Immigration and Asylum Bill (Sixth sitting)

Blake Stephenson Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

Family life

[Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 98, in clause 18, page 15, line 14, leave out from “must” to end of line 15 and insert

“must determine that question in accordance with section 117AA.”

This amendment would require courts and tribunals to decide whether Article 8 is engaged in accordance with new section 117AA, rather than only to have regard to it.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 99, in clause 18, page 15, line 21, leave out “normally”.

This amendment, with Amendments 101 and 102, would remove the word “normally” from new section 117AA so that family life for the purposes of Article 8 is limited to the core cohabiting family and the other relationships specified, without an open-ended qualification.

Amendment 100, in clause 18, page 15, line 25, at end insert

“(but only where A and the partner have lived together in a relationship akin to marriage or civil partnership for at least two years)”.

This amendment would require a partner who is not a spouse or civil partner to have lived with the person in a relationship akin to marriage or civil partnership for at least two years to count as part of the core cohabiting family.

Government amendment 44.

Amendment 101, in clause 18, page 15, line 30, leave out “normally”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 99.

Government amendment 45.

Amendment 102, in clause 18, page 15, line 33, leave out “normally”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 99.

Amendment 103, in clause 18, page 16, line 17, leave out subsection (6).

This amendment would remove the provision allowing the factors excluded by new section 117AA(5) to be considered at the public interest stage, to test whether subsection (6) undoes the effect of subsection (5).

Clause stand part.

[Blake Stephenson]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg.

Clause 18 is at the heart of part 2 of the Bill, and is where the Government set out for the first time in statute, as we heard earlier, what counts as family life for the purposes of article 8 of the European convention on human rights. Other than the fact that the Conservatives would withdraw from the ECHR to implement our borders plan, allow me to say at the outset that the Opposition do support the broad direction of travel of the clause. The public are entitled to expect that the right to respect for family life protects genuine, close family relationships and does not stretch to cover extended relationships and loosely evidenced dependency, which is the very problem that the Government’s explanatory notes identify. In my opinion, the question for the Committee is not whether the clause points the right way; it is whether it will make any difference at all in the courtroom. On the evidence the Committee has heard and read so far, I fear the answer is unfortunately that it will make very little difference.

Clause 18 does three things. First, subsection (3) inserts a two-stage sequence into section 117A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. A court or tribunal must first decide whether article 8 is engaged at all, having regard in particular to proposed new section 117AA, and only then turn to the public interest question. Secondly, clause 18(4) inserts proposed new section 117AA into the 2002 Act. A person’s family life is normally limited to their core cohabiting family: a spouse, civil partner or partner and minor children or parents, to the extent that they live together. A parent who does not live with a child does not normally have family life with that child unless there is evidence of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship, and an adult does not normally have family life with another adult unless they live together as partners or there is an additional element of dependency beyond normal emotional ties.

Thirdly, clause 18(5) lists four things that, on their own, do not amount to that additional dependency: financial dependence; illness, unless it meets a three-part test of constant care; emotional resilience; and concern for a relative living in a country affected by war or instability. Subsection (6) then provides that nothing in subsection (5) stops the court considering those same factors when it comes to the public interest question.

Why is the direction right? There is a real problem here. Mr Smith, the former director general of Border Force, told the Committee that article 8 is

“often used as a lever quite late in the process”,––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 44, Q67.]

as we all know from the cases we hear about on the news.

The Minister gave the Committee an example from Home Office casework of a man who falsely claimed paternity of eight children and was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. Families, of course, take many forms, and nobody on this side of the Committee wishes to deny that. However, the law should be clear that the core of family life is the family that lives together, and that anything beyond it must be proved. We support the principle of the clause, but we have been here before—I refer to the debate on clauses in group 14 and the many good speeches made—with the immigration rules in 2012 and the Immigration Act 2014. I want to test whether this clause will succeed where those attempts did not.

First, on the language, proposed new section 117AA to the 2002 Act does not say that family life is limited to the core cohabiting family; it says that it is “normally” limited to it. The same word appears in subsections (3) and (4). Professor Ekins told us that this word is where the litigation will end up turning. Justice, which opposes this part of the Bill, makes the same point from the other side: its written evidence accepts that the use of “normally”, together with the need only to “have regard” to those considerations,

“preserves the possibility of finding family life beyond these prescribed circumstances.”

I ask the Minister: in what circumstances do the Government expect a court to find family life outside the core cohabiting family, and will that be set out anywhere? If the Government cannot say, why is the word “normally” there at all? Amendments 99, 101 and 102 would remove it.

Secondly, let us look at the duty itself. Proposed new subsection (1B) to section 117A says that the court

“must (in particular) have regard to”

section 117AA. It does not say that the court must apply it—that matters. In Rhuppiah, a case mentioned in the previous sitting, the Supreme Court held that the “have regard” formula in the 2014 Act

“cannot put decision-makers in a strait-jacket”.

As was mentioned earlier, Chris Rowe of Swansea University, writing for the UK Constitutional Law Association, described the device as “insufficiently potent” to force a result incompatible with the convention. Clause 18 uses exactly the same device. What in proposed new subsections (1A) to (1C) to section 117A differs in kind from the formula that the Supreme Court has already held cannot bind? Amendment 98 would replace “have regard to” with a requirement that the court determine the question in accordance with proposed new section 117AA.

Proposed new section 117AA(5) tells the court that financial dependence, illness, emotional reliance and concern for a relative in a war zone do not, on their own, create family life. Subsection (6) tells the court that it may consider every one of those factors when it weighs the public interest. The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association adds that the Bill is silent on whether those factors may be combined when the court decides whether there is an additional element of dependency, and that the Strasbourg court, in Kumari and Martinez Alvarado, allows exactly that. If the court reads a combination test into paragraph (4)(b) to keep the clause compatible, the list in subsection (5) will do very little work. What is subsection (6) for, if not to give back at the second stage what subsection (5) takes away at the first? Amendment 103 would leave it out, to test exactly that.

The central question is whether clause 18 changes the law. The Government’s human rights memorandum says that proposed new section 117AA codifies the Strasbourg principles on the existence of family life. The House of Commons Library notes that the Strasbourg court has itself said, in Kumari v. the Netherlands, that family life is

“normally limited to the core family”,

and it records Professor Singer’s view on the clause’s effect, that

“it is unclear how this would differ significantly from current practice”.

However, the Law Society tells this Committee that the new emphasis on cohabitation is

“a significant move away from the current position in UK law and a substantial narrowing of Article 8 protections.”

Justice says the clause

“falls short of codifying the Strasbourg principles on the existence of family life, despite the Government’s assertion to the contrary in its ECHR memorandum”,

in particular for

“young adults who are still living with their parents”.

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[Ben Goldsborough (South Norfolk) (Lab)]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Blake Stephenson]

I was just about to close, but I will gladly give way.

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[Ben Goldsborough]

As the hon. Member very kindly name-checked my speech yesterday, I need to thank him first of all. He says there is no issue of “Lock, Stock and Two Smoking Barrels” when leaving the ECHR, but there is an issue concerning our colleagues and friends on the island of Ireland. What would be the result of leaving the ECHR when it comes to the Good Friday agreement? There is no question about it: Lord Wolfson may say that there may or may not be an issue with that, but the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission has noted that there would be an issue, and we have the history as well. Anything that comes back with this idea that, “Well, Australia and New Zealand don’t operate within these systems,” does not take into account the history of the island of Ireland.

[Blake Stephenson]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention—perhaps my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East was correct to say that I was far too generous in taking it; I should have just closed my speech.

The hon. Member for South Norfolk clearly recognises that the Opposition commissioned Lord Wolfson to conduct a very serious legal analysis of the benefits or otherwise of leaving the ECHR, which he has done. I go back to the comment I made earlier about how there are no legal barriers to us departing the ECHR. There is no risk to the Union and there is no risk to the Good Friday agreement in a legal sense. It will, of course, result in a political discussion, and that will be had at the appropriate time, but the political questions that will arise are not insurmountable.

I will now close. The Opposition support the aim of clause 18 and will not oppose it standing part of the Bill. We support Government amendments 44 and 45, but a definition that is qualified by “normally” applied through a duty only to “have regard to”, with the excluded factors let back in by clause 18(6), is a definition that the courts can step around. I will seek to press amendments 98 and 99 to a Division.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

It is a pleasure to have you in the Chair today, Mr Twigg.

I take completely the opposite position from the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire in almost every respect. I am going to speak against clause 18 and its inclusion in the Bill, and I am going to oppose the Government amendments that would put further tests on parent-child relationships and parental involvement for refugees. I will also be opposing the Conservative amendments, which would put even tighter constraints on family life.

I am here to defend our article 8 protections—I say “our”, because I believe it is really important that we set laws for refugees and asylum seekers that we would happily be subject to ourselves. That is absolutely at the core of the universal nature of human rights and the international agreements we have made to respect human rights around the world in the way that we would want them to be respected should we be in the horrible position of needing to claim asylum.

Article 8 protects the right to family life specifically for us under the European convention on human rights. Although it is not absolute, it requires any state interference in these rights to be lawful, necessary and proportionate. I do not agree with the Government when they say in their human rights memorandum that they are taking

“proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aims.”

To me, paragraph 26 in the memorandum clearly admits that there is interference in our rights with this legislation. The Government are using the argument that they are taking “proportionate means” of “achieving the legitimate aims”, but the legitimate aims they lay out are:

“maintaining effective immigration control, economic wellbeing and the prevention of disorder or crime.”

I honestly do not see how clause 18, on family life and people making claims for reuniting their families and maintaining this essential human right protected under article 8, comes into those “proportionate means”. It is about reducing the ability of families to reunite. The impact assessment clearly says that many thousands of people who would be able to come here under current laws will be denied their claims. This is a reduction in human rights and it seriously needs looking at. I am neither equipped nor planning to add further arguments relating to Northern Ireland and the Windsor framework, but further conversations are needed about what is currently in the Bill, never mind what would happen if we withdrew from the ECHR.

Everybody on the Committee wants a fair, robust and effective immigration system—one that works and upholds the rule of law and on in which people have confidence. Article 8 is not an abstract concept within all this; it is the law that decides whether a parent can stay in the country where their children live or whether a British child grows up with both parents. We do not want to see families separated or children separated from the parents who care for them, yet that is precisely the risk posed by clause 18, according to the Government’s own impact assessment.

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[Siân Berry]

I disagree wholly with that. During the speeches made by Opposition Members earlier in the debate, I kept thinking about the people who, due to natural disasters or wars, are left without core family, and have to find another family member who will take them in and take that place. There is an inherent danger in putting in place these limits, and in the amendments tabled by Conservative Members that would add rigid definitions. Given the stories about the different ways in which people have experienced refugee status over the years, which all hon. Members will have heard about in casework and read about in memoirs and novels, the need for this change does not ring true. We should keep the system as it is now, where the reality of every single case needs to be looked at.

[Blake Stephenson]

The hon. Lady described our amendments as “rigid definitions”, but is it not right that we as legislators make sure that our definitions have certainty? We want to have a system that the British public have confidence in, and that is not the case at the moment—in good faith, the Government are trying to deal with that. Do we not need rigid definitions and certainty to achieve that?

[Siân Berry]

I fundamentally disagree with the hon. Member. We need to look at individual cases individually, as no two families are the same. We could imagine many circumstances for which we would want exceptions to this rule. The Government have rightly left caveats in the Bill, but the Opposition are arguing against them. Putting in rigid criteria on top of what is already in the Bill is absolutely the wrong way to go about addressing the issue. The best way to deal with any problems we might see is to do so in the initial decision making.

Clause 18 says that financial or emotional dependence, illness, or living in a conflict zone alone is not enough to establish family life, yet families routinely support each other financially, emotionally and practically. Ministers say that those factors can still be weighed at the public interest stage, but once family life is ruled out, that stage is never reached. What will that mean in practice? As I have hinted at, the Government’s impact assessment says that their article 8 reforms will mean 14,000 more refusals every year. Even after appeals, around 11,700 people more will be refused each year. Under the law as it stands, those people would succeed. That shows that clause 18 does not simply clarify existing principles, but is intended to change outcomes at a substantial scale. The clause does diminish human rights for refugees in this country, as is admitted in the Government’s human rights memorandum.

The way the clause is doing that is very troubling for two main reasons. First, it suggests that family relationships deserve protection only when they fit a model chosen by the state, but article 8 has never worked that way. The European Court has always looked at the substance of an individual relationship, not its form. Indeed, the very cases the Government cite require an individualised assessment of all the circumstances. As the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire said, we have been here before. The examples we are hearing from the Home Secretary and the Minister come as part of what is now a mini-tradition of Home Secretaries using exaggerated anecdotes to add to toxic rhetoric about migrants.

[Blake Stephenson]

This might be an opportune moment to intervene and allow the hon. Lady to get to the right place in her notes. She mentioned that we have been here before; that was a central part of my speech. In order to break this cycle, would she not agree that the right thing to do is to depart from the ECHR?

[Siân Berry]

I thank the hon. Member for trying, but he is talking to a person who cannot read the universal declaration of human rights without welling up, and I will never give up making arguments of this sort.

Previous legislation on these matters, to which the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire referred, followed on directly from the infamous 2011 party conference speech of the then Home Secretary—now Baroness May of Maidenhead. She repeated false claims from newspapers that judges had permitted a man to escape deportation because he had a pet cat—something she says she did not make up. In reality, neither of the judges’ decisions in the case was based on the man having a pet, and the second and final decision was not based on any human rights consideration at all. It was straightforwardly based on a failure by the Home Office to apply its own policy.

Amnesty International gave us more information in its written evidence:

“This—together with the readiness of many political commentators to cherry pick often minor or irrelevant facts that are mentioned in tribunal or court judgments and present these as if the main or sole reason for a decision that may have little or nothing to do with them—continues to underpin criticism of Article 8 in immigration-related decision-making. That criticism is plainly misinformed, often careless and, in some cases, on its face, clearly ill-intended—including out of dogmatic hostility to the ECHR and other political motivations.”

On Second Reading of the Bill, the current Home Secretary summarised an unnamed case. She said:

“In 2025, an Albanian man jailed for growing cannabis escaped deportation not because he had any right to be here, but because it was deemed unduly harsh on his partner to deport him. She was not his wife or life partner—instead, this relationship began only after a deportation order had been served. Why was the deportation deemed to be unduly harsh? The partner spoke no Albanian and had never visited the country before.”—[Official Report, 13 July 2026; Vol. 789, c. 675.]

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[Siân Berry]

It is pretty clear that I think the Bill is a result of the Government responding to toxic rhetoric coming from other parties, and that it is an attempt to be seen to be doing something.

[Blake Stephenson]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Siân Berry]

I will finish my point. In an evidence session, we challenged the National Crime Agency on the roots of the organised crime that the hon. Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes mentions, which is doing huge harm. I will not argue that the small boats system is the best way to bring people to this country. Small boat numbers started to grow the moment safe routes were closed. We need safe routes, and that is the approach the Government could take to reduce small boat crossings. The law that protects our rights does not need to be undermined. I would absolutely argue that.

[Blake Stephenson]

The hon. Lady refers to other parties and their toxic rhetoric. Perhaps she could give some examples. If she wishes to call out those parties, will she do so by giving clear examples rather than by making throwaway comments? That would really help the Committee.

[Siân Berry]

I am happy to clarify that I am talking primarily about Reform UK. That party is not represented on this Committee and can answer for itself in other ways, but it has, until recently, been taking votes from the Government on the right. I am happy to come back in future sittings with further examples of anecdotes being used instead of evidence. I chose to highlight two examples of Home Secretaries doing that, because the Minister is here to represent a Home Secretary.