Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

Jess Brown-Fuller Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Mullan]

I want to pick up on the point made by the hon. Member for Amber Valley. She has engaged sincerely throughout this debate, so I do not think her comment was a deliberate. We are not saying that someone has to be charged with everything to be eligible; we are saying that anything that they are charged for on that basis that excludes them from a jury trial should only be those offences. We are saying that if someone is charged for insider dealing and the judge decides that the case is complex or lengthy, under the legislation they will get a single-judge trial. The proposed legislation says that if they were also charged with grievous bodily harm, then that case, which would ordinarily continue to have a jury trial, would be seen without a jury. That would mean that just because someone happens to be charged with one of those offences alongside another one, they lose their access to a jury trial on both offences.

[Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)]

The point that the shadow Minister is making is that the clause is a substantial expansion of what we understand the legislation to be doing in terms of a judge-only trial. Somebody could be charged with 10 offences. One of those could be related to a lengthy fraud case, but the rest of the offences would mean that they would still get a judge-only trial, which is a significant expansion of what we believe this Bill is trying to do.

[Dr Mullan]

Absolutely, and there is not even anything in the Bill about proportionality. There is nothing. If someone is charged with one of the offences and the trial will be complex and lengthy—which is different to it being serious—that is it. Whatever else someone is charged with, they have already lost their right to a jury trial. That is a huge expansion.

I intervened to ask the Minister to explain why they have chosen to exclude sexual assaults. If someone is charged with GBH, then they lose their right to a jury trial, but if they are charged with a sexual assault, which in the sentencing guidelines may lead to them having an even lower sentence than a serious GBH, they will continue to have a jury trial, and a fraud offence would continue to be seen by a jury instead of a judge. It is completely contradictory. There is no logic behind the Government’s position. If they had a throughline as to why sexual assault, which is an absolutely terrible offence, is being set to one side, but something as serious as GBH, which can carry a sentence of many years and is also terrible for victims, then there would be more logic to it. But the Government have crafted an approach that is simply unfair and, as the Lib Dem spokeswoman pointed out, represents a massive expansion in all the different types of offences and sentence lengths that could potentially lose access to a jury trial, just because they also happen to be charged with an ancillary offence related to complex fraud. I am afraid there is no rational basis to that at all.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

In the last couple of weeks, there have been press reports about a particular case that was charged in 2019. I will not go into that because it is going to reopen, but clause 4 would mean, for example, that somebody who has been abusing and defrauding the elderly—perhaps many different elderly people—over many years and has caused significant harm not of a sexual nature, and who is therefore charged with multiple offences, gets a judge-only trial and is not tried by a jury. If there was a sexual offence, they would get a jury, but if they had been harming multiple people and defrauding them, they would be tried by a judge alone. Does he agree that that feels quite perverse?

[Dr Mullan]

It is another example of what we have talked about: the move away from what we would consider to be natural justice. The scenario the hon. Member points to is not bizarre; there are offenders who target elderly women, for example, and will use all sorts of different methods to abuse them, from financial to sexual. I have seen cases of that nature. We see people who, at the same time as physically and sexually abusing a family member, were taking money from their bank account and falsely representing them to claim benefits, which again would be covered by the clause. It covers a whole range of offences, in all sorts of patterns. The Government call our amendment too rigid when, actually, the rigidity is quite clearly in the charging and allocation decisions; it is all on the Government’s side. They are being entirely rigid. If someone is subject to one of these cases and the judge thinks it is complex or lengthy, they will lose the right to a jury trial, end of story. I do not think that is a position that the Minister should feel comfortable advocating, and it is why we intend to press our amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Yasmin Qureshi]

Amendment 29 would insert into subsection (3) an additional ground for a lengthy or complex case to be tried without a jury in England or Wales, to require agreement by the defence and the prosecution that the trial is likely to exceed five months. Amendment 30 is almost self-explanatory: it would provide a right of appeal against a judge’s decision to prevent a case from going to a jury trial. We seek to give a right of appeal to the defence—and the prosecution—if the judge decides that the case fits the category of a complex case such as a fraud case. Amendments 31 to 33 would add additional offences to the list of offences that will be excluded from the provisions of clause 4. Offences such as homicide, including under road traffic legislation, will be excluded, and amendments 31 to 33 would extend that list.

I want to speak both to clause 4 and to clause 5, which, as I understand it, will enable clause 4. Unlike the provisions in clauses 1 to 3, clauses 4 and 5 at least provide that the defence and the prosecution may make representations before a judge directs a trial without a jury. I acknowledge that that is a meaningful procedural difference, but the principle remains deeply troubling, and I want to explain why. It is a further restriction on the right to trial by jury; more cases could be caught by this provision, which means that people will not be able to have a trial by jury.

The central argument for clauses 4 and 5 is that certain cases—fraud cases, multi-handed cases or those involving extensive financial or digital evidence—are simply too complex or long for a jury to follow. I have to say directly that I find that argument unfair to ordinary members of the public. Trial by jury is not simply a procedural mechanism; it is a fundamental expression of the relationship between the citizen and the state. It says that, when the state seeks to deprive a person of their liberty, that judgment will not be made by the state alone but by 12 of that person’s fellow citizens. That is important, because it is embedded in our legal tradition.

Let me speak from direct experience: in my years of criminal practice, I never once saw a jury that looked confused, overwhelmed or unable to follow the case before them. One of the last cases I conducted at the Bar was a seven-handed trial at the central criminal court. It went on for a number of weeks and involved serious allegations, multiple defendants, CCTV evidence and complex factual issues. Some of the defendants were charged with murder and manslaughter, there were issues such as joinder—agreement by different groups of people about whether they were committing crimes or not—and all sorts of legal directives had to be given. As it happened, the jury followed the evidence, assessed it and reached its verdicts. That has been my experience across many cases, including complex fraud, multi-defendant drug conspiracies and cases involving technical or sensitive evidence.

One of the jobs I had as a prosecutor was as a specialist casework lawyer for London CPS, which meant dealing with some of the most complex cases. When I was in the CPS, I also worked on proceeds of crime cases. In fact, I was what they call a POCA—Proceeds of Crime Act 2002—specialist for my branch. We were looking at financial auditing and asset recovery, deciding what kind of charges to go by, dealing with the issues of undercover operations, surveillance evidence, what we call the RIPA—Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 —rules, and cases involving public officials. Across all of that experience, the issue was never whether the jury could follow the evidence; the issue was whether the case was properly presented.

Given the way trials work, what a prosecutor presents to a jury is exactly what they would present to a judge. They explain the evidence, they connect the facts and the dots, and they build a case. The process does not change, but the audience does. If the evidence is presented clearly, a jury can follow it. If it is not, that is a failure of advocacy, not a failure of the jury, and the judge will get as confused as anybody else.

For example, if a prosecutor is trying to prove certain things, they will say, “If you look at exhibit 25 on page 1,000 of the jury bundle, you will see that this phone belongs to the defendant,” and create a link. Then they will say that another page shows the evidence extracted from the phone and explain how that is linked. They would do that for a judge as well, because judges want the prosecution to explain things to them, too. They must do that and follow the continuity of the evidence.

At the end of the day, whether the case involves insider dealing or financial accounting, people can see if the information is presented to them properly. The prosecutor might show them a document that says there was x amount of money in one account, but it went missing and has now been found in another person’s account. It is about making sure that all the dots are connected, and they would have to do that with a judge as well. The judge will not just flick through the papers and say, “Ms Prosecutor, you can just sit down and I’ll go through it.” The prosecutor, through their witnesses or their physical evidence or their section 9 statements or section 10 admissions, will have to prove each and every aspect of the case and the role each defendant played in it.

Although a number of people may be charged with one offence, we know that under our criminal law the sentence they can get if convicted varies depending on the role they played in the crime. Issues include who counselled it, procured it, aided and abetted it—who played what role—and people will be sentenced accordingly. Again, that is a matter on which a prosecutor or defence counsel would show everyone evidence and say, “This is what happened.” Therefore, it really makes no difference whether the case is being presented to jurors or a judge.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Does the hon. Lady agree with His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC, who argued that jury trials could actually impose discipline in complex fraud cases, whereas in a judge-only trial there is no incentive to get on and hear all the evidence? He also said that in such cases, juries decide issues of dishonesty and facts that are not necessarily technical, meaning that 12 jurors are in a much better position to reach a decision based on dishonesty.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I thank the hon. Lady for that intervention. I could go on and on explaining how evidence is presented, but all I will say from my years of experience—not just in the CPS, but in the independent Bar as well—is that I have gone through thousands of pages of documents, and juries have reacted to that and been able to deal with the cases unfazed. The issue is how well the evidence is presented, and counsel would have the same duty to do that in front of a judge.

In some respects, a jury trial is better when legal issues or the admissibility of evidence have to be determined during a trial. In a jury trial, the judge can send the jury out and listen to everyone’s representations about whether something should be admitted or not, and then make a decision. That is helpful because juries then never know about all the debates that have taken place. Sometimes there is evidence that a party wants to be admitted that is inadmissible or would be prejudicial.

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[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak in support of Opposition amendment 46, which is in my name, as we debate elements of the Government’s proposals to remove jury trials and make use of the new Crown court bench division in relation to potentially complex and lengthy trials.

To make sense of this debate, we must consider how the measures will apply. As we touched on earlier, the Government’s stated aim is to reduce the time taken to hear particularly lengthy and complex cases by permitting judge-alone trials and therefore—they say—freeing up additional Crown court capacity. The cases must involve at least one fraud or related financial offence listed in proposed new schedule 3ZA, which includes fraud by false representation, cheating the public revenue, money laundering and other offences, and would not involve an indictable-only homicide offence or sexual offence, including attempts or conspiracies to commit such offences.

We can already see, when considering the written evidence we have received, why there are rightly many questions about how the provisions will operate. In amendment 46, we therefore propose a requirement to ensure that defendants have a route in the law back to a jury trial. I draw the Committee’s attention to the evidence of Dr Natalie Hodgson, from the University of New South Wales, and Dr Matt Thomason, from the University of Nottingham, which was particularly helpful. They point out:

“Currently, the proposed s.42A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 does not define what is meant by “lengthy” or “complex”...Similarly, the proposed legislation provides no detail as to what judges can and should consider in determining whether ‘it is in the public interest’ for the trial to be conducted by judge alone. The Explanatory Note makes clear that ‘the court will retain full discretion’ as to whether it is appropriate to order a trial by judge alone.”

That is giving judges enormous power over these decisions.

Dr Thomason and Dr Hodgson also say:

“In contrast, we note that in New Zealand—which has a similar provision permitting judge-alone trials in cases ‘likely to be long and complex’—the relevant legislation sets out with greater specificity what a judge should consider in determining whether a case is likely to be long and complex…In particular, the New Zealand legislation specifies that a Court must not order a judge-alone trial unless all reasonable measures and arrangements have been taken to shorten the length of the trial, but the ‘duration of the trial still seems likely to exceed 20 sitting days.’”

So New Zealand was capable, in its legislation, of drawing a line in the sand as to what it considered to be a lengthy trial, but we do not seem to be doing the same.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

The hon. Member is making a really interesting point about what we perceive to be lengthy or complex, as the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden tried to do with her amendment. Amendment 29 seeks to define a lengthy trial as one going beyond the five-month point, but Geoffrey Rivlin KC collected data over six years from Southwark Crown court—the primary venue for complex financial crime trials—which showed that the vast majority of fraud cases lasted less than three months, with only one or two typically lasting more than that, and only two cases in total lasting over six months. Does the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle agree that it would be helpful for the Minister to clarify what she believes “lengthy” or “complex” to be? The judiciary will also be asking that.

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[Sarah Sackman]

I will make a bit of progress.

We also need to be mindful of the burden that lengthy trials place on jurors. In this country, between January 2024 and December 2025, almost 3,000 jurors sat in trials that lasted more than six weeks. We should be mindful that trials for fraud and serious financial crime, which are within the purview of this clause, are some of the longest and most demanding in the Crown courts. We also have to be mindful of our argument on the time savings of having judge-only trials for such cases.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Has the Ministry of Justice done any modelling on the benefits of introducing Maxwell hours for all lengthy fraud cases? Doing so would benefit jurors, as they would only be committed to sitting from 8 am until midday and could go on to fulfil their caring responsibilities and such. The same goes for judges when dealing with complex fraud cases.

[Sarah Sackman]

I do not have any modelling to hand, but I can certainly take that away. If that work has been done, I will let the hon. Lady have it, but I do not have it to hand so I simply do not know.

I do not want to go over old ground, but we heard in oral evidence, particularly from the panel of experienced judges, about the time savings related to judge-only trials. Reference was made to other jurisdictions, and the data from New South Wales, which is a comparable common law jurisdiction, shows that when it introduced judge-only trials in complex cases, it saw a 29% reduction in the length of trials, so the Government are confident that clause 4 will result in material time savings.

Amendment 29 would make parties’ agreement that a trial is likely to last more than five months a condition of judge-only trials under clause 4. Of course, I agree that five months is an exceptionally long time to expect any member of the public to serve on a jury, but we cannot ignore the fact that considerably shorter trials can be equally as disruptive to jurors’ lives, particularly if they are self-employed or have caring responsibilities.

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[Rebecca Paul]

I agree with my hon. Friend, as I normally do.

Finally, there is the obvious practical point that there are better answers available. The Law Society says that reform and investment must be strategic, not piecemeal, and warns against stand-alone measures such as changing from jury trials to judge-only trials without convincing evidence that they will significantly reduce the backlog. It says that Parliament should insist on “detailed modelling” and on understanding the Government’s intentions across the whole package of reform, not just on this isolated measure. The existence of pressure in the system does not prove that every proposed constitutional shortcut is justified. The question is whether the shortcut is necessary. With clause 4, the answer is plainly no. For all those reasons, I oppose clause 4 and schedule 1, and I support amendment 51.

Clause 4 offers a constitutionally serious reduction in jury trials for a tiny claimed benefit of 200 sitting days. The evidence does not show that juries are the cause of delay, collapse or miscarriage in these cases. Fraud cases are not too technical for juries. The key issue is dishonesty, and ordinary citizens are uniquely well placed to judge that. The removal of juries in these cases would damage open justice and public confidence. Schedule 1 gives effect to that flawed principle and then goes further by creating a route to ministerial expansion. Amendment 51 is therefore a sensible and necessary safeguard, but in truth, the better course is simpler still: clause 4 and schedule 1 should not be included in the Bill at all.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I will speak against the inclusion of clause 4. It inserts part 6A in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which will allow complex or lengthy cases to be tried without a jury. My main opposition to the clause is that it is a pointless exercise by the Government that will in no way affect the backlog. The Government’s own impact assessment suggests that the savings will amount to just 200 sitting days per year, which is a tiny fraction—0.18% of the current sitting days. The Government argue that these cases can continue for many months, thereby wasting jurors’ time or putting additional pressure on those called for jury service. However, data from Southwark Crown court, where the majority of fraud and other such cases are heard, shows that only one or two cases per year exceed three months, and only two between 2018 and 2024 went beyond six months.

His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC has argued that jury trials impose discipline, which helps to reduce the length of fraud trials. Without that incentive, judge-alone trials may be as long as or even longer than jury trials. I alluded to this earlier, but jurors decide on issues of dishonesty and fact in these cases, which are not necessarily technical. Twelve jurors are therefore in a much better position to reach a decision.

I also have grave concerns about the terminology of “complex” and “lengthy”. I know the Minister has said that the meaning of complex and lengthy are well understood in the judiciary. I would argue that a lot of people in the legal profession are pushing back against that assertion, and that the Bill does not provide clarity on what they should determine to be complex or lengthy.

[Joe Robertson]

The hon. Member is making a very good speech, but she is almost being generous. The wording in the Bill is not “complex”; it is “complexity”, which is a description, not even a value. The Bill is even vaguer than what the hon. Member is suggesting in her well-made point.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I thank the hon. Member for his point; he characterises me very well as being generous.

I would also argue that the scope is expanded significantly if one of the offences that a defendant is charged with is fraud, money laundering or any of the offences that sit in that category. There can be 10 charges against a defendant, and if one of them is fraud, money laundering or terrorism funding, that entire case could be heard in a judge-alone trial.

The Minister spoke very clearly about recognising the burden on jurors. She made a legitimate point, and it is certainly reflected in reality. Especially when jury trials do not run as we would expect them to run, the impact on jurors can be huge, especially for those who are self-employed or have caring responsibilities. As I mentioned earlier, I ask the Minister to go away and look at the Maxwell hours, which have been successful for longer cases. For a morning session, it means that those who are self-employed are able to commit to working in the afternoons. In some cases, it means that those with caring responsibilities know that they are going to get home at a reasonable hour. The Maxwell hours are used in lots of different areas, and could be the answer to retaining the key principle of jury trials in fraud cases, while still ensuring a better experience for jurors.

Amendment 51 would prevent

“the Lord Chancellor adding further offences to the list in Schedule 1 by regulations.”

The concern is that it would give unconstrained power over the list of offences that may be heard without a jury on the basis that cases are considered complex or burdensome for jurors. That rationale could easily be extended to lengthy murder, rape, or drug trials.

As the shadow Minister mentioned, if the wording in schedule 1 specified fraud or that particular type of case, it would be a different matter. However, it does not; it just says “complex or lengthy”. The Minister makes the point that this is a complex area, and criminal offences are added all the time, but she also referred to the specific types of fraud cases. If she can include the provision of fraud in clause 1, that would provide a reassurance that there would not be additionality of scope. That is not to suggest that the current Lord Chancellor would be inclined to increase the scope, but a future Lord Chancellor may be able to extend the provision far beyond the huge change that the Government are already proposing.

Trials for things like terrorism, murder, rape and drug offences can last many months. They can be as complex as fraud cases, and they can involve multiple defendants and expert evidence. On that basis, the arguments that the Minister has made do not stand. That is why I will be voting against clause 4.

[Joe Robertson]

How long is a piece of string? The unanswerable question. I could ask another question: is a 2-metre piece of string a long piece of string? If I asked you that question, Ms Butler, you would have a lot of questions for me before you gave your answer, yet the Minister thinks it is easy to answer the question, “Is a two-week trial a long trial?”. She thinks it is obvious and that a judge will be able to make a decision. She is not willing to put a definition on that, because she says it is evident in the way that the Bill is drafted.

I look at the words in the Bill—which is all that a judge will have to make that decision. On length, it says that the judge will have to decide if the

“likely length of the trial…makes it appropriate for the trial to be conducted without a jury.”

On complexity, they will have to decide whether

“the likely complexity of the trial”

is

“appropriate for the trial to be conducted without a jury.”

It is even hard to decipher from that whether it means complex is good or bad for a jury. Complexity is just a description; it is not a value. This is incredibly unusual, novel and, I would say, badly worded legislation. Ordinarily, a provision of this sort would say something along the lines of: “If the court is satisfied that the length of trial is so long that it would make it unreasonable for a jury”. That would be more normal wording.

The principle of reasonableness, while giving discretion and, some might argue, a vague term in the English language, is a well-tested word in criminal law and the English legal system. We know what reasonableness means; it is an objective test—“What would an ordinary person think is reasonable?” What about appropriateness? Does that mean appropriate to that judge on that day? Does it mean appropriate to a particular, theoretical juror? There is absolutely no guidance in Bill about how this novel word, “appropriate”, should be interpreted. Even when there are words in legislation such as “reasonableness”, which are backed by decades or even centuries of case law, the judge is very often given guidance in the legislation as to what is and is not reasonable.

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[Yasmin Qureshi]

Amendments 34 and 71 are probing amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central (Abtisam Mohamed). I will not be asking for them to be put to a vote.

Amendment 34 concerns magistrates’ sentencing powers. The amendment would remove the word “regulations” and insert

“made by the affirmative resolution procedure”

to prevent significant changes from being made to the sentencing powers of magistrates courts without a proper debate and vote in Parliament. If such changes are to be made, Parliament should fully discuss their impacts. Amendment 71 is consequential on amendment 34.

Clause 6 increases magistrates’ sentencing powers to 24 months. In my opinion, and in the opinion of many people, that represents a restriction on appeals. If sentencing powers are increased while access to appeals is reduced, which is what is being done in clause 7, the risks to fairness in the system are significantly heightened, particularly for those without legal representation, given that the rules for legal aid in the magistrates court are very different from those in the Crown court.

For those reasons, the Bill raises fundamental questions about fairness, trust and the proper functioning of the justice system. The solution to delay is not to remove our historical safeguards, but to fix the system. I ask the Minister to consider whether it is right to give the magistrates court the power to impose sentences of 24 months, which is a considerable period. If that is being contemplated, there should be a proper debate and a vote in Parliament; it should not be put through on the nod.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Amendment 13, which was tabled in my name, provides that magistrates’ sentencing powers cannot be increased beyond 12 months, which would keep the Bill in line with Leveson’s suggestions. The Government have failed to take into account the impact that increasing magistrates’ sentencing powers will have. Magistrates’ backlogs are increasing, and magistrates courts are not set up to take on more complex cases.

The Government are also making some bold assumptions about the speed at which magistrates can clear these cases. They have their own backlog to face, which stands at 379,000 cases and increasing. That is a 17% increase on the previous year, which comes alongside a major cut to the number of magistrates over the past decade or so, from 28,000 to just over 14,000. Removing the power of defendants to elect, plus the changes in sentencing powers, will increase the workload of magistrates courts, and the system will struggle to absorb that. Magistrates will be required to deal with more complex cases despite the summary nature of their jurisdiction. Either they will be unable to handle those cases and will send them to the Crown court, or they will risk delivering poor-quality justice, which would let down victims and defendants alike.

The cohort affected by this change consists by definition of defendants expected to receive a prison sentence of between one and two years. The impact assessment shows that the Government assume that each of these trials in the magistrates courts will be completed within just four hours. The impact assessment also assumes that cases involving a guilty plea will take just 30 minutes. Either the impact assessment is incorrect or these cases will not receive the scrutiny they deserve.

Our other amendment, amendment 21, would make changing the general limit on custodial sentences for either-way offences in the magistrates court possible by affirmative resolution only. It is very similar to amendment 34, which the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden spoke to on behalf of her hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central. The amendment would ensure that any changes to magistrates’ sentencing powers—if amendment 13, to limit their powers, is not passed—is subject to the affirmative procedure. It would give greater parliamentary oversight, as all changes would have to pass through a Delegated Legislation Committee. Leaving that to the discretion of the Lord Chancellor is not a strong enough condition; it does not provide enough scrutiny or protection against rogue actors. The measure was also recommended by the Law Society of England and Wales. It would provide just that protection, and would ensure that Parliament would have and maintain its say in matters.

[Siân Berry]

I will speak as quickly as I can. I support the amendments tabled in this group by the Liberal Democrats, which would limit any increase in the sentencing powers of magistrates beyond 12 months; amendment 34, which was moved by the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden; and the Liberal Democrat and Conservative amendments that would ensure that, if that limit is not accepted, any further changes are made by the affirmative resolution procedure.

I am sure we will all remind the Minister that Sir Brian Leveson specifically made his reforms to jury trials contingent on not increasing the sentencing powers of magistrates. He stated that specifically in paragraph 71 of his report. He also stated:

“My strong recommendation is that the maximum should remain at 12 months.”

That followed, in paragraph 70, another important caveat that the Government seem to have overlooked:

“While removing the right to elect for certain offences may streamline the judicial process and alleviate the burden on the higher courts, it raises concerns about balancing the right of the defendant with the broader interests of justice.”

We have to admit that the Government are taking a risk with the moves they are making. The magnitude and volume of that risk increase with the number of extra cases that are pushed to the magistrates courts through other provisions in the Bill, while the consequences of that risk increase with the higher sentences made possible under clause 6. This is not a step we should take alongside those other steps. They increase the risks to justice.

In oral evidence, we heard from Claire Davies, the leader of the south eastern circuit, who said of magistrates courts:

“There are errors and mistakes made, but if the length of sentence is extended, it will potentially increase that risk.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 51, Q99.]

We also heard from Emma Torr, from APPEAL, who described

“swift and speedy justice in the magistrates court. It is often rough and ready; we are talking about cases being tried by lay justices, some of whom may be experienced but some may not be, and we are also talking about less experienced judges. You often find in the lower court, the magistrates court, that advocates are more inexperienced and tend to be at the start of their career.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 86-87, Q185.]

This point was also emphasised by Fiona Rutherford, the chief executive of JUSTICE, who said:

“There is a question mark about the accuracy of the way in which magistrates are making decisions.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 82, Q174.]

These are the risks we are talking about compared with having a judge and jury.

Risks also come from the surrounding bureaucratic situation, which could lead to more defendants being unrepresented. When the shift is made, we will be leaving them without legal aid, because of the changes in the income requirements. We heard from Fiona Rutherford of JUSTICE that without this representation there could be additional risks to victims.

The Minister needs to admit that this part of the Bill goes too far. On top of the other things she is doing, she is adding more consequence, not just more volume, to the risk equation. That is a poor step to take. Clause 6 should not stand part, and I support all the amendments.

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[Sarah Sackman]

Amendment 10 is a technical amendment concerning magistrates court sentencing powers when imposing consecutive sentences for multiple summary offences.

The Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 introduced a power to vary the general limit on magistrates court sentencing powers for a single triable either-way offence between a maximum of six months or a maximum of 12 months. Clause 6(1) of the Bill amends that power so that the limit for a single triable either-way offence can be set at 18 months or 24 months, in addition to six months and 12 months.

As part of the changes in 2022, a consequential amendment was made to section 133 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, which makes provision in relation to consecutive terms of imprisonment imposed by a magistrates court. As a result, the maximum aggregate term of imprisonment that can be imposed for multiple summary-only offences cannot exceed the longest term that could be imposed for any one of those offences.

Therefore, where the highest maximum sentence for the individual offences is less than six months, the magistrates court cannot impose more than that maximum when imposing consecutive terms of imprisonment for multiple summary-only offences. For example, low-value criminal damage has a maximum sentence of three months’ custody. Therefore, in sentencing someone for two or more criminal damage offences, the magistrates court can impose only up to three months to be served consecutively, rather than six months.

As a result of this amendment, magistrates courts will be able to impose a maximum of six months’ custody consecutively for two or more summary only offences. That will ensure that magistrates courts can impose sentences that adequately reflect the overall offending behaviour, as consecutive sentences enable courts to proportionately reflect the overall criminality when multiple offences have been committed. Importantly, this amendment does not alter the statutory maximum penalties available for existing individual offences.

Amendment 10 agreed to.

Amendment made: 11, in clause 6, page 16, line 13, leave out “paragraph” and insert “paragraphs 16(a) and”.—(Sarah Sackman.)

This amendment is consequential on amendment 10.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I beg to move amendment 22, in clause 6, page 17, line 11, at end insert—

“(9) After section 15 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, insert—

‘15A Entitlement to Crown Court funding levels in certain proceedings in the Magistrates’ Court

(1) This section applies to criminal proceedings in a magistrates’ court where—

(a) an individual is charged with an either-way offence; and

(b) the court, having regard to the sentencing guidelines, considers it likely that a sentence of imprisonment exceeding 12 months will be imposed upon conviction.

(2) Where this section applies, any relevant representation order shall provide for remuneration at the same rates and under the same conditions as would apply if the proceedings were determined in the Crown Court.’”

This amendment links legal aid funding to the potential severity of the sentence rather than the venue of the trial. It ensures that defendants facing more than 12 months' imprisonment receive Crown Court level funding, regardless of which court the case is heard in.

The amendment would link legal aid funding to the potential severity of the sentence rather than the venue of the trial. It would ensure that defendants facing more than 12 months’ imprisonment received Crown court-level legal aid funding, regardless of which court the case was heard in.

The context of this is that the Bill’s equality statement acknowledges that

“if more cases are dealt with in the magistrates’ courts, it is likely that an increased proportion of these defendants may be ineligible for legal aid when they would otherwise have been eligible if their case had been heard at the Crown Court.”

That is because the eligibility threshold for receiving representation from a publicly funded lawyer in the magistrates court is an annual income of below £22,325—significantly lower than the Crown court threshold of £37,500. As a result, individuals in full-time minimum wage employment may not qualify for legal aid in the magistrates court.

Without that being addressed, it is clear that we will face an increase in the number of defendants attending court without legal representation, which undermines fairness for all those involved. Complainants, victims and witnesses may be cross-examined by the alleged perpetrator of the crime; it could slow proceedings down; it risks unfairness to the accused; and it means that the outcome of the cases will depend on whether the defendant can afford expensive lawyers, not on the true justice of the case. That concern is compounded by the fact that clause 6 provides magistrates with greater sentencing powers, meaning that defendants will be facing more serious cases. It will also prolong hearings, which will reduce the savings the Government claim they will make by shifting cases into the magistrates court.

Our amendment would ensure that, if the Government’s plans are implemented, which we oppose, legal aid would be linked to the sentence length, ensuring that those who face longer sentences in the magistrates court received the funding they would expect in the Crown court. There is a lower threshold for legal aid in the magistrates court because it is assumed that cases will be shorter and simpler. That will no longer be the case, with more serious cases taking place that could take days to complete. Our amendment would avoid concerns about two-tier justice and an increase in the number of defendants appearing in court without legal representation.

[Siân Berry]

It is very good to see you in the Chair this evening, Ms Jardine; thank you for looking after us. I will speak very briefly in support of the amendment, to which I have added my name. I have spoken already about the many risks piling up with the Bill, and this amendment is one essential mitigation for some of those risks. If the Government press ahead, they cannot ignore it.

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[Sarah Sackman]

I thank the hon. Member for Chichester for tabling the amendment, because the issue and importance of legal aid is something that I think we both care deeply about. Access to justice is a fundamental principle within our justice system; it is fundamental to the fairness of processing criminal cases through our courts. But if I am vociferous, I think it is entirely justified. We are a Government stretching every sinew to put our legal aid sector back on a sustainable footing.

That, by the way, is not simply a matter of increased fees, although we have done that and are continuing to do so. The inheritance we received—I say this not just as the Courts Minister responsible for the legal aid system—regarding the whole infrastructure of legal aid and the IT systems on which that was built, was wholly inadequate. It is no surprise, then, that the minute there is a cyber-attack, the whole thing keels over.

One of the difficulties with these fees is actually implementing them. We cannot implement them overnight because of the lack of investment, as well as the cutting of fees, that took place over 14 years. What we have done, as one of our first steps, is make significant uplifts to criminal legal aid fees for criminal solicitors, focusing on duty solicitors and prison lawyers—precisely the people we need to deliver this court transformation. That has already been implemented; we have an additional £116 million a year once in steady state. And we have announced the funding that is to come as part of these reforms, with £34 million for criminal legal aid advocates, alongside a commitment to match-fund criminal barrister pupillages to open up the pipeline to people from all backgrounds and to build our workforce.

So that is pragmatism, principle, social mobility and investment. No one could doubt the passion and commitment, as well as the investment, in transforming the infrastructure so badly needed to implement these criminal legal aid fees, and indeed the civil legal aid fees, which, by the way, we are also uplifting. This investment reflects the valuable and tough decisions that we have had to take, and the valuable and tough work undertaken by those who work in the criminal justice system. It will help them to ensure that justice is served.

Turning to the specifics of amendment 22, under the current financial eligibility rules, the Government are confident that the majority of defendants charged with either-way offences are expected to be eligible for legal aid at the magistrates court. For individuals who do not qualify for legal aid, there are already measures in place in the magistrates court to provide some support. The hardship review mechanism can provide support to those who fail or who do not meet the means test for legal aid but face higher than usual outgoings or expenses associated with their case. In addition, unrepresented defendants may also receive support via the free duty solicitor scheme, which we are investing in and that can provide representation at a first hearing if required.

In terms of remuneration for legal aid lawyers, legal aid fee schemes are specific to the court where the case is heard and are designed to reflect the differing processes and nature of work in the magistrates court and Crown court. The magistrates court fee scheme is designed to be simpler to administer and use for providers, reflecting the greater speed and volume of cases going through that court. Providers appreciate the greater simplicity. A non-standard fee route exists for exceptional cases to ensure that work on more complex cases is appropriately remunerated. Fees and financial eligibility conditions at magistrates courts can already provide representation for defendants facing potentially longer sentences if convicted of an either-way offence.

We remain committed to the provision of legal aid and recognise the vital role that it plays in underpinning access to justice. We will keep our approach to the rules that govern financial eligibility across legal aid under review, including by carefully assessing the impact of all the recommendations made by the independent review of the criminal courts and the final formation of the Bill before taking further decisions. In the light of that explanation, I hope the hon. Member for Chichester will agree to withdraw her amendment.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I thank the hon. Members for Bexhill and Battle and for Bolton South and Walkden for their contributions to the discussion on amendment 22.

I recognise that thresholds exist for a reason, but people earning £22,325 are not making a different consideration from somebody earning £23,325. They are lucky if they get to the end of the month with any money left in their bank account, let alone being able to consider paying for an hour’s legal advice. Even the concept of contacting a law firm and asking for simple, early-stage advice is going to feel totally alien to these people, because they do not have the funds to be able to do that. So thresholds exist for a reason, but the Government need to do a piece of work on where those thresholds land, because with the cost of living crisis, it is really hard in this country for people to afford to exist, let alone to afford the additional pressures that a case being heard in a magistrates court would put upon them.

The Minister said that access to justice is a fundamental principle. I agree entirely, and I know how strongly she feels about making sure that legal aid is fit for purpose. We have had many conversations about that, and I am confident that we will continue to do so. I know she will vote against the amendment, but that does not mean that I will not push it to a vote, because it is important to get how important legal aid provision is on the record. This conversation is not over, and I am sure the Minister will agree to carry it on.

[Sarah Sackman]

indicated assent.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Mullan]

I oppose clause 6, which, as we have discussed, grants the Lord Chancellor the power to increase the maximum sentencing limit in magistrates courts from the current 12 months to 18 or even 24 months. While the Government present that as a necessary measure to relieve the backlog in the Crown court, we must look closely at what is being sacrificed in the name of speed.

This proposal is not a minor adjustment; it is a fundamental shift in the nature of summary justice. It would allow magistrates—volunteers who have to sit only 13 days a year and who on average sit 17 to 23 days—to deprive a citizen of their liberty for up to two years. That expansion of power comes at a time when the system is already under immense strain in the magistrates courts, and it is the view of the Criminal Bar Association, JUSTICE, the Bar Council and others that this move is unnecessary and potentially unsafe for the integrity of our legal system.

The central concern shared by legal professionals is that magistrates courts are simply not designed to handle the complexity of cases that may, at some point, carry two-year sentences. As the Criminal Bar Association pointed out in its evidence, the “practices and procedures” of those courts are “necessarily ‘summary’ in nature.” They were built for the swift disposal of what some consider to be minor offences, not for the intricate legal and factual disputes that characterise more serious crimes. The Criminal Bar Association has been blunt in its assessment, calling the extension of summary justice to cases carrying two-year terms a “recipe for rough justice”. That concern is backed by the Government’s own impact assessment, which assumes that magistrates will complete those more serious trials in just a few hours. As the CBA notes, that assumption is

“clearly naïve in the extreme”.

Either the cases will not receive the scrutiny they deserve, or the predicted time savings will never materialise.

One of the most troubling aspects of increasing sentencing powers is the legal aid gap. Given that we were unsuccessful with amendment 53, it is important to reiterate the impact of that gap when considering the clause as a whole. At present, the income threshold to qualify for a publicly funded lawyer is significantly lower in the magistrates courts, at £22,305, than in the Crown court, at £37,500.

JUSTICE has highlighted the severe unfairness that this creates. Individuals in full-time, minimum-wage employment, who would be eligible for legal aid in the Crown court, will find themselves ineligible in the magistrates courts. We face a reality where a defendant could be facing a two-year prison sentence while being forced to represent themselves, because they cannot afford a lawyer and do not qualify for state support. As JUSTICE warns, unrepresented defendants are often observed to receive harsher sentences, as they do not know how to mitigate. We cannot call a system just if it increases the stakes of a trial, while simultaneously stripping away the means for a professional defence.

We must also confront the impact of these changes on minority communities. The Bar Council and JUSTICE both point to the findings of the 2017 Lammy review, as it is referred to in shorthand, which identified juries as a

“success story of our justice system”,

because they do not appear to discriminate between different ethnic groups when returning verdicts. However, the review found that the positive story of jury equity was not matched in magistrates courts. The Minister has previously spoken about the lack of disparity in sentencing outcomes, for example, but specific statistical analysis showed that black, Asian and mixed ethnic women were more likely to be convicted—conviction is the question we are considering here—in magistrates courts than white women.

We have discussed before how that may not necessarily be a direct causal relationship, as it could just be correlation. However, as the Lammy review points out, it is incumbent on Governments of any colour—Conservative, Labour or whatever they might be—to justify and explain those disparities. As we have discussed previously, we have not managed to justify and explain them, yet we are introducing measures that could potentially exacerbate them.

Beyond ethnicity, the Lammy review noted a great cultural gulf between predominantly white, middle-class judges and magistrates and the defendants appearing before them. By forcing more serious cases into the magistrates court, and removing the right of defendants to elect a jury trial, the Government are moving cases away from the most trusted and equitable part of our justice system into one where public trust, at least for some communities, is already fragile. JUSTICE notes that any reform that reduces choice risks deepening existing disparities and exacerbating distrust for minoritised communities.

The Government’s primary justification is efficiency, but the Bar Council argues that these reforms will likely consume resources without bringing down the backlog. As we have said, there is also a challenge with the backlog in the magistrates courts, which are currently facing their own record high of 370,000 cases. The system is also facing a critical shortage of magistrates and legal advisers. The loss of sitting days due to the absence of legal advisers, who are often trainees, even for better-paid work, is a persistent problem. Some estimates suggest that there are more than 20,000 sitting days-worth of work from professional judges in the Crown court. Expecting that to be absorbed into an overstretched and shrinking cohort of volunteers in the magistrates courts would, as the CBA describes,

“transfer the burden from one over-stretched part of the system to another.”

Finally, we must look at how the clause interacts with the rest of the Bill. While clause 6 increases power at the lower level, clause 7 restricts the ability to challenge those decisions by removing the automatic right of appeal and replacing it with a permission-based model. The Bar Council describes this combination as

“a comprehensive rolling back of safeguards.”

At present, around 40% of appeals against conviction from magistrates courts are successful, and 47% of appeals against sentence are upheld, demonstrating that the lower courts frequently make meaningful errors. Doubling their sentencing powers, while simultaneously making it harder for a defendant to correct a wrong conviction, is a dangerous path to take.

It is also worth noting that the Bill departs from the recommendations of the very review that it claims to implement. Sir Brian Leveson recommended that the current 12-month maximum should be made permanent. I draw attention to a previous response from the Minister, when she again raised the possibility that the review invited the Government to go further. We have discussed that this might be a relevant argument to make if, for example, we were talking about a recommendation on which the review did not clearly oppose the Government going further.

If I was Brian Leveson, I would feel a bit like I was being mugged off by the Government, because they are saying, “We agree with what you want to do, but we’re going ignore you on the position that you are fundamentally clear on. Indeed, we’re not only ignoring your specific recommendation, we’re ignoring what you said about the other recommendations being contingent on the Government doing this thing around controlling the sentencing”. It is doubly insulting to Sir Brian to then suggest, as the Minister did, that he would be relaxed about this, and that he invited them to go further. Certainly, no reasonable person would interpret his suggestion in that way.

There is also a question about the numbers. We know Sir Brian’s central recommendation is that we reach 130,000 sitting days. That is the number that he arrived at. We must assume that he has arrived at that number contingent on the Government sticking to his advice that we do not increase the maximum sentencing powers of the magistrates. If the Government are claiming that that will be a further 8,000 sitting days, there must be some juggling with the figures. If the Government are seeking to achieve 130,000, and Sir Brian thinks that is the right number, and the Government’s plan has got an additional 8,000 that Sir Brian never envisioned, does that mean we have 8,000 to play with in some other regard that Sir Brian did not understand? Can the Minister explain how we have ended up with the same figures and the same goal, but in a completely different way, with a further 8,000 that Sir Brian never anticipated or wanted?

We also heard the argument that this is fine because the youth courts do it. We had that argument in an earlier sitting, and I made it clear that there are some fundamental differences. It really undermines the concept of having a specialist court if what goes on in that specialist court is then used to support an argument of general application. That goes against the whole point of a specialist court—we have gone out of our way in that case, because we recognise that the circumstances are special. For example, the types of custody, the implications for criminal records and the style in which cross-examination happens are all different in the youth court and the adult estate. We must therefore recognise that we are in a completely different position.

The Minister also talked about how the negative resolution procedure is already used in this area. The crucial difference is that we are taking a leap to 24 months, in terms of the impact of these decisions. What might have arguably been permissible at the lower end of the threshold does not automatically translate into an assumption that it is therefore appropriate at the higher end of the threshold. It is because the measure will apply towards the higher end of threshold that we think it is inappropriate. We failed to persuade the Government, and as a result this clause remains concerning.

In summary, the proposal to increase magistrates’ sentencing powers to 24 months is a move towards cheaper, faster justice that is likely to be neither cheap nor fast, and it will certainly not be just. It risks creating a surge of unrepresented defendants, exacerbating racial disproportionality and displacing the backlog into a court jurisdiction that is structurally ill-equipped to handle it. We should not trade away fundamental procedural protections for a marginal gain in court sitting days.

If we want to solve the backlog, we should focus on the low-hanging fruit identified by the Bar Council and others: open all existing courtrooms, more than 10% of which are closed today and were closed yesterday; fix prisoner transport, an issue that costs us thousands of days every year; and properly resource the legal profession. We must reject the 24-month limit and maintain the 12-month cap to ensure that serious custodial decisions remain subject to the full rigour and safeguards of our Crown courts.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Clause 6 expands the Secretary of State’s regulation-making power to change the general limit on the custodial sentence that a magistrates court may impose. It replaces the current list of possible maximum terms—six or 12 months—with a new list of six, 12, 18 or 24 months. That will allow the Secretary of State, by regulation, to change the general limit within these set terms.

The sentencing powers of the magistrates court were increased in 2022 from six months to 12 months. This clause would allow the Lord Chancellor to further increase the maximum by statutory instrument to either 18 or 24 months. The result will be more triable either-way cases being heard in the magistrates court. The practical reason we oppose the clause is that magistrates courts are facing their own increasing list—Members can decide whether they want to call it a backlog or a list. I recognise the Minister’s comments that we should not describe the 379,000 cases waiting in the magistrates courts as a backlog and I agree with her assessment that we need a certain number of cases in order for the magistrates court to function.