Immigration and Asylum Bill (Third sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Good morning, everyone, and welcome. Before we begin, I remind Members to switch electronic devices to silent, please, and that teas and coffees are not allowed.

We will now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for the sitting is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. It shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. Any Division on amendments and new clauses takes place in the order that they appear in the amendment paper. The Member who has put their name to the lead amendment of the group is called to speak first. For debates on clause stand part, the Minister will be called first. Other Members are then free to indicate whether they wish to speak in that debate by bobbing. Please bob on each occasion on which you wish to speak during proceedings.

At the end of a debate on a group of amendments and new clauses, I shall call the Member who moved the lead amendment or new clause again. Before they sit down, they will need to indicate whether they wish to withdraw the amendment or new clause, or to seek a decision. If any Member wishes to press any other amendment, which includes grouped new clauses, in a group to a vote, that is at the Chair’s discretion. The order of decisions follows the order in which amendments appear in the amendment paper.

Clause 1

The Independent Immigration Appeals Authority

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I beg to move amendment 64, in clause 1, page 2, leave out lines 1 to 5 and insert—

“(5) In the exercise of its functions, the IIAA must—

(a) be accessible, fair and independent,

(b) handle its cases quickly and efficiently.”

This amendment would remove the requirement for the IIAA to “aim to” operate fairly and independently and handle cases quickly and efficiently, so that the IIAA instead has a duty to so act. It would also remove the requirement for the IIAA to have regard to the public interest.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 48, in clause 1, page 2, line 2, leave out “aim to”.

Amendment 49, in clause 1, page 2, leave out lines 4 and 5.

Amendment 87, in clause 1, page 2, line 4, leave out paragraph (c) and insert—

“(c) give effect to the public interest in the effective enforcement of immigration control, including the prompt removal from the United Kingdom of persons who have no right to remain, having regard to the fact that the IIAA operates as a key part of the immigration and asylum system.”

This amendment would require the IIAA to give effect to the public interest in effective immigration control, including the prompt removal of those with no right to remain, rather than merely to have regard to the public interest.

New clause 12—Independent Immigration Appeals Authority: commencement—

“(1) The Secretary of State may not make regulations under section 52(1) for the purposes of bringing Part 1 of this Act into force unless—

(a) the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a report into the establishment of the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority (IIAA), and

(b) a statutory instrument containing regulations for the commencement of sections 1 to 7 of this Act has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.

(2) A report under subsection (1)(a) must contain—

(a) the full cost of establishing and operating the IIAA, including transition and set-up costs, adjudicator recruitment and training costs, and ongoing annual administrative costs for at least the first five years of operation, with a comparison to the equivalent cost of operating the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (‘the Tribunal’);

(b) the date, or expected range of dates, on which each stage of commencement is expected to take effect, including the length of any period in which the IIAA and the Tribunal will operate in parallel and the date by which the full transfer of jurisdiction from the Tribunal to the IIAA is expected to be complete;

(c) the expected capacity of the IIAA, including the number of adjudicators expected to be appointed at each stage of commencement and the number of appeals the IIAA is expected to be capable of determining per year at each such stage.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish a report on the full costs of the IIAA, its expected commencement timetable and its expected capacity before the implementation of Part 1 of this Act.

[Siân Berry]

It is a pleasure to have you in the Chair, Dr Murrison. I am moving amendment 64, to make fairness and efficiency duties of the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority. I should add that in this group I also support amendments 48 and 49, tabled by my Lib Dem colleagues, I oppose amendment 87 tabled by my Conservative colleagues and I support the Lib Dems’ new clause 12.

My amendment would impose on the IIAA a duty to operate fairly and independently and to handle cases quickly and efficiently. The Bill only imposes an obligation on the IIAA to aim to do those things. The amendment also removes the requirement for the IIAA to operate as part of the immigration system.

The Independent Immigration Appeals Authority will be a body that is independent in name; the reality, however, will be much murkier and more ambiguous. The Home Secretary will personally appoint senior figures in the IIAA, including its chair, and a Home Secretary appointee will be responsible for appointing adjudicators who make appeals decisions. The effect of the Bill is to make asylum decision making less independent, less fair and less expert. It brings asylum appeals under greater political control, putting at risk people’s basic human right not to be persecuted for who they are.

The major driver of the appeals backlog is the poor quality of Home Office asylum decisions, not tribunal judges. The Refugee Council has shown that about two thirds of Home Office asylum decisions that are challenged are overturned, either by the tribunals or by the Home Office itself. My preference, therefore, is for the Government to scrap all of part 1 of the Bill and get back to the day job of making good asylum decisions. If part 1 does go ahead, however—I will debate later whether that should happen—it should contain safeguards for basic standards of independence and fairness.

The amendment deals with two ways in which the Bill tries unfairly to align the IIAA with the Home Office’s policy priorities, rather than the requirements of justice and fairness. First, clause 1(5) states only that

“the IIAA must…aim to be accessible, fair and independent”—

not that it must be independent, fair and accessible in practice, but merely that it must aim to be so. By contrast, under existing rules for tribunals, there is a duty, an overriding objective on tribunals, to deal with cases fairly and justly. That is not an aim, but a requirement. As such, subsection (5) is a watering down, a weakening and an undermining of the independence of asylum appeals. My amendment would make it a legal duty for the IIAA to be independent, fair and accessible, as it is for tribunals, and not merely an aim.

Secondly, the attempt to draw asylum appeals into the Home Office’s sphere of influence is seen even more clearly in the fact that subsection (5) requires the IIAA to prioritise

“in particular…the fact that the IIAA operates as a key part of the immigration…system.”

That, I think, is an unambiguous push to align the IIAA not with the requirements of justice and fairness, but with Home Office policy priorities. My amendment would therefore remove any risk that the IIAA will be pressured into aligning with the Home Office’s immigration policy priorities, and let the IIAA be what it is meant to be: a quasi-judicial body for deciding appeals fairly and independently.

Ultimately, without my amendment, the IIAA will be a body with a conflict of interest at its heart: a requirement to aim to be independent and fair, but also a priority to view itself as part of immigration control. If the Government are sincere about creating a body that can deal with cases independently and fairly, without interference from the Home Office, the IIAA’s duty to operate independently and fairly should be more than an aim; it should be a requirement, just as it is for tribunals. Moreover, there should be no pressure on the IIAA to align with the Home Office’s political vision of immigration control, whoever is in charge of the Home Office. The amendment would create that safety against the priorities of future Governments, as well as this one, being able to put political pressure on the IIAA. The amendment would put all that beyond doubt. It gives the IIAA the best chance of being truly independent and fair. I will seek a Division on this amendment.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. I will speak to Opposition amendment 87 and to two other amendments in the group.

As this is the Committee’s first debate on part 1 of the Bill, let me set out the test that the Opposition will apply to it. On Second Reading, the Home Secretary told the House that more than 150,000 people are waiting for an appeal decision and the average wait is well over a year. Every one of those months is a month in which someone whose claim may well fail remains in this country, very often at the taxpayer’s expense. The public have been promised for years that that would be fixed, and we need to see it happen now. Our test for every clause in this part is a simple one: will appeals be decided faster, and will those who lose be removed?

Clause 1(5) is where the Bill tells the new authority what it is for: the authority must aim to be accessible, fair and independent; it must aim to handle its cases quickly and efficiently; and it must have regard to the public interest. Amendment 48, in the name of the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, would remove the words “aim to” from the first paragraph only, so that the authority would be under a firm duty to be “accessible, fair and independent”. I understand the instinct, but that hardens the wrong limb of the measure. If any duty in this subsection needs to be firmer, it is the duty to handle cases “quickly and efficiently”. That is the duty that the authority is being created to discharge, and it is the one that the public will judge it on.

Amendment 64 would remove “aim to” from both limbs, subsection (5)(a) and (b), but it would also remove the public interest duty in paragraph (c) to which I now turn. Amendments 49 and 64 in its second paragraph would go further than amendment 48. They would remove the duty to have regard to the public interest altogether. I respect the concern for independence that lies behind amendments 49 and 64, but I cannot agree. It would be remarkable for Parliament to tell the body that decides who may stay in this country that it need have no regard to the public interest or to public confidence in the system it is part of. An immigration system that does not have the confidence of the British public is a system that will not work.

Amendment 87 takes the opposite approach. It strengthens the public interest duty instead of removing it. In the Bill as drafted, the authority must merely “have regard to” the public interest, and the only content that the Bill gives to that interest is the fact that the authority is part of the immigration and asylum system. That tells an adjudicator nothing. The amendment states what the public interest is:

“the effective enforcement of immigration control, including the prompt removal from the United Kingdom of persons who have no right to remain.”

It would require the authority to give effect to that interest, not simply to have regard to it. The difference between “have regard to” and “give effect to” is not a lawyer’s nicety. A duty to have regard to something can be satisfied by thinking about it and then setting it aside; a duty to give effect to something cannot.

Clause 1(5) reaches well beyond the final decision in each case: it governs the authority in the “exercise of its functions”, which means how it lists cases, handles requests to adjourn and manages its caseload. Under clause 4(5), the Procedure Rules Board must also have regard to those objectives when it writes the rules. Amendment 87 would therefore shape every deadline, every adjournment rule and every listing decision the authority makes. It would put the effective enforcement of immigration control into the DNA of the institution from the start.

The Committee heard in evidence why that matters. Professor Ekins of Oxford University told us that one of the potential advantages of the new authority is that it could make

“the public interest in the enforcement of migration law a more pressing consideration.”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 22.]

Amendment 87 would make sure that that advantage is actually realised, rather than left to chance. This is not new ground for Parliament. Section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 already states that

“the maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest.”

The Minister may say that amendment 87 would compromise independence, but it would not. Clause 1(4) will still require the authority to

“exercise its primary function with a view to ensuring that justice is done.”

Clause 1(6) will still require every Minister to uphold the IIAA’s independence. Each case will still be decided on its evidence and on the law. What changes is that the institution is told plainly what it exists to achieve. We are clear that the public interest includes the swift removal of those who have no right to be in the country. That is one of the public’s most pressing concerns, and the new authority should be in no doubt that it is there to serve it.

New clause 12 asks for a report on the cost, timetable and capacity of the authority before part 1 can be commenced. Whatever view the Committee takes of a statutory lock on commencement, the questions are fair, and I will put them directly: what is the full cost of setting up and running the authority over its first five years, and how does that compare with the tribunal it replaces? How many adjudicators will be in post on the first day, and how many appeals will they decide each year? On what date does the Minister expect the authority to hear its first appeal?

We will press amendment 87 to a Division when it is reached.

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[Siân Berry]

I am not convinced by anything I have heard from the Minister. She talked about my amendments not allowing flexibility, but let us be clear what she has said: she is asking for flexibility in fairness, but not flexibility in the political definition of public interest. The risk to human rights here is huge. Let us not forget that these are life and death decisions for people who are among the most vulnerable in the world. It is clear from the data that the backlog is being driven by the fact the Home Office is deciding to refuse more cases, and the risk that those decisions are bad ones is also pretty clear; we see the frequency with which they are overturned, or the Home Office’s objections are withdrawn, when they go to the current tribunal.

We know that bad decisions can be driven by a target-based culture. We saw that in the Windrush lessons learned review, which said that there was a target-dominated work environment and low-quality decision making. Those things go hand in hand, and we will create a hugely dangerous risk by putting the IIAA together with these objectives right at the heart of what it does. We risk doing Windrush again; we risk huge injustice; we risk huge costs for the Government in compensating people who have been subject to enormous detriment. This would be a really simple thing to fix at this stage. I will not withdraw my amendment, but will press it to a Division.

Question proposed, That the amendment be made.

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Division 4

Question accordingly negatived.

Ayes: 3

Noes: 12

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move amendment 65, in clause 1, page 2, leave out lines 11 to 14.

This amendment would remove the provision which prevents individuals from being able to initiate judicial review proceedings against decisions made by the IIAA.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 85, in clause 1, page 2, line 13, leave out from “decisions)” to the end of line 14.

This amendment would mean that IIAA decisions could not be appealed to the upper tribunal.

[Siân Berry]

Amendment 65 to clause 1 would allow judicial review of decisions. It would remove the provision in the Bill that excludes all judicial review of IIAA appeal decisions. Clause 1(8) is a so-called ouster clause, as the explanatory notes confirm. It is designed to immunise the IIAA’s appeal decisions from judicial review in the High Court. The purpose of the amendment is to remove the Government’s attempt to undermine the rule of law.

There will be two ways to challenge an IIAA appeal decision in the Bill as it stands. The first is that the IIAA can review its own decisions, under clause 6, and the second is that the upper tribunal can hear an appeal based only on a point of law, under clause 7. I hope we can agree that judicial review is a mechanism of fundamental constitutional importance and therefore should be restricted in only very limited circumstances. The Ministry of Justice has referred to judicial review as

“the rule of law in action”.

It ensures that public bodies act only in accordance with their legal powers and with respect for our human rights. The Home Office’s wish for faster and cheaper appeals does not come above the rule of law.

Ousting judicial review is unnecessary and disproportionate. Where there is a suitable alternative remedy, such as an appeal to the upper tribunal like the one for which the Bill provides, the High Court will normally refuse permission for a judicial review anyway. That is because the High Court considers that the alternative remedy will protect the rule of law. If the High Court considers that the upper tribunal appeal in clause 7 is sufficient, there will rarely be judicial review cases. Retaining the claimant’s ability to apply for judicial review would simply mean that the High Court could grant permission in residual cases where it believed that an upper tribunal appeal would not be an effective alternative remedy.

Clause 1(8) attempts to remove that residual right entirely. It is a rare absolute ouster clause, which does not permit judicial review of an IIAA appeal’s decision in any circumstances. Even the previous Conservative Government, when creating an ouster clause in section 1 of the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022, retained access to judicial review in some circumstances. Clause 1 of this Bill is constitutionally exceptional, and I would like the Minister to explain why this absolute exclusion from justice is deemed to be okay for those seeking asylum, when even the previous Government would not apply it to unnaturalised citizens.

[David Smith (North Northumberland) (Lab)]

The core point of the hon. Lady’s speech is the rule of law, which all members of the Committee support, but does she accept that, first, we are talking about the appeals process? At this point, they have already appealed—that is one opportunity that someone seeking asylum has already taken to question the decision. Secondly, there are two other ways in the Bill through which a person seeking asylum can have a decision reviewed. Some of the hon. Lady’s rhetoric does not do justice to the Bill.

[Siân Berry]

I appreciate that, and I have laid out the possible alternative remedies, but judicial review is an essential backstop. I do not see why the Government are trying to remove it. This is constitutionally exceptional and I want the Minister to explain why it is okay.

This measure will not only undermine the rule of law; it will inevitably provoke litigation in the courts about how this ouster clause should be interpreted and effected. It is concerning that the Government want the IIAA, which is a novel—experimental, even—non-expert body institutionally close to the Home Office, making life or death appeal decisions, to be made completely immune from judicial review at the outset. It demonstrates the Government’s continuing and concerning prioritisation of speed over the rule of law and justice, which we have seen in other Bills. In those circumstances, my amendment is completely necessary. It would ensure that judicial review remained available in those cases where the High Court believed it was necessary. I hope that all Members will support it.

[Matt Vickers]

I want to speak about amendments 85 and 65. Clause 1(8) provides that a decision of the authority may be questioned in legal proceedings in only two ways: through the authority’s own review power under clause 6, or through an appeal to the upper tribunal under clause 7. Amendment 85 would remove the latter, ending the onward appeal to the upper tribunal.

One of the public’s deepest frustrations with the immigration system is appeal after appeal after appeal. The Home Secretary herself described it on Second Reading. She told the House about a convicted rapist whom it took more than four years to remove from this country after he had served his sentence because of a succession of late claims and legal challenges. We agree with her diagnosis, but we do not understand why the Bill preserves the structure that makes that possible.

Let us consider the journey this Bill still allows. A claim is refused by the Home Office, so the person appeals to the authority and loses. They can then ask the authority to review its decision or for permission to appeal. If that is refused, they can ask the upper tribunal. If permission is granted, there is a hearing, and if that succeeds, the case may be sent to be decided all over again. Each step is measured in months and, at every one, the person remains here—usually at public expense. That expense is considerable—the National Audit Office estimates that the immigration and asylum chamber cost around £79.5 million to run in 2024-25, and that is before the cost of legal aid.

[Siân Berry]

I appreciate the hon. Member’s laying out the process, but can he honestly say that, if he were subjected to any area of justice, he would accept those arguments and the process for taking away his right to appeal twice, which the amendment would effect? Does he believe that that genuinely represents justice without fear or favour?

[Matt Vickers]

The hon. Member for North Northumberland made a valid point—this is an appeals process. The case has been considered once but can go to appeal for reconsideration and even that decision can be reviewed again—that is a lengthy process. The entire objective of this Bill is to speed up the process so that it is fair to the taxpayers, as well as to those subject to it. Removing a whole tier of appeal would reduce the burden on the taxpayer, as would other amendments the Opposition have tabled. The time limits in clause 8 will not help, because they bind the authority rather than the upper tribunal. The Bill does not shorten the queue; it moves part of it upstairs.

The Government’s case for part 1 is that the new authority will make robust and defensible decisions with trained adjudicators, a chief appeals officer overseeing quality, and a professional standards officer setting standards. If that is right, its decision should be capable of being final. Where a genuine error is made, clause 6 allows it to be corrected and that review should be carried out by a legally qualified senior adjudicator. That is a fair hearing—a check for error and then an end.

Let me be clear about what amendment 85 would leave in place, because the Minister will say it removes any check on the authority. It does not. Every appellant would still have a full hearing before the authority on the facts and the law. Every decision could still be reviewed for an error of law under clause 6. Government amendment 36 will mean that that review is confined to exactly the kind of point the upper tribunal would consider. Amendment 85 would remove the second external tier, and its two separate applications for permission—the listing queue and the power to send a case back to the start. The Government accept that the onward appeal is only on a point of law and not a rehearing. The question is simply who checks the law and how long it takes. Our answer is a legally qualified senior adjudicator, with the authority, and quickly.

There is a further problem with subsection (8) as drafted. Professor Ekins told the Committee that this is not an effective ouster clause, that the courts would read it narrowly and that the Committee should not rest content with it. He pointed to the more precise model that Parliament used in the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022. If the Government agree that the authority’s decisions should be final, they should draft subsection (8) so that it works, and we would welcome their help in doing so on Report.

Amendment 65, in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, would take the Bill in the opposite direction. It would delete subsection (8) altogether and reopen the possibility of judicially reviewing every decision the authority makes, adding a third route of challenge to the two already in the Bill. I understand the hon. Lady’s concern for safeguards, but they are already there. Parliament legislated in 2022 to end judicial review of the upper tribunal’s refusals of permission, precisely because that route had become a means of delay. Clause 7(3) rightly carries that rule across. Amendment 65 would reopen at the first tier what Parliament closed at the second. Our position is clear; enough is enough. Years of delay and expense must come to an end, and the legal merry-go-round has to stop. We will seek to divide the Committee on amendment 85 and we will oppose clause 7.

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That does not mean that the authority’s decisions are beyond legal challenge; it means that challenges to decisions must be brought through the review and appeals route that is specifically provided for in the Bill. The Bill provides clear and specialist routes for challenging the authority decision through internal review and onward appeal to the upper tribunal. Allowing judicial review proceedings alongside each of these routes for any decision could result in overlapping challenges, avoidable satellite litigation and further delay—exactly what we have seen when the process is strung out.

[Siân Berry]

On a point of clarification, is it not correct that under clause 7 the upper tribunal can hear an appeal only based on a point of law? Will the Minister comment on the way that challenging the processes or the administration of someone’s claim could therefore not be taken to the upper tribunal? Is she removing that safeguard? I remain concerned that the complexity of the law and the lack, often, of legal representation, as well as the difficulties that we all see in our casework of people claiming asylum, dealing with the Home Office’s processes and making their way through all this, mean that quite often there are process problems that ought to be challenged, and that this has been denied to people at the upper tribunal.

[Anna Turley]

The process mirrors the existing first-tier tribunal, which reviews errors of law, so it is important to clarify that this remains the same and retains the same definition. It is only on errors of law that a process can be appealed; this does not narrow that process any further.

Amendment 85 takes a very different approach. It would prevent decisions of the authority from being appealed to the upper tribunal at all. I am afraid we do not consider that acceptable. We do not believe that the authority’s decisions should be entirely prevented from onward appeal. That goes too far in the other direction and denies the right of justice where there has been an error of law.

Removing the statutory right of appeal could potentially open us up to even more litigation, as appeals where there has been an error of law would end up going straight to that process without this important safety valve. The authority will make important first-instance decisions, and it is right that there should be a means of correcting a decision when an authority has made, as we have said, an error of law.

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[Siân Berry]

I will speak to why clause 1 and schedule 1 should not form part of the Bill. Although I will not speak to every clause, all these reasons equally apply to the rest of part 1, which deals with the creation and implementation of the IIAA.

It is a real shame that this policy has not yet become another U-turn from this Administration. I compare this Bill with the Courts and Tribunals Bill, particularly how adjustments were made following feedback from the legal profession and human rights experts on the establishment of truncated legal process and rights, which was one of the Bill’s most misconceived parts. After the Government pressed on with those plans during the Bill Committee, on which I also sat, today it is being debated on Report without several of the clauses that would have put jury trials out of reach for far too many offences. Although they were quite rightly not selected, I tabled amendments to this Bill that would have removed part 1, which creates the independent immigration appeals authority and all its workings, and I look forward to seeing such proposals also being removed before its Report stage.

The Government said that clause 1 and the rest of part 1 are needed to clear a backlog of more than 150,000 appeals, which currently take an average of over 60 weeks to decide. That backlog is real, and it is important that actions are taken to clear it, but part 1 misconceives the issues. Evidence shows that delays are driven by poor initial Home Office decisions and a severe shortage of legal aid, but part 1 addresses neither.

Instead, the Bill would replace a working, independent judicial tribunal with a costly body that risks being ineffective and lacks independence and fairness. Above all, creating unfair processes and further adding to a hostile environment for asylum will not help stop the boats. In its written evidence, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees called for

“a comprehensive strategy addressing the drivers of irregular movement, expanding safe, regular pathways, strengthening international responsibility-sharing, and enhancing practical cooperation with European and other partner States.”

In oral evidence, the Government’s own National Crime Agency had no analysis or explanation about the real drivers of small boat crossings, being concerned only with the Government’s approach of layering an even harsher deterrence and enforcement regime on to the real causes. It is those real causes that need attention.

I want the Government to listen on this issue, and that depends on Ministers hearing the arguments—that is what this Committee is for. I will be here throughout the Committee to highlight the points made by experts on the needs and real lives of those seeking asylum. They are talking about the difficulties they face in gaining a hearing for their case or in dealing with Home Office processes. In particular—this is something we all know as MPs, because we try to help constituents navigate this system in our casework—they talk about how poor the decision making in the Home Office is, and how the Bill does nothing to improve it.

I want to bring some evidence from Brighton, given by one of a large number of charities that are providing direct support to refugees, as befits a city of sanctuary. The organisation One Church, which does a lot of work in this area, told me:

“The impact of UK immigration policies for the past 15 years has at times crippled our ability to do business and operate a charity focussed (ironically) on marginalised people across Sussex. The escalating cost of filing for visas, the precarity and punitive nature of asylum claims and other proceedings, and the emotional devastation when facing all-too-common Home Office errors have all contributed to outcomes including business costs we can’t afford, charitable work that we’ve had to stop or rein in, and full-on mental health breakdowns that rupture communities and cost incalculably more in long-term complications.”

One Church gave me several examples, but here is one:

“An asylum seeker from Zimbabwe…was unable to earn income or work a job for more than eight years—even as he also was barred from public funds—while his own appeals went through the Home Office system, requiring the community to house him for free and support his basic living needs for many years. He ultimately won his case as well, including a public apology from a judge, but struggled to cope with the effects of such a long stint in a precarious and dependent position. This entire cascade of events was due to an unclear Home Office deadline that meant his paperwork was alleged to have been filed less than 24 hours late.”

[David Smith]

I thank the hon. Lady for the powerful story that she has just shared. I ran a homelessness charity before becoming an MP, which housed people who were refugees or seeking asylum. Is not expediting the process—stopping appeal after appeal—as much about supporting those who seek asylum, doing justice to them, as it is about wider society?

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[Siân Berry]

I disagree. I think that the Government are focusing on the wrong part of the system here. As MPs, we are all aware of the processes involved in the initial decision making of the Home Office. The number of similar messes that my caseworkers have had to try to clear up—we often succeed—is absolutely huge, so not to focus on getting that initial decision making right the first time, and instead for the Bill simply to take away people’s rights of appeal, is absolutely the wrong approach.

With all such problems, the people who need asylum also need real knowledge of their rights and real access to people who can support their claims, but all that is really hard to get. Late claims and appeals with new information, when people finally get the right support and legal guidance about the grounds on which they should be making their claim, are all necessary to protect asylum rights. Therefore, judicial processes should not be downgraded and truncated, and people who are not legally qualified should not be hearing those cases.

[Dr Zubir Ahmed (Glasgow South West) (Lab)]

I share a lot of the hon. Lady’s concerns about the initial quality of assessment. I have one of the highest burdens of asylum seekers in my constituency in Scotland. Will she concede that the emphasis that the current Home Secretary has put on upgrading the quality of the assessment of those initial appeals since she has been in post is starting to work? I certainly feel that in my casework. Moreover, on the number of people who appeal to the first-tier tribunal at the moment and the current trajectory of the numbers coming in versus the numbers being processed, does the hon. Lady concede at least that the status quo is completely and utterly unsustainable? How we manage that system needs a fresh look.

[Siân Berry]

As I am sure the hon. Member will have imagined, I cannot agree, given the number of cases overturned. We have had some data from the Minister in her letter of 6 October, and 44% of human rights appeals are being allowed. Those are appeals where the initial decision was wrong. Emphasis needs to be on clearer processes, in which people can truly participate and get their information to the Home Office the first time, with the Home Office not losing it or reading it mistakenly, or any of the other problems. That is so important. These changes to the judicial process are the wrong solution to the wrong diagnosis, as with those in the Courts and Tribunals Bill.

[Melanie Onn]

One of the issues that the Bill seeks to address is the fact that, when it comes to the appeals process, people have been left for far too long. The longer they are here, the more routes of appeal they have. Does the hon. Member not agree that that needs to be resolved?

[Siân Berry]

I agree about the growth in the backlog, but as I said earlier, the analysis is pretty clear that that growth comes from an increase in refusals as well as the increasing speed with which the Home Office is making decisions. To me, those two things go together. The increase in refusals is likely to represent an increase in mistaken refusals—refusals that should not have happened. We cannot get away with just looking at the proportions here, either. We have to recognise that this will result in a number of people being treated as badly as they possibly can be by a country in which they are trying to seek asylum, having already had to leave the country in which they would much prefer to stay due to human rights considerations that are not properly taken into account at the initial decision stage in 44% of cases.

[Ben Goldsborough]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Siân Berry]

I have very nearly finished, so I will press on. At its heart, the IIAA fundamentally represents another ill-thought-through Government proposal to create a truncated legal process. It is part of the previous Prime Minister’s misconceived attempts to pander to the disturbing ideas of Reform UK and its even more unsettling offshoot, Restore Britain. We saw from Reform UK’s proposals yesterday that only standing up for asylum rights will do in the face of its politics, and that the far right of politics will never be happy with anything other than the total removal of asylum rights.

Meanwhile, measures like those in clause 1 of this Bill will prove impractical, expensive and ineffective in addressing the backlog, and they will hurt the most vulnerable people in the world. These proposals must be dropped, if not today then well before the Bill leaves the House of Commons. I will vote against clause 1.

[Anna Turley]

I thank all hon. Members for speaking in the opening debates. As we have discussed, clause 1 and schedule 1 will establish the IIAA, with the key aim of overhauling the current system and driving down the unacceptable waiting times, which are causing significant problems in the system. As I set out, we know that public consent for our asylum system is fraying, and we have heard that from colleagues today.

The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion set out very clearly and passionately that the current system is letting down those who are genuinely fleeing war and persecution as well. Genuine asylum seekers are not served by a process that gets ensnared in legal chew and does not have the opportunity to correct errors quickly. This is about enabling us to streamline the process, reduce errors and deal with people quickly and fairly in a much more managed way than the current system, which is letting everyone down on all sides, including those who are going through the process. As has been demonstrated, they are living in limbo at the taxpayer’s expense for far too long, and that is making it increasingly difficult for their cases to have a fair hearing. We all know the phrase about justice delayed, and I am afraid that that is the situation we are currently in.

I have set out the case fairly substantially, so I will not go over the arguments about the principles behind this again. Independence from Government is a cornerstone of the establishment of this new authority, and clause 1 seeks to protect that. Government amendments 22 to 24, while technical, will allow for the full operation of the IIAA when they begin their important work of determining cases. I want to come back to some of the questions raised by the hon. Member for Stockton West about transition and so on. As we have discussed, the scale and nature of the current asylum appeals caseload cannot be sustainably managed within the existing limits of the first-tier tribunal. Our assessment is that a fundamental reform is required to create a system capable of handling caseload volumes at speed while maintaining quality of decision making, fairness and independence.

--- Later in debate ---

Membership of the IIAA

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move amendment 66, in clause 2, page 2, leave out lines 24 to 28 and insert—

“(2) The executive and non-executive members of the IIAA specified in subsection (1) are to be appointed by the Judicial Appointments Commission.”

This amendment would require the Chair, Chief Executive, Chief Appeals Officer, Professional Standards Officer and adjudicators of the IIAA to be appointed by the Judicial Appointments Commission.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 25 and 26.

Amendment 67, in clause 2, page 3, line 6, leave out “a senior” and insert “an”.

This amendment would require all adjudicators deciding appeals for the IIAA to have legal qualifications or experience.

Government amendment 27.

Clause stand part.

Schedule 2.

[Siân Berry]

I will speak to amendment 66, about the appointments process to the IIAA, and amendment 67, about the legal qualifications and experience of adjudicators.

Under the Bill, the chair of the IIAA will be a Home Office appointee. The chair will decide the IIAA’s chief executive, who will then appoint adjudicators. By contrast, I believe that the leadership and decision-making roles in the IIAA should be decided by the Judicial Appointments Commission, the body that appoints judges. That would plainly and simply ensure independence from the Government and Parliament, which the Bill does not currently guarantee. We cannot risk leaving policies like this under the day-to-day political control of anyone in Government. Every safeguard must therefore be in place to make sure that this or any future Secretary of State cannot direct the outcome, prioritisation or disposal of these cases. My amendment 66 would fix that and make appointments to the IIAA the responsibility of the Judicial Appointments Commission, not Ministers or their appointees.

I will expand on some key points. According to the Bill, all members of IIAA, senior and junior, will be appointed either directly by the Home Secretary or by someone appointed by them. The chair of the IIAA, for example, will be appointed directly by the Home Secretary, and adjudicators will be appointed by the chief executive, who is given their role by the chair. The Home Office’s fingerprints will therefore be all over the membership of the IIAA, from top to bottom. As has been consistently clear, this Bill drags asylum appeals closer to the Home Office, risking the independence and fairness of appeals in a serious way. By contrast, tribunal judges, who currently hear asylum appeals, are appointed by the Judicial Appointments Commission, which is independent, with no direct input from Ministers.

Evidence has consistently shown over many years that Home Office officials face significant and sometimes inappropriate pressure to make decisions, including asylum decisions, in accordance with political goals. The independent chief inspector of borders and immigration found that that was the case as part of Operation Bridora in 2022, which was a Home Office strategy designed to speed up the processing of Albanian asylum claims. The chief inspector concluded that Ministers imposed an arbitrary and secret target on Home Office officials for only 2% of Albanian claims to be successful. In addition, in a report from the chief inspector this year, it was found that the Home Office was prioritising the quantity of decisions over their quality.

The Home Office’s institutional history is anathema to the independence and fairness that is needed. The ties between the IIAA and Home Office could impose political pressure on the IIAA to operate in accordance with Home Office preferences rather than law and facts. If Ministers are sincere about creating a truly independent appeals body, the safeguards to ensure independence should be robust and tried and tested. My amendment would make all appointments the responsibility of the Judicial Appointments Commission, not Ministers.

[Ben Goldsborough]

I understand the hon. Lady’s concerns about independence from the Government and other bodies, but many bodies across Government are involved in complex cases, such as in criminal law. For example, the Criminal Cases Review Commission is appointed by the MOJ to look into miscarriages of justice. Are we honestly saying that the IIAA would not have those same safeguards, in this case from the Home Secretary rather than the Lord Chancellor? Within the Bill, we are introducing a process that maintains independence while keeping accountability to Parliament, which will be vital in securing our constituents’ trust in a fair and transparent process for our immigration system.

[Siân Berry]

The hon. Member is right that, sometimes, appointments of supposedly independent commissioners are made—I had experience of that recently in relation to equalities—but there is often a political element to the appointment and the direction they seem to take. We must always appreciate that and guard against it. Taking the appointments one step away from the Home Office may not completely remove the possibility of that, but the Judicial Appointments Commission is a robust body doing a similar job already and should have this role. That is what my amendment seeks to introduce. The Judicial Appointments Commission has two decades of experience in appointing independent judges, and I think it is the body best able to ensure the independence of candidates for adjudicators.

[David Smith]

Before the hon. Lady moves on, I wish to build on the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk. It is a well-established principle within governance that quasi-judicial bodies are appointed by the Government. For example, the chief planning inspector is appointed by the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government. The chief inspector of prisons is appointed by the Secretary of State for Justice. The Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman is appointed by the Prime Minister. Furthermore, the Bill outlines that only the first chair and professional standards officer will be appointed by the Home Secretary. Is the hon. Lady arguing that all those other appointments made by Government have the same illegitimacy?

[Siân Berry]

All I am pointing out is that the Home Office’s record on this kind of thing is not brilliant, and that there exists a body far more appropriate than the Government’s proposal for direct appointments. I do not quite understand why Members are arguing so hard against that, when I am certain that the Judicial Appointments Commission would be happy to take up the role.

[Mr Jonathan Brash (Hartlepool) (Lab)]

The issue is about consistency. The hon. Lady mentioned specifically the Home Office. Well, the Home Secretary appoints the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration, the Migration Advisory Committee chair and the Domestic Abuse Commissioner. Why is this different? Surely, the hon. Lady’s argument is fundamentally inconsistent, given what the Home Secretary already does.

[Siân Berry]

I do not agree with that at all. This body will be making legal decisions. I will talk in a moment about how the chief executive and chair, who will be under the Home Office’s wing, will not be legally qualified to make those appointments. I cannot understand why every single safeguard should not be introduced in the Bill. Furthermore, this is a judicial process, so why should it not be the Judicial Appointments Commission? I fail to see the controversy with the amendment. The adjudicators will be making judicial decisions and considering law, evidence and facts. The Judicial Appointments Commission has the experience, the processes and—I am certain—the willingness to fairly test candidates’ skills and aptitudes in judicial functions. Therefore, the amendment would be highly appropriate, and I hope Ministers consider it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

The shadow Minister mentioned the Bill’s use of the phrase “adequate training and support”. In answering his question on that, as well as some of the other questions he asked that were more practical, it is really important for me to specify that it is not for the Home Office to decide that. The chief executive will be responsible for ensuring that the IIAA adjudicators have adequate training and support to maintain their independence from the executive. The chief appeals officer is responsible for overseeing the quality of decisions and developing a quality assurance mechanism. They will be able to identify any specific training needs of adjudicators and recommend them to the chief executive. It is really important that I confirm to the Committee that the IIAA is independent. It is not for the Government to decide what accreditation and continuous development will be required for the IIAA adjudicators, who will, in essence, be making decisions on appeals to which the Home Office is a party.

[Siân Berry]

I have heard arguments from Government Back Benchers and the Minister that, for example, Home Office officials are not required to be legally qualified. This is a notoriously complex area of law, and I cannot see how that does not reinforce the need for true expertise in appeals. We have also heard that magistrates are not required to be legally qualified, but magistrates’ decisions are backed up by appeals to a body of legally qualified people. The Bill seeks to remove that, so I cannot honestly agree with this measure.

There are two extra points I want to make from the written evidence that we received from JUSTICE. The first is about training. The Minister talks about the fact that adjudicators will be properly trained. According to JUSTICE, Home Office asylum decision makers were given 22 weeks’ training, but it was found that that was inadequate and did not provide them with the necessary information to perform their job effectively. I fail to see how things are going to work out any better for adjudicators taking the place of legally qualified professionals.

The Minister mentioned that legally qualified people advise magistrates and that legally qualified people will be available to advise the adjudicators. JUSTICE makes the point very well—

[Melanie Onn]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Siân Berry]

I have not made the point yet, so I will carry on. JUSTICE makes the point that there is a paucity of specialist lawyers able to advise in human rights and asylum appeals, and that these lawyers are doing—

[The Chair]

Order.