Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fourth sitting)

Anna Turley Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Blake Stephenson]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart; I hope you are ready for a lot of Divisions over the next few weeks. While clause 2 decides who the adjudicators will be, clause 3 decides how the quality of their decisions will be protected. That matters because poor-quality decisions will result in appeals, and appeals mean delays, fewer removals and increased costs for the taxpayer to bear.

Clause 3 sets out who is responsible for what: adjudicators decide on the cases; the chief executive must ensure that the adjudicators are adequately trained, as the Minister explained earlier; the chief appeals officer allocates cases, organises a system of legal support and oversees quality development and assurance; and the professional standards officer sets standards and publishes a code of conduct.

Dr Casey warned that adjudicators without legal training would be more likely to make “errors of law” and that the backlog, rather than genuinely decreasing, could simply relocate to the upper tribunal. The solution to that potential consequence must lie in this clause. What exactly is the “system of legal support” for adjudicators in subsection (3)(b)?

A question occurred to me over the adjournment, following the earlier debate about magistrates: will adjudicators sit with legal advisers, as lay magistrates do? That may or may not be helpful, but I would be interested in the Minister’s response. If so, at what cost?

The Law Society points out that the chief appeals officer is responsible for quality but has no power to intervene in any decision. What powers will the chief appeals officer have to act on poor performance?

Amendment 88 is a probing amendment. It would require the chief appeals officer to publish the number of applications for permission to appeal to the upper tribunal, how many are granted each year, the number and proportion of appeals authority decisions that the upper tribunal sets aside, and the number of decisions that the appeals authority reviews under clause 6, with their outcomes.

In her oral evidence session before the recess, Dr Sumption told this Committee that one of the key measures of success should be how many decisions are overturned. This amendment would ensure that Parliament is told every year whether that relocation of the backlog to the upper tribunal, which Dr Casey described, is happening.

Will the Minister confirm whether the appeals authority will publish annual data on the quality of its decisions, including the rate at which they are set aside? If the Minister can give assurances on that, we will not press this amendment. Finally, what training standards will apply under clause 3(2), and will they be published? Will the code of conduct be published before the first case is heard?

The Opposition support clause 3, which ensures that the quality of the decision making is the best answer to the criticism that the appeals authority would generate more appeals than it resolved, but only if it is real, resourced and reported to Parliament.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. I thank the hon. Members for Mid Bedfordshire and for Stockton West for tabling amendment 88. I will turn to that after giving a brief overview of the clause as it stands.

Clause 3 sets out the IIAA’s executive and non-executive members’ powers and duties. It makes the adjudicators responsible for the authority’s primary function: to make decisions on immigration and asylum appeals and certain bail applications. This will be the sole responsibility of executive adjudicators. Senior adjudicators will also have a responsibility to perform this function, but they may also have further responsibilities that are delegated to them by the chief appeals officer, as the clause permits. No other member or employee can determine the outcome of an appeal or application, reinforcing the autonomy of the adjudicator as the decision maker.

The clause also makes clear what the chief executive, chief appeals officer and professional standards officer are responsible for. Those members are responsible for putting adequate training and support in place for adjudicators, developing a quality assurance mechanism and setting the standards required of IIAA adjudicators. Those roles together will enable the IIAA to operate effectively and independently. Parliament will be kept abreast of important matters concerning the IIAA members or the administration of justice through written representations of the chief executive. Those representations must be laid before Parliament by the Secretary of State. This will also act as an important mechanism for the independence of the authority, which can communicate to Parliament through the Secretary of State on matters of concern.

Amendment 88 tabled by His Majesty’s Opposition would require the chief appeals officer to publish annual data on internal reviews and onward appeals against IIAA decisions. The Government support transparency and agree that the quality of the authority’s decisions must be properly monitored. However, we are confident that the Bill already establishes a comprehensive framework for quality assurance and accountability. Clause 3 requires the chief appeals officer to oversee the quality of adjudicators’ decisions, organise legal support and develop a quality assurance mechanism. The professional standards officer is also responsible for setting and maintaining the standards required of adjudicators, as well as publishing a code of conduct.

The authority will be required to produce an annual report; that is not for me to determine, but I fully expect it to cover the kinds of areas that the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire set out in his amendment. The annual report will be laid before Parliament. Its operation will also be subject to independent external scrutiny by the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration. Although I agree that it is important to scrutinise the specified figures that the hon. Member flags in his amendment, we do not feel that they on their own would provide a reliable measure of decision quality. It is therefore unnecessary to prescribe those particular measures in primary legislation. I ask the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment, but will quickly refer to a couple of points that he raised.

We discussed earlier the standards of adjudicators that the hon. Member mentioned, but it is important to reiterate that adjudicators should have the required training to give them the necessary decision-making expertise to make determinations on appeal cases and bail applications. It will be the responsibility of the chief executive to ensure that adjudicators have adequate training and support. The chief appeals officer will be responsible for organising a system of legal support for them. The Bill provides strong safeguards and quality assurance mechanisms to ensure high standards and to ensure adjudicators are entirely independent of the Executive.

The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire flagged adequate training and support, and it is important go into a bit more detail on that. The chief executive will be responsible for ensuring that the authority’s adjudicators have adequate training and support to maintain independence from the Executive. The chief appeals officer is responsible for overseeing that quality. The chief appeals officer will also be able to identify any specific training needs of adjudicators and recommend them to the chief executive if they desire. The important point is that the authority is independent. It is really important that we remember that. It is not for the Government to decide what accreditation and continuous development is required for the authority’s adjudicators. They will be making decisions against appeals to which the Home Office will be a party, so it is important that we allow the authority to set those standards itself.

I will move on to how things will be monitored. As I mentioned, we have built a few steps of quality assurance into the system from the outset through training, legal support, professional standards, decision quality oversight, internal review and onward appeal rights. As I said, the chief appeals officer will be responsible for organising that system of legal support, the professional standards officer will be responsible for setting professional standards, and the detailed operation of those arrangements will be developed through the authority’s quality assurance framework and procedural arrangements as they are established.

I hope that reassures the hon. Gentleman that we agree with the principle behind the amendment. We do not think the specific figures he outlined are the best way to reliably measure decision-making quality, but we share the determination to ensure that there are opportunities to scrutinise it throughout the process.

[Blake Stephenson]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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We support clauses 4 and 5 and schedule 3. We do not oppose the Government amendments and new clause 2. We will oppose amendment 63. The Opposition want rules that deliver fast, final decisions and that stand up in court. A set of rules quashed within a year would set the whole reform back.

[Anna Turley]

I again thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for her amendments. We are having numerous Divisions today, but it keeps us all on our toes. I will take her amendments in turn.

Clause 4 sets out that the authority will operate under a set of procedure rules determined by the IIAA procedure rules board. I will set out the details about the establishment of the board when we discuss clause 5, but that board is the body that will determine the procedure rules. In reference to some of the requests for more information on the rules, or for draft rules, those are not for us to determine. The procedure rules board will be set up through a proper establishment process as it is a statutory body, and it is important that it leads on the drafting of the procedure rules.

Those rules will be made by statutory instrument so we will have the opportunity to scrutinise them at that point. Making the IIAA procedure rules that way provides an important safeguard to the independence of the authority by placing control of its procedural framework—set out in schedule 3—in the hands of the IIAA procedure rules board. That is broadly similar to the process for the current tribunal rules, which sees the Tribunal Procedure Committee draft rule changes following consultations with relevant stakeholders. The IIAA procedure rules board, like the Tribunal Procedure Committee, will make its own procedure rules as if it were a Minister of the Crown.

Amendment 63, in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, seeks to amend clause 4 so that the authority’s procedure rules board must draft the procedural rules “with a view to” securing the statutory objectives in clauses 1(4) and 1(5). It would replace the current requirement for the board to draft the rules with

“regard to the desirability of”

meeting those objectives. The amendment mirrors the wording of the duty placed on the Tribunal Procedure Committee in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act.

The Bill sets out that in the exercise of its primary function, the IIAA must

“aim to be accessible, fair and independent…aim to handle its cases quickly and efficiently, and…have regard to the public interest, and…to the fact that the IIAA operates as a key part of the immigration and asylum system.”

The procedure rules board is internal to the authority and therefore members of the board would be expected to comply with the statutory duty set out in clauses 1(4) and 1(5). Amendment 63 would therefore have no practical impact on the way the authority’s procedure rules board develops its rules.

[Siân Berry]

The Minister has not justified why the wording is different. She said that members of the board would be expected to comply; my amendment would simply make that even clearer. Why say that they should

“have regard to the desirability of”

instead of using the wording that I suggest in amendment 63?

[Anna Turley]

We simply do not believe that is necessary. The procedure rules board does not require that change to the wording about its objectives, because that already forms part of the authority. As I have specified, the authority is under a duty, which is made explicit on the first page of the Bill, towards those objectives in the performance of its functions—it has to undertake them. It has a statutory objective to aim to be “accessible, fair and independent” in the performance of its functions, so we do not agree that this is any sort of watering down. The way that the procedure rules are made will be independent of the Government and it is crucial that we maintain these safeguards.

Schedule 3 establishes the framework within which the procedure rules of the authority will operate and ensures that the IIAA has the powers necessary to manage proceedings fairly, efficiently and transparently. The schedule provides for rules-governing matters such as hearings, evidence, representation, reviews of decisions, appeals to the upper tribunal, costs and the publication of decisions. It also enables the IIAA to make effective use of modern case management practices, including remote hearings and measures to support vulnerable participants.

The schedule promotes the timely and effective resolution of cases. It allows the procedure rules to address the treatment of evidence provided late, while preserving appropriate safeguards where there are good reasons for delay. It also reinforces transparency and accountability by providing for the publication of decisions, subject to safeguards, to protect the interest of justice and the anonymity of those who should not be identified. Taken together, these provisions will enable the authority to develop a clear and comprehensive procedural framework, supporting it to discharge its functions fairly, consistently and without unnecessary delay.

I turn to amendment 68, which would require the authority procedure rules to provide that an adjudicator involved in making the original decision cannot take part in a review of that decision. The Government recognise the importance of ensuring that these reviews are conducted fairly and impartially. Again, the Bill already provides appropriate safeguards around the exercise of the review power. Clause 6 will require a review to be carried out by an IIAA adjudicator, while schedule 3 will enable the procedure rules to set out the circumstances in which and the procedure by which the power under clause 6 may be exercised. Clause 3 also makes the chief appeals officer responsible for allocating cases to adjudicators and for developing a quality assurance mechanism. These are important safeguards to enable the fair and impartial allocation of reviews. The Government therefore consider that the allocation of reviews is more appropriately addressed through the authority procedure rules and case allocation arrangements, rather than being prescribed in the Bill.

Clause 5 sets out which of the IIAA members will sit on the IIAA procedure rules board and how appointments of standing members to the board can be made. The procedure rules board will consist of

“the Chief Executive…the Chief Appeals Officer…the Professional Standards Officer, and…any standing members appointed by the Chair.”

The statutory make-up of the board will ensure that it has adequate expertise to draft rules that are fit for purpose, including the legal expertise of the chief appeals officer and the professional standards officer. The option to appoint further standing members will enable the chair to ensure that the board can make rules in areas requiring specialist expertise, where relevant; that might include social worker expertise for rules related to unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, for example. Beyond that, as clause 4 sets out, the board must consult such persons as it considers appropriate. Again, that will support the IIAA to incorporate a range of views, expertise and experience into its rules.

The Government amendments in this group seek to achieve several aims. I will cover expedited appeal proceedings in more detail when we debate groups 8, 9 and 11 on the selection list. In this group, amendments 30, 31, 33, 34 and 35 will ensure that the immigration bail provisions operate consistently within the Bill’s expedited proceedings framework. The Bill already requires regard to be had, when considering whether to grant immigration bail, to whether proceedings are subject to the late claims process under clause 12. These amendments simply make equivalent provision where proceedings before the IIAA relating to a person are being expedited pursuant to a request by the Secretary of State under clause 9, which we will come to later and which will apply where the Secretary of State considers that it would be in the public interest for proceedings to be expedited. It is therefore appropriate that cases proceeding under the expedited process be treated consistently with cases subject to the late claims process.

These amendments will simply ensure that both categories are reflected in the matters to which regard must be had when determining whether to grant immigration bail. Crucially, however, they will not alter the legal test for immigration bail. The amendments will also remove applicants for immigration bail from the paragraph 11 credibility provisions in schedule 3, with the effect that those provisions apply only in relation to appellants. Taken together, these are technical and consequential amendments that will ensure that part 1 of the Bill operates as intended.

Government new clause 2 will give the Secretary of State a power to take such steps as they consider appropriate to increase the supply and capacity of qualified immigration advisers to appellants in the IIAA—that is, people who are qualified within the meaning of section 84 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 to provide immigration advice and services. Provision has already been made in schedule 3, which requires appellants to indicate whether they have obtained advice or representation.

This power is intended to complement that provision by expressly empowering the Secretary of State to invest in increasing the availability of advice and representation for appellants and bail applicants in the IIAA. I am glad to hear it welcomed by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, because it is intended to support access to justice by encouraging growth in the advice and representation sector and by increasing availability and access to advisers and representatives. It creates a clear legal basis on which to increase the general availability of IIAA advice and representation through financial and other assistance. For example, investment may be in training, accreditation, workforce development and support for service providers. Early legal advice helps to avoid delays and late claims, leads to better decisions and, crucially, ensures that individuals get the advice and support that they need at an appropriate time.

Government amendment 29 will amend schedule 3 to ensure that the IIAA procedure rules require the IIAA to provide all appellants and bail applicants with information on how to access advice and representation, reinforcing our intention that all appellants should have the opportunity to obtain it. Government amendment 28 is a small technical change to enable amendment 36, which we will come to in the next group. Finally, Government amendment 32 will limit the application of paragraph 11(3) of schedule 3, so that IIAA procedure rules are not required to make the same provision as is made in new clause 3, which we will come to later.

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[Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)]

I support amendment 68. My concern, which I am sure many people outside this place share, is that in effect it means people marking their own homework. Is there not a basic principle of fairness involved here? If we wish to see a genuine review in which all the information can be summed up and weighed, there might be issues of internal bias if the person who has already made the initial decision is reviewing it.

[Anna Turley]

The ultimate decisions on how this will be set up are for the procedure rules board. I am sure that its members will be watching and listening to these proceedings, and I am sure that they will be very careful to ensure, when they set up the procedures, that there can be no accusations of any duplication or of people marking their own homework in the process. I hope that the safeguards I have set out will ensure that, but it is not for us to propose that in the Bill; it is for the board to do so as it undertakes the whole assessment and development of the procedure rules.

[Tom Gordon]

May I press the Minister a little further on that point? What really concerns me is that a lot of this will be done using the negative procedure, as she has referred to. Our ability to influence and to resolve the issue down the line if the board does get it wrong, which I hope it does not, will be further constrained and our hands will be tied. Does the Minister share that concern?

[Anna Turley]

We are putting a huge amount into ensuring the quality and the expertise on the board that is setting up these rules. As I say, we have the legal expertise of the chief appeals officer and the professional standards officer. They will be reporting to Parliament in a whole range of ways, so we will be able to monitor the process throughout. The amendment would simply tie the hands of the procedure rules board. It is not for us to dictate how it undertakes the review process. It is important that it be independent of Government and be able to establish its own process, which will ultimately be accountable to Parliament.

It is also important to flag the equality and impartiality. There will be training, legal support, professional standards, decision quality oversight, internal review and onwards appeal rights, so there are a whole range of factors to ensure that the quality of adjudicators’ decisions is high. The chief appeals officer will oversee that. They will have to develop a quality assurance mechanism as well, and the professional standards officer will be setting and maintaining professional standards. We are putting a range of things in place to ensure the highest standards in the decision-making process.

On new clause 2, the shadow Minister asked about costs, about access and about when people will be able to have advice and representation during the process. We will ensure that all those who lodge an appeal to be heard in the new IIAA can access advice and representation, with access to legal aid where the eligibility tests are met. On the bail process, we are also ensuring that when we ask people to state whether they have advice and arrangements in place for representation, we encourage the uptake of suitably regulated advice and representation. That will help us to reduce delays, avoid disruption and provide fairness throughout the process.

I think I have answered most of the questions that hon. Members have raised, but if there are any further points that I have missed, I will come back to the Committee.

[Siân Berry]

The Minister’s insistence that this is not a watering down of previous rules does not wash. In my opinion, it is a double watering down: clause 4 makes a change to “have regard to”, and clause 1 includes a double use of “aim to” rather than “must”. That is certainly a watering down of the previous duties, and I think we should go along with the wording in amendment 63.

On amendment 68, we have heard a lot of assurances from the Minister that the quality assurance and rule-making processes are unlikely to do the opposite of what this amendment asks. We have heard the Minister say, “They can do this.” If she were prepared to say, “They will do this,” I could potentially withdraw the amendment, but in the absence of that assurance—with only “This is possible” and “We might see this,” and with only the negative procedure—I am afraid I will have to press it to a vote.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate what the hon. Member says, but as I say, it is not feasible for the Home Office or the Government to dictate in that way. I cannot give her that assurance, because we are setting up the body so that it can be independent and can set up its own rules, processes and procedures. It is really important that we allow it to undertake that, so I cannot put her recommendation explicitly in the Bill.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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Power of IIAA to review its own decisions

[Anna Turley]

I beg to move amendment 36, in clause 6, page 5, line 12, at end insert—

“(1A) The IIAA may undertake a review of a decision under this section only for the purposes of determining whether the decision contains an error of law.”

This amendment would mean that reviews under clause 6 may only be undertaken on the grounds of an error of law. Errors of fact may be dealt with under IIAA Procedure Rules made under paragraph 17 of Schedule 3.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Clause 7 stand part.

[Anna Turley]

Clause 6 provides the IIAA with the power to review its own decisions. This is an important safeguard in the new appeals system. It enables the IIAA, among other things, to identify and correct errors in its decisions without requiring parties to pursue an onward appeal to the upper tribunal. The review power supports the efficient administration of justice. It provides a mechanism for correcting errors at an earlier stage, which can reduce unnecessary litigation and ensure that cases are resolved more quickly where appropriate.

The clause reflects a common practice of decision-making bodies implementing a mechanism to review their own decisions. By enabling the IIAA to review its own decisions, the clause helps to promote fairness, accuracy and public confidence in the appeals system. The review power sits alongside the onward right of appeal to the upper tribunal provided by clause 7. Together, the provisions create a coherent framework through which decisions may be scrutinised and, where necessary, corrected. Clause 7 provides an important safeguard within the new appeals system by preserving a right of appeal from the IIAA to the upper tribunal on a point of law. A party will need permission from either the IIAA or the upper tribunal before an appeal can proceed, which should prevent the onward appeal route from becoming an opportunity to rehear the full case. That broadly mirrors the existing route from the first-tier tribunal to the upper tribunal, therefore maintaining continuity and legal accountability as cases transfer to the new authority. Where the upper tribunal finds an error of law, it will be able to remake the decision itself or remit the case to the IIAA for a fresh decision. The clause is necessary to ensure that the decisions of the new IIAA remain subject to judicial scrutiny at upper tribunal level. The upper tribunal will provide independent oversight of whether the law has been applied correctly.

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[Blake Stephenson]

The clause allows the IIAA to review its own decisions once, to correct errors, amend reasons or remake the decision. An internal review of that kind is consistent with the Opposition’s own plan for a short internal appeal. Clause 7 provides the only route from the IIAA to a court—appeal to the upper tribunal on a point of law, with permission—and also applies to the post-Cart ouster in section 11A of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, with refusals of permission. Government amendment 36 limits the IIAA’s power of review to errors of law. Errors of fact will instead be corrected under the procedure rules. We do not oppose that. A review that can reopen the facts is a rehearing by another name.

That changes the argument about clause 1(8), however. The narrower the IIAA’s own remedies, the harder it is to say that there is an adequate alternative to judicial review. How will errors of fact be corrected, and how quickly? Do the Government still regard review and appeal together as an adequate alternative remedy? What time limit will apply and will a pending review delay removal or an onward appeal? I think that the Minister touched on that in her remarks, but I will be grateful if she could unpack that somewhat. How many reviews do the Government expect, and what effect will those have on the upper tribunal? Do the Government regard review and appeal together as an adequate alternative remedy that justifies excluding judicial review?

The Government’s own impact assessment—admittedly the one published earlier, not the one published yesterday, because I have not seen that—expects a “sustained increase in demand” on the upper tribunal. What additional capacity—judges, sitting days and so on—has been funded, and how many onward appeals does the impact assessment assume? What proportion of IIAA decisions do the Government expect to be set aside?

Clause 6(3) is significant; it applies the partial ouster that the previous Conservative Government enacted in the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022, which was drafted precisely with narrow exceptions and is accepted by the courts. Professor Ekins, in his oral evidence a few weeks ago, told us that the model could be applied here to IIAA decisions. If that is right for the upper tribunal, why is it not right for clause 1(8)?

I have two final questions. First, will time periods such as those in clause 8 apply to upper tribunal appeals? Secondly, where an error of law is found, will the upper tribunal remake decisions itself or send them back? We support Government amendment 36 and clauses 6 and 7. A credible internal review and speed at the second stage, as well as the first, are part of a system that is fast, final and defensible in court.

[Anna Turley]

I thank hon. Members for the constructive way they have approached the clauses and amendments. As I mentioned, the clauses are important to ensure that decisions can be reviewed either by the authority itself or by the upper tribunal where there are errors in law. The Government amendment in this group seeks to clarify this position and support it on the face of the Bill.

I will turn to a few of the questions raised. On the point of law and the question posed about whether a review power is necessary if there is already a right of appeal to the upper tribunal, the review power enables IIAA to correct errors directly without requiring parties to pursue what can be a longer and more resource-intensive appeals process. This can lead to quicker resolution of cases and reduce unnecessary onward appeals. On the supposition that this is just an additional layer of appeal: it is not. The clause provides the IIAA with the power to review its own decisions, as I said. It does not remove or replace the onward right of appeal to the tribunal. The review mechanism and the onward appeal route operate as part of the wider appeals process established by the Bill.

On the question whether an appeal is limited to a point of law, this measure reflects the existing onward appeal route from the first-tier tribunal. The IIAA will determine the merits of the case. The upper tribunal’s role is to consider whether the law was applied correctly rather than, as the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire mentioned, to provide a full rehearing. I think reference was made to why permission is required as well. Permission provides an appropriate filter so that we can ensure that appeals only within an arguable point of law proceed. We are keen to avoid unnecessary resource expenditure and delay in the finality of decisions. Permission may be sought from either the independent immigration appeals authority or the upper tribunal. Any further questions, particularly around costs, will continue to develop during the process and development of the policy, and I will continue to keep Members updated.

Amendment 36 agreed to.

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

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[Anna Turley]

I thank Members again for their amendments in this group. I will turn to those amendments after explaining the drafting of clause 8.

Clause 8 enables the Secretary of State, following consultation with the authority—I have been using the word “authority” for brevity, so I hope that colleagues know I am referring to the IIAA—to set time limits for certain appeals, bail applications and procedural steps. The cohorts of appeals that may be expedited under clause 8 will be set out following consultation between the Home Secretary and the authority, but potential cohorts could include removable foreign national offenders, for whom the swift resolution of appeals and enforcement of deportation where appropriate is a long-standing Home Secretary priority, as set out in the Government’s “Restoring Order and Control” statement.

The purpose is simple: to support the timely resolution of cases. The clause will help to ensure that the appeals system is efficient, responsive and capable of delivering justice without unnecessary delay. Let me be absolutely clear: this clause does not affect the authority’s independence in deciding cases. It concerns the management of proceedings, not their outcome.

The Secretary of State must consult the authority before making regulations, and the authority retains the flexibility to allow additional time where the interests of justice or the practicalities of a case require it. This is a balanced and proportionate measure. It will improve efficiency and accountability while preserving fairness and access to justice. This clause is about timely justice—which, as other hon. Members have mentioned, is just as important for those undergoing the process as it is for the wider public—not rushed justice, and efficient case management, not ministerial control.

Amendment 89 would impose an arbitrary deadline for making the first regulations under clause 8. The clause is deliberately flexible, allowing time periods to be introduced where the evidence shows that particular cases should be prioritised. I appreciate the entreaties of the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, but it is really important that we do not pre-empt the evidence, particularly during the authority’s early development. Further reporting requirements are also unnecessary. Clause 8 already requires the authority’s annual report to cover cases where time periods have been extended.

Amendment 83 would unnecessarily broaden the statutory consultation requirement. Stakeholder engagement is of course important, and it is something I believe in very strongly, but prescribing a lengthy list of consultees in the Bill could delay our ability to respond quickly where particular cases need to be prioritised. Clause 8 already requires the Secretary of State to consult the authority and, crucially, does not restrict wider engagement if needed, so there is an opportunity for that.

I would also like to make this point: for me, Parliament is the ultimate stakeholder, and the public are ultimately the people this Bill is for. Our constituents have lived experience of this process, so it is important that they have the ultimate say, and that is why the Home Secretary is accountable to Parliament in this process. It is Members of Parliament, who represent their constituents, who can ultimately represent that stakeholder, and it is crucial to remember that.

More broadly, the Bill already places clear duties on the authority, which must exercise its primary function with a view to ensuring that justice is done. It must aim to be accessible, fair and independent, and it must aim to handle its cases quickly and effectively. It is in everyone’s interests that cases are resolved swiftly.

Before I finish, I would like to respond to a couple more of the points that were made. On the point of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion about lived experience, we recognise the value of wider stakeholder engagement, but prescribing this lengthy list could delay action where particular cases need to be prioritised. We do not want to restrict the flexibility around that. As I have said, the Bill already requires the Secretary of State to consult with the authority before making regulations and, crucially, it does not restrict that wider engagement, which is so important.

The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire asked for details on the timeframes and the kinds of cases that the authority will prioritise, which will be set out in regulations in due course. The Government are clear that appeals may be prioritised where there is a strong public interest or compelling operational reason to do so. As I have already mentioned, that could include the cases of foreign national offenders, where we have a genuine need to protect the public, or individuals who are in detention. Any prioritisation will support the efficient operation of the appeals system while ensuring that we maintain fairness and justice. For those reasons, I respectfully ask for the amendments not to be pressed to a vote.

[Siân Berry]

I will not labour the point any further. I will press my amendment to a Division, and I hope the Minister will keep looking at how this kind of consultation can be made more statutorily inclusive.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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Expedition of cases on request by Secretary of State

[Anna Turley]

I beg to move amendment 37, in clause 9, page 7, line 21, at end insert—

“(7) In Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016 (immigration bail), in paragraph 3 (exercise of power to grant immigration bail), in sub-paragraph (2), after paragraph (e) insert—

‘(eza) whether any proceedings before the IIAA relating to the person are being expedited pursuant to a request by the Secretary of State under section 9 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 2026,’.”

This amendment would mean that, in considering whether to grant immigration bail, the decision-maker must have regard to whether the applicant’s proceedings were being expedited pursuant to clause 9 of the Bill (as well as whether the late claims process applies: see clause 12(3)).

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 90, in clause 9, page 7, line 21, at end insert—

“(7) The IIAA must expedite any appeal brought by a person who—

(a) is liable to deportation under section 3(5)(a) or (6) of the Immigration Act 1971, and

(b) has been convicted of an offence in the United Kingdom or elsewhere,

and subsection (3) applies in relation to such an appeal as if the Secretary of State had made an expedition request.”

This amendment would require the IIAA to expedite appeals brought by foreign criminals liable to deportation rather than leaving expedition to a discretionary request by the Home Secretary.

Clause stand part.

[Anna Turley]

The clause allows the Secretary of State to request expedition of an appeal, bail application or procedural step within these proceedings where there is a public interest in securing a quicker resolution. This is an exceptional power for exceptional cases. It ensures that matters of particular importance can be brought to the attention of the IIAA for consideration of expedited treatment.

Let me be clear: this is a power to request expedition, not direct it. The IIAA decides whether a case should be accelerated and may refuse a request where expedition would not be reasonably practicable or would not be in the interests of justice. Nothing in the clause permits Ministers to influence the outcome of proceedings or diminishes the authority’s independence. Cases will continue to be determined impartially and on their merits. The clause is a balanced safeguard. It supports the timely resolution of cases, engaging public interest while preserving fairness and independence. The principle is simple: the Secretary of State may ask, but the authority decides.

Government amendment 37 seeks to ensure that the immigration bail provisions operate consistently with the Bill’s expedited proceedings framework. The Bill already requires regard to be had, when considering whether to grant immigration bail, to whether proceedings are subject to the late claims process under clause 12. The amendments make equivalent provision where proceedings before the authority relate to a person being expedited pursuant to a request by the Secretary of State under clause 9. Clause 9 applies where the Secretary of State considers that it would be in the public interest for proceedings to be expedited. It is therefore appropriate that cases proceeding under that expedited process are treated consistently with the cases subject to the late claims process.

[Blake Stephenson]

The clause lets the Home Secretary ask the authority to expedite a case where it is in the public interest. The authority must agree unless it is not practicable or not in the interests of justice. The Home Office has said that the power will be used for cases such as high harm foreign offenders and human rights claims that are clearly without merit. The Opposition support that.

On amendment 90, tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West, the principal question is: why leave it to discretion? The public have a direct interest in foreign criminals being deported and being deported quickly, so why leave it to the Home Secretary’s case-by-case discretion? Amendment 90 would require the authority to expedite any appeal by a person who is liable to deportation and has been convicted of an offence either here or abroad, exactly as if the Home Secretary had asked. Will the Government accept that incredibly sensible amendment, which I think the British public would support? I have a couple of basic questions. What criteria will the Home Secretary use, and will they be published? How many requests do the Government expect each year?

Government amendment 37 requires anyone deciding bail to consider whether the authority is expediting the person’s appeal at the Home Secretary’s request. We support that—someone whose appeal is being fast-tracked should not be released while it is heard—but it has a cost. How many additional people do the Government expect to remain in detention as a result, and is there the capacity? How do the Government intend to implement that?

On legal robustness, the House of Commons Library notes that lawyers are already asking how an appellant could challenge a decision to expedite, given clause 1(8)—we come back to clause 1(8) and the robustness, or otherwise, of that clause. That question will be answered in the courts if it is not answered here, so how do the Government expect expedition decisions to be challenged, and do they expect them to be judicially reviewed? When will the process regulations be made, and how long will the authority have to respond to a request?

We support the clause and the Government amendment. We will oppose any attempt to remove the power. Our amendment 90 would ensure that the appeals that matter most to public safety are always at the front of the queue, and I will seek to press that to a Division.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Member for his contribution to this debate and for tabling amendment 90. To reiterate, the Government amendment ensures that the immigration bail provisions operate consistently within the Bill’s expedited proceedings framework. The Bill already requires regard to be had, when considering whether to grant immigration bail, to whether proceedings are subject to the late claims process under clause 12. The amendment makes equivalent provision where proceedings before the authority relating to a person are being expedited pursuant to a request by the Secretary of State under clause 9.

Let us move to amendment 90. The clause is deliberately designed to deal with cases where the Secretary of State considers that expedition would be in the public interest. It allows those cases to be identified individually and an expedition request to be made to the IIAA. Amendment 90 would instead apply expedition automatically to a broad category of appeals, which is not the purpose of the clause. Where there is a case for setting time periods for a wider group of proceedings, clause 8 provides the appropriate mechanism.

That said, I think it is also important that we are not specifying a particular group in the Bill. Otherwise, potentially, we may need to amend legislation for every category of appeals that the Home Secretary wishes to expedite. It is really important that we maintain flexibility for the Secretary of State to respond to public opinion and to public safety in terms of the category of appeals that she would wish to be expedited.

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[Ben Goldsborough (South Norfolk) (Lab)]

rose—

[Anna Turley]

I will give way first to the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, then to my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk.

[Blake Stephenson]

You never know, Chair, we may be asking the same question. I asked the Minister whether she would provide some criteria—I am expanding my question, in fact—to give the public some certainty as to the decisions that the Home Secretary might make. Does the Minister expect some criteria to be published?

[Anna Turley]

It is important that we maintain flexibility, as I said. The Bill provides distinct mechanisms for very broad categories of cases and for exceptional individual cases. We should retain that flexibility, so I am afraid that I disagree with the hon. Gentleman on limiting the approach of the Home Secretary in the Bill. Particularly, this is also about case-specific assessment. We want to allow the Home Secretary the opportunity to look at case-specific assessments, rather than being too defined.

[Ben Goldsborough]

Does the Minister agree that the problem with amendment 90 is that if we expedite everything, we expedite nothing? Having the clause as drafted—making this a precise move taken by the Secretary of State—ensures that those cases that our constituents know need to be expedited, will be. The broadbrush approach proposed by the Opposition would fail that completely.

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend puts that perfectly, succinctly and clearly. I appreciate him saying that. This Government are absolutely clear that foreign national offenders with no right to remain should be removed as swiftly as the law allows. I have every anticipation—the Home Secretary has been clear—that in restoring order and control, they are exactly the kind of cohort that we have in mind. It is important, however, that clause 8 provides the appropriate mechanism for setting those time periods for groups of cases, clause 9 allows for individual cases to be expedited, and we continue to allow the Secretary of State to have that flexibility to respond to the public interest, rather than narrowing the measure to one specific cohort in the Bill.

Amendment 37 agreed to.

Amendment proposed: 90, in clause 9, page 7, line 21, at end insert—

“(7) The IIAA must expedite any appeal brought by a person who—

(a) is liable to deportation under section 3(5)(a) or (6) of the Immigration Act 1971, and

(b) has been convicted of an offence in the United Kingdom or elsewhere,

and subsection (3) applies in relation to such an appeal as if the Secretary of State had made an expedition request.”—(Blake Stephenson.)

This amendment would require the IIAA to expedite appeals brought by foreign criminals liable to deportation rather than leaving expedition to a discretionary request by the Home Secretary.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new clause 1—Enforcement.

[Anna Turley]

The Independent Immigration Appeals Authority has a statutory objective to handle its cases quickly and efficiently. It cannot do that if it cannot enforce the requirements set out in its procedure rules. It is anticipated that the requirements on parties to proceedings will be set out clearly under the authority’s procedure rules.

Clause 10 provides the authority with a lever to set tangible consequences for non-compliance by enabling it to charge a party to proceedings, among others, who has acted “improperly, unreasonably or negligently,” and whose actions have caused the authority’s resources to be wasted. That is intended to disincentivise tactical delay. The charge will be payable to the authority, rather than an order to pay costs to another party. It will be for the authority to determine what meets the threshold for a charge according to the circumstances of the case, and the detailed operation of the power should be set out in the authority’s procedure rules. Any moneys the authority receives under the power will be paid into the consolidated fund.

Government new clause 1 will enable a party or the authority to seek enforcement, as if the decision of the authority were that of the relevant court. That will simplify the process of recovering funds and will bring the authority in line with existing provisions in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.

[Blake Stephenson]

Clause 10 allows the authority to charge a party or representative who acts “improperly, unreasonably or negligently” and wastes its resources, and the Opposition support it. Last-minute applications and poorly prepared cases waste time the system does not have.

I have a couple of questions. The Bar Council objects that non-lawyer adjudicators could charge or fine barristers, with a chilling effect. We do not accept that representatives should be immune from the consequences of abusing the process, but the power must be clear. What level of charge is envisaged, and will there be a cap? How often are wasted costs orders made in the tribunal now? Will a person who is charged have a right to review or appeal?

Of course, fairness cuts both ways. The Home Office is a party. The Library records that 36% of asylum appeals disposed of last year were withdrawn, and the Refugee Council attributes that to poor initial decisions, a point that was made earlier in the debate. Will the Home Office be liable to charges when it withdraws a decision shortly before a hearing, and will guidance define what counts as acting improperly, unreasonably or negligently?

Government new clause 1 makes sums payable under a decision by the authority, including charges under clause 10, recoverable as if they were county court orders in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and enforceable in the sheriff court in Scotland. We support that. A charge that cannot be collected is no deterrent at all. Will charges against the Home Office be enforceable in the same way? What sums do the Government expect to be recovered each year?

We support clause 10 and Government new clause 1. A clear, fairly applied and enforceable power will discourage abuse of the process, which we think is important.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his contribution. Government new clause 1 ensures there is a mechanism for the enforcement of cost orders between parties to proceedings in the authority, in addition to charges made by the authority under its powers in clause 10. The clause allows the authority to charge a participant in proceedings where it considers that they have acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently, and that that has resulted in the authority’s resources being wasted. Schedule 3 provides for the authority to make rules in relation to cost orders, whereby the authority may order costs to be paid between parties as a result of any party acting improperly, unreasonably or negligently. In answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question about whether the Home Office is accountable, yes, we will be.

The new clause enables a party or the authority to seek enforcement as if the decision of the authority were that of the relevant court. When enforcement of a sum is pursued following the authority’s decision, that decision is to be treated as a registrable judgment in the relevant jurisdiction—in this case England and Wales, and Northern Ireland. This simplifies the process of pursuing sums payable under the authority’s decision. It is broadly in line with equivalent provisions in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, which enable tribunal costs to be enforced.

The hon. Gentleman made a few points about fairness and the ability to recoup the money. It is anticipated that the authority will take into account the circumstances of the case and the person’s ability to pay when deciding whether to impose a charge. Where there are genuine reasons for delay, for example, it is unlikely that those actions will meet the threshold for a charge. The value of the charge will, rightly, be set through the authority under its procedure rules. It will need to strike a balance between being proportionate and fair, and deterring tactical delay of the process. There will be appropriate parliamentary scrutiny of the charging power through the procedure rules, which will be subject to the negative procedure. We heard earlier a challenge to the use of the negative procedure, but the current tribunal rules are decided through that procedure, so there is no difference in the process.

The hon. Gentleman also mentioned enforcement. The new clause provides that a sum payable under an order of the authority is enforceable as if it were payable under an order of the relevant court. That means the person to whom the money is owed as a result of a decision of the authority can rely on the court processes for the enforcement of that sum.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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[Blake Stephenson]

Clause 11 tackles one of the most damaging features of the current system: claims raised at the last minute to prevent removal. It allows the Home Office to serve a claim notice on anyone liable to removal or deportation, requiring them to set out every reason they should be allowed to stay, including any modern slavery information, by a deadline. Clause 12 gives teeth to clause 11. Where someone ignores a claim notice and raises new grounds only once they are detained or given removal directions, their appeals will be fast-tracked and the late claim will count against them when bail is considered.

The Opposition support that approach, but there is a problem. The Minister told the Committee during the oral evidence sessions:

“More than a third of our charter returns that fail to go ahead have involved a modern slavery referral raised after the return arrangements have been made.”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 5, Q3.]

That is exactly the gaming of the system that the public will no longer tolerate. Our plan would require applicants to submit their claim in one go, with later claims disregarded unless there has been a material change in their home country. Clause 11 moves in that direction but stops short: a late claim goes into the late claims process and damages credibility, but it can still be heard and can still succeed. How long will people have to respond? Where will that be set? Who will be served? Beyond clauses 12 and 36, what are the consequences of failing to comply? Can late grounds still succeed on appeal?

Amendment 91 would close the gap: reasons or grounds raised after the claim notice deadline could not be relied on in an appeal before the appeal authority or the upper tribunal unless the appeal authority is satisfied that they arise from a material change of circumstances after the deadline. That is the principle of our plan: claims must be made in one go, and later claims disregarded unless something has genuinely changed. Will the Government accept that approach and therefore our amendment?

Clause 11(10) repeals a large part of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, including provisions on late evidence in section 26 and accelerated detained appeals in section 27. Why repeal them rather than bring them into force? What will replace them? The Immigration Law Practitioners Association points out that the priority removal notice regime gave recipients a period to access legal advice and clause 11 does not. We do not support the ILPA’s proposed legal advice precondition, but the Government should explain their answer to that point, because if they do not, it will be litigated.

Government amendment 38 goes further, repealing section 19(2) of the 2022 Act on credibility statements, which is replaced by new clauses 3 and 4. We do not oppose that approach. The risk is legal. Justice and the Bar Council remind us that, in the Detention Action case, the Court of Appeal quashed the detained fast-track rules because they were systematically unfair, and that the Court took comfort from specialist judges hearing those cases, which will not be true of the appeal authority. A fast track that is quashed delivers nothing.

What timetable will apply? Justice reports that the Home Office intends decisions “within a week”. What legal advice do the Government have that this process will survive legal challenge? How many cases are expected and what will happen to other appeals pushed back in the queue? What effect will the new bail conditions have on detention numbers and capacity? Will these cases, which often feature detention and are often complex, be decided by senior adjudicators?

Government amendments 39 and 42 mean that a person who gives modern-day slavery information late, after detention or after removal directions, will not go into the late claims process. I understand the reasoning, which responds to concerns from anti-trafficking organisations, but the Minister told the Committee that more than a third of failed charter returns involved a modern slavery referral raised after return arrangements were made. Does this change not reopen exactly that gap?

New clause 3 requires adjudicators in late claims cases to treat late information and late evidence as damaging credibility unless there are good reasons, and new clause 4 does the same for the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. We support them, but everything turns on “good reasons”. If that phrase is read generously, the rule will be swallowed up by the exception. Will the Government look to define it in the Bill or in guidance?

The written evidence adds two points to ILPA’s concern about legal advice. First, ILPA notes that nothing in clause 11 exempts under-18s from the credibility consequences of missing a claim notice deadline. Will children be exempt or protected by guidance? Secondly, Women for Refugee Women says that the Home Office’s guidance on gender-based claims

“recognises that late disclosure is common among survivors of trauma.”

The organisation After Exploitation and a coalition led by Hibiscus call a requirement to disclose everything at the outset “highly unrealistic”. How will the claim notice regime be applied consistently with the Home Office’s own guidance? Will trauma-related late disclosure count as a good reason? We want grounds raised early, but a regime that the Home Office’s own guidance contradicts will not survive its first test case.

Justice adds a point on Detention Action that the Minister should look to answer. When the Court of Appeal considered the fast-track rules, it took into account that independent specialist tribunal judges were hearing the cases. That will not be the case with the appeal authority. Has the Government’s legal advice taken that into account?

We support clauses 11 and 12 and the Government’s amendments, and we oppose attempts to weaken them. One notice, one deadline and one claim: that is the principle, and the Bill should apply it fully. I will seek to press amendment 91 to a Division.

[Anna Turley]

As the hon. Gentleman set out, we have an issue in our system in this country with late claims that are made in detention just prior to planned removal, which inevitably require release or lead to bail, as there is no mechanism for dealing with the appeals in an expedited way. That leads to a significant degree of gaming the system and compromises removals performance.

On the late claims process, a single fast appeal process, which we are setting out here, will apply to late claims—those made after the expiry of the new claim notice. Individuals must submit all relevant information up front. Failure to do so, unless justified, will damage their credibility and result in expedited handling, which will be relevant to maintaining their detention until removal. Late disclosure of modern slavery information may similarly damage credibility unless justified.

Receiving information at the earliest opportunity helps to ensure that cases are considered on the fullest possible picture, enabling timely and better-informed decision making. Clause 11 seeks to deliver that through a new claim notice, which may be issued to individuals to inform them of the need to submit any immigration claim or modern slavery information they have to the Home Office at the earliest opportunity. Where modern slavery issues are raised, that will help support early identification of needs.

Clause 11 works in conjunction with clause 12 to ensure that individuals are informed that failing to submit an immigration claim following receipt of the notice, only to make a claim from immigration detention or after being served notice of departure details, will leave them subject to an expedited late claims process and may have negative implications for their credibility. For modern slavery purposes, the notice will advise recipients that failure to provide modern slavery information only to do so after the claim notice deadline will be taken into consideration, under clause 36, as damaging the credibility of their account by decision makers assessing whether they are a victim of trafficking, unless there are “good reasons” for the delay. Clause 11 is intended to encourage early disclosure of immigration or modern slavery information and remove any perceived advantage of delayed disclosure.

Clause 12 sets out that anyone who receives a claim notice, as set out in clause 11, but makes a claim or provides information only after the deadline given in the notice when they are either in immigration detention or have received notice of their departure details from the UK will enter the expedited late claims process. It also states that, as far as is reasonably practicable, the authority will hear any appeal against such a late claim as a priority above all other claim types. The provision supports earlier disclosure of claims and enables more efficient and expedited determination of late claims. The swift timescales associated with the late claims process will support the maintenance in immigration detention, and subsequent removal from the UK, of these individuals.

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The other reason to put the requirement into the Bill is that when I have asked for information—particularly from the Home Office—I have too often been told that it is simply not collected or available. Putting it into the Bill would prevent the design of information systems that simply do not collect the information that we need to see the impact of the Bill. I hope the Minister listens and publishes all the information about the current situation as soon as possible, and will assent to publishing the data quarterly so that we can hold the Government to account from the outside. I know that the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration will review the work of the appeals authority, but it is important that external scrutiny occurs too.

[Anna Turley]

The clause sets out the extension of the remit of the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration so that they may inspect and report on the authority’s performance. That will allow them to examine the authority’s efficiency, effectiveness and consistency, as well as wider operational matters.

Independent scrutiny is an important safeguard. It will support transparency and accountability and help maintain public confidence in the new appeals system. The clause preserves the authority’s independence. The inspector will not be able to reconsider, overturn or otherwise interfere with the outcome of any individual appeal. The inspector’s role will be to identify systemic issues and opportunities for improvement, rather than to provide an additional route of challenge for individual appellants.

Inspection reports will be handled through the existing statutory framework, including the provision for reports to be sent to the authority and the Secretary of State, and for the Secretary of State to lay them before Parliament. The clause therefore strikes the right balance between robust independent oversight and the protection of independent decision making.

Amendment 92 would require the independent chief inspector’s report on the IIAA to include the proportion of authority decisions set aside by the upper tribunal and the number of people removed following the dismissal of an appeal. I thank the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire for tabling it. The Government agree that the authority must be subject to effective and transparent scrutiny, which is precisely why clause 13 extends the remit of the independent chief inspector to cover the authority’s performance. However, it would not be appropriate to prescribe those particular measures on the face of the Bill. The chief inspector will already be able to examine the authority’s efficiency and the effectiveness of its processes. Their role is to monitor the processes, not the outcomes.

The number of decisions set aside by the upper tribunal cannot by itself provide a complete assessment of the overall quality of the authority’s decision making, and nor will the number of removals following dismissed appeals provide a direct measure of the authority’s performance. The amendment would therefore risk holding the independent chief inspector, and indirectly the authority, to account for outcomes not wholly within the authority’s control. The chief inspector already has an established role in inspecting the immigration system, and clause 13 enables them to assess, as they consider appropriate, the efficiency and effectiveness of the authority and how it is delivering against its objectives. For those reasons, the Government cannot accept the amendment, and I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.

New clause 28 relates to publishing information on the operation and performance of the authority. The Bill already contains a comprehensive framework for accountability and transparency of the authority. First, paragraph 11 of schedule 2 requires the authority to prepare an annual report on the exercise of its functions, which must be laid before Parliament. That will ensure regular parliamentary scrutiny of the performance and operation of the new body. Secondly, the clause provides independent inspection of the performance of the authority’s functions. The purpose of that is to provide additional external reporting on the IIAA’s efficiency and effectiveness. It is unnecessary to prescribe a detailed list of operational metrics in the Bill.

[Siân Berry]

The Minister said, “efficiency and effectiveness”. One of the issues that I raised was equalities issues and discrimination. Will that also be in the remit?

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Lady makes an important point. Again, that is not something that is prescribed in the Bill. As we establish this, it will be important to have a look at whether that ought to be a key principle. I cannot make the commitment at the moment, but it is important that we reflect on that as the authority is established.

As I said, it is unnecessary to prescribe a detailed list of operational metrics. Precise reporting arrangements should be a matter for the authority once operational. Mandating specific requirements in primary legislation would reduce flexibility and constrain the authority’s ability to adapt its reporting arrangements as it becomes established. That will be an operational matter for the authority as it is set up, and should not be prescribed in the Bill. The Government therefore do not accept the amendment or new clause 28.

More broadly, I appreciate that there is a wider point, separate to the context of the Bill, about data and statistics. The Ministry of Justice publishes quarterly statistics that include information on receipts and outcomes. The Home Office immigration system statistics quarterly release covers data on a range of topics, including claims, outcomes and nationality. The full set of official statistics published by those Departments is kept under review in line with the code of practice for statistics. I think that is a conversation that we could have another day, but it is important that we do not accept amendments that seek to require the inspector to focus on what is not in his remit.

[Blake Stephenson]

Given the insufficient assurance on the outcome data, I wish to press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 93, in clause 15, page 12, line 32, after “force” insert

“, but no later than three years after the day on which section 1 comes into force,”—(Blake Stephenson.)

This probing amendment would limit the Home Secretary’s power to route appeals to the First-tier Tribunal to the first three years after the IIAA is established, so that the transition cannot run indefinitely.

Government amendment 43.

Clause 15 stand part.

Clause 16 stand part.

[Anna Turley]

Clause 14 addresses the dual-running process between the authority and the first-tier tribunal. It gives a power to the Secretary of State or the Lord Chancellor to, among other things, transfer property, rights, liabilities or staff used by the first-tier tribunal from the Secretary of State to the authority. This provision allows for operational flexibility and makes for a smoother transition in case it is later decided that assets or property should transfer to the authority.

Clause 15 provides an essential safeguard during implementation of the authority. Its principal purpose is to protect continuity. Before part 1 is fully in force, clause 15 provides for specified descriptions of cases that would be decided by the authority to be transferred to the first-tier tribunal. This could prove necessary in case of a significant disruption affecting the authority’s operation—for example, to manage unpredictable spikes in demand in the implementation period when the authority is not yet fully formed.

The clause may also be used to correct the rare occurrence in which a case needs to be moved to another body. This ensures that cases are heard by the appropriate forum without avoidable procedural complexity. This is not a power to influence individual decisions, avoid judicial scrutiny or alter appeal rights. Appeals will continue to be determined independently and in accordance with the law. Clause 15 simply provides the resilience and flexibility needed to keep cases moving and correct exceptional allocation discrepancies.

Clause 16 provides the Secretary of State with the power to make provision that is consequential on part 1 of the Bill, which establishes the authority. The clause ensures that the wider statute book can operate properly when functions transfer from the first-tier tribunal to the IIAA. It provides that the authority is generally to be treated as a tribunal where legislation applies to tribunals. However, not every provision applying to tribunals will necessarily be suitable for the authority. The clause therefore enables regulations to modify how individual provisions apply, or to disapply them where appropriate. The clause may be used to amend, repeal or revoke provision made by primary legislation that has been passed before the Bill receives Royal Assent, or passed later in the same parliamentary Session.

Government amendment 43 provides the Lord Chancellor with limited and backstop powers to make amendments to the tribunal procedure rules in connection with regulations made to transfer cases between the authority and the existing first-tier tribunal. Tribunal procedure rules will continue to be made by the independent Tribunal Procedure Committee in the usual way in all other circumstances, and in connection with the transition to the new appeals structure where time allows. However, during the transition there may be exceptional circumstances requiring urgent practice and procedural changes to be followed in the first-tier and upper tribunals that cannot be accommodated through the usual rule-making process. This amendment provides an important safeguard to ensure that tribunal procedure adequately supports the transfer of cases and that proceedings are not delayed should such circumstances arise.

[Blake Stephenson]

This group brings together the machinery clauses of part 1: transfer schemes in clause 14, the transition in clause 15, and the consequential power in clause 16. I will speak to amendment 93 tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West and to Government amendment 43.

Clause 14 is technical in nature. It allows transfer schemes to move property, rights and liabilities to the appeals authority. The Opposition support that, but it is also where the costs of the reorganisation begin to show. The impact assessment—again, the previous impact assessment, not the one that was issued yesterday—warns of significant judicial liabilities in winding down the tribunal, because full-time judges hold lifetime appointments and there are the additional costs of running two systems. What is the estimated cost of winding down the tribunal? How many staff will transfer? Why does the Lord Chancellor, as well as the Home Secretary, need this power? What will the parallel running costs be?

We want the new body up to speed as quickly as possible. Will existing first-tier immigration judges be able to transfer or apply as senior adjudicators, for example, should they wish to? How many of them do the Government expect to apply and employ? The Law Society points out that the impact assessment says the implementation plans are “not yet fully developed”, which I think the Minister reflected earlier. Will a full costing of the transfer be published before any scheme is made?

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We support clauses 14 to 16 and Government amendment 43, but a reorganisation whose cost is unknown and a transition that has absolutely no end date is not yet a reform. If the Minister can answer on the timetable, we will not press amendment 93 to a vote.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his response, his questions and his challenges. Amendment 93 proposes that the authority should be able to transfer cases back to the first-tier tribunal only for a maximum of three years after clause 1 comes into force. If the amendment were to be accepted, it would reduce the flexibility within the overall appeals system to reduce the appeals backlog while simultaneously determining new appeals. I am afraid we are not able to set an arbitrary target of that kind, although I am sure that, given that we are bringing this Bill forward, the hon. Gentleman will understand our sense of urgency behind this transition. He need be in no doubt about the urgency with which we want to make this transition.

The length of time that the FTT IAC—even more acronyms—and the authority will need to run concurrently to ensure optimal efficiency in the overall appeals system will depend on a number of operational matters when the authority is established as a new statutory body corporate. Therefore, legislating for an arbitrary cut-off point of three years is unhelpful, and may result in appeals taking longer than necessary to be determined. We need to be flexible and responsive, which the current drafting of the Bill allows us to do.

Government amendment 43 provides the Lord Chancellor with limited and backstop powers to make amendments to the tribunal procedure rules in connection with regulations made to transfer cases between the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority and the existing first-tier tribunal. The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire challenged me as to why that cannot be done by the Secretary of State. It is not appropriate for the Home Secretary to lead on that; the Lord Chancellor doing so is obviously more appropriate.

Tribunal procedure rules will continue to be made by the independent Tribunal Procedure Committee in the usual way in all other circumstances, and in connection with the transition to new appeals structure where time allows. However, during the transition there may be exceptional circumstances requiring urgent practice and procedural changes to be followed in the first-tier and upper tribunals that cannot be accommodated through the normal rule-making process. This amendment provides an important safeguard to ensure that tribunal procedure adequately supports the transfer of cases and that proceedings are not delayed should such circumstances arise.

More importantly, the power is tightly constrained and can be exercised only in connection with regulations made under clause 15, which provides that regulations can be made to transfer cases from the authority back to the first-tier tribunal, and clause 52, which provides for commencement regulations. The power is intended to be used only where urgent rule changes that cannot be taken forward in the usual process are required.

Given that the power to make rules is otherwise exercised by the Tribunal Procedure Committee, the Lord Chancellor must consult the Senior President of Tribunals before exercising it. The power is appropriately constrained and subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Regulations that amend, repeal or revoke primary legislation, as defined, must be approved by both Houses through the affirmative procedure. Other regulations made under the clause will be subject to the negative procedure.

In response to the question of the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire about which cases will transfer, clause 52 makes provision for the commencement regulations, including setting out which cases will transition and when. On his questions about cost and implementation, as I have said, detailed plans for the authority, including the costs, are being developed, and work is continuing across the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice and His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service to refine the authority costs and establish comparable, current costs for the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber. There are not yet agreed or publishable figures for either comparison, as programme costs, affordability and benefits will be developed through the business case.

The hon. Gentleman also asked when the authority will start to make decisions, and when it will take all new appeals. The authority will be introduced through a phased transition, with the FTT IAC continuing to hear existing appeals in parallel while the new authority begins taking specified cohorts of new cases. We know that the current system is taking too long to deliver decisions, so the Bill creates a more scalable appeals system with greater capacity and faster processes, while retaining independent scrutiny and fairness.

[Blake Stephenson]

The Minister did not respond to my question about the projection that by the time the appeals authority gets up and running, approximately 200,000 people could be waiting for an appeal. Does that projection resonate with the Minister? Is that situation a possibility?

[Anna Turley]

Could the hon. Gentleman say where he got that figure from?

[Blake Stephenson]

The figure is taken from the evidence the Committee received from Refugee and Migrant Justice.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that. I do not recognise that figure, but of course, the Government want to make sure that we are fully aware of the figures. As was detailed at the start of the Committee’s consideration, the Government know that there are a huge number of appeals in the backlog. As the authority is developed and starts to come into force, the transition will be made. I am afraid that I cannot give the hon. Gentleman any projections, as I would not want to mislead the Committee with any numbers or predictions we could make at this stage.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15

Power to specify cases to be heard by First-tier Tribunal instead of IIAA

Amendment made: 43, in clause 15, page 13, line 2, at end insert—

“(4) The Lord Chancellor may by rules made by statutory instrument make amendments to Tribunal Procedural Rules in connection with regulations made by the Secretary of State under this section.

(5) Before making rules under subsection (4), the Lord Chancellor must consult the Senior President of Tribunals.

(6) A statutory instrument containing rules under subsection (4) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”—(Anna Turley.)

This amendment would give the Lord Chancellor the power to amend Tribunal Procedure Rules in connection with regulations under clause 15 transferring cases back to the First-Tier Tribunal from the IIAA. (See also amendment 46.)

Clause 15, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Jade Botterill.)