Immigration and Asylum Bill (Third sitting)

David Smith Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Siân Berry]

Amendment 65 to clause 1 would allow judicial review of decisions. It would remove the provision in the Bill that excludes all judicial review of IIAA appeal decisions. Clause 1(8) is a so-called ouster clause, as the explanatory notes confirm. It is designed to immunise the IIAA’s appeal decisions from judicial review in the High Court. The purpose of the amendment is to remove the Government’s attempt to undermine the rule of law.

There will be two ways to challenge an IIAA appeal decision in the Bill as it stands. The first is that the IIAA can review its own decisions, under clause 6, and the second is that the upper tribunal can hear an appeal based only on a point of law, under clause 7. I hope we can agree that judicial review is a mechanism of fundamental constitutional importance and therefore should be restricted in only very limited circumstances. The Ministry of Justice has referred to judicial review as

“the rule of law in action”.

It ensures that public bodies act only in accordance with their legal powers and with respect for our human rights. The Home Office’s wish for faster and cheaper appeals does not come above the rule of law.

Ousting judicial review is unnecessary and disproportionate. Where there is a suitable alternative remedy, such as an appeal to the upper tribunal like the one for which the Bill provides, the High Court will normally refuse permission for a judicial review anyway. That is because the High Court considers that the alternative remedy will protect the rule of law. If the High Court considers that the upper tribunal appeal in clause 7 is sufficient, there will rarely be judicial review cases. Retaining the claimant’s ability to apply for judicial review would simply mean that the High Court could grant permission in residual cases where it believed that an upper tribunal appeal would not be an effective alternative remedy.

Clause 1(8) attempts to remove that residual right entirely. It is a rare absolute ouster clause, which does not permit judicial review of an IIAA appeal’s decision in any circumstances. Even the previous Conservative Government, when creating an ouster clause in section 1 of the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022, retained access to judicial review in some circumstances. Clause 1 of this Bill is constitutionally exceptional, and I would like the Minister to explain why this absolute exclusion from justice is deemed to be okay for those seeking asylum, when even the previous Government would not apply it to unnaturalised citizens.

[David Smith (North Northumberland) (Lab)]

The core point of the hon. Lady’s speech is the rule of law, which all members of the Committee support, but does she accept that, first, we are talking about the appeals process? At this point, they have already appealed—that is one opportunity that someone seeking asylum has already taken to question the decision. Secondly, there are two other ways in the Bill through which a person seeking asylum can have a decision reviewed. Some of the hon. Lady’s rhetoric does not do justice to the Bill.

[Siân Berry]

I appreciate that, and I have laid out the possible alternative remedies, but judicial review is an essential backstop. I do not see why the Government are trying to remove it. This is constitutionally exceptional and I want the Minister to explain why it is okay.

This measure will not only undermine the rule of law; it will inevitably provoke litigation in the courts about how this ouster clause should be interpreted and effected. It is concerning that the Government want the IIAA, which is a novel—experimental, even—non-expert body institutionally close to the Home Office, making life or death appeal decisions, to be made completely immune from judicial review at the outset. It demonstrates the Government’s continuing and concerning prioritisation of speed over the rule of law and justice, which we have seen in other Bills. In those circumstances, my amendment is completely necessary. It would ensure that judicial review remained available in those cases where the High Court believed it was necessary. I hope that all Members will support it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

I will speak to why clause 1 and schedule 1 should not form part of the Bill. Although I will not speak to every clause, all these reasons equally apply to the rest of part 1, which deals with the creation and implementation of the IIAA.

It is a real shame that this policy has not yet become another U-turn from this Administration. I compare this Bill with the Courts and Tribunals Bill, particularly how adjustments were made following feedback from the legal profession and human rights experts on the establishment of truncated legal process and rights, which was one of the Bill’s most misconceived parts. After the Government pressed on with those plans during the Bill Committee, on which I also sat, today it is being debated on Report without several of the clauses that would have put jury trials out of reach for far too many offences. Although they were quite rightly not selected, I tabled amendments to this Bill that would have removed part 1, which creates the independent immigration appeals authority and all its workings, and I look forward to seeing such proposals also being removed before its Report stage.

The Government said that clause 1 and the rest of part 1 are needed to clear a backlog of more than 150,000 appeals, which currently take an average of over 60 weeks to decide. That backlog is real, and it is important that actions are taken to clear it, but part 1 misconceives the issues. Evidence shows that delays are driven by poor initial Home Office decisions and a severe shortage of legal aid, but part 1 addresses neither.

Instead, the Bill would replace a working, independent judicial tribunal with a costly body that risks being ineffective and lacks independence and fairness. Above all, creating unfair processes and further adding to a hostile environment for asylum will not help stop the boats. In its written evidence, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees called for

“a comprehensive strategy addressing the drivers of irregular movement, expanding safe, regular pathways, strengthening international responsibility-sharing, and enhancing practical cooperation with European and other partner States.”

In oral evidence, the Government’s own National Crime Agency had no analysis or explanation about the real drivers of small boat crossings, being concerned only with the Government’s approach of layering an even harsher deterrence and enforcement regime on to the real causes. It is those real causes that need attention.

I want the Government to listen on this issue, and that depends on Ministers hearing the arguments—that is what this Committee is for. I will be here throughout the Committee to highlight the points made by experts on the needs and real lives of those seeking asylum. They are talking about the difficulties they face in gaining a hearing for their case or in dealing with Home Office processes. In particular—this is something we all know as MPs, because we try to help constituents navigate this system in our casework—they talk about how poor the decision making in the Home Office is, and how the Bill does nothing to improve it.

I want to bring some evidence from Brighton, given by one of a large number of charities that are providing direct support to refugees, as befits a city of sanctuary. The organisation One Church, which does a lot of work in this area, told me:

“The impact of UK immigration policies for the past 15 years has at times crippled our ability to do business and operate a charity focussed (ironically) on marginalised people across Sussex. The escalating cost of filing for visas, the precarity and punitive nature of asylum claims and other proceedings, and the emotional devastation when facing all-too-common Home Office errors have all contributed to outcomes including business costs we can’t afford, charitable work that we’ve had to stop or rein in, and full-on mental health breakdowns that rupture communities and cost incalculably more in long-term complications.”

One Church gave me several examples, but here is one:

“An asylum seeker from Zimbabwe…was unable to earn income or work a job for more than eight years—even as he also was barred from public funds—while his own appeals went through the Home Office system, requiring the community to house him for free and support his basic living needs for many years. He ultimately won his case as well, including a public apology from a judge, but struggled to cope with the effects of such a long stint in a precarious and dependent position. This entire cascade of events was due to an unclear Home Office deadline that meant his paperwork was alleged to have been filed less than 24 hours late.”

[David Smith]

I thank the hon. Lady for the powerful story that she has just shared. I ran a homelessness charity before becoming an MP, which housed people who were refugees or seeking asylum. Is not expediting the process—stopping appeal after appeal—as much about supporting those who seek asylum, doing justice to them, as it is about wider society?

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

The hon. Member is right that, sometimes, appointments of supposedly independent commissioners are made—I had experience of that recently in relation to equalities—but there is often a political element to the appointment and the direction they seem to take. We must always appreciate that and guard against it. Taking the appointments one step away from the Home Office may not completely remove the possibility of that, but the Judicial Appointments Commission is a robust body doing a similar job already and should have this role. That is what my amendment seeks to introduce. The Judicial Appointments Commission has two decades of experience in appointing independent judges, and I think it is the body best able to ensure the independence of candidates for adjudicators.

[David Smith]

Before the hon. Lady moves on, I wish to build on the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk. It is a well-established principle within governance that quasi-judicial bodies are appointed by the Government. For example, the chief planning inspector is appointed by the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government. The chief inspector of prisons is appointed by the Secretary of State for Justice. The Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman is appointed by the Prime Minister. Furthermore, the Bill outlines that only the first chair and professional standards officer will be appointed by the Home Secretary. Is the hon. Lady arguing that all those other appointments made by Government have the same illegitimacy?

[Siân Berry]

All I am pointing out is that the Home Office’s record on this kind of thing is not brilliant, and that there exists a body far more appropriate than the Government’s proposal for direct appointments. I do not quite understand why Members are arguing so hard against that, when I am certain that the Judicial Appointments Commission would be happy to take up the role.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I am afraid I completely disagree with the hon. Gentleman. The decisions that we ask our magistrates to take, which may result in restrictions on liberty, are life-changing. I think they are just as important as the decisions that we are discussing.

[David Smith]

To reiterate the point, as someone who stood to be a magistrate and was accepted, I can say that there was no requirement for legal qualifications, but there are still really important decisions that have to be made. Also, as I understand it, in the current system, first-instance asylum decision makers in the Home Office do not require legal qualifications, so this is not new.