Immigration and Asylum Bill (Seventh sitting)
(1 day, 10 hours ago)
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The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 13 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Chair
Good morning, everyone. We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Today, we will continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill. Before we begin, I remind Members please to switch electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during the sittings. The selection for today’s sitting is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. It shows how the clauses, schedules and amendments have been grouped together for debate. Members are reminded to bob and catch my eye if they wish to speak in any part of the debate.
Clause 19
Public interest considerations
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I beg to move amendment 61, in clause 19, page 17, line 1, at end insert—
“(3AB) It is in the public interest, and in particular in the interests of the elimination of violence against women and girls, that due regard be given to circumstances arising from a person who seeks to enter or remain in the United Kingdom being a victim of violence against women and girls, including domestic abuse (within the meaning of Part 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021).”
This amendment inserts a new public interest consideration into section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, requiring a court or tribunal to take into consideration the effects of violence against women and girls when deciding whether an interference with a person’s Article 8 rights is justified.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 104, in clause 19, page 17, line 1, at end insert—
“(3B) In determining for the purposes of subsection (3A)(c) whether a person is of good character, the court or tribunal must apply the guidance issued by the Secretary of State for the purposes of the good character requirement in paragraph 1(1)(b) of Schedule 1 to the British Nationality Act 1981, as that guidance has effect from time to time.”
This amendment would require the new “good character” consideration to be applied in the same way as the good character requirement for naturalisation as a British citizen.
Amendment 105, in clause 19, page 17, line 3, leave out “should” and insert “must”.
This amendment would require, rather than advise, that no weight is given to private or family life established while a person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully, with leave obtained by deception or in serious breach of their conditions.
Amendment 106, in clause 19, page 17, line 7, leave out “serious”.
This probing amendment would apply the “no weight” rule to private or family life established while a person is in any form of breach of a condition of their leave, not just a ‘serious’ breach.
Clause stand part.
Siân Berry
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Dr Murrison. My amendment would introduce a public interest test for survivors of violence against women and girls, domestic abuse and sexual violence into the considerations. I will also speak to the matter of leaving out the clause. I will start with the clause and what it does.
The clause will fundamentally alter the balance that has long existed between article 8 rights and the public interest by restricting the courts’ ability to assess the individual circumstances of each case. Our courts and tribunals carefully balance the right to private and family life against the public interest in an effective immigration system. Our judiciary performs that task every day, helping to deliver justice, uphold the rule of law and guard against abuse. Yet the clause assumes that the balance is being struck wrongly, without the Government having demonstrated that. The main evidence is only a 2022 internal sample of Home Office decisions.
The existing statutory framework already strongly favours the public interest, in particular in deportation cases. While preserving the ability to consider individual circumstances, the clause will replace that with a more prescriptive framework. Here are my views on the main changes in the clause: first, it will require courts to predict whether a person will remain financially independent. That is an inherently speculative exercise, because it fails to consider the uncertainties of ordinary life, including illness, disabilities, caring responsibilities or economic downturns. The effect is likely to discriminate most heavily against disabled people, as well as those with long-term health conditions and caring responsibilities.
Secondly, the clause will discount genuine family life, because of immigration status. Family life formed while a person was here with no leave to remain would be given no weight at all, and family life formed while people’s status was precarious would be given little weight. Precarious migration status covers everyone with anything short of indefinite leave to remain or citizenship—care workers, skilled workers, international students, refugees and partners on the family route.
Under the earned settlement proposals, the qualifying period to become eligible for settlement would be extended to a baseline of 10 years, and in some cases 15 or even 20 years for refugees. Many people will therefore remain on in a precarious position for years, during which the relationships they form and the children they raise would count for little or nothing under the clause. The reality is that family relationships do not cease to exist or be formed just because an immigration status is uncertain.
Strasbourg accepts that precarious status can reduce the weight that is given to family life, but it has not said that it counts for nothing. In an important case, Jeunesse v. the Netherlands, the European Court of Human Rights found a violation—even when the applicant had remained without leave for years—because of the impact on her children. With a “No weight” rule, as in clause 19(4), there will be no space to assess such cases and to retain flexibility. It will weaken protection for children.
Finally, and perhaps most alarmingly, when courts assess a child’s best interests they do not look at one factor in isolation—they examine the full picture: a child’s age, health, education, friendships, cultural identity, family circumstances, personal development and connection to the UK—and the children are not defined by a checklist; yet clause 19 would introduce a closed checklist, under which it would be unreasonable
“to expect a child to leave the United Kingdom if (and only if)”
they would receive no education abroad, face “very significant obstacles” to integrating in the new country, or suffer
“a very significant and long-lasting adverse effect”.
Each is a very high bar. Remarkably, the Government’s impact assessment describes those factors as a “non-exhaustive” list, but subsection (7) uses the phrase “if and (only if)”. It is very clearly a closed list. The Bill therefore goes even further than the Government say they intend, in terms of its effect on children.
I am also concerned that the clause applies to British children too. As drafted, it could result in a British child with a migrant parent either being separated from their parent or having to leave the UK to preserve the family unit. That results in two-tier British citizenship. The Government’s own impact assessment lists family separation among the consequences of these reforms, and says—with little humanity—that the new test will allow decision makers
“to consider whether parents can maintain their relationship with a child from outside the UK”
or whether a British child can
“successfully adapt to life abroad”.
The existing framework is not perfect, but it already places substantial weight on the public interest and has safeguards allowing courts to consider the facts of each case. Clause 19 risks upsetting that balance. At its heart, the issue here is a simple one: do we trust our courts to weigh the facts before them, or do we seek to predetermine the outcome through statutory presumptions? I believe that the existing approach better serves both justice and the rule of law, and for that reason clause 19 should not stand part of the Bill.
Amendment 61 would reduce the harm of this clause, if it remains, by inserting a new public interest consideration into section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, requiring a court or tribunal to take into consideration the effects of violence against women and girls when deciding whether an interference with a person’s article 8 rights is justified. In my view, without the amendment the Bill will remove or weaken application grounds or causes of appeal relied on by many women living in abusive or exploitative conditions, making them even more vulnerable. That may leave victim-survivors at risk of being refused leave to stay, removed or deported for factors that are a direct consequence of the abuse to which they have been subjected.
To bring that point home, I will provide some examples from organisations that are currently supporting such women. My first example shows how the stricter public interest considerations risk undermining evidence for financial dependency and contact with the criminal justice system being usual results of an experience of violence against women and girls. Julianne was living in another country when she began her relationship with a British man. While visiting him in the UK, she became pregnant with his child and he encouraged her to stay, promising to support her and secure her immigration status. Trusting those assurances, Julianne stayed and became an overstayer. Once her status became insecure, her partner’s behaviour changed dramatically. He subjected her to domestic abuse, isolated her from friends and family overseas, and exploited the fact that she had no support network in the UK. The abuse escalated after the birth of their child.
Julianne eventually fled with her child after a violent assault. She sought medical treatment, reported the abuse to the police and received emergency support from the local authority. Traumatised and destitute, Julianne was left to navigate a complex immigration system alone, as she had been unable to secure legally aided advice and could not afford to pay for a solicitor. She lives with the constant fear of removal. I have changed Julianne’s name.
Julianne had a pathway to regularisation as the parent of a British child; however, if clause 19 becomes law the barriers to regularising her immigration status would be raised significantly, potentially preventing her from qualifying to remain in the UK as the parent of a British child. Re-emphasising the weight of financial independence without reliance on state support and public services will create pressure on victim-survivors like Julianne to stay in abusive and exploitative situations instead of leaving and claiming support, as she did.
Women who have been subject to economic and immigration abuse will be penalised due to their lack of financial independence. The public interest considerations would weigh heavily against Julianne because she accessed support from the local authority while protecting herself and her children from domestic abuse, and because no weight would be given to her family life, as it was established when she overstayed. Without amendment 61, there would be no discretion to consider the role her abuser played in causing her to overstay.
In respect of the redefinition of family, I have a further example of where limiting family life to core cohabiting family and replacing a judicial assessment with a checklist will ignore nuances and external factors forcing a family not to cohabit, such as coercive and controlling behaviour. More broadly, women who are convicted of criminal offences would also be put at increased risk of deportation, as a high evidential standard is needed to prove a disproportionate impact on them or a family member.
That includes women who are coerced or pressured into criminal activity—those driven to engaging with the criminal justice system due to unmet needs, such as being unable to afford food or having unaddressed mental health problems, and those who retaliated against the person abusing or exploiting them, or who had a counter-allegation made against them falsely. All those women are vulnerable and deserving of protection and support, not the further punishment of possible deportation.
My second case study is Blanca. Blanca came to the UK with a visa to work, and while here, she married a British man and had a baby. He had a good job, so they agreed she would stop working, and they then had two more children together. Over time, he became more controlling. Although the children’s benefits were registered in her name, he controlled the payments and did not give her access to the money.
As Blanca did not have her own income, he gave her money for the family’s food, but he would demand that she provide receipts and the exact change. If she bought anything he considered unnecessary, he would be angry and make her return it. That included sanitary products, which Blanca found humiliating and confusing. He also became verbally and later physically abusive towards Blanca, and she became more and more scared of him.
One day, when she was in the supermarket, her period started. She did not know what to do, and she was scared of her husband seeing that she had bought something he thought was unnecessary. She stole a box of sanitary pads, but on her way out of the shop, she was stopped by security who reported her to the police. She was charged and later convicted of theft.
If part 2 of the Bill were fully implemented, Blanca’s conviction would put her at high risk of deportation. No consideration would be given to the abuse that she experienced, which pushed her to commit the crime, nor would it be given to her vulnerability and trauma. In addition, as she did not have lawful status for much of the time she was in the UK, her private and family life may be deemed to hold no weight—or, at best, little weight—if it were held to have been established when she arrived with precarious status.
The Committee can see that clause 19 has all these knock-on effects into further parts of the Bill, and that this additional public interest consideration is necessary. I hope the Committee will discuss and support amendment 61, if clause 19 is to remain in the Bill. I am happy for this to be a probing amendment, if the Government will consider these risks and make their own similar changes to the Bill later.
Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Dr Murrison. As we discussed in the last sitting, clause 18 asks who counts as family, but clause 19 asks what weight that family should carry against the public interest. The clause goes to the heart of public concern, as it considers people who build a life here, while they have no right to be here, only to rely on that recently constructed life as a reason to stay in the UK indefinitely.
I will speak to amendments 104 to 106, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West and I, as well as amendment 61, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, and clause 19. The Opposition support the broad direction of travel in which the Government are going with the clause; however, to our reading, much of it is unfortunately drafted in a way that means it will be all too easy for the courts to set aside. Furthermore, the evidence behind the clause has not yet been published. I will take the Committee through both aspects.
First, clause 19 amends section 117B of the 2002 Act, which deals with the public interest considerations that apply in every article 8 case. Subsection (2) replaces the requirement to be financially independent with a three-part, forward-looking test, which is that a person must be, and is
“likely to remain, financially independent…able to house themselves…without reliance on state support”
and is not
“reliant on public services, in particular health or social care services, in the long-term”.
Subsection (3) adds a new public interest in people who have not been convicted of an offence anywhere, have co-operated with the immigration authorities and
“are otherwise of good character.”
Subsection (4) changes “little weight” to “no weight” being given to a
“private or family life established by a person”
who is here without leave, or with leave obtained by deception, or who is in “serious breach” of its conditions. Subsection (5) extends “little weight” for precarious status to family life as well as private life. Subsections (6) and (7) tighten the rule on parents with qualifying children. There must now be
“a very significant and long-lasting adverse effect”
on a child who stays, and it is unreasonable
“to expect a child to leave the United Kingdom if (and only if)”
one of three conditions is met.
On the evidence base, the Home Office told the Committee that 71% of those newly granted article 8 leave
“had entered illegally or overstayed”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 73, Q130.]
and that grants made in 2025 cost the taxpayer an incredible £4.9 billion. If those figures are correct, the case for this clause is overwhelming and undeniable; however, the Committee has not seen the evidence behind them. If the Government want the House to legislate on the strength of the 71% and the £4.9 billion cost figures, it is our view that they should publish the sample, definitions and method before Report.
On financial independence, subsection (2) is, in our view, right in principle. The Library records that the Home Office’s aim is
“increased refusals or unsuccessful appeals in cases where applicants impose avoidable burdens on public resources”.
I certainly think the public will agree, but the test is a prediction about the future, and the Bill says nothing about how it is to be made. In its evidence, the Law Society told us:
“No detail has been provided on how the elements of this test are to be determined”.
Over what period will future reliance be assessed? What evidence will be required, and will guidance be published before commencement?
There is a further difficulty, which is whether this subsection will be able to survive the courts. Again, according to the Law Society,
“the Government’s human rights memorandum at paragraph 27”
acknowledges that the new criteria are
“likely to result in discriminatory outcomes for…older or disabled people”.
The Bar Council makes the same point. A test that the Government themselves expect to operate unequally is one that will in all likelihood be litigated under the Equality Act 2010 and perhaps article 14—and one that the courts may well soften as a result. I ask the Minister: what mitigation does the Government propose to avoid that?
On good character and amendment 104, subsection (3) sets out a new public interest in people who have not offended, have co-operated with the authorities and are “of good character”. Again, we support the direction of travel, but “good character” is not defined in the Bill or the explanatory notes, which seems an extraordinary gap, though I recognise that it is quite difficult to define it in the Bill. This is another example of the Government potentially setting themselves up for failure in the Bill. The Bar Council says that it hands the Home Office
“a general evaluative test that is highly subjective in scope”.
The Law Society and the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association made similar points in their evidence. An undefined test is an invitation to future litigation.
There is a ready answer, though, to which I shall point the Committee: the good character guidance used in naturalisation decisions, which is detailed and demanding, with periods that taper according to the length of sentence. Will the Minister confirm whether the Government will apply that guidance here? Amendment 104 would add that to the Bill. What will count as a failure to co-operate with immigration processes—absconding, the destruction of documents, ignoring a claim notice under clause 11, et cetera? It would be helpful to understand what the Government’s understanding is.
On amendments 105 and 106, the explanatory notes accept that courts can depart from the weightings under section 117A(2) of the 2002 Act. The Law Society says that the change
“appears to be an attempt to bar a full proportionality assessment”,
and sets up a conflict with the duty on the Home Secretary and the courts to
“act compatibly with Convention rights under section 6 of the Human Rights Act.”
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship today, Dr Murrison. My hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire has dealt with this point eloquently, but I wish to speak briefly on clause 19 and the Opposition amendments.
Obviously, I support what the Government are trying to achieve here, but I think they could go a little further in the drafting. When we talk about public interest, that goes to the heart of the whole issue and problem we have in this country of trying to tackle immigration—in particular, legal immigration and asylum claims. What is in the public interest? The problem is that the system we have has strayed so far from the public interest. Although the clause gives a legal definition, it is also a meaningful way of translating and understanding a political, social, economic and public problem. It is in the public interest that we do all we can to tackle the current volume of asylum and immigration claims. It is not a unanimous position, but very few in Parliament, and very few in the public at large, would disagree with the fundamental point that we need to bring down the level of immigration, asylum claims and illegal boat crossings.
On the public interest consideration, the topic of the right to family life picks up from the Committee’s discussion last week. The right to family life stems from the European convention on human rights and is a qualified right, meaning that it does not stand towering above all other considerations. It is my view, and a commonly held view—in fact, a view that was given by the Minister—that the right has strayed too far. Over many years, jurisprudence has allowed an expansive interpretation that has taken the family life core protection to cover a far wider set of circumstances. It is now used as a routine tool by those who wish to remain in the UK when the threat to or infringement of their family life, as a fundamental human right, is not really an issue. Clause 19 is part of the framework that seeks to attack that use.
We are where we are partly because of a set of legislation—with a convention at its core—made by Parliament over the years, including the Human Rights Act 1998 and other Acts, that has sought to define and in some cases limit, in others not, what we mean by the right to family life and the public interest. Those laws have been unsuccessful in doing that. The intention was there, but the drafting was insufficiently certain—though to some extent that is inherent in all legislating in this place—to ensure that the courts interpret the legislation as narrowly as Parliament intended. The Government have gone some way to try to be restrictive, as they think they have been in this clause, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire points out, some changes to the wording can be made. His amendments 105 and 106 seek to deliver those. The clause states:
“No weight should be given”;
but stating that no weight must be given would get rid of a door that is ajar to the courts to interpret the clause more expansively. The amendment slams that door by inserting the word “must”, so that there is no leeway for a clever legal argument that “should” gives sufficient leeway for a court effectively to make a decision that runs against what the legislation is trying to deliver.
I do not take the view that judges or indeed lawyers—on the whole, as a profession, broadly speaking—should be demonised for making decisions that use loopholes in the law. If this place fails to make the law certain and fails to close those loopholes, the fault comes back to Parliament and the Government who brought the legislation through Parliament. Here is the opportunity to tighten it up—that is the purpose of a Bill Committee: to tighten up wording through the fair scrutiny process.
The Opposition’s amendment 106 relates to a measure where the Government were perhaps not trying to completely close the door. It may be something that they deliberately left open. Amendment 106 would change proposed new section 117B(4)(b) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 in clause 19(4) of the Bill. I will quote proposed new paragraph 117B(4)(b) for Hansard, though it may appear out of context:
“they are in serious breach of a condition attached to their leave to enter or remain.”
The Opposition amendment seeks to leave out the word “serious” so that the provision applies to someone simply in breach of a condition.
My suspicion is that the Government want to leave a set of breaches of a condition that would not affect someone’s leave to remain. The Opposition’s position is that, if someone has breached a condition, that should mean the fundamental failure of any claim to remain that cites a right to family life. To me, the amendment would provide the certainty needed and deliver on what the public expect of us to tackle a significant problem in this country—the large number of claims that go beyond the original intention behind the right to family life.
The problem with leaving the word “serious” in the legislation is that it will be open to the court to make a decision about whether a breach is serious enough. Without any specific guidance or checklist in the legislation, the court will consider seriousness as a relative word or concept in an appellant’s case to not be returned to another country. A case could be made based on circumstance that family life is fundamentally important to someone and that sending them home would split up a family. They may paint a picture of the environment at home that could be very alien to us as a free and democratic society. Suddenly, that “serious breach” question might lead a court to conclude that a serious breach in the abstract becomes quite a minimal one when compared with an applicant’s story of hardship.
My concern is that the word “serious” will become a flexible term to be interpreted by the court. It will always be measured against the relative hardship of the claimant, who will of course state their case at its strongest in order to leverage the flexibility of the word “serious”. I struggle to see why the Government would not want to add in certainty, unless they particularly want to create an avenue where people can still make the right to family life claim. It would be extraordinary if they did, given all the rationale they have provided for bringing forward this set of provisions and the Bill in the first place. The Minister should be very clear about whether she sees this as a disagreement around drafting, or whether she is seeking—I am sure that she would have a reason for it, though I would disagree with it—to have an avenue of flexibility in the Bill, and why.
There is provision in the clause, and rightfully so, for particular circumstances in relation to children. Children are in a very special category because of their dependency and vulnerability. There are a number of situations laid out, but subsection (6) in particular deals with situations where there would be
“a very significant and long-lasting adverse effect on the child.”
We do not want to see people deported or removed when that would have a significant and long-lasting adverse effect on the child. There are protections are built in here. Others may say that this is a particularly draconian provision, but I see some protections there and in paragraphs (a) to (c) of proposed new subsection (7) that are widely accepted and uncontroversial, and I wanted to draw attention to them.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison.
The clause addresses a basic question: when someone asks to stay in this country, what does the public interest expect of them? The Government’s answer is one that I suspect most of our constituents would recognise: that the person pays their way, does not rely on the state to put a roof over their head, does not commit crimes, co-operates with the authorities and is of good character. Those are reasonable expectations and we welcome much of the clause.
The clause’s strength, however, comes down to a handful of words. Proposed new subsection 117B(4) of the 2002 Act says:
“No weight should be given to a private or family life”
that is built up while someone is here unlawfully, on leave obtained by deception or in serious breach of their conditions. Think about who that covers—someone who came here illegally, lied to get a visa or broke the conditions on which this country let them in. When the time comes to remove them, that person asks a court to weigh a life built up in that time against their removal.
We agree with the Government that weight should not be given. However, “should” is the language of advice; “must” is the language of law. The Government have already moved from “little weight” to “no weight”, and I welcome that—amendment 105 simply finishes the job. If the Government mean that no weight must be given, let the statute say, “No weight must be given”. In this area of law, a door left ajar is an invitation.
Moreover, the no weight rule applies only where someone is in serious breach of their conditions. What is serious? Is it working beyond the hours that their visa allows? Is it claiming benefits that they are not entitled to? Is it overstaying their visa by a month? The Bill does not say, so a tribunal will decide case by case, which will bring us back to the very weighing exercise that the Government say they want to end. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell the Committee what the Home Office understands a “serious breach” to mean, and whether it will be defined in guidance.
Amendment 104 deals with good character. Proposed new subsection 117B(3A) says it is in the public interest that people seeking to stay here are of good character, but clause 19 does not say what good character means. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire that there is already a well-established test in the good character requirement for British citizenship set out in Home Office guidance. Amendment 104 says that the court should apply that test. It would be strange if the bar to stay in this country were lower than the bar to become a citizen of it, and stranger still for every tribunal to invent its own version from scratch.
The clause asks the right questions. Our amendments ensure that the answers carry the force of the law. The Government have chosen “no weight” over “little weight”, and that is welcome; let them finish the job by replacing “should” with “must” and telling us what they mean by “good character” and “serious breach”. I commend our amendments to the Committee.
The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Dr Murrison. I thank all hon. Members for their contributions to the debate on the clause and amendments in this grouping.
Before moving on to the amendments, I will give some background on what the clause will do. The balance between an individual’s family rights and the public interest in maintaining an effective and controlled immigration system has shifted, and it needs to be reset. Without greater clarity from Parliament on how that balance should be struck, the domestic interpretation of article 8 has expanded beyond what our international obligations require, resulting in inconsistent decision making and high volumes of article 8 grants to people who cannot meet the rules to come or to stay in the UK.
More than half of those who stayed in the UK for family reasons last year did not meet our criteria to be able to stay here, instead relying on their article 8 rights. That undermines public confidence in the immigration system and the rules-based international order. It also comes at a significant cost to the UK taxpayer. As has already been mentioned, the average net lifetime fiscal cost for each first-time grant is £141,000, equating to approximately £4.9 billion for those granted on the basis of article 8 in 2025 alone.
Colleagues have asked about the evidence base behind those figures, so I will give a bit more information about it. We undertook a deep dive cohort analysis to examine a representative sample of 3,252 article 8-related applications, in order to support the policy development of these measures in the Bill. Further details are in the impact assessment. I am afraid that the unpublished internal sample that was referred to will not be made available due to the personal data sensitivities involved, but we will obviously keep under review any further analysis that we would be keen to share with the Committee throughout the course of the Bill, for example other statistics that have been mentioned.
This trend has been driven by high volumes of people who have arrived illegally or overstayed in the UK, at 71% of first-time grants, or by people who are unemployed and are making a minimal economic contribution—76% of first-time grants. It is clear that the system is not functioning fairly and effectively. That is why the British public feel exasperated that such exemptions are being abused to enable people to circumvent the system.
Clause 19 will help to restore a fairer balance between an individual’s right to family life and the public interest in maintaining an effective and controlled immigration system. It will provide a clearer statutory framework that places greater emphasis on compliance and contribution, resulting in more consistent and robust outcomes. These reforms will realign UK legislation with Strasbourg, ensuring that our domestic approach to article 8 is within and, crucially, not beyond our international obligations, as it is now.
Mr Paul Foster (South Ribble) (Lab)
Clause 19 introduces some quite fundamental changes, which I fully support, but is the Minister confident that it will still meet the requirements of the European convention on human rights? That is the litmus test.
Anna Turley
My hon. Friend makes an extremely important point. That is why the drafting of clause 19 has been very clear and specific, which I will say more about later.
It is important that we comply with our international obligations. We have a proud history of doing so—we helped to devise, draft and create these obligations—but we also have a history of overinterpreting them. It is not a free-for-all, but it is important that we act within the requirements we are obliged to meet and do not go beyond them. That is what the provisions in the Bill seek to achieve.
That includes a clarification that judges must consider the economic impact on the taxpayer of allowing people to remain in the UK, including by considering whether they can support themselves and their family. It is only fair to all those who work hard in this country to be financially independent and to house themselves, and who are not overly reliant on public services, that they do not see others who otherwise have no right to be here imposing avoidable burdens on society and public services.
Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)
Will the financial independence test be individualised, will it be evidence-based in its assessment, and will it recognise barriers such as credit history, references and guarantors? Furthermore, will a survivor’s use of refuge or public funds to escape abuse count against them?
Anna Turley
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his questions and I will say a lot more about those issues when I respond to the contributions by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. However, we are absolutely clear that we are not going to penalise people for experiencing hardship. These reforms preserve protections for vulnerable people and children, but it is vital that we make it clear that immigration control and the wider public interest should be given proper weight in any consideration. This is about restoring balance, not removing safeguards. That is critical.
Mr Jonathan Brash (Hartlepool) (Lab)
Having listened to some contributions, particularly from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, I think that most fair-minded people would be concerned that these reforms could have a detrimental impact on children. Can the Minister confirm whether or not these reforms remove protections for children?
Anna Turley
My hon. Friend raises a critical issue that is, of course, dear to all of our hearts. Again, I will say more about it later, but these reforms absolutely do not remove protections for children. The best interests of children will continue to remain a primary consideration in immigration decision making, as they should be. The reforms in clause 19 ensure that children’s interests are considered alongside other important factors, including compliance with immigration law and the wider public interest in maintaining an effective immigration system.
Anna Turley
Forgive me, but I have not addressed these issues yet, so if the hon. Gentleman can be patient for a little longer—I am sure he will have more questions afterwards—I would like to make some progress, if I may.
The clause also introduces character and conduct as a factor in the public interest test. This will require judges to have regard to harmful conduct, including criminality below the deportation threshold and outside the mandatory suitability refusals. This is an important element of tackling abuse and takes us one step towards a fairer system that the public can have confidence in.
The clause further reduces avenues for abuse by requiring that no weight—instead of little weight, as now—should be given to an article 8 claim established when someone is here illegally, or legally but only by deceiving the Home Office, or if they have seriously breached the conditions of their permission to be in the UK. That will enable us to more effectively enforce our immigration rules and prevent people from unfairly benefiting from time spent in the UK in violation of our rules, and will avoid the creation of perverse incentives for people who are here unlawfully to try to deliberately establish article 8 claims.
Although it is right that essential protections for children are retained, it is not right that adults who abuse our immigration system are almost guaranteed to be allowed to stay if they can prove a parental relationship with a child in the UK. Currently, there is no need to carry out a full balancing exercise if there is a child. This is the main source of successful article 8 claims, two thirds of which result in residence rights being granted.
The clause clarifies which factors should be considered when determining whether it is in the public interest to remove the parent of a qualifying child from the UK, and introduces a provision to assess the impact of removing a parent where a child remains in the UK.
I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for amendment 61, which sets out a new public interest consideration, under which specific regard would be given to the circumstances of victims of violence against women and girls when assessing whether interference with an individual’s article 8 right is justified. Of course, we absolutely recognise and take seriously the importance of tackling violence against women and girls, and the devastating impact that it has on victims. However, the Government do not consider the amendment to be necessary.
Clause 19 already preserves a case-specific assessment in which courts and tribunals can consider all relevant facts and evidence, including experiences of domestic abuse, violence and exploitation, and the safeguarding concerns that the hon. Lady mentioned in her case studies. The holistic article 8 assessment that the clause retains ensures that protections exist for vulnerable people and that support remains available for those who genuinely need it. In addition, existing provisions in the immigration rules, including “Appendix Victim of Domestic Abuse” and the migrant victims of domestic abuse concession, provide specific protections. Those safeguards are there to ensure that victims’ experiences are properly recognised and taken into account.
I thank the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire for tabling amendment 104. I understand the intention behind it, but I am afraid that the Government do not consider the amendment to be helpful. I agree that good character is an important consideration in article 8 cases. Including that factor in the public interest test ensures that protections are focused on those who have acted responsibly. That is an important element of creating a fair system that the public have confidence in and that is not open to abuse. The clause establishes that and requires the courts and tribunals to have regard to harmful conduct, including that below the deportation threshold and outside mandatory suitability refusals. We will set out further detail on that in published guidance and the immigration rules.
Let me be clear that the existing guidance, including the guidance mentioned by the hon. Gentleman, will be a useful comparator and will play an important role in shaping this. We do not want to be tied exclusively to the 1981 guidance, but want to develop ours further. Our approach will therefore reflect that already taken in nationality legislation, where good character is not exhaustively defined on the face of the Bill but is addressed through the guidance.
Siân Berry
I am very interested in the fact that the Minister has just talked about going further on good character in some guidance. Will that guidance take into account factors that might otherwise weigh against the character of someone making an appeal if they have been exploited or abused? Is that the kind of thing that the Minister is thinking about in terms of deviating from the 1981 guidance?
Anna Turley
The guidance will set out very clearly what we will ask the courts and tribunals to have regard to in relation to harmful conduct. We will also make sure, as I have already mentioned, that there is sufficient protection regarding issues around domestic violence. That will be in our immigration rules, and it is in our existing provisions. We will ensure that courts and tribunals consider all relevant facts and evidence. I place this on the record in Committee: we will expect experiences of domestic violence, abuse and exploitation, and safeguarding concerns to be a key part of that.
To go back to amendment 104, our approach will reflect the approach already taken in nationality legislation, so that good character is not exhaustively defined in the Bill, but addressed through guidance. Everything raised by colleagues in Committee will be on the record.
Joe Robertson
Surely the Minister understands that while “no weight” may be the starting point, the end point is the decision, and that is the issue. A decision maker can have a starting point of “no weight”, but attach weight, and suddenly the decision is not where I think even she might intend in many cases.
Anna Turley
I appreciate the point that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make, but it is important for cases to be considered on a case-by-case basis. We can be as specific as possible, but the reality is that courts and tribunals have to maintain the flexibility to determine cases based on the individual facts and circumstances before them. It is important that our drafting enables that.
Blake Stephenson
I want to press that point. If the Minister’s position is that she wants the starting point for tribunals to be “no weight”, then what is the harm in adding “must” to make it absolutely clear that the House expects tribunals to apply “no weight”? But then she says that she wants tribunals to have flexibility, so which one is it?
Anna Turley
I appreciate the point that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make, but we absolutely cannot bind the courts’ hands in this situation. The reality is that they have to be flexible. We can set a very clear steer—that is on the record, in the Bill and in legislation—but it is important that we allow the courts flexibility, because their role is to establish the facts, case by case.
David Smith
I was going to make the same point that the Minister has just made to some degree. It seems to me that the key terminology in the clause is “no weight”. Can she say more about what that will mean in practise?
Anna Turley
As my hon. Friend rightly flags, “no weight” is the starting point for the weight that should be given to a person’s private or family life established in the time that they were in the UK without permission. That is a clear definition for the court. Applying the “no weight” rule to all breaches of leave could mean minor or technical breaches leave cases open to challenges of disproportionality.
Amendment 106 is in a similar vein. Although we agree that non-compliance must have consequences, it is appropriate that we distinguish between serious breaches and less significant or technical non-compliance, because we always have to have proportionality. Removing “serious” would considerably widen the provision and could require the same approach to be taken to conduct of very different gravity. The Government’s reforms already substantially strengthen the public interest side of the article 8 balancing exercise. The inclusion of “serious” helps to ensure that the reforms are focused on the cases of greatest concern.
Blake Stephenson
In that case, if “serious” is to remain in the Bill, will the Minister help the Committee to understand what types of scenarios might constitute serious or not serious?
Anna Turley
I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s attempts to define this, but it is important to say that we are keen not to include specific definitions in the Bill, as we are worried that they could result in disproportionate outcomes. Our approach is to be robust, targeted and, crucially, legally sustainable. We do not want to allow ourselves to be open to challenge.
Tom Gordon
The Minister talks about not wanting to include specific definitions in the Bill, but some stakeholder groups are concerned that the Bill does not rule out British children being subject to the child test. Would she not consider including such a provision in the Bill to ensure that it does not end up forcing a British child out of the country?
Anna Turley
Again, we have to look at each case on its individual merits, and we cannot bind the court’s hands in such a situation; the family rules will be taken in their entirety.
Tom Gordon
Can I press the Minister a little further on that point? To give a direct quote, can the Minister guarantee that no British child will be expected to leave the country of which they are a citizen as a result of this clause?
Anna Turley
I am not going to rule that out here in the Committee, but I can come back and clarify that point for the hon. Gentleman. My expectation is that if someone is deported, and they wish to take their child with them, they are perfectly entitled to do so. It is not for the Government to say that the child has to stay in this country, rather than moving with their family. I will not rule that out here in the Committee.
In conclusion, clause 19 tightly defines the public interest test to ensure that individual rights are properly balanced against the public interest in effective immigration control, and to eradicate the abuse that has crept into our system.
Siân Berry
Further to the discussion with the Minister about ensuring that victims of abuse and sexual violence are protected, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 105, in clause 19, page 17, line 3, leave out “should” and insert “must”.—(Blake Stephenson.)
This amendment would require, rather than advise, that no weight is given to private or family life established while a person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully, with leave obtained by deception or in serious breach of their conditions.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Blake Stephenson
I beg to move amendment 107, in clause 20, page 18, line 13, at end insert—
“(3A) Where a person has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years—
(a) the first and second sets of exceptional circumstances do not apply, and
(b) the third set of exceptional circumstances applies only where there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in subsections (4) and (5).”
This amendment would restore the current rule that a foreign national sentenced to four years or more cannot resist deportation by relying on the long-residence or “unduly harsh” exceptions and must show very compelling circumstances over and above them.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 108, in clause 20, page 18, line 13, at end insert—
“(3A) The first and second sets of exceptional circumstances do not apply where a person has been convicted of—
(a) a specified offence within the meaning of section 306 of the Sentencing Code, or
(b) an offence listed in Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 committed against a person under the age of 18.”
This amendment would prevent foreign nationals convicted of specified violent, sexual or terrorism offences, or sexual offences against children, from resisting deportation on the long-residence or “unduly harsh” family grounds, whatever their sentence.
Amendment 109, in clause 20, page 18, line 29, leave out from “is” to end of line 30 and insert
“over and above that which would arise if the circumstances in subsection (4) or (5) applied.”
This amendment would require very compelling circumstances going beyond the long-residence and family exceptions, rather than circumstances merely “at least as strong as” them, restoring the formulation in the current section 117C(6).
Amendment 110, in clause 20, page 18, line 34, after “3(5)(a)” insert “, (5)(b)”.
This probing amendment would include family members of a deportee within the definition of a person liable to deportation for the purposes of Part 5A.
Amendment 111, in clause 20, page 18, line 36, leave out “(2) to (4)” and insert “(2) and (3)”.
This amendment is related to Amendment 107. It would retain section 117D(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which sets out how a period of imprisonment is calculated for the purposes of Part 5A of that Act.
Clause stand part.
New clause 45—Deportation of foreign offenders—
“(1) The UK Borders Act 2007 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 32, for subsections (1) to (3) substitute—
‘(1) In this section
“foreign criminal” means a person—
(a) who is not a British or Irish citizen, and
(b) who is—
(i) convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence, or
(ii) charged with an offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971.’
(3) In section 33, omit subsections (1)(b), (2), (3) and (6A).
(4) In section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971, omit all instances of the word ‘knowingly’.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to make a deportation order in respect of a foreign national who is convicted of an offence or who is charged with an offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971.
New clause 66—Automatic deportation: forced-marriage offences—
“(1) Section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007 is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1)(c), for ‘Condition 1 or 2’ substitute ‘Condition 1, 2 or 3’.
(3) After subsection (3) insert—
‘(3A) Condition 3 is that the person has been convicted of an offence under section 121 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (offence of forced marriage: England and Wales).’”
This new clause would amend section 32 of the UK Borders Act to create a separate basis for automatic deportation where a person is convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence under section 121 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, concerning forced marriage.
New clause 67—Particularly serious crime: National Security Act 2023 offences—
“(1) Section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 is amended as follows.
(2) After (5ZB) insert—
‘(6) A person is presumed to have been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime if—
(a) the person is convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence listed in the National Security Act 2023; and
(b) the person is not, by virtue of the conviction, a person falling within subsection (2).’”
This new clause would make any conviction of an offence under the National Security Act 2023 an automatic deportation offence, as is currently the case with offences under Schedule 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
Blake Stephenson
On Thursday 15 October, the Government were kind enough to accept Opposition amendment 96 to clause 17; I hope the Minister will look at these amendments with the same open mind, because of all the clauses in part 2, this is the one that the public care the most deeply about. People expect that foreign nationals who commit serious crimes in this country will be deported, and they do not understand why family life—often family life formed while the offender was here—so frequently stands in the way. It is frankly unacceptable.
Our reasoned amendment on Second Reading made the point that this Bill
“does not ensure all foreign criminals and illegal immigrants will be deported”.—[Official Report, 13 July 2026; Vol. 789, c. 679.].
Clause 20 is where that concern is tested. My case is that, although the clause contains real improvements, which we support, it also makes the position easier for the most serious offenders. Either way, it leaves the final word where it is today: with the judge’s assessment of proportionality.
The clause does four things. First, it extends the deportation rules in section 117C of the 2002 Act from foreign criminals to everyone liable to deportation, including those deported because it is conducive to the public good. Secondly, it replaces the current structure of a single rule, that deportation is required unless its effect on the person or their family would be disproportionate. Thirdly, it replaces the sentence length threshold of 12 months and four years with a sliding scale: the more serious the offending and its impact on society, the greater the public interest in deportation. Fourthly, it provides that deportation will be disproportionate if, and only if, one of three sets of exceptional circumstances applies: long residence and integration, an unduly harsh effect on a partner or child, or other very compelling circumstances, and the interference cannot be justified by the public interest.
I turn first to what the clause gets right, because I want to be fair to the Government in this Committee. Extending the rules to all deportation cases is a genuine tightening, and for that reason the Opposition support it. There is a reasonable legal argument that the new structure restores the balance test that the courts took away. Dr Chris Rowe of Swansea University argues that after the Supreme Court’s decision in KO (Nigeria) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, the unduly harsh exception came to operate as an unqualified right, which we heard about in earlier Committee sittings. If the effect on the family was harsh enough, the strength of the public interest did not matter. He argued that clause 20(3) would be effective in restoring a balance against the public interest. If that is correct, it is a real improvement for so-called medium offenders.
Once again, however, I cannot help but notice what kind of improvement this is. On Dr Rowe’s own analysis, clause 20 brings domestic law back to what the Strasbourg case law requires, but does not go beyond it, and for the most serious offenders, the clause appears to move in the wrong direction. Under the current law, someone sentenced to four years or more cannot rely on the long residence or unduly harsh exceptions on their own; they must show very compelling circumstances over and above them. Clause 20 removes the sentence thresholds altogether. Justice, which, I should say, supports the change for very different reasons, describes the effect precisely in its evidence, stating that the Bill
“flattens out the application of the exceptions, so that all three apply, regardless of the length of a person’s sentence.”
The House of Commons Library briefing says that it is “not clear” how the new rules are stricter for people sentenced to more than four years.. Does the Minister accept that under clause 20, the most serious offenders gain access to exceptions one and two? If so, why? What reasons could the Government have for loosening the rules for the worst-offending foreign criminals? Presumably, the Government are trying to achieve the opposite.
Ben Goldsborough (South Norfolk) (Lab)
I completely understand the thrust of the hon. Gentleman’s argument and the good intentions behind it. We do not want those who seek to harm our nation or our citizens to have leave to remain. However, my concern regarding the Opposition amendments, which have been tabled with those good intentions, is that they come with such a prescriptive list. Over time, different crimes and offences will evolve that we want to include, so is there not a fear that such a prescriptive list will not protect us in the long term, as opposed to leaving the Bill with a slightly wider scope, as was intended?
Blake Stephenson
I thank the hon. Gentleman for supporting the general thrust of what we are trying to achieve with the amendments, and I accept his point. By having a narrow list, we may constrain future opportunities and changes, and we need to be flexible. However, it is important that the Committee expresses its view that these crimes are abhorrent. Although it is a narrow list, this place can of course legislate further in the future, as life changes. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his general support and I understand his point, but given the gravity of these crimes, it is important that this Committee is very clear that they are totally unacceptable.
Melanie Onn (Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes) (Lab)
I think there is broad agreement on the principle behind the hon. Gentleman’s amendments, but is he seriously suggesting that, for every additional crime that we decide needs to be added to his inexhaustible list, we must come back to the House and somebody has to sign off on it?
Blake Stephenson
We are here to legislate, so I do not think it is unreasonable for us to be defining what is right and wrong. Perhaps we can leave it to the Minister to respond.
The unfortunate reality is that, with this Bill, the Government are falling into the very same trap that the previous Government fell into. The legislation may be designed to work around the constraints imposed by the ECHR, but it will ultimately run up against the very same problems. The courts will default to the positions that they have consistently taken, enabling individuals with no right to remain in this country to delay or prevent their removal. Indeed, when the Bill fails to enable the Government to address the extensive range of grounds for resisting removal that flow from the ECHR, will the Minister finally accept that—as we have long argued—the real problem lies outside the drafting of the legislation, however robust it might be, and however robust the Government intend it to be today?
As I have already noted, the Minister described discussions about leaving the ECHR last week as unnecessary and counterproductive. If she genuinely believes that deterrence must sit at the heart of the response to these challenges, I struggle to see how removing the ability of foreign criminals to rely on the convention to delay or prevent their removal could reasonably be considered as either unnecessary or counterproductive.
The Opposition will not oppose clause 20. Extending these rules to all deportation cases and restoring the balance against the public interest are steps in the right direction that we support. However, the clause removes the clear lines that protected the public from the most serious offenders, and it gives these criminals access to exceptions that cannot be used today. We will seek to press amendments 107 and 108 to a vote, and I would be grateful for the Minister’s answers to the various questions I have asked.
Siân Berry
I will speak very briefly on clause 20, specifically subsection (4). At present, it will expand the scope of section 117D of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 so that it automatically applies to everyone whose deportation the Home Secretary has decided is conducive to the public good, regardless of the objective seriousness of their offence, under the Immigration Act 1971 and its use of the word “deems”, which I think is very important.
I hope the Minister can answer three questions on the clause. First, do the proportionality qualification and the exceptions in the clause offer any protection for those whose criminality is as a result of exploitation or abuse, particularly those who face immigration-related domestic abuse and have been convicted of crimes related to that? On that theme, the new clauses tabled by the official Opposition would clarify the word “serious” so that some offences would be considered serious automatically. I see the point they are trying to make, but if we made that automatic, it would not be possible for those who are exploited and drawn into criminality to face a proportionate, human-rights-based public interest test. I do not support those new clauses, nor do I support amendments 108 to 111.
Siân Berry
I am asking the Minister these questions, so it would be marvellous if we could wait to see how she answers them.
Thirdly, does that approach not allow the Home Secretary to unilaterally stack the deck against an appellant in an appeal, on an arbitrary basis? Does that take away from the objective seriousness of the offence that they have committed? Does the approach therefore impermissibly limit the ability of the appellate body to decide an article 8 ECHR claim on its merits, as is required under the Human Rights Act 1998?
Joe Robertson
Clause 20 deals with cases involving foreign criminals and others liable to deportation. The issues I have with the clause are broadly twofold. One issue is around the drafting, which has a number of serious deficiencies. That is not about whether the Government are getting it wrong or right on what they are trying to achieve, but about having certainty on what the legislation will do when it comes to people having to make decisions. My second issue is disagreement with what the Government are trying to achieve.
Under proposed new section 117C, which I will try to deal with as precisely as I can,
“(1) Where a person is liable to deportation, the public interest, and in particular the interest in public safety and the prevention of disorder or crime, requires their deportation unless its effect on the person or a member of their family would be disproportionate.”
That deals with the public interest and its definition. Let us put aside the “unless”, which clearly opens an avenue for the court to examine whether the effect on the person or a member of their family would be disproportionate, and deal with that public interest element. Proposed new subsection (1) says that “the public interest...requires” the deportation of those liable to it, which directs the court to define “public interest” as one thing. However, the Bill tries to define what that public interest is in proposed new subsection (2). It sets out “more serious” factors that point towards a greater public interest in a person’s deportation. It does not matter what those factors are, but they are in proposed new subsection (2)(a) to (c).
Why on earth does the court need direction in assessing the extent of the public interest when it is being directed to consider that public interest simply “requires their deportation”? It seems entirely meaningless to start directing the court as to what public interest might mean in terms of giving weighting to the factors in proposed new subsection (2)(a) to (c) when the court is being told to simply deport under the public interest. I fail to see how it has any relevance whatsoever, and it is potentially distracting from what the Government are trying to achieve.
I will now deal with the “unless” element, because that is entirely separate. Proposed new section 117C says that deportation is required
“unless its effect on the person or a member of their family would be disproportionate.”
The court decision makers are given some help on what “disproportionate” would mean, which is entirely sensible. I disagree with some of the elements that the court should consider, but it is sensible to give the decision makers some direction.
I will stick to the drafting of paragraphs (a) to (c) of proposed new section 117C(4). Paragraph (a) says that exceptional circumstances apply where a person
“has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of their life”.
Given that provisions in relation to children, not just in this Bill but generally in the way we do law in this country, are different from provisions in relation to adults, that provision needs to be clear about whether it means a person has been resident in the United Kingdom for most of their adult life or their entire life from birth. Although it may suggest entire life from birth, I can see a court assuming it means adult life because we deal with children separately. It would therefore be much easier for someone who is, say, aged 24 and has been in the country for only three or four years to say that they have been a resident for most of their life, because provisions for children are separate. That is an avenue that could be exploited through a lack of drafting, unless the Government mean adult life. I think they should mean entire life, and they should be specific about what they mean.
Secondly, paragraph (b) says that exceptional circumstances apply where
“the person is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom”.
How on earth is a decision maker or a court supposed to determine whether someone is or is not socially and culturally integrated into the UK? We could have an entire PhD thesis on the extent of somebody’s social and cultural integration. We may all have views on what it means to be socially and culturally integrated. There may be some common themes around our views, but there will be much disagreement about the specifics when trying to make a decision about an individual case.
Of course, the decision makers are not there to do some highly resourced, detailed investigative study into someone’s circumstances. They will basically be relying on assertions. Surely it is open to someone saying, “I’ve lived here for a number of years. I speak English to a degree and I can go about normal daily life without endlessly causing friction or hardship, and I am therefore sufficiently socially and culturally integrated into the UK.” Or is the court supposed to examine the way they dress or eat, who they mix with and how often, the cultural background of the people they mix with or their religious traditions? Not only is it opening a can of worms, but it is quite offensive to have the state investigating someone’s social and cultural integration in order to make a yes or no decision.
According to this provision, a court—the decision maker—is not to make a decision about someone being reasonably well integrated or showing signs of cultural integration; someone is either socially and culturally integrated, or they are not. I just cannot see how the Government can possibly expect a decision maker to open up such an investigation. And that would be only one part of the integration inquiry.
Proposed new subsection (4)(c) then talks about
“very significant obstacles to the person’s integration in the country to which they are proposed to be deported.”
Having run the analysis and come up with a view about an individual’s cultural and social integration into the UK, the decision maker has to run a similar test on their ability to integrate into the country to which they are supposed to be deported—a theoretical test, because it might be somewhere they have not been for some time—where it is even harder to make some sort of value judgment, because it is a country that the decision maker could have absolutely zero experience of living in, and so they will, again, be reliant on assertions.
The test in that case is not even the same as in proposed new subsection 4(b), where the person must be “socially and culturally integrated”; at subsection 4(c), it is the person’s “integration”—there is no qualification of cultural and social integration. In this country, they could be socially and culturally integrated, but not integrated in a wide range of other ways; yet in the country that they are proposed to go to, any integration issues, not just social and cultural ones, could be a “significant” obstacle to integration. I do not understand why the definition is narrower on the question of a person’s integration—albeit far too broad for a court to tackle—for assessing the situation in this country and much wider for the situation elsewhere.
There are serious drafting issues here. We cannot merely just see where it all comes out in the wash, saying Home Office officials are very capable and all that sort of stuff. We have seen the problem with the number of appeals. Some of these provisions will genuinely need the court to tackle the interpretation issues, in the normal way that we do common law in this country, through test cases. These provisions will require an unusual set of test cases, through to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, to get judicial interpretation and assistance for the courts to apply thereafter, but, as we have seen in test cases, it is rarely one case that sets a new environment for the lower courts and decision makers to adhere to, but a series of them.
This is not only going to require an extraordinary amount of time to understand terms that the Government just need to deal with at this stage through the legislation process, but it will take years; any individual case that goes all the way up to the Supreme Court on how the court interpreted “socially and culturally integrated” will take a long time in and of itself—months into years. Where we may have challenging cases that seek to overturn what, for example, the Court of Appeal has said, by using the Supreme Court, we are talking years on years.
The Government are creating massive scope for backlog and uncertainty, and a huge opportunity for the legal profession to run a high volume of case law—it would be genuinely interesting, but would completely undermine the Government’s intention, which is to tackle backlogs, speed up the system and stop the endless need for judicial interpretation. That is what has led us to where we are, which is broader and broader interpretation.
Matt Vickers
Let us be absolutely clear about what this group of amendment is about: it is about whether a foreign national who comes to this country and commits a serious crime found to be worthy of a long sentence gets to stay here. The British public have a simple answer to that question, and so do we: they should go. The principle at stake is straightforward: if someone is a guest in this country and they rape, rob, deal drugs or abuse a child, they have forfeited the right to remain here—not after years of appeals or after a tribunal has weighed their family life against the lives of others that they have wrecked. They should go.
On Second Reading, the Government told the House that clause 20 would make it easier to remove foreign criminals and that deportation should go ahead outside of a limited number of truly exceptional circumstances. The trouble is that the clause does not match them; for the most serious offences, it does the opposite. Behind every one of these cases is a victim: a woman who lies awake wondering whether the man who attacked her is still living a few streets away, or a family who were told that justice had been done, only to learn that the offender is now fighting to stay.
My hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire explained how the law works today. Since 2014, someone sentenced to four years or more for rape, armed robbery or dealing drugs on our streets has been unable to hide behind their family or how long they have lived here. Those exceptions are simply not enough; someone has to show very compelling circumstances over and above them. That is a high bar, and it is meant to be. The worse the crime, the narrower the door.
Clause 20 takes that line away. The four-year threshold is gone. Someone serving 10, 15 or 20 years can now walk straight into the argument that deporting them would be unduly harsh on their family. Today that route is closed to them, but under this Bill, it is opened. Let us think about what that means. The victim found the courage to give evidence, the jury convicted, the judge handed down a long sentence and then, at the end of all that, the defender gets to say that deportation would be too hard on them.
The Minister will tell us not to worry, because subsection (2) of proposed new section 117C says that the more serious the offence, the greater the public interest. That goes to one of the oldest questions in lawmaking: do you legislate with a rule or with a standard? A rule says four years, and that settles it; a standard says to weigh everything up and decide case by case. Rules give certainty; standards give discretion. In this area, discretion has been a gift to lawyers and a source of deep frustration to the public.
That is precisely why Parliament chose a rule in 2014. The whole purpose was to narrow the discretion of the courts because the balance they were striking was one the public simply did not recognise. Clause 20 hands the scales back, and we all know where weighing exercises end up: in front of a tribunal, then an appeal, then another appeal. Can the Minister point to a single line in proposed new section 117C that stops someone sentenced to four years or more relying on the “unduly harsh” exception? I have read it several times and I cannot find one.
Between 2015 and 2022, around 420 foreign offenders a year won human rights appeals against their removal. That is more than one every single day, and that is with the four-year rule still in place. The Home Office does not even publish how many had sentences of four or more years. If the Government are so confident that the clause is tougher, let them publish the numbers. Amendment 107 would put the four-year rule back, and amendment 111 would keep the existing rules on how a sentence is counted, so that the system works.
Then there is amendment 109: it is only a few words, but they tell us everything. Today, a serious offender must show very compelling circumstances “over and above” the exceptions. Clause 20 changes that to circumstances “at least as strong”. “Over and above” means more; “at least as strong” means the same. That is not tightening the test but loosening it. When Parliament changes the wording of a test, the courts are entitled to presume that it meant to change the meaning, so a tribunal reading “at least as strong” will quite properly conclude that this House intended a lower bar. We would be legislating for exactly the outcome the Government say they want to avoid. Parliament chose those words in 2014, and the courts have applied them ever since, so why change them? Did the Home Office mean to lower the bar, or did nobody notice? Neither answer should give this Committee much comfort. Amendment 109 would put the original words back.
Amendment 108 goes further than the current law; we make no apology for that. Sentence length is a rough guide to how dangerous someone is, but it is not the whole story. Guilty pleas get discounts, and the facts of individual cases mean that some very dangerous people get less than four years. Amendment 108 says that, for the worst offences, the type of crime settles it. If someone is convicted of a specified violent, sexual or terrorist offence or a sexual offence against a child, long residence and family routes are off the table, whatever the sentence. Let me put that plainly: a foreign national who has sexually abused a child should not be able to stand in a tribunal and argue that deporting them would be unduly harsh on their family. What about the harshness inflicted on the child?
Melanie Onn
I am listening carefully to the hon. Gentleman’s points, but that is not what the Bill provides for; it certainly does not allow for what he suggests. We have had some silly games with semantics. Does he agree that this is a broad catch-all of very serious crimes, including those he is talking about?
Matt Vickers
We are saying that the Bill puts in place choices based on how long someone has been sentenced. We are saying that if someone is sentenced to more than four years, they should not be eligible. If someone commits specific offences, such as sexual offences against a child, they should not be able to rely on the exceptions. That is exactly where we are at.
Ben Goldsborough
Would the hon. Gentleman’s amendment not have the unintended consequence of creating a ranking system? Many of my constituents are concerned about the extremely high-level crimes that the Opposition rightly note, but an individual may commit a series of low-level crimes. This ranking proposal may have the unintended consequence of that not being considered and the individual getting let off the hook.
Matt Vickers
The other provisions in the Bill make the case that people can be sent down, depending on the harshness of the sentence. We are saying that if it is over four years, or if someone commits a sexual act against a child or a terrorist act, there will be no ifs or buts, and those exceptions will not apply. There will still be space under the other provisions of the Bill to take action.
An attempt to deport a Sri Lankan paedophile convicted of assaulting three teenage boys was delayed over claims that it would breach his human rights. People look at such cases and wonder whose side the system is on. On Second Reading, the Government cited the case of grooming gang leader Shabir Ahmed. If they accept the principle there, they should accept it here.
Last year, I tabled a new clause to the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill to stop the Human Rights Act 1998 being used to frustrate deportations. The Government voted it down, 14 votes to two. Today, we are asking for far less: simply that they do not make the current law weaker.
The Government say they want deportation to be the rule. Our amendments would make it the rule. An immigration system must rest on public consent. Every time a serious offender stays because the law gave them one more argument, that consent wears thinner. Lose it, and the system loses legitimacy. Every member of the Committee has constituents who have lost faith that the system is on their side. They are not asking for a finely balanced weighing exercise; they are asking for their safety and that of their children to come first. This group of amendments does exactly that, and I commend them to the Committee.
Anna Turley
I thank hon. Members for a very full discussion of the amendments. I have a lot to respond to, so I hope colleagues will bear with me while I try to pick up on all the points and make as much progress as I can.
I think all of us in this room will share a real commitment to the clause and this group of amendments. The clause is a huge priority; it really underlines the issue of the deportation of foreign national offenders and the exemptions through which they have sought to remain in this country. As the hon. Member for Stockton West expressed, the issue causes huge concern, fear, anxiety and outrage. This is such an important clause and such important part of the Bill and of what we are trying to do.
I also put on record the Government’s commitment on this issue; that is not to make a political point, but we have deported more than 60,000 foreign national offenders since we came to power at the 2024 elections—the highest number in a decade, and 41% higher than in the previous two-year period. I say that not to make a political point, because we are in Committee, but to underline our determination and commitment on this issue, should there be any doubt, given some of the concerns raised by Opposition Members, about our absolute determination on this issue. It is extremely important to us.
Clause 20 reforms the application of article 8 in deportation cases, restoring a proper balance between individual rights and the public interest. The current framework contains different, sentence-based tests, which act as exceptions to deportation. Where a person can meet the private and family life exceptions, or the higher test, which applies for the most serious offenders, they will not be deported. That means that, in some cases, deportation can be avoided by meeting the family or private life exceptions, without the court conducting a full consideration of all factors weighing in favour of the public interest in deportation.
The clause addresses that by requiring the courts to conduct a full proportionality assessment before it can find that deportation would be disproportionate. The public interest will therefore be considered in every deportation case before an article 8 breach can be found, rather than only in some categories of case, as at the moment. Judges will be able to block deportation only in certain exceptional circumstances. The clause retains important existing concepts, including “unduly harsh”. I appreciate some of the concerns expressed by Opposition Members, which I will come to, but the concept is well understood by the courts and supported by extensive case law.
Under the new framework, showing that deportation would have an unduly harsh effect is insufficient—without further consideration—to demonstrate a breach of article 8 and will no longer be the point at which an article 8 claim succeeds automatically. That is a fundamental change. The court will now have to go on to consider whether the interference with private or family life can be justified when weighed against the public interest in deportation. The new framework establishes a clear statutory framework for assessing whether deportation will be disproportionate, requiring proper weight to be given to factors such as the nature and seriousness of the offending, the person’s immigration status, the economic impact of allowing them to remain in the UK, and the wider public interest in public safety and the prevention of disorder and crime.
The effect of the reforms is to establish a clearer and more consistent framework, in which deportation may be avoided only in truly exceptional cases. For the record hereafter, I clarify that emphasis in Committee. A person will still receive an individual assessment of their circumstances, but the courts will be required—I emphasise “required”—to give proper weight to Parliament’s view that deportation is strongly in the public interest.
Before I speak to the amendments, I will refer to some of the points made in the debate. I was asked whether the clause weakens provision for more serious offenders. No, it does not; they must still meet the same tests as other offenders, and face a proportionality test. The clause provides that the more serious the offence, the greater the public interest in deportation. Again, I will say more on that when I come to the specific Opposition amendments.
I was asked why sentence thresholds are being removed. We do not need sentence thresholds if we are going to treat all deportation cases the same. The courts can still, and indeed must, take account of sentences and seriousness of offending in considering proportionality. That is required on the face of the Bill by subsection (2) of proposed new section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire asked, why not cover family deportation under section 3(5)(b) of the Immigration Act 1971? The key point is that the exclusion of section 3(5)(b) is deliberate. Clause 20 is concerned with how article 8 is to be interpreted in cases involving the deportation of a foreign national whose own conduct has made them liable to deportation. A family member liable to deportation under section 3(5)(b) of the 1971 Act is not being deported because of their own criminality or conduct. Even if that power were used, it is appropriate that any article 8 claim made by that family should continue to be assessed under the framework set out in section 117B of the 2002 Act, rather than the deportation framework.
The hon. Member for Stockton West made a number of points. On his point about the House of Commons Library briefing, those with a sentence of over four years would previously need to establish that they meet very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions. Now they must establish that they meet an exception and that their deportation cannot be justified. We would expect such cases to fail the proportionality assessment even if they meet the exception. Our provisions enhance those deportation provisions.
I would also like to refer to some of the questions raised by the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East. He criticised proposed new section 117C of the 2002 Act. It is important to make it clear that the public interest is in deportation unless it is not justified. That is enhanced in proposed new section 117C(2) by making it clear that the more serious the offending, the stronger the public interest is. The hon. Gentleman is right that the first exception under proposed new section 117C(4)(a) means the person’s whole life, not just their adult life. That is the same as under existing law. To his points on social and cultural integration, the onus is on the applicant to establish that. Again, that is already covered in existing legislation. Caseworkers are experienced in how to deal with that and familiar with that understanding.
I want to make some more points on the “unduly harsh” test. Again, that is in existing legislation. The Supreme Court has already interpreted it extremely narrowly. On the issue of court latitude, which the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East raised, proposed new section 117C makes it clear that deportation is in the public interest and, as I have said, that the more serious the offending, the stronger the public interest will be. It is important that courts have a clear steer on Parliament’s view of public interest, and the process of the Bill will establish that. To resist deportation, someone must meet the exceptions and establish that their deportation cannot be justified in the light of the public interest. Deportation can therefore be resisted only in clearly defined and limited circumstances.
I will move on to the amendments, and I hope to provide a bit more clarity. Amendments 107, 109 and 111 seek to impose a higher threshold for deportation for foreign criminals who receive a custodial sentence of four years or more, or who commit certain more serious offences. The amendments would require such persons to demonstrate something more than meeting the private or family life exceptional circumstances test. There should be no suggestion that we are seeking to lower the threshold for foreign criminals who are given sentences of more than four years. That is misplaced.
Clause 20 amends the current deportation framework by introducing a full proportionality exercise before an article 8 breach can be found. That will ensure that the courts are required to consider and take account of the overall public interest in deportation. All foreign nationals subject to deportation will now have to meet a two-stage test to succeed in their article 8 claim. The first stage of the test requires the person to satisfy one of three exceptional circumstances tests. Where that exceptional circumstances test is met, they must also show that the interference with their private or family life rights—as demonstrated by an exceptional circumstance—cannot be justified. The second stage of the test requires a full proportionality exercise, weighing all the factors in favour of deportation.
As I have said, clause 20 specifically states that the greater the severity of offending, the greater the public interest in deportation. That is clear. It will make it less likely that the interference with article 8 rights will outweigh the public interest in deportation. We expect the courts to give significant weight to the public interest in deporting persons with long custodial sentences and those who have committed serious offences. I also clarify for the record that exceptional circumstances are not exceptions to deportation. Now, when someone demonstrates an interference with their family or private life, they will no longer automatically avoid deportation. There will be an assessment of the public interest test—
11.25 am
The Chair adjourned the Committee without Question put (Standing Order No. 88).
Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.