Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fourth sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Government amendments 25 and 26.

Amendment 67, in clause 2, page 3, line 6, leave out “a senior” and insert “an”.

This amendment would require all adjudicators deciding appeals for the IIAA to have legal qualifications or experience.

Government amendment 27.

Clause stand part.

Schedule 2.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

It is great to have you in the Chair, Mr Stuart. I was just summing up on my amendments 66 and 67. When we adjourned, I had only one further point to make, which is a practical one. I well remember the arguments and discussions we had on the Courts and Tribunals Bill: yes, taking things off judges and putting them on to magistrates seems efficient, and we would save on judge time, but a serious concern is whether magistrates could fill the gap, given the number of magistrates that we would need.

In its written evidence, Justice stated that non-legally qualified adjudicators are going to require legal support. It raised the issue of the paucity of specialist lawyers able to advise in human rights and asylum appeals. A serious risk is that if those specialist legal advisers are brought into the tribunal system, they will be drawn away from their existing work, which is lower paid, of advising and preparing individuals in their appeals. That might even compound existing backlogs.

The Minister has said, I think, that a new impact assessment has more clarity, and I hope that in future debates—because I am just winding up this one—she will be able to say more about what is going on with the practicalities and the obvious shortages of specialist people needed to advise the new legally qualified people. That is a real issue, and I will press my amendments to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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IIAA Procedure Rules

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move amendment 63, in clause 4, page 4, line 21, leave out

“have regard to the desirability of”

and insert

“do so with a view to”.

This amendment would make the requirements relating to the IIAA Procedure Board equivalent to those of the Tribunal Procedure Committee when exercising its power to make rules.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Government amendment 28.

Amendment 68, in schedule 3, page 66, line 3, at end insert—

“(4) The Rules must make provision that when the IIAA reviews a decision, any adjudicator involved in the initial decision may not be involved in any review of that decision.”

This amendment would ensure that an IIAA adjudicator may not be involved in any review of their own decisions.

Government amendments 29 to 35.

Schedule 3.

Clause 5 stand part.

Government new clause 2.

[Siân Berry]

The Bill currently states that the IIAA procedure rules board must

“have regard to the desirability of”

ensuring that justice is done and that it is accessible, fair and independent. The amendment would simply strengthen that duty and ensure that it must act “with a view to” securing those things rather than merely considering them “desirable”. Importantly, the amendment would make the IIAA’s duties equivalent to the duties of the Tribunal Procedure Committee, so it would prevent the watering down that the clause represents.

Watering down and undermining fairness is a golden thread that runs through the Bill. We saw it originally with the watering down of the duty to be independent and fair, which was made an aim rather than a requirement, and we see it again in the IIAA’s powers over its procedure rules, which will govern the processes by which the IIAA hears and decides appeals.

Currently, the Tribunal Procedure Committee, which makes rules for the tribunals, has an obligation in section 22(4) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 to make procedure rules

“with a view to securing…that…justice is done”.

By contrast, clause 4(5) of the Bill says that the IIAA will have an obligation only to

“have regard to the desirability”

that justice is done. That is clearly an attempt at watering down and weakening obligations of fairness—from “duty” to “aim”, from “duty” to “desirable”. The amendment would ensure that the IIAA has equivalent obligations to ensure fairness as the Tribunal Procedure Committee currently does—no more, but certainly no less. In such high-stakes appeals as asylum, that is the least of what claimants, Ministers and the public should expect.

I will briefly quote the Bar Council’s written evidence, because it brings home that there are real people behind this. It says that on account of errors by the IIAA,

“a British citizen may wrongly be deprived of British citizenship, a refugee be returned to a place where they risk persecution or torture, a British family with a foreign member may be broken up, or an EU citizen be denied Withdrawal Agreement rights.”

Those are all serious consequences. We must strengthen this clause. It is not sufficient for this to be left to chance, to the courts or to later guidance on the IIAA produced by Ministers. It is so basic to fairness that it should be on the face of the Bill.

Amendment 68 fixes an omission from the Bill by the Government. It proposes preventing an IIAA adjudicator from reviewing their own decision. Under clause 6, the IIAA currently has the power to review its own decisions. In principle, there is nothing objectionable in this. The mechanism could provide a cheaper, quicker way to overturn inaccurate decisions than an appeal to the upper tribunal and provides a way for mistakes to be corrected quickly and without fuss. However, there is no provision in the Bill to say that an individual IIAA adjudicator cannot review their own decision when it is challenged.

I should note that the first-tier tribunal currently has the power to review its own decisions but adjudicators will not have the independence, experience and legal expertise of tribunal judges—at least if the Government have their way. It would be against fairness for such a non-judicial adjudicator to be in effect a judge in their own case. The adjudicator reviewing their own decision would also have an uncomfortable conflict of interest: either validate their own professional competence or vindicate the rule of law. No adjudicator should be put in that position and no asylum appellant should have their appeal dealt with in this unfair and potentially biased way.

Any internal review of an IIAA asylum decision should be heard by a different adjudicator who is as independent as possible from the original adjudicator. Amendment 68 is the best way to secure the psychological and emotional distance needed to conduct a fair review. It is perhaps indicative of the lack of serious thought that has gone into the Government’s proposals that the Bill does not contain a safeguard so basic and so clearly needed. The amendment would prevent an adjudicator from reviewing their own decision in any circumstances, thus increasing the chances of a fair and independent review. I hope it will be supported by us all today.

Government amendment 29 provides for information to be given on legal representation. That is an improvement on the original Bill, but a lot more should be done to prevent an appellant from being disadvantaged because they cannot obtain legal representation.

I welcome new clause 2, which inserts some concrete steps to provide some assistance in some cases, and the Government’s recognition of the significant issues when it comes to the availability of legal advice for people in different parts of the asylum system, which I have seen with my own eyes. It would be helpful, though, to know more about the Government’s thinking and their plans for providing this advice. How much additional funding and resource will the Home Office provide to deliver it? Will the Government commit to consulting with relevant groups and organisations that support people seeking asylum on how this advice can best be provided and routed to those most in need?

[Blake Stephenson]

The procedure rules will determine how fast the appeals authority works in practice, time limits, hearings, evidence and late claims. As Professor Ekins warned in oral evidence, they are also the part of this scheme most exposed to legal challenge. The group that we are considering includes clause 4, schedule 3 and clause 5, which cover the rules and the board that makes them, together with amendments 63 and 68 in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, a set of Government amendments to schedule 3 and Government new clause 2 on advice and representation, so there is a lot in there.

Clause 4 provides for the appeals authority procedure rules, made by the procedure rules board after consultation, with regard to the objectives in clause 1. They are to be made by statutory instruments subject to the negative procedure. Schedule 3 sets out what they may contain, including time limits, restrictions on fresh applications, decisions without a hearing and the treatment of late evidence. Clause 5 sets up the board that will write the appeals authority’s procedure rules, including the chief executive, the chief appeals officer, the professional standards officer and standing members appointed by the chair.

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[Anna Turley]

I again thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for her amendments. We are having numerous Divisions today, but it keeps us all on our toes. I will take her amendments in turn.

Clause 4 sets out that the authority will operate under a set of procedure rules determined by the IIAA procedure rules board. I will set out the details about the establishment of the board when we discuss clause 5, but that board is the body that will determine the procedure rules. In reference to some of the requests for more information on the rules, or for draft rules, those are not for us to determine. The procedure rules board will be set up through a proper establishment process as it is a statutory body, and it is important that it leads on the drafting of the procedure rules.

Those rules will be made by statutory instrument so we will have the opportunity to scrutinise them at that point. Making the IIAA procedure rules that way provides an important safeguard to the independence of the authority by placing control of its procedural framework—set out in schedule 3—in the hands of the IIAA procedure rules board. That is broadly similar to the process for the current tribunal rules, which sees the Tribunal Procedure Committee draft rule changes following consultations with relevant stakeholders. The IIAA procedure rules board, like the Tribunal Procedure Committee, will make its own procedure rules as if it were a Minister of the Crown.

Amendment 63, in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, seeks to amend clause 4 so that the authority’s procedure rules board must draft the procedural rules “with a view to” securing the statutory objectives in clauses 1(4) and 1(5). It would replace the current requirement for the board to draft the rules with

“regard to the desirability of”

meeting those objectives. The amendment mirrors the wording of the duty placed on the Tribunal Procedure Committee in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act.

The Bill sets out that in the exercise of its primary function, the IIAA must

“aim to be accessible, fair and independent…aim to handle its cases quickly and efficiently, and…have regard to the public interest, and…to the fact that the IIAA operates as a key part of the immigration and asylum system.”

The procedure rules board is internal to the authority and therefore members of the board would be expected to comply with the statutory duty set out in clauses 1(4) and 1(5). Amendment 63 would therefore have no practical impact on the way the authority’s procedure rules board develops its rules.

[Siân Berry]

The Minister has not justified why the wording is different. She said that members of the board would be expected to comply; my amendment would simply make that even clearer. Why say that they should

“have regard to the desirability of”

instead of using the wording that I suggest in amendment 63?

[Anna Turley]

We simply do not believe that is necessary. The procedure rules board does not require that change to the wording about its objectives, because that already forms part of the authority. As I have specified, the authority is under a duty, which is made explicit on the first page of the Bill, towards those objectives in the performance of its functions—it has to undertake them. It has a statutory objective to aim to be “accessible, fair and independent” in the performance of its functions, so we do not agree that this is any sort of watering down. The way that the procedure rules are made will be independent of the Government and it is crucial that we maintain these safeguards.

Schedule 3 establishes the framework within which the procedure rules of the authority will operate and ensures that the IIAA has the powers necessary to manage proceedings fairly, efficiently and transparently. The schedule provides for rules-governing matters such as hearings, evidence, representation, reviews of decisions, appeals to the upper tribunal, costs and the publication of decisions. It also enables the IIAA to make effective use of modern case management practices, including remote hearings and measures to support vulnerable participants.

The schedule promotes the timely and effective resolution of cases. It allows the procedure rules to address the treatment of evidence provided late, while preserving appropriate safeguards where there are good reasons for delay. It also reinforces transparency and accountability by providing for the publication of decisions, subject to safeguards, to protect the interest of justice and the anonymity of those who should not be identified. Taken together, these provisions will enable the authority to develop a clear and comprehensive procedural framework, supporting it to discharge its functions fairly, consistently and without unnecessary delay.

I turn to amendment 68, which would require the authority procedure rules to provide that an adjudicator involved in making the original decision cannot take part in a review of that decision. The Government recognise the importance of ensuring that these reviews are conducted fairly and impartially. Again, the Bill already provides appropriate safeguards around the exercise of the review power. Clause 6 will require a review to be carried out by an IIAA adjudicator, while schedule 3 will enable the procedure rules to set out the circumstances in which and the procedure by which the power under clause 6 may be exercised. Clause 3 also makes the chief appeals officer responsible for allocating cases to adjudicators and for developing a quality assurance mechanism. These are important safeguards to enable the fair and impartial allocation of reviews. The Government therefore consider that the allocation of reviews is more appropriately addressed through the authority procedure rules and case allocation arrangements, rather than being prescribed in the Bill.

Clause 5 sets out which of the IIAA members will sit on the IIAA procedure rules board and how appointments of standing members to the board can be made. The procedure rules board will consist of

“the Chief Executive…the Chief Appeals Officer…the Professional Standards Officer, and…any standing members appointed by the Chair.”

The statutory make-up of the board will ensure that it has adequate expertise to draft rules that are fit for purpose, including the legal expertise of the chief appeals officer and the professional standards officer. The option to appoint further standing members will enable the chair to ensure that the board can make rules in areas requiring specialist expertise, where relevant; that might include social worker expertise for rules related to unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, for example. Beyond that, as clause 4 sets out, the board must consult such persons as it considers appropriate. Again, that will support the IIAA to incorporate a range of views, expertise and experience into its rules.

The Government amendments in this group seek to achieve several aims. I will cover expedited appeal proceedings in more detail when we debate groups 8, 9 and 11 on the selection list. In this group, amendments 30, 31, 33, 34 and 35 will ensure that the immigration bail provisions operate consistently within the Bill’s expedited proceedings framework. The Bill already requires regard to be had, when considering whether to grant immigration bail, to whether proceedings are subject to the late claims process under clause 12. These amendments simply make equivalent provision where proceedings before the IIAA relating to a person are being expedited pursuant to a request by the Secretary of State under clause 9, which we will come to later and which will apply where the Secretary of State considers that it would be in the public interest for proceedings to be expedited. It is therefore appropriate that cases proceeding under the expedited process be treated consistently with cases subject to the late claims process.

These amendments will simply ensure that both categories are reflected in the matters to which regard must be had when determining whether to grant immigration bail. Crucially, however, they will not alter the legal test for immigration bail. The amendments will also remove applicants for immigration bail from the paragraph 11 credibility provisions in schedule 3, with the effect that those provisions apply only in relation to appellants. Taken together, these are technical and consequential amendments that will ensure that part 1 of the Bill operates as intended.

Government new clause 2 will give the Secretary of State a power to take such steps as they consider appropriate to increase the supply and capacity of qualified immigration advisers to appellants in the IIAA—that is, people who are qualified within the meaning of section 84 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 to provide immigration advice and services. Provision has already been made in schedule 3, which requires appellants to indicate whether they have obtained advice or representation.

This power is intended to complement that provision by expressly empowering the Secretary of State to invest in increasing the availability of advice and representation for appellants and bail applicants in the IIAA. I am glad to hear it welcomed by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, because it is intended to support access to justice by encouraging growth in the advice and representation sector and by increasing availability and access to advisers and representatives. It creates a clear legal basis on which to increase the general availability of IIAA advice and representation through financial and other assistance. For example, investment may be in training, accreditation, workforce development and support for service providers. Early legal advice helps to avoid delays and late claims, leads to better decisions and, crucially, ensures that individuals get the advice and support that they need at an appropriate time.

Government amendment 29 will amend schedule 3 to ensure that the IIAA procedure rules require the IIAA to provide all appellants and bail applicants with information on how to access advice and representation, reinforcing our intention that all appellants should have the opportunity to obtain it. Government amendment 28 is a small technical change to enable amendment 36, which we will come to in the next group. Finally, Government amendment 32 will limit the application of paragraph 11(3) of schedule 3, so that IIAA procedure rules are not required to make the same provision as is made in new clause 3, which we will come to later.

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[Anna Turley]

We are putting a huge amount into ensuring the quality and the expertise on the board that is setting up these rules. As I say, we have the legal expertise of the chief appeals officer and the professional standards officer. They will be reporting to Parliament in a whole range of ways, so we will be able to monitor the process throughout. The amendment would simply tie the hands of the procedure rules board. It is not for us to dictate how it undertakes the review process. It is important that it be independent of Government and be able to establish its own process, which will ultimately be accountable to Parliament.

It is also important to flag the equality and impartiality. There will be training, legal support, professional standards, decision quality oversight, internal review and onwards appeal rights, so there are a whole range of factors to ensure that the quality of adjudicators’ decisions is high. The chief appeals officer will oversee that. They will have to develop a quality assurance mechanism as well, and the professional standards officer will be setting and maintaining professional standards. We are putting a range of things in place to ensure the highest standards in the decision-making process.

On new clause 2, the shadow Minister asked about costs, about access and about when people will be able to have advice and representation during the process. We will ensure that all those who lodge an appeal to be heard in the new IIAA can access advice and representation, with access to legal aid where the eligibility tests are met. On the bail process, we are also ensuring that when we ask people to state whether they have advice and arrangements in place for representation, we encourage the uptake of suitably regulated advice and representation. That will help us to reduce delays, avoid disruption and provide fairness throughout the process.

I think I have answered most of the questions that hon. Members have raised, but if there are any further points that I have missed, I will come back to the Committee.

[Siân Berry]

The Minister’s insistence that this is not a watering down of previous rules does not wash. In my opinion, it is a double watering down: clause 4 makes a change to “have regard to”, and clause 1 includes a double use of “aim to” rather than “must”. That is certainly a watering down of the previous duties, and I think we should go along with the wording in amendment 63.

On amendment 68, we have heard a lot of assurances from the Minister that the quality assurance and rule-making processes are unlikely to do the opposite of what this amendment asks. We have heard the Minister say, “They can do this.” If she were prepared to say, “They will do this,” I could potentially withdraw the amendment, but in the absence of that assurance—with only “This is possible” and “We might see this,” and with only the negative procedure—I am afraid I will have to press it to a vote.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate what the hon. Member says, but as I say, it is not feasible for the Home Office or the Government to dictate in that way. I cannot give her that assurance, because we are setting up the body so that it can be independent and can set up its own rules, processes and procedures. It is really important that we allow it to undertake that, so I cannot put her recommendation explicitly in the Bill.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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Regulations about time periods

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move amendment 83, in clause 8, page 6, line 32, leave out “the IIAA” and insert “individuals and organisations with an interest in how the IIAA operates, including—

(a) the IIAA,

(b) people granted protection status,

(c) people with lived experience of the asylum system,

(d) legal practitioners and organisations representing the interests of people with, or seeking, protection status, and

(e) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”

This amendment would expand the list of those whom the Secretary of State must consult before making regulations about time periods for IIAA proceedings to include people and organisations with experience of the immigration system.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 89, in clause 8, page 6, line 32, at end insert—

“(8) The first regulations under subsection (1) must be made before the end of the period of six months beginning with the day on which section 1 comes into force.

(9) The annual report of the IIAA must state the proportion of proceedings in which a time period set out in regulations under this section was extended.”

This probing amendment would require the first time-period regulations to be made within six months of the IIAA being established, and the IIAA to report how often deadlines are extended.

Clause stand part.

[Siân Berry]

Clause 8 allows the Secretary of State to set time limits for the work of the IIAA. That is in notable contrast to all the claims of independence, and I think it is very wrong to do that. My amendment 83 therefore expands the list of people whom the Secretary of State must consult before making those regulations, although I would still be against the clause as a whole.

I have worked on this amendment with organisations that represent people who claim asylum and with people with lived experience, including Freedom from Torture. It would require a wide consultation, including with people with lived experience, before any time limits are set. That is because clause 8 gives the Home Secretary the big power to set default time limits. I think it is concerning that the IIAA itself will not be able to decide those, based on the time that it thinks it needs to decide appeals fairly, as if it were a truly independent body. Clause 8 is a prime example of how, in fact, the new system will not be as independent or fair as is claimed. Through those regulations on time periods, the Home Office could overtly put pressure on the IIAA to fulfil a political wish for rushed appeals.

There is a long history of seeking to rush immigration appeals through fast-track proceedings; every time that has been tried, it has turned out badly. In 2014, for example, the Tribunal Procedure Committee introduced fast-track rules setting time limits for asylum appeals. The Court of Appeal and the High Court both found those fast-track rules to be structurally unfair and unjust, because

“the time limits are so tight as to make it impossible for there to be a fair hearing…in a significant number of cases.”

The Court of Appeal explained in 2015:

“The scheme does not adequately take account of the complexity and difficulty of many asylum appeals, the gravity of the issues that are raised by them and the measure of the task that faces legal representatives in taking instructions from their clients who are in detention”,

and, as the Court of Appeal robustly summarised,

“justice and fairness should not be sacrificed on the altar of speed and efficiency.”

We need to make sure that history does not repeat itself. My amendment would, at the very least, require the Home Secretary to consult widely before issuing regulations about time limits, including with people with lived experience of the asylum system and professional bodies that represent individuals in asylum decisions and appeals. That should increase the chances that the time limits set are not politically driven only, but are realistic, workable and fair. Under the current version of the Bill, however, the Home Secretary is obliged to consult only the IIAA itself.

Open consultations are essential for good government and good decisions. They make sure that decision makers get all the relevant information that they need, including information that they do not know they do not know, which comes from people experiencing the systems that they set up. It is incredibly important to ensure that the Home Secretary has access to the full range of external opinions and advice when setting those time limits. My amendment would mean that people with lived experience of the asylum system—the kind of people directly affected by the Home Secretary’s policies—could offer their views and explain what different time limits would mean for them in practice.

When we took oral evidence in September, I asked the Minister about the issues around engagement and making sure that what is done is fit for purpose as far as people experiencing the asylum system are concerned. She said:

“I am always a believer in service user feedback, including from people who have been through the process and have lived experience, to help us develop better policymaking.”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 81, Q148.]

In that light, I do not see why this amendment should not be fully accepted by the Minister. People with lived experience of the asylum system bring essential experience of how legal processes operate in practice and how they are felt by the people who are affected by them, and they can help policymakers to identify barriers, unintended consequences and gaps that may not be visible from institutional data alone. Meaningful consultation with people who have navigated the asylum appeal system strengthens the quality of policy and must be done.

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[Blake Stephenson]

I thank my hon. Friend for those very kind words about how powerful my arguments are. I am sure the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion will respond to that when she has the opportunity.

[Siân Berry]

My arguments were not that it should be longer, but that it should be the right amount of time to achieve fairness and justice. I am sure that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East would not disagree that the right amount of time is essential, and that shorter is not necessarily better.

[Blake Stephenson]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention.

The Opposition will support clause 8 and oppose amendment 83. We want deadlines that are set, met and reported on. If the Minister can tell us when the first regulations will be made and that extension rates will be published, we will not press amendment 89 to a vote.

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[Anna Turley]

I thank Members again for their amendments in this group. I will turn to those amendments after explaining the drafting of clause 8.

Clause 8 enables the Secretary of State, following consultation with the authority—I have been using the word “authority” for brevity, so I hope that colleagues know I am referring to the IIAA—to set time limits for certain appeals, bail applications and procedural steps. The cohorts of appeals that may be expedited under clause 8 will be set out following consultation between the Home Secretary and the authority, but potential cohorts could include removable foreign national offenders, for whom the swift resolution of appeals and enforcement of deportation where appropriate is a long-standing Home Secretary priority, as set out in the Government’s “Restoring Order and Control” statement.

The purpose is simple: to support the timely resolution of cases. The clause will help to ensure that the appeals system is efficient, responsive and capable of delivering justice without unnecessary delay. Let me be absolutely clear: this clause does not affect the authority’s independence in deciding cases. It concerns the management of proceedings, not their outcome.

The Secretary of State must consult the authority before making regulations, and the authority retains the flexibility to allow additional time where the interests of justice or the practicalities of a case require it. This is a balanced and proportionate measure. It will improve efficiency and accountability while preserving fairness and access to justice. This clause is about timely justice—which, as other hon. Members have mentioned, is just as important for those undergoing the process as it is for the wider public—not rushed justice, and efficient case management, not ministerial control.

Amendment 89 would impose an arbitrary deadline for making the first regulations under clause 8. The clause is deliberately flexible, allowing time periods to be introduced where the evidence shows that particular cases should be prioritised. I appreciate the entreaties of the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, but it is really important that we do not pre-empt the evidence, particularly during the authority’s early development. Further reporting requirements are also unnecessary. Clause 8 already requires the authority’s annual report to cover cases where time periods have been extended.

Amendment 83 would unnecessarily broaden the statutory consultation requirement. Stakeholder engagement is of course important, and it is something I believe in very strongly, but prescribing a lengthy list of consultees in the Bill could delay our ability to respond quickly where particular cases need to be prioritised. Clause 8 already requires the Secretary of State to consult the authority and, crucially, does not restrict wider engagement if needed, so there is an opportunity for that.

I would also like to make this point: for me, Parliament is the ultimate stakeholder, and the public are ultimately the people this Bill is for. Our constituents have lived experience of this process, so it is important that they have the ultimate say, and that is why the Home Secretary is accountable to Parliament in this process. It is Members of Parliament, who represent their constituents, who can ultimately represent that stakeholder, and it is crucial to remember that.

More broadly, the Bill already places clear duties on the authority, which must exercise its primary function with a view to ensuring that justice is done. It must aim to be accessible, fair and independent, and it must aim to handle its cases quickly and effectively. It is in everyone’s interests that cases are resolved swiftly.

Before I finish, I would like to respond to a couple more of the points that were made. On the point of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion about lived experience, we recognise the value of wider stakeholder engagement, but prescribing this lengthy list could delay action where particular cases need to be prioritised. We do not want to restrict the flexibility around that. As I have said, the Bill already requires the Secretary of State to consult with the authority before making regulations and, crucially, it does not restrict that wider engagement, which is so important.

The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire asked for details on the timeframes and the kinds of cases that the authority will prioritise, which will be set out in regulations in due course. The Government are clear that appeals may be prioritised where there is a strong public interest or compelling operational reason to do so. As I have already mentioned, that could include the cases of foreign national offenders, where we have a genuine need to protect the public, or individuals who are in detention. Any prioritisation will support the efficient operation of the appeals system while ensuring that we maintain fairness and justice. For those reasons, I respectfully ask for the amendments not to be pressed to a vote.

[Siân Berry]

I will not labour the point any further. I will press my amendment to a Division, and I hope the Minister will keep looking at how this kind of consultation can be made more statutorily inclusive.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Blake Stephenson]

Clause 13 brings the authority within the remit of the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration, with an annual report and the chief executive’s response laid before Parliament. The Opposition support accountability to Parliament, as we have discussed on several occasions today.

Amendment 92 is another probing amendment. The inspection regime in clause 13 focuses on process: premises, technology and training. Parliament will also want to know whether the authority is working. Dr Sumption told us that the data needed to judge those reforms—what happens to refused cases and how many decisions are overturned—largely does not exist.

Amendment 92 would require the chief inspector’s report to cover two outcomes: the proportion of the authority’s decisions set aside by the upper tribunal, and the number of people removed after the appeals authority dismisses their appeal. Will inspection reports cover those outcomes? What additional resources will the chief inspector receive? Is one report a year enough in the first years? When would material be omitted from published reports?

New clause 28, in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, would require quarterly publication of data of the authority’s work on appeals, outcomes, representation, the backlog, timings, withdrawals and reviews. It overlaps with our amendment 88 on decision quality. Transparency around whether the new body is working is in everyone’s interest. I hope the Government will say whether they intend to publish data of that kind.

We support clause 13. Scrutiny should measure results, not just process. If the Minister can give assurances on the outcome data, we will not press amendment 92.

[Siân Berry]

I agree with the shadow Minister that amendment 92 and new clause 28 are quite compatible. They both ask for more data from the Government and the IIAA about its work and what is going on. That is essential.

My new clause 28 would require the Home Secretary to arrange for the publication, at least every quarter—that timing is the same as for the existing Immigration and Asylum Tribunal—of data relating to the work of the appeals authority. It sets out properly detailed requirements for quarterly data publication. It includes requirements for information on decisions, appeals and outcomes, including where the appeals authority has reviewed decisions ahead of appeals and where appellants withdraw; information about who has had legal representation; and information about backlogs, timelines and delays on decisions.

The new clause also ensures that we can see that data broken down by nationality, gender and age, and what kind of appeal grounds are being made. Given the concern about the discriminatory and human rights impact of the Bill on people claiming asylum and our obligations under international agreements, all that information is essential.

We cannot have a publication scheme only set out by the appeals authority itself or by Ministers. It is important that Parliament should put such essential reporting information into the Bill; otherwise, we will simply not know the consequences of those changes or their consequences will become a matter of contention and further politicise the lives of those seeking asylum here. I have a related new clause that asks for a report in a similar fashion on current decision making, and the comparison between the two is vital.

I asked the Minister for some baseline data on the current situation during the oral evidence sessions. The reason I asked is that until March 2023 we had quite a lot of details, including around nationality, in the Home Office’s own quarterly statistics release. However, for over three years now, the appeal statistics have not been included, and we do not see the information about nationality broken down. The letter we received from the Minister on 6 October gave some information about the breakdown of different human rights grounds, which was useful, but unless comprehensive information is provided about the current situation and the changes that will take place when we introduce the appeals authority, we will not really see the impact of the Bill. This is absolutely essential.

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[Anna Turley]

The clause sets out the extension of the remit of the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration so that they may inspect and report on the authority’s performance. That will allow them to examine the authority’s efficiency, effectiveness and consistency, as well as wider operational matters.

Independent scrutiny is an important safeguard. It will support transparency and accountability and help maintain public confidence in the new appeals system. The clause preserves the authority’s independence. The inspector will not be able to reconsider, overturn or otherwise interfere with the outcome of any individual appeal. The inspector’s role will be to identify systemic issues and opportunities for improvement, rather than to provide an additional route of challenge for individual appellants.

Inspection reports will be handled through the existing statutory framework, including the provision for reports to be sent to the authority and the Secretary of State, and for the Secretary of State to lay them before Parliament. The clause therefore strikes the right balance between robust independent oversight and the protection of independent decision making.

Amendment 92 would require the independent chief inspector’s report on the IIAA to include the proportion of authority decisions set aside by the upper tribunal and the number of people removed following the dismissal of an appeal. I thank the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire for tabling it. The Government agree that the authority must be subject to effective and transparent scrutiny, which is precisely why clause 13 extends the remit of the independent chief inspector to cover the authority’s performance. However, it would not be appropriate to prescribe those particular measures on the face of the Bill. The chief inspector will already be able to examine the authority’s efficiency and the effectiveness of its processes. Their role is to monitor the processes, not the outcomes.

The number of decisions set aside by the upper tribunal cannot by itself provide a complete assessment of the overall quality of the authority’s decision making, and nor will the number of removals following dismissed appeals provide a direct measure of the authority’s performance. The amendment would therefore risk holding the independent chief inspector, and indirectly the authority, to account for outcomes not wholly within the authority’s control. The chief inspector already has an established role in inspecting the immigration system, and clause 13 enables them to assess, as they consider appropriate, the efficiency and effectiveness of the authority and how it is delivering against its objectives. For those reasons, the Government cannot accept the amendment, and I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.

New clause 28 relates to publishing information on the operation and performance of the authority. The Bill already contains a comprehensive framework for accountability and transparency of the authority. First, paragraph 11 of schedule 2 requires the authority to prepare an annual report on the exercise of its functions, which must be laid before Parliament. That will ensure regular parliamentary scrutiny of the performance and operation of the new body. Secondly, the clause provides independent inspection of the performance of the authority’s functions. The purpose of that is to provide additional external reporting on the IIAA’s efficiency and effectiveness. It is unnecessary to prescribe a detailed list of operational metrics in the Bill.

[Siân Berry]

The Minister said, “efficiency and effectiveness”. One of the issues that I raised was equalities issues and discrimination. Will that also be in the remit?

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Lady makes an important point. Again, that is not something that is prescribed in the Bill. As we establish this, it will be important to have a look at whether that ought to be a key principle. I cannot make the commitment at the moment, but it is important that we reflect on that as the authority is established.

As I said, it is unnecessary to prescribe a detailed list of operational metrics. Precise reporting arrangements should be a matter for the authority once operational. Mandating specific requirements in primary legislation would reduce flexibility and constrain the authority’s ability to adapt its reporting arrangements as it becomes established. That will be an operational matter for the authority as it is set up, and should not be prescribed in the Bill. The Government therefore do not accept the amendment or new clause 28.

More broadly, I appreciate that there is a wider point, separate to the context of the Bill, about data and statistics. The Ministry of Justice publishes quarterly statistics that include information on receipts and outcomes. The Home Office immigration system statistics quarterly release covers data on a range of topics, including claims, outcomes and nationality. The full set of official statistics published by those Departments is kept under review in line with the code of practice for statistics. I think that is a conversation that we could have another day, but it is important that we do not accept amendments that seek to require the inspector to focus on what is not in his remit.