Immigration and Asylum Bill (Third sitting)

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. I will speak to Opposition amendment 87 and to two other amendments in the group.

As this is the Committee’s first debate on part 1 of the Bill, let me set out the test that the Opposition will apply to it. On Second Reading, the Home Secretary told the House that more than 150,000 people are waiting for an appeal decision and the average wait is well over a year. Every one of those months is a month in which someone whose claim may well fail remains in this country, very often at the taxpayer’s expense. The public have been promised for years that that would be fixed, and we need to see it happen now. Our test for every clause in this part is a simple one: will appeals be decided faster, and will those who lose be removed?

Clause 1(5) is where the Bill tells the new authority what it is for: the authority must aim to be accessible, fair and independent; it must aim to handle its cases quickly and efficiently; and it must have regard to the public interest. Amendment 48, in the name of the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, would remove the words “aim to” from the first paragraph only, so that the authority would be under a firm duty to be “accessible, fair and independent”. I understand the instinct, but that hardens the wrong limb of the measure. If any duty in this subsection needs to be firmer, it is the duty to handle cases “quickly and efficiently”. That is the duty that the authority is being created to discharge, and it is the one that the public will judge it on.

Amendment 64 would remove “aim to” from both limbs, subsection (5)(a) and (b), but it would also remove the public interest duty in paragraph (c) to which I now turn. Amendments 49 and 64 in its second paragraph would go further than amendment 48. They would remove the duty to have regard to the public interest altogether. I respect the concern for independence that lies behind amendments 49 and 64, but I cannot agree. It would be remarkable for Parliament to tell the body that decides who may stay in this country that it need have no regard to the public interest or to public confidence in the system it is part of. An immigration system that does not have the confidence of the British public is a system that will not work.

Amendment 87 takes the opposite approach. It strengthens the public interest duty instead of removing it. In the Bill as drafted, the authority must merely “have regard to” the public interest, and the only content that the Bill gives to that interest is the fact that the authority is part of the immigration and asylum system. That tells an adjudicator nothing. The amendment states what the public interest is:

“the effective enforcement of immigration control, including the prompt removal from the United Kingdom of persons who have no right to remain.”

It would require the authority to give effect to that interest, not simply to have regard to it. The difference between “have regard to” and “give effect to” is not a lawyer’s nicety. A duty to have regard to something can be satisfied by thinking about it and then setting it aside; a duty to give effect to something cannot.

Clause 1(5) reaches well beyond the final decision in each case: it governs the authority in the “exercise of its functions”, which means how it lists cases, handles requests to adjourn and manages its caseload. Under clause 4(5), the Procedure Rules Board must also have regard to those objectives when it writes the rules. Amendment 87 would therefore shape every deadline, every adjournment rule and every listing decision the authority makes. It would put the effective enforcement of immigration control into the DNA of the institution from the start.

The Committee heard in evidence why that matters. Professor Ekins of Oxford University told us that one of the potential advantages of the new authority is that it could make

“the public interest in the enforcement of migration law a more pressing consideration.”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 22.]

Amendment 87 would make sure that that advantage is actually realised, rather than left to chance. This is not new ground for Parliament. Section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 already states that

“the maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest.”

The Minister may say that amendment 87 would compromise independence, but it would not. Clause 1(4) will still require the authority to

“exercise its primary function with a view to ensuring that justice is done.”

Clause 1(6) will still require every Minister to uphold the IIAA’s independence. Each case will still be decided on its evidence and on the law. What changes is that the institution is told plainly what it exists to achieve. We are clear that the public interest includes the swift removal of those who have no right to be in the country. That is one of the public’s most pressing concerns, and the new authority should be in no doubt that it is there to serve it.

New clause 12 asks for a report on the cost, timetable and capacity of the authority before part 1 can be commenced. Whatever view the Committee takes of a statutory lock on commencement, the questions are fair, and I will put them directly: what is the full cost of setting up and running the authority over its first five years, and how does that compare with the tribunal it replaces? How many adjudicators will be in post on the first day, and how many appeals will they decide each year? On what date does the Minister expect the authority to hear its first appeal?

We will press amendment 87 to a Division when it is reached.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. I thank all Members for the constructive debate we have had on the amendments to clause 1 of this Bill, particularly the hon. Members for Brighton Pavilion and for Stockton West, and the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, who tabled amendment 87.

I would like to say up front that it is very clear that consent for our asylum system in the public domain is fraying. The important part of this Bill is to seek to restore control, restore fairness and rebuild the public’s confidence. We have made huge progress on initial decision making; we have cut the backlog in initial decisions by 72% from the 2023 peak. However, as we have done so, the appeals backlog has grown substantially, now with waiting times of more than two years. Some appeals are absolutely genuine, and they of course must be heard fairly. However, it is clear that some claimants are lodging appeals to frustrate their legitimate removal from this country.

As of June 2026, the open caseload in the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber was about 156,000. The average time taken to clear appeals across all categories is currently at 65 weeks: 72 weeks for asylum protection, 74 weeks for human rights and 48 weeks for European economic area free movement. The Government have substantially increased both capacity and productivity in the FTT IAC, but demand has risen considerably faster. Receipts increased from around 58,000 in 2023-24 to almost 118,000 in 2025-26, while the outstanding caseload rose from around 50,000 to more than 150,000. We have done our best to try to support the workforce within that existing system. We increased the judicial workforce by 21% to 311 judges, including 61 new fee-paid judges and 25 salaried judges who began sitting between January and March this year, and we are continuing further recruitment.

The structural constraint is just how quickly judicial capacity can scale. Judicial recruitment draws on a relatively limited pool of experienced lawyers, and it currently takes around 12 to 18 months from launching an exercise to a judge being able to sit, so that is not feasible. The IIAA therefore broadens the recruitment pool, providing greater flexibility and allowing us to increase capacity while maintaining robust safeguards around training, legal support, quality assurance and professional standards.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

Is it not the case that the long backlog of cases for judges is largely driven by the poor quality of original decision making by Home Officials, as shown by the number of successful appeals? I was slightly concerned that senior officials at the evidence session seemed not to be willing to acknowledge that. Will the Minister acknowledge that the quality of some of those first Home Office decisions is not particularly good?

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point, and all of us, as Members of Parliament, will have had our own cases that challenged some of the standards. However, what we have seen is that, while the number has increased, the decision making quality has not gone up or down. I would also say that, at the moment, the delays in the current system mean that decision making becomes poorer, because evidence is produced later in the system and some of it is not sustainable, and more and more different routes are being attempted to string out appeals. The longer the process goes on, the more complex and difficult the decision making becomes. This is about having swift and fair decision making, but we will always keep the quality of decision making in this process under review in the Department.

To create the swift and fair appeals system that we need, we are scrapping the judge-led asylum and immigration tribunal, which just cannot keep pace with demand, and we are replacing it with a new independent appeals authority to deliver swift and fair decision making. This authority will be staffed by independent adjudicators, who will be ordinary citizens trained like magistrates. To reduce abuse of the system, claimants will be allowed just a single route for appeal, which must be lodged as early as possible. That will remove the scope for bringing multiple appeals, as some claimants do, that are often vexatious and at the very last minute before removal. Late claims will be heard under an expedited process, ensuring that they cannot be used to frustrate a removal. There will be a right for a further appeal to a judge-led tribunal only on a point of law.

The new authority will be independent of Government, with a chair and chief executive officer who are accountable to the Home Secretary and Parliament for delivering an effective and efficient system. All appointments will be based on merit and subject to fair and open appointments principles. All Ministers, including the Home Secretary, will be under a statutory duty to uphold the IIAA’s independence and not to influence its decisions.

[Melanie Onn (Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes) (Lab)]

It is undeniable that there is an appetite in the country for an asylum system that is robust but fair, and it seems to be the case that people are abusing the system. With the extended period for appeals in the current process, despite the good will in the intentions behind it. This IIAA process will not only speed up the decisions, which is compassionate for people, rather than leaving them lingering in a system for months or years on end, but provide the British public with the necessary confidence and security of knowledge that the system we have employed in this country is fair and robust.

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. We are really keen to ensure that public confidence is at the heart of this process; it cannot be allowed to operate in a vacuum. The public rightly expect us to have an immigration system that has regard to the public interest, and that is what these amendments and the Bill seek to reinforce.

Clause 1 establishes the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority as a body corporate: a public body that is independent of Government. It is the first step in the Bill to overhaul the immigration and asylum appeals system, which has seen unacceptable caseloads and waiting times for determinations to be reached. Amendments 64, 48, 49 and 87 concern subsection (5), which sets out the objectives the authority must meet when exercising its functions, namely

“(a) the aim to be accessible, fair and independent,

(b) the aim to handle its cases quickly and efficiently, and”—

crucially, as the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion mentioned—to

“(c) have regard to the public interest”.

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[Melanie Onn]

The Minister talks about the public interest test. Could she explain how public interest is considered under the current judicial system?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. I do not think many members of the public understand how our appeals process works. They see, particularly in the public domain, many cases that have been strung out with tentative evidence and means to do so, and that has led to a huge crisis of confidence. The Home Secretary set out very clearly that she is keen to restore order and control in our immigration service. That is crucial to the public confidence that we need in this country and for us to have a system that protects people from genuine war and persecution. It is vital that we maintain public confidence. Having regard to public interest is a key part of the system; the public would expect nothing less.

Today, asylum and protection appeals take 72 weeks to be determined on average. As we set out in the “Restoring Order and Control” announcement, that extended period can lead to people bouncing around the systems for years—that is neither fair on them nor, given its cost, acceptable to the public—and, in turn, accruing new, additional reasons for delay. The objectives make it clear not only that justice will be done, but that to have an effective immigration and asylum system, the end-to-end decision making and the enforcement regime must be aligned. Importantly, the decision making is still independent, but it cannot operate in a vacuum. The body must be a key part of the country’s immigration and asylum system; as I say, the public would expect nothing less.

New clause 12 seeks to require the Secretary of State to provide a report on the authority’s operations prior to commencement under clause 52(1). In our view, producing such a report prior to commencement is both unnecessary and, given the requirement on the IIAA to operate independently, inappropriate. Decisions on recruitment and training, which will ultimately inform capacity, timeframes and productivity, are for the authority alone; the Home Office should not pre-empt them in a parliamentary report. The Bill contains plenty of parliamentary reporting and accounting measures, which I am sure we will come to—

[Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)]

The Minister mentions other scrutiny measures, but the Bill in its entirety relies heavily on Henry VIII powers. Additionally, the impact assessment repeatedly admits uncertainty, and we do not know the deterrent impact. How does she make the case that there will be better scrutiny and accountability? Does she not agree that having a full understanding of the implementation of the Bill up front would be a good thing?

[Anna Turley]

I hope the hon. Gentleman has seen the revised impact assessment, which now has a green flag.

Let me set out some of the reporting avenues that are already in the Bill. At the end of each financial year, the authority must produce an annual report on the exercise of its functions and any other information as directed by the Secretary of State. The chief inspector of UK Border Agency will also produce a report once a year, and at other times if requested by the Secretary of State. The chief executive of the authority has a statutory duty to respond to that report and to send that response to the Secretary of State, who must lay it before Parliament alongside the report. The chief executive may also lay written representations on matters they consider to be of importance through the Secretary of State. There is a wide range of provisions in the Bill to ensure proper accountability to Parliament.

Let me pick up the questions asked by the hon. Member for Stockton West about the costs of the IIAA. Detailed plans are currently being developed, and full costs and affordability will be developed through the business case; I undertake to keep Parliament completely updated throughout the process. As I say, we will be developing that, and I will make sure that Parliament is able to scrutinise it in the fullness of time, but in terms of operational capacity and productivity, we should not be pre-empting this. A report prior to commencement is not appropriate; it is for the IIAA, once established, to undertake its reporting duties.

Amendment 87 seeks to narrow the scope of the public interest considerations to those that concern just effective immigration control and the “prompt removal” of those with no right to remain in the United Kingdom. While I have some sympathy with the objectives of the amendment, I am afraid that it cannot be accepted because it is far too narrow in its definition. The authority is an independent body—we have established that very clearly in the Bill—and one crucial part of the immigration and asylum system, not just an extended branch of immigration enforcement. The public interest spans the entire spectrum, and could include things that are not included in the amendment, such as public safety, operational impact and value for money. We do not want to lose those other factors by limiting the definition to effective immigration control and removal. It is important that we keep the scope broad.

[Ben Goldsborough (South Norfolk) (Lab)]

It is important to consider this—and this is why we must reject the Opposition’s approach—in the same way that we consider the police. We must ensure that the public interest covers a wide range of things; if we said it only concerned crime, we would end up in a situation where our police were not protecting individuals or running an effective constabulary in their area and were, in effect, letting down the rest of the country. Does the Minister agree?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right and makes a really good comparison with the police. The police are to some extent accountable to the Home Secretary, but she does not get involved in operational decision making. Our approach to the IIAA is similar: it is vital that we ensure that we have the wider public interest at the heart of it, because it will be a key part of the country’s nationality, immigration and asylum process.

[Tom Gordon]

One of my concerns is that the public interest is quite subjective; we are, in effect, giving a statutory steer on what any Government at any given point decide is in the public interest. Does the Minister not have concerns about how that could be applied by future Governments?

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[Anna Turley]

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point, but we live in a democracy. The Home Secretary of the day will be the Home Secretary of the day, and it is for them to define, legislate and direct the broader immigration system. To me, that is a key feature. It is really important that we have the flexibility to respond to the challenges and changes that our system faces, and that we ensure that we maintain public confidence in this process. At the moment, we have an abstract body that operates in a vacuum, purely with lawyers, and does not become part of the broader immigration process. It is important that public interest is part of this.

[Melanie Onn]

My right hon. Friend makes an excellent point about flexibility. Over recent years, we have seen such an increase in the number of applications and appeals. A system that pays no regard to that finds itself falling behind the times, does it not?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. As I said, we know that things ebb and flow in the immigration system, and it is important that the Home Secretary has a system that commands the confidence of the general public, does not operate in a vacuum and considers the wider public interest.

For the reasons that I have outlined, the Government cannot accept the amendments, and I invite hon. Members to withdraw them.

[Tom Gordon]

I want to press the point that I made to the Minister a moment ago about how one defines public interest. It concerns me that the appeals body that will be deciding on these cases of law will end up with a challenge when different Ministers of the day provide a different steer as to what is in the public interest. Stemming from that, how does Parliament hold the relevant Ministers to account when we are introducing subjective terms and concepts around public interest? For that reason, we will be pressing amendments 48 and 49.

Amendment 48 would make the provision about the IIAA’s exercise of its functions affirmative: as amended, the clause would say that the IIAA must be accessible, fair and independent, not just “aim” to be. What really concerns me and my colleagues is that the element of flexibility, as the Minister calls it, might lead to unfair application and due process throughout the entirety of the process. I would like to know more about what is meant by “aim to”, as opposed to it being actually accessible, fair and independent.

I will oppose amendment 87, because the IIAA should be independent. The amendment would require the authority to give effect to prompt removals and turn an independent adjudicator into an arm of enforcement, and I am concerned that the public and courts would have no confidence in its decisions.

I welcome the fact that the impact assessments have been updated, but there are lingering questions about the scale and timing of the benefits, and the costs are unclear. We are being asked in effect to abolish a working tribunal jurisdiction without a price tag at this point. I would appreciate clarity on those issues as we move forward.

[Anna Turley]

A lot of these issues will be addressed during the course of the day’s discussion, so I look forward to responding to the hon. Gentleman further on those points.

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Division 1

Question accordingly negatived.

Ayes: 2

Noes: 13

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Division 2

Question accordingly negatived.

Ayes: 2

Noes: 13

Amendment proposed: 49, in clause 1, page 2, leave out lines 4 and 5.—(Tom Gordon.)

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Division 3

Question accordingly negatived.

Ayes: 2

Noes: 13

Amendment proposed: 87, in clause 1, page 2, line 4, leave out paragraph (c) and insert—

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Division 4

Question accordingly negatived.

Ayes: 3

Noes: 12

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move amendment 65, in clause 1, page 2, leave out lines 11 to 14.

This amendment would remove the provision which prevents individuals from being able to initiate judicial review proceedings against decisions made by the IIAA.

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[Matt Vickers]

The hon. Member for North Northumberland made a valid point—this is an appeals process. The case has been considered once but can go to appeal for reconsideration and even that decision can be reviewed again—that is a lengthy process. The entire objective of this Bill is to speed up the process so that it is fair to the taxpayers, as well as to those subject to it. Removing a whole tier of appeal would reduce the burden on the taxpayer, as would other amendments the Opposition have tabled. The time limits in clause 8 will not help, because they bind the authority rather than the upper tribunal. The Bill does not shorten the queue; it moves part of it upstairs.

The Government’s case for part 1 is that the new authority will make robust and defensible decisions with trained adjudicators, a chief appeals officer overseeing quality, and a professional standards officer setting standards. If that is right, its decision should be capable of being final. Where a genuine error is made, clause 6 allows it to be corrected and that review should be carried out by a legally qualified senior adjudicator. That is a fair hearing—a check for error and then an end.

Let me be clear about what amendment 85 would leave in place, because the Minister will say it removes any check on the authority. It does not. Every appellant would still have a full hearing before the authority on the facts and the law. Every decision could still be reviewed for an error of law under clause 6. Government amendment 36 will mean that that review is confined to exactly the kind of point the upper tribunal would consider. Amendment 85 would remove the second external tier, and its two separate applications for permission—the listing queue and the power to send a case back to the start. The Government accept that the onward appeal is only on a point of law and not a rehearing. The question is simply who checks the law and how long it takes. Our answer is a legally qualified senior adjudicator, with the authority, and quickly.

There is a further problem with subsection (8) as drafted. Professor Ekins told the Committee that this is not an effective ouster clause, that the courts would read it narrowly and that the Committee should not rest content with it. He pointed to the more precise model that Parliament used in the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022. If the Government agree that the authority’s decisions should be final, they should draft subsection (8) so that it works, and we would welcome their help in doing so on Report.

Amendment 65, in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, would take the Bill in the opposite direction. It would delete subsection (8) altogether and reopen the possibility of judicially reviewing every decision the authority makes, adding a third route of challenge to the two already in the Bill. I understand the hon. Lady’s concern for safeguards, but they are already there. Parliament legislated in 2022 to end judicial review of the upper tribunal’s refusals of permission, precisely because that route had become a means of delay. Clause 7(3) rightly carries that rule across. Amendment 65 would reopen at the first tier what Parliament closed at the second. Our position is clear; enough is enough. Years of delay and expense must come to an end, and the legal merry-go-round has to stop. We will seek to divide the Committee on amendment 85 and we will oppose clause 7.

[Anna Turley]

Amendments 65 and 85 concern the routes through which decisions of the authority may be challenged. I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion and the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), who tabled the amendments.

Amendment 65 would allow individuals to bring judicial review proceedings against the decisions made by the authority. As we have heard, the Bill already provides clear routes for correcting errors and for onward appeals. The authority can review its own decisions under clause 6 and decisions can be appealed to the upper tribunal on a point of law under clause 7 where permission is granted.

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[Siân Berry]

On a point of clarification, is it not correct that under clause 7 the upper tribunal can hear an appeal only based on a point of law? Will the Minister comment on the way that challenging the processes or the administration of someone’s claim could therefore not be taken to the upper tribunal? Is she removing that safeguard? I remain concerned that the complexity of the law and the lack, often, of legal representation, as well as the difficulties that we all see in our casework of people claiming asylum, dealing with the Home Office’s processes and making their way through all this, mean that quite often there are process problems that ought to be challenged, and that this has been denied to people at the upper tribunal.

[Anna Turley]

The process mirrors the existing first-tier tribunal, which reviews errors of law, so it is important to clarify that this remains the same and retains the same definition. It is only on errors of law that a process can be appealed; this does not narrow that process any further.

Amendment 85 takes a very different approach. It would prevent decisions of the authority from being appealed to the upper tribunal at all. I am afraid we do not consider that acceptable. We do not believe that the authority’s decisions should be entirely prevented from onward appeal. That goes too far in the other direction and denies the right of justice where there has been an error of law.

Removing the statutory right of appeal could potentially open us up to even more litigation, as appeals where there has been an error of law would end up going straight to that process without this important safety valve. The authority will make important first-instance decisions, and it is right that there should be a means of correcting a decision when an authority has made, as we have said, an error of law.

[Ben Goldsborough]

One of the main arguments that the Opposition spokesperson put forward was that the system would be too slow under the Bill. However, one key thing that was not mentioned was clause 9(4), which gives the Secretary of State the ability to expedite individual cases. Is it not the case that the Bill as drafted protects the individual’s legal right while also making sure that, when there are grotesque crimes against this country, we can expedite to give people the certainty they need that the system is fair and swift?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. The hon. Member for Stockton West suggests that any unsuccessful appellant could appeal to the upper tribunal and that it will just create another tier, but that is not the case. An appeal may be brought only on a point of law and permission must be granted first, so those safeguards are in place. Permission acts as an appropriate filter so that only cases raising an arguable legal error can proceed. The upper tribunal’s role is not to rehear the appeal simply because a party disagrees with the outcome. It is important to determine whether the law was applied correctly.

Another point about an error of law has been flagged, and I would like to clarify what that means. An error of law is a mistake about the law or its application, rather than a simple disagreement with the outcome or an administrative error. It may arise, for example, where the wrong legal test has been applied, relevant matters have not been considered, the process has been unfair or the reasons given are legally inadequate. The purpose of the review and appeal framework is to ensure that those legal errors can be identified and corrected. It is important that we allow the process to be clear, legally fair and balanced so that, where there is an error of law, that can be referred onwards.

Taken together, the provisions in the Bill strike the right balance. They support the finality and efficient disposal of cases while ensuring that errors can be corrected through clear and appropriate routes. The Government cannot accept these amendments, and I invite the hon. Members not to press them.

Question proposed, That the amendment be made.

Division 5

Question accordingly negatived.

Ayes: 2

Noes: 14

Amendment proposed: 85, in clause 1, page 2, line 13, leave out from “decisions)” to the end of line 14.—(Matt Vickers.)

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Division 6

Question accordingly negatived.

Ayes: 3

Noes: 13

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 22 to 24.

Schedule 1.

[Anna Turley]

I would like to speak to clause 1 in more detail. As we have discussed, clause 1 will establish the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority as a body corporate: a public body that is independent of Government. It is the first step in the Bill towards overhauling the current immigration and asylum appeals system, which has seen unacceptable caseloads and waiting times for a determination to be reached. The clause details the primary function of the authority, which will be to determine immigration and asylum appeals as well as applications for immigration bail. It will give the IIAA the authority to determine the same case types determined by judges in the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber today.

Access to justice is a fundamental common-law principle and a core requirement of the rule of law. Clause 1 will place a statutory duty on the IIAA to uphold that through a statutory objective to be accessible, fair and independent. As set out in the clause, the authority must also aim to handle its cases quickly and efficiently, and have regard to the public interest in the performance of its functions. The clause makes robustly clear that Ministers must uphold the independence of the authority and not influence decisions through any special access to its adjudicators. The clause also states that a decision of the authority in relation to its primary function may be challenged in legal proceedings only in line with the review and appeal framework. Such challenges will be directed to the authority’s review process and onward appeal route to the upper tribunal.

Schedule 1 makes a number of consequential amendments needed to transfer specified immigration and asylum appeal and immigration bail functions from the first-tier tribunal to the authority. Government amendments 22 and 24 make further consequential amendments to the schedule, which I will be detailing in due course. The schedule updates the relevant legislation so that references to the first-tier tribunal, the tribunal and tribunal procedure rules are replaced, where appropriate, with references to the IIAA and its procedure rules. Those amendments apply across the categories of cases that will form the IIAA’s primary function, as set out in clause 1. They are necessary and largely technical amendments, required so that the wider legislative framework operates coherently once the authority begins determining those cases. I commend Government amendments 22 and 24, clause 1 and schedule 1 to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Government amendments 22, 23 and 24 make further consequential changes to schedule 1 and appear to be technical. We do not oppose them. Is the Minister confident that the list is now complete? On clause 1 itself, the Opposition and the British public have one main question: how will this new appeals body get decisions made more quickly? What will the authority be able to do that the existing tribunal cannot? What reduction in waiting times do Ministers expect it to deliver, and by when?

Let me put the question plainly. The Government are taking immigration appeals away from the first-tier tribunal and giving them to a new body, but let us look at what stays the same: the same appeals brought by the same people against the same Home Office decisions, with a right of appeal to the same upper tribunal. Unless something fundamental changes in how quickly cases are decided and in how many people are removed at the end of them, this is rearranging the deckchairs. A new name on the door and a new chief executive will not clear a single case. The public will rightly ask what all that upheaval is for.

The Committee has been given very little to go on, and it has not been told what the Government heard before they wrote the Bill. In March, the Home Office opened a call for evidence on how the body should be designed, covering the recruitment and training of adjudicators, timeframes and oversight. It closed on 6 May. The Home Office said the responses would “inform the legislation”. The Bill was introduced seven weeks later and, so far as I can find, no response to that call for evidence has been published, then or since. Why not? What did the respondents say? Where did the Government disagree with them, and why? Will the Minister commit to publishing the response before Report stage?

Next, the backlog. More than 150,000 people are waiting for an appeal. Do those cases move to the new authority? Do they stay with the first-tier tribunal until they are finished? The authority is to take over gradually, so both systems will be running side by side for some time. How will the Government stop that creating more delay, or cases being lost between the two? The Government will be aware, from the difficulties of folding NHS England back into the Department of Health and Social Care, how hard it is to move functions, staff and buildings from one body to another while keeping a service running. What lessons have been learned, and when will any of this actually happen? The Bill does not say.

Part 1 comes into force when Ministers decide. The authority opens its doors when Ministers decide. Under clause 15, the first-tier tribunal carries on hearing immigration appeals for as long as Ministers decide. The Committee is being asked to approve the replacement of the tribunal without being told when it will be replaced. I ask the Minister for three dates. When will the first case be transferred to the authority? When will the last? On what date will the first-tier tribunal hear its final immigration appeal? If the Government do not know, they should say so.

Turning to the breadth of what the authority will decide, subsection (2) goes well beyond asylum. The authority will decide applications for immigration bail, appeals against deprivation of British citizenship and appeals under the EEA citizens’ rights regulations. Those are serious decisions about liberty and nationality. Under clause 2, many of them could be taken by adjudicators with no legal qualification. Will deprivation of citizenship appeals and deportation appeals brought by foreign criminals be reserved for senior adjudicators? Also, how will clause 1(8) operate where the complaint is about a procedural decision taken during a case, rather than about the final outcome?

Finally, on the practicalities, when will the authority start hearing cases? How many cases will it handle in its first year? Are the staff and money in place? Will the Minister publish the staffing, funding and transition plans, including the arrangements for appeals that are already listed for hearing?

The Opposition’s own borders plan would go further than the Bill. It would abolish the immigration tribunal altogether, with decisions instead being made in the Home Office through a quick, internal appeal. However, whichever model is chosen, the test is the same: decisions made quickly, and decisions acted on.

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[Siân Berry]

I have very nearly finished, so I will press on. At its heart, the IIAA fundamentally represents another ill-thought-through Government proposal to create a truncated legal process. It is part of the previous Prime Minister’s misconceived attempts to pander to the disturbing ideas of Reform UK and its even more unsettling offshoot, Restore Britain. We saw from Reform UK’s proposals yesterday that only standing up for asylum rights will do in the face of its politics, and that the far right of politics will never be happy with anything other than the total removal of asylum rights.

Meanwhile, measures like those in clause 1 of this Bill will prove impractical, expensive and ineffective in addressing the backlog, and they will hurt the most vulnerable people in the world. These proposals must be dropped, if not today then well before the Bill leaves the House of Commons. I will vote against clause 1.

[Anna Turley]

I thank all hon. Members for speaking in the opening debates. As we have discussed, clause 1 and schedule 1 will establish the IIAA, with the key aim of overhauling the current system and driving down the unacceptable waiting times, which are causing significant problems in the system. As I set out, we know that public consent for our asylum system is fraying, and we have heard that from colleagues today.

The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion set out very clearly and passionately that the current system is letting down those who are genuinely fleeing war and persecution as well. Genuine asylum seekers are not served by a process that gets ensnared in legal chew and does not have the opportunity to correct errors quickly. This is about enabling us to streamline the process, reduce errors and deal with people quickly and fairly in a much more managed way than the current system, which is letting everyone down on all sides, including those who are going through the process. As has been demonstrated, they are living in limbo at the taxpayer’s expense for far too long, and that is making it increasingly difficult for their cases to have a fair hearing. We all know the phrase about justice delayed, and I am afraid that that is the situation we are currently in.

I have set out the case fairly substantially, so I will not go over the arguments about the principles behind this again. Independence from Government is a cornerstone of the establishment of this new authority, and clause 1 seeks to protect that. Government amendments 22 to 24, while technical, will allow for the full operation of the IIAA when they begin their important work of determining cases. I want to come back to some of the questions raised by the hon. Member for Stockton West about transition and so on. As we have discussed, the scale and nature of the current asylum appeals caseload cannot be sustainably managed within the existing limits of the first-tier tribunal. Our assessment is that a fundamental reform is required to create a system capable of handling caseload volumes at speed while maintaining quality of decision making, fairness and independence.

[Tom Gordon]

The Government have already increased the first-tier tribunal sitting days by 19% and set a 24-week target. Is there a reason why the Minister does not want to see those measures work before dismantling the judge-led system? Could she elaborate on that?

[Anna Turley]

We have put in substantial investment. I mentioned at the beginning that we have increased the judicial workforce by 21% to 311 judges, with 61 new fee-paid judges and 25 salaried judges starting between January and March this year, but we cannot continue to increase the judicial workforce at the rate that we need to deal with the ever-burgeoning appeals process—it is simply not sustainable. We need a system in which we can recruit people far more quickly and flexibly to make important decisions. I will come on to this later in our discussions, but we trust all sorts of people with important decisions, whether magistrates or planning inspectorates. We are building a workforce that will be making serious and consequential decisions, and we are doing so in a way that is not reliant on a slow process to increase the judicial workforce, which simply cannot cope with the increase in volumes of appeals.

[Tom Gordon]

I appreciate the Minister being generous with her time. Is she able to rule out this model becoming something that other tribunals, such as benefits or property, might end up seeing, with Departments gaining greater statutory powers over the tribunal hearing appeals against them?

[Anna Turley]

I think we have been clear, and the Bill is clear, about the safeguards—not least the statutory requirement for Ministers to respect the independence of the authority. Those important safeguards are on the face of the Bill, and we are very clear about that.

To continue responding to the questions from the hon. Member for Stockton West, we are establishing the authority to offer increased and more flexible capacity and an enhanced ability to prioritise cases in the public interest. We expect a significant period of dual running, where the first-tier tribunal will continue to hear the existing appeals. That will run in parallel to the new Independent Immigration Appeals Authority, and will ensure continuity and that backlogs are addressed as quickly as possible.

On costs, implementations and benefits, as I mentioned earlier, we will bring forward detailed plans for the new authority, which will include the costs. Work is continuing across the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice and His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service to refine those costs and establish comparable current costs for the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber. Those are not yet agreed or publishable for either comparison, but throughout the business case we will develop the full programme costs, affordability and benefits.

In terms of when we will start to make decisions, the authority will be introduced through a phased transition. The first-tier tribunal will continue to hear existing appeals in parallel, as I said, while the new authority begins to take on specific cohorts of new cases. We know that the new system will be quicker. The current system is taking too long to deliver decisions. The Bill creates a scalable appeals system with greater capacity and faster processes, while retaining independent scrutiny and fairness on individual decision making.

I have hopefully answered most of the questions that have been raised so far, so I will conclude by summarising the Government amendments in this group. Although technical, they will allow for the full operation of the IIAA when it begins its important work of determining cases. Therefore, I commend them to the Committee.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Division 7

Question accordingly agreed to.

Ayes: 14

Noes: 2

Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

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Division 8

Question accordingly agreed to.

Ayes: 13

Noes: 2

Schedule 1, as amended, agreed to.

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If the Government persist in the choice to have some non-qualified adjudicators, they need to consider making amendments to introduce further safeguards, for example to ensure that panels cannot contain non-legal members unless the legally qualified member remains responsible for legal determinations, or perhaps unless the appellant consents to it, or if the case does not raise a protection, article 3, article 8 or non-refoulement issue. I really worry that non-legally qualified adjudicators will fall short on those issues. I thank the Committee for its attention for such a long time. I plan to press amendments 66 and 67 to a vote.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for introducing her amendments. I will address amendments 66 and 67 and respond to some of the points she raised, but I will first give an overview of the measures grouped for consideration, including the Government amendments.

Clause 2 introduces the IIAA’s non-executive and executive members and deals with their recruitment. Those are fundamental roles, needed to enable the authority to recruit more widely and to begin operating, and with the leave of the Committee, I will explain some of them now.

The chair and the professional standards officer are non-executive members. The Secretary of State will be responsible for their appointment in accordance with the existing public appointments process; there is clear guidance from the Cabinet Office for setting up new bodies. The chief executive and chief appeals officer are executive members. The Secretary of State will appoint the first holders of those roles on merit through fair and open recruitment. Subsequent appointments will be made by the chair in consultation with the professional standards officer. Ministers will have no role in subsequent appointments of the executive roles.

The IIAA adjudicators will also be executive members and each will be appointed by the chief executive as an executive adjudicator or senior adjudicator. All IIAA executive members will be employees, meaning they will be subject to the terms and conditions of their role, have employment law protections and could be subject to employment proceedings as appropriate. Such proceedings could be in respect of poor performance, and may even lead to dismissal, enabling the IIAA to take the action it considers necessary.

The IIAA will incorporate experience and expertise as much as possible and certain roles will have statutory appointment criteria. The professional standards officer and chief appeals officer must have practised as legal professionals, as defined in the clause, in the UK for at least five years or, in the opinion of the chief executive, have suitable experience in law-related activities. Government amendments 25 to 27 will make a small change to that arrangement, in that the chair, rather than the chief executive, will be the individual who decides whether the professional standards officer possesses that suitable experience.

Senior adjudicators must also meet appointment criteria. They will need to have practised as a legal professional, as defined in the clause, in the UK for at least two years or, in the opinion of the chief executive, have suitable experience in law-related activities. The IIAA will thereby be able to recruit from a much wider pool of potential candidates. Enabling those who have suitable experience in law-related activities to become a senior adjudicator will make the authority better able to retain talent and knowledge, as it will allow executive adjudicators with no prior legal background to be appointed as senior adjudicators. Being able to retain a strong pipeline of talent with clear opportunities for career progression will be key to our success.

[Tom Gordon]

The Committee has heard from several stakeholders, including UNHCR, which stated:

“Lowering professional requirements in response to capacity pressures risks undermining the quality of decision-making and may ultimately prove counterproductive.”

Will the Minister address that point?

[Anna Turley]

I recognise the hon. Gentleman’s challenge, but I am not sure how that is lowering standards. Just because they are not legally qualified does not necessarily demean the professional standards by which people will be making these decisions. I will explain more about our expectations of people in those roles.

[Melanie Onn]

Is it not the case that there will be people working in UNHCR who are not lawyers, such as people who have worked in refugee charities or who are experts in migrant work, and who have been doing that for a lifetime more than the time that somebody needs to go to law school in order to practise, or to go through the glad-handing process of becoming a judge? Would such people not be equally well qualified as somebody who has gone through an academic route?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend makes a crucial point. We have to be really careful to say that having legal qualifications is not a prerequisite for having good judgment. We see all sorts of good judgment by professionals; it is demonstrated every day by magistrates, ombudsman and planning inspectors, for example.

[Mr Paul Foster (South Ribble) (Lab)]

The Minister mentioned magistrates. Magistrates are the backbone of our court structure, and they are not legally qualified. Does she agree that there is a huge precedent there and that magistrates do a great job?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend is right to pay tribute to our incredible army of magistrates, who are volunteers. We are talking about professionals who will have a whole process of support, qualification and assessment. It is wrong to say that legal qualifications should be the only prerequisite for that kind of judgment.

[Tom Gordon]

I want to press the Minister a little further. While our magistrates do incredible work, they often hear cases concerning relatively low-level crimes. Does she think that is comparable to understanding immigration and asylum claims, which might be really complex, from people fleeing political violence overseas?

[Anna Turley]

I am afraid I completely disagree with the hon. Gentleman. The decisions that we ask our magistrates to take, which may result in restrictions on liberty, are life-changing. I think they are just as important as the decisions that we are discussing.

[David Smith]

To reiterate the point, as someone who stood to be a magistrate and was accepted, I can say that there was no requirement for legal qualifications, but there are still really important decisions that have to be made. Also, as I understand it, in the current system, first-instance asylum decision makers in the Home Office do not require legal qualifications, so this is not new.

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[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend makes a really important point. As I have set out, there will be senior appointees within the organisation who have legal qualifications, so any concerns on any aspect of law can be immediately referred to seniors. We do not have to have people with those incredibly costly and time-consuming qualifications to enable people to make these decisions. That is a really important point of principle.

Schedule 2 introduces important protections that will enable the authority to operate independently and autonomously. It makes it clear that the IIAA is not to be regarded as a servant or agent of the Crown. The disqualification of IIAA members from serving simultaneously as members of any UK legislatures underlines the expectation that authority members will be impartial in the performance of their functions. To further protect the IIAA from undue influence, all IIAA members, inclusive of senior officers and adjudicators, must be appointed on merit and based on fair and open competition.

The schedule limits the grounds for removal of non-executive members to serious misconduct, conflict of interest or being unable, unwilling or unfit to carry out their functions. Those in these important roles cannot be removed through the involvement of the Secretary of State. Executive members of the IIAA, the chief executive, the chief appeals officer and the adjudicators will be employees. The terms of their employment are to be set by either the Secretary of State, in the case of the first chief appeals officer and chief executive, or the IIAA, in the case of future appointments of senior officers and adjudicators.

The IIAA will be accountable to Parliament as a public body. Schedule 2 places a duty on the IIAA to report annually, providing Parliament with a means to scrutinise the authority on the performance of its functions. I hope hon. Members agree that the schedule strikes the right balance between operational autonomy and parliamentary accountability.

Let me move on to the amendments tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. Amendment 66 would give the Judicial Appointments Commission a role in appointing not only adjudicators, but the IIAA’s executive and non-executive members. These are completely different statutory roles from judicial offices, with their own employee arrangements and distinct governance, leadership and adjudicative responsibilities, and it would not be appropriate to apply the single judicial appointments model to them. That is designed for people who are legally trained to be candidates for judicial office. That is not what the adjudicators will be. They are not legal appointments—professionals who will be highly trained, yes, but not legal appointments.

The Bill establishes clear and transparent appointment arrangements appropriate to each role. The non-executive members and the first chief executive and chief appeals officer will be appointed by the Secretary of State. Subsequent appointments of the chief executive and chief appeals officer will be made by the chair, and adjudicators will be appointed by the chief executive. Those appointments must be made following fair and open competition, as set out in paragraph 2 of schedule 2. Ministers will also be under an express duty on the face of the Bill to uphold the independence of the IIAA.

To be clear, there will be no direct involvement of Ministers in the recruitment processes for adjudicators. I therefore do not consider that involving the Judicial Appointments Commission in appointments is necessary or appropriate.

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[Matt Vickers]

I will deal first with the amendments and then with the clause. Amendment 66, in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, would require every member of the authority, from the chair to each adjudicator, to be appointed by the Judicial Appointments Commission. I understand that that is offered as a guarantee of independence; in practice, it could rebuild the very recruitment pipeline that the Government say they are trying to escape. The case made for part 1 is that reliance on judicial availability has left the system without the capacity or the flexibility to meet demand. Routing every appointment through the commission would import that constraint on to the new body on its first day. We cannot support that.

Amendment 67 would require every adjudicator to be legally qualified. It raises an important question, and the Opposition have our own concerns about qualification, which I will come to. What matters is that every adjudicator is properly equipped to make sound decisions quickly and that the authority can recruit enough of them to make a real difference.

Government amendments 25 to 27 provide that where a professional standards officer is appointed on the strength of experience rather than formal qualifications, it will be the chair and not the chief executive who judges whether that experience is sufficient. That seems sensible, since the officer who sets standards for adjudicators should not owe their appointment to the executive they oversee. I would be grateful if the Minister set out the rationale in a little more detail.

Clause 2 states that the Home Secretary is to appoint the chair, the professional standards officer, the first chief executive and the chief appeals officer. After that, the chair will appoint the two chief officers, and the chief executive will appoint the adjudicators who hear cases.

On qualifications, the Bill sets out a test for senior adjudicators: they must have spent two years in practice as a legal professional or have law-related experience that the chief executive considers equivalent. On executive adjudicators, the Bill is silent; clause 3(2) says only that adjudicators must receive “adequate training”. The Committee would benefit from knowing more of what the Government have in mind. What standard will an executive adjudicator be expected to meet before deciding a case, and how will it be tested? Will it be set out in the standards the professional standards officer must publish under clause 3(6), so that Parliament and the public can see it? That matters for speed as much as for fairness. Whoever is recruited, training and assessment must be up to the job. A poor first decision is one that is challenged, set aside and heard again, and every such case is potentially another year in which someone with no right to be here remains.

I have several further questions for the Minister. What criteria will the chief executive use to decide whether law-related experience is equivalent to legal practice? How many adjudicators will be recruited at the outset, and will experienced tribunal judges be encouraged to apply? Which categories of case will be reserved to senior adjudicators, and will the time it takes to recruit and train this new workforce add to the backlog in the meantime? Finally, when will the first appointments be made? Can the recruitment process begin before Royal Assent?

[Anna Turley]

The shadow Minister mentioned the Bill’s use of the phrase “adequate training and support”. In answering his question on that, as well as some of the other questions he asked that were more practical, it is really important for me to specify that it is not for the Home Office to decide that. The chief executive will be responsible for ensuring that the IIAA adjudicators have adequate training and support to maintain their independence from the executive. The chief appeals officer is responsible for overseeing the quality of decisions and developing a quality assurance mechanism. They will be able to identify any specific training needs of adjudicators and recommend them to the chief executive. It is really important that I confirm to the Committee that the IIAA is independent. It is not for the Government to decide what accreditation and continuous development will be required for the IIAA adjudicators, who will, in essence, be making decisions on appeals to which the Home Office is a party.

[Siân Berry]

I have heard arguments from Government Back Benchers and the Minister that, for example, Home Office officials are not required to be legally qualified. This is a notoriously complex area of law, and I cannot see how that does not reinforce the need for true expertise in appeals. We have also heard that magistrates are not required to be legally qualified, but magistrates’ decisions are backed up by appeals to a body of legally qualified people. The Bill seeks to remove that, so I cannot honestly agree with this measure.

There are two extra points I want to make from the written evidence that we received from JUSTICE. The first is about training. The Minister talks about the fact that adjudicators will be properly trained. According to JUSTICE, Home Office asylum decision makers were given 22 weeks’ training, but it was found that that was inadequate and did not provide them with the necessary information to perform their job effectively. I fail to see how things are going to work out any better for adjudicators taking the place of legally qualified professionals.

The Minister mentioned that legally qualified people advise magistrates and that legally qualified people will be available to advise the adjudicators. JUSTICE makes the point very well—