe and legal route, but until such time as we do that, I do not think such a transfer is reasonable.
By the way, the people who are crossing by small boat are not the most vulnerable. They are not typically women and children, or people who are sick and vulnerable. They are mostly young men who are paying people smugglers. If we were going to choose who to help, it would not be them.
Several hon. Members rose—
I will give way again, but I want to make a bit of progress first. There will be plenty of other opportunities later.
I will briefly touch on indefinite leave to remain, which is conspicuous by its absence from the Bill. We heard the policy proposal when it was announced last November, but we still do not have any of the details laid out. I agree with the thrust of the Home Secretary’s proposal to increase the period to 10 years, because otherwise a large number of people—about 2 million—who entered in the past four or five years will get a permanent right to stay, including a full right to benefits. That includes people who came in on skilled worker visas sponsored by, among others, kebab shops and fried chicken shops.
I am keen to make sure that the Home Secretary sticks to her previous pledge that these rules would apply to people who are in the country already, and does not give in to pressure from her Back Benchers. I remind the House that the Home Secretary said to the Institute for Public Policy Research on 5 March this year that the change to a 10-year qualification period means
“applying any rule changes to those who are in the UK today, but have not yet received settled status.”
I hope she stands by her commitment. If she does, we Opposition Members will vote for it. She has our support on that.
While we are speaking about legal migration, let me urge the Home Secretary to reconsider her plan to introduce remote language tests, which are open to enormous fraud and abuse. Australia and Canada rejected them for that reason, and some domestic professional bodies, including the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, have stopped carrying them out because they are so open to fraud. I know that this testing is more efficient and I know that it will save money, but it is massively open to fraud.
It is quite something to listen to a shadow Secretary of State whose party oversaw a net migration increase of 2.5 million in four years, and who has the brass neck to lecture the party in government on how to clear up his mess. Does he think he has any credibility at all on this matter, or is this just about the Facebook clip that he will undoubtedly be pumping out on his social media this evening?
I am sure that the hon. Gentleman knows nothing about Facebook clips, but let me be honest: mistakes were made in the past, and the policies that we have now developed, under new leadership, will fix those issues. In fact, this indefinite leave to remain policy was first proposed by us about a year ago, and then, very wisely, the Home Secretary adopted it.
Let me come to the commitment that the Home Secretary made on Shabir Ahmed, the vile gang rapist who should be deported back to Pakistan. We support the amendment to section 7 of the Immigration Act 1971, although section 33 of the UK Borders Act 2007—I think it is subsection (1)(b)—might need some attention as well. I would only ask the Home Secretary not to do that by amending this Bill, which will probably take a year or so to reach the statute book. I hope that she will consider doing it instead through emergency legislation in September, which could be completed in a couple of weeks; we took the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020 through Parliament in, I believe, 15 days in February of that year. There is not a moment to lose, and this can be fixed quite quickly.
As for the substance of the Bill, I agree with some of the Home Secretary’s analyses of where the problems lie. She is right to say that the immigration appeal system, modern slavery laws and human rights laws are being abused on an industrial scale by foreign criminals, and also by people with no legal right to be here, including people who came here illegally in small boats. These illegal immigrants and foreign criminals do make repeated claims, time after time.
The Home Secretary gave the example of a foreign criminal whom it took four years to deport. I was aware of the case of a Somali man who entered the country illegally and participated in the violent gang rape of a 16-year-old girl. On his release from prison, it took eight years to deport that man back to Somalia, because he made two or three different claims on sometimes contradictory grounds. I think that he made two modern slavery claims, and a number of human rights claims as well. There have been other cases in which foreign criminals have avoided being deported. For example, an armed robber avoided being deported back to Nigeria on the grounds that his mental health needs would not be taken care of perfectly there. Another man, a drug dealer, was not sent back to Iraq on ECHR grounds because, apparently, he had become too westernised. There was not a single thought for the safety of British children and the need for them to be protected from paedophiles. A Zimbabwean paedophile was not deported to Zimbabwe because he might get treated with hostility there. The judge gave no thought to protecting British children, and no thought to protecting our citizens from criminals.
In another case, a man was taken off a charter flight to Jamaica, again on human rights grounds—I think it was article 8—and about six months after being removed from that flight, he murdered someone on the streets of south London. That happened because of the supposed human rights of a criminal who went on to commit murder. I agree with the analysis that our immigration legal system, our modern slavery system and the human rights system are being abused on an industrial scale, and that has to end.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that part of the problem is that practitioners of the legal system seem to believe that there are such things as absolute human rights, whereas most human rights are relative, and can be trumped by other people’s human rights, and in fact, can be abrogated? When you infringe other people’s human rights, you surely cannot expect your own to have priority over theirs, in a sensible system.
I entirely agree with my right hon. Friend. When it comes to foreign criminals, and people who enter this country illegally, having exited a safe place, namely France, I do not think that they should be given all the protections that we have been discussing this afternoon.
Let me turn to some of the specifics that the Home Secretary has put in the Bill. The changes to the immigration tribunal system, and the measures dealing with modern slavery and trying to better define article 8 constitute small steps in the right direction, but on their own, they are not going to work. Past Governments have attempted to make such measures work, but they have essentially failed, and I think that they will fail again. For example, better defining article 8 in domestic law was attempted in—I think, from memory—section 19 of the Immigration Act 2014, which I believe created section 117 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. That was an attempt to do, broadly speaking, what the Home Secretary is trying to do now, and it did not work, because judges—not just those in Strasbourg, but our domestic judges, empowered by the Human Rights Act—simply continued interpreting family rights very expansively and allowing foreign criminals to stay. I admire the Home Secretary’s effort to do this, but it has been tried before and it did not work.
Excluding modern slavery claims by foreign criminals has also been attempted before. The Bill essentially seeks to amend section 63 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, which was an attempt by a previous Government to fix this problem four or five years ago, and it has been repeatedly struck down by the courts. Because of the ECHR and the way in which it is incorporated by the Human Rights Act, it does not matter how we legislate. As with section 63 a few years ago, following the Home Secretary’s most recent attempt today judges will use the European convention on human rights, empowered by the HRA, to circumvent laws passed by this Parliament. The Home Secretary experienced that herself just last week, when her “one in, one out” scheme was upset by vexatious modern slavery claims. She tried valiantly to fix the loophole in guidance, and last week a court struck it down. The conclusion that I have reached—having suffered in the Home Office in the past as she is suffering now, trying to fix these issues within the construct of the ECHR and modern slavery legislation, and the examples that the Home Secretary gave only support this—is that the only way to fix this issue is to come out of these institutions entirely. We cannot do it by tinkering, which is what the Bill seeks to do. The previous Government tried it, I have tried it personally, the Home Secretary’s predecessor tried it, and she is now trying it again. The truth is—
Let me finish the point. The truth is that tinkering like this does not work when we have very expansive rights-based conventions. The only way of fixing this properly is to exit the ECHR entirely, repeal the Human Rights Act entirely, exit the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings—the modern slavery treaty—and say that people entering the country illegally, particularly from a safe place such as France, simply cannot claim asylum. That would enable us to legislate in this House without courts’ effectively circumventing our legislation, as they do on a near-daily basis. It would enable us to deport not just some foreign criminals but all foreign criminals, and it would enable us to deport, within a week of arrival, anyone entering the country illegally by small boat, either to their country of origin or to a safe third country if we could not deport them to their country of origin. That would be a genuine deterrent to prevent these unnecessary crossings, and would give us back control of our borders. While I share many of the diagnoses in the Home Secretary’s speech, I honestly do not think that these measures, which are incremental and an attempt to work within the existing framework, will work. Only radical solutions will actually work.
I see that the hon. Member for Norwich South (Clive Lewis) is twitching with excitement, so I think I had better give way.
I do not know whether I am alone in this, but I am hearing the shadow Secretary of State glibly throw away 80 years of legislation on human rights—human rights that were forged in the aftermath of the Holocaust, of concentration camps, of the horrors of fascism. He stands there and talks glibly about throwing them out when they have protected hundreds of millions of people around the world. There is a clue. The reason they are called “human” rights is that this is the universal condition—we are all human beings—and the day we forget that in this place is the day we open a dark chapter in our country’s history.
When the ECHR was first conceived and entered into as a treaty in 1950, it was developed for very good reasons. It was designed to avoid a repetition of the horrors of the second world war, which the hon. Gentleman refers to, but over the years judges in Strasbourg and domestically, using the living instrument doctrine, have expanded and expanded and expanded the definitions of the articles, which are necessarily very vaguely worded.
For example, article 3 of the ECHR is on
“freedom from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment.”
When it was written, that meant “Don’t send people to concentration camps.” On the face of it, the words are very reasonable; if we were to sit down today and come up with a convention, it would have those words in it. But the way it is applied by judges today means that we cannot send foreign criminals back to other countries, like Zimbabwe, in case they face hostility there as foreign criminals. We cannot run our border system because of the way the articles are interpreted. The balance has now shifted so far that it is preventing border control and a number of other things as well, and that is why we have to leave the ECHR.
I do not accept the proposition that the only thing standing between us and barbarism is the ECHR or the Human Rights Act. This country has led the world in human rights, not just for decades but for centuries. If there are any gaps in our protection of rights that this Parliament feels are exposed by leaving the ECHR, the proper remedy is for this sovereign, democratically elected Parliament to legislate to fill them. If there is a gap in our domestic statute or our common law, and this House feels that the gap needs to be filled, the right way to do so is not by having judges make up expansive case law; it is by having this democratically elected parliament debate the issue, as we are doing now, and take a vote on it. That is the way in which democracy should function.
I think that one of the reasons mainstream politics is coming under pressure, if I can put it euphemistically, is that pledges made at elections, by successive Governments, on issues like immigration do not get delivered. One of the reasons why is that the human rights legal framework prevents them from being delivered. The Home Secretary gave examples of that, and it is essentially a democratic deficit; this Parliament, not judges, should decide how our borders are run. While I welcome these measures as small steps in the right direction, I do not think that they will work. I do not think that the measures in this Bill go far enough, because they do not address the fundamental problem.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving us his experience. Governments of all colours have always been angry about the European Court of Human Rights, because they are kept honest by having a court of human rights that can act to protect citizens when Governments make incorrect decisions about people’s basic fundamental liberties. If he wants a good example of why upholding international treaties matters, I suggest that he talk to our colleagues from Northern Ireland about the Good Friday agreement, which is rooted in the European Court of Human Rights. Before he argues that we should remove those protections in such a cavalier fashion, perhaps he might reflect on why people like Winston Churchill wanted to protect citizens from Governments who might make incorrect decisions, whether in the immigration system or about their fundamental human rights.
First of all, I do not think that Winston Churchill would ever have envisaged that the ECHR, which he helped create, would lead us to being unable to control our borders. Secondly, on the Good Friday agreement, I urge the hon. Lady to read the 175-page report by Lord David Wolfson KC, which explains how our Good Friday agreement obligations could be upheld after leaving the ECHR. Thirdly, on her point about protecting rights, the ultimate guarantor and protector of the rights of people in this country should be this democratically elected Parliament, not judges handing down expansive definitions of vaguely-worded clauses that have acted as a charter for illegal immigrants and foreign criminals.
I ask the House to support our reasoned amendment. While these are small steps in the right direction—
I need to finish.
While I agree with the diagnoses that the Home Secretary eloquently set out in her speech, the measures that she proposes simply will not work. I know that because I have tried to introduce such measures in the past, including by amending section 63, and the courts do not let them stand. Until we come out of the ECHR and the ECAT treaty, stop illegal immigrants claiming asylum and end judicial review of most immigration cases, we will not get control of our borders and the public will continue to lose trust in mainstream politics. That is why I moved the Opposition’s reasoned amendment.
There is now a seven-minute time limit.
I listened with great care to the Home Secretary’s speech, and one of the things she said—she said it more than once, in different phraseology—was that her legislation is designed to remove the burden of asylum seekers from the shoulders of British people. I live in a part of the world that has as many asylum seekers and immigrants as anywhere else. Over the centuries, we have had Irish immigrants, Jewish immigrants, Caribbean immigrants, south Asian immigrants, Turkish immigrants and African immigrants. None of them was a burden on anyone’s shoulders, and my constituents will be dismayed to hear her talk in those terms.
The Home Office website tells us that there have been well over 150 pieces of primary legislation or policy changes on immigration since 1988. I have been in the House for some of them, and each one was accompanied by the same grand assertions that the Home Secretary has made this afternoon: that they would bring fairness to our immigration system and fairness to our asylum system. They did not. They simply took away rights and treated people badly. One example of a piece of legislation that was introduced in precisely the same terms in which she is introducing this Bill is the Immigration Act 2014, which was created in the name of the hostile environment. Again, the House was told that it would bring fairness. Instead, it led directly to the Windrush scandal. People who had been invited here, with cross-party support, to help rebuild Britain after world war two were treated in the most shameful way. People who had given their lives to the UK were deported. People born here were deported. Families were split up. People lost their jobs. Others were denied re-entry to the country after holidays or travelling to family events, including funerals.
That scandal is not over, and it is not something that we can move on from. Very many victims of that legislation are still facing severe delays, wrongful rejections and low payouts. Maybe the Minister should talk to some of the people waiting for their compensation, because there is a view that Ministers or officials are trying to wait out the victims. It is as if they are hoping that, year by year, there will be less victims to give compensation to.
The legislation before us is being sold and explained in exactly the same way that nearly 40 years of immigration legislation has been sold to this House. I would argue that that legislation has failed to do what Ministers said it would do; in fact, it has made people’s lives harsher and more difficult. I would argue that if the Bar Council or any amount of legal bodies are saying to the Secretary of State that this legislation is unfair and unduly cruel, and will not achieve the result that it is meant to achieve, she needs to look again. This very negative and hostile rhetoric and language about asylum seekers and immigrants is not what one would want to hear in this House.
My parents were immigrants, and many of my relatives were asylum seekers. We need to be talking about the contribution that immigrants and asylum seekers have made to this country, not talking about them as if they are some kind of burden. Even at this late stage, maybe the Home Secretary will reconsider the legislation that she is bringing forward.
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
Max Wilkinson (Cheltenham) (LD)
I was quite taken aback by the passion that the shadow Home Secretary showed for wiping out many decades of hard-won human rights that we all enjoy. Human rights are not just for asylum seekers and people from other countries; in the first instance, human rights are for all of us. To put the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) slightly correct, some rights are absolute, and others are qualified and limited.
To put the hon. Gentleman right, it is customary when a Member names another Member, particularly in a critical way, to give way to them freely, not to have to be forced into it.
The fact of the matter is that I would love the hon. Gentleman to list all these absolute human rights. Even in a democracy, there is not an absolute right for people not to put themselves in danger when they get conscripted in a wartime situation. Does he or does he not accept the basic moral fact that, if someone infringes the human rights of other people, they cannot expect their own rights to be fully respected, because they abrogate those rights? If there has to be a clash between an innocent person’s rights being infringed and the perpetrator’s rights being infringed, I—and, I would like to think, most sensible people—would say it is the perpetrator who should lose out.
Max Wilkinson
These things are actually defined in law. I saw a human rights barrister on the other side of the Chamber, the hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Tony Vaughan), furrowing his brow at the same time. The shadow Home Secretary mentioned the report by Lord Wolfson, who is in fact a commercial barrister. When he goes into a hospital with a urology complaint, I assume, therefore, that he demands a cardiologist. Maybe he does not, but who knows? Does he seek experts from the right field? Perhaps he does not.
According to the Oxford Migration Observatory, asylum seekers in Calais regularly tell researchers that they know the UK’s absence from agreements with the EU is a weakness in our asylum system. They even use the word “Dublin” in reference to the agreement that we left. If asylum seekers have worked it out, why have Ministers not done so? One commentator has even described how Brexit has turned the UK into the final court of appeal for any asylum seeker in the EU.
It will come as no surprise that the Liberal Democrats will not be supporting this Bill. It is not because we deny the problems in the UK’s asylum system, which impact not only local people in our constituencies but asylum seekers themselves. It is quite the opposite: the backlog is too large, accommodation costs have spiralled and dangerous small boat crossings must be brought to an end for the good of everyone.
However, this Bill does not solve those problems. It piles more bureaucracy on to the Home Office, it risks greater costs to the taxpayer, it undermines integration and it still fails to address the fundamental causes of irregular migration. The Government’s stated rationale for this Bill is:
“Claiming asylum in Britain today is more attractive than elsewhere in Europe”.
However, data from the Home Secretary’s own Department shows this not to be true. Britain was fifth in the number of asylum applications made to European countries in 2025, behind Germany, France, Spain and Italy.
The truth is that many migrants who have had their asylum claims rejected in EU nations are trying their luck in Britain. This is the legacy of the Brexit given to us by Farage and the Conservatives, including the shadow Home Secretary. Our damaged relationship with Europe has created Brexit pull factors, yet nowhere does this Bill attempt to restore an orderly relationship on asylum with our European neighbours to end small boat crossings once and for all. It is an uncomfortable truth for the Conservatives, but it is a problem they created.
There is the issue of the asylum backlog. Accommodation costs have risen sharply, with more and more people stuck in hotels at considerable cost. Poor Home Office decision making is a key cause of this backlog, with two thirds of the concluded appeals finding that the Home Office’s initial decision was flawed, yet the Bill does not address the quality of first instance decisions. Instead, it proposes the wholesale reform of the appeals process, creating the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority, which will not be operational until late next year. Even the Home Office has described the value of this measure as uncertain. If the Government want to solve the problem, they should focus their resources on clearing the backlog by expanding processing capacity and ensuring decisions are right first time.
Those asylum seekers fortunate enough to be successful in their claims will apparently face a later penalty of £10,000. We Liberal Democrats are in favour of asylum seekers and all migrants contributing to our economy and paying taxes. That is the fair thing to do. It is just one way that we believe migration can make our country a stronger place, but only if integration is successful. However, this measure is punitive, and pushes refugees further towards destitution and state support. Refugees with a job after eight years of being here had a median income of just £23,000 per year. It has been suggested that repayments will start when refugees are earning far less than that, which seems unfair. If the Home Secretary was serious about getting refugees to pay their way, she would take the opportunity to allow asylum seekers to work. This would immediately relieve the burden on the taxpayer and bring down costs.
Instead, these proposals create a bigger burden on the state, often falling on already overstretched local councils, which will be forced to look after those who would otherwise become destitute. That is un-British. Sadly, this measure, coupled with potential decades-long waits for leave to remain, will actively undermine the integration that everyone in this House should be aiming for. Costs to the taxpayer are likely to go up and not down. The reviews of refugee status alone are set to cost up to £725 million extra in the first 10 years.
On the unintended yet entirely foreseeable consequences, there are serious concerns that this Bill could inadvertently criminalise victims of modern slavery. It is simply unrealistic to assume that people trafficked here by criminal gangs will be able or willing to raise a claim on arrival. The Home Office’s own statistics suggest that there is not widespread abuse of the current system, so it seems this particular measure is unnecessary and could work against the Government’s aims.
On the point about the ECHR, the Government know that the interpretation of the law remains in the gift of the UK courts—the judges whom the shadow Home Secretary dislikes so much, but who perform such a valuable role in our justice system—and that will be the case regardless of what happens with this Bill. The reality is that this Bill is all show and no substance.
When this House discussed the Home Secretary’s statement last November, something weird happened. An unholy alliance emerged between Labour and the Conservatives, and even the Reform party welcomed the Home Secretary’s approach. The thrust of our response to that statement last November was that there were issues to resolve in the asylum system, which had been devastated by the Conservative Government, but recognition was also needed that immigration has a role to play in our economy and in delivering public services.
I also urged the Government to drop divisive rhetoric on this subject, but that suggestion did not quite find favour with the Home Secretary and others. Indeed, after my plea for moderate language, I was in receipt of some direct and forthright feedback from the Home Secretary, which the Minister for Border Security and Asylum will remember. Lord Gove used his “Quite right!” Spectator podcast to call me “oleaginous”, a word that I later learned means oily, the “king of smuggery” and an offensive term, but I will spare Members’ blushes by simply saying that it starts with d and rhymes with “mick”. That is from a Member of the House of Lords in this Parliament. I continue to wear that as a badge of honour.
In a different recent podcast, the Home Secretary told an audience member who disagreed with her stance on migration and asylum to eff off, and later she joked that she would taser and deport four of her political opponents. I am clear it was a joke, but I am not absolutely certain that those are the actions a Government Minister should be taking. It is clear that the tone of this debate has not improved much since November. Unfortunately, policy heavy and rhetoric—
Max Wilkinson
Unfortunately, this is policy heavy on rhetoric and light on substance, and it risks playing into the hands of Nigel Farage. I thank the right hon. Member for his heckle. He says, “Get it right!” I suggest he gets his knowledge of human rights right.
Accommodation costs will remain sky high, small boats will keep coming, with all the danger that that causes to people being trafficked, and the British people will rightly feel that the system is neither fair nor functional. Until Ministers recognise, as asylum seekers seem to, that not having a proper agreement with the EU is at the heart of the small boats crisis, there will be no resolution. Labour MPs claim that the new Prime Minister will present a reset for the country, and we all hope it does, but if the right hon. Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham) sticks with these plans, it will be more of the same—bad value for money for the taxpayer, failures on integration and no comprehensive plan to stop dangerous small boat crossings. That is why the Liberal Democrats will not support this Bill.
I think all of us in the Chamber accept that the immigration and asylum system is broken. All of us want an asylum system that is both firm and fair, in which the impact is managed both for those seeking asylum and coming here to build a better life for themselves and their families, and for the host communities, with integration managed in that process.
Where there is clearly disagreement is on how on earth we fix a system that is so broken that there is not a single lever to pull to make all this mess right. We have an absolute crisis in our immigration system, as well as in our asylum system, and every debate is polarised. Unfortunately, when we come to this place, which is meant to be a place of evidence-based policymaking and exchanges that try to find a degree of common ground, at times it feels as though we are just parroting the social media posts that I see every morning when I dare to open X or Facebook. We need to be better than that.
I think we can say that immigration has made a positive contribution to our country, but that there are strains of immigration in some parts of the country that have been managed so poorly the public consent for immigration is fraying. If we do not accept that principle, we will not win back public support. But we also have to accept that the tone of the debate means that every person coming to flee persecution and war is being cast somehow as a chancer—that they are here to try it on and are acting against our national interest. I do not think that that is in tune with British values.
We have a long and proud history, certainly in a town such as Oldham, of supporting people fleeing persecution. We are, however, also a town that believes in fair play and contribution. On the other side, there are people in the system who are not living up to those values. They are trying to play the system through the appeals process and different claims, and are not contributing because when they arrive they break the laws of the land. If we on the Labour Benches are not willing to be honest about those tensions, how on earth can we build the middle ground?
There is a lot of work to do to build trust and I have a great deal of confidence in the work the Home Secretary is doing. The evidence speaks for itself, and not just on asylum and immigration. This week, the figures on knife crime have come down again. It takes a lot of hard work—often quiet hard work—to get through these issues, but it is happening and we are just two years in, so I am optimistic that we can get a grip.
But where I think the country, and certainly people in Oldham, want to see progress is on a tougher line on small boat crossings, because they do not believe that is playing fairly or playing by the rules if people are breaking them on day one. But people are aghast that there are no safe routes to support families fleeing persecution. Most fair-minded people look at the images of children fleeing war—we see it in Gaza, but also across the world—and think, “There but for the grace of God go I. If that was my child, what would I want in terms of sanctuary to give them a future and not leave them exposed to starvation or death?” This is where we are not quite getting the balance right, so I welcome the efforts being made to introduce safe routes.
I want a fairer distribution of asylum seekers around the country. Under the previous Labour Government, we were so fearful of right-wing headlines about asylum seekers being housed in accommodation in London “living in a £1 million townhouse”—they would pick out a Camden townhouse as an example—that the Government responded by saying, “Where is accommodation cheapest?” So, of course, they came to towns such as Oldham, Rochdale and Stoke, where housing at that time was probably plentiful and very cheap. That is not the case today.
In Oldham, there are 588 children living in temporary accommodation and over 100 of those households have been in temporary accommodation for over a year. Those housing pressures are felt by the whole community across Oldham. A fairer distribution of asylum seekers might win a bit more public support. On top of that, we are still waiting for the asylum hotel to close at some point. The Minister has been lobbied heavily on that. It is important to know, as a way of rebuilding public consent, that all parts of the country are playing their part and are taking their fair share.
I appreciate the speed and the efforts being taken in the case of Shabir Ahmed. I do not think that anybody would look at the Rochdale grooming gang and Shabir Ahmed as its ringleader over a long period of time and think that he is anything other than evil and abhorrent. The way he sexually abused and exploited young girls in both Oldham and Rochdale shook the town. It was on a scale that we had not seen before. What really struck home was the complete lack of any empathy for the victims, his refusal to take any responsibility, and his laughing at the justice process that was holding him to account. When news came of his release back into the community—of course, we do not know where he is; it certainly is not in Oldham and Rochdale, because of the exclusion zones—it retraumatised the victims who have spent a long time trying to rebuild their lives.
The fact is this: he has already been stripped of his British citizenship. He has no right to be here, bar the loophole in the Immigration Act 1971 that will now be closed thanks to the actions of our Home Secretary. That is not to say that we should rush to say the answer is always deportation, but in the case of a child rapist who has acted in such an abhorrent way, that must be the ultimate justice secured for the victims who were affected.
I give credit for the work that is taking place, but pace is really important. The parole board rejected his early release on three separate occasions because of the risk he posed to victims and wider society. I do not believe that he is any safer today than he was 18 months ago when the parole board last looked at the terms of his licence conditions. As speed is of the essence, I ask Ministers, please, whether there are grounds in such cases to return people back to custody, pending deportation?
It is an honour to follow the hon. Member for Oldham West, Chadderton and Royton (Jim McMahon). He was absolutely right about the tone we need to employ. I recognise the comments he made about his constituents. I suspect that his constituents have a very similar view to my constituents—we are not too far apart. I refer him to the Home Affairs Committee report on asylum accommodation, which talked about the point he made about the disproportionate numbers of asylum seekers in lower-cost accommodation areas. We did ask the Home Office to look at that. I also suggest that he avoids X and Facebook in the morning. It will probably make his life a lot better.
I rise to speak briefly on the Bill, which I broadly welcome. These are matters on which our constituents expect action to be taken. It may not go as far as some would like in some areas and it may go too far for others, but on Second Reading we look at the principle of a Bill, and I agree that it should have a Second Reading and then be considered in Committee and on Report.
There are a couple of points I want to make before I move on to my main comments. On article 8 of the ECHR, the Chişinău declaration was very encouraging. It is a good step forward to see agreement across the Council of Europe area on the way article 8 and other parts of the ECHR are being abused. I suggest that the Minister look at section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which states that the UK courts “must” refer to decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. Perhaps the wording could be changed to “may” to make it easier for courts to disregard clearly ridiculous decisions that should not have any bearing on the decisions being taken in our courts. I also refer him to the work done in the coalition Government on the European arrest warrant, when we were still a member of it. We changed the rules in the UK so that only somebody who was guilty of a crime that would be a crime in the UK could have an arrest warrant applied to them. Previously, we had all sorts of spurious claims such as not paying tips to Greek waiters and so on. The Minister may want to look at that.
On small boats, the Select Committee visited northern France. The hon. Members for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh (Chris Murray), for Sunderland Central (Lewis Atkinson) and for Bassetlaw (Jo White) were all there to see the work being done. It is very impressive to see the work being done jointly with the UK. We heard a lot from UK law enforcement and others who were working closely with their French counterparts. I encourage more of that.
However, I cannot stress enough how important ministerial oversight is. I pay tribute to our former colleague James Brokenshire, who as Immigration Minister insisted that he receive an update every single day on the number of people entering the country, the number who were in claims and the number of visas being issued. He kept on having a daily update. Madam Deputy Speaker, it is a delight that you are in the Chair, but my right hon. Friend the Member for Romsey and Southampton North (Caroline Nokes) was also an Immigration Minister and she employed a similar approach. It would be fair to say that the evidence we have heard on the Select Committee indicates that that level of ministerial oversight has not happened at all times, and perhaps that is why we saw some big spikes.
Chris Murray
The Chair of the Home Affairs Committee and I were in northern France together. Does she share my impression from that trip that the scale and complexity of the operations the French Government were undertaking was quite astonishing? Will she join me in welcoming the new iteration of the Sandhurst treaty? This may be stretching the bounds of bipartisanship too much, but does she agree that it is good to reset the relationship with our European friends and neighbours? In cross-border channels, when difficult issues arise, it is only through those joint working operations—now that we have left the European Union—that we can collectively tackle the small boats, which are as much of an issue for France as for the UK.
I thank the hon. Member—my friend from the Select Committee—for an enjoyable visit. We learned a lot, but it was a challenging visit, as there was an awful lot to take in. This is a problem that affects countries across the world; it is not an issue that can be solved by one country alone. We have to work together. We also came away agreeing that if everybody who arrived from France was immediately taken back to France, it would kill the trade of the people smugglers. That is something that we should start trying to negotiate with our friends in France.
In the short amount of time that I have left, I will focus on part 5. I declare that, as co-chair of the all-party parliamentary group on human trafficking and modern slavery, I have some concerns. Apart from anything else, human trafficking and modern slavery is not an immigration crime. Someone’s immigration status may make them more vulnerable, but it is a financial crime—it is the exploitation of one human being by another for financial gain. Although I understand the reasons and we are grateful that there are some good points in the Bill, it is concerning that it keeps being put into the migration bucket, rather than being seen as the financial crime that it is.
I am in contact with a number of organisations, and the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, Eleanor Lyons, has been in touch with me. There is general agreement that there are some good things in the Bill—the strengthening of civil orders and the support for children are welcome. However, the abuse of the modern slavery protections needs to be looked at, because nobody can self-declare as a victim of modern slavery. A first responder has to say that this person is likely to be a victim of modern slavery, so what is going wrong with the first responders? Why is it that first responders are being dragged into, as the Government say, declaring people to be victims of modern slavery to avoid deportation? That is something that should be looked at without removing protections for victims.
One has to have a victim-centred approach to this crime in order to solve it; it cannot be solved only by pursuing the bad guys. The victims have to be at the centre, because it is an extraordinary crime in which the commodity that money is being made from is the human being. It is not a drug, a firearm or any other product; it is a human being. That human being needs to be prepared and able to give evidence, to speak out and to recognise the crime that has been committed against them.
Victim support is essential to solve this crime. If one wants to see the issue in a hard-nosed way, the only way we are going to kill the trade is by looking after the victims so that we can stop the bad guys. That is the basic point. I do not have time to go through the specifics, but I urge the Minister to engage with the many authorities—in particular, the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner—to see where the measures that the Government have introduced may have unintended consequences that make it harder to tackle this crime. With that, I will sit down and let other Members speak, as there are many others who wish to do so.
Several hon. Members rose—
Order. I am imposing an immediate three-minute time limit.
In the time that I have, I will focus my remarks on clauses 1 to 16, which create a new appeals body for immigration and asylum cases known as the independent immigration appeals authority. It will be staffed by non-lawyers or members of the public and will perform much of the work currently done by the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber.
The backlogs in the FTT have reached around 60 weeks for cases to be heard—11 weeks longer than a year ago. It is vital, however, that such reforms are properly thought out and resourced. Last week, the Justice Committee took evidence from experts in the sector. The Committee has taken a keen interest in the proposals since they were announced last year and has visited the first-tier tribunal. We saw a system under great operational strain, but with judges doing a good and efficient job. From that visit, our diagnosis was that these are operational problems.
There are two key questions for the House: will the IIAA fix the problems with the current system, and will it be truly independent from the Home Office? On the first point, while I do not have time to give all the figures, a big part of the problem is the poor quality of initial decision making, with 45% of decisions being overturned. How will a body staffed by members of the public, as opposed to judges and legal experts, result in a reduction of errors in a complex area of law?
A further risk created by an increase in errors is that it may shift the current backlog in the first-tier tribunal to the upper tribunal. It is not clear from the impact assessment accompanying the Bill that enough thought has been given to the potential impact on the upper tribunal. It is also fair to assume that non-expert adjudicators will take more time to hear cases than judges would, given the complexities of asylum cases. There is insufficient legal aid available, which is likely to lengthen hearings as well.
On the second point—the issue of independence—the Home Secretary says that the IIAA will be independent from the Home Office and puts the word in its title, but the Bill contains provisions for the Home Secretary to expedite cases, to set the length of time for cases, and to appoint the chair and chief executive. The IIAA is effectively a quango over which the Home Secretary has substantial control. I cannot do further justice to the issue in the time available, but I would like to see that this body, if it is set up, is independent and able to make sensible and judicial decisions. I do not see that at the moment with what is in the Bill.
I hope the whole House can agree—surely it can—that public confidence in our immigration system depends on the principle that those who seek to undermine our borders, exploit vulnerable migrants or, worse still, profit from illegal migration are identified, apprehended and removed wherever possible. All our constituents expect robust border security, effective immigration enforcement, and a system that distinguishes between genuine asylum seekers and those who seek to abuse the rules.
It is against that backdrop that I wish to raise the deeply troubling case of Twana Jamal, who was recently exposed by journalist Sue Mitchell and her team through a BBC investigation, which was broadcast only a week or so ago. Twana Jamal was exposed as an illegal asylum seeker apparently working in my constituency in Blaby—and worse still, in a mini-mart right next door to my constituency office. According to reporting by Sue Mitchell and the BBC, Mr Jamal is a convicted people smuggler who was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment in France after being identified by French authorities as a major organiser of illegal migration operations. The BBC subsequently traced him to my South Leicestershire constituency, where he was allegedly working while also claiming asylum in the United Kingdom. The allegations reported by the BBC are extremely serious.
Sue Mitchell confirmed with me only a few hours ago that the Home Office has not engaged with her or her team, post broadcast, about the evidence that they gathered during their painstaking and thorough investigation. I am grateful to the Home Secretary for confirming earlier today that she will seek to ascertain why civil servants have not responded, or done me the courtesy, as the local MP, of giving me an update on what the Home Office is doing, and I hope that the Minister will ensure that that is taken forward.
What we all want to know today, and what I would be grateful to hear from the Minister, is whether the Bill will militate against a case like that of Mr Jamal’s arising again, if it is passed into law. Can the Minister assure all of us that convicted human traffickers will not be allowed into the United Kingdom, let alone allowed to apply for asylum?
Paul Waugh (Rochdale) (Lab/Co-op)
First, I thank the Home Secretary for listening to me and my hon. Friends the Members for Oldham West, Chadderton and Royton (Jim McMahon), and for Heywood and Middleton North (Mrs Blundell), as well as all our constituents; she acted super quickly and seized this issue, to make sure that we could change the law to allow for the deportation of Shabir Ahmed.
The Bill introduces a new power, personally applied by the Secretary of State, to allow offences like Ahmed’s to be classed as so serious that the offender loses protections under the Immigration Act 1971. Let us be clear: that Act was meant to give rights to law-abiding citizens of the Commonwealth who came here to work hard and play by the rules; its drafters never intended for it to exempt vile sex offenders and grooming gang leaders from deportation.
Shabir Ahmed’s release from prison this month was, for many, another painful reminder of the wicked crimes he committed. Ahmed, who lived in Oldham, was the ringleader of the Rochdale grooming gang. He was convicted of the serial rape, exploitation and vile abuse of young white girls in Heywood, and was separately convicted of 30 rapes of a young Asian girl. All his victims were failed for years by the institutions that should have protected them. It is important for me to say that the people of Rochdale, whatever their racial background, are united in their disgust at paedophiles like Ahmed.
It was this Labour Government who finally created a specific offence of grooming, which, unbelievably, did not exist before. The Government are also trialling the use of chemical castration for convicts in jails, which I personally would welcome being made compulsory for sex offenders like Ahmed. Ever since my election, I have pressed Ministers to pursue the deportation of every grooming gang member who can legally be removed from the UK. I know that this is just the start, and that even once the law is changed, Pakistan may still say that it will refuse to take back this man. Whatever diplomatic barriers exist must be challenged, and every possible avenue must be explored.
The public interest is clear in this case; more broadly, the public interest is strengthened by this Bill. Article 8 of the European convention on human rights—the right to family life—has always been a qualified right, as the Home Secretary has pointed out. This means that judges are asked to strike a balance between those rights and the public interest. That is precisely why the Rochdale grooming gang members lost their appeals under human rights law. However, these bogus appeals happen far too often, and for many, it is a sick joke that paedophiles who have robbed children of their own right to family life depend on human rights to stay in this country. That is why I welcome the new provision in the Bill to require decision makers and courts—
This Bill is riddled with bogus context and false premises, as are most debates on this issue. It is worth bearing in mind that the majority of European Union countries take more asylum seekers per head than the United Kingdom.
We heard from the Conservative Front Benchers this stuff about young men coming here in disproportionate numbers as irregular migrants. I just want to tell the House a little story on that, which I am sure the hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Tony Vaughan) will also recall. Just over a year ago, we went to Cairo, where we met some young women, mostly refugees from Sudan. One of them was presented to us as the chair of the young mothers group—it all sounded very lovely. It turned out, though, that every single person in that young mothers group had been a victim of sexual violence between the ages of 14 and 20. There are reasons why women do not end up on these boats, and do not take those risky journeys. I wish that we could have a debate on the reality of fleeing for your life from war-torn circumstances.
The problem with this Bill is that it is a set of proposed changes that are a combination of the ineffective, the performative and the cruel. Let us start off with the new appeals body. We already see 40% of decisions successfully appealed. How does it make any sense to reduce the quality of the decision-making process now? They tried the same thing in Australia, and it clogged up the system even further. On article 8, 382 applications under the ECHR were decided against the Government in the last 10 years. How many of those were under article 8? Just one. Again, the Government are being performative, and are not tackling the issue. When all is said and done, human rights matter for all of us. To throw them out of the window because of a few difficult cases is to throw human rights out of the window entirely.
Telling asylum seekers who have been successfully granted refugee status that they will have to repay the cost of their asylum is performative and cruel. This Government are refusing to allow asylum seekers the right to work.
Brian Mathew (Melksham and Devizes) (LD)
I wonder whether my hon. Friend and the Minister, in their efforts to prevent modern slavery, might consider asylum seekers being be allowed to work, so that they can pay their way, but being fitted with ankle tags until their status is decided.
I certainly think that people who are seeking asylum in this country should be given the right to work. First, it will help them to integrate, if their asylum claim is successful; secondly, it will enable them to cover the cost of their accommodation and many other things while they are here. How cruel it is to tell people who have gone through goodness knows what and have been granted refugee status that they have to pay it all back. We do not make British prisoners pay back the cost of their time in prison, but we are going to do this to asylum seekers. Again, this is performative and cruel, and it will probably end up costing as much to administer as it would bring in. Victims of modern slavery are terrified of their captors. They are often under coercion, and may not realise that they are victims of modern slavery until much later, so giving people only a handful of days to declare themselves victims is cruel and, again, performative.
There is nothing in this Bill to undo or relax the moratorium on family reunion, which is a safe route. Nine times out of 10, the beneficiaries of that safe route are women and girls. The failure to restore family reunion is a deliberate decision to remove a safe route that would have been a good and positive way to counter the need for people to cross the channel irregularly.
For the Government to give raw meat to people who will never vote for them anyway—to people who already take the view that immigration and immigrants are bad—is utterly and totally pointless and counterproductive. When the last Government—some of whom are in the Reform party now—did this kind of thing, I thought it was despicable, but at least they meant it.
Several hon. Members rose—
I cannot see Steve Yemm, so I call Euan Stainbank.
Euan Stainbank (Falkirk) (Lab)
In Falkirk, discussion of asylum policy has taken unprecedented command of our local debate. What has occurred in our community is an example of the failure of the past Government to provide solutions that work in the best interests of communities across the country, or the best interests of asylum seekers fleeing persecution and conflict, to put it mildly.
The previous Government’s lack of control over the asylum system has almost destroyed public confidence in the system. The number of applicants rose from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands from 2020 onwards, which led to Ministers in a panicked state directing the acquisition of town-centre hotels for use as accommodation. They placed asylum seekers, who are unable to work, as Members have mentioned, into goldfish-bowl hotels across the country. They ground processing to a halt. They forgot about asylum seekers, and forgot, or simply did not care, about communities like Falkirk, which hosted them. We saw costs balloon, and we failed to stop the rise in the number of people coming through illegal routes.
Under this Labour Government, on the other hand, Tory asylum hotels are down by over half since the peak of 400. Crossings came down 41% in one year, and claims came down by 12% in one year. We have also seen the grant rate fall from 45% in July 2024 to 39% today, enabling £1 billion a year to be saved in accommodation costs. Where the previous Government lost control, this Government have taken steps to restore it.
The challenge that the Bill presents us with is finding a way to re-establish public confidence in an asylum system that many of my constituents have told me they are questioning. We cannot let the palpable anger—and there is anger out there, in certain corners of our community—irrevocably push us towards breaking the rights-based order that we have had for 80 years. We must demonstrate that we can control the asylum system without sacrificing our constituents’ rights, as many from opposition parties have suggested.
The tone that the Government have used to communicate our record has caused, I will admit, reasonable concern in my constituency. There are concerns about the measures that we are considering today, and the measures that we have to acknowledge we are not considering today. I do not believe that we can deal with those concerns tonight by abandoning the essential objectives that the Bill seeks to pursue. If we vote against the Bill, we throw away an opportunity for asylum appeals reform. The backlog left by the Conservatives has been rapidly reduced, but many cases have been displaced into the appeals system. We must be quicker, imminently, to resolve appeals. If we vote against the Bill, we are throwing away a chance to build a system of controlled routes, which is the only sustainable solution to boat crossings, but one that requires the public to have confidence in the basic norm of an asylum system, which is being threatened. We also throw away a chance to align with our partners in the Council of Europe on article 8 interpretation, as we did in May in Chi inău, as we seek to resolve an international humanitarian crisis, instead of being pushed to the more extreme solutions that others offer.
There are several areas where we could improve the Bill, and I will bring those up with Ministers in Committee. However, I will not be indulging Conservative Members, who broke my community’s confidence in the asylum system; I will support the Government in making a good faith attempt to resolve it.
I am conscious of the short time we have. I will concentrate most of my comments on clauses 44 to 49. This is a Bill about our border, who crosses it and on what terms, but a border policy that scrutinises every person while waving through products of slavery is really only half a border policy. The slavery that we see in the modern world impacts every part of the globe, and greatly impacts this country. One in five cotton garments worldwide is linked to forced labour in China, and Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights warned in July 2025 that the UK risked becoming “a dumping ground” for goods prohibited elsewhere. The International Labour Organisation estimates that forced labour generates roughly £176 billion in illegal profits every year. The Bill does many things, and I welcome many of them, but when it comes to combating modern slavery, which is mentioned in its long title, it does nothing more than offer meek and weak words.
Members on both sides of the House have often worked together to make a difference—we led the world in tackling modern slavery—but we see the United States charging ahead and taking more action than we are. If we look across the channel, which we all talk so much about in this debate, we see that the European Union is doing more than we are doing in this House. What are we proposing to do? We are just asking for a little more reporting. We are not acting to stop goods produced by slavery coming to these shores. In fact, we will act as a magnet for slave-produced goods from not just China, but so many other countries that turn a blind eye to slave labour.
While there is much that I welcome in the Bill, I urge the Government to look at how they can work cross-party, so that they can have an improved Bill that protects some of the most vulnerable people in the poorest parts of the world from being exploited. If they do that, they will have made a much better Bill than the one currently in front of the House.
Tom Collins (Worcester) (Lab)
I have been campaigning on modern slavery for over 20 years. Back when I started, most modern slavery in the UK was sexual exploitation, and let me be clear that it was of girls. I put myself in the shoes of a parent whose child was in another country, suffering unimaginable abuse and exploitation. I realised that I would pray every night for someone in that country not to rest until my child was rescued. I realised that I had to be that person in this country, and I brought that sentiment with me to Parliament.
The Government have taken some good steps to tackle modern slavery by breaking down the criminal gangs and international organised networks behind small boats, starting to open up more safe and legal routes, and clearing the operational backlog of immigration cases. That is good, but if there is diminishing consideration of cases in which people do not disclose that they were victims of modern slavery straight away, or in which the victims had carried out criminal activity, that goes against the very basic, fundamental, “modern slavery 101” principles of how to tackle modern slavery. Recognising who is a victim and who is a perpetrator, and recognising the effects of trauma, were great accomplishments of the Modern Slavery Act, but I fear that there is now a risk that we will start to see tackling illegal immigration and tackling modern slavery as being in conflict or in tension, when in fact they are entirely aligned.
The Secretary of State raised some powerful examples, but they are examples of decision making that was clearly bureaucratic, detached and lacking professional judgement. I echo the comment by the right hon. Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley) that disclosure does not automatically mean a referral under the national referral mechanism. We should be fixing those operational problems. We should be fixing the system, rather than hoping that changing the law will suddenly result in it making better decisions. In fact, I would say that deploying that approach—right the way down to policing and through our multi-agency response to modern slavery in local areas—is a job still to be done, even since we introduced the Modern Slavery Act.
We should not be going backwards. We should be surging and pushing forwards to eradicate modern slavery in the UK. If we were to do that, we would find that much of what concerns our communities about illegal immigration would be solved. We must tackle modern slavery head-on. We must strengthen our systems, which are failing at an operational level in their design, decision making and implementation, and we must bring in good governance. For that reason, I really welcome the further discussions with the Government following today to improve this Bill.
There are several reasons why my Plaid Cymru colleagues, along with hon. Members from the Scottish National party, the Greens and others, have tabled a reasoned amendment to oppose this Bill. The Bill does not fix the problems in the UK asylum system; nor does it deliver the controlled and compassionate system we need. It sees political heavy-handedness creeping into an area where there should be clear division between the Executive and the rightful domain of the judiciary, with the creation of the independent immigration appeals authority. It also sees the creation of a non-judicial body for immigration appeals, as well as high-handed use of Henry VIII powers in clause 16, whereby the IIAA replaces any reference to tribunals in previous law, including devolved legislation.
The Bill avoids the roots of real problems while creating others, and the level of detail in some of its measures is scant at best. There is little information on how the core protection status provision will work, or on the requirements for asylum support contributions. I understand that more detail will be provided elsewhere, but when we have had announcement after announcement —often directly to the press rather than here in this House—how can the Government expect the public to keep track of which proposals are in motion as we all endlessly wait for further details? This creates complexity and confusion, which does nothing to address the dangerous narratives about people fleeing war and persecution who are genuinely seeking safety through asylum. All the while, people’s rights under the international order, including the rights of innocent children, are further undermined. Is this truly what Labour wants as its legacy? Apparently the Prime Minister-in-waiting is happy with this approach.
Last month, Plaid Cymru colleagues in the Senedd stood in defence of the nation of sanctuary scheme in Wales, when all it does is help people already living there to become a part of our communities. That is the reality of where we really are. This is the performative nature of politics and how it plays out in our communities. In the age of misinformation, surely it is the UK Government’s duty not to harm our communities further by brushing over the real problems in our asylum system. Such problems include the Home Office’s poor initial decision making, limited safe routes, and further demonising individuals, all while shifting away from long-held principles of needs-based and rights-based protection. With this in mind, and given the concerns we have heard today from both sides of this House about the detail and the principles of this legislation, I call on the Home Secretary to consider the arguments in the reasoned amendment tabled by the SNP, the Greens and Plaid Cymru. The Bill as it stands should not proceed.
I always hear the UK being described as having a welcoming nature and being a haven for people in times of great difficulty. I would say that it is, but only in limited circumstances. With Ukraine, for example, there was a broad consensus that the UK should play its part and offer assistance, but we should be under no illusion that that agreement was anything more than temporary, limited in scope and made in the context of the current status of the social contract. Where specific schemes have been agreed separately by the Government, the public have felt that there was good reasoning, exceptional circumstances and that the UK had a greater reason to provide assistance.
That is not the case with small boat crossings. The social contract is fragile and a careful narrative is required to clearly explains what the UK is doing, for who and for how long. We will not be able to take the heat out of this policy area until the Government can clearly, confidently and repeatedly demonstrate that the systems in place are sufficiently robust that citizens do feel secure and that they understand the system, and increasingly that the measures in place cannot be undermined through endless appeals or judicial reviews.
Article 8 has to receive serious attention when we see that in 2025, 71% of people with newly granted residence rights had either entered the UK illegally or overstayed their previous visa. It is also concerning that more than half of those who had their article 8 appeal turned down may remain in the UK illegally. Those who commit a crime are utilising the same article, despite breaching the terms of permission of being in the country. It is just not seen as being fair. When the host nation’s people start to feel that their hospitality has been exploited, that quickly turns to resentment and a rejection of the whole principle—none of us wants to see that.
We should be speeding up the processing of applications for immigration and asylum claims. That is what we promised we would do at the last election. While asylum processing is not far off 2020 rates, it is unreasonable to leave people waiting for months or years on end to get their initial decision, and we should also be taking action to speed up appeals. I worry that anything that undermines this delicate balance will see even greater frustrations growing and being exploited by those who thrive on disruption and division. This is not about chasing the policies of the right; it is about having rules that meet the needs of the day, and they cannot be static, because the world is not.
We are at a critical juncture in the whole debate about immigration. Look at what is going on across the UK—things are not good. Such is the noise that a general culture of anti-immigrant sentiment now sweeps this country, leading to whole communities feeling unsafe, demonised and scapegoated. On a weekly basis, we now see disgusting scenes at hotels hosting asylum seekers, vigilantism is on the rise, and people of colour do not feel safe in their own homes. All the time, dangerous misinformation fuels the mood, supported by billionaires and bad actors spreading messages of hate and division.
The far right is on the rise—more confident, visible and organised than it has been in decades. The rise of the far right is perhaps the most dangerous political development of recent years. Looking at the situation just now, I would say that, at best, it is 50:50 whether it succeeds or not. That is the context for the introduction of the Bill. The Government continue to think that they can beat the far right and the populists by doing exactly what the anti-immigration right wants them to do: they accept the right’s premise that immigration is bad and negative, and that it must be controlled by ever-increasing restrictive and repressive measures; they join in calls to weaken essential human rights protections and to use force to remove them; and they agree that routes to citizenship should be extended and for payments that cannot be afforded. It is the usual doomed attempts to try and out-Farage Farage. After two years of following this particular logic, the Government’s attempts are almost becoming heroic.
People who come to this country seeking refuge from conflict and persecution are not asking for special treatment—they just want to feel safe. I have gone through the Bill hoping to find measures that genuinely address the problems facing the asylum system, and I have spoken to organisations that work daily to support refugees and survivors of trafficking and modern slavery. All are disappointed and concerned because the Bill does not address any of the issues at hand.
I thought that when we had a Labour Government, we would see a new and fresh approach to issues around immigration—how disappointed we have all been. At least there are some Labour Back Benchers who are prepared to change the narrative and who want to do something positive when it comes to things like indefinite leave to remain. This is their chance. They will have new leadership within the next week, so they should try and impress upon whoever is going to be leading this country that we cannot go on continuing to do these things again. We are at a critical juncture and we need to change our approach.
Jo White (Bassetlaw) (Lab)
I will be blunt: my constituents have lost faith in the asylum system. Under the previous Government, they watched borders slide out of control, criminal gangs profit and taxpayers face ever-rising costs while hotel use spiralled. Fairness collapsed and public trust collapsed with it. This Bill is how we earn that trust back.
First, we need control at the border. A fair system needs a firm line. We must stop the boats, target the smugglers and strengthen the checks so we know who is coming, how and why.
Secondly, we need swift decisions and final outcomes. Endless delays destroy confidence. Claims must be processed quickly. Appeals must be heard promptly by independent adjudicators, with decisions enforced. If someone qualifies, they receive protection without unnecessary delay; if they do not, departure should follow swiftly.
Thirdly, fairness means contribution. Those granted protection should work, rebuild their lives, contribute to our society, and help to offset the costs associated with processing their claims. Responsibility must sit alongside rights, and contribution alongside compassion.
Fourthly, protection must remain justified. Refugee status should be reviewed through a clear and streamlined process. If danger remains, protection continues. If circumstances change significantly, the system should respond accordingly. That is how we keep asylum credible.
Fifthly, we need honesty about costs and communities. Hotels are a symptom of a system under strain. By reducing backlogs and speeding up decisions, we can lower costs and ensure that outcomes are delivered. If protected, people move into work; if not, they are removed. Every pound saved can be redirected towards border security and genuine protection.
Sixthly, we need safe and legal routes. If we want people to choose safe routes, these routes must be real, reliable and fast. Clear criteria, rapid processing, UNHCR referrals and community sponsorship can provide a genuine alternative to dangerous crossings. The legal route must always be the better route. That is how the economic model of the people smugglers can be broken.
Those constituents who have lost faith are right to want to control the borders and to want faster decisions, lower costs and rules that are enforced. We need control of the border, compassion where it counts, and contribution and consequences in equal measure. We cannot undo yesterday’s failures, but we can build a system that is fair and credible. That is why I support the Bill.
Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)
We must reduce immigration to this country and get a grip of our asylum system. Unlike the MPs behind her, I do think the Home Secretary is starting to move in the right direction. But, as she will know, small boat crossings are on the rise since Labour came to power, with an average of 105 illegal migrants crossing the channel every single day for the last two years. Almost 100,000 people are being housed in asylum accommodation, with the numbers in houses in multiple occupation up 11% under this Labour Government.
The case for urgent action is now overwhelming, but the measures in the Bill before us fail to meet the gravity of the situation. I will therefore be supporting the reasoned amendment in the name of the Leader of the Opposition. Just look at the tinkering to the application of article 8 of the European convention on human rights. We all know that the protection to family life has been abused and twisted far from its original purpose. The public rightly expect foreign nationals who have broken our laws to be deported. The rights of the British people should always outweigh the interests of foreign criminals—no ifs, no buts.
In 2023, a Nigerian man used article 8 to stay in this country despite a two-year prison sentence, but the tribunal ruled that deportation would breach his article 8 rights. Horrifically, he then went on to violently rape a teenage girl—whose rights were being protected then? Will these sorts of cases be a thing of the past as a result of the modest changes within this Bill? I am not convinced. The Government are allowing vague and ambiguous exceptional circumstances to be used by criminals to avoid deportation. The phrasing in the Bill leaves far too much room for legal argument, appeals and delays. No ifs, no buts—every illegal immigrant should be deported.
By making changes to article 8, the Government have conceded that membership of the European convention on human rights places significant limits on the UK’s ability to maintain and control our borders. There is only one logical conclusion: the only way that we will truly end illegal immigration into the United Kingdom, deport all foreign criminals, and create a system that is genuinely fair and robust, is to leave the European convention on human rights in its entirety, and repeal the Human Rights Act.
There is little evidence that the Bill will do what it claims and fix the most serious issues in our asylum system. In fact, experts say that it will divert focus and resources to a system that is unfair, unsafe and unworkable. There are many problems in the Bill, but for the sake of time I will focus on the independent immigration appeals authority. The Government say that to tackle the backlog they will replace the tribunal system, which is made up of judges, with a new system of adjudicators, who are not legally qualified but who are given power and responsibility to make what are, in many cases, life and death decisions. The Government claim that they will be independent, but they are appointed by the chief executive, who is appointed by the Secretary of State. That undermines the independence of the judiciary and the separation of powers, which are key cornerstones of our democracy. The Law Society says that it risks
“more wrong decisions, more court challenges, higher costs and longer uncertainty.”
Poor Home Office decision making drives the appeals backlog. In the last financial year, 39% of appeals were granted, and more than 10,000 were withdrawn because the Home Office abandoned its initial decision. Rather than building new expensive bodies, the Government should invest in the existing system and get asylum decisions right the first time. The Government could have brought forward a Bill containing evidence-based policies that would fix our broken asylum system—for example, a not-for-profit asylum accommodation system to improve living conditions and integration, genuinely safe routes that are not severely restricted and heavily capped, and fast tracking of obviously well-founded asylum cases such as those from war zones. Instead, I am ashamed to say that the Bill is a betrayal of our party’s values, and I cannot support it. I urge the Government to withdraw this Bill, and instead to work with sector organisations and experts to create an immigration and asylum system that is rooted in compassion, justice and human rights.
I agree with one word that the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Nadia Whittome) said, “betrayal”, but the Bill is not a betrayal of the Labour party; it is a betrayal of the British people. This Bill will fail, just as the Labour Government have been promising for two years that they will smash the gangs and stop the boats, but they have failed—[Interruption.] Labour Members all laugh; they are all laughing at the British people who are furious with this Labour Government. This Government have failed, the last Tory Government failed, because they have been lying to the British people—[Interruption.] I will get to that.
Why will the Bill fail? Why is it a total and utter farce? It is because of the European convention on human rights. Reform UK has tabled a reasoned amendment opposing the Bill because it does not do what is needed. It does not take the United Kingdom out of the ECHR, and that is what we need to do if we have to stop the boats.
Mike Martin (Tunbridge Wells) (LD)
Will the right hon. and learned Lady give way?
I will not because I do not have any time. Let us go through this. Part 1 is about the independent immigration appeals authority. That will get ripped to shreds by article 6 of the ECHR, with claims in the High Court saying that it does not offer a right to a fair trial. Part 2 is on article 8 reform, but that will get destroyed by article 8 claims in the High Court, and it will probably get overturned by Strasbourg. Part 3 of the Bill is on protection status and asylum. Article 3 of the ECHR is about rights against torture and inhumane or degrading treatment, and that will block the operation of part 3. The Bill is not fit for purpose, and it will let the British people down. Now I will give way to the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells (Mike Martin).
Mike Martin
The right hon. and learned Lady advocates leaving the ECHR. I assume that is after a process of analysis, so could she tell the House two good things that the ECHR does for British citizens?
It is after a process of analysis: 10 years as a barrister, five of which were spent defending the Home Office in the immigration tribunals; time as Attorney General, finding and seeing how the ECHR thwarted Government decision making time and again, including in relation to eco-protesters and using articles 10 and 11; and then as Home Secretary in 2022. That is why, in 2022, I was the first Conservative Minister to say publicly that if we wanted to stop the boats, we needed to leave the ECHR. For that, I was attacked by my former Conservative colleagues, including the current leader of the Conservative party, the right hon. Member for North West Essex (Mrs Badenoch), and many members of the shadow Cabinet—many of whom still privately oppose leaving the ECHR today, as they did publicly four years ago.
I am glad that it has taken the Conservative party three years to catch up with me, but it is three years too late and too little. When they had the power and the mandate, and when they had Ministers telling them that we needed to leave the ECHR, they blocked, attacked, criticised and vilified people like me. I will not take any lectures from the Conservative party, which cannot be trusted one bit on leaving the ECHR.
The former hon. Member for Clacton was the original advocate for leaving the ECHR; he first raised the alarm about the small boats crisis, and it was only thanks to his pressure and his campaigning, which he led single-handedly, that this place was forced to wake up and take some action. We need to leave the ECHR, and I have set out a plan on how to do so, which was published last year. I urge all hon. Members to read it—the Conservative party copied it about a year later. It sets out how to leave, why to leave, how to protect civil liberties in doing so, how we can amend the Good Friday agreement and protect Northern Ireland in doing so, and why it is what the British people deserve if we are going to stop the boats.
Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. and learned Member for Fareham and Waterlooville (Suella Braverman), who was the author of the mess that we are discussing clearing up; I am sure she will look forward to sharing her comments with Count Binface soon enough. I draw the House’s attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.
The Government are absolutely right to be tackling the appeals process—as a supporter of humanitarian protection, I accept that it needs reform if it is to be resilient—but I will focus on part 4, which creates powers to recover the costs of asylum support. I am pleased that the Bill discusses the cost of asylum system, and I support the principle that refugees who go on to earn a lot should contribute back what they received from this country. I suspect that many of them would be happy to do so.
However, let us be clear that those refugees are not responsible for the extraordinary costs of the asylum system. Since entering Parliament, I have been on a one-man mission to highlight the biggest public procurement scandal in Britain—a system causing untold damage but costing the taxpayer £15 billion. The real problem lies with the asylum contracts, signed by the previous Government and overseen by the right hon. and learned Member, with three private providers. The contracts generated eye-watering profits; a founder of one of the companies entered The Sunday Times rich list at taxpayer expense. When these companies come before the Home Affairs Committee, they refuse to answer even the most basic questions, while serious concerns about misconduct in their supply chains remain.
I recognise that this Government inherited those contracts from the right hon. and learned Member and are roped into them for the foreseeable future. I support asking successful refugees to contribute, but that is a peripheral issue.
The hon. Gentleman is almost making my argument for me. The whole reason the Home Office has to enter into expensive contracts and spend £5 million of British taxpayers’ money every day to house asylum seekers is that the ECHR imposes onerous duties on the state to accommodate unlimited numbers of asylum seekers, without any thought as to cost effectiveness.
Chris Murray
No, it is not. It is because the right hon. and learned Lady passed the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024, which allowed the backlog to soar. It is because the right hon. and learned Lady signed off on putting asylum seekers in hotels, which cost £34,000 per asylum seeker, as opposed to £14,000 per asylum seeker when she came into office. It is because the right hon. and learned Lady failed to get the Department to grip the use in public procurement of taxpayers’ money, which she wasted then tried to instrumentalise to sow division in the country.
These outsourcing contracts have allowed extortionate profit at taxpayers’ expense. They have damaged communities, failed the vulnerable and exposed serious weaknesses in Home Office procurement. Are the Government certain that they do not need further powers to sort out these contracts and recoup the costs that have already been wasted? If not, why is that not included in the Bill?
Second Reading is about principles. I believe that this Bill identifies the right areas for reform—appeals, protection and costs—and, for that reason, I will support it tonight. I look forward to seeing concerns about the detail, implementation and asylum contracts being addressed as it progresses.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I support the reasoned amendment tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire (Pete Wishart), which has not been selected, alongside me, my Green party colleagues and a cross-party grouping. I associate myself with the comments made already by Members on the Opposition Benches; we must reject division, not feed it.
I believe that our reasoned amendment represents the views of the majority of the UK public, who reject the far right, delight in the strong reputation that this country has for welcoming refugees and believe in human rights. We must treat those fleeing war, danger, discrimination and oppression the same as we would want to be treated if circumstances changed in this country. I believe the majority of the UK public are proud of the many, many migrant families of all kinds over the years, who are not only well-settled and well-integrated, but integral to our British identity.
This Bill will do the opposite of maintaining our proud British tradition of integration and community cohesion. It is designed to make it harder for families to form, reunite or remain together, and it is clearly designed to prevent refugees from finding a permanent safe new home here, which will damage community cohesion by preventing long-term integration.
The conclusions of Liberty around the impact of the Bill on children are stark. It says that more children will face separation, either from their parent or their home. It has huge concerns about the proposals to force no weight to be given to relationships formed by people in the UK in irregular circumstances. Banning people from falling in love is unlikely to work, so many children will undoubtedly be seriously harmed by this blunt and bad-faith proposal.
In addition, the proposals in part 4 of the Bill to force payments from financially vulnerable refugees are misconceived and cruel. Remember, these proposals will apply to the very poorest refugees, so it is a tax on poverty and on being a victim of war or persecution. It is a tax on free speech exercised by those who end up as political prisoners. It is a tax on LGBT+ people and on women fighting for education. It is a tax on discriminated-against minorities under authoritarian regimes.
The Bill does nothing to increase the right to work for people seeking asylum, which is the most obvious way of closing the hotels, reducing poverty and destitution and reducing the costs to the state of the long waits that refugees face. Above all, the Bill does nothing to improve the poor initial decision making that every MP’s caseworkers know all too much about. It does not fix the problems caused by Brexit or provide any new safe routes for seeking asylum here. It does not reduce the number of small boats or prevent the criminal exploitation of those with clear and legitimate claims, but no safe way to reach the UK at all. The Home Secretary must reconsider and withdraw this Bill.
Several hon. Members rose—
I have made it very clear to the Whips on duty that I am not going to get everybody in, and interventions are not helping.
Lewis Atkinson (Sunderland Central) (Lab)
Asylum and immigration are key concerns for my constituents, and their judgment on the asylum system that this Government inherited is clear and correct: the system was broken, lacked control and cost taxpayers too much. By that, they do not just mean illegal and dangerous crossings of the channel; they mean that it was broken post-arrival, in the extended periods of time in which people have been accommodated in dispersal accommodation while awaiting decision or appeal outcomes. They are right to expect that the amount of public money spent on that system will reduce—an amount that has increased as a result of the failings of the system that the right hon. and learned Member for Fareham and Waterlooville (Suella Braverman) oversaw. It is on that basis that I welcome this legislation, along with the other steps that the Government are taking to restore control to the system while maintaining a proper offer of safe routes for those fleeing war and persecution.
In the two years since the election, rather than chuntering on like those on the Opposition Benches, the Government have begun to get a grip. Small boat crossings are down by 12% compared with the equivalent period in 2024; initial decisions are at the highest level on record; and removals of people without a legal right to remain in this country are increasing. That is not happening by accident, and it is certainly not happening because of gimmicks and political game-playing. It is happening as a result of hard, unglamourous work: disrupting the gangs, deepening co-operation with our European partners, and actually making decisions on applications.
Like others have said, I travelled to northern France last year with Home Affairs Committee colleagues and saw the significant UK-backed efforts to stop the boats. However, I also heard from the French a concern that we cannot dismiss—that there remain pull factors on this side of the channel, including a system that incentivises late appeals. Because of the lengthy appeals backlog, it is right that this Government take steps to reform the appeals system. I think the shadow Home Secretary said that no previous attempts to reform the system had worked. The Blair Government, faced with a broken appeals system, passed immigration Acts in 2002 and 2004. Against opposition from across the House, they ensured that, by slowly getting through appeals and making sure that decision-making was proper and streamlined, the backlog fell repeatedly. That is not glamourous work. It is not noisy work that seeks to score political points, but it is the real work of governing that my constituents expect.
Our country has a proud tradition of offering refuge to those fleeing war and persecution, and Sunderland has lived that tradition, including the many families who offered their city of sanctuary to Ukrainian refugees. As others have said, in order to maintain that proud tradition, we need a system that commands public confidence, and it is right to reform it in the way that the Government are proposing.
The media, Reform and all on the far right in Britain have created the most horrible and dangerous atmosphere in this country against refugees, migrants and minorities. They have promoted racism, and that racism has played out in the violence on the streets, the violence against mosques, the violence against synagogues, and the violence against any minority group within our society. They should think very carefully about what they say and how they depict asylum seekers and refugees. When I listen to the rhetoric in the media and follow it in some of the papers, it seems to me that they have taken leave of all aspects of humanity.
The hon. Member for Sunderland Central (Lewis Atkinson) said that he had been over to northern France to examine what was going on there. I have been over to northern France as well—I have been over to Calais and talked to people living in tents, and they are desperate. They are desperate people who once worked for the British Army in Afghanistan. They are desperate people who were bombed in Iraq or in Syria. They are desperate people trying to find somewhere in this world to survive, and what they find is hostility, danger and abuse.
Nobody in their right mind would get into one of those dinghies and cross the channel unless they were utterly desperate to do so, so can we not just have a sense of humanity about this and have an international, Europe-wide approach to the issues faced by people who are desperate? Thousands have died crossing the Mediterranean, and hundreds have died crossing the channel. The historians of the next century will say of this century, “What were the politicians of Europe doing while all these people were drowning because they were trying to get to a place of safety?” Can we not instead accept the importance of international institutions and the value of the European convention on human rights, which protects all of our human rights, and try to have a humane system of doing things?
In the last minute I have for my speech, I want to draw attention to the amendment I have tabled, endorsed by Members of the independent alliance group, which concerns the Afghan resettlement schemes. The people of Afghanistan have suffered grievously from the war. In August 2021, the Taliban took over in Kabul; the UK created resettlement schemes, and then dropped them all. Now, we have the horrible situation in which, although many Afghan families who have come to Britain as part of those schemes were told that the rest of their family could come, there are many dependants stuck in Afghanistan who can have no place here. The Government, through the Ministry of Defence and the Home Office, guaranteed that right of family reunion and guaranteed that extended family members could come here. When the Minister for Border Security and Asylum responds to the debate, I hope he will remember the words of the Afghan International Council in the United Kingdom, who said that
“many Afghan families continue to endure the pain of prolonged separation”—
Rachel Taylor (North Warwickshire and Bedworth) (Lab)
My constituents in North Warwickshire and Bedworth have been clear that Britain must secure its borders, enforce the rules and remove those with no right to remain here. They also recognise that Britain should continue to uphold our proud tradition of offering sanctuary to people genuinely fleeing war, persecution and violence. Those two principles do not conflict. A system that is firm, fair and fast is the only way to maintain public confidence. My constituents are angry about the fundamental unfairness in the current system at a time when they are having to tighten their belts ever more.
Clause 23 tackles that unfairness head-on by giving the Secretary of State the power to require adults who have received asylum accommodation or financial support to make a contribution when they have sufficient means. Those who can afford to contribute should pay their fair share. That principle safeguards taxpayers’ money and creates a stronger incentive to come through safe and legal routes.
The new capped routes for genuine refugees being introduced alongside the Bill are so important. Working with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Government will establish controlled community sponsorship, study and work routes. The numbers will start small, because we have to restore confidence in the system. People arriving through those routes will have proper support in place, so that they can reach safety without dangerous journeys or people smugglers.
My constituents are rightly concerned when serious foreign criminals are allowed to remain here by relying on a broad interpretation of article 8 of the European convention on human rights, but the answer is not to leave the ECHR; the answer is to make the law clearer. Clauses 18 to 20 clearly define what constitutes family life and ensure that public safety and the prevention of crime come first.
People in North Warwickshire and Bedworth are tired of politicians making promises on immigration without a credible plan to deliver them. They want border security, not slogans, and an asylum system that protects the vulnerable without being open to abuse. I am backing this landmark legislation because it will restore control of Britain’s borders and deliver an asylum system that is fair to the British taxpayer, compassionate to those genuinely seeking safety, and tough on those who seek to exploit our country and its generosity.
Tony Vaughan (Folkestone and Hythe) (Lab)
I draw attention to my declaration in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I will focus in the short time that I have on part 1 of the Bill on immigration appeals reform and specifically on whether it will cut the appeals backlog.
I start by making the point that Home Office decision making is a significant driver of appeal numbers. The Home Office’s internal quality checks show an error rate of around 48% in the most recently published figures, and around 45% of Home Office refusals were overturned on appeal, according to MOJ statistics for the year ending March 2025. It is important to make the point that if those decisions were right first time, there would be substantially less pressure on the appeals system.
I fundamentally agree with the Government that the asylum appeal backlog must be addressed urgently. They were right to enact a six-month target for asylum appeals in accommodated cases in section 49 of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025. Since then, around 70 first-tier tribunal judges have been recruited. My first question for the Minister is this: given the increase in FTT numbers, the increase in sitting days and the impact of section 49 and other measures, where can we find the Ministry of Justice and Home Office assessment that explains why the FTT is unable to clear the backlog? Without that kind of assessment, and in particular an estimate of how much it will cost, it is impossible to understand why these far-reaching reforms are better than improving the existing system.
My second question is, why are the Government bringing forward a new model for appeals, when the Home Office’s impact assessment says that it will have an “uncertain” effect on the appeal backlog, with no evidence that the appeal reforms will actually work?
Sarah Smith (Hyndburn) (Lab)
Does my hon. and learned Friend agree that it is incredibly important that there is certainty that the reforms we are making will create a better system, rather than risk making things worse?
Tony Vaughan
I completely agree. Another hon. Member referred to the importance of evidence-based policymaking. When I look at the impact assessment, it is not clear to me that the case has been made. I think it fair to say that the only evidential basis for these reforms is a hope that they will be better than the current system, but that, I suggest, is not a basis on which to abolish an arm of the judiciary of this country and undertake major structural changes to a key part of our asylum system.
There is evidence to suggest that a lay adjudicator system will not work. Last week the Justice Committee heard evidence that Denmark tried to bring in lay adjudicators about 15 years ago, but, as non-lawyers, they struggled to apply the law to the facts. They made numerous errors and ended up being either too sympathetic or too harsh, and they were got rid of. Danish asylum appeals are now heard by a judge, a lawyer and a civil servant. As another Member pointed out, Australia tried the same system some years ago, but it too was got rid of because it increased the backlog.
That brings me to my third question to the Minister: what assessment has been made of the impact of this new system on the upper tribunal? I believe that the new appeals body will simply shift the backlog, or a major part of it, from the first-tier tribunal to the upper tribunal, because lay judges will make more legal errors that will have to be corrected on appeal to the upper tribunal. I say that on the basis of 18 years of full-time practice in the courts and tribunals of this country, when I appealed against decisions made by both lay decision makers and judges. However, that is not just my view but the view of witnesses who came before the Justice Committee last week, including a former judge of the upper tribunal itself.
Let me add that the way in which the Bill has been sold—for example, its purpose is said to be to crack down on abuse of appeals—is incorrect, given that about half those appeals are allowed. The idea that all unsuccessful appeals are abusive, as was suggested at the outset of the debate, is wrong. A case that was clearly unfounded would not go to appeal. We already have a filter to get rid of weak cases before they start.
To end, I quickly point out that in respect of every element of the reforms, the Home Office’s own impact assessment says that the effects are uncertain. There is, I suggest, scant evidential basis for believing that these measures will actually work.
To have concerns about this Bill does not mean that we defend the status quo. It does not mean that we want the boats to continue, or that we do not want to see Shabir Ahmed deported, or that we do not recognise that claims are down, channel crossings are down, the number waiting for decisions is coming down and things are moving in the right direction. It means making the very simple case that the Bill could take us backwards, and could end up being more expensive for the taxpayer.
I do not stand here raising concerns about this legislation because of my concerns about the approach to the ECHR and my belief in the importance of defending it as a fundamental part of our liberty, or because I am proud to live in a community that welcomes refugees and proud to have spent this morning talking to a refugee businessman. If we are going to tell stories about refugees, let us tell the whole story about the contribution that they make to our country. I stand here as someone speaking up for the taxpayer’s interest.
As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Tony Vaughan) has just pointed out, the truth is that much of the backlog is a result of poor-quality decision making. That is where cost is mounting up for the British taxpayer. The idea that there are no lessons to be learned about how we can save money, when in two thirds of cases the appeals are accepted or the decisions are withdrawn by the Home Office, does not bear scrutiny. Frankly, it would be decent if the Home Office turned up at those first-tier tribunals in the first place, and it would probably improve decision making as well, because we know that that has been a problem. Our failure to go after the Eurodac data means that it is harder for us to deal with asylum claims between the UK and Europe. That is why Brexit has caused problems.
Fundamentally, spending money on getting it right the first time would be the best way to give people confidence in our asylum system. Bringing in a new system that will add further complexity is only likely to add cost. We are creating a refugee system that will see us spending money on repeatedly asking people whether they are still victims of torture and whether there is still civil war in their country—testing and retesting these people for no apparent gain other than proving that we have a broken system. The Bill introduces a Diet Coke version of refugee status, the core protection visa, which will require refugees to be retested every two and a half years, potentially for 20 years. Think of the cost! The Refugee Council has estimated it to be about £1 billion. Then there are all the people that we are forgetting in this process. We have already talked about the madness of introducing a £10,000 debt for people on low incomes so that they are never able to sort themselves out properly in the UK if we do give them status.
In the final seconds remaining to me, I want to refer to the overseas domestic workers in this country who are being exploited. The right hon. Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley) spoke powerfully about the importance of not seeing everyone who comes here as a criminal, but recognising criminal behaviour. There are things that we could do so much better, which would save the British taxpayer money and restore confidence in the system, but I am sad to say that I do not think the Bill will take us in that direction.
This Bill seems inspired by the belief that hostility towards asylum seekers will deter them, whereas hostility towards migrants will not deter those we need economically, but we cannot have it both ways. There is a deeper problem with the Bill’s logic on citizenship provisions. The only way to make this approach work is by creating a second class of citizen, but what do we do with those whom we cannot deport? What happens when the person who has done the harm was born here, with no claim to another citizenship? The Bill has no answer, because citizenship deprivation was never really about safety; it is about who this Government treat as fully British, and the proposed amendment on citizenship deprivation confirms that.
To be absolutely clear, I am not arguing against deporting foreign national criminals, which we too often fail at. My concern is that the Home Office, with its full arsenal, cannot think of any other way to ensure that we are safe from all groomers and abusers, regardless of where they or their grandparents were born. The Home Office seems able to resolve difficult cases only by creating citizens with fewer rights, which should trouble every single Member, whatever their view on deportation.
Press briefings have suggested that the Bill hands Ministers sweeping powers to strip British citizenship. Rather, it moves deprivation appeals out of the independent courts and into an immigration appeals authority that is largely controlled by the Home Secretary. That is a serious change to who judges these decisions, but it is a change of process, not of who can be deprived of citizenship or why. This appears to be blurred with a separate Bill that stops citizenship being restored after the first successful appeal, letting this Government sound tougher than they are while avoiding scrutiny of a power that is already used disproportionately against black, Asian and migrant-heritage citizens.
Forcing asylum seekers to pay £10,000 for their own shelter is purely punitive and ignores the legal right to asylum. Denying the right to work and rent, and then demanding repayment, is designed to punish, not uphold human rights. The Bill also deliberately ignores article 8, the right to family life, potentially tearing people away from loved ones, including British citizens. The Bill contravenes the spirit of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 by imposing arbitrary disclosure deadlines and removing leave to remain for trafficking survivors. Automatic deportation for custodial sentences introduces double jeopardy; a wrongful sentence can now also mean unjust deportation. The deportation system is already a mess and is run by the Home Office, which is now asking for sole control of it, without oversight. If the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs oversaw food shortages, would we accept a bid from it to take over all our farms?
Finally, this Government have yet again missed the chance to fix child citizenship fees. It costs £1,214 for a child who was born here, and who has lived here their whole life, to register as a citizen in the country that they call home—a fee that the Court of Appeal found unlawful. Between 85,000 and 215,000 such children remain undocumented because their families cannot pay. These children are not migrants, and they are not asking for anything that is not already theirs. If it was not clear, I do not support this Bill.
I wish to briefly return to the issue of trafficking. I welcomed Theresa May’s proposals and legislation on trafficking, which represented a huge breakthrough. I did so because in my constituency, we had hundreds of unaccompanied children coming into Heathrow, being taken into care and then disappearing. They would often end up in cannabis farms. We also had a large number of young women being brought in for prostitution in local hotels, and often they would have a drug dependency.
Like the Anti-Slavery Commissioner, who has criticised the Government for the language that they have used and for their contextualisation of this issue, I am appalled at the way in which trafficking has been included in this Bill, but also at the narrative that has been developed by those on the Labour Front Bench. Qualifying for asylum as someone who has been trafficked is not a soft touch. As the right hon. Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley) said, no one individual can claim asylum in that way, because there has to be a first responder—in my constituency, it is usually a police officer. Then there is an assessment process, which is tough. The first stage is demonstrating grounds. The second stage is demonstrating conclusive grounds, and it is a tough assessment. It is a high threshold to meet.
I am concerned that we have been dragged into this debate in a way that undermines the whole process that we have developed in recent years and have been so proud of. The debate does not seem to relate to the reality of trafficking. We are introducing a time limit, and are saying no to people who did not claim that they were trafficked at the first instance, or within a limited period of time. The people we are dealing with are traumatised. Some of them, such as the young women I mentioned, have been made drug dependent and are often ashamed to admit to what they have been doing. The Bill does not reflect the reality of what is happening on the ground. As a result, some people who have been trafficked will be made vulnerable again.
I am really disappointed. The Home Secretary said that this Bill was all about the calculus of those people who were thinking about coming here on the boats. I think it is electoral calculus, and if it is, it is mistaken calculus, because I think it will lose the Labour party votes. It will also lose us the respect we gained for our cross-party approach to tackling trafficking. I am extremely disappointed, and I think this is a step backward. I cannot support the Bill tonight, and I will vote against it at every opportunity.
Steve Witherden (Montgomeryshire and Glyndŵr) (Lab)
I recognise the need for reform of our immigration system, but many of the measures in this Bill require further scrutiny. Existing legislation has long served as an important safeguard, ensuring that powers are exercised properly. The Bill in its current form would make it significantly harder for families to claim the rights of a child who is British, or who has lived here for seven years. This will affect a large number of families. The Government’s own assessment suggests that around 11,700 people would be affected. We pride ourselves on the British value of decency, but this Bill risks moving the goalposts and separating loved ones, despite their long-established ties to the UK. I welcome the open approach and accessibility of the Department, but what I would appreciate even more is clarification from the Minister of how these changes can be reconciled with the UK’s obligations under international law.
As we consider this Bill and the direction of immigration reform more widely, we must think about the enormous contribution that migrants make to our communities and public services. In NHS Wales, more than one in 10 members of staff are non-UK nationals. Across my constituency—in Newtown, Rhosllannerchrugog and the Dee valley—migrant workers play a vital role in our health and social care services. Their dedication and commitment deserve our gratitude, not policies that make life harder for them and their families. This Government should not allow anti-migrant rhetoric and division to shape policy. We should stand firmly on the side of the migrants, who are our neighbours, friends, vital contributors to our economy, and the people who help keep our essential public services running.
David Smith (North Northumberland) (Lab)
Let us be straight: immigration is a good and necessary thing for our country. Successive waves of immigration over hundreds of years have helped make Britain the country we are, whether we are talking about the Huguenots fleeing French persecution in the 17th century, or the West Indians answering Britain’s call for workers in the aftermath of world war two. However, it is also true to say that preceding waves of immigration have been small compared with the size of the population, and the pace has been relatively slow.
Today, many Brits hold two positions simultaneously. We want to be a generous, open and welcoming country, but we are also concerned about the lack of control that successive Governments have had over our borders. In the last five years, over 460,000 people have claimed asylum in the UK. A decade ago, that figure was 165,000, and the last Government allowed net legal migration of 2.5 million people in just four years. We must be in no doubt: if we fail to achieve a just and fair system, we will undermine public support for our asylum system, and there is a risk that the general population will turn away from our being the generous and compassionate country that most of us consider the UK to be.
I could talk about many things in the Bill that I think are good and necessary, but I will talk about just one, which is the introduction of requirements for asylum seekers to contribute financially towards the costs of our asylum system, as long as doing so would not push them into destitution. When I was leading a homelessness charity before entering Parliament, we supported a young man called Mobarak, who was only 18. He had come to the UK from Sudan via Libya and Malta. When we asked him what he wanted to do, he was clear: “I want to be a plumber,” he said. Let us not deny people such as Mobarak the dignity that they deserve. Let us give them the chance to contribute to the society that has taken them in as soon as they can. Indeed, in my experience, what people who have been welcomed into this country as refugees most often want to do is make a contribution to the country that has welcomed them.
I give my full support to much of what else the Government are doing to secure control of our borders, including community sponsorship schemes, through which they are creating the first ever safe and legal routes to this country. The Government are picking up the pieces of the mess that the previous Government made. The only way we can restore the bonds of solidarity and compassion between citizen and asylum seeker is by restoring trust that the system is fair, effective and based on contribution. That is what the Bill seeks to do, and I fully support it.
Several hon. Members rose—
I am going to squeeze in one more speaker, with two minutes.
Dr Peter Prinsley (Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket) (Lab)
I want to speak about something very simple: the difference between being put somewhere and being welcomed somewhere. When Russia invaded Ukraine, we welcomed Ukrainians into our home, as many here have done. The questions were practical: “Where is the nearest doctor?”, “How does the bus work?”. That is why I welcome the Home Secretary’s commitment to named community sponsorship. The Government retain control over who enters and in what numbers, and the welcome will come from the community. Canada has a similar system, and we have seen that sponsorship works from Homes for Ukraine. More than 400 Ukrainians were welcomed into west Suffolk; the people of Suffolk are keen to help—they have proved it.
I met the parish council and the headteacher at Barnham primary school. They are concerned about the use being made of the RAF Barnham base. That does not make these people uncaring. Their concern is about how this is being done. They deserve to be properly consulted. Named community sponsorship and asylum accommodation are not the same. One offers refugees a safe and legal route, while the other houses people as their asylum claims are decided. The question is simple: do we begin with a site and ask the community to accept it, or do we begin with a community and ask what it is willing to do to help? The second is a much better starting point.
For sponsorship to work, communities need training, clear guidance and continuing support. The people of Suffolk do not need lessons in compassion—they have opened their homes—but they must be heard when they raise concerns about RAF Barnham. The Home Secretary’s reforms can combine control with sanctuary, but to achieve that, we must trust our communities and listen to them.
Several hon. Members rose—
Unfortunately, I have to go to the Front Benchers now. I call the shadow Minister.
This has been an important and thoughtful debate, and I begin by thanking Members from across the House for their contributions.
There have been genuine differences of opinion this evening, but I think there is broad agreement on one point: our immigration system is not working. Immigration is one of the defining issues facing our country. It goes to the security of our borders, the integrity of our laws, the pressure on our public services, and, ultimately, the confidence the British people have in the ability of the Government to keep their promises.
The British people expect an immigration system that is fair to those who play by the rules and firm with those who seek to abuse them. They expect secure borders, swift decisions, effective enforcement and, above all, a Government to deliver. That is the test the Bill must meet.
In many respects, today’s debate brings us full circle. Ministers stood at the Dispatch Box and argued that immigration policy should be about grip and control, not gimmicks and false promises, yet over the past two years, we have seen too many headlines, too many announcements and too many promises, while illegal migration has continued to undermine confidence in our borders.
Let me be clear: I do not believe that anyone in this House wants to see people risking their life crossing the channel in small boats. Those crossings benefit organised criminal gangs, undermine confidence in our immigration system, place enormous pressure on communities, public services and public finances, and all too often end in tragedy. Nobody should accept them as inevitable. The question before us today is therefore a simple one: does the Bill contain the measures necessary to stop illegal migration? That must surely be the ambition.
The Government’s own impact assessment recognises that deterrence is essential, but it also accepts that the deterrent effect of these proposals is too uncertain even to quantify. That uncertainty goes to the heart of the Bill. The fundamental principle should be straightforward: if someone enters the United Kingdom illegally, they should not be able to stay. Everything else flows from that principle. Without it, public confidence is weakened and genuine refugees lose out. Those who come here legally and contribute to our country are let down, and the criminal gangs continue to exploit the gaps in our system.
To be fair to the Home Secretary, there are measures in the Bill that the Opposition welcome. It is right that the Government are seeking to recover more of the costs of asylum support. It is right that Ministers are finally acknowledging that the article 8 framework has frustrated removals. It is right that they recognise shortcomings in the operation of the modern slavery system. It is right that they acknowledge that the current appeals process is too slow, too cumbersome and too vulnerable to abuse. In truth, one of the most striking features of the Bill is that the Government have finally accepted many of the arguments that they have spent the last two years dismissing.
Recognising a problem, though, is not the same as solving it. The Home Secretary and I agree on much of the diagnosis; we disagree on the cure. Time and again, the Bill identifies the right issues but stops short of the reforms needed to address them. The Government propose a new independent immigration appeals authority, yet they cannot tell us with any certainty whether it will speed up removals or simply replace one backlog with another.
The Bill looks to narrow article 8 claims, while simultaneously creating a new, sponsored human rights claim that risks opening another avenue for litigation. It speaks about strengthening deportation powers, yet it leaves unanswered the wider questions about the legal framework that continue to frustrate removals. Despite repeated promises, the Bill contains no comprehensive reforms to settlement, no clear answer on preventing those who arrive illegally from obtaining citizenship, and no comprehensive removals framework capable of delivering the deterrence that Ministers say is necessary.
That is why the Opposition have tabled our reasoned amendment. We believe that the Bill does not yet go far enough to restore public confidence or deliver the outcome that the British people rightly expect. Our alternative is clear: those who enter the country illegally should have no right to stay.
Several Members have spoken about public confidence, and they are right to do so. Public confidence depends on knowing that the rules matter; that those who have no right to remain will be removed; that foreign national offenders can be deported swiftly; that endless legal challenges cannot frustrate the clearly expressed will of Parliament; and that those who come here legally, work hard and contribute are not disadvantaged by a system that appears unable to distinguish between those who respect the rules and those who seek to exploit them.
As has been mentioned, the Home Secretary faces a political challenge from her own Benches. If she wants to come back and deliver real and meaningful reform that will properly secure our borders, and if she needs some support to do that, she can give us a call—[Interruption.] Give me a call.
The British people do not want another cycle of announcements followed by disappointment. They want to know that criminal gangs will no longer profit from human misery; that dangerous channel crossings will end; and that those with no right to remain will not spend years exhausting endless appeals while the taxpayer picks up the bill. They want to know that Britain remains a country that welcomes those who come legally, while maintaining control over who enters and stays. Those are not unreasonable expectations, but the foundations of a fair immigration system.
As the Bill progresses through Committee, the Opposition will scrutinise it carefully. Where measures meaningfully strengthen border security, improve enforcement and restore confidence, we will support them. Where they fall short, we will seek to strengthen them. The Home Secretary has moved some way towards recognising the scale of the challenge facing our immigration system, and I welcome that. The Bill identifies many of the right problems, but it still stops short of the bold reforms needed to solve them. For that reason, we have tabled our reasoned amendment.
The British people deserve an immigration system that is fair to those who follow the rules, uncompromising with those who do not, and capable of restoring control of our borders. That remains the standard by which the Opposition will judge the Bill. I commend our reasoned amendment to the House.
I call my favourite Home Office Minister.
You are not alone in that assessment, Madam Deputy Speaker—you are not alone!
It is a privilege to close this debate. Today the House is going through the collective trauma of the loss—the murder—of one of our former Members, Ann Widdecombe. During the Home Secretary statement earlier, colleagues from across the House spoke about the forthright way in which Ann Widdecombe put her views, never fearing to tell people that they were wrong, but always listening and keen to engage. The debate we have had today has been in that very best tradition of this House; I have agreed with lots of what colleagues have said, and disagreed with lots, too. I hope to cover as much of it as possible.
It is important to recognise where this Government started from. Two years ago, we inherited a total lack of control and order at our borders; an asylum system in which criminal gangs, not the Government, decided who came into the country; hundreds of hotels being used to house vast numbers of people at enormous cost to the public; and decision making that had quite simply ground to a halt. We have changed that reality. The system that we inherited worked for neither the collective, nor the refugees who wanted protection. It was a reality that has had to change; it is a journey that we are on.
We have made significant progress. Asylum decision making is up, costs are down, and we are on track to close all asylum hotels in this Parliament. We are seeing a reduction in demand for asylum, getting us much closer to more usual levels for this country. However, we have a long way to go in order to win back the trust of the British public, which is why this Bill is needed.
On trust, one of the issues that my constituents have is with the sudden rise in planning applications for houses in multiple occupation. Does the Minister think that putting asylum seekers into HMOs in our local communities is really the answer to the immigration problem?
Houses in multiple occupation have always been a part of providing refuge for people with mental health issues, people fleeing domestic abuse and those in many other circumstances. Use of them can be right. We want to find the right balance and ensure, through our policy of full dispersal, that the burden is shared more equitably. Fundamentally, we want to reduce demand—that is at the heart of the debate.
The Bill does five things, and I will try to group the points made by hon. Members around those five things. On the independent immigration appeals authority, we heard lots from the right hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott), from my hon. Friends the Members for Hammersmith and Chiswick (Andy Slaughter), for Bassetlaw (Jo White), for Nottingham East (Nadia Whittome) and for Clapham and Brixton Hill (Bell Ribeiro-Addy), from my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Tony Vaughan), and from the hon. Members for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron) and for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Liz Saville Roberts).
I want to recognise the important work that judges do in the system. They work hard and have been creative to provide more capacity, and I am grateful to them for doing so. Nevertheless, I want to be clear with the House that simply trying to sweat the existing model will not give us the capacity that we need to have a functioning appeals system. That is why we are making these changes.
I cannot accept that the lack of legal training in itself is a weakness in this model. As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has said, we see it, for instance, in the magistrates system. We also know that other countries, such as Canada and New Zealand, have lay adjudication as well.
Colleagues have made important points about the independence of the appeals body and the potential blurring of lines with the Executive. We have no desire whatsoever to do that. I think that what is on the face of the Bill shows that separation clearly, but we will nevertheless work with colleagues throughout the passage of the Bill to give them the confidence that, as I say, we have no desire to blur those lines.
On the impact assessment, a lot of the uncertainty relates to the fact that we are not setting an arbitrary timeline by which the new system must be fully operational. We have to have security that the system will stand up properly, including with a period of double running. That is why there is a degree of uncertainty. Nevertheless, we need the greater capacity that the system will give us.
On the European convention on human rights, again, we have heard important contributions from colleagues across the House, including my hon. Friends the Members for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes (Melanie Onn), for Sunderland Central (Lewis Atkinson), for Montgomeryshire and Glyndŵr (Steve Witherden) and for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy), the right hon. and learned Member for Fareham and Waterlooville (Suella Braverman), the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), and the hon. Members for South Leicestershire (Alberto Costa) and for Broxbourne (Lewis Cocking).
On this point, we have a contrast. We have the empty calories offered by the Opposition in their reasoned amendment, with the idea that all our issues could be solved by leaving international agreements—which would, in fact, make all of us weaker. These rights, both domestic and international, are for all of us. In lieu of serious answers, the Opposition try to offer us three-word solutions, but that will not work in this case. They talk about this in the context of returns, but returns need two things: yes, an individual must be barrier-free legally, but there must also be a place for that individual to return to. Having negotiated returns agreements around the world, I say gently to colleagues that resiling from very important international agreements would weaken the process, rather than strengthen it.
What I will say to those on the Government Benches, but perhaps not to those on the Opposition Benches, is that we must ensure that we do not defend a broken status quo, although I am happy to say that I did not hear much of that in the debate. We must recognise that it is not unreasonable to seek to align those agreements a little better, particularly when they are being applied more broadly domestically than in Strasbourg case law. I think that is an entirely reasonable thing to do.
We have heard from my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary about the ways in which some people have sought to game the process. We should close the loopholes so that we maintain can public confidence and consent for the ECHR.
Luke Myer (Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland) (Lab)
Will the Minister give way?
I am afraid not.
My hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow mentioned core protection. It is right that we simplify the protection status in this country and put into statute what we put into the immigration rules in the spring. I say to those who are concerned about the 30-month status that I have been clear from this Dispatch Box and in other forums that we do not want people to stay on core protection for long periods of time. If they switch to a protected work and study route, it will take them out of the 30-month renewal, as will coming via safe and legal means.
Let me turn to asylum support. Important contributions were made by the hon. Members for Cheltenham (Max Wilkinson), for Perth and Kinross-shire (Pete Wishart) and for Brighton Pavilion (Siân Berry), and by my hon. Friends the Members for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh (Chris Murray), for North Warwickshire and Bedworth (Rachel Taylor) and for North Northumberland (David Smith). In principle, it is reasonable to recognise that support for asylum seekers is a unique thing and that it comes from a significant multibillion-pound contribution made by British taxpayers. It is right, and perfectly in line with the refugee convention and our international obligations, that we ask for a contribution towards that.
I cannot recognise or agree with the concerns around destitution. We have been very clear that this is about when people have the means to earn. We do not want to choke off someone’s life that they are building in Britain, and we certainly would not want to push people into poverty. I have heard from colleagues, particularly Labour Members, that they want to see greater detail. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary made the commitment in her opening speech that we will publish that regime as this legislation goes through, so that colleagues will know exactly what we are seeking to put into practice.
On modern slavery, lots of colleagues talked about their own personal records in this space, and I say to them: well, me too. I have been doing this for nine years in this place; I have always used my platform to push for better protections against slavery.
Some colleagues—including the right hon. Members for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley) and for Stone, Great Wyrley and Penkridge (Sir Gavin Williamson), my hon. Friend the Member for Worcester (Tom Collins), and my right hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell)—asked, “Why is this in here?” First, it is an opportunity to strengthen the regime. I have spoken about transparency in supply chains and section 54 for all my years in this place. This provision strengthens that, and it recognises that there are ways in which the system is being used in interaction with the immigration system.
On the late disclosures, I accept that not everybody’s recovery from slavery will allow them to immediately disclose that they have been a slave—they may not even recognise it themselves or have overcome their trauma. We are saying that when that is used at the very, very last minute—as it has multiple hundred times in the last hours before removal—the court ought to take into consideration whether that is really being declared in good faith or not. That will still be a rebuttable proposition, but I think that is right.
Similarly on the public order disqualification, I urge colleagues to look at what is in the Bill. It is totally reasonable for the Government of the day to say that the interaction of slavery protections should not trump considerations of national security. If people do seek to do terror and are convicted of terror offences, then of course that must be taken into account.
I am really sorry, but I cannot.
On Shabir Ahmed, my hon. Friends the Members for Oldham West, Chadderton and Royton (Jim McMahon) and for Rochdale (Paul Waugh) made really important points. They heard me say it last Monday, and they will hear me say it again: from the Government’s point of view, all options are on the table. We believe that this legislation provides a really good vehicle to tackle this challenge, alongside working on removals too. I will be very keen to continue to engage with hon. and right hon. Members on this, but I am glad, as I think everyone in this debate has been, that we have the opportunity to move forward on this shared priority.
On safe and legal means, my hon. Friends the Members for Falkirk (Euan Stainbank), for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes, for Oldham West, Chadderton and Royton and for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket (Dr Prinsley) talked about what British people will do if given schemes that are ordered and controlled, and I totally agree. I have seen it in my own community with the schemes on Ukraine, Hong Kong British nationals overseas, Afghanistan and Syria. What British people will not accept is a lack of order and control. That is what is at the heart of this Bill and the Government’s approach. We have the chance to pivot from that broken model to a fixed model that works within our values and keeps public confidence too.
My hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow talked about the overseas domestic worker visa. I would encourage her, if she has not already, to talk to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips). She will know that we are reviewing it at the moment, but if she thinks the Bill is a good vehicle for pushing the points that she makes very well, I would agree.
Finally, on contracts, I agree with what my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh said—that is why we are going to reform them. With that, I commend the Bill to the House.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
(6 days, 5 hours ago)
Public Bill Committees
The Chair
Good morning, everyone, and welcome. Before we begin, I remind Members to switch electronic devices to silent, please, and that teas and coffees are not allowed.
We will now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for the sitting is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. It shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. Any Division on amendments and new clauses takes place in the order that they appear in the amendment paper. The Member who has put their name to the lead amendment of the group is called to speak first. For debates on clause stand part, the Minister will be called first. Other Members are then free to indicate whether they wish to speak in that debate by bobbing. Please bob on each occasion on which you wish to speak during proceedings.
At the end of a debate on a group of amendments and new clauses, I shall call the Member who moved the lead amendment or new clause again. Before they sit down, they will need to indicate whether they wish to withdraw the amendment or new clause, or to seek a decision. If any Member wishes to press any other amendment, which includes grouped new clauses, in a group to a vote, that is at the Chair’s discretion. The order of decisions follows the order in which amendments appear in the amendment paper.
Clause 1
The Independent Immigration Appeals Authority
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I beg to move amendment 64, in clause 1, page 2, leave out lines 1 to 5 and insert—
“(5) In the exercise of its functions, the IIAA must—
(a) be accessible, fair and independent,
(b) handle its cases quickly and efficiently.”
This amendment would remove the requirement for the IIAA to “aim to” operate fairly and independently and handle cases quickly and efficiently, so that the IIAA instead has a duty to so act. It would also remove the requirement for the IIAA to have regard to the public interest.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 48, in clause 1, page 2, line 2, leave out “aim to”.
Amendment 49, in clause 1, page 2, leave out lines 4 and 5.
Amendment 87, in clause 1, page 2, line 4, leave out paragraph (c) and insert—
“(c) give effect to the public interest in the effective enforcement of immigration control, including the prompt removal from the United Kingdom of persons who have no right to remain, having regard to the fact that the IIAA operates as a key part of the immigration and asylum system.”
This amendment would require the IIAA to give effect to the public interest in effective immigration control, including the prompt removal of those with no right to remain, rather than merely to have regard to the public interest.
New clause 12—Independent Immigration Appeals Authority: commencement—
“(1) The Secretary of State may not make regulations under section 52(1) for the purposes of bringing Part 1 of this Act into force unless—
(a) the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a report into the establishment of the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority (IIAA), and
(b) a statutory instrument containing regulations for the commencement of sections 1 to 7 of this Act has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.
(2) A report under subsection (1)(a) must contain—
(a) the full cost of establishing and operating the IIAA, including transition and set-up costs, adjudicator recruitment and training costs, and ongoing annual administrative costs for at least the first five years of operation, with a comparison to the equivalent cost of operating the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (‘the Tribunal’);
(b) the date, or expected range of dates, on which each stage of commencement is expected to take effect, including the length of any period in which the IIAA and the Tribunal will operate in parallel and the date by which the full transfer of jurisdiction from the Tribunal to the IIAA is expected to be complete;
(c) the expected capacity of the IIAA, including the number of adjudicators expected to be appointed at each stage of commencement and the number of appeals the IIAA is expected to be capable of determining per year at each such stage.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish a report on the full costs of the IIAA, its expected commencement timetable and its expected capacity before the implementation of Part 1 of this Act.
Siân Berry
It is a pleasure to have you in the Chair, Dr Murrison. I am moving amendment 64, to make fairness and efficiency duties of the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority. I should add that in this group I also support amendments 48 and 49, tabled by my Lib Dem colleagues, I oppose amendment 87 tabled by my Conservative colleagues and I support the Lib Dems’ new clause 12.
My amendment would impose on the IIAA a duty to operate fairly and independently and to handle cases quickly and efficiently. The Bill only imposes an obligation on the IIAA to aim to do those things. The amendment also removes the requirement for the IIAA to operate as part of the immigration system.
The Independent Immigration Appeals Authority will be a body that is independent in name; the reality, however, will be much murkier and more ambiguous. The Home Secretary will personally appoint senior figures in the IIAA, including its chair, and a Home Secretary appointee will be responsible for appointing adjudicators who make appeals decisions. The effect of the Bill is to make asylum decision making less independent, less fair and less expert. It brings asylum appeals under greater political control, putting at risk people’s basic human right not to be persecuted for who they are.
The major driver of the appeals backlog is the poor quality of Home Office asylum decisions, not tribunal judges. The Refugee Council has shown that about two thirds of Home Office asylum decisions that are challenged are overturned, either by the tribunals or by the Home Office itself. My preference, therefore, is for the Government to scrap all of part 1 of the Bill and get back to the day job of making good asylum decisions. If part 1 does go ahead, however—I will debate later whether that should happen—it should contain safeguards for basic standards of independence and fairness.
The amendment deals with two ways in which the Bill tries unfairly to align the IIAA with the Home Office’s policy priorities, rather than the requirements of justice and fairness. First, clause 1(5) states only that
“the IIAA must…aim to be accessible, fair and independent”—
not that it must be independent, fair and accessible in practice, but merely that it must aim to be so. By contrast, under existing rules for tribunals, there is a duty, an overriding objective on tribunals, to deal with cases fairly and justly. That is not an aim, but a requirement. As such, subsection (5) is a watering down, a weakening and an undermining of the independence of asylum appeals. My amendment would make it a legal duty for the IIAA to be independent, fair and accessible, as it is for tribunals, and not merely an aim.
Secondly, the attempt to draw asylum appeals into the Home Office’s sphere of influence is seen even more clearly in the fact that subsection (5) requires the IIAA to prioritise
“in particular…the fact that the IIAA operates as a key part of the immigration…system.”
That, I think, is an unambiguous push to align the IIAA not with the requirements of justice and fairness, but with Home Office policy priorities. My amendment would therefore remove any risk that the IIAA will be pressured into aligning with the Home Office’s immigration policy priorities, and let the IIAA be what it is meant to be: a quasi-judicial body for deciding appeals fairly and independently.
Ultimately, without my amendment, the IIAA will be a body with a conflict of interest at its heart: a requirement to aim to be independent and fair, but also a priority to view itself as part of immigration control. If the Government are sincere about creating a body that can deal with cases independently and fairly, without interference from the Home Office, the IIAA’s duty to operate independently and fairly should be more than an aim; it should be a requirement, just as it is for tribunals. Moreover, there should be no pressure on the IIAA to align with the Home Office’s political vision of immigration control, whoever is in charge of the Home Office. The amendment would create that safety against the priorities of future Governments, as well as this one, being able to put political pressure on the IIAA. The amendment would put all that beyond doubt. It gives the IIAA the best chance of being truly independent and fair. I will seek a Division on this amendment.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. I will speak to Opposition amendment 87 and to two other amendments in the group.
As this is the Committee’s first debate on part 1 of the Bill, let me set out the test that the Opposition will apply to it. On Second Reading, the Home Secretary told the House that more than 150,000 people are waiting for an appeal decision and the average wait is well over a year. Every one of those months is a month in which someone whose claim may well fail remains in this country, very often at the taxpayer’s expense. The public have been promised for years that that would be fixed, and we need to see it happen now. Our test for every clause in this part is a simple one: will appeals be decided faster, and will those who lose be removed?
Clause 1(5) is where the Bill tells the new authority what it is for: the authority must aim to be accessible, fair and independent; it must aim to handle its cases quickly and efficiently; and it must have regard to the public interest. Amendment 48, in the name of the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, would remove the words “aim to” from the first paragraph only, so that the authority would be under a firm duty to be “accessible, fair and independent”. I understand the instinct, but that hardens the wrong limb of the measure. If any duty in this subsection needs to be firmer, it is the duty to handle cases “quickly and efficiently”. That is the duty that the authority is being created to discharge, and it is the one that the public will judge it on.
Amendment 64 would remove “aim to” from both limbs, subsection (5)(a) and (b), but it would also remove the public interest duty in paragraph (c) to which I now turn. Amendments 49 and 64 in its second paragraph would go further than amendment 48. They would remove the duty to have regard to the public interest altogether. I respect the concern for independence that lies behind amendments 49 and 64, but I cannot agree. It would be remarkable for Parliament to tell the body that decides who may stay in this country that it need have no regard to the public interest or to public confidence in the system it is part of. An immigration system that does not have the confidence of the British public is a system that will not work.
Amendment 87 takes the opposite approach. It strengthens the public interest duty instead of removing it. In the Bill as drafted, the authority must merely “have regard to” the public interest, and the only content that the Bill gives to that interest is the fact that the authority is part of the immigration and asylum system. That tells an adjudicator nothing. The amendment states what the public interest is:
“the effective enforcement of immigration control, including the prompt removal from the United Kingdom of persons who have no right to remain.”
It would require the authority to give effect to that interest, not simply to have regard to it. The difference between “have regard to” and “give effect to” is not a lawyer’s nicety. A duty to have regard to something can be satisfied by thinking about it and then setting it aside; a duty to give effect to something cannot.
Clause 1(5) reaches well beyond the final decision in each case: it governs the authority in the “exercise of its functions”, which means how it lists cases, handles requests to adjourn and manages its caseload. Under clause 4(5), the Procedure Rules Board must also have regard to those objectives when it writes the rules. Amendment 87 would therefore shape every deadline, every adjournment rule and every listing decision the authority makes. It would put the effective enforcement of immigration control into the DNA of the institution from the start.
The Committee heard in evidence why that matters. Professor Ekins of Oxford University told us that one of the potential advantages of the new authority is that it could make
“the public interest in the enforcement of migration law a more pressing consideration.”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 22.]
Amendment 87 would make sure that that advantage is actually realised, rather than left to chance. This is not new ground for Parliament. Section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 already states that
“the maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest.”
The Minister may say that amendment 87 would compromise independence, but it would not. Clause 1(4) will still require the authority to
“exercise its primary function with a view to ensuring that justice is done.”
Clause 1(6) will still require every Minister to uphold the IIAA’s independence. Each case will still be decided on its evidence and on the law. What changes is that the institution is told plainly what it exists to achieve. We are clear that the public interest includes the swift removal of those who have no right to be in the country. That is one of the public’s most pressing concerns, and the new authority should be in no doubt that it is there to serve it.
New clause 12 asks for a report on the cost, timetable and capacity of the authority before part 1 can be commenced. Whatever view the Committee takes of a statutory lock on commencement, the questions are fair, and I will put them directly: what is the full cost of setting up and running the authority over its first five years, and how does that compare with the tribunal it replaces? How many adjudicators will be in post on the first day, and how many appeals will they decide each year? On what date does the Minister expect the authority to hear its first appeal?
We will press amendment 87 to a Division when it is reached.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. I thank all Members for the constructive debate we have had on the amendments to clause 1 of this Bill, particularly the hon. Members for Brighton Pavilion and for Stockton West, and the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, who tabled amendment 87.
I would like to say up front that it is very clear that consent for our asylum system in the public domain is fraying. The important part of this Bill is to seek to restore control, restore fairness and rebuild the public’s confidence. We have made huge progress on initial decision making; we have cut the backlog in initial decisions by 72% from the 2023 peak. However, as we have done so, the appeals backlog has grown substantially, now with waiting times of more than two years. Some appeals are absolutely genuine, and they of course must be heard fairly. However, it is clear that some claimants are lodging appeals to frustrate their legitimate removal from this country.
As of June 2026, the open caseload in the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber was about 156,000. The average time taken to clear appeals across all categories is currently at 65 weeks: 72 weeks for asylum protection, 74 weeks for human rights and 48 weeks for European economic area free movement. The Government have substantially increased both capacity and productivity in the FTT IAC, but demand has risen considerably faster. Receipts increased from around 58,000 in 2023-24 to almost 118,000 in 2025-26, while the outstanding caseload rose from around 50,000 to more than 150,000. We have done our best to try to support the workforce within that existing system. We increased the judicial workforce by 21% to 311 judges, including 61 new fee-paid judges and 25 salaried judges who began sitting between January and March this year, and we are continuing further recruitment.
The structural constraint is just how quickly judicial capacity can scale. Judicial recruitment draws on a relatively limited pool of experienced lawyers, and it currently takes around 12 to 18 months from launching an exercise to a judge being able to sit, so that is not feasible. The IIAA therefore broadens the recruitment pool, providing greater flexibility and allowing us to increase capacity while maintaining robust safeguards around training, legal support, quality assurance and professional standards.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
Is it not the case that the long backlog of cases for judges is largely driven by the poor quality of original decision making by Home Officials, as shown by the number of successful appeals? I was slightly concerned that senior officials at the evidence session seemed not to be willing to acknowledge that. Will the Minister acknowledge that the quality of some of those first Home Office decisions is not particularly good?
The hon. Gentleman makes an important point, and all of us, as Members of Parliament, will have had our own cases that challenged some of the standards. However, what we have seen is that, while the number has increased, the decision making quality has not gone up or down. I would also say that, at the moment, the delays in the current system mean that decision making becomes poorer, because evidence is produced later in the system and some of it is not sustainable, and more and more different routes are being attempted to string out appeals. The longer the process goes on, the more complex and difficult the decision making becomes. This is about having swift and fair decision making, but we will always keep the quality of decision making in this process under review in the Department.
To create the swift and fair appeals system that we need, we are scrapping the judge-led asylum and immigration tribunal, which just cannot keep pace with demand, and we are replacing it with a new independent appeals authority to deliver swift and fair decision making. This authority will be staffed by independent adjudicators, who will be ordinary citizens trained like magistrates. To reduce abuse of the system, claimants will be allowed just a single route for appeal, which must be lodged as early as possible. That will remove the scope for bringing multiple appeals, as some claimants do, that are often vexatious and at the very last minute before removal. Late claims will be heard under an expedited process, ensuring that they cannot be used to frustrate a removal. There will be a right for a further appeal to a judge-led tribunal only on a point of law.
The new authority will be independent of Government, with a chair and chief executive officer who are accountable to the Home Secretary and Parliament for delivering an effective and efficient system. All appointments will be based on merit and subject to fair and open appointments principles. All Ministers, including the Home Secretary, will be under a statutory duty to uphold the IIAA’s independence and not to influence its decisions.
It is undeniable that there is an appetite in the country for an asylum system that is robust but fair, and it seems to be the case that people are abusing the system. With the extended period for appeals in the current process, despite the good will in the intentions behind it. This IIAA process will not only speed up the decisions, which is compassionate for people, rather than leaving them lingering in a system for months or years on end, but provide the British public with the necessary confidence and security of knowledge that the system we have employed in this country is fair and robust.
My hon. Friend makes an important point. We are really keen to ensure that public confidence is at the heart of this process; it cannot be allowed to operate in a vacuum. The public rightly expect us to have an immigration system that has regard to the public interest, and that is what these amendments and the Bill seek to reinforce.
Clause 1 establishes the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority as a body corporate: a public body that is independent of Government. It is the first step in the Bill to overhaul the immigration and asylum appeals system, which has seen unacceptable caseloads and waiting times for determinations to be reached. Amendments 64, 48, 49 and 87 concern subsection (5), which sets out the objectives the authority must meet when exercising its functions, namely
“(a) the aim to be accessible, fair and independent,
(b) the aim to handle its cases quickly and efficiently, and”—
crucially, as the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion mentioned—to
“(c) have regard to the public interest”.
The Minister talks about the public interest test. Could she explain how public interest is considered under the current judicial system?
My hon. Friend makes an important point. I do not think many members of the public understand how our appeals process works. They see, particularly in the public domain, many cases that have been strung out with tentative evidence and means to do so, and that has led to a huge crisis of confidence. The Home Secretary set out very clearly that she is keen to restore order and control in our immigration service. That is crucial to the public confidence that we need in this country and for us to have a system that protects people from genuine war and persecution. It is vital that we maintain public confidence. Having regard to public interest is a key part of the system; the public would expect nothing less.
Today, asylum and protection appeals take 72 weeks to be determined on average. As we set out in the “Restoring Order and Control” announcement, that extended period can lead to people bouncing around the systems for years—that is neither fair on them nor, given its cost, acceptable to the public—and, in turn, accruing new, additional reasons for delay. The objectives make it clear not only that justice will be done, but that to have an effective immigration and asylum system, the end-to-end decision making and the enforcement regime must be aligned. Importantly, the decision making is still independent, but it cannot operate in a vacuum. The body must be a key part of the country’s immigration and asylum system; as I say, the public would expect nothing less.
New clause 12 seeks to require the Secretary of State to provide a report on the authority’s operations prior to commencement under clause 52(1). In our view, producing such a report prior to commencement is both unnecessary and, given the requirement on the IIAA to operate independently, inappropriate. Decisions on recruitment and training, which will ultimately inform capacity, timeframes and productivity, are for the authority alone; the Home Office should not pre-empt them in a parliamentary report. The Bill contains plenty of parliamentary reporting and accounting measures, which I am sure we will come to—
Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)
The Minister mentions other scrutiny measures, but the Bill in its entirety relies heavily on Henry VIII powers. Additionally, the impact assessment repeatedly admits uncertainty, and we do not know the deterrent impact. How does she make the case that there will be better scrutiny and accountability? Does she not agree that having a full understanding of the implementation of the Bill up front would be a good thing?
I hope the hon. Gentleman has seen the revised impact assessment, which now has a green flag.
Let me set out some of the reporting avenues that are already in the Bill. At the end of each financial year, the authority must produce an annual report on the exercise of its functions and any other information as directed by the Secretary of State. The chief inspector of UK Border Agency will also produce a report once a year, and at other times if requested by the Secretary of State. The chief executive of the authority has a statutory duty to respond to that report and to send that response to the Secretary of State, who must lay it before Parliament alongside the report. The chief executive may also lay written representations on matters they consider to be of importance through the Secretary of State. There is a wide range of provisions in the Bill to ensure proper accountability to Parliament.
Let me pick up the questions asked by the hon. Member for Stockton West about the costs of the IIAA. Detailed plans are currently being developed, and full costs and affordability will be developed through the business case; I undertake to keep Parliament completely updated throughout the process. As I say, we will be developing that, and I will make sure that Parliament is able to scrutinise it in the fullness of time, but in terms of operational capacity and productivity, we should not be pre-empting this. A report prior to commencement is not appropriate; it is for the IIAA, once established, to undertake its reporting duties.
Amendment 87 seeks to narrow the scope of the public interest considerations to those that concern just effective immigration control and the “prompt removal” of those with no right to remain in the United Kingdom. While I have some sympathy with the objectives of the amendment, I am afraid that it cannot be accepted because it is far too narrow in its definition. The authority is an independent body—we have established that very clearly in the Bill—and one crucial part of the immigration and asylum system, not just an extended branch of immigration enforcement. The public interest spans the entire spectrum, and could include things that are not included in the amendment, such as public safety, operational impact and value for money. We do not want to lose those other factors by limiting the definition to effective immigration control and removal. It is important that we keep the scope broad.
Ben Goldsborough (South Norfolk) (Lab)
It is important to consider this—and this is why we must reject the Opposition’s approach—in the same way that we consider the police. We must ensure that the public interest covers a wide range of things; if we said it only concerned crime, we would end up in a situation where our police were not protecting individuals or running an effective constabulary in their area and were, in effect, letting down the rest of the country. Does the Minister agree?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right and makes a really good comparison with the police. The police are to some extent accountable to the Home Secretary, but she does not get involved in operational decision making. Our approach to the IIAA is similar: it is vital that we ensure that we have the wider public interest at the heart of it, because it will be a key part of the country’s nationality, immigration and asylum process.
Tom Gordon
One of my concerns is that the public interest is quite subjective; we are, in effect, giving a statutory steer on what any Government at any given point decide is in the public interest. Does the Minister not have concerns about how that could be applied by future Governments?
The hon. Gentleman makes an important point, but we live in a democracy. The Home Secretary of the day will be the Home Secretary of the day, and it is for them to define, legislate and direct the broader immigration system. To me, that is a key feature. It is really important that we have the flexibility to respond to the challenges and changes that our system faces, and that we ensure that we maintain public confidence in this process. At the moment, we have an abstract body that operates in a vacuum, purely with lawyers, and does not become part of the broader immigration process. It is important that public interest is part of this.
My right hon. Friend makes an excellent point about flexibility. Over recent years, we have seen such an increase in the number of applications and appeals. A system that pays no regard to that finds itself falling behind the times, does it not?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. As I said, we know that things ebb and flow in the immigration system, and it is important that the Home Secretary has a system that commands the confidence of the general public, does not operate in a vacuum and considers the wider public interest.
For the reasons that I have outlined, the Government cannot accept the amendments, and I invite hon. Members to withdraw them.
Tom Gordon
I want to press the point that I made to the Minister a moment ago about how one defines public interest. It concerns me that the appeals body that will be deciding on these cases of law will end up with a challenge when different Ministers of the day provide a different steer as to what is in the public interest. Stemming from that, how does Parliament hold the relevant Ministers to account when we are introducing subjective terms and concepts around public interest? For that reason, we will be pressing amendments 48 and 49.
Amendment 48 would make the provision about the IIAA’s exercise of its functions affirmative: as amended, the clause would say that the IIAA must be accessible, fair and independent, not just “aim” to be. What really concerns me and my colleagues is that the element of flexibility, as the Minister calls it, might lead to unfair application and due process throughout the entirety of the process. I would like to know more about what is meant by “aim to”, as opposed to it being actually accessible, fair and independent.
I will oppose amendment 87, because the IIAA should be independent. The amendment would require the authority to give effect to prompt removals and turn an independent adjudicator into an arm of enforcement, and I am concerned that the public and courts would have no confidence in its decisions.
I welcome the fact that the impact assessments have been updated, but there are lingering questions about the scale and timing of the benefits, and the costs are unclear. We are being asked in effect to abolish a working tribunal jurisdiction without a price tag at this point. I would appreciate clarity on those issues as we move forward.
A lot of these issues will be addressed during the course of the day’s discussion, so I look forward to responding to the hon. Gentleman further on those points.
Siân Berry
I am not convinced by anything I have heard from the Minister. She talked about my amendments not allowing flexibility, but let us be clear what she has said: she is asking for flexibility in fairness, but not flexibility in the political definition of public interest. The risk to human rights here is huge. Let us not forget that these are life and death decisions for people who are among the most vulnerable in the world. It is clear from the data that the backlog is being driven by the fact the Home Office is deciding to refuse more cases, and the risk that those decisions are bad ones is also pretty clear; we see the frequency with which they are overturned, or the Home Office’s objections are withdrawn, when they go to the current tribunal.
We know that bad decisions can be driven by a target-based culture. We saw that in the Windrush lessons learned review, which said that there was a target-dominated work environment and low-quality decision making. Those things go hand in hand, and we will create a hugely dangerous risk by putting the IIAA together with these objectives right at the heart of what it does. We risk doing Windrush again; we risk huge injustice; we risk huge costs for the Government in compensating people who have been subject to enormous detriment. This would be a really simple thing to fix at this stage. I will not withdraw my amendment, but will press it to a Division.
Question proposed, That the amendment be made.
Siân Berry
I beg to move amendment 65, in clause 1, page 2, leave out lines 11 to 14.
This amendment would remove the provision which prevents individuals from being able to initiate judicial review proceedings against decisions made by the IIAA.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 85, in clause 1, page 2, line 13, leave out from “decisions)” to the end of line 14.
This amendment would mean that IIAA decisions could not be appealed to the upper tribunal.
Siân Berry
Amendment 65 to clause 1 would allow judicial review of decisions. It would remove the provision in the Bill that excludes all judicial review of IIAA appeal decisions. Clause 1(8) is a so-called ouster clause, as the explanatory notes confirm. It is designed to immunise the IIAA’s appeal decisions from judicial review in the High Court. The purpose of the amendment is to remove the Government’s attempt to undermine the rule of law.
There will be two ways to challenge an IIAA appeal decision in the Bill as it stands. The first is that the IIAA can review its own decisions, under clause 6, and the second is that the upper tribunal can hear an appeal based only on a point of law, under clause 7. I hope we can agree that judicial review is a mechanism of fundamental constitutional importance and therefore should be restricted in only very limited circumstances. The Ministry of Justice has referred to judicial review as
“the rule of law in action”.
It ensures that public bodies act only in accordance with their legal powers and with respect for our human rights. The Home Office’s wish for faster and cheaper appeals does not come above the rule of law.
Ousting judicial review is unnecessary and disproportionate. Where there is a suitable alternative remedy, such as an appeal to the upper tribunal like the one for which the Bill provides, the High Court will normally refuse permission for a judicial review anyway. That is because the High Court considers that the alternative remedy will protect the rule of law. If the High Court considers that the upper tribunal appeal in clause 7 is sufficient, there will rarely be judicial review cases. Retaining the claimant’s ability to apply for judicial review would simply mean that the High Court could grant permission in residual cases where it believed that an upper tribunal appeal would not be an effective alternative remedy.
Clause 1(8) attempts to remove that residual right entirely. It is a rare absolute ouster clause, which does not permit judicial review of an IIAA appeal’s decision in any circumstances. Even the previous Conservative Government, when creating an ouster clause in section 1 of the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022, retained access to judicial review in some circumstances. Clause 1 of this Bill is constitutionally exceptional, and I would like the Minister to explain why this absolute exclusion from justice is deemed to be okay for those seeking asylum, when even the previous Government would not apply it to unnaturalised citizens.
David Smith (North Northumberland) (Lab)
The core point of the hon. Lady’s speech is the rule of law, which all members of the Committee support, but does she accept that, first, we are talking about the appeals process? At this point, they have already appealed—that is one opportunity that someone seeking asylum has already taken to question the decision. Secondly, there are two other ways in the Bill through which a person seeking asylum can have a decision reviewed. Some of the hon. Lady’s rhetoric does not do justice to the Bill.
Siân Berry
I appreciate that, and I have laid out the possible alternative remedies, but judicial review is an essential backstop. I do not see why the Government are trying to remove it. This is constitutionally exceptional and I want the Minister to explain why it is okay.
This measure will not only undermine the rule of law; it will inevitably provoke litigation in the courts about how this ouster clause should be interpreted and effected. It is concerning that the Government want the IIAA, which is a novel—experimental, even—non-expert body institutionally close to the Home Office, making life or death appeal decisions, to be made completely immune from judicial review at the outset. It demonstrates the Government’s continuing and concerning prioritisation of speed over the rule of law and justice, which we have seen in other Bills. In those circumstances, my amendment is completely necessary. It would ensure that judicial review remained available in those cases where the High Court believed it was necessary. I hope that all Members will support it.
I want to speak about amendments 85 and 65. Clause 1(8) provides that a decision of the authority may be questioned in legal proceedings in only two ways: through the authority’s own review power under clause 6, or through an appeal to the upper tribunal under clause 7. Amendment 85 would remove the latter, ending the onward appeal to the upper tribunal.
One of the public’s deepest frustrations with the immigration system is appeal after appeal after appeal. The Home Secretary herself described it on Second Reading. She told the House about a convicted rapist whom it took more than four years to remove from this country after he had served his sentence because of a succession of late claims and legal challenges. We agree with her diagnosis, but we do not understand why the Bill preserves the structure that makes that possible.
Let us consider the journey this Bill still allows. A claim is refused by the Home Office, so the person appeals to the authority and loses. They can then ask the authority to review its decision or for permission to appeal. If that is refused, they can ask the upper tribunal. If permission is granted, there is a hearing, and if that succeeds, the case may be sent to be decided all over again. Each step is measured in months and, at every one, the person remains here—usually at public expense. That expense is considerable—the National Audit Office estimates that the immigration and asylum chamber cost around £79.5 million to run in 2024-25, and that is before the cost of legal aid.
Siân Berry
I appreciate the hon. Member’s laying out the process, but can he honestly say that, if he were subjected to any area of justice, he would accept those arguments and the process for taking away his right to appeal twice, which the amendment would effect? Does he believe that that genuinely represents justice without fear or favour?
The hon. Member for North Northumberland made a valid point—this is an appeals process. The case has been considered once but can go to appeal for reconsideration and even that decision can be reviewed again—that is a lengthy process. The entire objective of this Bill is to speed up the process so that it is fair to the taxpayers, as well as to those subject to it. Removing a whole tier of appeal would reduce the burden on the taxpayer, as would other amendments the Opposition have tabled. The time limits in clause 8 will not help, because they bind the authority rather than the upper tribunal. The Bill does not shorten the queue; it moves part of it upstairs.
The Government’s case for part 1 is that the new authority will make robust and defensible decisions with trained adjudicators, a chief appeals officer overseeing quality, and a professional standards officer setting standards. If that is right, its decision should be capable of being final. Where a genuine error is made, clause 6 allows it to be corrected and that review should be carried out by a legally qualified senior adjudicator. That is a fair hearing—a check for error and then an end.
Let me be clear about what amendment 85 would leave in place, because the Minister will say it removes any check on the authority. It does not. Every appellant would still have a full hearing before the authority on the facts and the law. Every decision could still be reviewed for an error of law under clause 6. Government amendment 36 will mean that that review is confined to exactly the kind of point the upper tribunal would consider. Amendment 85 would remove the second external tier, and its two separate applications for permission—the listing queue and the power to send a case back to the start. The Government accept that the onward appeal is only on a point of law and not a rehearing. The question is simply who checks the law and how long it takes. Our answer is a legally qualified senior adjudicator, with the authority, and quickly.
There is a further problem with subsection (8) as drafted. Professor Ekins told the Committee that this is not an effective ouster clause, that the courts would read it narrowly and that the Committee should not rest content with it. He pointed to the more precise model that Parliament used in the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022. If the Government agree that the authority’s decisions should be final, they should draft subsection (8) so that it works, and we would welcome their help in doing so on Report.
Amendment 65, in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, would take the Bill in the opposite direction. It would delete subsection (8) altogether and reopen the possibility of judicially reviewing every decision the authority makes, adding a third route of challenge to the two already in the Bill. I understand the hon. Lady’s concern for safeguards, but they are already there. Parliament legislated in 2022 to end judicial review of the upper tribunal’s refusals of permission, precisely because that route had become a means of delay. Clause 7(3) rightly carries that rule across. Amendment 65 would reopen at the first tier what Parliament closed at the second. Our position is clear; enough is enough. Years of delay and expense must come to an end, and the legal merry-go-round has to stop. We will seek to divide the Committee on amendment 85 and we will oppose clause 7.
Amendments 65 and 85 concern the routes through which decisions of the authority may be challenged. I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion and the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), who tabled the amendments.
Amendment 65 would allow individuals to bring judicial review proceedings against the decisions made by the authority. As we have heard, the Bill already provides clear routes for correcting errors and for onward appeals. The authority can review its own decisions under clause 6 and decisions can be appealed to the upper tribunal on a point of law under clause 7 where permission is granted.
Siân Berry
On a point of clarification, is it not correct that under clause 7 the upper tribunal can hear an appeal only based on a point of law? Will the Minister comment on the way that challenging the processes or the administration of someone’s claim could therefore not be taken to the upper tribunal? Is she removing that safeguard? I remain concerned that the complexity of the law and the lack, often, of legal representation, as well as the difficulties that we all see in our casework of people claiming asylum, dealing with the Home Office’s processes and making their way through all this, mean that quite often there are process problems that ought to be challenged, and that this has been denied to people at the upper tribunal.
The process mirrors the existing first-tier tribunal, which reviews errors of law, so it is important to clarify that this remains the same and retains the same definition. It is only on errors of law that a process can be appealed; this does not narrow that process any further.
Amendment 85 takes a very different approach. It would prevent decisions of the authority from being appealed to the upper tribunal at all. I am afraid we do not consider that acceptable. We do not believe that the authority’s decisions should be entirely prevented from onward appeal. That goes too far in the other direction and denies the right of justice where there has been an error of law.
Removing the statutory right of appeal could potentially open us up to even more litigation, as appeals where there has been an error of law would end up going straight to that process without this important safety valve. The authority will make important first-instance decisions, and it is right that there should be a means of correcting a decision when an authority has made, as we have said, an error of law.
Ben Goldsborough
One of the main arguments that the Opposition spokesperson put forward was that the system would be too slow under the Bill. However, one key thing that was not mentioned was clause 9(4), which gives the Secretary of State the ability to expedite individual cases. Is it not the case that the Bill as drafted protects the individual’s legal right while also making sure that, when there are grotesque crimes against this country, we can expedite to give people the certainty they need that the system is fair and swift?
My hon. Friend makes an important point. The hon. Member for Stockton West suggests that any unsuccessful appellant could appeal to the upper tribunal and that it will just create another tier, but that is not the case. An appeal may be brought only on a point of law and permission must be granted first, so those safeguards are in place. Permission acts as an appropriate filter so that only cases raising an arguable legal error can proceed. The upper tribunal’s role is not to rehear the appeal simply because a party disagrees with the outcome. It is important to determine whether the law was applied correctly.
Another point about an error of law has been flagged, and I would like to clarify what that means. An error of law is a mistake about the law or its application, rather than a simple disagreement with the outcome or an administrative error. It may arise, for example, where the wrong legal test has been applied, relevant matters have not been considered, the process has been unfair or the reasons given are legally inadequate. The purpose of the review and appeal framework is to ensure that those legal errors can be identified and corrected. It is important that we allow the process to be clear, legally fair and balanced so that, where there is an error of law, that can be referred onwards.
Taken together, the provisions in the Bill strike the right balance. They support the finality and efficient disposal of cases while ensuring that errors can be corrected through clear and appropriate routes. The Government cannot accept these amendments, and I invite the hon. Members not to press them.
Question proposed, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 22 to 24.
Schedule 1.
I would like to speak to clause 1 in more detail. As we have discussed, clause 1 will establish the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority as a body corporate: a public body that is independent of Government. It is the first step in the Bill towards overhauling the current immigration and asylum appeals system, which has seen unacceptable caseloads and waiting times for a determination to be reached. The clause details the primary function of the authority, which will be to determine immigration and asylum appeals as well as applications for immigration bail. It will give the IIAA the authority to determine the same case types determined by judges in the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber today.
Access to justice is a fundamental common-law principle and a core requirement of the rule of law. Clause 1 will place a statutory duty on the IIAA to uphold that through a statutory objective to be accessible, fair and independent. As set out in the clause, the authority must also aim to handle its cases quickly and efficiently, and have regard to the public interest in the performance of its functions. The clause makes robustly clear that Ministers must uphold the independence of the authority and not influence decisions through any special access to its adjudicators. The clause also states that a decision of the authority in relation to its primary function may be challenged in legal proceedings only in line with the review and appeal framework. Such challenges will be directed to the authority’s review process and onward appeal route to the upper tribunal.
Schedule 1 makes a number of consequential amendments needed to transfer specified immigration and asylum appeal and immigration bail functions from the first-tier tribunal to the authority. Government amendments 22 and 24 make further consequential amendments to the schedule, which I will be detailing in due course. The schedule updates the relevant legislation so that references to the first-tier tribunal, the tribunal and tribunal procedure rules are replaced, where appropriate, with references to the IIAA and its procedure rules. Those amendments apply across the categories of cases that will form the IIAA’s primary function, as set out in clause 1. They are necessary and largely technical amendments, required so that the wider legislative framework operates coherently once the authority begins determining those cases. I commend Government amendments 22 and 24, clause 1 and schedule 1 to the Committee.
Government amendments 22, 23 and 24 make further consequential changes to schedule 1 and appear to be technical. We do not oppose them. Is the Minister confident that the list is now complete? On clause 1 itself, the Opposition and the British public have one main question: how will this new appeals body get decisions made more quickly? What will the authority be able to do that the existing tribunal cannot? What reduction in waiting times do Ministers expect it to deliver, and by when?
Let me put the question plainly. The Government are taking immigration appeals away from the first-tier tribunal and giving them to a new body, but let us look at what stays the same: the same appeals brought by the same people against the same Home Office decisions, with a right of appeal to the same upper tribunal. Unless something fundamental changes in how quickly cases are decided and in how many people are removed at the end of them, this is rearranging the deckchairs. A new name on the door and a new chief executive will not clear a single case. The public will rightly ask what all that upheaval is for.
The Committee has been given very little to go on, and it has not been told what the Government heard before they wrote the Bill. In March, the Home Office opened a call for evidence on how the body should be designed, covering the recruitment and training of adjudicators, timeframes and oversight. It closed on 6 May. The Home Office said the responses would “inform the legislation”. The Bill was introduced seven weeks later and, so far as I can find, no response to that call for evidence has been published, then or since. Why not? What did the respondents say? Where did the Government disagree with them, and why? Will the Minister commit to publishing the response before Report stage?
Next, the backlog. More than 150,000 people are waiting for an appeal. Do those cases move to the new authority? Do they stay with the first-tier tribunal until they are finished? The authority is to take over gradually, so both systems will be running side by side for some time. How will the Government stop that creating more delay, or cases being lost between the two? The Government will be aware, from the difficulties of folding NHS England back into the Department of Health and Social Care, how hard it is to move functions, staff and buildings from one body to another while keeping a service running. What lessons have been learned, and when will any of this actually happen? The Bill does not say.
Part 1 comes into force when Ministers decide. The authority opens its doors when Ministers decide. Under clause 15, the first-tier tribunal carries on hearing immigration appeals for as long as Ministers decide. The Committee is being asked to approve the replacement of the tribunal without being told when it will be replaced. I ask the Minister for three dates. When will the first case be transferred to the authority? When will the last? On what date will the first-tier tribunal hear its final immigration appeal? If the Government do not know, they should say so.
Turning to the breadth of what the authority will decide, subsection (2) goes well beyond asylum. The authority will decide applications for immigration bail, appeals against deprivation of British citizenship and appeals under the EEA citizens’ rights regulations. Those are serious decisions about liberty and nationality. Under clause 2, many of them could be taken by adjudicators with no legal qualification. Will deprivation of citizenship appeals and deportation appeals brought by foreign criminals be reserved for senior adjudicators? Also, how will clause 1(8) operate where the complaint is about a procedural decision taken during a case, rather than about the final outcome?
Finally, on the practicalities, when will the authority start hearing cases? How many cases will it handle in its first year? Are the staff and money in place? Will the Minister publish the staffing, funding and transition plans, including the arrangements for appeals that are already listed for hearing?
The Opposition’s own borders plan would go further than the Bill. It would abolish the immigration tribunal altogether, with decisions instead being made in the Home Office through a quick, internal appeal. However, whichever model is chosen, the test is the same: decisions made quickly, and decisions acted on.
Siân Berry
I will speak to why clause 1 and schedule 1 should not form part of the Bill. Although I will not speak to every clause, all these reasons equally apply to the rest of part 1, which deals with the creation and implementation of the IIAA.
It is a real shame that this policy has not yet become another U-turn from this Administration. I compare this Bill with the Courts and Tribunals Bill, particularly how adjustments were made following feedback from the legal profession and human rights experts on the establishment of truncated legal process and rights, which was one of the Bill’s most misconceived parts. After the Government pressed on with those plans during the Bill Committee, on which I also sat, today it is being debated on Report without several of the clauses that would have put jury trials out of reach for far too many offences. Although they were quite rightly not selected, I tabled amendments to this Bill that would have removed part 1, which creates the independent immigration appeals authority and all its workings, and I look forward to seeing such proposals also being removed before its Report stage.
The Government said that clause 1 and the rest of part 1 are needed to clear a backlog of more than 150,000 appeals, which currently take an average of over 60 weeks to decide. That backlog is real, and it is important that actions are taken to clear it, but part 1 misconceives the issues. Evidence shows that delays are driven by poor initial Home Office decisions and a severe shortage of legal aid, but part 1 addresses neither.
Instead, the Bill would replace a working, independent judicial tribunal with a costly body that risks being ineffective and lacks independence and fairness. Above all, creating unfair processes and further adding to a hostile environment for asylum will not help stop the boats. In its written evidence, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees called for
“a comprehensive strategy addressing the drivers of irregular movement, expanding safe, regular pathways, strengthening international responsibility-sharing, and enhancing practical cooperation with European and other partner States.”
In oral evidence, the Government’s own National Crime Agency had no analysis or explanation about the real drivers of small boat crossings, being concerned only with the Government’s approach of layering an even harsher deterrence and enforcement regime on to the real causes. It is those real causes that need attention.
I want the Government to listen on this issue, and that depends on Ministers hearing the arguments—that is what this Committee is for. I will be here throughout the Committee to highlight the points made by experts on the needs and real lives of those seeking asylum. They are talking about the difficulties they face in gaining a hearing for their case or in dealing with Home Office processes. In particular—this is something we all know as MPs, because we try to help constituents navigate this system in our casework—they talk about how poor the decision making in the Home Office is, and how the Bill does nothing to improve it.
I want to bring some evidence from Brighton, given by one of a large number of charities that are providing direct support to refugees, as befits a city of sanctuary. The organisation One Church, which does a lot of work in this area, told me:
“The impact of UK immigration policies for the past 15 years has at times crippled our ability to do business and operate a charity focussed (ironically) on marginalised people across Sussex. The escalating cost of filing for visas, the precarity and punitive nature of asylum claims and other proceedings, and the emotional devastation when facing all-too-common Home Office errors have all contributed to outcomes including business costs we can’t afford, charitable work that we’ve had to stop or rein in, and full-on mental health breakdowns that rupture communities and cost incalculably more in long-term complications.”
One Church gave me several examples, but here is one:
“An asylum seeker from Zimbabwe…was unable to earn income or work a job for more than eight years—even as he also was barred from public funds—while his own appeals went through the Home Office system, requiring the community to house him for free and support his basic living needs for many years. He ultimately won his case as well, including a public apology from a judge, but struggled to cope with the effects of such a long stint in a precarious and dependent position. This entire cascade of events was due to an unclear Home Office deadline that meant his paperwork was alleged to have been filed less than 24 hours late.”
David Smith
I thank the hon. Lady for the powerful story that she has just shared. I ran a homelessness charity before becoming an MP, which housed people who were refugees or seeking asylum. Is not expediting the process—stopping appeal after appeal—as much about supporting those who seek asylum, doing justice to them, as it is about wider society?
Siân Berry
I disagree. I think that the Government are focusing on the wrong part of the system here. As MPs, we are all aware of the processes involved in the initial decision making of the Home Office. The number of similar messes that my caseworkers have had to try to clear up—we often succeed—is absolutely huge, so not to focus on getting that initial decision making right the first time, and instead for the Bill simply to take away people’s rights of appeal, is absolutely the wrong approach.
With all such problems, the people who need asylum also need real knowledge of their rights and real access to people who can support their claims, but all that is really hard to get. Late claims and appeals with new information, when people finally get the right support and legal guidance about the grounds on which they should be making their claim, are all necessary to protect asylum rights. Therefore, judicial processes should not be downgraded and truncated, and people who are not legally qualified should not be hearing those cases.
Dr Zubir Ahmed (Glasgow South West) (Lab)
I share a lot of the hon. Lady’s concerns about the initial quality of assessment. I have one of the highest burdens of asylum seekers in my constituency in Scotland. Will she concede that the emphasis that the current Home Secretary has put on upgrading the quality of the assessment of those initial appeals since she has been in post is starting to work? I certainly feel that in my casework. Moreover, on the number of people who appeal to the first-tier tribunal at the moment and the current trajectory of the numbers coming in versus the numbers being processed, does the hon. Lady concede at least that the status quo is completely and utterly unsustainable? How we manage that system needs a fresh look.
Siân Berry
As I am sure the hon. Member will have imagined, I cannot agree, given the number of cases overturned. We have had some data from the Minister in her letter of 6 October, and 44% of human rights appeals are being allowed. Those are appeals where the initial decision was wrong. Emphasis needs to be on clearer processes, in which people can truly participate and get their information to the Home Office the first time, with the Home Office not losing it or reading it mistakenly, or any of the other problems. That is so important. These changes to the judicial process are the wrong solution to the wrong diagnosis, as with those in the Courts and Tribunals Bill.
One of the issues that the Bill seeks to address is the fact that, when it comes to the appeals process, people have been left for far too long. The longer they are here, the more routes of appeal they have. Does the hon. Member not agree that that needs to be resolved?
Siân Berry
I agree about the growth in the backlog, but as I said earlier, the analysis is pretty clear that that growth comes from an increase in refusals as well as the increasing speed with which the Home Office is making decisions. To me, those two things go together. The increase in refusals is likely to represent an increase in mistaken refusals—refusals that should not have happened. We cannot get away with just looking at the proportions here, either. We have to recognise that this will result in a number of people being treated as badly as they possibly can be by a country in which they are trying to seek asylum, having already had to leave the country in which they would much prefer to stay due to human rights considerations that are not properly taken into account at the initial decision stage in 44% of cases.
Siân Berry
I have very nearly finished, so I will press on. At its heart, the IIAA fundamentally represents another ill-thought-through Government proposal to create a truncated legal process. It is part of the previous Prime Minister’s misconceived attempts to pander to the disturbing ideas of Reform UK and its even more unsettling offshoot, Restore Britain. We saw from Reform UK’s proposals yesterday that only standing up for asylum rights will do in the face of its politics, and that the far right of politics will never be happy with anything other than the total removal of asylum rights.
Meanwhile, measures like those in clause 1 of this Bill will prove impractical, expensive and ineffective in addressing the backlog, and they will hurt the most vulnerable people in the world. These proposals must be dropped, if not today then well before the Bill leaves the House of Commons. I will vote against clause 1.
I thank all hon. Members for speaking in the opening debates. As we have discussed, clause 1 and schedule 1 will establish the IIAA, with the key aim of overhauling the current system and driving down the unacceptable waiting times, which are causing significant problems in the system. As I set out, we know that public consent for our asylum system is fraying, and we have heard that from colleagues today.
The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion set out very clearly and passionately that the current system is letting down those who are genuinely fleeing war and persecution as well. Genuine asylum seekers are not served by a process that gets ensnared in legal chew and does not have the opportunity to correct errors quickly. This is about enabling us to streamline the process, reduce errors and deal with people quickly and fairly in a much more managed way than the current system, which is letting everyone down on all sides, including those who are going through the process. As has been demonstrated, they are living in limbo at the taxpayer’s expense for far too long, and that is making it increasingly difficult for their cases to have a fair hearing. We all know the phrase about justice delayed, and I am afraid that that is the situation we are currently in.
I have set out the case fairly substantially, so I will not go over the arguments about the principles behind this again. Independence from Government is a cornerstone of the establishment of this new authority, and clause 1 seeks to protect that. Government amendments 22 to 24, while technical, will allow for the full operation of the IIAA when they begin their important work of determining cases. I want to come back to some of the questions raised by the hon. Member for Stockton West about transition and so on. As we have discussed, the scale and nature of the current asylum appeals caseload cannot be sustainably managed within the existing limits of the first-tier tribunal. Our assessment is that a fundamental reform is required to create a system capable of handling caseload volumes at speed while maintaining quality of decision making, fairness and independence.
Tom Gordon
The Government have already increased the first-tier tribunal sitting days by 19% and set a 24-week target. Is there a reason why the Minister does not want to see those measures work before dismantling the judge-led system? Could she elaborate on that?
We have put in substantial investment. I mentioned at the beginning that we have increased the judicial workforce by 21% to 311 judges, with 61 new fee-paid judges and 25 salaried judges starting between January and March this year, but we cannot continue to increase the judicial workforce at the rate that we need to deal with the ever-burgeoning appeals process—it is simply not sustainable. We need a system in which we can recruit people far more quickly and flexibly to make important decisions. I will come on to this later in our discussions, but we trust all sorts of people with important decisions, whether magistrates or planning inspectorates. We are building a workforce that will be making serious and consequential decisions, and we are doing so in a way that is not reliant on a slow process to increase the judicial workforce, which simply cannot cope with the increase in volumes of appeals.
Tom Gordon
I appreciate the Minister being generous with her time. Is she able to rule out this model becoming something that other tribunals, such as benefits or property, might end up seeing, with Departments gaining greater statutory powers over the tribunal hearing appeals against them?
I think we have been clear, and the Bill is clear, about the safeguards—not least the statutory requirement for Ministers to respect the independence of the authority. Those important safeguards are on the face of the Bill, and we are very clear about that.
To continue responding to the questions from the hon. Member for Stockton West, we are establishing the authority to offer increased and more flexible capacity and an enhanced ability to prioritise cases in the public interest. We expect a significant period of dual running, where the first-tier tribunal will continue to hear the existing appeals. That will run in parallel to the new Independent Immigration Appeals Authority, and will ensure continuity and that backlogs are addressed as quickly as possible.
On costs, implementations and benefits, as I mentioned earlier, we will bring forward detailed plans for the new authority, which will include the costs. Work is continuing across the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice and His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service to refine those costs and establish comparable current costs for the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber. Those are not yet agreed or publishable for either comparison, but throughout the business case we will develop the full programme costs, affordability and benefits.
In terms of when we will start to make decisions, the authority will be introduced through a phased transition. The first-tier tribunal will continue to hear existing appeals in parallel, as I said, while the new authority begins to take on specific cohorts of new cases. We know that the new system will be quicker. The current system is taking too long to deliver decisions. The Bill creates a scalable appeals system with greater capacity and faster processes, while retaining independent scrutiny and fairness on individual decision making.
I have hopefully answered most of the questions that have been raised so far, so I will conclude by summarising the Government amendments in this group. Although technical, they will allow for the full operation of the IIAA when it begins its important work of determining cases. Therefore, I commend them to the Committee.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Siân Berry
I beg to move amendment 66, in clause 2, page 2, leave out lines 24 to 28 and insert—
“(2) The executive and non-executive members of the IIAA specified in subsection (1) are to be appointed by the Judicial Appointments Commission.”
This amendment would require the Chair, Chief Executive, Chief Appeals Officer, Professional Standards Officer and adjudicators of the IIAA to be appointed by the Judicial Appointments Commission.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 25 and 26.
Amendment 67, in clause 2, page 3, line 6, leave out “a senior” and insert “an”.
This amendment would require all adjudicators deciding appeals for the IIAA to have legal qualifications or experience.
Government amendment 27.
Clause stand part.
Schedule 2.
Siân Berry
I will speak to amendment 66, about the appointments process to the IIAA, and amendment 67, about the legal qualifications and experience of adjudicators.
Under the Bill, the chair of the IIAA will be a Home Office appointee. The chair will decide the IIAA’s chief executive, who will then appoint adjudicators. By contrast, I believe that the leadership and decision-making roles in the IIAA should be decided by the Judicial Appointments Commission, the body that appoints judges. That would plainly and simply ensure independence from the Government and Parliament, which the Bill does not currently guarantee. We cannot risk leaving policies like this under the day-to-day political control of anyone in Government. Every safeguard must therefore be in place to make sure that this or any future Secretary of State cannot direct the outcome, prioritisation or disposal of these cases. My amendment 66 would fix that and make appointments to the IIAA the responsibility of the Judicial Appointments Commission, not Ministers or their appointees.
I will expand on some key points. According to the Bill, all members of IIAA, senior and junior, will be appointed either directly by the Home Secretary or by someone appointed by them. The chair of the IIAA, for example, will be appointed directly by the Home Secretary, and adjudicators will be appointed by the chief executive, who is given their role by the chair. The Home Office’s fingerprints will therefore be all over the membership of the IIAA, from top to bottom. As has been consistently clear, this Bill drags asylum appeals closer to the Home Office, risking the independence and fairness of appeals in a serious way. By contrast, tribunal judges, who currently hear asylum appeals, are appointed by the Judicial Appointments Commission, which is independent, with no direct input from Ministers.
Evidence has consistently shown over many years that Home Office officials face significant and sometimes inappropriate pressure to make decisions, including asylum decisions, in accordance with political goals. The independent chief inspector of borders and immigration found that that was the case as part of Operation Bridora in 2022, which was a Home Office strategy designed to speed up the processing of Albanian asylum claims. The chief inspector concluded that Ministers imposed an arbitrary and secret target on Home Office officials for only 2% of Albanian claims to be successful. In addition, in a report from the chief inspector this year, it was found that the Home Office was prioritising the quantity of decisions over their quality.
The Home Office’s institutional history is anathema to the independence and fairness that is needed. The ties between the IIAA and Home Office could impose political pressure on the IIAA to operate in accordance with Home Office preferences rather than law and facts. If Ministers are sincere about creating a truly independent appeals body, the safeguards to ensure independence should be robust and tried and tested. My amendment would make all appointments the responsibility of the Judicial Appointments Commission, not Ministers.
Ben Goldsborough
I understand the hon. Lady’s concerns about independence from the Government and other bodies, but many bodies across Government are involved in complex cases, such as in criminal law. For example, the Criminal Cases Review Commission is appointed by the MOJ to look into miscarriages of justice. Are we honestly saying that the IIAA would not have those same safeguards, in this case from the Home Secretary rather than the Lord Chancellor? Within the Bill, we are introducing a process that maintains independence while keeping accountability to Parliament, which will be vital in securing our constituents’ trust in a fair and transparent process for our immigration system.
Siân Berry
The hon. Member is right that, sometimes, appointments of supposedly independent commissioners are made—I had experience of that recently in relation to equalities—but there is often a political element to the appointment and the direction they seem to take. We must always appreciate that and guard against it. Taking the appointments one step away from the Home Office may not completely remove the possibility of that, but the Judicial Appointments Commission is a robust body doing a similar job already and should have this role. That is what my amendment seeks to introduce. The Judicial Appointments Commission has two decades of experience in appointing independent judges, and I think it is the body best able to ensure the independence of candidates for adjudicators.
David Smith
Before the hon. Lady moves on, I wish to build on the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk. It is a well-established principle within governance that quasi-judicial bodies are appointed by the Government. For example, the chief planning inspector is appointed by the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government. The chief inspector of prisons is appointed by the Secretary of State for Justice. The Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman is appointed by the Prime Minister. Furthermore, the Bill outlines that only the first chair and professional standards officer will be appointed by the Home Secretary. Is the hon. Lady arguing that all those other appointments made by Government have the same illegitimacy?
Siân Berry
All I am pointing out is that the Home Office’s record on this kind of thing is not brilliant, and that there exists a body far more appropriate than the Government’s proposal for direct appointments. I do not quite understand why Members are arguing so hard against that, when I am certain that the Judicial Appointments Commission would be happy to take up the role.
Mr Jonathan Brash (Hartlepool) (Lab)
The issue is about consistency. The hon. Lady mentioned specifically the Home Office. Well, the Home Secretary appoints the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration, the Migration Advisory Committee chair and the Domestic Abuse Commissioner. Why is this different? Surely, the hon. Lady’s argument is fundamentally inconsistent, given what the Home Secretary already does.
Siân Berry
I do not agree with that at all. This body will be making legal decisions. I will talk in a moment about how the chief executive and chair, who will be under the Home Office’s wing, will not be legally qualified to make those appointments. I cannot understand why every single safeguard should not be introduced in the Bill. Furthermore, this is a judicial process, so why should it not be the Judicial Appointments Commission? I fail to see the controversy with the amendment. The adjudicators will be making judicial decisions and considering law, evidence and facts. The Judicial Appointments Commission has the experience, the processes and—I am certain—the willingness to fairly test candidates’ skills and aptitudes in judicial functions. Therefore, the amendment would be highly appropriate, and I hope Ministers consider it.
I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for introducing her amendments. I will address amendments 66 and 67 and respond to some of the points she raised, but I will first give an overview of the measures grouped for consideration, including the Government amendments.
Clause 2 introduces the IIAA’s non-executive and executive members and deals with their recruitment. Those are fundamental roles, needed to enable the authority to recruit more widely and to begin operating, and with the leave of the Committee, I will explain some of them now.
The chair and the professional standards officer are non-executive members. The Secretary of State will be responsible for their appointment in accordance with the existing public appointments process; there is clear guidance from the Cabinet Office for setting up new bodies. The chief executive and chief appeals officer are executive members. The Secretary of State will appoint the first holders of those roles on merit through fair and open recruitment. Subsequent appointments will be made by the chair in consultation with the professional standards officer. Ministers will have no role in subsequent appointments of the executive roles.
The IIAA adjudicators will also be executive members and each will be appointed by the chief executive as an executive adjudicator or senior adjudicator. All IIAA executive members will be employees, meaning they will be subject to the terms and conditions of their role, have employment law protections and could be subject to employment proceedings as appropriate. Such proceedings could be in respect of poor performance, and may even lead to dismissal, enabling the IIAA to take the action it considers necessary.
The IIAA will incorporate experience and expertise as much as possible and certain roles will have statutory appointment criteria. The professional standards officer and chief appeals officer must have practised as legal professionals, as defined in the clause, in the UK for at least five years or, in the opinion of the chief executive, have suitable experience in law-related activities. Government amendments 25 to 27 will make a small change to that arrangement, in that the chair, rather than the chief executive, will be the individual who decides whether the professional standards officer possesses that suitable experience.
Senior adjudicators must also meet appointment criteria. They will need to have practised as a legal professional, as defined in the clause, in the UK for at least two years or, in the opinion of the chief executive, have suitable experience in law-related activities. The IIAA will thereby be able to recruit from a much wider pool of potential candidates. Enabling those who have suitable experience in law-related activities to become a senior adjudicator will make the authority better able to retain talent and knowledge, as it will allow executive adjudicators with no prior legal background to be appointed as senior adjudicators. Being able to retain a strong pipeline of talent with clear opportunities for career progression will be key to our success.
Tom Gordon
The Committee has heard from several stakeholders, including UNHCR, which stated:
“Lowering professional requirements in response to capacity pressures risks undermining the quality of decision-making and may ultimately prove counterproductive.”
Will the Minister address that point?
I recognise the hon. Gentleman’s challenge, but I am not sure how that is lowering standards. Just because they are not legally qualified does not necessarily demean the professional standards by which people will be making these decisions. I will explain more about our expectations of people in those roles.
Is it not the case that there will be people working in UNHCR who are not lawyers, such as people who have worked in refugee charities or who are experts in migrant work, and who have been doing that for a lifetime more than the time that somebody needs to go to law school in order to practise, or to go through the glad-handing process of becoming a judge? Would such people not be equally well qualified as somebody who has gone through an academic route?
My hon. Friend makes a crucial point. We have to be really careful to say that having legal qualifications is not a prerequisite for having good judgment. We see all sorts of good judgment by professionals; it is demonstrated every day by magistrates, ombudsman and planning inspectors, for example.
Mr Paul Foster (South Ribble) (Lab)
The Minister mentioned magistrates. Magistrates are the backbone of our court structure, and they are not legally qualified. Does she agree that there is a huge precedent there and that magistrates do a great job?
My hon. Friend is right to pay tribute to our incredible army of magistrates, who are volunteers. We are talking about professionals who will have a whole process of support, qualification and assessment. It is wrong to say that legal qualifications should be the only prerequisite for that kind of judgment.
Tom Gordon
I want to press the Minister a little further. While our magistrates do incredible work, they often hear cases concerning relatively low-level crimes. Does she think that is comparable to understanding immigration and asylum claims, which might be really complex, from people fleeing political violence overseas?
I am afraid I completely disagree with the hon. Gentleman. The decisions that we ask our magistrates to take, which may result in restrictions on liberty, are life-changing. I think they are just as important as the decisions that we are discussing.
David Smith
To reiterate the point, as someone who stood to be a magistrate and was accepted, I can say that there was no requirement for legal qualifications, but there are still really important decisions that have to be made. Also, as I understand it, in the current system, first-instance asylum decision makers in the Home Office do not require legal qualifications, so this is not new.
My hon. Friend makes a really important point. As I have set out, there will be senior appointees within the organisation who have legal qualifications, so any concerns on any aspect of law can be immediately referred to seniors. We do not have to have people with those incredibly costly and time-consuming qualifications to enable people to make these decisions. That is a really important point of principle.
Schedule 2 introduces important protections that will enable the authority to operate independently and autonomously. It makes it clear that the IIAA is not to be regarded as a servant or agent of the Crown. The disqualification of IIAA members from serving simultaneously as members of any UK legislatures underlines the expectation that authority members will be impartial in the performance of their functions. To further protect the IIAA from undue influence, all IIAA members, inclusive of senior officers and adjudicators, must be appointed on merit and based on fair and open competition.
The schedule limits the grounds for removal of non-executive members to serious misconduct, conflict of interest or being unable, unwilling or unfit to carry out their functions. Those in these important roles cannot be removed through the involvement of the Secretary of State. Executive members of the IIAA, the chief executive, the chief appeals officer and the adjudicators will be employees. The terms of their employment are to be set by either the Secretary of State, in the case of the first chief appeals officer and chief executive, or the IIAA, in the case of future appointments of senior officers and adjudicators.
The IIAA will be accountable to Parliament as a public body. Schedule 2 places a duty on the IIAA to report annually, providing Parliament with a means to scrutinise the authority on the performance of its functions. I hope hon. Members agree that the schedule strikes the right balance between operational autonomy and parliamentary accountability.
Let me move on to the amendments tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. Amendment 66 would give the Judicial Appointments Commission a role in appointing not only adjudicators, but the IIAA’s executive and non-executive members. These are completely different statutory roles from judicial offices, with their own employee arrangements and distinct governance, leadership and adjudicative responsibilities, and it would not be appropriate to apply the single judicial appointments model to them. That is designed for people who are legally trained to be candidates for judicial office. That is not what the adjudicators will be. They are not legal appointments—professionals who will be highly trained, yes, but not legal appointments.
The Bill establishes clear and transparent appointment arrangements appropriate to each role. The non-executive members and the first chief executive and chief appeals officer will be appointed by the Secretary of State. Subsequent appointments of the chief executive and chief appeals officer will be made by the chair, and adjudicators will be appointed by the chief executive. Those appointments must be made following fair and open competition, as set out in paragraph 2 of schedule 2. Ministers will also be under an express duty on the face of the Bill to uphold the independence of the IIAA.
To be clear, there will be no direct involvement of Ministers in the recruitment processes for adjudicators. I therefore do not consider that involving the Judicial Appointments Commission in appointments is necessary or appropriate.
I will deal first with the amendments and then with the clause. Amendment 66, in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, would require every member of the authority, from the chair to each adjudicator, to be appointed by the Judicial Appointments Commission. I understand that that is offered as a guarantee of independence; in practice, it could rebuild the very recruitment pipeline that the Government say they are trying to escape. The case made for part 1 is that reliance on judicial availability has left the system without the capacity or the flexibility to meet demand. Routing every appointment through the commission would import that constraint on to the new body on its first day. We cannot support that.
Amendment 67 would require every adjudicator to be legally qualified. It raises an important question, and the Opposition have our own concerns about qualification, which I will come to. What matters is that every adjudicator is properly equipped to make sound decisions quickly and that the authority can recruit enough of them to make a real difference.
Government amendments 25 to 27 provide that where a professional standards officer is appointed on the strength of experience rather than formal qualifications, it will be the chair and not the chief executive who judges whether that experience is sufficient. That seems sensible, since the officer who sets standards for adjudicators should not owe their appointment to the executive they oversee. I would be grateful if the Minister set out the rationale in a little more detail.
Clause 2 states that the Home Secretary is to appoint the chair, the professional standards officer, the first chief executive and the chief appeals officer. After that, the chair will appoint the two chief officers, and the chief executive will appoint the adjudicators who hear cases.
On qualifications, the Bill sets out a test for senior adjudicators: they must have spent two years in practice as a legal professional or have law-related experience that the chief executive considers equivalent. On executive adjudicators, the Bill is silent; clause 3(2) says only that adjudicators must receive “adequate training”. The Committee would benefit from knowing more of what the Government have in mind. What standard will an executive adjudicator be expected to meet before deciding a case, and how will it be tested? Will it be set out in the standards the professional standards officer must publish under clause 3(6), so that Parliament and the public can see it? That matters for speed as much as for fairness. Whoever is recruited, training and assessment must be up to the job. A poor first decision is one that is challenged, set aside and heard again, and every such case is potentially another year in which someone with no right to be here remains.
I have several further questions for the Minister. What criteria will the chief executive use to decide whether law-related experience is equivalent to legal practice? How many adjudicators will be recruited at the outset, and will experienced tribunal judges be encouraged to apply? Which categories of case will be reserved to senior adjudicators, and will the time it takes to recruit and train this new workforce add to the backlog in the meantime? Finally, when will the first appointments be made? Can the recruitment process begin before Royal Assent?
The shadow Minister mentioned the Bill’s use of the phrase “adequate training and support”. In answering his question on that, as well as some of the other questions he asked that were more practical, it is really important for me to specify that it is not for the Home Office to decide that. The chief executive will be responsible for ensuring that the IIAA adjudicators have adequate training and support to maintain their independence from the executive. The chief appeals officer is responsible for overseeing the quality of decisions and developing a quality assurance mechanism. They will be able to identify any specific training needs of adjudicators and recommend them to the chief executive. It is really important that I confirm to the Committee that the IIAA is independent. It is not for the Government to decide what accreditation and continuous development will be required for the IIAA adjudicators, who will, in essence, be making decisions on appeals to which the Home Office is a party.
Siân Berry
I have heard arguments from Government Back Benchers and the Minister that, for example, Home Office officials are not required to be legally qualified. This is a notoriously complex area of law, and I cannot see how that does not reinforce the need for true expertise in appeals. We have also heard that magistrates are not required to be legally qualified, but magistrates’ decisions are backed up by appeals to a body of legally qualified people. The Bill seeks to remove that, so I cannot honestly agree with this measure.
There are two extra points I want to make from the written evidence that we received from JUSTICE. The first is about training. The Minister talks about the fact that adjudicators will be properly trained. According to JUSTICE, Home Office asylum decision makers were given 22 weeks’ training, but it was found that that was inadequate and did not provide them with the necessary information to perform their job effectively. I fail to see how things are going to work out any better for adjudicators taking the place of legally qualified professionals.
The Minister mentioned that legally qualified people advise magistrates and that legally qualified people will be available to advise the adjudicators. JUSTICE makes the point very well—
Siân Berry
I have not made the point yet, so I will carry on. JUSTICE makes the point that there is a paucity of specialist lawyers able to advise in human rights and asylum appeals, and that these lawyers are doing—
(6 days, 5 hours ago)
Public Bill Committees
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Government amendments 25 and 26.
Amendment 67, in clause 2, page 3, line 6, leave out “a senior” and insert “an”.
This amendment would require all adjudicators deciding appeals for the IIAA to have legal qualifications or experience.
Government amendment 27.
Clause stand part.
Schedule 2.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
It is great to have you in the Chair, Mr Stuart. I was just summing up on my amendments 66 and 67. When we adjourned, I had only one further point to make, which is a practical one. I well remember the arguments and discussions we had on the Courts and Tribunals Bill: yes, taking things off judges and putting them on to magistrates seems efficient, and we would save on judge time, but a serious concern is whether magistrates could fill the gap, given the number of magistrates that we would need.
In its written evidence, Justice stated that non-legally qualified adjudicators are going to require legal support. It raised the issue of the paucity of specialist lawyers able to advise in human rights and asylum appeals. A serious risk is that if those specialist legal advisers are brought into the tribunal system, they will be drawn away from their existing work, which is lower paid, of advising and preparing individuals in their appeals. That might even compound existing backlogs.
The Minister has said, I think, that a new impact assessment has more clarity, and I hope that in future debates—because I am just winding up this one—she will be able to say more about what is going on with the practicalities and the obvious shortages of specialist people needed to advise the new legally qualified people. That is a real issue, and I will press my amendments to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 88, in clause 3, page 3, line 34, at end insert—
“(3A) The Chief Appeals Officer must, for each financial year, publish—
(a) the number of applications for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal against decisions of the IIAA, and the number of such applications granted;
(b) the number and proportion of decisions of the IIAA set aside by the Upper Tribunal; and
(c) the number of decisions reviewed under section 6, and the outcome of those reviews.”
This probing amendment would require the IIAA to publish annual data on the quality of its decisions, including data on onward appeals, decisions set aside by the Upper Tribunal and internal reviews.
Blake Stephenson
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart; I hope you are ready for a lot of Divisions over the next few weeks. While clause 2 decides who the adjudicators will be, clause 3 decides how the quality of their decisions will be protected. That matters because poor-quality decisions will result in appeals, and appeals mean delays, fewer removals and increased costs for the taxpayer to bear.
Clause 3 sets out who is responsible for what: adjudicators decide on the cases; the chief executive must ensure that the adjudicators are adequately trained, as the Minister explained earlier; the chief appeals officer allocates cases, organises a system of legal support and oversees quality development and assurance; and the professional standards officer sets standards and publishes a code of conduct.
Dr Casey warned that adjudicators without legal training would be more likely to make “errors of law” and that the backlog, rather than genuinely decreasing, could simply relocate to the upper tribunal. The solution to that potential consequence must lie in this clause. What exactly is the “system of legal support” for adjudicators in subsection (3)(b)?
A question occurred to me over the adjournment, following the earlier debate about magistrates: will adjudicators sit with legal advisers, as lay magistrates do? That may or may not be helpful, but I would be interested in the Minister’s response. If so, at what cost?
The Law Society points out that the chief appeals officer is responsible for quality but has no power to intervene in any decision. What powers will the chief appeals officer have to act on poor performance?
Amendment 88 is a probing amendment. It would require the chief appeals officer to publish the number of applications for permission to appeal to the upper tribunal, how many are granted each year, the number and proportion of appeals authority decisions that the upper tribunal sets aside, and the number of decisions that the appeals authority reviews under clause 6, with their outcomes.
In her oral evidence session before the recess, Dr Sumption told this Committee that one of the key measures of success should be how many decisions are overturned. This amendment would ensure that Parliament is told every year whether that relocation of the backlog to the upper tribunal, which Dr Casey described, is happening.
Will the Minister confirm whether the appeals authority will publish annual data on the quality of its decisions, including the rate at which they are set aside? If the Minister can give assurances on that, we will not press this amendment. Finally, what training standards will apply under clause 3(2), and will they be published? Will the code of conduct be published before the first case is heard?
The Opposition support clause 3, which ensures that the quality of the decision making is the best answer to the criticism that the appeals authority would generate more appeals than it resolved, but only if it is real, resourced and reported to Parliament.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. I thank the hon. Members for Mid Bedfordshire and for Stockton West for tabling amendment 88. I will turn to that after giving a brief overview of the clause as it stands.
Clause 3 sets out the IIAA’s executive and non-executive members’ powers and duties. It makes the adjudicators responsible for the authority’s primary function: to make decisions on immigration and asylum appeals and certain bail applications. This will be the sole responsibility of executive adjudicators. Senior adjudicators will also have a responsibility to perform this function, but they may also have further responsibilities that are delegated to them by the chief appeals officer, as the clause permits. No other member or employee can determine the outcome of an appeal or application, reinforcing the autonomy of the adjudicator as the decision maker.
The clause also makes clear what the chief executive, chief appeals officer and professional standards officer are responsible for. Those members are responsible for putting adequate training and support in place for adjudicators, developing a quality assurance mechanism and setting the standards required of IIAA adjudicators. Those roles together will enable the IIAA to operate effectively and independently. Parliament will be kept abreast of important matters concerning the IIAA members or the administration of justice through written representations of the chief executive. Those representations must be laid before Parliament by the Secretary of State. This will also act as an important mechanism for the independence of the authority, which can communicate to Parliament through the Secretary of State on matters of concern.
Amendment 88 tabled by His Majesty’s Opposition would require the chief appeals officer to publish annual data on internal reviews and onward appeals against IIAA decisions. The Government support transparency and agree that the quality of the authority’s decisions must be properly monitored. However, we are confident that the Bill already establishes a comprehensive framework for quality assurance and accountability. Clause 3 requires the chief appeals officer to oversee the quality of adjudicators’ decisions, organise legal support and develop a quality assurance mechanism. The professional standards officer is also responsible for setting and maintaining the standards required of adjudicators, as well as publishing a code of conduct.
The authority will be required to produce an annual report; that is not for me to determine, but I fully expect it to cover the kinds of areas that the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire set out in his amendment. The annual report will be laid before Parliament. Its operation will also be subject to independent external scrutiny by the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration. Although I agree that it is important to scrutinise the specified figures that the hon. Member flags in his amendment, we do not feel that they on their own would provide a reliable measure of decision quality. It is therefore unnecessary to prescribe those particular measures in primary legislation. I ask the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment, but will quickly refer to a couple of points that he raised.
We discussed earlier the standards of adjudicators that the hon. Member mentioned, but it is important to reiterate that adjudicators should have the required training to give them the necessary decision-making expertise to make determinations on appeal cases and bail applications. It will be the responsibility of the chief executive to ensure that adjudicators have adequate training and support. The chief appeals officer will be responsible for organising a system of legal support for them. The Bill provides strong safeguards and quality assurance mechanisms to ensure high standards and to ensure adjudicators are entirely independent of the Executive.
The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire flagged adequate training and support, and it is important go into a bit more detail on that. The chief executive will be responsible for ensuring that the authority’s adjudicators have adequate training and support to maintain independence from the Executive. The chief appeals officer is responsible for overseeing that quality. The chief appeals officer will also be able to identify any specific training needs of adjudicators and recommend them to the chief executive if they desire. The important point is that the authority is independent. It is really important that we remember that. It is not for the Government to decide what accreditation and continuous development is required for the authority’s adjudicators. They will be making decisions against appeals to which the Home Office will be a party, so it is important that we allow the authority to set those standards itself.
I will move on to how things will be monitored. As I mentioned, we have built a few steps of quality assurance into the system from the outset through training, legal support, professional standards, decision quality oversight, internal review and onward appeal rights. As I said, the chief appeals officer will be responsible for organising that system of legal support, the professional standards officer will be responsible for setting professional standards, and the detailed operation of those arrangements will be developed through the authority’s quality assurance framework and procedural arrangements as they are established.
I hope that reassures the hon. Gentleman that we agree with the principle behind the amendment. We do not think the specific figures he outlined are the best way to reliably measure decision-making quality, but we share the determination to ensure that there are opportunities to scrutinise it throughout the process.
Blake Stephenson
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Siân Berry
I beg to move amendment 63, in clause 4, page 4, line 21, leave out
“have regard to the desirability of”
and insert
“do so with a view to”.
This amendment would make the requirements relating to the IIAA Procedure Board equivalent to those of the Tribunal Procedure Committee when exercising its power to make rules.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Government amendment 28.
Amendment 68, in schedule 3, page 66, line 3, at end insert—
“(4) The Rules must make provision that when the IIAA reviews a decision, any adjudicator involved in the initial decision may not be involved in any review of that decision.”
This amendment would ensure that an IIAA adjudicator may not be involved in any review of their own decisions.
Government amendments 29 to 35.
Schedule 3.
Clause 5 stand part.
Government new clause 2.
Siân Berry
The Bill currently states that the IIAA procedure rules board must
“have regard to the desirability of”
ensuring that justice is done and that it is accessible, fair and independent. The amendment would simply strengthen that duty and ensure that it must act “with a view to” securing those things rather than merely considering them “desirable”. Importantly, the amendment would make the IIAA’s duties equivalent to the duties of the Tribunal Procedure Committee, so it would prevent the watering down that the clause represents.
Watering down and undermining fairness is a golden thread that runs through the Bill. We saw it originally with the watering down of the duty to be independent and fair, which was made an aim rather than a requirement, and we see it again in the IIAA’s powers over its procedure rules, which will govern the processes by which the IIAA hears and decides appeals.
Currently, the Tribunal Procedure Committee, which makes rules for the tribunals, has an obligation in section 22(4) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 to make procedure rules
“with a view to securing…that…justice is done”.
By contrast, clause 4(5) of the Bill says that the IIAA will have an obligation only to
“have regard to the desirability”
that justice is done. That is clearly an attempt at watering down and weakening obligations of fairness—from “duty” to “aim”, from “duty” to “desirable”. The amendment would ensure that the IIAA has equivalent obligations to ensure fairness as the Tribunal Procedure Committee currently does—no more, but certainly no less. In such high-stakes appeals as asylum, that is the least of what claimants, Ministers and the public should expect.
I will briefly quote the Bar Council’s written evidence, because it brings home that there are real people behind this. It says that on account of errors by the IIAA,
“a British citizen may wrongly be deprived of British citizenship, a refugee be returned to a place where they risk persecution or torture, a British family with a foreign member may be broken up, or an EU citizen be denied Withdrawal Agreement rights.”
Those are all serious consequences. We must strengthen this clause. It is not sufficient for this to be left to chance, to the courts or to later guidance on the IIAA produced by Ministers. It is so basic to fairness that it should be on the face of the Bill.
Amendment 68 fixes an omission from the Bill by the Government. It proposes preventing an IIAA adjudicator from reviewing their own decision. Under clause 6, the IIAA currently has the power to review its own decisions. In principle, there is nothing objectionable in this. The mechanism could provide a cheaper, quicker way to overturn inaccurate decisions than an appeal to the upper tribunal and provides a way for mistakes to be corrected quickly and without fuss. However, there is no provision in the Bill to say that an individual IIAA adjudicator cannot review their own decision when it is challenged.
I should note that the first-tier tribunal currently has the power to review its own decisions but adjudicators will not have the independence, experience and legal expertise of tribunal judges—at least if the Government have their way. It would be against fairness for such a non-judicial adjudicator to be in effect a judge in their own case. The adjudicator reviewing their own decision would also have an uncomfortable conflict of interest: either validate their own professional competence or vindicate the rule of law. No adjudicator should be put in that position and no asylum appellant should have their appeal dealt with in this unfair and potentially biased way.
Any internal review of an IIAA asylum decision should be heard by a different adjudicator who is as independent as possible from the original adjudicator. Amendment 68 is the best way to secure the psychological and emotional distance needed to conduct a fair review. It is perhaps indicative of the lack of serious thought that has gone into the Government’s proposals that the Bill does not contain a safeguard so basic and so clearly needed. The amendment would prevent an adjudicator from reviewing their own decision in any circumstances, thus increasing the chances of a fair and independent review. I hope it will be supported by us all today.
Government amendment 29 provides for information to be given on legal representation. That is an improvement on the original Bill, but a lot more should be done to prevent an appellant from being disadvantaged because they cannot obtain legal representation.
I welcome new clause 2, which inserts some concrete steps to provide some assistance in some cases, and the Government’s recognition of the significant issues when it comes to the availability of legal advice for people in different parts of the asylum system, which I have seen with my own eyes. It would be helpful, though, to know more about the Government’s thinking and their plans for providing this advice. How much additional funding and resource will the Home Office provide to deliver it? Will the Government commit to consulting with relevant groups and organisations that support people seeking asylum on how this advice can best be provided and routed to those most in need?
Blake Stephenson
The procedure rules will determine how fast the appeals authority works in practice, time limits, hearings, evidence and late claims. As Professor Ekins warned in oral evidence, they are also the part of this scheme most exposed to legal challenge. The group that we are considering includes clause 4, schedule 3 and clause 5, which cover the rules and the board that makes them, together with amendments 63 and 68 in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, a set of Government amendments to schedule 3 and Government new clause 2 on advice and representation, so there is a lot in there.
Clause 4 provides for the appeals authority procedure rules, made by the procedure rules board after consultation, with regard to the objectives in clause 1. They are to be made by statutory instruments subject to the negative procedure. Schedule 3 sets out what they may contain, including time limits, restrictions on fresh applications, decisions without a hearing and the treatment of late evidence. Clause 5 sets up the board that will write the appeals authority’s procedure rules, including the chief executive, the chief appeals officer, the professional standards officer and standing members appointed by the chair.
I again thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for her amendments. We are having numerous Divisions today, but it keeps us all on our toes. I will take her amendments in turn.
Clause 4 sets out that the authority will operate under a set of procedure rules determined by the IIAA procedure rules board. I will set out the details about the establishment of the board when we discuss clause 5, but that board is the body that will determine the procedure rules. In reference to some of the requests for more information on the rules, or for draft rules, those are not for us to determine. The procedure rules board will be set up through a proper establishment process as it is a statutory body, and it is important that it leads on the drafting of the procedure rules.
Those rules will be made by statutory instrument so we will have the opportunity to scrutinise them at that point. Making the IIAA procedure rules that way provides an important safeguard to the independence of the authority by placing control of its procedural framework—set out in schedule 3—in the hands of the IIAA procedure rules board. That is broadly similar to the process for the current tribunal rules, which sees the Tribunal Procedure Committee draft rule changes following consultations with relevant stakeholders. The IIAA procedure rules board, like the Tribunal Procedure Committee, will make its own procedure rules as if it were a Minister of the Crown.
Amendment 63, in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, seeks to amend clause 4 so that the authority’s procedure rules board must draft the procedural rules “with a view to” securing the statutory objectives in clauses 1(4) and 1(5). It would replace the current requirement for the board to draft the rules with
“regard to the desirability of”
meeting those objectives. The amendment mirrors the wording of the duty placed on the Tribunal Procedure Committee in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act.
The Bill sets out that in the exercise of its primary function, the IIAA must
“aim to be accessible, fair and independent…aim to handle its cases quickly and efficiently, and…have regard to the public interest, and…to the fact that the IIAA operates as a key part of the immigration and asylum system.”
The procedure rules board is internal to the authority and therefore members of the board would be expected to comply with the statutory duty set out in clauses 1(4) and 1(5). Amendment 63 would therefore have no practical impact on the way the authority’s procedure rules board develops its rules.
Siân Berry
The Minister has not justified why the wording is different. She said that members of the board would be expected to comply; my amendment would simply make that even clearer. Why say that they should
“have regard to the desirability of”
instead of using the wording that I suggest in amendment 63?
We simply do not believe that is necessary. The procedure rules board does not require that change to the wording about its objectives, because that already forms part of the authority. As I have specified, the authority is under a duty, which is made explicit on the first page of the Bill, towards those objectives in the performance of its functions—it has to undertake them. It has a statutory objective to aim to be “accessible, fair and independent” in the performance of its functions, so we do not agree that this is any sort of watering down. The way that the procedure rules are made will be independent of the Government and it is crucial that we maintain these safeguards.
Schedule 3 establishes the framework within which the procedure rules of the authority will operate and ensures that the IIAA has the powers necessary to manage proceedings fairly, efficiently and transparently. The schedule provides for rules-governing matters such as hearings, evidence, representation, reviews of decisions, appeals to the upper tribunal, costs and the publication of decisions. It also enables the IIAA to make effective use of modern case management practices, including remote hearings and measures to support vulnerable participants.
The schedule promotes the timely and effective resolution of cases. It allows the procedure rules to address the treatment of evidence provided late, while preserving appropriate safeguards where there are good reasons for delay. It also reinforces transparency and accountability by providing for the publication of decisions, subject to safeguards, to protect the interest of justice and the anonymity of those who should not be identified. Taken together, these provisions will enable the authority to develop a clear and comprehensive procedural framework, supporting it to discharge its functions fairly, consistently and without unnecessary delay.
I turn to amendment 68, which would require the authority procedure rules to provide that an adjudicator involved in making the original decision cannot take part in a review of that decision. The Government recognise the importance of ensuring that these reviews are conducted fairly and impartially. Again, the Bill already provides appropriate safeguards around the exercise of the review power. Clause 6 will require a review to be carried out by an IIAA adjudicator, while schedule 3 will enable the procedure rules to set out the circumstances in which and the procedure by which the power under clause 6 may be exercised. Clause 3 also makes the chief appeals officer responsible for allocating cases to adjudicators and for developing a quality assurance mechanism. These are important safeguards to enable the fair and impartial allocation of reviews. The Government therefore consider that the allocation of reviews is more appropriately addressed through the authority procedure rules and case allocation arrangements, rather than being prescribed in the Bill.
Clause 5 sets out which of the IIAA members will sit on the IIAA procedure rules board and how appointments of standing members to the board can be made. The procedure rules board will consist of
“the Chief Executive…the Chief Appeals Officer…the Professional Standards Officer, and…any standing members appointed by the Chair.”
The statutory make-up of the board will ensure that it has adequate expertise to draft rules that are fit for purpose, including the legal expertise of the chief appeals officer and the professional standards officer. The option to appoint further standing members will enable the chair to ensure that the board can make rules in areas requiring specialist expertise, where relevant; that might include social worker expertise for rules related to unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, for example. Beyond that, as clause 4 sets out, the board must consult such persons as it considers appropriate. Again, that will support the IIAA to incorporate a range of views, expertise and experience into its rules.
The Government amendments in this group seek to achieve several aims. I will cover expedited appeal proceedings in more detail when we debate groups 8, 9 and 11 on the selection list. In this group, amendments 30, 31, 33, 34 and 35 will ensure that the immigration bail provisions operate consistently within the Bill’s expedited proceedings framework. The Bill already requires regard to be had, when considering whether to grant immigration bail, to whether proceedings are subject to the late claims process under clause 12. These amendments simply make equivalent provision where proceedings before the IIAA relating to a person are being expedited pursuant to a request by the Secretary of State under clause 9, which we will come to later and which will apply where the Secretary of State considers that it would be in the public interest for proceedings to be expedited. It is therefore appropriate that cases proceeding under the expedited process be treated consistently with cases subject to the late claims process.
These amendments will simply ensure that both categories are reflected in the matters to which regard must be had when determining whether to grant immigration bail. Crucially, however, they will not alter the legal test for immigration bail. The amendments will also remove applicants for immigration bail from the paragraph 11 credibility provisions in schedule 3, with the effect that those provisions apply only in relation to appellants. Taken together, these are technical and consequential amendments that will ensure that part 1 of the Bill operates as intended.
Government new clause 2 will give the Secretary of State a power to take such steps as they consider appropriate to increase the supply and capacity of qualified immigration advisers to appellants in the IIAA—that is, people who are qualified within the meaning of section 84 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 to provide immigration advice and services. Provision has already been made in schedule 3, which requires appellants to indicate whether they have obtained advice or representation.
This power is intended to complement that provision by expressly empowering the Secretary of State to invest in increasing the availability of advice and representation for appellants and bail applicants in the IIAA. I am glad to hear it welcomed by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, because it is intended to support access to justice by encouraging growth in the advice and representation sector and by increasing availability and access to advisers and representatives. It creates a clear legal basis on which to increase the general availability of IIAA advice and representation through financial and other assistance. For example, investment may be in training, accreditation, workforce development and support for service providers. Early legal advice helps to avoid delays and late claims, leads to better decisions and, crucially, ensures that individuals get the advice and support that they need at an appropriate time.
Government amendment 29 will amend schedule 3 to ensure that the IIAA procedure rules require the IIAA to provide all appellants and bail applicants with information on how to access advice and representation, reinforcing our intention that all appellants should have the opportunity to obtain it. Government amendment 28 is a small technical change to enable amendment 36, which we will come to in the next group. Finally, Government amendment 32 will limit the application of paragraph 11(3) of schedule 3, so that IIAA procedure rules are not required to make the same provision as is made in new clause 3, which we will come to later.
Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)
I support amendment 68. My concern, which I am sure many people outside this place share, is that in effect it means people marking their own homework. Is there not a basic principle of fairness involved here? If we wish to see a genuine review in which all the information can be summed up and weighed, there might be issues of internal bias if the person who has already made the initial decision is reviewing it.
The ultimate decisions on how this will be set up are for the procedure rules board. I am sure that its members will be watching and listening to these proceedings, and I am sure that they will be very careful to ensure, when they set up the procedures, that there can be no accusations of any duplication or of people marking their own homework in the process. I hope that the safeguards I have set out will ensure that, but it is not for us to propose that in the Bill; it is for the board to do so as it undertakes the whole assessment and development of the procedure rules.
Tom Gordon
May I press the Minister a little further on that point? What really concerns me is that a lot of this will be done using the negative procedure, as she has referred to. Our ability to influence and to resolve the issue down the line if the board does get it wrong, which I hope it does not, will be further constrained and our hands will be tied. Does the Minister share that concern?
We are putting a huge amount into ensuring the quality and the expertise on the board that is setting up these rules. As I say, we have the legal expertise of the chief appeals officer and the professional standards officer. They will be reporting to Parliament in a whole range of ways, so we will be able to monitor the process throughout. The amendment would simply tie the hands of the procedure rules board. It is not for us to dictate how it undertakes the review process. It is important that it be independent of Government and be able to establish its own process, which will ultimately be accountable to Parliament.
It is also important to flag the equality and impartiality. There will be training, legal support, professional standards, decision quality oversight, internal review and onwards appeal rights, so there are a whole range of factors to ensure that the quality of adjudicators’ decisions is high. The chief appeals officer will oversee that. They will have to develop a quality assurance mechanism as well, and the professional standards officer will be setting and maintaining professional standards. We are putting a range of things in place to ensure the highest standards in the decision-making process.
On new clause 2, the shadow Minister asked about costs, about access and about when people will be able to have advice and representation during the process. We will ensure that all those who lodge an appeal to be heard in the new IIAA can access advice and representation, with access to legal aid where the eligibility tests are met. On the bail process, we are also ensuring that when we ask people to state whether they have advice and arrangements in place for representation, we encourage the uptake of suitably regulated advice and representation. That will help us to reduce delays, avoid disruption and provide fairness throughout the process.
I think I have answered most of the questions that hon. Members have raised, but if there are any further points that I have missed, I will come back to the Committee.
Siân Berry
The Minister’s insistence that this is not a watering down of previous rules does not wash. In my opinion, it is a double watering down: clause 4 makes a change to “have regard to”, and clause 1 includes a double use of “aim to” rather than “must”. That is certainly a watering down of the previous duties, and I think we should go along with the wording in amendment 63.
On amendment 68, we have heard a lot of assurances from the Minister that the quality assurance and rule-making processes are unlikely to do the opposite of what this amendment asks. We have heard the Minister say, “They can do this.” If she were prepared to say, “They will do this,” I could potentially withdraw the amendment, but in the absence of that assurance—with only “This is possible” and “We might see this,” and with only the negative procedure—I am afraid I will have to press it to a vote.
I appreciate what the hon. Member says, but as I say, it is not feasible for the Home Office or the Government to dictate in that way. I cannot give her that assurance, because we are setting up the body so that it can be independent and can set up its own rules, processes and procedures. It is really important that we allow it to undertake that, so I cannot put her recommendation explicitly in the Bill.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I beg to move amendment 36, in clause 6, page 5, line 12, at end insert—
“(1A) The IIAA may undertake a review of a decision under this section only for the purposes of determining whether the decision contains an error of law.”
This amendment would mean that reviews under clause 6 may only be undertaken on the grounds of an error of law. Errors of fact may be dealt with under IIAA Procedure Rules made under paragraph 17 of Schedule 3.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Clause 7 stand part.
Clause 6 provides the IIAA with the power to review its own decisions. This is an important safeguard in the new appeals system. It enables the IIAA, among other things, to identify and correct errors in its decisions without requiring parties to pursue an onward appeal to the upper tribunal. The review power supports the efficient administration of justice. It provides a mechanism for correcting errors at an earlier stage, which can reduce unnecessary litigation and ensure that cases are resolved more quickly where appropriate.
The clause reflects a common practice of decision-making bodies implementing a mechanism to review their own decisions. By enabling the IIAA to review its own decisions, the clause helps to promote fairness, accuracy and public confidence in the appeals system. The review power sits alongside the onward right of appeal to the upper tribunal provided by clause 7. Together, the provisions create a coherent framework through which decisions may be scrutinised and, where necessary, corrected. Clause 7 provides an important safeguard within the new appeals system by preserving a right of appeal from the IIAA to the upper tribunal on a point of law. A party will need permission from either the IIAA or the upper tribunal before an appeal can proceed, which should prevent the onward appeal route from becoming an opportunity to rehear the full case. That broadly mirrors the existing route from the first-tier tribunal to the upper tribunal, therefore maintaining continuity and legal accountability as cases transfer to the new authority. Where the upper tribunal finds an error of law, it will be able to remake the decision itself or remit the case to the IIAA for a fresh decision. The clause is necessary to ensure that the decisions of the new IIAA remain subject to judicial scrutiny at upper tribunal level. The upper tribunal will provide independent oversight of whether the law has been applied correctly.
Blake Stephenson
The clause allows the IIAA to review its own decisions once, to correct errors, amend reasons or remake the decision. An internal review of that kind is consistent with the Opposition’s own plan for a short internal appeal. Clause 7 provides the only route from the IIAA to a court—appeal to the upper tribunal on a point of law, with permission—and also applies to the post-Cart ouster in section 11A of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, with refusals of permission. Government amendment 36 limits the IIAA’s power of review to errors of law. Errors of fact will instead be corrected under the procedure rules. We do not oppose that. A review that can reopen the facts is a rehearing by another name.
That changes the argument about clause 1(8), however. The narrower the IIAA’s own remedies, the harder it is to say that there is an adequate alternative to judicial review. How will errors of fact be corrected, and how quickly? Do the Government still regard review and appeal together as an adequate alternative remedy? What time limit will apply and will a pending review delay removal or an onward appeal? I think that the Minister touched on that in her remarks, but I will be grateful if she could unpack that somewhat. How many reviews do the Government expect, and what effect will those have on the upper tribunal? Do the Government regard review and appeal together as an adequate alternative remedy that justifies excluding judicial review?
The Government’s own impact assessment—admittedly the one published earlier, not the one published yesterday, because I have not seen that—expects a “sustained increase in demand” on the upper tribunal. What additional capacity—judges, sitting days and so on—has been funded, and how many onward appeals does the impact assessment assume? What proportion of IIAA decisions do the Government expect to be set aside?
Clause 6(3) is significant; it applies the partial ouster that the previous Conservative Government enacted in the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022, which was drafted precisely with narrow exceptions and is accepted by the courts. Professor Ekins, in his oral evidence a few weeks ago, told us that the model could be applied here to IIAA decisions. If that is right for the upper tribunal, why is it not right for clause 1(8)?
I have two final questions. First, will time periods such as those in clause 8 apply to upper tribunal appeals? Secondly, where an error of law is found, will the upper tribunal remake decisions itself or send them back? We support Government amendment 36 and clauses 6 and 7. A credible internal review and speed at the second stage, as well as the first, are part of a system that is fast, final and defensible in court.
I thank hon. Members for the constructive way they have approached the clauses and amendments. As I mentioned, the clauses are important to ensure that decisions can be reviewed either by the authority itself or by the upper tribunal where there are errors in law. The Government amendment in this group seeks to clarify this position and support it on the face of the Bill.
I will turn to a few of the questions raised. On the point of law and the question posed about whether a review power is necessary if there is already a right of appeal to the upper tribunal, the review power enables IIAA to correct errors directly without requiring parties to pursue what can be a longer and more resource-intensive appeals process. This can lead to quicker resolution of cases and reduce unnecessary onward appeals. On the supposition that this is just an additional layer of appeal: it is not. The clause provides the IIAA with the power to review its own decisions, as I said. It does not remove or replace the onward right of appeal to the tribunal. The review mechanism and the onward appeal route operate as part of the wider appeals process established by the Bill.
On the question whether an appeal is limited to a point of law, this measure reflects the existing onward appeal route from the first-tier tribunal. The IIAA will determine the merits of the case. The upper tribunal’s role is to consider whether the law was applied correctly rather than, as the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire mentioned, to provide a full rehearing. I think reference was made to why permission is required as well. Permission provides an appropriate filter so that we can ensure that appeals only within an arguable point of law proceed. We are keen to avoid unnecessary resource expenditure and delay in the finality of decisions. Permission may be sought from either the independent immigration appeals authority or the upper tribunal. Any further questions, particularly around costs, will continue to develop during the process and development of the policy, and I will continue to keep Members updated.
Amendment 36 agreed to.
Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Siân Berry
I beg to move amendment 83, in clause 8, page 6, line 32, leave out “the IIAA” and insert “individuals and organisations with an interest in how the IIAA operates, including—
(a) the IIAA,
(b) people granted protection status,
(c) people with lived experience of the asylum system,
(d) legal practitioners and organisations representing the interests of people with, or seeking, protection status, and
(e) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”
This amendment would expand the list of those whom the Secretary of State must consult before making regulations about time periods for IIAA proceedings to include people and organisations with experience of the immigration system.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 89, in clause 8, page 6, line 32, at end insert—
“(8) The first regulations under subsection (1) must be made before the end of the period of six months beginning with the day on which section 1 comes into force.
(9) The annual report of the IIAA must state the proportion of proceedings in which a time period set out in regulations under this section was extended.”
This probing amendment would require the first time-period regulations to be made within six months of the IIAA being established, and the IIAA to report how often deadlines are extended.
Clause stand part.
Siân Berry
Clause 8 allows the Secretary of State to set time limits for the work of the IIAA. That is in notable contrast to all the claims of independence, and I think it is very wrong to do that. My amendment 83 therefore expands the list of people whom the Secretary of State must consult before making those regulations, although I would still be against the clause as a whole.
I have worked on this amendment with organisations that represent people who claim asylum and with people with lived experience, including Freedom from Torture. It would require a wide consultation, including with people with lived experience, before any time limits are set. That is because clause 8 gives the Home Secretary the big power to set default time limits. I think it is concerning that the IIAA itself will not be able to decide those, based on the time that it thinks it needs to decide appeals fairly, as if it were a truly independent body. Clause 8 is a prime example of how, in fact, the new system will not be as independent or fair as is claimed. Through those regulations on time periods, the Home Office could overtly put pressure on the IIAA to fulfil a political wish for rushed appeals.
There is a long history of seeking to rush immigration appeals through fast-track proceedings; every time that has been tried, it has turned out badly. In 2014, for example, the Tribunal Procedure Committee introduced fast-track rules setting time limits for asylum appeals. The Court of Appeal and the High Court both found those fast-track rules to be structurally unfair and unjust, because
“the time limits are so tight as to make it impossible for there to be a fair hearing…in a significant number of cases.”
The Court of Appeal explained in 2015:
“The scheme does not adequately take account of the complexity and difficulty of many asylum appeals, the gravity of the issues that are raised by them and the measure of the task that faces legal representatives in taking instructions from their clients who are in detention”,
and, as the Court of Appeal robustly summarised,
“justice and fairness should not be sacrificed on the altar of speed and efficiency.”
We need to make sure that history does not repeat itself. My amendment would, at the very least, require the Home Secretary to consult widely before issuing regulations about time limits, including with people with lived experience of the asylum system and professional bodies that represent individuals in asylum decisions and appeals. That should increase the chances that the time limits set are not politically driven only, but are realistic, workable and fair. Under the current version of the Bill, however, the Home Secretary is obliged to consult only the IIAA itself.
Open consultations are essential for good government and good decisions. They make sure that decision makers get all the relevant information that they need, including information that they do not know they do not know, which comes from people experiencing the systems that they set up. It is incredibly important to ensure that the Home Secretary has access to the full range of external opinions and advice when setting those time limits. My amendment would mean that people with lived experience of the asylum system—the kind of people directly affected by the Home Secretary’s policies—could offer their views and explain what different time limits would mean for them in practice.
When we took oral evidence in September, I asked the Minister about the issues around engagement and making sure that what is done is fit for purpose as far as people experiencing the asylum system are concerned. She said:
“I am always a believer in service user feedback, including from people who have been through the process and have lived experience, to help us develop better policymaking.”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 81, Q148.]
In that light, I do not see why this amendment should not be fully accepted by the Minister. People with lived experience of the asylum system bring essential experience of how legal processes operate in practice and how they are felt by the people who are affected by them, and they can help policymakers to identify barriers, unintended consequences and gaps that may not be visible from institutional data alone. Meaningful consultation with people who have navigated the asylum appeal system strengthens the quality of policy and must be done.
Blake Stephenson
I am going to start using the words “appeals authority”, because “IIAA” is doing my head in.
Clause 8 lets the Home Secretary set time periods for the appeals authority decisions, with extensions where compliance is not practicable or not in the interests of justice. The Opposition supports statutory deadlines; 67-week waits for an appeal are, frankly, indefensible.
Amendment 89, in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West, is a probing amendment. It would require the first regulation setting time periods to be made within six months of the appeals authority being established, and require the appeals authority’s annual report to say how often a deadline was extended. A power to set deadlines is, of course, not a deadline. What periods do the Government intend, and when will the first regulations be made? Extensions “in the interests of justice” could become routine. How often do the Government expect them, and will extension rates be published? There is also a puzzle in here: schedule 1 repeals the 24-week statutory timeframes in the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025 before they have even come into force, and I would like to know from the Minister why that is the case. Why are out-of-country appeals, including deportation appeals after certification, excluded? What happens if the appeals authority simply misses a deadline? Is there any consequence beyond a line in an annual report?
Amendment 83 would broaden the list of those the Home Secretary must consult before setting time periods to include people with protection status, those with lived experience of the asylum system and legal practitioners, as we have just heard from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. Consultations of course have their place, but this list would turn every set of regulations into a lengthy exercise and delay the very deadlines we need, so we intend to oppose that amendment.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
I should probably have directed my intervention to the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. The point she was making is that decisions done too speedily are against the interests of justice and fairness. The argument the shadow Minister is making—a far more powerful one from my point of view—is that delays make the system unfair. Of course, that is the system we currently have, which is why I support the position that he has taken in support of the Government.
Blake Stephenson
I thank my hon. Friend for those very kind words about how powerful my arguments are. I am sure the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion will respond to that when she has the opportunity.
Siân Berry
My arguments were not that it should be longer, but that it should be the right amount of time to achieve fairness and justice. I am sure that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East would not disagree that the right amount of time is essential, and that shorter is not necessarily better.
Blake Stephenson
I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention.
The Opposition will support clause 8 and oppose amendment 83. We want deadlines that are set, met and reported on. If the Minister can tell us when the first regulations will be made and that extension rates will be published, we will not press amendment 89 to a vote.
I thank Members again for their amendments in this group. I will turn to those amendments after explaining the drafting of clause 8.
Clause 8 enables the Secretary of State, following consultation with the authority—I have been using the word “authority” for brevity, so I hope that colleagues know I am referring to the IIAA—to set time limits for certain appeals, bail applications and procedural steps. The cohorts of appeals that may be expedited under clause 8 will be set out following consultation between the Home Secretary and the authority, but potential cohorts could include removable foreign national offenders, for whom the swift resolution of appeals and enforcement of deportation where appropriate is a long-standing Home Secretary priority, as set out in the Government’s “Restoring Order and Control” statement.
The purpose is simple: to support the timely resolution of cases. The clause will help to ensure that the appeals system is efficient, responsive and capable of delivering justice without unnecessary delay. Let me be absolutely clear: this clause does not affect the authority’s independence in deciding cases. It concerns the management of proceedings, not their outcome.
The Secretary of State must consult the authority before making regulations, and the authority retains the flexibility to allow additional time where the interests of justice or the practicalities of a case require it. This is a balanced and proportionate measure. It will improve efficiency and accountability while preserving fairness and access to justice. This clause is about timely justice—which, as other hon. Members have mentioned, is just as important for those undergoing the process as it is for the wider public—not rushed justice, and efficient case management, not ministerial control.
Amendment 89 would impose an arbitrary deadline for making the first regulations under clause 8. The clause is deliberately flexible, allowing time periods to be introduced where the evidence shows that particular cases should be prioritised. I appreciate the entreaties of the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, but it is really important that we do not pre-empt the evidence, particularly during the authority’s early development. Further reporting requirements are also unnecessary. Clause 8 already requires the authority’s annual report to cover cases where time periods have been extended.
Amendment 83 would unnecessarily broaden the statutory consultation requirement. Stakeholder engagement is of course important, and it is something I believe in very strongly, but prescribing a lengthy list of consultees in the Bill could delay our ability to respond quickly where particular cases need to be prioritised. Clause 8 already requires the Secretary of State to consult the authority and, crucially, does not restrict wider engagement if needed, so there is an opportunity for that.
I would also like to make this point: for me, Parliament is the ultimate stakeholder, and the public are ultimately the people this Bill is for. Our constituents have lived experience of this process, so it is important that they have the ultimate say, and that is why the Home Secretary is accountable to Parliament in this process. It is Members of Parliament, who represent their constituents, who can ultimately represent that stakeholder, and it is crucial to remember that.
More broadly, the Bill already places clear duties on the authority, which must exercise its primary function with a view to ensuring that justice is done. It must aim to be accessible, fair and independent, and it must aim to handle its cases quickly and effectively. It is in everyone’s interests that cases are resolved swiftly.
Before I finish, I would like to respond to a couple more of the points that were made. On the point of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion about lived experience, we recognise the value of wider stakeholder engagement, but prescribing this lengthy list could delay action where particular cases need to be prioritised. We do not want to restrict the flexibility around that. As I have said, the Bill already requires the Secretary of State to consult with the authority before making regulations and, crucially, it does not restrict that wider engagement, which is so important.
The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire asked for details on the timeframes and the kinds of cases that the authority will prioritise, which will be set out in regulations in due course. The Government are clear that appeals may be prioritised where there is a strong public interest or compelling operational reason to do so. As I have already mentioned, that could include the cases of foreign national offenders, where we have a genuine need to protect the public, or individuals who are in detention. Any prioritisation will support the efficient operation of the appeals system while ensuring that we maintain fairness and justice. For those reasons, I respectfully ask for the amendments not to be pressed to a vote.
Siân Berry
I will not labour the point any further. I will press my amendment to a Division, and I hope the Minister will keep looking at how this kind of consultation can be made more statutorily inclusive.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I beg to move amendment 37, in clause 9, page 7, line 21, at end insert—
“(7) In Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016 (immigration bail), in paragraph 3 (exercise of power to grant immigration bail), in sub-paragraph (2), after paragraph (e) insert—
‘(eza) whether any proceedings before the IIAA relating to the person are being expedited pursuant to a request by the Secretary of State under section 9 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 2026,’.”
This amendment would mean that, in considering whether to grant immigration bail, the decision-maker must have regard to whether the applicant’s proceedings were being expedited pursuant to clause 9 of the Bill (as well as whether the late claims process applies: see clause 12(3)).
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 90, in clause 9, page 7, line 21, at end insert—
“(7) The IIAA must expedite any appeal brought by a person who—
(a) is liable to deportation under section 3(5)(a) or (6) of the Immigration Act 1971, and
(b) has been convicted of an offence in the United Kingdom or elsewhere,
and subsection (3) applies in relation to such an appeal as if the Secretary of State had made an expedition request.”
This amendment would require the IIAA to expedite appeals brought by foreign criminals liable to deportation rather than leaving expedition to a discretionary request by the Home Secretary.
Clause stand part.
The clause allows the Secretary of State to request expedition of an appeal, bail application or procedural step within these proceedings where there is a public interest in securing a quicker resolution. This is an exceptional power for exceptional cases. It ensures that matters of particular importance can be brought to the attention of the IIAA for consideration of expedited treatment.
Let me be clear: this is a power to request expedition, not direct it. The IIAA decides whether a case should be accelerated and may refuse a request where expedition would not be reasonably practicable or would not be in the interests of justice. Nothing in the clause permits Ministers to influence the outcome of proceedings or diminishes the authority’s independence. Cases will continue to be determined impartially and on their merits. The clause is a balanced safeguard. It supports the timely resolution of cases, engaging public interest while preserving fairness and independence. The principle is simple: the Secretary of State may ask, but the authority decides.
Government amendment 37 seeks to ensure that the immigration bail provisions operate consistently with the Bill’s expedited proceedings framework. The Bill already requires regard to be had, when considering whether to grant immigration bail, to whether proceedings are subject to the late claims process under clause 12. The amendments make equivalent provision where proceedings before the authority relate to a person being expedited pursuant to a request by the Secretary of State under clause 9. Clause 9 applies where the Secretary of State considers that it would be in the public interest for proceedings to be expedited. It is therefore appropriate that cases proceeding under that expedited process are treated consistently with the cases subject to the late claims process.
Blake Stephenson
The clause lets the Home Secretary ask the authority to expedite a case where it is in the public interest. The authority must agree unless it is not practicable or not in the interests of justice. The Home Office has said that the power will be used for cases such as high harm foreign offenders and human rights claims that are clearly without merit. The Opposition support that.
On amendment 90, tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West, the principal question is: why leave it to discretion? The public have a direct interest in foreign criminals being deported and being deported quickly, so why leave it to the Home Secretary’s case-by-case discretion? Amendment 90 would require the authority to expedite any appeal by a person who is liable to deportation and has been convicted of an offence either here or abroad, exactly as if the Home Secretary had asked. Will the Government accept that incredibly sensible amendment, which I think the British public would support? I have a couple of basic questions. What criteria will the Home Secretary use, and will they be published? How many requests do the Government expect each year?
Government amendment 37 requires anyone deciding bail to consider whether the authority is expediting the person’s appeal at the Home Secretary’s request. We support that—someone whose appeal is being fast-tracked should not be released while it is heard—but it has a cost. How many additional people do the Government expect to remain in detention as a result, and is there the capacity? How do the Government intend to implement that?
On legal robustness, the House of Commons Library notes that lawyers are already asking how an appellant could challenge a decision to expedite, given clause 1(8)—we come back to clause 1(8) and the robustness, or otherwise, of that clause. That question will be answered in the courts if it is not answered here, so how do the Government expect expedition decisions to be challenged, and do they expect them to be judicially reviewed? When will the process regulations be made, and how long will the authority have to respond to a request?
We support the clause and the Government amendment. We will oppose any attempt to remove the power. Our amendment 90 would ensure that the appeals that matter most to public safety are always at the front of the queue, and I will seek to press that to a Division.
I thank the hon. Member for his contribution to this debate and for tabling amendment 90. To reiterate, the Government amendment ensures that the immigration bail provisions operate consistently within the Bill’s expedited proceedings framework. The Bill already requires regard to be had, when considering whether to grant immigration bail, to whether proceedings are subject to the late claims process under clause 12. The amendment makes equivalent provision where proceedings before the authority relating to a person are being expedited pursuant to a request by the Secretary of State under clause 9.
Let us move to amendment 90. The clause is deliberately designed to deal with cases where the Secretary of State considers that expedition would be in the public interest. It allows those cases to be identified individually and an expedition request to be made to the IIAA. Amendment 90 would instead apply expedition automatically to a broad category of appeals, which is not the purpose of the clause. Where there is a case for setting time periods for a wider group of proceedings, clause 8 provides the appropriate mechanism.
That said, I think it is also important that we are not specifying a particular group in the Bill. Otherwise, potentially, we may need to amend legislation for every category of appeals that the Home Secretary wishes to expedite. It is really important that we maintain flexibility for the Secretary of State to respond to public opinion and to public safety in terms of the category of appeals that she would wish to be expedited.
I will give way first to the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, then to my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk.
Blake Stephenson
You never know, Chair, we may be asking the same question. I asked the Minister whether she would provide some criteria—I am expanding my question, in fact—to give the public some certainty as to the decisions that the Home Secretary might make. Does the Minister expect some criteria to be published?
It is important that we maintain flexibility, as I said. The Bill provides distinct mechanisms for very broad categories of cases and for exceptional individual cases. We should retain that flexibility, so I am afraid that I disagree with the hon. Gentleman on limiting the approach of the Home Secretary in the Bill. Particularly, this is also about case-specific assessment. We want to allow the Home Secretary the opportunity to look at case-specific assessments, rather than being too defined.
Ben Goldsborough
Does the Minister agree that the problem with amendment 90 is that if we expedite everything, we expedite nothing? Having the clause as drafted—making this a precise move taken by the Secretary of State—ensures that those cases that our constituents know need to be expedited, will be. The broadbrush approach proposed by the Opposition would fail that completely.
My hon. Friend puts that perfectly, succinctly and clearly. I appreciate him saying that. This Government are absolutely clear that foreign national offenders with no right to remain should be removed as swiftly as the law allows. I have every anticipation—the Home Secretary has been clear—that in restoring order and control, they are exactly the kind of cohort that we have in mind. It is important, however, that clause 8 provides the appropriate mechanism for setting those time periods for groups of cases, clause 9 allows for individual cases to be expedited, and we continue to allow the Secretary of State to have that flexibility to respond to the public interest, rather than narrowing the measure to one specific cohort in the Bill.
Amendment 37 agreed to.
Amendment proposed: 90, in clause 9, page 7, line 21, at end insert—
“(7) The IIAA must expedite any appeal brought by a person who—
(a) is liable to deportation under section 3(5)(a) or (6) of the Immigration Act 1971, and
(b) has been convicted of an offence in the United Kingdom or elsewhere,
and subsection (3) applies in relation to such an appeal as if the Secretary of State had made an expedition request.”—(Blake Stephenson.)
This amendment would require the IIAA to expedite appeals brought by foreign criminals liable to deportation rather than leaving expedition to a discretionary request by the Home Secretary.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new clause 1—Enforcement.
The Independent Immigration Appeals Authority has a statutory objective to handle its cases quickly and efficiently. It cannot do that if it cannot enforce the requirements set out in its procedure rules. It is anticipated that the requirements on parties to proceedings will be set out clearly under the authority’s procedure rules.
Clause 10 provides the authority with a lever to set tangible consequences for non-compliance by enabling it to charge a party to proceedings, among others, who has acted “improperly, unreasonably or negligently,” and whose actions have caused the authority’s resources to be wasted. That is intended to disincentivise tactical delay. The charge will be payable to the authority, rather than an order to pay costs to another party. It will be for the authority to determine what meets the threshold for a charge according to the circumstances of the case, and the detailed operation of the power should be set out in the authority’s procedure rules. Any moneys the authority receives under the power will be paid into the consolidated fund.
Government new clause 1 will enable a party or the authority to seek enforcement, as if the decision of the authority were that of the relevant court. That will simplify the process of recovering funds and will bring the authority in line with existing provisions in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
Blake Stephenson
Clause 10 allows the authority to charge a party or representative who acts “improperly, unreasonably or negligently” and wastes its resources, and the Opposition support it. Last-minute applications and poorly prepared cases waste time the system does not have.
I have a couple of questions. The Bar Council objects that non-lawyer adjudicators could charge or fine barristers, with a chilling effect. We do not accept that representatives should be immune from the consequences of abusing the process, but the power must be clear. What level of charge is envisaged, and will there be a cap? How often are wasted costs orders made in the tribunal now? Will a person who is charged have a right to review or appeal?
Of course, fairness cuts both ways. The Home Office is a party. The Library records that 36% of asylum appeals disposed of last year were withdrawn, and the Refugee Council attributes that to poor initial decisions, a point that was made earlier in the debate. Will the Home Office be liable to charges when it withdraws a decision shortly before a hearing, and will guidance define what counts as acting improperly, unreasonably or negligently?
Government new clause 1 makes sums payable under a decision by the authority, including charges under clause 10, recoverable as if they were county court orders in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and enforceable in the sheriff court in Scotland. We support that. A charge that cannot be collected is no deterrent at all. Will charges against the Home Office be enforceable in the same way? What sums do the Government expect to be recovered each year?
We support clause 10 and Government new clause 1. A clear, fairly applied and enforceable power will discourage abuse of the process, which we think is important.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his contribution. Government new clause 1 ensures there is a mechanism for the enforcement of cost orders between parties to proceedings in the authority, in addition to charges made by the authority under its powers in clause 10. The clause allows the authority to charge a participant in proceedings where it considers that they have acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently, and that that has resulted in the authority’s resources being wasted. Schedule 3 provides for the authority to make rules in relation to cost orders, whereby the authority may order costs to be paid between parties as a result of any party acting improperly, unreasonably or negligently. In answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question about whether the Home Office is accountable, yes, we will be.
The new clause enables a party or the authority to seek enforcement as if the decision of the authority were that of the relevant court. When enforcement of a sum is pursued following the authority’s decision, that decision is to be treated as a registrable judgment in the relevant jurisdiction—in this case England and Wales, and Northern Ireland. This simplifies the process of pursuing sums payable under the authority’s decision. It is broadly in line with equivalent provisions in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, which enable tribunal costs to be enforced.
The hon. Gentleman made a few points about fairness and the ability to recoup the money. It is anticipated that the authority will take into account the circumstances of the case and the person’s ability to pay when deciding whether to impose a charge. Where there are genuine reasons for delay, for example, it is unlikely that those actions will meet the threshold for a charge. The value of the charge will, rightly, be set through the authority under its procedure rules. It will need to strike a balance between being proportionate and fair, and deterring tactical delay of the process. There will be appropriate parliamentary scrutiny of the charging power through the procedure rules, which will be subject to the negative procedure. We heard earlier a challenge to the use of the negative procedure, but the current tribunal rules are decided through that procedure, so there is no difference in the process.
The hon. Gentleman also mentioned enforcement. The new clause provides that a sum payable under an order of the authority is enforceable as if it were payable under an order of the relevant court. That means the person to whom the money is owed as a result of a decision of the authority can rely on the court processes for the enforcement of that sum.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Blake Stephenson
I beg to move amendment 91, in clause 11, page 8, line 36, at end insert—
“(7A) Where the recipient of a claim notice provides any reasons or grounds after the claim notice deadline, those reasons or grounds may not be relied on in any appeal before the IIAA or the Upper Tribunal unless the IIAA is satisfied that they arise from a material change of circumstances occurring after the claim notice deadline.”
This amendment would require people served with a claim notice to raise all their grounds by the deadline, so that grounds raised later could not be relied on in an appeal unless they arise from a material change of circumstances.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendment 38.
Clause stand part.
Government amendments 39 to 42.
Clause 12 stand part.
Government new clause 3—Late claims process: credibility.
Government new clause 4—Late information etc: proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission.
Blake Stephenson
Clause 11 tackles one of the most damaging features of the current system: claims raised at the last minute to prevent removal. It allows the Home Office to serve a claim notice on anyone liable to removal or deportation, requiring them to set out every reason they should be allowed to stay, including any modern slavery information, by a deadline. Clause 12 gives teeth to clause 11. Where someone ignores a claim notice and raises new grounds only once they are detained or given removal directions, their appeals will be fast-tracked and the late claim will count against them when bail is considered.
The Opposition support that approach, but there is a problem. The Minister told the Committee during the oral evidence sessions:
“More than a third of our charter returns that fail to go ahead have involved a modern slavery referral raised after the return arrangements have been made.”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 5, Q3.]
That is exactly the gaming of the system that the public will no longer tolerate. Our plan would require applicants to submit their claim in one go, with later claims disregarded unless there has been a material change in their home country. Clause 11 moves in that direction but stops short: a late claim goes into the late claims process and damages credibility, but it can still be heard and can still succeed. How long will people have to respond? Where will that be set? Who will be served? Beyond clauses 12 and 36, what are the consequences of failing to comply? Can late grounds still succeed on appeal?
Amendment 91 would close the gap: reasons or grounds raised after the claim notice deadline could not be relied on in an appeal before the appeal authority or the upper tribunal unless the appeal authority is satisfied that they arise from a material change of circumstances after the deadline. That is the principle of our plan: claims must be made in one go, and later claims disregarded unless something has genuinely changed. Will the Government accept that approach and therefore our amendment?
Clause 11(10) repeals a large part of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, including provisions on late evidence in section 26 and accelerated detained appeals in section 27. Why repeal them rather than bring them into force? What will replace them? The Immigration Law Practitioners Association points out that the priority removal notice regime gave recipients a period to access legal advice and clause 11 does not. We do not support the ILPA’s proposed legal advice precondition, but the Government should explain their answer to that point, because if they do not, it will be litigated.
Government amendment 38 goes further, repealing section 19(2) of the 2022 Act on credibility statements, which is replaced by new clauses 3 and 4. We do not oppose that approach. The risk is legal. Justice and the Bar Council remind us that, in the Detention Action case, the Court of Appeal quashed the detained fast-track rules because they were systematically unfair, and that the Court took comfort from specialist judges hearing those cases, which will not be true of the appeal authority. A fast track that is quashed delivers nothing.
What timetable will apply? Justice reports that the Home Office intends decisions “within a week”. What legal advice do the Government have that this process will survive legal challenge? How many cases are expected and what will happen to other appeals pushed back in the queue? What effect will the new bail conditions have on detention numbers and capacity? Will these cases, which often feature detention and are often complex, be decided by senior adjudicators?
Government amendments 39 and 42 mean that a person who gives modern-day slavery information late, after detention or after removal directions, will not go into the late claims process. I understand the reasoning, which responds to concerns from anti-trafficking organisations, but the Minister told the Committee that more than a third of failed charter returns involved a modern slavery referral raised after return arrangements were made. Does this change not reopen exactly that gap?
New clause 3 requires adjudicators in late claims cases to treat late information and late evidence as damaging credibility unless there are good reasons, and new clause 4 does the same for the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. We support them, but everything turns on “good reasons”. If that phrase is read generously, the rule will be swallowed up by the exception. Will the Government look to define it in the Bill or in guidance?
The written evidence adds two points to ILPA’s concern about legal advice. First, ILPA notes that nothing in clause 11 exempts under-18s from the credibility consequences of missing a claim notice deadline. Will children be exempt or protected by guidance? Secondly, Women for Refugee Women says that the Home Office’s guidance on gender-based claims
“recognises that late disclosure is common among survivors of trauma.”
The organisation After Exploitation and a coalition led by Hibiscus call a requirement to disclose everything at the outset “highly unrealistic”. How will the claim notice regime be applied consistently with the Home Office’s own guidance? Will trauma-related late disclosure count as a good reason? We want grounds raised early, but a regime that the Home Office’s own guidance contradicts will not survive its first test case.
Justice adds a point on Detention Action that the Minister should look to answer. When the Court of Appeal considered the fast-track rules, it took into account that independent specialist tribunal judges were hearing the cases. That will not be the case with the appeal authority. Has the Government’s legal advice taken that into account?
We support clauses 11 and 12 and the Government’s amendments, and we oppose attempts to weaken them. One notice, one deadline and one claim: that is the principle, and the Bill should apply it fully. I will seek to press amendment 91 to a Division.
As the hon. Gentleman set out, we have an issue in our system in this country with late claims that are made in detention just prior to planned removal, which inevitably require release or lead to bail, as there is no mechanism for dealing with the appeals in an expedited way. That leads to a significant degree of gaming the system and compromises removals performance.
On the late claims process, a single fast appeal process, which we are setting out here, will apply to late claims—those made after the expiry of the new claim notice. Individuals must submit all relevant information up front. Failure to do so, unless justified, will damage their credibility and result in expedited handling, which will be relevant to maintaining their detention until removal. Late disclosure of modern slavery information may similarly damage credibility unless justified.
Receiving information at the earliest opportunity helps to ensure that cases are considered on the fullest possible picture, enabling timely and better-informed decision making. Clause 11 seeks to deliver that through a new claim notice, which may be issued to individuals to inform them of the need to submit any immigration claim or modern slavery information they have to the Home Office at the earliest opportunity. Where modern slavery issues are raised, that will help support early identification of needs.
Clause 11 works in conjunction with clause 12 to ensure that individuals are informed that failing to submit an immigration claim following receipt of the notice, only to make a claim from immigration detention or after being served notice of departure details, will leave them subject to an expedited late claims process and may have negative implications for their credibility. For modern slavery purposes, the notice will advise recipients that failure to provide modern slavery information only to do so after the claim notice deadline will be taken into consideration, under clause 36, as damaging the credibility of their account by decision makers assessing whether they are a victim of trafficking, unless there are “good reasons” for the delay. Clause 11 is intended to encourage early disclosure of immigration or modern slavery information and remove any perceived advantage of delayed disclosure.
Clause 12 sets out that anyone who receives a claim notice, as set out in clause 11, but makes a claim or provides information only after the deadline given in the notice when they are either in immigration detention or have received notice of their departure details from the UK will enter the expedited late claims process. It also states that, as far as is reasonably practicable, the authority will hear any appeal against such a late claim as a priority above all other claim types. The provision supports earlier disclosure of claims and enables more efficient and expedited determination of late claims. The swift timescales associated with the late claims process will support the maintenance in immigration detention, and subsequent removal from the UK, of these individuals.
Blake Stephenson
I beg to move amendment 92, in clause 13, page 10, line 33, at end insert—
“(d) the proportion of decisions of the IIAA set aside on appeal to the Upper Tribunal;
(e) the number of persons removed from the United Kingdom following the dismissal of an appeal by the IIAA.”
This probing amendment would require the Chief Inspector’s reports on the IIAA to cover the outcomes of its work – decisions set aside on appeal and removals after dismissed appeals – as well as process.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
New clause 28—IIAA: publication of data—
“(1) The Secretary of State must make arrangements for the publication of data relating to the work of the IIAA.
(2) The data required by this section must be updated and published at least every three months.
(3) The data to be published under this section must include—
(a) the number of appeals submitted to the IIAA;
(b) the number of decisions made by the IIAA;
(c) the outcomes of decisions made by the IIAA;
(d) the proportion of people submitting appeals to the IIAA who had legal representation;
(e) the number of appeals waiting to be processed by the IIAA;
(f) the length of time taken for a decision to be made on an appeal by the IIAA;
(g) the number of appeals that were withdrawn before being heard by the IIAA;
(h) the number of reviews of decisions made by the IIAA under section 6; and
(i) the outcomes of reviews of decisions made by the IIAA under section 6.
(4) The data published must, where possible, be broken down by—
(a) the type of appeal;
(b) the nationality of the person submitting the appeal;
(c) the gender of the person submitting the appeal; and
(d) the age of the person submitting the appeal.”
This new clause would require the Home Secretary to arrange for the publication, at least every quarter (as is the case for the existing Immigration and Asylum Tribunal), of data relating to the work of the IIAA.
Blake Stephenson
Clause 13 brings the authority within the remit of the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration, with an annual report and the chief executive’s response laid before Parliament. The Opposition support accountability to Parliament, as we have discussed on several occasions today.
Amendment 92 is another probing amendment. The inspection regime in clause 13 focuses on process: premises, technology and training. Parliament will also want to know whether the authority is working. Dr Sumption told us that the data needed to judge those reforms—what happens to refused cases and how many decisions are overturned—largely does not exist.
Amendment 92 would require the chief inspector’s report to cover two outcomes: the proportion of the authority’s decisions set aside by the upper tribunal, and the number of people removed after the appeals authority dismisses their appeal. Will inspection reports cover those outcomes? What additional resources will the chief inspector receive? Is one report a year enough in the first years? When would material be omitted from published reports?
New clause 28, in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, would require quarterly publication of data of the authority’s work on appeals, outcomes, representation, the backlog, timings, withdrawals and reviews. It overlaps with our amendment 88 on decision quality. Transparency around whether the new body is working is in everyone’s interest. I hope the Government will say whether they intend to publish data of that kind.
We support clause 13. Scrutiny should measure results, not just process. If the Minister can give assurances on the outcome data, we will not press amendment 92.
Siân Berry
I agree with the shadow Minister that amendment 92 and new clause 28 are quite compatible. They both ask for more data from the Government and the IIAA about its work and what is going on. That is essential.
My new clause 28 would require the Home Secretary to arrange for the publication, at least every quarter—that timing is the same as for the existing Immigration and Asylum Tribunal—of data relating to the work of the appeals authority. It sets out properly detailed requirements for quarterly data publication. It includes requirements for information on decisions, appeals and outcomes, including where the appeals authority has reviewed decisions ahead of appeals and where appellants withdraw; information about who has had legal representation; and information about backlogs, timelines and delays on decisions.
The new clause also ensures that we can see that data broken down by nationality, gender and age, and what kind of appeal grounds are being made. Given the concern about the discriminatory and human rights impact of the Bill on people claiming asylum and our obligations under international agreements, all that information is essential.
We cannot have a publication scheme only set out by the appeals authority itself or by Ministers. It is important that Parliament should put such essential reporting information into the Bill; otherwise, we will simply not know the consequences of those changes or their consequences will become a matter of contention and further politicise the lives of those seeking asylum here. I have a related new clause that asks for a report in a similar fashion on current decision making, and the comparison between the two is vital.
I asked the Minister for some baseline data on the current situation during the oral evidence sessions. The reason I asked is that until March 2023 we had quite a lot of details, including around nationality, in the Home Office’s own quarterly statistics release. However, for over three years now, the appeal statistics have not been included, and we do not see the information about nationality broken down. The letter we received from the Minister on 6 October gave some information about the breakdown of different human rights grounds, which was useful, but unless comprehensive information is provided about the current situation and the changes that will take place when we introduce the appeals authority, we will not really see the impact of the Bill. This is absolutely essential.
The clause sets out the extension of the remit of the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration so that they may inspect and report on the authority’s performance. That will allow them to examine the authority’s efficiency, effectiveness and consistency, as well as wider operational matters.
Independent scrutiny is an important safeguard. It will support transparency and accountability and help maintain public confidence in the new appeals system. The clause preserves the authority’s independence. The inspector will not be able to reconsider, overturn or otherwise interfere with the outcome of any individual appeal. The inspector’s role will be to identify systemic issues and opportunities for improvement, rather than to provide an additional route of challenge for individual appellants.
Inspection reports will be handled through the existing statutory framework, including the provision for reports to be sent to the authority and the Secretary of State, and for the Secretary of State to lay them before Parliament. The clause therefore strikes the right balance between robust independent oversight and the protection of independent decision making.
Amendment 92 would require the independent chief inspector’s report on the IIAA to include the proportion of authority decisions set aside by the upper tribunal and the number of people removed following the dismissal of an appeal. I thank the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire for tabling it. The Government agree that the authority must be subject to effective and transparent scrutiny, which is precisely why clause 13 extends the remit of the independent chief inspector to cover the authority’s performance. However, it would not be appropriate to prescribe those particular measures on the face of the Bill. The chief inspector will already be able to examine the authority’s efficiency and the effectiveness of its processes. Their role is to monitor the processes, not the outcomes.
The number of decisions set aside by the upper tribunal cannot by itself provide a complete assessment of the overall quality of the authority’s decision making, and nor will the number of removals following dismissed appeals provide a direct measure of the authority’s performance. The amendment would therefore risk holding the independent chief inspector, and indirectly the authority, to account for outcomes not wholly within the authority’s control. The chief inspector already has an established role in inspecting the immigration system, and clause 13 enables them to assess, as they consider appropriate, the efficiency and effectiveness of the authority and how it is delivering against its objectives. For those reasons, the Government cannot accept the amendment, and I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.
New clause 28 relates to publishing information on the operation and performance of the authority. The Bill already contains a comprehensive framework for accountability and transparency of the authority. First, paragraph 11 of schedule 2 requires the authority to prepare an annual report on the exercise of its functions, which must be laid before Parliament. That will ensure regular parliamentary scrutiny of the performance and operation of the new body. Secondly, the clause provides independent inspection of the performance of the authority’s functions. The purpose of that is to provide additional external reporting on the IIAA’s efficiency and effectiveness. It is unnecessary to prescribe a detailed list of operational metrics in the Bill.
Siân Berry
The Minister said, “efficiency and effectiveness”. One of the issues that I raised was equalities issues and discrimination. Will that also be in the remit?
The hon. Lady makes an important point. Again, that is not something that is prescribed in the Bill. As we establish this, it will be important to have a look at whether that ought to be a key principle. I cannot make the commitment at the moment, but it is important that we reflect on that as the authority is established.
As I said, it is unnecessary to prescribe a detailed list of operational metrics. Precise reporting arrangements should be a matter for the authority once operational. Mandating specific requirements in primary legislation would reduce flexibility and constrain the authority’s ability to adapt its reporting arrangements as it becomes established. That will be an operational matter for the authority as it is set up, and should not be prescribed in the Bill. The Government therefore do not accept the amendment or new clause 28.
More broadly, I appreciate that there is a wider point, separate to the context of the Bill, about data and statistics. The Ministry of Justice publishes quarterly statistics that include information on receipts and outcomes. The Home Office immigration system statistics quarterly release covers data on a range of topics, including claims, outcomes and nationality. The full set of official statistics published by those Departments is kept under review in line with the code of practice for statistics. I think that is a conversation that we could have another day, but it is important that we do not accept amendments that seek to require the inspector to focus on what is not in his remit.
Blake Stephenson
Given the insufficient assurance on the outcome data, I wish to press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 93, in clause 15, page 12, line 32, after “force” insert
“, but no later than three years after the day on which section 1 comes into force,”—(Blake Stephenson.)
This probing amendment would limit the Home Secretary’s power to route appeals to the First-tier Tribunal to the first three years after the IIAA is established, so that the transition cannot run indefinitely.
Government amendment 43.
Clause 15 stand part.
Clause 16 stand part.
Clause 14 addresses the dual-running process between the authority and the first-tier tribunal. It gives a power to the Secretary of State or the Lord Chancellor to, among other things, transfer property, rights, liabilities or staff used by the first-tier tribunal from the Secretary of State to the authority. This provision allows for operational flexibility and makes for a smoother transition in case it is later decided that assets or property should transfer to the authority.
Clause 15 provides an essential safeguard during implementation of the authority. Its principal purpose is to protect continuity. Before part 1 is fully in force, clause 15 provides for specified descriptions of cases that would be decided by the authority to be transferred to the first-tier tribunal. This could prove necessary in case of a significant disruption affecting the authority’s operation—for example, to manage unpredictable spikes in demand in the implementation period when the authority is not yet fully formed.
The clause may also be used to correct the rare occurrence in which a case needs to be moved to another body. This ensures that cases are heard by the appropriate forum without avoidable procedural complexity. This is not a power to influence individual decisions, avoid judicial scrutiny or alter appeal rights. Appeals will continue to be determined independently and in accordance with the law. Clause 15 simply provides the resilience and flexibility needed to keep cases moving and correct exceptional allocation discrepancies.
Clause 16 provides the Secretary of State with the power to make provision that is consequential on part 1 of the Bill, which establishes the authority. The clause ensures that the wider statute book can operate properly when functions transfer from the first-tier tribunal to the IIAA. It provides that the authority is generally to be treated as a tribunal where legislation applies to tribunals. However, not every provision applying to tribunals will necessarily be suitable for the authority. The clause therefore enables regulations to modify how individual provisions apply, or to disapply them where appropriate. The clause may be used to amend, repeal or revoke provision made by primary legislation that has been passed before the Bill receives Royal Assent, or passed later in the same parliamentary Session.
Government amendment 43 provides the Lord Chancellor with limited and backstop powers to make amendments to the tribunal procedure rules in connection with regulations made to transfer cases between the authority and the existing first-tier tribunal. Tribunal procedure rules will continue to be made by the independent Tribunal Procedure Committee in the usual way in all other circumstances, and in connection with the transition to the new appeals structure where time allows. However, during the transition there may be exceptional circumstances requiring urgent practice and procedural changes to be followed in the first-tier and upper tribunals that cannot be accommodated through the usual rule-making process. This amendment provides an important safeguard to ensure that tribunal procedure adequately supports the transfer of cases and that proceedings are not delayed should such circumstances arise.
Blake Stephenson
This group brings together the machinery clauses of part 1: transfer schemes in clause 14, the transition in clause 15, and the consequential power in clause 16. I will speak to amendment 93 tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West and to Government amendment 43.
Clause 14 is technical in nature. It allows transfer schemes to move property, rights and liabilities to the appeals authority. The Opposition support that, but it is also where the costs of the reorganisation begin to show. The impact assessment—again, the previous impact assessment, not the one that was issued yesterday—warns of significant judicial liabilities in winding down the tribunal, because full-time judges hold lifetime appointments and there are the additional costs of running two systems. What is the estimated cost of winding down the tribunal? How many staff will transfer? Why does the Lord Chancellor, as well as the Home Secretary, need this power? What will the parallel running costs be?
We want the new body up to speed as quickly as possible. Will existing first-tier immigration judges be able to transfer or apply as senior adjudicators, for example, should they wish to? How many of them do the Government expect to apply and employ? The Law Society points out that the impact assessment says the implementation plans are “not yet fully developed”, which I think the Minister reflected earlier. Will a full costing of the transfer be published before any scheme is made?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his response, his questions and his challenges. Amendment 93 proposes that the authority should be able to transfer cases back to the first-tier tribunal only for a maximum of three years after clause 1 comes into force. If the amendment were to be accepted, it would reduce the flexibility within the overall appeals system to reduce the appeals backlog while simultaneously determining new appeals. I am afraid we are not able to set an arbitrary target of that kind, although I am sure that, given that we are bringing this Bill forward, the hon. Gentleman will understand our sense of urgency behind this transition. He need be in no doubt about the urgency with which we want to make this transition.
The length of time that the FTT IAC—even more acronyms—and the authority will need to run concurrently to ensure optimal efficiency in the overall appeals system will depend on a number of operational matters when the authority is established as a new statutory body corporate. Therefore, legislating for an arbitrary cut-off point of three years is unhelpful, and may result in appeals taking longer than necessary to be determined. We need to be flexible and responsive, which the current drafting of the Bill allows us to do.
Government amendment 43 provides the Lord Chancellor with limited and backstop powers to make amendments to the tribunal procedure rules in connection with regulations made to transfer cases between the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority and the existing first-tier tribunal. The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire challenged me as to why that cannot be done by the Secretary of State. It is not appropriate for the Home Secretary to lead on that; the Lord Chancellor doing so is obviously more appropriate.
Tribunal procedure rules will continue to be made by the independent Tribunal Procedure Committee in the usual way in all other circumstances, and in connection with the transition to new appeals structure where time allows. However, during the transition there may be exceptional circumstances requiring urgent practice and procedural changes to be followed in the first-tier and upper tribunals that cannot be accommodated through the normal rule-making process. This amendment provides an important safeguard to ensure that tribunal procedure adequately supports the transfer of cases and that proceedings are not delayed should such circumstances arise.
More importantly, the power is tightly constrained and can be exercised only in connection with regulations made under clause 15, which provides that regulations can be made to transfer cases from the authority back to the first-tier tribunal, and clause 52, which provides for commencement regulations. The power is intended to be used only where urgent rule changes that cannot be taken forward in the usual process are required.
Given that the power to make rules is otherwise exercised by the Tribunal Procedure Committee, the Lord Chancellor must consult the Senior President of Tribunals before exercising it. The power is appropriately constrained and subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Regulations that amend, repeal or revoke primary legislation, as defined, must be approved by both Houses through the affirmative procedure. Other regulations made under the clause will be subject to the negative procedure.
In response to the question of the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire about which cases will transfer, clause 52 makes provision for the commencement regulations, including setting out which cases will transition and when. On his questions about cost and implementation, as I have said, detailed plans for the authority, including the costs, are being developed, and work is continuing across the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice and His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service to refine the authority costs and establish comparable, current costs for the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber. There are not yet agreed or publishable figures for either comparison, as programme costs, affordability and benefits will be developed through the business case.
The hon. Gentleman also asked when the authority will start to make decisions, and when it will take all new appeals. The authority will be introduced through a phased transition, with the FTT IAC continuing to hear existing appeals in parallel while the new authority begins taking specified cohorts of new cases. We know that the current system is taking too long to deliver decisions, so the Bill creates a more scalable appeals system with greater capacity and faster processes, while retaining independent scrutiny and fairness.
Blake Stephenson
The Minister did not respond to my question about the projection that by the time the appeals authority gets up and running, approximately 200,000 people could be waiting for an appeal. Does that projection resonate with the Minister? Is that situation a possibility?
Blake Stephenson
The figure is taken from the evidence the Committee received from Refugee and Migrant Justice.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that. I do not recognise that figure, but of course, the Government want to make sure that we are fully aware of the figures. As was detailed at the start of the Committee’s consideration, the Government know that there are a huge number of appeals in the backlog. As the authority is developed and starts to come into force, the transition will be made. I am afraid that I cannot give the hon. Gentleman any projections, as I would not want to mislead the Committee with any numbers or predictions we could make at this stage.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 15
Power to specify cases to be heard by First-tier Tribunal instead of IIAA
Amendment made: 43, in clause 15, page 13, line 2, at end insert—
“(4) The Lord Chancellor may by rules made by statutory instrument make amendments to Tribunal Procedural Rules in connection with regulations made by the Secretary of State under this section.
(5) Before making rules under subsection (4), the Lord Chancellor must consult the Senior President of Tribunals.
(6) A statutory instrument containing rules under subsection (4) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”—(Anna Turley.)
This amendment would give the Lord Chancellor the power to amend Tribunal Procedure Rules in connection with regulations under clause 15 transferring cases back to the First-Tier Tribunal from the IIAA. (See also amendment 46.)
Clause 15, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Jade Botterill.)
(4 days, 5 hours ago)
Public Bill Committees
The Chair
We continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill. Before we begin, I remind Members to switch off their electronic devices or put them on silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings. The selection list for today’s sittings is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. This shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped for debate. Members are reminded to bob and catch my eye if they wish to speak in any debate.
Clause 17
Sponsor claims
I beg to move amendment 130, in clause 17, page 13, line 30, leave out from “claim’” to “, at” in line 32.
This amendment and amendment 131 are consequential on the repeal of section 12 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 2006 (which was never commenced) by the Schedule inserted by NS1.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendment 131.
Amendment 94, in clause 17, page 14, line 8, at end insert—
“, provided that the Secretary of State may only designate a place by regulations made by statutory instrument and that such a statutory instrument may only be made if a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This amendment would require the place at which sponsor human rights claims may be made to be set by regulations subject to the affirmative procedure.
Amendment 112, in clause 17, page 14, line 11, at end insert—
“(e) after subsection (1A) insert—
“(1B) Where a person makes a sponsor human rights claim, the Secretary of State must carry out safeguarding checks in relation to that person before determining the claim.
(1C) The safeguarding checks under subsection (1B) must establish, so far as reasonably practicable, whether the person making the sponsor human rights claim—
(a) has been convicted of an offence involving domestic abuse, stalking, sexual offending or forced marriage;
(b) is subject to a relevant protective order relating to domestic abuse, stalking, sexual offending or forced marriage;
(c) has been the subject of a finding by a court or other competent authority of conduct involving domestic abuse, stalking, sexual offending or forced marriage; or
(d) has previously been the subject of an immigration decision in which concerns relating to forced marriage, abuse or the genuineness of a family relationship were material.
(1D) Where information falling within subsection (1C) is identified, the Secretary of State must take that information into account when determining the sponsor human rights claim and any decision relating to the family member to whom the claim relates.
(1E) The Secretary of State must consider whether the information identified under subsection (1C) indicates that the admission of the family member to the United Kingdom would give rise to a safeguarding risk to—
(a) the family member;
(b) any child affected by the decision; or
(c) any other person who may reasonably be expected to be at risk as a result of the admission.””
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to carry out safeguarding checks where a person makes a sponsor human rights claim under Clause 17.
Amendment 95, in clause 17, page 14, line 15, leave out subsection (3).
This amendment would remove the exemption of sponsor human rights claims from the inadmissibility provisions in section 80A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, to test why such claims should be treated more favourably than other human rights claims.
Government amendment 96.
Amendment 97, in clause 17, page 15, line 4, at end insert—
“(8) In section 82 (right of appeal to the Tribunal), after subsection (1) insert—
“(1ZA) An appeal does not lie under subsection (1)(b) against a decision to refuse a sponsor human rights claim unless the family member to whom the claim relates would, if they lived with the person who made the claim, be a member of that person’s core cohabiting family within the meaning of section 117AA(2).””
This amendment would confine the new sponsor right of appeal to claims relating to a spouse, civil partner, partner or minor child (or, for a child sponsor, a parent), in line with the Government’s own definition of the core cohabiting family in clause 18.
Clause stand part.
It is good to see you again this morning, Mr Stuart, and good morning to all colleagues. We start our debate by moving on to part 2 of the Bill, which relates to article 8 of the European convention on human rights. Article 8, the right to a family life, is an important protection, but it is a qualified right. That means that it can be balanced against a public interest—such as the safety of the community or the security of our borders—where that outweighs an individual’s personal rights. We will not step away from our belief that the right to family and private life must be respected and upheld. However, we have been clear that we must strike the right balance between the rights of the individual and fairness to the UK public, and, crucially, bear down on abuse of the system.
As set out in our impact assessment, each main applicant granted first time on article 8 grounds carries an estimated lifetime cost to the taxpayer of about £141,000, equating to approximately £4.9 billion for those granted in 2025 alone. Home Office analysis suggests that 71% of first-time grants on the basis of article 8 were to individuals who had entered illegally and/or overstayed. If the same applied to the estimated 42,000 first-time grants in 2025, this would mean that 30,000 overstayers and illegal entrants would have been allowed to stay last year on the basis of article 8. Between 1 April 2016 and November 2021, of 1,011 foreign national offender deportation appeals allowed on human rights grounds, 70% were solely on article 8 grounds. And with 77,000 applications granted on article 8 grounds last year, this is having a significant effect on our ability to enforce our immigration laws.
Therefore, in this Bill, we are changing how article 8 is applied in the UK immigration system, to restore public confidence and ensure that the UK application of rights is in line with the Strasbourg court. The application of article 8 will be tightened to prevent misuse of the system and ensure that the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control carries proper weight in immigration decisions. As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has made clear, the abuse of human rights law does not just erode the public’s support for our immigration system; it erodes their support for the very idea of having such laws at all. For those who believe that those laws matter, it is essential that we reform them to end their abuse. The reforms will put more emphasis on compliance with our rules and contribution to our economy and to our society.
Clause 17 aims to bring greater clarity and control to entry clearance applications that engage article 8, protecting genuine family relationships while preventing weak or tenuous claims from undermining public confidence. Taken with the reforms in clauses 18 and 19, which we will come to in forthcoming groups and which tighten key elements of the article 8 assessment, it strengthens our ability to enforce the immigration rules and create a fairer, more controlled system.
The clause amends the definition of a human rights claim in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 to create a “sponsor human rights claim”. This will lay the foundations to allow UK-based sponsors to make an entry clearance application for an overseas family member to join them in the UK if the application relies on the sponsor’s article 8 right to family life. It will also enable the sponsor to appeal to the immigration tribunal if the Home Office refuses their application. I want to be very clear that only individuals with a specified status, including British citizens and those with other lawful residence, will be able to make a sponsor human rights claim. They need to establish a genuine family life claim and show that refusal would disproportionately interfere with their article 8 rights. These reforms do not create a new migration route or entitlement to come to the UK. They simply ensure a correct process that is based on the UK sponsor, not the family abroad.
The clause will affect sponsors who wish to rely on article 8 family life because their family member does not meet the entry clearance requirement under the family routes and immigration rules. Enabling the UK-based sponsor to apply will focus attention on the circumstances and article 8 rights of the sponsor, rather than the overseas family member. This reflects the established legal position that it is the sponsor who is within the UK jurisdiction for the purposes of article 8 decision making. The focus on the rights of the UK sponsor is intended to reduce expansive interpretation of where article 8 rights are found to exist, and to prevent article 8 becoming a route for those with tenuous family links to the UK.
Too often, the focus can be on the circumstances of the applicants abroad, whereas the main legal question should be whether there is a disproportionate interference with the family life of the UK-based sponsor.
Will clause 17 make it easier for people to come to the UK on an article 8 basis if we do not specify where sponsor human rights claims can be made?
I thank my hon. Friend for asking a really important question, because it is right that we clarify this matter. The clause does not make it easier for overseas family members to enter the UK. Sponsors will still need to meet a very high threshold to argue successfully that it would be a breach of their article 8 rights if the Home Office refused their family member entry to the UK. Strict requirements for the procedure sponsors must follow to make an application, which will be set out in the immigration rules.
The focus on the rights of the UK sponsor is intended to reduce expansive interpretation of where article 8 rights are found to exist, and to prevent article 8 from becoming a route for those with tenuous family links to the UK. Too often, the focus can be on the circumstances of the applicants abroad, whereas the main legal question should be whether there is a disproportionate influence on the family life of the UK-based sponsor.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
As I understand it, the purpose of this new provision is to focus on the rights of the person in the UK, to ensure that their right to a family life is respected according to their circumstances. But their circumstances will be that their other family member is living abroad; that is their family life. I do not understand why that pre-existing situation would suddenly infringe their human rights and give them the right to bring in a family member. Their circumstance, by nature, is people living in two different countries.
The hon. Member makes a really important point. That is why we are trying to narrow the definition to those who are here in the UK, because for far too long it has been on the basis of a very tenuous link that family members can put in a claim from abroad to come to the UK. This measure narrows that definition while still ensuring that we maintain our obligations under article 8 rights.
The recent Court of Appeal judgment in IA and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department provided helpful clarification around the correct tests to determine where article 8 family life exists, especially between extended family members. However, the judgment addressed an issue with article 8 family life being applied to a broader set of circumstances and relationships, which risked undermining our systems and rules. Despite these helpful findings, there remains a risk of inconsistent decision making, where the primary focus is not on the article 8 rights of the family member in the UK—the person within the UK’s jurisdiction according to ECHR case law.
The clause will add greater weight to the findings of the Court of Appeal and bring more clarity to decision making for entry clearance cases that engage article 8 family life. In IA, the Court of Appeal also reaffirmed the importance of the Government’s immigration policy when striking the right balance between an individual’s rights and the public interest.
In combination with the reforms in clauses 18 and 19, clause 17 makes it clear where the Government’s policy position lies in relation to the application of article 8 and where the Government expect the rules to be enforced. This will create a clearer, fairer and more controlled system. Details of the application process, including forms and evidential requirements, will be set out in immigration rules and supporting guidance.
Given the complexity of the clause, I will give Members an overview of each subsection. Subsection (1) creates a “sponsor human rights claim” in law by adding to the existing definition of a human rights claim at section 113 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. This has the effect of permitting a UK-based sponsor to appeal against a decision to refuse a human rights claim for their overseas family member. That is the starting point for future changes to the rules, forms and guidance.
Subsection (2) explains that further amendments are required to the 2002 Act for the clause to operate properly. Those changes are set out in subsections (3) to (7). Subsection (3) makes changes so that a sponsor human rights claim cannot be deemed inadmissible or not suitable to be considered, which is necessary because reforms in the clause mean that the UK sponsor is the applicant, not the overseas individual requiring entry clearance. As I will cover in relation to amendment 95, it would be inappropriate simply to refuse to consider a human rights claim because the UK sponsor is a national of a safe country. Such safeguards are designed to prevent improper protection claims from nationals of those countries.
Subsection (4) makes further changes linked to the fact that the clause makes the sponsor the applicant, not the person overseas. In effect, at appeal, the courts will hear all matters relating to the family member seeking entry to the UK and not include any immigration matters related to the sponsor. Subsection (5) creates an exception so that sponsor human rights claims do not need to have their appeals considered within the timeframe set out in the statute. That is because an individual will not be able to act as a sponsor if they are liable to deportation action.
Subsection (6) prevents a sponsor human rights claim being certified and denied an appeal simply because the UK-based sponsor is entitled to live in a safe state, primarily European countries. That would not be a fair application of the power where a right to family life was being relied on. The clause does not prevent a claim being refused and denied an appeal where the matters under consideration are clearly unfounded, for example because the relationship was a sham. Subsection (7) ensures that sponsor human rights appeals are not treated as abandoned or cancelled because the UK sponsor holds permission to be in the UK. Instead, an appeal is abandoned if the overseas family member is granted leave to enter or remain in the UK.
The Minister mentioned sham relationships. Will she clarify who will be eligible to act as a sponsor?
My hon. Friend makes an important point. Basically, anyone who is a British citizen will be eligible to become a sponsor, I believe. Forgive me, I did not want to mislead her by getting the wrong answer, but yes, I was right: individuals with specified status in the UK, including British citizens, settled persons and those with certain other lawful residence will be able to make a sponsor human rights claim. They will need to establish a genuine family life claim—we will talk about that in more detail in the following clauses—and show that refusal would disproportionately interfere with their article 8 rights. As I said, the reforms do not create a new migration route or entitlement; they simply ensure that human rights claims for those who are settled British citizens, settled persons and those with residence here are raised and considered through the correct process.
I thank the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire for tabling amendment 94. It would enable the Home Office to designate a place only when a sponsor human rights claim can be made via statutory instrument subject to the affirmative procedure. The Bill does not require the definition of a designated place to be the subject of regulations, as there are currently no plans to specify the geographical place from where such claims can be made. The focus of article 8 is on whether the individual in the UK making a sponsorship claim has a strong enough claim, not where the family is based. That is because a UK-based sponsor will be expected to make their claim through a paid-for online application. We will use the immigration rules to specify the procedures that applicants must follow to make a sponsor human rights claim. That will allow us to go into the necessary level of technical detail, while retaining flexibility to make changes as we implement the new application process.
Ben Goldsborough (South Norfolk) (Lab)
What is interesting about the subsections that the Minister has gone through is that one of the huge problems we face is the judicialisation of British law, where we see interpretation because the law has been too loose. Will she explain how the steps that we are taking will rein those powers back into the sovereignty of Parliament, so that we have more control and can represent our constituents on the issues that they care about the most?
My hon. Friend gets to the exact heart of what we are doing with this legislation. Through the build-up of the legal framework, we have been guilty of over-interpreting Strasbourg law. By codifying what we are doing, through this Bill, we are ensuring that we are not going over and above that but are simply complying with our international obligations.
Does the Minister have any thoughts about what the fee structure might look like?
That is an important point. I will be delighted to provide more evidence as we go through due process. We must make sure that they are proportionate and do not push people into poverty, but it is important that we are charging people a fee where they are bringing family members to this country under article 8. For the reasons I have set out, the Government do not support the amendment.
Amendment 112 would require the Home Office to carry out safeguarding checks on individuals who make a sponsor human rights claim and that any information uncovered in these checks is considered when the Home Office determines that claim. I thank the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) for raising the importance of safeguarding vulnerable migrants, particularly children and victims of domestic abuse, in this amendment. It is a really important issue and one that will be fully considered in the design and implementation of the application process for sponsor human rights claims. As clause 17 simply paves the way for changing how an entry clearance application relying on article 8 family life can be made, we do not believe this level of detail is required in the primary legislation.
The immigration rules already contain safeguards to protect children coming to the UK to join family members who could put them at risk of harm. However, we will fully consider if additional safeguarding requirements are necessary as we develop the procedural requirements for sponsor human rights claims in the immigration rules, because an important point is made through amendment 112. This is a safeguarding proposal that we would support in principle when the application process is designed. I hope that hon. Members are reassured that our support for the principle is on the record through this Committee.
Ben Goldsborough
I would be keen to hear the Minister expand on the issue of safeguarding particularly for victims of domestic abuse and domestic violence. Can she expand on the action the Government will be taking to protect people from that heinous crime?
Absolutely. We will of course come on to talk about modern slavery and so on later in the Bill. Protection for vulnerable people is at the heart of what this Bill is about.
Where a UK-based sponsor is young or vulnerable and unable to complete an application, they can give permission to someone else to enter their details, but for those who are vulnerable overseas, existing safeguarding measures are already in place to identify any indicators of coercion, exploitation or trafficking. We will of course consider how these measures can be further strengthened to enhance the identification and management of risk, but our approach ensures that vulnerable individuals are protected while maintaining the integrity of the system, through ensuring the rights of UK-based sponsors are the focus of entry clearance decisions that engage article 8.
We feel that a blanket rule to prevent individuals who have been convicted of these criminal behaviours would not be compatible with the EHCR, which necessitates an individualised assessment, but we are keen to make sure that safeguarding requirements are done through the immigration rules to protect anyone at risk of domestic abuse from their sponsor.
I want to press the Minister on this point. I am quite taken with amendment 112, and some of the issues to do with sponsors it raises are incredibly serious. I hear the Minister’s comment about not being explicit in primary legislation, but will she explain in simple details, for my understanding, how we will ensure that nobody convicted of an offence involving domestic abuse, stalking, sexual offending or forced marriage will be able to be a sponsor for the purposes of article 8 claims?
I share my hon. Friend’s view. When I saw this amendment, I thought the principle was really important. When we come to write the immigration rules, we would absolutely want to make sure that it is at the heart of them. We would not ever want to see someone convicted of domestic violence, anything to do with child protection or any of the issues outlined in the amendment ever being a sponsor to bring anybody into this country. I hope that the Committee is reassured by my placing all of that on record: when the immigration rules come to be written I would hope and expect to see that at the heart of them, with those protections in there.
Joe Robertson
The Minister says that her provision on the core cohabiting family member has been restricted by this definition to tackle the issue of people coming into this country. Can she tell us how many people are currently in the UK with a core cohabiting family member outside the UK? What is that figure so we can understand at least the potential pool of applications?
I cannot give the hon. Gentleman the figures that he asked for. I gave some initial examples at the start of my introduction about the volumes that we are dealing with. Some 77,000 applications were granted on article 8 grounds last year. We know that 71% of the first-time grants on the basis of article 8 were to individuals who had entered this country illegally and were overstaying. We are keen that this issue forms a core part of the reforms.
Joe Robertson
Could the Minister perhaps provide that figure, either later on this morning or this afternoon, for how many people are in the UK with a cohabiting family member overseas as of today?
I can absolutely undertake to provide as much information as I can to the Committee on that issue. We may not know how many children somebody has in another country. Unless they have put in an article 8 claim, we would not necessarily know about their family members, so it may be a little difficult for us to predict that. However, I can undertake, and give my commitment to the Committee, that we will do our best to get as close to a figure as we can and to provide that to the Committee.
To continue on the rationale for opposing amendment 112, we already have safeguarding measures in place across the immigration system to identify indicators of coercion, exploitation and trafficking. We will consider whether these measures can be further strengthened to improve the identification and mitigation of risk. Our approach ensures that vulnerable individuals are protected while maintaining the integrity of the system by ensuring that the rights of UK-based sponsors are the focus of entry clearance decisions that engage article 8.
Clause 17 does not exempt human rights claims from the general certification power in section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which applies irrespective of whether the claimant can reside in the listed safe countries. That means that we will be able to prevent appeals by certifying human rights claims that are bound to fail. Although it may be relevant to consider whether the UK-based sponsor is able to reside with a family member abroad, that will be done as part of the substantive article 8 assessment.
Will the Minister confirm whether clause 17 will be the way that people who have refugee status are expected to sponsor family members?
As I set out at the beginning, it will be those who have a settled status. My understanding is that those that have a settled refugee status will be able to apply. Again, I can get confirmation for my hon. Friend on that point.
Amendments 95 and 96 taken together would mean that sponsor human rights claims can be made inadmissible or certified as clearly unfounded in the same way as other human rights claims. Applying section 80A or section 94(3) of the 2002 Act to sponsor human rights claims would preclude, in many cases, a substantive assessment of the claim if the sponsor were a national of, or able to reside in, any of the safe countries listed in the Act. In most cases, it would not be reasonable to refuse to consider a sponsor human rights claim fully, just because the sponsor making it was able to reside in one of those safe countries. For that reason, the Government cannot accept amendment 95.
As the Committee will be aware, I have tabled amendments to part 3 of the Bill to insert a new schedule that provides greater clarity on the Government’s approach to the core protection model. We will debate those amendments and the new schedule later in Committee.
Dr Zubir Ahmed (Glasgow South West) (Lab)
As a matter of record, it is important for my right hon. Friend to outline why the amendments and new schedule have been tabled now and why they were not included in the original Bill. I know my constituents take a keen interest in this matter, as my constituency has one of the highest amounts of asylum seeker housing in the country.
My understanding is that it was recognised that we want to use this opportunity to ensure that the security in this process is as firm as possible, and we obviously have a fair amount of work to undertake to do that during the swift passage of the Bill. It is about ensuring that this Committee has the opportunity to consider the amendments and new schedule and that they are brought in at the right stage of the Bill. Some of these things take time, but we are keen for the Bill to close as many loopholes as possible.
Without the introduction of new schedule 1 by the Government, amendments 95 and 96 as originally put forward would have the effect of making the nationality of the UK-based sponsor dictate how a sponsor human rights claim was considered. That would also impact British citizens who are dual nationals, even when they were born in the UK and/or are British from birth if they also hold another nationality that is on one of the safe country lists.
Amendment 95 would mean that a British citizen who was born in the UK to British citizen parents but who also has citizenship of an EU member state, for example through their grandparents, would have an application to sponsor a family member to join them in the UK under article 8 declared inadmissible. Ireland is an EU member state and is therefore included within the existing section 80A inadmissibility provisions. That currently means that if an Irish citizen claims asylum in the UK, the claim is declared inadmissible and not substantively considered, but amendment 95 would mean that if an Irish citizen, resident in the UK, sought to sponsor a family member to join them in the UK, relying on article 8, that would be declared inadmissible. In contrast, a British citizen who holds no other nationality, or a citizen of a non-EU country or a country not on the section 80A list who is settled in the UK, would be able to sponsor a family member and rely on article 8 of the ECHR.
The Opposition originally introduced amendment 96, which would have meant that the nationality of a sponsor would dictate whether any article 8 claim would be presumed to be clearly unfounded. Instead, the Government have adopted the amendment, which now removes the exemption for human rights claims, but does so because, within the new schedule 1, it has also repealed the reference to human rights claims in section 94(3) altogether. That means that the nationality of a person will continue to dictate whether there is a presumption that any protected claim that they make is clearly unfounded, but nationality will not create any presumption in respect of non-protected human rights claims.
The Government’s position is that the designation of any country as safe should, quite rightly, relate to protection claims and that article 8 claims based on family or private life will always be person-specific rather than place-specific—a very important difference. The test to clarify the refusal of any claim remains that, without substance, it is bound to fail. That test applies to any claim made by a person of any nationality. Government amendment 96, in conjunction with new schedule 1, does not change the test for certification, but merely removes any presumption of certification for article 8 private or family life claims based on nationality. Government amendments 96, 130 and 131 are consequential and will support the model that the Committee will examine shortly.
Amendment 97 would limit appeal rights to the immigration tribunal to sponsors whose article 8 claim relates to a member of their core cohabiting family, as defined in clause 18. The Government do not think that the amendment would be appropriate. ECHR case law is clear that family life is usually confined to, but can exist outside of, the core cohabiting family.
Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stuart.
I thank the Minister for her opening remarks, and indeed for pre-empting and answering some of the questions that I have in my speech. It is almost as if she might have had a spy in my team, looking at the questions that I might ask. For these debates on the ECHR, we perhaps had a dry run yesterday in the first Opposition day debate.
Let me start by saying that the Opposition oppose clause 17—perhaps not a surprise to Members, as we said so in our reasoned amendment on Second Reading—and we will vote against its standing part of the Bill. Our amendments are tabled to test the Government’s reasoning. Some of our points have already been answered by the Minister, but I will go through them for the record. If the Committee decides to keep the clause, we submit that our amendments would limit the damage that it will cause.
Clause 17 is the first clause of part 2 of the Bill, which the Government believe is the answer on article 8 of the ECHR. That makes this the right place to ask the question on which the whole debate on part 2 will turn: does the Bill change what a court must do when someone says that article 8 prevents their removal, or does it simply change what the court should have regard to? I will deal first with clause 17 itself and then with what it tells us about the Bill as a whole.
The clause creates a new statutory category of “sponsor human rights claim”. This would enable someone already situated in the UK to submit an application directly to the Secretary of State, at a location designated by the Secretary of State. Such a claim would assert that refusing a member of their family entry to the UK would breach article 8. Subsection (1)(d) then brings those sponsor claims within the scope of the human rights appeals framework set out in part 5 of the 2002 Act. As the explanatory notes confirm, the effect is that the UK-based sponsor becomes the claimant, with the right to appeal.
As the Minister went through, subsections (3) to (7) then carve out sponsor claims from the provisions that apply to other human rights claims in the 2002 Act. They cannot be declared inadmissible under section 80A of the 2002 Act; they cannot be certified as clearly unfounded under section 94; they sit outside the statutory timeframe in section 86B—I suspect that the civil servants might be looking those up now for the Minister—and there are bespoke rules on pending and abandoned appeals.
The Government are presenting these changes as a tightening of the rules: overseas family members may not claim, because the sponsor must. However, our reasoned amendment on Second Reading set out our concern that the Bill would allow sponsor human rights claims and so enable people outside the UK to enter on human rights grounds. There is nothing in the evidence, nor in what the Minister said in her opening remarks, to convince me that that concern was misplaced, so I have a few points to go through, if I may.
Is the shadow Minister’s principal concern that the clause will result in an increase in overseas human rights claims?
Blake Stephenson
Yes, and fundamentally I think the clause is tinkering around the edges with the application of the ECHR. We have been here before; I will come on to this later in my speech. Successive Governments have tried to do this, but my fundamental concern is that the clause will not work.
Let me turn first to the drafting. The explanatory notes say that overseas article 8 applications must be made by the sponsor, but the clause defines a claim as made
“at a place designated by the Secretary of State”.
As the House of Commons Library points out, it deals with the appeal stage; it does not say how claims are lodged in the first place. Minister, where in the Bill is the provision that stops an overseas family member applying? Which places will be designated and by what regulations, rules or guidance?
Who holds the right of appeal today? In written evidence submitted to the Committee, the Bar Council stated:
“Until now, an application for entry clearance to come to the UK had to be made by the person overseas and any appeal against refusal had to be brought by them.”
Clause 17 would now give the UK-based sponsor an appeal of their own. Does the Minister accept that clause 17 introduces a right of appeal that currently does not exist today? If so, how is clause 17 in any way, as she says, tightening the rules?
Secondly, I want to discuss the exemptions. Clause 17 leaves inadmissibility and certification in place for other human rights claims. Why should a sponsor claim be exempt from both? On amendments 95 and 96, I note that the Government have adopted our amendment 96, for which I am grateful. I am sure that they did so for their own good reasons, not just to copy and paste an Opposition amendment. Those amendments were tabled to remove those exemptions. They were probing amendments, but let us assume that amendment 96 probed sufficiently for it to be taken on board by the Government. If the Minister cannot explain to the Committee for what reason a sponsor claim would be treated more favourably than any other human rights claim, the exemptions should go. Perhaps she could address that point on amendment 95 in more detail.
There is a point of drafting to consider in whether the clause actually works at all. Clause 52(5) ties the commencement of clause 17(3) to section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, and clause 17(5) to section 50 of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025 when it comes fully into force. The Minister may not have the answers to a complicated drafting question, but perhaps during the course of today’s debate, her civil servants might provide an answer. I note that section 50 of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act is not yet in force, and that schedule 1 to this Bill would repeal it. Would the Minister explain how clause 17(5) is meant to commence? If there is an error in drafting, will it be corrected?
I will move on to the interaction with family reunion. Three witnesses in our oral evidence sessions—Vicky Tennant of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Jon Featonby of the Refugee Council and Angela Afzal of the International Rescue Committee—took views very different from the Opposition on the Bill, but their evidence is relevant as we scrutinise the clause. Ms Tennant told us that the Bill’s presumption of cohabitation
“is a difficult threshold to make”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 9, Q7.]
in the refugee context, particularly given the suspension of the refugee family reunion route. Mr Featonby estimated that probably 20,000 people have been unable to apply since that route was suspended just over a year ago. Ms Afzal warned that families could be encouraged to resort to smugglers to reunite.
The written evidence goes a bit further. The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association tells us that the human rights claim
“may be the only realistic remaining path”
for refugee families while the dedicated route is suspended. The Bar Council told us that it will be the “only practical gateway”. The British Red Cross highlights that 12,888 family reunion visas were granted in the year to June 2026, and that the core protection status of cause 21 is expected to carry “no family reunion rights” at all.
Although I draw different conclusions, the dedicated route has been suspended, and the clause creates a statutory sponsor claim with a right to appeal and without safe country filters. The people with expertise in this field who gave evidence expect that it will become the main entry route, so are the Government not simply closing one back door and opening another? What assessment has the Home Office made of those numbers?
David Smith (North Northumberland) (Lab)
It is obviously not on the face of the Bill, but does the hon. Gentleman recognise that the Government’s intention to introduce safe and legal routes would ultimately solve the problem that he is describing, as raised by the witnesses?
Blake Stephenson
I recognise the Government’s intentions. Of course, we are here to talk about the implications of the Bill, but I recognise the hon. Gentleman’s broader point.
The Bar Council also points out that the details of how the sponsor claims will work will be set out in immigration rules, which have not yet been made, although the Minister has referred to them. Will the Government publish the draft rules and the new refugee family reunion rules before Report so that Members of this House can know exactly what they are voting for?
The Library records that roughly 500 people abroad were granted article 8 visas in 2025. How many out-of-country applications and appeals are there each year, and how many do the Government expect there will be under clause 17?
Amendment 97 would at least confine the new right of appeal to the family, which is what the Government say article 8 is about. An appeal against a refused sponsor claim would stand only where the family member was part of the claimant’s core cohabiting family under proposed new section 117AA—that would be a spouse, civil partner, partner, minor child, or the parent of a child sponsor. If the Government truly believe in their own definition in clause 18, why will they not accept that the sponsor’s right of appeal should be limited to that definition?
Amendment 112, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford, would require the Home Secretary to carry out safeguarding checks before deciding a sponsor claim. Such checks would include whether the sponsor has convictions, protective orders or findings for domestic abuse, stalking, sexual offending or forced marriage, or a history of immigration decisions in which those matters were material. It would also require a consideration of the weight of any risk to the family member, the children or others. If the Government are to create a statutory route in which the sponsor drives the claim, the least they should do is check who the sponsor is.
I thank the Minister for supporting the amendment in principle. She described some of the existing safeguarding measures, which will be strengthened, but I would be grateful if she unpacked that somewhat more to demonstrate the Government’s clear commitment to ensuring that the spirit of the amendment, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford, will be implemented in a way that works in practice, if it is not on the face of the Bill. I ask that for a particular reason. The Minister knows that I have been asking the Home Office quite a lot of written parliamentary questions in recent months, particularly about legal immigration and visa controls. Given the responses that I have been getting, I seriously question whether the systems that the Home Office has in place to monitor, track and oversee the compliance of visa sponsors are fit for purpose. It would be prudent for the Minister to provide comfort to this Committee that there will be better controls for sponsors who use this route.
Professor Singer—who, it is worth noting, is opposed to the Bill—told us that the Court of Appeal’s recent decision in IA and others
“was a very restrictive interpretation of article 8…I do not see the courts taking a particularly liberal approach to article 8.” ––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 61, Q99.]
If that is right, what is the mischief that clause 17 addresses? Is it meant to reverse the Court of Appeal in IA, to codify it, or to do something else? I know that the Minister referred to that particular Court of Appeal case, but I would be grateful if those specific questions could be answered.
Ben Goldsborough
I know that the Opposition place a lot of emphasis on the Lord Wolfson report on leaving the ECHR entirely, but that report states that doing so would terminate part 3 of the UK-EU trade co-operation agreement that was secured by the hon. Gentleman’s party, meaning that we would leave Eurojust, Europol and fast-track expedition frameworks. All that puts us at risk of not being able to manage the immigration system in the fair and transparent way that our constituents want. Does he not agree?
Blake Stephenson
Funnily enough, I do not agree with the hon. Member—shock horror. Lord Wolfson produced an extremely extensive piece of legal advice, running to some 180 pages, which the hon. Member has, I am sure, read from front to back. There are absolutely no legal impediments to us leaving the ECHR, and to do so would resolve the issues before us in the Bill. Some of the matters that he has raised are political rather than legal, in the sense that they can be negotiated politically. The important thing is that we are fair to the British people and that we have an immigration system that they can have confidence in, and we can deliver that only by departing from the ECHR. I do not want to go down rabbit warrens on all the reasons why it is a fantastic policy, but no doubt the hon. Member will ask further questions as we proceed.
The one time Parliament tried to disapply the convention in this area—hon. Members will love to hear the word “Rwanda”, I am sure—was in the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024. The provision never took effect and was repealed by the Labour Government in 2025. Government and Parliament must be willing to take steps that require the courts to decide convention cases differently. That is the direction in which the evidence we heard points this Bill Committee.
If the Government will not change the framework and merely ask the courts to “have regard”, part 2 will at best deliver what the Government’s own impact assessment predicts: refusals that do not become removals. Why have the Government not considered giving the courts a direction that they cannot set aside—an exclusive code, for example, or disapplication of the Human Rights Act in this context? If they have considered that but have not moved forward with it, can the Minister explain why it was rejected?
The unfortunate reality for the Bill is that the Government are falling into the same trap as previous Governments: legislation that is well meaning—even well drafted—and designed to circumvent the constraints of the ECHR. The courts will inevitably default to the same positions that they always have, allowing people who have no right to be in this country to stay for longer in the meantime. If, or more likely when, this Bill fails to genuinely empower the Government to deal with the extensive grounds for resisting removal that the various articles of the convention create, will the Minister and other Labour Members finally join us in accepting that the issue here is not how carefully the legislation is drafted but the ECHR itself, and that we cannot have a meaningful conversation about restoring control over our immigration system without taking steps to leave the ECHR?
Blake Stephenson
I am going to close, because I think I have spoken enough and time is pressing on.
Clause 17 creates a new statutory claim for sponsors, and new rights of appeal, which will become the main route for refugee families. It exempts those claims from the safe country filter. Its detail is left to rules that we have not seen, and it commences by reference to provisions that are not yet in force or that the Bill would repeal. Amendment 84, which would have left out the clause, has not been selected, so the Committee will instead decide the matter by voting on whether the clause should stand part of the Bill. For the reasons I have mentioned in this speech, which has gone on far too long, the Opposition will vote against it.
Joe Robertson
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Stuart. I am speaking a little earlier than I had expected—I misunderstood the shadow Minister. I thought he was just getting started, but it turns out that he considers his speech on the long side. Just for the record, I do not.
I am going to address the wider issue of whether the Bill, the clause and this set of amendments really do address the issue that the Minister, and indeed the entire Government, want them to. Their intention, as I understand it—I do not think this is controversial, at least given what the Government say they want to do—is to reduce the number of claims, to ensure that claims are genuine and to create efficiencies in the system. Of course, we all have those aims. I think that the Government have made a genuine attempt with the Bill, but as far as I can see, it will fail substantially.
David Smith
I understand the point the hon. Gentleman seeks to make about the potential pool of people, but is that not theoretical? The pool of people around the world who may be refugees is tens of millions. Ultimately, it is up to the Government of this country to determine the criteria for someone to be accepted as a refugee. It seems like a slightly philosophical point, if he does not mind me saying so.
Joe Robertson
I do not accept that it is philosophical. The pool of people in the world who could make an asylum claim runs to hundreds of millions, and possibly billions, because, tragically, a lot of the world is very unsafe and there is a lot of inhumane treatment and activity. As much as our hearts want us to try to improve the lives of those people, we would probably all agree that the UK cannot take in those vast numbers. However, I am addressing the more limited provision that the Government have put forward; I am talking not about the pool of people in the world who may be suffering inhumane or degrading treatment, but about the “core cohabiting” family members overseas who have a family member in the UK who might want to make an application on their behalf under the newly qualified right to a family life in proposed new section 117AA of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
Let me turn to the new definition of a core cohabiting family member. Those words might prompt a debate of many hours or days, but the Bill helps us. It tells us that a “core cohabiting family” member of Person A is
“(a) A’s spouse, civil partner or partner;
(b) where A is a parent, A’s children who are under the age of 18;
(c) where A is under the age of 18, A’s parents.”
That makes sense: we are talking about children, parents, partners or civil partners. However, if we take the example of a civil partner, the provision would, as I understand it, allow someone in the UK—remember, that person may not be a British citizen, but someone who has a right to be here—to make an application to bring their civil partner, who is living outside the UK, into the UK, on the basis that to do anything else would be to infringe their right to a family life.
The Minister said pointedly that the focus is on the claim made by the person already here and their circumstances, rather than on the person outside the UK, but we know the circumstances of the person in the UK making such an application for their civil partner. Their family circumstances are that they are living a family life in two different countries; that is the pre-existing arrangement when they make the application. To most of us, though not everyone, that might seem unusual, but those are the circumstances. I do not understand why, if we have a system based on the circumstances of someone who has made an application, that application should seek to rearrange their family life and say, “We’re no longer happy to live in two different countries; we want to live in the same country—and, by the way, that same country must be the UK and not the other country.”
This provision does not seem to be person-focused at all; it seems to have been drafted in effect, almost as of right, to allow someone’s civil partner into the UK. If we run the argument the other way and say, “Of course two civil partners should be able to live together in the same country and, indeed, in the same household. Isn’t that what a right to a private family life means?”, the case will be won by the sponsor making the application, because they will say, “How can you possibly expect me to live in a separate country to my civil partner? That is inhumane and unfair. You wouldn’t expect it of an ordinary citizen in the UK, so why do you expect it of me? It is discriminatory. It is against the provisions in the Human Rights Act and the ECHR,” and so on. It seems to me that all those cases will be won on that basic assertion, and that what this provision really does is allow someone to bring in their civil partner in all circumstances, as of right.
Indeed, it may be worse than that. If that is in effect what is happening, we may as well say it, but what we have here is law that will be contested in court. If the Government contest each case, that will lead to a huge administrative process and a huge court backlog and appeals issues, just to end up with a set of decisions that all say the same thing: “Yes, of course, that overseas partner can come in.”
Setting that aside—and that is the most certain part of the provision, even though I argue that it is inherently uncertain and that it does not achieve its objectives—there are other circumstances set out in the provision in which someone does not need to be a core cohabiting family member. Proposed new section 117AA(1) says that the provision is “normally limited” to a core cohabiting family member, so there will be abnormal situations in which someone can come into this country even if they are not a core cohabiting family member. That, surely—obviously—is the gateway for Strasbourg jurisprudence. I acknowledge the Minister’s honesty when she said earlier that we—and by “we” I think she meant the British state rather than her Government particularly—as a country have been guilty of over-interpreting Strasbourg law, but that provision in her Government’s Bill is the gateway for Strasbourg law to be applied in the ordinary way that it has been over years, and that is the issue we are trying to tackle.
The Bill gives us some help on what constitutes an abnormal situation—a situation where a non-core cohabitant family member could come in. To quote proposed new section 117AA(4)(b) of the 2002 Act, that is where
“the circumstances are such that there is an additional element of dependency”
between two family members. But there could be an additional element of dependency between anyone residing in the UK and a family member overseas. Let us remember that we are not talking about core cohabitants now; we are talking about any family member. That could be a cousin, uncle, aunt, second cousin or third cousin—who knows?
Who will decide whether there is an additional element of dependency? Well, it will be based on the facts. The applicant will have to present a whole set of circumstances, including the family relationship that existed before anyone ever got to the UK and how much it meant to them emotionally or financially: “Yes, normally third cousins are not close and interdependent, but you must understand the culture where I am from. We had a relationship that was more like brother and sister or husband and wife, and therefore I should be successful.”
Who will decide that? It will be the bureaucratic infrastructure of the state, which is already overburdened, be it the Home Office, which typically makes a decision that gets overturned, a new system of judges appointed on the advice of the Home Office, or the existing appeal structure all the way up through the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court and the interpretation of Strasbourg jurisprudence, including the Human Rights Act and the fundamentals of the ECHR. All the things that currently challenge our ability to say no are brought in or retained by this provision. Even if a number of claims are unsuccessful—and I am sure a number will be—the number of cases that will go through the courts to establish their success or otherwise will continue to overburden the system and give everyone at least the hope that they might be successful, even in hopeless cases.
I say as a former lawyer—not a human rights lawyer or one who has been involved in this type of case—that this sort of provision is a gift to the world of ongoing litigation. Legal professionals try to construct a strong case with new legislation, as is their legitimate role. There is nothing like a bit of new legislation for the legal profession to get their teeth into. They try to create new case law to interpret it and find out what it is all about. Very often, litigation increases rather than decreases, at least in the short to medium term, when a novel provision like this one is introduced.
An abnormal, or not normal, family situation is not defined, but there are a few examples of an abnormal situation where an applicant would be successful. To paraphrase proposed new section 117AA(5)(b)(i) to (iii) of the 2002 Act—we can see just how complicated the Bill has become to try to achieve an aim that I do not think it will—one example is where there is mental illness in the person who is outside the UK, and care and support would need to be provided by the person in the UK. An application is therefore likely to be successful if the sponsor in the UK says: “My family member who is not in the UK”—they do not have to be a core cohabiting family member; they just have to be family, whatever that means—“has a mental illness.” Presumably whether they have a mental illness or not will be judged by a healthcare system outside the UK, which might be very different from our own, with a very different standard of what counts as a diagnosis. “That person has a mental illness and there is no care or support available to them other than me, a family member in the UK.” Again, they might be in a country with a health service that, almost universally, does not provide sufficient care and support to people with mental illness. That could, in reality, be quite an easy application to make.
The hon. Member has spent a long time focusing on clause 18. I wonder whether he is going to repeat his comments when we come to the next group of amendments.
Joe Robertson
I shall speak to the next group when the time comes. I do not make any apology for focusing on what I see as a major flaw in the legislation. I do not have a political disagreement with the Government; I just think that what they are trying to do is not achieved by this provision. I am certainly not here to give an overall appraisal of the Bill or of this group. That is for the Minister and the shadow Minister. As a Back Bencher, I am here to try to examine, explore and understand what I see as a weakness in the Bill. That is my job in Committee.
The hon. Gentleman is clearly misunderstanding, because this is not what we are meant to be discussing right now.
Joe Robertson
I have it right in front of me. I think the wider points have been made. The hon. Member is obviously desperate to make the decisions that a Chair would ordinarily make. Maybe one day she will be elevated to the position of chairing a Committee. If she would like me to repeat everything I have said, I will be happy to do so in this afternoon’s sitting.
I am slightly reluctant to stop now, because it looks like I have wilted in the face of an intervention from the Government Benches, but I had come to the end of my contribution. I hope I have made my point, even if it is not agreed with.
I thank the hon. Members for Mid Bedfordshire and for Isle of Wight East for their very thorough comments. For me, this absolutely explains the benefit of line-by-line discussion of a Bill. There have been important challenges and critiques, and I will do my best to answer as many as I can—I think the shadow Minister must have had more than 20 or 25 questions; I will endeavour to write to him and the Committee on any that I accidentally overlook.
I really appreciated the statements from the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East, but I think my hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes was right: he did stray into clause 18, which we will come to this afternoon. I took note of his views and look forward to responding to some of those later.
There is a lot to cover, so I will do my best to race through it. We will have a longer conversation this afternoon about the ECHR, so I will not pre-empt my comments on that. I do want to push back on the accusation that the legislation will not make a difference. At the moment, we have a free-for-all. Courts are basically over-interpreting Strasbourg. There is no real codification in this country of what the right to a family life means, and we are seeing a huge number of cases, as we have discussed. The point of the Bill is to ensure that our provisions will be no different to the position under Strasbourg but will realign the domestic position, because we are currently being far more generous than our international obligations require. I think the Committee can agree that it is important that we do not over-interpret what Strasbourg suggests.
I appreciated the challenge from the shadow Minister about the 2014 Act and not reinforcing any previous errors, but the Government provisions reflect more up-to-date case law, which was not captured by that 2014 Act—for example, the weighting provisions, which will apply to all of family life. I hope, and am sure, that we will have more success than the 2014 Act had.
The Minister refers to the UK having gone above and beyond its requirements in relation to Strasbourg law. In bringing us into line and not overextending ourselves, I wonder whether there are any other countries with which we could compare ourselves, in terms of where we will find that line and alignment. That might assist us in understanding how this process will work in practice.
I appreciate my hon. Friend raising that point. We have become a country with pull factors that have encouraged people to this country while asylum claims have been going down across Europe. Ours have not been going down at the same pace, and I think our over-interpretation of some of the Strasbourg laws has been a pull factor. So I appreciate her raising that.
I have quite a lot to plough through, so I apologise if there is not a coherent thread to some of these answers. I will try to respond as quickly as possible to as many of the questions as I can. I remind the Committee that, just because family life is established, that does not necessarily mean that the individual will automatically be able to remain in or enter the UK. All cases where family life is found to exist will be considered at the second-stage test, where the courts will have to consider whether it is in the public interest to refuse leave to remain or enter. We will come to the issues that were referred to about mental illness and so on this afternoon, but I am trying to make the point that the partner will still need to meet those substantive tests.
On the family circumstances that we discussed, the vast majority of people seeking to bring a partner will have to meet the rules. That means minimum income and English language. The example that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East gave almost certainly would not meet the bar of a successful article 8 claim, unless there were extremely exceptional circumstances.
On the hon. Member’s point about volumes and numbers, I am struggling to understand what he is asking me to do. Anyone in this country who has a family member outside the UK could put in an appeal for this. There is absolutely no way we could know whether anyone in this room may have a child, a dependant or anyone in another country; that is simply not evidence or information that this country would keep.
Joe Robertson
If the Minister’s position ends up being that there is no data, I will take that. To be clear, I am asking for the data of people residing in the UK who have a family member who is not a British citizen and who has no right to be in the UK, be they a spouse, civil partner or child. If it is the case that we simply do not have that data, obviously I will accept that, but the question remains on the table.
I completely appreciate where the hon. Gentleman is coming from, because I know he wants to get a sense of how many people could and would apply, but it would be impossible for us to know without knowing the family circumstances of everyone in the country. What we can do is best extrapolate from the applications that have been made as to whether they would fail or pass our new tests. I reassure him that it will be a high bar; the majority will be refused if they and their overseas family members do not meet the rules. Article 8 is a safeguard—that is what the Bill maintains—not a gateway.
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, referenced the publishing of the modelling. He referred to the representative sample of 3,252 article 8-related applications. That is an internal sample that has not been published due to personal data sensitivities, but I commit to write to set out our data on article 8 for the Committee.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I am afraid I still cannot find the updated impact assessment, either on the website, by email or on the table in this Committee Room. I would very much like to see the new information that the Minister referred to yesterday.
I appreciate that. I believe the updated impact assessment has been published, but I will double-check. If it has not been published on the website, I am sure that the Clerks or someone in administration will be able to deal with that.
I want to draw out some of the figures from the impact assessment. There is to be an additional 3,600 removals a year. We have tried to be realistic and transparent in the impact assessment. We say that there will be 11,700 additional refusals a year. When applied to the net lifetime fiscal cost per applicant, 11,700 applicants would cost the taxpayer more than £1.7 billion, which is a considerable amount. I am sure hon. Members can understand why we are trying to do what we are doing through the Bill.
We took a deep-dive cohort analysis to examine the representative sample that I mentioned of 3,252 article 8-related applications. That was to support our policy development. I am afraid that further details of the cohort analysis from the unpublished internal sample will not be available due to personal data considerations, as I mentioned, but I appreciate the importance of further analysis. I have noted that, and we will bring that to the Committee.
A question was asked about what assessment has been made of the potential merits of disapplying the Human Rights Act to immigration matters. I remain committed to ensuring that our broader human rights framework is fit for the challenges of today, but there are currently no plans to amend the Human Rights Act. We do not have to withdraw from the ECHR—I will discuss that further this afternoon—or disapply the Human Rights Act to create meaningful reform. We are reviewing our approach to ECHR implementation within the immigration system; that is the intention of the Bill.
Articles 8 and 3 address different harms and legal thresholds. We do not expect the reforms to generate an increase in successful article 3 claims. There will be no new rights or entitlements that will make it any easier for people to apply. Indeed, we are codifying the restrictions in the clauses we will discuss this afternoon. Sponsors will still need to demonstrate a very high bar for their family to be able to join them in the UK on the basis of article 8.
The Government are keeping under review whether and how to commence the inadmissibility provisions in section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which amended section 88 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2022 to include human rights claims. However, those provisions would not be applied to sponsored human rights claims, as in most cases it would not be reasonable to declare a claim inadmissible just because the sponsor could reside in one of the listed safe countries. Clause 17 can be commenced without that, and we can write to Members further with the details.
(4 days, 5 hours ago)
Public Bill Committees
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Government amendment 131.
Amendment 94, in clause 17, page 14, line 8, at end insert
“, provided that the Secretary of State may only designate a place by regulations made by statutory instrument and that such a statutory instrument may only be made if a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This amendment would require the place at which sponsor human rights claims may be made to be set by regulations subject to the affirmative procedure.
Government amendment 96.
Amendment 97, in clause 17, page 15, line 4, at end insert—
“(8) In section 82 (right of appeal to the Tribunal), after subsection (1) insert—
“(1ZA) An appeal does not lie under subsection (1)(b) against a decision to refuse a sponsor human rights claim unless the family member to whom the claim relates would, if they lived with the person who made the claim, be a member of that person’s core cohabiting family within the meaning of section 117AA(2).””
This amendment would confine the new sponsor right of appeal to claims relating to a spouse, civil partner, partner or minor child (or, for a child sponsor, a parent), in line with the Government’s own definition of the core cohabiting family in clause 18.
Clause stand part.
Amendment 130 agreed to.
Amendment made: 131, in clause 17, page 13, line 33, leave out paragraph (b).—(Anna Turley.)
See the explanatory statement for amendment 130.
Amendment proposed: 94, in clause 17, page 14, line 8, at end insert
“, provided that the Secretary of State may only designate a place by regulations made by statutory instrument and that such a statutory instrument may only be made if a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”—(Blake Stephenson.)
This amendment would require the place at which sponsor human rights claims may be made to be set by regulations subject to the affirmative procedure.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 98, in clause 18, page 15, line 14, leave out from “must” to end of line 15 and insert
“must determine that question in accordance with section 117AA.”
This amendment would require courts and tribunals to decide whether Article 8 is engaged in accordance with new section 117AA, rather than only to have regard to it.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 99, in clause 18, page 15, line 21, leave out “normally”.
This amendment, with Amendments 101 and 102, would remove the word “normally” from new section 117AA so that family life for the purposes of Article 8 is limited to the core cohabiting family and the other relationships specified, without an open-ended qualification.
Amendment 100, in clause 18, page 15, line 25, at end insert
“(but only where A and the partner have lived together in a relationship akin to marriage or civil partnership for at least two years)”.
This amendment would require a partner who is not a spouse or civil partner to have lived with the person in a relationship akin to marriage or civil partnership for at least two years to count as part of the core cohabiting family.
Government amendment 44.
Amendment 101, in clause 18, page 15, line 30, leave out “normally”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 99.
Government amendment 45.
Amendment 102, in clause 18, page 15, line 33, leave out “normally”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 99.
Amendment 103, in clause 18, page 16, line 17, leave out subsection (6).
This amendment would remove the provision allowing the factors excluded by new section 117AA(5) to be considered at the public interest stage, to test whether subsection (6) undoes the effect of subsection (5).
Clause stand part.
Blake Stephenson
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg.
Clause 18 is at the heart of part 2 of the Bill, and is where the Government set out for the first time in statute, as we heard earlier, what counts as family life for the purposes of article 8 of the European convention on human rights. Other than the fact that the Conservatives would withdraw from the ECHR to implement our borders plan, allow me to say at the outset that the Opposition do support the broad direction of travel of the clause. The public are entitled to expect that the right to respect for family life protects genuine, close family relationships and does not stretch to cover extended relationships and loosely evidenced dependency, which is the very problem that the Government’s explanatory notes identify. In my opinion, the question for the Committee is not whether the clause points the right way; it is whether it will make any difference at all in the courtroom. On the evidence the Committee has heard and read so far, I fear the answer is unfortunately that it will make very little difference.
Clause 18 does three things. First, subsection (3) inserts a two-stage sequence into section 117A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. A court or tribunal must first decide whether article 8 is engaged at all, having regard in particular to proposed new section 117AA, and only then turn to the public interest question. Secondly, clause 18(4) inserts proposed new section 117AA into the 2002 Act. A person’s family life is normally limited to their core cohabiting family: a spouse, civil partner or partner and minor children or parents, to the extent that they live together. A parent who does not live with a child does not normally have family life with that child unless there is evidence of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship, and an adult does not normally have family life with another adult unless they live together as partners or there is an additional element of dependency beyond normal emotional ties.
Thirdly, clause 18(5) lists four things that, on their own, do not amount to that additional dependency: financial dependence; illness, unless it meets a three-part test of constant care; emotional resilience; and concern for a relative living in a country affected by war or instability. Subsection (6) then provides that nothing in subsection (5) stops the court considering those same factors when it comes to the public interest question.
Why is the direction right? There is a real problem here. Mr Smith, the former director general of Border Force, told the Committee that article 8 is
“often used as a lever quite late in the process”,––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 44, Q67.]
as we all know from the cases we hear about on the news.
The Minister gave the Committee an example from Home Office casework of a man who falsely claimed paternity of eight children and was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. Families, of course, take many forms, and nobody on this side of the Committee wishes to deny that. However, the law should be clear that the core of family life is the family that lives together, and that anything beyond it must be proved. We support the principle of the clause, but we have been here before—I refer to the debate on clauses in group 14 and the many good speeches made—with the immigration rules in 2012 and the Immigration Act 2014. I want to test whether this clause will succeed where those attempts did not.
First, on the language, proposed new section 117AA to the 2002 Act does not say that family life is limited to the core cohabiting family; it says that it is “normally” limited to it. The same word appears in subsections (3) and (4). Professor Ekins told us that this word is where the litigation will end up turning. Justice, which opposes this part of the Bill, makes the same point from the other side: its written evidence accepts that the use of “normally”, together with the need only to “have regard” to those considerations,
“preserves the possibility of finding family life beyond these prescribed circumstances.”
I ask the Minister: in what circumstances do the Government expect a court to find family life outside the core cohabiting family, and will that be set out anywhere? If the Government cannot say, why is the word “normally” there at all? Amendments 99, 101 and 102 would remove it.
Secondly, let us look at the duty itself. Proposed new subsection (1B) to section 117A says that the court
“must (in particular) have regard to”
section 117AA. It does not say that the court must apply it—that matters. In Rhuppiah, a case mentioned in the previous sitting, the Supreme Court held that the “have regard” formula in the 2014 Act
“cannot put decision-makers in a strait-jacket”.
As was mentioned earlier, Chris Rowe of Swansea University, writing for the UK Constitutional Law Association, described the device as “insufficiently potent” to force a result incompatible with the convention. Clause 18 uses exactly the same device. What in proposed new subsections (1A) to (1C) to section 117A differs in kind from the formula that the Supreme Court has already held cannot bind? Amendment 98 would replace “have regard to” with a requirement that the court determine the question in accordance with proposed new section 117AA.
Proposed new section 117AA(5) tells the court that financial dependence, illness, emotional reliance and concern for a relative in a war zone do not, on their own, create family life. Subsection (6) tells the court that it may consider every one of those factors when it weighs the public interest. The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association adds that the Bill is silent on whether those factors may be combined when the court decides whether there is an additional element of dependency, and that the Strasbourg court, in Kumari and Martinez Alvarado, allows exactly that. If the court reads a combination test into paragraph (4)(b) to keep the clause compatible, the list in subsection (5) will do very little work. What is subsection (6) for, if not to give back at the second stage what subsection (5) takes away at the first? Amendment 103 would leave it out, to test exactly that.
The central question is whether clause 18 changes the law. The Government’s human rights memorandum says that proposed new section 117AA codifies the Strasbourg principles on the existence of family life. The House of Commons Library notes that the Strasbourg court has itself said, in Kumari v. the Netherlands, that family life is
“normally limited to the core family”,
and it records Professor Singer’s view on the clause’s effect, that
“it is unclear how this would differ significantly from current practice”.
However, the Law Society tells this Committee that the new emphasis on cohabitation is
“a significant move away from the current position in UK law and a substantial narrowing of Article 8 protections.”
Justice says the clause
“falls short of codifying the Strasbourg principles on the existence of family life, despite the Government’s assertion to the contrary in its ECHR memorandum”,
in particular for
“young adults who are still living with their parents”.
Ben Goldsborough
As the hon. Member very kindly name-checked my speech yesterday, I need to thank him first of all. He says there is no issue of “Lock, Stock and Two Smoking Barrels” when leaving the ECHR, but there is an issue concerning our colleagues and friends on the island of Ireland. What would be the result of leaving the ECHR when it comes to the Good Friday agreement? There is no question about it: Lord Wolfson may say that there may or may not be an issue with that, but the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission has noted that there would be an issue, and we have the history as well. Anything that comes back with this idea that, “Well, Australia and New Zealand don’t operate within these systems,” does not take into account the history of the island of Ireland.
Blake Stephenson
I thank the hon. Member for his intervention—perhaps my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East was correct to say that I was far too generous in taking it; I should have just closed my speech.
The hon. Member for South Norfolk clearly recognises that the Opposition commissioned Lord Wolfson to conduct a very serious legal analysis of the benefits or otherwise of leaving the ECHR, which he has done. I go back to the comment I made earlier about how there are no legal barriers to us departing the ECHR. There is no risk to the Union and there is no risk to the Good Friday agreement in a legal sense. It will, of course, result in a political discussion, and that will be had at the appropriate time, but the political questions that will arise are not insurmountable.
I will now close. The Opposition support the aim of clause 18 and will not oppose it standing part of the Bill. We support Government amendments 44 and 45, but a definition that is qualified by “normally” applied through a duty only to “have regard to”, with the excluded factors let back in by clause 18(6), is a definition that the courts can step around. I will seek to press amendments 98 and 99 to a Division.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
It is a pleasure to have you in the Chair today, Mr Twigg.
I take completely the opposite position from the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire in almost every respect. I am going to speak against clause 18 and its inclusion in the Bill, and I am going to oppose the Government amendments that would put further tests on parent-child relationships and parental involvement for refugees. I will also be opposing the Conservative amendments, which would put even tighter constraints on family life.
I am here to defend our article 8 protections—I say “our”, because I believe it is really important that we set laws for refugees and asylum seekers that we would happily be subject to ourselves. That is absolutely at the core of the universal nature of human rights and the international agreements we have made to respect human rights around the world in the way that we would want them to be respected should we be in the horrible position of needing to claim asylum.
Article 8 protects the right to family life specifically for us under the European convention on human rights. Although it is not absolute, it requires any state interference in these rights to be lawful, necessary and proportionate. I do not agree with the Government when they say in their human rights memorandum that they are taking
“proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aims.”
To me, paragraph 26 in the memorandum clearly admits that there is interference in our rights with this legislation. The Government are using the argument that they are taking “proportionate means” of “achieving the legitimate aims”, but the legitimate aims they lay out are:
“maintaining effective immigration control, economic wellbeing and the prevention of disorder or crime.”
I honestly do not see how clause 18, on family life and people making claims for reuniting their families and maintaining this essential human right protected under article 8, comes into those “proportionate means”. It is about reducing the ability of families to reunite. The impact assessment clearly says that many thousands of people who would be able to come here under current laws will be denied their claims. This is a reduction in human rights and it seriously needs looking at. I am neither equipped nor planning to add further arguments relating to Northern Ireland and the Windsor framework, but further conversations are needed about what is currently in the Bill, never mind what would happen if we withdrew from the ECHR.
Everybody on the Committee wants a fair, robust and effective immigration system—one that works and upholds the rule of law and on in which people have confidence. Article 8 is not an abstract concept within all this; it is the law that decides whether a parent can stay in the country where their children live or whether a British child grows up with both parents. We do not want to see families separated or children separated from the parents who care for them, yet that is precisely the risk posed by clause 18, according to the Government’s own impact assessment.
Dr Zubir Ahmed (Glasgow South West) (Lab)
Does the hon. Lady accept that article 8 was never intended to be interpreted as it is now, and therefore that if we do not provide guidance or adjust it, we will further dampen the British public’s confidence and trust in the immigration and asylum system? I can tell her from personal experience that when that happens, it is people from minority communities that are already here, sometimes for many generations, such as my father, who are first in the firing line. Does she therefore agree that if she, like me, wants Britain to be a compassionate, welcoming country, we must acknowledge that those articles are in some cases not being interpreted in the intended manner and that the adjustment is appropriate?
Siân Berry
I thank the hon. Member for his perspective. He must appreciate through his constituency casework, as I do, the general principle that article 8 claims need to be assessed on an individual basis. The Bill tries to codify and generalise things in ways that reduce the ability for anyone making decisions to look at the genuine family lives of those making the claims. Bad decisions can result from people misunderstanding different cultures, from unconscious biases and from all kinds of things like that. It is really important that we do not try to prescribe family life under state definitions. I will come on to talk more about that and about the toxic rhetoric and the awful anecdotes, such as the examples we have heard from Ministers, which increase the toxicity of the debate. We can do much better than this Bill to reduce that.
Clause 18 would replace the reality of family relationships with statutory presumptions. Families today come in many forms. We have single-parent households, blended families, grandparents raising children, and parents who do not live under the same roof through circumstance rather than choice. A family does not stop being a family because it fails a cohabitation test. I will always stand up against people trying to define what a normal family is. The Government’s stated objective is to confine family life “normally” to the core cohabiting family unit. A parent who does not live with their child must prove that the relationship is genuine and be judged on how often and how recently they have had contact, even where work, shared care or the immigration system itself has kept them apart.
Ben Goldsborough
If we followed the hon. Lady’s line of thinking, my concern is that we would leave section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 completely unamended, which would mean that there is no clarity—not just for the state and our constituents, but for those going into the system who may be seeking refuge. Is there not also a moral case? If we leave this be, we will end up in a muddle, which will mean that backlogs continue to grow, people do not get the surety of an answer and the immigration and asylum system will not have the confidence of the public.
Siân Berry
I thank the hon. Member for making those points, but as we spoke about on Second Reading and in earlier debates on this topic, the muddle lies in the bad initial decision making in the Home Office. If it is not clear what kind of evidence people need to establish family life, it should be dealt with through better processes, better information and more support for legal representation. Codifying it, as is done in the Bill, is not the right way to deal with that.
David Smith
I thank the hon. Lady for being so generous with her time. I want to build on the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk. The hon. Lady spoke about the Bill referring to core cohabiting family, but does she accept that there must at some point be a limit on what we define as family? If I were fleeing to another country, would it be reasonable for me to say, “I desperately want my third great uncle on my mum’s side to be part of my family”? Does she accept that there has to be a definition and parameters for what family actually is, which the Bill seeks to establish?
Siân Berry
I disagree wholly with that. During the speeches made by Opposition Members earlier in the debate, I kept thinking about the people who, due to natural disasters or wars, are left without core family, and have to find another family member who will take them in and take that place. There is an inherent danger in putting in place these limits, and in the amendments tabled by Conservative Members that would add rigid definitions. Given the stories about the different ways in which people have experienced refugee status over the years, which all hon. Members will have heard about in casework and read about in memoirs and novels, the need for this change does not ring true. We should keep the system as it is now, where the reality of every single case needs to be looked at.
Blake Stephenson
The hon. Lady described our amendments as “rigid definitions”, but is it not right that we as legislators make sure that our definitions have certainty? We want to have a system that the British public have confidence in, and that is not the case at the moment—in good faith, the Government are trying to deal with that. Do we not need rigid definitions and certainty to achieve that?
Siân Berry
I fundamentally disagree with the hon. Member. We need to look at individual cases individually, as no two families are the same. We could imagine many circumstances for which we would want exceptions to this rule. The Government have rightly left caveats in the Bill, but the Opposition are arguing against them. Putting in rigid criteria on top of what is already in the Bill is absolutely the wrong way to go about addressing the issue. The best way to deal with any problems we might see is to do so in the initial decision making.
Clause 18 says that financial or emotional dependence, illness, or living in a conflict zone alone is not enough to establish family life, yet families routinely support each other financially, emotionally and practically. Ministers say that those factors can still be weighed at the public interest stage, but once family life is ruled out, that stage is never reached. What will that mean in practice? As I have hinted at, the Government’s impact assessment says that their article 8 reforms will mean 14,000 more refusals every year. Even after appeals, around 11,700 people more will be refused each year. Under the law as it stands, those people would succeed. That shows that clause 18 does not simply clarify existing principles, but is intended to change outcomes at a substantial scale. The clause does diminish human rights for refugees in this country, as is admitted in the Government’s human rights memorandum.
The way the clause is doing that is very troubling for two main reasons. First, it suggests that family relationships deserve protection only when they fit a model chosen by the state, but article 8 has never worked that way. The European Court has always looked at the substance of an individual relationship, not its form. Indeed, the very cases the Government cite require an individualised assessment of all the circumstances. As the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire said, we have been here before. The examples we are hearing from the Home Secretary and the Minister come as part of what is now a mini-tradition of Home Secretaries using exaggerated anecdotes to add to toxic rhetoric about migrants.
Blake Stephenson
This might be an opportune moment to intervene and allow the hon. Lady to get to the right place in her notes. She mentioned that we have been here before; that was a central part of my speech. In order to break this cycle, would she not agree that the right thing to do is to depart from the ECHR?
Siân Berry
I thank the hon. Member for trying, but he is talking to a person who cannot read the universal declaration of human rights without welling up, and I will never give up making arguments of this sort.
Previous legislation on these matters, to which the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire referred, followed on directly from the infamous 2011 party conference speech of the then Home Secretary—now Baroness May of Maidenhead. She repeated false claims from newspapers that judges had permitted a man to escape deportation because he had a pet cat—something she says she did not make up. In reality, neither of the judges’ decisions in the case was based on the man having a pet, and the second and final decision was not based on any human rights consideration at all. It was straightforwardly based on a failure by the Home Office to apply its own policy.
Amnesty International gave us more information in its written evidence:
“This—together with the readiness of many political commentators to cherry pick often minor or irrelevant facts that are mentioned in tribunal or court judgments and present these as if the main or sole reason for a decision that may have little or nothing to do with them—continues to underpin criticism of Article 8 in immigration-related decision-making. That criticism is plainly misinformed, often careless and, in some cases, on its face, clearly ill-intended—including out of dogmatic hostility to the ECHR and other political motivations.”
On Second Reading of the Bill, the current Home Secretary summarised an unnamed case. She said:
“In 2025, an Albanian man jailed for growing cannabis escaped deportation not because he had any right to be here, but because it was deemed unduly harsh on his partner to deport him. She was not his wife or life partner—instead, this relationship began only after a deportation order had been served. Why was the deportation deemed to be unduly harsh? The partner spoke no Albanian and had never visited the country before.”—[Official Report, 13 July 2026; Vol. 789, c. 675.]
Ben Goldsborough
I thank the hon. Lady, who is being very generous with her time. It is important for us to hammer home that, through the Bill, we are passing legislation for all eventualities. I wish that everyone coming here was squeaky clean and had the best intentions in the world, but we have to pass legislation that takes those with bad motivations into account. Will she respond to that?
Siân Berry
Yes, I will respond to that shortly with some data.
To return to the anecdote from the current Home Secretary, Amnesty again corrects the record:
“A key error in this summary is the statement that the relevant relationship had only begun after a deportation order had been served. That is not correct. The judge’s decision makes clear that it began significantly before the order. Of especial relevance was that the notice that such an order might be made was served in December 2019, but no order was then made for more than four years. By the time it was made in January 2024, the relationship had developed over a relatively lengthy period.”
The Home Secretary mentioned the criminal conviction. Amnesty also corrects that information. It says that he was jailed for four months for a relatively minor offence, and was now
“working lawfully and supporting himself.”
It also says:
“There was no suggestion of any risk of reoffending. His partner, who had no connection and had never been to Albania, was working and providing daily support to her sister and mother. Whatever may have been the position in 2019 was clearly not the position in 2024; and the relevant facts were clearly not adequately presented in what had been reported or at Second Reading.”
The hon. Lady says that this is not a way to reform the system. Does she have any ideas about the kinds of reform that she would be ready to accept?
Siân Berry
I have said that, based on my own casework, my experience of the Home Office’s errors, and the cases that I have seen, I would like to see investment in Home Office decision making to make it better in the first place. That would be the best way to deal with this issue, particularly when more than half of appeals are being approved.
I thank the hon. Lady for giving way once again. Given the number of amendments she has tabled—the point being that she will not support any element of change whatsoever—I gently and respectfully suggest that she is actually very happy with the system as it is, she is happy to accept all the evidence from a huge industry that exists to support immigrants, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and she does not want any reform whatsoever other than throwing the system open even further.
Siân Berry
It is pretty clear that I think the Bill is a result of the Government responding to toxic rhetoric coming from other parties, and that it is an attempt to be seen to be doing something.
Siân Berry
I will finish my point. In an evidence session, we challenged the National Crime Agency on the roots of the organised crime that the hon. Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes mentions, which is doing huge harm. I will not argue that the small boats system is the best way to bring people to this country. Small boat numbers started to grow the moment safe routes were closed. We need safe routes, and that is the approach the Government could take to reduce small boat crossings. The law that protects our rights does not need to be undermined. I would absolutely argue that.
Blake Stephenson
The hon. Lady refers to other parties and their toxic rhetoric. Perhaps she could give some examples. If she wishes to call out those parties, will she do so by giving clear examples rather than by making throwaway comments? That would really help the Committee.
Siân Berry
I am happy to clarify that I am talking primarily about Reform UK. That party is not represented on this Committee and can answer for itself in other ways, but it has, until recently, been taking votes from the Government on the right. I am happy to come back in future sittings with further examples of anecdotes being used instead of evidence. I chose to highlight two examples of Home Secretaries doing that, because the Minister is here to represent a Home Secretary.
Several hon. Members rose—
Siân Berry
This is turning into a very broad debate, but I give way to the hon. Member for Glasgow South West.
Dr Ahmed
It is the hon. Lady’s contention that those of us on the Government Benches were somehow manipulated by others to arrive at this Bill. Will she at least concede that toxic rhetoric and hatred do not occur in a vacuum, as I know personally, but often exploit structural deficiencies in systems, and that sadly there are structural deficiencies in this system? Is fixing them not therefore the responsible thing to do, so that we can turn the tap off that these haters and racists use to fire abusive language at Members of Parliament and members of the public who do not look like them?
The Chair
Order. I have been very lenient, but I gently say that we need to keep interventions sharp and succinct, please.
Siân Berry
Much appreciated, Mr Twigg.
I would say that the best way to stand up to toxic rhetoric is to stand up to it. We are familiar with the concept of the Overton window, and I am distressed that a Labour Government have been moving in this direction through their immigration policies. As I said at the beginning of my speech in the previous debate, the Government ought not to bring forward this Bill or row back on other civil liberties and human rights legislation—that would be the right thing to do. I am a lone voice on this Committee, but that cannot be right when we know that people around the country want migrants to be welcomed and want to see more unity, inclusion and social cohesion. The way to build that is not to hear the argument about how article 8 and the ECHR need to go and then do a little bit of that. The answer is to stand up to the rhetoric and build a better country.
Joe Robertson
I agree with the hon. Lady that there is some toxic rhetoric around this, although not from Members on this Committee. Does she not agree nevertheless that there is a problem with immigration and asylum in this country, and that part of the problem is that the numbers are too high?
Siân Berry
I do not concede that we are taking in too many refugees. As I said at the beginning, we have an international obligation to take our fair share of people seeking asylum, because of all the causes around the world that the hon. Gentleman mentioned earlier—he left out climate change, but I will forgive him that. There are many, many reasons why we ought to take a humane approach to asylum.
Some Government Back Benchers talked earlier about safe routes. There have been good schemes, aimed at particular conflicts in particular countries, and I hope the Government will continue to bring in more such schemes, but it is not good enough to cherry-pick particular conflicts or the kinds of refugees that we find acceptable. The volume of Ukrainian refugees has been absolutely huge, and has not caused social cohesion problems. We can make that work for many other countries as well, but the volumes in other schemes have always been too low. We need a universal framework of law that will work for all kinds of refugees.
David Smith
I was one of the Members who referred earlier in the debate to safe and legal routes, which are a very good idea. May I ask a very simple question: are there any specific restrictions at all that the hon. Lady would like to add to our immigration system?
Siân Berry
Off the top of my head, I cannot think of any. I really think that the current law needs to be administered better, and that we need better decision making, more humanity in all of this, and more support for people to get good decisions made the first time. I would be very happy to receive from the Government any clear evidence of abusive claims under the current law that does not rely on anecdote, but I am absolutely sure that, in clause 18, the Government are seeking to prevent people who would currently succeed from achieving asylum in this country and from being reunited with their families.
Let me move on to more things that the Government have said. The Government tell us that clause 18 is consistent with Strasbourg case law, and they even cite the cases, but, as other hon. Members have mentioned, they cannot have it both ways. If the clause simply restates the law, it is unnecessary. The Government’s impact assessment says that they expect grants to be cut by a third by those reforms. If the clause goes further, it risks putting the country in breach of the convention and inviting years of litigation. Either way, the clause does not deliver the clarity that Ministers promise, and I think that Opposition Members are united on that today.
I believe that a fair immigration system should tackle abuse while protecting genuine family life, and that it should put the best interests of children first and reflect the reality of modern families. Clause 18 does neither. It risks real hardship for genuine families, with little evidence that it will achieve anything else. I urge the Government to think again. We can maintain effective immigration control without using this clause to break up thousands of families. We can protect our borders without sacrificing the fundamental British values of compassion and fairness. For those reasons, I ask the Committee to agree that clause 18 should not stand part of the Bill.
Joe Robertson
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Twigg. I will address clause 18. I must confess that I have a slight tendency to stray, but I am comforted by the fact that the hon. Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes will be on it and ensure that I stick to the grouping before us.
I made some comments on clause 18 in the morning sitting, so what I will say now is additional. I will focus on situations in which a right to family life can still be argued under the Bill, even though it seeks to restrict human rights applications based on family life. Those are not situations involving a core cohabiting family, but ones in which a sponsor in the UK who does not necessarily have a UK passport but nevertheless has a right to reside here applies for somebody—not necessarily a family member—who lives elsewhere with no right to come here, has a mental illness, needs the sponsor’s support and cannot find that support at home. That seems to me the widest part of the Bill, allowing a great range of claims to be made and increasing or maintaining the backlog at the Home Office and in the courts.
It seems that this mental illness provision could create a dodgy market of mental health clinics elsewhere in the world, set up specifically to provide paperwork for an application—that is not fanciful. We know the huge pressure from the black market abroad, involving people smugglers and all sorts of behaviour that is not just immoral but illegal and abhorrent, to get people into this country, because of course it is a great place to live and build a life. We know that the pressure is already there; that is why we have such high numbers coming. Setting out in law a mental illness route that seems to have such a low bar for evidence could lead, I think, to an entirely new dodgy avenue opening up.
Let us envisage a very real type of application. Someone in this country says that a family member or close friend living in another part of the world has a mental illness and a certificate to prove it. However, that certificate could very well come from a clinic that does not adhere to the standards of the NHS, the Care Quality Commission or anything that could be recognised in this country. That bit of paperwork—the bottom of which says, by the way, “Sorry, there is no support at home”—could give rise to an application. Without any evidence to the contrary, I do not see how the Home Office—or indeed a court—could deny that application.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg.
Let us be clear about what clause 18 is actually for. The phrase “family life” has been stretched for years, and now covers almost anything: adult siblings, distant relatives and relationships that seem to spring up the week a removal notice lands on the doormat. The Government say that clause 18 will bring that to an end, and that family life will mean what most people think it means: someone’s husband or wife, partner or children. That is what the public think family life means, and it is what Parliament should say it means.
The trouble is the drafting. Clause 18 sets out a clear definition and then, in three separate places, adds a single word that undoes it. As my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East rightly set out, that word is “normally”. Proposed new section 117AA says that family life
“is normally limited to their core cohabiting family.”
A parent who does not live with their children does not “normally” have family life with them. One adult does not “normally” have family life with other adult relatives, such as brothers and sisters, unless there is real dependency.
Every immigration lawyer in the country will read the word “normally” the same way. If family life is only “normally” limited, their job is to show that their client is not normal. Every case becomes the exception. We have seen that before: a clear rule, a soft word and 10 years of litigation about what the soft word means. It is not as if the clause lacks a safety valve. Proposed new section 117AA(4)(b) provides for adults with a genuine
“additional element of dependency (beyond normal emotional ties)”.
The Court of Appeal set out that test in Kugathas v. Secretary of State for the Home Department more than 20 years ago, and it is where genuinely exceptional cases belong. “Normally” does not add fairness; it adds a second door.
David Smith
I have a fundamental question. The hon. Gentleman is outlining the word “normally”; if, to his estimation, all asylum lawyers or whoever is involved in the process would look at their individual case and say, “That’s not normal,” surely none of it would be exceptional.
We are trying to define something, and I think it is on us to define it. Adding “normally”—inviting them to look for the exception—is very unhelpful, particularly when proposed new section 117AA(4)(b) actually sets out the exception and gives that bandwidth for people to find exceptional cases. To write “normally” beside all these properties is to open a door, and would mean that we fail to do what we are aiming to do. That is the objective of the Bill. Amendments 99, 101 and 102 would take that word out. If the Government believe that their definition is right, let us say what it means.
Amendment 98 tackles the same problem from another angle. Under the clause, a court deciding whether article 8 was engaged must “have regard to” proposed new section 117AA, but having regard to something is not the same as following it. The court can have regard to the definition, nod politely and decide a case on a different basis altogether. Amendment 98 says that the court
“must determine that question in accordance with section 117AA.”
If Parliament is going to define family life, the court should apply that definition, not merely consider it.
Amendment 100 asks a simple question: what is a partner? The clause does not say. The immigration rules have required unmarried couples to have lived together in a relationship akin to marriage for at least two years. Amendment 100 would put that test into statute so that a relationship formed a few weeks before a removal date could not be used to frustrate it. It is good enough for the rules; it is good enough for the Bill.
Moving on to amendment 103, in proposed new section 117AA, subsection (5) says that financial dependency, illness short of needing constant care, emotional reliance or worry about relatives in a warzone do not, on their own, create family life between adults. Fair enough, but subsection (6) then says that nothing in subsection (5) stops a court considering every one of those factors at the public interest stage. Can the Minister explain what subsection (5) achieves if subsection (6) allows the very same factors to tip the balance a few paragraphs later?
I welcome Government amendment 45. It asks decision makers to look at whether contact between a parent and child has only recently been established or re-established. That goes to a real problem: relationships that come to life only when removal is on the cards. By tabling it, the Government make our point for us. If it is right to be sceptical of a parental relationship that appears just in time, it is right to be sceptical of a partnership that does the same. That is all amendment 100 asks. Clause 18 is a good idea let down by its drafting. The Government have written a definition and then handed every lawyer in the land the words to argue their way around it. Our amendment would make that definition stick.
If the Minister cannot accept our amendments, I hope that the Government will reflect before Report. I commend the amendments to the Committee.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. I thank hon. Members for their contributions this afternoon. It has been fascinating to have one side saying that we are not going far enough and the other that we are going too far. I hope that means that we are getting the right balance between what the British people wish to see and allowing for the fundamental human rights we all benefit from.
I hope the Chair will indulge me for a moment because I would like to directly address the comments from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. It was unfair and, frankly, quite insulting to suggest that we introduced the Bill to chase rhetoric. I feel very passionately on behalf of my constituents about the importance of the Bill. I know that the hon. Lady and I represent very different constituencies, but she says that there is universal support for refugees. I am sure that she, like me, is watching with horror the masked-up thugs on the streets trying to attack asylum seekers and chasing them out of their accommodation, but when I knock on doors in my constituency, people constantly raise the unfairness of people who seek to exploit our systems, processes and commitment to values like universal human rights, because they can see that those people are not genuine and that they are exploiting our generosity. While we want to fulfil those commitments, it is really important to me that the system has integrity, and that is what the Bill is about.
I do not mean to be rude, but the hon. Lady has had plenty of time. We can pick this up outside the Committee room, but I wanted to get that on the record.
Clause 18 introduces a definition of article 8 family life into UK primary legislation for the first time, giving courts and decision makers a more consistent framework to apply to immigration cases. Until now, courts have had to determine the existence and scope of family life on a case-by-case basis, which has resulted in significant variability in outcomes. Article 8 is a two-stage test. First, a decision maker or court must decide if family or private life exists. Secondly, where family or private life is established, they must decide whether interference with it pursues a legitimate aim, such as the interests of public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, and is proportionate when the nature of the breach is balanced against the public interest of removing an individual or refusing them entry.
It is right that article 8 acts as a safeguard to protect genuine family relationships. However, these protections can create opportunities for individuals to rely on weak or peripheral family connections as a basis to remain in or come to the UK. Clause 18 addresses this. It acts in tandem with clause 19 by setting coherent parameters for when family life can be established in line with Strasbourg case law before the strengthened public interest test is applied. It provides a clearer statutory framework for determining whether family life exists for article 8 purposes.
David Smith
Does the Minister agree that unless we introduce a definition of a family, the term becomes entirely subjective?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is why we have seen the extreme examples of people clearly thwarting the system to try to remain.
The clause makes clear that family life will normally concern the core cohabiting family unit while retaining provision for cases involving genuine parental relationships or additional elements of dependency. This will narrow the circumstances in which a tenuous relationship with a child, or an extended family relationship involving no more than nominal ties, can be used as the basis of a claim. It will support more consistent decision making while retaining the flexibility required. This is key to restoring order and control to the immigration system, ensuring that if someone does not meet the requirements of our rules, they will not have the right to reside here.
Clause 18 makes clear that family life is normally limited to the core cohabiting family unit while preserving flexibility for cases where family life may exist outside of that, aligned with Strasbourg case law. It also clarifies that biological parenthood alone is not enough to constitute family life; there must be evidence of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship. For adult relatives outside the core family unit, financial support, illness, emotional support or concern about conditions overseas will not by themselves establish family life; the relationship must involve true elements of dependency.
Would it be the case that someone who had hitherto been an absent father would not meet the criteria in the Bill?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is exactly what we are seeking to do. We have had evidence of people moving back in with families and dependants purely on the basis of trying to put forward this claim.
We are talking about the use of the term “normally”, but would the examples the Minister listed not fall into subsection (4)(b) anyway, meaning that the word “normally” is not required to help them get across the line?
I am afraid that I disagree. I remind the Committee that, just because family life is established, it does not mean that an individual will automatically be able to remain in or enter the UK. Instead, all cases where family life is found to exist will also be considered at the second stage test, where the courts will have to consider whether it is in the public interest to refuse leave to remain or enter.
I will just explain a little bit more, and I will hopefully answer the hon. Gentleman’s point. The word “normally” is deliberate and necessary. It allows us to establish a clear and deliberatively restrictive framework in which article 8 family life will ordinarily be confined to the core family while retaining the limited flexibility required for ECHR compliance.
Family relationships, as we have said, do not always fit neatly in formal categories or involve cohabitation. In exceptional cases, a relationship outside the core cohabiting family may, in substance, be akin to one within it. “Normally” enables a court to recognise genuine family life in those limited circumstances, based on the facts of the individual case. Removing it would turn a strong presumption into an inflexible rule, which would risk the exclusion of genuine family relationships and therefore be incompatible with the ECHR, potentially opening us up to even more litigation.
Crucially, this is only a threshold test. Establishing that family life exists does not mean that an article 8 claim succeeds, or that an individual has the right to remain. It simply means that the court moves on to the next stage to consider whether interference with that family life is justified and proportionate, taking account of public interest. Accordingly, the Government do not support the amendments.
Amendment 103, also tabled by the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, seeks to remove subsection (6) of this clause, on the basis that it undermines the effect of subsection (5). I do not, however, accept that that is the case. Those two provisions address different questions: subsection (5) clarifies what cannot independently establish family life between adult extended family members, while subsection (6) preserves the fact-sensitive assessment that is required once family life is engaged.
Subsection (5) makes it clear that financial support, emotional reliance, illness and concern for someone living amid war or instability do not, when taken independently, establish the necessary dependency. Those circumstances do not, however, cease to be relevant for every purpose. If family life is established, the court must then undertake the separate public interest and proportionality assessment.
Subsection (6) therefore provides an important safeguard to ensure that, at that stage, the full factual circumstances can be considered when balancing any interference with family life against the public interest. It also protects the Home Office’s freedom to consider those factors when arguing that the public interest requires a refusal of leave.
Turning to the Government amendments, it is right that children are given additional safeguards in article 8 decision making. Given those well-meaning protections, a tenuous relationship with a child can be used by an adult to remain in the UK. The first step to prevent people from relying on weak parental links to children in article 8 claims is to ensure that the genuine and subsisting parental relationship test under this clause operates as intended.
Government amendment 44 therefore makes it clear that a parent does not normally have family life with a child under the age of 18 for the purposes of article 8 unless there is evidence of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship. It broadens the application of the test so that it applies consistently to all parent-child relationships involving a child under 18, regardless of whether the parent and child live together. That clarifies what is relevant: the substance of the parental relationship, not simply the living arrangements. The amendment aims to reduce the scope for weak or limited parental relationships to be relied on in article 8 claims, including where cohabitation has been resumed opportunistically for immigration purposes; it does not remove protection for genuine parent-child relationships. Where there is evidence of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship, family life will continue to be recognised.
Government amendment 45 builds on amendment 44 to ensure that the genuine and subsisting parental relationship test under the clause will have its intended effect of preventing people from relying on weak parental links to children in article 8 applications. Government amendment 45 provides additional detail on how courts and tribunals should assess whether a parent has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a child for the purposes of article 8. It sets out factors that may be relevant to that assessment, including the nature of the relationship, the duration and frequency of contact, and whether contact has recently been established or re-established. The amendment aims to promote greater consistency in the application of the genuine and subsisting parental relationship test, ensuring that courts and tribunals focus on the substance of the relationship; the amendment does not prevent genuine parent-child relationships from attracting article 8 protection. Courts and tribunals will continue to consider all relevant circumstances in each individual case.
Joe Robertson
What would happen if someone were living here, but their child was overseas with the other parent—they were cohabiting there, not with the parent here—but the parent overseas died? What happens to the child? I cannot see a provision by which the child can come here, because there was no core cohabiting family arrangement.
Exactly such a circumstance is why we have provided flexibility within the Bill. The individual case will be assessed under article 8. In such a situation, there is space for that individual case to be assessed. Together with clause 19, Government amendments 44 and 45 provide a clearer and more consistent framework for determining whether removing an individual with a tenuous relationship to a child in the UK is compliant with article 8.
I will just add something on the key principles behind clause 18. The clause establishes clear boundaries for where family life exists, consistent with Strasbourg case law, providing the foundation on which clause 19’s strengthened public interest test is applied. Together, clauses 18 and 19 will ensure that article 8 is not used routinely to circumvent immigration rules, supporting a more ordered and controlled system where those who do not meet the rules are not routinely able to stay in the UK. Members have suggested that the clauses are too expansive and may widen where family life can be found to exist, but that is not correct. A recent Court of Appeal judgment reaffirmed the existing legal framework for assessing family life under article 8. Clause 18 provides greater clarity. The reforms will make clearer how family life and dependency should be assessed, promoting greater consistency in decision making and curtailing expansive interpretation of where family life can be found to exist. I had intended to talk more about the ECHR, but I shall not test the patience of the Committee.
Other points made during the debate included whether the clause was relevant or whether the courts would just ignore what we are trying to codify. Successive Governments have recognised concerns about how article 8 operates in the immigration system, but this Government are undertaking the hard work to understand the comprehensive reform required to restore order and control to the system. We are working within our international obligations to reset this balance, and to provide a more comprehensive and consistent framework to article 8 decision making. Clause 18 works alongside clause 19 by establishing the clear basis on which the Home Office can argue that family life does not exist before consideration of whether the public interest warrants a refusal of leave. Together, the clauses provide a clearer framework for how article 8 should be assessed to promote greater consistency in decision making and ensure that when considering article 8 immigration decisions, the courts place appropriate weight on what Parliament considers to be in the public interest.
In response to some of the other points made by hon. Members, the framing of proposed new section 117AA preserves the small degree of flexibility necessary for decision makers and the courts not to be constrained to determine claims made under article 8 that are inconsistent with the article. Reference was made to the definition of an eligible partner. That definition will be set out in rules and guidance; it is not appropriate to have that level of detail in primary legislation. We need to have flexibility to be able to change and respond to patterns of behaviour and abuse. One hon. Member spoke about young adults. The word “normally” in clause 18 is a caveat to preserve flexibility for young adults who have family life with parents.
I was asked for more evidential requirements; here some case studies might be helpful. The family immigration rules are intended to create a fair system that balances the important of protecting family and private life. When 71% of first-time grants are made to applicants who have arrived illegally or who have overstayed the time they are permitted to be here, it is clear that article 8 is not operating effectively. I was also asked about retrospective claims and whether the measures would impact people already in the UK. Clause 52(9) allows part 2 of the Bill to be commenced with retrospective effect; we will set out our plans for how the measures will be commenced in due course.
I was asked how the adjudicators would be able to interpret the complexity of clause 18 without legal training—something the Committee spoke about quite a lot in the first sitting of its scrutiny. Adjudicators will be properly trained, with all the safeguards that we talked about in the Committee sitting last Tuesday, to apply the new framework and immigration law. The authority will have legal support, underpinned by clauses 2 and 3 of the Bill. The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asked about interference. Clause 18 is not about whether interference is proportionate—that is assessed under clause 19. The grounds for interference, such as for the effectiveness of the immigration system, are consistent with ECHR case law.
Nothing in the Bill prevents individualised decision making; we have deliberately kept that ability, and that is a clear requirement of article 8 compliancy in decision making. Hon. Members also spoke about Home Office decision making. As I have made clear throughout the passage of the Bill, we will of course continue to work to improve decision making. The reforms in the clause clarify how family life should be assessed and strengthen the role of public interest in maintaining effective immigration control, which will help to improve decision making by providing the courts with greater clarity, consistency and predictability.
On mental illness and whether that is a route, it is correct that under proposed new section 117AA(4), family life can be engaged where a person suffers a mental illness or infirmity. However, they would need to be incapacitated to the extent that they need constant care and support, and there would have to be no other viable care options. Examples in established case law include where an adult or child becomes paraplegic after a serious illness, or where an adult or child suffers from Down syndrome and is fully incapacitated. It is worth remembering that the provision is only about establishing family life, and that the decision makers and the courts will go on to consider the public interest question. I hope I have answered all colleagues’ points, and I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put, That the amendment be made.