Immigration and Asylum Bill (Third sitting)

Ben Goldsborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Anna Turley]

I hope the hon. Gentleman has seen the revised impact assessment, which now has a green flag.

Let me set out some of the reporting avenues that are already in the Bill. At the end of each financial year, the authority must produce an annual report on the exercise of its functions and any other information as directed by the Secretary of State. The chief inspector of UK Border Agency will also produce a report once a year, and at other times if requested by the Secretary of State. The chief executive of the authority has a statutory duty to respond to that report and to send that response to the Secretary of State, who must lay it before Parliament alongside the report. The chief executive may also lay written representations on matters they consider to be of importance through the Secretary of State. There is a wide range of provisions in the Bill to ensure proper accountability to Parliament.

Let me pick up the questions asked by the hon. Member for Stockton West about the costs of the IIAA. Detailed plans are currently being developed, and full costs and affordability will be developed through the business case; I undertake to keep Parliament completely updated throughout the process. As I say, we will be developing that, and I will make sure that Parliament is able to scrutinise it in the fullness of time, but in terms of operational capacity and productivity, we should not be pre-empting this. A report prior to commencement is not appropriate; it is for the IIAA, once established, to undertake its reporting duties.

Amendment 87 seeks to narrow the scope of the public interest considerations to those that concern just effective immigration control and the “prompt removal” of those with no right to remain in the United Kingdom. While I have some sympathy with the objectives of the amendment, I am afraid that it cannot be accepted because it is far too narrow in its definition. The authority is an independent body—we have established that very clearly in the Bill—and one crucial part of the immigration and asylum system, not just an extended branch of immigration enforcement. The public interest spans the entire spectrum, and could include things that are not included in the amendment, such as public safety, operational impact and value for money. We do not want to lose those other factors by limiting the definition to effective immigration control and removal. It is important that we keep the scope broad.

[Ben Goldsborough (South Norfolk) (Lab)]

It is important to consider this—and this is why we must reject the Opposition’s approach—in the same way that we consider the police. We must ensure that the public interest covers a wide range of things; if we said it only concerned crime, we would end up in a situation where our police were not protecting individuals or running an effective constabulary in their area and were, in effect, letting down the rest of the country. Does the Minister agree?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right and makes a really good comparison with the police. The police are to some extent accountable to the Home Secretary, but she does not get involved in operational decision making. Our approach to the IIAA is similar: it is vital that we ensure that we have the wider public interest at the heart of it, because it will be a key part of the country’s nationality, immigration and asylum process.

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[Anna Turley]

The process mirrors the existing first-tier tribunal, which reviews errors of law, so it is important to clarify that this remains the same and retains the same definition. It is only on errors of law that a process can be appealed; this does not narrow that process any further.

Amendment 85 takes a very different approach. It would prevent decisions of the authority from being appealed to the upper tribunal at all. I am afraid we do not consider that acceptable. We do not believe that the authority’s decisions should be entirely prevented from onward appeal. That goes too far in the other direction and denies the right of justice where there has been an error of law.

Removing the statutory right of appeal could potentially open us up to even more litigation, as appeals where there has been an error of law would end up going straight to that process without this important safety valve. The authority will make important first-instance decisions, and it is right that there should be a means of correcting a decision when an authority has made, as we have said, an error of law.

[Ben Goldsborough]

One of the main arguments that the Opposition spokesperson put forward was that the system would be too slow under the Bill. However, one key thing that was not mentioned was clause 9(4), which gives the Secretary of State the ability to expedite individual cases. Is it not the case that the Bill as drafted protects the individual’s legal right while also making sure that, when there are grotesque crimes against this country, we can expedite to give people the certainty they need that the system is fair and swift?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. The hon. Member for Stockton West suggests that any unsuccessful appellant could appeal to the upper tribunal and that it will just create another tier, but that is not the case. An appeal may be brought only on a point of law and permission must be granted first, so those safeguards are in place. Permission acts as an appropriate filter so that only cases raising an arguable legal error can proceed. The upper tribunal’s role is not to rehear the appeal simply because a party disagrees with the outcome. It is important to determine whether the law was applied correctly.

Another point about an error of law has been flagged, and I would like to clarify what that means. An error of law is a mistake about the law or its application, rather than a simple disagreement with the outcome or an administrative error. It may arise, for example, where the wrong legal test has been applied, relevant matters have not been considered, the process has been unfair or the reasons given are legally inadequate. The purpose of the review and appeal framework is to ensure that those legal errors can be identified and corrected. It is important that we allow the process to be clear, legally fair and balanced so that, where there is an error of law, that can be referred onwards.

Taken together, the provisions in the Bill strike the right balance. They support the finality and efficient disposal of cases while ensuring that errors can be corrected through clear and appropriate routes. The Government cannot accept these amendments, and I invite the hon. Members not to press them.

Question proposed, That the amendment be made.

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[Siân Berry]

I agree about the growth in the backlog, but as I said earlier, the analysis is pretty clear that that growth comes from an increase in refusals as well as the increasing speed with which the Home Office is making decisions. To me, those two things go together. The increase in refusals is likely to represent an increase in mistaken refusals—refusals that should not have happened. We cannot get away with just looking at the proportions here, either. We have to recognise that this will result in a number of people being treated as badly as they possibly can be by a country in which they are trying to seek asylum, having already had to leave the country in which they would much prefer to stay due to human rights considerations that are not properly taken into account at the initial decision stage in 44% of cases.

[Ben Goldsborough]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Siân Berry]

I have very nearly finished, so I will press on. At its heart, the IIAA fundamentally represents another ill-thought-through Government proposal to create a truncated legal process. It is part of the previous Prime Minister’s misconceived attempts to pander to the disturbing ideas of Reform UK and its even more unsettling offshoot, Restore Britain. We saw from Reform UK’s proposals yesterday that only standing up for asylum rights will do in the face of its politics, and that the far right of politics will never be happy with anything other than the total removal of asylum rights.

Meanwhile, measures like those in clause 1 of this Bill will prove impractical, expensive and ineffective in addressing the backlog, and they will hurt the most vulnerable people in the world. These proposals must be dropped, if not today then well before the Bill leaves the House of Commons. I will vote against clause 1.

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[Siân Berry]

I will speak to amendment 66, about the appointments process to the IIAA, and amendment 67, about the legal qualifications and experience of adjudicators.

Under the Bill, the chair of the IIAA will be a Home Office appointee. The chair will decide the IIAA’s chief executive, who will then appoint adjudicators. By contrast, I believe that the leadership and decision-making roles in the IIAA should be decided by the Judicial Appointments Commission, the body that appoints judges. That would plainly and simply ensure independence from the Government and Parliament, which the Bill does not currently guarantee. We cannot risk leaving policies like this under the day-to-day political control of anyone in Government. Every safeguard must therefore be in place to make sure that this or any future Secretary of State cannot direct the outcome, prioritisation or disposal of these cases. My amendment 66 would fix that and make appointments to the IIAA the responsibility of the Judicial Appointments Commission, not Ministers or their appointees.

I will expand on some key points. According to the Bill, all members of IIAA, senior and junior, will be appointed either directly by the Home Secretary or by someone appointed by them. The chair of the IIAA, for example, will be appointed directly by the Home Secretary, and adjudicators will be appointed by the chief executive, who is given their role by the chair. The Home Office’s fingerprints will therefore be all over the membership of the IIAA, from top to bottom. As has been consistently clear, this Bill drags asylum appeals closer to the Home Office, risking the independence and fairness of appeals in a serious way. By contrast, tribunal judges, who currently hear asylum appeals, are appointed by the Judicial Appointments Commission, which is independent, with no direct input from Ministers.

Evidence has consistently shown over many years that Home Office officials face significant and sometimes inappropriate pressure to make decisions, including asylum decisions, in accordance with political goals. The independent chief inspector of borders and immigration found that that was the case as part of Operation Bridora in 2022, which was a Home Office strategy designed to speed up the processing of Albanian asylum claims. The chief inspector concluded that Ministers imposed an arbitrary and secret target on Home Office officials for only 2% of Albanian claims to be successful. In addition, in a report from the chief inspector this year, it was found that the Home Office was prioritising the quantity of decisions over their quality.

The Home Office’s institutional history is anathema to the independence and fairness that is needed. The ties between the IIAA and Home Office could impose political pressure on the IIAA to operate in accordance with Home Office preferences rather than law and facts. If Ministers are sincere about creating a truly independent appeals body, the safeguards to ensure independence should be robust and tried and tested. My amendment would make all appointments the responsibility of the Judicial Appointments Commission, not Ministers.

[Ben Goldsborough]

I understand the hon. Lady’s concerns about independence from the Government and other bodies, but many bodies across Government are involved in complex cases, such as in criminal law. For example, the Criminal Cases Review Commission is appointed by the MOJ to look into miscarriages of justice. Are we honestly saying that the IIAA would not have those same safeguards, in this case from the Home Secretary rather than the Lord Chancellor? Within the Bill, we are introducing a process that maintains independence while keeping accountability to Parliament, which will be vital in securing our constituents’ trust in a fair and transparent process for our immigration system.

[Siân Berry]

The hon. Member is right that, sometimes, appointments of supposedly independent commissioners are made—I had experience of that recently in relation to equalities—but there is often a political element to the appointment and the direction they seem to take. We must always appreciate that and guard against it. Taking the appointments one step away from the Home Office may not completely remove the possibility of that, but the Judicial Appointments Commission is a robust body doing a similar job already and should have this role. That is what my amendment seeks to introduce. The Judicial Appointments Commission has two decades of experience in appointing independent judges, and I think it is the body best able to ensure the independence of candidates for adjudicators.