Courts and Tribunals Bill
Tuesday 10th March 2026
(5 months, 1 week ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Courts and Tribunals Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
18:56 - The House divided: - Ayes: 203 / Noes: 311 - Question accordingly negatived.
19:09 - The House divided: - Ayes: 304 / Noes: 203 - Question accordingly agreed to.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
The reasoned amendment in the name of the loyal Opposition has been selected.
The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice (Mr David Lammy)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
I am very proud to bring this Bill back before the House, because it will drive long-overdue reform to effectively evolve our 20th-century criminal justice system so that it is fit for the 21st century. This House will recognise that a particular kind of silence now echoes through the corridors of our courts. It is not the silence of a jury carefully weighing the evidence, or the hush as a judge delivers their verdict; it is the silence of waiting. It is the silence of victims who have been told, sometimes for the third or fourth time, that their trial has been adjourned because there is no judge, no courtroom, and no capacity to hear it. It is the silence of people like Katie, who reported her partner for actual bodily harm and rape in 2017 but, staggeringly, did not see justice until 2024, after waiting seven years. Her life fell apart over that period—it left her mental health in tatters and caused her to lose her job. This is an injustice. It is Katie’s injustice and the injustice of thousands of victims across the country, and this Bill seeks to redress that today. It builds on Sir Brian Leveson’s thoughtful and considered review. I am grateful to Sir Brian for all his work, particularly in getting us to this point with part 1 and part 2 of this Bill.
This Government inherited a justice system close to breaking point from the previous Government, who could and should have reformed it. The consequences of their inaction are clear: we have nearly 80,000 cases in the Crown court backlog. That is more than double the number in 2019. More than 20,000 cases wait for more than a year, and that includes around 2,000 rape cases. It is an average of 255 days before a Crown court case gets heard and finishes. For rape, it is a staggering 423 days. If we do nothing, the backlog is projected to reach 200,000 within the next decade. That is five times what it was in 2019. This is not a matter of efficiency; the progressive case for court reform is about whether the institutions of the British state can still deliver justice. For the people we were elected to represent in Parliament, when we speak about the rule of law, we do so as though it is a lofty constitutional principle, but the rule of law is not abstract. It is a public service. If that service cannot be delivered in a timeframe that allows victims to move on with their lives, the law is not ruling, but failing.
Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)
The right hon. Gentleman is right that the rule of law is a living thing, and the connection between the public and the exercise of criminal justice is fundamental. Central to that is the age-old principle of juries and jury service. It is a direct engagement of the public in something that otherwise would be remote from the vast bulk of them. Does he retain my view that jury service is critical, and that juries should play a continuing part in the criminal justice system, or is he determined to minimise the number of jury trials? That is certainly what his proposal looks like to the vast majority of people in the Chamber.
Mr Lammy
I absolutely retain the right hon. Gentleman’s view that juries are a cornerstone of our system. They are fundamental. This Bill is about protecting them. All Governments put thresholds on where juries sit. He will recall that one of his great heroes, Margaret Thatcher, made such a change in 1989.
Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)
I thank the Secretary of State for the progress he is making. I am for reform. My concern, as his own review in 2017 highlighted, is that this will fall on people from black and minority ethnic backgrounds and the inequalities that they already face. Can he reassure me, my constituents in Bradford West and people more widely that he will robustly review the impact of this Bill on people from minority ethnic backgrounds? Will he ensure that it is a meaningful review that holds weight?
Mr Lammy
My hon. Friend probably has more lived experience of the criminal justice system than many others in this Chamber. She has been a doughty campaigner on issues for ethnic minorities across our country for many years. I can give her that reassurance, and I will come to that point a little later in my speech. It is right that there will be a review, so that we understand exactly how our reforms—and, indeed, our criminal justice system in a deeper and better way—are affecting ethnic minority populations. I hope that she will engage in the ambit, scope and direction of that review.
Imran Hussain (Bradford East) (Lab)
My right hon. Friend is right to set out the importance of jury trials as a cornerstone of our democracy and justice system. They are in place for a very good reason. In the Lammy review, he previously emphasised the importance of jury trials and, in particular, the disproportionate impact on BAME communities. What has changed?
Mr Lammy
I know that when my hon. Friend is upset, his baritone deepens—it was not quite as deep today as it has been on other occasions. He will know that I take very seriously the review I did. I will say more about disparities in a moment, but if we look at that review, we see that it was clear that there is tremendous public trust in our juries. When I was asked by David Cameron to do the review, there was concern in some towns and cities and among some ethnic minority populations about situations where they perceived they had an all-white jury. They asked whether it was still fair. Broadly, it was found to still be fair, and there was no evidence that there were unfair trials in our magistrates courts, which do 90% of the work, or if a single judge is sitting on their own. For the reasons that I gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West (Naz Shah), it is right that we review how the system is working and fully understand how these changes will affect the system.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
The Minister and the Government are caught between a rock and a hard place. They have to address the backlog while trying to ensure that jury trials are retained. The general public have deep concern that speed cannot come at the expense of fundamental rights. I know that the Secretary of State will ensure that does not happen, but can he reassure me that any reforms will preserve the right to have a jury trial where that is essential to justice, rather than making piecemeal changes that will, I suspect, prevent people who need jury trials from having them?
Mr Lammy
Juries remain a cornerstone, and I reassure the hon. Gentleman that what we are proposing is about protecting juries. Let us be clear, however, that the Bill is not just about juries; it is a whole package, and that is why I set out just a few weeks ago that investment was key. This is £2.78 billion of investment. As Sir Brian told us in part 2 of his reforms, modernisation and dealing with efficiencies in the system are fundamental.
Victims are worn down, people simply give up, cases collapse and offenders remain free to roam the streets, to commit more crimes and to create more victims. To restore swift and fair justice, we are pulling every lever available, with essential investment, modernisation and reform. Let me start by addressing the reform that has provoked the fiercest debate. The new Crown court bench division, or our so-called swift courts, are dealt with in clause 3 of the Bill. The new division will hear cases with a likely custodial sentence of up to three years, to be heard by a judge sitting alone. The independent review of the criminal courts predicts that this will reduce trial times by at least 20%, and Sir Brian believes that the gains could be greater still. It will free up thousands of hearing days for the more serious cases. That is not just Sir Brian’s view; analysis published today by the Institute for Government supports the modelling behind these reforms, and the predicted time savings that they will deliver. Let me be absolutely clear: indictable-only offences will remain for juries. The most serious crimes, including murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery and grievous bodily harm with intent will never be heard in the new division.
This is not a new principle. Judge-alone trials operate successfully in countries such as Canada, where judges told me that such trials were as much as twice as fast as jury trials, and they are already a normal, everyday part of our justice system. District judges sit alone in magistrates courts every single day, youth courts operate without juries, and family courts deciding whether a parent can see their child always sit without juries.
Karl Turner (Kingston upon Hull East) (Lab)
When the Justice Secretary talks about juries, is it not right to point out that 0.4% of cases from the magistrates courts are appealed against, and that of that 0.4%, which is about 5,000, 41% are successful on appeal? What does he say about that?
Mr Lammy
My hon. Friend is entirely right: 41% are successful, and that, of course, means that 59% are not. With the new permission stage, those 41% would still get through. It seems to me absolutely right that, in order to make the system properly efficient, we have the same set of standards. As is set out in the Bill, people would appeal from a Crown court beyond, as they appeal from the magistrates court to the Crown courts.
Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)
The Lord Chancellor has quite properly recognised the Government’s debt of gratitude to Sir Brian Leveson, but will he accept that the Government have been somewhat selective in adopting Sir Brian’s recommendations? He knows that Sir Brian did not recommend that all cases that are triable either way should have the right to elect for jury trial to be removed from them. He also knows, incidentally, that Sir Brian did not propose an increase in magistrates’ sentencing powers to up to two years; he suggested that it remain at 12 months. What the Lord Chancellor has not done is adopt some of Sir Brian’s recommendations in relation to encouraging early guilty pleas, which would have a significant impact on the backlog. Why have the Government selected for priority purposes the recommendations that would have an impact on the right of jury trial, and not some other recommendations that would have a similar effect on the backlog?
Mr Lammy
We have, of course, accepted the thrust of Sir Brian’s recommendations, but there are areas in which we have chosen to go further—the right hon. and learned Gentleman is right about that—because of the modelling, and what it says the effect on the backlog will be. He will recognise, when presented with the evidence, that the backlog would be heading to 200,000 by 2035—notwithstanding all that has been said about investment, which we are putting in, and notwithstanding all that has been said about modernisation and the efficiencies about which Sir Brian went into such detail in part 2 of his review—because, with all good will, the reform proposed in the Bill will not get through this Parliament until towards the end of the year, we felt that there were some areas in which we wanted to go further.
Ms Stella Creasy (Walthamstow) (Lab/Co-op)
Will my right hon. Friend give way?
Ms Creasy
I think we all share my right hon. Friend’s passionate desire to support the victims who are waiting too long to get to court, but that means that we also owe them a debt of truth. The concern highlighted in the Institute for Government report is that magistrates courts will struggle to absorb such a large increase in demand, so we may not see the faster justice that he is promising under these proposals. Will he recognise that those of us who cannot support the Bill as it currently stands think that the way forward is to look at the data and consider whether juries are actually a red herring when it comes to the investment that we so sorely need because of the damage done by the previous Government?
Mr Lammy
That is why we have uncapped sitting days for the Crown Court, and that is why I am proposing further investment in our magistrates. I want to get the number of magistrates back to more or less where it was when the Labour party was last in government. It was 29,000 then, and it dropped to 21,000 under the previous Government. My hon. Friend is right—we will have to invest, and increase the number of magistrates—but I hope that, given her long-standing record of working with victims in particular, she will look hard at the Bill as it continues its passage, and will ultimately feel able to support it.
Mr Lammy
I am going to make some progress, because I think that otherwise I will upset you, Madam Deputy Speaker.
I recognise that some argue that the reform risks eroding trial by jury, but let me make it clear that juries will remain the cornerstone of our democracy under these reforms. Far from diminishing juries, the Bill protects them, enabling them to be used in a timely fashion when it matters most. What we are proposing changes the threshold for juries; it does not change the fundamental right to a fair trial, which remains absolute. Since the Magna Carta, no part of our justice system has stood still. Governments of all stripes have changed jury thresholds—it has been business as usual for Governments. James Callaghan removed automatic jury trials for theft, burglary, actual bodily harm and certain drug offences in 1977, and Margaret Thatcher did the same in 1988 in relation to criminal damage.
There is not, and never has been, an automatic right to a trial by jury. In the current system, only 3% of criminal trial cases go before a jury. More than 90% of all cases are already heard, fairly, by magistrates and district judges across the country. Following our changes, about three quarters of Crown court trials will still be heard by a jury, including the vast majority of serious youth cases. We will also introduce judge-alone trials for complex and technical cases that tie up judges, juries and courtrooms for months—time that could be spent hearing violent and sexual offence trials. Our changes will ensure swifter justice and avoid undue burden on juries.
As the author of the Lammy review and a child of the Windrush generation, as a black man who has been stopped and searched repeatedly because of the colour of my skin, I know as well as anyone in the House that disproportionality in the justice system must be addressed, and now, since I published my review, 21% of judges come from an ethnic minority background. However, we must recognise that the status quo of the broken system does produce injustice, and the burden of that delay is not evenly shared.
Black people are 14% more likely to be victims of crime, and people from mixed ethnic backgrounds, such as my children, are 43% more likely. Defendants from black, Asian and minority ethnic backgrounds are statistically more likely than white defendants to be held on remand before trial. As the backlog has grown, remand waits have increased from 16 to 23 weeks. There is nothing progressive about a young working-class black or white man sitting in a cell for months on end, with no judge, no jury, no end in sight. There is nothing progressive about a rape victim waiting years for their day in court. There is nothing progressive about the Tory status quo. That is why tackling delay is in itself a progressive cause.
Following extensive engagement with Members of this House to ensure that the full impacts of my reforms are properly scrutinised, I am, as I have said, committing myself to a full independent review, which will look at how our new reforms will affect particular groups—working-class people as well as ethnic minorities—and assess more broadly whether justice is being delivered, not just in our new division but in all parts of our courts system, in a way in which no Government have ever done before, because sunlight is, of course, the best disinfectant.
Munira Wilson (Twickenham) (LD)
I think that all of us across the House share the Justice Secretary’s passion for delivering justice more quickly for victims. I visited Isleworth Crown court at lunch time on Friday and spoke to barristers there. They impressed upon me that it is extremely rare that juries and jurors are the cause of delays to court cases. Recently, there have been delays because the cells have been too cold for defendants or Serco staff to use. Defendants are routinely delivered late by Serco, and there are no contractual penalties. That is pushing cases back repeatedly. Why will the Justice Secretary not take action on those things, rather than restricting trial by jury, which will make a limited difference?
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
Order. Before the Lord Chancellor responds, let me say that many Back Benchers wish to contribute. No doubt he is coming close to a conclusion sometime soon-ish.
Mr Lammy
We are piloting the national listing scheme at Isleworth Crown court. I refer the hon. Lady to my speech setting out what we are doing in relation to part 2 of Sir Brian Leveson’s review. She is absolutely right: we have to address all of the problem. Sir Brian was absolutely clear that we need investment, that we have to deal with the inefficiencies that the hon. Lady has talked about, and that we have to modernise our courts, but we also need reform. Look at the tables and graphs that the Institute for Government has corroborated today. If we are to see the backlog fall by the next election, we have to do all three things, not just cherry-pick.
Mr Lammy
I will not, given what has just been said by Madam Deputy Speaker.
The Bill will remove the ability of defendants to elect a jury trial for either-way offences. That is too often done by criminals to delay proceedings and wear down victims, preventing justice from being secured. Under our changes, the decision about where a case is heard will rest where it belongs: with a judge. It will be determined by the matter’s seriousness and suitability for jury trial, not by criminals gaming the system.
This Bill also strengthens the role of magistrates. As has been said today, magistrates’ sentencing powers are capped at 12 months, and cases that could be concluded quickly are too often pushed up to the Crown court, clogging up capacity that would be better focused on more serious crimes. We will extend magistrates’ sentencing powers to 18 months for offences that are triable either way. The Bill does not increase the maximum penalty for offences; it simply lets cases be heard by magistrates without unnecessary escalation, saving Crown court time for the most serious cases.
Mr Lammy
I will not, given what has been said by Madam Deputy Speaker. I have to make some progress.
We will also reform the appeals process from the magistrates court to the Crown court. At present, an automatic right to a full rehearing forces victims and witnesses to endure the ordeal of their case over and over again, even when there is little merit to an appeal. The Bill will introduce a new permission stage, which will allow judges to filter appeals and decide whether there are genuine points of law that require an appeal hearing. That mirrors the process for appeals from the Crown court to the Court of Appeal. To support that, we will allow audio recording in all magistrates courts for the first time, so that the record is clear and accurate, should an appeal be necessary.
Alongside reform, we are investing. There is a record £2.78 billion settlement for the coming year. That includes £287 million for vital repairs, digital upgrades and unlimited sitting days in the Crown court next year—the most ever funded in the history of our courts. We are modernising, investing in artificial intelligence and other technology, and expanding the use of video hearings to speed up justice. Working with the judiciary, we will bring in a new national listing system to end what some victims justifiably describe as a postcode lottery that has left some waiting longer than others. We will expand blitz courts to clear cases that are stuck in the system, and introduce new case co-ordinators in every Crown court to free up judges’ time.
Even with record investment and ambitious efficiencies, an unreformed justice system has a structural ceiling. That is why the third lever, reform, is essential. The projections are crystal clear: if we do nothing, we will have a backlog of 200,000 cases; if we invest and tackle the inefficiencies, as suggested by the hon. Member for Twickenham (Munira Wilson), the backlog will be 133,000; if we pull all three levers, the backlog will be 49,000. The difference is 84,000 more lives on hold. Even if we implement all our measures, the backlog will get worse before it gets better—it will rise before we begin to turn the corner, prior to the end of this Parliament. It is important to be honest with the House: because of the seriousness of the situation, we must proceed with the full, undiluted package. If we step back from or water down action on any of the three levers, victims will continue to be forgotten.
This Bill puts victims first, as well as delivering the swift justice that they deserve. It will also strengthen protections for victims in court. In response to a Law Commission recommendation, clauses 8 and 9 tighten the rules of evidence in sexual offences cases, so that information about a complainant’s past can be used only when it genuinely matters, and cannot be used to fuel myths, to make insinuations, or to humiliate victims, as has been the case. Clauses 12 to 16 strengthen and clarify the use of special measures, ensuring that victims have access to screens, live links and support, so that they can give their best evidence and, importantly, stay in the justice system and the family courts. Clause 17 repeals the presumption of parental involvement—something that many people have campaigned for. That measure was created with good intentions, but it has contributed to a culture in which contact is prioritised.
Jacob Collier (Burton and Uttoxeter) (Lab)
The campaign to introduce clause 17 was supported by my Conservative predecessor, Kate Kniveton, who bravely spoke about her experience of sexual violence. Will the Justice Secretary join me in congratulating Kate and all the other campaigners who have been involved in this change?
Mr Lammy
Absolutely. I also want to refer to the case of Claire Throssell—she is in the Gallery—and her sons, Jack and Paul. Claire’s loss is beyond words. She is with us today, and I know that the whole House joins me in paying tribute to her for her courage and her tireless campaign to ensure that others do not suffer as she has done.
Finally, the Bill brings the leadership of our tribunals in England and Wales, which have until now been separate, into the 21st century. The Bill brings tribunals into a judicial structure headed by the Lady Chief Justice. It modernises magistrates’ expenses rules, so that they reflect modern working life; that will help us to increase the number of magistrates across the country. The Bill also preserves the unique status of the Old Bailey as the central criminal court.
At its best, Labour has always been a party of institutional renewal. We do not worship at the altar of how things have always been; we ask how things can work better. We have a record of reforming public services that are failing working people. Despite opposition from small-c conservative institutions at the time, our movement delivered trade union legislation before we ended up in government. Bevan created the national health service, despite fierce opposition from the British Medical Association. Against economic orthodoxy, we introduced the minimum wage. Labour has a proud record of putting victims’ voices into the system. We introduced the victims code; we introduced the Victims’ Commissioner; and we bring experiences to this House, including those of Morwenna Loughman, Katie Catt, Vicki Crawford, Jade Blue and Charlotte Schreurs, some of whom are in the Public Gallery. Since taking office again in 2024, we have put victims first. We are introducing protections, so that therapy notes cannot be used against women. The tightened safeguards around how we use their sexual history are important and fundamental to this Bill.
The choice before the House is stark, and we cannot continue with the rising backlog. Clause 40 of Magna Carta is clear:
“To no one will we…deny or delay the right to justice.”
Today, that promise will ring hollow if we do nothing. Let us be the Parliament that chose to act. Let us be the Parliament that turned the tide. Let us be the Parliament that restored swift and fair justice to this country. I urge the House to support this Bill.
Nick Timothy (West Suffolk) (Con)
I beg to move an amendment, to leave out from “That” to the end of the Question and add:
“this House declines to give a Second Reading to the Courts and Tribunals Bill because trial by jury is a fundamental part of the United Kingdom’s constitution and democracy; it is wrong to remove defendants’ right to elect for trial in the Crown Court for all triable either-way offences; extending magistrates courts’ sentencing powers, and restricting the right to appeal against sentences and convictions in the magistrates courts, compounds the fundamental injustice at the heart of the Bill; reducing public participation in the justice system will undermine confidence in it; eroding the right to trial by jury will not make a meaningful impact, if any, on the backlog of court cases; and it calls on the Government to instead tackle the court backlog by improving case management and encouraging earlier pleas, increasing sitting days in the Crown Court, and increasing the hours per day that courts are able to sit by improving the use of technology and the efficiency of prisoner transport.”
Today, the Government attack an ancient English right that runs through our constitution, from Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights to trials taking place at this very moment in courts across the land. That right—that nobody should be seized, imprisoned or deprived of his standing in any way, except by the lawful judgment of his equals—is an essential part of our national inheritance. It is part of what makes our legal system the envy of the world. It is admired by jurists and legislators from all around, and it has been copied by all those countries—success stories, like America and Australia—that have followed our common law model.
However, this Government—without a mandate, without a case and without any evidence to justify their actions—have decided that our ancient rights are little more than an inconvenience that this Justice Secretary thinks he can sweep away with only the briefest consideration. Why? He says this is about efficiency and protecting the rule of law, but that is nonsense. According to the Government’s own impact assessment, reducing jury trials will cut the Crown court workload by about 3.5%, but even that number, as I will explain, is wrong. According to the Institute for Government, this Bill will reduce the Crown court workload by only 1% or 2%. In other words, rape victims, who are waiting for a year for their case to be heard at present, would have their cases heard just one week earlier. From the basics, such as getting defendants to court on time, to intensive case management, there is much more that can be done to make the courts more efficient without attacking jury trials.
Amanda Martin (Portsmouth North) (Lab)
Has the hon. Member, since writing his speech, seen the updated information available about the percentage reduction in our courts?
Nick Timothy
The Institute for Government has made it absolutely clear that the figures that the Government have produced are based on assumptions that are not necessarily shared by anybody who knows what we are talking about.
Pam Cox (Colchester) (Lab)
Would the hon. Member agree that legal judgment by peers or equals can include legal judgment by magistrates, and that indeed there is no ancient right to jury trial? To say so is to misrepresent the case.
Nick Timothy
Magistrates have their place in the system, but jury trials are fundamental to our inheritance, and to public confidence in the criminal justice system.
If the reason is not efficiency, why are the Government doing this? There are only two plausible explanations. The first is that this left-wing Government—determined to censor free speech, and indifferent to public concern about two-tier justice—simply want to do away with the hassle of juries. The second is that the civil service has long sought to do this, and after a line of wiser Secretaries of State than this one, they finally found a Secretary of State foolish enough to go along with it.
We can imagine the scene in the Ministry of Justice. A reshuffle is under way, and the Cabinet Secretary tips off Sir Humphrey, who promptly gathers his officials and asks them what the new Justice Secretary is all about. A private secretary plays the now notorious episode of “Celebrity Mastermind”. “What blue cheese is paired with port?”, asks the quizmaster. “Red Leicester”, says the right hon. Gentleman. Sir Humphrey’s eyebrow arches. “Which Marie won the Nobel prize for physics?” “Antoinette”, comes the answer. Sir Humphrey smiles a wry smile. “Which English King followed Henry VIII?” “Henry VII,” cries the right hon. Gentleman. Sir Humphrey looks around at his trusted officials, and says, “Finally, I think this time we’ve found our man.”
For this is not a new idea. Officials have been itching to do this for years, but wiser Secretaries of State have always said no. Under this explanation of events, the Justice Secretary accepted the advice of his officials, failed to interrogate their arguments, and without so much as a second thought, decided to do what was rejected even during the pandemic, when lockdown and social distancing rules meant criminal trials were postponed.
Emily Darlington (Milton Keynes Central) (Lab)
I appreciate that the hon. Member is into storytelling—it may be his next job—but what did he think was going to happen to the courts system when there was a 23% cut under the last Government? It was going to crumble. Does he not agree?
Nick Timothy
Crown court waiting times were actually lower under the Conservatives until the pandemic. It is true that the backlog grew during the pandemic, but the pandemic came before the general election, so why, if it was so necessary, was this measure not in the Labour party manifesto?
I am willing to accept that my account may be unfair. Despite all the evidence provided by the Justice Secretary over the years, the policy might not be explained by his incompetence. Just as plausible is ideological vandalism, and we should take Ministers at their word. To be clear, I do not mean the occasion when the Justice Secretary insisted:
“Criminal trials without juries are a bad idea.”
No, I mean the explanation given by the Minister for Courts. She said, “This is ideological.” Asked if the Government would be doing this for reasons other than efficiency, she said yes. If we join the dots, this does make sense, because Labour Governments have tried to do it before—in 1999, 2003 and 2007. [Interruption.] The Justice Secretary says Margaret Thatcher did it. Not only is that not true, but if he reads “The Downing Street Years” he will get a lesson in conviction politics and strong leadership, which this Government do not understand.
Nick Timothy
I will not give way.
Of course, when the Justice Secretary’s predecessor, the Home Secretary, commissioned Sir Brian Leveson to conduct a review of the criminal courts, she knew what she was doing, because in an earlier review Sir Brian had already said that jury trials should be restricted, with magistrates deciding the mode of trial and appeals made to a circuit judge. Perhaps the Justice Secretary sees this, like the early release scheme, as another hospital pass from his predecessor, who like the hardened criminals she let out of prison early, got out of the MOJ before facing the consequences of her actions. If he does think that, he should not feel that he has to go ahead with it.
Yet here the Justice Secretary is today proposing not only what Sir Brian Leveson recommended, but an even more radical change. He is telling the House that he has no choice but to rush this very serious legislation through Parliament at breakneck speed. The Bill was published less than two weeks ago, after no consultation at all, and today he is already asking hon. Members to approve its Second Reading. He is allowing only five days for Members to scrutinise the Bill line by line in Committee. That is less than the Government allowed for the Railways Bill, the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill and the Pension Schemes Bill. It is about the same time the House once spent scrutinising the Salmon Act 1986, which introduced the offence of handling salmon in suspicious circumstances. It is less time than the 44 debates, statements and urgent questions this House has heard on Israel, Palestine and Lebanon since the election.
We are not talking about legislating to recognise the sentience of crustacea or regulate travelling circuses; we are talking about a fundamental change to our constitution, the operation of our courts and the rights of our people. In the words of His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC, this Bill is
“one of the most radical and revolutionary events in English legal history. Yet it has not appeared in any manifesto; it has not been put out for consultation; it has not been recommended by Leveson”.
He says that it
“has been ‘published’ with virtually no notice to anyone”.
What arrogance, Madam Deputy Speaker—what a disgrace!
If this Bill had been the subject of consultation and this Justice Secretary had spent any time listening to judges, lawyers and the public, he would know that it will fail on its own terms. He says that it will deliver justice for more victims, but in Canada and Australia—jurisdictions he cites as an inspiration—judge-only trials have seen more acquittals than jury trials. Indeed, the impact assessment predicts that fewer people will go to prison as a result of these changes. That should be no surprise: asking judges sitting alone to take responsibility for depriving somebody of their liberty is far more onerous than asking 12 fellow citizens who can discuss the evidence, argue the case and share the burden between them.
A corresponding danger to justice is posed by the proposals to increase magistrates’ sentencing powers to two years and to limit the right to appeal their rulings. As the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner) said earlier, no fewer than 40% of appeals against verdicts and 47% of appeals against sentences issued by magistrates are successful. Incredibly, the Justice Secretary seemed to suggest just now that these figures are not a cause for concern, but a cause for celebration.
Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)
On appeals against magistrates’ rulings, is the shadow Minister aware—as I am, through my experience—that appeals are essentially a retrial in the magistrates court, and that many appeals are successful simply because the victim cannot face giving evidence for a second time and being retraumatised? Defendants will use that to retraumatise the victim all over again, particularly in circumstances where there is domestic abuse.
Nick Timothy
I do not accept that characterisation of magistrates courts. If that were a true cause for concern for the hon. Lady, this Bill would perhaps try to address what she says, yet it does not.
The Government’s claims about what the Bill will achieve are hopelessly confused. The Justice Secretary leans heavily on Sir Brian Leveson, who says that limiting jury trials will save 20% of court time, but there has been no modelling to justify this number, and Sir Brian has admitted that it is little more than a guess. When challenged by my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley (Dr Shastri-Hurst), the Justice Secretary said,
“We will…publish our modelling alongside the…Bill”.—[Official Report, 3 February 2026; Vol. 780, c. 109.]
Yet no modelling worthy of the name has been published. The impact assessment takes Sir Brian’s guess and uses it as the median estimate. This is fiction masquerading as science.
The Criminal Bar Association calls the impact assessment “meaningless verbiage”, “total gibberish” and something that
“would make the script writer of ‘In the Thick of it’ wince with embarrassment”.
It concludes:
“If anyone can make any sense of this, please get in touch.”
If the Justice Secretary wanted to accept that invitation right now, I would be willing to give way to him—but he does not.
The Government have overstated the length of trials for cases in scope of the proposed change by more than 100%. The better estimate has been made by the Institute for Government, where researchers have listened to judges and lawyers and understood that only 20% of Crown court time is spent trying either-way offences. Of course, half of those cases will remain jury trials because the likely sentence is above three years. The cases in scope therefore take up only 5% to 10% of Crown court time, so even if they could be tried 20% faster, it would save only 1% or 2% of court time.
Sir Jeremy Wright
My hon. Friend is making the point that consultation on and discussion of the Bill may be fruitful if we are to properly understand its effects. One difference the Bill will make is that when a judge tries a case on his or her own, in the absence of a jury, they will be required by the Bill to give reasons for any conviction that they conclude is appropriate. Does my hon. Friend think that the Government have considered the potential impact of that on likely appeals of those decisions to the Court of Appeal?
Nick Timothy
My right hon. and learned Friend is exactly right. I was planning to turn to that point, because the Bill creates a problem not only in the burden of time it creates, but in the politicisation of our judiciary.
The Bill does create new time burdens. When juries deliberate, judges do other work in court, including on other trials. If judges deliberate instead, the court time used to hear other cases is lost. Because a defendant’s right to a jury trial will depend on the likely custodial sentence if he is found guilty, if the Bill becomes law, a judge will, for the first time, be needed to first conduct a hearing to determine the likely sentence. The Bill says that the parties involved should make representations; in cases with several defendants, the judge would need to hear from all their representatives and the prosecutor, taking up hours of time. There is more: defendants often plead guilty after the plea and trial preparation hearing, but before trial. In these cases, the sentencing judge—possibly not the same as the allocating judge—will have to hear the submissions all over again.
Then there are the reasons for conviction or acquittal, as my right hon. and learned Friend has just said. Juries do not have to provide reasons, but the Bill says that judges must. That will inevitably take many hours per case—time that right now is used to try cases.
Nick Timothy
I will make some progress.
This opens up new risks. The publication of judges’ reasons is likely to lead to more appeals and more court time being taken up. As questions are posed about judges’ reasons, we are likely to see the politicisation of judges and judicial appointments—something that will be made worse by the blurring of our adversarial model and the European inquisitorial role of judges. Under our model, judges are entitled to intervene and seek further information to help the jury with their assessment; in a judge-only trial, where the judge inevitably takes on a more inquisitorial role, those interventions and requests will inevitably be portrayed as the display of bias.
This will be made worse when it comes to the role of the judge in deciding on the admissibility of evidence. A judge usually sees all manner of material that is prejudicial to the defendant but deemed inadmissible, which does not matter when it is a jury who decides innocence or guilt. When a judge sees prejudicial material and deems it inadmissible, however, it will be difficult for anybody to believe that the information was simply erased from their mind. Judges may be professional and fully committed to their impartiality, but they are not superhuman.
Nick Timothy
I will not.
It is not difficult to see how this, too, will undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system and put judges in an impossible situation.
Sir Oliver Dowden (Hertsmere) (Con)
My hon. Friend is making some very important points. There is a more fundamental point about public perception, which he may come on to in a moment. If we pass this legislation at a time when confidence in this place and in conventional politics is at an exceedingly low ebb, we will be sending a signal to people that this place does not trust 12 good men and true to make decisions, and, in fact, that we want to take that decision away from them. Does he agree that that will further erode confidence in conventional mainstream politics?
Natalie Fleet
The right hon. Member for Hertsmere (Sir Oliver Dowden) is absolutely right to talk about confidence in public institutions, because that is what we are addressing today. I stand before the House as a victim who would not report because I do not want to be retraumatised over years. I speak on behalf of the victims in the Gallery and the victims out there in the country. That is where I want us to restore confidence. That is what we need to do today.
Nick Timothy
I totally understand what the hon. Lady says, and we are all interested in the best interests of victims. [Interruption.] To suggest otherwise is absolutely appalling, and the hon. Member for Milton Keynes Central (Emily Darlington) should withdraw that comment.
I completely agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Sir Oliver Dowden). I was concerned by the Justice Secretary saying that he is proud of the fact that his party does not just look to the past and to how things have been; I think one of the problems with Labour is that it is too careless with how things have always been. This is exactly what we are talking about. This is an ancient constitutional and legal right, and Labour is being careless about it.
Nick Timothy
I will not give way again.
We are talking about a fundamental change in the way that we try criminal cases, and the cases in scope are not minor; they are cases where the likely sentence is between 18 months and three years in prison. Before Government Members decide how to vote this evening, they need to search their souls and ask themselves three vital questions. Is this Bill just? Is it thought through? Is it going to make our courts more efficient? If they are honest with themselves, and if they ask judges, lawyers and their own colleagues, such as the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East, they will know that the answer to all three questions is no. None of the great Labour Prime Ministers would ask them to take this step—not Clement Attlee, not Harold Wilson, and not James Callaghan, as the Justice Secretary earlier claimed. As Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins would never have invited MPs to put their conscience aside and vote for what they believe, deep down, to be wrong—and, as I understand it from the media briefings, neither would the former Deputy Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Angela Rayner).
Government Members know the policy was not in their manifesto, they know that there has not even been a consultation, and they know that it is wrong to rush this through the House after just five days of scrutiny in Committee. They know, too, that in perhaps just a few months, this Prime Minister will be gone. I do not believe that they wish to look back in the years ahead and remember voting to attack an ancient English right and to undermine what makes ours the best legal system in the world, all for a Prime Minister who takes them for granted and who they will soon replace. We will vote against this terrible Bill today, and so should they.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
There are shy of 60 people wishing to contribute. I urge Members to keep their contributions brief.
Karl Turner (Kingston upon Hull East) (Lab)
Madam Deputy Speaker, you and I have been friends for some time. I think you were elected in 2015. Soon after that, your talents were recognised and you were quickly given a ministerial brief. You know my politics, as we have crossed swords many a time, so you know it pains me to congratulate the hon. Member for West Suffolk (Nick Timothy), the shadow Justice Secretary, on his outstanding contribution; there was really nothing in it that I could disagree with. None the less, I do welcome the intervention of my right hon. Friend, the Justice Secretary and Deputy Prime Minister, because it is true that since he has been in post, he has secured the biggest investment for the criminal justice system in decades, amounting to something in the region of £2.5 billion. I commend my dear friend for that work, which I know will have taken some serious graft with the Treasury officials and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
It is true that much of this Bill is absolutely critical, including the actions to reduce the backlog. No Member of this House wants to see victims of crime languishing, waiting for months and years for their cases to be heard. The Labour Government’s policy on reducing violence against women and girls is crucial as well. It is also right to say that the previous Government savaged the criminal justice system, underfunding it during the austerity years. But I have to be honest: it was not just the previous Tory Government who did that. The criminal justice system has been badly treated and badly funded for decades.
There are parts of this Bill, though, that are unworkable, unjust, unpopular and unnecessary, including jury trial curtailment, the extended powers for sentencing in the magistrates courts, and the removal of the right to elect jury trial for offences with less than three years’ tariff. It is concerning that the Government are doing away with the automatic right of appeal in the magistrates courts—that is essentially what is happening—because, as I said in an intervention, about 0.4%, or around 5,000 cases, go to appeal and 41% of those appeals are successful.
I am afraid to say that the analogy used by the Justice Secretary, of somebody stealing a bottle of whisky, is an unfortunate one. I do not pretend to be a terribly eminent lawyer—I was prosecuting and defending the theft of Mars bars in my second six pupillage before I was elected to this House in May 2010—but never did I see a situation in the magistrates court in which a defendant was advised to elect for a trial when they had allegedly nicked a bottle of whisky. That scenario is for the birds, to be perfectly honest. It is on the same level as the Justice Secretary, in his MOJ video, referring to a scraped knee in an A&E triage situation—it is unfortunate and disappointing, and he could do much better. The Institute for Government report, published today, states that the MOJ modelling is sound, but that it relies on several uncertain assumptions. That is a very grave concern.
I am not going to detain the House terribly long. Yesterday evening, I had what I can only describe as an incredibly honest and robust, but constructive, discussion with the Deputy Prime Minister, and I am glad to say that that discussion produced something of an offer. I think it is absolutely imperative that one of our number—one of those of us who are opposed to these changes for principled reasons—has a seat on the Public Bill Committee. Colleagues told me that this was impossible. They said, “It’s never going to happen.” They said that the Chief Whip would never concede to allowing one of the so-called rebels on to the Bill Committee. But, following the Deputy Prime Minister’s representations to the Chief Whip, that guarantee was made. For that reason and for that reason alone, I will abstain from voting on the Bill today.
Let me put it in this way: I will abstain today because I think there is a possibility of making progress, and because I trust my right hon. Friend to negotiate in good faith with colleagues who are opposed to the Bill. What I do not appreciate is MOJ officials spinning the line that “even Karl Turner was unable to persuade enough people to rebel against this Bill.” That is not right, it is unfair and, frankly, it is unbecoming of a Secretary of State in any Department. None the less, I abstain today and I sincerely urge my colleagues to abstain as well. I am more confident now than ever before that the worst parts of the Bill will be defeated by amendments. I sincerely ask my right hon. and hon. Friends to let the Bill pass its Second Reading, so that we can make progress on getting rid of the bits of this Bill that are completely unworkable, unpopular, unjust and unnecessary.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)
The Liberal Democrats will be voting against the Bill, and we have tabled a reasoned amendment that sets out why we fundamentally disagree with the approach of the Deputy Prime Minister and the Courts Minister to tackling the Crown court backlog. Our views have been well aired in this place over the last few months, but today is an opportunity for us to lay out the reasons why the Bill should not progress in its current form.
Something that we agree on is that the current backlog is unacceptable, untenable and unsustainable. We agree with the Government that that is because of the historic and monumental failings of the previous Conservative Government, whose complacency and mismanagement of the justice system left the criminal justice system on the brink of collapse. It is a shameful legacy.
The backlog in our criminal courts now stands at 80,000. That disgraceful situation deprives victims and defendants of justice for years—cases are now being listed for the end of this decade. This has a huge impact on the quality of evidence, and it even causes victims to pull out of cases because so long has passed since the crime and they just want to move on with their lives. It also leaves defendants’ lives on pause while they await the opportunity to prove their innocence. The system as it stands fails everyone. Something must be done about this crisis, and it must be done now.
Sir Brian Leveson was clear in his report that the fundamental drivers of the ever-increasing backlog were systematic underfunding, the readiness of defence and prosecution teams, and the availability of witnesses, victims and defendants, but he did not identify juries as the cause of the problem. Between 2016 and 2024, the number of ineffective trials increased from 15% to 25%. In that time, the average court sitting time fell from 3.8 hours per sitting day to 3.2 hours. Juries are not the problem; inefficiencies are.
In my Crown court in Chichester, all cases were suspended for a fortnight in January because the heating system failed and it was too cold in the building. Across the country, there are stories of courts closing due to crumbling roofs, water pouring into courtrooms, gas leaks and general poor maintenance over many years. Juries are not the problem; crumbling infrastructure is.
Dr Chambers
I visited the Winchester courts recently and spoke to about a dozen barriers, who were all concerned about us taking a sledgehammer to jury trials, not only because they are a fundamental part of our justice system, but because doing so will not even help to clear the backlog, as jury trials are not the limiting factor. They reiterated that it is about defendants and prisoners getting to court on time, the number of sitting days and the crumbling infrastructure. Does my hon. Friend agree that we should listen to the professionals, who know what the problems are?
Jess Brown-Fuller
Joanna Hardy-Susskind put it well today, when she said:
“I have seen the adjournment of two rape trials this year. It’s only March. Nothing in Lammy’s proposed Bill would have saved the trial dates in either case. Nothing.”
Barristers across England and Wales are reporting delays to their cases because of the failed prisoner escort and custody services contracts—something I have asked the Justice Secretary about many times. These issues regularly cause cases to run late because the defendant has not been delivered on time from prison, or because there is nobody on site to bring them up from the holding cells. Juries are not the problem; Government contracts are the problem.
Mr Adnan Hussain (Blackburn) (Ind)
I have been a civil and a criminal law practitioner. The civil courts are not that far from the criminal courts when it comes to delays, but there are no juries in the civil courts, so does the hon. Lady agree that the delays are due to a lack of investment?
Jess Brown-Fuller
I thank the hon. Member for that intervention; I have also seen the amendment that his group has tabled, and I agree with that.
Trial by jury is deeply enshrined in our conscience and constitution, and it is respected all over the world.
Rachel Gilmour (Tiverton and Minehead) (LD)
Does my hon. Friend agree that the original clause 39 of Magna Carta has guaranteed an individual’s right to due process in the court for 800 years, and that trial by jury is at its heart? This Bill asks the right question but gives a reckless answer. There is no modelling or evidence to show that this move will reduce the backlog.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I agree with some of what my hon. Friend said. I do agree that trial by jury is one of the only parts of our justice system that is still actually trusted. The possibility of being tried by one’s peers is fundamental to a fair trial in this country. The Deputy Prime Minister himself recognised that point in the Lammy review in 2017, and then again during the pandemic when curtailing the right to a jury trial was proposed to deal with the increasing backlog.
Emily Darlington
I am trying to understand the hon. Lady’s point. Is she saying that we should now extend jury trial to all trials, or that we should keep the status quo? Is she saying that it is sacrosanct and so should in fact be extended? I am confused.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I am happy to make it absolutely clear for the hon. Member. If I was allowed to get on, I could make that point. Trial by jury is not the problem. We agree that there is a problem that needs to be solved, but curtailing the right to a jury trial will not achieve what the Government and the Opposition want: the backlog coming down.
Leveson’s report proposed a bench division with a judge and two magistrates. The Government have gone further and proposed a swift court with just one sitting judge. Did they choose to ignore Sir Brian Leveson’s proposal of a Crown court bench division with a judge and two magistrates because, although they agree—I think—that the lay element to a trial is an important part of the system, they know that they do not have enough magistrates and are likely to struggle to find enough willing to preside over lengthy cases? Does the Courts Minister really believe that defendants opt for a Crown court trial because they want their cases to be heard in a Crown court building—because of the facilities or because it might have better coffee—rather than because they want a trial by jury?
Jess Brown-Fuller
I will make some progress.
If the Deputy Prime Minister and the Courts Minister believe that this is fundamentally the right thing to do practically and ideologically, why did it not feature in the Labour party manifesto? Like many Members, I take issue with the Deputy Prime Minister’s messaging around the Bill. He chose to describe defendants as “offenders”, rather than applying the principle of innocent until guilt is proven. He also described a case that carries a sentence of up to three years as akin to having a grazed knee and seeing a consultant. I think most of the public outside this building would argue that three years’ imprisonment is a life-changing sentence. If I were tried for a crime that I was arguing that I did not commit, I would like that to be in front of a jury of my peers.
I believe the Government are wasting severely limited political capital on something that will not shift the dial. They stated themselves that they expect all the measures in the Bill to show just a 5% decrease in the backlog by the end of this Parliament and a return to pre-covid backlog levels only in a decade.
Instead of these drastic changes, we are urging the Government to look at alternative options to reduce the Crown court backlog. We should look at measures that have been tried and tested before, such as those piloted during the pandemic to supercharge the Crown courts, when extended sitting hours allowed am and pm trials. Used in select courtrooms, that method can funnel through cases that have been stuck in the backlog for years. In the original pilots, the approach cleared 3.5 cases per courtroom each week, compared to fewer than one in courts operating standard hours. That is how we can begin to reduce the backlog without removing liberties that we should all hold as sacred. Will the Government please give consideration to the Liberal Democrat proposals, which would not only boost efficiencies in the Crown courts but would make the experience for jurors, victims and judges better, and could attract retired judges back into the system to preside over half-day cases?
Another glaring flaw in the Bill is that more serious cases will be heard in the magistrates court, where there is a higher income threshold to qualify for legal aid. Many more defendants who could be accused of crimes that carry sentences of up to 24 months will be unrepresented and defending themselves. That is very likely to drag out hearings, which will lower the overall savings that the Government claim to be making with these reforms. How will the Government respond when magistrates courts start pushing cases with longer sentences back to the Crown court as they struggle to absorb the additional work, as happened with the previous reform of magistrates’ sentencing powers?
The Government are also proposing to abolish the right of appeal from the magistrates court. Why does the Deputy Prime Minister believe that should be done when 42% of appeals from the magistrates court are successful? If the Government are willing to include an important clause on the presumption against parental responsibility in the Bill, why will they not extend the scope of the Bill to address the fundamental reforms needed in the broken family court system?
The Government’s proposals are opposed by the Criminal Bar Association, the chair of the Bar Council, the Law Society, the Four Bars, the Secret Barrister, Judge Rob Rinder, Jo Hamilton OBE, many Labour Members and 3,200 legal professionals, who have written to the Deputy Prime Minister today. If they will not listen to all those organisations and people who have spent their lives committed to making the criminal justice system, which has been poorly managed by successive Governments, as effective as possible for victims and defendants, who will they listen to?
I have a huge amount of respect for the Courts Minister and for the Deputy Prime Minister, which is why I am disappointed to be here making this speech. It is not too late for them to change course.
Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith and Chiswick) (Lab)
The number of outstanding cases in the Crown court is 79,619. The outgoing Conservative Government promised to reduce the backlog; it should have been 53,000 by April last year. Their abject failures led the present Government to ask one of the country’s most foremost experts on the criminal courts, Sir Brian Leveson, to propose comprehensive court reforms—reforms without precedent in half a century. Sir Brian produced his review in two parts, totalling over 1,000 pages and 180 recommendations. The Bill legislates where legislation is necessary to implement parts of Sir Brian’s review.
Given the current dire situation, with many victims waiting two or more years for their cases to be resolved and defendants spending far too long in custodial remand, the Government are right to propose structural change; otherwise, they would be endorsing perpetual delay.
Andy Slaughter
Not yet; I am conscious of the time.
The removal of the right to elect for either way offences in clause 1 is the single most significant measure in reducing the caseload of the Crown court, with the Bill’s impact assessment indicating that that change will see 16,000 fewer sitting days in the Crown court each year.
In clause 6, the Government propose to increase the maximum sentencing power of the magistrates court to 18 months. We are told that will save a further 8,000 sitting days in the Crown court. Taken together, those two measures—ending election and extending magistrates’ powers—represent a sizeable shift of the caseload out of the Crown court and into the magistrates court. That will deliver on the main objective of these reforms, which is to ensure the capacity of the Crown court to try the most serious criminal cases in a fair and timely manner. There has been less scrutiny on how magistrates will cope with their new responsibilities; I will deal with that in a moment.
Clauses 3 to 5—the provisions that have attracted the most debate—will establish the Crown court bench division to enable cases with a likely sentence of three years or less to be tried on indictment without a jury. Clause 4 will allow trial by judge alone for some complex and lengthy cases. Compared to the other measures in part 1 of the Bill, those will have a less significant effect on the backlog, but a still substantial 5,000 Crown court days will be saved.
I accept the Government’s argument that there is a strong case for modernising how the Crown court operates. Some improvement will be achieved through adopting the measures on efficiency set out in part 2 of Sir Brian Leveson’s review, or the additional resources promised under the concordat with the Lady Chief Justice that will remove restrictions on court sitting days, but those are unlikely to be enough on their own. Given the crisis that the criminal courts are facing, I am willing to support the creation of the Crown court bench division and the other measures in part 1 of the Bill.
I do not accept the case made by some that the proposals represent the end for jury trial and that the Bill should be opposed on that basis. Of the 3% of criminal cases that currently go before a jury, about a third—some 4,000—of the less serious of those offences, such as possession of class A drugs, car theft, affray and large-scale waste dumping, will now go before a judge alone. I do not believe that undermines the jury system, although it will undoubtedly change how some cases are tried. Therefore, arrangements for judge-only trials in the Crown court need to be carefully reviewed once they are in force to test whether they deliver the time saving promised without undermining the right to a fair trial.
I turn to my reservations on the proposals. I am concerned that magistrates courts will not be able to cope with the increase in caseload envisaged by the Bill. The work of the magistrates court is delivered by a range of dedicated public servants: magistrates, district judges, legal advisers, His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service staff, probation, the Crown Prosecution Service and legal aid lawyers. However, we know that recruiting and retaining many of those key personnel are long-standing problems.
The Lord Chancellor wrote to the Justice Committee last week and told us that the Ministry of Justice hopes to recruit thousands of magistrates and hundreds of legal advisers and district judges over the next year or two. I am concerned that those are very ambitious targets, and that even if the recruitment bear fruit, they will not meet the challenge of diverting 24,000 days of complex hearings from the Crown court each year while dealing with the existing problems in the magistrates court, which has its own backlog.
Clause 7, which seeks to reform appeals from the magistrates court, will require electronic recording of proceedings. That strikes me as a significant change. The impact assessment is not clear about how much that will cost, but I doubt whether it can be delivered either quickly or cheaply.
Another area of concern is the process for allocating cases for judge-only trials. Prosecution and defence lawyers will wish to make written and oral submissions, and some may seek to challenge decisions on allocation by judicial review. To those concerns should be added the differing eligibility for legal aid in the Crown and magistrates courts and concerns that the loss of a lay presence in determining innocence or guilt risks losing diversity and adding unconscious bias.
Sarah Russell (Congleton) (Lab)
In the magistrates court, only those who earn less than £21,000 a year—less than a full-time job at real living wage rates—are entitled to legal aid. Does my hon. Friend agree that there is real danger in that in terms of access to justice?
Andy Slaughter
That is exactly the point that I somewhat briefly alluded to; I am glad that my hon. Friend outlined it in more detail. The Government really must address that before the Bill concludes its passage through this House and the other place.
In relation to both restriction of jury trials and the decision not to accept Sir Brian’s recommendation that a judge should sit with lay magistrates in the Crown court bench division, the point has been made that the lay element is being limited too far. I could say a lot more, but I am conscious of the time. Many details need to be worked out. I see why the Government are giving themselves until March 2028 to implement the Bill’s proposals.
As the Bill progresses, I hope that the Government will listen to Members of this House and the other place and to those with an interest in the criminal justice system—from lawyers to victims—on how it can be clarified and improved. The Justice Committee has held evidence sessions and been in detailed correspondence with the Lord Chancellor, the Courts Minister and Sir Brian for several months. Our current call for evidence closes tomorrow, and on 17 March we will hold a further evidence session.
I do not have time to cover the other important but less controversial parts of the Bill, but I would like to recognise the Law Commission, which has done the hard work on the proposals on evidence in sexual offence prosecutions that lies behind clauses 8 to 12. I also pay tribute to the campaigners who worked tirelessly for the removal of the presumption of parental involvement. Those measures will help to ensure that some of the most vulnerable in our society are protected by our courts.
Finally, I know that the Lady Chief Justice will be pleased that the Government have found a legislative vehicle to bring the leadership of tribunals within the wider courts structure. That is a good thing. Overall, this is a necessary package of reforms. I look forward to working with the Government to improve it as it progresses through Parliament.
Sir Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and Tavistock) (Con)
I should declare an interest at the beginning. I am a member of the Bar—that is not uncommonly known—I still practise at the Bar, and I have the honour to be a criminal barrister and a member of the Criminal Bar Association. I have spent 44 years at the Bar. I have defended and prosecuted in some of the largest criminal trials that this country has ever seen—and some of the longest.
I have been experienced in seeing how juries react to circumstances of adversity and circumstances that challenge and test the very boundaries of humanity in the appalling nature of the crimes they are forced to adjudicate upon. Without exception, they have responded in a manner that I think generally gives rise to the hugest admiration, not to say awe, from those who are otherwise engaged in the administration of justice.
There is something about the gathering of 12 ordinary citizens, chosen at random and brought together into the crucible that a criminal trial produces, that strips away ideological and racial prejudice or preconception, and that causes them to focus upon a single question: is the allegation true, or is it not; and can we be sure, or is there any doubt?
Again and again, throughout our legal history, the wisdom and capacity of juries have been repeatedly vindicated every time they have been analysed, tested or sought to be examined by those who research these matters.
Sir Geoffrey Cox
Not just now, but I will come back to the hon. Member.
We in this House are engaged in ideological strife. Every day of our lives we are engaged in a political battle, and frankly, sometimes we do not always live up to the highest standards that even our own parties have set. In the course of my legal career, I have been led—when I say “led”, I mean that I was a junior in the courts—by some distinguished Labour Members of Parliament who continued to practise in the criminal courts and regarded it is a noble honour to do so. Peter Archer, the former Solicitor General, led me in the early 1980s; John Morris led me just eight weeks before the ’97 election, when the Blair landslide swept in—oh, halcyon days to those across the aisle, or some of them, anyway; and Bob Marshall-Andrews led me right up to the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords. What remarkable men they were.
Those men would never have countenanced—not for a single second—the compromise of principle that Government and Opposition Members are now being asked to make. I knew these people, and I knew them well. John Morris would never have countenanced it. Peter Archer would never have countenanced it. Bob Marshall-Andrews would never have countenanced it.
Sir Geoffrey Cox
Not now—later. I will.
I want to appeal to Labour Members. We are engaged in ideological strife. But in the Venn diagram that any society depends upon for the sustaining of sufficient points of common ground to keep a society together, jury trial is one of those that appear in a point of intersection between the vast numbers of this House and outside it.
Catherine Atkinson (Derby North) (Lab)
Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?
Sir Geoffrey Cox
I will give way to the hon. Member for Colchester (Pam Cox) first, if she can give me just two seconds. I want to develop this theme, because it is very important to me.
There are some things that have to be above politics. If there are not, we have no society to defend. Jury trial is one of those institutions that have been defended by those across the aisle from me, on the opposite extreme of the political spectrum, and by those on our side of the House, out to the furthest waters of the right. Why is that? Because the administration of justice must be a non-ideological space. Jury trial unites us all for a simple reason: it is the most powerful instrument and engine of social justice that this country has ever invented. It is a safeguard against oppression. It is a built-in defence against establishment and administrative power.
Pam Cox
We could think of this exchange as Cox v. Cox. The right hon. and learned Gentleman mentions legal history. I have more than a passing interest in that and am minded to think of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879, which moved a lot of cases from a jury system into the magistrates system. The architect of that was Disraeli, a former Conservative Prime Minister. Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman not agree that many politicians across this House have acted to shape jury trials over time?
Sir Geoffrey Cox
There has always been a summary jurisdiction—invariably never for offences of dishonesty, and invariably never for offences that might lead to the destruction of the reputation of those who are facing it.
If one Member of this House, who must be disqualified if there is a sentence of imprisonment of more than 12 months, after the passage of this Bill is arraigned before a court on a case that might involve 12 months and one day, he or she will lose the right to a trial by jury, despite the fact that that might be an offence of protest. It might well be an offence where the Member of the House has felt so powerfully that they must breach the law that they are arrested and arraigned on a potential sentence of up to three years. Three years is a long time. As that could easily be an offence of protest, are we therefore saying that those who seek to go to jail, such as the suffragettes, should lose their right to trial by jury—a jury that is not obliged to follow the diktats or directions of a judge on the law; a jury that is entitled to reach its decision on its judgment about what is fair? I say—
Sir Geoffrey Cox
Not just now.
I say to the House, in all conscience, that jury trial is precious. Why? It is precious because it unites all parts of the political spectrum. It is precious because it allows the people of this country to be directly engaged in the adjudication of guilt or innocence in thousands of cases across the country.
At a time, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Sir Oliver Dowden) pointed out when he rose to intervene, when our institutions are under unprecedented attack, is now the time to transfer a massive chunk of the administration of criminal justice and the decisions on the guilt or innocence of a fellow citizen to a representative who unquestionably will be seen as a representative of the state? It is the jury that protects us from the allegation that the state is deciding upon that citizen’s future. That is what protects, preserves and enhances the reputation of the administration of justice.
Karl Turner
It was telling when Jo Hamilton OBE wrote to the Justice Secretary—I think it was yesterday—to respectfully remind him that, as a victim of the Post Office Horizon scandal, under the legislation proposed, not one of the 900 sub-postmasters who were convicted would have been entitled to a trial before their peers. What does the right hon. and learned Gentleman say to that?
Sir Geoffrey Cox
I agree entirely with the hon. Gentleman. Postmasters, postmistresses, postmen—those whose honesty and integrity are integral to their employment and who, for a breach of trust, would not receive three years’ imprisonment—would all be deprived of their jury trial, and at a time when the sharks and the vultures are circling around the institutions of this country. We are now on the brink of undermining—I believe irredeemably—one of the most precious of those institutions, which commands almost universal assent. Let me say why.
Sir Geoffrey Cox
No, I am not giving way. I am mindful of time and I must complete what I have to say.
This is a time when not just this House but the judiciary and the courts are under attack. The unprecedented attacks upon the judiciary and the legal profession are deplorable. Institutional trust is under siege, and now is not the time—[Interruption.] I am trying to make a speech that is non-partisan—[Interruption.] It really is not. I remember vividly when I sat where the Lord Chancellor now sits and he was on this side of the House. I remember the fire that breathed from his soul as he spoke about justice. I can hear him now, in my mind’s eye, speaking on this subject, and I know that he would have been saying the direct polar opposite of what he is advancing today in the House. I would say that he was his wiser self in those days. He was his best self then, because at that time he was motivated by those who were oppressed, who were poor and who faced the full phalanx of the state reined against them. It was this Secretary of State in a different guise who was their champion and their voice.
A jury trial is the most potent weapon and instrument against oppression and injustice. It serves not just those who are wealthy but those who are poor, and not just those who have a voice but those who do not. It is the 12 members of a jury who will give a hearing to people who otherwise have no hearing—
Several hon. Members rose—
Sir Geoffrey Cox
I will not take interventions now, and certainly not if they are of the quality that we have had up till now.
The reality is that jury trial is the cornerstone of our justice system. Do away with it and we are in trouble. Let us look at the way in which this Bill operates. It automatically presumes jury trial for everything that will have a likely sentence of three years, and those will involve some grave offences. However, in relation to serious, complex or lengthy cases, it could cover any allegation, so long as a judge concludes that it is appropriate that it should be dealt with without a jury. Apart from the excluded offences, which I accept exist, it is not just fraud trials but all kinds of trials that will be tried without a jury if a judge concludes that is appropriate.
The moment we make jury trials subject to the individual view of a judge as to whether that is appropriate or not, we drive a hole through the fundamental, accepted right that all of us on both sides of the House have accepted over so many years, which is that if someone is accused of a serious crime that could destroy their reputation, disqualify them from the House of Commons, wreck their professional reputation or result in the loss of their employment—as with the postmasters and postmistresses—they should be able to be judged by 12 people.
There is a reason why summary justice is called “summary”. There is a reason that summary justice was always subject to a complete rehearing. It has been suggested that there is no right to a jury trial. Of course there is no written right, but there has always been an accepted consensus, on both sides of this House and throughout the system of this country, that jury trials are precious for those kinds of cases, particularly those involving allegations of dishonesty. The right to elect is crucial. That is what this Bill is undermining. That is what is so dangerous about it. And undermining it on what basis? Arbitrary rules and arbitrary divisions. Why three years? Why not next year four or five? Why not extend it gradually, little by little, until we reduce—
Sir Geoffrey Cox
No, I am not giving way. Let me make that clear now. I want to finish in a moment.
The reality is that jury trial is too precious a thing to lose. We are faced with a question of principle here. The savings that the Government claim will be made are contested by many expert analyses from the profession, the Institute for Government and others. They are based on questionable assumptions. Are those savings sufficient for us to abrogate a fundamental principle that attracts almost universal assent across the political spectrum, which is so rare in our institutional and political life? Are they sufficient for us to take this highly unprecedented and questionable step? I would submit that they are not.
I would submit to the House that we should pause long and hard before we encroach upon this fundamental principle. I have seen it work in practice over 40 years and, as I have said, I have never failed to be awe-inspired by the sheer quality of attention and fairness that a jury brings to its deliberations. Summary justice can never replicate that. We are about to take a step that will irretrievably damage the quality of justice in this country.
I do not watch television much, but sometimes I watch something called “Digging for Britain”. It is apparent from that programme that we can tell when a civilisation starts to degrade when the quality of its architectural constructions changes; they start to look cheaper, and there is less attention to detail. If we take this step, we will be degrading our system of justice. A summary justice trial is summary—the clue is in the name—but that has always been corrected by the power to have a full rehearing in the court above: the Crown court. The Bill is even taking that away. We are ensuring that many thousands of people will be dealt with summarily in cases of great importance to their life and reputation.
I can only appeal to the House—ineffectually, perhaps; and I regret that I have attracted comments from Labour Members suggesting that my comments are controversial. They come from the heart, and from my 44 years’ experience of a system and a profession that I love. If I have attracted the ire of Labour Members, I apologise for that; I was hoping to induce reflection on the sheer importance of the institution about which we are to take this important decision.
Several hon. Members rose—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
We are now on a speaking limit of six minutes. I call Catherine West.
Catherine West (Hornsey and Friern Barnet) (Lab)
I hope to be a little more brief and less pompous than previous speakers. I am indebted to the many who serve, day to day, in the Wood Green courts, and in other parts of the London circuit. I thank them for their hard work in this rather thankless legal environment. I commend the Minister for Courts and Legal Services on her active engagement with Members across the House on these principles and proposals. I also thank the Select Committee for its important work scrutinising the Bill. I was pleased to hear my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner) say that he was looking to abstain in the vote on Second Reading, so that he could hear more debate as the Bill passes through the House. That is the spirit in which debate on the Bill should be listened to; there should be less bombast, and more practical solutions for victims of crime.
We need to end the court backlog and ensure access to justice for all. We also need to properly fund our justice system. Congratulations to the team who have got £2 billion out of the Treasury to fix our courts. I welcome the recent announcement of the investment in criminal legal aid—the 24% overall uplift in funding—and of the £287 million to be invested in vital repairs and digital upgrades to court buildings. The day I visited Wood Green, it was a heatwave. We were sitting there—everyone had all their legal coats, dresses and wigs on—and I had the most ordinary plate of fish and chips from the canteen that I have ever had. Given the basic conditions that victims, security teams and legal personnel experience when they go to court, we need to get this money out the door and spent on improving the estate, so that we can have more confidence in the system.
We need to be aware that the legal aid funding for magistrates court cases often barely covers costs. That is one of the serious concerns that I know Labour Members have about what is being proposed. As it stands, there is an automatic right to appeal a magistrates court conviction in the Crown court. Forty per cent of appeals against conviction from the magistrates court to the Crown court are successful. The Bill would end the automatic right to appeal a magistrates court conviction, which is one of the concerns raised by the eminent legal constituents who contacted me yesterday.
Thinking more in depth about the legal aid question, the means-tested threshold is just £22,000. Those in full-time, minimum-wage jobs may not qualify for that in a high-value, expensive city like London. If the Bill becomes law as it stands, will our defendants who are not eligible for legal aid, but who barely manage to keep their heads above water, be expected to draft their own grounds of appeal? I suspect that might lead to more costs in the long term, so we need to look at that.
Why is the court backlog so great? Will the Minister say more about defendants? I am sure that some people will make points about defendants possibly gaming the system—that is what I have been hearing. I have no doubt that there is an element of that, which has to be clamped down on, but let us not ignore the delays in police investigations, often due to the cuts that the police endured over the previous decade, and the sheer churn. If a woman has to wait four years for her case, how many police officers does she see? How many times does she have to repeat her dreadful situation to them? That is a trauma in itself. How many victims’ champions have had to listen to story after story?
Let us not ignore all the other elements of this system, such as delays to do with the police, and sometimes the Crown Prosecution Service. There is also a large churn in expertise there; it has become an unattractive place to work, due to the stretch on the service provided. Decisions are therefore being made at a slow pace; it is quite frustrating, on all counts.
One of my constituents, a practising legal aid solicitor of many decades’ standing, recently told me that his 19-year-old client was just sentenced for an incident that occurred in November 2024 when he was 17 years old. The client was not gaming the system; he pleaded guilty, yet he faced all those delays, so the delays are very real.
The preferred option, from my point of view, would be to have a pilot scheme, and to see after three or four years which system is best: the pilot scheme, or the scheme that we have. Of course, for that to happen, I would have to vote for the Bill’s Second Reading, wouldn’t I? I am being pragmatic and helpful, and am following the lead of Members who have given a lot of thought to this, such as my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull East, as well as the Select Committee. I look forward to following the Bill closely as it goes through its stages, including in the upper House, and to coming up with a good solution at the end of this process.
Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)
Quite unusually, I have served as a practising barrister in courts and have also served on juries. I never fail to be impressed by the extraordinary care that juries take in deciding a case. Undoubtedly, the stand-out speech of the debate so far has been by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and Tavistock (Sir Geoffrey Cox). He addressed us like a jury; it was actually rather wonderful. He posed a question to us that is always posed to a jury, and which is emphasised by the judge at the end of the case: are you certain? Are we sure that trial by jury is guilty? Frankly, I do not think that the Government have made the case so strongly that we can be certain of the outcome.
We are debating something of deep and fundamental seriousness. No one doubts that the backlog in the criminal courts is serious. Everybody agrees—I follow the hon. Member for Hornsey and Friern Barnet (Catherine West) in saying this—that justice delayed is justice denied for victims, whom we would certainly always put first, and for defendants alike. We know that Parliament has a duty to act. The question before us, however, is not whether we solve the backlog, but how we solve it. The concern many of us have is that we may be tempted to treat trial by jury as just some procedural device that can be adjusted for administrative convenience. Leaving aside the fact that there was no mention of this measure in any manifesto, trial by jury is not merely a procedure of the courts; it is one of the constitutional foundations of our liberty.
As William Blackstone wrote in the 18th century,
“Trial by jury ever has been, and I trust ever will be, looked upon as the glory of the English law”.
It would have been inconceivable to Blackstone that what he called the “grand bulwark” of an Englishman’s liberties might be voluntarily and needlessly surrendered.
Sarah Russell
What does the right hon. Gentleman say about the freedom of women to walk the streets without fearing for their physical safety? What does he say about the freedom of women who have made allegations of rape, and who are waiting six years between reporting to the police and having a trial? Does he recognise that those are liberties that matter, too?
Sir Edward Leigh
Of course that is an important point—we are not debating that. Of course the backlog is wrong, but this is not the right way to correct it. The backlog is caused by administrative delays or, if hon. Members want, cuts to the judicial system; it is not caused by trial by jury. Of course we put defendants first.
Sir Edward Leigh
I may give way in a moment.
Others, not necessarily in our country, have commented on this. Alexis de Tocqueville observed in the 19th century that the jury
“places the real direction of society in the hands of the governed”.
That was in his book, “Democracy in America”, and the great republic has followed our example.
Sir Edward Leigh
I am not suggesting that jury trials have been abolished. If the hon. Member listens to my speech, she will hear me talk later about jury trials for people who are accused of, for instance, shoplifting.
The freedom of the citizen is not solely determined by the state, but by his or her peers—that is the important point. The senior judge and legal philosopher Lord Devlin captured this perfectly when he wrote:
“Each jury is a little parliament.”
The jury trial is the point at which ordinary citizens participate directly in the administration of the King’s justice. The existence of the jury tells a citizen that the determination of justice ultimately belongs to free people of good character, not to bureaucrats, officials or state-appointed mandarins. That is why the principle has deep historical roots in our constitutional tradition, and why this debate is so fundamental.
As long ago as 1215, Magna Carta declared that
“No free man shall be seized or imprisoned…except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.”
For more than eight centuries, that principle has stood as a reminder that liberty must always be guarded against the power of the state. Today we are told that this safeguard must be weakened because the courts face a serious backlog. A temporary administrative crisis should not lead us to dismantle a permanent constitutional protection; that is the point. It would be the height of folly.
Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)
Will my right hon. Friend give way?
Sir Edward Leigh
I hope my hon. Friend will forgive me, but Madam Deputy Speaker wants me to proceed.
The backlog did not arise because juries exist; it arose because the system itself has been placed under strain for many years. Opposition Members, like others, have a responsibility here. If the courts are struggling, the answer is to repair the system rather than weaken the principle. Many sensible proposals have been suggested, such as restoring bigger and longer court sitting patterns, opening additional courtrooms, and treating the backlog as a genuine national crisis that requires urgent resources.
Many people have pointed out the flaws in the Lord Chancellor’s plan. Several senior legal figures have written to The Times explaining that the proposals are “unworkable”. Perhaps there is one possible compromise: to at least preserve the absolute right of those of good character to a jury trial. If a person of good character—perhaps a Member of Parliament—is accused of something such as shoplifting, which would be quite a minor case, it can have a devastating impact on their career and life.
Sir Geoffrey Cox
The other logical absurdity is that, under the Government’s proposed reforms, somebody with a previous conviction may well go above the three-year threshold, so those who have a string of previous convictions will get a right to jury trial, but a person of good character will not.
Sir Edward Leigh
That is a very fair point.
I ask Members to look to their conscience. If they, a Member of Parliament—a person of good character—were accused of shoplifting, what would they choose? They would choose trial by jury, would they not? They would not choose to be tried by a magistrate. The task before us is to solve this practical problem without undermining our constitutional safeguards. The danger that we face is the temptation to sacrifice a long-standing liberty for the sake of short-term administrative convenience.
The Lord Chancellor is a friend of mine and a good man. He is not a villain; he approaches things with the best of intentions—I say that without doubt. The problem is that we may not always have individuals as good natured and well intentioned as him. We accept that he is genuinely trying to solve a problem, but I fear that he is doing it with the wrong mindset. Constitutional safeguards are not designed for moments when power is exercised by good men; they exist precisely because future holders of power may not always be so wise or so restrained. We have become so used to our state of freedom that we are in danger of imagining that it is the natural state of mankind. History teaches us that it is not. We have reached our advanced state of structured freedom, responsible government and parliamentary democracy through centuries of slow, organic growth. They grew through the common law, through Magna Carta, through Parliament and through the principle that the community—the people—participate in justice.
Henry Tufnell (Mid and South Pembrokeshire) (Lab)
The right to a fair trial is fundamental to our democracy. For certain offences, a fair trial will always be a trial by jury. However, it has been long been the case that the right to a trial by jury is contingent on the offence. The Interpretation Act 1978 set out the three-tier classification of criminal offences, and created a category for less serious offences that would be tried only by a magistrates court—without a jury.
The question of which crimes fall into that category has been revisited periodically. The Criminal Justice Act 1988 reclassified three groups of offences—common assault, taking vehicles without consent, and criminal damage under a certain value—as summary-only offences to be dealt with in magistrates courts, without a jury. In the same year, the Thatcher Government passed the Road Traffic Act 1988, which made driving while disqualified a summary offence. It is not new for a Government to make choices about who can access a jury trial by reclassifying offences to reflect changes in wider society and technology.
This Government face important choices about how to address the urgent problem of the backlog in our Crown courts. As hon. Members have powerfully illustrated, justice is being delayed for far too many victims, witnesses and defendants. The scale of the problem demands ambitious and radical reforms, and to deny the need for them is to downplay the impact that our broken criminal justice system has had on the lives of so many people. One measure at the Government’s disposal to tackle the backlog is restricting the right to a jury trial to a smaller number of offences. Although jury trials account only for about 3% of criminal trials, they take up 60% of Crown court hearing time. The Government’s increased investment in magistrates courts, and the expansion of their powers, would also help to reduce the burden on Crown courts.
However, magistrates courts are feeling the effects of 20 years of under-investment, and have an open caseload of over 370,000 cases and counting. Turning the tide on capacity pressures will take time. High conviction rates in magistrates courts, as well as increased sentencing powers and the reduced right to appeal proposed in clauses 6 and 7, risk lengthier sentences and adding to our ballooning prison population. Reducing the burden on the Crown court is vital, but the Government must be careful not to rely too heavily on lay magistrates in doing so.
There is a practical middle way that could see swift and effective reductions to the Crown court backlog and avoid overloading the lay magistrates courts: give district judges greater powers to try criminal cases. District judges are valuable and experienced members of our criminal justice system, and they have years of professional experience behind them. Many sit as recorders in the Crown court and go on to become Crown court judges themselves. Many also have experience of trying the most serious cases, such as rape, when sitting in the youth court, so why should they not be trusted to hear more serious adult cases? If their jurisdiction were increased to offences carrying up to three years’ imprisonment, they could take on cases such as assaulting an emergency worker, dangerous driving and indecent exposure.
To make this work, the right to elect to have a jury trial would need to be limited to offences with a maximum penalty above three years. That is slightly more than Sir Brian Leveson’s recommendation of two years, and the effect would be immediate: far fewer cases sent to the Crown court, quicker hearings before experienced district judges, fewer unnecessary referrals to the Crown court and more time for the Crown court to focus on more serious crime. This would still require important choices to made about the right to a jury trial itself. The Government could reduce the maximum sentence for certain offences that are currently set between three and five years—offences where sentences above three years are rarely imposed. That would allow them to fall within the jurisdiction of district judges.
Critics may say that this looks soft on crime, but in truth it simply reflects sentencing reality. For example, actual bodily harm carries five years under section 47 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, but 98% of custodial sentences between 2020 and 2024 were for three years or less. For knife and offensive weapon offences, the average sentence is just eight months. Those offences could also reasonably have their maximum sentence reduced to three years, thus restricting the right to elect to have a jury trial.
I refer to Scotland’s sheriff courts as a useful model. Like district judges, sheriffs are legally qualified and experienced and have the capacity to handle both low and mid-level offences. Between sheriff courts and the lay justice of the peace courts, the majority of local criminal business is covered, reserving the High Court for more serious cases.
If we want justice delivered quickly and fairly, we must use every tool at our disposal, so I ask my right hon. Friend: will he consider expanding the powers of district judges as part of this Government’s ambitious plan to invest in and reform our justice system?
Gideon Amos (Taunton and Wellington) (LD)
I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Jess Brown-Fuller) on defending trial by jury, which is a long-standing right that people have enjoyed—albeit only in certain circumstances—and we should think very seriously before taking it away. One hundred senior barristers and KCs have written to the Secretary of State to say that taking away this right for those cases would be an “irremediable error”, and many others have criticised the move.
When I visited the magistrates court in my constituency, magistrates told me of their challenges in recruiting, which must place serious doubts on the assumptions that have been made about the time savings that would result from this Bill. I also have serious concerns about the removal of the right to appeal those cases in the Crown court.
Carla Lockhart (Upper Bann) (DUP)
The Criminal Bar Association says it is “fundamentally opposed” to restricting jury trials, with around 90% of criminal barristers being against these proposals. This was not in Labour’s manifesto, and there has been an admission that the plans are ideological rather than practical. Does the hon. Member agree that weakening trial by jury will not solve the crisis in our courts and risks undermining a safeguard that has protected our justice system for over 800 years?
Gideon Amos
I do. The hon. Member is right: the problem with these reforms is that they are not going to speed up the criminal justice system or solve the backlog issues. We have rehearsed all the challenges that the system faces—we know what they are, and they need to be addressed, but abolishing trial by jury for those affected will not do that.
Madam Deputy Speaker, if I may, I would like to spend a few minutes on a missed opportunity in this Bill: dealing with the state of our immigration and asylum system, which we all know the Conservatives left in an appalling state. The asylum backlog more than doubled in just two years, from 70,000 to 166,000 people waiting in 2022. Instead of processing those claims, the Conservatives opened over 400 asylum hotels. As the Government began clearing up the—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
Order. I suggest that the hon. Gentleman might like to stay within the scope of this Bill rather than discussing asylum hotels.
Gideon Amos
The point I wish to make, Madam Deputy Speaker, is that this Bill should address the challenge faced by the immigration system. Alongside the Bill, the Government have a parallel proposal to abolish the current system and to replace immigration tribunals with a new appeals system. I believe that that should be debated in the House and that it is relevant to this Bill, but I will move quickly through my points about this issue so as not to irritate you, Madam Deputy Speaker.
This Bill offers an important opportunity to address the immigration system. I am concerned that the creation of a new body and the abolition of the appeals tribunal is not the right approach, and that it will devalue the tribunal judges who are ready and available to sit and hear more cases. I genuinely welcome the Secretary of State’s announcement of an extra 26,000 sitting days for that chamber, but extra days will not be useful if there are not enough judges to sit for them. In the words of a judge who wrote to me,
“there are not enough judges and if the Home Office does not do the work quicker at their end, which is where the delay is, it makes no difference.”
There are enough immigration and asylum tribunal judges, but we need them to be allowed to sit for more than 220 capped days to deal with the backlog. I tabled a written question on this point. Those judges are prevented from being paid more than salaried judges, and therefore there is an effective cap on their sitting. Those are the kinds of issues that we need to deal with, as well as dealing with the backlog in the criminal courts and allowing our courts to be used for two sittings each day—am and pm—as my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester explained. Those are the kinds of measures that would speed up the criminal justice system, not the abolition of trial by jury for those cases that would be affected.
Some hon. Members have made the point that trial by jury is not necessarily a constitutional right in all cases, and we understand that. However, denigrating trial by jury as unimportant or a minor right does not help the argument of those who are seeking to abolish it for certain cases. Looking back, it has been called in case law a
“highly valued part of our unwritten constitution.”
Going back to the 18th century, Lord Justice Camden said that it was
“the foundation of our free constitution”.
In the 20th century, Lord Justice Devlin said that
“it is the lamp that shows that freedom lives”.
Catherine Atkinson
I fully agree that jury trials are a hugely important part of our justice system, but does the hon. Gentleman agree that the way that summary offences, either-way offences and indictable-only offences are classified has altered over the years? That classification was changed in the 1970s and in the 1980s, and it is incorrect to try to portray our legal system as one that is unchanged in 800 years.
Gideon Amos
Of course I accept that the legal system has evolved and changed, and that the right to trial by jury has changed, but my concern is that in serious cases, where someone could be imprisoned for up to two years and their reputation destroyed, people would want to be tried by jury. Our legal system currently protects that right, but that would be swept away by this Bill.
Warinder Juss (Wolverhampton West) (Lab)
We already have judges who make decisions on cases where children are taken away from parents, so does the hon. Gentleman not consider those to be serious cases? Some 90% of cases are dealt with by magistrates, so does he say that justice is not achieved in those cases?
Gideon Amos
Of course magistrates do a vital job, but when I visited magistrates in my constituency, they explained that they seriously doubt that it will be possible to recruit sufficient people to meet Ministry of Justice estimates about cost saving and time saving.
To conclude, for me cases that will result in imprisonment of up to three years—or up to two years if they come before a magistrate—are serious enough to warrant the right of defendants to request a trial by jury. Those are the protections currently in place in law. We should hold on to those protections and defend them as a guarantee of our liberty in this House and in the country.
Natalie Fleet (Bolsover) (Lab)
I want to start by pointing out that in this debate, we have called more barristers to speak than we have called women. It would be wrong of us not to realise that we are the absolute epitome of the British establishment. I have never come across as many barristers in my life; before I came here, the only time I ever saw a barrister was when I was helping a loved one who faced trial. This is about the reality of the real world, but we are more likely to have victims watching on than we are to have victims on these Benches. The voices of victims have been lacking from this debate. We have heard about the Bar Council and we have heard lots of references to men, but Claire Waxman emailed every single MP and said, “I want you to listen to the victims—their voices, their stories and the realities of the waits that they endure.”
We have a system in this country where you can rape somebody and get away with it. It happens every single day. For too long, society has told women that it is their fault that they have been raped and that nobody will believe them if they do report, so five out of six of them do not. And if they do go to trial, they will face years of re-traumatisation, which is why 60% drop out. You know what is worse than being raped? I can tell you from personal experience: facing years of waiting to see if people believe you.
We all have a role to play in eradicating our rape culture, but today we see the state stepping up for victims. This is about making sure that they are supported and believed by our institutions, harnessing the nation’s sense of urgency to do more, and smashing the status quo by cutting the standard half-a-decade wait for justice. We know that if we do not invest and modernise our courts system, everything else is just tinkering around the edges. A young woman named Sienna came up to me last week and said, “Natalie, I just don’t get it, but you do. What is happening? This is just complete common sense to everybody I speak to and everybody at work—I am a police officer. I just don’t get it. Where is the catch? Why are people so angry?” So what I want to do now is talk the House through the arguments for the status quo to remain.
We keep hearing that we need more money. We are having record investment—and—I’ll tell you what—it is not enough. Trials by jury are part of our history, but we have to adapt. When trials are taking twice as long as they did in the year 2000, we need to keep up. Judges alone cannot hear trials. We have already heard about district judges and the work that they do; we need a jury of peers. I want to point out that nobody questioned the legitimacy of the trial of Gisèle Pelicot, the bravest woman I look up to. I am not saying that we should abolish jury trials. What I am saying is that if we create capacity and protect juries for the most serious trials, I will do everything I can to get as many rapists as I can into those courts.
Hon. Members will hear that this is a class issue—and, yes, it is. This is about victims versus the establishment, which we are hearing far too much from today. Instead of putting themselves in the place of the defendant and imagining how that would feel, I am asking Members to put themselves in the shoes of the victim, because a quarter of us women become one. Imagine if this was you. This is not about denying anybody justice; it is about enabling victims and innocent parties to have a more efficient path to getting that justice.
Once again, courage calls to courage everywhere. I call on our Government to replicate the courage of victims and use it to get our justice system moving. Show that we can be bold disruptors, smashing the status quo, taking the difficult choices, taking on the arguments, delivering for victims across the land, who need leadership and decisive action, and rebalancing power between victims and perpetrators.
I back these reforms not because I am made to, but because they are right—because I want my granddaughter to grow up in a world where women can be believed, get fast justice and move on with their lives. I tell the 200 women in this country who will be raped today: I am sorry that you will have to wait until 2030 for a trial, but today we are doing something about it, and I am so proud to walk through the Lobby on your behalf.
Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bolsover (Natalie Fleet). Although she is on the opposite side of the debate from me, she always speaks with huge passion on these issues. I should start with a couple of declarations. First, my wife is a sitting employment judge, and therefore the tribunal element of the Bill pertains to her. Secondly, like many right hon. and hon. Members in this Chamber, I was a barrister immediately prior to coming into this place, and I maintain my practising certificate. I hope the hon. Lady will indulge me if I pontificate on this issue for a few moments.
While I was not a criminal barrister, I did a significant amount of inquest work, so I had face-to-face, first-hand experience with jurors, and I can say without a shadow of a doubt that they are the most remarkable, ordinary people, who give up their time for civic engagement. They sit there quietly, listening to the evidence; they take their role seriously; and they sit in judgment and make findings of fact. That is a huge constitutional principle. We have talked about rights, and I am not going to pretend that there is an innate right to a trial by jury, but there is a firm constitutional principle of ensuring that justice is not merely done to the public, but that it is done with the public.
We all know about the problem of court backlogs. It would be a farce to pretend that this is not a significant and serious issue—it is a failure of the state that we have got to this place. It is a failure of successive Governments, and we recognise that across the board, but the question we have to ask ourselves is not whether trial by jury should be abandoned; it is whether the reforms that are before this House, with the scrutiny that has been undertaken and the impact assessment that accompanies the Bill, constitute sufficient evidence for making such a reform to this country’s constitution.
What the Bill asks for is very clear, and we have to be honest about it. We are asking for a shift in the balance between the state and its people, and that may lead to inequality before the law. Take the prime example raised by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and Tavistock (Sir Geoffrey Cox): that of two individuals who, on a factual matrix, committed precisely the same crime. Those individuals appear before the court, but one has a string of previous convictions. Are we really saying that a person should be denied the opportunity of a jury trial if they have not previously been of bad character? That is a nonsense, and it does not achieve what we should be seeking to achieve.
The further point, of course, is that if we are making such a constitutional change on the basis that it will enable us to deal with the backlog in the criminal courts, why is there no sunset clause in the Bill? Why are we not saying that the purpose of the Bill is to shift the dial and make progress, but that we recognise that it should not be a blank cheque for the state? We should recognise that if this change has to be made—although I do not believe it does—it should be made on a limited basis, because if we are to change a right that is older than most institutions in this country, the least Parliament should do is base its decision on more than just an assumption in the impact assessment.
Let me turn to the modelling, which was also raised by the shadow Justice Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for West Suffolk (Nick Timothy). In this House on 3 February, I asked the Lord Chancellor a question about the 20% reduction in the time taken by court hearings. He gave me a very clear answer—that he accepted Sir Brian Leveson’s findings, but that the Government would publish their own modelling alongside the Bill. However, page 10 of the impact assessment is very clear that the Government have adopted Sir Brian’s assumption. That is an assumption; it is not modelling. There is a distinct difference. Analysis is helpful, but modelling is critical, and if we are weighing up the evidence base for the Bill, we have to have more than analysis alone.
Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)
Can my hon. Friend give us his views as a practitioner on something that has not yet been mentioned in the debate, which is the usefulness of juries in protecting the institution of the judiciary? At the moment, if there is a string of sentencing that the Government or politicians do not like, there is not a lot they can do about it. If it is judges who are handing out those sentences, they will come under direct political attack, as we unfortunately see from time to time. The distance and insulation that a jury gives is not just a protection for the citizen, but a protection for the judiciary and its ongoing integrity.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
My right hon. Friend is right. There is a reason that judges wear a wig and barristers wear a wig and gown. It provides a shield between the arm of the law and the citizen. To dilute that would fundamentally upset the settlement that has been reached over hundreds and hundreds of years.
Alicia Kearns
Drawing on my hon. Friend’s point, we have also heard much argument that somehow reducing down to one judge would be a fairer and less biased system. As a woman, I do not feel that one person—we have to be honest with ourselves, they will likely be a man—who does not share my life experiences is more likely to be less biased than a jury of my peers. If the Government really want to tackle this issue, they need simply to turn to page 67 of their own manifesto, where they promise fast-track rape cases with specialist courts for every Crown court location. Surely that would be a better policy. It would make sure that women, when they give evidence, are hearing from a jury of their peers, who are more likely together to understand life experiences than one individual.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
My hon. Friend is right. First, there is the argument that this is of such constitutional significance that it should have been in a manifesto. Secondly, there is the argument that there was a proposal within the manifesto that the Government are not bringing forward. Thirdly, this is about getting the right settlement for the public, where they are judged by a body of their peers on the evidence before them. That is as opposed to a distant judge, who perhaps at times appears aloof, which fails to achieve that balance. We are being asked today to curtail a constitutional safeguard that has been apparent for so many years, and it goes much further than Sir Brian’s report. There were many good things in that report, but this legislation goes much further than any of his suggestions.
We have to ask what the real issues are. They are plain to see. There are too few judges and too few advocates able to prosecute or defend the cases. There are too few functioning courtrooms. Removing jury trials will not fix any of that. There is a further issue that the Government have failed to address, which is around the recruitment of magistrates. We know that in this country, recruitment cycles of magistrates have often not returned the numbers required. The presumption must be that the reason the Government did not adopt Sir Brian’s recommendation of having two magistrates as wing members was because they knew they could not recruit a sufficient number of magistrates to implement it. There is logic on that front, but if we are pushing more cases down to the magistrates court, who will be able to hear them and listen to them? Who will be able to draw those conclusions?
My final point, which I will make briefly, pertains to parliamentary scrutiny. The Bill will be rushed through this House and through Committee. It will get a mere five days in Committee, but it is of such constitutional importance. There is strong feeling across the House both for and against these proposals. Would it not be wiser in such circumstances to adopt an approach similar to what we do for armed forces Bills, for example, where we have a Select Committee of the House? Members with experience within the law and with experience of being victims could scrutinise the legislation and come back with a report. We could then do Report stage on the Floor of the House. That way, the country can know that we have given this legislation the due regard that it deserves.
There is a reason that jury trials have endured, and it is because they command the trust of the public. They ensure that the law is exercised with public participation. If the Government believe in diluting that right, they must provide the evidence for that change, and thus far they have failed to do so.
Several hon. Members rose—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
Order. I propose putting in place a five-minute time limit after the next speaker.
Charlotte Nichols (Warrington North) (Lab)
I thought long and hard about speaking today. I will allow right hon. and hon. Members from the legal profession to make the legal arguments better than I can, and will allow Members who rightly have procedural or rights-based concerns for defendants, which I share, to raise them. I trust that those points will be satisfactorily covered. I want to focus my remarks on a particular perspective that I feel has been too often ventriloquised in this debate, and I hope that the House will be gentle with me as I do so.
I have spoken before in this place about having post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of being the victim of a crime, but I have never specified the nature of that crime, and in doing so now I am aware that I am waiving my right to anonymity, and aware of the personal consequences that come along with that.
I care profoundly about rape victims facing intolerable delays for their day in court. I know only too well what that feels like, because, after being raped at an event that I attended in my capacity as a Member of Parliament, I waited 1,088 days to go to court. Every single one of those days was agony, made worse by having a role in public life that meant that the mental health consequences of my trauma were played out in public, with the event that led to my eventual sectioning for my own safety still being something that I receive regular social media abuse about from strangers to this day.
But here is the kicker. In this debate, it feels as if experiences like mine have been weaponised and are being used for rhetorical misdirection in relation to what this Bill actually is. The violence against women and girls sector has not had the opportunity to come together to discuss it, and the Government’s framing and narrative has been to pit survivors and defendants against each other in a way that I think is deeply damaging.
We have been told that if we have concerns about the Bill, it is because we have not been raped, or because we do not care enough for rape victims. The opposite is true in my case; it is because I have been raped that I am as passionate as I am about what it means for a justice system to be truly victim-focused. It is because I have endured every indignity that our broken criminal justice system could mete out that I care about what kind of reform will actually deliver justice for survivors and victims of crime more widely. In our manifesto, we promised specialist rape courts. This Bill is not that.
The transition away from jury trials in certain cases might itself take up operational time, with changes to an already overstretched system entrenching issues and delays. The timeline for these changes to take effect is 2028-29. We know what works because it is already happening in a few key areas, including pioneering work in Liverpool and Preston Crown courts in the north-west. This is a bearing down on waiting lists that could be taking place in months, not years—proven, meaningful and significant reductions in waiting times for complainants and defendants, rather than speculative, unevidenced reductions that the Institute for Government says could be as little as 1% to 2%, and coming years down the track. It is worth saying that the Bar Council believes that even that 1% to 2% reduction is wishful thinking, so we risk offering false hope to rape victims, rather than real change.
We know that juries are more diverse than the judiciary, and an unintended consequence of these changes could be that women from minoritised backgrounds are less likely to come forward, not more. Juries do not make perfect decisions, but neither do judges. An unintended consequence of measures that enabled pre-recorded evidence has been significant slippage in case handling, which is where the most significant procedural delays are. A clear re-prioritisation is needed here, alongside the expansion of recorders in cases involving rape and serious sexual offences.
The second thing to say is that the Bill does little for instances in which a rape victim actually comes to court. I still have almost as many nightmares about my experience on the witness stand as I do about my rape. The defence barrister, who had previously faced investigation after a witness took her own life following cross- examination in a different rape case, does not seem to have learnt much from that experience, and went for me in a way that undermined all the progress I had made in therapy and led me to blame myself for the eventual acquittal. We need far greater safeguards for those giving evidence. Actually, we need a reframing of the fact that legally you are a “witness” at your own trial. It is wild to me that we are still arguing, after many years, about a person’s right to a free transcript of their own trial, particularly as the recent move to allow access to sentencing remarks does nothing to help with closure for those whose cases sadly do not end in a conviction.
Ms Creasy
I know at first hand the strength that my hon. Friend is showing in making this speech, and I know why it matters for us to be confident that what we bring forward actually will change this situation—that we will not go down rabbit holes and be distracted by changing juries, but will focus ruthlessly on the victim’s experience. I want to speak on behalf of everyone in the Chamber in saying that we are with my hon. Friend every step of the way, and we are so damn proud of her today.
Charlotte Nichols
I thank my hon. Friend.
The third thing to say is that, for me, closure began after a successful civil process following the acquittal. My rapist may not be considered to have met the criminal threshold for guilt beyond all reasonable doubt, and is out there on the streets as a free man while I live with the life sentence of what he did to me, but what has been established, at a civil standard of proof, is what happened. It found that I had been raped, and a compensation order was made that recognises me as the blameless victim of a violent crime.
Despite the recommendations of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, we are still nowhere on civil remedy, including movement on the criminal injuries compensation scheme reform. Shamefully, the tariffs have not been uprated in line with inflation since 2012 and have no eligibility for non-contact sexual offences, which can cause significant and lasting harm.
Finally, the VAWG sector has been under-invested in for such a significant period that the best things that we can do to drive down waiting times and improve the experience of victims require money, and the Treasury remains unwilling to adequately cough up. I welcome the announcement of independent legal advisers, but the £6 million that sits alongside this is woefully inadequate. I could not have made it all the way to trial without my independent sexual violence adviser, Jaz, whose support saved my life, but I had to wait seven months to be allocated one, given how under-resourced the system is. That is not good enough.
I have enormous respect for many of my Front-Bench colleagues, particularly my hon. Friends the Members for Pontypridd (Alex Davies-Jones) and for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips), but from where I am sitting it feels that, despite their best efforts and the publication of our groundbreaking VAWG strategy, we could do so much for rape victims that does not involve the Lord Chancellor using them as a cudgel to drive through reforms that are not directly relevant to them. As a starting point, Rape Crisis England & Wales has called for five key demands in its “Living in Limbo” report. Do not say that this Bill helps deliver justice for rape victims until it actually, materially does.
Sarah Pochin (Runcorn and Helsby) (Reform)
I speak today in favour of the reasoned amendment standing in the names of Reform UK MPs. Although it has not been selected for debate, I would like to draw hon. Members’ attention to the wording, particularly where it says that
“the right to trial by one’s peers…has been an essential part of UK freedoms for centuries.”
As a magistrate of 20 years and a chairman of the court for 17 of those years, I hope that I have something to offer this debate. During those 20 years, I was part of a judicial process in which I, together with two fellow magistrates, sent many defendants to prison. I will never forget the first time I was part of a bench that sent someone to prison. I can still see that young man’s face, and see his distraught parents at the back of the court. I had to fight back my own tears, as a mother feeling for his mother and her pain, knowing the life-changing impact that our decision would have on that young man’s life. I should say that I toughened up pretty quickly.
On many occasions, I found myself chairing a trials court that would inevitably start late or end up with magistrates twiddling their thumbs when trials cracked or fell apart. That could be for a variety of reasons, but it was often due to last-minute pleas by defendants who had been presented with irrefutable evidence, or to the failure of the Crown Prosecution Service to prepare adequately for the case.
The process in the magistrates court is already inefficient, and a sizeable backlog of cases exist—reportedly, over 370,000. It is worth pointing out that a magistrates bench operates as a mini-jury, with three magistrates sitting on a trial to ensure a majority verdict, so it represents trial by the people, not the state. Be in no doubt: a prison sentence of up to three years will change someone’s life forever. A prison sentence of that length will mean the loss of employment, and therefore the loss of one’s ability to pay a mortgage or rent, often resulting in the loss of one’s home, which may in turn lead to a family being made homeless. A prison sentence often means the break-up of a family, with permanent damage inflicted on the partner and children in that family, whether by becoming outcasts in their community, being bullied at school, or adopting learned behaviour and offending themselves later in life.
For one individual—one judge—to have the power and to be the only perspective in administering a prison sentence is not justice. Furthermore, a single justice acting alone may come under pressure from politicians not to send defendants to prison due to a lack of prison space available, regardless of whether that defendant should in fact receive a custodial sentence. There may also be cases where a single justice is more lenient towards defendants from ethnic minorities for fear of being called racist if custodial sentences are frequently given by that judge to such defendants from ethnic minorities, regardless of the demographics of that court area.
With this Bill, there is no scrutiny of a judge, no ability to question that judge’s decision and no majority vote. A life-changing prison sentence can be given on the judgment of an individual with a single perspective and prejudice, without any checks and balances. The state will be administering justice, not the people. Everyone deserves the right to trial by their peers. In this Bill, the Government are removing trial by jury for serious crimes that attract prison sentences of up to three years. These could be serious domestic violence incidents, sexual assault, theft, fraud and so on.
This Bill is intended to speed up justice and cut court waiting lists, but there is no credible evidence to suggest that will be achieved by these changes. Courts need investment and to be run more efficiently to speed up justice. Solicitors need to be on time and ready for trial. So much of the delay is caused in the process before the case even comes before a jury. These proposals are the exact opposite of justice. These proposals go against the foundations of law and order in this country.
Jon Trickett (Normanton and Hemsworth) (Lab)
When I was working for a living as a building worker, rather than being here, if there was a backlog of work, we were told to work through the night and at weekends, and on not very much additional pay. I wonder how it is that, today in our country, one tenth of all the courts are not even sitting, despite the backlog that the Deputy Prime Minister has told us about and many others have spoken about. Why is it that, when there is a backlog, manual workers, as I was, are made to work hard, and rightly so, to catch up, but the barristers, judges, solicitors and all the other accoutrements of a court are simply told, “Well, we’ll make it easier for you by reducing the amount of jury trials that are going to be held.” It is rather odd.
Jon Trickett
No. I have only five minutes, and I will have to move fast.
The Deputy Prime Minister did convince me, and I am sure all of us, that there is a backlog, and it is not reasonable or fair, in terms of justice, that people should wait so long. Obviously, today we have heard some very powerful speeches from victims that reinforce the case. However, he has not shown to my satisfaction that the cause of the backlog is the juries. In fact, there is much evidence to show that they have a marginal impact at the most. The cause of the backlog is all sorts of things, including the failure of the courts to meet for long enough hours, as other working people have to do all over the country.
Let me reflect for a moment—in a sense, going back to the basics—on why juries are in place, and I think it is to do with the fact that the Crown has the power, uniquely, to imprison people and deprive them of their liberty. No other organisation has that massively powerful capacity. The point is that, in a case where the Crown—or the Government, acting on behalf of the Crown—is operating in an unreasonable, unfair or even oppressive way, what the person facing imprisonment has is the jury system. Twelve people drawn from the citizenry of our country at random are able to speak together and make a final decision about whether the Crown has made out the case that that person should be imprisoned. That is a fundamental part of our constitutional system, and the idea that we should begin to abandon it is mistaken. Some hon. Members have said today that we have done similarly in the past, but making mistakes in the past does not at all justify continuing to make mistakes in the present. I have not heard the case made that juries are a bad thing in principle, although we are reducing them.
One further point I want to raise is the question of how the backlog occurred. Again, no one has made the case that the backlog occurred because of some sort of permanent, strategic problem with the way our judicial system works. It is the product of a series of cuts by Governments of both parties, to be honest, and of a number of failures—there was privatisation, and all sorts of other issues. If those changes are contingent, rather than permanent, and a temporary problem that can be resolved, why are we destroying an element of the jury system? If the Deputy Prime Minister had said that the world and the country had changed, and that our way of looking at the judicial system had to be reformed, he might have had a case, although I would not necessarily agree with it. However, he has not said that. He has said that this is a contingent problem.
When I was working for a living, I regularly used a ratchet—I do not know if the DPM has ever used one. A ratchet is a device that moves in only one direction. In the jury system, citizens have had, over centuries, a ratchet that gives protection from an oppressive Government. If the Deputy Prime Minister had come to the House and said that he was going to do some things that were extraordinary but temporary, to deal with the problems facing all victims, I might well have been prepared to listen to him. However, he has not said that; instead, he says that this will be a permanent change to the way that we do things. I am not convinced. This is oppressive, authoritarian and, quite honestly, much as I admire the Deputy Prime Minister, reactionary.
Katie Lam (Weald of Kent) (Con)
We have heard a great deal from Government Members about the necessity of these court reforms. They say that in order to tackle the backlog in our courts, we need to curb jury trials, but previous statements from Ministers betray the Government’s true intentions. On 7 January, standing at the Dispatch Box, the Minister for Courts and Legal Services said,
“People ask me, ‘Sarah, would you be doing this if there was not a crisis in our courts?’ I say yes”—[Official Report, 7 January 2026; Vol. 778, c. 284.]
It would be bad enough to attack the time-honoured right to a jury trial in the name of administrative efficiency; to do so for ideological reasons, without candidly making that ideological case to the public, is a disgrace.
The British people can see what is really going on. The Government want to curb jury trials because they do not trust the public. They think that judges know best, and would rather the justice system was run entirely by them. We know this to be the case because whenever the Government have a choice to make between the British people and their friends in the legal profession, they are on the side of the lawyers, every single time. We saw this “judges know best” approach in the Prime Minister’s disastrous Chagos giveaway; we see it on asylum, immigration and the European convention on human rights; we see it in the Government’s plans to allow prosecutions of veterans who fought in Northern Ireland; and now, we see it in their plans to curb jury trials.
However, jury trials exist for a reason. They are designed to ensure that the judiciary can never stray too far from the public’s conception of justice and fairness. At a time when public trust in the judiciary is low, can it really be sensible to take away this crucial backstop?
I will take just a single example of the divergence between public morality and judicial opinion. According to research conducted by the Free Speech Union, there is a huge gap between the successes of defences based on the right to free speech in judge-led cases and in cases heard by a jury. In judge-only cases at magistrates courts, just 16% of free-speech defences succeeded; in Crown court cases, where juries very often sit, 28% of free-speech defences succeeded. There is a clear divergence between the public’s appreciation of justice and the views of the judicial establishment.
The result of this Government’s plans will be to further alienate the public, and to drag the justice system further away from the views of the British people. If that is what they want, they should at least be straightforward about it.
Lee Barron (Corby and East Northamptonshire) (Lab)
This has been an incredible debate. I pay tribute to those who have felt able and courageous enough to share their personal circumstances with the House, and to the campaigners in the Public Gallery who have come along to hear a debate that will help make a success of their campaigns.
I go back to what my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner) said: no Second Reading, no Bill. If we want to keep the good bits, we have to keep the Bill. If we want to change the bits that my hon. Friend mentioned, we have to give the Bill its Second Reading and get it into Committee. That is probably what we should do.
I was a magistrate for 20 years. I stood down in 2023, when I was selected as the candidate for Corby and East Northamptonshire. The case for reforming our justice system has been made. Every time a victim waits months for justice, they are being failed, and trust is lost. Justice delayed is justice diminished. I thank the Minister for spending some time with me, to discuss this issue. I welcome many of the things that we spoke about, including bringing the number of magistrates back up to previous levels. To bring down the backlog, we might have to look at the number of court buildings that the last Government closed, because once a magistrates court is full, it is full.
The courthouse in my constituency was closed, along with our police station. Kettering lost its courthouse, as did Daventry and Towcester. The reality is that justice no longer feels close to our people. I have some concerns, which I spoke to the Minister about, but let me come back on a couple of points. First, the amendment of the official Opposition talks about people’s right to elect which court they go to; if they are in a magistrates court, they can elect to go to Crown court. I was magistrate for 20 years and I never saw one person do that, because there are consequences: a judge in a Crown court has greater sentencing powers than a magistrates court. To those howling about this ability being taken away, I say this: in Scotland, defendants cannot elect what court they go to; the court decides that, so I do not see much wrong with that proposal.
Concerns have been raised, both today and previously, about defendants causing delays. I did not really see much evidence of that, but I do not see a need to stand in the way of the changes being proposed. The constitutional right to trial exists for offences with a sentence of more than three years, but we need to look at that, because that was not what Leveson recommended.
There are various other concerns that I have expressed, but let me say this to those who do not want any change at all: that position is not acceptable for victims, workers in the sector, or our constituents. Our system must deliver justice that is fair, timely and trusted. There are those who think that today is the end of the process. I have seen people saying, “This is D-day”, or “Today, MPs are going to scrap this, that and the other.” That is not the case. This is Second Reading. Once the Bill passes its Second Reading, as I think it will, we can start to look into the detail, and make the changes that my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull East mentioned.
I believe that there should be some changes, and I believe that is the view of Members from across the House. I hope that the Government will work with colleagues across the House to produce a Bill that Members can feel comfortable supporting, that strengthens trust in our justice system, and that delivers justice for victims.
Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)
We all know that years of underfunding and under-investment have caused a crisis across our legal and justice systems. I commend some of the people who spoke earlier about their experiences, particularly the hon. Members for Bolsover (Natalie Fleet) and for Warrington North (Charlotte Nichols). It takes immense courage to stand up in the Chamber and put those experiences on record. They came at this from a different point of view. I have immense respect for them. Of course, they are doing what we should be doing here. Victims and survivors—their voices, stories and needs—should be at the heart of the justice system, and they are, as we know, facing unacceptable delays to justice. The Government, of course, must speed up the process. Only the state can do that. It is only through the state that the citizen can get justice, so there is an undeniable need for reform.
The second part of the Bill makes immensely important interventions that will make a real difference to victims. They include the repeal of the presumption of parental involvement, and measures relating to the admissibility of evidence and special measures in court, and they are to be welcomed. The question that we are debating, however, is the degree to which clauses 1 to 7 are the major reforms needed to speed up the process. Removing the right to jury trial for offences that are triable either way and imposing a single-judge model are serious changes to individual rights, as we have heard. They go beyond what Sir Brian Leveson recommended that the Government do to address court backlogs, and they increase the risk of bias and miscarriages of justice, increase the risk to the safety of judges, and increase pressure on legal aid services.
Although nobody denies that action is necessary, we have to bear in mind that the Institute for Government estimates that the Bill will save only between 7% and 10% of total court time, and that judge-only trials will save only 1.5% to 2.5%. There is little concrete evidence that these are the right sorts of changes to make, and we fear that they will not achieve what we want.
I turn to Wales, because the problems are not the same everywhere across the England and Wales jurisdiction. Welsh Crown courts make up only a small proportion of the overall court backlog. Indeed, the Lady Chief Justice said that Wales is disposing of—wait for it—
“more Crown Court cases than it receives”.
That suggests that our Crown court backlog is actually going down. The legal reform charity JUSTICE points to Welsh Crown court measures that were taken to increase efficiency when those courts faced covid-era backlogs as examples of practical steps that have helped to keep clearance rates high.
Rather than us restricting a fundamental public right in order to tackle a problem, what would be useful in Wales is action to tackle the operational issues that our courts face, which we all know about. We need better data tracking, modern systems, improved pay, measures to address the Tory court closures, and proper building maintenance. Some of those things are pretty boring, but we will not make a difference until we address them.
We fear that the Bill could make things worse in Wales. Although there were 2,663 outstanding cases at the Crown court in Wales as of December 2024, there were nearly 12,000 outstanding cases in magistrates courts; they have serious capacity challenges that look set to increase as a direct result of the Bill. We also have serious challenges in Wales in recruiting magistrates, especially Welsh-speaking magistrates.
The hon. Member for Hornsey and Friern Barnet (Catherine West) mentioned a pilot scheme. It seems to me that, rather than making a huge, untested change of this gravity, a pilot scheme is exactly what we should be looking at, if we are to make changes to jury trials, because then we would actually know the effect. We need a pilot scheme with a sunset clause, rather than changes that will break the system everywhere to address an urban English problem.
It is undeniable that there is a crisis in the court system, and that we need changes to address it, but we need different solutions to address different problems in different areas. We must not break something in which there is so much trust at a time when we should be doing everything in our power to protect trust in politics—and, I fear, trust in the law, too.
Emma Foody (Cramlington and Killingworth) (Lab/Co-op)
I have spoken in this place about my experience of being a magistrate before being elected. I remember the weight of responsibility vividly. I recall the mornings in courtrooms, as we weighed defendants’ circumstances and mitigations against the urgent need for public safety. I have seen the sheer graft of the staff who keep our legal gears turning, but I have also seen the cracks that turn into chasms. There is nothing more frustrating than sitting on a bench and seeing a case adjourned for the third or even fourth time, not because of legal complexity, but because the system simply could not cope.
This is not just about administrative efficiency; it is about people. For too long, victims have been the forgotten party in our courtrooms, treated more like pieces of evidence than human beings. I note the offence taken by the hon. Member for West Suffolk (Nick Timothy) at being reproached for not mentioning victims enough in his opening speech. I gently suggest that if he had devoted as much time to victims as he did to talking about “Mastermind”, he would probably not have received the charge in quite that way.
The Victims’ Commissioner has been clear that survivors are bearing the brunt of a system under unprecedented pressure. She rightly pointed out that delay is the enemy of recovery. Every day that we shave off the backlog is a day we give back to a survivor to rebuild their life. I particularly welcome the measures to remove bad character evidence and the removal of assumed parental contact. That is a huge step for domestic abuse and sexual violence survivors and campaigners, and it is no exaggeration to say that it will save lives.
Magistrates are the backbone of our legal system, but we are also the most human element of it. We are everyday people drawn from all walks of life—teachers, retirees and neighbours—volunteering to give something back to the community and to deliver justice locally. We move the system from feeling like something far removed and distant from our communities—a private club, even; alien and abstract from most people’s lives—towards what it should be, which is a public service for every citizen.
I note the remarks of the Magistrates’ Association that these proposals are a “vote of confidence” in our magistracy. It is therefore surprising to hear the Opposition’s sudden change of heart, as when they increased magistrates’ sentencing powers to 12 months back in 2022 the impact on the Crown court was undeniably positive. It leads us to wonder why Opposition Members are so vehemently against our increasing those powers further—is it a matter of principle, or is it simply because it was not their idea?
As anyone who has worked in the system knows, magistrates can implement changes quickly. We are the speedy end of the system and the key to unlocking the backlog.
The Government’s impact assessment is striking: increasing magistrates’ sentencing powers is projected to save 8,000 Crown court sitting days by 2029. Just think about that: 8,000 days of judicial time redirected to the most harrowing cases such as rapes, murders and serious assaults, ensuring that victims of the most complex crimes are not left languishing for years.
In my communities, local justice has too often felt like a distant concept, but my constituents deserve to see justice delivered by people who actually understand the streets they live on. Local justice delivered by local people is how we restore trust, and it is how we deliver the fair, swift justice that communities like mine rightly expect.
Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)
I should first declare an interest as an NHS consultant paediatrician who has given evidence in court in that capacity. The references to the Magna Carta are particularly profound for a Lincolnshire MP, because one of the copies of Magna Carta from 1215 is kept in Lincoln. The Father of the House, my right hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh), and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and Tavistock (Sir Geoffrey Cox) talked eloquently and at length about jury trials, why they should remain, and why removing the right of appeal for magistrates court decisions is the wrong thing to do, so I will not focus on that in the few minutes I have.
I will focus on clause 17, which removes the presumption of involvement of parents in their child’s life. When there is dispute over who cares for a child, courts can make decisions: they can decide who a child is to live with; they can decide who has contact with the child, for how long, and when; they can decide what form that contact takes, whether it is by telephone, in a supervised contact centre or face to face; and they can make specific decrees such as where the child is to go to school.
The law is clear that when courts are making those decisions, the welfare of the child is paramount. They can take into account the child’s wishes if old enough and capable of making decisions in that respect. They can think about whether the child has been subject to any harm. They can talk about whether the child is at risk of further harm. They can talk about whether the parents are capable of providing for the needs of the child. However, section 1 of the Children Act 1989 is clear that the courts must presume, unless shown otherwise, that the involvement of both parents is in the child’s best interests.
Dr Marie Tidball (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)
Does the hon. Lady recognise that in 2020 the harm panel said that that section creates a “pro-contact culture” that puts children at risk, and that post the publication of that review, it received no response from her Government?
Dr Johnson
That is why I have explained that the presumption is that the parents have involvement. The court must take the risks to the child into consideration and, unless shown otherwise, give contact to both parents. If the child is at risk, however, the court has the absolute right to prevent the child from seeing those parents or to restrict contact to different forms and timeframes. The welfare of the child is key in those decisions.
That is in line with international law, which I know the Government are fond of. The UN convention on the rights of the child says that parents and children should maintain
“personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child’s…interests.”
Dr Johnson
Not for the moment. Article 8 of the European convention on human rights provides the right to family life and suggests that consideration be given to all alternatives before ordering no contact. The Government, however—
Josh Fenton-Glynn
In talking about the right to family life, the hon. Lady is talking not about the rights of the children, but about the rights of the abusers. If we start from the idea that an abuser has the right to contact their children, we end up with bad decisions. That is why, in the past 30 years, 67 children have died when contact should not have been granted. That is the change that we are making, those are the lives that we are saving and that is why it is important to do this today.
Dr Johnson
I understand what the hon. Gentleman is saying. I will continue my speech and perhaps he will listen to what I have to say.
The purpose of court decisions is, as the hon. Gentleman said, to prevent unsafe contact and to prevent tragedies. As a paediatrician, I have seen situations where children have been given back to parents and have come to significant harm as a result. I have dealt with and looked after those children, and unfortunately they have not been protected or saved in every case. The law is there to prevent unsafe contact, but the children’s needs must be put first, with the power to restrict access where they are in danger. The court must listen to all the evidence available, but no system is infallible and sometimes judges get it wrong. When they do, the outcomes can be hugely tragic, leading to the loss or serious injury of a child.
I know that this legislation has been brought forward with good intentions. The test is whether it will prevent such harm and such tragedies. I think that it might not. The reason is that the impact assessment produced by the Government says that it is “unlikely to materially change” the outcome in court. If that is the case, what is the point of the legislation? Will it, on the other hand, reduce the likelihood of children seeing their parents? Will that, in and of itself, cause some harm? Will it prevent some children from having the contact they need with their family members? Will it prevent the tragedies that we wish to prevent or not? Will it isolate those children who will come to harm? Do we have the right risk assessments to do that?
Every single one of us in this House wants to protect children. We need to improve the risk assessments and ensure that social workers have time to make proper risk assessments so that they identify the children who may be at risk and separate them from those who are not. We also need to improve the representation of children in court. I was once in court, in the witness box, and the barrister who was representing the children got up to speak. He asked me a question, but he had forgotten the name of one of the two children in the family and I had to remind him from the witness box. We really need to improve the quality of the representation of children.
Dr Johnson
I will not.
This legislation is potentially just a distraction—something that makes people feel like they are doing something and making a difference, when the impact assessment that the Government have produced suggests it will not. Is this change going to make any difference or not? Is this a lost opportunity to improve the risk assessments, children’s representation and social work and to actually make a difference?
Tony Vaughan (Folkestone and Hythe) (Lab)
I draw the House’s attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, which includes my status as a barrister.
Let us remind ourselves of the issues here. It is unacceptable that criminal trials should be listed today for 2030. That is a failure of the state. It is a failure of the state to provide a fundamental public service—that of justice. So the Government have to act, and I do not accept the argument that things have to stay as they are. I welcome the Government’s £2 billion investment in the criminal justice system and the decisions to lift the cap on Crown court sitting days, to implement efficiencies, to invest in the estate and to streamline case management. All of that is overdue and should have been done by the Conservatives. This is about ensuring that trials actually go ahead. However, the Government believe that that will not be enough to address the backlog without structural change, and I have not heard any attempt to argue to the contrary.
I turn to the most contentious element, which is the permanent removal of the right to elect jury trial for either-way cases. As hon. Members have said, this rests heavily on Sir Brian Leveson’s assessment of a minimum 20% time saving in the Crown court. Sir Brian has been candid that his estimate is based on modelling and is an informed qualitative judgment, not a hard empirical fact. The Ministry itself accepts that this modelling might not fully reflect real-world operations, and when dealing with a safeguard as important as trial by one’s peers, where liberty is at stake, the distinction between modelling and hard data matters. Most people seem to agree that those measures will save time, but there is a dispute about how much they are likely to save.
Karl Turner
What does my hon. and learned Friend say about the fact that judges will have to give detailed reasons for their judgments and for why they have decided on a case in a particular way? I declare an interest: my wife is a judge and it takes her days, and often more than a week, to come up with the reasons for the decisions that she has taken.
Tony Vaughan
I practised as a civil lawyer for most of my career, and I have been challenging written reasons and decisions my whole career. I do not have a problem with judges issuing written reasons in the criminal jurisdiction. I think it is a way of getting more transparency about why those decisions have been made. That is my personal view.
Ideally, I would have piloted this system first and gathered the data, and only then, if that data showed that the measures were necessary to reduce the backlog, would it have been difficult to rebut. If Sir Brian is right and these reforms clearly cut waiting times, that will be good for victims and public confidence. However, if the proposals are rolled out nationwide and he and the Government are wrong, and the gains are negative or outweighed by harms to fairness, equalities or public trust, particularly for minority defendants, it will be important that this House should not have tied its hands.
Removing the right to elect jury trial takes out around half of our jury trials. It is a very real interference with existing safeguards and it should not be a permanent change before we know that it works in practice. That is why I believe there must be a clear statutory mechanism in the Bill allowing Parliament to reverse this change if it does not work. In my view, we need a time-limited mandatory review on the face of the Bill to track timeliness, conviction patterns and equalities impacts, with an explicit power to require Ministers to restore the right to elect if the reforms do not deliver. A clause of that nature would be a statement of confidence in Parliament’s oversight, rather than of a lack of faith in the reforms, as has been suggested.
Expanding judge-only trials requires us to address the fact that the judiciary do not reflect our country’s diversity. Replacing lay juries with a single judge demands an intense focus on how we improve judicial diversity, and particularly transparency in appointments. For example, judicial references must be disclosable so that there is accountability for providing objective, evidence-based references if we are to improve the recruitment and promotion pipeline for women and minority ethnic judges.
One of the last cases in the courts that I was involved in before I was elected to Parliament was a judicial review of a decision of the Judicial Appointments Commission not to promote a district judge into a more senior position. The whole case was about why she could not see the reasons that she was not promoted. That secrecy, which is behind what many campaigners believe has been a process of secret soundings or a tap on the shoulder, has resulted in the situation that we have of a bench recruiting in its own image. That concept was recognised by the Lammy review, and it is a very real thing that we must address if we are to expand judge-only trials.
We face a grave crisis, but if we are to curtail long-standing rights, we must build robust safeguards into the Bill. I hope that Ministers will work constructively with Members across the House to ensure that we tackle the backlog effectively while strengthening confidence in our justice system.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
It was a privilege to be here for the powerful and effective speech from the hon. Member for Warrington North (Charlotte Nichols).
When literally thousands of venerable members of the legal profession are saying so clearly that jury trial restrictions will not be effective or practical and may be counterproductive, and that they threaten our rights, surely the Government must listen. The Green party’s reasoned amendment sets out clear reasons for the awful court backlog that is letting down so many victims—it talks about Conservative underfunding over many years—and sets out the missing resources that will help to properly solve it. It is rare for us to agree with some colleagues on anything, but the fact is that we are all right on this point. We need alternatives to the restrictions on jury trials in the Bill, including intensive listings, more sitting days, legal aid investment, better buildings and better services to deliver defendants to court.
The Green amendment also raises the question of whether these measures are yet another part of the Government’s wider attack on civil liberties. They are building a toolkit for tyrants also out of digital ID, facial recognition surveillance on our streets and the erosion of fundamental asylum rights—all things contrary to our British values and which should not be packaged up for this or any future Government to use against minorities, protesters and dissidents. This is all so dangerous. Can the Minister truly deny that the growing acceptance by juries of defences of proportionality or necessity in some protest cases was not a factor in the inclusion of the unnecessary and dangerous curtailment of jury trials in the Bill?
The category of triable either-way cases where jury trials will be restricted includes several of the specific offences created or made more serious by successive Governments in the wake of successful non-violent protest action. By successful, I mean non-violent actions that have—yes—caused inconvenience but which did what non-violent direct action is for: directly aiming to prevent harm to people or the environment, or to create a stir that raises public awareness of serious injustice. Actions made into more serious offences have included interference with infrastructure, blocking roads or demonstrating in airports, specific tunnelling offences, conspiracy to lock on to each other during protests, or symbolically using statues in actions, as well as some kinds of noisy protests—for being annoying.
Along with the wider principle here, I am so concerned, in connection with rights and liberties around dissent and resistance to state power, that juries could no longer be able to judge the public interest or proportionality of the actions of defendants of these kinds of charges. Such people have achieved so much progress throughout our history—that, nobody can deny. The Bill should not affect our citizens’ rights in this way. It should be about real investment in our courts to ensure that justice is not delayed for the victims, who we all care about.
Apsana Begum (Poplar and Limehouse) (Lab)
No one is denying that after 14 years of desecration by the Conservatives, the backlog in the Crown courts is out of control and stacked against victims, but curtailing jury trials is not necessary to tackle it. There is no evidence that these plans will fix the problems in our criminal justice system, and the Institute for Government has suggested that restricting juries could save less than 2% of court time.
It is no wonder, then, that thousands of lawyers have written to the Government to oppose these plans. They do acknowledge, like many of us, that the Bill contains some good provisions, including the repeal of the presumption of child contact, which has been long campaigned for by many of us in this House and by organisations such as Women’s Aid and Right to Equality, and led by the incredible Claire Throssell, who joins us in the Special Gallery. The Bill will also make transcripts available from the magistrates court, which has been long campaigned for by Charlotte and the team at Open Justice for All, among others, and supported by many of us in this House. However, on the curtailment of jury trials, I have spoken with many rape victims who feel that their trauma is being instrumentalised to undermine and restrict a fundamental cornerstone of our democracy—all for cost-cutting purposes. Of course, they want reform of the criminal justice system, but they want it to be evidence-led.
The value and importance of a jury system cannot be overstated. The House will be aware that I was cleared by a jury in 2021 after a vexatious trial driven by malicious intent. Originally, my case was set to be heard in a magistrates court. I am not saying that that would have led to a different outcome for sure, but for someone of my background—working class, Muslim, and a woman of Bangladeshi heritage—the risk of a miscarriage of justice would have been much higher, without a shadow of a doubt. Back in 2017, the now Justice Secretary said in his report:
“Juries are a success story of our justice system. Rigorous analysis shows that, on average, juries—including all white juries—do not deliver different results for BAME and White defendants…This positive story about the jury system is not matched by such a clear-cut story for magistrates’ verdicts… In particular, there were some worrying disparities for BAME women… Of those women tried at Magistrates’ Court, Black women, Asian women, Mixed ethnic women and Chinese/Other women were all more likely to be convicted than White women.”
The Bill will entrench structural discrimination, and I believe that Justice Secretary knows it. Indeed, I am also alarmed by the proposals to introduce trial by judge for some financial and fraud cases. As the Criminal Bar Association has highlighted, over 78% of barristers have said that it is important for juries to be able to evaluate complex evidence and prevent overreach in financial and fraud cases. In my case, the jury considered evidence over eight days—that was necessary, in my view.
Karl Turner
I have just looked at the recent stats. In 2025 there were 67 ethnic minority circuit judges and 42 judges of unknown ethnicity, while there were 637 white judges, the vast majority of whom were men. What does my hon. Friend say about that?
Apsana Begum
My hon. Friend highlights important and vital statistics that illustrate an issue in the legal system: it does not reflect the wider diversity of communities who experience and go through the criminal justice system.
The majority of women in prison are survivors of violence against women and girls; nearly 70% of women in prison report having experienced domestic abuse. They are more likely to have been tried in a magistrates court for either-way offences that could have been considered by a jury. I am very worried that the proposals in the Bill will result in more victims being jailed. This really matters. Three-year prison terms are life-altering sentences, but under the Bill they could be handed out by a judge.
The Government have no mandate for a decision of such magnitude—it was not in the Labour party’s 2024 manifesto. Instead of restricting jury trials, I urge them to invest in and properly fund our criminal justice system in order to address the issue of court backlogs. Everyone—every single one of us—should have equal rights in our legal and court systems. Jury trials are a fundamental legal safeguard against miscarriages of justice, and surely our society should be based on true fairness in the course of delivering justice.
Jim Allister (North Antrim) (TUV)
We have heard some powerful speeches today, none more so than that from the hon. Member for Warrington North (Charlotte Nichols), and we heard something very striking from the Justice Secretary: he told us that juries are the “cornerstone” of our criminal justice system. What is a cornerstone? A cornerstone is the most important part of something, on which everything else depends. What is the cornerstone of democracy? It is voting. We would not think of getting rid of voting, but we are invited in this House to get rid of the cornerstone of jury trials in a huge spectrum of cases.
Dr Tidball
Does the hon. and learned Member agree that, in fact, we are getting rid of them in only a quarter of 3% of cases that go through the court process?
Jim Allister
We are getting rid of them in thousands of cases, which will deny to those who are accused in those cases the right that each one of us would claim for ourselves: to be judged by our peers. We are doing it in cases that involve a large sentence. Three years is no trifling sentence—it is a substantial sentence that is life-changing, and yet we are suggesting that we should move away from that cornerstone of justice in all those cases.
Emma Foody
I ask the hon. and learned Member two questions. First, does he not accept that magistrates are indeed peers? Secondly, does he agree that 12 months is a pretty considerable, life-changing sentence as it stands?
Jim Allister
Judges, no matter how intellectual, erudite or experienced they might be, do not have the life experiences of 12 jurors. I spent my professional life as a junior and senior counsel in the criminal courts of Northern Ireland, and therefore I have substantial experience of appearing in not just jury trials but judge-alone trials, because for decades we had Diplock courts. I can tell the hon. Lady from my experience that if I was charged with an offence, without doubt I would choose the jury rather than the judge alone, because whether we like it or not, the most experienced judge becomes case-hardened. You will get far more empathy, either as a victim of crime or as a person accused of crime, from a jury. Why? Because they have the lived experience and so are likely to show an affinity with you, be you the victim or the accused.
It is an immeasurable advantage in our justice system to have those deciding the facts of a case be those who have the feel for what it is to live in that community and know what it is to have empathy with either the person accused or the victim. They are in a far superior position to some case-hardened judge who has heard it all before and, frankly, cannot deliver the quality of dependable justice. I know from my experience that even many people who were convicted would have said, “Well, at least it was my peers who convicted me. I have more confidence in what they did than what a single judge would do.”
What is a jury? When we abolish juries, we are abolishing not just an established right going back 800 years. We are abolishing a protection against arbitrary power. We are abolishing the honest broker. Who brings a case against an accused? The state. Who is the honest broker in that? The jury. The jury, who have that affinity and that lived experience, are in a far better position to reach a sustainable and credible verdict. In the end, it is about public confidence in our criminal justice system, which matters hugely.
Far more public confidence is generated in our criminal justice system through jury trials than through judge-alone trials. The point was made earlier that around 41% of all summary trials that go to appeal are overturned. What does that tell us? It tells us of how case-hardened some of those who are hearing them are, it tells us of the summary nature and the speed with which some of the cases are heard, and it tells us that an injustice was done in 41% of those cases. Are we in the business of accentuating injustice? Surely not. Surely we are in the business of extracting injustice from our system, and we will do that far stronger and far better through maintaining, not diminishing, jury trials. As the Justice Secretary said, jury trials are indeed the cornerstone. Take away the cornerstone and you have begun to demolish the edifice in which we all have so much pride: our criminal justice system.
Matt Bishop (Forest of Dean) (Lab)
At the heart of the reforms before us today is one word and one simple question: the word is victims and the question is, how do we ensure that victims actually receive the justice that they are promised?
Hon. Members will know that before coming to this place I served as a police officer over three different forces. During that time I saw at first hand the impact that crime has on people’s lives. I met victims at some of the worst moments that they will ever experience, often after deeply traumatic incidents. What always stayed with me was the faith that victims place in our justice system. They believe that if they report what has happened, come forward and endure the stress of an investigation and a trial, the system will ultimately deliver justice. They believe that the institutions of this country—the police, the courts and the rule of law—will stand behind them.
When victims report a crime, they are making a promise to us and to the justice system that they will follow through and endure the issues that they have to endure. The least we can do is to ensure that the justice system keeps its promise to them. However, today that faith is being tested far too often. I regularly meet victims and victims’ groups who speak about the anxiety, uncertainty and sheer exhaustion that comes with waiting for their case to reach court. Many have done everything we have asked of them—reported the crime, given evidence and supported the investigation—only to be left waiting months and years for a conclusion.
Through my work on the Justice Committee, I have heard extensive evidence about the state of our courts. The reality is stark. The Crown court backlog has more than doubled since 2019. Trials are taking longer and for some of the most serious offences, particularly rape and sexual assault, victims are waiting well over a year on average for their cases to conclude. Behind those numbers are real people: victims who cannot move on with their lives, families left in limbo and witnesses forced to relive traumatic experiences as hearings are delayed or postponed. Justice delayed really does become justice denied.
Before going further, I want to recognise the people who keep our justice system running: the magistrates, judges and court staff all do extraordinary work. Magistrates in particular give up their time voluntarily to serve the public and uphold the rule of law in their communities. Too often we talk about the pressures on the justice system without recognising the people who are holding it together. They deserve our gratitude, but they also deserve a system that properly supports the work that they do, and that is why this reform is necessary.
The reality is that cases today are more complex than they once were. Digital evidence, mobile phone data, body-worn cameras and modern forensic techniques have all improved the fairness of trials, but they have also made cases longer and more demanding to process. The measures in the Bill seek to address that. Giving magistrates greater sentencing powers will allow more cases to be resolved in the magistrates courts, freeing up Crown court capacity for the most serious offences. Similarly, allowing courts greater flexibility in determining where cases should be heard helps to ensure that the most serious crimes are not competing for court time with cases that could be resolved more quickly elsewhere.
Another important aspect of the Bill is the modernisation of the courts. For too long, our justice system has lagged behind the technology available to it. Victims still face unnecessary barriers when trying to access transcripts or understand the progress of their case. Using technology more effectively can make the system faster, more transparent and more accessible.
Finally, I will briefly address the removal of the presumption of parental involvement from children. For many years, survivors of domestic abuse and campaigners have raised concerns about what has sometimes been described as a pro-contact culture in parts of the family courts system. Organisations, such as PEEPSA—Prevent, Educate and Eradicate Post Separation Abuse—that support survivors of post-separation abuse have welcomed the Government’s decision to repeal the presumption of parental involvement. They have long warned that a pro-contact culture can risk sidelining the safety of children and survivors.
Kirith Entwistle
Too many women have told me that the family courts felt like an extension of the abuse that they were trying to escape. Does my hon. Friend agree that ending the presumption of parental involvement is a crucial step towards ensuring that children’s safety, not the automatic assumption of contact, is the starting point in every case?
Matt Bishop
I completely agree. Children must never be used as a tool through which abuse can continue after separation.
Removing the presumption also sends a clear message that children’s safety and wellbeing must always come first. Reforms of this scale will rightly be scrutinised as the Bill progresses, but the alternative—doing nothing—is simply not acceptable. Without reform, the backlog will grow, victims will continue to wait and confidence in our justice system will continue to erode.
Justice is the foundation of public confidence in this country. When victims lose faith in the system, the rule of law itself begins to weaken. This Bill is about restoring the faith and ensuring that when victims come forward, the justice system is ready to stand behind them. For that reason, I am pleased to support the Bill today.
Several hon. Members rose—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
Members will be aware that a large number of people still wish to speak, so I will reduce the time limit to four minutes after the next speaker.
Sir Ashley Fox (Bridgwater) (Con)
I support the reasoned amendment tabled by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, which declines to give this Bill a Second Reading. I do so because while there are some useful measures in the Bill, at its heart is an unjust proposal. The Government’s plan to curtail jury trials is wrong.
Sarah Russell
I respect the hon. Gentleman and understand that his concerns about the Bill are genuinely rooted. None the less, the presumption of parental involvement being revoked in this Bill is absolutely critical, and I do not understand how he can proceed with a reasoned amendment that would kill the entire Bill on that basis.
Sir Ashley Fox
The right to a trial by jury is central to the English legal system. It has its roots in Magna Carta. It ensures that the public participate in the administration of criminal justice and gives protection to citizens from politically inspired trials. It is regrettable that some parts of the Labour party seem to take delight in tearing up long-held principles that underpin our constitution simply because it is politically expedient to do so. They are shredding our constitution without much thought as to the consequences.
Helen Maguire (Epsom and Ewell) (LD)
Removing jury trials is surely an erosion of the criminal justice system. As the hon. Gentleman has alluded to, one judge cannot provide the same scrutiny as 12 random jurors. If the need is to reduce the backlog, maybe we should consider using courtrooms 100% of the time to actually reduce the backlog in the first place.
Sir Ashley Fox
I agree with the hon. Lady’s point. The Government are changing the balance of power between the citizen and the state, then pleading delays in Crown court trials as justification.
This policy of curtailing the right to jury trials is ideological. In January, the Courts Minister was asked about the plans to overhaul jury trials. She admitted that she would be scrapping jury trials even if there was no courts backlog. I wonder how many Labour colleagues agree with her. I think that is disgraceful, and I suspect that there are more than 80 Labour MPs who agree with me.
There is no doubt that the Crown court backlog is a serious issue. The Leveson report contains many useful proposals to improve the criminal justice system, and I will support them, but the backlog was not caused by the right to trial by jury, and it will not be alleviated by curtailing that right.
In my view, the solution is to increase the capacity of the Crown court, and in fairness, parts of the Bill aim to do that. However, why does the Lord Chancellor think that abolishing jury trials for those likely to receive a sentence of three years or less is the right thing to do? Senior judges, legal professionals, and even learned Labour MPs have all warned that removing juries will make only a marginal difference—if any—and as a former solicitor, I agree. Judges themselves have said that the supposed time savings are inherently uncertain. Single-judge trials still require full evidence, witnesses, legal argument and detailed, reasoned judgments. That takes time; in fact, the Bill risks leaving courtrooms empty while judges write up their decisions instead of hearing other cases.
There are other reforms that we should make before sacrificing the right to trial by jury. To take one example, the Lord Chancellor should look at the wider efficiency of the Ministry of Justice. For the past two years, the MOJ—which includes the courts service—lost the highest number of days to sickness and absence per member of staff in the whole of Whitehall. Each employee took an average of 10.7 days of sickness, which equates to over two working weeks a year for every member of staff. Not only is that 30% higher than the civil service average, but it is double the average of the private sector. I have always thought that sickness is a fairly good indication of how well a company, charity or Department is run, and perhaps if the Lord Chancellor focused his efforts on improving the efficiency of his own Department, he might start to see the whole system improve.
The Lord Chancellor should also look at the listing practices of different court circuits in England. The western circuit, which covers Somerset, has a much lower backlog than London does, and the Liverpool circuit is probably the most efficient in the country. Why does the Lord Chancellor not try to replicate the listing practices of the Liverpool circuit before taking this disastrous step? He has previously said that cutting jury trials would be a mistake—in the past, he thought that was wrong. I believe that his first judgment, according to his conscience, was the right one, and I urge him to reconsider his plans.
Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)
I welcome much in this Bill, including the investment in legal aid, the additional sitting days and the funding for our courts. However, I want to focus my remarks on two proposals within it: the restriction of jury trials for either-way offences, and the removal of the automatic right of appeal from the magistrates court to the Crown court.
I speak as someone who began their legal career as a prosecutor in the 1990s. The kind of backlogs we see today simply did not exist in those days, even though more cases were heard in the Crown court because magistrates had sentencing powers of only six months. The delays we face today are not caused by jury trials. I remember that as shadow Justice Minister I repeatedly challenged the previous Conservative Government about the consequences of the decisions they were making. Courts were closed, judicial sitting days were cut, court staff were reduced, and legal aid was placed under enormous strain. At the same time, the system had to cope with the demands of modern digital evidence, delays in disclosure, problems with prisoner transport and the disruption caused by covid.
The Government argue that these reforms are necessary to reduce the Crown court backlogs, and often point to the delays faced by victims of sexual and domestic abuse. I take those concerns very seriously—a substantial part of my career as a prosecutor was spent as a designated child and sexual abuse specialist and rape specialist. I worked closely with victims, witnesses and families affected by these traumatic offences. If I believed that the abolition of jury trials would genuinely allow those cases to be heard more quickly, I would support it, but I do not.
There is also the issue of removing the automatic right of appeal from the magistrates court to the Crown court. This change will disproportionately affect defendants from poorer backgrounds who may not have legal aid representation. We know that a significant proportion of those appeals succeed, which raises serious concerns about access to justice.
These two proposals will disproportionately impact the most vulnerable in our society, particularly those from socially, economically and educationally deprived backgrounds. My constituency ranks as the 38th most deprived in the country. For many of my constituents, the criminal justice system already feels distant and difficult to navigate. We should be careful not to introduce changes that risk criminalising and disadvantaging them even further.
There are real reforms that could address the delays. The first and foremost is the Labour party’s commitment to having properly funded specialist rape courts. I know that lawyers and judges will be prepared to sit at weekends to tackle those cases. Secondly, we could be more like the civil system, where timelines are set so that cases progress properly. If any of the parties do not act properly, there could be financial sanctions for them. I know we will be opening more courts and courtrooms, but we need to expand the number of judicial sitting days. We also need to review the contracts with Serco and other bodies that produce defendants in court, because a lot of delay is caused by defendants not being produced at court. The prosecution and the police need to be able to present their evidence to the defence as soon as possible, and the defendant needs to be legally represented, so that additional evidence can be considered. As a result, we could have pleas at a much earlier stage. We need to look at those things first, put them in place, and see what happens, before we get rid of or restrict jury trials.
Vikki Slade (Mid Dorset and North Poole) (LD)
There is absolutely no doubt that long delays in criminal court shake public confidence, and I can only imagine the distress of victims forced to wait years for justice. In my role as an MP, I have supported those who have experienced repeat offences as they wait for stalkers to face justice. It is tragic that cases collapse because victims cannot face reliving their experience, or witnesses’ memories fade. It is not just victims who are harmed by these delays. Defendants, who are innocent until proven guilty under the law, are also having their life suspended, and those defendants deserve fairness.
I am deeply worried about the income thresholds for legal aid in the magistrates court. It is ridiculous that someone in an entry-level minimum wage job will not automatically be eligible. How is that justice? Do the Government really believe that unless someone can afford to fund their defence, their freedom should be at stake? I hope that if this Bill passes Second Reading, the Government will put forward some substantial changes.
At the heart of my concern about this Bill is the fundamental shift in the role of the magistrate and the bench division. A typical magistrates trial lasts five to six hours; a similar case in the Crown court is likely to take three to four days. That is for good reason, as more legal direction ensures that victims and defendants understand the process and upholds the integrity of justice. I am deeply concerned that if complex cases carrying sentences of up to 24 months in prison are passed over to the magistrates court, they, too, will become longer, creating even bigger backlogs, and just shifting the problem somewhere else. What assessment has been carried out—I have asked this on several occasions—of the capacity of magistrates to sit in multi-day trials? Those trials require attendance day after day, so younger working magistrates will be far less likely to be able to take part in them.
The Magistrates Association has deemed that 17,000 magistrates are needed, and we have only 14,000. Previous recruitment drives have not generated enough applicants. Where is the evidence that our communities can find these extra people, who can give this extra time? The other problem is the age of magistrates. While there are some notable exceptions in the Chamber, 81% of magistrates are over 50. That is much higher than the average age of a judge. This proposal widens the demographic gap between the court and those facing justice. Juries provide broader diversity in age and background.
This Bill is a real diversion. We have an insufficient number of magistrates now; where is the evidence that people will be willing and able to fulfil this critical and increasingly difficult role, in which they can take someone’s liberty for up to two years? That is a huge responsibility for somebody who is not legally trained. Speaking of legally trained people, I have raised the issue of access to legal advisers before. The Lord Chancellor has indicated that there will be more money for legal advisers, but that was before this proposal came forward. I raised the matter after seeing the issues locally. I see no evidence that enough legal advisers are willing to work at this lowest rung of the court system to support magistrates.
I also wanted to raise the issue of the processes in the magistrates courts. One of my constituents, having been denied the right to go to the Crown court, has been told that she has just 27 minutes to plead her case, which she feels is a denial of her rights. We are talking about cases in which liberty is at risk, and a criminal conviction could lead to the loss of employment or travel rights, and could have a reputational impact for years to come, so we really must consider the effect of this significant move on both victims and defendants.
I wonder whether the Lord Chancellor can tell us who said that
“juries are representative of local populations”,
and
“a filter for prejudice”;
that
“Criminal trials without juries are a bad idea”,
and that the Government should not fix backlogs by abandoning a
“valuable tradition for short term benefit”
in either-way trials.
Abtisam Mohamed (Sheffield Central) (Lab)
In my previous work as a solicitor, I represented women who had suffered terrible violence, and people who had been pushed to the margins of society. I have seen at first hand how fragile access to justice can be, and how years of under-investment have taken a wrecking ball to our justice system. Change is clearly needed, but the reforms before us, removing the right of defendants to elect trial by jury, do not appear to be a proportionate answer to that problem. The evidence does not support the claim that the reforms will deliver the benefits suggested, with projections suggesting that the impact on the backlog may at best be modest. That raises an obvious question: if the contribution that these measures will make to reducing the backlog is uncertain, why are we being asked to make such a profound and permanent change to one of the central safeguards in our criminal justice system?
Members have spoken about a range of offences, from theft to drug-related crimes, but when people are taken to court over action to advance causes in which they believe—in the past it was the suffragettes; today it is the climate activists and Palestinian protesters—it is ordinary people, their peers, who recognise the moral imperative behind their actions to prevent greater harm. The freedoms that this system protects are not abstract. They exist precisely to safeguard individuals against the power of the state when they stand accused of a criminal offence, and that is why we should be cautious before curtailing them.
There is also a serious question about the impact that these reforms may have on black and ethnic minority defendants. The Justice Secretary’s own review, published in 2017, highlighted deep disparities and a troubling lack of trust in parts of our criminal justice system. One of his key messages was that fairness must not only exist, but must be seen to exist. Juries who are drawn from our communities play an important role in public confidence. Reducing access to jury trial could risk further eroding trust among certain communities who already feel disproportionately affected by the criminal justice system. It is therefore essential that if these reforms proceed, their impact on black and ethnic minority defendants is specifically examined, transparently and rigorously.
None of this is to deny the seriousness of the backlog crisis. The courts must function efficiently, and the victims should not have to wait years for justice. However, if the purpose of these reforms is to address the backlog, I suggest that we should understand why they are being introduced as a permanent alteration to our justice system, rather than a time-limited measure.
James Naish (Rushcliffe) (Lab)
I will support the Government tonight, because it is clear that decisive action is needed to tackle the backlog that so many Members have described, but does my hon. Friend agree that if the Government are genuinely confident about the package of reforms that they are presenting, it would be fair and proportionate to add a review clause or the equivalent to ensure that we are clear about whether we actually need some of these measure?
Abtisam Mohamed
I do agree. The logical approach would be to treat this as a time-limited measure—or the Justice Secretary should consider a mandatory time-bound review, assessing the impact of these changes not only on the backlog but on trial outcomes, on equality before the law, on public confidence, and specifically on black and ethnic minority defendants. All those matters must be included in a review if it is to be robust. The review must not only allow Parliament to examine the evidence but, if the reforms fail to deliver the benefits claimed or produce serious unintended consequences, allow us to revisit and, if necessary, reverse them. That would be a constructive and responsible approach.
Efficiency in the courts is important, but justice is equally important. I say to the Justice Secretary that if we are to take a step as serious as limiting the right to jury trial, at the very least Parliament should have the right to rigorous scrutiny, a meaningful review, and the clear possibility of reversal if this policy does not work.
Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)
May I begin by paying a huge tribute to the hon. Member for Warrington North (Charlotte Nichols) for her testimony to the House today? It was a privilege to be here to hear it, and it will last long in the memory.
I do not have a huge amount of experience of jury trials; in fact, what I have experience of is the antithesis. When we were training to go to Northern Ireland in 1992, the IRA was wont to put us on the horns of a dilemma, in terms of whether we could open fire or not. We used to do cine ranges, and they would pause the action. I remember saying to my trainer, “Can I fire?” He said to me, “That is a very difficult situation, sir. That is when you remind yourself that it is better to be tried by 12 men than to be carried by six.” It was quite chilling, particularly given that two of my guardsmen were involved in a judgmental shooting a few months later. It turned out that you do not get tried by 12 men; you get tried by one. Those guardsmen were convicted of murder and sent away for life, so I have seen this issue from the other side.
There has been something of a consensus in today’s debate that justice delayed is justice denied, and that the backlog needs to be reduced. I do not think that there is a consensus on whether halving the number of cases that go to jury trial, and removing from thousands of victims and defendants the right to jury trial, will actually reduce the backlog in the way that the Deputy Prime Minister suggested.
In the absence of my experience of jury trials, I want to spend some time outlining the concerns of a constituent who wrote to me. His name is Sir Ivan Lawrence KC, and he is a former Member of Parliament. He says:
“After 63 years conducting jury trials at the criminal bar, sitting as a Recorder, speaking to countless ex-jurors, and discussing with lawyers in other countries their jury systems, I can confidently say that, despite the waste of jurors’ time that often occurs, our system contributes to justice in almost certainly the fairest and most efficient way.
The great point about juries is that ordinary people trust the twelve members to spread their judgment and to use ordinary common sense. Those who have been accused of dishonesty, however small, or of violence, however petty, could have decent lives totally ruined, if common sense is replaced by the strictest application of the law which may be required of judges.
Jury trial is not merely an important and traditional human right, and a clear form of democracy. Juries are, like our judges, totally independent. Any wrongs that may occur are redressed by retrials or appeals to higher courts. Those accused of crimes are more likely to turn up for their trials and, when they do, are less likely to need handcuffs, leg-irons, or expensive incarceration.”
I have listened to Sir Ivan Lawrence, and I am reminded of my grandmother’s words: an ounce of experience is worth a tonne of enthusiasm.
Sally Jameson (Doncaster Central) (Lab/Co-op)
I, too, pay tribute to those Members of the House who made exceptional contributions, particularly my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North (Charlotte Nichols). Her bravery today will be the debate’s real stand-out moment.
As we all know, the backdrop to this Bill is a court system that is facing crisis; that has been the case throughout the criminal justice system for many years. People up and down the country are waiting years for their day in court. When the justice system breaks down, it is our constituents and victims in our areas who pay the price. Although I will not address the presumption of contact in my speech, I pay tribute to the campaigners in this House, in the Gallery and around the country who have made sure that a measure on the presumption of contact is included in the Bill. It is a really special moment.
In the last six months, a number of my surgeries have been attended by constituents who are bearing the brunt of court delays—victims of serious crime who have been waiting years without justice and without closure. That is why, in the House today, I will be supporting this Bill on behalf of my constituents, who deserve timely justice.
We also have to remember the remand population, which has not been talked about much today. It is well publicised that our prison estate is in absolute crisis, having reached capacity and been totally stretched. While the Government are making the necessary reforms to address that and are building up capacity, they can ill afford to have the remand population at its current level. Frankly, those people are entitled to their day in court, to get their verdict and to be able to get on with their lives one way or the other.
Rachel Taylor (North Warwickshire and Bedworth) (Lab)
Does my hon. Friend agree that there is nothing progressive about a working-class man spending a year on remand—without a judge or a jury, and without any end to his turmoil in sight—when he may in fact be innocent?
Sally Jameson
I completely agree. Whether they will be found innocent or guilty, people are entitled to their day in court, and within a reasonable amount of time, as are the victims who need to have their cases heard. Frankly, that also allows prisons to get on with the important work of punishing those who are guilty and focusing on rehabilitation.
I want to take the opportunity of this Bill to push for a further reform of courts policy—I know the Minister is aware of this issue. I understand the reasons it is not in the Bill, but there was a particular case in my constituency. Somebody arrived for their day in court and ready for their trial, but because one of the jurors went sick, the judge decided it would not go ahead, even though the minimum number of jurors was available. They had to wait for a new trial date, which was many months later and, sadly, in the time they were waiting, the defendant—the perpetrator—died. In that case, justice delayed really was justice denied. Will the Minister meet me at another time to discuss whether there can be, if not a legislative change, a policy change on the expectation on judges to carry out trials when the minimum number of jurors is in attendance, unless there are exceptional circumstances?
Kirith Entwistle
I recently met judges in Bolton who spoke about issues with prisoner transportation that are also causing serious delays. Does my hon. Friend agree that we should also look at that as a means of speeding things up and improving efficiency?
Sally Jameson
Yes, as someone who was regularly held back from going on my dinner break because we were waiting for prisoner transportation, I would always welcome further improvement of prisoner transportation. I am all for that.
To close, we are not the first Government to change the threshold for jury trials, and because of the scale of the crisis we face, the circumstances demand that we must do so again. I am backing this whole package of reforms, because I know from my constituents that they want a courts system that delivers timely justice, supports victims and, frankly, allows them to move on with their lives. The alternative—and I think it is important that we explore the alternative—is that we manage the slow decline of our courts and watch victims walk away and public confidence drain away. We can modernise the system so that justice is delivered swiftly, fairly and for everyone, and that is what I choose today.
Several hon. Members rose—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)
Order. I call Paulette Hamilton on a four-minute time limit, but after her I will be reducing it to a three-minute limit.
Paulette Hamilton (Birmingham Erdington) (Lab)
I rise to speak on a Bill that is both necessary and difficult. Let me start by saying that I support its intention to tackle a Crown court backlog that has more than doubled since the pandemic, leaving victims waiting years for justice. Let us be clear what the backlog means: as the Victims’ Commissioner has warned, some trials are now listed for 2030. The bench division serves a purpose by enabling judge-alone trials for lower level cases, which means we can free up capacity and expect hearings to take about 20% less time.
I represent Birmingham Erdington, a working-class constituency with a proud and diverse ethnic minority community. It is from the perspective of my constituents that I must scrutinise this Bill.
Clause 3 removes a defendant’s right to elect for a jury trial for either-way offences, replacing it with a judge-alone trial in a new bench division for offences likely to attract sentences of three years or less. Crucially, this is not a temporary pilot—it contains no sunset clause. This is a permanent structural change to one of the oldest rights in our justice system. The intention to speed up our justice is honourable, but my concern is about trust and perception.
Paulette Hamilton
I thank my hon. Friend for that contribution.
For ethnic minority communities, that right has been seen as a vital protection against fear of bias, whether conscious or unconscious. A diverse jury of 12 brings the common sense of the community into the room; a single judge, however learned, does not offer that same representation.
Sarah Russell
The Judicial Executive Board produced a report on judicial bullying and racism in 2022, but has never published it. Does my hon. Friend agree that that backs up her point that there are concerns about the judiciary?
Paulette Hamilton
I absolutely agree. That does back up what I am saying.
I am not suggesting that our judiciary is biased, but perception matters, so I ask the Minister for two specific assurances. First, the Bill contains no clear statutory review, and there is no start or end date. Clause 3 allows the new provisions to be brought into force by regulation with a three-month minimum lead-in time, but beyond that, scrutiny is absent. I welcome that the Justice Secretary has announced a review. Can the Minister confirm the exact timeframe for that review? When will it begin and, crucially, when will it end?
Secondly, if there is to be a review, I urge the Minister to make its scope explicit. Will the Minister commit today that any review will break down data by ethnicity? We need to know if this new system is leading to disproportionate outcomes for ethnic minority defendants.
Jonathan Davies (Mid Derbyshire) (Lab)
My hon. Friend is making a very good speech and putting victims at the heart of what she is saying. I share some of her concerns about the legislation as it stands, but does she agree that we should vote for it today, so that we have the opportunity to influence it and improve it in the interests of public trust as it passes through the House?
Paulette Hamilton
I agree absolutely. Unless we work together to sort this out, we will not get a decent Bill that everybody can be happy with. To just throw it out at this stage would serve no purpose for anyone.
The crisis in our courts demands action, and the Government are right to act. I urge the Minister to commit today to strengthening the scrutiny of these measures and putting a clear review on the face of the Bill. Let us prove to my constituents that their faith in justice is still well placed. I look forward to working with the Justice team on the Committee to strengthen this clause.
Lloyd Hatton (South Dorset) (Lab)
I am delighted to speak as an enthusiastic supporter of the Courts and Tribunals Bill. I wish to put on record my thanks to both the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister for Courts and Legal Services for their excellent work before the Bill came to this place, which included consulting with Back Benchers at every opportunity.
This is a critical piece of legislation that will rebuild our buckling criminal justice system after years and years of neglect. I will keep my remarks focused on the important context within which this Bill should be considered. We must, in this place, be absolutely clear that the previous Government left the criminal justice system on the brink of collapse. It is important to acknowledge this challenging landscape, so that victims, those who work within the criminal justice system and the wider public can all appreciate exactly why this Government are taking forward the bold measures in the Bill.
Whichever part of the criminal justice system we inspect, we see the devastating impact of the swingeing cutbacks and gross mismanagement of the previous Government—cuts to prisons, cuts to the Probation Service, cuts to legal aid, cuts to the Crown courts, cuts to policing and cuts to the Crown Prosecution Service.
What I find most frustrating is that we too often forget our inheritance, and we must not do so when we go into the Lobbies this evening. We cannot forget the chronic backlog of cases in the Crown courts that we inherited. We must always understand that this is not a static problem, but a compounding one. If we do not proceed with the measures in the Bill, we will not be able to improve the situation in the Crown courts. Instead, it will deteriorate further and the backlog will spiral out of control. The situation is simply inexcusable. We must understand that it is impossible to defend the status quo. Without structural reform, the criminal justice system will continue to buckle, which is why I am such a keen advocate of it.
Sir Ashley Fox
The hon. Member seems entirely ignorant of the success in Liverpool Crown court, where from 23 June, Operation Expedite reduced court delays by one third. Does he not think that it is worth replicating that experiment, which has been so successful in Liverpool, before curtailing the right to trial by jury?
Lloyd Hatton
I completely accept that there have been successes in some parts of the country, including in Liverpool, but that is not the case elsewhere, which is why a much wider package of structural reforms is essential. I firmly believe, in response to that point, that we must pull every lever at our disposal to stabilise the system and begin to turn the corner on the rising backlog in the Crown court. We need transformative change, backed up by investment and modernisation, to fix the problem. That is not optional; it is essential. That is why, in my view, the reforms in the Bill form a coherent package designed to deliver system-wide change. We cannot indulge in a game of pick and mix and simply implement the measures that we prefer. We must understand that, to relieve the scale of pressure currently facing the Crown courts and the wider criminal justice system, this Bill must make its way through this place.
Jess Brown-Fuller
If the hon. Gentleman believes that we should not have a pick and mix approach to Sir Brian Leveson’s proposals, why does he think that the Government have chosen only some of the measures and not others?
Lloyd Hatton
The Government can put certain measures into one piece of primary legislation, but there could be others down the line to pick up the recommendations of the review.
We must remember that magistrates, prison and probation officers and police officers will not thank us if we preside over an unreformed system in which Crown courts are allowed to crumble and backlogs are allowed to balloon for years to come. Every aspect of reform is required, otherwise cutting the backlogs and providing more timely justice will never be achieved, and we in this place will have done too little.
Finally, I add my voice to the chorus of parliamentarians who have been speaking up for victims who have so far been failed by the status quo. At the heart of the criminal justice system are people waiting for justice—waiting for wrongs to be put right, for fairness, for their day in court and for closure.
The progressive case for court reform is not a technocratic exercise in efficiency; it is a fundamental argument about how our legal institutions serve the British people, because when the criminal justice system breaks down, it is the most vulnerable who always pay the highest price. We must not lose sight of that today. We can either manage the slow decline of our courts, watching as victims are neglected and abandoned, and public confidence drains away, or we can support the Bill and modernise and repair the system so that justice is delivered quickly and fairly. I enthusiastically choose the latter option.
Imran Hussain (Bradford East) (Lab)
I draw the attention of the House to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests: I am a member of the Bar.
I rise to oppose the plan to curtail jury trials, because restricting jury trials is wrong in principle and wrong in practice. Trial by jury is not some quaint tradition that we can trade away when Ministers feel the pressure. As has been said, it is one of the great democratic safeguards in our justice system; it allows ordinary citizens to be judged by their peers and the power of the state to be held in check. It is dangerous to challenge that principle, because there is a reason for it: the balance between the state and the citizen. History teaches us that changing that balance in favour of the state is a dangerous road to go down. The power that we are giving the state is not simply the power for it to issue a fine; we are talking about people losing their liberty.
Catherine Atkinson
I, too, am a passionate believer in the jury system, but Sweden—which is No. 1 in the World Justice Project’s global rankings—does not use jury trials at all, and neither do Norway, Germany or the Netherlands. In France, Denmark and Canada, only the most serious cases are dealt with by juries. My hon. Friend is not suggesting that those countries do not have liberty, is he?
Imran Hussain
What I am saying is that there is a reason that we protect this liberty—this cornerstone of our system of justice and democracy. When we see this much of a change in state power, I will tell my hon. Friend who is at the receiving end first: it is black, Asian and minority ethnic communities, working-class communities, elderly communities and women who are disproportionately impacted.
Warinder Juss
Does my hon. Friend agree that the restriction of jury trials in some cases is just one among a whole range of measures, and that in order to protect really vulnerable victims—for example, rape victims, who will have a jury trial—we need to make the process quicker? That necessarily means that, for some other cases, the decision to take away juries is a measure to protect the most vulnerable.
Imran Hussain
These are not competing interests. I thank all hon. Members who have made brave and passionate speeches today—I salute their courage. Of course we want to see justice delivered to victims as soon as possible, but there is not a shred of evidence that suggests that curtailing jury trials will do that. My hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy) addressed that point with great passion.
Let us be clear about what the proposals mean in practice. The Government are suggesting that people could face lengthy prison sentences following judge-only processes in a new category of so-called swift courts. Frankly, that should send a chill through every democrat in this country. Ministers claim that this is about efficiency, but no argument has been put forward in this debate to support that. Restricting jury trials would deliver only limited time savings in the Crown court system—hon. Members have made that case time and again today.
The core point is that undermining fundamental rights will not fix a backlog caused by years of under-investment, court closures, reduced capacity and a criminal justice system stretched to breaking point. Ministers have published impact assessments, but they have still not shown that curtailing jury trials will meaningfully solve a backlog caused by years of under-resourcing.
Jonathan Davies
My hon. Friend is generous in giving way. He is making important points about potential overreach of the state. Might I suggest that this is not the end for the Bill and that if there are concerns—people are rightly raising issues—we can progress them in Committee and at subsequent stages to ensure that the Bill is where it needs to be to retain public trust.
Imran Hussain
I will come to that point. I note, Madam Deputy Speaker, that I did not get an extra minute for taking an intervention—will I get one?
Imran Hussain
Okay. Perhaps I have been too generous with my time.
The real fear is that these changes will not simply speed things up but change how justice is done. In the limited time I have—it is a tragedy that I have only three minutes to speak in a debate of this magnitude, amending cornerstones of our democracy—I ask the Justice Secretary to take advice from the Member he was a number of years ago, when he made some of the most powerful arguments for the jury system. I ask him to look back at his old self.
Tristan Osborne (Chatham and Aylesford) (Lab)
First, I pay tribute to all the hon. Members across the Chamber who have contributed to the debate with their life experiences, from barristers and prosecutors to criminal justice experts, as well as the powerful victim testimony we have heard. I welcome to the Gallery those victims who have put themselves forward and articulated their convictions to improve the lives of all our residents and communities; I thank them and salute them for their service.
I thank Sir Brian Leveson for the time he took in coming forward with his proposals and Ministers for the time they have given to me. I have held Westminster Hall debates concerning Kent court waiting times and found Ministers to be respectful and to engage on issues; I thank them for that.
As a former police officer, I always say that you should judge an individual on their patterns of behaviour, and as many of my hon. Friends have said, we inherited a terrible situation in our criminal justice system, with see-sawing numbers of police officers, morale at a record low and a rise in crime. We saw the botched privatisation of the Probation Service, and the prison system was left in a state of disrepair when we inherited it in July 2024. I am afraid that the Conservatives’ track record, which is in the dock today, is part of the reason we are debating these issues.
As a member of the Public Accounts Committee, I know that the National Audit Office report, “Reducing the backlog in the Crown Court” was clear. The Leveson report gives a number of solutions to reducing the backlog. I will touch on a couple of points in the minute and a half I have remaining.
First, the criminal justice system has never been preserved in aspic. We have seen evolution over time as sentencing guidelines have changed, and we have seen different types of cases referred to and dealt with in the magistrates court. During the last Government, magistrates’ sentencing powers were extended to 12 months. We have also learned from Canada and Australia, which have gone through similar challenges on these issues and got into a stronger position. We should learn those international lessons. The criminal justice system is always evolving.
Secondly, I welcome the investment—an extra £2.2 billion —in the criminal justice system. That will reform our courts, with a removal of the cap on court sitting days, and digital improvements. Fundamentally, my constituents want to see justice delivered, and I cannot stand idly by when people in my surgeries are waiting three to four years for their court cases to be heard because of a failed system.
All these reforms should be debated in Committee. I am disappointed that the Opposition will not vote for the Bill to support that process.
Ian Lavery (Blyth and Ashington) (Lab)
Many of my constituents tell me that they are disillusioned with politics and the institutions that shape their lives. They feel alienated, with the system appearing remote, unresponsive and unaccountable—here we are again. I fear that my right hon. Friend the Justice Secretary’s proposals to limit the right to trial by jury risk deepening and encouraging that mood of cynicism and distrust. Generally, 90% of the Bill is spot-on, but 10% of it needs to be looked at very closely in future stages.
There is a cultural importance to jury trials. For nearly two centuries, the legitimacy of the criminal justice system has rested on a simple idea: that guilt should be judged not by the state alone, but by a person’s peers. It is quite simple, really. The public sees trial by jury as a fundamental right—one that embodies fairness and equality before the law. There is an existing mistrust of judges and magistrates—and do you wonder why, when three quarters of the judges are Oxbridge graduates, the majority attended public schools, and only 10% of magistrates and judges are from ethnic minority backgrounds. That sort of thing has really got to change, because the situation is not acceptable.
There needs to be more scrutiny of the proposal to limit defendants’ rights to appeal a magistrates court conviction, because the current position is, quite frankly, indefensible. It is not acceptable. The right to appeal is fundamental to natural justice. If this proposal reaches the statute book, it will trigger—in my view and in the view of many experts—an avalanche of judicial reviews and appeals to the European Court.
There are commendable elements in the Bill, particularly those that strengthen protections for women who have survived sexual violence, as we have heard today, but the proposals to curtail the right to trial by jury offer no discernible benefit. They risk undermining centuries of legal tradition, damaging trust in our institutions, and threatening social stability at a time when the fabric of our society is already under strain.
Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)
Anyone who has worked on the frontline of the criminal justice system knows that the Crown court crisis has been years in the making. Underfunding, austerity, covid and the changing nature of crime, with cases becoming increasingly complex and evidential volumes growing exponentially, have compounded the issue.
The changes in the Bill offer a pragmatic solution, and it is important that we are all clear about what is being proposed. The Bill does not abolish jury trials; it simply adjusts the threshold at which a case warrants a jury’s involvement. Magistrates are absolutely capable of hearing cases commanding a sentence of up two years; they already do in the youth court and there has been no outcry that young people do not get justice because of it.
As the Crown court backlog has increased, so has the percentage of cases committed to that court, because defendants have overruled the magistrates’ decision, and that is despite the sentence, in the most serious version of the Crown’s case, not exceeding the magistrates’ maximum powers. One may wonder why a defendant would seek to take his case to a court with greater sentencing powers, but the calculation is clear. The longer the wait for a trial, the harder it will be for witnesses to have a clear recollection of events and the more likely it is for victims to withdraw. Indeed, in one of my cases, a defendant hoped that the 96-year-old victim of burglary would die before the trial took place.
Amanda Hack (North West Leicestershire) (Lab)
This is the crux of the issue that we are discussing today: how do make sure that justice is given to victims as quickly as possible? Does my hon. Friend agree that the Bill enables us to do that?
Linsey Farnsworth
I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend that this is about getting justice to victims, which defendants game the system to prevent.
Arguments against the Crown court bench division seem to presuppose some measure of unfairness of having a single judge deciding guilt or innocence, but district judges have sat alone in the magistrates court for decades, and there have been no campaigns suggesting that they should be abolished on the grounds of unfairness or otherwise. The Crown court bench division is predicted to save 5,000 sitting days in 2028-29. As well as reducing the time spent in the courtroom, fewer jury trials will also free up administrative staff, who are feeling under immense pressure.
For those who suggest that greater investment and efficiencies alone will be sufficient, I remind them that Sir Brian Leveson has said that this alone cannot solve this crisis. That accords with my experience of working as a Crown prosecutor from 2003 right up until just before the general election, during which time countless efficiency initiatives were introduced but were ultimately unable to prevent the crisis from developing. Efficiencies alone cannot turn this around.
Lloyd Hatton
I thank my hon. Friend for making such an eloquent speech. Does she share my concern that if we were, heaven forfend, to walk away from the crucial reforms in this Bill, the police officers, prison officers, CPS staff and those who work in our Crown courts would not thank us for the mess that we would be leaving them, with the Crown court system grinding to a halt and backlogs ballooning?
Linsey Farnsworth
I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend, and I thank all those people working in the criminal justice system who, frankly, have been propping up the system with the generosity of their time, working extra hours over and above, and giving everything. They have propped up the criminal justice system in that way for years.
If we do not act now, the wait time for cases to reach trial is projected to increase, and the consequences will be stark. First, justice will be delayed. That means victims waiting years for closure and a chance to heal, it means the wrongly accused waiting years for their name to be cleared, and it means those who have offended waiting years until they can be rehabilitated. Secondly, if we do not act, we will not fix the vicious cycle of interconnected crises: the staffing crisis, the prison crises, the recidivism crisis and the VAWG crisis.
We finally have a Government brave enough to grip these problems through record levels of investment, through the emergency early release scheme, through sentencing reform and through the measures in this Bill. The Bill rebalances the criminal justice system to ensure that jury trials are always available for the most serious cases, that cases are heard sooner, that victims are treated more fairly, that our criminal justice system continues to provide justice now, and that it is future-proofed for years to come. I wholeheartedly support the Government and this Bill.
Catherine Fookes (Monmouthshire) (Lab)
I rise to speak in favour of the Bill, but first I want to remind the House why these reforms matter to victims. When the powerful wave of the MeToo movement washed over us in 2017, almost 10 years after the incredible Tarana Burke began the MeToo programme in US schools and women began to share their stories, I froze when I heard on the radio what Harvey Weinstein had been doing in plain sight. I spent the rest of the day scrolling through courageous women’s stories online, and despite my horror at each of their experiences, I felt relief and hope. I felt relief that we could share our stories of experiences that I know every woman in this Chamber and, unfortunately, every woman and girl in the UK, has at some level had to endure. And I felt hope that this would be a watershed moment and that there would be no more Harvey Weinsteins. Recently, however, we have come to learn of the monstrous abuses committed by Jeffrey Epstein and his associates, reminding us that this fight is by no means over.
Regardless of whether a victim has survived a high-profile repeat offender or abuse from someone they knew and trusted at home or at work, they deserve justice. The Tories utterly failed victims in their 14 years. They ran up a huge backlog. Some women victims have said recently that they have waited 10 years, and that is a 10-year sentence for them. We cannot accept these delays. Over 90% of all criminal cases are already heard fairly without a jury by magistrates.
Clause 8 of the Bill puts restrictions on evidence or questions about a survivor’s sexual history. That should never have been part of the trial in the first place. Clause 17 will mean that courts will no longer have to start from the presumption that parental involvement will always be in the interests of a child. Women’s Aid has called this
“a significant shift in the ‘pro-contact’ culture”
that puts children at risk. This change will be incredibly encouraging for one of my constituents whose ex-partner was convicted of child sex offences and who has seen her children’s wellbeing massively impacted. I pay tribute to the campaigners here today, who have worked so hard to make this happen. Today we can move the dial towards a system that does not unfairly advantage perpetrators and does not retraumatise victims.
Sarah Russell
On that point, there is a backlog in the family courts of 110,000 cases, more than what we are discussing, and legal aid rates for family law have not gone up since 1997. Does my hon. Friend agree that this is an important move but we need to do more?
Catherine Fookes
I agree that we need to do more. As a recipient of legal aid myself in the past, I know how important it is that its budget is increased.
It is almost 10 years since the birth of the MeToo movement. We must now ensure that we deliver on the hope that it engendered. Real change is needed. I back survivors of domestic abuse and sexual violence, and I therefore back the Bill.
Rachael Maskell (York Central) (Lab/Co-op)
When debating justice, I am first minded of the victim’s right to a process producing a fair and timely verdict and the defendant’s right to know that justice has been served fairly and without delay. There is much to commend in the Bill, including the removal of the presumption of parental involvement, protecting children from becoming the proxy target of a perpetrator’s abuse and the better handling of evidence.
The listing backlog is not universal. York Crown court’s cases are being listed for 2026-27. The Government must learn from successful courts and think about instituting things like Nightingale courts to deal with the backlog. When I visited York Crown court, I was told about the dysfunctional IT system and how difficult it was to connect to achieving best evidence videos. I was told about the PECS contracts. I say to the Government that we should in-source that work to ensure that we do not see those delays. Estate improvements are also vital, not least in a Crown court built in 1777, like York.
I want to focus on the removal of jury trials. We know that the judiciary lacks diversity, as we have heard, and I fear that is the result of unconscious bias, as academic papers have pointed out. We need to ensure that we have stronger deliberations of trials, and therefore to hand that to a jury would give more security.
The final point I want to impress upon the Justice Secretary is a political one. When victims and defendants have lost confidence in the establishment and the elite, including the judiciary, a bridge to maintain confidence between them and their communities and the justice system is vital. As has been put to me, without that, a victim is less likely to have confidence in someone whose experiences are a million miles from their own. The same is true for a defendant, having been failed by the establishment time and again. Maintaining the bridge to justice with people who have walked in their shoes, grown up on their street and faced the same challenges enables the victim and the defendant to know that at least the court understands, even if it has not found in their favour.
For someone to have their truth told to those from their community serving on a jury, and to know that the evidence has been deliberated well, upholds confidence in the courts and in justice, but to break that trust breaks justice and builds barriers. Justice must not only be done but be seen and felt to be done. It is easy for Ministers to get lost in the data and miss the purpose of justice, and I believe that it is this miscalculation that we wrestle with today. It is about who holds power and, ultimately, trusting that power.
Andrew Cooper (Mid Cheshire) (Lab)
A foundational principle of our constitution is that everyone is bound by and entitled to the benefit of the law, but the long-running crisis in our justice system has stretched that principle to breaking point. Other right hon. and hon. Members have covered in depth the disastrous decisions by the previous Government that have got us to this point. I would only add that on my visit to Chester Crown court last month, they told me about a recent trial that had to finish at 3 pm each day because they could not get the light bulbs in the court replaced.
The Government have invested significantly in court infrastructure, legal aid and uncapping sitting days, but it is clear that investment alone will not be enough to deal with this crisis. We also need to reform the system and make it fit for how criminal justice operates today. A raft of measures in the Bill will do that, alongside important reforms such as the removal of the presumption of contact.
I intend to focus specifically on the proposals for the Crown court bench division. Parliament has taken a view on where the line should be drawn between offences disposed of by magistrates and offences that require a full Crown court trial with a jury, owing to a different level of severity and jeopardy for the defendant. Elsewhere in our system, it is not unprecedented for serious matters to be decided by a judge alone, such as in the family court. The question is whether the Government have struck the correct balance in their proposals, and whether there are sufficient safeguards for defendants. I have two points to make in that respect.
Although Sir Brian Leveson intended for the three-year threshold in the presumption on whether a case should be allocated to the bench division, judicial discretion would be maintained for exceptional circumstances. It is not difficult to imagine cases in which the broader public interest is best served by a jury trial. One wonders how the Colston four would have fared in a judge-only trial. The last word on where such cases should be tried should sit with a judge who has considered all the arguments and nuances.
Leveson recommended that the bench division consist not only of a judge but of two magistrates, in order to retain community involvement in the judgment, as well as to address the diversity gap in the judiciary. The Bill’s proposal to try by judge alone eliminates all community involvement for that class of defendant, treating them differently from those facing charges of both lesser and greater severity. The 2022 University of Manchester study “Racial Bias and the Bench” found that over half of respondents had witnessed one or more judges acting in a racially biased way towards a defendant in their judicial rulings, summing up, sentencing, bail, comments or directions.
I have listened carefully to Ministers’ arguments, but I am nevertheless concerned that significant risks remain. I intend to support the Bill’s Second Reading, because it contains important reforms to our criminal justice system, and it is essential that we deal with the crisis that has failed victims for too long, but I also intend to continue engaging with Ministers, and I look forward to my concerns being addressed as the Bill progresses.
Warinder Juss (Wolverhampton West) (Lab)
I was recently contacted by a constituent who was raped more than three years ago. Her initial court date was set for February last year, more than two years after the offence. She prepared for that day practically, mentally and emotionally, only for the hearing to be pushed back by 24 hours at the last minute. That happened three times in a row—three nights without sleep, three mornings of preparation, three days of reliving her trauma with no progress being made. The case was then postponed again, this time for an entire year. She went through another 12 months of stress and uncertainty, hoping to close this painful chapter of her life in January of this year, but the date was once again pushed back, this time until November. All my constituent wants is to receive the justice that she deserves and move on with her life. Our justice system is failing victims by delaying justice. Justice delayed is justice denied.
Rachel Taylor
I really feel for my hon. Friend’s constituent. Warwickshire police used to have one of the worst records in the country for charging in rape cases, but they have turned that around and now have one of the best. Does he agree that, for the police to continue doing their work investigating the accused, our court system must support fair and timely trials? Only then will we restore public trust in our justice system.
Warinder Juss
Yes, the measures are all about getting timely justice, which is why I will support the Bill.
This Labour Government inherited a system on the brink of collapse, and in which cases like my constituent’s are all too common. We must all recognise that action is sorely needed, and I welcome the Government’s commitment to reform. I thank Sir Brian Leveson for his detailed and thoughtful review—part 1 was completed last July, so the Bill is not being rushed. His review has played a significant role in shaping the reforms in the Bill. I know that there are mixed opinions about the proposed changes to jury trials, but the independent review of the criminal courts was carried out because of the truly appalling backlog in our criminal justice system. I have heard of trials in the most seriously affected courts being listed into 2030. I heard this morning that victims are saying that waiting three years for their case to come to court was worse than the rape itself. Jury trials do take longer, and I would have preferred the Government to follow Sir Brian’s recommendation that a new bench division be created, in which a judge and two magistrates try cases without a jury.
However, I trust this Government to take the necessary steps to repair our justice system while preserving the sanctity, fairness and integrity that underpin justice in this country. Any proportionate and appropriate amendments to the Bill can be made in Committee. I also welcome the investment that this Government have made in modernising our court system, to try to reduce the backlog while ensuring that victims do not face unnecessary delays and inefficient processes when seeking justice.
Anna Dixon (Shipley) (Lab)
I recently visited Leeds Crown court, where I saw the benefits of some of that investment in a victim support suite, which ensured that victims, particularly of violence against women and girls, were safe and secure. Does my hon. Friend agree that both the investment and the reforms that we are considering are necessary to deliver swift and fair justice for victims?
Warinder Juss
Absolutely. I have had discussions with Sir Brian Leveson on a number of occasions, and he confirms that no one measure will achieve the reforms we need; we need to take a number of measures, of which the restriction in jury trials is just one, to achieve what we are trying to achieve.
I also welcome the additional safeguards for victims in rape and serious sexual offences cases, drawing on recommendations from the Law Commission. These new procedures will ensure that vulnerable victims of these horrific crimes are protected throughout the justice process, prevent further trauma, and ensure a move away from lines of questioning that perpetuate harmful rape myths and stereotypes.
The backlog in our courts and the delays denying justice to victims require bold and drastic action, and we need to take that action now. I therefore welcome this Government taking concrete steps to address the crisis that we have inherited, and I will support this Bill. Although I have concentrated on jury trials, there are other measures in the Bill that I welcome, such as the move away from the presumption of parental involvement in family courts, which will allow the Government to put the best interests of children first. We need drastic action, and we need to take it now, so I welcome everything the Government are doing.
Kim Johnson (Liverpool Riverside) (Lab)
There is lots in this Bill that I really support, but I am ideologically opposed to restricting the right to jury trial, because it undermines the foundations of our democracy, and I have not seen any evidence to show that it will go anywhere near tackling the backlog.
Madam Deputy Speaker,
“Our jury system may be centuries old, but it is still fit for purpose today. Successive studies have shown that, on average, jury verdicts are not affected by ethnicity… including in cases with all-white juries… ‘one stage in the criminal justice system where B[A]ME groups do not face persistent disproportionality is when a jury reaches a verdict.’”
Those are not my words—they are the words of the Justice Secretary, written in his seminal 2017 review. While the findings are nearly a decade old, the research by Cheryl Thomas on which those conclusions are based still holds true today.
Bell Ribeiro-Addy (Clapham and Brixton Hill) (Lab)
Does my hon. Friend agree that after enduring 14 years of Conservative government, now is the opportunity to implement the Lammy review in full?
Kim Johnson
I really appreciate my good friend’s intervention, and I do agree. The review was a great piece of work, and it contains some really great recommendations that will work, particularly on joint enterprise.
Only 10% of Crown court judges are from ethnic minority backgrounds, and just 1% are black—a figure that has remained the same for a decade. When trust in the police and the criminal justice system remains chronically low among black communities, and when we know that these systems produce disproportionate outcomes, particularly in relation to joint enterprise, why are we pouring yet more fuel on the fire? Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, particularly when we all know that evidence exists but is being ignored.
All hon. Members recognise that the backlog needs to be tackled, and that victims need to be given the swift justice that they deserve, because justice delayed is justice denied. However, we need evidence-based solutions, focused on what is causing the backlog. The Institute for Government says that the proposals will save only between 1% and 2% of court time. To put that into perspective, that means that rape complainants and victims who are currently waiting for around a year for their case to be heard may see their cases brought forward by just a week.
Last month, I was pleased to visit Liverpool Crown court with the Criminal Bar Association. I had the pleasure of hearing from Judge Andrew Menary, under whose leadership Liverpool courts can now proudly boast the lowest backlog in the country. His work in bringing together prosecution and defence teams to negotiate common-sense solutions to avoid cases needlessly going to court, speeding up access to justice for victims and ensuring fair outcomes for defendants, make him a leading light in our country. I am pleased that the Government are looking to roll out these solutions.
I know that the Justice Secretary cares deeply about tackling racism in the justice system; it is on record that he has been trying to do exactly that for decades. I urge him to listen to the strength and breadth of feeling in the House today, and across the legal profession and our country, including to the voices of the 3,000 signatories of a letter to the Prime Minister. Once the right to trial by jury is removed, we may never get it back again. Justice needs juries, and today we must defend them.
Pam Cox (Colchester) (Lab)
The Opposition have chosen to misrepresent this Bill. That is their choice, but it does the delivery of justice in this country no favours. That misrepresentation has centred on one of the Bill’s many provisions—the proposed changes to mode of trial—but this Bill does not abolish jury trials. It moves some cases to the magistrates courts, introduces bench trials for certain other cases, and introduces reforms to either-way proceedings. If implemented, the Bill will mean that the accused in either-way cases will no longer have the ability to overrule the decision of a magistrates court about the mode of trial, namely where their trial should be held.
I want to offer a different perspective on this point. The current right to elect for a jury trial is not an ancient right. Instead, we can think of it as an anomaly—a legal practice created in the 1850s that survived reforms in the 1970s—and court modernisers have been calling for the practice to be closed down for decades. I focus on the history, because it is important for us to be aware of how others before us have used democratic processes to enact judicial reform in the public interest.
In 2001, Lord Justice Auld noted that
“our system is probably unique in that, in a large range of offences…the accused, not the court, decides how and where he is to be tried.”
Lord Auld recommended that this element be abolished, but that is the system that the Opposition are defending. When they defend that anomaly, they are delaying justice and undermining victims.
Last year, more than 4,000 defendants opted for a jury trial. As the Magistrates Association reported to the Justice Committee, some will have done so in the hope that the resulting delay would deter victims from continuing. We know that many stopped prosecutions are caused by victims dropping out—demoralised, defeated and denied justice. This Bill turns that dreadful situation around through a whole package of measures, but in part by ending the either-way anomaly.
This Bill preserves jury trials for the most serious cases. If it did not, I would not support it. It also allows those presiding over a bench trial to reallocate the case to jury trial if new evidence emerges to suggest that the defendant might receive a sentence of more than three years. That is an important point that has been overlooked so far in this debate.
There is more that I could say about the other measures introduced by the Bill, and about the desperate need to do more for sexual offence victims; for example, I would love us to fast-track RASSO courts at pace. We have a once-in-a-generation chance to improve our courts, so let us take that chance today.
Amanda Hack (North West Leicestershire) (Lab)
We have heard many moving speeches today. I pay tribute to my hon. Friends the Members for Warrington North (Charlotte Nichols), and for Bolsover (Natalie Fleet), for sharing their personal experiences.
Jury trials are a really important mechanism in the British legal system, and should not be taken for granted, so I want to share my experience. A number of years ago, I was asked to be a witness in a trial in which somebody I knew was being prosecuted for harassment. Just a couple of years ago, I was the victim of harassment myself. The detail of these cases are not needed, but the premise is. In the earlier case, the trial was led by a judge. While I was inexperienced, I felt that the judge and legal representatives worked hard to ensure that both sides of the case were examined and presented as openly as possible. Fast-forward some years, and I found myself in a different situation. I was a victim, alongside a number of individuals, of direct harassment. In that case, the perpetrator wanted to proceed with a jury trial, and they got that choice.
The trial was postponed repeatedly and went forward after the third rescheduled date. Each postponement meant more delay, more cost to the public purse, and more stress for the victims. The delays were extremely frustrating and meant that justice—whatever the jury may have decided—was delayed for a long time. Those of us who were victims were unable to move on, and that is what it is like for so many victims. I would be grateful if the Minister could elaborate on how victims will be supported by the proposed changes.
In the first trial, as a witness, I was cross-examined by the opposing counsel. In the second trial, I was cross-examined by the person who committed the crime against me. I could see that the jurors were uncomfortable with the perpetrator’s line of questioning. We should spare a thought for those jurors—people from across society doing a really important job for the public by serving on a jury. Many of them would have had to rearrange work commitments; would have lost money, if they were self-employed; and would have had to catch up on work in the evenings, just to make justice happen. In my view, the defendant should not have been able to delay the case in the way that they did, and the jurors should not have had to sit through a trial that could have been managed effectively with just a judge.
Finally, we should spare a thought for taxpayers, including those in North West Leicestershire who have been in touch. I understand their concerns. They do not want to see the loss of jury trials, and they will not; we will see a restriction of jury trials. We should recognise that there are too many cases in which perpetrators can choose to go for a jury trial, and that is being used by people simply to delay justice. As we have already heard, justice delayed is justice denied, and victims deserve so much better.
Dr Marie Tidball (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)
I rise to support this Bill, particularly clause 17— Jack and Paul’s law—to finally repeal the presumption of contact in the family courts. It is the result of 11 years of campaigning by my incredible constituent Claire Throssell MBE, who is in the Gallery today, following the tragic deaths of her beautiful sons, Jack and Paul. They were killed in a house fire by their father, a known domestic abuser. Their dad lured Jack and his nine-year-old brother Paul into the attic with the promise of a train set, but he started 14 fires around their family home, killing himself in the blaze.
Jack and Paul’s deaths happened during a two-hour, court-ordered, unsupervised contact visit permitted by a family court and allowed to go ahead by the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service. The state failed Jack and Paul; it failed to put their wellbeing first, after a decade of their father’s abuse, neglect and coercive control of them and their mother. This House must act today and vote through this Bill to save the lives of a future generation of children by ending contact at any cost.
The presumption of parental involvement is a legal principle in the Children Act 1989 that means that any parent, even those who are known domestic abusers, should always be given contact with their children, but the retention of presumption continues to be fatal. Some 68 children—that we know of—have died at the hands of known domestically abusive parents since Women’s Aid started research on this issue. This Bill presents a life-changing opportunity to prevent such deaths and puts children’s wellbeing at the heart of our family courts.
Sarah Russell
Does my hon. Friend agree it is absolutely crucial that we fund contact centres properly, so that there are properly supervised options for courts to order?
Dr Tidball
I do indeed. In combination with the provisions in the Bill to effect structural reform, to stop criminals from gaming the system and to triage trials effectively, such measures will embed a child-centred and victim-centred approach in the courts.
Kirith Entwistle
I commend my hon. Friend on her exemplary campaigning on behalf of her constituent Claire Throssell. Does she agree that it is not right that rape victims are waiting 400 days to be heard?
Dr Tidball
I do indeed agree with my hon. Friend.
When Jack and Paul died, Claire promised them that no more children should lose their lives like they did, at the hands of an abusive parent. When I first met Claire, I told her that if I was elected, I would do all I could to help her. That was in 2023. On the 11th anniversary of the boys’ death, in October last year, I took Claire to No. 10 Downing Street to meet the Prime Minister—the first Prime Minister to personally commit to fulfil Claire’s promise to her beautiful boys.
I ask this House to vote for the Bill today, so that we can collectively fulfil Claire’s promise to her sons Jack and Paul; so that children like Jack and Paul are listened to, not ignored; and so that no more towns like mine are left to grieve. I urge this House to make that world a reality and support the Bill.
Bell Ribeiro-Addy (Clapham and Brixton Hill) (Lab)
While there is lots to welcome in the Bill, I fear it has been completely overshadowed by plans to restrict jury trials. This is not what victims are asking for—they need changes that are backed by evidence and that will result in genuine improvements to the criminal justice system. Jury trials are not what has led to the backlog, and these reforms will not reduce it.
I have a close friend who is a survivor of rape, and she is alarmed by this proposal. After a three and a half year wait for her trial, the delay made her suicidal. She desperately wants action on court backlogs, but she opposes these plans and is outraged that her trauma and that of thousands of survivors is being used to justify what she sees as effectively a cost-cutting exercise. As learned Friends know, courts could be instructed to prioritise rape cases and have them heard in a set period of time, such as six months. As my brave hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North (Charlotte Nichols) asked, where are the specialist courts? None of these things require legislation. We need to address the backlog in our criminal courts, but any steps taken should never jeopardise equality or access to justice.
Kim Johnson
My hon. Friend is talking about not jeopardising equality. Does she agree that more needs to be done to recruit more people from diverse communities, to ensure that our systems are far more diverse and represent the communities they serve?
Bell Ribeiro-Addy
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. She will have heard people talk many times in this Chamber about the lack of diversity in our judicial system.
Last July, I met the Bar Council, because when a sector has issues we should talk to the workers—more often than not, they have the solutions. In my view, that has always been the Labour way. They had a number of recommendations that should be considered—for example, that defendants who are awaiting trial should be remanded at a conveniently located prison close to the court, because Serco, the company tasked with prisoner transportation, persistently fails to transport prisoners in good time. This wastes the court’s time and results in a new court date having to be set. We should end that privatisation and bring prisoner transportation back in-house.
We should provide greater flexibility for hearings and allow virtual courts, so that more cases are heard; permit all available judges, including those who have retired but are below the age of 75, to sit as many days as they are available; invest in more court staff and support; and list trials from Monday to Thursday, so that all short matters can be dealt with on one day—namely, Friday—minimising disruption for all other court users, such as jurors, witnesses and defendants. These are all simple changes that would significantly maximise sittings while preserving the basic foundations of our criminal justice system. The wholesale change that we ought to be considering today is the complete reversal of the austerity measures introduced by the coalition Government, which led to this mess, but that has been overshadowed by the proposal to restrict jury trials.
Finally, racial bias in our criminal justice system is well documented. Any reforms should address this head-on, but to conduct a post-legislative review on discrimination is deeply insulting to those communities that are impacted. As I said earlier, this Bill was our opportunity to fully implement the Lammy review; instead, we will have a situation where there is no automatic right to appeal, when black women are 22% more likely to be convicted. To quote Ife Thompson, one of the brilliant lawyers who was protesting outside Parliament today,
“In a justice system that already produces racially discriminatory outcomes, removing juries means removing one of the few spaces where ordinary people and some real diversity still exist in the courtroom.”
We all have to have red lines, and racism in our justice system has ruined so many lives in our communities. I cannot support this measure, and if it is not removed from the legislation, I will not be supporting this Bill.
Several hon. Members rose—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)
I call Sarah Russell to make the final Back-Bench speech.
Sarah Russell (Congleton) (Lab)
I draw attention to the fact that I am a solicitor with a current practising certificate who has appeared before tribunals historically.
I will speak briefly today about the £1.3 billion maintenance backlog in our courts. We have heard that the Justice Secretary will commit £287 million to it. That is a large sum of money, but it is not enough.
I want to talk about the fact that legal aid rates have not gone up since 1997. The Justice Secretary is looking at increasing them significantly, but unfortunately that is moving them from £40 an hour to £60 an hour. In private practice, most solicitors would expect to be billing about five times that to run their firms. It is just not enough.
Sarah Russell
I am afraid I will not.
When we look at how much these measures will bring down the backlog in totality, it is simply not enough. When the time from reporting a rape to an actual trial is, on average, six years, bringing down the backlog slightly by the end of the next Parliament is just not enough. I have significant concerns about the restrictions on access to jury trials.
Anyone who has read Baroness Harman’s independent review of bullying, harassment and sexual harassment at the Bar should have real concerns about the attitudes of some barristers towards women and ethnic minorities. Not every barrister exhibits those traits, but they are a systematic problem. She talks about the fact that:
“A recurrent theme in the submissions was that there is a tolerance of misconduct at the Bar which is learned and passed down from generation to generation. I was told that some barristers, particularly men of the older generation, ‘have no idea how outdated and offensive some of their views are, nor do they care about the impact of sharing those views with others who may be offended by them’.”
Kim Johnson
The Justice Secretary identifies that we have these problems, and he talks about the delivery of training on racism and misogyny to support people to be brought into the 21st century. Does my hon. Friend believe that those kinds of training courses can work?
Sarah Russell
Obviously not everyone is exhibiting these traits and training can help, but my understanding, from what I have heard anecdotally, is that substantial numbers of members of the judiciary are not up to date with the training requirements that they already have. I would welcome hearing more from the Secretary of State about exactly how those training programmes will be developed, brought forward and made mandatory in a way that is effective.
It is of significant concern that Baroness Harman had to make a recommendation on the importance of the Judicial Appointments Commission taking into account findings of misconduct when considering who to appoint as judges. It is astonishing that she had to recommend that that should be required. How has the Judicial Appointments Commission been operating to date?
I stand here as someone who does not like to criticise the judiciary. I know that it has many hard-working members who have been operating in a difficult environment for a very long time. We have to be honest in saying that most of the rates that I have referred to were not put up by the new Labour Government either. We have had cuts to the justice system for 25 years, and that is why it is on its knees. We can do things within the context of the current system that might make it somewhat better, but I go back to my original question: when rape trials are taking six years from arrest to prosecution, what are we going to do to make wholesale change? Nothing I have heard so far has convinced me that what we will do here today, whichever permutations we go with, will fundamentally transform those waits.
Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)
It has been a positive debate in terms of the exchange of ideas, and there have been some fantastic contributions. I pay particular tribute to the hon. Members for Bolsover (Natalie Fleet) and for Warrington North (Charlotte Nichols) for the very personal way in which they made their cases. There is consensus that for victims, the current waits are terrible and an experience that they should not have to go through. It is not only damaging for them as individuals, but some of them drop out as a result. We see perpetrators who would have been found guilty walking away and escaping justice, and we see defendants who would have been found innocent having to wait too long to have the accusations over their head removed.
Dr Mullan
Not yet.
We must have a serious discussion about why that is. It was disappointing for those who sought to put forward a credible analysis of what has happened that the Justice Secretary and most Labour Members did not mention the word “covid” once. In reality, the backlogs in the Crown court under this Government before covid were lower than those we inherited from the previous Government.
It is fair to say that for many years—25 years, as we heard from the hon. Member for Congleton (Sarah Russell)—it has been accepted that not enough political attention has been paid to our justice system. The question is, what do we do about it? There is no single answer to that question, because there is no single problem. A whole variety of things are going wrong in our justice system. We are seeing late pleas because of insufficient early advice, faulty courtrooms, a lack of reports from probation services, and problems with prison transport. All those problems, and others, cause the delays and other issues.
The central recommendation of the Leveson report was for more sitting days— 130,000—and that will require more venues, more court staff, more prosecution staff, more solicitors and more barristers. However, as I have mentioned, there are simpler things that we can do ahead of that, and we need look no further than Liverpool Crown court under the leadership of Andrew Menary. At a time when the national average wait from charge to trial is 321 days, that court manages an average wait of 206 days. As far as I am aware, neither the Justice Secretary nor any of his team has visited Liverpool Crown court to speak to the judge and hear how he does that. In fact, he achieves it partly through the use of early guilty pleas. Nationally, we lose court time because too many people—31%—plead guilty on the day of a trial. In Liverpool, the proportion is just 6%. Those are not bold reforms. They are not measures that allow a Secretary of State to give a grand speech and consider himself a great reformer. It is just hard work, or what one Member described as “pretty boring” stuff that gets the job done.
As was pointed out by the hon. Members for Warrington North and for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy), these reforms will not only fail to achieve what the Government claim they will; they will be an overbearing, destructive distraction from that sort of hard work. And what will the Government gain? Certainly not what they claim in the impact assessment, which is full of assumptions and fantasies, and certainly not anything that might be described as modelling. The Government want us to believe that 24,000 Crown court days will simply be converted into 8,500 magistrate days, but they have no evidence for that claim. They want us to believe that trials without juries will be 20% shorter, but they have no evidence to support that claim either.
Alex McIntyre (Gloucester) (Lab)
Has the shadow Minister seen today’s statement from the Institute for Government, which has backed the Government’s modelling and overturned its previous position? He might want to reflect that in his comments.
Dr Mullan
I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman read the entire statement. What the institution actually said was that the modelling
“relies on several assumptions—some of which are highly uncertain.”
Did he read that part of the statement? I do not think he did, because it claims that there will be reductions of only 2% in trial time as a result of these reforms.
What are we being asked to give up? We are being asked to give up 800 years of English legal history. A sledgehammer is being taken to the cornerstone of our system, and to fundamental rights. Thousands of accused people risk spending years in prison, losing their livelihoods, losing their families, losing their homes, and not being able to make the simple request for a forum of their peers to make that decision—a part of the justice system that is trusted and supported more than any other. That is perhaps why it is being defended so robustly by those within it. Just today, thousands of retired judges and retired and working legal professionals asked the Justice Secretary to think again. What has been the Government’s response to that? It has been to denigrate the role of jury trials.
We have had the appalling sight of the Lord Chancellor comparing three years in prison to a scraped knee. We have heard the Minister for Courts say that being accused of an offence of sexual assault, which could be considered either way at the moment, was not serious—an accusation that, if proven, would lose someone their livelihood. It is shameful and desperate stuff from a desperate Government. In contrast, what did the Prime Minister say? He said:
“The right to trial by jury is an important factor in the delicate balance between the power of the state and the freedom of the individual. The further it is restricted, the greater the imbalance.”
Now he asks us to upend that balance in a historically unprecedented way.
Of course, we can talk about the facts and figures, as woeful and thin as they have been, but at the end of the day, these decisions come from political instinct and a deep sense of what is right and wrong. That is not shallow; it is based on knowledge and years of experience —the sort that the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner) and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and Tavistock (Sir Geoffrey Cox) have. That experience told them, before they saw the figures, that the Government’s approach was not going to work. They have been proven right by the figures.
Is it any surprise that the Prime Minister does not understand this? Time and again, we have seen that he is absolutely devoid of any sort of deep political instinct. His only instinct is to chop and change his mind as it suits him on any particular day. No wonder he has been, more than any other Prime Minister in recent history, an agent of the civil service. He has forgotten the golden rule that civil servants advise and Ministers decide. The Conservatives have said yes to more resources, to efficiency and to the hard work of getting things done, but we have said no to eroding a fundamental right, no to more overbearing state power, and no to gutting and scouring away the mechanism by which all of us watch the watchmen.
The Courts Minister tells us that the Bill has been introduced on a point of political principle, whereas other Members have argued that it is a matter of necessity and resource. Too often, Labour Members have said yes to a Prime Minister to whom they should have said no. They have an opportunity tonight to say no to the Prime Minister when it counts. Let us hope they have the courage to do so.
The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)
It is my pleasure to deliver the closing speech for this Second Reading of the Courts and Tribunals Bill. I thank right hon. and hon. Members for all their contributions. A consensus has broken out across this Chamber that the acute backlog in our criminal courts represents an injustice. We have a record and rising backlog of 80,000 cases, and behind each and every one is a victim and somebody accused of a crime. Lives are put on hold, immiserated by the fact that today we are seeing trials listed in 2030.
A consensus has broken out that we cannot sit idly by and do nothing. We have to act based on pragmatism, on what works and on the principle of fairness to ensure that every citizen in this country has the right to a fair trial. Whether someone is a defendant or a victim, it is deeply unfair to make them wait years for justice. Victims’ lives are put on hold, and witnesses’ memories fade. People are pulling out of trials, allowing perpetrators to walk away. That is not justice at all. That is what we mean when we say justice delayed is justice denied, and we have to act.
How do we frame these principles? We make a choice. Traditionally, our justice system has had two central parties: on the one hand, the prosecution; on the other, the defence. Victims have only a walk-on part. That will change, because the measures in this Bill place victims at their heart, and I pay tribute to them today. Again, consensus reigns in endorsing the fine speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge (Dr Tidball), who paid tribute to her constituent Claire Throssell for her campaign. The measures in the Bill repeal the presumption of parental contact.
We have heard powerful speeches from my hon. Friends the Members for Bolsover (Natalie Fleet), for Warrington North (Charlotte Nichols) and for North West Leicestershire (Amanda Hack). Their voices have been added to those of the countless victims I have met throughout this process, who have implored me to act and to challenge the injustices in our court, the delays and the nature of the justice process, which means that so often they feel they have been put on trial. That is why, as part of the reforms that we are bringing forward, we have centred victims by delivering a package of over half a billion pounds to support victims’ services. Today we have announced that there will be independent legal advisers for rape victims and that we are changing the law on the rules of evidence, which means that rape myths will be busted in our courts. Of course, as the Victims’ Commissioner has said, there is a need to address the delays.
We are being asked to vote on a reasoned amendment, and before I turn to the remarks made by other hon. Members—
Sarah Sackman
The right hon. Member has not been here for the entire debate, so I am afraid that I am not going to address his comments.
The hon. Member for West Suffolk (Nick Timothy) moved a reasoned amendment that would drive a coach and horses through this Bill. Politics is about choices, and to govern is to choose. We know what choices those on the Opposition Benches would make about our justice system, because it is writ large in how they gutted legal aid, shut criminal courts and capped sitting days. They have presented many criticisms, but one thing I have not heard is an apology, nor have I heard an alternative plan for how to address the backlog.
This Government have brought forward a plan built on three pillars, or three levers that we choose to pull. The first is investment in uncapping sitting days, removing the financial constraint on how much our courts can sit and putting record investment into criminal legal aid. I have heard the important contributions from my hon. Friend the Member for Hornsey and Friern Barnet (Catherine West), the hon. Members for Mid Dorset and North Poole (Vikki Slade) and for Chichester (Jess Brown-Fuller), and my hon. Friend the Member for Congleton (Sarah Russell) about needing to look at the availability of legal aid, because of course access to justice is vital.
The second lever is modernisation. Many Members across the House have pointed to the wasted time in our inefficient and broken court system, with the time it takes to bring prisoners to court, the courtrooms empty because of disrepair—we are now investing in courtrooms —and problems with listing and how we adopt best practice from successful courts such as Liverpool. These are all valuable suggestions, and as the Deputy Prime Minister said in his vision speech last week, we are taking them all forward because we have to pull every lever.
Thirdly, the conclusions of the independent review of criminal courts led by Sir Brian Leveson were clear: investment and efficiency alone will make a dent, but they will not bring down the backlogs. We have to bring forward structural reforms to alleviate the growing pressure on our Crown courts. That was caused not simply by covid or by lack of investment; these long-term changes in our criminal justice system have been coming down the track for decades. Crown court trials take twice as long as they did 20 years ago, the police are making more arrests and it is right that we have more procedural protections. All this means that our system is creaking under the demand, as the modelling we have put forward demonstrates.
The way we are going to bring about transformation is through people—the brilliant people who work every day in our criminal justice system. I am grateful to my hon. Friends the Members for Amber Valley (Linsey Farnsworth), for Forest of Dean (Matt Bishop) and for Doncaster Central (Sally Jameson), to the CPS, the police and the prison staff, and to the defence and prosecution barristers who power our criminal justice system, because we will need them. As many have pointed out, we will also need our magistrates, and I commend my hon. Friends the Members for Cramlington and Killingworth (Emma Foody) and for Corby and East Northamptonshire (Lee Barron), who demonstrated how magistrates will power our system. These are lay justices—
Sarah Sackman
I will give way, but I am mindful of the time. I have to wrap up on time.
Sir Edward Leigh
I do not expect an answer now, but will the Minister take away one point that I and others made, which is that people of good character should have an absolute right to a jury trial? She need not answer now, but will she at least consider that point?
Sarah Sackman
I will not respond to that point now, but I will say that there needs to be equality before the law irrespective of background.
That brings me to the point raised by the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley (Dr Shastri-Hurst) about rushing. We are not rushing. This Bill, as seen in the vibrant debate we have had today, will receive ample scrutiny. I have taken on board the suggestions from right across the House, whether it is the idea of my hon. Friend the Member for Mid and South Pembrokeshire (Henry Tufnell) about district judges, or those of my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner). We will engage in constructive dialogue to strengthen the Bill. One of the most important ways in which we will do that is through a review, to which the Deputy Prime Minister has committed, focused primarily on the racial disparities and the inequalities in our system.
I am not here to defend the status quo. We know that for too long, marginalised communities, working-class communities and racial minorities—
Sarah Sackman
I will not give way, because I have a lot of comments to cover.
Members representing those communities have been vocal in this debate. We hear you, and that is why we will be bringing forward a review in Committee. I pay tribute to the contributions from my hon. Friends the Members for Birmingham Erdington (Paulette Hamilton), for Sheffield Central (Abtisam Mohamed), for Bradford West (Naz Shah), for Bradford East (Imran Hussain), for York Central (Rachael Maskell), for Poplar and Limehouse (Apsana Begum) and for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson). Something that came through in their comments was the importance not just of justice being done, but of justice being seen to be done. The justice system that we reform needs to command the confidence of communities, and we will work constructively to ensure that the review that we put on the face of the Bill does just that.
I return to the central theme, which is the need to act. For too long, those on the Conservative Benches were prepared to sit idly by while they presided over a crisis in our prisons, a crisis in probation and, now, a crisis in our courts. We have heard loud and clear from my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Tony Vaughan) and my hon. Friends the Members for South Dorset (Lloyd Hatton), for Chatham and Aylesford (Tristan Osborne), for Monmouthshire (Catherine Fookes), for Wolverhampton West (Warinder Juss) and for Hammersmith and Chiswick (Andy Slaughter) that there is a necessity to act. As Sir Brian Leveson himself said,
“if not this, then what?”,
and if not now, then when?
Politics is about choices. This Labour Government choose modernisation over tradition, investment over decline, and to put victims and communities first in a transformed, modernised justice system in which our public and our citizenry can have confidence.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (First sitting)
Wednesday 25th March 2026
(4 months, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Courts and Tribunals Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 25 March 2026 - (25 Mar 2026)
The Chair
Before we begin, I ask Members to switch electronic devices to silent. Tea, coffee, soft drinks and sandwiches are not allowed, although water is permitted. There are a couple of procedural things to do before we hear from our witnesses. We will first consider the programme motion on the amendment paper, and then consider a motion to enable the reporting and publication of written evidence to the Committee. There is also a motion to allow us to deliberate in private before the oral evidence session begins, to talk about how we are going to handle the session. Date Time Witness Wednesday 25 March Until no later than 9.55 am Rt Hon Sir Brian Leveson Wednesday 25 March Until no later than 10.35 am Victims’ Commissioner for England and Wales; Professor Katrin Hohl, Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice, City St George’s, University of London; Dame Vera Baird KC Wednesday 25 March Until no later than 11.25 am Women’s Aid Federation of England; Jade Blue McCrossen-Nethercott; Charlotte Meijer; Morwenna Loughman Wednesday 25 March Until no later than 2.30 pm The Bar Council; Criminal Bar Association Wednesday 25 March Until no later than 3.00 pm Claire Davies KC, Leader of the South Eastern Circuit; Samantha Hillas KC, Leader of the Northern Circuit; Caroline Goodwin KC, Leader of the North Eastern Circuit Wednesday 25 March Until no later than 3.20 pm Claire Throssell Wednesday 25 March Until no later than 3.35 pm Chief Constable of Lancashire Constabulary Wednesday 25 March Until no later than 3.50 pm HM Courts and Tribunals Service Wednesday 25 March Until no later than 4.20 pm JUSTICE; Centre for Criminal Appeals (APPEAL); Institute for Government Wednesday 25 March Until no later than 4.40 pm Hon Doug Downey KC MPP, Attorney General of Ontario Wednesday 25 March Until no later than 4.55 pm Plan B. Earth Wednesday 25 March Until no later than 5.30 pm Hon Sir Richard Henriques; His Honour Clement Goldstone KC; RT Hon Lord Burnett of Maldon Wednesday 25 March Until no later than 5.50 pm Ministry of Justice
Ordered,
That—
(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Wednesday 25 March) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Wednesday 25 March;
(b) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 14 April;
(c) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 16 April;
(d) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 21 April;
(e) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 23 April;
(f) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 28 April;
(2) the Committee shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following Table:
(3) proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 4; Schedule 1; Clauses 5 to 7; Schedule 2; Clauses 8 to 18; Schedule 3; Clauses 19 and 20; new Clauses; new Schedules; Clauses 21 to 27; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
(4) the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Tuesday 28 April.—(Sarah Sackman.)
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Sarah Sackman.)
The Chair
Copies of written evidence the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee Room, which is very useful for the Opposition and for the Government, as I am sure you all know. I said to the Minister before we started that my view is that the Government’s job is to get legislation through and the Opposition’s job is to scrutinise it, and I will protect both in that pursuit. My job as Chairman is to help both sides to achieve those aims, and it is entirely possible to do so.
Resolved,
That, at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be heard, the Committee shall sit in private until the witnesses are admitted.—(Sarah Sackman.)
The Chair
We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we start, do any Members wish to make a declaration of interest in connection with the Bill? No. If any Member has an interest that is relevant to their question or speech, they should declare it at the appropriate time.
Examination of Witness
Sir Brian Leveson gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from Sir Brian Leveson. We must stick to the timings of the programme order that the Committee has agreed, so we have until 9.55 am for this panel. Will the witness please briefly introduce themselves for the record?
Sir Brian Leveson: My name is Brian Leveson. I was a practising criminal lawyer from 1970. I became a silk in 1986. I went on to the High Court bench in 2000, and the Court of Appeal in 2006. I was the senior presiding judge for England and Wales between 2007 and 2009, the inaugural chair of the Sentencing Council between 2010 and 2013, president of the Queen’s bench division from 2013, and latterly head of criminal justice. I retired at the compulsory age of 70 in 2019. I am now the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. I have spent the last 15 months seeking to review criminal justice, a subject which I rather thought I had left behind.
Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)
Q
Sir Brian Leveson: No, although I recognise that, in 2015, I looked at efficiency in criminal proceedings. Everybody says that was a wonderful time—no, it was not. I published a report that dealt with efficiency. It was not to incorporate anything that involved legislative change, but in chapter 10, “Out of Scope”, I discussed what Sir Robin Auld said in 2001. Anybody looking at that material would have seen that I was seriously concerned about the way in which criminal justice was proceeding and progressing, notwithstanding the backlog then because of an absence of police officers. What I visualised has actually come to pass.
Dr Mullan
Q
Sir Brian Leveson: Well, I have been visiting Crown courts for 50 years. I personally visited Liverpool Crown court, and I am sure I went to another Crown court, but my team went a large number of Crown courts. I was assisted by three advisers: Professor David Ormerod, who is I think the foremost criminal academic lawyer in the country; Chris Mayer, a former chief executive of HM Courts Service; and Shaun McNally, a former director of crime at HMCS and a former chief executive of the Legal Aid Agency. I had plenty of expertise. I did not need to visit courts; they did. I spoke to a lot of judges, though.
Dr Mullan
I do not want to assume what you may or may not know about Liverpool, but are you aware that Liverpool does not have a backlog in its courts?
Sir Brian Leveson: I am very aware of Liverpool: I am a Liverpudlian. I practised in Liverpool. I know all the judges in Liverpool extremely well. It would be a mistake to think that Liverpool is a microcosm of the country, for lots of reasons. Liverpool has a single Crown court. There are 20-odd courts in one building. It was opened in 1984—I was present. It has its problems, but it is still a very highly functioning court. There is one Crown Prosecution Service area. There is essentially one police force, although there is a second in Cheshire. There is one chief probation officer. Much more importantly, there is a small local Bar where everybody knows everybody else and they all get on with it. That is not the case in other parts of the country.
Dr Mullan
Q
Sir Brian Leveson: Yes, and I have made recommendations. It is critical that the systems join up: the police, the CPS, the defence community, the courts, the judiciary, and the prison and probation services. They all have their own budgets, their own problems and their own priorities. One of the recommendations I made in part 2 of my review—which is not considered in the Bill, obviously—was the creation of a criminal justice adviser whose only responsibility was co-ordinating the work of each of the agencies to try to make them work together. That is where it has worked in Liverpool. But doing that on its own would not be sufficient.
Dr Mullan
Q
“I have no doubt that the MoJ will want and need to conduct more detailed modelling, including through impact assessments of any recommendations taken forward.”
It is a common theme throughout the report that you say, repeatedly, that you expect that the Ministry of Justice will want to undertake more detailed modelling than the modelling you undertook. Are you aware of what, if any, more detailed modelling the MOJ did undertake?
Sir Brian Leveson: That is not my responsibility. What I wanted to say about modelling was this: it is bordering on the speculative to think that you can model all the changes to get one set of results. I am very conscious, for example, of the modelling in relation to the time saved by a bench division. You will know, and doubtless quote it at me in a moment, that the modellers suggest 20%, which I believe is pessimistic. Let me say why I think that is so, because it is very important that the Committee understands this.
How can modelling be undertaken in relation to systems that have never operated? The first question is, “What time would be saved?” The modellers—the analysts—looked to the court service: “How many minutes would be saved by not having to do this with a jury? How many by doing that, and the other?” They also spoke to some judges. I believe they came up with a figure that is far too pessimistic, as I said.
Let me explain why. The dynamic of a criminal trial conducted with a jury is very different from the dynamic of a trial conducted without a jury. Take family work, for example. The judge gets involved. If there is a jury, he finds no facts—every fact that anybody wants to elicit or develop, unless it is inadmissible, they can—but if a judge is conducting a trial, he or she will say, “Well now, what’s the issue in this case? Let’s get down to it,” and, “I’ve got that point; what’s the next point?” That changes the dynamic of the trial entirely.
Indeed, I have spoken to district judges who try rapes in the youth court and are also sex-ticketed recorders, so are trying rapes in the Crown court, and they say to me that trials in the Crown court are twice as long as for the same sort of acquaintance-type rape in the youth court. Canadian judges talk about 50%; I am concerned to achieve fair justice, and I need to speed that up because of the backlog.
Dr Mullan
On the right to elect, your report—we are not talking about further work that you are not responsible for—says:
“It has been assumed that disposals per day in the magistrates’ court are in line with the current average.”
So if we change the system, disposals will remain at the current rate. If we are trying more complex, more serious cases, is it reasonable to assume that the disposal time will be the same as for those currently seen for less serious cases?
Sir Brian Leveson: Why do you say they are more complex? They are not necessarily more complex at all.
Dr Mullan
If they are being given sentences of potentially up three years versus, for example, six months, you do not think that will have any impact on the time, complexity or seriousness of the cases?
Sir Brian Leveson: I am not suggesting it will not have any impact; I am suggesting that the time cases take is not necessarily governed by the nature of the charge or, indeed, the eventual sentence. In the 1970s, I could conduct two trials in a day; nobody ever conducts a trial in a day these days.
Dr Mullan
The most specific element of modelling that the MOJ undertook was something called a structured elicitation workshop, which found that the time saved would be between 10% and 30%. At the lower the end, that is half of the 20% estimate that you put forward. Would you accept that?
Sir Brian Leveson: No. I think that is wrong. As far as I am concerned, there will be a considerable time saving and, much more importantly, there will be a cultural shift. At the moment, if you can put your trial off until 2028, what is not to like?
Dr Mullan
Q
Sir Brian Leveson: I do not accept that characterisation at all. I believe that savings in a Crown court will be dramatic, for cultural and involvement reasons, in the same way that family judges get through cases more quickly. If you ask those who are opposed to any change what they think will happen as a result of change, they are going to be—
The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)
Q
Sir Brian Leveson: Yes. At the moment, there are undeniably defendants who are gaming the system. They are charged with a crime, they are told their trial will not be until 2028 or 2029, and they are happy to put it off.
I gave an example in a debate on this subject. I said that in 1970 I would say to defendants in around November, “Well, this is a very strong case. If you are guilty, you are much better admitting it. You get a discount for pleading guilty and you can explain it, which will contain litigation.” More than once defendants would say, “Well, Mr Leveson, I am guilty, and I will plead guilty, but I want to spend Christmas with my kids, so I will plead guilty in January.” Now they can say, “I would like to spend Christmas 2028 with my children.” That was an anecdote from me, but after the debate a defence solicitor from London came up to me and said, “That example you gave—I am having that conversation every day of the week.”
We need people to confront what they have done. I do not want anybody to plead guilty who is not guilty and has seen the evidence. I am not asking to change the guilty plea rate, but in the early days, you pleaded guilty on the first or the second occasion you appeared at the Crown court—now there are many examples of that happening on the fifth or the sixth occasion you are in the Crown court. Each one of those takes a considerable amount of time. That is what is sucking up part of the time.
There are lots of other challenges to the system, which if you have had what I do not say is the benefit or privilege of reading both parts 1 and 2 of my review, you will see that I try to elaborate on there. I am concerned that we need to change the dynamic so that people address allegations that are made against them at the first opportunity, rather than hoping that the victim will withdraw, the witnesses will forget or the case will just fade away. That is the point I am talking about with cultural change.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Sir Brian Leveson: No, I do not. I have spent my life trying to improve the efficiency of criminal courts, from the time that I was senior presiding judge in 2007. I have spent a lot of time trying to improve efficiency. It has deteriorated for all sorts of reasons, which I elaborate on in my review. It will be difficult to get that moving. It can be done. The money going into the system has been dramatically reduced over the years. The MOJ was not a protected Department, and has really suffered as a consequence. Do I believe that money and efficiency will do it? No, I do not, because that will not change the cultural dynamic.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Sir Brian Leveson: The reason why I started to think about that was that I have long been of the view that it would be valuable, as technology has improved, to record magistrates court proceedings—in other words, to have a record of what is said in the magistrates courts. Once one is doing that, there is no reason why one should not introduce the same sort of approach to appeals as the one used in the Crown court and the Court of Appeal criminal division.
I was particularly impressed—I use the word impressed, but I was concerned—by an argument that I heard that many minor sexual assaults that were dealt with in the magistrates courts or the youth courts, which could include rape, almost automatically went to appeal to the Crown court, on the basis that the victim would not turn up the second time and be prepared to go through the whole process again. That is a serious problem. To require victims to go through the experience of giving evidence and being cross-examined twice is unfair on them. Everybody needs to be able to move on with their lives, and that is victims and defendants as well.
Although I have talked about defendants gaming the system, I do not ignore defendants who are determined to pursue a not guilty plea because they do not feel they have done anything wrong, but whose lives are on hold for years until their trials happen. I had an example of a young man who was at university and charged with rape. His university career is long since gone, and he could not get a job because he had to tell potential employers, “I’m due to be tried for rape.” The system has to change. That is what I believe, but of course it is for you to decide whether it does.
Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)
Q
Sir Brian Leveson: That is easily answered: there are just too many of them. My view is that nobody should be a circuit judge unless they are capable of trying serious sexual crime—nobody. The empathy required to deal with victims is not just restricted to rape and serious sexual crimes. The make-up of cases going to the Crown court has changed over the last 10 years, so what might have been a good idea 10 or 15 years ago when there were fewer such cases does not cut it now. There are just too many cases, and that is why I did not recommend a specialist rape court.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Sir Brian Leveson: That is an interesting question. I have long since believed that there needed to be radical change. The fact is that the backlog went up in the 12 months since I was appointed in December 2024—sorry, this will be a longish answer. You would have thought that everybody would be working like mad to demonstrate that efficiency could bring the backlog down over the year following my appointment. Not only did the backlog not go down, but it went up higher than the highest projection that the Ministry had.
I have always been of the view that efficiency alone would not do it, and you were going to have to look at legislative change. If you were going to look at legislative change, it was important that you all had the chance to consider that as soon as possible, so I was perfectly content to deal with policy first and efficiency afterwards, on the basis that by the time you got around to dealing with it, you would have both reports anyway and you could look at everything together; I hope you have.
The Chair
I want to get three more people in, so pithy questions and pithy answers, please.
Sir Brian Leveson: I am sorry.
Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)
Q
On 17 March, we heard evidence on the Justice Committee from Tom Guest, the director of policy at the Crown Prosecution Service. He talked about the CPS being supportive of the structural reform that is proposed in the Bill. He said that we were “at a critical juncture” and that this is
“a generational opportunity for end-to-end reform. Our view is that we have gone far beyond the point where piecemeal or non-legislative solutions will suffice. They are definitely part of the solution, but they will not solve the problem. The status quo is failing victims, witnesses and defendants.”
Do you recognise that sentiment, and do you have any comments in relation to the view of the Crown Prosecution Service and its role to play in this structural reform?
Sir Brian Leveson: I do recognise the sentiment: it is exactly my own. I think the CPS has an enormous role to play. You will know from the report that I wrote that there are lots of areas in which improvement and co-ordination of activity is critical. IT changes have to made: there are 43 forces with 43 different IT systems, each of which the CPS have to negotiate with. Redaction is an enormous problem, as is file build. The relationship between the police and the CPS, and the inability of police defence lawyers to speak to CPS lawyers—all that needs to change, and that is why I suggested the adviser.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
Q
Sir Brian Leveson: There are lots of reasons.
Joe Robertson
But jury trials are not the principal reason.
Sir Brian Leveson: No, no, I do not and have never blamed jury trials at all. The reason is that the complexity has changed. Pace, disclosure of unused material, special measures, bad character, hearsay and data—cell site data, which is now critical to almost every single prosecution, and data taken from phones—have all added to the complexity and length of trials. I am not criticising juries at all, and I welcome jury trials, but the threshold must now be adjusted if we are to get justice for everybody in good time.
The Chair
That brings us to the end of the time allocated for the Committee to ask questions during this panel. Thank you very much for coming to give evidence, Sir Brian. We would have liked to have longer with you, but we have many witnesses to question. On behalf of the Committee, I thank you for coming and for giving evidence.
Sir Brian Leveson: You are very welcome, Sir John. If I can help in any other way, I will. I am happy to meet parliamentarians: I have offered to meet the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats, and I am happy to meet anybody to talk about this on a cross-party basis.
The Chair
There we go: that is a very generous offer. For hon. Members who signalled that they wanted to ask questions, my apologies, but from what Sir Brian just said, he will make himself available to meet you at will.
Sir Brian Leveson: I do not know about “at will”.
The Chair
Thank you very much, Sir Brian.
Examination of Witnesses
Claire Waxman, Professor Katrin Hohl and Dame Vera Baird gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from Claire Waxman, Professor Katrin Hohl and Dame Vera Baird. It is good to see you and to have you back here, Vera, albeit in a different guise.
I will follow the same procedure as I did in the previous panel, but I want to get more Committee members in, as I know that Members on both sides of the Committee missed out. I ask Dr Mullan and the Minister to try to keep the Front-Bench questions tighter, so that we can get more participation from all parts of the Committee.
Dr Mullan
Q
Claire Waxman: Of course. My role is very much focused on listening directly to victim survivors and families bereaved by homicide, so any changes in legislation and proposals are sense-checked with them. I have been listening to victims since 2020, when the pandemic hit, and have seen the direct impact of the long delays, with cases now going well into 2030. There is a human cost to that. We often say, “Justice delayed is justice denied,” but justice is not abstract for victims. When we delay justice, what it really means for victims is a lack of security and safety, and an inability to process what has happened, to get closure and to move on with their lives; all those are denied. We trap victims in prolonged years of uncertainty, which compounds and prolongs their trauma. I have spoken at length publicly about what that looks like for victims.
You will hear from victims shortly, and a letter signed by 18 victims who have actually been in the criminal justice system and sustained long waits for justice was sent last week. I have spoken to victims, and they want this to end: they want a way out, and they are desperate. They are saying that if having a judge-only trial in a case will mean that they will come out of the system more quickly, they want to see timely justice. Without that, we are seeing a reduction in access to justice, an increase in victim attrition—and not just post-charge, as we have seen an increase of more than 5% in the last five years—and a third of trials breaking down because victims have withdrawn as they cannot sustain staying in the system.
We are also seeing it impact the pre-charge phase. Last year, as London’s Victims’ Commissioner, I published the London victim attrition review, finding that on average 40% of victims withdraw from the system, and that delays are playing a part in that—not just delays in investigation, but the thought of having to wait years to get into court.
Dr Mullan
Q
Claire Waxman: Yes, I am absolutely aware of it.
Dr Mullan
Q
Claire Waxman: That letter was actually around victims who have been criminalised, so it is a different issue; they are dealing with victims who are defendants in the system, not victims who are complainants.
Dr Mullan
Q
Claire Waxman: In that letter, the focus is on the criminalisation of victims, which is awful. The overlap of criminalisation and victimisation needs to be dealt with way earlier on in the system.
The Chair
Kieran, can we just ask a question and get the answer?
Claire Waxman: You would need to ask Welsh Women’s Aid. They have signed up to a slightly different tone of a letter, which is around the criminalisation of victims coming into the system as defendants. It is very different to the victims I listen to—
Sarah Sackman
Q
Professor Hohl: The measures in the Bill that address sexual offences broadly fall into two groups. The first group clarifies and tightens admissibility rules around sexual history evidence and previous reports of sexual violence that may be portrayed as so-called “victim bad character”, tightening that threshold to better protect victims from unnecessary, intrusive and unfounded lines of questioning. We very much welcome those.
There is also a set around special measures, which effectively clarify how they should apply. Those are also very welcome, and my understanding is that they are largely uncontroversial; they seem to be welcomed across the board.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Claire Waxman: Thank you. First of all, victims are not a homogeneous group, and they do not always agree on everything, but the majority of victims, who are so desperate to get out of these long waits, are looking to you—to Government and to parliamentarians—to provide that reassurance that hope is on the horizon. As Sir Brian laid out this morning, and in all his analysis work, we need some structural reform in order to take the pressure off the overburdened court system. That is what we need to be looking at to alleviate what victims have to experience.
That sector letter is talking about a really serious failing of our criminal justice system, but it is about the criminalisation of victims. They should not even be coming into court. We need to be dealing with that way earlier in the process. We need to be looking at diversion, better identification of victims and pushing them into trauma-informed responses and support.
I do not want to see victims coming into the system as defendants, but we cannot ignore the many victims I speak to—and there are victims who will speak to you directly today—who are in as complainants rather than as defendants. They are waiting years to give evidence. We know that when they wait years, there is a chance that they will withdraw; if they do not, the wait impacts the quality of their evidence. The impact of delays on memory will understandably affect their evidence. Inconsistencies naturally arise and that becomes very challenging for victims giving evidence years after the offence.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
“also stress important safeguards: tackling the lack of diversity on the bench, and ensuring judges are robustly trained in the dynamics of abuse and trauma.”
You know that over many years many different parliamentarians have tried to legislate to ensure that everyone in the judiciary has mandatory training on those important safeguards. You also know that we are always told that, because the judiciary is independent, we cannot legislate to mandate that training. What would you like to see in the Bill to ensure the important safeguards that victims have reflected to you?
Claire Waxman: I have made that point for years, regardless of these reforms. We have to improve and get reassurance around judicial training, including training on cultural competency, on understanding bias and prejudice and on the dynamics of abuse. We still see issues around coercive control, post-separation abuse and stalking. I need to be reassured that judges are being trained to the level that will give assurances to victims and to myself that they understand what is coming in front of them. We need reassurance from Government on that. I would suggest more investment in judicial training. We saw, over years—Vera will remember more than me when it happened—that the training on rape went down from three days to two days for judges. That was meant to be a temporary measure; I do not think it has gone back up. We need to make sure that we have good, robust training for judiciary and magistrates.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Claire Waxman: People in the criminal justice system need to move ahead with the efficiency measures. We need to move ahead with that so that we can start to see some of the adjournments not happening, better listing and so on. Of course, it is a desperate state. Just yesterday I spoke to a male victim of child sex abuse. He has been in the system since 2021 and in the court system for two years. He thought that he was giving evidence in the coming weeks. That has been adjourned and he has been asked his availability for 2027, 2028 and 2029. He is going to withdraw. I think Sir Brian said it—looking at structural reform came first because we know that the efficiency measures are not going to bring the backlog down quickly enough. We need to do everything together as a package of measures and we need to move ahead.
Matt Bishop (Forest of Dean) (Lab)
Good morning, all. I welcome your work and the support that you offer victims—all of you, in what you have been doing. I am sure there is cross-party support for that in the room this morning. Do you think the changes in the Bill will improve the confidence of victims that, when they report crimes, they will receive justice more swiftly than they currently do and, more importantly, that the changes will also encourage more brave victims to come forward and report crimes?
Claire Waxman: There are a lot of good measures in the Bill that, if delivered and implemented well and with important safeguards, should have positive impacts for victims. We are removing appropriate cases from the Crown court, easing the burden there, and limiting the right to elect for a Crown court trial. By the way, victims view that right as an injustice. They feel that power and control is being given to the defendant, knowing full well that there is a chance they will come out of the process or that their evidence will be impacted over the years. That is something that victims regularly talk to me about. The measures around the automatic right to appeal and to make the magistrates a court of record will open up transparency in the courts and hopefully stop victims having to be called back in for a rehearing. That has devastating impacts; you cannot overestimate what it does to a victim when they think that they have gone through the process of giving evidence, and then they have to come in again.
If all those things ease the pressure and burden on the Crown court, that will give reassurance and confidence to victims who are thinking about whether to stay in the process currently. The measures Katrin talked about—putting in important safeguards around the cross-examination of rape victims—are so important. Vera and I have worked on this since 2019, because of section 41, past sexual history, and issues around cross-examination and compensation claims. That is a financial motive used to undermine the credibility of victims. Victims come out of the system and often say, “I will never report again,” but they tell their friends and families about their experiences, and that deters people and erodes public trust and confidence.
Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
Q
Claire Waxman: That is impossible to answer. We need to see it happen. You need to come back to me and say if it is not going to reduce—
Rebecca Paul
Q
Claire Waxman: It is the case. The Crown court is overburdened. You have heard Sir Brian Leveson’s analysis; it cannot continue in the state it is in. If we do not take appropriate cases out of the Crown court, then what is the answer?
Rebecca Paul
Q
Claire Waxman: But I cannot imagine it. If you are taking cases out of the Crown court that cannot deal with the pressure, that will save time.
Rebecca Paul
That is what we will be analysing over the next few weeks—whether it will or not.
The Chair
We will limit ourselves to one question each at this stage so that everyone can get in. If there is more time, I will call people again.
Paulette Hamilton (Birmingham Erdington) (Lab)
Q
Dame Vera Baird: It is absolutely imperative. There is no way of stopping the problems that my colleague Claire has so well expressed without stopping smaller cases going into the jury list. The state has not said that they need to be tried by jury. As you know, the state says all summary offences go to the magistrates court, as do all indictable offences where it is imperative to have a jury trial—they are very important; the public needs transparency. That is what has been fixed.
It is the cases in the middle, which are at a relatively lower level of crime, where there is a right that the guy charged with rape or murder does not have to pick where he is tried. There is a right to do that for relatively small cases, which is exercised sometimes —you have heard from Sir Brian—in a very self-interested way, which doesn’t surprise you, does it, really? If you can put the case off for three years, the witnesses might never come.
All of that is a problem, and it should be dealt with by bringing in a perfectly fair method of trial: a skilled judge, with or without two magistrates. Make no mistake about judges, there is a need to keep them well trained, of course there is. However, judges now do a lot of fact-finding, not only in criminal cases. Look at the case of Charlotte Nichols, who waited 1,088 days to get to court. She told the most convincing story—what a woman; she is brilliant—to the House of Commons about what happened to her. After 1,088 days, the man was acquitted of raping her. She then had the resource to sue, and she sued in the civil court. A judge believed her and awarded compensation, which she felt was redeeming. There are many cases now where jury trials fail complainants and, if they have the resource, they go to the civil courts, and the judges there are more amenable.
We must not muddle jury trial and fair trial. In many cases—in Australia, all over New Zealand and in most of Canada—there is a right for a jury trial-allocated defendant to opt out. More opt out of jury trials than remain in. Do you know why that is? It is because the acquittal rate is higher in judge-alone trials universally. A judge reasoning a case cannot just say, “Well, I don’t really believe that Baird woman—I didn’t like the look of her. I’m not going to follow what she says,” as juries can. You have to sit down and reason out why it is so. Are you being rational or not? That will be a great asset to fair trial in the middle tier where Sir Brian is going to allocate the most serious of cases, which, frankly, the state has never said need to go to jury. It is about having a punt on a jury trial.
Joe Robertson
Q
Dame Vera Baird: Is it your only point? The answer would be that judges are not as diverse as juries.
Joe Robertson
Q
Dame Vera Baird: Not in the slightest. I assume you know that 73% of people who are entitled to a jury trial do not elect it and choose to stay in the magistrates court. That is men, women and black people. Black people and women disproportionately elect trial because they clearly feel that they will get a fairer trial with a diverse jury, but who says that is right? On the day, if you were a sex offender with some nasty allegations, for instance, you would have a better chance of acquittal in front of a judge than you ever would in front of a jury. It is just an opportunity to try to pick the best trial for yourself, but it is a punt in the dark. It is a go on the wheel of fortune. Sometimes it will work and sometimes it will not.
Joe Robertson
Q
Dame Vera Baird: Seventy-three per cent of people offered jury trials do not take the offer up. Are you sure that the term “elect” is correct? Is it not “demand”?
Amanda Hack (North West Leicestershire) (Lab)
Q
Dame Vera Baird: Is that not part of why this is very odd? We do not give a person alleged to have committed a very serious crime and whose life will be utterly transformed by what happens in the jury a right not to have a jury trial or to pick where he goes at all—and why would we?—but we do give that right to a small cohort of people on relatively small trials. Some of the trials are big, but the bigger ones will go into the judge court, not stay in the magistrates court. Why, when we have legislated for where these cases should be tried, do we allow that relatively small cohort to pick, in addition to the legislation the state has set out? The difference is between a magistrates court case coming in six months and a Crown court case coming in three or four years. That is the impact on the victim. For what?
As I have already said, the majority—73%—of people offered a jury trial do not take it up. There is no understanding anywhere—not at the Bar, I can tell you—that it is fairer than a judge-alone or magistrates trial would be. Everybody at the Bar has had cases where they were absolutely shocked when a conviction happened because they never thought it possible and cases where they have got people off when they never thought it possible—of course, they are very chipper about that. Ask them when they come later. There is absolutely no hallmark anywhere that says jury trial is the only fair way.
Judges find facts in all kinds of cases outside the criminal courts. Of course, they also do so in trials; they have to decide, “Is there enough factual evidence here even for a case that a jury can answer?” They are a pretty good substitute for a jury—if that is how you want to look at it—to deliver fair trial.
Dr Mullan
Q
“The Government’s proposed reforms will likely create significant operational disruption and practical challenges that pull resources from more effective measures to reduce the backlog. This would prolong the uncertainty that leads many survivors to withdraw support for the prosecution of their abuser.”
Do you accept that the letter does, in fact, also talk about the impact on victims of the jury trial changes?
Claire Waxman: If you read the letter, it focuses on the victim coming in as a defendant, but it is also—
Dr Mullan
Q
Claire Waxman: You have to read the whole context of the letter—you have pulled out one bit. The whole context of that letter really focuses on listening to women who are wrongly being criminalised, as opposed to victims.
Dr Mullan
Q
Dame Vera Baird: Yes, but she is on her own—
Dr Mullan
Oh dear!
Dame Vera Baird: Kieran, you are not listening to what Claire says—she is right. The women’s movement is very disappointed with the Bill because it does not tackle the issue of criminalisation of women. They think that dealing with delays in the list is a very poor substitute, and they will not have it. They want to stand up at last for a proper defence of coercively controlled women who are put into crime—goodness knows it has been long enough coming—but that does not appear in the Bill. The women’s movement is very upset about that, and in my view that has driven this. I do not doubt—
The Chair
Order.
Dame Vera Baird: No, it is not at all disrespectful. Natalie Fleet, who has also been abused, takes the opposite view. She does not want to be weaponised, Kieran, and that is a very sound point. None the less, her example is appalling, and nobody could doubt her. The man was acquitted, but a judge believed her, so what is your argument now? Judges are not fair.
Alex McIntyre (Gloucester) (Lab)
Q
To bring it back to victims—you referred to this, Claire—the Bill makes changes to the bad character evidence. Can you go into a bit more detail on what that is like from a victim’s perspective to have to go through a line of questioning about bad character evidence? Why is it so important that we are changing it?
Claire Waxman: These are important safeguards that need come in to better protect victims during the cross-examination process. I have to say that most victims I speak to who have gone through the cross-examination process—and this is not just rape victims—describe it as “brutal”. That is their word, not mine. They feel that it is often an experience to try to undermine their credibility at every point.
We have seen the use of past sexual behaviour or past sexual allegations to somehow undermine credibility. We have also seen it with compensation: as I said, it is a right under the victims code to be told about compensation, yet victims trying to access compensation is being weaponised and used as a way to undermine credibility. Many victims feel like they are the ones on trial, and they are being scrutinised. Putting in these important safeguards will help to improve that experience, so that they do not feel like they are under attack.
As I say, you are going to hear from victims shortly, one of whom has gone through that very experience, and I urge you all to listen to them. That is really important, because they are the ones with lived experience—they are living and breathing this delayed criminal justice system. Delays are not the only issue for victims; it is also about the treatment that they experience throughout the criminal justice system. Both need to be dealt with to really reduce victim attrition and improve victim satisfaction.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
Q
Dame Vera Baird: No, it is not. It has been, I am afraid, ramped up outside these rooms, with all these Churchillian speeches suggesting that jury trial is being taken away, full stop. That is completely untrue, as you rightly say.
Siân Berry
Q
Professor Hohl: One thing to remember here is that over 90% of domestic abuse cases are already heard in the magistrates court. VAWG comprises not just sexual violence; it includes domestic abuse, sexual violence and sexual offences. There are some that will be in the either-way category.
We have had a really emotive conversation this morning. One of the issues is judge-alone versus jury trials, and there is a lot of emotion on either side. When we look back at the actual research, there is mention that judges may have biases, and a judge-alone trial may disadvantage people. If that is the genuine concern, why are we happy to accept that for sentencing and admissibility? Why is it that in all the law we are making to guide admissibility of evidence, we trust a judge to separate between myth and stereotypes and facts, but not a jury? If we are genuine about it, we have to go a lot further around oversight and accountability in the judiciary. It would be odd to just worry about it on that specific issue.
I would also like the Committee to consider the evidence around juries. This is not to cast shade on juries but to pause and look at the research, which shows that juries, too, have biases, and there are worries about myths and misconceptions. The research on juries shows that these problems exist there, too. These issues exist with judges and juries. The remedy is not going to be either holding on to the status quo or not. The remedy will be something utterly outside of the discussion we are having that is about accountability and oversight.
Some of the measures in the Bill go that way—for example, recording creates transparency, and judges having to spell out the reasons for their verdict also goes towards that. The debate has moved a really long way away from what the research actually tells us, to quite an emotive batting to and fro. If there is space for the Committee to consider that wider evidence, I would recommend it is looked at.
John Slinger (Rugby) (Lab)
Q
Professor Hohl: This is an unanswerable question. What is fairness? [Interruption.] Well, it is an answerable question, but not a black and white one. We have heard this morning about a separation between the speediness of justice and the fairness of justice, as if they were two different things, when all the research shows that, for both defendants and victims, the time taken is part of justice. To artificially separate them does not work.
The way we measure the fairness of the system is about due process, not about outcomes. We cannot measure fairness through conviction and acquittal rates. The way our system is set up is about due process. Due process is not taking place when the system is on its knees, so getting the system to function better, so that due process can take place, should lead to a fairer system—provided that the Bill functions as intended.
Joe Robertson
Q
Dame Vera Baird: Of course not, and I did not intend to say that. I have been trying to think, since we discussed it, about how I would feel if my experience were being used for a political cause, and it had been a very nasty experience. I might feel the same sort of—I do not know whether it is resentment or disappointment, or whether it is that it was inappropriate. I can well understand that, but many other victims do not agree that this will not help.
Women are waking up every morning, for three or four years, dreading the day when they will have to relive what happened to them in rape cases, or a man who has been very badly beaten up might wake every morning, worrying that he will have to relive it. It goes on and on like that, because there is a right to demand—as, I am afraid, I would phrase it—a trial for relatively small offences. I do not make little of them, but those will be in the queue. If Charlotte’s case is coming up next Monday, all the cases that have elected for trial before hers will be in the queue in front of it.
Dr Mullan
indicated dissent.
Dame Vera Baird: I see Kieran shaking his head, but there is no other way. There is a limited opportunity to give priority to cases. Obviously a very important point is whether the defendant is in custody. Most rape defendants are not in custody, because it is a “one word against the other” case, so they cannot be given any real priority for that reason. We end up very regularly with cases that took as long as Charlotte’s. That is really awful for a large number of victims. It also gives very little to the people who want this right: 64% of people who elect for trial plead guilty before they get to trial. You have to ask why they are electing for trial if they are going to plead guilty, but they have blocked up the jury list all of that time. This is about freeing up the jury list.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
The Chair
Can you respond briefly, please? I want to get Paulette in.
Claire Waxman: I can answer very quickly. It is a very good question, but unfortunately I think we have moved past the point at which we can pilot, because of where we are heading with the trajectory of the Crown court—the increase in the wait lists and how long victims are waiting. Modelling is very difficult, but we should not get stuck on percentages. The Government are saying around 20%, and the Institute for Government has now corrected its figures from 2% up to, I think, 9% or higher—to 15%. It is around the direction of travel and recognising that we have an overburdened Crown court. We need to move things out of the process.
Paulette Hamilton
Q
The Chair
We need two clear reasons in less than a minute, so fire away.
Professor Hohl: One is that the world is changed and the justice system has not updated when the size, nature and volume of cases has changed. Getting the system to cope with today’s demands would be one reason. The other reason is not addressed by the Bill and keeps being surfaced by the discussion: oversight, accountability, transparency and assurance to the public. We are in a space where the public do not trust authority that much any more, so we need more transparency. Things such as recording and reasoned verdicts would help with that. Those would be the reasons for reform—if you allow me to speak only on reasons for, not those against.
The Chair
Wonderful. That was remarkably brief and most welcome. Thank you so much for your participation. We have greatly benefited from your presence, so thank you for answering all our questions. We are very pleased to let you go and move on.
Dame Vera Baird: Thank you for the opportunity.
Examination of Witnesses
Farah Nazeer, Jade Blue McCrossen-Nethercott, Charlotte Meijer and Morwenna Loughman gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from Women’s Aid, Jade Blue McCrossen-Nethercott, Charlotte Meijer and Morwenna Loughman. Once again, we must stick to the timings of the programme order. The Committee has agreed that this session will end at 11.25 am. I will ask the witnesses to introduce themselves briefly; I did not do so with the last panel for reasons of speed.
Farah Nazeer: Good morning. I am Farah Nazeer, chief executive officer of Women’s Aid.
Jade Blue McCrossen-Nethercott: Morning, I am Jade Blue. I am a victim of rape.
Charlotte Meijer: Hello, I am Charlotte. I am a victim of rape and coercive control, and I was seen in a magistrates court.
Morwenna Loughman: I am Morwenna Loughman. I am a victim of rape and actual bodily harm, and I was seen in a Crown court with a jury.
The Chair
Impressively brief. If we can have those kind of pithy answers—and pithy questions, by the way—we can get through our questions and cover as much ground as possible.
Dr Mullan
Q
Farah Nazeer: I am conscious that there are victim-survivors here as well, so I will be brief. In the Bill, we are pleased to see the repeal of the presumption of parental involvement. That is absolutely critical. We know that the vast majority of survivors of domestic abuse do not go into the criminal justice system. Only one in five women will ever report to the police, so they find themselves in the family courts. The repeal will make a huge difference to them.
We now need to see the culture around that change. We have had a pro-contact culture in the family courts for a very long time. We can see through our experience working with vast numbers of survivors every day that the vast majority of judges are not as aware as they should be of domestic abuse and coercive control—they are not trauma-informed. We need to see judges trained to be able to apply this effectively.
We also see that, across all those other safeguarding contexts for children, such as health and safety, police and schools, there is mandatory training required, and a framework and infrastructure. Strangely, there is not the same infrastructure here, where you are actually talking about children’s lives and wellbeing. I previously heard a comment about how we cannot mandate judges to have training, but perhaps you should be mandating, because you do so in every other safeguarding context.
For further context, the majority of people affected by domestic abuse are children; we have more children in our refuges across the country than we do adults. It is a huge safeguarding matter, and I would encourage the Committee to think about mandatory training for judges.
Dr Mullan
Q
Jade Blue McCrossen-Nethercott: I come from an angle of delay being a key factor. While my case was dropped 13 days before trial, from report to court it would have been 1,317 days, which is now becoming quite the norm. I regularly hear fellow victims advising on very similar situations, and how they feel about that and how it changes their perspective on wanting to navigate the justice process. If people are telling us that they would not necessarily come back into the system, for me, that is the clearest possible signal that change is not optional but very much overdue.
We published a letter last week in response to the Bar Council’s letter, just to try to centre lived experience in this conversation and debate, which felt like it had been predominantly missing. In statements of support, a couple of victims have described the process of waiting for court and the delays as “extreme harm”—that was from Victoria. Sarah advised that she felt “suffering, gaslighting and anxiety”.
Charlotte said that report to court was “total agony” and that we need to reduce the suffering. Jane advised that it felt like years on “eggshells, in limbo”. She said:
“Waiting years with no guarantee of getting justice is like torture.”
Charlotte—another Charlotte—advised of the delays that:
“They shape our lives, our ability to move forward, and our trust in justice itself.”
Those are important and strong statements from women describing that process. That is the angle that I come from.
Charlotte Meijer: We have also handed the letter over to one of your colleagues, so that the Committee can read it. I was seen in a magistrates court, so having the recording of magistrates courts that is in the Bill is incredibly important. That transparency, which I did not have, will really change victims’ lives, whether that is just to understand what happened in their trial or to hold people to account.
I did not have a good experience with my judge, but I am still pro my case being seen by a judge. I am so glad that my perpetrator chose that—although there is an issue with that in itself, as they should not be able to choose, and I am glad to see that being taken away. I am so glad I was seen in front of a judge, because to me a judge is educated in all aspects—or should be, as there is a definite need of training, as has been said—while 12 strangers off the street all have their own biases. We know that one in four men are generally perpetrators, so that could be three on the panel that is judging you and your case.
For me, having transparency really changes things. We talk about justice and the system being closed, so if we have more recording and transcripts, it will really help people. There is something that is not in the Bill that I would love to see; I have fought for the last three years for sentencing remarks to be made free, which we did earlier this year, but I believe that is not going to extend to magistrates courts. If they are now being recorded, my belief is that they should also be free in that way.
One thing that I think is also really important in this discussion, where there is so much pushback against more cases going to magistrates courts, is that coercive control essentially involves rape—it involves coercive sex—and yet it is seen in a magistrates court. When we talk about how only the worst crimes are being seen by juries, and they need to be seen by juries, what does that mean about all the other crimes, including domestic abuse and coercive control, that are being seen in magistrates courts? Are we saying that they are not getting fair trials as it is? We believe that they are, so why is there such pushback at the moment about more cases going to magistrates courts? Magistrates are laypeople as well, so there is still that accountability from the general public.
Dr Mullan
Q
Morwenna Loughman: Thank you for having us all here. I waited two and a half years for my rape trial to go ahead. It was delayed twice—each time, the day before we were due in court. The second time it was delayed, it was actually confirmed, and then five hours later, on email, we were told that it was not going ahead. He had lied his way out on bail and breached his bail conditions 23 times. During those two and a half years, I lost my job, I lost my home and I developed acute PTSD, a side effect of which was a repeated vomiting syndrome, which meant that I had to go to hospital to have my oesophagus repaired.
I am also here to speak about juries not being bastions of infallibility. The treatment of the jury that I experienced was one of attrition. In particular, the foreman came out at one point and asked the judge, “If she’d been raped so many times, why did she not leave earlier?”
I would also like to talk about the treatment of victims while they are on the stand. During cross-examination, I experienced pervasive and repeated use of rape myths and stereotypes in a way to deliberately mislead the jury against me.
Dr Mullan
I am really sorry for the experiences that you have had, and certainly for any role that we played in government in not better addressing these delays and the challenges that you faced. The consequences of that are really powerfully illustrated by the things that you have talked about, so thank you for sharing that. I really hear all the evidence that you have given.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Charlotte, I wanted to pick up on something that you said. You talked about transparency and about the benefit that the recording of proceedings in the magistrates court would have. We are committed, as part of these reforms, to recording all proceedings in the magistrates court. Can you describe and explain what difference you think that might have made in cases like yours?
Charlotte Meijer: Definitely. After I gave my evidence in my trial, I left. The gallery was not somewhere I could sit safely. It was a tiny bench. His best mate and his sister were sat there, so I could not really go and sit between them.
I had said to the CPS and the police that I might want to come and hear the verdict. I was not given that opportunity, unfortunately. I got a call from my independent sexual violence adviser to say that the verdict had been made and that he was found not guilty. From that day, I really wanted to understand what had happened. For me, it was a very clearcut case of coercive control. I cannot go into too much detail, because he was found not guilty, but there was a huge age difference and there was a power imbalance and so forth, so I never understood how he was found not guilty.
The judge also made some comments. She said that, because I waited eight months to report, I was unreliable, and that I had clearly spoken to other victims of domestic abuse, so I knew what to say. Those comments really stuck by me. For my healing, and for me to be able to move on, I just needed to understand what was said in court, so I went to ask for the transcripts, of which of course in the magistrates courts there are none. It is definitely twofold: I wanted to understand what happened for my healing, but I also still want to hold that judge to account, because the things she said are not true and should not be said by someone who should be in a position of power and education.
I also think there is an important argument to be made around transparency, because people do not feel that the system is transparent—and to be fair, if it is not recorded, it is not. If you cannot sit in the gallery, if no one can watch and if there are no transcripts, then it is not. It is important to have the ability to record everything so that people can listen back, whether that is for their healing or for their understanding, or to hold people to account. We need to be able to hold people who are in power to account.
Sarah Sackman
Q
As you have heard from previous witnesses, the primary thrust behind the Government’s measures in the Bill is to address the unacceptable delays that you have all described. However, we also have a responsibility to build back a better system. One choice that the Government made was to remove the right to elect, so that it is the court that allocates cases to the appropriate venue. We think that that makes things quicker and more efficient, but there is also a normative idea behind it that it is the court that should triage cases; you mentioned that in your remarks, Charlotte. What is your view on that reform? From a victim’s perspective, do you see sense in it, or not?
Charlotte Meijer: Definitely. Throughout the system, the victim is always on the back foot. You get told a day later—or, depending on the service that you receive, two days, three days, four days or a month later—what has gone on, but the perpetrator always knows exactly what goes on, because they have to be present and able to make decisions. Why is the perpetrator the one who can make these decisions? It makes it feel like they are in control, and that, as a victim, you are running behind to catch up.
That was exactly the case for me when I found out that he had selected a court. All of a sudden, I got a call to say, “Your perpetrator has picked a magistrates court, so that is now what will happen.” I had no choice in it. I had already had no choice for three years when he was controlling me; I had no choice for three years when he was raping me; and now I had no choice for two and a half or three years when I was in the system.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Farah Nazeer: Thank you for the question. There are a few things around presumption that could make a big difference. One is training for the entirety of the court staff, because the stories that we hear and the experiences that we support women and children through are frankly appalling. The staff are not trauma-informed and there is no understanding of what a victim is going through. The courts are weaponised and survivors are brought back to the courts repeatedly. It is an appalling process. No policy area that you work on at Women’s Aid is a picnic, but this is the worst. People describe the trauma that they go through in the family courts as worse than the trauma that they endured through the abuse that they experienced.
One thing is for the court system to understand domestic abuse, understand sexual violence, understand coercive control and be trauma-informed. That means having processes in which a survivor knows what is happening, understands what the next steps are and is supported through the system, and having separate places where a survivor can be. Some of it is quite basic, but it is really important to improving the survivor experience.
Another thing is the regulation of experts. We often have unregulated experts coming into the family courts to provide expertise and advice to the judge on what is happening in a relationship. You would not have unregulated experts in any safeguarding context; it is absolutely wild that you would have that. One thing we really want to see is regulated experts: psychiatrists and psychologists who are regulated by the appropriate body, rather than, seemingly, people who are just not.
The last thing that I want to focus on is the concept of parental alienation, which is often invoked in family courts. It is a concept that is not evidenced and is not recognised in psychiatric or medical practice, but it is often invoked as a concept to defend against claims of domestic abuse. What needs to happen is a child’s safety being put at the heart of the decision by a regulated expert, by a trained judge. If you get that right, you immediately improve the experience for survivors and children, and you improve the safeguarding around survivors and children. Those three things are absolutely critical to changing the culture and the experience and to ensuring safety.
Tristan Osborne (Chatham and Aylesford) (Lab)
Q
Morwenna Loughman: Absolutely. One thing that kept me going—I was so close to pulling out multiple times—was that I had this sense that he had done it before. In fact, what I was later told—it was not admissible, but under the Bill it would become admissible—was that he had broken his ex-partner’s leg repeatedly and raped her as well. His defence barrister stood in front of the judge, the jury and me, and said, “This man has never hurt a woman.” Given that this man was out on bail and repeatedly breaching his bail conditions, brutal is the word. I cannot overstate the impact that that has on victims. It was devastating. I did not look people in the eye for two years. I wore a hat everywhere I went so I could hide my face, because he could have been anywhere. I had to move out of my home. My home became a crime scene. I lost my job. It was daily torture. I echo what Natalie Fleet said the other week in the House of Commons: that the one thing worse than being raped is waiting four years or more to hear if people actually believe you.
Rebecca Paul
Q
We have focused a lot on jury trials, but there is a real opportunity here to think about what we need to deliver improvements in our judicial system, because the thing we all agree on here is that it is not working as it should. We might disagree on the best way to address that, but we do agree on the fact that change is needed in some form. What would you like to see in this Bill that is not there? What is needed to address some of the issues? Any of you who want to answer, please feel free to take the question.
Jade Blue McCrossen-Nethercott: It is a very big question. It is tricky, because I do not think that we can really ask for perfection; we are very much asking for a system that is bearable and has a bit of credibility about it. That just has to be centred, with lived experience at the forefront. So often, many victims, myself included, have said that it feels like it has gone so far to the defence side that it is no longer a justice balance. It has flipped so much on that side that I really want to urge you to consider that aspect: that it feels like the balance has gone in favour of the defence, essentially. In any decisions that you make about the Bill, just consider rebalancing that and ensuring that victims’ voices are centred in the decision-making process. If increasing magistrates to the three-year limit reduces the delays by even a small percentage, that can only be a positive thing. All those smaller elements will eventually snowball into more meaningful change across the entire sector. I could ramble on, so I will let someone else have a go.
Charlotte Meijer: I guess the other thing to add, which has been discussed a few times already, is the training of judges and magistrates. We have to find a way to do that—you would not let an untrained teacher into a school—because they are making decisions that mean life or death. After my not guilty verdict, I tried to kill myself, because nobody believed me, clearly. There is a huge impact. Things do need to change.
As I mentioned, I was a victim of rape. The rape did not go to court, because of many mistakes. The police offered to reinvestigate and I declined, because I knew what I would be going into and I did not want to go into that again, as it stands. A lot of that is about not just the courts, but the process leading up to it: the police and the CPS, and making sure that the police, the CPS and the courts are working together, which at the moment they are not. I am going through a three-year complaints process with the police, and they just blame each other. There needs to be accountability from start to end, because, while the Government have many different institutions that you deal with as a victim, you do not always understand it. You should not have to. I should not have to know that the CPS needs to do this and the police need to do that. It should be me coming in and other people understanding that journey for me and holding them to account.
There are no consequences if the victims’ rights we have at the moment are not adhered to. I was failed on at least seven points of the victims’ rights, but there is nothing that anyone can do. It has gone up to the ombudsman, and they said, “Yes, they failed”—great.
Matt Bishop
Q
Morwenna Loughman: I did not actually know that it was the defendant’s right to elect where their trial was heard, and that was a real shock to me. I echo what these extraordinary women on my right have said: it feels like a system that has been weighted against you, and there is no doubt that defendants are gaming the system. As it stands, I would absolutely not recommend this system to someone who finds themselves in my position.
I also agree with what Sir Brian Leveson said. A cultural reform needs to take place, because we are way past the mark of funding being enough. It needs a systemic, systematic, fundamental paradigm shift in how the system is run.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
There is an amendment that is going to the House of Commons today that is specifically about bail decisions and the route to verdict that juries are presented with before they go away to deliberate. Do you agree that sentencing remarks are only part of the journey that we need to be on, and that we need to be quite ambitious in ensuring victims have all the evidence in their own case, so they can start to move on and process?
Charlotte Meijer: Yes, absolutely. My campaign for all transcripts to be made available very quickly was shut down, so I have gone for little bits at a time. Sentencing remarks are an amazing change. At first, that was just for rape victims; now it is for all victims, which is great. However, if we look at RASSO cases, only 2% get a guilty verdict, so only 2% will get the free sentencing remarks. There needs to be something for the 98%.
The next thing that I have been campaigning for is the judge’s summing up, now the route to verdict, which is incredibly important. I am a not guilty verdict case, so I would not get my sentencing remarks either. It is about being able to understand. If we take that further, I believe the whole case should be available free, as it is in many other countries, or for a couple of pounds in administration costs. If we are taking it a bit at a time, the next bit would be, as you say, bail conditions and the route to verdict, to understand how someone got to that decision. That is all to aid people to understand what happened and process it a little better.
Amanda Hack
Q
Jade Blue McCrossen-Nethercott: I guess there is the hope of fewer adjournments and fewer last-minute changes, which we hear about quite a lot. Any measure that could increase capacity for these kinds of cases is a measure we could get behind. Just having that—being able to plan your life and have reassurances that it will be going ahead—is important.
In the past, one of us mentioned floating trials for rape cases, which is, quite frankly, just absurd. Being able to have dedicated time to ensure that these cases do not become floating trials and that there is capacity for them to be seen in a prompt and timely manner would be welcome.
Morwenna Loughman: The first time my trial was listed, unbeknown to me and the rest of my family, it was listed as a floating trial, which means that two or more cases—in this instance, rape cases—are scheduled for the same time, on the same date and in the same court, on the assumption that at least two of you will drop over the course because it is so harrowing and re-traumatising. That is why mine got delayed right at the last minute.
We have talked a lot about the education of judges, which is absolutely essential, but we must also consider the education of juries. As I have said, they are not bastions of infallibility. The man who raped me was convicted. He was found guilty, but not unanimously. He was sentenced to 15 years, which gives an indication as to the level of injury that I sustained.
Two members of the jury found him not guilty and acquitted him of all charges. It was a majority vote; there was no unanimity, and it took them three and a half days to deliberate, even though I had received 48 injuries and he was arrested on the scene. I could go on about the extenuating circumstances. In every sense, how did it take them three and a half days to not even conclusively decide that this man had raped me?
Charlotte Meijer: I will add to that. The removal in the Bill of the defendant’s right to elect will make the victim feel empowered, knowing that the perpetrator is not in control. As I have said, there is the recording of magistrates courts, and the Bill is our hope that the waiting time will go down. That is the core reason why we are doing this. The system cannot get any worse than it is, so the waiting going down will be a significant change.
Joe Robertson
Q
I turn specifically to the removal of the presumption that a child should have involvement from both parents. What do you say to the overwhelming body of evidence that for most children—not all, but most—it is in their best interests to have some contact with both parents?
Farah Nazeer: The point is about abusive relationships. If the court is set up to look at the welfare of the child primarily, if there is not a history of abuse or domestic abuse in that setting, that will invariably be the outcome. This is to protect those cases where there is abuse within the context of the relationship, so it is not a case of one thing or another thing; it clears the path so a court can look objectively at whether or not there is a safeguarding issue there for the child without the burden of the presumption of contact. You start with the welfare of the child.
Joe Robertson
Q
“the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount consideration.”
That is already there. Section 1(3)(e) says that the court must have regard to harm that a child
“has suffered or is at risk of suffering”.
Those two provisions will instantly knock out any presumption that it is in the child’s best interest to have some involvement—that does not even mean contact—of both parents. I am just trying to understand why you think this change is needed, given that those provisions are already in the law.
Farah Nazeer: Primarily because those provisions have not saved the lives of the 63 children who have died since Women’s Aid has been working on this. In spite of known abuse, the court has granted unsafe contact, primarily to abusive fathers, and those children have died as a result.
Last year we published a report called “Nineteen More Child Homicides”. Those child homicides were as a result of known perpetrators having unsafe child contact in spite of the court hearing about abuse by those fathers, predominantly—18 were fathers, one was a mother—who then murdered their children. The previous report some four years before also saw 19 children murdered in exactly the same set of circumstances. The report before that saw significantly more children murdered. What this does is set a very clear bar that you start with the welfare of the child. This is a response to the failure of that culture. That is why it is so important.
Joe Robertson
Q
Farah Nazeer: Absolutely. The presumption is a really important first step because without the presumption, we will automatically default to the status quo. That is where the training and an understanding of domestic abuse and coercive control come in. As you can hear, we are not in a situation where safeguarding is applied consistently or domestic abuse or sexual violence are understood consistently. That is where the mandatory training piece has to come in to accompany the change to the law.
Linsey Farnsworth
Q
As a former Crown prosecutor, one aspect of the criminal justice system that concerned me was the appeals process from the magistrates court to the Crown court. As you all know, if somebody is convicted in the magistrates court, they have an automatic right to a retrial at the Crown court without having to give any reasons, regardless of whether there was a fair trial in the magistrates court or otherwise. If the victims and witnesses want to continue the process, they have to give evidence all over again through that appeal, otherwise the appeal is successful.
The Bill seeks to get rid of that automatic right and put the process more in line with the Crown court appeals process. There will have to be grounds to suggest that the original trial was unfair. As victims and survivors who have had access to the criminal justice system, what is your view on the current system of retrials and appeals from the magistrates court in terms of fairness to victims and the likelihood of victims attending to give evidence and being re-traumatised? I am also interested in whether the automatic right to appeal and have a retrial is used as coercive control in the current justice system. There is a lot to unpack there, I grant you.
Charlotte Meijer: There are a lot of questions there. From my experience, we will never know whether my perpetrator picked a magistrates court because he knew that, if he was found guilty, he could have then dragged me on to a Crown court case—we do not know.
It is absolutely terrifying because, as we all know, going through a trial for the first time is horrific—it is something that I never want to do in my life again. I had the ability to go to court again for rape, and I declined it; if there had been an appeal and I had to go again to a Crown court, I probably would have dropped out. It is not something that I would want to experience twice.
There is also a really interesting thing there. What does that say about our magistrates courts? Are we basically saying that they cannot do what they should be doing? I think that changing the system strengthens the trials and credibility of magistrates courts—they should be credible, given that 90% of cases go there. It also shows that it is the final choice; the decision will be made there, unless more evidence comes forward.
On what you said about fairness to the victim, there is obviously no right to appeal for a victim if there is a not guilty verdict. I know there is a tiny bit of legislation to say that, if there is a huge amount of new evidence, they could reopen a case. However, that barely happens. You are basically told no, so how come a perpetrator can just appeal without any reason? From victims’ perspectives, and from my perspective, it is an absolute no-brainer.
Paulette Hamilton
Q
Farah Nazeer: I think the repeal of the presumption is the cornerstone, because that gives the foundation on which the other measures rest. I think the first thing is mandatory training so that there is real understanding of coercive control and domestic abuse. I still speak to survivors daily who tell us that judges are saying, “Well, why didn’t you leave earlier? If it was that bad, why are you still there?” There is a real lack of understanding of coercive control, economic abuse and how coercive control can manifest in multiple different ways—the isolation, the withdrawal of technology and all the many things that make it impossible to leave. I think that mandatory training is really important.
The training also has to include a real understanding of the barriers that survivors face, particularly those with minoritised backgrounds, such as black women, women from minority backgrounds, deaf and disabled women and LGBTQ+ constituents. They face additional barriers and challenges in accessing justice, as well as in accessing empathy and understanding of their particular situations, which might have cultural implications, or mean different things in the domestic abuse context. We need really comprehensive training and understanding.
We also need unevidenced concepts like parental alienation to be banned from family courts, and we need actual regulated professionals—if they need to be brought in—to advise courts and judges in a way that the system and survivors can have confidence in. Right now, this is inconsistent and, in some cases, outright dangerous, as we can see from the many reports we have produced at Women’s Aid. I would say that those are the three most important things to ensure that we have a safe system.
The other piece that perhaps sits outside the provisions of the Bill is the specialist domestic abuse and sexual violence services that need to be there to support survivors through either the family court processes or the criminal court processes. Unless you have someone supporting survivors through those processes, they can be brutal. It is very hard to sustain the energy and commitment to return to those settings, time after time.
You build yourself up, as my fellow panellists have said, and then you are let down again. The experiences themselves are also deeply distressing. Without those specialist services there to support survivors, justice will not happen either way. It is really important that there is a recognition that specialist services are pivotal to ensuring that justice happens.
The Chair
I know that Kieran and Jess wanted to come back in. Kieran Mullan first—briefly, please.
Dr Mullan
Q
Morwenna Loughman: I was aware of it. He is actually appealing the length of sentence at the moment, but has not yet been granted leave to do so.
Dr Mullan
Q
Obviously, an increased sentencing length means that someone could be sentenced for three years in a magistrates court, without a right to appeal that sentence. This question is to all three of you. Do you think it is important to ensure that, even if we increase sentence lengths in the magistrates court, victims have the opportunity, in certain circumstances, to appeal sentences that they think are unduly lenient?
Charlotte Meijer: Yes.
Jade Blue McCrossen-Nethercott: Straight and to the point: yes.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Morwenna Loughman: Yes.
Jess Brown-Fuller
You also spoke about the concept of floating cases. Were you told beforehand that your case had been listed as a floating case? The reason I ask is that the legislation does not address how many adjournments we have. There is no mechanism in the legislation—I am happy to be corrected by the Minister—to address how often cases are adjourned. Listing officers will continue to list floating cases because they know that so many victims drop out of the process, or the CPS comes back and says that it does not have enough evidence to convict, and so on.
Did you have an ISVA supporting you through the process? Were you communicated with well enough? Did you know that your case could fall at that final hurdle? The most important thing is what victims such as yourselves would like to see from that process to understand that your cases could get adjourned, were they listed as floating cases.
Morwenna Loughman: I was never told that that was a possibility. Again, that fundamental lack of understanding points to a system weighted against the victim and against the complainant. You are hermetically sealed off from a system that has been designed to dismiss and re-silence you because there is this sense that you need help, or might seek help, and to be told what to say on the stand. I would not have been there for any reason other than that I had been raped, but there was this sense that I needed to be kept at arm’s length from the system. If this Bill can change how the whole justice process is seen, that is absolutely what we should be fighting for.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Alex McIntyre
Q
As victim-survivors, how would you feel if the Government adopted the Opposition’s proposal, which is to only do two of those three things and leave one on the table that might speed up the delays in the criminal justice system? Do you think the Government would be going far enough if they left options on the table?
The Chair
Last word, witnesses—over to you.
Jade Blue McCrossen-Nethercott: I think we need to go full force. Now is the time for change. This is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to—I am not going to swear—get stuff done. If we do not do it now, it would be a missed opportunity. It is about centring lived experience: all these rippling changes being put forward will have trickling effects on the wider justice system, including support services. Centring victims’ voices in that is pivotal.
Charlotte Meijer: Agreed.
The Chair
That brings us to the end of our session. My task is a very pleasant one: to thank you. Thank you so much for coming. Your evidence has been invaluable to this Committee and really worth while. I will just add this. As Members of Parliament, we meet all kinds of constituents with the most life-changing challenges who face up to the most dreadful and awful things. Sometimes those people turn that to something positive, and that is what you have done. Thank you so much for coming today.
That brings us to the end of our morning session—
Several hon. Members rose—
The Chair
Hang on a minute! The Opposition are getting on the wrong side of me; that is very dangerous. That brings us to the end of our session. We will meet again at 2 pm this afternoon here in the Boothroyd Room.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Stephen Morgan.)
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Second sitting)
Wednesday 25th March 2026
(4 months, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Courts and Tribunals Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 25 March 2026 - (25 Mar 2026)
The Chair
Q
Kirsty Brimelow: My name is Kirsty Brimelow, a King’s counsel. My practice, until my election as chair of the Bar Council, where I started on 1 January this year, was in criminal law, public law and international law. In particular, I have worked on reforming sexual offences legislation across Europe and also conducted and led training to improve practices in court for victims, particularly in sexual offences globally. I am now chair of the Bar Council, which means I lead around 18,000 barristers across England and Wales.
Riel Karmy-Jones: My name is Riel Karmy-Jones. I am a criminal barrister with over 30 years’ experience, and I am also chair of the Criminal Bar Association. I became King’s counsel in 2015, and a significant part of my practice has revolved around prosecuting cases involving serious sexual offences and vulnerable victims. I was senior counsel to the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, and led the investigation into the Roman Catholic Church—specifically, the English Benedictine congregation. I have spent a considerable part of the last 30 years working on cases with victims, so they are very much at the forefront of my mind when I give this evidence.
Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)
Q
Riel Karmy-Jones: We start from a presumption of innocence in a criminal case, so if I say “victim” and “complainant”, no disrespect is meant. Hearing any victim speak about what they have been through is shocking and has a huge impact on all of us at the criminal Bar, but we are the ones who, day in and day out, deal with them and have to explain to them why things have gone wrong.
One of the things that I heard this morning gave me pause for thought, in the sense that some of our processes are poor. Clearly, the processes in place are not being properly followed. That does not change my approach to the Bill, because fundamentally there is a disconnect between clauses 1 to 7, on the right to jury trial, and clauses 8 to 16.
As I will be arguing, we have issues with clauses 1 to 7 and think they should be struck out. We largely support clauses 8 to 16—the victims measures. They are good measures, and in fact there are some things that we would propose to strengthen them further. I would encourage you to look that way. This Bill is about making cases move more swiftly, and jury trials do not impact on that question, as even Sir Brian Leveson acknowledged this morning.
Dr Mullan
Q
Riel Karmy-Jones: Absolutely. I have sat and held the hands of many, many victims of really serious sexual offences. I have talked to them before, during and after the cases. Trust me when I say that those who prosecute these cases feel very intensely about the victims, so that would be a complete mischaracterisation—and frankly, it has hit the criminal Bar very hard and made us quite angry.
Dr Mullan
Q
Kirsty Brimelow: It is really sad that some of the political messaging has been positioning barristers against victims. It is barristers who prosecute in the courts every day and give voice to victims and complainants in court, enabling their evidence to be heard. It is the barristers in court who apply the law and safeguards around those witnesses so that they are not subject to inappropriate questioning—I know we will come on to that.
The key to your question is that nobody wants to see complainants—victims—waiting, and having the trauma of waiting. That is what we are focusing on. In doing that, we take into account the non-governmental organisations that represent the violence against women and girls sector. Rights of Women was the lead NGO on a letter a couple of weeks ago—it decided to write it independently, without having been approached. It set out its concern about reducing jury trials. Its concern is not only that there are victims of violence who become defendants but, as it sets out clearly in the letter, there is, unfortunately, discrimination and a lack of trust in the criminal justice system.
Overall, the jury system is seen as the only part that still works, so why are we focusing on that? We want to focus on all those aspects that will reduce delays now, rather than hacking at a constitutional cornerstone, which also reflects community participation.
Dr Mullan
Q
Kirsty Brimelow: No, it is not, because that is not actually what it says. The letter sets out that they are against curbing jury trials because of the lack of trust in the criminal justice system, and that impacts those from minoritised communities in particular. We know from the statistics that black defendants and women by majority elect to go to the Crown court. Those are the ones who have trust in the jury system. That is the objection within the letter. I am sorry to see that she is mischaracterised in that way, because that is not what the letter is about.
The letter does say that it is a crude approach to characterise victims as simply those who are complainants: victims can also end up as defendants, and we have had many examples of that. I had a case at the end of last year representing a woman who was subject, clearly, to coercive control and, in part, physical abuse. She ended up a defendant, and the jury heard from her about how she ended up getting in the position she did alongside the man who was controlling her. They acquitted her; they convicted him.
The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)
Q
Kirsty Brimelow: Yes, of course. That has always been the position.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Kirsty Brimelow: I disagree that it is one Government. I would say, across Governments, there is a lot to answer for. We saw a rapid cutting of MOJ funding between 2009-10 and 2022-23: it declined by 22.4%. We are about 30% below where we should be.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Kirsty Brimelow: That is welcomed.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Kirsty Brimelow: Well, the Institute for Government disagrees with that. The Institute for Government says that if you focus on productivity and capacity in the courts—
Sarah Sackman
Yes.
Kirsty Brimelow: You asked the question; just let me answer. If you focus on that, then that is the way to get back to 2016-17 productivity. The Institute for Government does not agree and says that it is highly uncertain, and even Sir Brian says that his time estimates are highly uncertain and based on assumptions.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Let us come back to the IFG because the IRCC’s modelling is clear that, without structural reform, we will not bring down the backlog. A key conclusion of the IFG is that the major constraint on productivity is the workforce challenge. We know that 4% of Crown court cases did not go ahead last year because of the lack of barristers. The Bar Council and the CBA have pointed that out, and we know that the number of publicly funded silks has dropped by a quarter in the last decade. That is right, is it not?
Kirsty Brimelow: Yes.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Kirsty Brimelow: I disagree with that, because the positive news is that when there is an investment in legal aid, such as happened in 2022—unfortunately, after criminal barristers had to take action—we see an increase in barristers coming back into criminal law. They are already trained—they have just left to go into other areas—but when there is an increase in legal aid, they have come back. Another Government pledge has been to increase legal aid by around £27 million. Our recommendation is that the sooner that can be done, the sooner you will hopefully reverse this and bring back some of the KCs who have left.
May I pick up one other point? We are suggesting amendments to the Bill. We are completely alongside the Criminal Bar Association on restrictions on clauses 1 to 7. One proposal that we say will make a huge difference is, instead of having a court without a jury, having a court with a jury that focuses on sexual offences and domestic abuse cases. I think that was in the Labour party manifesto. Focus on those cases of the vulnerable people who are waiting. Bring those forward, prioritise those and reduce delays for those people.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Kirsty Brimelow: I disagree, because we have the example from 2022, where you have the increase in the barristers coming back. That happened within that first year. You could see the increase in the barristers coming back.
Looking at the courts, we can see that happen when they are given the tools they need—where the courts cap is lifted. Woolwich in 2023 was an example of that, when it could then operate properly and start to reduce its backlog. When the courts were capped again, and they had reduced capacity and lost two judges, their backlog started going up again. We have plenty of examples where it is not as you are saying.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Kirsty Brimelow: We know, operationally, what works. You will hear some more of that from the circuit leaders who are giving evidence. I have pointed to Woolwich as an example in 2023. We are agreed on the fact that we need to reduce delays. We focus on, “Where are the delays happening?” If we are serious about reducing them, we need to look at where they are happening.
You have heard a lot from victims of rape this morning. It should be made clear to them that the delays are weighted pre-court, so the median average that a rape victim is waiting is happening in the investigation stage and the charge stage—it is around two years. The median average currently from receipt in Crown court to completion is around a year. That is still too long, but we need to focus, therefore, on what is happening with the CPS and what is happening on investigation.
Charlotte Nichols was mentioned this morning by Vera Baird. In her case, she had more than two years waiting before getting to court. When it got to court, it was eight and a half months to conclude, so it is important to look at where the problem is and focus there.
Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)
Q
Kirsty Brimelow: We have heard—and I agree with this—that we already have the data, and I believe some more data is coming over the next weeks. We already have the data to show that a quarter of King’s counsel have now left working in publicly funded work. As I have said, we have the retention back on our junior Bar, which is very positive after the investment in legal aid, but we need the legal aid promise to come through quickly to keep that retention, and hopefully attract back the KCs.
However, if jury trials are removed for those cases where juniors are currently very much cutting their teeth—they are doing those trials in their early years of practice before a jury—it may well be a disincentive to doing criminal law. From my own experience of coming from a mixed, publicly funded chambers—we do not do private cases, but legal aid cases across all the jurisdictions—there is always that persuasion with our young barristers as to what area of law they will go into. The persuasion that lands is, “You will have the advocacy with the jury trial.”
If they do not have that advocacy, my fear is that we will lose our junior practitioners, who are very important, or we could end up with very junior practitioners whose first jury trial may have a level of seriousness beyond their ability, which again impacts on the quality of justice, and there could be a potential increase in miscarriages of justice.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Kirsty Brimelow: I am going to hand over to Riel on this. We support much of the reform from clause 8 onwards, on which I will hand over to her. We are all absolutely there to make improvements; no system is perfect, and the criminal justice system absolutely is not. We are there ready to support the reforms, and we are very experienced in bringing in reforms. Some of the issues I heard spoken of this morning included clearly terrible communication issues, where people were not informed as to what was going on, and they should be fairly easy to sort out.
Also, we very much support the idea that there is a lawyer advising complainants, which is another proposal that has been put forward by the Government. We support that because complainants often get wrong information from NGOs or the police—doing their best—about what might be happening, and what might happen to them in court. That, in itself, can cause them to be anxious about what might happen, and it can contribute to the attrition rate. We have always had an issue with an attrition rate in sexual offences cases, and each time we need to look at why that is, so we welcome any proposals. I will hand over to Riel.
The Chair
We have a very limited amount of time, but please come in, Riel.
Riel Karmy-Jones: In terms of the culture, all the things that were spoken about this morning have no relevance, in a sense, to jury trial. Juries are in the best possible position to consider the situation that victims are in; they are more likely to have someone who really understands, who is from the community and who may have some experience themselves of what the victim has gone through, or to know someone who has.
To change the culture, some of which I do not really recognise—it may be slightly older than the way things have progressed now—we would firmly recommend creating a specialist sexual/domestic abuse court. We would add to that by saying there should be specific training for the judges and jury—the jury could have a short period of training—and we would say that the prosecution and the defence need to be qualified or accredited advocates to deal with this sort of work. One of the problems we have at the moment is that the prosecution are accredited, but the defence are not, so questions coming from the defence are not as properly informed by the training that they could receive. Specialist court facilities, aimed at the comfort and safety of complainants, accommodating special measures, are really important, because at the moment we have victims in terrible rooms, with the ceilings coming down and water leaking through, and having to share loos, potentially with other witnesses in the case, risking coming across defendants in the court building.
We need to have stricter time limits on case preparation, and more active case management, and we suggest a national protocol on the approach to third-party material and the review of third-party material, and disclosure with strict time limits applicable to mirror the service of the case—also, fixed trial dates.
One of the issues that complainants in sexual and domestic violence cases have to contend with is that the defendant is often on bail. That is why they get shunted to the end of the line, because we have custody time limits that apply to custody cases. We need to consider a mechanism to give priority to these very important cases, and we think that a specialist domestic abuse court could do that.
Alex McIntyre (Gloucester) (Lab)
Q
Riel Karmy-Jones: It depends what we are talking about—
Alex McIntyre
Just as a general ballpark figure—
Riel Karmy-Jones: It is less, yes.
Alex McIntyre
Q
Riel Karmy-Jones: We are not suggesting replacing district judges with full jury trials. What we are saying is: do not lose jury trials for those more important, more serious cases in the Crown court.
The Chair
If we have very quick questions and responses, I can perhaps squeeze in two more.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
Q
Riel Karmy-Jones: Yes. We are already seeing that in immigration cases. We are seeing judges being targeted and threatened as a result of decisions made in immigration cases. The problem is that the judge will set out his decision making in writing; it will be on a transcript; and, under these proposals, it will go to a victim. It is wrong, not for those decisions to go to a complainant in a case, but for them then to be pored over and disagreed with.
What does the judge say if they do not believe a complainant victim? They have to say so, and that could lead to huge disruption and upset, whereas with a jury, those people are largely anonymous and protected by reason of their anonymity. It is far rarer for us to get jurors who are targeted and attacked than it will be, in our view. As the Lady Chief Justice pointed out recently, it is far more likely that judges will be targeted as a result of their decision making.
Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
Q
Kirsty Brimelow: May I deal with that briefly? Absolutely, if you open the courts, then the courts can hear the cases. Also, let us look at the reason for the lack of productivity. Our courts are just not sitting as many hours as they did in 2016 or 2017. We should get the number of hours back up, and cut out the delays even in the courts that are sitting. That includes looking at the defendants being brought to court late. We are collecting data on that, and it is an astonishingly high number. Around a quarter of the data we have collected so far shows defendants being brought more than five hours late to court. You attack that, do the type of listing that is working now, bring the investment in quickly—
The Chair
Order. Sorry to stop you, but that brings us to the end of time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witnesses for their evidence. Sorry it was so short.
Examination of Witnesses
Claire Davies, Samantha Hillas and Caroline Goodwin gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Claire Davies: I am Claire Davies, King’s counsel. I am leader of the south-eastern circuit, which covers London and the whole of the south-east of England. My main practice is in criminal law.
Samantha Hillas: My name is Sam Hillas KC. I am leader of the northern circuit, which is in the north-west of England, from Chester to Carlisle. I am a family barrister.
Caroline Goodwin: My name is Caroline Goodwin KC. I practise in criminal law. I am the leader of the north-eastern Circuit. We cover a very large geographical area, from Newcastle through to Sheffield, encompassing Leeds and York and so on.
Dr Mullan
Q
“Modelling assumes cases sent to the CCBD are 20% quicker to try than Crown Court cases with a jury and that the same proportion of cases ultimately plead guilty. However this… 20% assumption is highly uncertain”.
Do you agree that the central assumption is highly uncertain? What are your views about how will this operate in practice?
Claire Davies: We agree it is uncertain. When you go into a court trial process involving a jury, the types of cases that will go before these courts are generally the three to four or maybe five-day trials. When you look at those, the jury involvement is such that the only time that you would really save, so far as we can see, is in the swearing in of a jury, which takes 15 to 20 minutes, and maybe a factual summing up from the judge, which tends not to be very long in these cases. We therefore see the saving as minimal, because to maintain open justice, the evidence must be heard in court. That is very important for the public to understand what happens in our courtrooms.
Sir Brian Leveson suggested this morning that judges would be more interventionist, saving more time and getting to the point. While one can see on the one hand that that is an attractive argument, it simply cannot happen because the defendant and the witnesses are there and the public needs to know what the evidence is. It is all very well saying that a judge can read the papers effectively, and that they do not need to elaborate on it in court and can get to the issues, but that would defeat the very important principle of open justice, so we do not agree that the time savings will be as significant for those reasons.
Dr Mullan
Q
“Should the MoJ consider pursuing this course of action, it may wish to consider undertaking further detailed analysis in order to understand the potential time-saving fully.”
Besides the stakeholder engagement exercise, are you aware of any of the “further detailed analysis” that Sir Brian said was necessary before coming to any conclusions about the time savings of the policies?
Samantha Hillas: No.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Claire Davies: Yes, and I agree that something has to be done.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Claire Davies: Absolutely. That is something we have wanted for a very long time now, because that would have seen an immediate effect before now.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Claire Davies: We do not necessarily agree. The difficulty has been that the sitting days have been cut not just under one Government, but more. The Nightingale courts that were dealing with the bail cases that are the ones at the end of the outstanding cases that we have, certainly in London and the south-east, were closed. I think we have one that has just been made permanent, thank you—Chichester. They were there, and that is what kept part of our outstanding cases under control.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Caroline Goodwin: Can I deal with this? The reality is that we have not been able to do this. Because there has been a consistent cap on sitting days, judges have not been able to open up court days. They have not been able to run blitz days where they can really take hold of a case and shake it and say, “Right, what is going on?” We have not had any great directives to the CPS to say, “When you’re charging these cases, you need to review these very thoroughly.” Throughout this entire time, the criminal Bar and the entire justice system has been brought to its knees. So if you are saying, “Is there any empirical evidence that this doesn’t work on your circuit, Ms Goodwin?”, we have not been able to do it.
If I can finish on this point, I can point to where our courts have taken over pleas, have been able to open up another court and have brought in 300 extra cases, which is really important, and 80 of those are RASSO. The example I am going to give you on my circuit at the coalface is Teesside. Newcastle has also been enabled in the last six months to open up one more case. The reality is that all their class 2 cases, which are very serious cases dealing with sexual offences, are now listed within their time limits. So if you want to see if there is a change, it is happening now. You just have to let us do it. May I make this very clear? I do acknowledge that you have finally lifted up the cap on the sitting days, but we need it consistently. You can twist all these figures around however you want to, but you have to let us try.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Samantha Hillas: The difficulty is that we do not necessarily accept the assertions about the time saving. Let us take at face value the assertion that there is a 20% time saving, which takes a five-day case down to four. Clause 5 says that the judge has to produce a judgment as soon as reasonably possible thereafter, so when is that going to be written? That is your fifth day. That is what the judge is going to have to do on that day.
Claire Davies: Can I answer the question about the lack of evidence? Wood Green Crown court is a prime example. In August 2023, Harrow Crown court was closed. It has still not reopened; in fact, it reopens on 13 April, due to the state of the building. Wood Green was using Hendon magistrates as four Crown courtrooms, and it got its backlog down to near pre-covid levels. When Harrow closed, Wood Green lost those four Crown courtrooms, because of course Harrow had to function somewhere. The consequence was that Wood Green’s backlog went up. That is a simple example of what extra court space does.
Maidstone has been listing into Southwark and Woolwich. There have been ramifications for Woolwich and Southwark, because they have lost courtrooms, but giving them more court space has enabled them to reduce their lists too. That is without any other efficiencies, and we say that the efficiencies must be tried first. For example, in the trial I am in at the moment in Winchester, prisoner escort has not managed to bring the defendants to court on time for most of the trial, even though they are in Winchester prison.
The Chair
Thank you very much. The Minister wants to come in very quickly, and then I will bring in the Lib Dem spokesperson.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Claire Davies: We do not know, because we have not been provided with the data that the Government have. We have consistently asked for the data.
Sarah Sackman
It is in the impact assessment.
Claire Davies: The impact assessment does not provide data.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Claire Davies: I think we would all agree that it is nothing to do with jury trials. What is happening is that, due to a lack of sitting days, judges are having to deal with more administrative matters and other hearings before they begin a trial, if of course any of those are in custody. If there is a delay—they are not always delayed, of course—that pushes matters back. A trial will take longer, and they do not have the whole day available to them. They do not have 10 am till 4.30 pm, which is a court sitting day; they get only part of that day. That is what is eating into the hours—or it is one of the reasons.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Caroline Goodwin: Yes, I do. As I have pointed out, you have to allow us the opportunity to put in place very key and significant changes. Frankly, senior judges have already identified that they would enable us to get through this backlog.
In addition, the investigative stage needs to be got hold of and have a coach and horses driven through it. One of the big complaints that we have been hearing about today—it is a terrible complaint, when one thinks about it—is about the time it takes from investigation stage through to Crown court and the final determination with a jury. All those things could be addressed with efficiencies, which do not mean that you have to remove the right to a jury trial. Let us focus on those.
Let me make it clear that it is very commendable that this large investment has been put in, but it brings us back to where we ought to have been after the last 10 years, in which we have suffered significant cuts. There is a will from the judiciary and practitioners; we just have to be able to make it work. You have experienced judges telling you, “I need blitz courts. I need more courts,” so let us open them, staff them, resource them and make them work.
Tristan Osborne (Chatham and Aylesford) (Lab)
Q
Claire Davies: It is 18 months. The difficulty is the percentage of appeals against conviction, because we take a slightly different approach in relation to appeals against sentence. With appeals against conviction, the success rate is something like 40%. I understand that there is no data that demonstrates whether that is because witnesses do not attend the retrial hearing or simply because a wrong decision was reached in the lower courts. What concerns me is when you have the chair of the Magistrates’ Association giving evidence before the Select Committee that he would like the right of appeal retained.
There are errors and mistakes made, but if the length of sentence is extended, it will potentially increase that risk. The other difficulty that follows is that the number of those who qualify for legal aid will reduce, which means that they will not have access to legal advice as to whether they should be appealing or not, and if restrictions are brought in on the basis on which you can appeal, they will not be adequately equipped to launch what should perhaps be a successful appeal.
Mr Paul Kohler (Wimbledon) (LD)
Q
Claire Davies: I have not read that article, but if there is more judiciary, then there is more access for people. A lot of residents are taking the approach of looking at the outstanding cases, looking at the sorts of cases that may not go to trial, and bringing them in. As well as more judiciary to assist in that process, or to crack through the trials that there are, there would need to be the courtroom availability, and of course what has to come with more courtroom availability is staff so that the courts run efficiently. We would welcome retired judges to come back. There are many who currently sit in retirement in any event.
Caroline Goodwin: It would be absolutely brilliant to have these very senior judges come back. They have an absolute wealth of knowledge that they can bring. If they are prepared to operate in that role, it is a win-win situation. If we can instantly recruit more judiciary to deal with these cases, then it is something we should be proactively looking at.
Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)
Q
Caroline Goodwin: It might understand the system, but it is about the application of the system. You may have a set of papers that comes in from the police and is sent to a reviewing lawyer—
Linsey Farnsworth
I am getting to my point; I am very conscious of time. It is fair to say that the CPS has a good overview of the system.
Caroline Goodwin: Yes.
Linsey Farnsworth
Q
“Our view is that we have gone far beyond the point where piecemeal or non-legislative solutions will suffice.”
He went on to say that the official view of the CPS is that the 20% time-saving projection regarding jury trials in the independent report is
“very much on the conservative side”.
Does the CPS not have a credible voice on those two points?
Caroline Goodwin: May I deal with that? It may be a credible voice in terms of having an argument in the debate, but it is not actually addressing the efficiencies of the Crown Prosecution Service; it is merely saying, “Yes, we think 20% could be a parsimonious figure. It could be a far greater saving of time.” But if we turn and look inwards, at ourselves, the CPS is the start of a lot of the difficulties that there can be around case preparation. That is why I say that there needs to be a rigorous approach when material is sent in to a reviewing lawyer, which is really when the process starts. They need to be saying, “I need you to find me that telecommunications evidence. I need to make sure that that media evidence from those telephones has been produced.” All that should be starting from the word go.
Tom Guest may be right in terms of—[Interruption.] May I finish, please? He may have a voice in the debate and the argument, but in so far as the efficiencies of the service are concerned, the CPS really needs to start looking at itself, and then perhaps it can come on a very strong footing.
Linsey Farnsworth
Q
Caroline Goodwin: With respect, often what happens is that counsel are told, “Please make sure that you know what’s going to be in the jury bundle.” That gets sent to counsel; counsel deals with that. Counsel is asked, “Can you make sure you can deal with the witness order?” Counsel produces that. All that you are having to do, basically, is either put material on a photocopier or put it into a media form so it can be played in court.
Linsey Farnsworth
Having been a Crown prosecutor for 21 years, I find it very disturbing that you take that view.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
Q
Samantha Hillas: I have not made the arrangements for who is attending, so I do not find it odd. Whoever has been asked to attend is attending. I can talk a little bit about the repeal of the presumption—
Joe Robertson
Q
Samantha Hillas: I am not quite sure I understand the question, so I will answer it like this. From the practitioner perspective, we have always found the insertion of the presumption fairly odd, because it goes without saying that it is usually in children’s best interest to have a relationship with both parents. Where there are circumstances in which it is not safe for a child to have a relationship with both parents, the child’s welfare is protected and is paramount under section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989.
The insertion of section 1(2A) into that Act in 2014 came on the back of quite a lot of protest and demonstration by certain pressure groups for the amendment to be made, to try to promote a presumption of involvement that really is tacitly always there. For practitioners, it was probably something of an otiose insertion. The difficulty with it is that even though a review has demonstrated that it has not been the basis for judgments—the welfare principle has not been subordinate to it; the welfare principle has still been paramount—it has created a sort of pro-contact culture.
You have to remember that when it came in, that coincided with basically the eradication of legal aid in family cases. Even though lawyers would advise that the welfare principle is paramount, if you are a litigant in person without the funds to afford legal fees, you might read that presumption and read a pro-contact culture into it, and might then be agreeing to situations that are not safe for a child.
I have not answered your question, but—I am sorry that this is taking quite a long time—practitioners thought that it was a fairly redundant insertion, and it is sensible for it to be repealed.
Joe Robertson
Q
Samantha Hillas: Yes. Well, there is a presumption that a child’s best interests would be served, as I said in the first place, by having a relationship with both parents. It is only where there would be a risk to that child that there would not be involvement.
John Slinger (Rugby) (Lab)
Q
Claire Davies: Of course they are going to view it with concern—it is common sense that anyone would be concerned—but we need to have the opportunity, which we have not been given, to demonstrate that in fact it will not reach that high with the measures that we support.
Efficiency in our system has long been lacking, despite repeated efforts, and this Government have shown that they will invest, and substantial investment is what is needed. We are not afraid of change—we make that absolutely clear. A lot more use could be made of technology in our courts; remote courtrooms could take the shorter hearings away from the trial courts so that they can concentrate on what they should be doing and have the full use of a court day to maximise that.
It is a combination of features in the trial, but the matters that we have proposed—you heard this morning, as well, that we encourage the use of specialised courts—would have a dramatic impact. You have to remember that new sentencing provisions came into force on 22 March, and we believe that they will also have a dramatic impact on the current caseload. The ability to give suspended sentences for a longer period of up to three years will have an impact, as will efficiency measures and, most importantly, the investment that the Government have made in relation to uncapped sitting days. All of that, combined, will have a dramatic impact, to the point that losing, or curtailing, the right to jury trial—because we are not losing it completely. We make that clear and accept it. We say that it is not necessary to lose the legitimacy that juries bring to our court system.
The judiciary have made great strides in their diversity, but they are still not representative of the communities they serve. The equalities statement makes clear the way that people elect those of different ethnic backgrounds. Given all of that combined, we would urge that clauses 1 to 7, which deal with repealing or restricting the right to a jury trial under certain circumstances, are not brought into force. There are many more ways in which action can be taken.
Dr Mullan
Q
The Chair
You have 30 seconds to respond.
Claire Davies: Frankly, the answer is that we are the ones who are in court day in, day out doing the job. With the greatest of respect to Sir Brian, he is not doing the job in the current day and age—we are.
Matt Bishop (Forest of Dean) (Lab)
I will keep it quick. I think we all agree that victims are very brave, and we know that the delays are having a massive effect on them. I think we all agree, too, that the measures in the Bill will reduce timescales—
The Chair
Order. That brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witnesses for their evidence.
Examination of Witness
Claire Throssell gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from Claire Throssell. We have until 3.20 pm for this panel. Claire, will you briefly introduce yourself?
Claire Throssell: My name is Claire Throssell MBE, and I am a campaigner, an advocate, an author, an educator and an ambassador for two domestic abuse charities, Women’s Aid and IDAS. I am at the forefront of the child-first campaign, and I am the one pushing for the repeal of presumption in the Bill.
Wednesday 25 March | Until no later than 3.40 pm | Hon Doug Downey KC MPP, Attorney General of Ontario |
Wednesday 25 March | Until no later than 3.55 pm | Chief Constable of Lancashire Constabulary |
Wednesday 25 March | Until no later than 4.10 pm | HM Courts and Tribunals Service |
Wednesday 25 March | Until no later than 4.40 pm | JUSTICE; Centre for Criminal Appeals (APPEAL); Institute for Government |
The Chair
Following the Divisions in the Chamber, the timings for this afternoon will be adjusted. I will announce at the start of each panel when the questioning will start and end. We already heard your introduction before the votes, Claire. If you do not mind, we will jump straight into the questions.
Dr Mullan
Q
Claire Throssell: Thank you for the question, and I have four points that I really want to get across this afternoon. First, I want to make it clear that presumption has no place when it comes to children’s safety. Presumption has no place when it comes to children’s lives. Presumption has no place when it comes to our lives.
What happened to Jack and Paul was based on a series of presumptions under practice direction 12J, and you have to ask the question: why did a professional working for CAFCASS, after being barricaded in her office, presume that Jack and Paul were safe to go on a visit? Why did she presume that I was exaggerating, despite me telling her and a court—let us be clear that I did—that he was capable of killing? Why was it presumed that it was okay to ignore my voice? Why did they presume that two children would be safe when they had clear evidence in front of them that they would not be?
We are talking about presumption, and people say, “Yes, the practice direction is there in the Children Act 1989.” Let us be clear: there are 68 children who have died under that Act. There are 68 children who have died under practice direction 12J. I say again: presumption has no place when it comes to children’s safety.
I am going to show some evidence now, and I show these pictures not to shock or upset people, but to show the reality of presumption of contact. I would like to show you two photographs, the first of which shows Jack and Paul. They were never child A and child B in a serious case review. They are child 18 and child 19 in a Women’s Aid report that looked into how many children have died at the hands of known perpetrators of domestic abuse.
This 12-year-old boy, Jack, died believing that he had saved the life of his younger brother, because I never told him differently—I held both my sons in my arms as they died. Jack’s voice was never heard; the day he was supposed to have his interview with CAFCASS was the day that he died in my arms. The only time this boy’s voice was heard was on a landing, when he spoke to a fireman and a doctor. Although he was dying, he used as much of his strength as he could to tell as many people in that property, “My dad did this, and he did it on purpose.” This was taken by the police as a dying testimony. Why did they not take his words in life? Why did they take his words in death?
This second photograph of Jack is again evidence of what happens with presumption of contact. The first photograph of Jack was taken in the July, and this second photograph shows Jack in the October. CAFCASS and a court presumed that this boy would be safe. Social services presumed that this boy would be safe. This boy died believing that he had saved the life of his brother, and more importantly, he thought of everybody else but himself. When people should have protected him, he went back for his brother. He gave his brother his hand. He gave his brother his strength. He was there for his brother, but who was there for him at 12 years old? Not the court that ordered contact because of the culture in the family courts that contact is in the best interests of the child—that they should see both parents.
Jack had nobody, and he thought about me—he made sure that everybody in the property knew that I was not to blame. As a parent, I am ashamed of that, because it was my role to protect them. Let us be clear that I have to live with the fact that they died only because a domestic abuser wanted to punish me. A family court allowed him to do that, but these two beautiful boys only lost their lives because of me.
When we talk about repealing presumption of contact, let us look at it: over 30 years, children have died. In 2014, Jack and Paul were child 18 and child 19. Let us face the fact that, in 2026, we are at 68 children. That is not good enough, because every child deserves to live. Every child deserves to have a childhood, and their childhood should not be allowed to be torn apart piece by piece by seeing a perpetrator of domestic abuse—by seeing a person who just wants to hurt them, humiliate them and punish an ex-partner.
Children have one childhood. Children at risk of harm only have today; they do not have tomorrow. You have a chance—a lifesaving opportunity—right here, right now to make a difference to children’s lives, not just today, not just tomorrow, but for generations of children to come. It is no surprise that there are many people in their 20s with mental health issues. Mental health has never been as bad as it is right now in young people. And why is that? It is because they are made to see a parent who is hurting them. They are made to see a parent who is harming them. It might not be physical, and it might not be the ultimate act, like it was for Jack and Paul, but if a child comes back from a visit and they are different from how they were when they went on the visit, let us be clear: that is child abuse.
Children are supposed to have a voice. Children are supposed to have opinions. But all too often there are too many other voices in this complex system that are louder than the child. We hear about parental rights all the time, but around children’s rights there is a deafening silence. We have an Act that protects them: the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. They are supposed to be seen as victims in their own right, and yet, up and down our country, their rights are still being walked over—not only their rights under the Domestic Abuse Act, but their human rights too. They have the same rights as we do. They are people; they are humans; they are themselves. Their basic rights—to live, to thrive, to live in privacy, to live in peace—are being broken in courts up and down the country. That is not good enough. They are the future of this country, and if we get this wrong, what does the future of our country look like? What have we got for the future? They are not being allowed to live as they want to live. They are not being allowed to be free. They are certainly not allowed to thrive. If you go to school, college or university and you have suffered that morning, how are you going to learn? How is that conducive to achieving in life and being who you could be?
I used to tell the boys, “Be the best that you can be today.” They only had today. Right now, with this Bill repealing presumption of contact, we can give every child in this country the tomorrow that not just Jack and Paul, but 66 other children will never see. This issue is bigger than Jack and Paul, but they were my reality. They were my children. They were the better parts of me.
But 66 children are anonymous. Successive Governments have made them a child A or a child B in a serious case review, to gather dust in a file in Whitehall or around here, just brushed under the carpet. Serious case reviews—lessons must be learnt. I can ask everybody in here, “What lessons have we learnt?”, because every year we are losing more children, and we are losing more children because of practice direction 12J, because of presumption of contact. There should never be presumption—not in law, not when it comes to safety, not when it comes to lives. You would not go in a court and presume that somebody is guilty.
Sarah Sackman
Thank you, Claire, for sharing such a powerful testimony. I think I first met you during a Westminster Hall debate, which was called by your tireless and fearless MP Marie Tidball, the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge. Your testimony is compelling and it is why we are bringing forward the provision in clause 17 of the Bill to repeal the presumption of parental contact. We know that will not protect every single child, but it does send quite an important message about what we in Parliament say, which is that the courts should always have at the forefront of their minds the best interests of the child, and that alone. I just want to say thank you.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Claire Throssell: What I would like to see moving forward is an understanding of what it looks like without presumption of contact; what good practice looks like; understanding trauma; understanding what coercive control is; understanding emotional abuse. We all understand physical abuse—it is there; we see it. What we do not understand is the emotional abuse and the scars that we carry. We must always look from the position of actually seeing a child, hearing a child, believing a child, protecting a child, and we must go from this basis. We must use the legislation that we have in the Domestic Abuse Act. We know that it is not being used in courts. We must see children as victims in their own right of this crime. We must accept children as victims in their own right of this crime, and we must take away the fact that we are always trying to prove the crime that has been committed against us.
Domestic abuse is a crime, so why is it that when we go into family courts we are ripped apart by barristers? Why is it that a crime has been committed against us, but we are always the ones who have to prove it has been committed, and by whom? Why do we have to go into a court, when we have committed no crime, and stand up and be humiliated in order to fight for our children? Why do we have to do that alone?
With any other crime, the onus is on the police to prove that a crime has been committed and by whom, and then sentencing is carried out accordingly, but in a family court, the person who has had the crime committed against them time and again has to prove that that has happened. We are not believed automatically, and we are not supported automatically. There should be special measures in family courts to help see the child, like in the Pathfinder courts, but it is not just about seeing the child; it is about hearing them, believing them, supporting them, and letting perpetrators of abuse know that it will not be accepted and that we are going to take action, protect that child and always presume the unthinkable.
Matt Bishop
Q
Claire Throssell: Absolutely—I agree with that 100%. It comes back to the fact that we must not presume that children are safe. We must not presume that children are not going to lose their lives, because perpetrators of abuse manipulate, they lie, they turn it around and they use DARVO—everything is always everybody else’s fault, and their voice is always louder than the child’s. You have an opportunity now to change that. You have the opportunity to make sure that no other child has to use their voice and say to a fireman, a police officer or a doctor, “My dad did this, and he did it on purpose.” No other boy should have to have a dying testimony and believe that he saved the life of his brother, because I never told him differently. Mistakes are not good enough. Sixty-eight mistakes is a national disgrace, and in 2026, there should be no more.
Siân Berry
Q
Claire Throssell: Yes, I do back that up. Judges do need training. They are hiding behind the fact that they are independent. They should be independent—they are the law of the land—but they should not be above the laws that they serve, and they do need training. They do need understanding. Like I say, the court is another arena; it is a secondary abuser. We go through the abuse, we take the courage to leave—that is not easy—and we enter a court system where we think, “This is going to be fair; this is going to be just.” We go into these arenas, and there are no guarantees that we can protect our children. We are ripped apart, and our personalities—we go through trauma. We tell people the same thing again and again, but we are not seen, heard, believed or supported.
The Chair
Order. Thank you, Claire. I am sorry, but we have reached the end of the time allotted for your evidence. Thank you so much for sharing with us today. We really appreciate it and your campaigning.
Examination of Witness
Doug Downey gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from Doug Downey. We have until 4.54 pm for this session. Thank you for joining us today. Will you please briefly introduce yourself?
Doug Downey: My name is Doug Downey. I am the Ontario attorney general. I have the privilege of overseeing the administration of justice in Ontario, Canada. I look forward to being able to talk with you a little about our experience with juries, and the lack of juries in certain cases, and how that relates to efficiencies and otherwise.
Dr Mullan
Q
Doug Downey: Absolutely. As we went into covid, we were developing backlogs, and then of course through covid we had more. I can share some specific numbers with you if you wish. For a sense of scale, we have about 250,000 cases a year that come into the system, and the backlog made that grow quite significantly. We are chunking our way through it, if I can put it that way, and employing technology processes and increasing capacity across the system.
Dr Mullan
Q
Doug Downey: We have not made changes to the jury trials, but we have made changes to compensation for jurors and how we get responses from jurors electronically versus in paper, and we changed our jury rolls. But in terms of what juries apply to, we have not made changes during that period.
Dr Mullan
Q
Doug Downey: We have not used that as one of the levers. To give a sense of scale, about 96% of our trials are judge-alone, so in terms of making a change, it would be to add more juries, which I would suggest, based on the data and experience we have, would move us in the wrong direction on the backlog.
Dr Mullan
Q
Doug Downey: Increasing capacity across the system. We have different levels of court: the Ontario court and the superior court. The Ontario court has a complement of approximately 300 judges. We have added 52 to that complement. In addition, when we add a judge, we add seven full-time staff, whether it be Crown prosecutors, victim service workers or whatnot. In total, we added about 700 full-time staff over that period. Building that capacity has helped. The challenge we have is the increasing rate of intake. There are theories on why that is, but it is a fact that we are dealing with.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Doug Downey: Absolutely. They have been in place for quite some time. They produce a number of benefits for the system. It is not just the length of trials; it is the expertise that can be brought to bear by an experienced judge. To become a judge, you have to have a minimum of 10 years’ experience at the Bar. It can also create scheduling advantages, because you do not have to schedule contiguously; you can have a break in a trial and come back a few days later, and not have to manage the jury in that sense. There are cost consequences, but there are also scheduling and efficiency consequences that we harness. More than 95% of our cases are judge-alone, but there is a mechanism by which the individuals can choose judge or jury. We put that in the hands of the accused. By and large, they choose judge.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Doug Downey: Absolutely true—they do elect for that. There are different advantages for them, including the speed of the matter. There are advantages for our system in terms of the cost of the matter and getting people to a just outcome. It is more than an academic exercise in terms of what is fair, but people do choose that. I can tell you that we track the court of appeal pieces, and more often the appeal is because a jury has been misinstructed. Judges, trained properly, when they come to the bench, can segregate out things that need to be segregated out, but you cannot always do that with a jury.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Doug Downey: At a minimum, months. There is no question but that it is faster, from the data and anecdotally. It is not just our jurisdiction; other jurisdictions in Canada have similar experiences; British Columbia, on our west coast, is a good example. There is absolutely no question. You can move through motions in the middle of trials without disrupting, and you can do preliminary hearings beforehand and not have to redo something in front of a jury, because the judge has already heard that part. There are systemic advantages for time.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Doug Downey: There are two parts to that. First, clearly, people are choosing judge-alone. On its own, the fact that the accused are choosing judge-alone speaks to the confidence they have in that system. There have been studies, such as the national justice survey in 2023 and 2025. Half the respondents to those studies indicated that they are moderately to very confident that our criminal justice system is fair to all people, and more than half—59%, to be exact—reported being moderately to very confident that the criminal justice system is accessible to all people. That is a fairly high number for people who are experiencing the system or know people who are experiencing the system.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Doug Downey: Are you talking about the non-lawyers who are hearing—
Jess Brown-Fuller
Yes.
Doug Downey: We have in the Ontario Court of Justice what we call a lay bench—the justices of the peace. They do a lot of the bail hearings and a lot of the provincial offences—traffic and that sort of thing. That is where the lay bench resides, but the trials are not done by the justices of the peace when it comes to criminal matters; they are done by judges who are appointed, with a minimum of 10 years’ experience and quite often more than that.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Doug Downey: It is a great range. Let me answer that in reverse, if I may. The most significant matters, such as murder and treason, will default to a jury, but if the Crown agrees with the accused, they can move it to judge-alone. That generally is not the case—it generally stays where it is—but they can. For the balance of matters, such as serious sexual assaults, it is not directly based on what the consequence might be; it is a class of cases that we call hybrid and I think you call either-way cases, where an individual can make an election to move into the superior court and, by consequence, get a jury, but generally they do not do that.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Doug Downey: I think so. The right to elect is a feature, but I do not think there would be any less confidence if they were not given that right, simply because the default would probably be with jury, but that would become very inefficient for us.
Tristan Osborne
Q
Doug Downey: I think we are seeing, around the world, a heightened level of concern about individuals taking things into their own hands, so court security is very important to me. Judicial security is something that we have put a lot of effort into.
As for whether it happens because of a sentence, I cannot say with confidence that that is the driver. I think our societies are becoming more vitriolic, and that is what we need to guard against in protecting individuals. But if an individual judge is presiding anyway, I am not sure that they are going to attract more attention as a result of whether or not there is a jury.
To be honest, the nice thing about judges is that we get written reasons why things happen. In Canada it is very different from the United States: the jurors are not allowed to be debriefed afterwards in a public way. I do not know whether that is the case in Britain, but that provides a little bit of anonymity and protection against people drawing attention to themselves.
Mr Kohler
Q
Doug Downey: It is a complicated piece in Canada, because the criminal code is governed by the federal Government. We are a provincial Government, so although I am tasked with running the Administration, I do not get to set all the rules. If I can be a politician for a second, I think that it is healthy that you are having this vigorous debate. I am certainly not comfortable telling you what you should do, but in our experience, from the perspective of running the system, it is definitely having a positive impact.
Rebecca Paul
Q
Doug Downey: That is a great question. I do not have data on the different groups electing, but we often see high-profile matters trying to move towards a jury. We know that individuals with very technical defences or very technical legal approaches will sometimes go to a judge, so that they can have that expressed. It really depends on the facts of the case, as opposed to the kind of case. I do not have running data on that, so I hesitate to be categorical. The motivation for going to jury, or not, can change with the theory of the case, the approach of the lawyer and, ultimately, the client.
Paulette Hamilton (Birmingham Erdington) (Lab)
Q
Doug Downey: Again, that is a wonderful question. One of the dynamics is cultural sensitivity. Whether a jury can be walked through what they are dealing with, with the proper lenses, is open for debate. I can tell you that we have a lot of effort going into judicial education, by the judges for the judges, on First Nations perspectives, with everything from body language to lived experience. That knowledge resides with the judge; it may or may not reside with the community of peers. That is the goal. That issue can go both ways, but we have some confidence that judges are exposed to things that juries may not be.
The Chair
Mr Downey, thank you very much for joining us today from Canada.
Doug Downey: It was such a pleasure. Thank you.
The Chair
That brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions.
Examination of Witness
Chief Constable Sacha Hatchett gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Chief Constable Hatchett: I am Sacha Hatchett. I am chief constable of Lancashire constabulary, but I am also the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for criminal justice. Thank you for giving the opportunity to come today.
I am sure you have questions to ask me, but if you do not mind, I have taken the liberty of preparing a few points that I thought would be helpful to you. We were asked about the backlog in the system and why the measures may be needed. I thought it would be worth giving a bit of context, in part about how policing adds to the problem—
The Chair
Sorry, but can I ask how long it will take? It is just that we have very little time.
Chief Constable Hatchett: Two minutes.
The Chair
Perfect.
Chief Constable Hatchett: It is about the context of the problem and the impact of court delays felt by policing. Clearly, you are very well sighted on the increase in Crown court volumes, which means that in some areas cases are being listed into 2030. It also means that we are seeing an increase in victim and witness attrition rates. The number of cases in which suspects are charged is also going up, so policing is putting more into the system. We are charging more and we have more evidence, improved technology and proactive policing. We have also had more police investment over the years. The fact that we are charging more is helping to put the system under some strain.
In terms of the impact on policing, there are three areas. Our victim care units are the people who support witnesses and victims and keep them updated post charge but prior to the hearing. They are the people who deal cases when they are adjourned. They deal with the emotions of victims and witnesses, and they do a fantastic job. The number that they are having to manage in that sphere has gone up significantly since 2019-20. They are also seeing the impact of the fact that some third-party agencies—independent domestic violence advisers and independent sexual violence advisers—are inundated with supporting victims. If those agencies cannot do that, some of the emotional support is falling to the victim care units—
The Chair
Thank you very much. We have only 15 minutes for this session, so I would like to go into our questions now, but hopefully we will cover the other points you want to make.
Dr Mullan
Would I be correct in saying that it should not be inferred from anything you say today about the issues that need to be addressed, the challenges that victims are experiencing and the challenges in policing that you support, for example, a reduction in jury trials? The National Police Chiefs’ Council does not have any views on that.
Chief Constable Hatchett: No, we do not.
Dr Mullan
Q
Chief Constable Hatchett: Obviously, there are the adjournments and the upset to victims and witnesses, including police witnesses. I just want to make the point that for the whole time the adjournments are taking place—you are sometimes looking to 2030—the risk in the community is being managed by policing. Whether the person has a tag or is on court bail, with or without conditions, they are being managed in the community by policing.
Dr Mullan
Q
Chief Constable Hatchett: I am really conscious that the Bill takes it from the point of charge and into the court system. We are working with the Crown Prosecution Service and in policing to see how we can decrease the time from the point of the recording of the crime to when we actually get a charge. There are initiatives going on with the Crown Prosecution Service, so maybe more will come into policing for charging. Some work is being done on redaction and on rebuttable presumption disclosure. There are a number of pilots going on to see how we can streamline the system to make that part as short as possible, recognising that no matter what we do there—and there is complexity in policing in terms of the investigations, the digital forensics and the third-party evidence that all adds to the delay—once there is a charge, there is a challenge in how you get through the process as quickly as possible, so that we do not have victims and witnesses who are not prepared to give evidence because of delays.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Chief Constable Hatchett: I talked briefly about the witness care units, which have had an increasing demand placed upon them since 2019-20. There are two other areas. There is greater demand on investigators. We are managing a growing number of caseloads for an extended period of time. If you think about the requirement of the prosecution team, we are obliged to continually review evidence, so the longer it takes to go through the court process, the more reviews are required. That requires rework. That also could mean changes to the officer on the case or the prosecutor, which then asks for additional work. From an investigation perspective, there is an impact on policing.
The management of risk in the community also falls to police, as I mentioned. You will have individuals who are remanded by police. They are remanded into the court process; a proportion of them will be then taken to prison, so they will be managed within the prison estate. However, the vast majority of the individuals will not go into the prison system. They will either be on conditional or unconditional bail. A proportion of them—about 9,500—are on a court tag. That means that they would have gone into the prison system if not for the fact that they had tags with conditions associated with them. Then, if there are breaches in relation to the tags or the conditional bail, that adds on to policing, which is then expected to manage those individuals, arrest them and take them back into the court process.
It is not just the investigations, and it is not just the victim care side of things; it is the management of risk in the community. We sometimes do that with risk assessments, and we do it with multi-agency public protection arrangements and multi-agency working, but there is still that risk, and we are managing that risk for longer.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Chief Constable Hatchett: Absolutely. Because we carry around a phone and we have computers, laptops and a whole host of other electronic items, the investment in digital forensics for policing has been exponential. The types of offence that digital-enabled crime allows for are prioritised. You would expect child abuse cases and so on to get the priority because of the risk, including offenders’ risk to other children, but all forces across England and Wales have had to put significant investment into digital forensics.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Chief Constable Hatchett: Absolutely. We sometimes get better at what we do with it and I suppose the innovations become better, which may enable us to interrogate devices quicker. We hope that will come in time and we invest in the technology to do that, but the reality is that we live in a digital age. That goes across the board for us all.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Chief Constable Hatchett: I think there are multiple reasons. There are people who are far better qualified to give you evidence on that; undoubtedly you will have spoken to defence lawyers and the Crown Prosecution Service, who can probably give you some really good evidence.
There are a whole host of reasons why cases are adjourned. Sometimes it is evidence, sometimes it is witnesses and victims, sometimes it is disclosure, sometimes it is court time—the reasons are multiple, but ultimately victims and witnesses are suffering as a consequence. My witness care units then have to pick up the conversations with those victims and witnesses to prepare them, hoping to keep them on board and confident enough in the criminal justice system to give evidence at a future date.
Matt Bishop
Q
Chief Constable Hatchett: Respect.
Matt Bishop
Thank you, and thank you for your service. My question is about the morale and mental health of police officers, as you might expect. It is not to the same level as victims, but with the inevitable delays is there a risk of retraumatising the police officers who have to look at evidence of the most heinous crimes years down the line and give statements at each court case? Is there a risk that police officers’ mental health is being affected as well?
Chief Constable Hatchett: Police officers are particularly challenged with the caseloads. Not only are you are dealing with the cases that you are investigating that day, but you have the cases that are in the system that need reinvestigation and rework. Caseload work is challenging and tough for some of our officers. Lots of work is being done on the wellbeing of officers, in terms of trauma and the types of case that they deal with, and on how police forces can get better. Forces are working with lots of people to make sure that the support is there for police officers.
It is not an easy job. You know that it is not an easy job. Day in, day out, we deal with people in crisis. Our focus has to be on victims and on keeping people safer from harm. That is absolutely where our officers are, but the caseload and the work that is generated by delays in the system do affect our officers.
Amanda Hack (North West Leicestershire) (Lab)
Q
Chief Constable Hatchett: A lot of it falls to the witness care units. Those are the individuals who are at the sharp end, dealing with victims and witnesses, trying to keep them on board. They do a phenomenal job, and they do it under really difficult circumstances. Every officer investigates, particularly in the serious cases—
The Chair
Order. I am sorry to interrupt you, but that brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank you very much for your evidence.
Examination of Witness
Daniel Flury gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service. We will have until 5.24 pm. Will you please briefly introduce yourself to the Committee?
Daniel Flury: I am Daniel Flury. I am the operations director in His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, and I am also the senior responsible officer in HMCTS for the implementation of the outcomes of the Leveson reports.
Dr Mullan
Q
Daniel Flury: It is not within my remit, no.
Dr Mullan
Q
Daniel Flury: That modelling is not undertaken by HMCTS. It is undertaken by the Ministry of Justice, and there are analytical teams. We produce projections and assessments on a routine basis—things like projections around the Crown court caseload, prison populations and so on. The findings and outcomes of the Leveson reports, and whatever happens with the Bill, will be factored into those projections, which are updated on a six-monthly basis, in terms of caseload projections, and are routinely shared with Ministers, and occasionally published.
Dr Mullan
Q
Daniel Flury: No—we have obviously never operated in this way, or this potential way, before. As all projects and programmes do, we are currently relying on assumptions. I know that teams have tested these assumptions with a whole variety of people who work in the criminal justice system—judges and so on—but they still are assumptions.
Dr Mullan
Q
Daniel Flury: I would not like to comment on that. The analysis is primarily undertaken by the Ministry of Justice; I am here representing the courts service and the operational side.
Dr Mullan
Q
Daniel Flury: The top two things are uncapped sitting days, and long-term certainty over sitting days. That is what we have been provided with in HMCTS. But as I am sure the Committee has heard, on the current projections, even sitting at uncapped levels and having certainty over three years is not enough to reverse the Crown and magistrates’ caseload. We need something else if we are to arrest the growth in caseload.
Dr Mullan
Q
Daniel Flury: On the principal sources of delay, you have mentioned the police and the effectiveness of trials, and we see lots of ineffective trials because of an absence of an advocate—an advocate is engaged in a case elsewhere. The situation with the Prison Escort and Custody Services—the delivery vans—is well known, and well documented in the Leveson report. Finding a way to improve that is pretty near the top of the list.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Daniel Flury: I can, but may I begin by saying a bit about why certainty is so important for the courts, in particular? We go through this annual round—what we call the concordat process—where we discuss with the MOJ and the judiciary the amount of funding that HMCTS gets. That has been an annual process, so we operate on an annual cycle.
Now that we have certainty over three years, it means quite a considerable amount to us. It means that we can confidently list over the next three years, so we can say to recorders whom we are trying to book now, “Look, this case is going to get on, and this date is going to be sat. We have the money to do this.” Having that certainty to book Crown court recorders and to recruit both staff and judges is a really important step for us.
I will come back to the question about the other things that we are doing to improve efficiency. We are about to roll out case co-ordinators, which is another recommendation in the Leveson report. These are people in the Crown court who will actively manage the case, and who will be able to make decisions on behalf of the judge using delegated powers. They will really corral the system together to drive efficiency and drive readiness in a case.
There is a whole variety of what we call blitz courts, which I would almost describe as a bet on the system. We try to brigade a number of cases that we know will either plead guilty or be discontinued by the Crown Prosecution Service. Under the direction of the judges, we list those cases, knowing that they will be disposed of there and then. This essentially brings those cases forward on the hope and expectation—we use data to establish what could plead out—that it will give us an opportunity to clear them from the caseload. The product of that is not only reducing the caseload but indicating to the system, particularly the defendants, that their case is not going to languish for three or four years in places like London. It means that it will come on, and they have a far greater incentive to plead guilty knowing that the trial is a bit more proximate.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Daniel Flury: One of our biggest challenges in this whole programme is the need to expand operations in the magistrates court, particularly the numbers of legal advisers and magistrates we have. We expect to recruit 100 additional legal advisers every year for the next three years, and the critical thing for us is to make them stay and retain them—we have seen lots of our legal advisers go off to local authorities or the CPS. We are working closely with our trade unions at the moment on potentially improving their pay to improve retention, and we are devising development schemes, so we are hopefully going to offer pupillage to our barrister legal advisers.
We are also supporting them in court. For example, we have recently developed a pilot using AI, where you take a case summary—what is called an IDPC pack, or initial details of the prosecution case—and it essentially summarises that case for the legal adviser. It tells them what the relevant points of law are and what the facts are in the case. These are ways in which we are both improving the efficiency of the magistrates court and improving the working conditions of legal advisers, because they really are critical if we are going to expand the magistrates court in this way.
Mr Kohler
Q
Daniel Flury: I think we all agree that there is room for improvement. We have had lots of testimony, certainly from Crown courts, about late starts and subsequent late finishes. That obviously affects not only the hearing but our staff, who have longer working days. I think we are all seized of the importance of driving improvements—there is now a ministerial board, which HMCTS sits on, to work with the prisoner service to improve the service we get. The service itself will be retendered in the next couple of years, and we hope improvements will arise from that, but it is certainly a factor in court output, and certainly in late sittings and late starts, particularly in the London Crown courts.
Mr Kohler
Q
Daniel Flury: It is certainly a cause of delays. As I said, it causes late starts and late finishes. This is why we over-list cases in both the Crown court and the magistrates court—to fill those gaps where they arise, but it is certainly a factor in the effectiveness and efficiency of the court day.
Tristan Osborne
Q
Daniel Flury: The consequences of the Bill for the Crown court, other than the jury trial element, will be relatively small. It will not really affect its day-to-day workings; there will just be a portion of cases that will be heard without a jury. In terms of the processes in the Crown court—how it operates and how judges list—we are not expecting profound changes at all. As I said, the real change arising from the Bill is the expansion of the magistrates court, and the real challenge for us in HMCTS is the need to recruit legal advisers and magistrates to expand the court and make its operations more efficient.
Dr Mullan
Q
Daniel Flury: As I said, to deliver the components of this Bill and its changes to jury trials, a number of relatively minor IT changes are needed. We need to change—
Dr Mullan
Q
Daniel Flury: Our biggest risks around this programme are retaining legal advisers and recruiting magistrates. We need 7,000 magistrates over the next three years and 100 more legal advisers each year. We have mitigations in place, especially on magistrates.
Linsey Farnsworth
Is it not the case that magistrates courts can be more agile in terms of court listing and picking up cases, like we heard from the Canadian—
The Chair
Order. Sorry, but that brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank you very much for your evidence. Wednesday 25 March Until no later than 4.25 pm Hon Sir Richard Henriques; His Honour Clement Goldstone KC; RT Hon Lord Burnett of Maldon Wednesday 25 March Until no later than 4.55 pm JUSTICE; Centre for Criminal Appeals (APPEAL); Institute for Government Wednesday 25 March Until no later than 5.10 pm Plan B. Earth Wednesday 25 March Until no later than 5.30 pm Ministry of Justice
Ordered,
That the Order of the Committee of 25 March 2026, as amended, be varied by as follows—
Leave out rows 28 to end and insert—
“
”—(Sarah Sackman.)
Examination of Witnesses
Sir Richard Henriques, Clement Goldstone and Lord Burnett of Maldon gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear from Sir Richard Henriques, His Honour Clement Goldstone KC and Lord Burnett of Maldon. We have until 5.59 pm for this panel. Thank you all very much. Could you briefly introduce yourself for the record?
Lord Burnett of Maldon: I am Ian Burnett, Lord Burnett of Maldon. I was Lord Chief Justice until October 2023.
Sir Richard Henriques: I am Richard Henriques, a retired High Court judge. I was called to the Bar in 1968.
Clement Goldstone: I am Clement Goldstone. I was a resident judge and the recorder of Liverpool until 2019.
Dr Mullan
Q
Lord Burnett of Maldon: Public involvement.
Sir Richard Henriques: I do not disagree with that, but it is also the fact that the world at large is able to observe justice and what is going on. In the present context, they will be extremely unhappy.
Clement Goldstone: I agree and have nothing to add.
Dr Mullan
Q
Clement Goldstone: First, every Crown court has a backlog—they need one to function. Why was Liverpool a success? It was a success, first of all, because it is an excellent single court centre; secondly, because it has a very positive interactive relationship between the bench and the Bar and the Bar and the bench; and thirdly, because the staff are always willing to go the extra mile, which is probably because of the way they interact with the judiciary.
The fourth reason, which I know is something inherited by my successor, is that, as recorder, I believed that if you want to bring out the best in people you give them responsibility. Everybody wants to be part of a success story, as Liverpool in that way was. What has happened over the last seven years since I retired is that the same standards have been maintained—albeit, it must be said, in much more difficult and trying circumstances than when I was in the position.
Dr Mullan
Q
Lord Burnett of Maldon: I have spoken publicly on many occasions about my personal belief that there is a need to rebalance the work between magistrates courts and Crown courts. I was aware of the detailed work done 25 years ago by Sir Robin Auld. He made certain proposals which, even then, although I was not a criminal barrister at the Bar, I took an interest and many of them struck me as being quite sensible.
During covid, I had detailed discussions with the then Lord Chancellor, Sir Robert Buckland, about adjusting the way we did trials, because it seemed to me that it was not a sensible approach to assume that covid would be over within weeks or a few months, which is what most people were doing, I’m afraid. Robert Buckland floated the idea of trying either-way cases in the Crown court with a judge and two magistrates—something I personally have favoured for a long time—but it did not fly politically; I think that is the best way of putting it.
Dr Mullan
Q
Lord Burnett of Maldon: Again, the Government well know my view on this—I see the Minister nodding. It seems to me that if one is going to reduce the involvement of the general public, as members of a jury, in the relatively low-level cases that go to the Crown court, maintaining public involvement through the magistracy is a good course to follow. It also has the great advantage of simply replicating a constitution and jurisdiction that exists in the Crown court at the moment. When there is an appeal from the magistrates court against conviction or sentence, including an appeal against conviction in an either-way case, it is heard in the Crown court by a judge and two magistrates. They take very little time. Both Sir Richard and Judge Goldstone are much more experienced, over many more years, in what happens in the Crown court than I can pretend to be, but those cases take very little time and the judge, on behalf of the court, gives an immediate judgment, just as in the Crown court generally the judge gives an immediate summing up. That struck me as being a much better course.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Sir Richard Henriques: Not much pragmatism as gravity, I think. The more serious cases will remain, pursuant to Sir Brian’s review, with juries. I heard the question “Are you trying to do away with juries?” earlier this afternoon. It is critical that the public do not think that we are doing away with juries. What is happening is a matter of pragmatism, as you say. Something has to change. The backlog has gone from 17,400 cases exactly six years ago to 80,000 now, and cases are being listed for four or five years’ time. Something has to be done. For my part, I agree with Lord Burnett: I would have preferred a judge and two magistrates. But something has to be done, and if judge alone is the only option, I am 100% in favour of it. I have no doubt that it will work and that it will save far more time than the Bar contends it will save. It will save a lot of time.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Lord Burnett of Maldon: Yes, it certainly is my view. To be perfectly blunt, I am rather astonished by some of what I have been reading from people who I do not think are necessarily focusing on the evidence of what happens.
I do not know whether the Committee is hearing from any magistrates or from district judges who sit in the magistrates court and the youth court, but they will tell you that either-way cases in the magistrates court and the youth court—of course, the youth court also does indictable offences—very rarely go beyond half a day. In the Crown court—Judge Goldstone will, I hope, be able to give you more detail—very few cases take less than a day and a half. That is not only because of the time-and-motion calculable time that having a jury involves, but because the way that advocates conduct cases in front of professional courts is completely different from the way they conduct cases in front of juries. It is much quicker, and a professional court can get the advocates to focus on the real issues, whereas in the Crown court the judge cannot interfere. I am convinced that the time saving will be enormous if the relatively low-level cases are tried by a new constitution. The same savings clearly would not be made in a 10-day or 15-day trial but that is, I think, not what we are looking at.
Sarah Sackman
No, that is not what is in the Bill. Mr Goldstone, I noticed you were nodding. Do you want to come in?
Clement Goldstone: I had the advantage of listening with interest to the three circuit leaders straight after lunch today. They will probably never speak to me again, but I have to say that I did not recognise the validity of the argument that time would not be saved.
Time will be saved in a number of ways. First, a lot of defendants who would otherwise have been tried by a jury and taken their chance will be far more realistic and take whatever credit is going if they know that they are going to be dealt with by a new division, whether it is one or three. Secondly, in my experience it is wrong to confine the savings, or the assessment of the savings, to empanelling and swearing in a jury. That is where it begins.
Every sex case, I suspect probably nationally, now comes before the court with a direction that there will be no witnesses before 2.15 pm on the first day or, if the case is starting at 2.15 pm, until 10.30 the following morning. If there is no jury, there is no bar to the evidence starting within 10 or 15 minutes, because if there is to be an opening at all, it can be very brief—and I mean very brief. Half a day, at least, will be saved on every sex case that is heard in the Crown court. That is before you start with time lost as a result of jury sickness, or a juror being delayed because his train has been cancelled or her bus was delayed. It is also easier to call a witness out of order if you are not trying to take a jury through in the order in which the evidence would otherwise be called. You do not need to worry about engaging with counsel to ensure that they stick to and get to the point. They will realise that they will not be playing to the gallery as, with the best will in the world, we have all been inclined to do in the past when we have had a jury to try to convince, particularly if we have a bad case.
I also do not accept that there will be additional time spent in the writing of judgments. The vast majority of decisions will follow the conclusion of the defence speech: ex tempore judgments in the overwhelming majority of cases or, in those very rare cases where something needs to be put into detailed construction, a verdict followed by a decision in writing, before sentence if there has been a conviction, within the next seven days if there has been an acquittal. There may be plenty of reasons why the restriction on the right to jury trial is not a good idea, but to suggest that time will not be saved is, in my view, not one of them.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Clement Goldstone: I think that many of the efficiencies that Liverpool has created can be replicated across the country, because many efficiencies stem from positive leadership and proactive engagement. In a way, it is much more difficult to achieve those efficiencies with a larger court centre than with a centre where there are only two judges. There really is a limit to what you can do if you are running a two-judge court, but in the larger courts I believe that there is far more room for efficiency than is perhaps readily assumed.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Sir Richard Henriques: I see no evidence at all that it is being abused. Sir Brian thinks that there should be an application for leave to appeal, as there is between the Crown court and the Court of Appeal. It is finely balanced, in my view.
With respect to the perfectly good question, I think we need to look at the bigger picture here. Sir Brian’s work is phenomenal—if anyone apart from Lord Burnett has read every word of it, they have done extremely well—but it would conceivably create more communications and more work, and it would not necessarily achieve a great deal, as I think that only 2% of cases are appealed. While it is a very interesting dilemma, I have not given it a huge amount of thought myself.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Lord Burnett, would you say the same?
Lord Burnett of Maldon: I was going to make the observation that Sir Richard just made about the very low level of appeals from the magistrates court to the Crown court, which is something of a tribute to our magistracy. It really is a very low level, so I do not personally see this as a big problem.
You asked about risk; one of the reasons why the current system exists is that the magistrates court is not a court of record and transcripts of what has gone on in the magistrates court are not readily available. If there were to be an appeal of the sort that is contemplated in this legislation, my understanding is that there needs to be quite a lot of work to put the nuts and bolts in place in the magistrates court. Forgive me if I have misunderstood, but I had not understood that it was expected that this could be put into place immediately. It is more a tidying-up measure, as I see it, that accompanies issues that are really much more important.
Clement Goldstone: In principle, I am in favour of controlling the right of appeal to the Crown court. When I was in Liverpool—it is not that long ago—we were sitting one or sometimes two judges on Thursdays and Fridays on appeals. For some unknown reason, there seemed to be a lot dangerous dogs in Liverpool, so there were a lot of dangerous dog appeals.
More seriously, I do not think the right is abused, because it is there to be utilised, but I do believe that there is an argument for weeding out a lot of hopeless appeals. Also, you must bear in mind that if there is an appeal based on a wish to call fresh evidence, particularly perhaps bearing in mind that a defendant in the magistrates court was not represented, that is something that would have to be carefully considered, so I would not reject it as a good idea, because it could result in time savings, but it is something that has to be counselled with caution.
Linsey Farnsworth
Q
Lord Burnett of Maldon: District judges (magistrates’ court), formerly stipendiary magistrates, have been a feature of our system since the mid-19th century—I cannot remember precisely which year they were introduced. I have never been aware of any reasoned criticism of the way in which they conduct cases. On the contrary, the rate of appeal that Sir Richard referred to includes cases that have been tried by district judges and deputy district judges. It is a phenomenon that we are used to in the criminal justice system.
Linsey Farnsworth
Q
Clement Goldstone: It would give the opportunity to a judge who was in the middle of a judge-alone or judge-with-magistrates trial to say, “We will have to break off because this witness is ill,” to use your example, or, “because the defendant is ill,” and that would enable him to start another trial. At the moment, in the Crown court, where there is a judge and a jury, when a witness is ill, very often there is an abortive trial. If a witness does not turn up and the witness cannot be found, a decision has to be taken whether to go on or to give a little limited time for the witness to be found. Therefore, one of the other savings of time that will follow is that there will be no retrials and no juries to discharge, for whatever reason.
I know that is not a direct answer to your question, but it is another by-product of restricting the right to trial by jury to the cases that are envisaged. There is, of course, a catch-all for the cases in which the public interest requires a trial by jury, even if conviction merits a sentence of less than three years.
Linsey Farnsworth
Q
Clement Goldstone: You would have one trial listed once, hopefully.
Linsey Farnsworth
Q
Lord Burnett of Maldon: I have read some of these arguments, and I have been slightly surprised by them. I cannot help the old advocate in me thinking that lawyers are terribly good at finding nine reasons why you should not do something. We all did that; that is what lawyers are sometimes asked to do. I think this one will very much depend upon the procedures that are put in place for dealing with it.
Obviously, if you are going to create a new decision that has to be made, there will need to be adjustments to the practice direction and probably the criminal procedure rules, and I am not sure that detail has been thought through yet. If it has, I am not aware of it. I imagine that most of these decisions would be done on the papers. It strikes me as rather extravagant to suppose that you list it for half an hour for argument to deal with something like that, so I think that one is a bit of a bogeyman.
Sir Richard Henriques: Paper applications seem to me to be fairly obvious.
Clement Goldstone: Judges in the Crown court are very good at paper applications. They are used to them.
Mr Kohler
Q
Lord Burnett of Maldon: It is a very good journalistic article.
Mr Kohler
He is not a journalist, though; he is a retired Lord Justice of Appeal.
Lord Burnett of Maldon: Let me give you a sense of how we had to deal with this when we got through covid. There was by then a backlog of 60,000 cases in the Crown court—it is 80,000 now, and it is going up. Critically, the proportion of cases not dealt with within six months and a year was growing, and that continues to grow. We tried to bring to bear every possible judicial resource to sit as many days as we could, because the Government of the day removed the cap on sitting days.
I authorised to sit in retirement pretty well anybody who wanted to come in and help. We changed the system so that magistrates court district judges could sit in the Crown court; we got a cohort of those in. We allowed recorders to sit in retirement, effectively, to enhance the numbers. We did enhance the numbers, but—with the greatest of respect to Sir Alan, whom of course I know extremely well—to suggest that you can solve this problem by the click of a finger is just not right. People have been trying to solve the problems of backlogs and inefficiencies in the criminal courts for pretty well as long as there have been criminal courts. I really can assure you that if there were any simple answer it would have been found long ago.
I set up something called the Crown Court Improvement Group, now the Criminal Court Improvement Group, which does fantastic work in bringing together all the players in the system to improve efficiency, and they are doing so, but those looking at a system from the outside, when they do not live in it—with the greatest of respect to those elsewhere who do that—and think that there are simple answers, are just not right. I would be putting myself in that position if I tried to tell the Royal Navy how to make sure that its ships worked and got around the world. People think they know the answers, but until they live and understand the system in detail, that is not how it works.
Mr Kohler
I would like to hear your view.
Clement Goldstone: Because of the involvement of the public and the right of the person to be tried by his or her peers—but something has to give. We are in a situation where something has to change. In fact, a lot of things have to change, because the restriction on the right to jury trial will not work alone, and let nobody think that it will. Someone used the expression, “It’s not a pick and mix”; it is part of a much bigger picture. On the point that you suggested, which Sir Alan Moses had raised, not a Crown court centre in the country of any substance does not already have in existence precisely that procedure of trying to force into the list those cases that have any prospect of—for want of a better phrase—cracking, whether by way of the prosecution offering no evidence or by way of the defendant pleading guilty.
John Slinger
Q
“did not immediately give us trial by jury, although when jury trial did evolve it came to be regarded as based on the Charter’s guarantee of trial by one’s peers. It did not offer sweeping statements about personal freedoms or human rights or fair trials and, in fact, for the most part did not establish general rights, but rather created or recognised privileges.”
Therefore, as we debate this matter, we ought to bear those points in mind. Do you agree?
Sir Richard Henriques: I agree with those observations without reservation. I think I speak for all of us present: given no backlog, we would not be here at all. We are concerned about this being shameful—a word I used in The Times, I think, in March 2020, and it was shameful then. On trial by jury, I have spent my whole professional life in the presence of juries, save in the very early days—
The Chair
Order. That brings us to the end of the time to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, thank you.
Examination of Witnesses
Fiona Rutherford, Emma Torr and Cassia Rowland gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from JUSTICE, APPEAL and the Institute for Government. We have until 6.29 pm for this evidence session. Thank you for attending today, and for waiting. Can the witnesses briefly introduce themselves for the record?
Fiona Rutherford: I am Fiona Rutherford. I am the chief executive of JUSTICE, the UK’s law reform and human rights charity.
Emma Torr: I am Emma Torr. I am a barrister and the co-director of the charity APPEAL, the Centre for Criminal Appeals, which represents people who have been convicted of a criminal offence in England and Wales.
Cassia Rowland: I am Cassia Rowland. I am a senior researcher and criminal justice specialist at the Institute for Government.
Dr Mullan
Q
Emma Torr: Correct.
Dr Mullan
Q
Fiona Rutherford: I certainly did. I cannot speak on behalf of the other organisations, but certainly from my behalf, that is exactly my understanding.
Emma Torr: I would agree with that.
Dr Mullan
Q
Fiona Rutherford: We have not participated in any of the conversations that may well have happened with or without Ministers or officials.
Emma Torr: Not within my knowledge at all, no.
Dr Mullan
Q
Fiona Rutherford: We have already heard from Daniel Flury in relation to the way that the magistrates courts are simply not structurally set up in many different ways. We know that magistrates typically undertake 13 sitting days on average. They also receive only three weeks’ training. If we are talking about moving into a situation where the sentencing powers are going to get far higher, that is of significant concern.
We all hope that there will be recruitment of magistrates, bearing in mind they have been cut by over 50% in the last 15,16 or 20 years. We know if the recruitment that is being talked about is successful, those people will be highly inexperienced, whether they are the legal advisers or the magistrates who are making decisions themselves.
To counter what I think was by said by the previous panel, of the appeals that come from the magistrates court to the Crown court when there is a concern about conviction or sentence, 40%—nearly half—are overturned when it is to do with an appeal against conviction, and 47% are overturned when it is an appeal against a sentence. There is a question mark about the accuracy of the way in which magistrates are making decisions.
We have heard about diversity among magistrates, and it is true that magistrates are more diverse than the judiciary, both in terms of gender and age. However, socioeconomically, there is a big gap for both the judiciary and magistracy. When looking at, for example, the number of applications to become a magistrate, only 3% of those people who applied are from manual labour jobs, which of course, again, will not be commensurate or replicative of the people who are going through the system.
You have already covered unrepresented defendants. That will only increase in relation to the existing legal aid issues. It will fundamentally mean that the defendants in those positions—particularly with very difficult cases—could be cross-examining their victims. If there is no lawyer to put that barrier in the way, then I can only imagine that the impact on those victims will be tremendous, particularly in very difficult cases.
We have talked about minorities and disproportionality. There was a fantastic question from the Committee earlier. We know that there is greater confidence among the public, particularly minority communities, in jury fairness over and above anything else. The Deputy Prime Minister has already written this down and has found that out from his own research. Racial disproportionality in the criminal justice system is and will continue to be a problem if we do not continue to try to work through that and keep juries as the clearest and fairest way of doing that.
Emma Torr: The proposal to reduce the automatic right of appeal from the magistrates court to the Crown court has been presented as part of a package of measures to reduce the backlog in the criminal courts; however, removing the automatic right of appeal will introduce a multi-step process, which will only increase the workload of both the magistrates and Crown courts. To give a very brief outline of how it works at the moment, the defendant or the solicitor can fill out a very simple form, which results in a quick rehearing at the Crown court. As we heard from the previous panel, that works very well. It takes a couple of hours at most and even less for sentence appeals.
What the Government are proposing in the Bill is a multi-layered process. That involves consideration of grounds of appeal, articulation of those grounds in an application, consideration of that application by a Crown court judge—with or without a hearing—followed by a potential remittal to the magistrates court if there is to be a rehearing if leave is granted. That will add to the workload of not only the courts but criminal solicitors who work under legal aid and are chronically underfunded and overstretched in capacity.
One important thing to consider when talking specifically about the right of appeal from the magistrates courts is that the Law Commission very carefully considered this in its 700-page consultation paper last year and took views from a number of different stakeholders. Its independent analysis was that the removal of the automatic right to appeal will increase the workload of the magistrates court and the Crown court.
Dr Mullan
Q
Cassia Rowland: The approach that the MOJ has taken in thinking about the modelling totally makes sense and is very similar to what we did. I want to make it really clear that our numbers are the same in our first and second reports. We are looking at the numbers in a slightly different way from the MOJ. The 19% overall saving in the Crown court is specifically for the Crown court. Our figure that is a 10% to 13% saving takes into account the increase in demand in magistrates courts as well. That is a big part of the difference. I just wanted to clarify that.
Dr Mullan
Q
Cassia Rowland: There are a lot of uncertainties behind the modelling. Some of that is inevitable because we do not have the information available. In particular, the bulk of the savings come from moving cases into the magistrates courts, rather than from the bench division, the judge-only-trial element, and there are quite substantial questions as to how feasible it is to move that many cases into magistrates courts if the Bill passes and as to the amount of time that those cases might take once they are in magistrates courts.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Cassia Rowland: That is absolutely true. We do not know what is likely to happen on plea rates or dropped cases. A lot of cases are dropped at the moment, partly because of the length of delays. The modelling makes certain assumptions about how that might change, but there is a lot of uncertainty there. There is definitely uncertainty in both directions, but what we do not and cannot really capture in modelling in the short to medium term is the effect of the reforms themselves and the disruption that that potentially creates in the system, in the form of short-term productivity and performance problems.
Sarah Sackman
Q
“The shortage of criminal lawyers is a crucial source of productivity problems in the criminal courts…with 4%”—
this is more than 1,000 cases—
“of all scheduled crown court trials in 2024 rescheduled on the day because the prosecution or defence lawyer was absent.”
For what it is worth, I agree with that analysis—it is really helpful. However, even with the massive investment that the Government are making, in both criminal pupillages and legal aid, it is not realistic to suppose that we can address that workforce shortage in anything other than years. It takes years to train a barrister; it takes years to recruit lots of judges, does it not?
Cassia Rowland: indicated assent.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Cassia Rowland: It does need to be a long-term programme. There are some things that you can do in the short term, and we have already seen that. Just in the last couple of years, there has been an increase in publicly funded criminal barristers receiving legal aid income and so on.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Cassia Rowland: No, it is not what you would need, but you also have to take it into account that there are risks on the other side with some of these proposals, which would reduce the amount of publicly funded work existing in the system. Potentially you could lose people from the criminal Bar. There is the risk of making things worse, so you do also have to balance that.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Cassia Rowland: I do not think I necessarily agree with that. It will take time but, respectfully, the proposals in this Bill will also take years. There are measures that you can do on the productivity side that will be faster than some of the measures contained in the Bill. A case co-ordinator role, for instance, is really fantastic; we are very strongly supportive of that.
Sarah Sackman
Thank you.
Cassia Rowland: We are always banging the drum for more back office and admin staff at the IfG. I worry that some of these reform programmes will move productivity in the wrong direction, in a way that may counteract the benefits of the structural reforms.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Fiona Rutherford: We do not do that, no.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Emma Torr: Yes, but you have to understand that if you—
Sarah Sackman
Yes, you do provide services to victims.
Emma Torr: We provide services to individuals who have been wrongfully convicted and unfairly sentenced. You could classify people like Andrew Malkinson and Peter Sullivan as victims, because they have suffered horrendous miscarriages of justice, so in that sense we do.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Fiona Rutherford: Yes, and I referred earlier to the impact of having more litigants in person, which would be the impact of there being fewer lawyers representing defendants in the magistrates court. If you are looking at it from a victim’s perspective, one of the key things is that you will get the cross-examination directly from the defendant in court. Equally, there are some issues with the way that appeals will take place. At the moment, as Emma has said, there is a reliance on the lawyers to really lead the way with those appeals—that is possibly why only 1% of appeals go from the magistrates to the Crown court.
Without a lawyer being present, and of course without there even being the right to appeal directly, you are leaving a whole load of defendants, who may well be wrongly convicted or may get the wrong sentence for the crime they have committed, floundering. From what we know, either about the legislation or the policy that sits around it, I simply don’t know who will inform these people about how they will put grounds of appeal together, what grounds of appeal even are, how you formulate those, what key points you need to make in them to persuade a Crown court judge sitting alone in a room with just some evidence papers and how to put your best case forward. There are a number of ramifications of legal aid being an issue in the magistrates court, or of there not being enough legal aid.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Emma Torr: There is a simple form where you have to set out your reasons for appealing, but there is no judge in the Crown court looking at that form and saying, “You’re not entitled to an appeal because you haven’t set out the reasons why you want to appeal.” It is an automatic right to a full rehearing in the Crown court. That is so important, because that automatic right acts as an essential counterbalance. We have heard about swift and speedy justice in the magistrates court. It is often rough and ready; we are talking about cases being tried by lay justices, some of whom may be experienced but some may not be, and we are also talking about less experienced judges. You often find in the lower court, the magistrates court, that advocates are more inexperienced and tend to be at the start of their career. The more experienced they are, the more serious the cases they deal with. What I am trying to say is that to have rough and ready justice dealt with quickly, the magistrates court requires that automatic right to redress any mistakes that might have happened. Let me put it this way: the automatic right of appeal is the ying to the magistrates’ yang, in the sense that you have an important safeguard against the miscarriages that do happen.
It is worth pointing out that the Magistrates’ Association, in its response to the Law Commission’s consultation paper, agreed with retaining the automatic right of appeal on the basis that justice may occasionally result in rough edges and potential errors in the magistrates court. In its view, the automatic right of appeal operates as a crucial safeguard, and that is essentially what we are saying.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Cassia Rowland: We have not done an in-depth assessment of that. If by mitigation you are thinking about the justice fairness outcome, we have been principally focused on the ability of the courts to cope with this, but there is, as Emma mentioned, an acceptance that summary justice is rapid justice and it can be a bit rough around the edges. There needs to be a clear-eyed assessment of the trade-off you are potentially making between swifter justice by hearing more cases in magistrates courts and more robust justice in the Crown court.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Cassia Rowland: We have not. Regarding the specialist RASSO courts, the principal arguments for those are about not efficiency, but the experience of the victim and the more trauma-informed and wraparound approach that that kind of set-up would allow for.
Alex McIntyre
Q
Earlier, we heard evidence from victims who supported the change to the right to appeal against a magistrates court decision to include a review from a judge, on the basis that a number of victims drop out of the process because they fear being retraumatised by a system that is not designed to support them. How do you balance that with your position that there needs to be checks and balances? Do you not agree that, by having a judge look at it, we are not refusing a right of appeal but merely qualifying it first?
Fiona, JUSTICE has said that the magistrates are ill-equipped to enable the reforms, and you have made that point again today, but the Magistrates’ Association, which is not here to give evidence today, has said that magistrates are ready and willing to play their part. Why does your assessment differ from that of the magistrates themselves?
Fiona Rutherford: We already know that the numbers are not where they need to be, given the number of magistrates required to do the huge amount of work that would be placed into their hands. Equally, we have not heard yet —maybe there are plans on this—how magistrates will be better trained to be able to cope with the greater complexity of cases that they will necessarily hear. I have talked about the disproportionality of magistrates in terms of socioeconomic grouping; that is absolutely critical when it comes to public trust. There is a final point, but it has escaped me, so I will let Emma come in on this and I might come back to you.
Emma Torr: That was a good question, on which I would like to make two points. The case of Andrew Malkinson is a good example to consider when talking about these changes. Of course, there was a victim in that case, who was certain that the right person had gone to prison, but we know that Andrew Malkinson spent 17 years in prison for something that he did not do. When he appealed at the time, a judge looked at his appeal at the Court of Appeal; twice he went to the Criminal Cases Review Commission, and twice his case was turned down. That is an example of where a judge has looked at the appeal, but would not give him—
Alex McIntyre
Q
Emma Torr: No, that is not APPEAL’s position.
Alex McIntyre
Q
Emma Torr: We are dealing with two different sets of processes. You are talking about the magistrates court, where there is more risk of miscarriages of justice happening by the very nature of the system—by who is hearing and who is presenting the case, as I said before. But perhaps the most important thing in magistrates court is unrepresented defendants. Around 50% of people in magistrates court do not have access to legal advice, either for their trial or to help them with their appeal, so it is important that you have the automatic right to appeal.
Alex McIntyre
Q
Emma Torr: It is not about faith in the Crown court judges. APPEAL receives hundreds of letters from people asking for our assistance. In the majority of those cases, they cannot necessarily articulate, in their letter or communications to us, what has gone wrong. They might be concerned about things that have happened during the trial process, but they cannot articulate what could amount to grounds of appeal. It takes a lot of care by us to look at the case, understand what has gone wrong and analyse it before we can decide whether we can draw out grounds of appeal.
You would be asking judges to do exactly that; not just to read the application and dismiss it because they have not been able to identify compelling grounds of appeal. Will the judge look at the digital case system, will they review evidence of witnesses or will they simply look at a short transcript? A lot of care needs to go into that analysis to formulate what could be compelling grounds, and giving that job to Crown court judges will increase the workload.
The Chair
That brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank you all for your evidence.
Examination of Witness
Tim Crosland gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear evidence from Plan B. We have until 6.44 pm for this panel. Could you please briefly introduce yourself for the record?
Tim Crosland: Good afternoon, I am Tim Crosland. I was previously a Government lawyer, working mainly on criminal justice issues. I am now at the climate justice charity Plan B, and I also helped establish the civil liberties movement Defend Our Juries in 2023. That was before this Bill was born, but in anticipation that it would not be long before legislation like this came along that threatened to remove trial by jury from protest cases.
Dr Mullan
Q
Tim Crosland: There had been a pattern of jury acquittals in protest cases. In April 2021, the Shell six, who had spray painted “Shell Lies” on Shell headquarters, were acquitted by a jury. In January 2022, the Colston four, who toppled the statue of the slave trader Edward Colston into Bristol harbour, were acquitted by a jury. In November 2022, members of Palestine Action, who had defaced Elbit Systems—suppliers of drones to the Israel Defence Forces—were acquitted by a jury. In January 2023, members of Insulate Britain were acquitted by a jury for blocking roads. It goes on, and we were seeing the reaction to that. It was nothing to do with the efficiency of the courts; it was the reactions from companies like Shell and Elbit, the meetings with Ministers, and the call, “How do we stop this happening because this is deeply embarrassing?”
Dr Mullan
Q
Tim Crosland: It is a vital component of democracy. The classic example that comes up a lot is Clive Ponting. This is going back few decades—I remember it. In the 1980s, he was a civil servant who heard an account of what happened to the General Belgrano being presented to the public and Parliament that he knew was not true. He knew that the Belgrano was driving away from the British forces when it was sunk, so he leaked that information and was prosecuted for breach of the Official Secrets Act. The judge said, “You have no defence in law.” If it was down to the judge, Clive Ponting would have been convicted as a criminal and jailed.
The jury saw somebody who had acted to get good information to the public, so they disregarded the judge’s ruling—a principle known as jury equity—and Clive Ponting was acquitted. That sent a powerful message to politicians about the standards that the public expect: standards of honesty and integrity. If we do away with the principle of jury equity, we do away with a vital democratic safeguard.
Dr Mullan
Q
Tim Crosland: What I said was do away with jury equity. Jury equity—the principle that a jury can acquit a defendant irrespective of the directions of the judge—only applies to cases where people are unlikely to receive a sentence of more than three years. It applies to cases of conscience where people have acted in the public interest, at least in their own self-understanding, and that is what they want to present to the jury. Those people are very unlikely to get long sentences of beyond three years imprisonment. In reality, this measure will do away with the principle of jury equity altogether.
Linsey Farnsworth
I want to declare that, as Crown prosecutor, I was assigned to the team that looked at the Insulate Britain campaign and reviewed the evidence as to whether charges should be brought. I want to make that clear and put it out in the open.
Tim Crosland: Thank you.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Tim Crosland: Increasingly they are getting to the Crown court, because of this and the previous Government’s crackdown on protests. We had the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022; there is now a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment for any act that interferes with the rights of anybody in any way. We are now getting more protest cases coming to the Crown court, and more than 200 people have been jailed in the last few years for peaceful acts of protest. But of those 200 people, only one has been jailed for more than three years. A number of people have been jailed for precisely three years—the threshold in this legislation—but only one for more than four years. Almost any judge would be able to say that it is incredibly unlikely that you will get a sentence of more than three years imprisonment—therefore, no jury.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Tim Crosland: You mean in the Official Secrets Act case?
Sarah Sackman
No, not in the Ponting case. In the recent Elbit case.
Tim Crosland: No, these were criminal damage cases.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Tim Crosland: There have been a number of these cases. Mainly, they are either way, because they are usually criminal damage cases. The case now—as it remains, because there is a retrial—is criminal damage, and these are either-way cases. On the tests as set out in the Bill, mainly—and we have a lot of evidence of this—a judge would say that this would be less than three years, because it is mostly spray paint and relatively low-level damage. We have seen cases of high-level damage too, but it is never more than three years.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Tim Crosland: Of course it is, but the proposition here is neutral to the wider argument about addressing the backlog. It is about a very niche number of cases where people have taken action to expose Government or corporate wrongdoing. The impact of this proposal is that they would no longer be tried by a cross-section of their peers; they would be tried by someone who, ultimately, is paid by the state, where we all know what the outcome will be, because judges in those trials have directed juries, as far as they possibly can, that there is no defence.
Most of these acquittals have involved a jury going, “Hang on a second. I’ve listened to the evidence over a week or two, and I’m satisfied that these people took action because they were desperate and felt that there was no option for getting the truth into the public domain to counter the disinformation of”—for example—“the fossil fuel companies.” Those jury acquittals then send an important signal to politicians that when the public actually get good information—let’s say about the nature of the climate emergency—they are shocked at Government inaction. Those acquittals are meaningful in a profound way, and we will not have them any more. It will just be guilty, guilty, guilty.
Sarah Sackman
Q
Tim Crosland: I think that is a good question—
Sarah Sackman
It is a good question. Can you answer it?
Tim Crosland: I want to talk particularly about cases where people are saying—like Clive Ponting and many activists did—that the motivation for taking the action is that what the state is doing is insufficient to protect the public. That is a fundamentally different situation. Look at the Colston situation: who better to decide whether that action crossed a threshold than a cross-section of Bristol residents, who would understand better than anybody in this room the impact of that statue on that community? That would not happen any more; it would be a paid judge deciding. In my submission, it is precisely those cases where a jury trial is a democratic imperative and where you would lose something really profound.
To answer your question, I would not wish to say that other people should not have a jury trial. I am not saying that at all; I am just making a particular argument for these cases.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Tim Crosland: The risk is to democracy and to people’s confidence in democracy in cases that explore the boundaries between public interest, the right to protest and criminal law. We lose the essence of democratic rights if people know that they will not get a trial before their peers. It is a very profound danger. It was only in 2024 after 69-year-old retired social worker Trudi Warner had been arrested and prosecuted for holding up a sign outside London Crown court that the High Court said that juries were entitled to acquit as a matter of conscience. Her case came before the High Court, which dismissed the Government’s prosecution of her and said that jury equity is a vital principle of our democracy and she was right to uphold it. It was part of her convention rights. We lose that principle if we ignore protesters when we look at this legislation.
Alex McIntyre
Q
The Chair
You have 30 seconds to respond.
Tim Crosland: We have this in the civil courts. Jury trials in the civil courts are reserved only for cases such as malicious prosecution or unlawful imprisonment—
Alex McIntyre
Q
Tim Crosland: If they argued that they acted in the public interest, then potentially, yes, but drawing that line—
The Chair
Order. That brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, thank you very much for your evidence.
Examination of Witness
Sarah Sackman gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear evidence from the Ministry of Justice. We have until 7.04 pm for this panel. Could the Minister introduce herself for the record?
Sarah Sackman: I am Sarah Sackman MP, and I am the Minister of State for Courts and Legal Services.
Dr Mullan
Q
Sarah Sackman: We are having, including today, an incredibly open and robust debate on an issue of real national importance. We have had robust debate in the Chamber and we have heard from witnesses with very different perspectives, some of whom are clearly against these proposals—I welcome their contribution to the debate— and some who favour them. There is clearly a spectrum of opinion, and I welcome that debate; I have never shied away from it. Over the last year, on behalf of the MOJ, I have personally engaged with stakeholders, including—this is probably the most engagement I have had—with people and groups that oppose the measures we are bringing forward. They include the Bar Council and the Criminal Bar Association, for example, with which I have good relationships, although we disagree quite significantly on these proposals.
In respect of the letter, which was signed by 70 groups, all of those groups can speak for themselves. In advance of the letter being published, engagement took place with those groups to hear them out. Many of them maintained their objections, particularly Rights of Women, which led the objection. But it was important to have that engagement and dialogue on where there were areas of consensus and where we could work together. I would never—you heard the exchange I had with JUSTICE—put pressure on anybody to withdraw their objection. If people have objections, those objections need to be heard. There needs to be constructive engagement, and we have sought to have that in this debate. I think that people would agree that that is what has taken place.
Dr Mullan
Q
Sarah Sackman: Look, I genuinely cannot state every conversation that was had, because I do not know. What I can say is that a number of the groups who led the letter, Rights of Women—I hope it will not mind me saying—being one of them, attended a meeting with myself and Minister Jones. We had a good, full and frank conversation, and that letter then went to publication. You can see what the arguments are, and you have deployed them in your arguments, as well you might—if I were in your shoes, I would do the same.
Dr Mullan
Q
Sarah Sackman: What I know is that as a Minister, I seek, along with other Ministers, to set the culture of my Department. We keep the channels of communication open with all the stakeholders that you have heard from today, including many who are robustly not just opposing but campaigning against this. I was counting, and I think I must have engaged with the Bar at least 10 times since I became a Minister. I expect my officials to follow that lead, and that is the steer that they get from me: that we want to engage and have those conversations.
In advance of the particular engagement I am talking about, I held and led a number of stakeholder engagement sessions where I explained the rationale for the measures and what we were doing for victims. A number of those groups’ signatures ended up on that letter, so I did not persuade them, but the engagement was there—and it was open, convivial and constructive.
Dr Mullan
Q
Moving on to some extent, I can say to you, “This modelling says this,” and you can point to other modelling that says otherwise; I can say that court judge X disagrees with you, and you can point to a judge who agrees with you, and we can go back and forth. I am not seeking to do that, because I do not think it would be particularly productive.
I will instead try to pique your intellectual curiosity about the challenges for any Minister. Let us say we all agreed with your proposals in principle and that, if you were able to secure the changes you are seeking, they would be positive. The question is how you secure reform in Government—particularly major systems reform—successfully, and the challenges and unintended consequences that can arise. Have you spoken to any current or former Ministers who have embarked on a major reform programme similar to this? What lessons or points did they raise about how it can go wrong?
Sarah Sackman: There is no doubt that reform is challenging, but defending a status quo that—I think of the words used earlier—is producing shameful outcomes should shame us as a society. The first job of the state is to provide a justice system that is there for the citizen, whether accused of a crime or a victim. We are not doing that at the moment, in my view.
As you know, I was appointed a Minister on becoming an MP in July 2024, and I have always tried to approach that with a degree of humility, taking soundings from those with greater experience—including, by the way, Ministers from the previous Government, with whom I do not share politics but whose experience I respect. Over time I have met the likes of Alex Chalk, Jeremy Wright and Dominic Grieve and spoken to them about the state of our justice system and the challenges they faced in Government. Of course, I have also spoken to Ministers in the previous Labour Government, who did a huge amount as a reforming Government.
I am always somebody who asks questions. I hope I am intellectually curious and that I have asked questions of those who have administered the justice system, and so know how resistant it has been to reform. I will be really blunt and candid with you: I know when we have undertaken some reforms in the justice system—for example, before my time, the attempted digitisation of the civil justice system—billions of pounds of taxpayer money were spent and, frankly, it was a flop. It is still not digitised. You still go to county courts and they are covered in paper. A number of—I do not want to say bodies, because that is a bit crude—attempts at reform have been made in the past, and they have failed. I am realistic about the challenge we are facing, but I am also clear that the status quo is broken and that if we do not act, it would be a dereliction of duty.
Dr Mullan
Q
Sarah Sackman: Of course I do. I have always said—and the Deputy Prime Minister has made the same point—that in reforming and rebuilding this system, we have sought to put victims at the heart of what we are doing. You will know that we are doing a lot on the victims code, through investment in victim services and how the reforms reflect that centring of the victims. Of course, victims are not a monolith. I met and spoke to Charlotte Nichols, who opposes aspects of these reforms and has her own experience as a victim. There is no universal victims’ voice, but there are very powerful victims’ voices we have heard today saying that we must improve and work together to get a better system to deal with those shameful delays.
Amanda Hack
Q
Sarah Sackman: There are two tests that I set myself, and neither is going to be easy to achieve within this Parliament. The first essay question is: can you deal with the intolerable delays? Can you ensure swift justice? That does not mean summary justice. That does not mean rushing through the cases, but it does mean getting through the caseload quicker so that people are not waiting for years. At the end of this Parliament, I do not want people waiting years for justice. That is the first test. It is the timeliness, which is the essential ingredient of fairness.
The second thing is: we are in a crisis, but we have an opportunity—with justice being the focus of our Parliament and our national debate for the first time in a very long time, and with real investment from the Treasury—to create something better. Our justice system has remained largely unreformed since the 1970s. There are lots of things that people might like about the 1970s, not least the music, but there were lots about our social values and our societal norms that were very different then. It was a different place for women, for black and minority ethnic communities, for gay people and lots of other communities. I do not think the system that was designed then is the one that we would design now.
We heard earlier from Katrin Hohl, who is leading work for the Government to embed some of the Soteria measures, which have been so good and progressive in the police and the CPS, into our courts. I know it can sound like a cheesy cliché, but my objective is the idea of building back something better, and designing a system that is not just sustainable and capable of dealing with the delays question but, in terms of its design, centres victims and is fair, particularly to women and black and minority ethnic communities. That is my objective: can we get a more progressive justice system?
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Sarah Sackman: The difficulty is that any pilot where you are testing the sorts of measures that we are countenancing, which have taken their cue from the IRCC, would require primary legislation. We could not do this without primary legislation in the first place. Secondly, I do not feel discomfort, and I feel confident in the measures, because they are based on expertise that the independent review gave us. Thirdly, as we have heard, the time for pilots was yesterday—it was probably 10 years ago. The state of the backlogs at 80,000 and continuing to grow means that we have to pull every lever to not just reform the system but to invest in it and modernise it, to bring down those backlogs.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Sarah Sackman: We learned a huge amount through the pandemic. To give a personal example, I had a trial that was due to come on the day that we went into lockdown, and we were told that we were going to do it on video link. People had been speaking for years about the use of videos in courts. They said you couldn’t do it: you could not cross-examine a witness; you could not do your advocacy. Yet there we were. We were all told to go on video, and the sky did not fall in—it worked. We learnt and the MOJ got a lot of institutional knowledge through the pandemic.
There are also a lot of piloting initiatives that the MOJ is undertaking: for example, our pilots for our new digital listing tool, where we are taking some of the lessons from Liverpool and elsewhere but doing that using data. We are piloting that in Isleworth and Preston. A lot of that evidence would have been put forward to the IRCC. Obviously, it is also held within the MOJ. This package of measures that we are bringing forward, when you model, it is what we believe is capable of bringing down the backlog, together with the investment and modernisation.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Sarah Sackman: On that specific example, I would have to go away and ask what was considered by officials because it has not been surfaced to my attention. I have had the blitz courts, where cases are listed very aggressively, brought to my attention, and we are doing them in London as of next month. I do not know about the specific pilot you are talking about. I have not considered that directly, but I am sure that my officials have.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I am happy to send you the Government link to that.
Sarah Sackman: I would appreciate that, thank you.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Sarah Sackman: I think that I know where this is going, because I think that you will push me on this. Plainly, we are here, and the nature of the debate is shaped by the appalling backlog in our courts and the crisis we face—we all agree on that. There are 80,000 cases, and behind every one is a victim, and cases are being listed into 2030. This British justice system, which we will have huge pride in, is kind of indefensible.
You have heard me say in the Chamber, and I am not going to resile from it, that there are certainly parts of this plan that I would be advocating for anyway, because I think that they will make the system fairer and more sustainable. You heard the police chief talk about the fact that demand pressures come into the picture not just because of the backlog but because of the changing nature and complexity of criminal trials. The system needs to reform itself.
You heard Charlotte, one of the victims who spoke earlier, talk about the changes to the right to elect. I find it curious that Scotland, for example, does not have the right of election for a defendant. We know that it exists in Canada—we heard about that example—but it does not exist in Scotland, and there are lots of other jurisdictions where that does not exist. I find it strange that the defendant chooses the mode of trial, rather than the court triaging it. I use a healthcare analogy: if I go to A&E on a Saturday night, I do not get to insist that I get to see the specialist consultant if I can be treated appropriately by a resident health associate. It seems to me that the changes are normative and values-driven, and would be good for the system anyway.
We probably would not be here at this time of night with this exact shape of debate if it was not for the crisis, but I stand by the principles that lie behind the reforms we are bringing forward.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Sarah Sackman: That is a really good question, and you have asked me it in the Chamber. At the moment, 97% of applications for legal aid in the magistrates context are approved. We have to fully consider the IRCC package and see what final version of this Bill, if it passes through Parliament, receives Royal Assent, and then reassess and ensure that the availability of legal aid across both magistrates and Crown courts is not a barrier to access to justice. We have a means test in criminal legal aid, and that is important. It is important that people who can afford to pay their legal fees do but, where you do not have the means, it is important that you can access legal aid to get representation, which is why the hardship mechanism that we currently have exists. That will be a really important feature of the system to ensure that legal aid provision—
The Chair
Order. That brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions of the Minister. I thank the Minister for her time today.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Stephen Morgan.)
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Seventh sitting)
Tuesday 21st April 2026
(3 months, 4 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Courts and Tribunals Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Notices of Amendments as at 21 April 2026 - (21 Apr 2026)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we begin, I remind Members please to switch electronic devices to silent, and that tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings.
Clause 3
Trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation
Amendment proposed: 12, in clause 3, page 9, line 28, leave out subsections (2) to (4).—(Jess Brown-Fuller.)
This amendment would prevent the provisions on trial on indictment without a jury applying retrospectively to cases where the defendant has elected trial by jury before these provisions become law.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 29—Review of impact of provisions of section 3—
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament a report containing a review of the impact of the provisions of section 3 during each relevant period.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the relevant periods are—
(a) before the end of 12 months, and
(b) no sooner than 35 months but no later than 36 months
beginning on the day on which section 3 of this Act is commenced.
(3) Reviews under this section must consider the impact of the provisions of sections 74A to 74D of the Senior Courts Act 1981, as inserted by Section 3 of this Act, on persons who—
(a) are from any ethnic minority background;
(b) are White British and live in lower income households.”
This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to review, after one year and three years, the impact of the provisions of section 3 on people who are from ethnic minority backgrounds, and on White people from lower-income households.
The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair once again, Ms Jardine.
As Members will have heard me say on countless occasions, the pressures on our criminal courts are unprecedented. I do not intend to rehearse arguments that have been made many times in the House. There is a broad consensus that urgent action is required, and it is in that context that I turn to clause 3, which provides for trial by judge alone in cases likely to attract a custodial sentence of three years or less.
Clause 3 introduces a new judge-only division of the Crown court—the so-called bench division—to hear less serious cases without a jury. This does not create a separate jurisdiction; one’s case will still be heard in the Crown court if assigned to the bench division. The same appeal route that is currently available from the Crown court will still be available. The clause operates to provide that certain either-way cases defined by the seriousness threshold in the legislation will be tried by a judge sitting alone in a Crown court.
The evidence we heard in Committee is that sitting with judge alone saves time. A former Lord Chief Justice, Lord Burnett of Maldon, told us he was convinced that
“the time saving will be enormous if the relatively low-level cases are tried by a new constitution.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 76, Q161.]
Similarly, Doug Downey, Attorney General of Ontario, said in evidence to us that there is “no question” but that judge-alone cases are “faster”, and that that is borne out by the data there.
Let me be clear, as I have tried to be clear a number of times: jury trials will remain in place for the most serious crimes. Indictable-only offences such as murder, rape, armed robbery, grievous bodily harm with intent and arson endangering life will never be heard without a jury. But it remains the case that while jury trials are not at fault for the delays, although jury trials only account for 3% of all criminal trial cases they take up approximately 60% of Crown court hearing time, and the independent review’s findings show that jury trials take twice as long now as they did in 2000.
As Sir Brian Leveson told the Committee, trials have become longer and more complex for many reasons, due to the high volume of digital evidence now central to many prosecutions, and the consequence is clear that the delays are rising, and victims and defendants alike are waiting longer for justice. The independent review of the criminal courts estimates that judge-only trials can reduce hearing time by at least 20% and save Crown court time—a figure that Sir Brian himself describes in his review as “conservative”—and those savings will generate more capacity for jury trials where they are most needed.
Critics have said that this measure would produce no time saving at all, but the Committee heard from respected members of the judiciary that that is not the case, and that judge-only trials would save time in practical and important ways, by encouraging more realistic guilty pleas, by avoiding the delays inherent in empanelling and managing a jury, by allowing evidence to begin earlier in the day, and by reducing the disruption caused by juror absence or delay.
As I have set out, the application of these changes would apply to cases in the existing backlog where a trial has not already commenced. It is because we must tackle the mounting caseload in the Crown court as soon as we can that we are implementing the measures in this way. The clause allows cases in the current open Crown court caseload where a trial has not yet begun to be considered under the new allocation test. Trials should take place in accordance with the law as it stands, and applying the new regime to cases in the open caseload will help us begin to reduce delay from the outset. This is a practical step to ensure that the courts can make the best use of available capacity.
The clause also provides safeguards in the form of reallocation provisions, as we have debated. Cases can, and sometimes do, evolve as they progress through the courts, and the clause makes clear provision for cases to be reallocated to a jury trial where the seriousness increases, even after a judge-only trial has begun. The intention of the clause is not to remove jury trials for the most serious cases in our justice system, and where an indictable-only offence is added to a bench division case, it will always be reallocated to a jury trial.
The Government have been clear: we have made the investment in courts that people have been calling for, by uncapping sitting days as well as investment in our workforce through legal aid, but investment alone is not enough. The pressures on the system require structural reform, because it was not designed to withstand the challenges of both the present backlog and the profile of modern criminal trials. We are seeing a growing number of remand cases entering the system, and those cases must be prioritised for hearing in order to meet statutory custody time limits. That in turn pushes other serious cases where the defendant is on bail, including rape and serious sexual offences, further down the list.
The consequences of those delays are not abstract. Longer waits mean longer periods in which the accused may remain on bail, which places greater pressure on policing and monitoring, while victims and complainants endure prolonged uncertainty and distress. Persistent delay, as we have learned, also distorts behaviour across the system, encouraging defendants to postpone guilty pleas in the hope that witnesses, and sometimes victims, will lose confidence as cases drift further into the future. That cannot be right. That is not justice, and it is not sustainable.
The failings of our system were laid bare, not just by the independent review but by the Committee, when we heard most powerfully from victims of crime themselves. We need a more modern model of criminal justice that serves those affected by these failings, and clause 3 is an important part of delivering that change.
I would like to hear from my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington, and hear the debate in Committee, before I set out the Government’s position on new clause 29. It may be convenient, therefore, Ms Jardine, to hear from my hon. Friend at this juncture.
Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)
I am sure we will get to hear from the hon. Member for Birmingham Erdington shortly.
The proposal in clause 3 is being framed as a mere administrative adjustment—a common-sense fix for a system under strain. The Government’s plan to introduce a Crown court bench division, where a judge sits alone without magistrates to decide the fate of those accused of either-way offences, is being sold to the public as a remedy for the backlogs that currently paralyse our courts. But we must be clear from the outset that the crisis in our courts is not the result of the jury system. The backlog, which sees tens of thousands of cases waiting for a hearing, is the result of long-term challenges and the unprecedented impact of covid on our justice system.
Eroding a defendant’s right to a trial by their peers is not a fix; it is a fundamental reconfiguration of the English legal system. Across the Bill, we see a pattern emerging: a shift away from what we are clear is the gold standard of justice towards a swift model. The evidence supporting it is dangerously thin, and we must resist the permanent eroding of a right that has stood for hundreds and hundreds of years.
The right to a jury trial is often described as fundamental. It is not merely a traditional quirk of our system; it is an important constitutional safeguard. The core of the Government’s plan, as outlined in their impact assessment and the Second Reading briefings, is to remove the right to elect. Currently, if someone is charged with an either-way offence—crimes like theft, assault or certain drug offences—they have a right to choose whether they are tried by a jury in the Crown court or by magistrates. The Government’s plan to strip away that choice in clause 3, under a new bench division model for when the sentence outcome is likely to be three years or less, will remove even the role of lay magistrates from the decision.
The briefing provided by the organisation JUSTICE, which I have referred to several times, makes a compelling case against that. JUSTICE points out that the right to elect is a long-standing protection that ensures that a defendant can seek the judgment of a diverse group of citizens when they feel the state’s power is being unfairly applied. By removing that right, we are effectively saying that the state knows better than the citizen how they should be judged. This is not unheard of, as we have talked about before, but clause 3, combined with previous clauses, represents it being done at a scale never seen before.
This is a dangerous path. When we move cases from juries to a bench division, we are moving from a system of community participation to a system of professionalised adjudication. The jury is the part of our constitution where the greatest number of ordinary citizens have a direct, hands-on role in the administration of justice. It is the primary way that the public grant their consent to the upholding of criminal law. If we remove the public from the process, we risk the law becoming something done to people, rather than something that belongs to them.
The Government’s narrative suggests that a judge-led bench division will be just as fair as a jury, only faster. But it ignores the fundamental and unique aspect of fairness delivered by a jury trial, which they acknowledge by continuing to maintain jury trials for what they describe as the “more serious” offences. A jury is, by definition, balanced. It consists of 12 people from different backgrounds, with different life experiences and different biases, in the crucible of the jury room. Their diversity is its greatest strength; a single judge, no matter how well intentioned, cannot possibly replicate that breadth of perspective.
There is also the phenomenon of being case-hardened: when a professional judge or magistrate hears 50 similar cases of theft or assault in a year, there is a natural human tendency to begin seeing patterns rather than individuals. Evidence that might seem fresh or potentially exonerating to a jury can seem like the usual excuse to a professional who has heard it hundreds of times before.
Juries bring fresh eyes; they are not jaded by the grind of the system. They are instructed to look only at the facts of the case before them. That is why juries are considered—by the Opposition, at least—to be the gold standard. The evidence submitted to the Committee warns that we lack clarity as to why the Government are so eager to discard this standard. If the jury is the best way to ensure an accurate and fair verdict, the burden of proof for removing it must be exceptionally high.
Furthermore, the bench division model threatens to undermine the lay element of our justice system. Originally, as recommended in the Leveson review, the idea was that a judge would sit with two magistrates. That was intended to maintain at least some form of community involvement. However, clause 3 moves towards judge-only trials for many cases, discarding even the judge-plus-two compromise.
I will now address the primary argument made by the Minister in her opening remarks. The Government claim that moving to the bench division will significantly reduce the backlog. However, the Institute for Government has produced an insightful analysis, which we have referred to frequently, suggesting that the evidence for those savings is incredibly weak.
The IFG points out that the vast majority of Crown court time is not actually spent on the types of trials that the Government want to move to the bench division. The cases being targeted are the less serious ones, which already take up less time than more complex cases such as murder, which will remain subject to jury trial. According to the IFG’s modelling, if judge-only trials are 20% faster than a jury trial, the total impact on the overall Crown court backlog would be a reduction of 2%. When we consider the constitutional cost of us losing, at this unprecedented scale, the right to access a jury, that is simply not sufficient.
The backlog is not caused by juries being slow; it is more often caused by ineffective trials that are postponed because witnesses do not show up, because solicitors or barristers are unavailable, or because courtrooms are not fit to operate in. These are systemic failures, and moving a trial from a jury to a judge does not make a witness appear or fix a broken courtroom.
The Bill proposes a threshold of cases likely to attract a sentence of up to three years being diverted to the bench division. Predicting a sentence before a trial is never an exact science, and that is something that magistrates actually have more experience of than judges. That unprecedented scenario—without the safeguards that we sought to add through a right of appeal, which the Government rejected—will create huge questions of impartiality and bias.
A three-year sentence is not a minor matter. Three years in prison is a life-altering event. It can mean the loss of a home, a career and a family. To suggest that a person facing such a consequence does not deserve what they consider to be the fairest possible trial betrays that principle of fairness in our justice system when the consequences are so severe.
There is also the issue of the absence of a sunset clause. If these measures are truly a temporary response to tackle an emergency backlog, they should include a sunset clause that ensures that rights are restored once the crisis has passed. As I have said previously, changes were made during world war two and then reversed when the war was over. The fact that the Government have resisted such a clause suggests that this is not a temporary fix, but a permanent land grab by the state. Once the right to a jury is surrendered for either-way offences, it is highly unlikely that any future Government will be in a position to restore it.
We must see the Crown court bench division for what it is: a policy of convenience, not a policy delivering justice. It is a policy that ignores the findings of the IFG, which would require us to focus more heavily on other elements of the system. It is a policy that ignores the warnings from JUSTICE, which highlight the erosion of the defendant’s right to elect and its impact on public confidence and fairness in the judicial system. It is a policy that even ignores the original, more balanced recommendations of the Leveson review, which at least sought to keep lay magistrates involved.
We are told that we must modernise and that we must be efficient. The purpose of a criminal trial is not to process cases as quickly as possible; it is to arrive at the truth through a process that the defendant, the victim and the public have trust in. If we allow the Government to erode the jury system in the name of the backlog on this occasion to this extent, we are sending a message that this constitutional right is highly conditional, and that it can be traded away whenever the state finds it too expensive or too cumbersome to maintain. As the Minister frequently points out, lots of countries do without it; “Why shouldn’t we?” will be the next argument.
Instead of stripping away rights, the Government should be more focused on the areas that we can all agree on: prisoner transport, early legal advice, more efficient listing, Crown Prosecution Service reviews of cases in the backlog, facilities that work and IT that works. We do not fix a house by tearing it down to its foundations because the roof is leaking; we fix the roof. Jury trials ensure that our laws remain grounded in the common sense of ordinary people. Let us apply some of that common sense to tackling this issue. Common sense will lead us to oppose clause 3.
Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)
Clause 3 and its various parts outline how trials can take place without juries. The Liberal Democrats have always fundamentally opposed the move to remove the right to a trial in front of one’s peers and the introduction of single-judge trials. To be clear, we do not accept the status quo and neither does anyone who I have spoken to in the legal profession or courts. The backlogs are totally unacceptable and they are failing victims, defendants and the people working in the criminal justice system. But no one in that system thinks that the fault lies with the jury trial system. In fact, Sir Brian stated that in our recent evidence session.
The decision is being made without any decisive modelling that would demonstrate that it would have the intended effect. There is also a timing issue with the proposal to restrict the use of a jury. Nationally, we have seen an intense displeasure with our democracy, and faith in politics and our political system is at an all-time low. It is fractured and deeply distrustful. When we have mistrust in our political system, it seeps into our justice system. Around six in 10 people express a fair amount or a great deal of confidence in juries delivering the right verdict compared with around four in 10 for courts and judges more generally.
Clause 3 proposes something that will risk a great deal without the evidence that shows it will actually work. That is why it is so strongly opposed. The Government instead should be implementing evidence-based reforms to target inefficiencies, including but not limited to negotiating the failed prisoner escort contract, introducing victim-led intensive case management across the regions, and investing in rehabilitation to reduce reoffending. They could also explore reducing the court backlog by running two trials in a day in select courtrooms instead of one, making more efficient use of time by nearly doubling the hearing time per sitting day and accelerating the throughput of cases. They could also develop and implement a more ambitious strategy to reduce delays in rape and serious sexual offences cases, or implement their own manifesto pledge to introduce speciality RASSO courts, which we will no doubt debate at a later stage of the Bill.
I am confident that the Minister will say, as she did in the evidence session, “Why is the backlog not coming down if we can make the system work better?” She put that question to Caroline Goodwin KC, Claire Davies KC and Samantha Hillas KC, saying,
“I have not seen any evidence that it can be reduced absent reform from the circuits.”
Caroline Goodwin came back with:
“The reality is that we have not been able to do this. Because there has been a consistent cap on sitting days, judges have not been able to open up court days. They have not been able to run blitz days where they can really take hold of a case and shake it and say, ‘Right, what is going on?’ We have not had any great directives to the CPS to say, ‘When you’re charging these cases, you need to review these very thoroughly.’ Throughout this entire time, the criminal Bar and the entire justice system has been brought to its knees. So if you are saying, ‘Is there any empirical evidence that this doesn’t work on your circuit, Ms Goodwin?’, we have not been able to do it.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 48, Q94.]
Why do we believe that we need to protect the safeguard of a jury trial while still reforming the criminal courts in other ways? The Lammy review in 2017 found that black and Chinese women were convicted at higher rates than white women in magistrate courts but not by juries. The Criminal Bar Association commissioned an independent study of criminal barristers; of the 2,029 who responded, 94% raised concerns about the lack of diversity in the Crown court bench division and 88% were against the introduction of a Crown court bench division altogether.
If we take the figures in the impact assessment that the Government have provided at face value, the proposal will save 5,000 sitting days per annum. That is around 3.5% of the Crown court workload. That means that rape complainants or victims who are currently waiting years for their own trial to be heard might see their cases brought forward by about a week. On the Government’s own estimates, the changes will not start taking effect until after the next general election. It is not providing a solution to the current crisis. Indeed, the impact assessment was based on a premise that it compared “do nothing” with the effects of all of the Government’s measures proposed in the Bill, but nobody is proposing “do nothing”. Radical investment and reform is already taking place and is welcomed. The Government were right to introduce removing the cap on sitting days and encourage blitz courts in a number of courts in the different regions. That has cross-party support and will bring down the backlog by more direct means.
I would also like to briefly highlight the perversity in the cut-off of three years. Let us take the case of a 20-year-old student charged with unlawful wounding, where someone’s face was gashed by a glass thrown in a bar. Under the sentencing guidelines, if they were of good character they would face imprisonment of between two and three years. That conviction would be life changing and that young defendant would not qualify for trial by jury under these proposals. Let us take exactly the same case, but involving a 40-year-old defendant with a long criminal record who has been to prison before. Because of their record, the likely sentence for the same offence would exceed three years and they would get trial by jury, whereas a young man with no convictions would not. I ask the Committee to reflect on the perversity created by changing the threshold.
I conclude by reiterating that clause 3, which sets out how the Crown court should allocate a case for trial without a jury and the procedure, should not be included in the Bill, and I shall vote against its inclusion.
Paulette Hamilton (Birmingham Erdington) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Jardine. I rise to speak to the new clause that is tabled in my name, which I do not intend to push to a vote. It would require the Lord Chancellor to conduct and lay before Parliament a review of the impact of clause 3 after 12 months, and again after no later than 36 months. At its heart, the new clause is both modest and reasonable. It does not seek to block the Government’s proposals outright, nor does it attempt to rewrite the substance of the Bill. It simply asks that we understand the impact of the changes we are making and that we are accountable for them.
As Members across the House know, clause 3 introduces significant changes to the operation of the courts, particularly through the insertion of the new provisions into the Senior Courts Act 1981. Those provisions mark a clear shift in how justice is delivered. When we make changes of this scale, we have a duty not only to legislate, but to reflect on their impact and remain accountable for the consequences.
The Law Society of England and Wales has raised concerns that reforms to court processes must be carefully monitored to ensure they do not inadvertently undermine access to justice, particularly for those who already face barriers in navigating the legal system. These concerns are drawn from the experience of legal practitioners working day to day in the courts, particularly in cases involving litigants in person who often are trying to navigate complex procedures without legal representation. It has also emphasised the importance of evaluating how such changes operate in practice, including their impact on vulnerable and disadvantaged groups and on the capacity of the courts to deliver justice effectively.
The society has made it clear that such changes can have unintended consequences that are often felt most by the people who already struggle to access justice. That goes directly to public confidence in the justice system. Surely, trust and perception in the justice system are just as important as the legal framework itself. Concerns have also been raised by the Family Services Foundation, which highlights how procedural changes can disproportionately affect vulnerable individuals and families already facing complex challenges. That reflects its work with the families involved in the court system, where even small procedural changes can have a significant impact on people who are already dealing with instability, stress or crisis situations.
New clause 29 would ensure that Parliament receives clear evidence-based assessments of how the provisions are working in practice. Crucially, it would require that the assessments consider the impact on two groups: people from ethnic minority backgrounds and white British individuals living in lower-income households. As highlighted in earlier stages of the scrutiny of the Bill, there is a lack of clear statutory review built into the provisions, in particular in clause 3.
Some may ask, why specify those groups? The answer is simple—because justice is not experienced equally by all. We know all too well through evidence, lived experience and countless testimonies that people from ethnic minority communities often have lower levels of trust in the criminal justice system. That shapes how justice is perceived and whether it is seen as legitimate. For ethnic minority communities, this is fundamentally about trust in the justice system and perception of fairness.
Equally, we must recognise that socioeconomic disadvantage can profoundly affect a person’s experience of the courts. White British individuals from lower-income households are also more likely to feel marginalised by systems that appear distant, complex or unresponsive to their circumstances. If this House is serious about fairness, we must be serious about understanding how reforms affect those who are most at risk of being left behind.
New clause 29 does not assume the outcome. It does not claim that the provisions of clause 3 will necessarily have a negative impact, but it does recognise that without proper review, we simply will not know. That in itself would be a failure of our responsibility as legislators. The timeline set out in the new clause—a review after 12 months and a further review no later than after 36 months—strikes a careful balance. The reviews allow for early identification of any emerging issues, while also ensuring that long-term effects are properly understood. Importantly, the reviews would be laid before Parliament, ensuring transparency and enabling this House to scrutinise the findings. If the changes are working well, a review would demonstrate that; if they are not, a review would give us the opportunity to put things right.
I urge Members across the House to support new clause 29, not as a challenge to the Bill, but as a practical step towards fairness, transparency and accountability in our justice system. This House should be confident in reforms, but it should also be confident in knowing when to pause, assess and reflect. That is all that the new clause asks for.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
I wish to address a number of issues in relation to this grouping. First, I will say something about the figures that have been quoted at length today and in previous sittings. Secondly, I will say something about the reasons given by the Government for curtailing jury trials in this way. Then I want to go on to say something about evidence and procedure, and why jury trials exist at all, because sometimes it is possible to sit here listening, wondering whether the Government’s reasoning would not justify a banning of all jury trials for evermore on any crime. Finally, I will talk about some of the perversities that the hon. Member for Chichester has articulated well.
Alex McIntyre (Gloucester) (Lab)
I will keep my contribution brief. I want to speak in support of new clause 29, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington. It is clear that Government Members accept the need for reform but, as we go through those reforms, it is also important to keep one eye on ensuring justice for everyone in our society. We know that historically the criminal justice system has not ensured equal opportunity for everyone in our society—there are inequalities within it.
I was pleased to hear the Secretary of State and the Minister confirm that the Government are committed to reviewing the reforms in the future to ensure that they do not exacerbate inequalities in the system. I look forward to hearing the Minister continue to reassure the Committee that that is the Government’s commitment. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington is a tireless campaigner on these issues, and she made an outstanding speech. I will not add anything further to it, other than to thank her for tabling the new clause and introducing the debate.
Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Jardine. As the Committee has likely anticipated, I will argue that clause 3 should not stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3 is the heart of the Government’s constitutional gamble. It creates a wholly new general rule for trial on indictment without a jury in a substantial category of criminal cases. Under the clause, a defendant charged with an either-way offence who has pleaded not guilty will lose the right to be tried by a jury unless the court considers that, on conviction, they would be likely to receive a sentence of more than three years’ imprisonment. It also allows reallocation later if the case changes, says that there is no right of appeal against allocation or reallocation, permits some decisions to be made without a hearing, and still allows a judge sitting alone to impose a sentence of more than three years.
The Government continue to maintain that this change is necessary to reduce the Crown court backlog and reserve jury trials for the most serious cases. I note, though, that the very good House of Commons Library briefing points out that these provisions are based only in part on Leveson, and contain material differences from that which he recommended. Sir Brian proposed restricting, not abolishing, the right to elect, he did not propose the same increase in magistrates’ sentencing powers, and the Government’s model is more aggressive than the one on which much of the original discussion was based.
JUSTICE makes the same point directly in its written evidence. It says that the Bill goes further than the review by removing the right to elect entirely, replacing the full rehearing appeal from the magistrates court with a permission stage, allowing the extension of magistrates’ custodial powers to 18 or 24 months, and introducing judge-only trials for either-way cases with likely sentences of three years or less.
I say that at the outset because I am keen to avoid the suggestion that the Bill amounts to the Government reluctantly implementing a difficult but expert-led recommendation. That is simply not the case in clause 3. In fact, we are dealing with a discretionary political choice to legislate in a way that is broader, harder and less cautious than many of the evidence-based alternatives that are already on the table. As the Law Society put it:
“Clauses 1 to 7 represent radical changes to criminal procedure without convincing evidence that they will improve efficiency.”
The Bar Council says:
“Radical changes to the availability of jury trials…are unnecessary and will consume resources without bearing down on the backlog.”
That is the proper context in which clause 3 should be considered.
As much for my own clarity as for the benefit of the Committee, I would like to dedicate a limited amount of time to clarifying what the clause actually does. It inserts into the Senior Courts Act 1981 proposed new sections 74A to 74D, which create a mechanism under which, in a very wide category of cases, the court must decide at the outset whether a defendant will be tried by a jury or by a single judge alone. The central test is the threshold sentence: whether the defendant, if convicted, would be likely to receive more than three years’ imprisonment or detention. If the likely sentence is above that threshold, the defendant gets a jury; if not, the default is a judge-alone trial in what the Government and stakeholders have described as the Crown court bench division, although that phrase is not used in the Bill itself.
This is about not a tiny number of trivial cases but a structural redesign of the Crown court’s work. According to the Government’s own modelling, about 14,000 cases would continue arriving at the Crown court in 2028-29 and would require a trial, of which approximately 4,000 are expected to be heard by a judge alone, rather than a jury. The package is said to reduce Crown court sitting day demand by 27,000 days a year while increasing magistrates court sitting day demand by 8,500. Even if one accepts every assumption behind those figures—many serious people do not—they demonstrate that this is a major transfer of work and power. The offences within scope are not, as has sometimes been implied, confined to the sort of minor petty theft case used in media briefings.
The written evidence from JUSTICE makes that point bluntly. Clause 3 would cover a huge number of either-way offences, including
“sexual offences, sexual abuse of children, stalking, fraud offences, violence against the person offences and theft offences.”
JUSTICE offers a chilling practical illustration with this observation:
“Most of the postmasters wrongly convicted in the Horizon scandal received a sentence under three years.”
That point ought to give the Committee serious pause. We are being asked to remove jury trial for the types of case in which miscarriages of justice have historically occurred.
The centrepiece of clause 3 is the idea that a court can safely determine, at an early stage, whether a defendant is likely to receive more than three years if convicted, and that that prediction is a just and adequate basis for deciding whether the defendant gets a jury at all. I do not accept that. More importantly, the Bill itself does not truly accept it either. The Commons Library briefing I referenced earlier notes this contradiction plainly:
“While cases that are less likely to result in a sentence of more than three years would be allocated for trial by a judge alone, the judge could still pass a custodial sentence of more than three years.”
In other words, the very legislation that uses the three-year threshold as the decisive basis for removing jury trials simultaneously recognises that the threshold may not map on to the final seriousness of the case at all. The initial allocation may say that the case is not serious enough for a jury, yet the final outcome may be serious enough for more than three years in prison. If that is not an admission that the threshold is an unstable and unsafe proxy, I do not know what is.
Does that not cut to the most basic but most profound concern about this Bill—that it just is not fair? If the threshold cannot reliably distinguish the cases that merit a jury from those that do not, the clause is not preserving jury trial for the most serious cases. It is rationing jury trial on the basis of an impressionistic and sometimes speculative sentence prediction. The written evidence from the London School of Economics says exactly that, stating that the three-year threshold
“is a poor metric for determining the right trial procedure”
and that if jury trial is a
“cornerstone protection against the state”,
alternative measures ought to be exhausted first.
We cannot properly predict a sentence at the plea and trial preparation hearing, and in the context of clause 3, that is a problem. If the allocation decision is to be made at the hearing, the notion that a judge can decide the likely sentence then and there is, in many cases, unrealistic and, at the extreme, absurd. In many cases, the evidence is incomplete at the PTPH. In sexual offences, full achieving better evidence transcripts are often unavailable, and practitioners rely on summaries. CCTV may not yet have been watched in full, medical evidence may be outstanding and the victim impact, which can materially affect a sentence, may be unknown. Sometimes the complainant is still in hospital. It may well be that the psychiatric or psychological impact becomes clear only weeks or months later. Yet the clause asks the court to decide mode of trial at exactly this sensitive and uncertain stage. The Government are therefore building a supposedly rational system on a procedural moment that practitioners know, and I am sure the Minister knows, is often evidentially immature.
The Committee will remember reading the Victims’ Commissioner’s written evidence, which accepts the need for reform but recognises the concern that sentencing ranges vary and that the evidential picture may be incomplete when the crucial decision is taken. JUSTICE likewise says that the proposal risks unfairness because the allocation and reallocation system lengthens the PTPH and depends on speculative assumptions about how much court time will actually be saved. The Bar Council adds that the Bill gives no schedule or annexe identifying categories of offence; instead, a Crown court judge will simply assess in individual cases whether the likely sentence exceeds three years, meaning that the determination is case specific, contestable and uncertain from the outset.
I can well imagine the response to all that being that if circumstances change, the case can be reallocated, but to my mind that is not a defence of the clause; it is an admission that the initial prediction is often too flimsy to bear the weight placed on it. As any King’s counsel will readily point out, real criminal cases are not static things. Charges are amended, defendants are added and new evidence emerges. Perhaps a section 18 becomes a section 20. When something like that happens, is it seriously proposed that the case repeatedly cycles through reallocation every time? Clause 3 says yes, at least in substance.
Proposed new section 74B provides for a formal reallocation mechanism where there is a relevant change of circumstances, including changes in the indictment or new evidence affecting likely sentence. The problem is that that does not solve the uncertainty; it adds another layer of litigation, or at least potential litigation. It invites both sides to argue over whether the threshold position has changed, whether reallocation is required, whether the change is sufficiently material, what prejudice would be caused by moving the case, whether delay, wasted cost or witness inconvenience should prevail, and what happens if the case is already part way down the tracks. Frankly, that sounds like a dream come true for a solicitor’s billing manager, but the rest of us can surely see the problem.
JUSTICE and the Bar Council have both picked up on that point. JUSTICE notes that the
“allocation of cases is going to lengthen the plea and trial preparation hearing as will the process of reallocation”,
and it warns that the absence of any right of appeal against allocation decisions is likely to increase judicial reviews and Court of Appeal litigation. In the Bar Council’s written evidence, it states:
“The proposed Crown Court Bench Division introduces an extra layer of hearings and complication…It could result in further litigation at an interlocutory stage.”
It argues that one of the Bill’s fundamental flaws is precisely the fact that it presents a false binary: either do nothing, or do this. The Bill does not properly assess a range of other policy options.
Having made those points, I would like to pose a question to the Minister, which I think may shed some light on where we are with the clause. Has the additional work needed at both Crown court and magistrates court level for allocation, reallocation, submissions and case management been factored into the claimed 27,000 sitting day decrease and 8,500 sitting day increase? If the answer is yes, can we get some insight into precisely where and how? If the answer is no, the core productivity claim behind clause 3 is overstated from the start.
If clause 3 were merely a bad threshold coupled with an elaborate reallocation maze, that would be bad enough. However, the Government have compounded the problem by providing no right of appeal against allocation or reallocation decisions, and by permitting some decisions to be made without a hearing. Under proposed new section 74D, there would be no right of appeal against an allocation or reallocation determination made under proposed new sections 74A or 74B, and a reallocation determination could be made without a hearing. That is extraordinary. A defendant may lose trial by jury on the basis of an early-stage sentence prediction, under a mechanism that the Government know may need to be revisited as the case develops, yet there is no appeal.
JUSTICE warns that the likely consequence of the proposal is judicial review pressure on the High Court, and appeal pressure on the Court of Appeal once written reasons are handed down, meaning that the supposed efficiency savings may be displaced into other courts. The Bar Council says much the same; it proposes, as a minimum safeguard, that there should be a hearing before reallocation, unless the parties waive it, and that there should be an appeal right. The absence of appeal is especially troubling because summary trial has historically been justified by two safeguards: lower-level offences and the ability to appeal. The Bill proposes to remove both. It moves up the seriousness of cases, while stripping away the classic safeguard of easy correction—that is not a tolerable bargain.
Although the Committee has already debated the retrospectivity point at some length, clause 3 itself remains infected by it. The new allocation procedure will apply to cases already in the Crown court open caseload, including cases where the defendant has already been arraigned at a PTPH before the new regime comes into force, so long as the prosecution has not yet opened its case. For those cases, the court must make a determination under proposed new section 74A as soon as is reasonably practicable, and may do so without a hearing. That means that a defendant who chose a Crown court trial, expecting a jury, may wait months, prepare for that jury and then lose it retrospectively.
The Minister herself has defended that approach by saying that the Government are on sound legal ground, and that there is no procedural or legal impediment, relying on advice from—as I recall—an unnamed KC. However, political defensibility and legal ingenuity are not the same as fairness. To put this in very plain terms, people did not opt to go to Crown court for the car parking or the architecture; they chose it for one thing only—a jury. To move the goalposts after the choice is made is profoundly unfair, regardless of other considerations.
The Committee will recall reading through the written evidence from some eminent groups and individuals that, in as many words, call this retrospective application contrary to the rule of law. The Bar Council says:
“The retrospective provisions may also be subject to numerous legal challenges.”
Dr Samantha Fairclough argues that the plan is unfair, and she says:
“It will also create significant additional work…and likely result in appeals.”
That all points in the same direction. Retrospectivity here is not just constitutionally unattractive; it will ultimately prove to be practically self-defeating.
A very large part of the Government’s case for clause 3 rests on the impact assessment, which says that clauses 1 to 7 will reduce Crown court sitting days by 27,000 a year, while increasing magistrates court sitting days by 8,500. It also says that the Crown court open caseload will fall by around 14,000 cases over 2028-2029, and that
“overall the reforms will reduce demand on Crown Court time by almost 20%”.
However, several stakeholders have criticised the assumptions and modelling, especially those on how much time judge-only trials would save. The Government’s core assumption is that hearing times will fall by 20% for judge-only trials, but Sir Brian himself accepted that this was associated with high levels of uncertainty, and the Justice Committee challenged how anecdotal the basis for that figure appeared to be.
The Chair
Order. The hon. Member has not done anything disorderly or out of order in any way, but I remind Members that the House has agreed that this Committee must conclude its work by 5 pm on Tuesday 28 April. I have no power to impose a time limit on speeches, and it is for the Committee to decide how it uses its time, but I gently encourage Members to consider the length of speeches in the light of the desire of all Members to speak in the debate and on the later parts of the Bill.
Rebecca Paul
I thank you for making that point, Ms Jardine. I just emphasise how serious the changes in this legislation are. I know the Opposition are willing to put in the hours that are needed to go through the full detail, so that everyone can say what they need to. I imagine the Government are equally keen to spend the hours required to do full justice to the Bill.
Rebecca Paul
Absolutely, Ms Jardine—we can go into the early hours of the morning if we need to, and I am happy to do so this evening if that is what people would like to do.
In cases of offensive communications, malicious communications, harassment, stalking and other digital evidence-related cases, the line between criminality and obnoxiousness can be fact-sensitive and context-heavy. We have all seen how politically sensitive a question this has become. We should remember, too, that some of these cases are driven almost entirely by screenshots and unauthenticated digital material, which may be manipulated, selectively presented or forensically thin.
The Chair
I say gently that if we are referring to the Lammy review we give it its name, and if we are talking about the Secretary of State we refer to him as that and not just his name.
Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Jardine. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington for tabling new clause 29, which I support. It is a long-standing principle, established in the case of R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy, that justice must be done and be seen to be done. It is famous as a legal precedent in establishing the principle that the mere appearance of bias is sufficient to overturn a judicial decision.
To be confident in our criminal justice system, the public need to be satisfied that it is fair. New clause 29 would provide important reassurance that there is a check and balance in place to review the changes the Bill introduces, and that any issues of bias arising from a trial without jury can and will be addressed.
The Chair
Order. As I have said, if you are referring to the Secretary of State, can you use his title?
Linsey Farnsworth
I do apologise, Ms Jardine.
The report by the Deputy Prime Minister, as he is now, was conducted almost a decade ago. It highlighted concern about the sentencing decisions of judges, so it is often cited—understandably—as a reason to be cautious about judge-only trials. New clause 29 would ensure that a review of judge-only trials will be conducted after a year, and should there be disparities in the conviction rates for those of an ethnic minority background and/or for white British persons living in lower-income households, measures can and will be put in place to prevent such disparities from arising.
It is also right that a further review is conducted between 35 and 36 months after enactment, as the new clause suggests, both to check the initial findings and to take account of the fact that things can change. In the review conducted by the Deputy Prime Minister, for example, it was found that where CPS charging decisions were concerned, a defendant’s ethnicity did not affect the likelihood of their being charged. However, subsequent research conducted by the University of Leeds, in which the outcomes of decision making in 195,000 cases between 2018 and 2021 were examined, identified evidence of disproportionality in CPS decision making. Specifically, defendants from minority ethnic backgrounds were significantly more likely to be charged than a white British defendant for a comparable offence.
Additional research by the independent disproportionality advisory group and scrutiny by the CPS itself has led to an action plan to tackle the disproportionality that was found to exist, and to deliver change. There is precedent for ongoing review of disparities in outcomes within the criminal justice system where ethnicity is concerned, and precedent for action being taken to address such disparities.
Recent research by the University of Birmingham identified concern about racial bias within juries, particularly when there is no representation of ethnic minorities among the 12 people serving on a jury. This research cited a case in which an attack on the victim was caught on CCTV, yet in May 2022 a jury with no black members acquitted most of the perpetrators. The researchers concluded that their study raised important questions about whether the public in England and Wales see juries as being fair and just in relation to racial minorities, and that juries in England and Wales remain extremely lacking in diversity; that is what the study found. Another problem the study identified in that case was that the concerns of victims’ families about racial bias among the jury were never investigated.
Linsey Farnsworth
No. I will make some progress; we need to make progress today.
The researchers found that more than 90% of respondents in the survey they conducted believed that discrimination on juries should be reported to trial judges and properly investigated, yet there is no mechanism under current law that allows juries to do so.
Appeal, a not-for-profit organisation, has submitted evidence opposing some elements of the Bill. However, in a paper that it prepared in 2024, Appeal set out concerns relating to majority decisions, as opposed to unanimous jury decisions, and the impact of racial bias. The case of R v. Connor et al was cited, in which questions from the jury suggested that there had been a focus on the defendant’s race and a letter from a juror after conviction confirmed racial bias in the jury’s deliberations.
Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 provides for confidentiality in jury decision making. However section 8A, enacted in Scotland, permits the Lord Justice General to allow information about deliberations from the jury room to be disclosed for the purposes of research. That provides an opportunity for the same to follow in England and Wales. Recent statistics show an increase in hate crime, including crime based on race and religion, rates of which spiked after Brexit and, recently, following the Southport murders. Now more than ever, we must be conscious of the impact that discrimination could have on the fairness, or otherwise, of jury trial.
Linsey Farnsworth
I am about to conclude, so I will not.
I support new clause 29, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington, but I submit that the change and modernisation that the Bill seeks to introduce bring an opportunity to review all aspects of the criminal justice system in relation to ethnicity and socioeconomic background to ensure fairness for all.
Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)
I want to comment on two points. First, I agree entirely with the speech of the hon. Member for Chichester on the problem with clause 3 and jury allocation, and I especially agree with her point about the retrospective reallocation of cases, whereby people waiting for trial by jury will suddenly find that their case will be removed from the jury and heard elsewhere. She outlined in comprehensive detail all the issues—not just jurisprudence issues but legal and factual issues. I support what she said so I will not repeat it.
I also agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Amber Valley about these issues. She highlighted the disparities in the way that different groups of people are treated in our criminal justice system. I applaud my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington for tabling new clause 29. I hope that the Government will consider accepting it although, of course, if we did not abolish jury trial we would not need it.
We are told that the reason for clauses 1 and 3, which restrict access to jury trials in many cases, is to do with the backlog. That is where the Government start their position—the backlog—and I want to concentrate on that aspect. Please bear with me: I will blind the Committee with a few facts and figures because I think that they will make logical sense of why people such as me say that juries are not the reason for the delays. It is important that we get that sense.
There are currently around 88,000 cases awaiting trial in the Crown courts. The queue for the Crown court is now so long that some trials are being fixed for 2030—the Committee has heard that. We have talked about the old adage that, “Justice delayed is justice denied.” That is happening, and the delay is unacceptable, but the answer is honestly not to get rid of one of the fundamental systems that we have had in our country for centuries.
The reason for the delay is not juries but the court structure and how things happen there. One judge sitting in one courtroom for one day is known as a sitting day. The Old Bailey has 18 courts. It therefore has capacity for 18 sitting days per day, 90 sitting days per week and 4,500 sitting days in a 50-week year. For the last 15 years, restrictions have been placed on the number of sitting days in Crown court centres around the country. Resident judges, who are the principal judges at each court centre, have been told that funding will be given only for a limited number of sitting days. Restrictions of between 9% and 25% have been imposed. That is what the previous Government did.
There is always a queue for the Crown court; that is inevitable, as cases cannot be tried immediately. However—and here is the story—up until the start of 2019, that queue was managed without any undue delay. The backlog had come down from around 56,000 cases in 2014 to 33,000 cases by the start of 2019. All those cases were tried by a jury, and within a reasonable time: within six months if the defendant was in custody, and between eight and 12 months if they were on bail. Given that cases were being tried within a reasonable time in 2019, the suggestion that jury trials somehow take longer or are more complicated has no basis.
The length of the cases backlog rose from 33,000 at the start of 2019 to 71,000 by summer 2024, and rose by another 10% to around 80,000 last year. That increase is a direct consequence of the restrictions placed on sitting days. The problem was exacerbated by the closure of some courts. For example, Blackfriars Crown court in central London, which was a custom-made, modern Crown court building with eight courtrooms and the capacity to host 2,000 sitting days in a 50-week year, was closed and sold in 2019. Over the six years since then, 12,000 potential sitting days have been lost.
There are around 4,000 rape cases in the backlog. Trials for rape that have one defendant and one complainant often takes five days—although some trials are quicker and some take longer—so 2,400 of such cases could have been tried in the 12,000 sitting days that were lost following the closure of those eight courtrooms at Blackfriars. The budgetary decision to close one court led to the inability to try what would have been half of all rape cases in the backlog. Similar examples exist all over the country, including where individual courtrooms within a Crown court building sit empty, meaning that the court is open but operating below its potential capacity.
The Crown court estate has a maximum capacity of around 130,000 sitting days. Currently, it is permitted to have 113,000 sitting days, which is partly because the Government have invested some money and allowed an increase to the number of sitting days. The Government have said that that number is a “record high”, but it is high only relative to the low numbers of the previous 15 years. Given the current backlog, I would say that it is incorrect to say that it is high. We need to invest in more sitting days and having more courtrooms open.
Alex McIntyre
I too am pleased that the Government have decided to uncap sitting days, but does my hon. Friend recognise that although the physical capacity might be there, there are capacity issues with all the teams around that? Even if we open the courts and uncap sitting days, it will not bring down the backlog in the short term, because we will still need to find more prosecutors, solicitors, barristers, court clerks and, of course, judges. All those need to be in place, which would take longer than just uncapping the funding.
Yasmin Qureshi
There are enough solicitors, barristers and judges available. Some of my former colleagues, who are now assistant recorders and recorders, were told that they could do x number of jury trials in a year, then the night before they would be due to sit in a particular Crown court, their session would get cancelled. The only issue here is with the number of court clerks, many of whom were dismissed during the years of Conservative Governments. However, those people do exist, and they can be recruited. It is not that difficult to recruit a few extra court clerks, as courts still have the capacity to do so, and it is better to do that than to throw away the whole jury system as we are doing at the moment.
It is important to note that, in any event, this law will not come into place for two or three years, which is enough time to recruit more people if there is a capacity issue—
Yasmin Qureshi
I will, but first let me explain. We have enough time to get those people in, so that we can increase the sitting days and reduce the backlog.
Alex McIntyre
I do not recognise my hon. Friend’s assertion that the workforce is there and ready and raring to go. Even the Bar Council’s own evidence suggests that the number of silks doing publicly funded criminal cases dropped by about a quarter and the number of senior juniors has gone down significantly as well. Silks are the most senior barristers. I am happy to be corrected if that is not the case. Will it not take time to fill those gaps so that we can have appropriately senior barristers in the courts?
Yasmin Qureshi
No, because let’s face it: in the jury trials we are talking about, people are not getting sentences of more than three years. There is hardly going to be a King’s counsel dealing with those cases—it is not even going to be a leading junior who will deal with those cases. A lot of the barristers will be middle ranking; the KCs will not be dealing with these types of cases. There are enough members of the Bar to fill the capacity issue.
Dr Mullan
The hon. Member for Gloucester pointed to what the Bar Council said, but let us be fair and talk about what it said in its completeness. It may well have said that the people currently practising dropped out, but the Minister quite directly asked how it was going to train these people up and get back to that point, and it made the point that the people who have dropped out of practising criminal law have not evaporated into thin air. They are still there; they are just practising in other areas of law, and when the situation is right for them, they can just come back into practising criminal law.
Yasmin Qureshi
That is absolutely correct. Of course, one of the reasons why some people left the criminal Bar is the fact that the legal aid funding was not great, but I assure Members that if they did not have other work to do, they would come back to the Bar. There are enough barristers and solicitors in the legal system for that.
Yasmin Qureshi
In a moment.
The main reason why the Government have cited is the backlog. What I am trying to say is that it is not the juries that cause the backlog. It is quite clearly the case that, with investment in court structures and court personnel, the courts could be fully up and running, and we could probably get rid of the backlog within the next year or two. The right to a jury trial is not worth sacrificing to get rid of court backlogs.
Alex McIntyre
I remember the discussion the shadow Minister spoke about; we discussed MPs swapping political constituencies at the same time. The Institute for Government was very clear that the biggest constraint is the workforce, so is my hon. Friend saying that the Institute for Government has got it wrong?
Yasmin Qureshi
The Institute for Government also said that juries do not take up that much time—they save more time. The point is that, without too much difficulty, we could get the courts up and running and working for extra sitting days. Essentially, if we had more court sitting days, we would not have the backlog; it is not the juries that are causing the backlog.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Does the hon. Lady recognise that the 2025 Criminal Bar Association study noted that one in five barristers are considering leaving the criminal Bar, not because of the ineffectiveness of jury trials but because they have to work in crumbling buildings, because there is a significant administrative burden associated with passing on information to the CPS and because of the number of ineffective cases that then do not go ahead? Does she agree that if we tackle the inefficiencies in courts, we are more likely to improve our retention of criminal barristers and encourage some of them to come back into the profession because the system will work better?
Yasmin Qureshi
I entirely agree. The state of some of the courts in this country is sad. They are completely neglected, which creates a lot of challenges.
Dr Mullan
We are leaning heavily on the points made by the Criminal Bar Association. The Government seem quite rightly to be extremely concerned about the training of future barristers, but the Criminal Bar Association has made the point that that training often takes place in what the Government are describing as less serious cases. That is where the more junior people get the experience they need to work on the more serious cases. If those cases are not available, how do the Government expect barristers to be trained to the level required to take on the more serious cases with a jury trial?
Yasmin Qureshi
I agree with the hon. Member.
I want to set out why we have a backlog and what we can do. Everybody has talked about various things that we could do, such as triaging the cases more effectively and more routinely, like Liverpool Crown court and some of the others that have seen a considerable reduction. There are the issues of transporting prisoners on time and internet connections in court. We have discussed a number of things that can lead to a reduction in the backlog.
I entirely agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington and I thank her for tabling new clause 29. The reason why we need it is that, years ago, the importance of jury trials was recognised by the current Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, and the fact that the new clause has been tabled shows that we believe they are important. We really should not be restricting jury trials. It is like throwing the baby out with the bathwater.
Amanda Hack (North West Leicestershire) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Jardine.
My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington is a passionate advocate for fairness and equality, as she has demonstrated throughout this Committee and in her work more broadly. By tabling new clause 29, she offers an approach to ensuring that we can build confidence in the system once the changes have been implemented. We have to recognise that the system is not creating fairness at the moment. We have significant backlogs, which have more than doubled since 2019. Continuing with the system as we find it is simply not an option. Ensuring that trials go ahead in a timely manner will also improve fairness.
On Second Reading, I spoke about my experience as a victim of an either-way offence. The defendant chose a jury trial. The choice to experience a jury was not mine. I did not choose to be cross-examined by the defendant. I did not choose for the case to be postponed twice, and colleagues working in the system, who had to arrange for witnesses and courts to be available not just once but three times, did not choose those postponements either. We heard the testimony from Chief Constable Sacha Hatchett about the process and the impact that delays are having on all parts of the system. She said:
“Our focus has to be on victims and on keeping people safer from harm. That is absolutely where our officers are, but the caseload and the work that is generated by delays in the system do affect our officers.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 68, Q137.]
We have an opportunity to tackle the backlog and to put trust back into the system. I spoke to the CPS in the east midlands just a few weeks ago, and it said that it is currently listing cases for 2028. We cannot just rely on increasing sitting days to solve the backlog. If it were that simple, we would not have an increasing backlog today. We cannot just rely on improving technology. We have to work through a whole package of changes, and that was echoed in Sir Brian Leveson’s report.
I have heard, not only in the Chamber but in this Committee, that jury trials are a cornerstone of the legal system, but we have to be honest with ourselves. That cornerstone is at risk if changes are not made. We need to ensure that changes to the system, including to jury trials, create confidence in that very system. The evidence presented by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington identified that we need to address the perception of fairness from those of any ethnic background or those who are white British and live in lower-income households. It needs addressing now, even without the changes—we have to reflect on that. The current system has to be addressed, and I would welcome a response from the Minister on how we can work through the detail of the review mechanism suggested by my hon. Friend.
Tristan Osborne (Chatham and Aylesford) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Jardine. I want to discuss two aspects. First, I welcome the consideration of new clause 29. I absolutely believe it is correct for the Government to review and look into inequalities in the criminal justice system. I pay testament to the work done by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington and other MPs, including the Lord Chancellor and Justice Secretary.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)
Tuesday 21st April 2026
(3 months, 4 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Courts and Tribunals Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Notices of Amendments as at 21 April 2026 - (21 Apr 2026)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 6 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 5 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 5 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 5 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 6 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are considering new clause 29—Review of impact of provisions of section 3—
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament a report containing a review of the impact of the provisions of section 3 during each relevant period.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the relevant periods are—
(a) before the end of 12 months, and
(b) no sooner than 35 months but no later than 36 months
beginning on the day on which section 3 of this Act is commenced.
(3) Reviews under this section must consider the impact of the provisions of sections 74A to 74D of the Senior Courts Act 1981, as inserted by Section 3 of this Act, on persons who—
(a) are from any ethnic minority background;
(b) are White British and live in lower income households.”—(Paulette Hamilton.)
This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to review, after one year and three years, the impact of the provisions of section 3 on people who are from ethnic minority backgrounds, and on White people from lower-income households.
Tristan Osborne (Chatham and Aylesford) (Lab)
My contribution will be brief, as other colleagues said a lot this morning. Clause 3 is extremely pragmatic and proportionate to the challenges we face. As Sir Brian Leveson made clear in his oral testimony, it is necessary because financial investment and efficiency measures alone, while essential—no one present disagrees with that—are insufficient to bring down the backlog. We all know that structural reform is critical if we are to see a meaningful reduction in the backlog.
Clause 3 comes with context, because the backlogs have more than doubled since 2019. Despite some quarterly variations, which have been mentioned, we see that the backlog is increasing annually. On the current trajectory, we are now entering unparalleled territory, with real, material consequences for the victims of crime. This was all predicted and modelled in the previous Parliament, and it has since come to pass. The current trajectory is 130,000 cases by 2030, and 200,000 cases by 2035. While some may acknowledge that there are decisions that have led to this position, it requires the Government to step in and deal with the consequences.
We need the policy in the Bill to meaningfully reduce caseloads, and we need it today. There is clear evidence from the testimony of many of the witnesses that cases are sometimes taking 80% longer compared with 2019, due to their complexity and the evidence and digital analysis that is required in many cases. Currently, 21,000 cases have been open for a year or longer. Again, that is the current trend and trajectory.
Inequity is undermining confidence in our justice system. I say this as a former police officer: it is not just the victim who suffers, although they absolutely do need justice for the crime committed against them; defendants, some of whom may be innocent, are also having to await outcomes. The police and agencies, while not necessarily being responsive because of their independent nature, have to manage the victim. I know from testimony given directly to me by police that court waiting times and having to manage victims over many years have direct consequences for cases. There are no winners when it comes to inaction.
Today, more than 90% of cases are dealt with by magistrate benches, and in some cases that is with multiple magistrates. The evidence pack indicates that only 3% of criminal cases go to jury trial. Even if the reform takes place, the majority of cases will still be dealt with in the same way as previously. Only 1% of cases will be heard by the new division. Despite the claim that there will be substantial changes for the majority of cases, only a very small number will be affected. The Bill is not about the abolition of jury trials; it is about changing the thresholds at which they are implemented.
Mr Paul Kohler (Wimbledon) (LD)
I think the evidence is that 3% of trials currently have a jury, and that will go down to 1.5%. That is a 50% reduction. Does the hon. Member not agree that that is a huge reduction in the number of jury trials from the present number?
Tristan Osborne
We are absolutely seeking to reduce the number of cases going before jury trials. It comes back to the thresholds. We have seen a long history of changes to thresholds, as well as changes to those serving on juries. In the early part of the 20th century, women were allowed to sit on juries for the first time, and it was only in the mid part of the last century that we allowed people who did not own property to sit on juries. There has, then, been an evolution in both the composition of the jury and the thresholds that are applied. For example, in 1977 Callaghan changed the law so that some cases—including of theft, burglary and criminal damage offences—could be dealt with in magistrates courts, and many of the debates we are having today happened at that time as well.
Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)
The hon. Member for Wimbledon pointed out that we are talking about a 50% reduction; can the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford tell us the percentage reduction in relation to the points he is making?
Tristan Osborne
I do not have the answer for the Callaghan reduction, but my point about the thresholds is that previous Governments of both colours have looked at thresholds, had conversations similar to those we are having today, and concluded that it was a sensible and necessary step—both under Callaghan and Margaret Thatcher.
Sir Brian Leveson, who was independently commissioned, indicated that
“there are certain circumstances where a trial by judge alone is appropriate…based on the need for cases to be resolved in a more timely manner, in a forum most proportionate and suitable to the alleged offence or offences.”
My argument is that the threshold that Sir Brian Leveson defined is the one that I agree with.
Dr Mullan
The threshold that Sir Brian recommended was two years, not three years, and the forum that he recommended was a judge with two magistrates, but we are doing just one judge. The hon. Member should be more careful in making claims about what Sir Brian recommended to support what he is saying, because we are not doing what he recommended.
Tristan Osborne
The point is that the premise of his inclination was that it is appropriate for thresholds to be changed. Although there will absolutely be principled disagreement between different advocates about where that threshold will be and the appropriateness of who will oversee those cases, be that a bench or a single judge, the reality is that there is consensus, I hope, that thresholds have changed through time. The thresholds in the Bill are a proportionate response to the overwhelming challenge of a court backlog that we inherited from the previous Government. In my view, clause 3 allocates mid-level cases effectively and ensures that demand in Crown courts is reduced. We know the consequences if we do not do this.
To the critics saying this is not fair, the reality is that our constitution says that everyone is entitled to a fair trial, and I believe that everyone in our courts system, be that the 90% who are engaged with magistrates courts, or those who go to Crown court, is dealt with fairly. As has been mentioned, I do not want to create an artificial divide between cases that are heard in one or the other; both are deemed fair, and we believe that people sentenced in magistrates courts are given a fair trial.
The thresholds in the clause are fair and reasonable, and we have to consider this as a wider package of reforms along with the digitalisation of the court system, the modernisation of the estate and improvements to transport and infrastructure, all of which play a part. Fundamentally, it goes back to my central point that those things alone will not bring about the reduction in backlogs that we all want to see.
Dr Mullan
I will not speak at length—much to the delight, I am sure, of Government Members—but I want to pick up on a few key points that have been raised. I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Reigate and for Isle of Wight East for their extensive review of clause 3, and also the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden, who is not in her place.
Let us be clear about all the things we have highlighted that are lacking. We are talking about a significant erosion for 50% of those who currently enjoy jury trial, and we have made it clear that the evidence for the necessity of that is lacking. In earlier sittings, we talked about the backlog already falling in a number of regions, even though we are so early on in the process of trying to tackle this issue. Today alone, 11% of Crown courts are not sitting—they are sat empty—and it was the same yesterday and it was even higher last week, so there are clearly other things we could be doing.
There has been criticism of the retrospective element of the measures in clause 3, which the Opposition, at least, have agreed is unacceptable. Different standards will be applied because we have not been able to amend the measures on reallocation, so there is a different standard for allocation and reallocation. That is doubled with the lack of appeal, on which we were not able to make progress.
We have covered the lack of community confidence that will arise from these measures. The hon. Member for Birmingham Erdington has tabled new clause 29, which we think is sensible, to try to go at least some way to addressing the issue of community confidence. However, I am not convinced that, even if the Government accept the new clause, we will get any change as a result. Let us say we do the review in a year from now and it finds there has been a deterioration in these issues, will they unpick their reforms? I am not confident that they will.
We have had suggestions that the cross-examination of the defendant is inappropriate. Of course, the reforms will lead to more defendants being cross-examined, unrepresented, in the magistrates court. We have had a suggestion that the changes are not substantial. I made it clear in my intervention that, under any sensible reading of the facts, most people would consider a 50% change to be substantial.
We have laid out, in a clear and detailed way, all the different ways in which clause 3 is wrong and fails on its own merits. I hope the Minister will reflect on that and make some necessary changes.
The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)
A number of the points just made were covered in earlier debates. I do not intend to rehearse the Government’s case for why the reforms we are introducing, based on the recommendations of the independent review of the criminal courts, are needed, but we think that they are. The central insight of the independent review was that, absent structural reforms, we simply will not get the shameful delays under control. The three-year threshold that we picked is highlighted in the IRCC recommendation 30, with a three-year sentence being the appropriate basis for allocation to a judge-alone trial.
Sarah Sackman
I refer the hon. Gentleman to pages 243 and 245 of the independent review. If we want to come back on the detail, we can, but I am going to make progress.
I have dealt with retrospectivity. I want to spend a bit of time on new clause 29, which my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington spoke powerfully about. She is absolutely right to highlight the disparities in outcomes across our criminal justice system. This is not something new. The problem was not created by our reforms, but it is something that we seek to transform in the transformation of our courts. We know that, for too long, there have been lower levels of trust and confidence among many minoritised communities. I am keenly aware that those groups experience disproportionality in our criminal justice system. That comes across not just in our courts but in remand decisions, sentencing outcomes and the fact that people who are black or of mixed ethnicity are statistically more likely to be a victim of crime than people who are white.
I welcome the new clause and the intent behind it, as laid out by my hon. Friend. As I said on the first day in Committee, the Deputy Prime Minister committed to an independent review to properly monitor the impacts of not just judge-only trials but all the court reform measures in the Bill on precisely the communities that my hon. Friend is concerned about.
I welcome the opportunity we have had to debate the scope of the review. What I will take away is the fact that some deep thinking needs to be done about having good baseline data, about the scope of the review and whether it could perhaps go even further than what is proposed in new clause 29, about timing to make sure that the datasets can tell us something meaningful about the impacts of the reforms, and about the appropriate feedback mechanism so that Parliament, and future Parliaments, can consider the disproportionality that exists within our system.
It will be important to benchmark the impacts of reforms against the current system. The Ministry of Justice already publishes extensive operational metrics, including on case timeliness, conviction rates and sentencing outcomes, and they provide the insight that we have been debating into the performance of criminal courts today. We have to ensure that we are looking at the right things. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington and I have been discussing an important point. It is about ensuring not just that justice is done, but that it is seen to be done and people can have confidence in the system.
Dr Mullan
As I alluded to, it seems like the Government are convinced of the need for a review clause. If the review is undertaken and it finds that the reduction in jury trials has led to greater disparities in the justice system, will the Government commit to reversing the measures?
Sarah Sackman
An important point was discussed in earlier exchanges with the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East. While I absolutely accept that marginalised communities experience lower confidence in the criminal justice system, the current data, certainly as regards triable either-way offences and conviction rates—both for men and women, and for black, Asian, mixed race or white individuals—shows that those disparities do not actually exist based on the conviction rate data. All that is set out, and Members can find that on page 51 of the equality impact assessment.
We do, though, need to get a really good sense of the baseline. If the review shows a deterioration of the position, and if the cause of that deterioration is found to be the measures themselves, then of course future decision makers, policy makers and Parliaments will want to respond and mitigate the effects. That is not to be understood as my saying we are going to rip up the Bill, because we believe that what is in the Bill is fair, and guarantees fairness at every level of the criminal justice system. But we want data and information precisely so that if disparities are exposed by the review, and if there is a worsening position, then whether it is me or someone else lucky enough to fulfil this role, someone will no doubt respond. That is exactly the point.
To my mind, this is an opportunity not just to understand and monitor the impacts of the Bill, but to develop a better understanding of outcomes across the criminal justice system, and how we improve them. Given our commitment to undertake a review of the wider reforms, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington not to press the new clause to a vote.
I want to pick up a couple of other points, which we may pick up later. We discussed at some length the application of the law as it stands to the existing caseload and the allocations decision. During Thursday’s Committee, the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle raised questions with me about three-strike offences. In order not to take up further Committee time, I will write to the hon. Member to address those point, and I am happy to make that correspondence available to the Committee and the wider public. However, I can confirm that clause 3 does not alter the existing statutory framework for those offences.
In a similar vein, we had an exchange about situations where allocations are not amenable to judicial review, and we discussed the operation of section 29 of the Senior Courts Act 1981. I intend—not least because we have also had correspondence from the Bar Council in relation to this issue—to write separately in relation to those questions. I will ask the Chair to publish that letter on the public register of written evidence, so that all Members can clearly see the Government’s understanding of the position.
Dr Mullan
The Minister can probably anticipate what I am going to say: this situation is highly unsatisfactory, considering that we will again be asked to vote—not have a view or give an opinion, but be asked to vote—on the system of allocation and reallocation in relation to complex and lengthy trials. Members may have seen the evidence provided by the Bar Council, which makes absolutely clear its view that the Minister was wrong in her assessment that the decision to allocate will be subject to judicial review. That was my view, the view of the Bar Council and the view of the hon. Member for Wimbledon, with his expertise. It is not satisfactory to be told we will vote again later today not knowing what the Government’s clear position is. What the Minister said is now surely under very significant doubt, given what the Bar Council has told us. The Minister should have been able to come here today—rather than writing to us later—to give us the facts. We have had a big gap between Thursday and today, and we should not be left in the position of being asked to vote without the full facts.
Sarah Sackman
I was about to get to the essential position, which is that what I said on Thursday is twofold. What we were debating was in the context of whether there was an appeal route in relation to the mode of trial decision—the allocation decision. I have been absolutely clear that nowhere in this Bill is there any specific route to appeal, and I have never sought to suggest otherwise.
Taking a step further, the law points against there being a jurisdictional power for judicial review on an allocation decision. Where the Bar Council’s letter discusses the availability of judicial review, it sets out that section 29(3) of the Senior Courts Act significantly limits the circumstances in which judicial review will be available for decisions affecting the conduct of a Crown court trial. That is the point that is raised in its letter, and to which I will provide a line-by-line response, but the Government essentially agree with that position.
As I have said in Committee—if any of this was not clear, let me be clear about it now—there is a very high bar. There might be exceptional circumstances, which might well be tested when this legislation, if it comes forward, comes into force. For example, if a Crown court judge clearly acts outside the parameters of the legislation by allocating a case that is clearly excluded under these provisions from being judge-only—because it is, say, complex and lengthy or indictable-only—that may fall outside of this rule, but it is certainly going to be only an exceptional case.
The best thing for me to do is write, so that Members can see what those reasons are and see what the Government’s position is. Essentially, we think that what is set out in the Bar Council’s letter as regards the availability of judicial review—there is no appeal route, and I have never suggested otherwise—correctly states the law.
Dr Mullan
Just so the Committee is clear exactly what I said and what the Minister said in return, it was in response to an intervention from the hon. Member for Birmingham Erdington, who asked what it would take to get me to accept the Government’s position. I said:
“If the Minister wants to intervene on me and say, ‘I am absolutely certain that there would be a right to judicially review the allocation decision by a Crown court,’ I will be satisfied. I am asking for the Minister to stand up and say that she is absolutely certain.”
The Minister replied:
“If, at a PTPH, a judge makes an error of law, that is amenable to judicial review. Full stop.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 16 April 2026; c. 271.]
That is completely different from what the Minister has just said now, where she is making it very clear that this will be extremely in its provisions.
The appropriate thing to do is not to vote on amendments and clauses of this Bill when we are not clear on the position. It is open to the Minister to defer and to seek to reallocate the proposals before us today, instead of again asking us to vote when she is telling us that she will send us a further letter with a full, detailed explanation of the position. That is not the way we should be doing things on a matter as important as whether we will remove an expansive existing right to judicially review an allocation decision that sits with the magistrates court.
Sarah Sackman
As regards the last point, Ms Butler, I am ultimately in your hands as to how you want to deal with it. I have said how I am going to deal with it, and what I consider the position to be vis-à-vis the operation of section 29 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and the availability, or lack thereof, of a judicial review route. There is no appeal route. An allocation decision in this context is final, and deliberately so, because we want to speed up the system. There are other appeal routes when one gets to questions of verdict.
I have said that I will set that out. I do not want to rush Members or not provide them with the full information, and I am seeking to be as transparent as I can be. As I said, we will write to the Committee, so that everyone can have the full information. I do not think the issue radically changes the substance of our debate, but given the position the shadow Minister has taken, I will not force the point. I would rather that we ventilate the issues fully, Members get the letter and we then vote accordingly.
Ultimately, I have made it clear that there is no specific appeal right or route to challenge the mode of trial allocation. There are, however, a number of safeguards, including a judge hearing from both parties and giving reasons for the decision. Those all safeguard the allocation process, but if there is any lack of clarity that I have contributed to, albeit inadvertently, in relation to how JR interacts with the Senior Courts Act, let me set the information out, and Members can have it before we proceed.
Dr Mullan
On a point of order, Ms Butler. I am being reasonable. On the matters on which the Minister said she would write to us—the three offences and whether there will be amendment in that respect— I have accepted a letter. However, it is not appropriate to ask us to vote when we are unclear about the implications of these changes. We have already had to do that once, and it is not appropriate to ask us to do it again. We can debate the clauses, which relate to the potential loss of an important right, but we do not necessarily have to vote on them. I have never said there was a right of appeal; I have never described it as a right of appeal. I have said that there is a right to judicial review of an allocation decision. It is not right that we proceed without knowing the full implications of that being taken away through the Bill.
The Chair
It is up to the Minister how we proceed. We could suspend the sitting—[Interruption.] We are going to suspend the sitting and sit in private.
Dr Mullan
I beg to move, That the debate be now adjourned.
We have had some discussion in private, and I think it will be helpful, while not revealing what was said in private, to illustrate the Opposition’s thinking on the matter. As I explained during our previous sitting on Thursday—there has been a significant length of time since—I was of the understanding that moving the allocation decision away from the magistrates court to the Crown court would lead to a substantial reduction in access to judicial review of allocation decisions. This is not about appeal—we argued separately for appeal. Rather, the point of contention is about the right to judicial review. In that debate, the Minister, I am sure inadvertently, potentially misled the Committee by suggesting that that was not true, and I was called patronising by the hon. Member for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy, the Parliamentary Private Secretary sitting behind her, when I suggested that that was the case.
The Bar Council has submitted evidence to the Committee that supports my argument that there would be a substantial change in access to judicial review. That is directly relevant, not just to clause 3, which we are being asked to vote on, but to the next clause. The Minister accepts that she needs to write to us with further clarity on this issue, so she is conceding that it is not clear, but we are still being asked, by the Government Whip and the Minister, to vote on this measure. That is highly unsatisfactory. I want us to vote with a shared understanding of what the implications are. If the Minister agreed that there would be a significant reduction in access to the right to judicial review, we would have that shared understanding, but I do not believe that she is willing to concede that point.
On the basis that it is unclear what we are voting on, I am afraid that it is simply not appropriate for us to be asked to vote on clause 3. That was not my intention; I was of the understanding—I accept incorrectly—as I think the Minister also was, that we could shelve the vote and continue the debate, so that progress on the Bill was not curtailed. However, the Clerks have advised us that we cannot shelve the vote, so if this is the only available option to prevent us from voting without the full facts, I think it is appropriate that we adjourn the debate until such time as we get them. To reiterate, this was not my intention; I had expected that we would continue the debate and then have an option—[Interruption.] Does the PPS want to say something? No. On that basis, I think that we should adjourn.
Sarah Sackman
I oppose the Adjournment because I want us to make progress. Everyone is here to continue the important work of line-by-line scrutiny. I do not think that anything that I have said, to assist the Committee and Members across the House, should undermine that approach, so we should proceed.
Sarah Sackman
I think we are maybe dancing on the head of a pin. Whether it is a concession or not, I accept that there is no right of appeal of the allocation decision. I also accept that there is no obvious route to judicial review, because of the operation of section 29 of the Senior Courts Act. If I might say so, the hon. Member and I are agreeing. Whether he or the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle wants to categorise that as a concession, as a reduction of rights, that is a matter for them; but we are agreeing as to the legal position. What I wanted to do was set that out formally in writing, in response to that and to the various other questions that the Bar Council asked in their letter, because I thought that would be useful. However, we are in agreement, and I think that is why we can proceed to a vote, because we have a shared understanding of the law.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
I intended to intervene on the Minister to ask a question, but I am happy to pose it by way of a speech. She has indicated—in fact, she stated very clearly—that she wants to formally clarify in writing, but she is declining to formally clarify orally. Does she not accept that if we proceed to a vote on clause 3, she is at risk of inadvertently misleading this Committee if she cannot clarify what she says she wants to clarify in writing before we vote?
Sarah Sackman
I think I did clarify; I do not think I have anything more to say. I clarified it in answer to the hon. Member for Wimbledon. I am not going to say anything more; I think we should go to a vote.
Dr Mullan
I think the Minister is accepting that there is no obvious route to judicial review, which is completely contrary to what she said to us on Thursday. I think anyone would interpret that as a significant reduction in rights compared with the existing status quo, so with that clarification from the Minister, I am happy to continue.
Question put and negatived.
Question put, That clause 3 stand part of the Bill.
Dr Mullan
I beg to move amendment 45, in clause 4, page 10, line 16, leave out “one or more of the offences is an offence” and insert “all of the offences are”.
This amendment would limit judge-only trials to situations where all of the offences are listed in Schedule 3ZA.
Clause 4 relates to the allocation to the Crown court bench division of complex or lengthy cases. The amendment relates to how the mixture of cases presented on an indictment would affect the allocation decision. It addresses a clear overreach and would limit judge-only trials to situations where all the offences of which someone was accused are listed in new schedule 3ZA to the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
As it stands, a case may be directed to be judge-only where only one of the offences on the indictment falls within the schedule list, with only very limited exceptions in relation to murder and related offences, and sexual assault and related offences. It is important for Members to realise just how potentially expansive new schedule 3ZA is. If just one of these offences appears on someone’s list of charges, they will lose their access to a jury trial. They include conspiracy to defraud, cheating the public revenue, offences under the Taxes Management Act 1970, offences of false accounting under the Theft Act 1968, insider dealing, money laundering and bribery—a whole range of offences whereby, just one of which will remove access to a jury trial.
Someone could be accused at the same time of offences as serious as serious physical assault, grievous bodily harm, burglary or theft. Those offences may be many years apart; there may be a series of offences, dating over a number of years. That means that someone may lose a right that the Government otherwise accept they should have access to. Someone could have a serious offence of theft, with a likely sentence that, as we know, can be over the three-year benchmark. They could be facing a sentence of four years, which the Government otherwise agree should allow them to have a trial with a jury, and they will lose access to a trial by jury in relation to one of the other offences.
The test is not about the seriousness of the offences; it is a test of complexity. Someone may have a less serious but complex case, in the Government’s view, and lose access to a right to jury trial. I cannot see how the Government can possibly argue that that is fair. This is a matter of coherence and fairness. Our position is quite clear: only when all the offences, instead of just one of the offences, are those listed under proposed new schedule 3ZA should someone lose access to their right to a trial by jury on the basis of clause 4.
Sarah Sackman
I thank the hon. Member for his amendment, which would require cases to be eligible for an order under proposed new section 42A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 only where all offences listed are schedule offences. We consider that such a method would be overly rigid and would limit the application of clause 4. In reality, most complex and lengthy cases involving fraud and financial crime often prosecute a mix of principal and ancillary offences, some of which would not appear on the schedule of eligible offences. For example, sometimes theft offences, which are not included in the schedule, are prosecuted alongside fraud or money laundering crimes.
Imagine a large-scale conspiracy to defraud and false accounting, perhaps involving multiple offenders operating through a network of shell companies. The prosecution case relies on hundred, perhaps thousands, of pages of electronic banking records, company accounts, internal emails, encrypted messaging data, and expert accounting evidence that traces the movement of funds through dozens of linked corporate entities across multiple jurisdictions. This is in every sense a highly technical and inherently complex case, which is likely to last several months. But there are counts of theft-adjacent offences of, say, handling stolen goods on the indictment. Those counts are not incidental: they are related to the fraud. They provide the fact finder with a holistic picture of the alleged offending. The judge considers the counts to be clearly related and properly joined for trial. If clause 4 were constrained in the way proposed by the amendment, that plainly suitable case—long and exceptionally complex—would be excluded even from consideration for judge-only trial, because those additional connected counts are not listed in the schedule.
Requiring every offence to fall within the schedule would exclude cases that meet the policy intent of clause 4, thereby preventing the court from applying the provision precisely where it is most needed, solely because of the presence of additional non-schedule counts.
Sarah Sackman
The Government have deliberately drafted clause 4 in a manner that focuses on the overall nature of the case, rather than applying an artificial count-by-count test. The necessary question that we are asking the court to apply is whether, taken as whole, it justifies an order for a judge-only trial, given the policy intent that lies behind clause 4, not whether every individual count meets a particular threshold. Such an approach also risks incentivising artificial charging decisions or indictment charges to determine the eligibility for mode-of-trial decisions, rather than focusing on the effective management and efficient conduct of the trial.
Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)
The Minister mentions charging decisions. As it stands, the amendment would suggest absolutely nonsensical charging decisions. Prosecuting somebody for all the offences listed in part 1 of schedule 3ZA would fly in the face of common sense and go against the code for Crown prosecutors, which makes it clear that prosecutors should select charges to
“reflect the seriousness and extent of the offending…give the court adequate powers to sentence”
and
“enable the case to be presented in a clear and simple way.”
Does the Minister agree that if all the charges listed in the schedule had to be included in a case, that would be completely contrary to the prosecutor’s obligation?
Sarah Sackman
My hon. Friend is right. Flexibility is not a weaking of the safeguards; it is what actually allows the statutory test in clause 4 to operate properly and in appropriate scenarios.
Judges will already be required to consider the technicality and length of the case when making an order as to whether to allocate to a judge-only trial. Cases including indictable-only homicide and sexual offences are excluded from the outset because we regard those as cases where a jury trial is in the public interest. For those reasons, I urge the shadow Minister to withdraw his amendment.
Dr Mullan
I want to pick up on the point made by the hon. Member for Amber Valley. She has engaged sincerely throughout this debate, so I do not think her comment was a deliberate. We are not saying that someone has to be charged with everything to be eligible; we are saying that anything that they are charged for on that basis that excludes them from a jury trial should only be those offences. We are saying that if someone is charged for insider dealing and the judge decides that the case is complex or lengthy, under the legislation they will get a single-judge trial. The proposed legislation says that if they were also charged with grievous bodily harm, then that case, which would ordinarily continue to have a jury trial, would be seen without a jury. That would mean that just because someone happens to be charged with one of those offences alongside another one, they lose their access to a jury trial on both offences.
Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)
The point that the shadow Minister is making is that the clause is a substantial expansion of what we understand the legislation to be doing in terms of a judge-only trial. Somebody could be charged with 10 offences. One of those could be related to a lengthy fraud case, but the rest of the offences would mean that they would still get a judge-only trial, which is a significant expansion of what we believe this Bill is trying to do.
Dr Mullan
Absolutely, and there is not even anything in the Bill about proportionality. There is nothing. If someone is charged with one of the offences and the trial will be complex and lengthy—which is different to it being serious—that is it. Whatever else someone is charged with, they have already lost their right to a jury trial. That is a huge expansion.
I intervened to ask the Minister to explain why they have chosen to exclude sexual assaults. If someone is charged with GBH, then they lose their right to a jury trial, but if they are charged with a sexual assault, which in the sentencing guidelines may lead to them having an even lower sentence than a serious GBH, they will continue to have a jury trial, and a fraud offence would continue to be seen by a jury instead of a judge. It is completely contradictory. There is no logic behind the Government’s position. If they had a throughline as to why sexual assault, which is an absolutely terrible offence, is being set to one side, but something as serious as GBH, which can carry a sentence of many years and is also terrible for victims, then there would be more logic to it. But the Government have crafted an approach that is simply unfair and, as the Lib Dem spokeswoman pointed out, represents a massive expansion in all the different types of offences and sentence lengths that could potentially lose access to a jury trial, just because they also happen to be charged with an ancillary offence related to complex fraud. I am afraid there is no rational basis to that at all.
Jess Brown-Fuller
In the last couple of weeks, there have been press reports about a particular case that was charged in 2019. I will not go into that because it is going to reopen, but clause 4 would mean, for example, that somebody who has been abusing and defrauding the elderly—perhaps many different elderly people—over many years and has caused significant harm not of a sexual nature, and who is therefore charged with multiple offences, gets a judge-only trial and is not tried by a jury. If there was a sexual offence, they would get a jury, but if they had been harming multiple people and defrauding them, they would be tried by a judge alone. Does he agree that that feels quite perverse?
Dr Mullan
It is another example of what we have talked about: the move away from what we would consider to be natural justice. The scenario the hon. Member points to is not bizarre; there are offenders who target elderly women, for example, and will use all sorts of different methods to abuse them, from financial to sexual. I have seen cases of that nature. We see people who, at the same time as physically and sexually abusing a family member, were taking money from their bank account and falsely representing them to claim benefits, which again would be covered by the clause. It covers a whole range of offences, in all sorts of patterns. The Government call our amendment too rigid when, actually, the rigidity is quite clearly in the charging and allocation decisions; it is all on the Government’s side. They are being entirely rigid. If someone is subject to one of these cases and the judge thinks it is complex or lengthy, they will lose the right to a jury trial, end of story. I do not think that is a position that the Minister should feel comfortable advocating, and it is why we intend to press our amendment.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
Amendment 61 stands in the name of the hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Hussain), who is not a member of the Committee. Does anyone wish to speak to amendment 61? As nobody wishes to move the amendment, we come to amendment 29 in the name of Yasmin Qureshi, with which it will be convenient to debate amendment 46.
Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)
Could I have a little guidance, Ms Butler? Amendment 29 goes hand in hand with amendments 30 to 33. Can I cover those all in one go, instead of repeating the same speech in support of each amendment?
The Chair
If the Committee is happy to debate amendments 30 to 33 then we can do that now, but they will be voted on later on, when we come to them in the Bill.
Yasmin Qureshi
I understand that. It will just save me repeating the same thing again and again in support of each of the amendments, all of which concern clause 4. I thank the Committee for enabling me to deal with them in one go.
I beg to move amendment 29, in clause 4, page 10, line 34, at end insert—
“(d) the length of the trial is agreed by the defence and prosecution to be likely to exceed 5 months.”
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 46, in clause 4, page 10, line 34, at end insert—
“(3A) A court may not make an order under this section if it considers that it is the interests of natural justice for the defendant to have a trial with a jury.”
This amendment prevents a judge-only trial in complex and lengthy cases where it would be in the interests of natural justice for the defendant to be tried with a jury.
Amendment 30, in clause 4, page 11, line 1, leave out “no” and insert “a”.
Amendment 31, in clause 4, page 11, line 38, at end insert—
“(k) an offence of causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving under section 2B of the Road Traffic Act 1988;
(n) health and safety offences resulting in a fatality or offences connected to a fatality; and
(o) offences under the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 where there has been a fatality.”
Amendment 32, in clause 4, page 11, line 41, at end insert—
“(c) any offence resulting in a person becoming subject to a notification requirement under Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.”
Amendment 33, in clause 4, page 12, line 9, at end insert—
“(e) an offence of causing serious injury by dangerous driving under section 1A of the Road Traffic Act 1988;
(f) an offence of causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving under section 2C of the Road Traffic Act 1988;”.
Yasmin Qureshi
Amendment 29 would insert into subsection (3) an additional ground for a lengthy or complex case to be tried without a jury in England or Wales, to require agreement by the defence and the prosecution that the trial is likely to exceed five months. Amendment 30 is almost self-explanatory: it would provide a right of appeal against a judge’s decision to prevent a case from going to a jury trial. We seek to give a right of appeal to the defence—and the prosecution—if the judge decides that the case fits the category of a complex case such as a fraud case. Amendments 31 to 33 would add additional offences to the list of offences that will be excluded from the provisions of clause 4. Offences such as homicide, including under road traffic legislation, will be excluded, and amendments 31 to 33 would extend that list.
I want to speak both to clause 4 and to clause 5, which, as I understand it, will enable clause 4. Unlike the provisions in clauses 1 to 3, clauses 4 and 5 at least provide that the defence and the prosecution may make representations before a judge directs a trial without a jury. I acknowledge that that is a meaningful procedural difference, but the principle remains deeply troubling, and I want to explain why. It is a further restriction on the right to trial by jury; more cases could be caught by this provision, which means that people will not be able to have a trial by jury.
The central argument for clauses 4 and 5 is that certain cases—fraud cases, multi-handed cases or those involving extensive financial or digital evidence—are simply too complex or long for a jury to follow. I have to say directly that I find that argument unfair to ordinary members of the public. Trial by jury is not simply a procedural mechanism; it is a fundamental expression of the relationship between the citizen and the state. It says that, when the state seeks to deprive a person of their liberty, that judgment will not be made by the state alone but by 12 of that person’s fellow citizens. That is important, because it is embedded in our legal tradition.
Let me speak from direct experience: in my years of criminal practice, I never once saw a jury that looked confused, overwhelmed or unable to follow the case before them. One of the last cases I conducted at the Bar was a seven-handed trial at the central criminal court. It went on for a number of weeks and involved serious allegations, multiple defendants, CCTV evidence and complex factual issues. Some of the defendants were charged with murder and manslaughter, there were issues such as joinder—agreement by different groups of people about whether they were committing crimes or not—and all sorts of legal directives had to be given. As it happened, the jury followed the evidence, assessed it and reached its verdicts. That has been my experience across many cases, including complex fraud, multi-defendant drug conspiracies and cases involving technical or sensitive evidence.
One of the jobs I had as a prosecutor was as a specialist casework lawyer for London CPS, which meant dealing with some of the most complex cases. When I was in the CPS, I also worked on proceeds of crime cases. In fact, I was what they call a POCA—Proceeds of Crime Act 2002—specialist for my branch. We were looking at financial auditing and asset recovery, deciding what kind of charges to go by, dealing with the issues of undercover operations, surveillance evidence, what we call the RIPA—Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 —rules, and cases involving public officials. Across all of that experience, the issue was never whether the jury could follow the evidence; the issue was whether the case was properly presented.
Given the way trials work, what a prosecutor presents to a jury is exactly what they would present to a judge. They explain the evidence, they connect the facts and the dots, and they build a case. The process does not change, but the audience does. If the evidence is presented clearly, a jury can follow it. If it is not, that is a failure of advocacy, not a failure of the jury, and the judge will get as confused as anybody else.
For example, if a prosecutor is trying to prove certain things, they will say, “If you look at exhibit 25 on page 1,000 of the jury bundle, you will see that this phone belongs to the defendant,” and create a link. Then they will say that another page shows the evidence extracted from the phone and explain how that is linked. They would do that for a judge as well, because judges want the prosecution to explain things to them, too. They must do that and follow the continuity of the evidence.
At the end of the day, whether the case involves insider dealing or financial accounting, people can see if the information is presented to them properly. The prosecutor might show them a document that says there was x amount of money in one account, but it went missing and has now been found in another person’s account. It is about making sure that all the dots are connected, and they would have to do that with a judge as well. The judge will not just flick through the papers and say, “Ms Prosecutor, you can just sit down and I’ll go through it.” The prosecutor, through their witnesses or their physical evidence or their section 9 statements or section 10 admissions, will have to prove each and every aspect of the case and the role each defendant played in it.
Although a number of people may be charged with one offence, we know that under our criminal law the sentence they can get if convicted varies depending on the role they played in the crime. Issues include who counselled it, procured it, aided and abetted it—who played what role—and people will be sentenced accordingly. Again, that is a matter on which a prosecutor or defence counsel would show everyone evidence and say, “This is what happened.” Therefore, it really makes no difference whether the case is being presented to jurors or a judge.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Does the hon. Lady agree with His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC, who argued that jury trials could actually impose discipline in complex fraud cases, whereas in a judge-only trial there is no incentive to get on and hear all the evidence? He also said that in such cases, juries decide issues of dishonesty and facts that are not necessarily technical, meaning that 12 jurors are in a much better position to reach a decision based on dishonesty.
Yasmin Qureshi
I thank the hon. Lady for that intervention. I could go on and on explaining how evidence is presented, but all I will say from my years of experience—not just in the CPS, but in the independent Bar as well—is that I have gone through thousands of pages of documents, and juries have reacted to that and been able to deal with the cases unfazed. The issue is how well the evidence is presented, and counsel would have the same duty to do that in front of a judge.
In some respects, a jury trial is better when legal issues or the admissibility of evidence have to be determined during a trial. In a jury trial, the judge can send the jury out and listen to everyone’s representations about whether something should be admitted or not, and then make a decision. That is helpful because juries then never know about all the debates that have taken place. Sometimes there is evidence that a party wants to be admitted that is inadmissible or would be prejudicial.
Dr Mullan
I rise to speak in support of Opposition amendment 46, which is in my name, as we debate elements of the Government’s proposals to remove jury trials and make use of the new Crown court bench division in relation to potentially complex and lengthy trials.
To make sense of this debate, we must consider how the measures will apply. As we touched on earlier, the Government’s stated aim is to reduce the time taken to hear particularly lengthy and complex cases by permitting judge-alone trials and therefore—they say—freeing up additional Crown court capacity. The cases must involve at least one fraud or related financial offence listed in proposed new schedule 3ZA, which includes fraud by false representation, cheating the public revenue, money laundering and other offences, and would not involve an indictable-only homicide offence or sexual offence, including attempts or conspiracies to commit such offences.
We can already see, when considering the written evidence we have received, why there are rightly many questions about how the provisions will operate. In amendment 46, we therefore propose a requirement to ensure that defendants have a route in the law back to a jury trial. I draw the Committee’s attention to the evidence of Dr Natalie Hodgson, from the University of New South Wales, and Dr Matt Thomason, from the University of Nottingham, which was particularly helpful. They point out:
“Currently, the proposed s.42A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 does not define what is meant by “lengthy” or “complex”...Similarly, the proposed legislation provides no detail as to what judges can and should consider in determining whether ‘it is in the public interest’ for the trial to be conducted by judge alone. The Explanatory Note makes clear that ‘the court will retain full discretion’ as to whether it is appropriate to order a trial by judge alone.”
That is giving judges enormous power over these decisions.
Dr Thomason and Dr Hodgson also say:
“In contrast, we note that in New Zealand—which has a similar provision permitting judge-alone trials in cases ‘likely to be long and complex’—the relevant legislation sets out with greater specificity what a judge should consider in determining whether a case is likely to be long and complex…In particular, the New Zealand legislation specifies that a Court must not order a judge-alone trial unless all reasonable measures and arrangements have been taken to shorten the length of the trial, but the ‘duration of the trial still seems likely to exceed 20 sitting days.’”
So New Zealand was capable, in its legislation, of drawing a line in the sand as to what it considered to be a lengthy trial, but we do not seem to be doing the same.
Jess Brown-Fuller
The hon. Member is making a really interesting point about what we perceive to be lengthy or complex, as the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden tried to do with her amendment. Amendment 29 seeks to define a lengthy trial as one going beyond the five-month point, but Geoffrey Rivlin KC collected data over six years from Southwark Crown court—the primary venue for complex financial crime trials—which showed that the vast majority of fraud cases lasted less than three months, with only one or two typically lasting more than that, and only two cases in total lasting over six months. Does the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle agree that it would be helpful for the Minister to clarify what she believes “lengthy” or “complex” to be? The judiciary will also be asking that.
Dr Mullan
The hon. Lady is absolutely right. The Minister is always keen to draw lessons from other jurisdictions, and as I said we have a clear lesson from another jurisdiction that is specific. In our system, my understanding is that the practice directions for complex cases are that the prosecution and defence should do everything possible to make sure a trial does not last longer than six weeks. So that is another example where we might expect the Minister’s view.
Dr Hodgson and Dr Thomason go on to say:
“The New Zealand legislation also specifies that judges should consider the following factors in deciding whether the defendant’s right to trial by jury is outweighed by the likelihood that potential jurors will not be able to perform their duties effectively.”
Those include
“the number and nature of the offences with which the defendant is charged…the nature of the issues likely to be involved…the volume of evidence likely to be presented…the imposition on potential jurors of sitting”
for a long time and
“any other matters the court considers relevant.”
Again, that is much more specific than the measures we have before us.
The written evidence continues:
“In New South Wales, Australia—where judge-alone trials can be ordered when a defendant elects a judge-alone trial and the judge considered that a judge-alone trial ‘is in the interests of justice’—the legislation specifies that, without limiting the factors a Court may consider, ‘the court may refuse to make an order…if it considers that the trial will involve a factual issue that requires the application of objective community standards’ such as an issue of reasonableness, negligence, or dangerousness.”
Again, that cuts to the heart of the difference in our approach. We have talked about matters of dishonesty and the different elements of an offence that we might seek to prove. Even if a trial is highly complex, if it comes down to a judgment about reasonableness, behaviour and the choices people make, that is where a jury trial comes in. The approach in the Bill has a comparative lack of clarity and specificity, and that is why I have tabled amendment 46, which would weight things back towards the defendant, who at this stage is still innocent until proven guilty.
Even if the general right to elect for a jury trial is restricted for certain offences, defendants must be allowed to elect for one where they can demonstrate that a summary trial would violate the principles of natural justice. That is vital for individuals with a previously unblemished character or those whose livelihoods are directly imperilled by a conviction. The evidence from the Institute for Government and JUSTICE, and from recent parliamentary debates, is clear that a one-size-fits-all approach to efficiency risks compromising the integrity of the justice system it seeks to serve.
In relation to similar Opposition measures on previous clauses, the Government said that if they supported us, they would lose the court time they were seeking to secure. Let us remind ourselves of how questionable those claims are. The Institute for Government believes that the Government’s claims are highly uncertain, and others have questioned whether the claimed savings will ever actually be made; we will visit that later—for example, when we discuss the summing up the judge will need to make. The backlog is largely a product of longer-term issues related to, for example, judicial vacancies, prison transport, lack of early pleas and all sorts of other reasons not related to jury trials. So the efficiency gain is marginal, and we must ask whether it is worth the constitutional cost.
By forcing complex cases or those with high personal stakes into a bench division, we are essentially prioritising a spreadsheet of data over citizens’ rights to be judged by their peers. A natural justice exception would act as a safety valve, ensuring that speed does not override the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. Why does it matter whether a judge or a jury hear a case? In many instances, the legal outcome might be the same. However, the process of reaching the outcome is where natural justice resides.
In his paper “For Mercy’s Sake”, Geoffrey Robertson KC emphasised the importance of jury equity—the ability of a jury to look beyond the strict letter of the law to the broader circumstances of a defendant’s life. He is right to argue that a jury possesses the unique capacity to dispense mercy where the law, in its rigidity, cannot. For a defendant of previous good character or one whose career hangs in the balance, the collective common sense of 12 citizens provides a bulwark against the mechanical application of statute, which may result in an outcome that is legally correct but morally disproportionate.
That is the essence of my argument: for a first-time offender, the move from a clean record to a criminal conviction is a life-altering transition. In some cases, the evidence may be nuanced or the impact of a guilty verdict may be uniquely devastating, such as the immediate loss of a professional license or employment. In previous debates, we referred to the fact that MPs might suffer those consequences, as would doctors, judges and all sorts of other people. When the defendant can show that the consequences of a trial are so profound that they require the ability to exercise their right to a jury, rather than just a professional bench, the law should accommodate that request.
When we speak of natural justice, we speak of the right to be heard in the manner that is fair. If the defendant can demonstrate that their case involves something that a professional bench might treat with case-hardened cynicism, the system must remain flexible. The Law Society highlights that public trust in the legal system is inextricably linked to the jury, and that the perception of fairness is as important as the reality. If defendants feel that they have been processed through an administrative division, rather than tried by their peers, the moral authority of the sentence is diminished.
Critics will argue that an exception for natural justice will lead to every defendant claiming they are a special case, thereby clogging the system further. That is a misplaced fear; we already have established legal tests for interests of justice in other areas of the law, such as the granting of legal aid or the admissibility of evidence. In fact, just yesterday, the Government accepted a reform to expand the eligibility to apply to the unduly lenient sentence scheme, when it is in the interests of justice to do so.
In an earlier sitting, the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden helpfully approached similar issues with an amendment that was more specific about the situations in which we might agree that natural justice should allow for a jury trial—for example, when the defendant is of good character, has not previously been convicted of an imprisonable offence, or will be treated as a rehabilitated person under section 1 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, or where being convicted of the offence or offences for which they are to be tried would likely result in significant reputational damage or their employment or professional qualifications being adversely affected. As I discussed in previous debates, those are all scenarios in which we think not having a jury trial would be against the interests of natural justice, and which our amendment seeks to curtail.
To conclude, the Bill in its current form is too blunt an instrument in relation to the decision to remove the jury. The tests set by the Government are not well defined and are too heavily weighted against the rights of the defendant. That is why our amendment introduces a stronger requirement to consider the matter from the perspective of the, until proven guilty, innocent defendant and what represents natural justice for them. By incorporating this safeguard, we preserve the mercy and common sense that Geoffrey Robertson KC so eloquently defends. Yes, justice must be efficient, but above all it must be fair. Let us not sacrifice the principles of natural justice on the altar of administrative expediency. Let us allow defendants who can show just cause to elect for a jury they deserve.
Yasmin Qureshi
I will not press my amendment to a vote. In fact, Ms Butler, I notify you and the Committee that I am not asking to vote on any of my amendments.
Sarah Sackman
To be clear, I intend to address amendment 29, albeit that it is not being put to a vote, and amendment 46, which was grouped with it. My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden referred to other amendments further ahead, but it may be convenient to deal with those when we get to them, unless you want me to deal with them now, Ms Butler. I am in your hands; I am happy to deal with them either way.
Sarah Sackman
In that case I will deal with amendments 30 to 32 once I have addressed amendments 29 and 61, because they all touch on similar issues in relation to clause 4.
Much has been said about the policy rationale behind this provision, and whether juries are somehow incapable of following complex trials involving fraud or financial matters. That is not the Government’s contention, although some of the cases that are routinely dealt with in Southwark Crown court, particularly in a modern environment with crypto and complex financial instruments, are indeed highly complex.
The primary issue is jury burden, which is a theme that emerged from the independent review of criminal courts, and it has long been identified as a significant issue. As long ago as 2001, Lord Justice Robin Auld said that the
“increase in the length of such trials over recent years has become a severe intrusion on jurors’ working and private lives. It cannot be good for them or for justice.”
Sir Brian Leveson picked up that theme in part 1 of his review, in which he said that
“the personal and financial burden placed on jurors, particularly those involved in lengthy trials, is significant.”
He also said that
“serious and complex fraud trials…place more significant burdens on court resources and jurors’ time.”
There is evidence of the financial strain on jurors who sit in lengthy trials, particularly those who are self-employed or who have caring responsibilities.
In addition, under the current system, the companies that jurors work for cannot claim back losses incurred while their employee is on jury service. As I have said before, we commend the participation in jury service of people from across society and from all backgrounds, which is why we are seeking to preserve jury trials for our most serious cases—those pertaining to matters that are not only serious for individuals but are in the public interest.
Sarah Sackman
I will make a bit of progress.
We also need to be mindful of the burden that lengthy trials place on jurors. In this country, between January 2024 and December 2025, almost 3,000 jurors sat in trials that lasted more than six weeks. We should be mindful that trials for fraud and serious financial crime, which are within the purview of this clause, are some of the longest and most demanding in the Crown courts. We also have to be mindful of our argument on the time savings of having judge-only trials for such cases.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Has the Ministry of Justice done any modelling on the benefits of introducing Maxwell hours for all lengthy fraud cases? Doing so would benefit jurors, as they would only be committed to sitting from 8 am until midday and could go on to fulfil their caring responsibilities and such. The same goes for judges when dealing with complex fraud cases.
Sarah Sackman
I do not have any modelling to hand, but I can certainly take that away. If that work has been done, I will let the hon. Lady have it, but I do not have it to hand so I simply do not know.
I do not want to go over old ground, but we heard in oral evidence, particularly from the panel of experienced judges, about the time savings related to judge-only trials. Reference was made to other jurisdictions, and the data from New South Wales, which is a comparable common law jurisdiction, shows that when it introduced judge-only trials in complex cases, it saw a 29% reduction in the length of trials, so the Government are confident that clause 4 will result in material time savings.
Amendment 29 would make parties’ agreement that a trial is likely to last more than five months a condition of judge-only trials under clause 4. Of course, I agree that five months is an exceptionally long time to expect any member of the public to serve on a jury, but we cannot ignore the fact that considerably shorter trials can be equally as disruptive to jurors’ lives, particularly if they are self-employed or have caring responsibilities.
Joe Robertson
The Minister talks about the statutory test for complexity, among other things. I cannot identify the statutory test for complexity. Where is the test in the new legislation?
Sarah Sackman
We consider it to be set out in clause 4 as drafted. It is sufficiently flexible and will no doubt be subjected to interpretation. We think that, as drafted—with all the carefully prescribed exceptions to what could be included, in addition to the public interest exclusion—it is sufficiently clear, and that there is a clear understanding of the sorts of offences that would come within the provision.
I am also keen to work together constructively to ensure public confidence, particularly in cases involving loss of life, while still providing the courts with the flexibility they need for the clause to work appropriately. In the case of amendment 31, given the high bar already set in the clause and the cautious way that we expect judges will exercise these powers, we consider the statutory exclusion of these additional offences unnecessary. Again, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden not to press her amendment.
Finally, the placement of amendment 32 in proposed new section 42B(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 means that it would not, in fact, exclude any offences beyond the indictable-only sexual offences that are expressly excluded by proposed new section 42B(2)(b). As I have said previously, we set up the clause so that jury trial is the default. Judges apply the test, and there are safeguards for case suitability and public interest. It would be very rare for sexual offences to be tried alongside the kinds of complex or lengthy fraud and financial cases that clause 4 is designed to capture. For those reasons, once again, I urge my hon. Friend not to press the amendment.
Yasmin Qureshi
I thank the Minister for her response. My amendments are short and easily identifiable. I think the offences I have suggested should be included within the categories of certain murders and homicides, but as I said earlier, I will not press the amendments to a vote.
Sarah Sackman
Forgive me, Ms Butler, is it possible that I have not addressed the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle?
Sarah Sackman
Finally, let me address amendment 46. As Members will get sick of hearing me say, the courts are facing an unprecedented challenge. Although relatively few in number, cases involving fraud and serious financial crime are some of the longest and most demanding trials in the Crown court. In that context, and in line with the recommendation of the independent review of the criminal courts, we have taken the decision to introduce judge-only trials for lengthy and complex cases. The policy is intended to create an additional, tightly defined and controlled discretion for a very small number of cases where the burden on jurors and court resources is excessive, ensuring that cases are dealt with efficiently while maintaining fairness and judicial rigour.
Dr Mullan
I am in danger of not knowing my figures, but I think the impact assessment suggests that 25% of cases in the list of offences will be included, so I am not sure whether it is reasonable to describe that as a small proportion—I do not know whether the Minister said “proportion” or “number”. How many cases does she think it will involve?
Sarah Sackman
My understanding of the time saving—we measure it in the context of Crown court sitting days—is that we are looking at around 500 sitting days, which no one is suggesting is a huge number. As I said, the reality of how we expect judges to apply the provision in these cases is that jury trial is the default. The provision in clause 4 is fairly narrowly drawn, so we do not expect that lots of cases will be captured by it, but we expect that lengthier fraud and financial crime cases that come within the provision will result in significant time savings—significant when every little helps, to put it that way. I hope that answers the hon. Gentleman’s question.
As I have said previously, the principles of natural justice—the way in which the amendment is framed—are preserved in the framework provided by these reforms. We think that makes the introduction of an additional, open-ended safeguard unnecessary.
The right to a fair trial, protected under article 6 of the European convention, is preserved here. Judges will be required to apply the statutory test carefully and under the proper safeguards of clause 4, considering suitability and public interest on a case-by-case basis. It is not a category approach; it is based on the individual nature and facts of the case. Judges will also, in accordance with the established principles of fairness and open justice, have to give reasons for those allocation decisions, which we think will also ensure a level of accountability. We think that judges, in accordance with their judicial oath, will do this transparently, fairly and well. For those reasons, the amendment would not add to a procedural safeguard, and I urge the hon. Member not to press it.
Yasmin Qureshi
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 46, in clause 4, page 10, line 34, at end insert—
“(3A) A court may not make an order under this section if it considers that it is the interests of natural justice for the defendant to have a trial with a jury.”—(Dr Mullan.)
This amendment prevents a judge-only trial in complex and lengthy cases where it would be in the interests of natural justice for the defendant to be tried with a jury.
Dr Mullan
I beg to move amendment 47, in clause 4, page 11, line 1, leave out from “is” to end of line 2, and insert
“a right of appeal against a decision to make an order under this section on the grounds of natural justice.
(5A) where an appeal is made under subsection (5), it must not be heard by the judge who made the original determination.”
This amendment would add a right for defendants to appeal against the decision for a judge-only trial for lengthy and complex cases.
Much of our discourse has focused on whether judge-only trials should exist at all, but as with the previous amendments, we must also address the critical procedural omission in the drafting of this clause: the absence of a clear interlocutory right of appeal for a defendant against a decision to allocate them to a judge-only trial. The Government’s stated aim is efficiency, but efficiency without a safety valve of oversight often leads to systemic instability. By denying a defendant the right to appeal an allocation decision before the trial begins, we are not streamlining justice but creating a procedural blind spot.
We believe that providing an immediate right of appeal is not only a matter of fairness, but the most efficient path available to the court. As we debated in relation to clause 3, on the Crown court bench division, the lack of such a mechanism risks baking in errors that can be rectified only through costly and time-consuming post-trial appeals.
The pursuit of headline-ready speed must not eclipse the logistical reality that a trial conducted in the wrong forum is a wasted trial. If an allocation decision is found to be flawed only after a conviction, the state incurs the double cost of the original judge-led hearing and a subsequent jury retrial. If a case is allocated incorrectly, the defendant currently has no immediate recourse, and they must undergo the entire trial in the bench division. If, on appeal against conviction, it is determined that their allocation was indeed improper, the entire proceeding is voided.
An interlocutory appeal lasting perhaps one or two hours is a negligible investment compared with the risk of a three-week trial perhaps being overturned on a procedural technicality regarding allocation. By resolving the question of the right forum at the outset, we ensure that when a trial does proceed, its verdict is final and resistant to procedural challenge. That is the true meaning of efficiency.
Joe Robertson
I support the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the shadow Minister, which would ensure the right of appeal to a decision whether a trial should be heard by a jury. The Government’s reason for not accepting the amendment, as they have put forward on a number of previous amendments, is the principle of efficiency—that it would slow the system down and would not drive the efficiencies that they hope to secure through the Bill.
The principle of efficiency cannot be an untamed principle that runs roughshod over carefully fought legal principles of fairness and natural justice. Efficiency cannot simply trump everything. If efficiency has no limits, why have trials of more than a few days at all? The arguments have been well made by the shadow Minister, and I do not wish to repeat them, but it is not an inefficient process to allow a right of appeal. I assume that the decision made by the judge in the first instance on how to allocate the trial will not be a particularly lengthy process anyway, so an appeal of that decision will be no lengthier—indeed, less so.
I have never heard the argument that appeals are against efficiency in any other aspect of law. Indeed, appealing the substantive outcome of a case—a claim of wrongful conviction—has not one but many stages of appeal: appeal to the High Court, appeal to the Court of Appeal and appeal to the Supreme Court. I have never heard the argument that someone should not have the right to appeal the outcome of a trial because it is inefficient or might cause delays.
It seems that efficiency is being used to justify a fairly hastily put together Bill, and that the Government do not recognise the possibly unintended consequences of its provisions in order to get their business through. The best way of addressing those issues, and accepting that there might be loopholes and unintended consequences, is to give genuine due regard to amendments tabled in good faith, on this occasion by the shadow Minister, to improve the lawmaking process and the Bill.
The amendment does not seek to drive a coach and horses through what the Government are trying to achieve with the Bill, even though we disagree with some of it; it seeks to improve, to perfect and not to allow unfairness to creep into the Bill. I am sure that the Government do not intend the Bill to be unfair, but time and again they risk allowing it to be so.
Sarah Sackman
The amendment would effectively introduce a new right of appeal against a decision to order a judge-only trial. Once again the Government does not consider that to be necessary in the interests of fairness, or appropriate given the time saving this Bill seeks to achieve. We are seeking, by the process set out in clause 4, to encourage procedural finality and to avoid delay rather than setting up additional procedural layers to add complexity and delay.
Of course, all that should not come at the expense of overall fairness. That guarantee of fairness is expressed in a number of ways: because we consider the different modes of trial that might be afforded to a case to be fair; because a judge sitting alone will be required to give reasons for the allocation itself and then for the substantive verdict, whether a conviction or an acquittal; and because that in itself can be subject to an appeal in the Crown court in the usual way. We regard that as an important safeguard in terms of fairness, but we do not want to encourage mode-of-trial allocations—which we think that judges will do well, transparently, efficiently and having heard from both sides—to be relitigated. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.
Dr Mullan
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East for his remarks. I will paint a scenario for the Minister and ask whether she thinks it is one she will end up regretting if she does not accept at some point, if not at these stages, the idea that appeal is actually serving her own interests in reducing the backlogs. The scenario is that the Bill has passed, has been operating for a year or even two, and there have been multiple complex and lengthy cases heard without a jury under the schedules in this clause—potentially saving, in the Government’s own arguments of its merits, many days of crown court time—but then one of those people appeals post-conviction and successfully argues there was some error of judgment in the judge’s decision to allocate them a trial without a jury.
My understanding of the law is that that would set a precedent and that anybody in those same circumstances allocated a trial without a jury would then be entitled to say that the law as then written by the Court of Appeal should apply to them. We could have a situation where dozens and dozens of cases were then ordered to be retried with a trial by jury. That would not only fail to have made the savings the Government wants to achieve, but make the situation even worse, leading to many more Crown court sitting days being taken up by these cases.
The Court of Appeal approach on allocation will allow the case law to be built up quickly, ahead of trials and convictions, to bring the clarity that judges will need to make sure their decisions are not successfully challenged in the Court of Appeal. We made that argument in relation to clause 3, but it is even stronger in relation to clause 4, because it is just so much more subjective and open to interpretation, and there is so much more room for judges to make decisions that the Court of Appeal find erred against what the Minister is intending through her legislation.
This amendment is a genuine attempt to save trouble down the line. I hope—even if not at this stage—the Minister reconsiders her view that these appeals are necessary. We know that people are not allowed to make meritless appeals. They have to have legal advice from somebody, telling them, “Yes, you have a reasonable case to be made”, and so this will not become some frivolous thing. We have talked about the magistrates court and the Government seeking to restrict that, but even without that restriction, the vast majority of people do not seek to exercise an appeal right—when they already have that right and exercising it comes at a low opportunity cost—even though the Government’s argument is that it can be used as appeal for appeal’s sake.
The idea that an appeal right would flood the courts with those types of cases does not stand up to much scrutiny. Even if that were the case initially, as the case law developed, it would become harder and harder for people to make appeals on this element of the process. On that basis, we will push the amendment to a vote.
Dr Mullan
I beg to move amendment 50, in clause 4, page 12, line 27, leave out subsection (5)(a).
This amendment would prevent the court unilaterally overriding a reason to issue a revocation order so that a case allocated for judge-only trial under this section could be tried by jury.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 48, in clause 4, page 13, line 11, at end insert—
“(g) the interests of natural justice for the defendant.”
This amendment would ensure that the interests of natural justice for the defendant are relevant to the decision to revoke an order for a judge-only trial for the offences listed in Schedule 1.
Dr Mullan
In earlier sittings, I spent some time testing the basis on which the Government are asking the Committee to accept the changes proposed in the Bill, particularly in relation to the claimed benefits and how the system will work in practice. That is particularly relevant in the context of clause 4, where the justification for removing jury trials rests on the assessment of complexity and length, and therefore on how those judgments are made and revisited in practice. During evidence, I asked Sir Brian Leveson about the modelling underpinning the proposals. His report points to the need for further modelling, but when that modelling was discussed, it was clear that there is uncertainty about the figures and what the impact will be.
That is important context for these amendments; if there is uncertainty about how the system will operate and what it will deliver, it becomes even more important that the framework we are putting in place is clear on how decisions are to be made and what factors will be taken into account. Throughout our discussions, I have also tried to focus on how the provisions will operate and what they will mean for people going through the system, particularly those who are not legally represented and who may find it difficult to navigate more complex procedures. The amendments are aimed at those practical questions.
Amendment 50 relates to a point that is fundamental to how the framework will operate in practice. The Bill sets out conditions under which a judge-only trial order may be revoked, including where the case is no longer sufficiently complex or lengthy. That reflects the Government’s central argument that a jury trial is displaced only because certain features of the case justify it. However, the Bill then provides that, even when those conditions are met, the court may none the less decide not to revoke the order if it considers that
“it would not be appropriate to do so”.
I want to be clear about what that means in practice. If the justification for removing the jury is complexity or length, what is the position when that justification falls away? What is the court expected to do at that point? Is the expectation that the case should ordinarily return to a jury or that, once the decision has been made, it should remain judge-only unless something else actively pushes it back? The Bill does not answer that question, and that matters because, throughout our debates, I have tried to emphasise that it is about not just what is written in the Bill, but how its provisions will operate day to day in real cases.
As I set out in earlier debates, we have a whole range of factors here, and many of them must be weighed rather than applied as straightforward rules. That inevitably leaves a significant role for judicial interpretation. Judicial discretion in itself is not a problem, but when Parliament sets out a structured framework with specific conditions, it is important that those conditions actually do something and have a clear consequence. Otherwise, we risk creating a system in which the criteria exist on paper, but the outcome is ultimately determined by a broader and less clearly defined set of judgments, and that is precisely the concern here.
We are told that if a case is sufficiently complex or lengthy, it may be tried without a jury, but we are also told that if it is no longer sufficiently complex or lengthy, the court may nevertheless decide that it is still not appropriate to return it to a jury. The Committee is entitled to ask, “What weight are we really giving to those original criteria?” In earlier debates, I made the point that courts will look at the legislation, and indeed our debates, to understand what Parliament intends. If we leave this question too open, it is not clear what guidance the courts are expected to follow in practice. If a defendant is told that their case is no longer sufficiently complex to justify a judge-only trial, but that it will nevertheless continue without a jury because it is considered not appropriate to change it, the basis of that decision will not be clear to them.
This amendment is relatively modest but important. It seeks not to remove judicial discretion entirely or create an inflexible system, but to ensure that, where Parliament has set out the conditions for revocation, those conditions have a clear and meaningful effect. If the basis for removing the jury no longer exists, that should carry real weight in the decision that follows. Otherwise, we are in danger of creating a framework in which the justification for removing the jury and the decision to keep the jury become disconnected.
Amendment 48 relates to the factors that a court must consider when deciding whether to revoke a judge-only trial order. The Bill sets out a number of considerations, including delay, the interests of victims and the impact on court business. Those are clearly important issues. We have heard a great deal of evidence in Committee about the impact of delays, particularly on victims, and I do not think anyone would dispute that that is a serious concern.
In my role as shadow Justice Minister, I have focused on the experience of victims in all different elements of the system, including the effect that long delays can have on them. Looking at the list of factors in the Bill, I am interested in what is not included. It is striking that, in the statutory list, there is no explicit reference to the interests of natural justice for the defendant. That omission matters.
In earlier debates, we have been clear that these questions are, in part, about weighing exercises—balancing different factors—and that there are, in reality, more and less fair ways of doing things. We have also discussed that defendants are not all in the same position. The system already recognises that in other ways, whether through good character, prior convictions or the wider consequences that a conviction may have on someone’s life. We treat individuals differently, because fairness requires us to do so. That is why the framework matters.
If the court is directed to consider certain factors, those factors will shape how decisions are made in practice. If fairness to the defendant is not explicitly part of that framework, there is a risk that it will not be given the weight it should be. That is particularly important in this context, because we are dealing with decisions about whether a person should continue to be tried without a jury.
In debates on earlier clauses, I made the point that jury trial is, in some respects, a superior form of justice, even if we accept that it is not practical in every single case. That necessarily means that moving away from it is not a neutral step; it is a step that has consequences for fairness. When the court is deciding whether that position should continue and whether a case should remain judge-only or return to a jury, it seems entirely reasonable that fairness to the defendant should be part of that decision—not assumed or left to implication, but explicitly recognised.
Amendment 48 would not remove any of the existing factors. It would not prevent the court from taking into account delay, the interests of victims or the impact on the wider system, but it would ensure that, alongside those considerations, the court was also required to consider the interests of natural justice. Given the nature of the decision, that seems to be an essential part of a balanced framework.
These amendments are intended to clarify how this framework will operate in practice. They are about ensuring that the conditions set out in the Bill have a clear effect, and that the factors guiding courts’ decision making reflect the full range of relevant considerations.
Sarah Sackman
I will address amendments 50 and 48 together. The cases that we are considering in the context of clause 4, which involve fraud and serious financial crime, are, as I have said, among the longest and most demanding trials in the Crown court, routinely running for many weeks and often months. Cases can, and sometimes do, evolve as they progress through the courts—that is not unusual.
Like earlier clauses, clause 4 makes clear provision for orders for a judge-alone trial to be revoked where the circumstances of a case change. That is, again, an important safeguard. For example, a charge on the indictment may be dropped, suggesting that the case becomes less technical, but that is not always clear cut. Money laundering, tax evasion and fraud charges can fall, but cases may none the less remain complex and lengthy in nature due to the volume of digital material, financial accounts or, indeed, the number of defendants involved.
That is why the policy is intentionally designed in a discretionary manner and defines what is required for a judge-alone order, but ultimately a judge, seized of the facts of the case, is best placed to determine whether the conditions are met for each case. Judges must have discretion to determine whether an order is or no longer remains appropriate. In deciding whether to revoke an order, the court must also consider named factors such as delays to the proceedings and the impact on Crown court listings. I am pleased to hear that there is consensus, in this context, about the relevancy of the factors that are prescribed. I do not think that anybody here would disagree that we want judges to have regard to the efficiency of our system and the impact on individual cases.
For all cases under a judge-alone order, it is important to underscore that if an excluded offence is added or the court considers that it is in the public interest for the trial to be conducted with a jury, the order will always be revoked and the case sent to be dealt with in that way, with a jury. Where a jury trial has started already, an order can never be made. That would clearly cause disproportionate disruption within our courts.
In relation to the points around natural justice, the right to a fair hearing, the rules against bias and the duty to act fairly, we consider that those are already upheld within our reforms and therefore do not require the specific provision that is provided for in amendment 48. As hon. Members have heard me say, the fact that a trial happens without a jury does not in itself offend the principles of natural justice.
We have also designed the test for revoking an order, as set out in clause 4, to ensure that relevant interests are properly balanced by the courts. Importantly, parties are given the opportunity to make representations on reallocation, meaning that the defence can draw the court’s attention to how the factors in the Bill intersect with a defendant’s interests, including the issue of delay. At the same time, as we have heard, clause 4 requires the court itself to have regard to the interests of victims when deciding whether reallocation would be appropriate. That ensures that interests are properly weighed by the court, alongside the other factors set out in the Bill. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.
Dr Mullan
To reiterate, as in clause 3, we risk creating an unfair dual standard for defendants. The Government accept that such defendants should have rights to a jury trial, but they will potentially be denied one unnecessarily because of the circumstances changing throughout their trial, rather than at the outset. Can we create two identical legal tests for the outset versus in the trial? No, but we can certainly make a better effort than we have.
This issue ties back into the question of appeals. If we do not make the process fairer, there is a greater likelihood that defendants who experience failure to reallocate when the circumstances change—who sit there knowing that, if they had been in those circumstances at the outset of the trial, they would have had access to a jury trial—will be encouraged to appeal, post conviction, against the decision not to allocate them to a jury trial. Therefore, again, on the Government’s own test in relation to efficiency, there is a benefit to having a more effective and more balanced test for reallocation during trials. On that basis, we will push our amendments to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Dr Mullan
I beg to move amendment 49, in clause 4, page 13, line 30, leave out “trial beginning on or” and insert
“cases whose first hearing in the magistrates’ court takes place”.
This amendment prevents the provisions in section 4 coming into effect retrospectively.
We previously discussed the issue of retrospectivity in clause 3, and the exact same questions arise here. As drafted, the Bill provides that the new regime applies to trials listed to begin after a specified day, regardless of when earlier stages in the case have taken place. Subsection (6) makes it clear that this applies regardless of when the preparatory hearing was ordered, for example. That means that cases already in the system may be brought into the new regime before they are heard. We have already considered this issue in debates on earlier clauses, where I raised concerns about how changes to the procedural framework affect people who are already part way through the process.
Defendants do not approach their case in a vacuum. They make decisions at different stages about how to approach it, how to prepare and how to engage with the system, based on the entire framework that applies to them at the time. In this context, that includes the expectation that their case will be heard by a jury. Where a defendant has proceeded on that basis and the case has progressed through the system with that understanding, it is not a small matter to change that position part way through. To change the basis on which a case is to be tried part way through proceedings is not simply a technical or procedural adjustment; it alters the ground beneath the defendant’s feet, and that point goes directly to fairness.
The Government may argue that this is simply a procedural change, and that the case remains in the Crown court with the same offences and the same sentencing powers, but that does not fully address the issue. We have already discussed the meaningful distinction between a trial before a jury and a trial before a judge sitting alone. The Minister has accepted that there is “something special” about a jury trial. If that is the case, removing it cannot be treated as a neutral step. It follows that changing the mode of trial after a case has already entered the system is not simply a question of procedure, but a change that affects how the case is determined.
There is also a practical dimension to this. I have referred to the position of defendants who may have made decisions in expectation of a jury trial. That may affect whether they elect a particular route, how they prepare the defence and how they approach the proceedings as a whole. It has also been pointed out that defendants awaiting trial may be doing so on remand, expecting that their case will be heard in a particular way. Had they known that the framework would change, they may have taken different decisions at an earlier stage. That illustrates that this is not simply an abstract concern; it has real consequences for individuals.
There is also a broader question of how such changes will operate in practice. Applying a new regime to cases already in the system introduces an additional layer of complexity. It raises questions about how existing cases should be treated, how decisions already taken are to be revisited and how the courts should manage that situation practically. We have already heard concerns that this could lead to additional steps in the process, including further consideration of allocation and, potentially, challenge. That has implications for the efficiency of the system. If all the cases currently sat in the backlog to which this applies are subject to a further additional hearing in addition to the new cases coming in, that will create a burden on the courts.
On fairness, it is difficult to justify changing the basis on which a case should be tried after it has already progressed through the system. On practicality, it is not clear that retrospective application will achieve the objectives that the Government have set out—particularly if it introduces additional complexity. In debates on earlier clauses, I also made the point that retrospective measures require a particularly strong justification. We previously talked about the guidance to the House and how stringent those tests are. We have heard an unconvincing case, in my view, that such a justification exists here.
The amendment therefore takes a straightforward and proportionate approach. It would ensure that the new regime applies only prospectively to cases entering the system after the change, rather than to those already under way. That respects the position of defendants who are already part way through the process, avoids the fairness concerns that arise from changing the framework mid-stream, and provides greater clarity about how the system will operate. Given the nature of the change being made, that is a distinction that I think the Committee should take seriously.
This is a question about how changes to the system are applied in practice. The amendment is intended to provide clarity about that and to ensure that the framework is applied consistently to cases moving forward, but not retrospectively.
Sarah Sackman
On amendment 49, consistent with our approach to the allocation of cases within the existing caseload but where trials are not yet commenced in relation to allocation to a Crown court bench division, we follow the same approach in relation to questions of allocation with the creation of a judge-only forum for cases of the nature we have been discussing in relation to clause 4—namely those of a lengthy and complex nature. We follow the same rationale and principles that trials should be treated and heard in accordance with the law as it stands at the commencement of trial.
As I said earlier in the debate, applying the measures in the Bill to cases in the open caseload will enable us to bring forward and thereby accelerate caseload reduction, which is one of the main—if not the primary—objectives of the Bill. That approach to the application of the law to the existing caseload is consistent with precedent. For example, Parliament previously legislated in 2003 for judge-only trials in cases involving jury tampering and that applied to trials begun after commencement, regardless of when the case first entered the system. I grant that what we are seeking to do here is bolder and more extensive, but it is the principle of whether trials should be heard in accordance with the law as it stands when the Bill is brought into force.
That also means that we avoid a situation where there are two different procedures running in parallel in the Crown court as a result of arbitrary cut-off dates. Although I do not seek to overstate the impact that that application of the legislation will have on the relatively small number of cases that we are talking about in this context, it is important that we derive, in the delay reduction, every little benefit that we can from the measures that we are bringing forward as soon as we can, because of the extent of the delays. For those reasons, I urge the shadow Minister to withdraw his amendment.
Dr Mullan
The only point I would add is that, as the Minister has accepted, this is a relatively small number of cases, so the test of what is justifiable is actually disproportionately weighted against the Minister in these cases, in comparison with the earlier cases on clause 3. People’s rights and expectations remain the same, and from their perspective will be undermined by these measures, yet the benefit that the Government will actually secure from them is relatively minor, as the Minister accepts. I refer to the fact that 11% of Crown courts are sat empty today, and for a very minimal gain we are putting forward measures that make it difficult for people to exercise their rights in the legal system in a fair and reasonable way. On that basis, we will press the amendment to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 51, in schedule 1, page 38, line 3, leave out paragraph 20.
This amendment prevents the Lord Chancellor adding further offences to the list in Schedule 1 by regulations.
Schedule 1.
Sarah Sackman
I thank the shadow Minister for tabling amendment 51. I will first set out the rationale for clause 4 and schedule 1 and then address the amendment.
Clause 4 and schedule 1 will allow for particularly complex or lengthy fraud and financial offences to be tried by a judge sitting alone. Cases involving fraud and serious financial crime are some of the longest and most demanding trials in the Crown court. They routinely run for weeks or even months, and there are examples of the most complex cases running for over a year. That is an incredibly substantial burden for jurors—lay members going about their lives—to bear, particularly as the compensation for those they work for is non-existent and their own compensation covers expenses but no more.
Let me give a real-world example. A Crown court fraud trial was listed to run for 13 weeks—already a substantial commitment for any jury. Partial verdicts were returned by the jury four months later, with further verdicts provided the following month. The case finally concluded five months after it started. By that point the jury had dwindled from 12 to nine, worn down by delay after delay in such a long-running and complex trial. As I said, this is the primary rationale behind what we consider will also be a time-saving measure.
This is a significant challenge. In fraud cases, marathon trials can drag on for months—at times, well beyond the original estimate—as jurors fall away, delays compound and the system ends up bending around the logistics of keeping 12 ordinary men and women available for an extraordinary length of time. Sir Brian Leveson was clear, as was Lord Justice Auld, that trial by jury is not always the most sensible and proportionate approach to the resolution of these types of lengthy and complex cases.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
The Minister has already said “particularly complex or lengthy”, and just then she said “complex and lengthy”. Having rejected an amendment that would have set a limit of five months, will she think again about defining both complex and lengthy more rigorously in the Bill? The explanatory notes say “complex and lengthy”, but we do not have a definition of complex or a length limit. I think we need to hear more about that from her.
Sarah Sackman
I thank the hon. Member for her point, which has been raised by others. Those terms are well understood in their ordinary meaning and can be applied in a clear and straightforward way by judges.
Sarah Sackman
I am going to make some progress— I know the hon. Gentleman has raised this with me. Those responsible for drafting the legislation do not need to add further definitions of what we mean by “complex” and “lengthy”. That is well understood. As I said, given the other safeguards and considerations related to the kinds of cases that will be suitable, we think that the discretionary approach that judges will apply will suffice.
Sarah Sackman
I will not; I am going to make some progress.
As Sir Brian’s report clearly outlines,
“this is a principled reform based on the need for cases to be resolved in a more timely manner, with a forum well suited to the demands of the case.”
He suggests that allowing a judge to hear these cases alone—in tightly defined circumstances, of course—can cut hearing time by at least 20%. As we have said already, we heard from various witnesses about how that time saving would be achieved. That is a gain for the system and for capacity in the Crown court that can be used to progress other sorts of cases. That is not an abstract assumption. There is not an absence of evidence here: we have heard from those with judicial experience, as well as from international comparators such as New South Wales, where complex cases have been found to be 29% quicker when tried by judge alone.
Let us be clear about what we mean in practice when we talk about long jury trials. Imagine someone being told they are required to serve on a jury in the Crown court, not for the typical two weeks’ jury service, but for at least several months. Imagine receiving that letter and that news. Although we are very grateful for people who do that—I know how willingly so many citizens participate in juries—I have, as the Minister for Courts, received lots of correspondence about the burden that lengthy trials can impose. If someone is self-employed or in insecure employment, the time away can mean a significant loss of income. If they are a carer, it can mean scrambling around to find, or having to pay for, alternative support for a loved one. Even for many in stable employment, it is not just inconvenient; it has a real impact on personal life and finances.
That is why, as policymakers, we need to be proportionate and, dare I say it, judicious about how we use this special resource. Yes, I use the word “special”, and I do not resile from it—sitting on a jury is a special thing. However, we have to use that resource where it is right, proportionate and appropriate to do so. Reducing the need for members of the public to sit as jurors on very long and intensive trials means that fewer people will face that disruption and loss of earnings.
The nature of crime and evidence has changed. It is no longer a couple of paper files and a handful of witnesses; Sir Brian Leveson is clear that modern cases of the sort we are talking about can involve vast volumes—terabytes—of digital material held on servers and hard drives, and highly complex financial records. All that complexity means that directing and explaining the evidence at the pace of the slowest juror, which is the pace that an advocate has to go at, presents additional delay. I am grateful to Sir Brian for making that point clearly in his report.
The scale of “The Crown Court Compendium”, which is the guide that judges use to direct juries in criminal trials, is such that it now runs to some 560 pages, demonstrating the extraordinary time and effort that judges now need to devote to guiding juries in these complex trials. That support is plainly valuable and shows the great effort the system has already made to account for the huge change over the last couple of decades in the complexity of such cases. It also powerfully illustrates the real impact on timeliness, and Sir Brian’s observations only reinforce why it is right that we address the challenge head on. If it was true when Lord Justice Auld talked about the rationale for a judge-only trial in these sorts of cases over 25 years ago, it is certainly even more true now.
As I have said, the crux of the legislation is not whether a judge or a jury is better at understanding evidence or ascertaining the honesty or dishonesty of a defendant; it is about being honest with ourselves about the time that we have, ensuring that trials run as efficiently and effectively as they can, and preserving jury trial for the cases where it makes most sense and matters most. It is important to remember that this is not wholly new territory. Our justice system already recognises limited exceptions to jury trial, most notably where there is a risk of jury tampering, and those trials are conducted fairly by a judge sitting alone.
The clause does not bring about wholesale change to jury trials, which the Bill preserves for the most serious cases; it creates an additional, tightly defined and controlled, discretion for a small number of cases where the burden on jurors and court resources is excessive. It means that no case can be moved into the judge-alone route without a rigorous, transparent assessment against the statutory tests, with both the defence and prosecution having the opportunity to make representations, ensuring that decisions are fair and balanced. A case can only ever qualify if it involves a scheduled fraud or financial crime offence, and even then, a judge must first have ordered a preparatory hearing—something that happens only where a case is genuinely complex or lengthy.
We have also drawn hard lines. The gravest crimes can never be heard under this policy. That is why we have carved out all indictable-only sexual offences and homicide offences, such as rape, murder and manslaughter, which are all excluded. If any such offence is added to a case, the order must be revoked and the case must be sent for a jury trial, without exception. Where a jury trial would be in the public interest, a judge cannot hear the case alone.
The clause is about three crucial things. First, it is about making a reasonable ask of the public in respect of their important civic duties, and not asking them to bear a disproportionate burden on themselves, their jobs or their loved ones. Secondly, it is about taking every responsible option available to us to get the criminal justice system moving again, because justice delayed is justice denied. Thirdly, it is about modernisation. The world has changed, and the nature of these crimes and the evidence that is involved have changed. What made sense in 1971, or even 25 years ago, is not always what works best today. In that reforming spirit, the clause presents a modern, balanced and proportionate approach. It is exactly the sort of thing that is needed in the light of the current pressures on the system. For that reason, I commend clause 4 and schedule 1 to the Committee.
Amendment 51 would remove the power for the Secretary of State to amend the list of offences in proposed new schedule 3ZA to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 by order, and the Government cannot support it. A fixed and closed list would not reflect the reality of modern crime. Fraud and financial offending continue to evolve rapidly, and new forms of criminality and new legislative offences across all aspects of crime will inevitably emerge in the coming years. If Parliament were required to revisit primary legislation every time a new, appropriately relevant offence was created or identified as suitable, that would significantly reduce the agility and effectiveness of this framework. Criminal cases are increasingly shaped by technological change, new technical and digital instruments, and increasingly sophisticated ways of handling evidence. A system that cannot adapt risks becoming obsolete almost as soon as it is enacted.
I have heard concerns that this power amounts to Government overreach, and I want to be clear that it does not and that this is not an unconstrained Executive power. The schedule can be amended only via the affirmative procedure, which requires debate and approval by both Houses of Parliament. That ensures proper democratic oversight, while ensuring that the law can keep pace with the ever-changing nature of crime without unnecessary delay. This is not an unusual approach to criminal legislation. Parliament has adopted similar delegated powers elsewhere in criminal legislation, including provisions now consolidated in the Sentencing Act 2020.
For those reasons, the Government believe that this power strikes the right balance between keeping pace with modern crime and remaining firmly anchored in parliamentary oversight. I urge the shadow Minister not to press his amendment to a vote.
Dr Mullan
I rise to speak in opposition to clause 4 and in support of amendment 51 in my name. I remind the Committee that this is not a new debate. As the Minister touched on, it is an idea that has been postponed, debated and largely rejected several times over the last few decades. Each time, the conclusion has been that the jury is not the problem in fraud cases, but a vital component of the solution.
The Government’s current justification rests on two pillars: that fraud causes are too complex for ordinary citizens, and that removing the jury will create significant efficiencies to help clear the record-breaking court backlog. Although we all acknowledge the severity of the backlog, we must ask whether these specific measures are evidence-based or merely an attempt to appear tough on administrative delays at the expense of the right to trial by one’s peers. The Bill will allow a judge to order a trial to be conducted without a jury if they are satisfied that the complexity or length of that trial would make it a heavy burden on a jury. As the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion pointed out, it would be good to get clarity on whether a judge may make such a determination on the basis of complexity or of length individually, or whether they must do so on the basis of both complexity and length—that was a fair question.
Complexity is highly subjective. For one judge, a case involving intricate cryptocurrency ledgers might seem manageable for a jury, but for another, it may seem impenetrable. By making the right to a jury trial contingent on a judge’s personal assessment of what a typical citizen can understand, we introduce an element of judicial lottery. Furthermore, fraud is fundamentally about honesty and dishonesty, which are concepts that ordinary people are well placed to judge. When we professionalise the verdict in fraud causes, we move away from a community-based standard of morality towards a technical, legalistic one that may lack the public’s moral buy-in.
I draw the Committee’s attention to the evidence provided by the City of London Law Society, which points out:
“The government’s rationale for judge-only trials in ‘complex or lengthy cases’ rests on two assumptions: that juries struggle to understand complex fraud cases, and that judge-only trials will be significantly more efficient.
Neither assumption is adequately supported by evidence.
There is substantial research and practical experience demonstrating that juries, when properly directed and assisted with appropriate case management, are capable of understanding and deciding complex fraud cases. Modern trial techniques have been brought in to address issues that arose in the past, significantly enhancing jury comprehension.
Juries have been involved in many hundreds of fraud trials, following the evidence and reaching rational decisions. The Leveson Review noted that in the Jubilee Line case (one of the longest running in British legal history and one which pre-dated many of the changes that have been introduced to help improve the jury’s understanding), jurors reported ‘a very good understanding of the evidence’, with ‘some commenting that it was not all that difficult’.
More recently, in R v Hayes & Palombo, the Supreme Court opined that a properly directed jury would have no problem assessing dishonesty in the context of a complex financial service-related case.
The assumption that juries cannot cope with complexity is unproven and patronising. It fails to recognise that juries regularly include individuals with professional expertise, financial literacy and analytical capabilities, and that issues of intent and dishonesty are familiar and well understood by the jury.”
The society states that we should also note
“that the cases that have been preserved for jury trial under the Bill are also likely to include complex expert evidence (such as forensic medical or science-based expert evidence or statistical analysis), which undermines the argument that complex trials should be left to a judge alone.
The hypothesis that judge-only trials are more efficient also relies on the assumption that time will be saved by counsel not having to simplify evidence when presenting to a judge rather than a jury. However, this fails to take into account that, without the requirement to simplify charges and evidence, this is likely to encourage increased charging by the prosecution and increased applications for more complex evidence to be presented to judges.”
While judges are experts in the law and legal matters, there is nothing at all to say that they are any more or less expert in cryptocurrency or complex financial matters than a member of a jury. In total, the society continues:
“This will thereby increase the time spent in pre-trial hearings and evidence presentation, as well as the length of and time to produce written judgments.”
In total, this will thereby increase the time spent in pre-trial hearings and evidence presentation, as well as the length of time to produce written judgments.
Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
It will no doubt be a relief to Members to hear that I am not going to talk for quite as long as I did this morning. I oppose clause 4 and schedule 1 standing part, and I support amendment 51, tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle.
As is becoming habit, I will begin with a very brief overview of what we are considering. Clause 4 and schedule 1 create a new framework for judge-only trials in certain complex or lengthy cases. The listed offences include fraud, tax evasion, false accounting, insider dealing, money laundering, terrorist funding, bribery and related offences. The court may order trial without a jury if it is satisfied that the likely complexity and/or length makes that appropriate, that it is not in the public interest for the trial to be conducted with a jury, and that there are no other reasons why it would be more appropriate for the trial to be with a jury. There would be no right of appeal against that decision.
That is a serious and constitutionally significant change in its own right, but what makes it even more troubling is that it has been justified on the strength of a paper-thin theoretical benefit. The House of Commons Library states that the Government estimate clause 4 will save 200 Crown court sitting days. That is around 0.18% of current Crown court capacity, which indicates just how small the potential gain is—if there is that gain at all.
That is the first and most obvious point I want to make. The Government are proposing a very serious encroachment on jury trials in return for a saving that amounts to just 200 sitting days. JUSTICE describes the change as “unnecessary,” says that it
“will not impact the backlog in any meaningful way”
and warns that it risks opening the door to restricting jury trials in other categories of case too. The Law Society is similarly clear:
“Removing jury trials for serious fraud cases is unlikely to have a significant effect on the backlogs, but would significantly erode the fundamental principle of open justice.”
That should be the frame for the whole debate on clause 4. We are not being asked to approve some modest efficiency measure; we are being asked to displace the jury in some of the most important and contested criminal cases for an alleged benefit so small that, even in the Government’s own case, it barely registers against total Crown court demand. That trade-off is so poor that I refuse to believe the Minister, in her heart of hearts, believes it is the right way to proceed.
The second point is that the case against juries being used in serious fraud and related cases has never really been made. In written evidence, the Law Society tells us:
“Serious cases of any complexity, including serious allegations of fraud, must be presented by the prosecution in a way that is understandable, not only to the judge and jury…but also, in line with the principle of open justice, to the public.”
It goes on to say:
“They should be subject to effective case management to ensure they take only a reasonable length of time, if necessary, by reducing the number of charges”.
In other words, the answer to complexity is to manage it properly, not to remove the jury.
It is worth reminding ourselves that the issues juries decide on in fraud trials are factual, not technical—in particular, whether the defendant was dishonest. That is judged by reference to the standards of ordinary decent people. Twelve ordinary jurors are far better placed to decide that than a single judge alone. That goes to the very nature of fraud. Fraud is not merely an accounting or regulatory puzzle; it is an allegation of dishonesty, and dishonesty, by definition, is exactly the sort of question on which the community’s judgment matters. Who should decide dishonesty: a single professional judge, or 12 citizens applying the standards of ordinary life? In a democratic criminal justice system, the answer should remain: the jury.
The evidence that we have does not support the idea that juries are what make these cases collapse, drag on or miscarry. JUSTICE’s written evidence points to the Southwark Crown court data gathered by His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC, showing that the vast majority of fraud cases lasted less than three months, with only one or two per year lasting over three months and only two cases in total lasting over six months. That is important, because it rather punches the myth that these are all endless epics that juries simply cannot understand or follow.
Rivlin’s evidence also says that jury trials compose a discipline that helps to keep fraud trials shorter. Without that discipline, judge-alone trials may end up running as long as, or even longer than, jury trials. More to the point, delays, collapses and miscarriages of justice in fraud are not caused by juries, as shown by R v. Hayes where convictions were quashed because of judicial misdirection, not because of anything the jury did wrong. That strongly refutes the suggestion that juries are the weak link in these cases.
The Government have two problems here: first, they have not shown that such cases are generally too long for juries; secondly, they have not shown that juries are what is causing the failures when these cases go wrong. Unfortunately, that leaves the Government looking rather like they are indulging in ideological hostility to jury trials rather than evidence-based reform.
There is also a wider constitutional point. The Law Society says, and I very much agree, that removing jury trials for serious fraud cases
“would significantly erode the fundamental principle of open justice.”
These are often cases involving major companies, financial institutions, public markets, public money, terrorism financing, bribery and corruption. They are exactly the sort of cases where the public must have confidence that justice has not simply been done inside a closed professional world by one member of that same world.
Fraud and related financial cases often concern the conduct of powerful, well-resourced and sophisticated defendants. In those cases, public confidence matters immensely. A verdict reached by a jury of citizens commands a kind of legitimacy that a judgment by a single judge does not carry in the same way. That is not a criticism of judges, but a recognition of why juries exist in the first place. They are there to not just decide facts but connect the administration of criminal justice to the public itself.
Dr Mullan
If the schedule said complex and lengthy fraud cases, then the Minister might be able to argue that it is constrained, but the schedule is just “Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases”. It actually opens the door to any number of types of offence being added purely because they are complex and lengthy. I think of, for example, the Lucy Letby trial, which was clearly complex and lengthy, but something that clearly needed to have a jury in terms of public confidence. That could end up included by schedule 1.
Rebecca Paul
I completely agree with my hon. Friend. What is considered complex and lengthy could be quite subjective. We all know that we are potentially going to end up in the courts over defining exactly what is complex and lengthy. It feels like the Bill is not written clearly enough for us to understand exactly how it will work in reality. Amendment 51 is an important safeguard against those risks.
In his written evidence, His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC notes that the schedule 1 list already
“appears to be arbitrary, perhaps the work of a moment; and it goes beyond anything suggested before. But even that is not the end of it.”
That is because part 2 of the schedule gives the Secretary of State the power by order to add or remove offences. He quotes the explanatory notes to show that offences not related to fraud or financial crime could easily be added in the future. He describes this as
“a mighty step along the way to the end of jury trials.”
That does not strike me as overstatement. The Secretary of State will indeed have this untrammelled power, and we should carefully heed this sober warning from a senior judge.
For similar reasons, the Opposition oppose schedule 1 standing part of the Bill. Schedule 1 is the list that gives clause 4 its reach, and the list is already troubling. It is not confined to a tiny, tightly defined category of unusual mega-fraud; it covers a wider class of economic and financial offences, including money laundering and terrorist funding, and can then be expanded later. If we think the core principle of clause 4 is wrong, then the schedule that operationalises it is wrong too.
Rivlin’s description of the list as “arbitrary” is worth keeping in mind. One of the reasons that schedule 1 is objectionable is that once Parliament accepts the principle that a whole category of serious Crown court cases can be singled out for juryless trial on grounds of length and complexity, the argument for confining the list to that category becomes very hard to sustain. The logic of the thing pushes outward. That is why schedule 1 is dangerous: for not only what it contains now but what it invites later.
I am particularly concerned that there is an ideological push away from jury trials. My concern is that this is only the start, not the end of where the Government want to get to. I urge the Committee to think about this carefully. We are taking important decisions for the future.
Dr Mullan
As I have talked about in earlier debates, uniquely in this situation we already know what the Lord Chancellor wanted to do. From leaks, we know that five years was the test, in terms of these proposals. The Opposition are being fair in suggesting that this is potentially the thin end of the wedge.
Rebecca Paul
I agree with my hon. Friend, as I normally do.
Finally, there is the obvious practical point that there are better answers available. The Law Society says that reform and investment must be strategic, not piecemeal, and warns against stand-alone measures such as changing from jury trials to judge-only trials without convincing evidence that they will significantly reduce the backlog. It says that Parliament should insist on “detailed modelling” and on understanding the Government’s intentions across the whole package of reform, not just on this isolated measure. The existence of pressure in the system does not prove that every proposed constitutional shortcut is justified. The question is whether the shortcut is necessary. With clause 4, the answer is plainly no. For all those reasons, I oppose clause 4 and schedule 1, and I support amendment 51.
Clause 4 offers a constitutionally serious reduction in jury trials for a tiny claimed benefit of 200 sitting days. The evidence does not show that juries are the cause of delay, collapse or miscarriage in these cases. Fraud cases are not too technical for juries. The key issue is dishonesty, and ordinary citizens are uniquely well placed to judge that. The removal of juries in these cases would damage open justice and public confidence. Schedule 1 gives effect to that flawed principle and then goes further by creating a route to ministerial expansion. Amendment 51 is therefore a sensible and necessary safeguard, but in truth, the better course is simpler still: clause 4 and schedule 1 should not be included in the Bill at all.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I will speak against the inclusion of clause 4. It inserts part 6A in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which will allow complex or lengthy cases to be tried without a jury. My main opposition to the clause is that it is a pointless exercise by the Government that will in no way affect the backlog. The Government’s own impact assessment suggests that the savings will amount to just 200 sitting days per year, which is a tiny fraction—0.18% of the current sitting days. The Government argue that these cases can continue for many months, thereby wasting jurors’ time or putting additional pressure on those called for jury service. However, data from Southwark Crown court, where the majority of fraud and other such cases are heard, shows that only one or two cases per year exceed three months, and only two between 2018 and 2024 went beyond six months.
His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC has argued that jury trials impose discipline, which helps to reduce the length of fraud trials. Without that incentive, judge-alone trials may be as long as or even longer than jury trials. I alluded to this earlier, but jurors decide on issues of dishonesty and fact in these cases, which are not necessarily technical. Twelve jurors are therefore in a much better position to reach a decision.
I also have grave concerns about the terminology of “complex” and “lengthy”. I know the Minister has said that the meaning of complex and lengthy are well understood in the judiciary. I would argue that a lot of people in the legal profession are pushing back against that assertion, and that the Bill does not provide clarity on what they should determine to be complex or lengthy.
Joe Robertson
The hon. Member is making a very good speech, but she is almost being generous. The wording in the Bill is not “complex”; it is “complexity”, which is a description, not even a value. The Bill is even vaguer than what the hon. Member is suggesting in her well-made point.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I thank the hon. Member for his point; he characterises me very well as being generous.
I would also argue that the scope is expanded significantly if one of the offences that a defendant is charged with is fraud, money laundering or any of the offences that sit in that category. There can be 10 charges against a defendant, and if one of them is fraud, money laundering or terrorism funding, that entire case could be heard in a judge-alone trial.
The Minister spoke very clearly about recognising the burden on jurors. She made a legitimate point, and it is certainly reflected in reality. Especially when jury trials do not run as we would expect them to run, the impact on jurors can be huge, especially for those who are self-employed or have caring responsibilities. As I mentioned earlier, I ask the Minister to go away and look at the Maxwell hours, which have been successful for longer cases. For a morning session, it means that those who are self-employed are able to commit to working in the afternoons. In some cases, it means that those with caring responsibilities know that they are going to get home at a reasonable hour. The Maxwell hours are used in lots of different areas, and could be the answer to retaining the key principle of jury trials in fraud cases, while still ensuring a better experience for jurors.
Amendment 51 would prevent
“the Lord Chancellor adding further offences to the list in Schedule 1 by regulations.”
The concern is that it would give unconstrained power over the list of offences that may be heard without a jury on the basis that cases are considered complex or burdensome for jurors. That rationale could easily be extended to lengthy murder, rape, or drug trials.
As the shadow Minister mentioned, if the wording in schedule 1 specified fraud or that particular type of case, it would be a different matter. However, it does not; it just says “complex or lengthy”. The Minister makes the point that this is a complex area, and criminal offences are added all the time, but she also referred to the specific types of fraud cases. If she can include the provision of fraud in clause 1, that would provide a reassurance that there would not be additionality of scope. That is not to suggest that the current Lord Chancellor would be inclined to increase the scope, but a future Lord Chancellor may be able to extend the provision far beyond the huge change that the Government are already proposing.
Trials for things like terrorism, murder, rape and drug offences can last many months. They can be as complex as fraud cases, and they can involve multiple defendants and expert evidence. On that basis, the arguments that the Minister has made do not stand. That is why I will be voting against clause 4.
Joe Robertson
How long is a piece of string? The unanswerable question. I could ask another question: is a 2-metre piece of string a long piece of string? If I asked you that question, Ms Butler, you would have a lot of questions for me before you gave your answer, yet the Minister thinks it is easy to answer the question, “Is a two-week trial a long trial?”. She thinks it is obvious and that a judge will be able to make a decision. She is not willing to put a definition on that, because she says it is evident in the way that the Bill is drafted.
I look at the words in the Bill—which is all that a judge will have to make that decision. On length, it says that the judge will have to decide if the
“likely length of the trial…makes it appropriate for the trial to be conducted without a jury.”
On complexity, they will have to decide whether
“the likely complexity of the trial”
is
“appropriate for the trial to be conducted without a jury.”
It is even hard to decipher from that whether it means complex is good or bad for a jury. Complexity is just a description; it is not a value. This is incredibly unusual, novel and, I would say, badly worded legislation. Ordinarily, a provision of this sort would say something along the lines of: “If the court is satisfied that the length of trial is so long that it would make it unreasonable for a jury”. That would be more normal wording.
The principle of reasonableness, while giving discretion and, some might argue, a vague term in the English language, is a well-tested word in criminal law and the English legal system. We know what reasonableness means; it is an objective test—“What would an ordinary person think is reasonable?” What about appropriateness? Does that mean appropriate to that judge on that day? Does it mean appropriate to a particular, theoretical juror? There is absolutely no guidance in Bill about how this novel word, “appropriate”, should be interpreted. Even when there are words in legislation such as “reasonableness”, which are backed by decades or even centuries of case law, the judge is very often given guidance in the legislation as to what is and is not reasonable.
Rebecca Paul
My hon. Friend is making some powerful points. Hearing him read out what the law says brings home to me just how terrible this Bill is. Surely everyone can see that there is no clarity how it would work. Rather than there being any clear guidance, it essentially feels as though any judge can have their own view on complexity and length. We will end up with inconsistency and disputes and arguments about the approach. Surely, that could do the opposite of address the backlog by adding additional complexity and confusion to our justice system.
Joe Robertson
I agree with my hon. Friend. Indeed, the Bill will basically lead to a complete lottery in decision making, depending on the judge a person gets on the day. I suspect that judges ordinarily do not like vague law or having to provide their own interpretation. They are usually more comfortable if the statute is more precise, or if it is backed by caselaw, but there is no caselaw here.
On the issue of length, we know what the Minister thinks because she has told us in this Bill Committee. I do not criticise her for this opinion, but she thinks a case is long if it is disruptive to the personal or professional life of a juror or their wellbeing. That is her view as to what will make a case lengthy, and I do not criticise her for that, but there is no guidance here for the judge to consider those things—[Interruption.] I paraphrase her—she is welcome to intervene if she disagrees about how I characterise her views on what is lengthy for a juror.
Dr Mullan
I talked before about how judges will look to what Ministers have said around a measure in trying to interpret it, so if a judge is not clear what was meant by this, and pulls up Hansard to read what the Minister has said, surely they will take from the fact that the Minister has talked about the disruption to a juror’s life that they should have that as the test. What is disruptive to one person’s life is very different from what is disruptive to another’s.
Joe Robertson
I agree with my hon. Friend; he actually pre-empts the point I am about to get on to. I thank him for taking me on to that. It should be fairly obvious to most people that there will be a wide range of views as to how much time a person can take out of their ordinary life, bearing in mind that people are not called for jury service at the drop of a hat. They are not told, “You must cancel all your plans next week”; there is a degree of warning.
Most people take quite a wide view on how much time they can afford to give, depending on what is going on in their life. For some people, taking two weeks or even a week out is very disruptive. This theoretical person that the judge has to imagine would make an argument that it is appropriate that the trial should not take place with a jury, because they do not have a week in their busy life to just hand over.
Alternatively, others may say that they see it as a civic duty and a fundamental contribution they make to society to be available for jury trial if called. Perhaps they have never been called and they have reached a ripe old age, and they are happy and prepared to take a month or two out of their life to devote to making a decision on whether someone is guilty.
Dr Mullan
Currently, when a person sits on a jury, it is understood that, outside of the most extreme circumstances, they will be there for as long as the case takes. However, if the public get the sense that they can debate what asks are reasonable or unreasonable, I would not be surprised if jury members, in trials that go on a little bit, start sending notes to the judge to complain. They might say, “This has gone on for a week, and I didn’t think I’d be here for that long. I understand that if a trial goes on for too long, it shouldn’t be heard by a jury. This is going on too long. Judge, will you look at that?” That will open a whole can of worms about something that at the minute is extremely constricted in people’s minds.
Joe Robertson
Indeed. Might a judge, halfway through a trial, decide that it has suddenly become inappropriate, having heard whatever formal or informal representations are made on that point? Even if there is some objective consensus about how long an ordinary person in this country should be prepared to set aside to serve on a jury, does that in itself make it appropriate that a case should not be heard by a jury?
Even if we could agree, for example, that devoting any more than a month to a jury trial is disruptive to a person’s life, does that automatically make it inappropriate for a case to be heard in a jury trial? No, not at all. If it is inconvenient for someone to sit on a jury for a particular length of time, that does not mean the case is inappropriate for a jury trial. Even the Government are not willing to put a specific time value on that.
Rebecca Paul
As my hon. Friend was speaking, it suddenly occurred to me that under our current system, jurors can already make that argument—that if sitting on a jury would be particularly disruptive, they should not have to do so. How does that interact with this measure? It feels like this does not make sense.
Joe Robertson
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. There are a number of personal and professional circumstances that can enable people to make that argument and get exempted from jury trial or, indeed, not have to sit on the jury in the original case but have it deferred to a more convenient time. She is absolutely right that flexibility for ordinary people in this country is already built into the way that juries are selected.
“Length” is probably the easiest of these three difficult terms; “complexity” is even harder to nail down. How is a judge supposed to decide what level of complexity makes it appropriate to have a jury? I would argue that the more complex a case, in certain circumstances, the more it should be heard by a jury, especially if the complexity relates to what is in the mind of the defendant, rather than, for example, complex financial papers.
Does the involvement of complex financial papers, on its own, necessarily make a trial more complex, if the real issue in the case is whether the defendant intended to be dishonest? As we have already heard with fraud cases, as well as most of the cases in schedule 1, the real issue is not whether something happened; it is the mindset—the legal term would be mens rea—of the person who did that thing. If they did something by accident or unintentionally, depending on the crime, that would often be enough for them to be acquitted. If they did something knowingly, dishonestly or recklessly, also depending on the crime, that would normally be enough for them to be convicted.
Dr Mullan
My hon. Friend the Member for Reigate has given one example, but another, with which I expect people will be familiar, is the LIBOR trials. They were very complicated and sophisticated, and the appeals were successful because of a judge. It was the judge’s misdirection to the jury that led to the LIBOR trials becoming another example of cases collapsing. If anything, the evidence shows that it is the judges who are the issue here, not the juries.
Joe Robertson
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Obviously judges are not infallible. That is not a criticism of judges—judges know that they can make mistakes. On the mindset of the person, I am unclear as to whether the Government or indeed anyone on the Committee, regardless of party, thinks that there is anything more complex than what is in a person’s mind—a mind that cannot be unlocked or opened. We can ask this person what was in their mind, but they want to be acquitted, so we must take a value judgment on whether they are telling the truth or not. Surely the most complex thing there can possibly be is what is in the mind of a human being. A very complex set of spreadsheets or cryptocurrency that only half of us understand is complicated, but there is perhaps nothing more complicated than the motivation and mindset of a human being.
That is specifically what juries are for—to make that sort of judgment on whether it was reasonable for someone to do something. That is why we have 12 members, so that they must come to a view unanimously, or certainly as a large majority. A judge is not in a more privileged position—no one would argue that they are—to decide what is and is not reasonable. They are in a more privileged position to make decisions about the law, and indeed they do make decisions about the law in jury trials and direct the jury on matters of law.
It is incredibly uncertain what “complexity” means. I know what the Minister thinks it means, and I do not criticise her. It is a perfectly reasonable view of what it means. My point is that it is not the only view. She thinks—I paraphrase; I do not seek to put words in her mouth—that it is complex financial evidence, presumably written evidence in many cases, in a fraud trial or crimes related to money. It is perfectly possible to have a great volume of evidence but, as the case unfolds, a detailed understanding of that paperwork may no longer be the issue on which the case turns. Does having a large volume of written evidence and a long list of witnesses make a case complex, or does it depend on what the witnesses might say or exactly what is in those papers?
The Minister has spoken about juries moving at the pace of the slowest member. Is her test for complexity the mindset of the slowest member of a random 12 selected from the British public, or is it the average—one might say reasonable—person? She could help judges making this decision by setting that out in the legislation.
This is not merely a theoretical, academic discussion on the criminal law of this country. I can point to another country. The Minister has taken pleasure in using other countries as examples to justify many provisions in the Bill, as though England and Wales can learn from other jurisdictions. I do not disagree with that premise. I will give her the example of New Zealand, another common-law jurisdiction. It has a similar provision, whereby a judge has to exercise a similar sort of decision making about whether a trial is likely to be “long and complex”, rather than its likely complexity. Set out in its legislation is a legal test. The Minister says that there is a test of complexity in the Bill. I tried to intervene on her to say that there is not.
This is what a test looks like. The law of New Zealand directs a judge to consider, in determining whether a case is likely to be long and complex,
“the number and nature of offences with which the defendant is charged”.
We understand what that means. It also directs them to consider
“the nature of the issues likely to be involved…the volume of the evidence likely to be presented”
and
“the imposition on potential jurors of sitting for the likely duration of the trial”.
It has a catch-all, which is not unusual in legal drafting:
“any other matters the court considers relevant.”
The judge in New Zealand has a test to apply: whether the case is likely to be long and complex. There is absolutely no reason why the Government could not have included a test in the Bill—it does not have to be the same test—to assist the court and give certainty, which would help defendants and victims and would improve efficiency.
Sarah Sackman
Several points have been raised in this debate. First, on the definition and the application of the eligibility test, when I was explaining the rationale behind the provision for judge-only trials in complex and lengthy cases—a realisation of one of the key recommendations of the independent review—I was talking about the importance of considering not just efficiency, but jury burden. While it is of course a relevant policy factor, I was not suggesting that that in itself is the test to be applied.
The terms used in the legislation have been the subject of criticism from a number of hon. Members. I consider that those terms are straightforward and well understood. The notion of a complex case is used in other contexts. Currently, for example, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Serious Fraud Office can send serious and complex fraud cases to the Crown court, subject to section 51B of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, so there is existing practice. Those are terms with which the judiciary are familiar. If it proves in due course that guiding factors and the Criminal Procedure Rules would be of assistance, that can be looked at. However, I do not think that the definition itself presents the cataclysmic problems that hon. Members suggest.
Sarah Sackman
I am not going to second-guess how the judges will apply this. As I say, that is for the judiciary and the courts. I am not going to put an arbitrary time length on it; I do not think that is needed.
The second point that hon. Members made was that the provision risks becoming too wide-ranging if a future Parliament or Secretary of State wishes to add to the offences. I addressed that point in my earlier remarks. I do not think that that is a real risk.
Another point that has been made is that none of this will have much of an impact, because we are talking only about a narrowly defined set of cases. I fully anticipate that while the system gets to grips with the use of this legislation, there will be a very small number of cases to begin with, but these are by definition the lengthiest cases and they take up a large amount of the courts’ time. The savings that we are talking about, which are set out in the impact assessment, may sound modest, but in a system under extreme pressure those small shifts matter. Every case heard by a judge sitting alone—as was deemed appropriate in these sorts of case not just by Sir Brian but by Lord Justice Auld and others—saves valuable Crown Court and jury time that can be deployed to serious cases that need a jury. In the context of the emergency in which we find ourselves, I make no apologies for seeking every little impact. For all those reasons, I commend the clause to the Committee.
Dr Mullan
I just want to pick up on some points. The point about the scale of the issue was well made by my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate, who pointed to 200 sitting days. She highlighted the criticism from others suggesting that the list of offences was “the work of a moment”, which is probably a fair description of what is going on.
As we have heard, trying to understand what “complex and lengthy” means has proved difficult. A telling point was the Minister’s insistence that it will be obvious to judges. Other jurisdictions have set out a minimum in legislation, but as the person legislating she is not able or willing to give a sense of how long she has in mind. On her suggestion that judges are better placed to understand this stuff, I say with no disrespect that over 70% of judges are aged over 50. I think some apprentices I have met at IT firms in my constituency might have a better understanding of the issues relating to cyber-crime than some of our judges.
The Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester, made it clear that it is not a supposition, nor does it take extensive reasoning, to suggest that future Governments will be able to make use of these powers in exactly the way that we have described. That is not a matter for debate; it is about the statutory framework that has been put in place, which will definitely be available to future Governments on the basis of the maximalist, expansive approach that this Government have chosen. My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East has explained how other jurisdictions have done a better job.
We are looking into the details of the Bill here, but goodness knows what will happen when a Minister has to defend these proposals in the Lords, with the expertise and experience of its Members, who include retired judges. Given clause 4’s lack of appeal, its illogical approach to how fraud and non-fraud offences interact, the minimal savings, the flimsy evidence and the lack of definition, which we have covered extensively, the Minister in the other place will have a very difficult time if the Government do not start being a bit more open to the non-wrecking but sensible amendments that Opposition Members put forward.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
I remind Members that the House has agreed that the Committee must conclude its work by 5 pm on Tuesday 28 April. We have just passed schedule 1. I have no power to impose a time limit on speeches, and it is for the Committee to decide on how to use its time, but I encourage Members to consider the length of their speeches and interventions in the light of the wish of all Members to consider the whole Bill and the amendments that have been tabled.
Clause 5
Consequential amendments relating to sections 3 and 4
Dr Mullan
I beg to move amendment 52, in clause 5, page 14, line 36, leave out subsection (5) and insert—
“(5) The judgment must be given at the time of conviction, except where an adjournment is necessary for preparing—
(a) pre-sentence reports,
(b) psychiatric or medical reports,
(c) victim personal statements, or
(d) further legal advice relating to sentencing.”
This amendment would ensure that judgments are handed down on conviction in all but the circumstances covered by the amendment.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Amendment 58, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert—
“(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make a statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (3) bringing sections 3 to 5 into force until he has—
(a) commissioned an independent review to assess the length of time required for a judge sitting alone to deliver a judgment after conviction,
(b) laid before Parliament a report on the outcome of the review under subsection (3A)(a), and
(c) made a statement to the House of Commons on the Government’s response to any recommendations from the review.”
This amendment would stop sections 3 to 5 coming into force until the Government had an evidence base for how long these provisions might delay the issuing of judgments after convictions.
Dr Mullan
I rise to speak in support of amendments 58 and 52; I will start with amendment 58.
We find ourselves at a significant juncture in the history of our legal system, and the Government have presented us with a Bill framed primarily as a pragmatic response to the current record-breaking backlog of nearly 80,000 cases in our Crown courts. The central justification for their reforms, specifically the restriction of the right to a jury trial, is efficiency; the Government argue that by moving towards judge-led trials, we can streamline proceedings and reduce the demand on the Crown court by almost 20%.
However, when we are asked to curtail a right that has stood as a cornerstone of our democracy for more than 800 years, we must move with extreme caution. We must ask whether this fundamental change is based on robust data or merely an intuitive sense of speed and individual opinions. It is not only reasonable, but essential to ask the Government to conduct an independent formal study into the actual time savings achieved by judge-only trials before they are implemented.
Amendment 58 focuses on one of the more easily measured elements, which could be properly studied. The Government’s case for reducing jury trials is predicated on the idea that it means the trials will be 20% shorter, yet when we examine the source of this figure, its foundation begins to look unstable. Sir Brian Leveson, whose review informed much of the Bill, stated that the estimate of a 20% reduction is subject to
“very high levels of uncertainty”.
He further stated that
“seeking to model how much time would be saved is extremely difficult.”
That point is reinforced by the Government’s impact assessment. Their attempt to quantify the time saving found that it was likely to be in the range of 10% to 30%—potentially half the time saving that Sir Brian claimed—and even that figure is born of what we might call a light-touch engagement session with judges and others, rather than rigorous comparative data. If the primary justification for stripping away a constitutional right is a 20% efficiency gain, then Parliament is entitled to see clear, verified evidence that that gain is actually achievable.
While the Government promise a transformation of the system, independent experts argue that the actual time saved will be marginal. The Institute for Government has analysed the proposals and suggests that the judge-only trials in the new bench division might save only 1.5% to 2.5% of total Crown court time. Furthermore, the Criminal Bar Association has pointed out that the Government’s impact assessment assumes that the average length of a trial in scope is six and a half sitting days when, in reality, these trials typically last closer to three days. By doubling the realistic length of those trials in their modelling, the Government have likely overestimated the potential savings. When we look at these figures, we must ask whether it is right to curtail a fundamental safeguard for a gain that may be as low as 1.5%, when today alone we have 10% of Crown courts sitting empty for no other particular reason than a lack of efficiency.
The Government’s efficiency narrative is focused almost entirely on the front end of a trial, the time it takes to empanel a jury and deliver legal instructions, and the time they claim is taken up by what some have described in evidence as playing to the jury. It ignores the back end of the process, the delivery of the judgment.
In a jury trial, once the evidence is closed, the jury deliberates continuously and provides an immediate verdict of guilty or not guilty. Importantly, in that time, a judge can be otherwise engaged, hearing other cases and doing other work. From their perspective, the fact-finding phase is over instantly.
A judge sitting alone does not have that luxury. To satisfy the requirements of transparency and guard against appeals, a judge must produce a reasoned judgment that addresses every point of law and fact. In other jurisdictions, delivering a verdict and providing those judgments can be reserved, meaning that they are written weeks or even months after the trial concludes.
Unlike a jury, a judge has a full docket of other administrative duties. We risk a situation where the time theoretically saved is then lost through another route. Without a comparative study of what I will refer to as the judicial deliberation gap, we are making systemic changes based on an incomplete set of metrics.
Additionally, because a judge’s written reasoning provides a detailed map of their logic, we are likely to see a significant spike in appeals. A jury’s verdict is difficult to appeal on the facts; a judge’s written judgment invites scrutiny for any minor error in law or logic, further clogging the higher courts. The Government have spoken frequently about the lack of availability of professionals within the legal system to hear criminal cases, and it will be the same KCs and others who will be stuck in the Court of Appeal on these cases, instead of being in the Crown court hearing cases from the backlog.
For those reasons, we propose a simple, pragmatic pause. We are asking the Government to commission an independent study of the length of time required for a judge sitting alone to deliver a judgment after conviction. This is a matter of sequencing: evidence first, implementation second. In any other field, be it medicine or engineering, we would never implement a change of this magnitude without a pilot study or a comparative dataset.
We picked this element as something amenable to study; there is nothing preventing the Government from commissioning a series of either sitting or retired judges to sit in the public galleries of trials happening in the ordinary way and then to go away and consider what reasons they would present and how long that would take. The Government could then measure and study the reality of that. Of course, that would vary from judge to judge, but a study with sufficient statistical power, with enough people taking part, could give us a genuine insight into how long these things will take.
If the Government are confident that this process will be short and sharp and able to save time, I see no reason why they would not want to know it for sure before proceeding on that basis. If that study showed that that 20% saving was a myth, and that the time taken on the back end cancelled out any gains made during the trial, of course the reforms should be paused or reversed. We should not trade a system that works for one that merely looks faster on a spreadsheet.
Jury trials are not an obstacle to justice; they are a safeguard against its abuse. It is important that we gather the facts and measure the actual time it takes for a judge to provide a reasoned judgment. If the evidence does not support the Government’s assumptions, we must have the courage to stop these reforms before we permanently damage one of our most valued constitutional inheritances.
I now move on to amendment 52. As I have mentioned, we are debating the important element of reforms that are historic in their reduction of our access to jury trials. They are predicated on the idea that that is the sole and only way that we can tackle the backlog in the Crown courts. If we are to accept the Government’s claim that trials without juries are a tool for efficiency, we must hold the system to that standard. For that reason, it seems sensible and necessary to require that, in any trial without a jury, the judge must provide their verdict and their reasons immediately.
Allowing a judge to delay their reasoning is not just a procedural flaw, but a logical contradiction that undermines the very efficiency that the Bill seeks to achieve. The Government’s most frequent argument for restricting juries is that they waste time due to the need to go slowly through the evidence and the unpredictable length of deliberations. The Government promise that a judge, as a legal expert, will streamline the process. However, that argument collapses the moment that a judge says, “I will give my verdict, but you will have to leave it with me while I go away and write it up.” The goal is to save time but, if there is a separate process that requires significant enough time that it cannot be done as part of the trial, where is the saving?
In written evidence, we were warned of what might be called a bottleneck shift, where we might clear courtroom space more quickly, only to move the delay into the judge’s chambers. As the Criminal Bar Association points out, the reasonable time provision is currently too vague. I understand that it is not unheard of in other jurisdictions with judge-alone trials, such as Canada and New Zealand, for parties to sometimes wait months for the full reasons to be given for the verdict. By contrast, a jury provides a benchmark of finality. They do not go home to handle other business for a month; they deliberate while the evidence is fresh and stay until the job is done. As I pointed out earlier, while they are doing that, the judge is free to carry on with other matters.
A case awaiting a verdict is a frozen case. It hangs over the court’s docket. It prevents the defendant from moving to the sentencing or appeal phase and potentially requires the judge eventually to relearn and reacquaint themselves with the full details of the case, perhaps weeks later. We are told that judges are professional triers of fact and that, precisely because of that expertise, we should be able to expect a system that reflects it.
A jury of 12 people must be taught the law from scratch, whereas a judge, who already knows the law, should be taking structured notes and filtering and identifying relevant and irrelevant information in real time. By the time closing arguments are finished, a professional judge has been living with the facts and the law for days or weeks. They are in the best possible position to explain their logic at that moment. When a judge delays a verdict and the reasons for it, they are forced into double-handling the evidence, re-reading transcripts and notes to recapture their original thoughts. That is not efficiency—it is a waste of judicial resources.
The requirement for immediacy is also a vital safeguard of the integrity of the law. There is potentially a subtle temptation for a judge who announces an initial verdict on a Monday, but writes the reasons for it on a Friday, to reverse engineer the logic of their original conclusions, even if inadvertently. Instead of the reasons leading the verdict, the verdict begins to dictate the reasons. The judge may subconsciously highlight only the facts that make their decision appeal-proof, rather than providing a raw, honest account of why they believed one witness over another. Members may well be familiar with the idea of confirmation bias; it is something that we are all affected by. If we make a decision and then come back to it at a later date, we have an inherent human failing of tending to dwell on, have our attention drawn to and be more mindful of things that reinforce our decision, rather than things that take away from it.
Therefore, immediate reasoning ensures that judges are ruling on the evidence as it was heard. If the Government claim bench trials are superior because they are reason-based, those reasons must be robust enough to be stated out loud at the moment of verdict, forcing a level of intellectual honesty that is the only acceptable substitute for the collective common sense of a jury.
Critics may argue that some cases are too complex for an immediate ruling. However, as some of the evidence suggests, very good reasons to delay should be defined strictly and should not include a busy schedule or a desire to write at another time. A very good reason should be limited to genuinely unforeseen situations. Indeed, as amendment 52 provides:
“The judgment must be given at the time of conviction, except where an adjournment is necessary”
for specific and well understood purposes, such as preparing medical or psychiatric evaluation reports, victim personal statements that were not available or that they sought to amend, or further legal submissions. However, the substance of why must be given when “guilty” or “not guilty” is uttered.
The Government cannot have it both ways. They cannot strip away, to a great extent, the historical right to a jury trial in the name of streamlining the system and allow that system to grind to a halt while a judge reserves a decision for days, weeks or potentially even months.
Joe Robertson
As my hon. Friend the shadow Minister pointed out, there are a number of problems that not only arise with what clauses 3 and 4 try to do, but carry over to clause 5, which tries to replicate aspects of jury trials in trials that will not be heard by a jury because a judge has made an allocation decision.
The problems with juries seem to be, as the Minister and the Government have articulated, time wasted through swearing in, the unpredictable nature of convening 12 people—with people sometimes dropping out—and the fact they can hear evidence only at certain times of the day, which makes the day for hearing evidence shorter. Of course, none of those things are new; they are things that have always existed with jury trials. Citing issues with juries that have existed since juries began, in order to deal with the more recent issue of backlogs, misses the point.
The Government have taken measures to deal with the more recent issues with criminal cases, including the fact that evidence inherently takes longer, although that is the same with evidence that a judge has to consider, and that cases have become more complex because of evidence and technology. That also is true of cases that are heard by a judge only. The Government have made plenty of complaints and shared plenty of views about what they think of the previous Government. They have spoken about under-investment and caps on sitting days, things that they say they have addressed through allocating more sitting days and investing in the legal system. Surely, that is the remedy for their complaints. However, they have not been prepared to spend the time to assess that remedy, to see whether the benefits in reducing the backlog will be felt in the coming months and years.
To take an inherent feature of the jury system—the jury itself—as a justification for doing away with it in certain cases because of more recent pressures for other reasons is neither logical nor fair. The problem with simply transferring all the provisions that would ordinarily happen in a jury trial to a trial that is decided by a judge alone, as clause 5 seeks to do, is that there are features of a jury system that cannot simply be replicated by a judge sitting alone. Let us remember that a jury decides the facts. It decides whether something happened and it decides what was in the mind of the defendant at the time in question. That is the preserve of the jury.
It is for the judge, even in a jury trial, to decide the law, to direct the jury—where appropriate—and to decide issues of procedure. Some of the procedural issues or arguments about evidence, including about whether evidence is admissible or not, are decided by the judge in the absence of the jury. The jury is sent out of the room. Of course, that can make the whole trial last longer, but there is a very good reason for it. It is because sometimes the arguments that are made—for example, arguments about the admissibility of certain evidence—are in themselves prejudicial to the decision maker of the facts, which is the jury, or prejudicial to the way that they might decide the case. A judge might need to hear the contested evidence, or at least hear what it is about to decide whether it is admissible.
A judge might decide that evidence is inadmissible because it is not relevant, or—this is where I go way beyond my legal expertise; I never practised as a criminal lawyer—because it might effectively prejudice the jury. We do not want the jury seeing that evidence, which is why they are out of the room. If the judge rules that the evidence is inadmissible, the jury come back into the room never having seen it, and the trial continues with the jurors’ minds unclouded by inadmissible evidence.
However, when the judge is also deciding the facts—that happens, of course in magistrates courts, where the magistrates decide the facts and are guided on the law by a legal professional sitting in front of them—and indeed when a judge is deciding the facts and the law, and procedural issues and issues of the admissibility of evidence, then, if they take separate arguments or separate submissions from the defence and prosecution on whether an item of evidence is admissible or not, and they decide that it is not admissible because it would cloud the judgment of the jury or confuse the issues of the main trial, they effectively have to pretend that they never heard that prejudicial evidence, having decided that it is prejudicial.
Judges are trained and professional, and have to do all this anyway in certain cases where a judge decides both—
Sarah Sackman
We have already covered a fair amount of the same ground. The example that I gave a couple of sittings ago was in relation to judges considering contempt of court applications, where they themselves would have seen the offending behaviour and have to make a determination about it. Judges are well used to dealing with these issues, both in the criminal context and the civil context. Does the hon. Gentleman accept that?
Joe Robertson
I accept that judges can do all this, and indeed sometimes do all this. Surely, however, the Minister will accept that, given human nature, there is a limit to the extent to which a human being can be so well trained or so professional that they can simply disregard something that they have heard as though they had never heard it. Indeed, that is one reason why we have jury trials. It is also one of the leading reasons why in more complex cases or longer cases—in cases involving murder, or sexual offences, or in all those cases that have to be heard by a jury—we have a jury. It is to separate the decision makers of fact from the decision makers of law and procedure.
Dr Mullan
As we are touching on these issues, those of us on the Opposition Benches are happy to say that we have to work harder on judicial accountability and decision making, and we are not afraid to say that we think it is better that juries do these things, because judges err.
There is an irony really, because at the heart of the Bill is another measure in relation to the powers that we give family court judges. My hon. Friend will know that the impact assessment says that the law at the moment basically says that judges already know—based on the law—that the welfare of the child comes before visitation rights. The Government accept that that is what the law says, but they do not trust judges to understand and accept that law. They want to introduce measures that further restrict judges’ decision making. The Government cannot have it both ways; they cannot introduce measures in the same Bill that are based on the idea that judges are not sufficiently enacting the law as written, and then say that we are wrong to have concerns about judicial decision making in these sorts of scenarios.
Joe Robertson
My hon. Friend the shadow Minister makes a good point, and we will get on to talking about the provisions relating to the family courts.
In relation to this particular provision, the family courts are where we have a judge making a decision on very emotive facts and on procedure. But family courts are far more collaborative in nature. A judge’s role is also about straining to find consensus. That is very different from the criminal courts where, ultimately, a judge or a jury, depending on who is hearing the case, has to make a yes-or-no decision on innocence or guilt. That has wide-ranging and profound impacts, which sometimes turn on a knife edge on hard-to-determine evidence. That is different from the family court, where the intention is to try and find consensus, rather than making those decisions.
Of course, juries are used in civil courts in some defamation cases. Again, it is where the value judgment on intention—why somebody made a statement about someone and whether they knew it to be false or not—of 12 ordinary people selected at random in this country is better than a judge’s decision making alone.
My issue with clause 5 is that it simply sweeps all sorts of provisions in a number of existing clauses of different legislation passed at different times into judge-only trials when those provisions were designed for jury-led trials. Unless I have misunderstood, that seems to have been done through a set of Government amendments and elements of existing law that were not envisaged on the first drafting of the Bill. That possibly demonstrates the slightly rushed and painful nature of how we are having to deal with this legislation, with so many loopholes and gaps in it.
I am happy to be discharging my duties, dissecting and scrutinising the Bill. I do not mind how long it takes because that is my job; it is why I am here and I am pleased to be doing it.
Sarah Sackman
On that final point, we are all delighted to be here and perform the function of Government properly. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] Exactly, and the company of all Members is a delight, as always.
On a serious point, there is some suggestion that the Government are rushing the legislation through. I do not think that is right. Yes, the Government have a sense of urgency about gripping this problem. I make no apologies for that. The depth of the problem and the shameful delays demands that urgency, but it is not true to say that this is rushed legislation. We commissioned a two-part independent review of hundreds of pages. We took our time to consider how we would bring that forward in a pragmatic way that vindicated the evidence base that the IRCC had put together. Now we are scrutinising it in the usual and proper way, and it will take as long as it takes. I do not want the public to think that the integrity of the process is somehow compromised. I know it would not be under your chairship, Ms Butler.
Dr Mullan
I want to pick up on a couple of points the Minister made, particularly the one that our amendment, in relation to a study, would require primary legislation. That is simply not the case. We specifically identified an element that could be studied without a need to change the law. No law would need to be changed to allow some retired or sitting judges to sit in on a court case and provide the judgment that they would have given had they been hearing it. No legislation is required for that.
The Minister leans heavily on the experienced judges who agree with her, but more than 3,000 legal professionals, including senior retired judges, disagree with her. And of course, to move away from opinions, the Government’s own study, which attempted to turn opinions into a quantitative exercise, found that the savings could be half those that Sir Brian Leveson said are achievable. It found that they could be between 10% and 30%, whereas Sir Brian said they would be 20%.
The Minister said that time would be saved on summing up. I sincerely hope the defendant will get to hear the same things a jury would have got to hear. If they do not, I suspect we will see a further increase in appeals.
The Minister spoke about the time taken. A Bill that will have a seismic impact on our legal system has been introduced without a public consultation or pre-legislative scrutiny, and the Committee time has been less than that given to the Railways Bill. As I understand it, the Bill has been given roughly the same time as the Salmon Act 1986, which introduced the offence of salmon handling, so it is reasonable to ask whether it has been given sufficient time.
If the Minister thinks there will be no real gap in time in terms of judgments, there is no reason for the Government to oppose amendment 52, which says that those should be immediate. Given the controversy and the varying opinions from experts on both sides of the debate, a non-legislative study is a perfectly reasonable thing for the Opposition to ask for. We will press amendment 52 to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Yasmin Qureshi
I beg to move amendment 34, in clause 6, page 15, line 28, after “regulations” insert
“made under the affirmative resolution procedure”.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 13, in clause 6, page 15, line 36, leave out lines 36 and 37.
This amendment provides that magistrates’ sentencing powers cannot be increased beyond 12 months.
Amendment 21, in clause 6, page 15, line 37, at end insert—
“(1B) Regulations under this paragraph are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.”
This amendment would make changing the general limit on custodial sentence for an eitherway offence in magistrates’ courts changeable by affirmative resolution only.
Amendment 53, in clause 6, page 15, line 37, at end insert—
“(1B) In paragraph 14A(3), for “negative” substitute “affirmative””
This amendment ensure regulations to extend magistrates’ courts sentencing powers must be approved by both houses of Parliament.
Amendment 71, in clause 6, page 15, line 37, at end insert—
“(1B) In Schedule 23 to the Sentencing Act 2020 (powers to amend the Sentencing Code), in paragraph 14A (general limit on magistrates’ court’s power to impose custodial sentence), omit sub-paragraph (3).”
This amendment is consequential upon Amendment 34.
Yasmin Qureshi
Amendments 34 and 71 are probing amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central (Abtisam Mohamed). I will not be asking for them to be put to a vote.
Amendment 34 concerns magistrates’ sentencing powers. The amendment would remove the word “regulations” and insert
“made by the affirmative resolution procedure”
to prevent significant changes from being made to the sentencing powers of magistrates courts without a proper debate and vote in Parliament. If such changes are to be made, Parliament should fully discuss their impacts. Amendment 71 is consequential on amendment 34.
Clause 6 increases magistrates’ sentencing powers to 24 months. In my opinion, and in the opinion of many people, that represents a restriction on appeals. If sentencing powers are increased while access to appeals is reduced, which is what is being done in clause 7, the risks to fairness in the system are significantly heightened, particularly for those without legal representation, given that the rules for legal aid in the magistrates court are very different from those in the Crown court.
For those reasons, the Bill raises fundamental questions about fairness, trust and the proper functioning of the justice system. The solution to delay is not to remove our historical safeguards, but to fix the system. I ask the Minister to consider whether it is right to give the magistrates court the power to impose sentences of 24 months, which is a considerable period. If that is being contemplated, there should be a proper debate and a vote in Parliament; it should not be put through on the nod.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Amendment 13, which was tabled in my name, provides that magistrates’ sentencing powers cannot be increased beyond 12 months, which would keep the Bill in line with Leveson’s suggestions. The Government have failed to take into account the impact that increasing magistrates’ sentencing powers will have. Magistrates’ backlogs are increasing, and magistrates courts are not set up to take on more complex cases.
The Government are also making some bold assumptions about the speed at which magistrates can clear these cases. They have their own backlog to face, which stands at 379,000 cases and increasing. That is a 17% increase on the previous year, which comes alongside a major cut to the number of magistrates over the past decade or so, from 28,000 to just over 14,000. Removing the power of defendants to elect, plus the changes in sentencing powers, will increase the workload of magistrates courts, and the system will struggle to absorb that. Magistrates will be required to deal with more complex cases despite the summary nature of their jurisdiction. Either they will be unable to handle those cases and will send them to the Crown court, or they will risk delivering poor-quality justice, which would let down victims and defendants alike.
The cohort affected by this change consists by definition of defendants expected to receive a prison sentence of between one and two years. The impact assessment shows that the Government assume that each of these trials in the magistrates courts will be completed within just four hours. The impact assessment also assumes that cases involving a guilty plea will take just 30 minutes. Either the impact assessment is incorrect or these cases will not receive the scrutiny they deserve.
Our other amendment, amendment 21, would make changing the general limit on custodial sentences for either-way offences in the magistrates court possible by affirmative resolution only. It is very similar to amendment 34, which the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden spoke to on behalf of her hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central. The amendment would ensure that any changes to magistrates’ sentencing powers—if amendment 13, to limit their powers, is not passed—is subject to the affirmative procedure. It would give greater parliamentary oversight, as all changes would have to pass through a Delegated Legislation Committee. Leaving that to the discretion of the Lord Chancellor is not a strong enough condition; it does not provide enough scrutiny or protection against rogue actors. The measure was also recommended by the Law Society of England and Wales. It would provide just that protection, and would ensure that Parliament would have and maintain its say in matters.
Siân Berry
I will speak as quickly as I can. I support the amendments tabled in this group by the Liberal Democrats, which would limit any increase in the sentencing powers of magistrates beyond 12 months; amendment 34, which was moved by the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden; and the Liberal Democrat and Conservative amendments that would ensure that, if that limit is not accepted, any further changes are made by the affirmative resolution procedure.
I am sure we will all remind the Minister that Sir Brian Leveson specifically made his reforms to jury trials contingent on not increasing the sentencing powers of magistrates. He stated that specifically in paragraph 71 of his report. He also stated:
“My strong recommendation is that the maximum should remain at 12 months.”
That followed, in paragraph 70, another important caveat that the Government seem to have overlooked:
“While removing the right to elect for certain offences may streamline the judicial process and alleviate the burden on the higher courts, it raises concerns about balancing the right of the defendant with the broader interests of justice.”
We have to admit that the Government are taking a risk with the moves they are making. The magnitude and volume of that risk increase with the number of extra cases that are pushed to the magistrates courts through other provisions in the Bill, while the consequences of that risk increase with the higher sentences made possible under clause 6. This is not a step we should take alongside those other steps. They increase the risks to justice.
In oral evidence, we heard from Claire Davies, the leader of the south eastern circuit, who said of magistrates courts:
“There are errors and mistakes made, but if the length of sentence is extended, it will potentially increase that risk.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 51, Q99.]
We also heard from Emma Torr, from APPEAL, who described
“swift and speedy justice in the magistrates court. It is often rough and ready; we are talking about cases being tried by lay justices, some of whom may be experienced but some may not be, and we are also talking about less experienced judges. You often find in the lower court, the magistrates court, that advocates are more inexperienced and tend to be at the start of their career.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 86-87, Q185.]
This point was also emphasised by Fiona Rutherford, the chief executive of JUSTICE, who said:
“There is a question mark about the accuracy of the way in which magistrates are making decisions.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 82, Q174.]
These are the risks we are talking about compared with having a judge and jury.
Risks also come from the surrounding bureaucratic situation, which could lead to more defendants being unrepresented. When the shift is made, we will be leaving them without legal aid, because of the changes in the income requirements. We heard from Fiona Rutherford of JUSTICE that without this representation there could be additional risks to victims.
The Minister needs to admit that this part of the Bill goes too far. On top of the other things she is doing, she is adding more consequence, not just more volume, to the risk equation. That is a poor step to take. Clause 6 should not stand part, and I support all the amendments.
Dr Mullan
I rise to speak to my amendment 53 and to amendment 13, tabled by the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester.
Clause 6 includes a provision that seeks to expand the Secretary of State’s power to vary the maximum custodial sentence that may be imposed by magistrates courts for triable either-way offences. At present, the general limit for such sentences stands at 12 months, having been increased from six months in 2022. The Bill proposes that we allow that limit to be further increased, by way of regulations, to 18 or even 24 months. While the Government frame that as a necessary tool for operational flexibility, it represents a significant extension of the custodial powers of our magistrates courts.
The central question we must address is not merely whether the powers should be increased, but how such a decision should be scrutinised by Parliament. The Bill allows the changes to be made under the negative procedure. Through amendment 53, we propose that any future exercise of the power be subject instead to the affirmative procedure, requiring the explicit approval of both Houses of Parliament. As I have said, I also support amendment 13 from the Liberal Democrats, which says the powers should not be increased full stop.
Increasing the maximum custodial sentence a court can impose is not a minor or technical adjustment; it is a substantive change in the fundamental balance of our criminal justice system. When we discuss the power to deprive a citizen of their liberty for up to two years, instead of one, we are discussing one of the most serious powers the state can wield. Magistrates courts are designed for summary trial, which is a process intended for the swift disposal of less serious, low-level cases. Allowing that framework to pass two-year sentences is a major shift. As laid out by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, the evidence we heard explained that such an expansion will mean that more serious and complex cases will be dealt with by lay justices.
For a change of this magnitude, the negative procedure provides an inappropriately low level of scrutiny. To understand why the affirmative procedure is necessary, we must look at the mechanics of parliamentary oversight. Under the negative procedure, a statutory instrument is usually made by a Minister and becomes law immediately upon being laid before Parliament. It remains law unless either House successfully votes to annul it, through a process known as praying against an instrument, within a set 40-day period. In reality, the power to object is rarely used and even more rarely successful. I understand that the House of Commons has not successfully prayed against a negative instrument since 1979, and the House of Lords has not rejected one since 2000. The procedure essentially relies on the absence of objection to grant legitimacy to a change in law. In an area as fundamental as the power to imprison citizens for extended periods, Parliament should not rely on a lack of noise to signify consent. It must require explicit, recorded approval.
The affirmative procedure provides a much more robust safeguard. Under that route, a statutory instrument is laid in draft and cannot become law until it has been actively debated and approved by both the Commons and the Lords. That ensures that the Government must stand at the Dispatch Box, in the same way the Minister has been doing all week, in a Committee Room just like this, and openly justify why the increase in sentencing powers is necessary and proportionate.
That level of scrutiny is essential, because the Government’s current justifications are contested. The Government argue that the powers will allow more cases to be retained in magistrates courts, thereby reducing pressure on the Crown court backlog. However, independent bodies such as the Institute for Government have noted that assumptions about time savings in magistrates courts are highly uncertain. There are serious concerns that magistrates courts, which already face their own peak backlog of over 370,000 cases, simply do not have the capacity to absorb that work. Although the provision in clause 6 will not lead to an immediate increase in sentencing length, it is reasonable to assume that the Government would not have introduced it if they did not have some intention, at some future point, to increase the sentencing powers available to magistrates and therefore to retain more cases in the magistrates courts.
We must also consider the differential quality in justice administered under the expanded powers. As we have heard, critics, including the Criminal Bar Association, warn that extending summary justice to cases carrying two-year sentences is a recipe for—[Interruption.]
The Chair
Order. I suspend the Committee for 15 minutes for the first vote and 10 minutes for each subsequent vote. I aim to resume at 8.25 pm.
Dr Mullan
Thank you, Ms Jardine, for taking the Chair as we continue this later sitting. Before we suspended, we were debating my amendment 53 to clause 6 in relation to the use of the negative procedure rather than the affirmative procedure to change sentencing powers. I was talking about the importance of considering the nature of the justice delivered in the magistrates court when making changes to the powers of that court. As I have said previously in Committee, the fact that we have some criticisms of elements of the magistrates court does not mean it should be got rid of—we accept that these must be balanced measures—but it is important for us to consider that when expanding its powers.
Critics, including the Criminal Bar Association, warn that extending summary justice to cases carrying two-year sentences is a recipe for what they describe as “rough justice”. The procedures in magistrates courts are streamlined. For example, the Government’s own impact assessment assumes that even these more serious trials will be completed in a matter of hours. Furthermore, there is a significant disparity in access to legal representation. The income threshold for legal aid in magistrates courts is much lower than in the Crown court. That means that a defendant who would have been eligible for a publicly funded lawyer in the Crown court might be forced to represent themselves in the magistrates court, even when facing a two-year prison sentence. If we are to allow a system where unrepresented defendants face longer custodial terms in shorter hearings, that decision must be subject to the highest level of parliamentary debate.
It is also worth noting that the Government’s proposals depart from the recommendations of the very review they claim to follow. Sir Brian Leveson, in his independent review of the criminal courts, recommended that the Government’s ability to amend magistrates’ sentencing powers by statutory instrument of any kind should actually be repealed. He suggested that the current 12-month maximum should be made permanent, rather than leaving it as a “variable” that the Executive can adjust.
Crucially, when we have previously raised the question of the Government varying from Sir Brian’s recommendations, the Minister has prayed in aid Sir Brian saying that the Government could go further in some circumstances. This could not be further from that. He said that the reforms he recommended were “contingent” on the Government also introducing a power to cap the sentences that could be passed by magistrates. The use of Sir Brian as evidence of opinions across the board is reaching farce now. We have the Government disagreeing with Sir Brian on whether there should be a judge and two magistrates, disagreeing with Sir Brian over the maximum sentence for triable either-way cases in the magistrates court, and now they are directly opposing what he wanted them to do in relation to magistrates’ sentencing powers.
It is important that we read what Sir Brian said:
“My strong recommendation is that the maximum should remain at 12 months. Furthermore, I recommend that the legislation be amended so that the Lord Chancellor no longer has the power to reduce the maximum to six months via a Statutory Instrument. The 12-month maximum should be made permanent.”
Here we have another example of the Government wanting us to set aside all our concerns about the erosion of jury trial rights on the basis of Sir Brian’s expertise and experience, at the same time as ignoring it themselves. If the Government intend to move in the opposite direction of expert legal advice, it is only reasonable that they be required to obtain explicit approval from Parliament through the affirmative procedure every time they seek to do so.
We must look at the cumulative impact of the Bill. While clause 6 increases the power of the magistrates courts at the front end, clause 7 restricts the right to appeal those decisions at the back end. The Bill replaces the automatic right of appeal and full rehearing with a permission-based model. That creates a clear and troubling shift: more power is being exercised at the lower level, while the ability to challenge those decisions is being constrained.
With around 40% of appeals against conviction from magistrates courts currently successful, it is clear that the system is correcting a meaningful level of error. Increasing sentencing powers while simultaneously narrowing the mechanisms for correcting those errors is a double blow to the rights of defendants. The combined effect makes it even more imperative that any increase in power is not snuck through via the negative procedure. As we have heard from other Members, there is a backlog in the magistrates courts of 379,000 cases. Anything that increases their workload will potentially have adverse consequences.
In summary, increasing the maximum sentence in magistrates courts is a major constitutional change that affects the liberty of the citizen. It is not a matter of administrative convenience that should be left to the fast track of the negative procedure. If the Government are confident that increasing the maximum to 18 or 24 months is the correct solution to the backlog, they should have no objection to making that case openly and seeking a positive vote of approval from both Houses.
We must ensure that our fundamental rights are not treated as administrative details to be checked off on a spreadsheet. For those reasons, I support the proposal that any future increase to magistrates’ sentencing powers must be subject to the affirmative procedure, as well as other amendments that seek to constrain the Government’s actions in this regard.
Joe Robertson
I support the position of my hon. Friend the shadow Minister. There is a degree of cross-party support on the Opposition Benches; we heard some very good submissions from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, which seems a while ago now.
The Government’s position on many of the contentious issues in Committee has been anchored on Sir Brian Leveson’s report—indeed, why would it not be? It is an independent report that the Government commissioned. But they freely depart from his recommendations, seemingly on a whim, without any substantial justification. This is one of those cases. Sir Brian Leveson was very clear that magistrates should continue to have sentencing powers only up to a year, and the Government are effectively doubling those sentencing powers.
This is about more than just sentencing powers; it fundamentally changes what magistrates courts are for and how our criminal courts are structured. The Crown court, whether sitting with only a judge or with a jury, is for more serious cases, with more serious sanctions, because it is able to deal with levels of complexity, be it in relation to evidence or procedure. We have heard about “rough and ready” justice in the magistrates court. That is not a criticism; it is a way of characterising the absolute foundations of our magistrates courts. They do a huge amount of criminal work in this country, but they are meant to be summary courts; they are meant to be courts that act quickly and do not have the rigour or probity of the Crown courts. That is their particular purpose, and it is therefore right that they have always had limited sentencing powers when it comes to deciding whether to lock someone up. Fines and community orders are the sort of sentences that are far more typical of magistrates courts.
Depriving someone of their liberty is a very serious matter. It is one thing to deprive someone of their liberty for months, especially given that such sentences are often reduced—in practice, a year can be reduced to months—but it is another thing to deprive someone of their liberty for two years. That would suddenly make the magistrates courts’ summary-style justice, or rough justice—call it whatever; I do not mean any of those words as a criticism—incredibly inappropriate for the powers that the Government would like them to exercise. The clause therefore does much more than just fiddle with thresholds, or however the Government might want to characterise it—we will soon find out. It fundamentally alters what magistrates courts are for.
Linsey Farnsworth
I remind the hon. Member that magistrates in the youth court are able to impose sentences of up to two years, and that in its written evidence, the Magistrates’ Association states that it asked for and welcomes the increase to up to 24 months in the sentencing powers of magistrates courts. Does he recognise that?
Joe Robertson
I recognise evidence, but I give greatest weight to Sir Brian Leveson, the author of the independent report commissioned by the Government. As the hon. Lady knows very well, the youth court is a very different beast, because a different set of principles and rules applies to cross-examination, evidence and so on for people who are of the age of minority. Simply to say that if the youth court can do it, then the magistrates court can do it for people over 18 is a slightly off-the-cuff argument, if I may say so; it does not really have any rigour at all.
Allow me to return to my line of argument about magistrates courts. If there is a genuine intention and belief that magistrates should be able to impose sentences of up to two years—as I say, in my view, that fundamentally changes the nature of the court—then that should be met with provisions that make the process in the magistrates court more rigorous. I would not agree with that, but at least it would hang together, show consistency and demonstrate an intention that justice must be delivered in a process that is commensurate with the sanction the state is looking to impose on someone.
There is no greater sanction in this country than depriving someone of their liberty and locking them up. In this case, it is more than a threshold argument; the Bill is fundamentally changing what magistrates courts are for, what Crown courts are for, and the difference in procedure between the two.
Yasmin Qureshi
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Ms Jardine. Amendment 34 would ensure that the negative procedure—what I call the back route—cannot be used to allow magistrates courts to take away people’s rights for up to 24 months; it would require a proper debate and a vote in Parliament.
Sarah Sackman
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central and the hon. Members for Bexhill and Battle and for Chichester for tabling the amendments in this group. In addressing them, I will seek to cover the principal arguments that have framed the debate: first, the impact of the clause on the magistrates court and the suggestion that it carries a risk of overburdening the court; secondly, the critique that because the clause departs from the recommendations of the independent review, somehow it is not a tenable or viable way to proceed; and, thirdly, the procedure through which magistrates courts’ sentencing powers may be varied.
By having the ability to vary magistrates court sentencing powers by statutory instrument using the negative procedure, the Government can respond flexibly to changing circumstances and manage unsustainable pressures on the criminal justice system. Magistrates court sentencing powers have been amended using the negative procedure for this very purpose in the past, including to mitigate pressures on prison capacity in 2023, and to address the Crown court open caseload in 2024.
Requiring changes to magistrates court sentencing powers to be made using the affirmative resolution procedure would constrain the Government’s ability to respond efficiently to pressures across the criminal justice system. It would mean that reductions in magistrates court sentencing powers, such as the 2023 decrease in response to prison capacity pressures, would also be subject to the affirmative procedure. The ability to vary sentencing powers using the negative procedure is an important mechanism, which enables the Government to act with the speed and certainty of timing that the affirmative procedure does not so readily allow.
We consider it proportionate and consistent with existing practice for the level of magistrates court sentencing powers to be adjusted by secondary legislation, within the limits that have already been set by Parliament, using the negative procedure. The negative procedure enables timely adjustments while still ensuring parliamentary scrutiny in the period following the statutory instrument being laid. In that respect, I ask the hon. Members to withdraw their amendments.
On amendment 13, tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester, Sir Brian’s recommendations have, as I have said previously, been critical in informing the Government’s thinking. I do not seek to suggest that clause 6 formed a specific part of his recommendations, but he invited the Government to consider the sorts of measures necessary to address the backlog. As the impact assessment demonstrates, on the Government’s modelling, which has been externally quality assured and verified, extending magistrates court sentencing powers to 18 months would produce a saving of some 8,000 Crown court sitting days. That is hugely significant.
To be candid, part of the reason why the Government are introducing this measure is not simply a vote of confidence in our magistrates court and what we think it can cope with and deliver, but because it will enable us to bring down the backlogs quicker. That is the rationale. Although it is an extension, and goes beyond what was recommended by the independent review, we think that it is justified in the circumstances.
We have therefore decided to introduce powers that would enable magistrates court sentencing powers to be extended either to 18 months or up to 24 months. Those powers provide flexibility to extend magistrates court sentencing powers in the future to respond to changing circumstances and manage unsustainable pressures on the criminal justice system.
The Crown court is facing significant pressures, and many triable either-way cases currently heard and sentenced there can be dealt with fairly and expeditiously in the magistrates courts. Lord Burnett, former Lord Chief Justice, told us in Committee that he had spoken publicly on many occasions about his personal belief that there is need to rebalance the work between the magistrates court and Crown court, and this measure is, in part, a way of doing that.
Rebecca Paul
If we are increasing the sentence in the magistrates court, I would imagine the Minister will agree that, in some situations, we are increasing the complexity of the case. For example, a sexual assault case could be quite complicated and require, in order to look after the alleged victim and make sure their wellbeing is managed, four consecutive days of sitting to get that over with. How will the magistrates court do that? They are all volunteers, and quite often they are working. How will this help address the backlog if we are in a situation where those volunteer magistrates are not able to commit to the four consecutive days needed to deal with a complex and sensitive case such as a sexual assault?
Sarah Sackman
One of the things we have to in order to successfully deliver this court transformation is properly resource our magistrates court. You have heard me say before about what we need to do to increase magistrates recruitment and the steps that the Government have taken in that regard. We are also increasing the recruitment of district judges who sit within the magistrates court. In reality, many of the serious and longer cases currently within the magistrates court would be heard by more experienced magistrates or a district judge.
We had a discussion earlier in Committee about the desirability of having lay magistrates serve alongside Crown court judges as part of the constitution of the Crown court bench division. I have recognised the merit in that. One of the challenges there is not just the number of magistrates you require, but finding magistrates who can sit in longer trials, which inevitably those would be. I understand what the hon. Member for Reigate said, but we already see on a daily basis how serious and less serious matters in the magistrates court are apportioned in that way. We are hiring up to an additional 80 district judges under our current plans, and they will be able to hear those sorts of cases. Part of the capacity also relies on expanding the number of, and support for, legal advisers, who are also critical to delivery.
Mr Kohler
Why is increasing resources a legitimate argument in favour of positions that you want to take and a criticism of positions that you want to criticise? We surely need to increase resources, but you are using that point to defend your position and not to address the criticisms we are offering.
Sarah Sackman
I am not sure that is right. I think we have all agreed—even those Opposition Members who were responsible for the justice system and deprived it of the resources that were needed—that more investment is needed, and the Government are making that. I make these points about capacity partly to meet the question that was asked, but also to meet the concern expressed. It is a legitimate concern: by following the thrust of the IRCC recommendations, are we diverting some cases into our magistrates court and creating a risk for that court?
People have pointed to the size of the caseload; we need to distinguish between open caseload and backlog. The magistrates court currently has a caseload, which it needs to operate efficiently, but we obviously do not want that to become a backlog, or to simply divert the problem from one place to another, which is why I talk about resources. I am trying to reassure the Committee and the wider public that by empowering magistrates to assume greater sentencing powers, which means dealing with more serious cases, we are equipping them with the resources they need to do that responsibly.
Extending magistrates courts sentencing powers will retain more cases in the magistrates courts, thereby freeing up valuable Crown court capacity. A sentencing increase of up to 18 months is estimated to save 8,000 Crown court sitting days in the 2028-29 financial year. When magistrates court sentencing powers were raised from six to 12 months in May 2022, a review of the impact confirmed that it helped to reduce the pressure on the Crown court at the time, with fewer cases sent for sentencing and trial. In November 2024, the extension of magistrates court sentencing powers was estimated to free up the equivalent of 2,000 Crown court sitting days a year—so it is proven to work.
By increasing magistrates courts sentencing powers, offences such as common assault, the theft of lower-value items and lower-level fraud could be heard in the magistrates court. This will ensure that Crown court resources are rightly focused on the most serious and complex cases. We have confidence in magistrates to exercise higher sentencing powers accurately and fairly. As others have pointed out, in the youth court magistrates already have the power to impose detention and training orders of up to two years in cases concerning serious violence.
It cheers me that the change was welcomed by the Magistrates’ Association and that magistrates are willing to take on the additional challenge with greater powers, aligning with the youth courts. The Magistrates’ Association has stated that this is
“the most effective and straightforward way for magistrates’ courts to further assist in reducing the Crown Court backlog”.
The introduction of the ability to increase magistrates’ sentencing powers to 18 or 24 months will address the open case law and provide the flexibility to enable a more proportionate allocation of resources. For the reasons I have set out, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden to seek to withdraw her amendment.
Yasmin Qureshi
As I said, my amendments are probing amendments. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The Chair
I gently remind Members to use the third person when speaking to one another, as when they say “you” they are actually referring to me.
Sarah Sackman
I beg to move amendment 10, in clause 6, page 16, line 2, at end insert—
“( ) in subsection (1)—
(i) after ‘imposes’ insert ‘, in respect of two or more offences,’;
(ii) for the words from ‘exceed’ to the end substitute
‘exceed—
(a) where each of the offences is a summary offence, 6 months;
(b) in any other case, the longest term that could be imposed in respect of any one of the offences’;”
The effect of this amendment is that, where a magistrates’ court imposes two or more terms of imprisonment or detention in a young offender institution to run consecutively, and the offences in question are all summary offences, the aggregate of the terms may not exceed 6 months.
Sarah Sackman
Amendment 10 is a technical amendment concerning magistrates court sentencing powers when imposing consecutive sentences for multiple summary offences.
The Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 introduced a power to vary the general limit on magistrates court sentencing powers for a single triable either-way offence between a maximum of six months or a maximum of 12 months. Clause 6(1) of the Bill amends that power so that the limit for a single triable either-way offence can be set at 18 months or 24 months, in addition to six months and 12 months.
As part of the changes in 2022, a consequential amendment was made to section 133 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, which makes provision in relation to consecutive terms of imprisonment imposed by a magistrates court. As a result, the maximum aggregate term of imprisonment that can be imposed for multiple summary-only offences cannot exceed the longest term that could be imposed for any one of those offences.
Therefore, where the highest maximum sentence for the individual offences is less than six months, the magistrates court cannot impose more than that maximum when imposing consecutive terms of imprisonment for multiple summary-only offences. For example, low-value criminal damage has a maximum sentence of three months’ custody. Therefore, in sentencing someone for two or more criminal damage offences, the magistrates court can impose only up to three months to be served consecutively, rather than six months.
As a result of this amendment, magistrates courts will be able to impose a maximum of six months’ custody consecutively for two or more summary only offences. That will ensure that magistrates courts can impose sentences that adequately reflect the overall offending behaviour, as consecutive sentences enable courts to proportionately reflect the overall criminality when multiple offences have been committed. Importantly, this amendment does not alter the statutory maximum penalties available for existing individual offences.
Amendment 10 agreed to.
Amendment made: 11, in clause 6, page 16, line 13, leave out “paragraph” and insert “paragraphs 16(a) and”.—(Sarah Sackman.)
This amendment is consequential on amendment 10.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I beg to move amendment 22, in clause 6, page 17, line 11, at end insert—
“(9) After section 15 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, insert—
‘15A Entitlement to Crown Court funding levels in certain proceedings in the Magistrates’ Court
(1) This section applies to criminal proceedings in a magistrates’ court where—
(a) an individual is charged with an either-way offence; and
(b) the court, having regard to the sentencing guidelines, considers it likely that a sentence of imprisonment exceeding 12 months will be imposed upon conviction.
(2) Where this section applies, any relevant representation order shall provide for remuneration at the same rates and under the same conditions as would apply if the proceedings were determined in the Crown Court.’”
This amendment links legal aid funding to the potential severity of the sentence rather than the venue of the trial. It ensures that defendants facing more than 12 months' imprisonment receive Crown Court level funding, regardless of which court the case is heard in.
The amendment would link legal aid funding to the potential severity of the sentence rather than the venue of the trial. It would ensure that defendants facing more than 12 months’ imprisonment received Crown court-level legal aid funding, regardless of which court the case was heard in.
The context of this is that the Bill’s equality statement acknowledges that
“if more cases are dealt with in the magistrates’ courts, it is likely that an increased proportion of these defendants may be ineligible for legal aid when they would otherwise have been eligible if their case had been heard at the Crown Court.”
That is because the eligibility threshold for receiving representation from a publicly funded lawyer in the magistrates court is an annual income of below £22,325—significantly lower than the Crown court threshold of £37,500. As a result, individuals in full-time minimum wage employment may not qualify for legal aid in the magistrates court.
Without that being addressed, it is clear that we will face an increase in the number of defendants attending court without legal representation, which undermines fairness for all those involved. Complainants, victims and witnesses may be cross-examined by the alleged perpetrator of the crime; it could slow proceedings down; it risks unfairness to the accused; and it means that the outcome of the cases will depend on whether the defendant can afford expensive lawyers, not on the true justice of the case. That concern is compounded by the fact that clause 6 provides magistrates with greater sentencing powers, meaning that defendants will be facing more serious cases. It will also prolong hearings, which will reduce the savings the Government claim they will make by shifting cases into the magistrates court.
Our amendment would ensure that, if the Government’s plans are implemented, which we oppose, legal aid would be linked to the sentence length, ensuring that those who face longer sentences in the magistrates court received the funding they would expect in the Crown court. There is a lower threshold for legal aid in the magistrates court because it is assumed that cases will be shorter and simpler. That will no longer be the case, with more serious cases taking place that could take days to complete. Our amendment would avoid concerns about two-tier justice and an increase in the number of defendants appearing in court without legal representation.
Siân Berry
It is very good to see you in the Chair this evening, Ms Jardine; thank you for looking after us. I will speak very briefly in support of the amendment, to which I have added my name. I have spoken already about the many risks piling up with the Bill, and this amendment is one essential mitigation for some of those risks. If the Government press ahead, they cannot ignore it.
Yasmin Qureshi
I rise to support the comments made by the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester, about the importance of legal aid. There has already been a real reduction in the number of cases in which legal aid is given. Many defendants turn up at the magistrates court without any legal representation because of the constraints on legal aid. Bearing in mind that such defendants could now, if the Bill goes through, be facing up to 24 months imprisonment, it is important that legal aid provision is given to people facing custodial sentences. Means should not be the only element; an important thing to consider is whether somebody has a real chance of going into custody.
We have found historically—this may be anecdotal evidence—that defendants not getting legal representation at an early stage results in more delays. They often plead guilty right at the last stage, when the matter is set for trial. By then, six or eight months have passed, and they might have been able to save some money; or it has got into their head that they have to have this trial, so they try to raise some money. That causes delays. If people are guided, right at the beginning, as to what the evidence and the likely sentence are, they are more likely to plead guilty at an earlier stage.
The previous Government made significant cuts to legal aid. One of the arguments I remember raising then—this was more than 10 years ago, during the passage of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012—was that restricting legal aid would mean lots of unrepresented people turning up at court, and that that would delay the system. It is also fundamentally unfair. Someone facing a criminal charge should be able to access legal aid. I ask the Government to think about that, and perhaps extend legal aid and make it more generous.
Joe Robertson
This looks like another entirely reasonable amendment, which looks to mitigate some of the harsher provisions in the changes that will allow magistrates to give sentences of up to two years. A moment ago, I talked about the difference between the more rough and ready justice in the magistrates court and the more rigorous, lengthy and developed procedure, practice and ability to operate in the Crown court. When it comes to deciding the income threshold for whether a defendant qualifies for legal aid, surely the most important thing is not the process or procedure as such, but the harshness of the possible sanction that the state is looking to impose on that person.
Rather than looking at the £22,000 income threshold for magistrates courts and £37,500 for Crown courts, we could instead say that, if someone will be sentenced for up to one year, the income threshold is £22,000, and if someone will be sentenced for more than one year, it is £37,500. That is a true statement—that is how it currently stands. We should merely extend that principle, basing the figures on sentencing thresholds rather than on the venue that dishes out that sentence. That would achieve fairness, so that if somebody might be locked up for two years, they have the legal might and can afford the legal advice to defend themselves and articulate a case in a more professional manner. If having a legal professional does not give someone at least the chance of delivering that in a more professional manner, there is plainly little point in the legal profession.
That is the rationale, and the Government do not have to apply a different principle at all if they just see the current threshold as applying to a one-year sentence rather than to venue. This delivers again on other amendments, not only from others on these Benches but from the shadow Minister, and it allows the Government to deliver what they want to deliver. It does not run against the principle of what the Government are trying to do, even though Conservative Members have differences of opinion on that. It merely perfects, improves and cures some of the defects and unintended consequences of the Bill. The entire reason that the Bill Committee sits is to seek to do that, but time and again, the Government would prefer to just vote things down and use their majority rather than taking the time to look at provisions that seem to me objectively reasonable.
Alex McIntyre (Gloucester) (Lab)
Another good thing we can do in Committee is try to clarify the Conservative party’s position. Is the hon. Member’s position now that the almost 40% cuts to legal aid during the last Conservative Government were wrong? If so, would he like to apologise for them?
Joe Robertson
This is a strange venue to ask for an apology for previous Government legislation from an MP who, like me, has been in this place for less than two years. The hon. Gentleman and I were on broadcast media yesterday; that might have been a better venue for him to ask me to apologise, but I would have rejected his invitation at that time, and I will certainly reject it in Committee. This is not about previous Governments’ views or opinions; it is about the views and opinions of this Parliament.
Dr Mullan
This happens all the time. We point out deficiencies in the Government’s position, so Members get their Whips’ handouts with suggestions to “just point out to them what they did on x, y and z.” But the public do not care. That is a zero defence of their position—[Interruption.]
Joe Robertson
Indeed, it is quite interesting that the Government’s benchmark is the previous Government. I do not recall them making that clear at the last election. I will leave it there.
Dr Mullan
I rise to speak in support of amendment 22 tabled by the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester. This is another element of the Bill that will not survive contact with the Lords. It is quite clearly unfair.
I want to pick up on some of the points that were made. There are key reasons why the amendment is sensible. In other parts of the debate, Government Members have raised the negative impact of cross-examination by defendants, which they do not think is a good thing. They do not think it is a good thing that victims may be cross-examined by defendants, yet they will not support a measure that would reduce the risk of that happening, and it does happen. The context of all the different parts of the clause is important to bear in mind.
Rebecca Paul
Does my hon. Friend agree that Government Members and the Minister have spent a lot of time talking about victims being central to all of the changes, so why on earth would they not support the amendment if it is really about protecting victims from being cross-examined?
Dr Mullan
The consistent position is that unrepresented defendants can take up more court time and can cross-examine victims, and that is more difficult for victims. As other Members have touched on, this takes place in the context of the other things that we have been unsuccessful in changing this evening. Sentencing powers are increasing and the right to appeal is being watered down. There is a pernicious erosion of the fairness of our courts at the same time as the yardsticks are being essentially changed in relation to access to legal aid.
This is important in the wider context of what is happening with legal aid. The Minister wants to say all the time that the Government are stretching every possible sinew to do everything else they possibly can to improve the backlogs in the courts. Yet we heard in evidence from the Criminal Bar Association and the Bar Council that the £34 million of legal aid announced in December still has not filtered through into the system and is still not available. We are now in April.
Sarah Sackman
Will the hon. Member acknowledge that one of the first things this Government did when we came into power was invest £92 million, focusing primarily on duty solicitors who deal with cases at the coalface, including those involving unrepresented defendants? That money is in play. It is in their pockets. Will he acknowledge that?
Dr Mullan
Yes, absolutely. I have acknowledged that on a number of occasions, along with what the Government have done on Crown court sitting days and a number of other ways that I recognise the Government have improved things. The point I have made repeatedly is that the Crown court backlog prior to the pandemic was lower than the backlog we inherited from the previous Labour Government. Again, I think the Minister might get a better hearing from us Conservatives if she was fairer in that regard, in terms of her criticisms of our record—if she actually acknowledged the record in its entirety in relation to the backlogs prior to covid.
I mentioned that £34 million because the Minister cannot have it both ways. She cannot say, “We are doing everything possible,” and then react so vociferously when I point out a clear example of where the Government are not doing everything possible. If they were doing everything possible, that £34 million would be available to practitioners through additional legal aid. So right now, the Government are not doing something that they could do to help increase things such as the availability of legal advice and the number of people choosing to practise in the criminal Bar.
Again, in relation to legal aid, this is a perfectly reasonable amendment. I am pretty confident that the Government will have to announce or concede to this change at some point, and it is purely for party political reasons that the Minister will not concede this point—because it is a Lib Dem amendment. I would eat my hat, if I ever had one, if this Government do not end up conceding this point in the end anyway.
Yasmin Qureshi
On a note of clarification, I understand that Opposition Members have mentioned defendants cross-examining victims, but, in fact, the procedures have been changed. For sexual or domestic abuse-type offences, a defendant cannot cross-examine the victim or complainant himself, or herself. Instead, the court will appoint a solicitor or barrister to do the cross-examination for them. I just add that for clarity.
Sarah Sackman
I thank the hon. Member for Chichester for tabling the amendment, because the issue and importance of legal aid is something that I think we both care deeply about. Access to justice is a fundamental principle within our justice system; it is fundamental to the fairness of processing criminal cases through our courts. But if I am vociferous, I think it is entirely justified. We are a Government stretching every sinew to put our legal aid sector back on a sustainable footing.
That, by the way, is not simply a matter of increased fees, although we have done that and are continuing to do so. The inheritance we received—I say this not just as the Courts Minister responsible for the legal aid system—regarding the whole infrastructure of legal aid and the IT systems on which that was built, was wholly inadequate. It is no surprise, then, that the minute there is a cyber-attack, the whole thing keels over.
One of the difficulties with these fees is actually implementing them. We cannot implement them overnight because of the lack of investment, as well as the cutting of fees, that took place over 14 years. What we have done, as one of our first steps, is make significant uplifts to criminal legal aid fees for criminal solicitors, focusing on duty solicitors and prison lawyers—precisely the people we need to deliver this court transformation. That has already been implemented; we have an additional £116 million a year once in steady state. And we have announced the funding that is to come as part of these reforms, with £34 million for criminal legal aid advocates, alongside a commitment to match-fund criminal barrister pupillages to open up the pipeline to people from all backgrounds and to build our workforce.
So that is pragmatism, principle, social mobility and investment. No one could doubt the passion and commitment, as well as the investment, in transforming the infrastructure so badly needed to implement these criminal legal aid fees, and indeed the civil legal aid fees, which, by the way, we are also uplifting. This investment reflects the valuable and tough decisions that we have had to take, and the valuable and tough work undertaken by those who work in the criminal justice system. It will help them to ensure that justice is served.
Turning to the specifics of amendment 22, under the current financial eligibility rules, the Government are confident that the majority of defendants charged with either-way offences are expected to be eligible for legal aid at the magistrates court. For individuals who do not qualify for legal aid, there are already measures in place in the magistrates court to provide some support. The hardship review mechanism can provide support to those who fail or who do not meet the means test for legal aid but face higher than usual outgoings or expenses associated with their case. In addition, unrepresented defendants may also receive support via the free duty solicitor scheme, which we are investing in and that can provide representation at a first hearing if required.
In terms of remuneration for legal aid lawyers, legal aid fee schemes are specific to the court where the case is heard and are designed to reflect the differing processes and nature of work in the magistrates court and Crown court. The magistrates court fee scheme is designed to be simpler to administer and use for providers, reflecting the greater speed and volume of cases going through that court. Providers appreciate the greater simplicity. A non-standard fee route exists for exceptional cases to ensure that work on more complex cases is appropriately remunerated. Fees and financial eligibility conditions at magistrates courts can already provide representation for defendants facing potentially longer sentences if convicted of an either-way offence.
We remain committed to the provision of legal aid and recognise the vital role that it plays in underpinning access to justice. We will keep our approach to the rules that govern financial eligibility across legal aid under review, including by carefully assessing the impact of all the recommendations made by the independent review of the criminal courts and the final formation of the Bill before taking further decisions. In the light of that explanation, I hope the hon. Member for Chichester will agree to withdraw her amendment.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I thank the hon. Members for Bexhill and Battle and for Bolton South and Walkden for their contributions to the discussion on amendment 22.
I recognise that thresholds exist for a reason, but people earning £22,325 are not making a different consideration from somebody earning £23,325. They are lucky if they get to the end of the month with any money left in their bank account, let alone being able to consider paying for an hour’s legal advice. Even the concept of contacting a law firm and asking for simple, early-stage advice is going to feel totally alien to these people, because they do not have the funds to be able to do that. So thresholds exist for a reason, but the Government need to do a piece of work on where those thresholds land, because with the cost of living crisis, it is really hard in this country for people to afford to exist, let alone to afford the additional pressures that a case being heard in a magistrates court would put upon them.
The Minister said that access to justice is a fundamental principle. I agree entirely, and I know how strongly she feels about making sure that legal aid is fit for purpose. We have had many conversations about that, and I am confident that we will continue to do so. I know she will vote against the amendment, but that does not mean that I will not push it to a vote, because it is important to get how important legal aid provision is on the record. This conversation is not over, and I am sure the Minister will agree to carry it on.
Sarah Sackman
Clause 6 introduces a measure to extend the Secretary of State’s regulation-making power to enable the general limit on magistrates court sentencing powers to be set at 18 or 24 months of maximum imprisonment for single and multiple triable either-way offences. Currently, magistrates court sentencing powers are set at 12 months. The Government can already vary magistrates’ sentencing powers between six and 12 months by secondary legislation using the negative resolution procedure. That has been done twice, and used to good effect, since July 2022.
However, the Crown court is now facing significant pressures, and many triable either-way offences currently heard and sentenced there can, as we know, be fairly and expeditiously dealt with in the magistrates court. Increasing magistrates court sentencing powers is one of the ways in which we will increase the range of cases that magistrates courts can hear and sentence, freeing up valuable Crown court capacity for the most serious and complex cases. By enabling the powers to be increased in that way, the clause will help us to free up capacity in the Crown court to the tune of 8,000 Crown court sitting days in the 2028-29 financial year, making a significant dent in the backlog.
Magistrates are well prepared to take on that responsibility. They are dedicated and highly trained volunteers who give back to their community, working alongside highly trained legal advisers and an impressive cadre of district judges. The magistrates undergo an extensive selection process and work tirelessly to ensure that justice is delivered swiftly and fairly, currently assuming responsibility for 90% of all criminal cases.
The clause does not increase magistrates court sentencing powers; instead, it enables the Secretary of State to set the general limit in the future at 18 or 24 months. As I have said, any such change would be made through a statutory instrument under the negative resolution procedure, when necessary, to respond to changing circumstances and manage unsustainable pressures across the criminal justice system.
Importantly, the clause also ensures that the aggregate maximum term available for consecutive sentences will track the general limit. It also provides a safeguard that magistrates courts cannot impose a sentence exceeding the offence-specific maximum available on indictment, even if the general limit is set at 18 or 24 months. As such, I commend clause 6 to the Committee.
Dr Mullan
I oppose clause 6, which, as we have discussed, grants the Lord Chancellor the power to increase the maximum sentencing limit in magistrates courts from the current 12 months to 18 or even 24 months. While the Government present that as a necessary measure to relieve the backlog in the Crown court, we must look closely at what is being sacrificed in the name of speed.
This proposal is not a minor adjustment; it is a fundamental shift in the nature of summary justice. It would allow magistrates—volunteers who have to sit only 13 days a year and who on average sit 17 to 23 days—to deprive a citizen of their liberty for up to two years. That expansion of power comes at a time when the system is already under immense strain in the magistrates courts, and it is the view of the Criminal Bar Association, JUSTICE, the Bar Council and others that this move is unnecessary and potentially unsafe for the integrity of our legal system.
The central concern shared by legal professionals is that magistrates courts are simply not designed to handle the complexity of cases that may, at some point, carry two-year sentences. As the Criminal Bar Association pointed out in its evidence, the “practices and procedures” of those courts are “necessarily ‘summary’ in nature.” They were built for the swift disposal of what some consider to be minor offences, not for the intricate legal and factual disputes that characterise more serious crimes. The Criminal Bar Association has been blunt in its assessment, calling the extension of summary justice to cases carrying two-year terms a “recipe for rough justice”. That concern is backed by the Government’s own impact assessment, which assumes that magistrates will complete those more serious trials in just a few hours. As the CBA notes, that assumption is
“clearly naïve in the extreme”.
Either the cases will not receive the scrutiny they deserve, or the predicted time savings will never materialise.
One of the most troubling aspects of increasing sentencing powers is the legal aid gap. Given that we were unsuccessful with amendment 53, it is important to reiterate the impact of that gap when considering the clause as a whole. At present, the income threshold to qualify for a publicly funded lawyer is significantly lower in the magistrates courts, at £22,305, than in the Crown court, at £37,500.
JUSTICE has highlighted the severe unfairness that this creates. Individuals in full-time, minimum-wage employment, who would be eligible for legal aid in the Crown court, will find themselves ineligible in the magistrates courts. We face a reality where a defendant could be facing a two-year prison sentence while being forced to represent themselves, because they cannot afford a lawyer and do not qualify for state support. As JUSTICE warns, unrepresented defendants are often observed to receive harsher sentences, as they do not know how to mitigate. We cannot call a system just if it increases the stakes of a trial, while simultaneously stripping away the means for a professional defence.
We must also confront the impact of these changes on minority communities. The Bar Council and JUSTICE both point to the findings of the 2017 Lammy review, as it is referred to in shorthand, which identified juries as a
“success story of our justice system”,
because they do not appear to discriminate between different ethnic groups when returning verdicts. However, the review found that the positive story of jury equity was not matched in magistrates courts. The Minister has previously spoken about the lack of disparity in sentencing outcomes, for example, but specific statistical analysis showed that black, Asian and mixed ethnic women were more likely to be convicted—conviction is the question we are considering here—in magistrates courts than white women.
We have discussed before how that may not necessarily be a direct causal relationship, as it could just be correlation. However, as the Lammy review points out, it is incumbent on Governments of any colour—Conservative, Labour or whatever they might be—to justify and explain those disparities. As we have discussed previously, we have not managed to justify and explain them, yet we are introducing measures that could potentially exacerbate them.
Beyond ethnicity, the Lammy review noted a great cultural gulf between predominantly white, middle-class judges and magistrates and the defendants appearing before them. By forcing more serious cases into the magistrates court, and removing the right of defendants to elect a jury trial, the Government are moving cases away from the most trusted and equitable part of our justice system into one where public trust, at least for some communities, is already fragile. JUSTICE notes that any reform that reduces choice risks deepening existing disparities and exacerbating distrust for minoritised communities.
The Government’s primary justification is efficiency, but the Bar Council argues that these reforms will likely consume resources without bringing down the backlog. As we have said, there is also a challenge with the backlog in the magistrates courts, which are currently facing their own record high of 370,000 cases. The system is also facing a critical shortage of magistrates and legal advisers. The loss of sitting days due to the absence of legal advisers, who are often trainees, even for better-paid work, is a persistent problem. Some estimates suggest that there are more than 20,000 sitting days-worth of work from professional judges in the Crown court. Expecting that to be absorbed into an overstretched and shrinking cohort of volunteers in the magistrates courts would, as the CBA describes,
“transfer the burden from one over-stretched part of the system to another.”
Finally, we must look at how the clause interacts with the rest of the Bill. While clause 6 increases power at the lower level, clause 7 restricts the ability to challenge those decisions by removing the automatic right of appeal and replacing it with a permission-based model. The Bar Council describes this combination as
“a comprehensive rolling back of safeguards.”
At present, around 40% of appeals against conviction from magistrates courts are successful, and 47% of appeals against sentence are upheld, demonstrating that the lower courts frequently make meaningful errors. Doubling their sentencing powers, while simultaneously making it harder for a defendant to correct a wrong conviction, is a dangerous path to take.
It is also worth noting that the Bill departs from the recommendations of the very review that it claims to implement. Sir Brian Leveson recommended that the current 12-month maximum should be made permanent. I draw attention to a previous response from the Minister, when she again raised the possibility that the review invited the Government to go further. We have discussed that this might be a relevant argument to make if, for example, we were talking about a recommendation on which the review did not clearly oppose the Government going further.
If I was Brian Leveson, I would feel a bit like I was being mugged off by the Government, because they are saying, “We agree with what you want to do, but we’re going ignore you on the position that you are fundamentally clear on. Indeed, we’re not only ignoring your specific recommendation, we’re ignoring what you said about the other recommendations being contingent on the Government doing this thing around controlling the sentencing”. It is doubly insulting to Sir Brian to then suggest, as the Minister did, that he would be relaxed about this, and that he invited them to go further. Certainly, no reasonable person would interpret his suggestion in that way.
There is also a question about the numbers. We know Sir Brian’s central recommendation is that we reach 130,000 sitting days. That is the number that he arrived at. We must assume that he has arrived at that number contingent on the Government sticking to his advice that we do not increase the maximum sentencing powers of the magistrates. If the Government are claiming that that will be a further 8,000 sitting days, there must be some juggling with the figures. If the Government are seeking to achieve 130,000, and Sir Brian thinks that is the right number, and the Government’s plan has got an additional 8,000 that Sir Brian never envisioned, does that mean we have 8,000 to play with in some other regard that Sir Brian did not understand? Can the Minister explain how we have ended up with the same figures and the same goal, but in a completely different way, with a further 8,000 that Sir Brian never anticipated or wanted?
We also heard the argument that this is fine because the youth courts do it. We had that argument in an earlier sitting, and I made it clear that there are some fundamental differences. It really undermines the concept of having a specialist court if what goes on in that specialist court is then used to support an argument of general application. That goes against the whole point of a specialist court—we have gone out of our way in that case, because we recognise that the circumstances are special. For example, the types of custody, the implications for criminal records and the style in which cross-examination happens are all different in the youth court and the adult estate. We must therefore recognise that we are in a completely different position.
The Minister also talked about how the negative resolution procedure is already used in this area. The crucial difference is that we are taking a leap to 24 months, in terms of the impact of these decisions. What might have arguably been permissible at the lower end of the threshold does not automatically translate into an assumption that it is therefore appropriate at the higher end of the threshold. It is because the measure will apply towards the higher end of threshold that we think it is inappropriate. We failed to persuade the Government, and as a result this clause remains concerning.
In summary, the proposal to increase magistrates’ sentencing powers to 24 months is a move towards cheaper, faster justice that is likely to be neither cheap nor fast, and it will certainly not be just. It risks creating a surge of unrepresented defendants, exacerbating racial disproportionality and displacing the backlog into a court jurisdiction that is structurally ill-equipped to handle it. We should not trade away fundamental procedural protections for a marginal gain in court sitting days.
If we want to solve the backlog, we should focus on the low-hanging fruit identified by the Bar Council and others: open all existing courtrooms, more than 10% of which are closed today and were closed yesterday; fix prisoner transport, an issue that costs us thousands of days every year; and properly resource the legal profession. We must reject the 24-month limit and maintain the 12-month cap to ensure that serious custodial decisions remain subject to the full rigour and safeguards of our Crown courts.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Clause 6 expands the Secretary of State’s regulation-making power to change the general limit on the custodial sentence that a magistrates court may impose. It replaces the current list of possible maximum terms—six or 12 months—with a new list of six, 12, 18 or 24 months. That will allow the Secretary of State, by regulation, to change the general limit within these set terms.
The sentencing powers of the magistrates court were increased in 2022 from six months to 12 months. This clause would allow the Lord Chancellor to further increase the maximum by statutory instrument to either 18 or 24 months. The result will be more triable either-way cases being heard in the magistrates court. The practical reason we oppose the clause is that magistrates courts are facing their own increasing list—Members can decide whether they want to call it a backlog or a list. I recognise the Minister’s comments that we should not describe the 379,000 cases waiting in the magistrates courts as a backlog and I agree with her assessment that we need a certain number of cases in order for the magistrates court to function.
Joe Robertson
The central issue here, as with so much of this, is the impact that a single provision, or a single intention—in this case clause 6—has on other areas of the criminal justice system, and indeed provisions in the Bill. There is a lot of interplay between clauses 6 and 7—we are about to discuss clause 7, so I will save my comments on that for a few minutes’ time.
The central issue is the unintended consequence, yes, but also the other provisions that Parliament will not get to debate. In this case, Parliament will not get a proper opportunity to debate the fairness of having magistrates courts sentencing up to two years, because the clause effectively creates a power for the Secretary of State to do that job instead. That is why this Committee is having to debate whether it is right that a summary court should suddenly have the power to sentence someone up to two years.
The Government can argue that at least some of the provisions that the Opposition do not agree with are anchored somewhere in Sir Brian Leveson’s report. I would argue that this provision is specifically argued out by Sir Brian Leveson. Indeed, he talked about it being contingent on the magistrates court continuing to have sentencing powers of up to only one year. When the Government appear, in my view, to be doing something that specifically runs against Sir Brian Leveson’s report, rather than is simply absent from it, they need to explain their position. It is not good enough to run the same old arguments. The central argument in all this seems to be efficiency. How much will the Government sacrifice at the altar of efficiency? Efficiency cannot trump all, and certainly not the justice arguments already made by me and others, which I will not repeat.
If the Government cannot explain where these provisions have come from, when they run counter to Sir Brian Leveson’s report, they should rightly submit these proposals through a proper procedure so that they can be debated by Parliament, rather than just giving a power to the Secretary of State.
As I say, I will restrict my comments to the interplay between clause 6 and clause 7, which restricts the right of appeal. We have already heard some good arguments about legal aid, and it does not do much for the Minister, who is quite exercised by the previous Government’s record on legal aid. This is about not necessarily increased funding for legal aid—she says she is doing that already—but the right to it when the state is trying to lock someone up.
Dr Mullan
If people end up being seen in the magistrates court when under the old measures they would have been in the Crown court, there will be lengthier trials and, potentially, a more expensive legal aid bill. It may not necessarily even be an issue of resource; it is just about making sure that legal aid follows the cases where they are being heard, which may well even save money.
Joe Robertson
That is entirely right but, of course, we do not know, because the assessments in respect of the Bill are so light—there is not one on that point. It may or may not at all mean more spending. So many times, the argument on this issue, and on many others, is, “Oh, it doesn’t affect that many cases,” or, “Don’t worry.” Well, it deeply affects the person whose case it is. If a defendant wants to exercise the right that the Government are pulling away, it is hardly an argument for the Government to say, “Well, we’re not pulling that right away from very many people.” For that defendant, the right has been lost.
The same applies to the argument when it is about victims or complainants. The Government are rightly willing to focus an argument on individual victims; they should be prepared to do that for the individual defendants who will lose rights and, in the case of sentences of up to two years, may suddenly no longer be able to access legal aid because the regime is focused on the venue rather than on sentencing power. That should be adjusted not because of what previous Governments have done, but because this Government are moving the goalposts on sentencing powers in the magistrates court, so they should make the matching adjustment when it comes to qualifying for legal aid. For that reason, I do not agree with clause 6.
Rebecca Paul
It is a pleasure to start the day with you and end the day with you, Ms Jardine. I am sure you are very much enjoying starting your day with me and ending your day with me, too. [Laughter.] I have just realised how that can be interpreted. My apologies, Ms Jardine; I cannot account for the minds of other Members.
To get back to business, I do not support clause 6 standing part of the Bill. It will expand the Government’s existing power to increase the maximum custodial sentence that a magistrates court can impose for a single either-way offence. The current maximum is 12 months, but the clause will permit Ministers, entirely at their own discretion, to increase that to 18 months or even 24 months. That will affect consecutive sentencing for multiple either-way offences.
The Government have justified the change on the basis that the power is needed so that sentencing limits can be adjusted swiftly to rebalance work between the magistrates courts and the Crown court. The Government estimate that increasing the maximum to 18 months would save 8,000 Crown court sitting days. That all sounds rather neat but, in reality, it is another example of the Government trying to force more serious criminal business into a part of the system designed for swift, relatively low-level justice, and doing so before they have properly shown that the courts can absorb it or that the benefits are worth it.
The first and perhaps most important point is that even Sir Brian Leveson did not recommend the change. Sir Brian said that his recommendation on restricting the right to elect trial by jury was
“contingent upon magistrates’ sentencing powers remaining at the current maximum of 12 months.”
He also recommended that the Government’s ability to amend magistrates’ sentencing powers by statutory instrument be repealed, and that the current 12-month maximum be made permanent.
Clause 6 therefore cannot be said to follow Leveson: it goes beyond him and, on this point, directly contradicts him. That is a serious weakness in the Government’s position. Ministers have repeatedly leaned on Leveson when defending the Bill as a whole, but in this instance he gave no endorsement of what clause 6 will usher in. More than that, he warned us directly against it. It is perfectly valid to ask, “If the very review on which the Government say the Bill is based said that 12 months should remain the ceiling, why are Ministers now seeking the power to raise it to two years?”
Let me briefly touch on a second common-sense point. The move from six to 12 months took effect only for offenders convicted on or after 18 November 2024. In other words, the current system has barely had time to bed in and the Government are already asking Parliament to authorise a further jump to 18 or 24 months. The earlier increase to 12 months was justified as a response to court pressures, and the Government said it would save up to 2,000 sitting days. We have not had anything like enough time to assess properly how that change has worked in practice before Ministers seek power to go dramatically further.
If the Government and the Minister wish to make evidence-based law, they should first show Parliament what the 12-month expansion has actually done: what kinds of cases have been retained, what sentencing patterns have changed, what effect there has been on appeals, what impact there has been on magistrates courts and whether the claimed savings have materialised. Instead, they are asking, through clause 6, for a much broader delegated power, and inviting us to trust that this will all somehow work out later. That is not good enough where a question as fundamental as the administration of good justice is concerned.
The Bar Council puts its objection crisply and, I think, rightly. It says:
“Summary trial is designed for the purpose of dispensing swift justice in low-level cases. The extension of summary justice to cases in which a defendant could receive up to 2 years’ imprisonment…particularly when combined with the removal of a right to elect Crown Court trial, and the removal of a right of automatic appeal”
amounts to a
“comprehensive rolling back of safeguards.”
That is blunt language, but it is hard to disagree with.
Clause 6 will change the kind of cases that summary justice is expected to absorb. The Law Society warns that under the clause magistrates will have the power to impose lengthy custodial sentences for serious offences such as actual bodily harm, grievous bodily harm and possession with intent to supply drugs
“in proceedings that are intended to be quicker”
and less formal than than those in the Crown Court. It warns that this raises the likelihood that
“people will receive longer custodial sentences with fewer safeguards or opportunities to rectify wrongful convictions.”
I will dwell on this point for a moment, as it is something that none of us who have been tasked with scrutinising the Bill in detail should forget. A system designed to be faster, simpler and less formal is being asked to shoulder cases in which the consequences are far more severe. Two years in prison is not some trivial matter: a custodial sentence like that can cost a person their job, their home, their family life, their good name and their future. A justice system that is appropriate for low-level offending cannot be assumed fit for cases that carry that sort of lifechanging penalty.
There is then the practical point that clause 6 will not solve the pressure in the system so much as move it around. The change will merely transfer the burden from one overstretched part of the system to another. The Law Society says that the magistrates court already has its own backlog of more than 370,000 cases, and that the Government have shown no convincing plan to deal with the added pressure brought by more serious and complex cases.
JUSTICE makes the same point, and adds an especially telling practical detail drawn from the Institute for Government’s analysis: since magistrates’ sentencing powers were increased from six to 12 months in 2024, only around 30% of sentences in the six-to-12-month band were handed down by magistrates. That suggests a lack of confidence, or a continuing tendency to send more serious cases upwards, which in turn means the Government’s projected savings may not materialise in anything like the way they hope.
If magistrates are already not retaining all the cases that the Government assumed they would after the jump to 12 months, what is the evidence that authorising 18 or 24 months will suddenly transform the position? If cases continue to be sent up, or bounce between jurisdictions, the supposed efficiency gain becomes much more doubtful.
Joe Robertson
The way my hon. Friend articulates the point suggests that the rules are effectively stripping people of the right to legal aid by pushing them down from a court where they currently qualify into a court where they do not. Is that a fair way to characterise it?
Rebecca Paul
I agree with my hon. Friend. Frankly, I am shocked that a Labour Government would do that. It is the last thing I expected of a Labour Government.
Sarah Sackman
On a point of order, Ms Jardine. I ask for your guidance. We hear the rehearsal of a number of the same arguments that we have heard again and again over a long period. Everyone here wants to make progress and wants to scrutinise, but I am not sure there is much merit in hearing the same arguments and, indeed, the same quotes again and again. I seek your guidance on how best to deal with that, Ms Jardine.
The Chair
The way we can best deal with it individually is by being succinct and not repetitive.
Dr Mullan
Further to that point of order, Ms Jardine. I seek your guidance. We are discussing issues on which amendments were tabled, but we were unsuccessful with those amendments, so is it not perfectly legitimate for us to discuss all the consequences for the Bill that flow from the fact that the amendments were denied? The Minister may be frustrated and think that that is not a good use of time; we were previously debating things that might not have happened, but now that the amendments have failed, we know exactly what the Bill will do, so it is perfectly in order to go back through the concerns we had. That is my understanding of it.
The Chair
I will check with the Clerk, but my understanding is that if an argument has been rehearsed and heard in full and a decision taken, we move on from that argument; we do not go back and re-rehearse it. To that extent, the Minister is right. If you have already debated an issue in connection with an amendment and voted on it, you do not go back and bring it up in relation to a further amendment, unless it is a new aspect that you have not debated before. Does that help?
Rebecca Paul
Thank you for that guidance, Ms Jardine, but that seems to suggest that we are not allowed ever again in this Bill Committee to bring up the fact that the right to elect for jury trial and rights to legal aid are being removed. Surely we need to be able to talk about that as we go through the Bill.
The Chair
You can ask for further advice, but the Clerk tells me that the scope of this debate is clause 6, and when we move on to other clauses, we will debate those clauses.
Rebecca Paul
Thank you for that guidance, Ms Jardine. I would suggest that the legal aid changes are a really important outcome of clause 6. In fact, I think I would come under huge criticism if I made this speech without mentioning legal aid, because I have not raised it at all—well, I did in an earlier speech. I have not raised it at all today.
The Chair
It is not for me to say what is a valid point. I was asked for guidance on the scope of this debate, which is clause 6.
Rebecca Paul
Thank you for that, Ms Jardine. I reassure you that I will not be speaking for very much longer, but I will cover the last of what I consider to be the important points. Thank you for your guidance and patience.
The Law Society warns that the Bill’s proposals will increase the number of defendants in magistrates courts who are ineligible for legal aid, even though they would currently qualify if their case were heard in the Crown court, because the magistrates court means test is significantly stricter. It notes that duty solicitor numbers have dropped sharply between 2017 and 2025 and that the impact assessment does not properly address
“the disparity between the magistrates’ and Crown Court means tests”.
We know that individuals in full-time, minimum-wage employment may not qualify for legal aid in the magistrates court, and that unrepresented defendants often do not understand charges, and often enter inappropriate pleas, struggle with cross-examination and end up with harsher outcomes. Under the Bill, then, a defendant may face a much more serious case in a summary forum, with a possible sentence of 18 months or two years, yet be less likely to have publicly funded legal representation than they would be if the case were before the Crown court. That simply is not fair.
Even if one were somehow persuaded that giving the magistrates courts the power to impose sentences of 18 or 24 months might in principle be acceptable, we would still have a major objection to how the clause is drafted. It does not simply set the limit and leave it there; it expands the regulation-making power so that the Government may increase the maximum to 18 or 24 months by statutory instrument. The delegated powers memorandum justifies that on the basis that magistrates’ sentencing limits may need to be adjusted swiftly “where operational pressures” require a “rebalancing of work”.
Are we not, then, being asked to hand over a flexible tool that could be used to rebalance criminal jurisdiction by secondary legislation? I could not be more convinced that Parliament should retain oversight of increasing the powers of magistrates. At the very least, any such regulation should be made by affirmative resolution. This is not the sort of decision that should be casually adjustable at ministerial convenience.
For all those reasons, I oppose clause 6 standing part of the Bill. Even Leveson did not recommend this change; on the contrary, he said his wider recommendations were
“contingent upon magistrates’ sentencing powers remaining at…12 months”
and recommended that the power to alter them by statutory instrument “should be repealed”. The move to 12 months has taken effect only recently and has not yet been properly evaluated. The clause will extend summary justice into cases carrying up to two years’ imprisonment, despite the fact that summary justice was designed for lower-level, swifter cases. It will push more serious cases into magistrates courts that are already under strain, and do so in a package that also weakens appeals and intensifies legal aid problems. It risks moving the backlog rather than solving it, and it does so by way of an over-broad delegated power that gives Ministers too much room to reshape criminal jurisdiction by regulation.
The magistracy deserves respect, and nothing I say should be taken as criticism of the many magistrates who serve conscientiously and well, but having respect for magistrates is not the same thing as assuming that every structural burden should now be placed on the summary justice system. The Government have not even begun to make the case for the clause compellingly.
Sarah Sackman
Members have asked about the intended impact of the clause. As I explained earlier, the reason why we are making this change is that we have confidence in our magistrates and because it would save a significant number of Crown court sitting days.
This is a tried-and-tested approach: the sentencing power of magistrates courts was raised from six months to 12 months for a single triable either-way offence in May 2022, under the previous Government—Conservatives can look to their own record to see the evidence for what we should do—and a review of the impact between May 2022 and March 2023 confirmed that increasing magistrates sentencing powers had helped to reduce to pressure on the Crown court. In that context, there was a 21% reduction in the number of defendants sent by magistrates courts to the Crown court for sentencing, and a further 6% reduction in the number of theft offences sent for trial to the Crown court by March 2023. That shows how recalibrating sentencing powers—[Laughter.] I did not realise it was that funny, but we are getting into the witching hour, so I am going to be kind to everybody. That reduction is just one of the ways in which we think the clause can assist with the backlogs.
I addressed the points about legal aid in my remarks on amendment 22, tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester. I have set out the justifications both for extending the powers and for the flexible, agile mechanism that the negative procedure affords us.
Sarah Sackman
I am not going to give way. For all those reasons, I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting)
Thursday 23rd April 2026
(3 months, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Courts and Tribunals Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Notices of Amendments as at 23 April 2026 - (23 Apr 2026)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 5 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 5 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Chair
We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we begin, I remind Members to switch electronic devices to silent, please. Tea and coffee are not allowed during proceedings, but there is plenty of water—blue is flat and silver fizzy.
I remind Members that amendments are voted on at the point at which they are found in the Bill, so any Division on amendment 37 to clause 26 will come later.
Clause 7
Appeals from magistrates’ courts
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 63, in schedule 2, page 38, line 33, leave out from “only if” to the end of line 35 and insert
“the Crown Court considers that—
(a) the appeal has a realistic prospect of success, or
(b) there is another compelling reason for the appeal to be heard.”
This amendment would broaden the test for granting permission to appeal from magistrates’ courts, so that appeals may proceed where they have a realistic prospect of success or where there is another compelling reason for the appeal to be heard.
Amendment 64, in schedule 2, page 38, line 33, after “appeal” insert “against sentence”.
This amendment is consequential upon Amendment 66.
Amendment 65, in schedule 2, page 39, line 1, after “(3)” insert “and (5)”.
This amendment is consequential upon Amendment 66.
Amendment 66, in schedule 2, page 39, line 10, at end insert—
“(5) There is a right to renew an application for permission to appeal orally.
(6) Grounds for appeal may raise issues of procedure and fact arising in the trial as well as law.”
This amendment ensures a right to appeal orally, and provides that grounds for appeal include procedure and fact, as well as points of law.
Amendment 54, in schedule 2, page 39, line 16, leave out from “if” to end of line 18 and insert
“the defendant has made one.”
This amendment would require the Crown Court to allow an appeal if the defendant makes one.
Amendment 55, in schedule 2, page 42, line 15, leave out “magistrates’ court” and insert
“jury in the Crown Court”.
This amendment would allow the Crown Court to order a retrial by jury in the event that it allows an appeal against a conviction or sentence in the magistrates court.
Amendment 56, in schedule 2, page 47, line 13, leave out “magistrates’ court” and insert
“jury in the Crown Court”.
This amendment would allow the Crown Court to order a retrial by jury in the event that it allows an appeal against a conviction or sentence in the magistrates court.
Amendment 57, in schedule 2, page 49, line 36, leave out from “Court” to end of line 39 and insert
“must allow an appeal under section 108 if the defendant makes one.”
This amendment would remove the provision limiting appeals to specific grounds and instead ensure the Crown Court allows appeals if one is made.
Schedule 2.
Amendment 37, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert—
“(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make a statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (3) bringing section 7 into force until he has undertaken an assessment of the rate of upheld appeals on convictions and sentences handed down in the magistrates’ court in the previous two years.”
This amendment would prevent the restriction of right of appeal against magistrates court decisions unless the rate of successful appeals from the magistrates courts has been below 10% in the previous two years.
The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)
It is a pleasure to see you in your place, Dr Huq. I thank the hon. Members for Blackburn (Mr Hussain) and for Bexhill and Battle, and my hon. Friend the Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell), for tabling the amendments in this group.
I will come to the amendments, but first I will take the opportunity to set out the rationale for the clause and schedule 2. The existing position for criminal appeals from the magistrates court is this: when an appellant wishes to appeal a conviction or sentence in the magistrates courts, they proceed to a full rehearing of their case in the Crown court. They do not have to state why they wish to challenge their conviction or sentence, nor produce any grounds for appeal. They simply lodge an appeal and obtain a full rehearing in the Crown court.
In many cases, there is no justifiable reason for that, yet the impact on victims and witnesses, who are often required to go through the ordeal of a second trial, in the Crown court, can be significant. Indeed, we heard from victims in the Committee’s evidence sessions that going through a trial was so traumatic that they would have probably dropped out if the case had been appealed to the Crown court.
Part of the evidence that persuaded Sir Brian Leveson to make recommendations 21 and 22 in his report, in respect of appeals, was that
“many minor sexual assaults that were dealt with in the magistrates courts or the youth courts, which could include rape, almost automatically went to appeal to the Crown court, on the basis that the victim would not turn up the second time and be prepared to go through the whole process again.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 9, Q11.]
This situation is unique in our criminal justice system. Magistrates courts are the only criminal court in which there is an automatic right to appeal without filter. In every other criminal court, including the Crown court, the appellant must obtain permission to appeal, they must provide their grounds, and the court has the opportunity to review appeal applications to determine whether there are sufficient grounds to warrant reconsideration.
The purpose of the clause and the provisions in schedule 2 is to bring magistrates courts appeals in line with other criminal appeals processes, and thereby reduce the number of unnecessary hearings that progress to the Crown court. That has the dual benefit of reducing the burden of appeals on victims and witnesses, and ensuring a sensible use of court resources, reserving Crown court time for the most serious cases.
Let me be clear on the data. Of all the cases in the magistrates court, which we know can be hundreds of thousands, only 1% get appealed to the Crown court. This to me is indicative of a system that generally commands confidence. I understand the concerns about access to justice, but to be clear, the right to appeal in magistrates courts remains. Defendants will still be able to appeal a conviction or sentence in magistrates courts, but with a straightforward permission stage, as already exists elsewhere, so that appeals with arguable grounds continue to receive a full appeal hearing. Appellants will retain the ability to seek a judicial review of a refusal of permission in the High Court, and applications to the Criminal Cases Review Commission remain possible where there have been alleged miscarriages of justice.
The clause also mandates the recording of trial and sentencing proceedings to support the evidential record for appeals. This is a significant step in making our courts more transparent and open to scrutiny, and it provides an opportunity to go further than in the current criminal procedure rules. The clause is proportionate and targeted. It will filter out unmeritorious, weak applications, helping to increase efficiency across the criminal courts and reduce the burden of appeals, which we know is born by witnesses and victims, while maintaining fairness and access to justice.
Amendment 63 was tabled by the hon. Member for Blackburn; I seek your guidance, Dr Huq, on whether it has actually been moved.
Sarah Sackman
Thank you, Dr Huq. Amendment 63 seeks to broaden the test for allowing an appeal from magistrates courts under the new reforms. The amendment expands the existing test so that permission will be granted where there is some other compelling reason. That is a test used in civil proceedings in the Court of Appeal civil division. There is not equivalent test for appeals in the Court of Appeal criminal division, which is what our new process for appeals in the magistrates courts is based on.
One reason why a court might hear an appeal due to some other compelling reason is to seek an authoritative binding judgment on a particular issue. A Crown court cannot provide a binding decision as to the law on magistrates courts generally, whereas the High Court can. If the appellant wished to appeal for this reason—in other words, in order to seek a binding judgment on a point of law—they could achieve that by using the existing process of appeals by way of case stated to the High Court. In short, we do not think it would be appropriate for there to be appeals to the Crown court in this context.
Instead, we have replicated the existing grounds for appeal in the Court of Appeal criminal division: whether it is reasonably arguable that an appeal will be allowed. An appeal of conviction will be allowed if it is unsafe, which can be the consequence of the incorrect application of the law, procedural irregularities, or the introduction of fresh evidence. An appeal against sentence will be allowed in the same circumstances as in the Court of Appeal: where a sentence is manifestly excessive or otherwise wrong in law or principle. These are well-established tests.
We are committed to ensuring that we create a fair appeals system that provides adequate safeguards for summary justice. In the event that appellants feel an incorrect decision has been made in respect of their application for permission, they have the opportunity to seek a judicial review of that decision to the High Court. I remind the Committee that, as I said earlier, the introduction of recording equipment into magistrates courts to accompany the change in the appeals process will increase the ability to scrutinise the decisions of magistrates courts. I hope I have reassured the Committee of our commitment to a fair and accessible criminal appeals process, and I urge that amendment 63 not be pressed to a Division.
Amendments 64 to 66, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central, relate to the right to renew an appeal for permission to appear at an oral hearing if the appeal has been refused on the papers. I will deal with these matters sequentially.
The right to renew an application for permission at an oral hearing when it has been refused on the papers does exist in appeals from the Crown court to the Court of Appeal. We decided not to replicate the provision for appeals from the magistrates courts. There will be occasions when an oral hearing may be regarded as necessary in order for a Crown court judge to determine whether to grant permission to appeal. For that reason, we have included a provision in proposed new section 108A of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, so that judges can hold an oral hearing if they feel it is necessary or for the purpose of making a determination more expeditiously.
However, the key is whether an oral hearing is necessary in the context. We are keen to avoid an influx of applications to renew permission to appeal at an oral hearing where that is unnecessary. That is particularly important when we consider the high volume of cases that our magistrates courts already consider, and the higher volume of cases that we anticipate they will be considering after the other reforms in the Bill come into play. The volume of appeals from magistrates courts to the Crown court will therefore be higher, proportionally, than the volume of appeals from the Crown court to the Court of Appeal. If we include provision for appellants to renew an application for permission that has already been refused, we risk creating a higher volume of unnecessary oral hearings than in the Court of Appeal, thereby placing a significant and unnecessary strain on Crown court time.
I understand that the amendment is driven by the desire to ensure that adequate safeguards are built into the process, and I hope my hon. Friend will be reassured that, as I have said, refusal of permission can still be challenged by applying to the High Court for judicial review.
The second part of the amendment provides that the grounds of appeal may be based on issues of procedure and fact arising in the trial, as well as on points of law. I want to reassure my hon. Friend that the grounds for appeal as currently drafted in the Bill capture the points raised in the amendment. An appeal of conviction will be allowed if it is unsafe, which can be the consequence of an incorrect application of law, procedural irregularities or fresh evidence.
Appeals of sentence could also be successful on the basis that the magistrates court has made a mistake as to the facts of the case or made a procedural error, as long as, by virtue of that mistake, the sentence was manifestly excessive or wrong in law or principle. The amendment would not change that position.
For the reasons I have set out, I urge Members not to support amendments 64 to 66. In essence, they are already covered by the Bill.
I thank the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle for tabling amendments 54 and 57, which would provide that whenever an appeal against conviction or sentence is made from the magistrates court to the Crown court, the appeal must be allowed, irrespective of whether there is any merit in the appeal. I suspect that was not the intention behind the amendments. If I read them in the spirit that I imagine they were tabled, I think they were designed to remove the permission test, rather than indicating to the Court that it should allow all such appeals.
Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Wimbledon, who is not in his place, for the advice received in relation to amendment 54, which was drafted with the assistance of the Clerks. The Minister is right that our intention was to unpick the barriers at the permission stage that the Bill introduces. I think her point applies just to the first amendment; the other amendments fit because they are about what happens after a successful appeal and how it might be re-instigated. On that basis, I will not press amendment 54 to a vote. We will table a suitable amendment at a later stage.
Sarah Sackman
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that clarification. I was pretty sure that that was what he must have meant and that it was not his intention to suggest that we should, essentially, allow and uphold all appeals as an automatic right. I understand, though, his intention to debate the merits of the permission test in the Bill.
I should make one point about the consequence anticipated in the amendments, in terms of appeals being directed automatically to a jury trial. To be clear, that is not how appeals currently operate, whereby a judge sitting with magistrates rehears the case on appeal in the Crown court. The effect of the amendments together could mean that we would see large numbers of appeals of conviction being allowed and sent to the Crown court for a retrial by jury, absent any permission test or filter. That could mean, for example, that low-level summary-only offences, such as being drunk and disorderly, are added to the Crown court caseload and, by extension, the backlog, which would only increase the waiting times for the more serious offences, which we want to get on with more expeditiously.
I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s correction, but we take issue with not just the effect of the amendment but the fact that it would mean that appeals would go to a jury trial, because that would extend the right to, or access to, a jury trial, which we do not want to encourage in this context. I anticipate that the intention was to expand the grounds for permission, so that instead of applying a test, any application for permission would be allowed. This would essentially remove the permission filter and return us to the status quo, where there is an automatic right to a rehearing on appeal, absent any filter for the merit of an appeal.
Dr Mullan
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Huq. Clause 7 and schedule 2 represent a fundamental and troubling departure from the way that our justice system corrects error. As the Minister said, we have tabled a number of amendments, which essentially form two groups. The first group seeks to reconstitute the existing right of appeal, and amendment 37 aims to stop the Government’s proposal until we have a more substantial and better understanding of how to drive the appeal success rate down, which is our primary aim.
As the Minister outlined, at present a defendant convicted in the magistrates court has an automatic right of appeal to the Crown court, where the case will be heard as a full rehearing before a judge and two lay magistrates. The Bill proposes to replace that long-standing framework with a permission-based model, whereby the defendant must first prove that their appeal is reasonably arguable before a single judge, often based only on written papers and transcripts. I rise to oppose that restriction on access to justice. I will argue that, where an appeal is successful, justice is best served by providing the option of a retrial before a jury.
I will reflect on the Minister’s remarks about how our amendments would operate. I always listen very carefully to what she says and, as I will explain, I think there is some merit in some of her points, so we can reflect on those. The Minister has pointed out the difference between the magistrates court and the Crown court, and processes elsewhere, but my contention is that that is not an accident or happenstance; that is by design, because the magistrates court is very different in many other ways from those other elements of the courts. That is why there is a difference there—for very good reason.
Because efficiency must be balanced with accuracy and fairness, the current automatic right of appeal is not simply a source of unnecessary delay; it is a vital check on a part of our system that others have described as being, to some extent, “rough justice”—a forum in which decisions are swift but carry a higher risk of mistake. The evidence—because let us look at the evidence; this is not just what people might say about it—is that the current system is performing a very necessary function. Around 40% to 42% of appeals against convictions from the magistrates court are successful, and roughly 44% to 47% of appeals against sentences are also successful. That is an extremely high rate of successful appeals. These are not marginal or trivial figures; they indicate, I am afraid, that the lower courts are making meaningful errors in nearly half of the cases in which they are challenged.
The Law Commission actually considered this issue in detail. It rejected the proposals that a permission stage should be introduced and highlighted a number of key points in relation to that. On the importance of correcting error, as I have mentioned, it emphasised the critical role that those appeals are playing. It also highlighted the low volume of appeals. The Minister talked about 4% of receipts in relation to one element; I think 1% of the total number of magistrates court cases are being appealed, so that demonstrates that this measure will make a transformative difference to the backlog.
We can talk about receipts, but the other thing to keep in mind is how long the actual appeals take. Although receipts are one way of looking at it—on a numbers basis—that is also distortive, of course, because appeals are much shorter hearings than the ordinary business of the Crown court.
The Law Commission pointed out that it found no meaningful evidence that this process was being abused, even without that permission stage in place. As we have talked about previously in the Bill, legal representatives cannot support an appeal that is completely without merit. As I have said, due to a combination of the low volume of appeals and the shorter hearing times, our contention is that there would be minimal efficiency gains to weigh against this erosion of an existing right.
Actually, the introduction of a permission stage is something that we welcome, but the work that will have to be done to support it, with the introduction of recordings and making available transcripts, will probably—or could—cost significantly more than will be saved. By introducing a permission stage, the Government are creating a multi-stage system that is complicated and potentially more inefficient than the current situation.
We know that many of those facing imprisonable offences in magistrates courts are currently unrepresented. The Bill simultaneously increases sentencing powers in clause 6 while narrowing the ability to challenge those decisions in this clause. The Bar Council has described this as a
“comprehensive rolling back of safeguards”.
An unrepresented defendant, potentially facing up to two years in prison, will now be expected to navigate the practicalities of reviewing transcripts and preparing permission grounds for appeal without professional help.
The legal aid gap means that many defendants who would have qualified for a solicitor and legal aid in the Crown court will be ineligible in the magistrates court due to the different low-income thresholds—£22,325 versus £37,500. Requiring those individuals to purchase costly transcripts just to ask for permission to appeal is a significant barrier that risks entrenching injustice. If the error rate in the magistrates court remains high, restricting access to the remedy is a recipe for uncorrected miscarriages of justice.
I will move on to our amendments about the case for retrial by jury. If we accept that the current appeal system exposes weaknesses in the original summary trial, we must also look at what happens after a successful appeal. As the Bill stands, if the Crown court quashes a conviction and determines that a retrial is necessary, the case must generally be returned to the magistrates court.
We believe that that is a rigid approach that ignores the complexity, which does not exist at present, of what might have been revealed by the appeal. Because we are introducing a new system of allocation and decisions around allocation, that is a new area of the law that could be contained within appeals. A successful appeal may demonstrate that the case was too complex, or the evidence too sensitive, for a summary disposal in the new division. Returning cases to the same level of court that originally fell into error will do little to restore public confidence.
Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq. I will speak to amendments 64 to 66, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central.
We have had a discussion about this provision. The amendments seek to give a right to renew an application for permission to appeal orally, and to allow grounds for appeal to raise issues of procedure and fact arising in the trial, as well as issues of law. Clause 7 currently suggests that a person can only appeal in writing on matters of law, which means that a person is going to have to construct a proper legal argument. The problem with that is that the majority of people in the magistrates court are unrepresented.
It is wrong to say that this is comparable with Crown court cases going to the Court of Appeal, or the higher courts having to deal with the issue of leave to appeal—for example, as in judicial review. Magistrates courts tend to have some very “minor” offences leading to some quite serious repercussions. When I say “minor”, I am talking only in terms of sentencing, because we must remember that offences that we call minor can have a significant impact on a defendant’s life—for example, even drink driving, which does normally not carry a custodial sentence, certainly carries a disqualification.
That is also often a mandatory disqualification so that no discretion is given to the magistrates as to whether they should disqualify somebody. If someone is the sole breadwinner, or has care of a disabled person, and they feel that this conviction was wrong, they will not have the right to appeal—because very rarely will somebody charged with those matters will be getting legal aid.
However, in the Crown court, most people will have legal aid or be using legal advice at some point, because the trial will normally be conducted by solicitors or lawyers. Therefore, they are already being paid and if there is an appeal against either conviction or sentence, they already know what they are talking about and what they need to quote—the legal jurisprudence that they need to refer to, to prove their case—along with the issues with examining the witnesses or the evidence that has been given. They are then able to say, for example, that a particular witnesses’ evidence was not credible or that a witness said contradictory things or different things in their statement to the police compared with during the trial. They can do that because they have conducted the trial and they can forensically examine what happened—not only what legal direction the judge gave, but the factual evidence that came out during the trial. In the magistrates court, most people are not represented, so they cannot argue all those things.
To take away the automatic right to appeal is, therefore, a change to the fundamental basic rights of an individual. Let us remember that the state has all the might and all the resources, and that professionals will be prosecuting—whether they are lay prosecutors, Crown prosecutors or independent lawyers. On the one side, there will be the state represented by legal professionals; on the other, there will be the lone individual coming up by themselves to be subject to trial. If they are then not satisfied with the conviction or the sentence, they must then think how to legally write an appeal. That is putting a lot of pressure on them.
As Members of Parliament, many of us will have met many constituents who are quite reluctant to even write to us. I often say to constituents, “Please can you drop us an email?” and they say, “Well, I don’t know how to use a computer, and I don’t have the internet at home.” We then make a face-to-face appointment so that they can explain themselves. That is not unusual because a lot of people are not able to write very well and would not be in a position to construct a coherent legal argument as to why they should have their appeal in the Crown court.
Sometimes, when we are talking about possible efficiencies and saving money, we forget about individuals. People who come before the criminal justice system tend to be from poorer backgrounds and are often less well educated. Some of them may well be unemployed. A lot of them have other issues going on in their lives. Therefore, the fact that they can appeal to the Crown court automatically in the current system is an immense safeguard for them.
Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)
The hon. Member is making an important point that we have not really discussed on the Committee. It is estimated that half the prison population have a reading age of less than 11; that is to say, they are counted as functionally illiterate. We have seen a decline in prison education. How does she expect all these prison inmates to be able to negotiate or navigate an appeals process?
Yasmin Qureshi
That is exactly the point I am trying to make. I think we sometimes forget, sitting in our rarefied environment, that a lot of the people out there—our citizens—are not well educated or able to write a proper paragraph or construct an argument. Sometimes they can just about get two or three simple sentences together. As they often do not have legal representation, allowing them to automatically appeal against a sentence or conviction is a really important safeguard for them. The Crown court and Court of Appeal criminal division is not the right comparison, because in most Crown court cases people have full legal representation who will be able to advise on this.
The other thing we found is that apparently 40% of appeals are successful. Think about that: four out of 10 appeals are successful. If people do not have a right to appeal, they have to find a way to make a legal argument on matters of law, which they know very little about. Asking them to do that is basically letting four out of 10 people be convicted or receive a sentence that could have an impact on their lives.
On sentences, when a conviction happens, even if it is in the magistrates court, it fundamentally affects people’s lives. It could mean that they are not able to get a job again or are dismissed from the job they have. If someone’s job involves driving and they are disqualified because of drink driving, that will be an extra burden on them, but it is not just that. Even if someone gets a suspended sentence or community service order for what we call smaller offences, a lot of people are not able to do that. Taking away their right to appeal is, with respect, very harsh.
Legal aid has already been reduced considerably over the years. I have to put the blame for that on the Conservatives, because they massively cut legal aid while in government. They also massively restricted the rights of judicial review. In that respect, I have to hold the Conservatives a bit responsible for what they did in 14 years in power. I am very grateful that the Labour Government have put money into legal aid—that is great—but I ask them to please give that to the magistrates court as well.
I have travelled in different parts of the world where the justice system is perhaps a bit haphazard or where there is not much trust in the state’s justice system, for whatever reason. It does not necessarily have to do with the wealth of a country; there are very wealthy countries where the state is much more authoritarian and the institutions are almost stacked against the individual. The one thing that people really love about the UK, apart from our beautiful country and everything else, is our judicial system. I am not just saying that; it is the most respected system in the world, especially our criminal justice system, because people feel that they have protection at the point that their liberties are being taken away.
Think about a conviction for shoplifting: people say, “Oh, shoplifting,” but even if someone takes a bottle of milk out of a shop, they may get a conviction and there will be hundreds of jobs that they can never apply for. For a lot of people who rely on shop work or other manual jobs where they may come across money, it means that they are never going to get a job. If they get a conviction in the magistrates court for theft, that is devastating for them. The Theft Act refers to the “intention of permanently depriving”. That is quite important, because people make mistakes, but intention has to be proved, because the Theft Act requires it. It is not just taking the thing; it is the intention to permanently deprive. How do we define “permanently deprive”? A layperson would not know how to construct that argument, but a lawyer would.
Jess Brown-Fuller
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq.
Clause 7 and schedule 2 will restrict the right to appeal the decision of a magistrates court to the Crown court, and will change the process that those appeals go through. Currently, a defendant has an automatic right of appeal from the magistrates court to the Crown court against either conviction or sentence; in either case, the appeal is a hearing before a judge and two magistrates. The Bill will instead introduce a requirement for an application for permission to appeal based on written grounds. A Crown court judge will decide whether to grant permission, and the appeal hearing would be heard by a single judge. Instead of a rehearing, the appeal would be only on the issues on which permission is granted. If the appeal is against conviction, the judge must allow the appeal if the conviction is unsafe. If so, the judge may order a retrial in the magistrates court.
It is not unreasonable to have a conversation about the appeals process, especially as there is a small amount of evidence of the system being abused by a very small minority of defendants who believe that the appeal will be successful on the grounds that the victim or witnesses will refuse to go through the experience again. I absolutely recognise that, and we need to put essential safeguards into the criminal justice system to provide greater protection for those victims. We will be getting to the crux of that issue over the next days in Committee.
However, clause 7 and schedule 2 are blunt instruments that will harm access to justice. We cannot ignore the fact that although a very small number of cases from the magistrates—less than 1%—go to appeal, more than 40% of those are successful at appeal. Given that the magistrates court will be hearing more complex cases that carry higher sentences, the measures will increase the risk of miscarriages of justice. Touching the appeals process at this point is unnecessary when it is currently sparingly used. The Criminal Bar Association has argued:
“Access to justice will be harmed. Who is going to find the lawyers who have time to review transcripts of evidence and prepare grounds of appeal? Who is going to pay them for that work? What about the defendants who were ineligible for Legal Aid, because of the lower cut off for eligibility?”
We discussed the eligibility cut-off in the previous clause.
JUSTICE has raised similar concerns, stating that replacing the automatic right of appeal with a multi-stage permission system
“is complicated and highly likely to be inefficient”,
and will fail defendants who cannot navigate these processes, as laid out articulately and clearly by the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden.
The current process means that appeals are heard by a judge and two magistrates. The opportunity for magistrates to sit with a Crown court judge to hear appeals is an important one, as it helps with the training of magistrates and drives up standards. Under the Bill, there are no circumstances in which lay justices would sit with professional judges. We are debating a number of amendments, some of which seek to restore the conditions we have right now—retaining the automatic right to appeal—and some that go further, although I think the shadow Minister suggested that he would not press them all to a vote.
I would appreciate the Minister’s explaining whether she thinks the processes being put in place by clause 7 and schedule 2 are compatible with the principles of access to justice that she has laid out previously in Committee. I remain gravely concerned that the measures will have a huge impact on the most vulnerable in society.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I am happy to have you back in the Chair today, Dr Huq. I wish to oppose the clause and the schedule. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden for pointing out so clearly that the restrictions on appeals will push down hardest on the least advantaged people and will compound injustices in wider society, as well as the injustices put in place by other clauses.
I will not reiterate in detail the evidence we heard, or the speeches I made previously, about the risks of more errors due to the speedier but rougher and readier justice of the magistrates courts being applied to more cases, or the risks arising from higher sentences. However, clause 7 adds yet more risk to the potential harm from reducing the right to select a jury trial in clause 1 and the restrictions put in place by other clauses. This is counterproductive for the overall courts workload, too.
As others have pointed out, the clause will introduce a multi-step process. We heard in oral evidence from Emma Torr of Appeal that the
“multi-step process…will only increase the workload of both the magistrates and Crown courts. To give a very brief outline of how it works at the moment, the defendant or the solicitor can fill out a very simple form, which results in a quick rehearing at the Crown court. It takes a couple of hours at most and even less for sentence appeals.”
She also pointed out that the Law Commission had carefully considered the matter last year in a consultation paper that ran to 700 pages. She said:
“Its independent analysis was that the removal of the automatic right to appeal will increase the workload of the magistrates court and the Crown court.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 83, Q174.]
In our oral evidence sessions, we heard clear views about the lack of legal aid in magistrates courts for people without representation to meet fairly the test set for appeals. Fiona Rutherford of JUSTICE told us:
“Without a lawyer being present, and of course without there even being the right to appeal directly, you are leaving a whole load of defendants, who may well be wrongly convicted or may get the wrong sentence for the crime they have committed, floundering…I simply don’t know who will inform these people about how they will put grounds of appeal together, what grounds of appeal even are, how you formulate those, what key points you need to make in them to persuade a Crown court judge sitting alone in a room with just some evidence papers and how to put your best case forward.” ––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 86, Q184.]
These are serious matters of injustice. I do not know how the least advantaged defendants will be able to do anything to use the application to the High Court for judicial review, which seems to be the only remedy that the Minister has put forward to us today. I do not know how many miscarriages of justice are acceptable to the Minister, but I believe that these measures must not form part of the Bill, because of the impact that they will have on the right to justice for too many people.
Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Huq. I do not support clause 7 or schedule 2. I welcome the debate on various amendments and the comments from the Minister.
Clause 7 and schedule 2 would replace the current automatic right of appeal from the magistrates court to the Crown court with a much narrower permission-based system. At present, a defendant convicted in the magistrates court can appeal to the Crown court against conviction or sentence, and that appeal is heard by way of a full rehearing, usually before a Crown court judge sitting with between two and four magistrates. About 40% of conviction appeals and 47% of sentence appeals succeed.
We are now being asked to introduce a system that would instead require permission for such appeals, would usually proceed on written grounds, would be heard by a single judge and would limit the grounds on which permission is granted. The Government say that that would save about 500 Crown court sitting days. I feel that I may be running out of ways to phrase this sentence, but yet again we are seeing a significant roll-back of an important safeguard, justified on the basis of a small hypothetical gain.
We should ask ourselves whether an important protection is being weakened for anything like a proportionate return. On clause 7, I do not believe that it is. I strongly emphasise that appeals are not historical oddities or a procedural quirk; they are one of the principal safeguards against the risks inherent in summary justice. The Bar Council is very clear:
“The proposed change would remove a vital safeguard against wrongful summary conviction and excessive (or unlawful) sentences imposed by magistrates. The consequence risks adding to the burden on the criminal courts rather than reducing it.”
It goes further and says that the current right
“does not appear to be exercised frivolously or vexatiously.”
The Law Society made similar points in its written evidence: it said that the automatic appeal route is a “vital safeguard” and that in 2024 it was used in 2,487 cases, overturning magistrates’ decisions in 41% of convictions and 44% of sentences. It describes about 1,000 miscarriages of justice as being corrected through that route. That is the central fact that the Government cannot really get around. If four in 10 conviction appeals and nearly half of sentence appeals succeed, that cannot be read as evidence that the appeals process is being abused. In fact, it is the opposite: the process is demonstrably being exercised appropriately.
I am deeply concerned that if we roll back the right to appeal, we will be locking the door on an unknown number of cases in which a conviction might have been found to be erroneous, but will now not be identified as such. That is an unknown number of miscarriages of justice not put right, and an unknown number of lives ruined. I am not willing to pay that price for the gain of 500 sitting days, and I cannot bring myself to believe that Government Members are differently inclined.
We do not particularly need to speculate about what the safeguards protect against, because we can point to recent examples. In the notorious Hamit Coskun case, a defendant convicted in the magistrates court of a section 5 public order offence had his conviction quashed on appeal to the Crown court. The appeal court found that the prosecution had failed to prove essential elements of the offence and stated plainly:
“For these reasons we allow this appeal and quash…conviction”.
That is the automatic appeal route doing exactly what it is supposed to do and correcting a conviction that should never have been imposed.
Sarah Sackman
I am grateful to all the Members who have spoken for the points they have raised. Without repeating myself, they have focused on a number of areas. The first is the concern around access to justice under the new process. We had a good debate on the question of the availability of legal aid in an earlier sitting. As I have said, the Government are committed to fair and accessible routes to legal aid. There are mechanisms such as passporting for those on universal credit. An example given was that the vast majority of prisoners do not have an income. The real picture is that the vast majority of them, unless they have personal wealth, do access legal aid and therefore would be represented and supported by those who are able to give legal advice in what are, of course, high-stakes situations.
As I mentioned in the earlier debate, a hardship mechanism is available where the matter necessitates greater complexity and expenses. I recognise that, where there are litigants in person, there is more to do, and part of the implementation and delivery of these reforms will involve looking at what support can be given to those who find themselves in that position. At the moment, litigants in person in the Crown court on appeal to the Court of Appeal are given targeted information and forms that allow them to formulate grounds of appeal and that make it user-friendly and intelligible to a lay person. That sort of thing will have to be put in place if a permission stage is extended to the magistrates court.
The points that have been made are valid, but I also want to present a realistic picture of the fact that the majority will continue to access legal aid. As I said earlier, the Department has committed to review the position once we know what the final shape of the Bill looks like to ensure that we are not creating a problem in respect of access to justice. However, in the event that there are litigants in person, we also know that we need to strengthen support for them more broadly across the system, not just in the context of these reforms. That will be a vital feature of the implementation.
The second issue raised was about the trade-offs between the efficiency savings versus the introduction of a permission filter to match the sort of permission filter that already exists in the Crown court. While I recognise that the current volume of appeals, in the context of the volume of work that the magistrates undertake, is small, that will grow as the volume of work that the magistrates undertake grows.
The sorts of appeals where success is achieved are precisely the ones that will not be prevented by this appeal test, because it is a low bar; all that has to be shown is reasonable arguability, and a court can identify that straightforwardly. It is not as if, all of a sudden, a huge risk to access to justice is created. However, what is permitted is the filtering out of wholly unmeritorious appeals, the volume of which may grow as the overall volume of cases within the magistrates court expands.
Dr Mullan
I direct the Minister to the report from the Law Commission, which said that there was no significant evidence of people abusing the system or lots of unmeritorious appeals. The point is that someone has looked at this in detail, on an independent, non-party political basis, and they do not support the suggestion that there are lots of appeals going through that should not be in there.
Sarah Sackman
I will say two things to that. Obviously, that report—as is typical from the Law Commission—is non-partisan, but it predates the reforms we are proposing in the Bill, which will inevitably increase the volume of cases we are talking about. It goes back to the point that, where we have finite resources, if the permission stage filters out only a relatively small number of cases—in fact, that is how I anticipate it will work—then that is all to the good, because even those take up a disproportionate amount of Crown court resources that we can ill afford to have directed to wholly unmeritorious appeals. That is what we are getting rid of.
The other thing is that this test is focused on specific grounds, much in the same way as exists in Crown court appeals. The treatment of that appeal can be directed towards the issue that has been the cause of the appeal, rather than having the whole thing looked at again, which is currently the case.
Dr Mullan
It is about the combination of those concerns, along with the fact that there are unrepresented people. The Minister is right to say that people who have representation, if their appeals are valid, will be able to carry on, because they will continue to meet the test. The reason the Opposition support the broader approach is because there are people who do not know the detail of the law or how to make a successful application. That is why there should be a freer approach. The concern is about those two things combining.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate pointed out, not only are things being made more consequential—longer sentences and a lower likelihood of a jury trial—but at the same time it is becoming more difficult in the other direction. That feels counterintuitive and not in line with what the Government are saying about making the system fairer. On that point, the Government are moving in directly opposing directions.
Sarah Sackman
I have heard that argument, but I do not accept it. I do not think the provision makes it less fair. But I accept that there is work to be done, which does not necessarily need to be reflected in the Bill, to support litigants in person, and to examine the approach and the structure to legal aid, to narrow the gap for those who do not have access to it. That way we can reduce the number of people who have to navigate the system without legal representation.
I will not repeat the arguments that I made earlier. For those reasons, I commend the clause and schedule 2 to the Committee.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I beg to move amendment 17, in schedule 2, page 52, line 5, leave out “on payment of a fee” and insert—
“to victims of criminal offence without a fee within 14 days of a request”.
This amendment would make magistrates’ court transcripts free for victims and requires that such transcripts are provided within 14 days of a request.
I first acknowledge that the Government have made steps to improve access to court transcripts after robust negotiations in both Houses and on various Bills, most recently the Sentencing Act 2026, the Victims and Court Bill and now this Bill.
I also put on record the exemplary effort made by my hon. Friend the Member for Richmond Park (Sarah Olney), who has been campaigning to ensure that court transcripts are made available for free for victims of crime, after her constituent was quoted thousands of pounds to access the transcript of her own court case. Nobody should be priced out of seeing their own story.
Why are transcripts important? For many victims, they choose not to attend the entirety of a hearing or trial. Even if they do, there is so much to take in. Being able to process the events of the court case provides a valuable opportunity to better understand why decisions were made and hopefully enables them to move on with their lives.
The Committee had the privilege of listening to the testimony of Charlotte Meijer, alongside other victims, Jade Blue McCrossen-Nethercott and Morwenna Loughman. I would like to remind Members of a few of the things that Charlotte said. She said:
“For me, having transparency really changes things. We talk about justice and the system being closed, so if we have more recording and transcripts, it will really help people. There is something that is not in the Bill that I would love to see; I have fought for the last three years for sentencing remarks to be made free, which we did earlier this year, but I believe that is not going to extend to magistrates courts. If they are now being recorded, my belief is that they should also be free in that way.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 25, Q49.]
Charlotte spoke about her experience. She did not feel that she could listen to the trial after she had given her evidence, because it was a very small bench and the defendant’s family and friends were sat there. She did not feel like she could go and sit and listen, so she left, but she had indicated that she would like to be there for the sentencing or the hearing. However, she just got a call from her independent sexual violence adviser telling her that he had been found not guilty. She was not given the opportunity to hear that. Charlotte continued:
“For my healing, and for me to be able to move on, I just needed to understand what was said in court, so I went to ask for the transcripts, of which of course in the magistrates courts there are none.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 26, Q51.]
It is important for victims of crime and victims who see their perpetrators found not guilty to have the opportunity to process that by seeing what happened, whether they were in the room or outside it. The transcript can also be a tool for those who choose to apply to the unduly lenient sentences scheme, which I am pleased that the Government have agreed to improve significantly, after working alongside Baroness Brinton in the other place.
I recognise the concerns raised by the Government, particularly about the cost of producing transcripts and the processing time for redaction, which is all currently contracted out. I am pleased that they have agreed to a proactive trial of AI in courtrooms to improve transcripts, and to a move to record all magistrate hearings. I know that that approach has cross-party support; I have been in the Chamber with many Labour MPs and MPs of other parties who have made exactly the same arguments that I am making now, that providing free court transcripts is a key step towards transparency.
The Minister knows that we have worked collaboratively on reducing the scope in other Bills and have called on the Government to provide judicial summings-up and the route to verdict, including for those whose defendants are acquitted, because there is still a process that they need to go through. I am keen to work with the Government on this. I hope that as the Bill progresses through the House, we can continue the good work that has started on court transcripts.
Dr Mullan
I rise to speak in support of amendment 17, which stands in the name of the hon. Member for Chichester. I acknowledge the progress that we have made on the issue; it has not been as fast or as good as personally I would like, but it has absolutely been progress. The hon. Member has laid out some of the important points.
The idea that we will record these proceedings and that the transcripts will exist, but that the victim cannot have them, is obviously not sustainable. If they do not exist at all and nobody has them, that is one thing, but when they are available and some people might be accessing them—defendants, for example—it is really not reasonable that victims cannot, for all the reasons that we have discussed in relation to the Crown court. The existence of recordings will make that less of an excuse. Again, the interaction of different elements of the Bill, with longer sentences, restricted appeals and more serious cases being heard, builds an even stronger case for victims to have access to the transcripts.
The hon. Member for Chichester mentioned the unduly lenient sentence scheme. As we talked about in the context of Crown court appeals and the current use of the scheme, it is pretty hard to appeal an unduly lenient sentence if we do not even have access to the route to sentencing that the judge laid out to explain why they gave the sentence that they did. In my understanding, we have a later amendment that asks for an expansion in the use of the scheme in order for it to be meaningful. We talk about the unduly lenient sentence scheme, but people cannot access it in the magistrates court, even though we are about to put more serious cases into that court. At the minute, people are able to access the scheme when a case is heard in the Crown court. For those reasons, we enthusiastically support the hon. Member’s amendment.
Siân Berry
I will speak briefly in support of the amendment, to which I have put my name. Later, I hope to speak about the real difference between viewing evidence—seeing it given in real life, or going into the room where evidence is given—and being able to review it more dispassionately later in writing. Given that we are now producing transcripts, the amendment would be an important measure to provide them free to victims who may want to see what has been said in court, without having to attend court and see it in a more triggering, more visceral way, and without facing a financial penalty. It is important that the amendment is agreed to, along with everything else, to allow for a more compassionate way to treat victims.
Sarah Sackman
I thank the hon. Member for Chichester for tabling the amendment. As she acknowledged, there has been fruitful cross-party working on the issue. I am really pleased to see the progress that we have made, both as a matter of open justice, because timely justice must be fair and transparent, and, candidly, because technology is our friend here and is enabling progress. It must be robust and tested, because the ability of AI to enable redactions where needed has to be properly studied, which is why we have initiated an AI study. But I am pleased with the progress that we have been able to make and that, as a Parliament, we will continue to make.
Dr Mullan
I have always struggled somewhat with the question of redaction. If reporting restrictions are in place, what can be shared and so on will be controlled, but anybody can sit in a court and listen to the whole thing, unredacted. I am not quite sure that I understand the absolute focus on transcripts being redacted. If someone could have sat in that court and written down what was said, word for word, why are we worried about its being redacted? The judge is the person who can say, “You can’t report that, beyond what you’ve heard,” but, separately, why are we so much more concerned about transcripts than we would be about open court, where everyone can hear the whole thing?
Sarah Sackman
It is context specific, which is exactly why we have a study: to test the level of accuracy. Accuracy is really important; we do not want a lot of judicial time to be taken up reviewing the accuracy of transcripts before they can be put out. That would not be a good use of judge time, which should be spent running trials and getting them concluded. In some contexts, most obviously in family law, redaction is really important.
Jess Brown-Fuller
On the shadow Minister’s point, does the Minister agree that, especially for victims of serious crime, there can often be things in court transcripts that might, without giving addresses, clearly describe the location where something happened? Although the shadow Minister is right to say that anybody can attend a trial, that could be used subsequently to retraumatise somebody, because they would be aware of exactly where something happened. It could also identify someone’s address, for example if it refers to the corner shop at the end of their road: even if the address may be redacted, the detail is not always. Does the Minister agree that redaction plays a really important part in protecting vulnerable witnesses and victims?
Sarah Sackman
Yes, I do. This is why we have to get this right. As I say, we are firmly committed to improving transparency across the system and making a success of it, but those changes have to be balanced against the operational realities and the financial realities in which our court system operates.
Proposed new section 108S of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, to be inserted by schedule 2 to the Bill, will already provide the power for the rules of court to provide free transcripts to any person the Secretary of State directs. The amendment is therefore not required, as the intended effect will already be achieved under the current drafting.
We have taken significant steps to strengthen transparency, including expanding transcript provision, so that all victims who want them will be able to request free transcripts of Crown court sentencing remarks directly relevant to their case from as early as spring 2027. That is a meaningful step forward for victims. In cases of public interest, Crown court sentencing remarks are already published online, and broadcasters are able to film sentencing remarks in the Crown court with the agreement of the judge.
We are focused on driving improvement for the longer term, exploring how technology, including AI, can reduce the cost of transcript production in future and make it more widely available. That is why we are undertaking a study into the use of AI transcription in court hearings. All this work will provide this Parliament and future Parliaments with an evidence base for future decisions about how transcript provision could be expanded in a way that is operationally sustainable and delivers real-world benefits for victims, including in the magistrates court, over time, as recording capability expands.
Rebecca Paul
One thing I have increasingly noticed, particularly in high-profile cases, is that people live-tweet, setting out exactly what is going on. That is another thing to bear in mind. I very much welcome the progress that the Minister has set out, but in the world of social media it is important that people, and particularly victims, can get an accurate transcript as easily as possible, especially if something inaccurate has been tweeted out.
Sarah Sackman
The hon. Lady raises a valid point. All sorts of work needs to be undertaken about the use of social media in courtrooms, whether by juries or other participants, and where that is and is not appropriate, particularly in the context of reporting restrictions that are put in place for a good reason. But on this point, we think that the amendment is not needed. We can continue to make progress informed by an evidence base. For those reasons, although we are in real consensus on the principle of this, I urge the hon. Member for Chichester to withdraw her amendment.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I appreciate the Minister’s constructive collaboration on this issue, but as it is my job to hold the Government’s feet to the fire, I will press amendment 17 to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Yasmin Qureshi
I beg to move amendment 67, in clause 8, page 19, line 13, after “charge” insert—
“including any behaviour or communication preceding the charge that is connected to the event itself”.
Yasmin Qureshi
I will not press the amendment, which is self-explanatory, to a vote, but I ask the Committee and the Minister to think about it.
Dr Mullan
We now come to a series of considerably less contentious clauses, including clause 8, relating to the admissibility of evidence in our criminal courts. This area of the Bill deals with the sensitive and often contentious issue of sexual history evidence. Of course, we want victims of rape, sexual violence and domestic abuse to experience a justice system that treats them with dignity and protects them from irrelevant, prejudicial attacks. Complainants can be subject to questioning that is invasive and distressing, that may not be relevant or may hold little or no genuine relevance to the legal issues at hand.
Clause 8 seeks to tighten and clarify the rules governing when a complainant’s previous sexual behaviour can be introduced as evidence. The underlying principle is that a complainant should not have their credibility undermined through assumptions, stereotypes or what are often described as rape myths regarding their past.
To achieve this, the clause will replace the current model with a more rigorous admissibility framework. Under the new rules, such evidence may be admitted only if it meets one of two criteria: it must have substantial probative value in relation to a matter of substantial importance to the case as a whole, or it must constitute important explanatory evidence. This shift is intended to ensure that only genuinely relevant material is put before the court.
Furthermore, the clause explicitly requires the court to consider whether the suggested value of the evidence relies on inferences that cannot be properly drawn, to avoid the situation in which evidence is admitted with the defence knowing what inferences be drawn even if it would not be proper to do so. That is another important safeguard designed to prevent the trial process from being distorted by prejudice.
Although the Opposition support the aim of ensuring better protection for complainants, our role in Committee is to ensure that the law is not only well intentioned, but clear, workable and consistent with the right to a fair trial. I am sure the Minister agrees that there cannot be a blanket ban on the admission of this sort of evidence where it meets those tests.
I have a number of questions in relation to the need to ensure that the measure does not create any unintended procedural hurdles. To forewarn the Minister, this will be a consistent question across these clauses, but what assessment has been made to ensure that the substantial probative value threshold is sufficiently precise—not sufficiently high or low, but sufficiently precise—to meet both sides of the coin, and that it is workable in practice? How do the Government intend to monitor the application of the new framework to ensure that it delivers the intended protection for complainants? Is the Minister confident that the drafting strikes the correct balance between protecting victims from inappropriate and invasive questioning and upholding the fundamental right of a defendant to a fair trial?
The need for reform in this area has been well argued, and protecting victims from irrelevant and prejudicial questioning is a goal we all share. However, as I have said, the Committee’s task is to ensure that this clause is the right approach. That is something we should continue to explore throughout the later stages of the Bill.
Rebecca Paul
It is truly a pleasure to get to a part of the Bill on which I suspect we will agree more than we will not. I think we will all find that rather refreshing after the last few sittings.
Clause 8 seeks to introduce a new framework governing the admissibility of evidence about the previous sexual behaviour of the complainant. I very much welcome the fact that we are now having this debate and looking to address some of the issues we currently see in the justice system with respect to sexual assault crimes. Rape and sexual violence are horrendous crimes that have a lifelong impact on victims. In oral evidence, we heard this directly from some of the brave witnesses who testified, and I thank them for giving their time so generously and for speaking so honestly and courageously. What was made very clear is that they are keen to see change in how the justice system deals with these types of offences. They want to see justice done swiftly and considerately.
It takes a huge amount of bravery for an individual to report these types of crimes and to pursue their attacker through the courts, so we must do all we can to ensure that the process is quick, supportive, effective and efficient for them, while preserving the principles of natural justice. Although I may disagree with some victims on the limitation of jury trials being a way to achieve this, I share the same ambition: to speed up the process so that justice is no longer delayed and denied.
It is important to remember that most of these crimes are committed by someone the victims knows, making the process even more of an intrusive ordeal. It is deeply personal. That is why it is important to treat victims with respect and care, not to diminish their experiences or feelings, and not to make them feel like they are the ones on trial. It is incredibly important not only for justice, but for deterrence purposes, that the state sends a clear message that those guilty of such crimes will face the consequences. This is much needed at a time when violence against women and girls is rife in our communities. If the state can get this right, we should see more victims coming forward and being more willing to undergo the stress of a trial in the confidence that justice will prevail.
In June 2021, the Conservative Government published the findings of an end-to-end review of the criminal justice system response to rape, which they referred to as the rape review. What it found made for difficult reading. In the prior five years, there had been a significant decline in the number of charges and prosecutions for rape cases and, consequently, fewer convictions. One in two victims were withdrawing from rape investigations, demonstrating a big problem. The Home Secretary at the time, my right hon. Friend the Member for Witham (Priti Patel), said:
“We are not prepared to accept that rape is just ‘too difficult’ a crime to prosecute. We can, and must, do better.”
The review set out that there are an estimated 128,000 victims of rape a year, that less than 20% of victims of rape report to the police, and that only 1.6% of rapes that are reported result in someone being charged. That means that considerably fewer than one in every 100 rapes actually leads to justice for the victim. That shows the scale of the issue. One of the actions set out was that
“only evidence about the victim that is pertinent to the case should be used at court and a victim’s credibility should not be undermined by pre-conceptions or rape myths.”
In the final recommendations issued by the Law Commission in 2025, it was made clear that the use of evidence relating to the previous sexual behaviour of the complainant—for example, previous consensual sex between the defendant and complainant, or between a defendant and a third party—is highly distressing, humiliating and even traumatising, and is often irrelevant and can prejudice a case.
The admission of sexual behaviour evidence has, rightly, long been restricted through so-called “rape shield” legislation, which applies specifically to a trial where a person is charged with a sexual offence. No question can be asked about the sexual behaviour of the complainant without the leave of the court, and various gateways are considered in determining that. However, the Law Commission has criticised those gateways for being too restrictive, too broad and too complicated.
Clause 8 seeks to address some of the issues raised by the Law Commission, and has incorporated the stage 1 recommendation accordingly. It amends the conditions that must be met before a defendant can adduce sexual behaviour evidence or ask questions intended to elicit evidence of sexual behaviour in criminal proceedings. It ensures that such evidence may be admitted only if it
“has substantial probative value in relation to a matter which—
(i) is a matter in issue in the proceedings, and
(ii) is of substantial importance in...the case as a whole”.
However, clause 8 does not include stage 2 of the two-stage framework suggested by the Law Commission, which prohibits the use of sexual behaviour evidence unless its admission would not significantly prejudice the proper administration of justice. The Law Commission has raised that specific deviation in its written evidence. I ask the Minister to give her reasoning for not adopting the second stage, so that we are all clear.
It is reassuring to see the Bar Council welcoming the changes brought by clause 8, which it says
“provide appropriate safeguards for victims and for fairness of trials.”
The Law Society also supports the proposals, along with many other rape crisis and women’s organisations. Having said that, I note that a joint letter from Rape Crisis England & Wales, the Centre for Women’s Justice, Rights of Women, the End Violence Against Women Coalition and Imkaan, while welcoming much of clause 8, raises some specific concerns. It would be helpful to hear from the Minister on those points and whether she intends to make any changes.
Dr Mullan
I mentioned this point in my speech, but I will repeat that these clauses interact with the other elements of the Bill that will remove juries. Under the older jury trial system, the judge decides on things that the jury will never hear, so if something is made inadmissible, there is no question at all of it colouring the judgment. Of course, if we remove the jury in potentially more serious cases, we can have all this legislation and all these things that become technically inadmissible, but as we have talked about, we are then relying on the intellectual operation of the judge’s mind. Whether or not people think it is right for them to draw a direct conclusion, it is a matter of fact that judges are a group of people who are more distant and removed from the people we are concerned about. For example, if we are talking about women and girls, judges are more likely to be men. Those are the issues that will become more contentious as a result of the other changes in the Bill.
Rebecca Paul
My hon. Friend makes a really important point. There is a lot that is positive about the clause, but, as he rightly says, we have to think about it in the context of all the other changes. Unfortunately, we could find that the other changes unwind the good that is done by this clause. That said, it is still a positive clause, and I am pleased to see it in the Bill and to debate it today.
Lastly, I want to flag that in its evidence, Victim Not Suspect notes a need to address verification and/or the reliability of digital evidence, which it believes is relevant to the admissibility test and has not been addressed in the Bill. It would be useful to hear the Minister’s view on that matter too. Victim Not Suspect says:
“Without forensic verification, including IP address data, account ownership confirmation from platforms such as Meta, and metadata examination, there is no reliable basis for assessing authorship.”
That is a point of detail, but it could become important in certain cases, so it is worth bearing in mind. There may be scope to improve and tighten that up in the Bill during its further progress, which is why I have flagged it to the Minister.
Sarah Sackman
I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Grahame Morris) for tabling amendment 67.
The speech that the hon. Member for Reigate just made was not only helpful and constructive, as is so often the case, but really compelling. At a societal level, we have been on a journey with regard to how we approach rape and serious sexual violence. There is a recognition that for far too long not only has the court been in danger of becoming a site for re-traumatisation, but frankly the response of our entire criminal justice system has been inadequate to meet what is now widely recognised to be an epidemic of violence against women and girls in our society. Unless we send a message at the very pinnacle of the criminal justice system that that is unacceptable and we cannot tolerate it, and get serious about conviction rates, the amount of charging decisions and the number of cases that come to court, we will not deter people from this kind of behaviour. Her speech setting that out, and some of the work that was done before this Parliament to get here, was very valuable.
Let me begin by setting out the rationale for clause 8, and then turn to amendment 67. Far too many victims of rape are dropping out of the justice system because they feel that they are the ones on trial. That needs to stop. Following the Law Commission’s careful consultation, the Bill will stop rape myths and misconceptions entering our court rooms. Clauses 8 to 11 will raise the threshold so that a victim’s past sexual history or previous allegations can be used only when necessary and relevant. The reforms will also prevent the defence from insinuating that victims are lying or motivated only by money just because they claimed compensation or reported a previous offence. We will also allow patterns of domestic abuse, of any type and against any victim, to be shown to the court in cases where they indicate a propensity for further offending.
All those measures sit alongside the Government’s wider efforts to improve the victim experience of the justice system. This Government have already implemented special protections for victims’ counselling records. We have commissioned a new project led by Professor Katrin Hohl to bring Operation Soteria into the courtroom. We are rolling out trauma-informed training for not just judges but all court staff, and we have dedicated £6 million, to be invested over the next two years, to deliver independent legal advice for rape victims. Taken together, these measures are transformative.
Clause 8 reforms the framework that governs when sexual behaviour evidence about a complainant may be introduced in criminal proceedings. Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 sets out important protections intended to prevent irrelevant or prejudicial material about a complainant’s previous sexual behaviour from being placed before the court. The Law Commission’s consultation found that the current provisions are complex and difficult to navigate, and that they are not being applied consistently across cases. That speaks to the point made by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle about monitoring the new framework, but some of this has been driven by the monitoring of the existing framework, and ensuring, by codifying the test, greater consistency of practice.
As a result of that complexity and inconsistency, there are some instances where sexual behaviour evidence about a victim’s previous sexual behaviour is admitted to a court and heard by a jury, despite it having no real bearing on the case. Simplifying the law will help judges to apply a clearer and more coherent test. Clause 8 replaces the existing statutory gateways with a clearer admissibility test. It will continue to be the case that sexual behaviour evidence should not be admitted into the court unless approval is granted by the judge. Judges must consider whether the evidence has substantial probative value. The clause also requires judges to consider a series of statutory factors, including whether the evidence relies on improper inferences, rape myths or misconceptions.
These reforms clarify the law, rather than altering the threshold per se. They reflect principles that are already applied by courts but set them out in a more structured way, which will improve consistency and transparency. We will also extend the new threshold to all offence types, not only sexual offences. This is because issues relating to a victim’s past sexual behaviour may occasionally arise in other trials, and complainants in those cases should benefit from the same safeguards and be treated equally.
The purpose of the clause is not to prevent a defendant from having a fair trial or to exclude evidence that is genuinely relevant; it is to ensure that decisions about admissibility are based on proper evidential reasoning and not on prejudicial assumptions. For that reason, I commend the clause to the Committee.
Amendment 67, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Easington, seeks to exclude from the proposed admissibility threshold any sexual behaviour evidence that took place prior to the charge, but that is connected to the offence. That goes against the purpose of the clause, which as I have said is to ensure that sexual behaviour from a victim’s past is admitted only when it has clear relevance to a significant issue in the case or is important explanatory evidence. That is to prevent evidence that relies solely on perpetuating rape myths and misconceptions from being used against a victim.
The amendment, which as we have heard has support from across the combating violence against women and girls sector, would significantly broaden the amount of sexual behaviour evidence that the defence could bring to court without any consideration from the judge, including evidence that neither has substantial probative value nor is important explanatory evidence.
Sexual behaviour evidence connected to the event itself could, for example, include any previous sexual behaviour between the same two parties, even though we know that the majority of sexual violence occurs within a relationship. That would allow a huge amount of sexual behaviour evidence to be brought into court entirely unscrutinised and unfiltered by the judge. Insinuating that because a victim has previously engaged in sexual behaviour of the same kind or with the same defendant they are somehow more likely to have consented to the events on trial is a well-known misconception.
Whether or not that was the intention of my hon. Friend the Member for Easington in tabling the amendment, the effect would be to perpetuate this narrative, and we cannot accept it. I therefore urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden to withdraw the amendment.
Yasmin Qureshi
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Stephen Morgan.)
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting)
Thursday 23rd April 2026
(3 months, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Courts and Tribunals Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Notices of Amendments as at 23 April 2026 - (23 Apr 2026)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 68, in clause 9, page 20, line 12, leave out “substantial probative value” and insert “relevance”.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 69, in clause 9, page 20, line 32, at end insert—
“(8) Where a compensation claim has been made, or an attempt to make a claim has been made, disclosure of the details of that claim is relevant notwithstanding that an application for leave has not been made.”
Clause stand part.
Yasmin Qureshi
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Jardine. The amendments are fairly self-explanatory: they just ask to insert a few words. I will leave it at that.
Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)
It is a pleasure to have you guiding us through the second part of the proceedings today, Ms Jardine.
Clause 9 is part of a rolling set of clauses about the admissibility of evidence. Our task is to ensure that, while we protect complainants from being retraumatised by intrusive lines of questioning, we also maintain a legal framework that is clear, workable and consistent with the fundamental right to a fair trial.
Clause 9 specifically addresses the use of evidence regarding compensation claims made by complainants in sexual offence cases. Under current practices, complainants are sometimes discredited or have their credibility attacked simply because they have sought compensation for the harm they say they have suffered. It is entirely fair and reasonable, and a valid part of our law, for someone to pursue a criminal case and also seek financial compensation. But sometimes there is an underlying misconception that the act of seeking compensation, on its own and without any more evidence, means that the original criminal complaint may have been fabricated.
To address that, clause 9 introduces the following measures: a leave requirement, which means that evidence about a compensation claim cannot be introduced without the court’s explicit permission, and an admissibility threshold, under which a court may admit such evidence only if it has “substantial probative value” in relation to a matter of “substantial importance” to the case as a whole. The goal is to ensure that irrelevant or purely prejudicial material is excluded, while still allowing genuinely probative evidence to be heard when the interests of justice require it. The law must guard against unfair insinuations, but the admissibility test must be applied with precision and discipline. While the objective of protecting complainants from unfair discredit is welcome, there are practical and legal implications that require clarification.
As I have said to the Minister, some of my questions will be consistent throughout the clauses. Can she elaborate on how she expects the courts to interpret the terms “substantial probative value” and “substantial importance”, and outline how the Government will seek to ensure that the restriction does not prevent a defendant from exploring the full circumstances of the case?
Is the Minister confident that the current drafting provides judges and practitioners with a clear enough structure to apply the principles consistently across different courts without creating a postcode lottery? In terms of monitoring and evaluation, what work will the Government do to ensure that these new measures have the desired impact?
Clause 9 is straightforward: its premise is that a victim should not be put on trial for seeking the compensation they are entitled to under the law. Excluding irrelevant and prejudicial material can help ensure that the trial remains focused on the actual evidence of the offence. However, we must be diligent in our scrutiny to ensure that the drafting delivers those protections without compromising the procedural rigour that a fair justice system demands.
The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)
As with the previous debate, I will set out the rationale for clause 9 and then turn to the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Grahame Morris).
Clause 9 will create a high admissibility threshold for evidence about a complainant’s compensation claims in sexual offence prosecutions. That could include evidence that a victim has made a compensation claim in relation to the offence being tried, the amount of money awarded as compensation, details of the claim or the fact that compensation was refused. The Law Commission report made clear that compensation claim evidence is disproportionately requested in sexual offence cases, and that, in some instances, it is used by the defence to insinuate that a victim has fabricated an allegation for financial gain. That kind of reasoning lacks a legitimate basis and risks unfairly undermining victims.
This measure will ensure that such evidence cannot be admitted when its sole purpose is to introduce or perpetuate misconceptions about why survivors come forward. Instead, a judge will be able to admit compensation claim evidence only when it has substantial probative value to a genuinely important issue in the case. These reforms therefore strengthen protections for claimants while maintaining the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
I will respond to the questions from the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle. He fairly raises the issue of how we can assess that these tests are being applied fairly and consistently. That will obviously take time as they bed in, but, in many ways, the precise rationale behind these changes is to codify, clarify and simplify tests that already exist for the treatment of evidence in these cases and to assist our judges to use them fairly. There is no doubt that future Ministers and others with responsibility for this issue will want to know that it is working as intended. No doubt studies can be undertaken in the future. I commend clause 9 to the Committee.
I turn to amendment 68. The Law Commission’s review made clear that compensation claim evidence is disproportionately requested in sexual offences cases, as I have said. That is precisely why we have introduced the high admissibility threshold in the Bill. The amendment asks for a threshold of merely “relevance”, which is lower than the statutory threshold we propose. If we were to accept it, it would not give complainants any additional protections above the current status quo, despite the Law Commission identifying a clear issue with how this evidence is currently being requested and used. For those reasons, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment 69 focuses on the disclosure of evidence to the defence before an application is made to admit that evidence to the courtroom. However, the clause does not change the test that the prosecution must currently apply when considering whether to disclose details of a complainant’s compensation claim to the defence. Instead, it focuses on the stage after the prosecution and defence have reviewed the evidence, and asks the judge to consider whether the evidence indeed has substantial probative value and can therefore be relied on in court.
As the clause stands, the case will remain that the prosecutor must disclose to the defence any material that might be considered capable of undermining or assisting the case of the accused—that is only fair—and that includes the compensation claim evidence. The defence, in cases involving sexual offences, can then consider how they wish to bring that forward. For those reasons, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden not to press the amendment to a vote.
Yasmin Qureshi
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 10
Evidence about previous false complaints relating to sexual offences
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Sarah Sackman
Clause 10 sets out that evidence or questioning about a victim’s previous allegation of a sexual offence may be admitted only when there is a proper evidential basis for doing so. It also clarifies that certain facts do not, by themselves, mean that a previous allegation was untrue. Those include: if the victim did not report the offence to the police; where an allegation did not result in a charge or conviction; and where a victim withdraws from proceedings.
The Law Commission’s report, alongside the sector campaign “Bad Experiences, not Bad Character”, identified inconsistencies in how courts currently approach previous allegations in sexual offence trials. There have been instances where previous unproven allegations have been raised to suggest, without evidence, that a victim is unreliable by insinuating that such allegations were false. That risks reinforcing myths and misconceptions, making the trial process a traumatic one for the complainant.
This measure will maintain a defendant’s right to a fair trial. Judges will still be able to admit evidence about a complainant’s previous allegations when there is a proper evidential basis for doing so. The clause simply creates a clearer and more consistent statutory test to ensure that such decisions are based on sound evidence rather than speculation. Victims should feel confident that a previous allegation will not be unfairly used against them in the courtroom. Clause 10 strengthens the integrity of the trial process while supporting complainants and survivors to come forward and engage in the justice system.
Dr Mullan
As the Minister said, we are considering the next iteration of the question of admissibility, which addresses the evidentiary rules regarding previous false complaints in sexual offence cases. This is a sensitive area of criminal law where the pursuit of truth must be carefully balanced against the need to protect complainants from unfounded attacks on their character. The primary objective is to ensure that trials remain focused on the actual facts of the case at hand rather than being diverted by speculative allegations that a claimant has made false allegations in the past. The Law Society and Bar Council have indicated their support for this measure; they recognise that it brings clarity to the statutory framework governing bad character and credibility.
The central feature of clause 10 is the introduction of a requirement for a “proper evidential basis” before any suggestion can be made that a complainant has previously fabricated an allegation of sexual offending. Currently, there is an ever-present danger that the defendant may attempt to undermine a complainant’s honesty by pointing to past allegations that simply did not result in a conviction. That is related to the challenges that we discussed in the debate on clause 8 regarding the difficulty of complainants when it comes to seeing a case through to the end—either because of the delays in the courts, which we are all concerned about; challenges with the police; or fears or concerns they might have about how their case was treated in the courts. There could be a whole series of reasons why a complainant does not pursue an allegation through to its fullest conclusion, none of which have anything to do with the allegation being false.
Under the clause, the following factors are explicitly excluded from being used as sole proof of a false complaint: the fact that a previous allegation was denied; the fact that a previous case did not lead to a charge or result in an acquittal; any delay by the complainant in reporting the previous matter; and a complainant’s decision not to pursue or support prosecution in the past. By codifying those exclusions, the Bill aims to eliminate the use of unsupported assertions and ensure that the court does not rely on assumptions or stereotypes that are frequently used to imply that a complainant is untruthful. This is a helpful step in reforming the trial processes by ensuring that a defendant’s conduct and not the complainant’s history remains the focus of the jury.
While the principle of clause 10 is sound, its success depends on how the courts interpret and apply the proper evidential basis test. We must ensure that this framework is robust enough to shield victims from speculative and prejudicial questioning while still being fair to the defendant.
I have some questions for the Minister. Can she provide the Government’s thinking on what a proper evidential basis will look like? Do the Government envisage it requiring independent, objective proof of falsity, such as a previous conviction for perverting the course of justice, or will a lower standard suffice? Is the Minister confident that the current wording provides a road map clear enough to prevent judges from applying different standards? I want to address the gap in the data and understand how the measure will be implemented.
In relation to previous complaints, very sadly there are victims of violence against women and girls who have been affected hundreds of times. Will the Minister explain what would happen if some of these “for exclusion” criteria had occurred at an extraordinary rate? If a complainant’s decision not to pursue or support a prosecution relating to a crime that happened hundreds of times, that could in itself be relevant. It would not necessarily be so—they may have chosen hundreds of times not to support a prosecution. However, unlike other elements of the Bill, the clause is highly specific in what it is excluding, so I want to check whether there is any flexibility for the judge so that, in extremis, they can still admit the evidence, or whether there is a hard no, regardless of circumstances.
Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)
Rape Crisis has pointed out that current practice ignores the fact that women are often subjected to multiple instances of sexual violence in their lives. Survivors have told Rape Crisis that they feel disbelieved, blamed and retraumatised when they simply try to seek justice. SafeLives and End Violence Against Women are both in favour of the reforms in clause 10. It is worth pointing out that black and minoritised women are disproportionately harmed in the criminal justice system by misuse of bad character evidence.
Office for National Statistics data shows that one in two adult survivors of rape have been raped more than once. The National Police Chiefs’ Council strategic risk assessment 2023 identified that 25% of victim survivors were repeat victims of violence against women and girls. The drafting of clause 10 reflects calls from a coalition of women’s rights groups for section 100 to be amended in this way. It was drafted and supported by the Centre for Women’s Justice, and the Liberal Democrats are pleased to support it.
Sarah Sackman
I welcome the support from Members across the Committee for clause 10. A proper evidential basis is defined in the Bill as ensuring that there is material before the court that shows both that the complainant made the previous allegation and that the previous allegation was false. I do not want to elaborate on the test, and thereby in any way tie the hands of the judge hearing the evidence in the case. The tests and the clear structure set out in the Bill will enable and empower the judge to test whether there is an evidential basis for the claim and whether it has probative value and relevance to the issues at hand. The judge will then be able to take a view on whether it can be included and put to a witness.
There will always be cases where the evidence is relevant to the proceedings, both for the prosecution and for the defence. There is certainly no hard rule excluding it altogether.
Dr Mullan
Contrary to our other interactions, I think it reasonable for the Minister just to write to me. I read the Bill to mean that these types of things cannot be included at all, so could she at some point to clarify whether that is the case or whether there is some flexibility at the edges?
Sarah Sackman
I am very happy to do that. I will make that correspondence available to all members of the Committee and the wider public because it is important that, when judges and others are looking to apply the test, they understand the Government’s rationale and understanding of the provisions.
For reasons that others have articulated, this is an important clause, which recognises something that women’s groups and others have been campaigning on for an awfully long time. It can help to change the culture in our criminal justice system for victims of sexual violence.
Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
I would appreciate some clarity from the Minister on the deviation from the recommendations of the Law Commission—again, just so that we are clear. To refresh her memory, the Law Commission, in its written evidence, states that
“Clause 10 does not implement our recommendations in two key respects.
(1) It does not implement our recommendations regarding distinguishing the different categories of evidence and the thresholds that should apply where there is a previous allegation of sexual offending. Nor does it address the confusion about whether FAE should be subjected to the BCE or SBE frameworks”—
that probably means more to the Minister than to me. It goes on:
“As set out above, in our view, if the evidence of an allegation does fall within the definition of ‘sexual behaviour’, the SBE framework should apply. If not, then the bad character framework will apply, or the relevance threshold will apply if the evidence of an allegation is not said to be false or is not alleged to be misconduct.
(2) It does not address the concern that within the BCE framework there is currently no express provision for consideration of the particular risks associated with the sexual nature of previous allegations, as we recommended.”
Sarah Sackman
I will set this out in writing so that, again, the hon. Member and the public have it, but I can say, in essence, that although we agreed with the spirit of the entirety of the Law Commission’s recommendation, our view was that stage 1 of the test, which is effectively reflected in the Bill, already sets a high bar. We thought that that was sufficient in the context and that stage 2— I was asked about this previously—would not add materially to the way in which the test operates. However, I will take the opportunity to give a response to the question that the hon. Member has just asked so that she can interrogate that over time.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 11
Evidence of propensity to commit offences involving domestic abuse
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Sarah Sackman
Clause 11 will ensure that if a defendant has a previous conviction for domestic abuse—of any type and against any victim—it can be taken into account as evidence of bad character in a further domestic abuse case. That will help courts to recognise relevant patterns of behaviour that might otherwise fall outside narrow offence category boundaries. We know that domestic abuse can take many forms and that patterns of domestic abuse do not always map neatly on to a single type of offending. Recognising those patterns can help juries to understand the context of the offence.
The clause therefore allows previous domestic abuse-related convictions to be admitted as propensity evidence when the statutory test is met. That will include cases in which the previous conviction involved coercive or controlling behaviour, and the current allegation involves a different form of domestic abuse, such as sexual assault against an intimate partner. Our aim is to ensure that courts can consider relevant patterns of abusive behaviour when they provide important context on the issues in the case while maintaining the full range of safeguards that protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial.
Clause 11 completes the package of evidential reforms set out in clauses 8 to 11. Taken together, the measures provide greater clarity, consistency and coherence to the rules governing sensitive evidence. They help to improve the experience of victims—particularly victims of sexual offences—in the criminal justice system while ensuring that trials remain fair and balanced. I urge that clause 11 stand part of the Bill.
Dr Mullan
We now go to the other end of the spectrum and look at this from a different direction by addressing how courts handle evidence of a defendant’s propensity to commit domestic abuse. The provision acknowledges that domestic violence is rarely a series of isolated, vacuum-sealed events; rather, it is often characterised by established patterns of coercion, control and escalation over time, repeated across relationships, although potentially in different ways. When thinking about the precedent in our system, it brings to mind Clare’s law, which we brought in for the very purpose of allowing members of the public to know someone’s domestic abuse history, because we recognised just how common it was for abusers to move from victim to victim.
The primary function of clause 11 is to clarify the rules regarding admissibility in respect of past domestic abuse offending. It establishes that a defendant’s previous conduct can be used to demonstrate an inclination to commit similar crimes, even in instances when the earlier and later offending take different forms. That ensures that the law recognises the underlying reality of abusive relationships, where the specific method of harm may change while the dynamic of power and intimidation remains constant. As we have discussed previously, the prevalence of such behaviour is so great that we have to do whatever we can to support victims.
The Bar Council has noted that while much of such material might already be admissible under existing bad character provisions, clause 11 provides statutory clarity for judges. Of course, the court’s duty is to ensure that a jury does not convict a defendant for a specific charge simply because they have behaved poorly in the past. The evidence has to remain relevant and fair, and to be assessed within the unique context of the case. Nothing about introducing that information stops that from happening, as the jury or judge can weigh it up as they see fit in that regard.
How do the Government intend to ensure that propensity is defined narrowly enough to prevent juries from using a defendant’s past as a shortcut to a verdict? Given the Bar Council’s view that that might already be covered, what did the Minister see as the key gaps between how the law operates at present? What are the direct benefits of clause 11 beyond how things currently operate?
I am personally more hard-line when it comes to bad character admissions and previous convictions. I think the whole system should be much more flexible. We have a tough, rigorous way of finding out if someone is guilty, and we know that previous offending is a massive indicator, across many offence fields, of a propensity to offend again. It is part of natural justice. We all understand that if someone has been found to have done the wrong thing on other occasions, it is quite natural and reasonable for people to give that considerable weight when determining that person’s credibility and reliability, and if they can be trusted.
A lot of court cases come down to the likelihood of something happening—how probable it was that someone did something. The fact that someone has done something similar before is clearly going to weigh heavily on any reasonable opinion former’s mind when deciding whether that person has done the same thing again. We support the clause, which has great merit.
Sarah Sackman
I will be brief. What we have tried to do with the definition of propensity—we think this is the benefit—is to provide clarity and a structured process for judges. Of course, it is important to remember that a trial is not a likelihood test. As we all know, it is a test of the criminal standard of proof beyond all reasonable doubt, whether it is a judge-made decision or a jury directed by a judge. It is really important, even in the context where bad character evidence is admitted—the issue of propensity is there—that juries are reminded that they have to be absolutely sure that the offence did happen.
A decision cannot be based on the fact that a person did something before and therefore probably did it again. The jury has to be absolutely sure. None of that changes. That standard of criminal proof does not change as a result of clause 11. We hope that, in line with the Law Commission’s recommendations, the measure provides a clear, structured and, above all, consistent series of tests so that, irrespective of where a trial happens in the country, the same approach is taken and there is a shared understanding among judges, juries and practitioners as to what the test is.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Use of screens etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Sarah Sackman
We now come to a series of clauses that deal with what happens during the course of trials and the use of special measures—the architecture, so to speak, of what takes place to ensure fairness for all participants. Clause 12 makes an important clarification to the operation of screens in our criminal courts. At present, section 23 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 allows for screens to prevent a witness from seeing the defendant. However, it does not make it explicit that the defendant should be unable to see the witness. In practice, that is almost always how screens are used. When I visited Harrow court, which I am pleased to say recently reopened after three years, I saw that in operation. However, the Law Commission has highlighted that the absence of clear statutory wording has, at times, led to confusion among complainants and practitioners as to who is entitled to what.
Dr Mullan
Clause 12 addresses an important aspect of protection: the use of screens in the courtroom. We must start from the position that special measures are not a luxury or optional administrative add-on; they are often essential to ensuring that the justice system remains capable of hearing evidence properly. We want to enable people to give evidence in the proper way, and victims and vulnerable witnesses must be able to give their best evidence—we always want people to be able to give their best evidence in court—without avoidable distress, intimidation or re-traumatisation.
For many, the prospect of being in the same physical space as the person who harmed them is a primary barrier to their participating in the justice system at all. Clause 12 will strengthen and clarify current provisions by creating a clearer statutory footing for the use of screens. Specifically, when a witness is providing testimony via live link or through a pre-recorded cross-examination, the clause will require the court to consider whether a screen should be provided. Crucially, the clause clarifies that that protection should operate in both directions: not just preventing the witness from seeing the accused, but shielding the witness from the accused’s gaze as well. That increased clarity is intended to support consistency in practice across the country.
For many victims, particularly those of sexual violence or domestic abuse, the physical presence of the accused is a source of profound distress that can affect their memory and the clarity of their evidence. The current application of these measures can be inconsistent, leading to what practitioners describe as a postcode lottery. By establishing a presumption in favour of screens unless it would be contrary to the interests of justice, the law recognises the practical reality. However, we must ensure that that presumption is not merely a tick-box exercise, but achieved effectively through things such as either-way screens.
We must recognise, as we have at several points in Committee, the challenge presented by the fabric of some of our courtroom buildings and their facilities. Evidence provided to the Committee—this is also highlighted by Sir Brian Leveson—suggests that malfunctioning equipment and poor infrastructure continue to create problems, specifically in relation to using special measures. A stronger use of screens can be mandated but, if the physical layout of the court and its facilities are insufficient, that will hamper the clause’s benefit.
What survey or review have the Government undertaken, or do they plan to undertake, to ensure that there are no physical barriers to the use of screens in this way? I suspect that, on a physical basis, it is easier to have screens just in one direction rather than two, and it probably involves different equipment and facilities. It would be good to get the Minister’s view on any barriers that might practically limit the intention of this measure.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Clause 12 stipulates that when a direction allows evidence by live link or pre-recorded cross examination, screens must also be provided unless that would be contrary to the interests of justice, such as due to preventing the adequate testing of evidence. It also clarifies under a special measure direction that a screen may be used to prevent either the witness from seeing the accused or the accused from seeing the witness. The Liberal Democrats welcome the clause.
Vulnerable and intimidated witnesses are entitled to a number of additional measures to protect them from defendants. When the Law Commission conducted a review of these measures in relation to sexual offences cases, it came up with a number of recommendations, although the Government have chosen not to take forward some of them, such as introducing automatic entitlement for sexual offence complainants or providing complainants with independent legal advice on their entitlement to special measures.
It would be helpful to understand from the Minister why the Government chose not to introduce those recommendations, which would have turned special measures into almost standard measures. The blanket introduction of these measures would save administrative time and cost. I recognise that this is anecdotal, but the judges I have spoken to have said that if they get a request for special measures, they never refuse it.
Surely by reversing the onus and introducing the special measures as standard, we would still provide an opportunity for victims to opt out of those measures if they have a particular desire to see, or to look into the eyes of, their defendant, but if they did not wish to do so, they would be, at the very minimum, provided with protections. If this was the standard approach, it would also give more women—this affects mostly women—the confidence to come forward knowing that their court experience is going to protect them.
On a recent visit to Chichester Crown court—I thank the Minister for committing to reopening that court fully—His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service talked about creating videos for those who are coming to give evidence, with the opportunity to have a virtual walk-through of the court. If vulnerable witnesses and victims were able to watch a walk-through to see exactly what measures could be put in place as standard to protect them, I imagine that would provide much more reassurance than saying, “This is what you are seeing, but there are also additional special measures that you can apply for.”
Introducing these measures as standard would also take away the stigma of being associated as a vulnerable witness. We talk a lot about victims. Some victims do not want to be described as victims; they want to be described as survivors. We talk about vulnerability. If we had these measures as standard, we would be acknowledging that vulnerability is expected, but that there is no stigma around it and that the courts have mitigated it, without being asked to do so.
The measures are backed by various victims groups, such as Women Against Rape, and by the Victims’ Commissioner. It would be helpful if the Minister could highlight whether the Government plan to go further and make these special measures standard.
Sarah Sackman
I thank the hon. Member for Chichester for the points she raised. In many respects, they are well made, and they consider people’s choice architecture—for want of a better phrase—their understanding of what they might be entitled to request, and whether we should default to providing all the special measures or maintaining, as we say we should, a tailored case-by-case assessment of the needs of the witness or the complainant. It is a tricky one.
We want to make sure that, where there is a proper basis for it, special measures can be provided to those who need them and where the judge agrees that they are needed. The hon. Member is right that in the vast majority of cases, the request for special measures or to give evidence by video link is approved— it is almost always approved—but there might be cases when, for reasons of trial fairness, that is not the case. The tailored approach is one that we regard as proportionate.
This also relates to the points made by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle about court layout and some of the physical constraints that exist within some of our Crown courts. We do not want a postcode lottery. We want consistency, which is what so much of the Bill is designed to achieve. However, we also have to acknowledge that in some of our Crown court centres, the physical constraints are real. That does not necessarily relate to screens, but it might relate to the entrance and exit. For example, there are limitations on the ideal situation of a complainant being able to avoid having to pass a defendant, which might be undesirable for all sorts of reasons. There are some courtrooms in which that simply is not possible without huge capital investment to change the physical structure.
Hon. Members have raised legitimate points and I understand the thinking behind them. We think that in the circumstances, and given that victims have a wide range of needs, a tailored approach, based on a detailed needs assessment, is the most effective approach, but we will continue to consider the situation.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13
Witness to be accompanied while giving evidence
Yasmin Qureshi
I beg to move amendment 70, in clause 13, page 27, line 37, at end insert—
“(7) Disclosure of the details of any connection between the independent supporter and the complainant is required prior to seeking the court’s agreement of the independent supporter.”
This proposed addition is simple. The clause centres on witnesses being accompanied while giving evidence. Essentially, it states that if somebody wants another person to accompany them, they should be able to do so if the court is satisfied that they meet the various criteria. The amendment proposes a seventh criterion requiring that the independent supporter must not be a connected person—that is, a friend, a member of the family or a relative. That is for an important reason: we know that in offences involving domestic abuse or sexual offences, the victims and witnesses can be traumatised, distressed and vulnerable, in which case they can be suggestible when it comes to comments, ideas or suggestions about something that they might not even have seen. That is why the person accompanying the witness should be independent.
I shall illustrate that argument by explaining what happens to children’s evidence when taken as evidence in chief. Often, a specialist lawyer, police officer or even psychologist is present when children give evidence. Sometimes, photographs, diagrams or pictures are shown to the children so as to elicit the best evidence out of them. Whenever such a trial takes place, the notes that a psychologist or other trained person has taken, and the pictures they may have shown to the child to get the best evidence, are adduced in court. There is always a suggestion that the person carrying out the interview may deliberately or inadvertently have put an idea in the head of the child, who may end up saying something that did not actually happen or emphasise that something was stronger than it was.
This small amendment says that this approach should apply to adults as well. It says that the connected person must not be family, a friend or a relative. Often, the first person a victim will talk to will be a friend or family member. I do not think that that would be very good. At the end of the day, we want to make sure that convictions are safe and that the best evidence comes through.
Dr Mullan
I rise to speak in connection to clause 13 and amendment 70, which are about how witnesses are supported while navigating the potentially stressful environment of the courtroom. Giving evidence in criminal proceedings is inevitably going to be stressful for many people. For victims of crime, including but not limited to victims of sexual violence and domestic abuse—any crime, really—the presence of an individual to support them in the process can mean the difference between successfully completing their testimony and being overwhelmed by the process.
Sarah Sackman
First, I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Easington for tabling the amendment and my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden for moving it today. While I recognise the concern that the amendment is seeking to address—specifically, the transparency about the relationship between complainants and independent supporters—the Government do not consider it necessary to include an express requirement in the legislation to disclose that relationship at the point of application.
Witness supporters are already an important and well-established feature of court proceedings. The court environment can be daunting for many vulnerable and intimidated witnesses. The presence of a trained professional supporter, such as an independent domestic violence adviser or an independent sexual violence adviser—an IDVA or ISVA—can play an important role in helping them feel more at ease while giving evidence.
Clause 13 places that established practice on a clear statutory footing by recognising the use of a professional supporter as a distinct special measure, alongside a presumption that it may be used by a vulnerable, intimidated witness where the supporter is a professional. In practice, details of the proposed independent supporter, including their relationship to the witness, are disclosed to the court before permission is granted to them to accompany the witness. A professional supporter must have no connection to the case in question, and cannot themselves be a witness. That approach will continue unchanged when the use of a supporter is formalised as a special measure.
As clause 13 makes clear, the court must also be satisfied that a supporter’s presence is not contrary to the interests of justice—an assessment that includes consideration of any potential adverse effects that the supporter may have on the fairness of the proceedings. Against that backdrop, we do not think that the amendment would add any substantive value or additional protection, given that all that information already forms part of a court’s decision-making process as to whether to permit the witness supporter. The term “independent supporter” is defined in the Bill, and the courts retain full discretion as to who can act in that capacity based on the factors that I have alluded to and while maintaining trial fairness. For those reasons, we do not think that the amendment is additive. I urge the hon. Member to seek to withdraw the amendment.
Yasmin Qureshi
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Sarah Sackman
Clause 13 introduces an important new special measure, which will make a real and tangible difference to vulnerable or intimidated witnesses who come before our courts. It enables them to be accompanied by a supporter when giving evidence to reassure them and help them to give their best evidence. Crucially, it creates a rebuttable presumption that a trained professional such as an IDVA or ISVA will be allowed to accompany the witness. These specialists play a vital role in helping witnesses navigate an often stressful and emotionally demanding experience. A presumption helps ensure that this is consistently accessible across our criminal courts.
While section 24 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 already permits witnesses giving evidence via a live link to be supported in this way, and the Criminal Procedure Rules 2025 create a presumption in favour of support from IDVAs or ISVAs, the Law Commission has highlighted that practice on the ground remains inconsistent.
Despite existing provisions, some witnesses who would benefit from the presence of a supporter are still unable to access that assistance. Such inconsistency both undermines witnesses’ confidence and risks adversely affecting the quality of the evidence that they can provide. By improving access to supporters, clause 13 improves the experience of vulnerable complainants and witnesses, while helping to maximise the quality of the evidence that they can give. I commend clause 13 to the Committee.
Dr Mullan
I ask the Minister to think about everything I said about the previous amendment. The Minister mentioned that there is a definition in the Bill. However, “definition” is open to interpretation. The Bill just says:
“an individual who performs a role which involves the provision of support to witnesses in criminal proceedings or victims of criminal conduct, where the support relates to those proceedings or that conduct.”
It seems to me that that could be anyone who says that they perform a role in supporting a witness. It is extremely open. The Minister rightly pointed to two specific roles that are well recognised and understood. However, the Bill does not say that—it does not say “IDVAs or ISVAs”; it just says an “independent supporter”. Questions about the previous amendment also apply here: what in the definition means that it could not be someone’s family member? There is not any kind of specification.
My understanding was that there might be further definition in secondary legislation. Could the Minister clarify whether there will be an attempt at further definition, either in secondary legislation or in criminal practice rules? I do not think that the definition is suitably robust at present. The Minister is not using it—because when the Minister is talking, she refers to the two very well-established and recognised roles that we all understand. However, that is not what is happening in the clause.
We are minded not to oppose the clause, but it appears to suggest that anyone can be an independent supporter. It does not even say that the court must test that; it suggests that if someone says they are an independent supporter, they are in. That cannot be what the Government intended. To avoid an unnecessary vote, perhaps the Minister could offer further clarification, unless I have misunderstood and there will be secondary legislation that provides further definition.
Sarah Sackman
I seek to assist the Committee, as I do not want us to get this wrong. The purpose of the definition is to exclude non-professional supporters or those who do not habitually perform a role in supporting witnesses. That is the intent. The fact that the court must also be satisfied that the support is not contrary to the interests of justice is an important protection in relation to who can and cannot perform the function. I do not think that necessarily excludes the fact that one could, in theory, have a relative perform it. I am, again, happy to provide that clarification so that there is no issue with the Committee not having the full information.
Dr Mullan
I wonder whether the Minister might reflect on that. I think there would be good reason to say that the supporter should not really be a family member. That is not how the system has been operating at present; it has been operating with professionals. I take the Minister’s point about the preceding clause, but the Government should perhaps be clearer about what they expect. I would not be neutral about whether a family member should sit with someone in that situation.
Sarah Sackman
I understand the point. In the circumstances, I would prefer to take officials’ advice and check that the legislation is doing what it intends to—providing a consistent practice of professional witness support, while maintaining trial fairness. I do not want to misdirect myself or the Committee.
Jess Brown-Fuller
My understanding of the legislation is that an independent supporter would be a recognised professional, but that does not exclude someone who may have a relationship outside their recognised profession with the person they are independently supporting. I wonder if clarification could be introduced—similar to what I think amendment 70 tried to achieve—to ensure that any relationship outside the professional role would have to be declared in front of the court. That would make it clear that, ideally, the only relationship between a witness and the independent supporter should be a professional one, and that any other one would have to be declared.
Sarah Sackman
I think all of that is right, but I would prefer to take the matter back to the Department and check that we have a common understanding. I do not want to do this on the hoof if I do not have the full information before me. I think that is the intention—the presumption is that it applies only to professional supporters. I suppose it is ultimately up to the court if a family member sits with the person, if that is deemed necessary in the interests of justice.
Sarah Sackman
I am more than happy to accede to that. This has been useful, and I am very happy to provide that clarity.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 14
Exclusion of persons from court
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Sarah Sackman
This clause represents an important and balanced step forward in strengthening the support available to intimidated complainants in our justice system. It will make it easier for courts to exclude individuals who may be causing distress or intimidation from the public gallery, while fully preserving the principle of open justice.
Section 25 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 already permits the exclusion of the public from the courtroom while a complainant gives evidence, yet the Law Commission has observed that the power is rarely used in practice. Concerns about its perceived impact on open justice, particularly the requirement that only a single member of the press can remain, means that courts are often reluctant to apply it. At the same time, we know that individuals present in the gallery, including supporters of the defendant, can on occasion create an atmosphere that is distressing for intimidated witnesses. My hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft (Jess Asato), who has huge amounts of experience in this area, told me of an egregious example affecting a constituent of hers who was giving evidence while friends of the defendant were creating an intimidatory atmosphere in the gallery, yet nothing was done about it.
The clause offers a practical and proportionate solution to that sort of situation. It will broaden the categories of individuals who may remain in the courtroom when the public gallery is cleared, allowing accredited members of the press, approved academic researchers and one supporter for the complainant to stay. It directly addresses concerns about transparency and open justice by allowing those reporting or researching the case in the public interest to remain. That is not a novel approach: comparable provisions already operate in Scotland and Northern Ireland, where courts can restrict public attendance while members of the press and a limited number of individuals remain in their place. Their experience demonstrates that it is entirely possible to restrict public access during particularly sensitive evidence without compromising the integrity or openness of the proceedings.
The clause will encourage courts to take a more flexible approach, excluding only those likely to intimidate the witness, where it is not necessary to clear the public gallery entirely. This will increase the likelihood that the measure can be used where appropriate, while maintaining open justice. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Dr Mullan
As the Minister points out, this clause interacts with the issue of transparency in the justice system. I recognise that the Minister thinks it attempts to strike a balance by clarifying the categories of people who may not be excluded, such as representatives of news organisations, witness supporters and approved researchers. The aim is to ensure that, while a witness may be shielded, the trial remains professional and legitimate.
However, we do not want the measure to have the unintended effect of narrowing public scrutiny, including by ordinary members of the public, who the Minister will accept are not necessarily there to intimidate or have any impact on the witness—they might not be even connected to the case. It should be assumed that people in this country can just turn up to a courthouse and watch a case, as they currently can, and as I have in the past.
Sad to say, but we have seen recently that practical transparency can be very difficult to achieve. We had the whole debacle with the Courtsdesk archive, which hugely assisted transparency in our legal system. The Opposition certainly do not feel that the Government’s initial response to that demonstrated that they were as committed to transparency in the justice system as they should be. It was only the effort of Opposition Members and media campaigners that secured a U-turn. We must ensure that these powers are used only when the interests of witnesses genuinely outweigh the public’s right to witness proceedings—although I note that the clause does not create an automatic entitlement for persons to be excluded.
We have discussed the availability of transcripts, and it would not be unreasonable to link the two issues. If people are excluded, I do not see why that could not become a trigger for making available those elements of the evidence that the public are for that reason unable to hear at first hand. I do not think the Minister is suggesting that the people in the gallery cannot hear the evidence; it is just about the impact on the witness of them being there. If that is happening and we accept that that is a break from the norm, it would be reasonable to say that transcripts of the elements that were not open to public scrutiny should be more widely available.
If the powers are enacted, it is important that the Government monitor their use going forward. They should have a clear position that they would be open to reforming or even removing the powers if they think they are not operating as intended.
We will not oppose these measures, but the Lords will want to look at them and ensure that we are excluding as little as possible. I accept the Minister’s point that, at the minute, nobody is getting excluded because of worries about how the provision operates, but that does not mean that we should just accept a new way of doing things when it could be better refined. If the Minister could clarify the point about transcript availability, it would demonstrate some good faith by ensuring that people can see for sure that we are not attempting to stop people from hearing what is going on in a courtroom.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I seek clarification from the Minister about the reference in clause 14 to
“representatives of news gathering or reporting organisations”.
Earlier, the hon. Member for Reigate raised the practice of live tweeting from court proceedings. I would appreciate it if the Minister set out her understanding of who would come under “a representative of a news gathering or reporting organisation”. With the rise of social media, and with more people getting their news online on things like X, we can have lots of news organisations with self-professed journalists or online commentators who are acting in the interests of providing online journalism, but who do not hold any form of accreditation or any official role as a journalist. It would be helpful if the Minister could explain who legitimate members of the press will be under this measure. Will they have to be recognised journalists? Will they have to have a press pass? Or can they say, “I’m here, in the interest of journalism, to live tweet the events because I am a self-employed journalist”?
Sarah Sackman
I am grateful for those questions and comments, because, through clause 14, we are seeking to strike a balance. At the moment, in the instance that I gave an example of, the balance is all one way. Of course we want open justice, but that is not the same, as can be the case, as having essentially a mob of people in the gallery whose mere presence is almost certainly intended to intimidate witnesses. Empowering the court to exercise discretion, while retaining the presence of at least one person connected to the defendant and protecting those representatives of newsgathering or reporting organisations, strikes the right balance.
On the question about everyone being a citizen journalist now, subsection (4)(b) refers to
“representatives of news gathering or reporting organisations”.
It refers to those who carry accreditation because they are a member of an organisation, not those who are self-appointed. I am happy to come back to the hon. Member for Chichester with clarification about that. When we talk about reporting restrictions and how they operate, they generally operate in connection with qualified journalists who are subject to the codes of conduct that go with that job. Indeed, that is something that arose with some of the issues in relation to Courtsdesk, because those who make use of that facility and that information, as opposed to the material that the public are entitled to see, are investigative journalists. I am happy to come back to the hon. Member with clarification, and if we think the legislation needs tightening up for the reasons she has outlined, then that can be looked at in the future.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 15
Editing of video recorded cross-examination and re-examination
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 28—Use of video recorded evidence in chief—
“(1) Section 27 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).
(2) After subsection (1), insert—
‘(1A) Evidence in chief admitted in accordance with subsection (1) may include transcription of any video recording, provided that such a transcript is not admitted in place of the recording.’
(3) After subsection (5) insert—
‘(5A) Where a witness is called in accordance with section (5)(a), the court must make arrangements so that the witness is not, in the course of proceedings, obliged to watch the video recording of the evidence in chief.’
(4) Section 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is amended as in accordance with subsections (5).
(5) After subsection (2) insert—
‘(2A) Where the direction provides for any cross-examination or re-examination of the witness, or reexamination, any questions that the accused or legal representatives representing to the accused intend to put during cross-examination or re-examination must be provided to the witness—
(a) within six months of the date on which evidence video recorded evidence in chief is submitted to the court under section 27, or
(b) 14 days before a cross-examination is due to take place under this section, whichever is the sooner.’”
This new clause amends the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 to prevent vulnerable witnesses from repeatedly watching their video testimony during court proceedings, and to require those witnesses to be provided with cross-examination questions in good time ahead of any cross-examination.
Sarah Sackman
Let me start by thanking the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for tabling new clause 28. But before I come to that, I will set out the rationale for clause 15.
The clause clarifies the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 by confirming that courts have a statutory power to direct the editing of pre-recorded cross-examination recordings under section 28 of the 1999 Act when material is inadmissible or where including it would not be in the interests of justice. That clarification matters because section 28 recordings capture the natural flow of their recollection under the pressure of cross-examination. Inevitably, that can sometimes include long periods of silence where the witness needs a break or material turns out to be inadmissible or prejudicial to the fairness of the trial.
Without an explicit power enabling the court to direct appropriate edits, there is a risk that either the edits are not made—potentially compromising the integrity of the trial and wasting court time—or that the edits made become a point of contention, requiring additional hearings or appeals to resolve. Additionally, in the event of a retrial, the pre-recorded evidence may require editing to ensure that it covers only the charges for which a retrial has been ordered.
Although the current criminal procedure rules already allow for editing of section 28 recordings, the Law Commission has highlighted that the absence of a specific statutory provision has created uncertainty and, once again, inconsistency in practice. The clause addresses that by placing the power on a firm statutory footing, ensuring that practitioners have a clear and consistent understanding of the power of the courts in this respect.
It is important to emphasise that the clause does not introduce a new process, nor does it expand judicial powers; it formalises the careful, limited editing that already occurs to ensure trial fairness and integrity. Witnesses can be assured that the substance of their evidence will remain intact. Only material that is legally inadmissible or wholly irrelevant to the issues in the case will be removed. I commend the clause to the Committee.
I will now turn to new clause 28, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. Before I come to the substance of the new clause, I want to begin by recognising the immense courage it takes for the vulnerable and intimidated witnesses we are talking about to come forward in the first place and give evidence. For many, recounting their experience is traumatic enough. Being asked to relive it by watching back their video-recorded police interview—known as their achieving best evidence interview—can be a great deal more challenging. It can bring distressing experiences flooding back. However, we must be careful not to reach for legislative change where it is not necessary or helpful. Prosecutors may suggest that a witness watches their ABE interview to refresh their memory before cross-examination, but there is no legal obligation to do so. For some, watching the recording is manageable; for others, it is not, and the law already accommodates that reality.
Where a witness does not wish to watch the recording, a written transcript can be provided for them to read instead. For some, that is a more accessible way of engaging with the material. Prosecutors make decisions about how and when memory refreshing should take place on a case-by-case basis, taking into account practical considerations, such as the length of the transcript and the witness’s ability to read and process it. However, I recognise that the achieving best evidence guidance for interviewers does not explicitly reference that practice. That omission will be addressed. The Ministry of Justice owns that guidance and will ensure that clarification is included in the next revision. Any future clarification to the ABE guidance will also be reflected in the relevant Crown Prosecution Service guidance and communicated to all prosecutors.
Let me now turn to the proposal to introduce a time limit for the defence to submit questions to the witness. I must be clear: cross-examination questions cannot, under any circumstances, be shared with witnesses before they give evidence. However well intentioned the proposal may be, it risks undermining the very integrity of the process it seeks to improve. Exposing a witness to questions in advance may influence, whether consciously or unconsciously, how they respond. Beyond that, it risks undermining the defendant’s right to a fair trial. If there is any suggestion that a witness’s evidence has been prepared or influenced in advance, the credibility of the whole process is jeopardised.
There are also practical implications to consider. Requiring counsel to finalise all cross-examination questions within six months of the ABE being submitted to court, or 14 days before cross-examination—whichever is soonest—would be unworkable in many cases. Defence questions evolve as new material is disclosed. Such a process would undermine the fairness of proceedings and the effectiveness of case preparations. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member not to press new clause 28 to a Division.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
It is great to see you back in the Chair to help us to make our way through the Bill, Ms Jardine. New clause 28 is a probing amendment, and I shall not press it to a Division when the time comes. To give the context for why I have tabled the new clause, I will lay out the experience faced by a young child—I cannot give many details of the case, as the Committee will appreciate.
This young child was below school age when they became the victim of and witness to abuse. They gave clear evidence on video at the time that it had happened, and while the case was investigated and awaiting trial in court, they continued with their childhood. Their mother helped them to move on from the abuse, and she says that the memory of what happened not being constantly brought back was a key part of their recovery. However, during the court case some years later, they were made to rewatch the video. By hearing their younger self talk about the abuse, they were, essentially, properly traumatised for the first time, as they for the first time properly understood, with a real, more mature understanding, what had happened to them in detail.
That case made me realise that the process of being cross-examined and watching back original, video-based evidence in chief, even just while the prosecution team refreshes their memory of their evidence, can do victims real harm. Although I can see why it may be necessary to cross-examine a witness on what happened, based either on their memory or facts stated in the evidence, I feel strongly that putting them through the additional trauma of rewatching it themselves is not necessary and should certainly not be routine, and that that should be in the law or guidance.
My new clause would amend sections 27 and 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, which are intended to relate to special measures and directions. It would ask that witnesses not be obliged to watch video recordings of their earlier evidence, and would allow transcripts, as a potentially less traumatic alternative, to be submitted for cross-examination. It would also ask for notice of questions for cross-examination to be provided in good time. Although I understand that there is no legal obligation for the videos to be rewatched, I know that it is happening even when concerns have been expressed. I want to make sure that it is clearer in the law or relevant guidance that no witness or victim is obliged, against their will, to relive the crimes committed against them.
As I said, the new clause is probing. I am grateful that the Minister has looked into the issue, and has today committed to updating the guidance. I have corresponded with her departmental colleagues who are leading a review of the victims code, passing to them more details than I can mention here on that particular case and some ideas for how relevant guidance around special measures could be amended, as that could take the place of changes in primary legislation. I hope that my bringing this point to the Committee is constructive, and I thank the Minister for her attention.
Dr Mullan
As we have heard, clause 15 clarifies the use of pre-recorded evidence for cross-examination and re-examination, which is often referred to as section 28 evidence. Our courts frequently rely on recorded testimony to spare witnesses the trauma of a live trial, so the rules governing the editing and presentation of that evidence must be clear and robust.
Clause 15 provides clarification on the circumstances under which a video recording may be edited before it is admitted as evidence in a trial. Editing may be required if certain procedural requirements were not met during the recording being taken, or if specific portions of the material are deemed inadmissible or contrary to the interests of justice. The clause requires the court to perform a delicate balancing act, weighing any potential prejudice towards the accused against the desirability of presenting the whole, or substantially the whole, recorded examination.
A clearer statutory footing for editing is welcome, but it must be applied with consistency and transparency. If recorded evidence is to protect witnesses properly, the rules for its use must be as rigorous as those for live evidence. We must acknowledge, as we discussed earlier in respect of screens, the highly variable state of court technology. In my time on the Justice Committee, I visited courts and heard that they sometimes did not have the screens necessary to show evidence. There is a huge difference between a poky little TV of low granularity and a proper screen for showing video evidence to the jury.
Sir Brian Leveson’s review and others have highlighted that malfunctioning or substandard equipment can derail trials or create grounds for appeal when it comes to the use of pre-recorded evidence. Without reliable hardware and skilled technical staff—I also heard about the challenge when something goes wrong and there is no one available to fix it—the legal clarification in clause 15 will remain theoretical rather than practical.
My final point is about the guidelines, which the Minister talked about. We must ensure that they are sufficiently detailed, rigorous and standardised, so that, notwithstanding the further clarifications in the clause, they are suitably consistent in their application.
What are the Government’s current plans to address the technological challenge on the court estate in relation to section 28 recordings? What steps will be taken to ensure that all parties have time to review and potentially challenge edited versions of recordings before they are played to a jury? The ability to challenge is vital to ensuring consistency and fairness.
Sarah Sackman
On the hon. Gentleman’s last point about the reliability of the kit in courtrooms, that is critical not just for evidence via video. We have an ambition for greater use of video right across our criminal justice system, not just for vulnerable witnesses but in other ways that have been touched on. We have talked a lot about prisoner transportation being a challenge for the system; one way to address that is by having less demand for it, unless it is needed in the interests of justice and fairness.
The increased use of video could be of real benefit but, of course, it has to be reliable. That is why the Government’s capital investment in increasing the budget for His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service—I saw some of that equipment in action in Harrow court—will make such a difference.
When we are talking about vulnerable witnesses, who are given the option of section 28, the quality of their evidence can be impacted if it is inconsistent or glitchy, or if the way it appears in a courtroom is somehow distorted because it is too big or too small, or whatever. All those things will be important, which is why the significant investment agreed with the judiciary through the concordat process over the next three years will make such a difference, and why all the court transformation and reform measures are being accompanied by significant inward investment, as announced by the Deputy Prime Minister.
I should say that HMCTS, the performance of which I routinely review with the Deputy Prime Minister, conducts regular audits of facilities and brings that to our attention so that we can see where the roll-out is happening, which courts are lacking facilities and which need to be prioritised for investment.
Sarah Sackman
I am very happy to provide that information, to the extent that we hold it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16
Application of special measures to victim personal statements etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Sarah Sackman
The clause makes it clear in legislation that special measures are available when a victim chooses to read their victim impact statement aloud at sentencing. This is a moment of real significance for many victims—the point at which they are able to explain, in their own words, the impact of the offending on their lives. Although special measures can already be used for this purpose, that entitlement is not explicitly set out in legislation.
As the Law Commission has explored, the lack of a clear statutory basis can create uncertainty about what victims may rely on, adding avoidable stress at a time when they are already managing the emotional weight of addressing the court. Clause 16 removes that uncertainty. It ensures that victims can rely on the same special measures at sentencing as they can when giving evidence, whether using screens, a live link or some other appropriate measure.
By placing the provisions on a clear statutory footing, clause 16 gives victims greater reassurance that their voice can be heard at sentencing and that they will have access to the support needed to participate effectively. It will enhance their overall experience of the justice system, and strengthen the quality of information available to the court when determining a sentence. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Dr Mullan
I have spent a lot of time working on the issue of victim personal statements, often referred to as victim impact statements, in work on other Bills. We are talking today about someone’s ability to give an effective statement, but the Opposition have also been concerned about restrictions on what people can actually say, and have tabled amendments to other Bills on that issue.
I have worked with a number of victims. The people who come to mind are the parents of Violet-Grace, a four-year-old girl who was hit and killed by a stolen car going 80 mph on a 30 mph road while she was crossing with her grandmother. The criminals involved fled the scene—they came back to step over her body as they grabbed the drugs they had left in the car—and then fled the country. Her grandmother suffered massive injuries and will never be physically the same. Violet-Grace’s parents, two amazing individuals who are part of the Justice for Victims campaign group, talked about their experience of what they wanted to say in their victim statement being interfered with.
I have also had the pleasure of meeting and working with Sarah Everard’s parents, who tell the same story of having wanted to say certain things. Of course, the Opposition do not think it should be a free-for-all, and people should say whatever they want in an impact statement, but surely the onus should be on allowing victims to have their say.
There is a need to reform what these statements are for. In statute, it is there purely as a way for victims to talk about the impact of the crime on them. That is helpful, but in other jurisdictions it is an opportunity for the victim to say what they want about what has happened—importantly, this is at the point of conviction, when someone has been found guilty. We will therefore continue to push for broader reforms to impact statements.
On screens, this one of those things we read and thinks, “Why wasn’t this thought of at the time?” It seems self-evident that everything is put in place for witnesses during a trial—before someone has even been convicted, when the state has not yet decided through the courts whether someone is guilty—but this is after the trial. Surely the protections for people taking part at that stage should have been included in the original envisaging of the use of screens. We wholly support the relevant measure. We have discussed physical infrastructure already, but I am sure there is something the Government can do on that.
I do not think the Minister is responsible for the content of statements—I think that lies with the Minister for Victims—but we would appreciate her lending support to her ministerial colleague in relation to further expanding what people can say in their statements. The clause seeks to ensure that they have their moment in court from a physical point of view, but that will be undermined somewhat if what they are allowed to say is not as expansive as we can possibly make it.
Sarah Sackman
I think we all agree that the victim impact statement, and that moment when victims read or speak aloud about the ways in which they have been impacted, is critical. Their ability to speak at all may depend on the consistent provision of the special measures in clause 16. All that can be done without compromising the fairness of what is to follow, which is the sentencing exercise in which a judge must engage in respect of the defendant. Clause 16 seeks to enable that, because there may be victims who simply cannot bring themselves to do it absent those special measures. That is why it is a really important clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17
Welfare of the child: repeal of presumption of parental involvement
Jess Brown-Fuller
I beg to move amendment 14, in clause 17, page 30, line 10, at end insert—
“(3) The Lord Chancellor must, within six months of the commencement of this section, lay before both Houses of Parliament a report on the resources required to give full effect to the repeal of subsection 2A in Section 1 of the Children Act 1989.—
‘(1) The report under subsection (3) must include—
(a) an assessment of the level of legal aid provision necessary to ensure that parties in child arrangements proceedings are able to obtain timely and effective—
(i) advice, and
(ii) representation
particularly where allegations of domestic abuse or safeguarding concerns are raised;
(b) an evaluation of the capacity of the family courts, including—
(i) the number of judges,
(ii) court staff, and
(iii) available hearing time,
to undertake robust risk assessment and fact-finding processes in line with Practice Direction 12J;
(c) plans to address any shortfalls in judicial training, including—
(i) training relating to coercive control,
(ii) domestic abuse dynamics, and
(iii) child safeguarding.
(d) proposals for investment in the family court estate and technology to ensure—
(i) the repeal operates effectively, and
(ii) decisions are consistently grounded in the welfare and safety of the child.’”
This amendment requires the Government to set out how the family courts and legal aid system will be resourced to give full effect to the repeal of the presumption of parental involvement.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
New clause 16—Protective relocation and presumption of reasonableness—
“(1) This section applies to family proceedings in which—
(a) a parent (‘the relocating parent’) has relocated, or proposes to relocate, with a child; and
(b) it is alleged that such relocation has adversely affected, or is intended to affect, the child’s relationship with another party.
(2) Where the relocating parent demonstrates that the decision to relocate was made in consequence of domestic abuse, and this is supported by documented advice from a relevant authority or support service, there is a presumption that the relocation was reasonable and in the best interests of the child.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), ‘documented advice’ includes advice, guidance, or referral from—
(a) a police force;
(b) a local authority exercising social services functions;
(c) a Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC); or
(d) an Independent Domestic Violence Adviser (IDVA) or equivalent specialist support service.
(4) The presumption in subsection (2) can be rebutted if the other party demonstrates, on the balance of probabilities, that the relocation is not reasonable or not in the best interests of the child.
(5) In determining whether the presumption has been rebutted, the court must have regard to—
(a) the nature and impact of the domestic abuse;
(b) the circumstances in which the advice or referral was given; and
(c) the welfare of the child as the court’s paramount consideration.
(6) The court may disapply the presumption in subsection (2) where it is satisfied that—
(a) the evidential basis for the documented advice is insufficient; or
(b) it is otherwise necessary to do so in order to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child.
(7) In this section—
(a) ‘domestic abuse’ has the same meaning as in section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021;
(b) ‘child’ means a person under the age of 18;
(c) ‘family proceedings’ has the same meaning as in section 75(3) of the Courts Act 2003.”
This new clause introduces a rebuttable presumption that a parent’s relocation with a child, undertaken in reliance on documented advice from authorities or support services in the context of domestic abuse, is reasonable and in the child’s best interests, unless the contrary is shown.
New clause 20—Determination of domestic abuse allegations and related presumptions—
“This section applies in family proceedings in which—
(a) party A alleges that party B has perpetrated domestic abuse, and
(b) the court is invited to consider whether a party A has engaged in conduct intended, or having the effect of, undermining a child’s relationship with another party.
(1) Where this section applies, the court must determine, as a preliminary issue, any allegation of domestic abuse before considering any allegation falling within subsection (1)(b).
(2) The court must treat the determination of allegations of domestic abuse as a matter of priority and, so much as reasonably practicable, must not proceed to determine any issue relating to the child’s relationship with either party until such allegations have been determined.
(3) Where the court finds, on the balance of probabilities, that party B has perpetrated domestic abuse against another party or the child—
(a) there shall be a rebuttable presumption that any reluctance or refusal by the child to spend time with party B constitutes a reasonable and justified response to the domestic abuse; and
(b) the court must not consider any allegation that party A has engaged in conduct falling within subsection (1)(b) unless satisfied that the presumption in paragraph (a) has been rebutted.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (4)(b), the presumption may be rebutted only where party B demonstrates, on the balance of probabilities, that the child’s reluctance or refusal cannot be reasonably attributed to the domestic abuse.
(5) Subsections (2) to (5) apply only where the allegation of domestic abuse meets such minimum evidential threshold as may be prescribed by rules of court.
(6) Notwithstanding the above, the court may disapply the presumption in subsection (4)(a), or the requirement in subsection (2), where it is satisfied that to do so is necessary to secure the welfare of the child as its paramount consideration.
(7) In this section—
(a) ‘domestic abuse’ has the same meaning as in section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021;
(b) references to a child are to a person under the age of 18;
(c) references to ‘family proceedings’ have the same meaning as in section 75(3) of the Courts Act 2003.”
This new clause requires courts to determine domestic abuse allegations before considering claims of parental alienation. If abuse is proven, a child’s reluctance to see the abusive parent is presumed a justified response. This presumption must be rebutted before the court can entertain allegations of alienating behaviour against the protective parent.
New clause 31—Determination of domestic abuse allegations and related presumptions—
“(1) There is a rebuttable presumption that any reluctance or refusal by a child to spend time with a party against whom the child, or a party representing the child, has made allegations of domestic abuse constitutes a reasonable and justified response to the domestic abuse.
(2) The presumption in subsection (1) may be rebutted only where the accused party demonstrates, on the balance of probabilities, that the child’s reluctance or refusal cannot be reasonably attributed to the domestic abuse.”
This new clause provides that, in family court, where a child refuses or is reluctant to spend time with one party as a result of an allegation against that party of domestic abuse against the child, the court must presume the reluctance or refusal is reasonable.
I remind hon. Members that any Divisions on new clauses will come later.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Amendment 14 would require the Government to set out how the family courts and legal aid system will be resourced to give full effect to the repeal of the presumption of parental involvement. It would necessitate a report being laid by the Government on the impact of repealing the presumption of parental responsibility. We are in favour of clause 17, but the amendment focuses on the impact of the provisions on legal aid and the capacity of family courts, judicial training and investment in the family court estate. Repealing the presumption of parental responsibility will lead to a need for more legal advice, as well as changes in hearings and court practices. It is important that the Government report on those changes to the House. We hope that they accept the need for a report.
Clause 17 will repeal the presumption of parental involvement in the Children Act 1989. The presumption was originally introduced to ensure that both parents could maintain a relationship with their children after separation. However, there have been long-standing campaigns to repeal the presumption, with evidence emerging—I say emerging, but it is long-standing evidence—that children could be left at risk of harm. The change will mean that the courts will no longer start from the assumption that parental involvement is always in the child’s best interests.
A key campaigner for this change, working with Women’s Aid, is Claire Throssell, who the Committee had the opportunity to hear from during the evidence session. Claire’s children, Jack and Paul, were killed by their father, who locked them in the attic and set fire to the house. If there was any moment that we all will remember for a very long time, it was Claire holding the images of her children before the incident and afterwards. I commend her for her bravery and for the way that she was able to speak so clearly not just for herself, but for all the families who have experienced devastating bereavement in that way—fighting for the children who will come after.
A family court judge, guided by the presumption, decided to allow Claire’s ex-husband unsupervised access to their children, despite evidence that he had threatened to harm both her and them. Since Women’s Aid first reported on the issue in 2004, 67 children have been killed by perpetrators of domestic abuse through contact arrangements, with 19 further child deaths documented in the decade to September 2024 alone.
The Lib Dems are in favour of the shift in law away from the presumption of parental involvement. Although the Bill seeks to repeal the presumption, there is a pro-contact culture in the family courts, as described by Farah Nazeer of Women’s Aid, who we also heard from in the evidence session. Will the Minister lay out what will be done to support the cultural reform of the family courts to ensure that this is a pivotal moment for victims of domestic abuse, who for so long have had their concerns around their children’s safety dismissed?
Claire spoke to that point in the evidence session. When I asked her what she believed the next steps should be, she said:
“What I would like to see moving forward is an understanding of what it looks like without presumption of contact; what good practice looks like; understanding trauma; understanding what coercive control is; understanding emotional abuse. We all understand physical abuse—it is there; we see it. What we do not understand is the emotional abuse and the scars that we carry. We must always look from the position of actually seeing a child, hearing a child, believing a child, protecting a child, and we must go from this basis.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 58, Q110.]
New clause 16, which I also tabled, is a probing amendment that I will not press to a vote, but I wish to discuss it further. It would introduce a rebuttal presumption that a parent’s relocation with a child in the context of domestic abuse, undertaken in reliance on and with documented advice from authorities or support services, is reasonable and in the child’s best interests, unless the contrary is known.
New clause 16 would allow a parent to relocate with a child if they have evidence or advice from a domestic abuse support service or authority. It would require the court to assume that the move is reasonable and place the burden on the other parent to prove that the move is not in the child’s best interest.
The new clause is aimed at making it easier for victims of domestic abuse to leave their situations safely, and to prevent them from being forced to remain near their abusive ex-partners. Currently, the legal framework does not adequately distinguish between a parent who removes a child to protect them and a parent who removes a child to punish the other party. Our new clause would not remove safeguards in respect of alienation, but would instead shift the dial towards believing and protecting victims of domestic abuse.
The new clause is supported by Fair Hearing, which shared multiple examples of its work with courts that failed to give proper weight to the relevance of domestic abuse in relocation decisions. In one such case, a mother who had experienced severe physical, sexual and psychological abuse had been forced by her partner, during the relationship, to move with their children to an isolated rural area. After leaving him, she sought permission to return to her home town, where she had family support and greater safety. The court none the less required her to remain in an isolated cottage near her abuser, failing to give proper weight to the impact of the abuse, or to her need for safety and support. Cases of that kind illustrate the consequences of a framework that, in its operation, too often treats a survivor seeking to relocate for safety no differently from any other parent seeking to move for lifestyle or preference reasons.
I make the point to the Minister that this could happen to any of us. So often, abuse does not start on day one, when the partner suggests that we move somewhere lovely and will be really happy there. I am a very long way removed from the version of myself who made the decision to follow a boy three hours away from my family in my early 20s. He turned out not to be the great guy I thought he was when I made that decision. I escaped from that situation, but had I stayed and ended up having children, the idea that I would have been trapped in a city that was not mine, away from my family, who were my support network, is too scary to bear. I remind the Minister that it could happen to literally any one of us.
Wider campaigns from Women’s Aid, SafeLives and Refuge have focused on ensuring that survivors can relocate to escape abuse. As subsection 2 of the new clause outlines:
“Where the relocating parent demonstrates that the decision to relocate was made in consequence of domestic abuse, and this is supported by documented advice from a relevant authority or support service, there is a presumption that the relocation was reasonable and in the best interests of the child.”
Under the new clause, the documented advice would include evidence from a police force, social services, a multi-agency risk assessment conference or an independent domestic violence adviser. We look to work closely with the Government on this issue, and I hope they recognise the need to go further, but I will not push new clause 16 to a vote.
I will speak briefly to new clause 20, also tabled in my name, which would introduce a statutory presumption that where domestic abuse is alleged, the court must make findings on the allegations before considering any claim that a parent has sought to undermine the child’s relationship with the other party. If one parent alleges domestic abuse and the other alleges alienating behaviour—that is, influencing the child against them—the court must decide the domestic abuse allegations first. The court cannot move on to contact issues until that is decided. If the court finds domestic abuse, a child’s reluctance to see that parent is presumed to be justified. That presumption can be overturned only with evidence. If abuse is proven, courts cannot consider claims of alienation until the alleged abusive parent proves the child’s resistance is not due to abuse.
Campaigners have long argued that the family courts have been used by abusers to retraumatise victims and have over-prioritised contact between parents and children. It is estimated that around 60% to 90% of child arrangement cases in the family court feature allegations of domestic abuse. In 2020, the report entitled “Assessing Risk of Harm to Children and Parents in Private Law Children Cases” highlighted serious issues with how the family court system addresses domestic abuse in child arrangement cases. It said that those issues were underpinned by a pro-contact culture, silo working, an adversarial system and resource constraints.
A 2023 report by the Domestic Abuse Commissioner stated:
“Victims and survivors and their advisors reported concerns that raising domestic abuse as an issue often risked the retaliatory use of so-called ‘parental’ alienation narratives by parties against whom domestic abuse had been alleged as a counter-claim, leading to worse outcomes for adult and child victims and survivors.”
Five years on from the harm report, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner found that despite overwhelming evidence of domestic abuse in most cases, a pro-contact culture and a failure to recognise abuse still contribute to decisions that may put children in harm’s way.
This can be considered a probing amendment; I will not press new clause 20 to a vote. We will be looking to work closely with the Government to make progress in this area. The new clause would tilt the dial slightly towards victims of domestic abuse by ensuring that courts properly examined cases before considering issues of alienation. It would prioritise the safety of victims of domestic abuse, whether partners or children, by requiring these allegations to be addressed first.
It is also sometimes argued that children resist contact with certain parents because of manipulation. Our proposal would ensure that courts did not assume that manipulation first, but it would also have safeguards. It would not allow domestic abuse organisations to submit evidence; instead, it would be the authorities, social services and an independent domestic violence adviser who would do that. A minimum evidential threshold would also have to be met.
Dr Mullan
I want to begin by acknowledging the gravity of what we heard in evidence in Committee. As the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester, pointed to, the evidence from Claire in relation to her children will stay with all of us. It was so moving and so upsetting for anyone thinking about how they would feel in that scenario. There was also the testimony of other parents who have lost children, and survivors of domestic abuse, who felt let down by a system that prioritised contact over their safety. That testimony matters. The Committee has a duty to take it incredibly seriously and give it the maximum possible weight.
We also have a duty to legislate carefully, however, and when it comes to legislating I do not think there are many areas of human frailty and human complexity that are more complicated than this. As anyone with any experience of the family court—and of life generally and the interactions between families who split up—will agree, all these things are incredibly complicated. When we seek to be prescriptive about how exactly a court should or should not seek to do things, that is fraught with risk and potential unintended consequences, just as today we are discussing the unintended consequences of a measure that may have been brought in for good reasons.
We must think very carefully, therefore, when it comes to the repeal of section 1(2A) of the Children Act 1989, and particularly about whether we think that will achieve what it promises. I make no apologies for saying that I want to consider this in some detail and that we will want to follow the discussions on it in some detail as the Bill progresses. Although we are not seeking to oppose the repeal at this stage, it is certainly not something—as opposed to some other measures—that is without the need for further scrutiny.
I want to say plainly that the courts, social services and CAFCASS have made serious mistakes in the past—importantly, both before that provision was inserted in 2014 and since—and those serious mistakes have cost children their lives. However, the question before us today is whether repealing the presumption will fix the mistakes or whether it might distract from the need for much deeper reforms and more complex and difficult work than can be achieved by a simple measure in a Bill.
Let me deal with the most important point: the presumption introduced in 2014 does not give any parent an automatic right to contact. It is important that we recognise that. It does not override the paramount principle in the law. I think we probably all remember the evidence given by one of the barristers in Committee, who was clear that while they thought the presumption could be repealed, the law as it stands does not allow the desire for a parent to have contact to override the welfare of a child. It also does not override the welfare checklist, or require courts to make an order that places children at risk.
The presumption establishes a starting point that, where it is safe to do so, children should generally benefit from the involvement of both parents. That starting point can be rebutted, but it expressly does not apply where a parent’s involvement would put the child at risk. In its written evidence, Both Parents Matter describe it as a “statutory benchmark”, not a straitjacket.
Siân Berry
I support this clause quite strongly. We heard powerfully from Claire Throssell in oral evidence how important its impact could be.
Most Members will have experiences like mine through casework of cases where this clause could help. I have heard from parents and family members so distressed at how their cases have been determined, despite clear evidence, where this presumption was obviously given far too much weight in decisions. These words in legislation, which were added and have had an influence on decisions, need to go.
I want to read parts of correspondence I received after the announcement in October 2025 that this measure was going to be changed. My constituent described it as an enormous relief. They were very impatient to know exactly when this was going to come forward. I am very pleased that we are discussing this now before the end of the Session.
My constituent said:
“I have personal experience of the impact the current legal framework can have. I am unable to provide specific information as a very close family member is still going through Family Court hearings to protect a child in a case of domestic abuse. However, as recently as January this year”—
this was in 2025—
“the aforementioned person was advised by two independent firms of solicitors to avoid the Family Court at all costs, due to the ‘presumption of involvement’, allied with the inconsistent and regionally patchy training and understanding by Family Court judges in domestic abuse (in spite of changes to the Domestic Abuse Act in 2021), referring to potential outcomes in Child Arrangements as ‘a lottery’.”
I really do support this clause. I also support the amendments in the name of the hon. Member for Chichester, which will help to tackle training gaps and which also reflect experiences that I can recall from casework. They are based on high-quality work and requests from organisations that work directly with victims and survivors, who have asked for these changes. I hope that the Minister will look at making changes that further strengthen the Bill in this way.
Rebecca Paul
I begin by echoing the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. I completely understand why the Government have brought this clause forward. I welcome the debate. Similar to the hon. Member for Chichester, who spoke so eloquently, I was deeply moved by the evidence we heard from Claire Throssell. I cannot even imagine how she has coped. To do what she has done and to try to take something positive from that is an incredible thing.
The evidence this Committee has heard from those witnesses and other survivors of domestic abuse is that they feel that the family courts have not properly identified risk and believe that a pro-contact culture has, at times, overridden safety. That is extremely concerning, and it is absolutely right that we take it extremely seriously.
Child safety must come first. Where the present framework has contributed to poor outcomes, it is right that the Government act, but it is also incumbent on us today to make sure that the clause that is being repealed is indeed the cause of the harm to those children. I also make the point that, where Parliament removes an existing statutory principle, it has a duty to be clear about what will replace it.
My concern today is less with the Government’s objective than with whether repeal on its own is sufficiently precise, evidence based and thought through to achieve the Ministers’ intended objective. The Government’s own impact assessment, which has already been set out, says that
“repeal alone is unlikely to materially change outcomes”,
even though it is expected to
“change the process judges follow”.
That is an important starting point for this debate. It is really important that we do not make changes to law because everyone wants us to make those changes and thinks that will improve things when, in reality, we have the evidence and facts to know that it may not deliver those outcomes.
It is incumbent on all of us to make sure that we actually deliver the outcomes that we all desire; we all have the same ambition. I know this comes from a good place and we are all approaching this debate in the best way we can to protect children. My purpose this afternoon is to be constructive—I am not saying I have all the answers on this, and I hope my comments will be taken in that spirit. If the Government proceed with repeal, do they also need to do more to provide a principles replacement framework, clearer guidance and stronger supporting reforms?
It is important to start with the facts around the presumption. The current presumption does not give any parent an automatic right to contact, override the welfare checklist or override the paramountcy principle in section 1 of the Children Act 1989, and it certainly does not require courts to make orders that place children at risk. The Family Services Foundation is clear in its written evidence that current law already places the child’s welfare first, stating:
“Section 1(6)…expressly ensures the presumption applies”
only where parental involvement
“does not put the child at risk of suffering harm”.
It says that practice direction 12J and the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 already provide an important framework for identifying and responding to abuse in family proceedings.
Equally, I recognise the contrary concern expressed by survivors who say that, in abuse cases, the presumption can place pressure on courts to prioritise parental contact even where there are serious safety concerns and can make it harder for victims to be properly heard and protected. The real question is therefore not whether safety matters more than contact—it plainly does—but whether removing the current presumption will improve how risk is identified and acted upon, or whether it risks creating new uncertainty while leaving the deeper operational problems untouched and discouraging parental involvement in cases where it would actually be beneficial.
There are already substantial protections in the current legal framework, although they clearly fail in the worst way on occasion. The Family Services Foundation points out that the Children Act 1989, practice direction 12J and the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 already equip the courts to restrict or refuse contact where “harm is shown”. It also reminds us that the UK is bound by the UN convention on the rights of the child, including article 9, which recognises that children should maintain regular contact with both parents unless that is
“contrary to the child’s best interests”.
Both Parents Matter makes a similar point, saying:
“The Presumption was introduced in 2014”
to reflect the UNCRC and provide a statutory benchmark that the safe involvement of both parents generally furthers child welfare. I emphasise the word “safe”—no one has ever said that parents should be involved if it is not safe. I make those points not to argue that nothing should change. If the Government are minded to proceed, we need a clear understanding of how the replacement framework will continue to distinguish between safe parental involvement, which can be beneficial, and unsafe parental involvement, which must be stopped. At present, I am not sure the Bill by itself gives enough reassurance on that point, and I am worried that safe parental contact will be discouraged.
That leads to one of the most important points of all. The Government’s own documents suggest that repeal alone may not be the solution that they are hoping it will be. As mentioned earlier, the impact assessment says,
“repeal alone is unlikely to materially change outcomes”,
although it is expected to change the process that judges follow. That is a significant admission. It suggests that if the Government want safer and better outcomes in family proceedings, repeal can be only part of the picture, and perhaps not the decisive part.
We should keep in mind that many of the awful failures that have rightly horrified people seem to be failures of risk assessment, information sharing, institutional practice, professional judgment and resourcing. The Centre for Policy Research on Men and Boys puts it well:
“If abusive contact is being ordered or preserved inappropriately, then the concern lies with the quality of risk assessment, the speed and fairness of investigation, and the consistency with which courts and agencies apply the law.”
That is a useful and constructive way of putting the point. It does not deny the seriousness of the problem, but it does ask whether the solution is the right one. My concern is not that the Government want to strengthen protection; it is that repeal may be presented as more self-sufficient than, on the basis of the evidence, it really is.
I also think the Committee should be careful and candid about the strength of the evidence base behind repeal. Both Parents Matter says that the Government’s own review
“provided limited and inconclusive evidence of the impact of the Presumption. It could not determine how often the Presumption was applied in judgments, nor could it assess how harm…related to the application of the Presumption.”
It also criticises the underlying methodology:
“Quantitative analysis was based on only 245 court judgments, with over half from a single magistrates’ bench. Qualitative analysis involved only 29 parents.”
It added that the literature review
“examined only 55 studies, excluded all research published after April 2024,”
and omitted
“major studies showing positive outcomes”
from safe shared parenting and ongoing parental involvement.
Other evidence goes further, arguing that the Government review appears to have misunderstood or overstated the conclusions to be drawn from Professor Anja Steinbach’s work. I recall a striking line from Professor Steinbach, who said:
“There is plenty of research showing that contact with both parents is beneficial”,
and
“except for violence…contact with both parents is the baseline.”
I do not think that material should make the Committee cautious about treating the review as a fully settled or exhausted evidential platform for repeal.
Again, my point is not that that means that repeal must not happen; it is that we should not over-claim what the existing evidence can prove or support. I also think it is important to avoid turning this into a false choice between protecting children from abuse and supporting children to maintain safe relationships with both parents. The Centre for Policy Research on Men and Boys says that the public debate often frames the issue in that way. However, it says:
“A good family justice system must do both. It must protect children and adult victims from abusive parents. It must also protect children from the avoidable loss of safe, loving, and important parental relationships.”
I think that is right.
The Family Services Foundation similarly said:
“reform should focus on enhancing the protections available, rather than creating conditions that may inadvertently prevent children from maintaining safe, meaningful relationships with their parents.”
That is why I urge the Minister not to present clause 17 as though all principled concern about repeal is somehow concern for parental rights over child safety. It is perfectly possible to support the Government’s child safety objective while asking whether the law should continue to recognise some clear and carefully framed way, where there is no established risk of harm, of enabling children to benefit from stable and safe relationships with both parents.
Several of the written submissions that we received raise concerns about unintended consequences if repeal proceeds without a clear replacement framework. Both Parents Matter warns:
“Removing this important statutory benchmark, and relying instead on practice and non statutory frameworks”
may increase uncertainty, inconsistency and conflict. The Family Services Foundation says something similar, warning that repeal may confuse frontline professionals, affect negotiations outside court, reduce the incentive for out-of-court resolution and, ultimately, increase strain on a family court system that is already under pressure. It notes that only a minority of separated families ever come before the courts, but many more families and professionals orient their expectations around the legal framework.
That is a serious point. Even if the court’s paramount consideration remains unchanged, removing a statutory starting point may still alter behaviour before a case ever reaches a final hearing. It may affect how solicitors advise, how CAFCASS frames disputes, how mediation is approached and how parents negotiate. With that point in mind, I hope that the Minister might be in a position to share some more detail on how she expects the changes to operate, and why she is confident that they will improve outcomes rather than simply shift conflict elsewhere.
Amanda Hack (North West Leicestershire) (Lab)
I am finding it difficult to listen to the hon. Member’s speech. I do not believe that we can talk about balance when 68 children have lost their lives because of the presumption. I feel that we have to take forward this clause; it is so important. I want to understand the hon. Member’s terminology and whether she can reflect on the fact that 68 children have already lost their lives because of this presumption.
Rebecca Paul
I am sure people saw me during evidence. I get really upset about the loss of any child’s life. We have to remember that we all want to keep children safe—[Interruption.]
Rebecca Paul
No, I’m okay.
I would gently say to the hon. Member for North West Leicestershire that I hope she has heard—and even seen—enough from me to know that I am here to protect children. Of course I am horrified by any loss of a child, but my point is that I am trying to step back, be objective and say, “What is the reason that those children lost their lives?”. I am not convinced that it was the parental presumption—I am not saying that I am right on that; I am just open-minded to it.
I have seen a particular case quite closely—I should declare that I am a serving county councillor in Surrey—and that is the case of Sara Sharif. I have gone through the safeguarding reviews in a huge amount of detail; it affected all of us councillors in Surrey greatly. It was an absolutely awful case. So many things went wrong throughout her life. From the family courts to social services, her GP and the school, there was just a barrage of failure that led to that poor little girl being murdered, and that absolutely could have been prevented.
People might argue, “Well, if we had removed the parental presumption, that would have saved her.” Having gone through all that, I can tell the hon. Member that, in that case, it would not have done anything. It was safeguarding failures. People just made mistakes. They got things wrong. They were too worried about offending people to take the right actions.
What I am saying today is just that it is really important, when we look at these things, that we diagnose what went wrong. We have to do that quite objectively. That is difficult when we are hearing from lots of different people who have gone through awful things, but our job is to try to not be emotional—I say that having got emotional myself—and to look at it logically. At the end of the day, we all just want to deliver the outcome that protects children. That is what all of us on this Committee want to do. But it is important that we can talk about that without the hon. Member suggesting that I somehow do not care about children, because what I am trying to do is to have that objectivity, because it matters to me so much that we do protect those children that I want us to have that proper debate and to say, “Is this really the right way or are there other things we can be doing? Do we need to do multiple things? Maybe this isn’t enough.” I am not saying that we should not do it; I am saying that we just need to make sure that we have thought this through.
I will be really keen to hear from the Minister; I know this really matters to her as well, and she will have done that thinking, so I look forward to hearing her thoughts on the challenges I have brought up today. But, as I say, I keep an open mind, and we all share the same objectives.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Am I right in thinking that the hon. Member agrees with me that, when we are trying to legislate for what the most complex part of our justice system—families—that is an incredibly hard job? We all know from personal experience that the one thing that binds us all is that we have a family; we might disagree on whether they are good ones or bad ones, and whether we get on with them or not, but we all came from somewhere, and they are complicated things.
Across the House, we all share the desire to ensure that we recognise the complexity of family relationships and protect those most vulnerable in our society by making sure that people do not have the right to still have contact with their children when they have done things that mean that they absolutely should not. However, we also recognise that systems are abused, and we see that in all directions; people will always find ways of getting around systems, or of using the criminal justice system to retraumatise or to hold on to some form of control. Does the hon. Member therefore agree with me that, while what we are trying to do here is really complex, we are all doing it for the right reasons?
Rebecca Paul
I completely agree with the hon. Member. I appreciate the fact that she has tabled these amendments and that she recognises that it is not easy to strike this balance, particularly when we are trying to address abuse and alienation cases and it is sometimes hard to know what situation we are dealing with.
We are trying to come up with a system that protects as many people as we possibly can, but I think we also have to acknowledge that it will never be perfect. If anyone thinks that we can change one bit of law and then all of a sudden nothing horrible will ever happen again, I am afraid to say that these awful things will always happen, and things will always go wrong. It is about trying our best to have a framework that gets the balance right.
I will stop there—I have probably made my point. This has been a really good debate, and I look forward to hearing from the Minister about some of the points I have raised.
Sarah Sackman
I thank all hon. Members for their contributions. I will set out the rationale for clause 17 and then address the central argument presented by Opposition Members about the repeal of the presumption —the Government do not overclaim for it; is not a silver bullet for the problems and challenges of child protection in this country and will not solve all the challenges in our family court—and why we nevertheless think that it is the right thing to do. I will then address the amendment and new clauses.
The Government’s intention through clause 17 is to repeal the presumption of parental involvement from the Children Act 1989. The child’s welfare must always be the court’s paramount concern when making decisions about a child’s life, and that principle is enshrined in the 1989 Act. The Children and Families Act 2014 amended the 1989 Act to introduce a presumption that, in certain private law proceedings, the child’s welfare will be furthered by each parent’s involvement, unless evidence shows otherwise.
We know that, in most families, both parents play a vital role in a child’s life. However, although the legislation clearly states that the presumption is rebuttable and does not apply where a parent poses a risk of harm to the child, it has none the less faced serious and sustained criticism. To echo what others have said about the testimony and campaigning work of Claire Throssell, ably supported by her MP, my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge (Dr Tidball), Women’s Aid and a whole host of survivors of domestic abuse and those who represent them, the presumption contributes to a pro-contact culture in the family courts that too often prioritises parental involvement over child welfare.
We published our review of the presumption in full last October, and its conclusion was that unsupervised and face-to-face contact was the most common outcome in child arrangements cases, even where there were allegations or findings of domestic abuse. To give some context, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner has presented evidence of her own that proven allegations of domestic abuse arise in 80% of those cases. This is prevalent. Those cases come to the court in the way they do because, by definition, family relationships have broken down and there is conflict—that is the nature of these cases, and domestic abuse is already an issue in so many of them. The review demonstrates that, although the presumption is not the sole driver, it can be a contributory factor to a culture in family courts that prioritises parental involvement, even in cases of abuse, which means that, too often, decisions are putting children in harm’s way.
I want to be really clear about that, because we are not overclaiming that the repeal of the presumption will change everything overnight, and we are certainly not saying that it will keep everybody safe. There has been a lot of criticism of the family court, but one thing I do know is that those tasked with making these decisions are trying, through their professionalism, empathy and training, to keep children safe. I do not doubt their good faith. I struggle to imagine the burden of having to make those decisions. We are talking about the devastation of loved ones who have lost children—but imagine being the judge who made that decision, and living with that. I do not think for one second that they would have intended that consequence, and I suspect that, where a child is harmed or even killed as a result of a child arrangement, they regret those decisions every single day.
Through clause 17, we are seeking to ensure that judges approach the application of the law and the welfare checklist, which we regard as really important, with an open mind. The danger with the presumption is that they start with just that: a weighted approach to the consideration of the child’s best interests. We do not think that repealing the presumption is a silver bullet, but it will send a signal to the system—to the leadership of the family court and to everybody who sits within it— that the way to approach this is purely with an open mind, focused on the child.
Dr Mullan
The Minister was absolutely right to point to the enormous burden on those judges. I should have made a similar observation, and I am happy to do so now. Although I have been critical of some of their decisions, I cannot imagine the weight that sits with some of those people all the time, so I want to put on the record my thanks to those judges—on the whole, they do a very good job.
However, we still come back to the issue of accountability. We can preload the system to ensure that judges are more likely to make suitable decisions but, if there are no accountability mechanisms at the other end, we will not necessarily get the results that we want. What thought has the Minister given as to how we better ensure accountability for decision making? In my practice as a doctor, for example, there are so many mechanisms in place to ensure that the decisions I make are not just technically justifiable, but good. The point my constituent made when she visited me was that there are no such mechanisms for judges. If they make a strict error in law, that can be tackled through the Court of Appeal, but outside of that, how can the judiciary better hold itself to account for poor-quality, even if legally defendable, decision making? I am not talking about the Government interfering with the judiciary.
Sarah Sackman
The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. Obviously, we have appeal systems and, in some family proceedings, the nature of them can be iterative; as family circumstances and the facts change, it might be that there are provisions in directions to come back and relitigate some of those child arrangements. In other cases, they are final. Accountability is really important to us as a ministerial team, and the Secretary of State does not shy away from it. While of course respecting separation of powers, the judicial complaints process must be important as well, not just in family courts, but right across the piece. Where judges fall short of the standards we require of them, they should be held accountable.
I want to make a point about transparency and the publication of family court judgments. That is happening more and more, and it is important because it holds it up and says, “That is what a good judgment looks like”. It also exposes where there is decision making that is either faulty, poorly reasoned or simply not justified, so that that cannot happen.
The other thing happening is not just the publication of those judgments, with all the support that transcription allows, but also opening up—again, where appropriate—to journalists and the public to come and see how those hearings operate.
Dr Mullan
The Minister has pointed to complaints, and that is an important element, but there is something in between complaints and legal appeal. Again, from my own experience, working extensively on trying to make quality improvements in healthcare, these are incredibly complex things that we expect experts to do. Someone might not have done the wrong thing but, when we look at their practice as a whole, it does not compare favourably with that of other clinicians. That is what we recognise as the manner in which we drive improvement.
Some of the high-profile statisticians who I have worked with in that regard and who speak publicly on these matters have looked at court decisions say that they can find similar patterns of what we might call outliers—for example, regarding how likely people are to grant parental custody. Any one of those decisions might not be a decision that would be legally wrong or warrant a complaint—but we might see that they are 10 times more likely than all the other judges to award custody. Again, that is not to say that they are wrong to do so; but, just as clinicians are forced to do, we should at the very least be forcing them to reflect on that internally within the judiciary, and say, “Why is it that you are awarding custody to both parents in so many more circumstances than all your peers?”. It is not about complaints or legally wrong actions, but someone’s practice as a whole.
As the Minister has said, there is a very important separation: it should not be the Minister responsible saying to that person, “I don’t like your rate of referral”, but there should be something else within the judiciary—something that is not complaints and is not legal challenge, but that just says, “You all have to be a bit more accountable for the decisions you take”. To give another example in sentencing, if we could consistently see that a judge’s sentencing was consistently very far away from their peers’, that is not something that we should just accept as a society. This is not a Government issue, but a society issue.
Sarah Sackman
The hon. Gentleman is making a fair point. I have no doubt that, not just in the context of this clause—where we are talking about family law—but more generally in other conversations that we have had around the criminal justice system, the Judicial Office and judicial leadership will be following these proceedings quite closely and will be hearing these exchanges. That is why—in a different context—the discussion that we had regarding the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington is so important, with that specific mischief in mind. Judicial performance is something that the judicial leadership ought to want to scrutinise and evaluate, and—where it falls short of the high standards that our judiciary so often deliver— remedy.
This measure, not in and of itself, but through clause 17 and alongside our wider reforms, such as the national roll-out of child-focused courts—the new name for what some hon. Members might know as Pathfinder—over the next three years will signal a step change in putting children’s safety and welfare back where it belongs, at the heart of every family court decision.
I do not want to digress, and this is not in the script but, for those unfamiliar with the Pathfinder programme—I am now told that I have to call them child-focused courts, and that is quite right, because that name describes exactly what they are—having been to observe those courts and spoken to judges, practitioners, social workers and families who have been through them, they are a really good model. They require the production up front of all the expert reports and all the assessments of the children, and there is much less conflict in the way that they operate. Judges like them; practitioners like them; families like them. They also go a whole lot faster. Of course, we must get to the bottom of things and make sure children are protected—but, if they are in an unsafe situation, we want them out of that unsafe situation sooner rather than later. We think that Pathfinder, coupled with the effects of clause 17, will be really important and I commend the clause to the Committee.
Amendment 14, tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester, would require the Lord Chancellor to lay a report before Parliament within six months setting out the level of legal aid provision, judicial capacity, specialist training and investment in the family court estate and in the technology needed to support the repeal of the presumption. Although all those things are essential, fundamental blocks of a well-functioning family court—the availability of legal aid, the judicial training, the specialism and the quality of the estate are all going to be important to producing better decisions and supporting families through an inherently difficult process—the Government do not consider the amendment necessary because the repeal of the presumption does not, in and of itself, alter what is going on within the courtroom. It alters the weighting that a judge gives in his or her decision making, but our endeavours to ensure that family courts are adequately resourced to make sure that children and victims are protected have to happen regardless. We do not need the amendment to achieve that.
As I said, we are already taking forward significant reforms to ensure that the family court system supports survivors of domestic abuse and delivers the right outcomes for survivors and their children. We have existing processes in place to monitor family court resourcing. All that work is led by my colleague Baroness Levitt.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I recognise that the amendment is limited in scope because the Bill is limited in scope, especially when it comes to the family court. Perhaps rather cheekily, I was trying to get a report on the general health of the family court system because so many organisations tell Members across the House that they are really concerned about a lot of the systems sitting in the family court, not just the parental responsibility piece. I remain hopeful that we will see family court legislation introduced, as the Minister will be aware that I have requested in multiple oral questions in the Chamber.
I am aware that the report required by the amendment would be specifically about the repeal, but we need a health check of our family court system because a lot of people are sounding the alarm about the concerns they have with that system.
Sarah Sackman
The family justice strategy, which will be forthcoming in July, will address a lot of what the hon. Member asks for. It will set out where the Government think reform is needed, and it will bring together what we are already doing with our child-focused courts programme, which is accompanied by a £17 million investment. We believe in that model, which we think has huge merit. It will be available to people regardless of where in the country they live.
More generally, we are introducing the funding that the Lord Chancellor has allocated to sitting days for family hearings, the targeted recruitment of more judges, more fee-paid judges, the greater use of virtual hearings—which can be a supportive measure for people giving evidence, not just an efficiency measure—and training.
The hon. Member for Chichester will know that the Domestic Abuse Commissioner has also undertaken detailed work in this area through her “Everyday business” report, which talks to some of the resourcing constraints faced by the family court. That work forms part of the commissioner’s report on a family court reporting mechanism, which is designed to provide ongoing evidence-based scrutiny of the family court’s response to domestic abuse in particular, and to highlight where systemic improvements are needed, so we have other accountability measures shining that light. If the hon. Member for Chichester awaits the strategy—she will no doubt want to take a look and critique parts of it—I think a lot of it will address some of the concerns she raises.
As I said, before proposing the repeal of the presumption, we carefully assessed the impact it would have. We do not overstate it, but it is important because the change affects the judicial process, not the underlying reasons why families come to court. Because we do not expect it to increase case volumes, case length or demand for legal aid, we think that the current arrangements can meet it, but there are so many other improvements that we want to drive.
Jess Brown-Fuller
This has been a robust and important debate, and there are strong feelings on both sides of the argument. As I said earlier, we are legislating in a complex area. I think the shared opinion is that the intention is correct. Some of the questions that have been asked are legitimate, but I know the Minister is keen to work collaboratively. I will not press my two new clauses to a vote—they are probing amendments to open up the conversation—but amendment 14, which would require a report as a health check for the family courts, is important, so I will press it to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 72 to 96.
Schedule 3.
Sarah Sackman
I will begin by addressing clause 18 and schedule 3 together before moving to Government amendments 72 to 96.
Clause 18 makes significant reforms to the leadership of tribunals, a change strongly supported by the senior judiciary. This is a key step in the One Judiciary programme, which was set up to achieve the long-standing shared ambition of the judiciary and the Ministry of Justice to have a single, unified judiciary across the courts and tribunals of England and Wales.
As the Lady Chief Justice recently noted, the reforms recognise the unity of judicial work across jurisdictions and will support more flexible deployment of judges, common standards and a more inclusive culture. Lord Justice Dingemans, the Senior President of Tribunals, endorsed this legislation in his annual report.
Clause 18 reforms the role of the Senior President of Tribunals and brings tribunals and their judiciary in England and Wales within the Lady Chief Justice’s leadership responsibilities. It gives effect to schedule 3, which reallocates the SPT’s existing England and Wales functions to the Lady Chief Justice. The SPT will continue to exercise statutory responsibility for some tribunals in Scotland and Northern Ireland, and the territorial extent of tribunals will remain as now.
The reformed office will retain the title of Senior President of Tribunals and will be equivalent to a head of division role. The provisions also bring the SPT role into line with heads of division by mandating a transparent appointment process, removing the option of a fixed-term appointment and providing for the SPT to be an ex officio member of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales.
The Bill also creates a new statutory post of deputy head of tribunals justice, similar to the statutory deputy head roles that exist in respect of criminal justice and family justice. The LCJ will become the statutory owner of the SPT’s current functions relating to tribunals operating under the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 in England and Wales. There are powers for the Lady Chief Justice to delegate those functions and, in practice, it is expected that most of them will be delegated to the SPT.
The provisions amend the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act to set out how the territorial split will operate for different statutory functions. Generally, they will reallocate functions by territory, so that the SPT will retain the functions in relation to judiciary or staff working primarily in Scotland and Northern Ireland, or to cases to be heard there, while the Lady Chief Justice will assume the functions in the same way for England and Wales.
However, there are some nuances to this approach to safeguard operational flexibility and to support consistency across pan-UK tribunals. For some functions—for example, appointing chamber presidents for cross-UK chambers or approving practice directions—the Bill enables shared decision making. The schedule makes similar changes in respect of the employment tribunals, where required.
The reforms will provide a modernised, unified leadership structure for our tribunals, which will encourage morale, recruitment and career development for the tribunals judiciary, and will support better use of flexible deployment and consistent practice. I should say that since I have been the Minister for Courts, I have had the privilege and pleasure of working with two remarkable Senior Presidents of Tribunals, Lord Justice Lindblom and Lord Justice Dingemans.
I have responsibility for tribunals, which form a huge part of where many of our citizens interact with our legal system, whether that is the employment tribunal, the special educational needs and disability tribunal, the social security tribunal or the property tribunal—I hope I have not forgotten one. I therefore welcome the introduction of this modernised structure to enable the best possible leadership, and to support our tribunal judges working within it. I commend clause 18 and schedule 3 to the Committee.
Dr Mullan
I had considered thinking of a question for every single amendment, but I elected against that. I speak in support of clause 18 and schedule 3. While the provisions may not generate the same level of public debate and scrutiny as the Bill’s earlier clauses regarding the restriction of jury trials, they carry significant institutional and constitutional weight within our judicial hierarchy.
The clause and schedule will bring the leadership of tribunals in England and Wales more firmly within the unified judicial structure, placing them under the overarching leadership of the Lady Chief Justice. In practical terms, this involves a title change for the Lady Chief Justice, who will become the president of the courts and tribunals of England and Wales. They also involve the transfer of specific leadership responsibilities that are currently vested in the Senior President of Tribunals.
The Government’s primary justification for the reform is administrative coherence and systemic flexibility. By reconfiguring the office of the Senior President of Tribunals, as the head of tribunals justice, the Bill attempts to create a more integrated and seamless judicial pyramid. In theory, such integration should allow for better co-ordination across different jurisdictions, ensuring that the tribunal judiciary is viewed not as a secondary or isolated branch of the law, but as an equal partner in the modern administration of justice.
The Opposition offer support for this move towards unity, acknowledging that a more cohesive leadership structure can streamline high-level decision making and improve the deployment of resources. However, that support must be tempered with a request for scrutiny. Unification should not be used as a tool for uniformity. Tribunals are substantially and culturally distinct from the traditional courts; they were designed specifically to be more accessible, specialist and often less formal in their proceedings. Their value to the public lies not only in their final adjudication of a dispute. Whether it is social security, immigration or employment, I am sure that we as MPs have all been contacted by constituents who have gone through, or expect to go through, a tribunal process.
Leadership arrangements are never merely technical; they shape the culture, training priorities and institutional identity of the body they lead. The Government have stated that practical leadership will continue to be exercised through a system of delegation back to the reconfigured office of the Senior President of Tribunals. While we recognise that this appears workable on paper, we must be satisfied that it will not allow creeping deprioritisation, a lack of focus, or a watering down of tribunals’ particular culture when they become part of this unified leadership. Will the Minister therefore assure us that thought has been given to ensuring an absence of uniformity, because we have specifically designed the courts not to be uniform, but different in their own way?
Sarah Sackman
That reflects the clause as drafted and the intention behind it, from speaking to our judicial leadership. In my experience, I have certainly found our judicial and tribunal leadership to be progressive, reforming and more open to cultural change, scrutiny and improvement than perhaps might previously have been the case. I welcome that, because it is as it should be. The hon. Member is right, of course: tribunals are different. They are meant to be informal and feel different from going to the High Court, which is all terribly alienating to the ordinary person who is untrained. A tribunal is supposed to involve a relatively cost-neutral and more relaxed process so that the individual can participate in it. Our proposals do not cut against that, but bring the judiciary across England and Wales into the notion of unity, with a lot of the benefits of being under a single leadership—sharing best practice and deploying judges across different jurisdictions—being enhanced, so that everyone can benefit without bleeding out the differences that rightly exist in our different courts and tribunals.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 3
Leadership of tribunals
Amendments made: 72, in schedule 3, page 68, line 4, after “may” insert
“, subject to the following provisions of this section,”.
This amendment is intended to clarify that the Lord Chief Justice’s general power under section 7A(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (inserted by the Bill) to delegate functions relating to tribunals is qualified by subsequent subsections of that section.
Amendment 73, in schedule 3, page 68, leave out line 5.
This amendment would remove redundancy in the drafting of new section 7A(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (inserted by the Bill).
Amendment 74, in schedule 3, page 68, line 9, at end insert—
“(1A) A function of the Lord Chief Justice may not be delegated under subsection (1) to a person who—
(a) is a judge, or other member, of the Upper Tribunal or First-tier Tribunal only by virtue of the person being a relevant Scottish office-holder or a relevant Northern Ireland office-holder, and
(b) is not a Chamber President, or a Deputy Chamber President, of a chamber of the Upper Tribunal or of a chamber of the First-tier Tribunal.”
This amendment, together with amendment 75, would prevent the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales delegating functions relating to tribunals to a person who is a judge of the Upper Tribunal or First-Tier Tribunal only because the person holds a particular judicial office in Scotland or Northern Ireland.
Amendment 75, in schedule 3, page 69, line 6, at end insert—
“(8A) For the purposes of subsection (1A)—
(a) a person is a ‘relevant Scottish office-holder’ if the person is—
(i) a judge of the Court of Session,
(ii) a sheriff in Scotland,
(iii) the President of Employment Tribunals (Scotland),
(iv) the Vice President of Employment Tribunals (Scotland), or
(v) a member of a panel of members of employment tribunals (whether or not a panel of Employment Judges) established for Scotland;
(b) a person is a ‘relevant Northern Ireland office-holder’ if the person is—
(i) a Lord Justice of Appeal in Northern Ireland,
(ii) a puisne judge of the High Court in Northern Ireland,
(iii) a county court judge in Northern Ireland,
(iv) a district judge in Northern Ireland,
(v) the Chief Social Security Commissioner, or any other Social Security Commissioner, appointed under section 50(1) of the Social Security Administration (Northern Ireland) Act 1992, or
(vi) a Social Security Commissioner appointed under section 50(2) of that Act (deputy Commissioners).”
See the explanatory statement to amendment 74.
Amendment 76, in schedule 3, page 69, line 21, after “may” insert
“, subject to the following provisions of this section,”.
This amendment would make a change to the drafting of new section 7B of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (further delegation of functions of the Lord Chief Justice) corresponding to the change made by amendment 72 to the drafting of new section 7A of that Act.
Amendment 77, in schedule 3, page 69, line 25, at end insert—
“(1A) A function of the Lord Chief Justice may not be further delegated under subsection (1) to a person who—
(a) is a judge, or other member, of the Upper Tribunal or First-tier Tribunal only by virtue of the person being a relevant Scottish office-holder or a relevant Northern Ireland office-holder, and
(b) is not a Chamber President, or a Deputy Chamber President, of a chamber of the Upper Tribunal or of a chamber of the First-tier Tribunal.”
This amendment would impose a limitation on the power to further delegate a function of the Lord Chief Justice under new section 7B of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 corresponding to the limitation imposed in relation to new section 7A of that Act by amendment 74.
Amendment 78, in schedule 3, page 69, line 28, leave out from “to” to end of line and insert
“a person appointed as—
(a) Deputy Head of Tribunals Justice, or
(b) Chamber President of a chamber of the Upper Tribunal.”
This amendment would enable functions of the Lord Chief Justice under paragraph 1(1) or 2(1) of Schedule 2 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 that are delegated to a senior judge to be further delegated to the Deputy Head of Tribunals Justice.
Amendment 79, in schedule 3, page 70, line 2, at end insert—
“‘relevant Scottish office-holder’ and ‘relevant Northern Ireland office-holder’ have the same meaning as in subsection (1A) of section 7A (see subsection (8A) of that section);”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 77.
Amendment 80, in schedule 3, page 70, line 7, leave out “(1)(b),” and insert
“(1)—
(a) in the words before paragraph (a), after ‘may’ insert ‘, subject to the following provisions of this section,’;
(b) in paragraph (b),”.
This amendment would make a change to the drafting of section 8 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (Senior President of Tribunals: power to delegate) corresponding to the change made by amendment 72 to the drafting of new section 7A of that Act.
Amendment 81, in schedule 3, page 70, line 8, at end insert—
“(2A) In subsection (1A)—
(a) for ‘paragraph 1(1) or 2(1) of Schedule 2’ substitute ‘any of the provisions listed in subsection (1B)’;
(b) for ‘a Chamber President of a chamber of the Upper Tribunal’ substitute ‘a person appointed as—
(a) Deputy Head of Tribunals Justice, or
(b) Chamber President of a chamber of the Upper Tribunal’.
(2B) After subsection (1A) insert—
‘(1B) The provisions are—
section 7(7);
section 7(8B) and (9);
paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 2;
paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 2;
paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 3;
paragraph 7(1) of Schedule 3;
paragraph 2 of Schedule 4;
paragraph 5(1) and (3) of Schedule 4;
paragraph 5(5) to (8) of Schedule 4;
paragraph 5A(3A) of Schedule 4.’”
This amendment would insert provision amending section 8 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 to enable the Senior President of Tribunals to delegate to the Deputy Head of Tribunals Justice or an Upper Tribunal Chamber President certain functions to which subsection (1) of that section does not currently apply.
Amendment 82, in schedule 3, page 70, line 9, leave out sub-paragraph (3) and insert—
“(3) For subsection (2) substitute—
‘(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to functions of the Senior President of Tribunals under any of the following—
section 29B;
section 29D;
section 46;
paragraph 3 of Schedule 5;
paragraph 2 of Schedule A1 to the Employment Tribunals Act 1996.’”
This amendment is consequential on amendment 81.
Amendment 83, in schedule 3, page 70, line 21, at end insert—
“18A After section 8 insert—
‘8A Delegation: supplementary
(1) Where a function is exercisable, in a particular case, by the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals, acting jointly—
(a) so far as the function is exercisable by the Lord Chief Justice, it is to be treated for the purposes of section 7A as a relevant tribunal function and may be delegated under that section, and further delegated under section 7B, accordingly (including to the Senior President of Tribunals);
(b) so far as the function is exercisable by the Senior President of Tribunals—
(i) it is to be treated for the purposes of section 8 as a function the Senior President of Tribunals has in that capacity and may be delegated under section 8 accordingly, but
(ii) it may not be delegated under that section to the Lord Chief Justice.
(2) Where a person (“the delegator”) has a power to delegate a function under section 7A, 7B or 8—
(a) any requirement that the delegator may exercise the function only with the concurrence of another person (“P”) does not prevent the delegator from delegating the function to P, and
(b) if the delegator delegates the function to P, any such requirement is to be disregarded so far as the function is exercised by P.
(3) In this section “the Lord Chief Justice” means the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales.’”
This amendment would insert provision intended to clarify the effect of delegation powers under the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, inserted or amended by the Bill, in cases where the function being delegated is exercisable jointly with, or with the concurrence of, the person to whom it is delegated.
Amendment 84, in schedule 3, page 75, line 6, leave out “senior judge” and insert
“person who holds high judicial office”.
This amendment would enable functions of the Senior President of Tribunals to be exercised during any vacancy or incapacity by a holder of high judicial office in Scotland or Northern Ireland (as well as in England and Wales).
Amendment 85, in schedule 3, page 75, leave out lines 12 and 13 and insert—
“‘high judicial office’ has the same meaning as in Part 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (see section 60(2)(a)of that Act);”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 84.
Amendment 86, in schedule 3, page 88, line 9, at end insert—
“32A In Schedule 8 (tribunals and inquiries: consequential and other amendments), in paragraph 41, omit sub-paragraphs (3) and (6) (which insert into the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 provision repealed by this Act).”
This amendment would repeal provisions of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 which insert into the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 provision repealed by the Bill.
Amendment 87, in schedule 3, page 92, line 38, at end insert—
“Agriculture Act 1947
43A In Schedule 9 to the Agriculture Act 1947 (constitution etc. of tribunals etc.), in paragraph 15A (which provides for a member of the First-tier Tribunal to act as a member of the Agricultural Land Tribunal)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (1), for ‘the Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘the appropriate office-holder’;
(b) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—
‘(1ZA) In sub-paragraph (1), “the appropriate office-holder” means—
(a) in relation to a member of the First-tier Tribunal who exercises functions wholly or mainly in Scotland or Northern Ireland, the Senior President of Tribunals;
(b) in any other case, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales.’
Lands Tribunal Act 1949
43B In section 1 of the Lands Tribunal Act 1949 (which makes provision including provision about selecting a surveyor for the purposes of section 58 or 106 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845)—
(a) in subsection (6), for ‘the Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘the appropriate office-holder’;
(b) after subsection (6) insert—
‘(6ZA) In subsection (6) “the appropriate office-holder” means—
(a) in relation to the determination of compensation to be paid in respect of land in England or Wales, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales;
(b) in any other case, the Senior President of Tribunals.
(6ZB) Section 7A of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (Lord Chief Justice: power to delegate) applies to any function of the Lord Chief Justice under subsection (6) as it applies to a relevant tribunal function within the meaning of that section.
For provision enabling the delegation of any function of the Senior President of Tribunals, see section 8 of that Act.’
Rent Act 1977
43C In Schedule 10 to the Rent Act 1977 (rent assessment committees), in paragraph 5A (which provides for a member of the First-tier Tribunal to act as a member of a committee in Wales)—
(a) the existing text becomes sub-paragraph (1);
(b) in that sub-paragraph, for ‘the Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘the appropriate office-holder’;
(c) after that sub-paragraph insert—
‘(2) In sub-paragraph (1), “the appropriate office-holder” means—
(a) in relation to a member of the First-tier Tribunal who exercises functions wholly or mainly in Scotland or Northern Ireland, the Senior President of Tribunals;
(b) in any other case, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales.’”
This amendment would insert provision amending provisions of the Agriculture Act 1947, the Lands Tribunal Act 1949 and the Rent Act 1977 so as to confer on the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales certain functions currently conferred on the Senior President of Tribunals.
Amendment 88, in schedule 3, page 93, line 12, leave out paragraph 46 and insert—
“46 In section 9 (assistance for transaction of judicial business)—
(a) in subsection (1), in the Table (judges deployable to certain courts), in column 1 of entry 4A (the Senior President of Tribunals), after ‘Senior President of Tribunals’ insert ‘, if not an ex-officio judge of the Court of Appeal’;
(b) omit subsection (1ZA).”
This amendment would enable a holder of the office of Senior President of Tribunals who is an ex-officio judge of the Court of Appeal to act on request as a judge of the Crown Court (like all other judges of the Court of Appeal).
Amendment 89, in schedule 3, page 93, line 29, at end insert—
“Mental Health Act 1983
48A In Schedule 2 to the Mental Health Act 1983 (Mental Health Review Tribunal for Wales), in paragraph 5 (which provides for certain members of the First-tier Tribunal to act as members of the tribunal)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (1), for ‘the Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘the appropriate office-holder’;
(b) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—
‘(1ZA) In sub-paragraph (1), “the appropriate office-holder” means—
(a) in relation to a member of the First-tier Tribunal who exercises functions wholly or mainly in Scotland or Northern Ireland, the Senior President of Tribunals;
(b) in any other case, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales.’
Landlord and Tenant Act 1987
48B In section 33 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 (acquisition order where landlord cannot be found)—
(a) in subsection (2)(a), for ‘the Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales’;
(b) after subsection (3) insert—
‘(4) Section 7A of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (Lord Chief Justice: power to delegate) applies to the function of the Lord Chief Justice under subsection (2)(a) as it applies to a relevant tribunal function within the meaning of that section.’
Local Government Finance Act 1988
48C In Part 1 of Schedule 11 to the Local Government Finance Act 1988 (the Valuation Tribunal for England), in paragraph A18A (power for member of First-tier Tribunal to act as member of the Tribunal)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (2)(a), for ‘the Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘the appropriate office-holder’;
(b) in sub-paragraph (9), after paragraph (a) insert—
‘(aa) “the appropriate office-holder” means—
(i) in relation to an FTT member who exercises functions wholly or mainly in Scotland or Northern Ireland, the Senior President of Tribunals, and
(ii) in any other case, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, and’.
Social Security Act 1998
48D (1) Section 15A of the Social Security Act 1998 (functions of Senior President of Tribunals) is amended as follows.
(2) For the heading substitute ‘Confidentiality in the First-tier Tribunal’.
(3) In subsection (1), for ‘The Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘The appropriate office-holder’.
(4) After subsection (1) insert—
‘(1A) In subsection (1), “the appropriate office-holder” means—
(a) in relation to the First-tier Tribunal in England and Wales, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales;
(b) in relation to the First-tier Tribunal in Scotland or Northern Ireland, the Senior President of Tribunals.’”
This amendment would insert provision amending provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983, the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987, the Local Government Finance Act 1988 and the Social Security Act 1998 so as to confer on the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales certain functions currently conferred on the Senior President of Tribunals.
Amendment 90, in schedule 3, page 94, line 1, at end insert—
“49A The Crime and Courts Act 2013 is amended as follows.”
This amendment is consequential on amendment 92.
Amendment 91, in schedule 3, page 94, line 2, leave out “the Crime and Courts Act 2013, in”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 90.
Amendment 92, in schedule 3, page 94, line 3, at end insert—
“50A In Schedule 13 (judicial appointments), omit the following provisions (which insert into the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 provision repealed by this Act)—
(a) paragraph 30(3);
(b) paragraph 43;
(c) paragraph 44(2);
(d) paragraph 45(2) and (4);
(e) paragraph 46(2) and (6);
(f) paragraph 47(4) to (6), (8), (9), (11) and (12).
50B In Schedule 14 (deployment of the judiciary), in paragraph 12, omit sub-paragraph (2) (which inserts into the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 provision repealed by this Act).”
This amendment would repeal provisions of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 which insert into the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 provision repealed by the Bill.
Amendment 93, in schedule 3, page 94, line 3, at end insert—
“Wales Act 2017
50A (1) Section 63 of the Wales Act 2017 (cross-deployment of tribunal members and judges) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1), for the words from ‘if’ to the end substitute ‘—
(a) in England and Wales, if the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales asks the member to do so and the President of Welsh Tribunals agrees to the request being made;
(b) in Scotland or Northern Ireland, if the Senior President of Tribunals asks the member to do so and the President of Welsh Tribunals agrees to the request being made.’
(3) In subsection (2), in the words after paragraph (b), for ‘the Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘the appropriate office-holder’.
(4) After subsection (2) insert—
‘(2A) In subsection (2), “the appropriate office-holder” means—
(a) where the tribunal member exercises functions wholly or mainly in Scotland or Northern Ireland, the Senior President of Tribunals;
(b) in any other case, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales.’”
This amendment would insert provision amending provisions of the Wales Act 2017 so as to confer on the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales certain functions currently conferred on the Senior President of Tribunals.
Amendment 94, in schedule 3, page 94, line 3, at end insert—
“Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018
50A In the Schedule to the Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 (authorised court and tribunal staff: legal advice and judicial functions), omit paragraph 40 (which inserts into the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 provision repealed by this Act).”
This amendment would repeal provision of the Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 which inserts into the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 provision repealed by the Bill.
Amendment 95, in schedule 3, page 95, line 4, at end insert—
“Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022
54 The Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 is amended as follows.
55 (1) Section 32 (judicial agreement to certain regulations) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1)(a)—
(a) omit the ‘or’ at the end of sub-paragraph (i);
(b) at the end of sub-paragraph (ii) insert
‘, or
(iii) relevant tribunal proceedings in England and Wales;’.
(3) In subsection (1)(b)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (i), after ‘First-tier Tribunal’ insert ‘in Scotland or Northern Ireland’;
(b) in sub-paragraph (ii), after ‘Upper Tribunal’ insert ‘in Scotland or Northern Ireland’;
(c) in sub-paragraph (iii), after ‘employment tribunals’ insert ‘in Scotland’;
(d) in sub-paragraph (iv), after ‘Employment Appeal Tribunal’ insert ‘in Scotland’.
(4) After subsection (2) insert—
‘(3) In this section, “relevant tribunal proceedings” means proceedings in—
(a) the First-tier Tribunal,
(b) the Upper Tribunal,
(c) employment tribunals, or
(d) the Employment Appeal Tribunal.’
56 (1) Schedule 3 (practice directions for online proceedings) is amended as follows.
(2) In Part 2 (proceedings in the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal), in paragraph 7 (giving practice directions)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (1), for ‘The Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘The Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals, acting jointly,’;
(b) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—
‘(1A) The Lord Chief Justice may give practice directions under paragraph 5 in relation to proceedings in a Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal whose business involves only the application of the law of England and Wales.
(1B) The Senior President of Tribunals may give practice directions under paragraph 5 in relation to proceedings in a Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal whose business involves only the application of the law of Scotland or Northern Ireland.’;
(c) in sub-paragraph (2), for ‘The Senior President may not give practice directions’ substitute ‘Practice directions may not be given under sub-paragraph (1), (1A) or (1B)’;
(d) in sub-paragraph (4)—
(i) omit the ‘and’ at the end of paragraph (a);
(ii) after paragraph (a) insert—
‘(aa) the Lord Chief Justice, if the business of the Chamber to which the directions relate involves the application of the law of England and Wales, and’;
(iii) in paragraph (b), after ‘Tribunals’ insert ‘, if the business of the Chamber to which the directions relate involves the application of the law of Scotland or Northern Ireland’;
(e) in sub-paragraph (6)—
(i) for ‘the approval of the Senior President of Tribunals if’ substitute ‘any approval’;
(ii) for ‘sub-paragraph (4)(b)’ insert ‘sub-paragraph (4)(aa) or (b)’.
(3) In Part 3 (proceedings in employment tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal), in paragraph 11 (giving practice directions)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (1)—
(i) for ‘The Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘The Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals, acting jointly,’;
(ii) for ‘any proceedings’ substitute ‘proceedings in the Employment Appeal Tribunal’;
(b) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—
‘(1A) The Lord Chief Justice may give practice directions under paragraph 9 in relation to proceedings in employment tribunals in England and Wales.
(1B) The Senior President of Tribunals may give practice directions under paragraph 9 in relation to proceedings in employment tribunals in Scotland.’;
(c) in sub-paragraph (2), for ‘The Senior President may not give practice directions’ substitute ‘Practice directions may not be given under sub-paragraph (1), (1A) or (1B)’;
(d) in sub-paragraph (5), for the words from ‘of—’ to’ the end substitute ‘of the Lord Chancellor’;
(e) after sub-paragraph (5) insert—
‘(5A) The President of the Employment Appeal Tribunal may not give practice directions without the approval of—
(a) the Lord Chief Justice, and
(b) the Senior President of Tribunals.
(5B) The President of Employment Tribunals (England and Wales) may not give practice directions without the approval of the Lord Chief Justice.
(5C) The President of Employment Tribunals (Scotland) may not give practice directions without the approval of the Senior President of Tribunals.’;
(f) in sub-paragraph (6), for ‘sub-paragraph (5)(a)’ substitute ‘sub-paragraph (5)’;
(g) in sub-paragraph (7)—
(i) for ‘sub-paragraph (5)(a)’ substitute ‘sub-paragraph (5)’;
(ii) for ‘the approval of the Senior President of Tribunals if’ substitute ‘any approval’;
(iii) for ‘sub-paragraph (5)(b)’ substitute ‘sub-paragraph (5A), (5B) or (5C)’.”
This amendment would insert provision amending provisions of the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 so as to confer on the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales certain functions currently conferred on the Senior President of Tribunals.
Amendment 96, in schedule 3, page 95, line 4, at end insert—
“57 In Schedule 5 (employment tribunal procedure rules: further provision)—
(a) in paragraph 3, omit sub-paragraphs (3) and (6) (which insert into the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 provision repealed by this Act);
(b) omit paragraph 28 (which inserts into the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 provision repealed by this Act).”—(Sarah Sackman.)
This amendment would repeal provisions of the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 which insert into the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 and the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 provision repealed by the Bill.
Schedule 3, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 19
Lay justices’ allowances
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Sarah Sackman
The clause will make it easier to make changes to the types of expenses that can be reimbursed so that we can more nimbly react to what the magistracy requires. It is right that our valued magistrates are reimbursed for reasonable expenses and should not feel out of pocket for serving their community.
Section 15 of the Courts Act 2003 sets out three specific categories of reimbursable expenses: travel, subsistence and financial loss. However, those statutory categories are, in effect, over-prescriptive. The provisions in the Bill follow the recommendation of the independent review of the criminal courts to move the categories of magistrates’ expenses which may be reimbursed from primary to secondary legislation, which will provide the flexibility to update them more quickly and to respond to changes in the evolving needs of magistrates’ expenses.
I turn now to the detail. Proposed new section 15(1) of the 2003 Act replaces the existing statutory categories of magistrates’ expenses with a delegated power enabling the Lord Chancellor to specify, in regulations, the categories of expenses or financial loss for which a magistrate can be reimbursed in connection with the performance of their duties. The power also enables regulations to provide for reimbursement of expenditure incurred or financial loss suffered as a result of those duties.
Subsection (2) outlines what matters may be addressed in the regulations and sets out what is and is not to be treated as the performance of a magistrate’s official duties, the circumstances under which expenditure of financial loss can be considered to arise from the carrying out of those duties, and administrative arrangements for making and determining claims.
I realise that the clause sounds a little dry, but it is really important. We have talked about the important role that our magistrates play in our criminal justice system. Whatever one’s view of the Government’s reforms, they are being given more responsibilities and work to do, and we will need to attract more people.
I think that the hon. Member for Chichester raised the important issue of magistrate retention. For every magistrate we recruit and train up and who must gain experience, we are seeing people leave the magistracy, partly because we are not supporting the important role they provide society and supporting them to remain magistrates for longer. That is about expenses and recognising people’s service, which is why we are looking to provide rewards and outward recognition through a long service medal. Those are all important.
Although the clause is technical, when I spoke to the Magistrates’ Leadership Executive and the Magistrates’ Association, they were delighted by it. They know that their members need to feel valued. Part of that is not making them feel undervalued by leaving them out of pocket. Even if the system were not reformed, this would be a good measure. If there is to be reform and we are to attract the magistrates we need, it is a really good thing.
John Slinger (Rugby) (Lab)
The Minister is quite right to point out that the clause is somewhat technical, but it speaks to the importance of we as a society and we as a Parliament—as legislators—making sure that, although we do not seek to professionalise the magistracy entirely, we give them the support that professionals would expect. If we want to attract people into the magistracy, this is exactly what we need to do. They certainly deserve an update to the system of expenses and more.
Sarah Sackman
I could not agree more. That is precisely why we are doing this, and it is why I commend the clause to the Committee.
Dr Mullan
I rise to speak in enthusiastic support of the clause. If we were starting from scratch, would we deal with this issue in primary legislation? I expect not. I do not know the history of why the approach of the time was followed, but it seems that the matter should be addressed flexibly via regulations. Members will have heard us argue vociferously against the use of both positive and negative regulations in different contexts, but it seems appropriate in these circumstances. The proposal reflects the changing nature of how people work, interact and fulfil their role as magistrates. We want to support and accommodate that in a way that is not over-rigid.
Of course, there will be opportunities for scrutiny of the legislation to come. Even though we have talked about the significant limitations of the negative procedure, scrutiny is still an option in theory if something were proposed that that we really were not happy about. Considering the stakes of this issue, that is a proportionate approach.
Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Jardine.
I wanted to speak on this clause because, as the Minister said, while it is technical and feels dry, it is incredibly important. I appeared in front of many magistrates over my 21 years as a Crown prosecutor. They do an incredibly important job and provide a huge public service. During the course of this legislative process, it has been concerning to hear suggestions that magistrates are, in some respects, an inferior bench or forum for our criminal justice system. That is far from my experience over 21 years.
I put on record my thanks to all the magistrates who serve day in, day out, across this country. The clause recognises them and shows that we can be dynamic in rewarding them. The Minister mentioned the medal, which I welcome. I can think of many magistrates who deserve a medal for their work. It is important that we pass the clause today.
Sarah Sackman
That is true. We should be doing what is set out in this good clause and I have nothing more to add.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 20
Special provision when Crown Court sits in City of London
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Sarah Sackman
Clause 20 concerns the statutory title “Central Criminal Court”, which has been on the statute book since 1834 and refers, in practice, to the Old Bailey. Under existing legislation, the title applies to the Crown court sitting within the City of London. Historically, the only Crown court located within the City has been the Old Bailey, so the provision has operated without difficulty. From next year, however, I am absolutely delighted to say that the City of London Corporation’s new courts complex at Salisbury Square will open. It is fantastic; I have been to seen it—I had to do that politician’s thing of wearing high-vis and a hard hat.
The complex is an amazing facility for London’s justice system, with modern courtrooms. It is a brilliant resource, providing much needed additional Crown court capacity following more than £600 million of investment. Without legislative clarification, however, both the Old Bailey and the new courts at Salisbury Square would automatically be designated as the Central Criminal Court. That would cause operational confusion for court users and practitioners. Clause 20 therefore clarifies that the statutory title will continue to apply only to the Old Bailey.
The clause also maintains the long-standing statutory entitlement of the Lord Mayor and aldermen of the City of London to sit as judges when the Crown court sits within the City. In practice, and as a matter of convention, they do not assert that entitlement in order to sit in hearings in criminal cases. The clause does not alter how that entitlement is exercised in practice; it ensures that the historic statutory entitlement continues to apply consistently when the Crown court sits in more than one location within the City.
The City’s historic relationship with the Central Criminal Court does not affect judicial independence or integrity, and all judicial business will continue to be conducted by independent, legally qualified judges. I commend clause 20 to the Committee.
Dr Mullan
I rise to speak in support of clause 20, which is a technical and geographic provision necessitated by the significant infrastructure developments currently under way in the City of London. As new law courts are developed, specifically at the Salisbury Square site—we mentioned the specialist fraud court earlier in the Committee, and I do not know if that is included in the site—the law must be updated to clarify how historical designations, sitting rights and traditional roles are to be maintained in a changing physical landscape. The clause is a matter of ensuring that our legal terminology catches up with the physical reality of the court estate.
The primary objective of the clause is clarity and the avoidance of ambiguity. It ensures that the prestigious and globally recognised designation of the Central Criminal Court remains attached exclusively to the historic Old Bailey site. “Old Bailey” is a phrase that many people will be familiar with, and it acts as a tourist draw for our visitor economy. It is important to ensure that the title is not diluted or confused as additional Crown court capacity is brought online at other locations within the City boundaries.
Simultaneously, the clause ensures that the historical sitting rights of the Lord Mayor and aldermen of the City of London are maintained and extended to any Crown court site within the City. That is a respectful preservation of the unique judicial heritage of the City of London Corporation, ensuring that ceremonial traditions and historical roles are not inadvertently extinguished by modern building projects.
The Opposition support clause 20 as a necessary administrative measure. It is a fundamental principle of good lawmaking that technical clauses should be explained clearly to the Committee so that their practical effect is well understood. I thank the Minister for doing that today.
Sarah Sackman
There is only one Old Bailey, and as a result of clause 20, there will only ever be one Old Bailey. I invite all members of the Committee to join together on a group tour of the new facility in Salisbury Square when it opens, hopefully in a year’s time.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Stephen Morgan.)
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eleventh sitting)
Tuesday 28th April 2026
(3 months, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Courts and Tribunals Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 28 April 2026 - (28 Apr 2026)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we begin, I will deal with the normal courtesies: devices must be on silent and tea and coffee are not allowed. Today is the last sitting of line-by-line consideration of the Bill. Under the programme order agreed by the Committee, I must bring proceedings to a close by 5 pm, if we have not already finished by that point.
New Clause 1
Reduction in sentence for a guilty plea
“(1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 73 (Reduction in sentence for guilty plea), after subsection (2) insert—
‘(2ZA) The maximum level of reduction in sentence for a guilty plea that the court can apply is two-fifths.
(2ZB) The reduction set out in subsection (2ZA) may not be limited to a guilty plea at the first stage of proceedings.
(2ZC) A reduction of sentence under subsection (2ZA) is available to the defendant prior to a retrial.’”—(Yasmin Qureshi.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir John. New clause 1, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson), would address cases in which the prosecutions need to start a second or third time. It would reclassify offences and move the threshold of offences that are in the Crown court to summary offences. It would increase the maximum possible sentence reduction on a guilty plea to two fifths, remove the restriction that means the highest reduction is available only for early-stage guilty pleas, allow the defendant to receive that reduction even if they plead guilty later in the process, and extend eligibility so that the reduction can also apply before a retrial.
The new clause would build on the huge successes of the Liverpool model and Operation Expedite—which was praised by Sir Brian Leveson’s review of the criminal courts—in bringing down court backlogs. Those successes were largely based on a focus on pre-trial negotiation or plea bargains to avoid cases going to a trial and taking up court time.
The new clause is in tune with the Government’s recent announcement following the review carried out by the former Lord Chancellor, David Gauke, which looked at trying to avoid giving people a sentence of less than one year because of the disruptive nature of those sentences. The Government could accept the new clause as part of the process of trying to prevent a backlog. It would also allow people to plead guilty, which would be better for victims, complainants, witnesses and the court system.
Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)
I wish to make some brief remarks. I am keen to see suggestions of alternative approaches, but we have to be careful when it comes to discounts for guilty pleas, because there is a balance to be struck from the perspective of victims and complainants. We do not want to be in a situation where they feel that justice is undermined, particularly given the many other things the Government are doing to reduce the punitive element of the justice system.
I am sure the Committee will know that thousands of serious violent sexual offenders will be getting reductions in their prison time. For example, two thirds of those sent to prison every year for rape will have their prison time reduced, and more than 90% of those sentenced for child grooming offences and similar offences will have their prison time reduced to one third. We are already seeing appalling erosions of the punitive element of the justice system by the Labour Government; I would be wary about doing anything that adds to that.
The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir John. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden for speaking to the new clause. As she knows, an early guilty plea avoids the need for a trial, shortens the gap between charge and sentence and, crucially, can save victims and witnesses from the concern of having to give evidence.
Sir Brian Leveson’s independent review of the criminal courts found that
“guilty pleas are being entered later and later”
in the process. It found that
“in 2016, approximately 25% of defendants who pleaded guilty to all counts prior to trial did so at or after their third pre-trial hearing”,
compared with 35% in 2024. That reflects the decline in the efficiency and the increase in delays in the criminal courts. Sir Brian made it clear that that was contributing to the backlog and, in turn, creating a “feedback loop” of perverse incentives for defendants. There are, then, clearly benefits to ensuring that those who intend to plead guilty do so at the earliest possible opportunity.
For those reasons, it has long been the practice of the criminal courts to give a reduction in sentence when an offender pleads guilty earlier in the process. The level of sentence reduction that the court can give on a guilty plea is currently set out in sentencing guidelines produced by the Sentencing Council. In his review, Sir Brian made a number of recommendations relating to early guilty pleas, including a recommendation to increase the maximum reduction in sentence for a guilty plea from 33% to 40%, which new clause 1 seeks to implement.
However, we must maintain the right balance between the benefits to the system obtained by the making of early guilty pleas and ensuring that offenders are appropriately punished for their crimes. Sir Brian also notes that increasing the maximum sentencing discount for early guilty pleas could increase the
“risk of pressure being brought to bear on defendants to plead guilty, who might not otherwise have done so.”
It is therefore important that we consider whether there are alternative ways to encourage early guilty pleas, as opposed to increasing the level of maximum sentence discount.
We are not convinced that a further discount will work to incentivise the behaviours that we desire in the system, not least because other matters play their part in incentivising an early guilty plea, or the opposite. They include the nature of the offence, whether a defendant is remanded or released on bail, and the level of early engagement by the prosecution and defence in advancing case progression. We consider all those things as alternative factors that drive defendant behaviour. Most importantly, the punishment must be appropriate to the offence in question, and we think the new clause would cut against that.
We are currently carefully reviewing Sir Brian’s remaining recommendations, alongside part 2 of his review, and we will set out our full detailed response to that review in due course. For those reasons, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden to withdraw the clause.
Yasmin Qureshi
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 2
Specialists courts for sexual offences and domestic abuse cases
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must by regulations establish specialist courts for cases relating to sexual offences and domestic abuse.
(2) Any case heard in a court established under subsection (1) must be conducted with a jury and specialist judge.
(3) Additional guidance or directions may be formulated by the judiciary in relation to—
(a) the nature and dynamics of behaviour including—
(i) coercive control, and
(ii) honour-based abuse;
(b) best practice in hearing cases involving violence against women and girls, including ensuring fair and trauma-informed proceedings.
(4) Regulations under this section must make provision for such courts to have specialist facilities for alleged victims.
(5) The Lord Chancellor must take reasonable steps for any necessary resources for judicial, administrative and legal support, including advisors, prosecution and defence, to be made available to operate such courts.
(6) Any case heard by a court established under subsection (1) must be subject to such considerations regarding—
(a) time limits for case preparation,
(b) fixed dates for trial, and
(c) third party material review and disclosure,
as the Lord Chancellor may by regulations specify.
(7) Regulations under this section must include provision for the prioritised listing and progression of hearings and trials for such cases in such specialist courts, including the prioritisation of cases where the defendant is on bail.
(8) Regulations in this section are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.”—(Yasmin Qureshi.)
This new clause would establish specialist courts for sexual offences and domestic abuse cases, with those cases heard by a specialist judge and a jury. It makes further provision including for victim support, and to prioritise cases where a defendant is bailed.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 6—Fast-track courts for rape and serious sexual offences—
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must by regulations make provision for specialist court capacity for cases involving rape and serious sexual offences (‘RASSO’).
(2) Regulations under this section must include provision for the prioritised listing and progression of RASSO cases.
(3) The Lord Chancellor must take reasonable steps for any necessary judicial, administrative and support resources to be made available to operate such court capacity.”
This new clause would require the Lord Chancellor to ensure that specialist court capacity is made available for the fast-tracking of RASSO cases.
New clause 23—Report on the effect of the Act on prosecution of rape and serious sexual offences—
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must commission a report on the effect of the provisions of the Act on proceedings of cases involving rape and serious sexual offences.
(2) The matters the report must consider include—
(a) the effect of the Act on the time taken to dispose of cases;
(b) the effect of the Act on witness participation in proceedings; and
(c) the effect of the Act on experience of victims during proceedings.
(3) The report must make recommendations to improve each of the matters set out in subsection (2).
(4) Recommendations may include—
(a) recommendations about how the Act is implemented, and
(b) recommendations about further provision necessary to improve each matter.
(5) In this section, serious sexual offences are such offences as the Crown Prosecution Service may from time to time specify.
(6) Within twelve months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament—
(a) a copy of a report under this section,
(b) the Lord Chancellor’s response to recommendations made by that report.”
This new clause would require a report on the effect of the provisions of the Bill on the progression of RASSO cases, and require the Lord Chancellor to respond to these recommendations.
New clause 25—Courts for rape and sexual offences—
“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for a specialist sexual offences court to be established at each Crown Court location in England and Wales for the purpose set out in subsection (2).
(2) The purpose of any court established under subsection (1) is to ensure that trials relating to sexual offences, sexual abuse, and rape are heard as quickly as possible.
(3) Any court established under subsection (1) must make provision for support from independent sexual violence advisers to be accessible to victims.
(4) Regulations under this section must make specialist trauma training available for staff working in each such court.
(5) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.”
This amendment would set up the specialist rape courts promised in the Labour Party Manifesto.
Yasmin Qureshi
I rise to speak in support of new clause 2, which was tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North (Charlotte Nichols). On Second Reading, my hon. Friend made one of the most powerful contributions the House has heard in recent memory. She spoke from her own experience as a victim of rape and made a point that deserves to be heard again in this Committee. She said that the experiences of victims are being “weaponised” and used as a rhetorical cover for reforms that do not deliver anything meaningful for those victims.
My hon. Friend also said something that goes to the heart of this debate: we promised specialist rape courts in our manifesto. The Bill does not deliver them. That observation raises a wider question for the Committee, as we consider new clause 2, about the manifesto commitment and what the Bill does instead. The Labour manifesto made a clear commitment to establish specialist courts for rape and sexual offences and for domestic abuse. That commitment existed because we recognised that the system was failing victims, not because of juries but because of how cases were being managed—the delays, lack of court capacity, the way evidence is handled and the limited support available to those giving evidence.
New clause 2 is the legislative delivery of that manifesto commitment. It would not require us to restrict jury trials or accept a reform the benefits of which may, according to the Institute for Government, amount to as little as a 1% to 2% reduction in delays—a reduction the Bar Council considers optimistic. Instead, it would require us to build something that is already proven to work.
What works and what does not work? On Second Reading, my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North pointed to the work already under way at Liverpool and Preston Crown courts. That work is reducing waiting times for complainants and defendants—we are talking about months, not years—without removing anyone’s right to be tried by a jury. That is the model, that is what we should be scaling, and that is what the new clause would require the Lord Chancellor to do.
Instead, the Government have brought forward reforms that will not take effect until 2028 or 2029. A victim who reports a rape today will wait through years under the existing system before a single one of the Bill’s provisions affects their case. We are being asked to accept a permanent reduction in defendants’ rights in exchange for a speculative and delayed improvement in victims’ experience. That is not a serious offer.
Let us be clear what the Bill does not do. It will not improve how evidence is handled, how cases are managed or how victims are supported through the process. It will not guarantee timely disclosure, it will not ensure fixed trial dates, it will not provide independent sexual violence advisers where they are needed, it will not reform the conduct of cross-examination, and it will not address wider support or compensation issues. All of those things, which the violence against women and girls sector and Rape Crisis England and Wales have consistently called for, remain untouched.
As my hon. Friend said on Second Reading, we should not claim that the Bill delivers justice for victims unless it actually does. The Bill will not do that. New clause 2 would take a different approach. It would preserve jury involvement in every case while introducing a specialist court designed to deal properly with sexual offences and domestic abuse. Each case would be heard by a jury and a specialist judge with training in coercive control, trauma responses, honour-based abuse and best practice in cases involving violence against women and girls. That combination matters. A specialist judge improves the management of proceedings. A jury brings the collective judgment and diversity of the public.
As the Lammy review found, juries are far more diverse than the judiciary, and there is no evidence that jury verdicts are affected by the ethnicity of the defendant. By contrast, the removal of juries risks undermining confidence, particularly among victims from minority backgrounds or people from poorer working-class backgrounds.
To address the real causes of delay, we ask that strict time limits for case preparation are set. We ask for fixed and reliable trial dates; the proper management of disclosure and third-party material; the prioritised listing of cases, including those of defendants who are on bail; specialist facilities for victims; and the adequate resourcing of judicial, administrative and legal support, including independent sexual violence advisers. These practical reforms would make a material difference to how cases are handled and to the experience of the victim, and they can be done quite quickly.
The Government have relied heavily on the experience of victims to justify the reforms, so they should support new clause 2, which would deliver on our manifesto commitment. It is based on a model that already works well. It would improve things for victims without removing fundamental safeguards and does not ask victims to wait until the end of the decade to see any benefit.
The Government have identified a real problem but, with respect, have chosen the wrong solution. If the Bill was truly about delivering justice for victims of rape and sexual violence, we would not be debating the restriction of jury trial; we would be implementing the specialist courts we promised. The Bill does not do that. I ask the Government to consider the new clause; otherwise, it will be a missed opportunity. I commend the new clause to the Committee.
Dr Mullan
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir John. We are all here because we recognise that the current state of our criminal courts is untenable. Complainants and defendants alike are facing unacceptable delays, and victims and innocent defendants are suffering as a result. The Government’s response, as set out in the Bill, is a radical restructuring of our trial processes, most notably in the removal of the right to a jury in a vast number of cases—around half, in fact. We believe there is a strong obligation on the Government to institute a more targeted, and potentially more effective, way to address the specific delays that they most frequently cite, through the establishment of specialist courts for rape and serious sexual offences.
The Minister herself raised this issue in the Chamber on 7 January. When talking about jury trial reforms, she said:
“Does it make sense that the queue of the victim of rape or of a homicide is shared with someone who has stolen a bottle of whisky”?—[Official Report, 7 January 2026; Vol. 778, c. 278.]
In December, the Deputy Prime Minister and Lord Chancellor said:
“if someone is charged with an offence such as theft of a bicycle, theft from a vehicle or employee theft, they can opt for a trial that, by necessity, goes into the system and will delay a rape trial”.—[Official Report, 2 December 2025; Vol. 776, c. 807.]
That point has been made by a number of Labour MPs, including the hon. Member for Bolsover (Natalie Fleet). The Opposition have been clear that that is an oversimplification of how the listing process works, and that some of those examples are extremely unlikely to be in the queue in the Crown court, except for in specific circumstances. Nevertheless, the Government have been advancing that case.
A commitment to introduce specialist courts was actually in the Government’s manifesto. By fulfilling the promises made to the electorate, the Government can deliver swifter justice for a group of victims they have centred in the debate, without dismantling the constitutional right to elect for jury trial. The Government’s proposals to halve the number of jury trials was not in the Labour party manifesto, but on page 67 there was a commitment to
“fast-track rape cases, with specialist courts at every Crown Court location in England and Wales.”
It could therefore be argued that—as much as we can debate what in an entire manifesto the public vote for—the public voted for a system that would prioritise these types of cases through specialisation and resourcing, and did not vote for a system that would instead prioritise administrative throughput by removing the right to elect to be judged by one’s peers.
Sometimes, Governments do things that were not in their manifesto one way or another, or were not touched on in any way, but it would be difficult for people to argue that the public had a specific idea that they were not going to get certain things. However, if a Government put in their manifesto a particular element of direct relevance, as they did in relation to specialist courts, the public would have every right to be aggrieved if something entirely different, and significantly so, appeared as Government policy instead of what was in the manifesto.
Opposition new clause 25 asks the Government to return to their original vision. It is similar to the other new clauses tabled by the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester, and by the hon. Member for Warrington North. They are crafted in different ways—for example, new clause 2, tabled by the hon. Member for Warrington North, is more prescriptive about how the courts would operate—but the intention and outcome are essentially the same. Specialist courts equipped with trauma-informed training and access to independent sexual violence advisers would recognise the unique complexity of these cases in a way that a simple bench division cannot.
As I have said, the Government frequently refer to the experience of rape victims waiting years for justice as a significant justification for restricting jury trials. They argue that moving towards judge-led trials in 50% of cases will streamline the process and reduce the backlog, but the evidence for the broader claims of efficiency is highly contested.
Independent analysis by the Institute for Government suggests that judge-only trials in the Crown court might save as little as 1.5% to 2.5%—[Interruption.] The Minister is right to say, and I do not mind accepting, that the saving is higher for the broader package—that has never been a point of dispute—but we are less concerned about the broader package, and there are things in it that we agree with. We are concerned about the much smaller saving that the IFG has pointed out. The Criminal Bar Association has pointed out that the Government’s modelling assumes that the trials will be completed twice as fast as is realistic. We must ask whether the trade-off is proportionate, especially when there is another option.
Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)
I rise to speak to my new clause 6, which would introduce specialist courts for sexual offences and domestic abuse cases. It is similar to new clause 2, tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Warrington North, and Conservative new clause 25, tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle.
We tabled new clause 6, which would ensure that specialist court capacity is made available for the fast-tracking of rape and serious sexual offence cases, because that was a Labour manifesto commitment. The Government have announced blitz courts, which will list similar cases together. They will be introduced to begin with in London and the south-east, where the backlog of cases is most severe, and will at first prioritise cases involving assaults on emergency workers. Our new clause would ensure that court space and time is set aside for RASSO cases.
The Government promised in their manifesto to implement specific rape-focused courts, but have chosen not to deliver that commitment. As of September last year, 16% of cases in the backlog were sexual offence cases. We all listened to the harrowing oral evidence from victims and survivors of rape who waited years for their cases to be heard. I pay tribute to them and to the hon. Member for Warrington North for their bravery in doing something incredibly challenging: reliving the most fragile moments of their lives. They did so incredibly well. We owe it to them to fix the system. I recognise that the Government are trying to do that, but they are choosing to do it in a different way from the way a lot of survivors are asking for it to be done.
Specialist rape courts have not been properly trialled. What have been trialled are courts with specific trauma-informed training. Fast-tracking rape cases will alleviate the wait that many face. If courts are trauma-informed, that might limit retraumatising experiences for victims at the point that they enter the process. In her written evidence, the Victims’ Commissioner said:
“Victims of rape are particularly impacted by the backlogs and by the criminal justice system more broadly. The duration between the case being received and completed at Crown Court is particularly high for rape offences, an average of 429 days compared to an average of 259 days for all offences… Specialist rape courts which expedite rape cases and ensure a trauma-informed approach via training and adaptions to the court environment could help lessen the impact of the system on victims.”
The Victims’ Commissioner has been calling for specialist rape courts since 2022 and was really pleased that the Government committed in their manifesto to introduce them. I think that comes from her experience working alongside a very limited pilot that created a trauma-informed court in a particular Crown court. I am sure she will be keen to see the Government make good on the commitment that they stood on just two years ago.
New clause 23, which is also tabled in my name, would require the Lord Chancellor to commission a report on the effect of the provisions of the Bill on the progression of rape and serious sexual offence cases, and to respond to the recommendations in the report. It is completely unacceptable that these cases are waiting for so long. We need to understand whether the Government’s measures make a material impact on those cases and reduce the time that people have to wait in the criminal justice system. The new clause is also supported by the Victims’ Commissioner, so that we can see real progress for victims who are stuck in the criminal justice system.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
Huge apologies for my lateness, Sir John. I wish to speak in support of new clause 2 and lend my support to new clauses 6, 23 and 25, all of which seek to honour the commitment that the Government made in their manifesto at the last election. I have huge admiration for the hon. Member for Warrington North, both for her courageous and clear speech on Second Reading and for tabling new clause 2, which seeks to honour that commitment. I am heartened by how many Labour Members have added their names to the new clause, and I hope that the Government will listen.
New clause 2, which is detailed, would introduce specialist courts. It sets out the different ways in which guidance can deal with the difficulties that courts currently have in dealing with issues such as coercive control and honour-based abuse, and would make sure that the courts deliver justice in a timely and compassionate way. It is so important that we look at the many practical ways of dealing with the cases that we need to hear, for victims of domestic violence and sexual offences, that do not completely remove the right to select a jury trial, as the Minister has admitted the Bill will do, and that do not adjust the thresholds in courts so as to effectively abolish the centuries-old principle of jury equity. That principle is important to our democratic right to protest and to protect our fellow citizens from unjust prosecution, including by authoritarian or tyrannical future Governments.
The new clauses in this group outline how much can be done to make court processes support victims in a practical, kinder and more compassionate way. They would make the processes more trauma-informed, and more effective and just, as they would bring more successful prosecutions in cases of sexual and domestic violence. I also support new clauses 8 to 10, which would mandate training in such matters and which we will discuss later.
A goal of the Government’s reforms is to increase speed, and the new clauses would achieve that by focusing specialist courts on these important cases. We have debated extensively the many other practical measures that could speed up justice more generally and clear the backlog, which is getting in the way of far too many of these cases.
I really hope that the Government are listening and that we can vote on these issues today. I hope they will go away and listen more to the victims groups that are determined to put forward practical measures to deal with these things without affecting our fundamental rights, and introduce clauses that will do that—and remove clauses 1 to 7—on Report. That is the right thing to do. The issues have been laid out clearly during the Committee’s debates, and the Government now have an important choice to make.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
It is, as ever, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir John. I too support the new clauses, and I concur with a lot of what has already been said about the reasons for supporting them. I will make a couple of wider points on the merits of specialist rape courts and courts for sexual offences.
There is nothing wrong with the legal system in this country when it comes to the fundamental principles of trying these crimes—that someone is innocent until proven guilty, that they have a right to be heard in court, and that evidence must be tested rigorously, as is the right of a defendant in any case. The issue is how that is applied in the way our courts operate in respect of a set of crimes that are extremely sensitive because of the impact on the complainant—the victim—who is almost always a live witness. It is trying to deal with the operation of the court that is at issue here.
Mr Paul Kohler (Wimbledon) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir John. I will speak on new clause 6, new clause 25 and, in particular, new clause 2 tabled by the hon. Member for Warrington North. Her proposal represents the genuine structural reform that victims of sexual violence and domestic abuse have long been promised and too long denied—the radical change that the Labour party proposed when in opposition and in fighting the last election. I acknowledge the hon. Member’s extraordinary courage in waiving her anonymity to speak openly in the Chamber. She revealed how long she had had to wait before going to court and mentioned that every single one of those days was agony, made worse by having a role in public life that meant that the mental health consequences of her trauma played out in public.
New clause 2 would deliver what this Labour Government themselves pledged in their manifesto: specialist courts for rape and domestic abuse, trauma-informed proceedings, fixed trial dates, and proper support facilities for victims. It would create time limits for case preparation, fixed trial dates and prioritised listings, including for cases where the defendant is on bail, addressing one of the most dangerous and distressing features of the current system.
I remind Government Members that the front cover of the Labour party manifesto featured one word: “Change”. The Government’s supporters and their own Members—and even the Opposition—all thought that would be change for good, not for bad. They thought that it would be change of the sort that was in the manifesto, not restricting jury trials, of which there was no mention in the manifesto. Public confidence in this place is at an all-time low. If Governments win elections with manifesto pledges and then ignore those pledges or offer diluted concessions that go not so very far, they lose the confidence of the public. It is so fundamental, and it is such an important moment in our democracy. Governments have to live by what they said they would do. Here is the Government’s chance to do so.
Rather than diluting the right to jury trial, as the Bill’s central provisions would do, new clause 2 proposes a better answer to the backlog: courts established specifically for sexual offences and domestic abuse cases, with specialist knowledge and resources to handle them properly. The Liberal Democrats believe, as I think do many Government Members, that victims of sexual violence and domestic abuse deserve a justice system designed with their needs in mind, not one that treats their cases as scheduling problems to be managed and uses a pretext for restricting jury trials.
Sarah Sackman
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden for speaking to new clause 2, the hon. Member for Chichester for tabling new clauses 6 and 23, and the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle for tabling new clause 25. Before I turn to new clause 2, I will take a moment, as others have done, to acknowledge the contribution of my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North, and to thank her for having the courage to share her experiences on this issue in the Chamber in order to drive forward change for victims of sexual violence. I think all of us remember the moment when she gave her speech in the Chamber—you could have heard a pin drop. That obviously took considerable personal courage. Hearing from her then, and subsequently when we have spoken about how she feels the system let her down, has been invaluable in shaping my thinking on the issue.
New clause 2 has catalysed the debate about how our criminal justice system treats those who have experienced rape and serious sexual violence. The hon. Member for Wimbledon made a powerful speech about the Labour party manifesto. It contained a commitment, which we have been driving forward, to halve violence against women and girls. Let me be absolutely clear. Our manifesto commitment to introduce specialist courts for rape and sexual offences has never changed. It has not been watered down, and our commitment to it has not wavered. The Minister for Victims and I, as well as others across Government, have been putting in place the foundations to deliver those specialist courts.
It is important to note that that change and the efforts to drive down the delays right across our criminal justice system are not mutually exclusive, because we need to deliver change for all victims of crime. Those two things are not an either/or. While it is true that the proposals, which build on the recommendations of the independent review of the criminal courts, are not in the Labour party manifesto, I also believe, as I have said before, that to govern is to choose. When we see a problem in any public service—when we see a backlog of over 80,000 cases, and cases being listed into 2030—we could say, “Well, we didn’t specify in our manifesto how we were going to fix it; we’ll just get on with everything that was in our manifesto and turn a blind eye.” I am not prepared to do that.
I want to be absolutely clear with the Committee, and with Parliament in general, that the two things are not mutually exclusive. We can deliver both specialist courts for victims of rape and the necessary changes that I have contended for to drive down the backlogs and delays that are denying justice to defendants and victims right across our criminal justice system.
Mr Kohler
While I concede that the black hole might not have been foreseeable, the fact that there was a backlog in the courts was clearly foreseeable. The idea that the Government came into power and then suddenly realised there was a backlog is implausible.
We are two years into this Government. The change that was promised is long delayed and people are losing confidence—we see that. This point crosses political boundaries. The public are losing confidence in our democratic processes, and change delayed is change denied.
Sarah Sackman
I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. I will make two points in response. First, the full extent of the crisis in our criminal justice system was not apparent. It was not apparent in prisons, when we opened the car bonnet on day one and essentially found prisons at breaking point. That obviously interacts with courts, because if we are sentencing people and there is simply nowhere to put violent criminals, we have a pretty serious problem on our hands. The full extent of the crisis in our courts was not apparent either, and we need to have a solution that meets the moment. That is what this Bill is.
Secondly, I strongly refute the suggestion that we have been sitting on our hands; rather, we have been putting in place the building blocks and ingredients of a specialist court. We are rolling out trauma-informed training not just for our specialist judges but for every member of the court staff—that is in train. We are changing the way that evidence is dealt with, as we debated on clauses 8 to 11. We are investing £6 million in the introduction of independent legal advisers for victims of rape as they go through that process. We are committing more than £500 million to victim support, some of which will cover victims of rape and sexual offences. I would argue that that is far from change denied. I would call that change in train, which will deliver a transformation for victims of rape in this country.
Dr Mullan
The Minister is in danger—there is a bit of a pattern here—of wanting to have things both ways. She is suggesting that waiting for Brian Leveson’s review, and the parliamentary time and effort going into the legislation, has had no impact or delay on the measures regarding specialist rape courts, which were in the Government’s manifesto and they could have just got on with from day one. That really stretches credibility.
The Government must accept the consequences of their decisions. If they have decided that the erosion of jury trials is the way forward, they should just say that and accept that there has been a negative consequence on their manifesto commitment to introduce rape courts. The Minister cannot say, “We’re pretty much doing what we would have done anyway, and this is all fantastic from both sides of the paper.” It is really not.
Sarah Sackman
Once again, I strongly reject that suggestion. The two things are not mutually exclusive: wanting to bring in measures that speed up justice for every victim in the criminal justice system and building the foundations for a specialist court.
Let us get back to basics. What is a specialist court? What are we talking about? I have discussed this with my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North. A specialist court prioritises a type of offence to address the timeliness issue. It guarantees special measures. Again, we have debated provisions in Committee about how we ensure the consistent guarantee of special measures in whichever Crown court in the country a rape trial occurs. Thirdly, it is a court in which not just those who are adjudicating and directing juries, but those who are supporting the participants, are trauma-informed, as that is how we now in contemporary society understand that evidence needs to be treated. That training is in train.
Those are the essential ingredients of a specialist court. Those are the building blocks. We guarantee them not just in this Bill but through the funding of training and the measures being implemented in our courts. That is really important, but it does not have a bearing on the overall backlog problem. It prioritises those cases, as we recognise them being among the most serious with some of the most acute trauma, but it does not deal with the huge backlog delays for other forms of violent crime and other types of crime.
Siân Berry
The Minister and I have both talked about making choices. The brass tacks are that the Minister has chosen to make huge changes to our court processes, but not to introduce this change in the Bill. There is still the chance to introduce measures into the Bill on Report and make different choices. Will she consider that?
Sarah Sackman
We are making those choices. The difference is that we do not need legislation to make those choices. We have made those choices, including the commitment of money to fund independent legal advisers, trauma-informed training and victim support. We have made those decisions. We have put those building blocks in place. We do not need legislation to deliver specialist courts. I had this discussion yesterday with the Victims’ Commissioner. We do not need legislation.
I wholeheartedly agree with the spirit of the new clause. How could I not? It is in our manifesto. We are taking action to deliver it. We do not need the new clause to deliver it—that is the point. I will come shortly to its unworkability, but I will not take from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion or anyone else the suggestion that we have not been making the choices to deliver on our commitment to halve violence against women and girls.
Sarah Sackman
I am going to make some progress.
As I said, and as I discussed with my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North, I assure the Committee that the principle behind this proposal is recognised by the Government. I agree with my hon. Friend on her assessment of what is needed: swifter justice and prioritisation so that victims do not wait years for their day in court; specialist staff and judges who are trained in these kinds of cases; and properly equipped courtrooms that support victims and witnesses to deliver their best evidence with dignity.
Jess Brown-Fuller
The Minister talks about the practice of floating trials or over-listing, which we know is so harrowing for victims, who get themselves ready for a case only for it to not go ahead. Quite often they are not told that they have a floating case or that their case has been listed; they are just told that their case has been adjourned and that they will be provided with a new date.
If we look at the data for the number of cases that fell at the last hurdle in 2024, we see that there were 444 where the prosecution advocate failed to attend; 314 where the defence advocate failed to attend; 209 where the prosecution advocate engaged in another trial; and 186 linked to prison transport delays, although I would argue that that number is much higher because of the way they are recorded. How does the Minister square the circle of trying to speed up the process while asking the judiciary not to over-list, which could cause the number of courts that are sitting empty each day to go up, because when a case falls that Crown court will then be empty?
Sarah Sackman
The hon. Lady asks a really good question. The point about ineffective trials is one of the greatest sources of both delay and waste in the system. She is right that last year over 1,000 trials were ineffective on the date of trial. That means that everyone had turned up except for one element, and the hon. Lady cited a number of the missing elements. That is why I do not take issue with the data presented by the Institute for Government, but I do take issue with its remedy. As the IFG itself points out, one of the greatest drivers of those ineffective trials is workforce pressures—the fact that we do not have enough prosecutors and defence barristers.
We are constantly being hit with the criticism that there are courtrooms lying empty. That slightly misrepresents the problem—sometimes we need that spare capacity in a court—but it is not entirely untrue. Part of that is about not just sitting days but system capacity and workforce. Building that workforce back up will take time. That is why the Government’s investment in criminal legal aid and match funding for pupillages is crucial, as is the record settlement that the CPS received. Building up the workforce to meet the demand and reduce the number of ineffective trials is so important.
The hon. Member for Chichester made an important point about the interaction between the measures we are discussing, the desirability of reducing the number of floating trials because of the impact of late adjournments, and the need for some agility and flexibility, which is why listing is a judicial function in individual Crown courts. Some parties might be ready to go, and they will want to get the trial on sooner, so we want to allow for some flexibility to enable that. It is not about watering down all the special measures that might be needed to support best evidence, but about where it is desirable to have some agility.
In that vein, the Government’s piloting of an AI, data-driven listing tool, which has been tested in Preston and Isleworth and is showing early positive results, will be crucial. I have seen the tool, and it allows us, based on certain factors in a case, to get a pretty rich understanding of how long it is likely to last. It works in much the same way as an NHS appointment: if somebody cancels because they are not well enough to go ahead with a surgery, but everybody else is ready—including the team, the doctors and the hip surgeon—can they pull in someone else on the waiting list? The tool will allow us to do the same kind of thing, building on some of the know-how from NHS appointment systems. We want to retain some agility while, at the same time, having a consistent approach to prioritising cases.
We want to see rape cases prioritised in the national listing model, because of the vulnerability of the witnesses involved and how pernicious delays can be, and we want to drive out floating trials, but there has to be some flexibility in the system. One thing we must guard against—this is why we have to think really carefully about when legislation is needed and when it is not—is creating a situation where the intent might be absolutely right, but we inadvertently create inflexibility by legislating.
In this case, we should not legislate in this way out of respect for the separation of powers and the constitutional dividing line between the executive and the judiciary, but there are other reasons why we might not want to legislate—for example, if it would lead to inflexibility and counterproductive results that go against the interests of some complainants in rape trials. That was a slightly long-winded answer, but I hope it gives the Committee a sense of how much is going on in the justice firmament that is not legislative but represents real progress for citizens in this country who have the misfortune of encountering the criminal justice system.
New clause 23 would require the Lord Chancellor to undertake a review of how the reforms impact the way RASSO cases are handled. It is not right for victims to continue to pay for the crisis in our courts, particularly in respect of delays. We know that victims of rape are facing, on average, a wait of over 400 days for trial, and we know that a large proportion of the outstanding caseload—around 20%—is made up of sexual offences. We need to drive down that backlog, why is why I have said that reform measures are needed. There is no doubt that, if these reforms receive Royal Assent, the Ministry of Justice, the Justice Committee and others will look to measure the impact they are having. I urge the hon. Member for Chichester not to press new clause 23 to a vote.
In a similar vein, new clause 25 seeks to introduce specialist courts, which I have already spoken about. I hope I could not have been clearer that the Government remain committed to this enterprise and to our manifesto commitment. However, the introduction of such courts does not require primary legislation. In essence, we are getting on with it, regardless.
One thing I have already mentioned is providing trauma-informed training to all court staff, which will be available from this spring. Again, there is change happening right now in our courts, irrespective of what happens with the Bill. That is happening as we speak, and it will be a real step change. It is something for which victims groups have been calling for a very long term, and which I hope and believe will improve the experience of going to court for victims of sexual offences.
I sincerely thank all Members who have tabled new clauses in this space. It is important—and, frankly, a welcome opportunity—for me, the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd (Alex Davies-Jones), and others to talk about how we are galvanising these different initiatives within our criminal justice system. We want to deliver the specialist courts that we promised, to drive forward progress and to encourage our judiciary to be front-footed and progressive in its listing practices, but this is not mutually exclusive with the reforms in the Bill designed to drive down the backlog; it is a question of both/and, not either/or. I thank hon. Members for raising these important issues, but I urge them not to press their new clauses to a vote.
The Chair
I remind Members that you will be able to decide later whether to press new clauses 6, 23 and 25 to a vote; you do not need to do that now.
I understand that you want to come back in, Kieran. I do not want to make a habit of that. I will allow it, because new clauses have been tabled from across the Committee and I can see that this is a very significant subject, but, in fairness to the Minister, I do not think other Members should come back in once she has spoken. I will make an exception this time, but please be brief.
Dr Mullan
Thank you, Sir John. I just want to make a simple point. The Minister said that what the Government want to do does not require primary legislation, but in the same speech referred to primary legislation that we are considering today as part of introducing specialist rape courts. It is obvious to anybody that there is a requirement for primary legislation. We waited a year for Brian Leveson and we are two years into the Parliament. There are uncontroversial clauses that we have not opposed; the Government could have got on with those and passed them within six months, and they would be operating right now. I just do not think the Minister’s argument that nothing has been lost from progress on these issues because of the jury trial reforms stands up to scrutiny.
Sarah Sackman
I do not think it is necessary. Everyone has heard what I have to say.
The Chair
Fair enough. I therefore turn to Yasmin Qureshi—you can speak now if you wish to.
Yasmin Qureshi
I will withdraw new clause 2, because I know that the Minister is addressing the issue and I accept her commitment. She is an honourable lady and I accept her word, and I look forward to the specialist courts being implemented very soon. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the new clause.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 4—Review of the Feasibility of Two Court Sittings per day—
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 12 months beginning on the day on which this Act comes into force, lay before Parliament an independent report into the feasibility of conducting two trials per day in designated court rooms (‘the Scheme’).
(2) The scheme would allow for proceedings in a Crown Court to consist of—
(a) a morning session, commencing at 09:00 and concluding at 13:00; and
(b) an afternoon session, commencing at 14:00 and concluding at 18:00.
(3) A report under subsection (1) must assess the impact of the scheme—
(a) on the efficiency and timeliness of court proceedings;
(b) on the availability of judges, legal practitioners, and court staff;
(c) the potential impact on defendants, victims, and witnesses; and
(d) the cost and resource implications of the scheme.
(4) The Lord Chancellor must, within three months of the laying of the report under subsection (1), publish a response.
(5) The response must include proposals for a pilot scheme based on the findings of the report including the proposed scope and duration of any such pilot.”
This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to commission and lay before Parliament an independent report on the feasibility of introducing two court sittings per day in designated courtrooms, including an assessment of its impact on efficiency, resources, and court users, and to set out the Government’s intended next steps.
New clause 5—Targets for Backlog Reduction—
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within six months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, set and publish annual targets for the reduction of the Crown Court backlog in England and Wales.
(2) There must be a target for the—
(a) overall reduction of the Crown Court backlog in England and Wales, and
(b) reduction of the backlog in each different HMCTS region.
(3) The Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament an annual report on progress against these targets.
(4) Any report under subsection (3) must include any steps taken to address the failure to meet the targets.”
This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to set and publish targets for reducing court backlogs and to report annually to Parliament on progress.
New clause 13—Report on the effect of the Act on public trust and participation in the criminal justice system—
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must commission a report on the effect of the provisions of the Act on public trust and participation in the judicial system.
(2) A report under this section must—
(a) include consideration of the effect of the provisions of the Act on—
(i) witness participation;
(ii) the effect of these reforms on public confidence and trust in the criminal justice system;
(iii) the effect of these provisions on BAME engagement with and trust of the criminal justice system;
(b) contain recommendations for further provision, or changes to delivery of provision under this Act, to increase the levels of each criterion set out in subparagraphs (2)(a)(i) to (2)(a)(iii).
(3) Within twelve months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament—
(a) a copy of a report under this section,
(b) the Lord Chancellor’s response to recommendations made by that report.”
This new clause would require the Lord Chancellor to commission, lay, and respond to a report on the effect of the Bill on public trust in the criminal justice system.
New clause 17—Review of Efficiencies in the Criminal Justice System—
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 24 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, conduct a review on the impact of the provisions of this Act on the efficiency of the criminal justice system.
(2) The review under subsection (1) must, in particular, consider the impact on the efficiency of the criminal justice system of—
(a) the provisions of this Act;
(b) The wider criminal justice system;
(c) the standard of delivery by court contract providers, including PECS contractors;
(d) the condition of the courts estate; and
(e) the use of technology.
(3) In considering ‘efficiency’, the review must consider the impact on—
(a) delays,
(b) backlogs, and
(c) the experience of victims and witnesses.
(4) The Secretary of State must lay a report on the review before Parliament.
(5) The report under subsection (4) must include recommendations for further legislative or administrative changes to improve the efficiency of the criminal justice system.”
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to review and report on whether the Act has improved the efficiency of the criminal justice system, including impacts on delays, backlogs, and the experience of victims and witnesses.
New clause 22—Remote Court Participation: Strategy—
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backlog (‘the strategy’).
(2) The strategy must include—
(a) an assessment of the current use of remote proceedings;
(b) an evaluation of the impact of remote proceedings on the speed of case disposal and the overall reduction of the outstanding caseload;
(c) recommendations on how the principle of open justice can be upheld with the increased use of remote proceedings;
(d) criteria for determining the suitability of proceedings for different forms of remote participation; and
(e) provisions for the security, reliability, and resilience of digital systems used in remote proceedings.
(3) The Secretary of State must, at intervals of no more than 24 months following the laying of the strategy, lay before Parliament a report on progress made against the strategy.
(4) The progress report must consider—
(a) the extent to which the strategy has been implemented;
(b) the impact on the criminal case backlog, including any measures by which that impact has been assessed; and
(c) any further legislative or budgetary provisions to ensure the effectiveness of remote proceedings.
(5) For the purposes of this section, ‘remote proceedings’ means any proceedings in which one or more participants attend by way of live video or audio link.”
This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to publish a formal strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backload in the criminal justice system.
New clause 32—Commencement dependent on independent review of racial disproportionality—
“(1) This section applies in relation to the commencement of Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act.
(2) The provisions inserted by Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act may not be brought into force unless the conditions in subsections (3) to (6) have been met.
(3) The Secretary of State must commission an independent review into racial disproportionality arising from—
(a) the changes to jurisdiction powers and procedures in the Magistrates’ Courts under Part 1; and
(b) the operation of trial-allocation decisions under Part 1.
(4) As soon as reasonably practicable after completing a review under this section, the reviewer must send a report on its outcome to the Secretary of State.
(5) On receiving a report under subsection (4), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before both Houses of Parliament.
(6) As soon as reasonably practicable, the Secretary of State must—
(a) prepare and publish a strategy setting out the measures the Secretary of State intends to take in consequence of the review’s findings; and
(b) implement those measures in full before Clauses 1 to 7 may be brought into force.”
This new clause introduces a duty to commission an independent review into racial disproportionality arising from the changes to jurisdiction, powers and procedures in the magistrates’ courts, and from the operation of the new trial-allocation provisions in Clauses 1 to 7 of the Bill.
New clause 33—Commencement dependent on review of differential impact on classes of persons—
“(1) This section applies in relation to the commencement of Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act.
(2) The provisions inserted by Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act may not be brought into force unless the conditions in subsections (3) to (7) have been met.
(3) The Secretary of State must commission an independent review on whether, and the extent to which—
(a) the changes to jurisdiction powers and procedures in the Magistrates’ Courts under Part 1; and
(b) the operation of trial-allocation decisions under Part 1,
are likely to have a disproportionate impact on particular classes of persons.
(4) The review under subsection (3) must consider—
(a) the extent to which, as a result of the provisions in subsections (3)(a) and (b), defendants in criminal proceedings are eligible for legal aid;
(b) whether persons of limited financial means are likely to be affected differently from other defendants as a result of those provisions; and
(c) the projected number of defendants who, as a result of those provisions, are likely to be unrepresented.
(5) As soon as reasonably practicable after completing a review under this section, the reviewer must send a report on its findings to the Secretary of State.
(6) On receiving a report under subsection (5), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before both Houses of Parliament.
(7) As soon as reasonably practicable, the Secretary of State must—
(a) publish a strategy setting out the measures the Secretary of State intends to take in consequence of the review’s findings; and
(b) implement those measures in full before Clauses 1 to 7 may be brought into force.”
This new clause introduces a duty to conduct an independent review of whether Clause 1 to 7 of the Bill give rise to disproportionate impacts on particular classes of persons.
Amendment 15, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert—
“, subject to the provisions of subsection (3A).
(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations under subsection (3) relating to the following sections until he has published a response to the recommendation of Part II of Independent Review of the Criminal Courts—
(a) Section 1 (Removal of right to elect trial on indictment);
(b) Section 2 (Written indication of guilty plea: removal of right to object to venue);
(c) Section 3 (Trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation);
(d) Section 4 (Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases);
(e) Section 5 (Consequential amendments relating to sections 3 and 4).
(f) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts)
(g) Section 7 (Appeals from magistrates’ courts)”.
This amendment would make the publication of the Government response to Part II of the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts a precondition of Clause 1 to 7 of this Bill coming into force.
Amendment 59, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert—
“, subject to the provisions of subsection (3A).
(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations under subsection (3) relating to the sections set out under subsection (3B) until he has taken reasonable steps to increase Crown Court sitting capacity, including but not limited to—
(a) using buildings not currently in use as courts to hear cases where cells are not needed, and
(b) reducing lost sitting days as a result of late guilty pleas and prison transport delays.
(3B) The sections referenced in subsection (3A) are—
(a) Section 1 (Removal of right to elect trial on indictment);
(b) Section 2 (Written indication of guilty plea: removal of right to object to venue);
(c) Section 3 (Trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation);
(d) Section 4 (Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases);
(e) Section 5 (Consequential amendments relating to sections 3 and 4).
(f) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts)
(g) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts)”.
This amendment would ensure that sections 1 to 7 of the Act could not be commenced until the Lord Chancellor has used alternative means to increase Crown Court sitting capacity.
Amendment 35, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert—
“(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make a statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (3) bringing sections 1 to 7 into force until the conditions in subsection (3B) are met.
(3B) The conditions are that—
(a) the Lord Chancellor has provided funding for at least 130,000 sitting days in the Crown Court in the financial year following the coming into force of this Act,
(b) HM Courts and Tribunals Service has made an assessment that the Crown Court has, so far as possible, used the allocation of sitting days provided under subsection (3B)(a), and
(c) the Lord Chancellor has made a statement to the House of Commons that the funding provided under subsection (3B)(a) has not reduced the number of cases pending trial in the Crown Court compared to the start of the financial year.”
This amendment prevents the provisions in sections 1 to 7 from coming into force until the Lord Chancellor has provided funding for 130,000 sittings days in the Crown Court; HMCTS has assessed that the Crown Court has used its allocation of sitting days; and the Lord Chancellor has made a statement to the House that this has not reduced the backlog.
Amendment 36, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert—
“(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make a statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (3) bringing sections 1 to 7 into force until he has—
(a) undertaken a consultation on the potential benefits of introducing extended sitting hours in the Crown Court, and
(b) laid before Parliament a report on the outcome of the consultation.
(3B) The consultation under subsection (3A) must consider—
(a) potential rates of fees and renumeration for legal professionals and court staff working extended hours, and
(b) the availability of HM Courts and Tribunal Service staff.”
This amendment would ensure that sections 1 to 7 of the Act did not come into force until the Lord Chancellor had reviewed how to increase sitting hours in the Crown Court.
Jess Brown-Fuller
The Minister said she could not support new clause 2 on RASSO courts tabled by the hon. Member for Warrington North, and other similar new clauses, because they would improve the experience of victims but do nothing to improve timelines. Well, I am delighted that my new clause 3 will address all those problems.
We all agree that what is needed is a proper plan to fix the system. My party and I believe that that starts with upping the number of trials in select courtrooms across England and Wales from one to two a day. Normal sitting hours for a Crown court are 10 am to 4.30 pm, during which only one trial is heard for four hours and 35 minutes, to allow for breaks for all those involved, including the judge and witnesses, and to allow for the jury to retire, because they receive a lot of information and need breaks too. The Liberal Democrats are calling for two trials to be heard per day in select courtrooms, split between morning and afternoon, with each trial sitting for four hours. One session would run from 9 am to 1 pm and another from 2 pm until 6 pm.
This simple change would nearly double court sitting time in those courtrooms. That is how to cut the backlog without eroding the right to a jury trial and jeopardising people’s experience of the justice system. Implementation would be determined at regional level by His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service. Listing officers may schedule cases into morning or afternoon sessions or standard sitting hours according to the needs of the case. For example, an afternoon slot may be given to allow additional time for prisoner transport—we are all well-versed in the issues surrounding that contract—while standard hours may be preferable when a victim is expected to give evidence for an extended period.
Court backlogs are not the same everywhere and our reforms would reflect that. HMCTS would decide at regional level which courtrooms would run two trials a day, and we would consult on exactly how many should adopt that approach across England and Wales to ensure that the system works efficiently and delivers change where it is needed most. New clause 3 would allow for the agility and flexibility that the Minister spoke about when responding to the previous group of amendments. It could also have the intended effect of pulling back in retired judges. In my Chichester constituency, we have recently reopened our Crown court, and I am pretty sure that I have quite a few retired judges knocking around in the Witterings who would quite happily come back if they were able to commit to half a day’s session, and make sure that they were finished by lunch time and back on the beach by 2 pm.
During coronavirus, HMCTS conducted a pilot in Crown courts using exactly the system of two trials a day instead of one. The evidence was overwhelming: the pilot courtrooms got through 3.5 trials per week compared with fewer than 0.9 trials in courtrooms operating on standard hours. We simply want to replicate that trial across the country. That is how to get through the backlog without eroding jury trials. It would be an evidence-based approach, because we already have a pilot that speaks to its benefit.
As Leveson’s report points out, Crown court hearing time per sitting day has dropped to just 3.2 hours on average; in an entire day running from 10 am to 4.30 pm, the amount of actual sitting time has reduced to 3.2 hours. On paper, courts sit from 10 am until 4.30 pm, but in reality only a fraction of that time is spent hearing cases, because of delays, gaps, cancellations and other inefficiencies that we have discussed. Our reforms would more than double the hearing time per sitting day in participating courtrooms by eliminating that wasted time and running a more intensive court sitting day.
As the Leveson report highlighted, any solution to fix the backlog is going to require resources. These trials have to happen at some point, and without the investment that would be required for the provisions that I am laying out, we will just kick the can down the road and deny victims the justice they deserve. The proposals in the Bill would require massive investment to implement an entirely new system, including the introduction of the Crown court bench division. It would be slow, costly and, according to modelling by the Institute for Government, would save only around 2% of court time, with the caveat that other efficiencies would increase that figure. That barely makes a dent in the backlog when we are looking at the erosion of jury trials. Our approach would be faster and, because we have a pilot, there is clear evidence that it would actually work. By extending hours, we can reduce the backlog and deliver justice for victims. It would make use of existing resources, target inefficiencies and deliver real results.
I believe everybody would benefit from a condensed-hours model, which would provide additional time in the working day for practical work outside the court setting. It would mean that the court day was shorter for barristers, judges and juries; they would spend less time in the courtroom, which would give them more time, in a normal working day, outside the court, to make preparations for the following day. It would also mean much less waiting time.
When we look at what jurors say about their experience of taking part in trials, quite often the bit that they enjoyed and appreciated is the bit when they were actually in the courtroom and could see justice being done and felt like they were a part of it. So often, the most frustrating bit for jurors is the bit when they are sat in the green room outside waiting for the trial—all the time that they feel is wasted. If we condensed the model, a juror coming in for an afternoon session might be able to do the school run in the morning; a self-employed juror—we know that serving on a jury is really challenging for self-employed people—might be able to commit to a few hours of work; and those with caring responsibilities could make sure that they are there for one half of the day.
The evidence tells us that such a model would be better. Legal professionals with childcare responsibilities who took part in the pilot were more likely to report a positive experience than those without them. Right now, barristers and judges are being paid for a full day of work, despite doing on average 3.2 hours’ hearing time per sitting day due to scheduling inefficiencies because of all the other work that they are doing throughout their day, and including all the issues, such as the reasons that cases drop. Even if we paid barristers and judges a full day’s rate for only half a day’s sitting time, it would still be more efficient than the current system. It could also impact the issue of over-listing and floating cases. If a case cannot take place on a certain morning because another case has been listed, it could be scheduled for the afternoon, just four hours later, and the people who are ready to take part in it would not have to wait for another date months ahead.
New clause 4, tabled in my name, would require the Lord Chancellor to commission and lay before Parliament an independent report on the feasibility of introducing two court sittings per day in designated courtrooms, including an assessment of its impact on efficiency, resources and court users, and to set out the Government’s intended next step.
New clause 5, also tabled in my name, would require the Lord Chancellor to set and publish targets for reducing court backlogs and to report annually to Parliament on progress. The Government have recognised that increasing funding and removing the cap on sitting days will absolutely support a lot of those measures, but the new clause would require the Lord Chancellor to set and publish targets for reducing the backlogs. That is needed to avoid the slide that we have seen in the past and to ensure consistent progress in bringing down the backlog so that we can take a mindful approach to whether measures are working and whether we need to think about introducing others.
The Government have published predictions of growth in the backlog as evidence underpinning their reforms. They predict that the backlog would rise to 135,000, but the Criminal Bar Association pushed back against that figure; it thinks that it is wildly pessimistic, especially with the measures already introduced, such as taking away the cap on sitting days. The Deputy Prime Minister has said of his reforms that he does not expect the backlog to decrease until 2029 and that it will not be cleared for a decade. The backlog has now exceeded 80,000, but the backlogs at courts in Wales and in the north-west and south-east of England fell considerably after the sitting days were added, and that was prior to the effects of increasing sitting days across the board. The Criminal Bar Association said that the move was already having an effect. It cited Maidstone Crown court, the largest in the south-east outside the capital, where the case backlog had fallen by more than 5% in the past six months.
New clause 13 would require a report on the effect of the reforms in the Bill on public trust in the criminal justice system—another issue that we have discussed throughout the Committee’s proceedings. It has been demonstrated that the public have more confidence in juries than in single-judge hearings. I think we can all agree that trust in the justice system is vital for keeping witnesses, defendants and victims engaged. The new clause would require a report into the impact on public trust of the Government’s reforms. Currently, six in 10 people express a “fair amount” or a “great deal” of confidence in juries delivering the right verdict, compared with around four in 10 for courts and judges more generally.
New clause 17 would require the Secretary of State to review and report on whether the Bill has improved the efficiency of the criminal justice system, including its impact on delays, backlogs, and the experience of victims and witnesses. On a number of occasions, Brian Leveson discussed a three-pronged approach to dealing with the backlog—reform, funding and efficiencies. He also said that “all the levers” must be pulled, and the Minister has said the same. The “efficiencies” part of that three-pronged approach is largely set out in part 2 of his “Independent Review of the Criminal Courts”, to which the Government have yet to respond. Improving efficiency would safeguard the system from getting into this mess again, and it is vital that the Government pursue reforms that improve that. The new clause would therefore require the Secretary of State to review the Bill’s impact on efficiency in the criminal justice system, focusing specifically on delays, backlogs and victims’ experience.
New clause 22 would require the Lord Chancellor to publish a formal strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backlog in the criminal justice system. Leveson himself suggests that the use of remote hearings with safeguards should be expanded to first hearings in the magistrates court, managed in police stations by prisoner escort and custody services contractors. He also proposes allowing for remote attendance during trial for certain professional witnesses, such as police officers, by default, and allowing remand defendants to attend sentencing hearings remotely, except when victim impact statements will be delivered.
Sir Brian Leveson outlined the need for more remote hearings, and we are calling on the Government to publish a strategy on how that will be implemented, because it is clear that there is potential for significant time savings and efficiencies if the Government get this right. It is also clear that investment will be needed in remote facilities not just in courts, but in prisons. Many people in the justice system have told me about evidence being presented on memory sticks, the telly not working, the sound not working when they are trying to listen to oral evidence, or the screen not working for somebody to give remote evidence. We need to know how the Government will strategise all the remote proceedings if they are going to progress in that way.
Dr Mullan
I rise to speak in support of amendments 59, 35 and 36 tabled in my name, and the amendments outlined by the hon. Member for Chichester, all of which enjoy our support.
Our amendments seek to ensure that efficiencies and improvements to the system are made, increasing the maximum of sitting days to 130,000 and, in a different way, addressing the issue of sitting hours. We are debating the fundamental restructuring of our criminal justice system, and the Government’s central argument—the Minister has admitted that it is not the sole argument; even though most of the rest of the Government talk about this as a necessity, she thinks it should be done anyway—is that the Crown court is in a state of emergency with the backlog that we all agree is causing much distress to victims and innocent defendants alike.
Amendment 59 asks the Government to take all reasonable steps to increase Crown court sitting days and address the other challenges in the system that are limiting our ability to tackle the backlog—the avoidable operational failures currently crippling our courts.
We must remember that Sir Brian Leveson acknowledged that jury trials are the gold standard of our justice system. The Minister herself accepted that there was something special about them. Juries are not just a step in a trial; they are a democratic barrier between the individual and the overreach of authority. They are an important way in which citizens participate in our justice system. The Deputy Prime Minister has been one of the biggest cheerleaders of the value and importance of jury trials, describing them as a “success story” and comparing them less favourably with the magistrates courts—although I am sure he respects and understands the benefit of magistrates courts—because of the ability of 12 citizens to look at a case uniquely and without prejudice.
Productivity in the Crown court has fallen significantly, and analysis shows that courts are hearing approximately 20% fewer hours per sitting day than they were less than a decade ago. In evidence to us, the Bar Council shared analysis showing that the average for which each Crown court judge sits in court each day has fallen to 3.2 hours. That is due to inefficiencies such as technological breakdown, prisoner transport delays and difficulties with interpreter services. Just getting back to the 2016-17 level of 3.8 hours would be an 18% improvement, far outstripping the much debated, but we think much fairer, figure of a 1% to 2% improvement in relation to the reforms to jury trials. If the Government were serious about efficiency, they would start by addressing the low-hanging fruit in respect of the logistical problems.
Members will remember the evidence from the HMCTS civil servant tasked with running the system, asking for it to operate efficiently. He talked about listing, prison transport and sitting days as his priorities, and none of the things that he felt would make a significant impact required any changes to jury trials.
Prisoner escort and custody services, as they are known, have been a strong theme of concern from a wide variety of witnesses. The figures that I have show that there were 713 ineffective trials in 2023 solely because the prison escort service failed to deliver a defendant to court on time. Reports from barristers indicate that, in a quarter of cases, their clients were brought to court more than five hours late, meaning that the trial day could not start on time or was lost entirely. That grit in the system causes thousands of hours of delays across our courts, yet the Government’s priority is to remove the jury trial rather than fix the transport contract.
Another major drain on efficiency is the timing of guilty pleas. Sir Brian Leveson noted that defendants used to plead guilty at their first or second appearance, but we now see many examples of guilty pleas occurring at the fifth or sixth occasion. The Minister is right to raise that, and we accept that one element is delays in the court system that reduce the incentive for a guilty plea. We have heard evidence that defendants would say, “I just want to hold off my guilty plea until I have a last Christmas,” but that has now become, “I want another two Christmases.” So we understand the delays, but they are not the only reason and are not an insurmountable problem.
Instead of removing the right to a jury, the Government should focus on improving access to early legal advice, which we know can make a big difference. We can also learn from courts such as Liverpool Crown court that have a laser focus on an approach to listing, which encourages early engagement by defendants and legal representatives alike. That has produced results with their Crown court backlogs that are nothing like the national figure. They are not alone in showing what can be done without the need to erode our jury trial rights. The Bar Council points to other successes in the system and says that blitz courts, established by Crown courts such as Preston, Liverpool, Nottingham and others, are effective.
Preston Crown court’s listing of domestic abuse cases from the autumn of 2024 until this year has reduced the time between plea and trial preparation hearing, listing and trial by 16%. Ipswich Crown court’s backlog is down 28% since January 2024, and Derby Crown court’s fast-track courts are being run with a specific focus on cases with allegations of domestic abuse. That scheme has been successful, with those cases now being listed for trial sooner than when they might have been otherwise. We also received evidence that the circuit in Wales does not have a backlog that is anything like the rest of the country, which shows what can be done.
The Government promise that judge-only trials will be 20% faster, but that figure is based on highly uncertain assumptions and anecdotal evidence. We have made the argument in Committee that there might be savings up front, but we could lose those savings in the time taken by judges to deliberate and provide their summation, which we should also weigh up.
Amendment 59 relates to all the things that could be done to improve efficiency without necessarily having an increase in sitting days, but we cannot support the removal of constitutional rights while we have not even hit the maximum sitting days target that Sir Brian Leveson recommended. Amendment 35 would require the Government to demonstrate that they have funded at least 130,000 Crown court sitting days before they can commence their reforms. That figure is the target number that Sir Brian says the Government should seek to achieve if they want to bring down the backlog. Our amendment would require HMCTS to assess that those sitting days have, as far as possible, been fully utilised, and that ties in with amendment 59. It is no good the Government funding, in theory, a maximum number of sitting days if they are not able to utilise them for various reasons, some of which I have covered. Amendment 35 would also require the Lord Chancellor to make a statement to the House confirming that, even after those steps have been taken, the number of cases pending trial has not been reduced compared with the start of the financial year.
We are essentially putting forward a litmus test. If the Government want to say that they have no other options and that there is no other way to do this, they should at least take the steps recommended by Sir Brian in terms of efficiencies, reforming how the system operates and having the maximum number of sitting days, which they have to get to at some point anyway if they want to argue in support of Sir Brian Leveson’s report as a litmus test for what is sufficient.
If the Government are confident in their analysis, they should have no difficulty meeting that test. I know the Minister will talk about the time it will take to reach that point, but the dial can be pushed both ways. I do not think the Government are seriously suggesting that the jury trial element of the reforms will make a drastic difference to the backlog in the next one or two years. As we have discussed, the time saving of the jury trial element on its own is not that significant.
Amendment 36 has a different approach, but seeks to make the same point as new clause 4, tabled the hon. Member for Chichester, which relates to having two court sittings a day. Our amendment 36 asks the Government to approach another possible alternative reform of the operating hours of our courts—specifically, the potential for extending court sitting hours and introducing weekend sittings. If we are in a state of emergency, as the Government claim, our response should focus on maximising the use of our existing infrastructure, rather than dismantling the rights of the citizen.
At present, our Crown courts often operate typically between 10 am and 4.30 pm. It is difficult to justify a policy that removes the right to a jury trial—a move estimated to save perhaps as little as 1.5% to 2.5% of court time—when we are leaving so many hours of the working day and the entirety of the weekend completely unutilised. Working normal business hours such as 9 to 5, or even utilising Saturdays for specific types of hearings, could provide a far more substantial reduction in the backlog than the structural reforms proposed in the Bill.
We recognise that a possible move towards extended or weekend hours must be handled with extreme care. That is why we proposed amendment 36, which would require the Lord Chancellor to undertake a comprehensive consultation on the potential introduction of extended sitting hours before the reforms can commence. Operational changes of this magnitude cannot be mandated from a desk in Whitehall without understanding the impact on the human beings who keep the system running.
The consultation would address the practical realities that will determine whether such a system is viable and sustainable, including the availability and wellbeing of HMCTS staff, who are already under significant pressure; the level of fees and remuneration required for legal professionals and court staff to work non-standard hours; and the impact on legal aid practitioners, many of whom, as we have discussed, find the challenges of working in criminal legal aid difficult. We must ensure that those who would be asked to work in this way—judges, barristers, solicitors and court staff—believe that any such plans are appropriate and supported by proper resourcing. To impose extended hours without their consent and without addressing the current crisis in retention and recruitment would potentially be counterproductive, rather than a benefit.
Where could we look for an example of how this can be done in a way that is welcomed by staff who want to increase their income in a fair way? I was glad that the Minister raised the example of the NHS, which has an equivalent issue with waiting lists as we do with Crown court waiting times. The NHS uses weekend operating as a core part of its elective recovery strategy. To be clear, the NHS has always been a 24 hours a day, seven days a week service for urgent and emergency care, but it specifically uses additional, elective, planned operations. By opening facilities 7 days a week, the health service aims to maximise the use of expensive equipment and theatre space that would otherwise sit idle. I am sure that every Committee member can see the direct read-across. The Crown court is an expensive space with expensive equipment that sits empty and unutilised in what the Government describes as a crisis.
A national programme in 50 hospitals runs what is called a weekend hitlist once a month. That approach focuses on one type of procedure a day, such as 24 endometriosis surgeries in a single weekend. It was pioneered by Guy’s and St Thomas’ foundation trust—the trust that looks after many of us when we are not well—and it is now being scaled up nationwide. The approach uses high staffing levels, rigorous pre-op assessment and enhanced theatre utilisation. Again, the read-across could not be more direct. We could have courts with trained staff to consider particular types of cases that had been assessed in advance as suitable for such sessions. Those courts could be set up to make the most of that, whether it is a Saturday or an evening.
It is not just in those approaches that we see the Government and the NHS thinking more innovatively about how to make use of resources. Many of us now have community diagnostic centres in our constituencies. I know from when I was a junior doctor that, previously, it was extremely difficult to organise certain types of scans out of hours. The NHS have reformed the whole approach so that such tests, which had typically been restricted to just the working day, can now take place seven days a week to maximise capacity.
Dr Mullan
The Minister is correct. That is the only time I have referred to it more broadly; I have been consistent throughout in saying that it is a system with significantly less access to jury rights than there is at present. There is a third way: to take the path towards operational excellence and better placed resourcing. We should not trade a centuries-old right for a 1.5% efficiency gain on a Government spreadsheet.
Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir John. I speak in support of amendments 59, 35 and 36 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle, and the new clauses tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester. Those new clauses are constructive, and the Government should engage with them seriously. They seek to address the right question: how can we increase capacity, improve efficiency, preserve public trust and make better use of the system before cutting into long-standing criminal justice safeguards?
The Opposition amendments would ensure that before clauses 1 to 7 are commenced, the Government must show that they have exhausted the practical alternatives, such as more sitting capacity, better use of buildings, fewer lost sitting days from late guilty pleas and prisoner transport delays, proper funding for sitting days and a serious examination of extended sitting hours. That is the right order of operations. The Government’s approach too often appears to be about restricting rights first and hoping that savings arrive later. Our approach is to build capacity and fix operational failures first and contemplate introducing legislation only then, and if truly necessary.
Our approach is encapsulated perfectly in amendment 59 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. The amendment would prevent clauses 1 to 7 of the Bill from coming into force until reasonable steps have been taken
“to increase Crown Court sitting capacity, including but not limited to—
(a) using buildings not currently in use as courts to hear cases where cells are not needed, and
(b) reducing lost sitting days as a result of late guilty pleas and prison transport delays.”
That is exactly the right approach, and it is at the heart of the argument we have made throughout proceedings. The Government say that the backlog is so bad that they must remove the right to elect a jury trial, create judge-alone trials, expand magistrates’ sentencing powers and restrict appeals. We say that before they do any of that, they should show us that they have used all the practical means already available to increase capacity and reduce wasted court time.
We are seeking to draw attention to the tangible, everyday causes of courtroom delay, which, as the Minister well knows, is often about the case not being ready, defendants not arriving, late pleas, poor listing, lack of courtrooms or staff, or failure to use the estate properly. If those are the root causes of inefficiency, it is extraordinary to reach first for the curtailment of our ancient right to jury trial rather than for more mundane operational fixes.
I would go as far as to suggest that the evidence that the Committee has received from the Bar Council could almost have been written in support of the amendment. It says that the current backlog was not caused by the availability of jury trials. It supports “opening all…courts so they can hear cases”,
“intense court listing” and “proactive” CPS “case ownership”, “revising” the PECS contract so that
“defendants are delivered to the dock on time”,
“better use of technology” and “proper resourcing”. It also specifically identifies PECS as a problem, and warns that the Government’s impact assessment does not contain enough modelling on the changes needed to make prisoner transport work under the new system.
Amendment 59 also references late guilty pleas. Late pleas waste enormous amounts of time. They consume preparation time, courtroom hours, witness time and judicial energy that is better spent elsewhere. If the Government can reduce late pleas by better case progression, better early engagement or stronger listing discipline, that should happen before constitutional rights are reduced. I am in danger of repeating myself, but this point is central to the Opposition’s position: it is far more sensible to make the existing system work properly than to redesign it around its current inefficiencies.
Another question we should ask is whether every possible physical capacity option has been explored. Are there hearings that do not require cells and could be heard in other suitable buildings? Are there underused spaces in the existing estate? Are there ways to free Crown courtrooms by moving appropriate administrative or preliminary business elsewhere? Those are practical questions to which I have not seen a satisfactory answer. It seems logical that the Government should be required to answer them before commencing clauses 1 to 7. In essence, if the Government are minded to oppose this amendment, they are effectively saying that they are content to shred legal rights before making the effort to prove that they have exhausted all possible operational reform first. That is the wrong way around.
That is also the crux of our case for amendment 35, which was also tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. It would prevent clauses 1 to 7 from coming into force until three conditions have been met. First, the Lord Chancellor must have
“provided funding for at least 130,000 sitting days in the Crown Court in the financial year following the coming into force of this Act”.
Secondly, HMCTS must have assessed that
“the Crown court has, so far as possible, used that allocation of sitting days”.
Thirdly, the Lord Chancellor must have
“made a statement to the House of Commons that the funding provided…has not reduced the number of cases pending trial in the Crown Court compared with the start of the financial year.”
Put as simply as possible, before the Government curtail fundamental safeguards in the criminal justice system, they should first fund and use the Crown court at maximum practical capacity. If that works, there is no need for clauses 1 to 7. If it does not, Ministers can come back to Parliament having at least proven that the obvious operational fix was seriously attempted.
One of the persistent weaknesses in the Government’s case thus far has been the “do nothing” comparison. Too often, the Government present the Bill in the context of a binary choice: do nothing, or accept the package as it is. But that is a false choice; there are other options. One of the most obvious is to run the Crown court at full sitting capacity and see what happens. The Bar Council has welcomed the removal of the cap on sitting days and has long argued that courts should sit at maximum capacity. If increased sitting days are now being funded, those additional days should be allowed to take effect before Ministers demand more controversial, and likely irreversible, changes.
The Institute for Government has also weighed in on this issue. It says:
“There is a lot of uncertainty attached to the potential benefits of the government’s proposed reforms.”
It also says that there is a serious risk that these reforms could backfire and actually cause a decline in court performance. It identifies productivity as central, noting that the assumptions behind the Government’s proposed savings are “uncertain”. If boosting productivity and increasing sitting capacity are critical, then amendment 35 is exactly the right kind of test. Let us see whether properly funded sitting days can reduce the backlog before proceeding with more radical measures.
Amendment 35 is therefore one of the strongest amendments we are considering today. It does not deny the reality of the backlog—the Opposition never have. Rather, it confronts it directly. It does not say, “Do nothing,” it says, “Do the obvious thing first—fund the Crown court, use the capacity, report back and only then consider whether more fundamental changes are genuinely necessary.”
I also support amendment 36, also tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. It would prevent the Lord Chancellor from
“bringing sections 1 to 7 into force until he has…undertaken a consultation on the potential benefits of introducing extended sitting hours in the Crown Court, and…laid before Parliament a report on the outcome”.
The consultation would have to consider
“potential rates of fees and remuneration for legal professionals and court staff working extended hours”
and the availability of HMCTS staff. The amendment is a reasonable one. It simply requires the Government to consult and report before commencing clauses 1 to 7. Given the scale of the changes the Government are asking us to approve, that is not an excessive demand, in my view.
The amendment also seeks to address one of the practical concerns around extended sitting hours. It recognises that extended hours may have benefits but also inherent costs. It explicitly requires consideration of remuneration and staff availability. We all understand that we cannot run a court system merely by wishing it to sit longer. Judges, advocates, court staff, legal professionals, witnesses and support services all have to be able to make the model work. If hours are to be extended, that must be properly resourced.
That is precisely why a consultation is needed. The Government should not be able to say on the one hand that extended hours are too complicated to consider, while on the other hand pressing ahead with sweeping reforms to jury trial and appeal rights. If their position is that extended hours are impractical, Ministers should set out the evidence. If extended hours are practical in some settings, Ministers should explain where and how. If remuneration is the problem, the Government should consult on it. If staffing is the problem, they should say so. What the Government should not do is ignore the question altogether, as they seem to have done here.
There is also a simple point of fairness. The Government are asking defendants, victims, witnesses, lawyers and the public to accept major changes to the criminal process. They should therefore be willing to accept a much smaller burden: to consult, report and explain why a less constitutionally disruptive capacity measure is or is not viable. Taken alongside amendments 59 and 35, amendment 36 offers a coherent and moderate alternative path forward: build capacity first, fund sitting days first, examine extended hours first, fix operational problems first and only then ask Parliament to consider whether the more drastic provisions in clauses 1 to 7 are necessary. That is a measured and responsible approach that the Government should consider accepting.
I will speak briefly to new clauses 3, 4, 5, 13, 17 and 22, which would improve the Bill. They focus on delivering capacity, efficiency, transparency, public trust and practical reform in line with what the Opposition also seek to achieve. New clause 3 would allow certain Crown court locations or courtrooms to operate as extended-capacity courts, with a morning session from 9 am to 1 pm and an afternoon session from 2 pm to 6 pm. The purpose of that is to allow two different cases to be heard in the same courtroom on the same day. That is clearly a significant operational proposal, and while the principle is sound, it raises serious questions about the availability of judges, court staff, interpreters, security and CPS staff. It also raises questions about remuneration, because the criminal Bar, solicitors and court staff are already under enormous strain. A justice system running on exhausted people will not produce better justice simply because the building stays open for longer. We need to consider all those things at the same time.
New clause 3 is aimed at the right problem: capacity. The Government are asking us to make very large changes to jury trials, allocation and appeals. Before they do that, they should be able to show that every realistic capacity option has been explored. If courtrooms can be used more intensively without compromising fairness, quality or the welfare of those involved, that should at least be examined. The Bar Council’s evidence is clear that the backlog has not been caused by jury trials but by under-investment, poor management of the estate, failures in prisoner transport, listing problems, technology issues and inadequate resourcing. New clause 3 seeks to address that; it asks how we increase throughput while keeping the basic architecture of justice intact.
New clause 4 takes a more cautious approach, and for that reason, it may be the more attractive version of the idea. It would require an independent report into the feasibility of holding two trials a day in designated courtrooms, followed by a Government response and proposals for a pilot, if appropriate. That seems to be a serious and reasonable way to proceed. It does not assume that the model will work: it asks for independent work; evidence; consideration of the effect on defendants, victims, witnesses, judges, practitioners and staff; and an assessment of cost and resource implications.
New clause 5 would require the Lord Chancellor to publish annual targets for reducing the Crown court backlog, both nationally and in each HMCTS region, and to report to Parliament on progress. Again, that appears useful and sensible. If backlog reduction is the central justification for the Bill, Ministers should be willing to define what success looks like and be judged against it.
The regional element is especially important. We know that the backlog is not the same everywhere, and it is undeniable that some court centres have done better than others, sometimes because of stronger local leadership, better listing or more effective case progression. Others face particular estate, staffing or operational problems, and a national figure alone can hide those differences. If the Government are relying on predicted reductions of sittings days and caseload, Parliament should be able to see whether those predicted benefits are actually being delivered, and where they are and are not being delivered.
Sarah Sackman
I thank the hon. Member for Chichester for tabling new clauses 3 and 4, which seek to extend Crown court sitting hours, including the possibility of running two separate sessions per day, and enabling multiple cases to be heard in a single courtroom each day. In the same vein, amendments 59, 35 and 36, tabled by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle, also call for a consultation on extending sitting hours in the Crown court, funding for 130,000 sitting days and a consultation on increased sitting days.
As colleagues know, the Government have funded Crown court sitting days to record levels, and we are funding unlimited sitting days in the new financial year. That means that there is no financial constraint on the hours that Crown courts can sit. They can sit for as many days as possible within capacity constraints. That offers complete flexibility in Crown court centres to hear as many cases as possible. That represents real progress, and has been welcomed by Members on both sides of the House, the Bar and judges.
But we cannot immediately increase capacity to 130,000 sitting days. That is not just a question of funding. Court capacity is not just about the rooms; it depends on judges, barristers, solicitors and court staff. We cannot 3D print those. We predict that sitting at unlimited levels next year will allow us to sit for 117,000 or 118,000 days, but we are not yet ready to ratchet up to 130,000 sitting days. That is the figure referred to in Sir Brian Leveson’s review, but he acknowledged that, even in the medium term, we will not get there. I say that because, although it is part of the Government’s ambition to grow capacity in the Crown court to meet the incoming demand and put the system on a sustainable level, the fact that we will not get there, even in the medium term, means that all those impacted by the cases sitting in the backlog—defendants on remand and potential victims—are left waiting.
The lifting of the cap on sitting days is highly significant and is part of the investment lever that we all agree is needed to get our Crown court back on its feet. However, the central insight of the independent review of criminal courts is that that investment alone will not be enough, because even when we remove the limit on sitting days we cannot get to 130,000 sitting days because of capacity constraints. Extending hours alone does not increase the underlying capacity. Extending sitting hours or attempting to run multiple trials per day risks, I would argue, reducing time for case preparation, potentially increasing ineffective and cracked trials, and then potentially worsening delays rather than improving them.
Sarah Sackman
Well, during covid courts did operate with extended and flexible arrangements, but those were temporary measures, under exceptional conditions, dealing with reduced volumes. By the way, to the point made by the hon. Member for Chichester, the reduction in the hearing time in a sitting day—now under four hours—concerns me greatly. That loss of time aggregated over the 117,000-odd sitting days adds up and is hugely significant. But where HMCTS conducted pilots of increased and flexible sitting hours, it found that increasing hours alone delivered limited gains. There was also, at the time, substantial opposition from the Bar, because although we are primarily concerned with the hearing time, because that is where progress is driven in a trial, all the case preparation—whether that is judicial, reading the papers, or the preparation time that is needed by the barristers and the prosecution—needs to be factored in. Extending sitting hours sounds like a good remedy to this problem, but we do not think it provides a solution, because time needs to be afforded to enable proper case preparation, so that when we do get on with a trial we can crack on with a hearing.
Dr Mullan
I intervened when the Minister said she thought that extending sitting hours would make things worse. When I asked her to explain that, she then said that she thought the benefit would be minimal. That is a different point. Given that we have said there should be an extensive consultation to figure out all those things, so that it appeals to people, such that that they will want to take part in these extended sitting hours, why would it make things worse? If people are willing to do it, I just do not see the logic of that point.
Sarah Sackman
As I have said, we have precedent. The pilots showed that there was precious little improvement. Extending sitting hours might make things worse if, for example, one is stuck in extended hours on one trial, meaning that one is not available to be in other parts of the country.
Mr Kohler
Is the Minister talking about extending one trial over more hours? Surely the solution is having two trials in parallel. I do not know whether the Minister has ever been on a jury; I have been on a jury three times. It is very difficult for jury members, particularly non-lawyers, to listen to evidence for more than four hours. Currently they might do five, or five and a half hours in a day, and that is difficult for them. The idea of a trial in the morning and a trial in the afternoon running in parallel, separately, is better for jury members and for the system, and addresses many of the Minister’s concerns, does it not?
Sarah Sackman
We heard evidence from Sir Brian Leveson about how in his earlier years sitting in the Crown court it was not unusual to hear a couple of trials in a day. One of his insights was that part of the changing nature of what we are grappling with here is that Crown court trials are just taking longer. That ability to hear multiple trials within the court day has been impeded by the fact that trials are taking longer because of the nature of the evidence and the procedural safeguards. I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point about multiple trials. It important to note that the Lord Chancellor has a power under section 78(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 to determine when the Crown court sits. The amendment is not necessary with regard to needing to change primary legislation in order to change sitting hours.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting)
Tuesday 28th April 2026
(3 months, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Courts and Tribunals Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 28 April 2026 - (28 Apr 2026)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
New clause 4—Review of the Feasibility of Two Court Sittings per day—
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 12 months beginning on the day on which this Act comes into force, lay before Parliament an independent report into the feasibility of conducting two trials per day in designated court rooms (‘the Scheme’).
(2) The scheme would allow for proceedings in a Crown Court to consist of—
(a) a morning session, commencing at 09:00 and concluding at 13:00; and
(b) an afternoon session, commencing at 14:00 and concluding at 18:00.
(3) A report under subsection (1) must assess the impact of the scheme—
(a) on the efficiency and timeliness of court proceedings;
(b) on the availability of judges, legal practitioners, and court staff;
(c) the potential impact on defendants, victims, and witnesses; and
(d) the cost and resource implications of the scheme.
(4) The Lord Chancellor must, within three months of the laying of the report under subsection (1), publish a response.
(5) The response must include proposals for a pilot scheme based on the findings of the report including the proposed scope and duration of any such pilot.”
This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to commission and lay before Parliament an independent report on the feasibility of introducing two court sittings per day in designated courtrooms, including an assessment of its impact on efficiency, resources, and court users, and to set out the Government’s intended next steps.
New clause 5—Targets for Backlog Reduction—
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within six months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, set and publish annual targets for the reduction of the Crown Court backlog in England and Wales.
(2) There must be a target for the—
(a) overall reduction of the Crown Court backlog in England and Wales, and
(b) reduction of the backlog in each different HMCTS region.
(3) The Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament an annual report on progress against these targets.
(4) Any report under subsection (3) must include any steps taken to address the failure to meet the targets.”
This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to set and publish targets for reducing court backlogs and to report annually to Parliament on progress.
New clause 13—Report on the effect of the Act on public trust and participation in the criminal justice system—
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must commission a report on the effect of the provisions of the Act on public trust and participation in the judicial system.
(2) A report under this section must—
(a) include consideration of the effect of the provisions of the Act on—
(i) witness participation;
(ii) the effect of these reforms on public confidence and trust in the criminal justice system;
(iii) the effect of these provisions on BAME engagement with and trust of the criminal justice system;
(b) contain recommendations for further provision, or changes to delivery of provision under this Act, to increase the levels of each criterion set out in subparagraphs (2)(a)(i) to (2)(a)(iii).
(3) Within twelve months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament—
(a) a copy of a report under this section,
(b) the Lord Chancellor’s response to recommendations made by that report.”
This new clause would require the Lord Chancellor to commission, lay, and respond to a report on the effect of the Bill on public trust in the criminal justice system.
New clause 17—Review of Efficiencies in the Criminal Justice System—
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 24 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, conduct a review on the impact of the provisions of this Act on the efficiency of the criminal justice system.
(2) The review under subsection (1) must, in particular, consider the impact on the efficiency of the criminal justice system of—
(a) the provisions of this Act;
(b) The wider criminal justice system;
(c) the standard of delivery by court contract providers, including PECS contractors;
(d) the condition of the courts estate; and
(e) the use of technology.
(3) In considering ‘efficiency’, the review must consider the impact on—
(a) delays,
(b) backlogs, and
(c) the experience of victims and witnesses.
(4) The Secretary of State must lay a report on the review before Parliament.
(5) The report under subsection (4) must include recommendations for further legislative or administrative changes to improve the efficiency of the criminal justice system.”
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to review and report on whether the Act has improved the efficiency of the criminal justice system, including impacts on delays, backlogs, and the experience of victims and witnesses.
New clause 22—Remote Court Participation: Strategy—
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backlog (‘the strategy’).
(2) The strategy must include—
(a) an assessment of the current use of remote proceedings;
(b) an evaluation of the impact of remote proceedings on the speed of case disposal and the overall reduction of the outstanding caseload;
(c) recommendations on how the principle of open justice can be upheld with the increased use of remote proceedings;
(d) criteria for determining the suitability of proceedings for different forms of remote participation; and
(e) provisions for the security, reliability, and resilience of digital systems used in remote proceedings.
(3) The Secretary of State must, at intervals of no more than 24 months following the laying of the strategy, lay before Parliament a report on progress made against the strategy.
(4) The progress report must consider—
(a) the extent to which the strategy has been implemented;
(b) the impact on the criminal case backlog, including any measures by which that impact has been assessed; and
(c) any further legislative or budgetary provisions to ensure the effectiveness of remote proceedings.
(5) For the purposes of this section, ‘remote proceedings’ means any proceedings in which one or more participants attend by way of live video or audio link.”
This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to publish a formal strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backload in the criminal justice system.
New clause 32—Commencement dependent on independent review of racial disproportionality—
“(1) This section applies in relation to the commencement of Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act.
(2) The provisions inserted by Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act may not be brought into force unless the conditions in subsections (3) to (6) have been met.
(3) The Secretary of State must commission an independent review into racial disproportionality arising from—
(a) the changes to jurisdiction powers and procedures in the Magistrates’ Courts under Part 1; and
(b) the operation of trial-allocation decisions under Part 1.
(4) As soon as reasonably practicable after completing a review under this section, the reviewer must send a report on its outcome to the Secretary of State.
(5) On receiving a report under subsection (4), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before both Houses of Parliament.
(6) As soon as reasonably practicable, the Secretary of State must—
(a) prepare and publish a strategy setting out the measures the Secretary of State intends to take in consequence of the review’s findings; and
(b) implement those measures in full before Clauses 1 to 7 may be brought into force.”
This new clause introduces a duty to commission an independent review into racial disproportionality arising from the changes to jurisdiction, powers and procedures in the magistrates’ courts, and from the operation of the new trial-allocation provisions in Clauses 1 to 7 of the Bill.
New clause 33—Commencement dependent on review of differential impact on classes of persons—
“(1) This section applies in relation to the commencement of Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act.
(2) The provisions inserted by Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act may not be brought into force unless the conditions in subsections (3) to (7) have been met.
(3) The Secretary of State must commission an independent review on whether, and the extent to which—
(a) the changes to jurisdiction powers and procedures in the Magistrates’ Courts under Part 1; and
(b) the operation of trial-allocation decisions under Part 1,
are likely to have a disproportionate impact on particular classes of persons.
(4) The review under subsection (3) must consider—
(a) the extent to which, as a result of the provisions in subsections (3)(a) and (b), defendants in criminal proceedings are eligible for legal aid;
(b) whether persons of limited financial means are likely to be affected differently from other defendants as a result of those provisions; and
(c) the projected number of defendants who, as a result of those provisions, are likely to be unrepresented.
(5) As soon as reasonably practicable after completing a review under this section, the reviewer must send a report on its findings to the Secretary of State.
(6) On receiving a report under subsection (5), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before both Houses of Parliament.
(7) As soon as reasonably practicable, the Secretary of State must—
(a) publish a strategy setting out the measures the Secretary of State intends to take in consequence of the review’s findings; and
(b) implement those measures in full before Clauses 1 to 7 may be brought into force.”
This new clause introduces a duty to conduct an independent review of whether Clause 1 to 7 of the Bill give rise to disproportionate impacts on particular classes of persons.
Amendment 15, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert
“, subject to the provisions of subsection (3A).
(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations under subsection (3) relating to the following sections until he has published a response to the recommendation of Part II of Independent Review of the Criminal Courts—
(a) Section 1 (Removal of right to elect trial on indictment);
(b) Section 2 (Written indication of guilty plea: removal of right to object to venue);
(c) Section 3 (Trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation);
(d) Section 4 (Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases);
(e) Section 5 (Consequential amendments relating to sections 3 and 4).
(f) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts)
(g) Section 7 (Appeals from magistrates’ courts)”.
This amendment would make the publication of the Government response to Part II of the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts a precondition of Clause 1 to 7 of this Bill coming into force.
Amendment 59, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert
“, subject to the provisions of subsection (3A).
(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations under subsection (3) relating to the sections set out under subsection (3B) until he has taken reasonable steps to increase Crown Court sitting capacity, including but not limited to—
(a) using buildings not currently in use as courts to hear cases where cells are not needed, and
(b) reducing lost sitting days as a result of late guilty pleas and prison transport delays.
(3B) The sections referenced in subsection (3A) are—
(a) Section 1 (Removal of right to elect trial on indictment);
(b) Section 2 (Written indication of guilty plea: removal of right to object to venue);
(c) Section 3 (Trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation);
(d) Section 4 (Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases);
(e) Section 5 (Consequential amendments relating to sections 3 and 4).
(f) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts)
(g) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts)”.
This amendment would ensure that sections 1 to 7 of the Act could not be commenced until the Lord Chancellor has used alternative means to increase Crown Court sitting capacity.
Amendment 35, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert—
“(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make a statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (3) bringing sections 1 to 7 into force until the conditions in subsection (3B) are met.
(3B) The conditions are that—
(a) the Lord Chancellor has provided funding for at least 130,000 sitting days in the Crown Court in the financial year following the coming into force of this Act,
(b) HM Courts and Tribunals Service has made an assessment that the Crown Court has, so far as possible, used the allocation of sitting days provided under subsection (3B)(a), and
(c) the Lord Chancellor has made a statement to the House of Commons that the funding provided under subsection (3B)(a) has not reduced the number of cases pending trial in the Crown Court compared to the start of the financial year.”
This amendment prevents the provisions in sections 1 to 7 from coming into force until the Lord Chancellor has provided funding for 130,000 sittings days in the Crown Court; HMCTS has assessed that the Crown Court has used its allocation of sitting days; and the Lord Chancellor has made a statement to the House that this has not reduced the backlog.
Amendment 36, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert—
“(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make a statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (3) bringing sections 1 to 7 into force until he has—
(a) undertaken a consultation on the potential benefits of introducing extended sitting hours in the Crown Court, and
(b) laid before Parliament a report on the outcome of the consultation.
(3B) The consultation under subsection (3A) must consider—
(a) potential rates of fees and renumeration for legal professionals and court staff working extended hours, and
(b) the availability of HM Courts and Tribunal Service staff.”
This amendment would ensure that sections 1 to 7 of the Act did not come into force until the Lord Chancellor had reviewed how to increase sitting hours in the Crown Court.
Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq. New clauses 32 and 33 can be considered almost part and parcel of each other. Our earlier discussion of new clause 29 involved a similar issue, but these new clauses are much more specific.
New clause 32 would introduce a duty to commission an independent review of racial disproportionality arising from the changes to jurisdiction powers and procedures in the magistrates court, and from the operation of the new trial-allocation provisions in clauses 1 to 7. The Government’s equality impact assessment of the proposal to restrict access to jury trial refers many times to the lack of evidence that the proposals in the Bill have a racist or discriminatory outcome, but the impact assessment does not refer once the Secretary of State’s own 2017 review, which showed reduced racial disparities in jury trial outcomes. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.
The new clause would mandate a full review of racial disproportionality before the changes are made. At a time when trust in the justice system among the black, Asian and minority ethnic community is already low, why rush through these changes before we have the full picture?
New clause 33 would introduce a duty to conduct an independent review of whether clauses 1 to 7 give rise to disproportionate impacts on particular classes of person. It is welcome that, in December last year, the Government announced a £92 million investment in criminal legal aid, after years of neglect. However, it will take a while for that investment to have an impact on the disproportionate outcomes across the criminal justice system for working-class defendants, young males and, in particular, vulnerable people.
Juries are hailed as the fairest component of the legal system, and are widely accepted as more likely to provide an equitable outcome than the judiciary, who are still overwhelmingly privately educated and from particular backgrounds. One of the big issues—this applies to new clause 32 as well as to new clause 33—is that joint enterprise is often used as a dragnet for marginalised and vulnerable communities, impacting not just black people but neurodivergent and working-class communities.
For those who may not be fully aware, a 2016 Supreme Court decision recognised that joint enterprise had been used wrongly for the past three decades. Despite that, little has changed. Very few appeals have been accepted, and there is significant evidence of the continued misuse of joint enterprise. This fills prisons with people of no risk to the public, who are labelled as murderers when they have not killed anyone—an expensive travesty of justice. They are often sent to jail or given longer sentences than they should have received on the basis of assisting or encouraging a crime. They are found guilty by association.
In our criminal justice system, joint enterprise essentially means that if someone has aided, abetted, counselled or procured the commission of an offence, they can be found guilty of an offence committed by someone else. However, the role they have played may vary, and the sentencing powers often reflect that. In reality, a lot of bystanders or people watching, or people who may have known one of the parties but did not take part in the crime, will also end up getting convicted. There has been an attempt to rectify that with a private Member’s Bill, but so far nothing has happened.
Some miscarriages of justice have been challenged, and some cases have received further examination. Dr Nisha Waller of the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies states that
“joint enterprise laws are vague and wide in scope, causing systemic injustice, including overcriminalisation, overpunishment, discriminatory outcomes, and convictions where there is no compelling evidence of intent”
or even
“a defendant’s physical contribution”.
Dr Waller’s research shows that the current law is flawed and that it
“encourages…the police and Crown Prosecution Service to charge suspects based on poor-quality evidence…highly speculative prosecution case theory to take precedence over…evidentiary foundations…the use of gang narratives and vague concepts such as ‘in it together’ to construct collective intent.”
She says it allows for a lot of young people to be stereotyped and criminalised, and recommends that
“the scope of secondary liability law needs to be narrowed in favour of a clearer and safer legal framework.”
One reason why it is important to address this issue, in conjunction with new clauses 32 and 33, is that the very people who would be affected by the new clauses are the people who are affected by the law on joint enterprise. I pay tribute to Joint Enterprise Not Guilty by Association, which has been doing tremendous work in this area for many years.
The most recent research by Appeal, which has been monitoring joint enterprise in court cases, concluded:
“There is a clear departure from what the law of complicity should be”
and that:
“Secondary liability is often diluted to little more than association, suspicion, and story.”
It says:
“Prosecution narrative strategy has replaced evidential clarity…meaning joint enterprise trials are often not a truth-seeking process.”
It concludes that the way joint enterprise laws are currently used is
“producing injustice at scale”
and that:
“Public money is being used to stage justice, rather than deliver it.”
Research by Becky Clarke and Patrick Williams at Manchester Metropolitan University shows that nearly £250 million is spent on prosecuting defendants in joint enterprise cases every year. The total future punishment of the 1,088 people convicted under joint enterprise cases each year costs the taxpayer £1.2 billion.
Finally, the report “In Their Own Words”, which is based on a series of family listening days organised by JENGbA, detailed the devastating impact of joint enterprise convictions on families and friends—
Yasmin Qureshi
I take your ruling and guidance, Dr Huq. I was trying to explain it because the disparities are important and the issue does affect people. I ask the Government to think about new clauses 32 and 33, because they will hopefully have an impact on joint enterprise. I will not press them to a vote.
The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)
This group contains a number of new clauses, and I want to make sure that I address all the principal themes.
New clause 5, tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester, relates to publishing targets for reducing court backlogs. It would require the Lord Chancellor to set and publish targets for reducing court backlogs, and to report annually to Parliament on progress. It is important to note that the Ministry of Justice and His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service are downstream Departments, by which I mean that we are subject to demand pressures that are not fully within our control as they are driven by additional arrests and charging decisions. We have published our central demand forecasts, on which the Department’s impact assessment and modelling is based, but the fluctuation and uncertainty in demand makes it particularly challenging for us to set a fixed, specific target.
In the absence of credible reforms, targets will not achieve much. I can tell the hon. Member for Chichester in general terms that we want to get back to a sustainable position. Some Members have referred to reverting to our position before the covid pandemic, which was when we saw the exponential rise in the backlogs. However, I do not want to put a figure on it, because that would simply not be achievable, and having targets that we know we cannot achieve is setting ourselves up to fail, and it lacks credibility.
In the independent review of the criminal courts, Sir Brian Leveson made a series of recommendations related to how performance management and accountability across the criminal justice system could be strengthened. We are looking carefully at those recommendations, particularly in respect of whether we ought to establish a performance oversight board, in addition to the governance forum that already exists. Sir Brian recommends that such a board should monitor and report on the performance of local criminal justice boards and publish a shared set of performance measures. As I have said, we will be publishing our response to the second part of Sir Brian’s review shortly.
Performance management, and monitoring our success in reducing the court backlogs, is essential. Within Parliament, we have the scrutiny provided not only by shadow Justice Ministers, as well as all parliamentarians, but by the Justice Committee, which provides rigorous scrutiny on a cross-party basis. Of course, we also have the regular, frequent publication of Crown court data. Although those targets are not specified, no one is pushing at them harder than the Ministry of Justice and myself, and that is what the Bill primarily targets. However, we do not think that it is necessary to publish specific targets in the legislation, and I ask the hon. Member for Chichester not to press new clause 5 to a vote.
New clause 17, and to some extent new clause 13, touches on efficiencies. It suggests that we ought to review efficiencies before we embark on reform. Indeed, the hon. Member for Reigate and others have made this argument during the debate: do the efficiency first, and see whether it works, before engaging in reform. I want to address that argument head on. We have been clear from the start that there is no silver bullet or simple panacea to the backlog. The insight of the independent review of the criminal courts is that we need investment, efficiencies and reform, and we are not ducking the need to drive efficiencies. One of the areas where I think we all agree is the fact that the system is incredibly inefficient, and the backlog itself compounds that inefficiency, but we are not waiting for legislation to drive at that efficiency reform.
A number of other Members and I have mentioned relevant measures, and I want to touch on a few. For example, the blitz courts have been in operation in London since April, and I am going to visit one in a couple of weeks. That highly effective model of very aggressive listing has had success in the past, and it is being used to drive down certain case types in the backlog, such as assault against an emergency worker. We also need a consistent and clear approach to national listing, such as using the AI listing assistant that I referred to earlier.
We are gripping the issue of prisoner delivery right across the country. Lord Timpson and I have established an oversight board, bringing together representatives of His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service, His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, and the prisoner escort and custody service. It is a year-long project—a sprint, as it were—to look at how we can drive improved performance under the existing contract, and how we can imbed digital solutions to make that run much more efficiently.
Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)
I appreciate the work the Minister is doing with the Prisons Minister. Can she explore something that has been reflected to me by court staff and judges working in the system? The PECS contract will say that it is delivering 99% of prisoners on time, and refer to the data that shows how many times PECS has delayed a case. But, because of the way we record the data in HMCTS, if a judge knows that the prisoner is not going to arrive until 11 am, they will make a decision not to sit until 12 pm. That is recorded as a judge’s decision, rather than reflecting that the reason for the delay is that the defendant has not been delivered to the court on time. Will the Minister take that away and work out whether there is a way of analysing and scrutinising the data slightly differently from how the PECS contract will try to explain it?
Sarah Sackman
The hon. Lady makes a fair point. There is a mismatch between the performance data that PECS has recorded and the qualitative evidence that one hears from barristers and the judicial office as to the time that is being lost because prisoners are not being produced on time. One of the things we discussed in the first meeting of the oversight board was that we need to have a shared understanding of the data and how we capture it.
Another important theme, which we will come to in respect of another new clause, is remote hearings. Clearly, while we absolutely need to improve and speed up the operation of prisoner transport, and initiatives like opening up bus lanes are all to the good, we also have a demand issue. If we want to reduce the demand for prisoner transport, unless it is needed to further the interests of justice, one way to alleviate some of the pressure is to make greater use of remote hearings. This kind of cross-agency working and grip, with ministerial attention, as well as taking soundings and engaging with the Bar, which sees the effects every day, is going to be really important.
We are expanding case-progression functions and case co-ordinators to every Crown court; introducing staff with delegated judicial powers to focus on progressing cases; and sorting out problems that would otherwise take up judges’ time and reduce the hearing time that we spoke about earlier. All those things are under way and will drive at the problem. But I want to be honest with the hon. Member for Reigate, and others who maintain the argument that we should make the efficiencies and have the uncapped sitting days and the investment before we trouble ourselves with reform.
I am a realist, and when I look right across Government, questions of efficiency and productivity challenge our public services all the time. Of course we want our systems to be more efficient, and so we should—the taxpayer deserves nothing less—but we have the insight of the independent review, and our own modelling, which assumes that we have maximalist investment coupled with 5% efficiency gains year on year, and those two things together will not reduce the backlog. They temper it and dampen it down, but they do not cut into it. Assuming efficiency gains above 5% year on year would be optimistic for the system. If it were easy to do, previous Governments would no doubt have achieved it. I am not going to assume more than a 5% efficiency gain, because to do so would be setting ourselves up to fail.
This is probably the area where I take issue with the Institute for Government, because although it accepts, in broad terms, the time savings that can be made through our reform package—I understand that Members will say, “The assumptions are highly uncertain” and all the rest of it—it assumes that we can revert to the efficiency levels that existed pre-pandemic. It essentially assumes an efficiency gain of between 18% and 20% practically overnight, and I simply do not think that that is achievable.
Of course we want to drive improvements in prisoner transfer. Of course we hope that case co-ordinators will get the systems going through, and that blitz courts will work, particularly in London, where things are most acute. But I am not prepared to assume that all that will cumulatively amount to efficiency gains of more than 5% year on year, because we have all seen the lessons, not just from the criminal justice system but right across public services, in respect of how difficult efficiencies are to achieve.
That is why we are pulling every lever—not just the investment or the efficiency drive but the structural reforms—so that the investment is going into a reformed, modernised system that takes the decision to reallocate work to the magistrates court, where we know that cases are dealt with in a more timely and proportionate fashion, and out of the Crown court. That is what all these reforms amount to.
I know the establishment of the Crown court bench division keeps being cited because it will make a 2% saving, but we estimate that the package of measures taken together will make a 20% saving, because of the combined effect of the changes to magistrates courts’ sentencing powers and the magistrates retaining more work. We are pulling every lever because, when we combine all three levers, that will get the backlog down in the timeframe that the Deputy Prime Minister has set out in his various statements.
Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
It is wonderful to hear the Minister’s enthusiasm for the changes, but if she is so confident that they will deliver that benefit, why was she not willing to start with a pilot, or even agree to a sunset clause?
Sarah Sackman
I do have confidence in the changes. Look at the levers in the Government’s gift: we can get more money for the system—tick. We can try to drive performance and govern the system to be more efficient—we are doing everything we can, but I refuse to be over-optimistic about that. The other lever I can pull is reform, based on the recommendations we have had. The hon. Lady asks me why we are not piloting, being more cautious or waiting for the efficiencies to work themselves through the system rather than running all these things in parallel, and I simply say: look at the crisis we are in, and look at the extent of the problem.
If I were to wait for that 5% to play out year on year, even with maximalist investment, I cannot say that we would get the backlog down in 20 or 30 years. I do not know if we would ever get it back down, because our modelling shows that it is insufficient. That is the conclusion that Sir Brian Leveson drew and it is supported by our impact assessment. It is why we have to act for the people stuck in the system now, with their cases being listed until 2030.
I have drawn on healthcare analogies a number of times in this debate, as have others. The NHS, for example, is an institution that always needs more funding—we are all living longer, and some of the conditions we are facing are more and more complex—but we do not keep pouring money into an unreformed system. Here, we are saying, “Let’s reform the system, get it working better and more efficiently, and give it a chance to succeed by equipping it not just with the investment in terms of sitting days, but with the capital investment, too.”
This is not, I hope, an enthusiastic strategy. I call it the kitchen-sink strategy, because I am trying to throw everything at it to achieve the real-time goal of bringing down these backlogs. When we announced these plans and the timeframe for when we expected to see the backlogs come down, even with these bold and radical plans, the argument I was met with was, “My goodness, you’re not getting the backlog down until 2035,” and we are pushing to see if we can make that date sooner and pulling at every lever we have.
I understand that this Department is going to be judged on whether we turn the corner on the backlog in this Parliament, and whether we see it start to come down in enough time, so that victims of crime and defendants on remand can start to feel it in this Parliament and certainly early into the next. That is the essay question I set myself, and we asked for a comprehensive, evidence-based answer from an independent review. It told us that we could not pick and choose our levers; we need to use all three, and that is what these measures are designed to drive at. That is the best explanation I can give for why we say that, while efficiency and investment are hugely important and necessary, they alone are not sufficient. We need the reforms in clauses 1 to 10.
New clauses 32 and 33, which were tabled by my hon. Friends the Members for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson) and for Bolton South and Walkden, rightly highlight the disparities in outcomes that we see across our criminal justice system, and the questions about the trust and confidence that many minoritised communities have in the system. We had a constructive debate on this issue last week, generated by new clause 29, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington.
As I said then, the Government are listening carefully, not only to the Committee but to stakeholders that represent those communities impacted every day by questions of racial inequality in the criminal justice system. We remain committed, during a later stage of the Bill’s passage, to tabling a Government amendment on a review that will cover all the things that we believe are necessary, including consideration of the impacts of our criminal justice system not just on black and minority ethnic groups but on those from working-class backgrounds. Given that commitment, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden not to press the new clauses to a vote.
New clause 13 touches on efficiencies, on which I have already set out my arguments, and also addresses questions of public trust in the system. A theme of our debates has been the importance of public trust in our criminal justice system. Even those who do not directly interface with the criminal justice system need to know that it works and is there if they need it.
There are two essential elements to sustaining public trust, the first of which is transparency. We have spoken about this a lot, and I know the hon. Member for Chichester has tabled further new clauses on transcripts. We have spoken a lot about transcripts and the recordings of proceedings in both the magistrates court and the Crown court. I think that opening up the process and making it intelligible to the public is so important, as well as the provision of reasons by judges in the Crown court bench division. Those are all ways in which transparency can play an important part in maintaining public trust.
However, there is another element of public trust: people trust systems that work. If a system ceases to work and breaks down—if someone who reports an assault that they experienced on their way home from the underground station is told that they will receive a court date that is one or two years away—that is the sort of thing that corrodes trust. We can think of myriad ways in which it can happen, but I would suggest that a state failing to deliver the very basics of timely justice is corrosive of trust.
That is why what I am trying to do is not just about efficacy, or being able to say that we now have a properly run criminal justice system; it is about trust and legitimacy. Those questions of trust are true, irrespective of someone’s social background. We say again that the new clause is not necessary, but those questions around public trust in our system are writ large through the Government’s mission, not just in our approach to this legislation, but in our entire approach to restoring our criminal justice system to the state it needs to be in.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I thank the Minister for her comprehensive response to this group of amendments. We have talked heavily about efficiencies: the shadow Opposition and the Liberal Democrats have put forward alternative measures to improve efficiencies that were not explored in Leveson’s report. I asked Sir Brian if he had explored the concept of doing two trials a day. He said, “No, that wasn’t really something that I looked at.” But he was quite open to it. We had the same conversation that it seems the Minister had with him, where he said, “I used to be able to get through two trials in a day.” We know that that world does not exist any more.
Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)
Interestingly, we have been told all along that this is about the complexity of cases, yet the evidence is that the number of hours that things have been looked at has shrunk. To me, that is a much bigger issue. If we have fewer hours in a day to operate, of course it is going to take longer to get through complex cases.
Jess Brown-Fuller
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. It is a worrying trend that the number of hours that are being used efficiently in Crown courts every day seems to be decreasing year on year.
The Minister spoke about not wanting to necessarily set a target. I agree with her: sometimes putting an arbitrary number on something does not actually reflect the situation. The previous Government attempted to do that, setting a target in 2019 to get the backlog down to a certain number. That does not always reflect the fact that the backlog could be a caseload 30,000 of the most complex cases that will take an incredibly long time to get to. Instead, we should look at the average time that it takes to get from charge to trial, and monitor whether we can bring that number down.
When I have talked about bringing that report to Parliament in new clause 5, it is not necessarily to say, “It was 80,000 and now it is 79,500,” because that does not reflect how long people are going to actually wait to have their cases heard. It is far more about the experiences of all of those people going through the system.
With regard to having reports established every year, the Minister spoke passionately, as she always does, about wanting to make sure that the reforms genuinely make a difference. But the Deputy Prime Minister has said that, even with all the reforms coming in together, he does not expect to see the backlog fall before the end of the Parliament. We need to be able to look at where the data is taking us every year, track what the backlog is doing, track the sorts of cases that are getting stuck in the backlog, and then scrutinise that, so that if there are other levers that can be pulled—whether they are things that have been suggested by me or by the shadow Minister—we have the opportunity to come back and review those things.
I am glad that the Minister recognises that trust in the criminal justice system is low anyway. It is not where it should be. I have said it before: the justice system is inextricably linked with how people view democracy. When trust in democracy is low, there is distrust in institutions, policing and the way our courts work. As cross-party parliamentarians, we have a duty to improve trust in all those systems. I worry that the measures in clauses 1 to 7 will not do that, but will erode trust.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 7 would require the Lord Chancellor to lay before Parliament a strategy for victim-led case management in relation to criminal court proceedings. The Government have highlighted the challenges that victims face in their briefings on the Bill’s provisions in both the media and the Chamber. As we all know, it is victims who have been affected by the horrendous backlogs that we see today, and I have no doubt that the unacceptable delays will have caused victims of crime to step away or choose not to pursue the criminal justice route at all.
Dr Mullan
I wish to speak briefly in support of the principle that different approaches to case management and ways of working are making a difference in a number of areas. The Committee has had extensive back and forth about the fact that backlogs are actually coming down in certain locations. There has been debate about whether that is just a seasonal trend that we see at some points in the year; we will have to wait to see whether that is the case.
We have also spoken about the approach to case management in Liverpool, and this morning I read out various statistics from other courts that are bringing the backlogs down. I think new clause 7 drives at the same point; other measures are already showing benefits before the passage of this legislation, and we should prioritise them.
Sarah Sackman
Let me begin, as we all have in this Committee, by acknowledging the challenges that victims face in accessing the information and support they need. We have talked about the Government’s drive to centre victims in the criminal justice process.
I have a couple of things to say in response to new clause 7. First, there is lots of work under way. For example, on 5 February this year we launched a consultation on a new victims code to ensure that we get the foundations right for victims. Through the connecting criminal justice data programme, we are aiming to strengthen data sharing by seeing how we can both track and share that data with victims, as appropriate. We have published statutory guidance on independent sexual violence advisers and independent domestic violence advisers, recommending best practice for those roles. Of course, we have also begun to roll out the independent legal adviser service for rape victims. We have also undertaken consistent engagement; I met the Victims’ Commissioner just yesterday to discuss some of the ways in which we can marshal the over £500 billion-worth of investment that the Government have made in victims services, so that we can ensure that we have a victim-centred approach.
Case management is ultimately a matter for the judiciary, but taking into account the impact that delays in processes have on victims will of course form an important part of that. I would say that a publication strategy is not a matter best addressed through primary legislation, but I understand the thrust behind the hon. Lady’s proposal, and it is one that we would agree with.
Jess Brown-Fuller
The Minister mentions the increased funding to victims support services, which I know is a really important arm of what the Government are trying to achieve. I would just caution that some of the victims support services that I have spoken to have said that, because of the length of the backlogs and the delays in the current system, the increase in funding has only allowed them to maintain the status quo, because they are now supporting people for much longer, and they are trying to make sure that they stay engaged in the process. It has not allowed them to change up their practices or introduce some of the best practice that they would like to see, just because of the length of time for which they are now supporting victims through the system. I just wanted to get that on the record.
Sarah Sackman
I absolutely recognise what the hon. Lady says. That is why I come back to this: swifter justice for victims is the guiding principle behind all these reforms. As she says, the longer people are stuck waiting for their day in court, the longer they need to be supported. It becomes a vicious cycle, because we must expend more resource on victim support to keep them engaged in the process. It is not just that we do that for longer; it gets harder the longer they are stuck in the backlog. I very much agree with her: I would rather that money were redeployed to enhance what those victim support agencies can do. I do not think primary legislation is the vehicle for it, but I absolutely agree with the sentiment. I urge her to withdraw her new clause.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I am pleased the Minister recognises the Government must go a long way to do more for victims, but it is getting harder for services such as victim support to manage an ever-increasing caseload. I am keen to press this new clause to a vote, because the idea of victim-led case management, which many of the courts are keen to adopt, is a key tenet of improving victims’ experience in the system.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 9—Judicial training: violence against women and girls—
“(1) Any member of the judiciary who may be assigned to proceedings for a trial on indictment without a jury must have access to training on matters relating to violence against women and girls.
(2) Training provided under subsection (1) must cover—
(a) the nature and dynamics of violence against women and girls, including—
(i) domestic abuse,
(ii) sexual violence,
(iii) coercive control, and
(iv) so-called honour-based abuse;
(b) best practice in hearing cases involving violence against women and girls, including ensuring fair and trauma-informed proceedings.
(3) The Lord Chancellor must by regulations specify how often members of the judiciary must undertake such training.
(4) The Lord Chancellor must lay an annual report before Parliament on the provision and uptake of training provided under this section.”
This new clause requires the provision of training for the judiciary focused on violence against women and girls.
New clause 10—Judicial training: domestic abuse—
“(1) Any member of the judiciary who may be assigned to proceedings for a trial on indictment without a jury must have access to training on matters relating to domestic abuse.
(2) Training provided under subsection (1) must cover—
(a) the nature and dynamics of domestic abuse, including physical, emotional, psychological, sexual, and economic abuse, as well as controlling or coercive behaviour;
(b) best practice in the management of cases involving domestic abuse, including ensuring fair and trauma-informed proceedings.
(3) The Lord Chancellor must by regulations specify how often members of the judiciary must undertake such training.
(4) The Lord Chancellor must lay an annual report before Parliament on the provision and uptake of training provided under this section.”
This new clause requires the provision of training for the judiciary focused on domestic abuse.
New clause 30—Duty to provide trauma-informed training—
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must ensure that appropriate training is made mandatory for members of all court staff working in the criminal courts on best practice in relation to victims' trauma.
(2) Training under subsection (1) must include—
(a) the nature, prevalence, and impact of domestic abuse, coercive and controlling behaviour, and rape and serious sexual offences (‘RASSO’);
(b) the dynamics and psychological effects of trauma on parties and witnesses involved in proceedings;
(c) the identification and appropriate handling of cases involving domestic abuse, coercive and controlling behaviour, and RASSO offences;
(d) the ways in which trauma may affect memory, communication, behaviour, and engagement with court proceedings;
(e) best practices for reducing retraumatisation within court and tribunals settings.
(3) Training provided under this section must—
(a) on initial appointment to a role within a court, and at regular intervals thereafter;
(b) reflect current best practice and be informed by up-to-date research and guidance;
(c) be developed in consultation with appropriate experts, including specialist support organisations and persons with lived experience of abuse and trauma.
(4) The Lord Chancellor must keep the training under review and revise it as appropriate.
(5) The Lord Chancellor must publish guidance on the implementation of this section.”
This new clause would require the Lord Chancellor to ensure that members of the court staff working in the criminal courts receive mandatory, consistent training on trauma-informed practice to improve understanding of how trauma affects victims’ evidence, behaviour, and engagement with court proceedings.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Me again. The new clauses would require provision for the training of the judiciary and, under new clause 30, for court staff. Each of these clauses focuses on a different area. New clause 8 focuses on discrimination against ethnic minorities, including racial bias and the impact on judicial decision making. New clause 9 requires the provision of training for the judiciary focused on violence against women and girls. New clause 10 requires the provision of training for the judiciary focused on domestic abuse. New clause 30 requires the Lord Chancellor to ensure that all members of court staff working in the criminal justice system receive mandatory and consistent training on trauma-informed practices, to improve understanding of how trauma affects victims’ experience, behaviour and engagement with court proceedings.
The reasons for the new clauses—they are tabled for basically every part of justice legislation—are that there is real frustration among organisations and charities working in the criminal justice space that Parliament does not have the ability to legislate for the judiciary to have mandatory training. How do we square the circle of all those campaign organisations sounding the alarm and saying that, in order for us to make these very serious changes in moving to judge-alone trials, we must ensure that judges approach them with trauma-informed practices in mind?
That was raised in the evidence session by Farah Nazeer from Women’s Aid. When we asked her, “What would you need to see in order for this Bill to give you the confidence that victims will have a better experience and women will be better supported through the criminal justice system?” she said:
“One is training for the entirety of the court staff, because the stories that we hear and the experiences that we support women and children through are frankly appalling. The staff are not trauma-informed and there is no understanding of what a victim is going through. The courts are weaponised and survivors are brought back to the courts repeatedly. It is an appalling process. No policy area that you work on at Women’s Aid is a picnic, but this is the worst.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 27, Q53.]
In the same evidence session, Claire Waxman, the Victims’ Commissioner, said:
“I have made that point for years, regardless of these reforms. We have to improve and get reassurance around judicial training, including training on cultural competency, on understanding bias and prejudice and on the dynamics of abuse. We still see issues around coercive control, post-separation abuse and stalking. I need to be reassured that judges are being trained to the level that will give assurances to victims and to myself that they understand what is coming in front of them.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 14, Q25.]
I know that there has been significant progress, and that the organisation Fair Hearing has worked closely with the judiciary to do training about violence against women and girls and to make sure that judges are trauma-informed in their practice, but it is not mandatory. One comment that stuck with me from the evidence session was from Charlotte, one of the victims who presented evidence. She noted, of her judge:
“She said that, because I waited eight months to report, I was unreliable, and that I had clearly spoken to other victims of domestic abuse, so I knew what to say. Those comments really stuck by me.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 26, Q51.]
The very concept that a judge looks at somebody who is trying to share their experiences and says, “Well, they’ve just trained for this,” is pretty appalling. It causes me to doubt that all judges are engaging in the judiciary training as effectively as they could be.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
I seek clarity on whether the new clause would apply to all judges or just to those in the criminal courts. In the family court the idea is to bring in expertise around the sort of issues that she talks about from agencies—such as the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service, and even social services—in which there are lots of trained people, but that system does not always ensure that the judge is best placed to make a good decision, as we have seen in evidence. Will the hon. Lady clarify that point?
Jess Brown-Fuller
The feeling of the organisations and charities that I have spoken to is that everybody in the judiciary should have the opportunity to go through trauma-informed training and training around violence against women and girls, around coercive control and around recognising and identifying racial bias so we can make sure that every victim is confident—whether they are going through the criminal or the family justice system—that everybody they will come in contact with understands them and the additional support that they may require.
I am sure that the Minister will say that the Government cannot mandate training because the judiciary are independent. New clause 30 aims to make sure that members of court staff, who are employed by His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, receive mandatory and consistent training on trauma-informed practice because they are the people who will support victims and witnesses through the criminal justice system. We clearly need to change our approach. In the evidence session, witnesses described an environment that is hostile to witnesses; we need one that stands up for their interests. Our new clause 30 should be the bare minimum across the courts estate, and represents a position supported by a number of organisations.
Sarah Sackman
I entirely agree that training, in all the respects that the hon. Member for Chichester speaks about, is key, whether it is training on equal treatment or on a trauma-informed approach to rape and serious sexual offences, or specific training pertaining to domestic abuse and identification of coercive and controlling behaviour, or to ensure the consistent application of special measures and evaluation of expert input into trauma-informed practice.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I thank the Minister for her remarks. I am still keen to see progress to ensure that everybody in the judiciary has that mandatory training. As we start to accept that domestic abuse so often plays a part in our criminal justice system—both for defendants and witnesses—and with the Government having made great strides in introducing a domestic abuse identifier for those who cannot be sentenced for a crime of domestic abuse, I think that having specially ticketed judges is something that we need to move away from. Instead, we should make sure that all judges have that special ticket, because they never know if they are hearing a case where a witness is taking somebody to court based on one thing but other things might be going on in the background. Having that trauma-informed training is really important and I will be seeking to push this new clause to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 27—Pilot of trial allocation reforms (No. 2)—
(1) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations bringing sections 1 to 5 of this Act into force unless he has first made arrangements for a pilot scheme for the provision of those sections in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).
(2) A pilot scheme must—
(a) be for the purpose of trialling all provisions of sections 1 to 5 of this Act;
(b) be for such a period as the Lord Chancellor may by regulations specify, provided that the period under paragraph (a) is met;
(c) take place in at least one location in England and Wales as the Lord Chancellor may by regulations specify.
(3) Within 12 months of the conclusion of the pilot scheme under subsection (2), the Lord Chancellor must—
(a) assess the impact of the pilot scheme on—
(i) the timeliness of the disposal of cases included in the pilot scheme,
(ii) appeal rates relating to those cases,
(iii) the outcomes of those cases,
(iv) defendants’ access to trial by jury, and
(v) public confidence in the criminal justice system; and
(b) Lay before Parliament a report on the assessment under paragraph (a).”
This new clause would require the Government to pilot the removal of the right to elect trial by jury before national implementation, and to report to Parliament on its impact.
Amendment 16, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert—
“, subject to the provisions of subsection (3A).
(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations under subsection (3) relating to the following sections until the pilot in accordance of section [Pilot of trial allocation reforms (No. 2)] has been concluded—
(a) Section 1 (Removal of right to elect trial on indictment);
(b) Section 2 (Written indication of guilty plea: removal of right to object to venue);
(c) Section 3 (Trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation);
(d) Section 4 (Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases);
(e) Section 5 (Consequential amendments relating to sections 3 and 4);
(f) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts);
(g) Section 7 (Appeals from magistrates’ courts).”
This amendment is consequential on NC11.
Amendment 60, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert—
“, subject to the provisions of subsection (3A).
(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations under subsection (3) relating to the following sections until the pilot in accordance of section [Pilot of trial allocation reforms (No. 2)] has been concluded—
(a) Section 1 (Removal of right to elect trial on indictment);
(b) Section 2 (Written indication of guilty plea: removal of right to object to venue);
(c) Section 3 (Trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation);
(d) Section 4 (Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases);
(e) Section 5 (Consequential amendments relating to sections 3 and 4).”
This amendment is consequential on NC27.
Jess Brown-Fuller
The new clause is consequential on amendment 16. Amendment 16 would require the Government to pilot the removal of the right to elect trial by jury before national implementation and report to Parliament on its impact.
The design of these reforms has not been tested in practice, and there are many different estimations of their impact on the backlog. The Institute for Government’s modelling suggests that that is likely to be around a 7% to 10% reduction in total time taken in the courtroom, with just 1.5% to 2.5% of that coming from the introduction of judge-only trials in the Crown court bench division. The Government’s impact assessment indicates an expected saving of 27,000 Crown court sitting days. That is based on the fact that cases heard in the bench division will reduce the time per hearing by 20%.
That 20% figure is an estimate that Sir Brian Leveson uses in part 1 of his independent report of the criminal courts. He is explicit that, should the Ministry of Justice
“consider pursuing this course of action, it may wish to consider undertaking further detailed analysis in order to understand the potential time-saving fully.”
That figure is based on a different package of reforms. Sir Brian includes the reclassification of some offences and the removal of the right to elect for some low-level figures.
The Government have used the 20% figure as a starting point, which is problematic. It is the number that informs their modelling, but there is no concrete data to prove that this would be the case. Policymaking must always be evidence-led. That imperative is even more urgent when such legislative reforms restrict fundamental rights. Time savings must be considered holistically. With no juries in the bench division, judges will have to provide a reasoned judgment for their decision. The Bill stipulates that this judgment must state the specific reasons for the conviction or acquittal. That represents a change from traditional jury trials, where juries do not provide written or spoken reasons for their verdict. The composition of these judgments will be time consuming for judges, who will have to ensure that their conclusions are legally tight. If the Government truly believe that the reforms laid out in the Bill will genuinely reduce the backlog, they should prove it before making a change to our justice system that we will never see reversed.
Sarah Sackman
We are not going to do a pilot, not because piloting is not a good idea per se, but because a pilot would necessitate legislation, which is why the hon. Lady has proposed it in this way, and because it would lead to a criminal justice system with different models running in parallel. That is okay—that happens with pilots and trying new things, I understand that—but fundamentally we are not piloting the changes to courts because of the extent of the crisis we are in.
We need to bear down on the backlogs. We are satisfied that we have the evidence that the package of reforms will deliver significant time savings in the Crown court to achieve those efficiencies. We think we have struck the right balance between access to jury trial and speeding up the courts. For that reason, we maintain that we do not need to do a pilot here.
We do not have anything against piloting per se, but in a world in which the demands on our criminal justice system are changing, we must keep up. We have thought long and hard, based on independent review. I would suggest that that is an evidence base.
Jess Brown-Fuller
If the Government will not agree to a pilot or to a report that would allow us to scrutinise whether the changes that they have introduced in the Bill actually make a difference to the Crown court, how are Labour and opposition MPs able to scrutinise whether these changes have made a fundamental difference to the backlog, especially if a sunset clause, which I am sure we will get on to shortly, is not included?
I totally recognise Sir Brian Leveson’s eminence and experience—he is right to point that out and has written a very comprehensive report—but people with thousands of years of combined experience within the criminal justice system are saying this will do nothing to reduce the backlog. I therefore would like the Minister’s guidance on how Members from across the House are supposed to scrutinise these decisions to see if they make a difference, if the Government will not agree to things like pilots or reports.
Sarah Sackman
I do not accept that the vast majority of the changes we are introducing are unprecedented; in the main, we are shifting caseload from the Crown court to the magistrates court, and we already have a way of testing that. Trials for either-way offences, some of which are already retained in the magistrates court, give us a direct comparison. People can elect the Crown court, and we can see that those retained in the magistrates court are dealt with more promptly.
We also saw evidence from international comparators, as well as from experienced judges. We think these are the right measures, and not only to deal with the backlog; they also have a normative basis in striking the right balance between defendant’s rights and those of complainants and victims. We think that is right. I understand that the Opposition disagree, but we think, based on the expert review we were provided with, that this is the right package. We do not think there is a need for a pilot, nor is there a need for a sunset clause.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I would still like to press my new clause to a vote, because having a pilot we can refer to, as in the earlier two-trials model, is really important. We should be data and evidence led as a Parliament.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would give victims a right to receive, free of charge, court transcripts on judicial summings-up and bail decisions relevant to their case. It would require that transcripts be provided within 14 days of a request and clarify that this right would applies whether or not the victim gave evidence in the case.
We spoke earlier in Committee about the important role of court transcripts. I recognise the challenges that the Government have in rolling out large-scale reforms to the way that we currently do court transcripts. The new clause is slightly more limited in its scope, because it specifically calls for transcripts on judicial summings-up and bail decisions relevant to the victim’s case. I know that the Government are doing a great deal in trying to move the dial on making sure that we slowly get to the point where everybody has access to court transcripts. As a spokesperson for an opposition party, I will continue to put pressure on the Government wherever I can to try and push them to go further and faster in this regard. I will not press the new clause to a vote.
Dr Mullan
I rise to speak briefly in support of the new clause. Whenever we talk about narrowed elements of a transcript, I always think to myself that, in giving these remarks, the judge will hopefully have written them down and not be doing these sorts of things off the top of their head. That is why I struggle to understand why these more limited elements are not more meaningful and easily available.
If a judge does not happen to write these sorts of things down, I do not think it will be much to ask them to do so and to make it so that the transcript can be quickly and easily checked. I appreciate that the hon. Member for Chichester will not press the new clause to a vote, but as she mentioned, in any opportunity we get we should push the issue of transcripts. It is particularly important in relation to, as we will come to talk about, the unduly lenient sentence scheme, because all these things would help somebody, in theory, to give an appeal a shot. If they do not have that sort of thing, it is much more difficult.
Sarah Sackman
The hon. Member for Chichester rightly acknowledges the significant amount of work that the Government are currently undertaking in this space, and we had an opportunity to debate that in Committee earlier.
In relation to the new clause, it might be worth briefly explaining why such an extension would not provide significant benefits compared with the systems already in place. In relation to bail decisions, a transcript of the hearing is rarely informative for victims. What victims need and want to know, and what the victims code already requires, is for victims to be informed of the outcome of the bail hearing and any conditions imposed. Those updates are already provided to victims by victim witness care units within five working days. We are currently exploring how responsibilities under the code are being met by the relevant service providers and how to better support them in the delivery of the code. To strengthen that further, once commenced, the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 will introduce a compliance framework, requiring criminal justice bodies to keep their performance against the code under review.
Transcripts of judicial summings-up are unlikely to add significant value for many victims. Those remarks are given before the jury begins to deliberate and are intended to guide them by summarising the evidence and setting out the relevant law. They are not, and cannot be, a reflection of the jury’s decision. Without the full context of the trial, they may risk causing confusion rather than providing clarity. Before being released, summings-up must be manually reviewed to ensure that they are accurate. That, too, is resource intensive. In looking at where we can roll out making transcripts available at either low or no cost, we must target those areas that add value for the public and victims.
As I said when we discussed this last Thursday, we are focused on driving improvement for the longer term. That is why we are undertaking a study in the use of AI to transcribe court hearings. The findings will identify what is possible from AI transcription in a Crown court setting, in considering how to make the provision of transcripts more cost-effective. I think we are in a good place. As the hon. Member for Chichester says, there is more to do, and the Government would be grateful for work across the House to see how we can drive greater transparency in transcription in our Crown courts, but I urge her to withdraw her new clause.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I am happy to withdraw the new clause, on the basis that the Government continue to work on the measures that they have already introduced. Let me quickly put on the record the work of my hon. Friend the Member for Richmond Park (Sarah Olney), who has been campaigning for access to court transcripts for many years. She is delighted that we are now seeing progress. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 13
Report on the effect of the Act on public trust and participation in the criminal justice system
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must commission a report on the effect of the provisions of the Act on public trust and participation in the judicial system.
(2) A report under this section must—
(a) include consideration of the effect of the provisions of the Act on—
(i) witness participation;
(ii) the effect of these reforms on public confidence and trust in the criminal justice system;
(iii) the effect of these provisions on BAME engagement with and trust of the criminal justice system;
(b) contain recommendations for further provision, or changes to delivery of provision under this Act, to increase the levels of each criterion set out in subparagraphs (2)(a)(i) to (2)(a)(iii).
(3) Within twelve months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament—
(a) a copy of a report under this section,
(b) the Lord Chancellor’s response to recommendations made by that report.”—(Jess Brown-Fuller.)
This new clause would require the Lord Chancellor to commission, lay, and respond to a report on the effect of the Bill on public trust in the criminal justice system.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 24—Expiry of sections 1 to 7—
“(1) Sections 1 to 7 of this Act expire three months after the date on which the condition in subsection (2) is met.
(2) The condition is that number of cases awaiting trial in the Crown Court has been below pre-pandemic level in each of the previous four quarterly reporting periods.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) the number of cases awaiting trial in the Crown Court is that which is calculated by HM Courts and Tribunals Service.”
This new clause sunsets sections 1 to 7 of this Act so that they will not longer be in force once the court backlog has been resolved.
Jess Brown-Fuller
The new clause is a sunset clause that would require a report on the effectiveness of certain provisions of the Bill. If the report found that the provisions were not effective, the Secretary of State would have to bring forward regulations to repeal them; if it found that they were effective, the Secretary of State would have to set a deadline for their repeal and a return to full jury trials.
The design of these reforms has not been tested in practice. There are many different estimations of their impact on the backlog, and if they are shown to not be effective, they must not continue. If they prove to be effective at reducing the backlog, full jury trials could be reinstated when the backlog is reduced and we are working at a level that the criminal justice system can cope with.
Dr Mullan
My new clause 24 and new clause 18 in the name of the hon. Member for Chichester seek to achieve a similar outcome. Although there is broad agreement that the backlog is a challenging issue that must be addressed, we believe that any measure that curtails jury trial rights in such a significant—and, I would say, unprecedented—way should be proportionate to the problem it seeks to solve and be used only for as long as absolutely necessary while we are presented with this problem. Therefore, we propose a sunset clause to ensure that the powers expire once the court backlog has returned to pre-pandemic levels for a sustained period.
A sunset clause is a measure in a statute that provides for a law or specific provisions to cease to be effective after a predetermined date, or once a specific condition is met, unless Parliament takes further action to renew them. Although they have experienced a resurgence in recent decades as a tool for managing extraordinary or controversial measures, sunset clauses have been employed by Parliament since at least 1500. Historically and in contemporary practice, they serve vital democratic functions. They are used to facilitate the passage of controversial legislation by assuring critics and the public that the measures are temporary, rather than a permanent erosion. They act as a safeguard for democracy, particularly when emergency legislation is required, by preventing the normalisation of extraordinary powers.
Furthermore, sunset clauses create a more formal trigger for post-legislative scrutiny, forcing both the Executive and the legislature to revisit their assumptions and evaluate whether a law has been effective before deciding whether to prolong its life. The Terrorism Act 2006 and the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 both utilise sunsetting or recurring renewal requirements to ensure ongoing parliamentary oversight. More recently, sunset clauses were used in covid-19 legislation to ensure that restrictive measures did not extend longer than necessary. The UK Coronavirus Act 2020 contained a two-year sunset clause and a requirement for six-monthly reviews to determine whether temporary provisions should expire early.
When considering radical changes to our trial system during a time of crisis, we should look to our history for a more direct precedent. During world war two, a period when our continued existence as a free nation was genuinely uncertain, the Government of the day did not choose to radically cut down the use of jury trials or erode the right of the citizen to elect to be judged by their peers. Instead, they reduced the number of jurors from 12 to seven. Importantly, that was a temporary adjustment. As soon as the Nazi threat was defeated, the Government of the day restored the number of jurors to 12. That demonstrates a principled understanding that emergency measures taken in response to a temporary crisis should be reversed once that crisis is resolved.
In contrast, the measures before us today regarding the erosion of jury trials and the abolition of the right to elect are drafted as permanent changes to our statute book, with no built-in mechanism for their reversal once the backlog is managed again. As I have said, that is a significant departure from the most closely related historical example of what we did during even the darkest days of the 1940s.
Our sunset clause would tie the duration of these reforms to the very problem they are intended to fix. The Government’s case is that these are necessary, backlog-driven measures, and it is entirely consistent to state that they should expire once that backlog is brought down to a more historically normal level, which we define as the pre-pandemic level—a level that the system was able to manage sufficiently, if not perfectly, without the need for structural erosion of the right to a jury.
Sarah Sackman
The Committee will not be surprised to hear that the Government do not support a sunset clause, for two primary reasons. First, these reforms address a challenge in our system that not only is acute—because of the crisis, which we inherited from the previous Government, that has been allowed to run out of control—but has long-term drivers, meaning that the demand pressures on our court system are not going away.
Of course we want to get the backlog down to a sustainable level, but that will not alleviate the challenges, described in the independent review of the criminal courts, presented by the changing patterns of crime; the procedural safeguards in our system, which mean that trials take longer; advancing technology; and the types of evidence that need to be dealt with. All that contributes to a demand pressure that will be sustained, and Government forecasting shows that that demand will continue to grow. Even once we have the backlogs under control, we will need these reforms to maintain an improved, sustainable position as part of the modernised rebalancing of the workload between Crown court and magistrates court, which is supported not just by the authors of the independent review but by the likes of Lord Ian Burnett, an experienced Lord Chief Justice, who spoke about this in his evidence.
Secondly, as colleagues well know, Parliament is sovereign. We are bringing these reforms forward because we believe they are the right measures to tackle a crisis and modernise our system. People have heard me say this time and again, and I stand by it, but this is about turning a crisis into an opportunity. I have spoken about the ways in which we have seized the opportunity to modernise our system and make it fairer and more sustainable. If future Parliaments think that we did not get it right, they can no doubt pass legislation to change it.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Yasmin Qureshi
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause is, in some respects, fairly self-explanatory, in that it provides that cases should not go to the Crown court without being trial-ready. In essence, it is a safeguard —we could call it an oversight amendment—that is linked to the jury trial reforms in the Bill.
The rationale behind the new clause is to reflect concern that the Government are making significant changes by removing or restricting jury trials without strong evidence of impact. It aims to introduce caution, likely through a review, limits or accountability mechanisms. In that respect it is similar to the approach in new clause 27, about piloting, but it is more about ongoing scrutiny than delaying implementation.
We are trying to say to the Government: “If you are going to do this, please prove that it works and build in the safeguards.” That aligns with the position of the Bar Council and others in the light of the argument regarding jury trials. It fits with the fact that the Government are trying to make structural change, but we say that, before they do that structural change, they should look at all these things before cases are sent up to the Crown court. I will not be pressing the new clause to a vote.
Sarah Sackman
Our understanding is that the new clause seeks to improve efficiency by requiring cases to be trial-ready before they are sent to the Crown court. I will explain very briefly how a case is currently prepared for trial in the Crown court and why it is important that that preparation takes place before a judge in the Crown court, as early as possible.
All criminal cases begin in the magistrates court, and indictable offences such as murder must, by law, be sent to the Crown court at the first hearing, after the magistrates have dealt with matters such as identification and bail or remand. At the plea and trial preparation hearing in the Crown court, a professional judge examines the issues between the parties, such as evidence and disclosure issues, and sets a timeline for trial preparation, as well as the trial date. It is also at that point that a formal plea is entered in the Crown court.
There are clear statutory expectations on parties, set out in the criminal procedure rules, to be proactive in case management, and judges are experienced in managing timeliness through enforcement action. However, we recognise that there is always more that can be done, which is why we have effected the roll-out of case co-ordinators in our Crown court to drive case progression. Magistrates are not similarly trained in managing trials on indictment, and we do not think they would be an effective equivalent to a Crown court judge in determining these matters before they reach the Crown court. Requiring cases to be held back until they are considered “ready” prior to being sent to the Crown court would, we believe, risk introducing further delay for the most serious offences.
In addition, retaining such serious cases for longer in the magistrates court could have several unintended consequences, including additional pressures on custody time limits and delays in accessing special measures—measures that enable vulnerable and intimidated witnesses to give pre-recorded evidence at an early stage. Those protections are available across the Crown court but are not all available in the magistrates court, so delaying transfer to the Crown court would delay access to them for some victims and witnesses, potentially undermining the quality of their evidence. The new clause would, in practice, introduce delays into the court system and delay the progression of the most serious cases. For that reason, I urge my hon. Friend to withdraw it.
Yasmin Qureshi
I thank the Minister for her response. I have made my points—throughout the Committee’s proceedings, I have been making points about the issue of jury trials—and I will not add anything further. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 22
Remote Court Participation: Strategy
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backlog (‘the strategy’).
(2) The strategy must include—
(a) an assessment of the current use of remote proceedings;
(b) an evaluation of the impact of remote proceedings on the speed of case disposal and the overall reduction of the outstanding caseload;
(c) recommendations on how the principle of open justice can be upheld with the increased use of remote proceedings;
(d) criteria for determining the suitability of proceedings for different forms of remote participation; and
(e) provisions for the security, reliability, and resilience of digital systems used in remote proceedings.
(3) The Secretary of State must, at intervals of no more than 24 months following the laying of the strategy, lay before Parliament a report on progress made against the strategy.
(4) The progress report must consider—
(a) the extent to which the strategy has been implemented;
(b) the impact on the criminal case backlog, including any measures by which that impact has been assessed; and
(c) any further legislative or budgetary provisions to ensure the effectiveness of remote proceedings.
(5) For the purposes of this section, ‘remote proceedings’ means any proceedings in which one or more participants attend by way of live video or audio link.”—(Jess Brown-Fuller.)
This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to publish a formal strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backload in the criminal justice system.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time
Dr Mullan
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
If you will indulge me, Dr Huq, I want to congratulate the hon. Member for Rugby on the news that he has been appointed as a trade envoy. We can all recognise that he has put an enormous amount of work into that. The Opposition think that he is amazing at selling the unsellable; he does it all the time. If he has British products to sell, he will be amazing at it. He should just double check that he is going to the south of Korea, rather than the north.
As we have said before, we are debating a Bill that represents one of the most significant reconfigurations of our criminal justice system in modern history, and it is therefore unsurprising that we feel that other contingent parts of the system need to be considered in that light and adjusted accordingly. As we expand the reach and punitive power of the magistrates courts, we must ensure that our procedural safeguards in both directions keep pace with that expansion. That is the core purpose of new clause 26, which proposes to extend the unduly lenient sentence scheme to triable either-way offences, which will now be increasingly retained and sentenced at the summary level. If we can trust magistrates with the power to deprive a citizen of their liberty for up to two years, the public must have the assurance that there is a mechanism to correct sentencing decisions that fall in the other direction by being unduly lenient.
The Government have occasionally attempted to reframe their reforms as affecting only low-level or petty crimes such as shoplifting, but the reality of the triable either-way category is very different from that. As the Criminal Bar Association and JUSTICE have pointed out, some of the offences that will be almost exclusively in the jurisdiction of the magistrates courts include unlawful wounding, actual bodily harm and, as we have discussed, even some sexual assault cases. Those are offences where the impact on the victims can be very significant. For some time, I have been aware of dissatisfaction in many ways with the punitive element of our justice system, and whether it sufficiently punishes perpetrators in a way that victims and the wider public would consider to be justice. That is one of the reasons why the unduly lenient sentence scheme exists.
In the Crown court, sentencing outcomes are subject to the oversight of the Attorney General’s office through the unduly lenient sentences scheme. It is an essential safety valve that helps contribute to public confidence by allowing the public—it has always been open to the public—and, most importantly for me, victims and family members to refer unduly lenient sentences for consideration by the Court of Appeal. As I have talked about previously, I have made it use of it and so have other Members of the House, so it is important. It would be illogical to allow offences with the same potential gap in public confidence in the outcome to be without this equivalent safeguard, simply because the Government have decided to change the likely venue of trial in so many of these cases.
The need for the extension is further underscored by the evidence on the rate of appeal of sentences from the perspective of defendants. About 47% of appeals against sentences from the magistrates courts result in a change. Those figures are not marginal; they indicate that the lower courts fall into meaningful error in nearly half of the cases where they are challenged. That is from the perspective of the defendant—that is, the person found guilty—appealing the sentence. There is nothing to suggest that, if victims were given a similar opportunity to challenge sentences, no similar rate of error would be found from their perspective. That is, at the very least, of equal importance to someone who has campaigned significantly on behalf of victims in sentencing. For me, it is probably the more important of the two.
Historically, one of the primary arguments against extending the ULS scheme to magistrates courts was a practical one: there was no comprehensive record of the proceedings and sentencing decisions were often delivered without the detailed recorded remarks that characterised the Crown court. However, the Bill fundamentally changes that landscape. Schedule 2 introduces proposed reforms to introduce a mandatory requirement for audio recording and the provision of transcripts in the magistrates court. The Government are making this change to support their new appeal model, recognising that a fair system cannot function without an accurate record of what was said and decided. This move towards digital transparency is a game changer for sentencing accountability for victims as well.
As the Minister herself noted, sunshine is the best disinfectant. Once we have a reliable audio record of the sentencing remarks and the mitigations offered, the logistical barriers to reviewing a sentence for undue leniency from a victim’s perspective and that of the wider public falls away. We will, for the first time, have the infrastructure to allow the Office of the Attorney General to scrutinise sentences with the same precision applied to the Crown court. We should use this new capability to ensure that the sentencing code is applied fairly. Extended sentencing powers must be matched with extended accountability. If a magistrate is given power more akin to a judge, then they must be subject to the same oversight of their sentencing decisions. New clause 6 is not about creating more work for the Court of Appeal; it is about ensuring that, as we redraw the boundaries of our legal system, we do not leave victims of serious crime behind in a two-tier justice system where leniency cannot be corrected.
In summary, the proposals to extend the ULS scheme to either-way offences is a necessary and proportionate response to the Government’s radical restructuring of the trial process. Magistrates will soon be passing sentence on much more serious offences where the interest of victims will be of even greater concern. The record is improving to allow this to happen at the same time and it is common sense that there is consistency. I do not think there is a rational basis for excluding more serious offences from the ULS scheme simply because of the venue.
We should not wait for a high-profile case where a victim is concerned and able to seek redress in the way that they might in the Crown court. I ask the Minister to be proactive. I can understand that the Minister would perhaps argue for a more gradual approach—and perhaps not applying it to every single case might be a compromise that the Minister could bring forward. Perhaps it should be for the more serious of these less-serious, more-serious cases. However, I certainly think that we can have some kind of progress.
Sarah Sackman
I thank the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle for this new clause on the unduly lenient sentencing scheme. The ULS scheme is an exceptional power, reserved for the most serious cases, that applies only to offences passed in the Crown court. One of the things that we have seen—this is not an unwelcome development—is its expanded use. What started as an exceptional power used in a handful of exceptional cases has grown in usage as members of the public, their representatives and others who have either experienced crime, or have loved ones who have, take up the ULS scheme in greater numbers. In 2025, the Office of the Attorney General assessed around 1,500 cases.
It is important to focus on what the ULS scheme is and what it is not. It is a legal backstop that rightly sets a hard test. Someone simply not agreeing with or taking issue with the sentence handed down to a particular offender is not, of itself, a basis for challenging it. One needs to show that there has been a gross error in the application of the sentencing guidelines, and that the sentence is manifestly inadequate given the seriousness of the offence.
I understand the points that the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle is making. I would, though, draw attention to the fact that the Law Commission is currently undertaking a review of criminal appeals, which includes looking at reforms to the unduly lenient sentencing scheme. The Law Commission is due to publish its report in autumn 2026. I suggest that that is an appropriate moment to look at the operation of the scheme and at what is suggested in the new clause about its current operation as it applies in the Crown court, rather than pre-empting what that report might say and how the Government might think about the scheme’s potential extension to the magistrates court.
I cannot support the new clause at the moment, as it would in effect significantly alter the scope and operation of a power that is supposed to be exceptional. It would make the exceptional the norm. It would entail administrative burdens and goes against the grain of what was intended when the scheme was first conceived. However, I look forward to seeing the Law Commission’s work. That will be the appropriate moment to re-examine how the scheme operates and how it operates in a reformed system. I urge the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle to withdraw the new clause.
Dr Mullan
The Minister opened her remarks by saying that the scheme applies only to certain cases in the Crown court. The point that the Opposition make is that it will no longer apply to some of the cases to which it would apply now. The Minister has given figures. If the scheme is configured in the right way, and sufficiently constrained to just pick up those cases that are moving, it should not necessarily lead to any increase in the number of cases referred, so I do not accept her argument.
I would not expect the Minister to know this—she has given a single set of figures—but I would be interested in the historical trend, and the number of applications in the preceding few years. It would be helpful if she could give those figures. I also want to make clear—I have been quite clear about this with other stuff that we have done on the ULS scheme—I think it is unusual that the scheme is available to absolutely anybody. I would be open to any expansion or modification being constrained just to victims and family members. I think that I have made that clear in relation to other reforms.
That brings me to the Minister’s point about the Law Commission. That was the answer I was given repeatedly over very many months by the Victims Minister as to why the Government would not make reforms to the scheme, yet they accepted such reforms last week as a result of pressure. If the Minister insists that that is the route forward, I ask her to write to the commission. I point out the reforms that the Minister is making, which will not have been in the terms of reference for the Law Commission. At the point at which it started that work, the reforms were not even on the operating table, so it is important that the Government write to the commission and make clear that they would welcome it expanding the matters that it is considering to include this question, which would have been novel to them at the point of that undertaking.
I have learned from our experience with the other element of the ULS that, I am afraid, one should just keep pushing and pushing on such issues, so I will put the new clause to a vote. However, I have given some points on which I ask the Minister to go away and reflect to determine whether there is a way forward that can be satisfactory to both sides of the House at some point in future proceedings.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 35, which I tabled last week after a conversation with the Victims’ Commissioner, would reinstate an inspectorate body for the criminal courts in England and Wales. The Courts Act 2003 introduced His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Court Administration, which was established in 2005. The inspectorate was then closed in 2010, with the then Government arguing that audits of HMCTS, combined with the inspection regimes of the current justice inspectorates and the National Audit Office, negated the need for HMICA. However, a 2022 Justice Committee report found that that argument had not stood the test of time, and it called for the re-establishment of an inspectorate body. The report stated:
“A Courts’ Inspectorate, which is independent from Government, could make a substantial difference to the accountability and transparency of the justice system. It could use inspections and the promised improvements to the quality of the data to make recommendations that can inform policy and guidance in both criminal and civil justice. An inspectorate could also help to monitor the use of technology in the courts.”
This is a really important time to introduce the additional level of having a courts’ inspectorate, especially when the use of technology will play a much larger role in the criminal justice system, as well as the quality of the data coming out, which the Committee has debated various times. The proposal was backed by Andrew Cayley KC, then chief inspector for the Crown Prosecution Service. He favoured an even broader court inspection regime to scrutinise the operation of the disjointed parts of the system, particularly regarding the listing of cases. The re-establishment of a courts inspectorate was also recommended by Sir Brian Leveson in part 2 of his independent review of the criminal courts; it was recommendation 58. While there are four criminal justice inspectorates, Sir Brian notes:
“There is, however, no one body that is responsible for the inspection of the criminal courts in England and Wales.”
Due to limitations to the scope of this Bill, our new clause proposes a criminal courts inspectorate that would inspect and report on the administration and operation of the criminal courts. The new clause stipulates that that inspectorate must have
“particular regard to the experience of witnesses and victims”
when assessing
“the efficiency, effectiveness and accessibility of those courts”.
An inspectorate would identify inefficiencies and monitor victims’ experience in the system.
When debating an earlier group, the Minister mentioned what I think she called a public governance board that she is exploring. It would be helpful if she could outline whether she sees my new clause as different from that, or whether she is looking to create an additional level of inspection and scrutiny in the criminal courts system.
Dr Mullan
As I have alluded to several times, the Conservative party is considering more broadly how we tackle judicial accountability in all its different elements. It would be premature for us to settle on this new clause if, as the hon. Member for Chichester pointed out, it had to be necessarily narrow to fit in the Bill. On that basis we will not vote for it. We are not against it as an idea, but we need greater time to think about accountability and performance in the justice system in a more comprehensive way.
Sarah Sackman
I agree with the sentiment behind the new clause to ensure that we are monitoring efficiency, effectiveness and performance across our criminal courts system. However, as the shadow Justice Minister just said, the best mechanisms for holding the system to account in terms of performance and judicial accountability merit greater reflection. We are taking the time to consider the IRCC’s recommendations. The hon. Member for Chichester alluded to the history, and that there has previously been an inspectorate of court administration; that of course ceased operation under the coalition Government, who found it unnecessary at the time.
Jess Brown-Fuller
The Minister is absolutely right that it ceased operation, but the report that led to that decision was published under a Labour Government. Does she recognise that that report was actually tabled in 2009, and that it was the coalition Government that carried out the function of the report that the Labour Government put forward?
Sarah Sackman
I think the hon. Member thinks that I rose to make some really brilliant, devastating party political point. I did not; I was just rehearsing the history of how we got here. At the time, the view was taken by those who finally took the axe to the inspectorate that it did not represent value for money and was not working in an effective way. I make that point to say that, if we are going to have an inspectorate that does some of the things we want it to do, or whatever system we alight on, we all want to ensure that it represents value for money and drives better performance. Clearly, the Government of the day did not think that it did.
No inspectorate would have scope to scrutinise judicial decisions. It is also important to say—there have been improvements in this regard—that extensive operational data and metrics, which everyone is welcome to look at, provide an insight into the performance of our criminal courts, whether in terms of case timeliness, conviction rates or sentencing outcomes. That is exactly as it should be.
At this point, my focus is on driving reform, modernisation and the proper delivery of the investment that we are making, rather than on the inspection landscape, but I do not disagree with the sentiment that lies behind the hon. Member for Chichester’s new clause. Getting the mechanism right and taking our time to think about what form it should take, and how it could be properly resourced and as effective as we want it to be is something that we all want to take our time over, so I urge the hon. Member to withdraw her new clause.
Jess Brown-Fuller
In the tradition of the last five days in Committee, I will push the new clause to a vote because I would like to see greater scrutiny of the way that our court system functions.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Sarah Sackman
These clauses are in part 3 of the general provisions of the Bill. They provide the position on the commencement of measures in the Bill, the powers to make consequential, transitional and other provisions in connection with the coming into force of the provisions of the Bill, and the Bill’s territorial extent and short title.
Clause 21 is a technical clause that will allow the Secretary of State to make any further consequential amendments or legislative changes where required to implement the provisions in the Bill. Clause 22 creates a power to allow the Lord Chancellor to make “transitional or saving provisions” by regulation
“in connection with the coming into force of any provision of this Act.”
Clause 23 will allow the Secretary of State to, by regulation, amend the Sentencing Act 2020, so as to specify the cases or purpose for which the amendment or repeal made by the Bill has effect.
Clause 24 allows for regulations under statutory instrument to be made under the Bill once it becomes an Act. The Bill contains nine delegated powers; we have considered the scope and extent of those powers carefully and have taken the decision to include them only where it is necessary, in respect of particularly technical or detailed areas, or to allow flexibility for our legislation to remain up to date and be responsive to changes.
Clause 25 sets out the extent of the Bill. All measures apply to England and Wales only, save in respect of four areas: section 7; section 18(6) and subsection (7); sections 10(4) and 11(8); and part 3. Those four areas have UK-wide extent, except for sections 10(4) and 11(8), which have the same extent at the Armed Forces Act 2006, so that they extend to the UK, the Isle of Man and British overseas territories except Gibraltar.
Clause 26 states that the measures in the Bill will be commenced via regulations on the day that the Secretary of State appoints apart from clauses 21 to 25 and clause 27, which come into force on the day on which the Act is passed, and section 6 and section 20, which come into force at the end of a period of two months beginning with the day on which the Bill is passed. Finally, clause 27 states that the Bill
“may be cited as the Courts and Tribunals Act 2026”
once it becomes an Act of Parliament.
I thank all members of the Committee for the spirit in which they have engaged over the last five days. Some may know the famous line, “I fought the law and the law won.” Some may also know that I have been developing a Spotify soundtrack to get me through the Committee, inspired by some of the interventions. Everyone has not only made this stage constructive and engaging, but given the Government a lot of food for thought as we take the Bill through to the next stage. It will be all the stronger for the contributions that have been made, so I thank everyone for that.
Dr Mullan
I have just one remark to make. I draw the Committee’s attention to the submission we received from the circuit in Wales. Clause 25 is about the territorial extent of the Bill, and the circuit pointed out that it feels the Welsh system has been unfairly caught up in these reforms, which it does not think are applicable in terms of the need to reduce waiting times. It is important that the Committee makes note of the evidence that was submitted to us.
I join the Minister in thanking everybody for their time and deep concentration when listening to the exchanges throughout. I thank the Clerks who have assisted us over the many days, including during a late sitting. I thank the House staff in that regard, and I thank the Minister for the constructive manner in which she has engaged with feedback and proposals from this side of the House.
Sarah Sackman
I commend clauses 21 to 27 to the Committee. I did not specifically mention the House staff and all our wonderful Chairs. I add my thanks to everybody for their hard work. I also thank my team of officials—those watching at home and those in the room—who have worked very hard.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 22 to 27 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Bill, as amended, to be reported.