Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fourth sitting)

Blake Stephenson Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

Powers and duties of IIAA members

[Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 88, in clause 3, page 3, line 34, at end insert—

“(3A) The Chief Appeals Officer must, for each financial year, publish—

(a) the number of applications for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal against decisions of the IIAA, and the number of such applications granted;

(b) the number and proportion of decisions of the IIAA set aside by the Upper Tribunal; and

(c) the number of decisions reviewed under section 6, and the outcome of those reviews.”

This probing amendment would require the IIAA to publish annual data on the quality of its decisions, including data on onward appeals, decisions set aside by the Upper Tribunal and internal reviews.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

[Blake Stephenson]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart; I hope you are ready for a lot of Divisions over the next few weeks. While clause 2 decides who the adjudicators will be, clause 3 decides how the quality of their decisions will be protected. That matters because poor-quality decisions will result in appeals, and appeals mean delays, fewer removals and increased costs for the taxpayer to bear.

Clause 3 sets out who is responsible for what: adjudicators decide on the cases; the chief executive must ensure that the adjudicators are adequately trained, as the Minister explained earlier; the chief appeals officer allocates cases, organises a system of legal support and oversees quality development and assurance; and the professional standards officer sets standards and publishes a code of conduct.

Dr Casey warned that adjudicators without legal training would be more likely to make “errors of law” and that the backlog, rather than genuinely decreasing, could simply relocate to the upper tribunal. The solution to that potential consequence must lie in this clause. What exactly is the “system of legal support” for adjudicators in subsection (3)(b)?

A question occurred to me over the adjournment, following the earlier debate about magistrates: will adjudicators sit with legal advisers, as lay magistrates do? That may or may not be helpful, but I would be interested in the Minister’s response. If so, at what cost?

The Law Society points out that the chief appeals officer is responsible for quality but has no power to intervene in any decision. What powers will the chief appeals officer have to act on poor performance?

Amendment 88 is a probing amendment. It would require the chief appeals officer to publish the number of applications for permission to appeal to the upper tribunal, how many are granted each year, the number and proportion of appeals authority decisions that the upper tribunal sets aside, and the number of decisions that the appeals authority reviews under clause 6, with their outcomes.

In her oral evidence session before the recess, Dr Sumption told this Committee that one of the key measures of success should be how many decisions are overturned. This amendment would ensure that Parliament is told every year whether that relocation of the backlog to the upper tribunal, which Dr Casey described, is happening.

Will the Minister confirm whether the appeals authority will publish annual data on the quality of its decisions, including the rate at which they are set aside? If the Minister can give assurances on that, we will not press this amendment. Finally, what training standards will apply under clause 3(2), and will they be published? Will the code of conduct be published before the first case is heard?

The Opposition support clause 3, which ensures that the quality of the decision making is the best answer to the criticism that the appeals authority would generate more appeals than it resolved, but only if it is real, resourced and reported to Parliament.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. I thank the hon. Members for Mid Bedfordshire and for Stockton West for tabling amendment 88. I will turn to that after giving a brief overview of the clause as it stands.

Clause 3 sets out the IIAA’s executive and non-executive members’ powers and duties. It makes the adjudicators responsible for the authority’s primary function: to make decisions on immigration and asylum appeals and certain bail applications. This will be the sole responsibility of executive adjudicators. Senior adjudicators will also have a responsibility to perform this function, but they may also have further responsibilities that are delegated to them by the chief appeals officer, as the clause permits. No other member or employee can determine the outcome of an appeal or application, reinforcing the autonomy of the adjudicator as the decision maker.

The clause also makes clear what the chief executive, chief appeals officer and professional standards officer are responsible for. Those members are responsible for putting adequate training and support in place for adjudicators, developing a quality assurance mechanism and setting the standards required of IIAA adjudicators. Those roles together will enable the IIAA to operate effectively and independently. Parliament will be kept abreast of important matters concerning the IIAA members or the administration of justice through written representations of the chief executive. Those representations must be laid before Parliament by the Secretary of State. This will also act as an important mechanism for the independence of the authority, which can communicate to Parliament through the Secretary of State on matters of concern.

Amendment 88 tabled by His Majesty’s Opposition would require the chief appeals officer to publish annual data on internal reviews and onward appeals against IIAA decisions. The Government support transparency and agree that the quality of the authority’s decisions must be properly monitored. However, we are confident that the Bill already establishes a comprehensive framework for quality assurance and accountability. Clause 3 requires the chief appeals officer to oversee the quality of adjudicators’ decisions, organise legal support and develop a quality assurance mechanism. The professional standards officer is also responsible for setting and maintaining the standards required of adjudicators, as well as publishing a code of conduct.

The authority will be required to produce an annual report; that is not for me to determine, but I fully expect it to cover the kinds of areas that the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire set out in his amendment. The annual report will be laid before Parliament. Its operation will also be subject to independent external scrutiny by the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration. Although I agree that it is important to scrutinise the specified figures that the hon. Member flags in his amendment, we do not feel that they on their own would provide a reliable measure of decision quality. It is therefore unnecessary to prescribe those particular measures in primary legislation. I ask the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment, but will quickly refer to a couple of points that he raised.

We discussed earlier the standards of adjudicators that the hon. Member mentioned, but it is important to reiterate that adjudicators should have the required training to give them the necessary decision-making expertise to make determinations on appeal cases and bail applications. It will be the responsibility of the chief executive to ensure that adjudicators have adequate training and support. The chief appeals officer will be responsible for organising a system of legal support for them. The Bill provides strong safeguards and quality assurance mechanisms to ensure high standards and to ensure adjudicators are entirely independent of the Executive.

The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire flagged adequate training and support, and it is important go into a bit more detail on that. The chief executive will be responsible for ensuring that the authority’s adjudicators have adequate training and support to maintain independence from the Executive. The chief appeals officer is responsible for overseeing that quality. The chief appeals officer will also be able to identify any specific training needs of adjudicators and recommend them to the chief executive if they desire. The important point is that the authority is independent. It is really important that we remember that. It is not for the Government to decide what accreditation and continuous development is required for the authority’s adjudicators. They will be making decisions against appeals to which the Home Office will be a party, so it is important that we allow the authority to set those standards itself.

I will move on to how things will be monitored. As I mentioned, we have built a few steps of quality assurance into the system from the outset through training, legal support, professional standards, decision quality oversight, internal review and onward appeal rights. As I said, the chief appeals officer will be responsible for organising that system of legal support, the professional standards officer will be responsible for setting professional standards, and the detailed operation of those arrangements will be developed through the authority’s quality assurance framework and procedural arrangements as they are established.

I hope that reassures the hon. Gentleman that we agree with the principle behind the amendment. We do not think the specific figures he outlined are the best way to reliably measure decision-making quality, but we share the determination to ensure that there are opportunities to scrutinise it throughout the process.

[Blake Stephenson]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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[Siân Berry]

The Bill currently states that the IIAA procedure rules board must

“have regard to the desirability of”

ensuring that justice is done and that it is accessible, fair and independent. The amendment would simply strengthen that duty and ensure that it must act “with a view to” securing those things rather than merely considering them “desirable”. Importantly, the amendment would make the IIAA’s duties equivalent to the duties of the Tribunal Procedure Committee, so it would prevent the watering down that the clause represents.

Watering down and undermining fairness is a golden thread that runs through the Bill. We saw it originally with the watering down of the duty to be independent and fair, which was made an aim rather than a requirement, and we see it again in the IIAA’s powers over its procedure rules, which will govern the processes by which the IIAA hears and decides appeals.

Currently, the Tribunal Procedure Committee, which makes rules for the tribunals, has an obligation in section 22(4) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 to make procedure rules

“with a view to securing…that…justice is done”.

By contrast, clause 4(5) of the Bill says that the IIAA will have an obligation only to

“have regard to the desirability”

that justice is done. That is clearly an attempt at watering down and weakening obligations of fairness—from “duty” to “aim”, from “duty” to “desirable”. The amendment would ensure that the IIAA has equivalent obligations to ensure fairness as the Tribunal Procedure Committee currently does—no more, but certainly no less. In such high-stakes appeals as asylum, that is the least of what claimants, Ministers and the public should expect.

I will briefly quote the Bar Council’s written evidence, because it brings home that there are real people behind this. It says that on account of errors by the IIAA,

“a British citizen may wrongly be deprived of British citizenship, a refugee be returned to a place where they risk persecution or torture, a British family with a foreign member may be broken up, or an EU citizen be denied Withdrawal Agreement rights.”

Those are all serious consequences. We must strengthen this clause. It is not sufficient for this to be left to chance, to the courts or to later guidance on the IIAA produced by Ministers. It is so basic to fairness that it should be on the face of the Bill.

Amendment 68 fixes an omission from the Bill by the Government. It proposes preventing an IIAA adjudicator from reviewing their own decision. Under clause 6, the IIAA currently has the power to review its own decisions. In principle, there is nothing objectionable in this. The mechanism could provide a cheaper, quicker way to overturn inaccurate decisions than an appeal to the upper tribunal and provides a way for mistakes to be corrected quickly and without fuss. However, there is no provision in the Bill to say that an individual IIAA adjudicator cannot review their own decision when it is challenged.

I should note that the first-tier tribunal currently has the power to review its own decisions but adjudicators will not have the independence, experience and legal expertise of tribunal judges—at least if the Government have their way. It would be against fairness for such a non-judicial adjudicator to be in effect a judge in their own case. The adjudicator reviewing their own decision would also have an uncomfortable conflict of interest: either validate their own professional competence or vindicate the rule of law. No adjudicator should be put in that position and no asylum appellant should have their appeal dealt with in this unfair and potentially biased way.

Any internal review of an IIAA asylum decision should be heard by a different adjudicator who is as independent as possible from the original adjudicator. Amendment 68 is the best way to secure the psychological and emotional distance needed to conduct a fair review. It is perhaps indicative of the lack of serious thought that has gone into the Government’s proposals that the Bill does not contain a safeguard so basic and so clearly needed. The amendment would prevent an adjudicator from reviewing their own decision in any circumstances, thus increasing the chances of a fair and independent review. I hope it will be supported by us all today.

Government amendment 29 provides for information to be given on legal representation. That is an improvement on the original Bill, but a lot more should be done to prevent an appellant from being disadvantaged because they cannot obtain legal representation.

I welcome new clause 2, which inserts some concrete steps to provide some assistance in some cases, and the Government’s recognition of the significant issues when it comes to the availability of legal advice for people in different parts of the asylum system, which I have seen with my own eyes. It would be helpful, though, to know more about the Government’s thinking and their plans for providing this advice. How much additional funding and resource will the Home Office provide to deliver it? Will the Government commit to consulting with relevant groups and organisations that support people seeking asylum on how this advice can best be provided and routed to those most in need?

[Blake Stephenson]

The procedure rules will determine how fast the appeals authority works in practice, time limits, hearings, evidence and late claims. As Professor Ekins warned in oral evidence, they are also the part of this scheme most exposed to legal challenge. The group that we are considering includes clause 4, schedule 3 and clause 5, which cover the rules and the board that makes them, together with amendments 63 and 68 in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, a set of Government amendments to schedule 3 and Government new clause 2 on advice and representation, so there is a lot in there.

Clause 4 provides for the appeals authority procedure rules, made by the procedure rules board after consultation, with regard to the objectives in clause 1. They are to be made by statutory instruments subject to the negative procedure. Schedule 3 sets out what they may contain, including time limits, restrictions on fresh applications, decisions without a hearing and the treatment of late evidence. Clause 5 sets up the board that will write the appeals authority’s procedure rules, including the chief executive, the chief appeals officer, the professional standards officer and standing members appointed by the chair.

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Government amendment 36 sets out that the IIAA may undertake a review of a decision under clause 6 only to determine whether that decision contains an error of law. Without that express limitation, the clause could be engaged by broader vexatious or trivial applications to prolong the time it takes for an appeal to be finalised. The amendment therefore establishes clearly on the face of the Bill that a review under the clause is concerned with errors of law. The amendment does not prevent factual mistakes or procedural irregularities from being corrected. The IIAA procedure rules may provide separate mechanisms for dealing with such matters, including under paragraph 17 of schedule 3. The Government amendment preserves an effective internal safeguard while ensuring that the clause 6 review power remains focused, efficient and consistent. The Government amendment and clauses 6 and 7 together will ensure the correct balance and safeguards of internal review and external appeal.

[Blake Stephenson]

The clause allows the IIAA to review its own decisions once, to correct errors, amend reasons or remake the decision. An internal review of that kind is consistent with the Opposition’s own plan for a short internal appeal. Clause 7 provides the only route from the IIAA to a court—appeal to the upper tribunal on a point of law, with permission—and also applies to the post-Cart ouster in section 11A of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, with refusals of permission. Government amendment 36 limits the IIAA’s power of review to errors of law. Errors of fact will instead be corrected under the procedure rules. We do not oppose that. A review that can reopen the facts is a rehearing by another name.

That changes the argument about clause 1(8), however. The narrower the IIAA’s own remedies, the harder it is to say that there is an adequate alternative to judicial review. How will errors of fact be corrected, and how quickly? Do the Government still regard review and appeal together as an adequate alternative remedy? What time limit will apply and will a pending review delay removal or an onward appeal? I think that the Minister touched on that in her remarks, but I will be grateful if she could unpack that somewhat. How many reviews do the Government expect, and what effect will those have on the upper tribunal? Do the Government regard review and appeal together as an adequate alternative remedy that justifies excluding judicial review?

The Government’s own impact assessment—admittedly the one published earlier, not the one published yesterday, because I have not seen that—expects a “sustained increase in demand” on the upper tribunal. What additional capacity—judges, sitting days and so on—has been funded, and how many onward appeals does the impact assessment assume? What proportion of IIAA decisions do the Government expect to be set aside?

Clause 6(3) is significant; it applies the partial ouster that the previous Conservative Government enacted in the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022, which was drafted precisely with narrow exceptions and is accepted by the courts. Professor Ekins, in his oral evidence a few weeks ago, told us that the model could be applied here to IIAA decisions. If that is right for the upper tribunal, why is it not right for clause 1(8)?

I have two final questions. First, will time periods such as those in clause 8 apply to upper tribunal appeals? Secondly, where an error of law is found, will the upper tribunal remake decisions itself or send them back? We support Government amendment 36 and clauses 6 and 7. A credible internal review and speed at the second stage, as well as the first, are part of a system that is fast, final and defensible in court.

[Anna Turley]

I thank hon. Members for the constructive way they have approached the clauses and amendments. As I mentioned, the clauses are important to ensure that decisions can be reviewed either by the authority itself or by the upper tribunal where there are errors in law. The Government amendment in this group seeks to clarify this position and support it on the face of the Bill.

I will turn to a few of the questions raised. On the point of law and the question posed about whether a review power is necessary if there is already a right of appeal to the upper tribunal, the review power enables IIAA to correct errors directly without requiring parties to pursue what can be a longer and more resource-intensive appeals process. This can lead to quicker resolution of cases and reduce unnecessary onward appeals. On the supposition that this is just an additional layer of appeal: it is not. The clause provides the IIAA with the power to review its own decisions, as I said. It does not remove or replace the onward right of appeal to the tribunal. The review mechanism and the onward appeal route operate as part of the wider appeals process established by the Bill.

On the question whether an appeal is limited to a point of law, this measure reflects the existing onward appeal route from the first-tier tribunal. The IIAA will determine the merits of the case. The upper tribunal’s role is to consider whether the law was applied correctly rather than, as the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire mentioned, to provide a full rehearing. I think reference was made to why permission is required as well. Permission provides an appropriate filter so that we can ensure that appeals only within an arguable point of law proceed. We are keen to avoid unnecessary resource expenditure and delay in the finality of decisions. Permission may be sought from either the independent immigration appeals authority or the upper tribunal. Any further questions, particularly around costs, will continue to develop during the process and development of the policy, and I will continue to keep Members updated.

Amendment 36 agreed to.

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

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[Blake Stephenson]

I am going to start using the words “appeals authority”, because “IIAA” is doing my head in.

Clause 8 lets the Home Secretary set time periods for the appeals authority decisions, with extensions where compliance is not practicable or not in the interests of justice. The Opposition supports statutory deadlines; 67-week waits for an appeal are, frankly, indefensible.

Amendment 89, in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West, is a probing amendment. It would require the first regulation setting time periods to be made within six months of the appeals authority being established, and require the appeals authority’s annual report to say how often a deadline was extended. A power to set deadlines is, of course, not a deadline. What periods do the Government intend, and when will the first regulations be made? Extensions “in the interests of justice” could become routine. How often do the Government expect them, and will extension rates be published? There is also a puzzle in here: schedule 1 repeals the 24-week statutory timeframes in the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025 before they have even come into force, and I would like to know from the Minister why that is the case. Why are out-of-country appeals, including deportation appeals after certification, excluded? What happens if the appeals authority simply misses a deadline? Is there any consequence beyond a line in an annual report?

Amendment 83 would broaden the list of those the Home Secretary must consult before setting time periods to include people with protection status, those with lived experience of the asylum system and legal practitioners, as we have just heard from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. Consultations of course have their place, but this list would turn every set of regulations into a lengthy exercise and delay the very deadlines we need, so we intend to oppose that amendment.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

I should probably have directed my intervention to the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. The point she was making is that decisions done too speedily are against the interests of justice and fairness. The argument the shadow Minister is making—a far more powerful one from my point of view—is that delays make the system unfair. Of course, that is the system we currently have, which is why I support the position that he has taken in support of the Government.

[Blake Stephenson]

I thank my hon. Friend for those very kind words about how powerful my arguments are. I am sure the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion will respond to that when she has the opportunity.

[Siân Berry]

My arguments were not that it should be longer, but that it should be the right amount of time to achieve fairness and justice. I am sure that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East would not disagree that the right amount of time is essential, and that shorter is not necessarily better.

[Blake Stephenson]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention.

The Opposition will support clause 8 and oppose amendment 83. We want deadlines that are set, met and reported on. If the Minister can tell us when the first regulations will be made and that extension rates will be published, we will not press amendment 89 to a vote.

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[Anna Turley]

The clause allows the Secretary of State to request expedition of an appeal, bail application or procedural step within these proceedings where there is a public interest in securing a quicker resolution. This is an exceptional power for exceptional cases. It ensures that matters of particular importance can be brought to the attention of the IIAA for consideration of expedited treatment.

Let me be clear: this is a power to request expedition, not direct it. The IIAA decides whether a case should be accelerated and may refuse a request where expedition would not be reasonably practicable or would not be in the interests of justice. Nothing in the clause permits Ministers to influence the outcome of proceedings or diminishes the authority’s independence. Cases will continue to be determined impartially and on their merits. The clause is a balanced safeguard. It supports the timely resolution of cases, engaging public interest while preserving fairness and independence. The principle is simple: the Secretary of State may ask, but the authority decides.

Government amendment 37 seeks to ensure that the immigration bail provisions operate consistently with the Bill’s expedited proceedings framework. The Bill already requires regard to be had, when considering whether to grant immigration bail, to whether proceedings are subject to the late claims process under clause 12. The amendments make equivalent provision where proceedings before the authority relate to a person being expedited pursuant to a request by the Secretary of State under clause 9. Clause 9 applies where the Secretary of State considers that it would be in the public interest for proceedings to be expedited. It is therefore appropriate that cases proceeding under that expedited process are treated consistently with the cases subject to the late claims process.

[Blake Stephenson]

The clause lets the Home Secretary ask the authority to expedite a case where it is in the public interest. The authority must agree unless it is not practicable or not in the interests of justice. The Home Office has said that the power will be used for cases such as high harm foreign offenders and human rights claims that are clearly without merit. The Opposition support that.

On amendment 90, tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West, the principal question is: why leave it to discretion? The public have a direct interest in foreign criminals being deported and being deported quickly, so why leave it to the Home Secretary’s case-by-case discretion? Amendment 90 would require the authority to expedite any appeal by a person who is liable to deportation and has been convicted of an offence either here or abroad, exactly as if the Home Secretary had asked. Will the Government accept that incredibly sensible amendment, which I think the British public would support? I have a couple of basic questions. What criteria will the Home Secretary use, and will they be published? How many requests do the Government expect each year?

Government amendment 37 requires anyone deciding bail to consider whether the authority is expediting the person’s appeal at the Home Secretary’s request. We support that—someone whose appeal is being fast-tracked should not be released while it is heard—but it has a cost. How many additional people do the Government expect to remain in detention as a result, and is there the capacity? How do the Government intend to implement that?

On legal robustness, the House of Commons Library notes that lawyers are already asking how an appellant could challenge a decision to expedite, given clause 1(8)—we come back to clause 1(8) and the robustness, or otherwise, of that clause. That question will be answered in the courts if it is not answered here, so how do the Government expect expedition decisions to be challenged, and do they expect them to be judicially reviewed? When will the process regulations be made, and how long will the authority have to respond to a request?

We support the clause and the Government amendment. We will oppose any attempt to remove the power. Our amendment 90 would ensure that the appeals that matter most to public safety are always at the front of the queue, and I will seek to press that to a Division.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Member for his contribution to this debate and for tabling amendment 90. To reiterate, the Government amendment ensures that the immigration bail provisions operate consistently within the Bill’s expedited proceedings framework. The Bill already requires regard to be had, when considering whether to grant immigration bail, to whether proceedings are subject to the late claims process under clause 12. The amendment makes equivalent provision where proceedings before the authority relating to a person are being expedited pursuant to a request by the Secretary of State under clause 9.

Let us move to amendment 90. The clause is deliberately designed to deal with cases where the Secretary of State considers that expedition would be in the public interest. It allows those cases to be identified individually and an expedition request to be made to the IIAA. Amendment 90 would instead apply expedition automatically to a broad category of appeals, which is not the purpose of the clause. Where there is a case for setting time periods for a wider group of proceedings, clause 8 provides the appropriate mechanism.

That said, I think it is also important that we are not specifying a particular group in the Bill. Otherwise, potentially, we may need to amend legislation for every category of appeals that the Home Secretary wishes to expedite. It is really important that we maintain flexibility for the Secretary of State to respond to public opinion and to public safety in terms of the category of appeals that she would wish to be expedited.

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[Blake Stephenson]

rose—

[Ben Goldsborough (South Norfolk) (Lab)]

rose—

[Anna Turley]

I will give way first to the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, then to my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk.

[Blake Stephenson]

You never know, Chair, we may be asking the same question. I asked the Minister whether she would provide some criteria—I am expanding my question, in fact—to give the public some certainty as to the decisions that the Home Secretary might make. Does the Minister expect some criteria to be published?

[Anna Turley]

It is important that we maintain flexibility, as I said. The Bill provides distinct mechanisms for very broad categories of cases and for exceptional individual cases. We should retain that flexibility, so I am afraid that I disagree with the hon. Gentleman on limiting the approach of the Home Secretary in the Bill. Particularly, this is also about case-specific assessment. We want to allow the Home Secretary the opportunity to look at case-specific assessments, rather than being too defined.

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[Anna Turley]

The Independent Immigration Appeals Authority has a statutory objective to handle its cases quickly and efficiently. It cannot do that if it cannot enforce the requirements set out in its procedure rules. It is anticipated that the requirements on parties to proceedings will be set out clearly under the authority’s procedure rules.

Clause 10 provides the authority with a lever to set tangible consequences for non-compliance by enabling it to charge a party to proceedings, among others, who has acted “improperly, unreasonably or negligently,” and whose actions have caused the authority’s resources to be wasted. That is intended to disincentivise tactical delay. The charge will be payable to the authority, rather than an order to pay costs to another party. It will be for the authority to determine what meets the threshold for a charge according to the circumstances of the case, and the detailed operation of the power should be set out in the authority’s procedure rules. Any moneys the authority receives under the power will be paid into the consolidated fund.

Government new clause 1 will enable a party or the authority to seek enforcement, as if the decision of the authority were that of the relevant court. That will simplify the process of recovering funds and will bring the authority in line with existing provisions in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.

[Blake Stephenson]

Clause 10 allows the authority to charge a party or representative who acts “improperly, unreasonably or negligently” and wastes its resources, and the Opposition support it. Last-minute applications and poorly prepared cases waste time the system does not have.

I have a couple of questions. The Bar Council objects that non-lawyer adjudicators could charge or fine barristers, with a chilling effect. We do not accept that representatives should be immune from the consequences of abusing the process, but the power must be clear. What level of charge is envisaged, and will there be a cap? How often are wasted costs orders made in the tribunal now? Will a person who is charged have a right to review or appeal?

Of course, fairness cuts both ways. The Home Office is a party. The Library records that 36% of asylum appeals disposed of last year were withdrawn, and the Refugee Council attributes that to poor initial decisions, a point that was made earlier in the debate. Will the Home Office be liable to charges when it withdraws a decision shortly before a hearing, and will guidance define what counts as acting improperly, unreasonably or negligently?

Government new clause 1 makes sums payable under a decision by the authority, including charges under clause 10, recoverable as if they were county court orders in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and enforceable in the sheriff court in Scotland. We support that. A charge that cannot be collected is no deterrent at all. Will charges against the Home Office be enforceable in the same way? What sums do the Government expect to be recovered each year?

We support clause 10 and Government new clause 1. A clear, fairly applied and enforceable power will discourage abuse of the process, which we think is important.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his contribution. Government new clause 1 ensures there is a mechanism for the enforcement of cost orders between parties to proceedings in the authority, in addition to charges made by the authority under its powers in clause 10. The clause allows the authority to charge a participant in proceedings where it considers that they have acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently, and that that has resulted in the authority’s resources being wasted. Schedule 3 provides for the authority to make rules in relation to cost orders, whereby the authority may order costs to be paid between parties as a result of any party acting improperly, unreasonably or negligently. In answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question about whether the Home Office is accountable, yes, we will be.

The new clause enables a party or the authority to seek enforcement as if the decision of the authority were that of the relevant court. When enforcement of a sum is pursued following the authority’s decision, that decision is to be treated as a registrable judgment in the relevant jurisdiction—in this case England and Wales, and Northern Ireland. This simplifies the process of pursuing sums payable under the authority’s decision. It is broadly in line with equivalent provisions in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, which enable tribunal costs to be enforced.

The hon. Gentleman made a few points about fairness and the ability to recoup the money. It is anticipated that the authority will take into account the circumstances of the case and the person’s ability to pay when deciding whether to impose a charge. Where there are genuine reasons for delay, for example, it is unlikely that those actions will meet the threshold for a charge. The value of the charge will, rightly, be set through the authority under its procedure rules. It will need to strike a balance between being proportionate and fair, and deterring tactical delay of the process. There will be appropriate parliamentary scrutiny of the charging power through the procedure rules, which will be subject to the negative procedure. We heard earlier a challenge to the use of the negative procedure, but the current tribunal rules are decided through that procedure, so there is no difference in the process.

The hon. Gentleman also mentioned enforcement. The new clause provides that a sum payable under an order of the authority is enforceable as if it were payable under an order of the relevant court. That means the person to whom the money is owed as a result of a decision of the authority can rely on the court processes for the enforcement of that sum.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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Claim notices

[Blake Stephenson]

I beg to move amendment 91, in clause 11, page 8, line 36, at end insert—

“(7A) Where the recipient of a claim notice provides any reasons or grounds after the claim notice deadline, those reasons or grounds may not be relied on in any appeal before the IIAA or the Upper Tribunal unless the IIAA is satisfied that they arise from a material change of circumstances occurring after the claim notice deadline.”

This amendment would require people served with a claim notice to raise all their grounds by the deadline, so that grounds raised later could not be relied on in an appeal unless they arise from a material change of circumstances.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendment 38.

Clause stand part.

Government amendments 39 to 42.

Clause 12 stand part.

Government new clause 3—Late claims process: credibility.

Government new clause 4—Late information etc: proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission.

[Blake Stephenson]

Clause 11 tackles one of the most damaging features of the current system: claims raised at the last minute to prevent removal. It allows the Home Office to serve a claim notice on anyone liable to removal or deportation, requiring them to set out every reason they should be allowed to stay, including any modern slavery information, by a deadline. Clause 12 gives teeth to clause 11. Where someone ignores a claim notice and raises new grounds only once they are detained or given removal directions, their appeals will be fast-tracked and the late claim will count against them when bail is considered.

The Opposition support that approach, but there is a problem. The Minister told the Committee during the oral evidence sessions:

“More than a third of our charter returns that fail to go ahead have involved a modern slavery referral raised after the return arrangements have been made.”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 5, Q3.]

That is exactly the gaming of the system that the public will no longer tolerate. Our plan would require applicants to submit their claim in one go, with later claims disregarded unless there has been a material change in their home country. Clause 11 moves in that direction but stops short: a late claim goes into the late claims process and damages credibility, but it can still be heard and can still succeed. How long will people have to respond? Where will that be set? Who will be served? Beyond clauses 12 and 36, what are the consequences of failing to comply? Can late grounds still succeed on appeal?

Amendment 91 would close the gap: reasons or grounds raised after the claim notice deadline could not be relied on in an appeal before the appeal authority or the upper tribunal unless the appeal authority is satisfied that they arise from a material change of circumstances after the deadline. That is the principle of our plan: claims must be made in one go, and later claims disregarded unless something has genuinely changed. Will the Government accept that approach and therefore our amendment?

Clause 11(10) repeals a large part of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, including provisions on late evidence in section 26 and accelerated detained appeals in section 27. Why repeal them rather than bring them into force? What will replace them? The Immigration Law Practitioners Association points out that the priority removal notice regime gave recipients a period to access legal advice and clause 11 does not. We do not support the ILPA’s proposed legal advice precondition, but the Government should explain their answer to that point, because if they do not, it will be litigated.

Government amendment 38 goes further, repealing section 19(2) of the 2022 Act on credibility statements, which is replaced by new clauses 3 and 4. We do not oppose that approach. The risk is legal. Justice and the Bar Council remind us that, in the Detention Action case, the Court of Appeal quashed the detained fast-track rules because they were systematically unfair, and that the Court took comfort from specialist judges hearing those cases, which will not be true of the appeal authority. A fast track that is quashed delivers nothing.

What timetable will apply? Justice reports that the Home Office intends decisions “within a week”. What legal advice do the Government have that this process will survive legal challenge? How many cases are expected and what will happen to other appeals pushed back in the queue? What effect will the new bail conditions have on detention numbers and capacity? Will these cases, which often feature detention and are often complex, be decided by senior adjudicators?

Government amendments 39 and 42 mean that a person who gives modern-day slavery information late, after detention or after removal directions, will not go into the late claims process. I understand the reasoning, which responds to concerns from anti-trafficking organisations, but the Minister told the Committee that more than a third of failed charter returns involved a modern slavery referral raised after return arrangements were made. Does this change not reopen exactly that gap?

New clause 3 requires adjudicators in late claims cases to treat late information and late evidence as damaging credibility unless there are good reasons, and new clause 4 does the same for the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. We support them, but everything turns on “good reasons”. If that phrase is read generously, the rule will be swallowed up by the exception. Will the Government look to define it in the Bill or in guidance?

The written evidence adds two points to ILPA’s concern about legal advice. First, ILPA notes that nothing in clause 11 exempts under-18s from the credibility consequences of missing a claim notice deadline. Will children be exempt or protected by guidance? Secondly, Women for Refugee Women says that the Home Office’s guidance on gender-based claims

“recognises that late disclosure is common among survivors of trauma.”

The organisation After Exploitation and a coalition led by Hibiscus call a requirement to disclose everything at the outset “highly unrealistic”. How will the claim notice regime be applied consistently with the Home Office’s own guidance? Will trauma-related late disclosure count as a good reason? We want grounds raised early, but a regime that the Home Office’s own guidance contradicts will not survive its first test case.

Justice adds a point on Detention Action that the Minister should look to answer. When the Court of Appeal considered the fast-track rules, it took into account that independent specialist tribunal judges were hearing the cases. That will not be the case with the appeal authority. Has the Government’s legal advice taken that into account?

We support clauses 11 and 12 and the Government’s amendments, and we oppose attempts to weaken them. One notice, one deadline and one claim: that is the principle, and the Bill should apply it fully. I will seek to press amendment 91 to a Division.

[Anna Turley]

As the hon. Gentleman set out, we have an issue in our system in this country with late claims that are made in detention just prior to planned removal, which inevitably require release or lead to bail, as there is no mechanism for dealing with the appeals in an expedited way. That leads to a significant degree of gaming the system and compromises removals performance.

On the late claims process, a single fast appeal process, which we are setting out here, will apply to late claims—those made after the expiry of the new claim notice. Individuals must submit all relevant information up front. Failure to do so, unless justified, will damage their credibility and result in expedited handling, which will be relevant to maintaining their detention until removal. Late disclosure of modern slavery information may similarly damage credibility unless justified.

Receiving information at the earliest opportunity helps to ensure that cases are considered on the fullest possible picture, enabling timely and better-informed decision making. Clause 11 seeks to deliver that through a new claim notice, which may be issued to individuals to inform them of the need to submit any immigration claim or modern slavery information they have to the Home Office at the earliest opportunity. Where modern slavery issues are raised, that will help support early identification of needs.

Clause 11 works in conjunction with clause 12 to ensure that individuals are informed that failing to submit an immigration claim following receipt of the notice, only to make a claim from immigration detention or after being served notice of departure details, will leave them subject to an expedited late claims process and may have negative implications for their credibility. For modern slavery purposes, the notice will advise recipients that failure to provide modern slavery information only to do so after the claim notice deadline will be taken into consideration, under clause 36, as damaging the credibility of their account by decision makers assessing whether they are a victim of trafficking, unless there are “good reasons” for the delay. Clause 11 is intended to encourage early disclosure of immigration or modern slavery information and remove any perceived advantage of delayed disclosure.

Clause 12 sets out that anyone who receives a claim notice, as set out in clause 11, but makes a claim or provides information only after the deadline given in the notice when they are either in immigration detention or have received notice of their departure details from the UK will enter the expedited late claims process. It also states that, as far as is reasonably practicable, the authority will hear any appeal against such a late claim as a priority above all other claim types. The provision supports earlier disclosure of claims and enables more efficient and expedited determination of late claims. The swift timescales associated with the late claims process will support the maintenance in immigration detention, and subsequent removal from the UK, of these individuals.

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Inspections

[Blake Stephenson]

I beg to move amendment 92, in clause 13, page 10, line 33, at end insert—

“(d) the proportion of decisions of the IIAA set aside on appeal to the Upper Tribunal;

(e) the number of persons removed from the United Kingdom following the dismissal of an appeal by the IIAA.”

This probing amendment would require the Chief Inspector’s reports on the IIAA to cover the outcomes of its work – decisions set aside on appeal and removals after dismissed appeals – as well as process.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

New clause 28—IIAA: publication of data—

“(1) The Secretary of State must make arrangements for the publication of data relating to the work of the IIAA.

(2) The data required by this section must be updated and published at least every three months.

(3) The data to be published under this section must include—

(a) the number of appeals submitted to the IIAA;

(b) the number of decisions made by the IIAA;

(c) the outcomes of decisions made by the IIAA;

(d) the proportion of people submitting appeals to the IIAA who had legal representation;

(e) the number of appeals waiting to be processed by the IIAA;

(f) the length of time taken for a decision to be made on an appeal by the IIAA;

(g) the number of appeals that were withdrawn before being heard by the IIAA;

(h) the number of reviews of decisions made by the IIAA under section 6; and

(i) the outcomes of reviews of decisions made by the IIAA under section 6.

(4) The data published must, where possible, be broken down by—

(a) the type of appeal;

(b) the nationality of the person submitting the appeal;

(c) the gender of the person submitting the appeal; and

(d) the age of the person submitting the appeal.”

This new clause would require the Home Secretary to arrange for the publication, at least every quarter (as is the case for the existing Immigration and Asylum Tribunal), of data relating to the work of the IIAA.

[Blake Stephenson]

Clause 13 brings the authority within the remit of the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration, with an annual report and the chief executive’s response laid before Parliament. The Opposition support accountability to Parliament, as we have discussed on several occasions today.

Amendment 92 is another probing amendment. The inspection regime in clause 13 focuses on process: premises, technology and training. Parliament will also want to know whether the authority is working. Dr Sumption told us that the data needed to judge those reforms—what happens to refused cases and how many decisions are overturned—largely does not exist.

Amendment 92 would require the chief inspector’s report to cover two outcomes: the proportion of the authority’s decisions set aside by the upper tribunal, and the number of people removed after the appeals authority dismisses their appeal. Will inspection reports cover those outcomes? What additional resources will the chief inspector receive? Is one report a year enough in the first years? When would material be omitted from published reports?

New clause 28, in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, would require quarterly publication of data of the authority’s work on appeals, outcomes, representation, the backlog, timings, withdrawals and reviews. It overlaps with our amendment 88 on decision quality. Transparency around whether the new body is working is in everyone’s interest. I hope the Government will say whether they intend to publish data of that kind.

We support clause 13. Scrutiny should measure results, not just process. If the Minister can give assurances on the outcome data, we will not press amendment 92.

[Siân Berry]

I agree with the shadow Minister that amendment 92 and new clause 28 are quite compatible. They both ask for more data from the Government and the IIAA about its work and what is going on. That is essential.

My new clause 28 would require the Home Secretary to arrange for the publication, at least every quarter—that timing is the same as for the existing Immigration and Asylum Tribunal—of data relating to the work of the appeals authority. It sets out properly detailed requirements for quarterly data publication. It includes requirements for information on decisions, appeals and outcomes, including where the appeals authority has reviewed decisions ahead of appeals and where appellants withdraw; information about who has had legal representation; and information about backlogs, timelines and delays on decisions.

The new clause also ensures that we can see that data broken down by nationality, gender and age, and what kind of appeal grounds are being made. Given the concern about the discriminatory and human rights impact of the Bill on people claiming asylum and our obligations under international agreements, all that information is essential.

We cannot have a publication scheme only set out by the appeals authority itself or by Ministers. It is important that Parliament should put such essential reporting information into the Bill; otherwise, we will simply not know the consequences of those changes or their consequences will become a matter of contention and further politicise the lives of those seeking asylum here. I have a related new clause that asks for a report in a similar fashion on current decision making, and the comparison between the two is vital.

I asked the Minister for some baseline data on the current situation during the oral evidence sessions. The reason I asked is that until March 2023 we had quite a lot of details, including around nationality, in the Home Office’s own quarterly statistics release. However, for over three years now, the appeal statistics have not been included, and we do not see the information about nationality broken down. The letter we received from the Minister on 6 October gave some information about the breakdown of different human rights grounds, which was useful, but unless comprehensive information is provided about the current situation and the changes that will take place when we introduce the appeals authority, we will not really see the impact of the Bill. This is absolutely essential.

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[Anna Turley]

The hon. Lady makes an important point. Again, that is not something that is prescribed in the Bill. As we establish this, it will be important to have a look at whether that ought to be a key principle. I cannot make the commitment at the moment, but it is important that we reflect on that as the authority is established.

As I said, it is unnecessary to prescribe a detailed list of operational metrics. Precise reporting arrangements should be a matter for the authority once operational. Mandating specific requirements in primary legislation would reduce flexibility and constrain the authority’s ability to adapt its reporting arrangements as it becomes established. That will be an operational matter for the authority as it is set up, and should not be prescribed in the Bill. The Government therefore do not accept the amendment or new clause 28.

More broadly, I appreciate that there is a wider point, separate to the context of the Bill, about data and statistics. The Ministry of Justice publishes quarterly statistics that include information on receipts and outcomes. The Home Office immigration system statistics quarterly release covers data on a range of topics, including claims, outcomes and nationality. The full set of official statistics published by those Departments is kept under review in line with the code of practice for statistics. I think that is a conversation that we could have another day, but it is important that we do not accept amendments that seek to require the inspector to focus on what is not in his remit.

[Blake Stephenson]

Given the insufficient assurance on the outcome data, I wish to press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Anna Turley]

Clause 14 addresses the dual-running process between the authority and the first-tier tribunal. It gives a power to the Secretary of State or the Lord Chancellor to, among other things, transfer property, rights, liabilities or staff used by the first-tier tribunal from the Secretary of State to the authority. This provision allows for operational flexibility and makes for a smoother transition in case it is later decided that assets or property should transfer to the authority.

Clause 15 provides an essential safeguard during implementation of the authority. Its principal purpose is to protect continuity. Before part 1 is fully in force, clause 15 provides for specified descriptions of cases that would be decided by the authority to be transferred to the first-tier tribunal. This could prove necessary in case of a significant disruption affecting the authority’s operation—for example, to manage unpredictable spikes in demand in the implementation period when the authority is not yet fully formed.

The clause may also be used to correct the rare occurrence in which a case needs to be moved to another body. This ensures that cases are heard by the appropriate forum without avoidable procedural complexity. This is not a power to influence individual decisions, avoid judicial scrutiny or alter appeal rights. Appeals will continue to be determined independently and in accordance with the law. Clause 15 simply provides the resilience and flexibility needed to keep cases moving and correct exceptional allocation discrepancies.

Clause 16 provides the Secretary of State with the power to make provision that is consequential on part 1 of the Bill, which establishes the authority. The clause ensures that the wider statute book can operate properly when functions transfer from the first-tier tribunal to the IIAA. It provides that the authority is generally to be treated as a tribunal where legislation applies to tribunals. However, not every provision applying to tribunals will necessarily be suitable for the authority. The clause therefore enables regulations to modify how individual provisions apply, or to disapply them where appropriate. The clause may be used to amend, repeal or revoke provision made by primary legislation that has been passed before the Bill receives Royal Assent, or passed later in the same parliamentary Session.

Government amendment 43 provides the Lord Chancellor with limited and backstop powers to make amendments to the tribunal procedure rules in connection with regulations made to transfer cases between the authority and the existing first-tier tribunal. Tribunal procedure rules will continue to be made by the independent Tribunal Procedure Committee in the usual way in all other circumstances, and in connection with the transition to the new appeals structure where time allows. However, during the transition there may be exceptional circumstances requiring urgent practice and procedural changes to be followed in the first-tier and upper tribunals that cannot be accommodated through the usual rule-making process. This amendment provides an important safeguard to ensure that tribunal procedure adequately supports the transfer of cases and that proceedings are not delayed should such circumstances arise.

[Blake Stephenson]

This group brings together the machinery clauses of part 1: transfer schemes in clause 14, the transition in clause 15, and the consequential power in clause 16. I will speak to amendment 93 tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West and to Government amendment 43.

Clause 14 is technical in nature. It allows transfer schemes to move property, rights and liabilities to the appeals authority. The Opposition support that, but it is also where the costs of the reorganisation begin to show. The impact assessment—again, the previous impact assessment, not the one that was issued yesterday—warns of significant judicial liabilities in winding down the tribunal, because full-time judges hold lifetime appointments and there are the additional costs of running two systems. What is the estimated cost of winding down the tribunal? How many staff will transfer? Why does the Lord Chancellor, as well as the Home Secretary, need this power? What will the parallel running costs be?

We want the new body up to speed as quickly as possible. Will existing first-tier immigration judges be able to transfer or apply as senior adjudicators, for example, should they wish to? How many of them do the Government expect to apply and employ? The Law Society points out that the impact assessment says the implementation plans are “not yet fully developed”, which I think the Minister reflected earlier. Will a full costing of the transfer be published before any scheme is made?

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[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his response, his questions and his challenges. Amendment 93 proposes that the authority should be able to transfer cases back to the first-tier tribunal only for a maximum of three years after clause 1 comes into force. If the amendment were to be accepted, it would reduce the flexibility within the overall appeals system to reduce the appeals backlog while simultaneously determining new appeals. I am afraid we are not able to set an arbitrary target of that kind, although I am sure that, given that we are bringing this Bill forward, the hon. Gentleman will understand our sense of urgency behind this transition. He need be in no doubt about the urgency with which we want to make this transition.

The length of time that the FTT IAC—even more acronyms—and the authority will need to run concurrently to ensure optimal efficiency in the overall appeals system will depend on a number of operational matters when the authority is established as a new statutory body corporate. Therefore, legislating for an arbitrary cut-off point of three years is unhelpful, and may result in appeals taking longer than necessary to be determined. We need to be flexible and responsive, which the current drafting of the Bill allows us to do.

Government amendment 43 provides the Lord Chancellor with limited and backstop powers to make amendments to the tribunal procedure rules in connection with regulations made to transfer cases between the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority and the existing first-tier tribunal. The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire challenged me as to why that cannot be done by the Secretary of State. It is not appropriate for the Home Secretary to lead on that; the Lord Chancellor doing so is obviously more appropriate.

Tribunal procedure rules will continue to be made by the independent Tribunal Procedure Committee in the usual way in all other circumstances, and in connection with the transition to new appeals structure where time allows. However, during the transition there may be exceptional circumstances requiring urgent practice and procedural changes to be followed in the first-tier and upper tribunals that cannot be accommodated through the normal rule-making process. This amendment provides an important safeguard to ensure that tribunal procedure adequately supports the transfer of cases and that proceedings are not delayed should such circumstances arise.

More importantly, the power is tightly constrained and can be exercised only in connection with regulations made under clause 15, which provides that regulations can be made to transfer cases from the authority back to the first-tier tribunal, and clause 52, which provides for commencement regulations. The power is intended to be used only where urgent rule changes that cannot be taken forward in the usual process are required.

Given that the power to make rules is otherwise exercised by the Tribunal Procedure Committee, the Lord Chancellor must consult the Senior President of Tribunals before exercising it. The power is appropriately constrained and subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Regulations that amend, repeal or revoke primary legislation, as defined, must be approved by both Houses through the affirmative procedure. Other regulations made under the clause will be subject to the negative procedure.

In response to the question of the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire about which cases will transfer, clause 52 makes provision for the commencement regulations, including setting out which cases will transition and when. On his questions about cost and implementation, as I have said, detailed plans for the authority, including the costs, are being developed, and work is continuing across the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice and His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service to refine the authority costs and establish comparable, current costs for the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber. There are not yet agreed or publishable figures for either comparison, as programme costs, affordability and benefits will be developed through the business case.

The hon. Gentleman also asked when the authority will start to make decisions, and when it will take all new appeals. The authority will be introduced through a phased transition, with the FTT IAC continuing to hear existing appeals in parallel while the new authority begins taking specified cohorts of new cases. We know that the current system is taking too long to deliver decisions, so the Bill creates a more scalable appeals system with greater capacity and faster processes, while retaining independent scrutiny and fairness.

[Blake Stephenson]

The Minister did not respond to my question about the projection that by the time the appeals authority gets up and running, approximately 200,000 people could be waiting for an appeal. Does that projection resonate with the Minister? Is that situation a possibility?

[Anna Turley]

Could the hon. Gentleman say where he got that figure from?

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[Blake Stephenson]

The figure is taken from the evidence the Committee received from Refugee and Migrant Justice.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that. I do not recognise that figure, but of course, the Government want to make sure that we are fully aware of the figures. As was detailed at the start of the Committee’s consideration, the Government know that there are a huge number of appeals in the backlog. As the authority is developed and starts to come into force, the transition will be made. I am afraid that I cannot give the hon. Gentleman any projections, as I would not want to mislead the Committee with any numbers or predictions we could make at this stage.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15

Power to specify cases to be heard by First-tier Tribunal instead of IIAA

Amendment made: 43, in clause 15, page 13, line 2, at end insert—

“(4) The Lord Chancellor may by rules made by statutory instrument make amendments to Tribunal Procedural Rules in connection with regulations made by the Secretary of State under this section.

(5) Before making rules under subsection (4), the Lord Chancellor must consult the Senior President of Tribunals.

(6) A statutory instrument containing rules under subsection (4) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”—(Anna Turley.)

This amendment would give the Lord Chancellor the power to amend Tribunal Procedure Rules in connection with regulations under clause 15 transferring cases back to the First-Tier Tribunal from the IIAA. (See also amendment 46.)

Clause 15, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Jade Botterill.)