Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

Rebecca Paul Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st April 2026 Public Bill Committees

The test for complexity is too subjective. The procedural safeguards are non-existent. The evidence for efficiency is weak, and the power to expand these measures through secondary legislation is constitutional overreach. If the Government are truly concerned about the backlog, let them invest in the mechanics of the court, fix prisoner transport, reform legal aid to ensure early guilty pleas and maintain the court estate. Those are the efficiencies that will actually work. Removing the jury from court fraud cases is an expensive, risky and ultimately ineffective distraction. We should maintain the jury as a permanent feature of the Crown court, not as an optional extra for the simple cases.

[Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)]

It will no doubt be a relief to Members to hear that I am not going to talk for quite as long as I did this morning. I oppose clause 4 and schedule 1 standing part, and I support amendment 51, tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle.

As is becoming habit, I will begin with a very brief overview of what we are considering. Clause 4 and schedule 1 create a new framework for judge-only trials in certain complex or lengthy cases. The listed offences include fraud, tax evasion, false accounting, insider dealing, money laundering, terrorist funding, bribery and related offences. The court may order trial without a jury if it is satisfied that the likely complexity and/or length makes that appropriate, that it is not in the public interest for the trial to be conducted with a jury, and that there are no other reasons why it would be more appropriate for the trial to be with a jury. There would be no right of appeal against that decision.

That is a serious and constitutionally significant change in its own right, but what makes it even more troubling is that it has been justified on the strength of a paper-thin theoretical benefit. The House of Commons Library states that the Government estimate clause 4 will save 200 Crown court sitting days. That is around 0.18% of current Crown court capacity, which indicates just how small the potential gain is—if there is that gain at all.

That is the first and most obvious point I want to make. The Government are proposing a very serious encroachment on jury trials in return for a saving that amounts to just 200 sitting days. JUSTICE describes the change as “unnecessary,” says that it

“will not impact the backlog in any meaningful way”

and warns that it risks opening the door to restricting jury trials in other categories of case too. The Law Society is similarly clear:

“Removing jury trials for serious fraud cases is unlikely to have a significant effect on the backlogs, but would significantly erode the fundamental principle of open justice.”

That should be the frame for the whole debate on clause 4. We are not being asked to approve some modest efficiency measure; we are being asked to displace the jury in some of the most important and contested criminal cases for an alleged benefit so small that, even in the Government’s own case, it barely registers against total Crown court demand. That trade-off is so poor that I refuse to believe the Minister, in her heart of hearts, believes it is the right way to proceed.

The second point is that the case against juries being used in serious fraud and related cases has never really been made. In written evidence, the Law Society tells us:

“Serious cases of any complexity, including serious allegations of fraud, must be presented by the prosecution in a way that is understandable, not only to the judge and jury…but also, in line with the principle of open justice, to the public.”

It goes on to say:

“They should be subject to effective case management to ensure they take only a reasonable length of time, if necessary, by reducing the number of charges”.

In other words, the answer to complexity is to manage it properly, not to remove the jury.

It is worth reminding ourselves that the issues juries decide on in fraud trials are factual, not technical—in particular, whether the defendant was dishonest. That is judged by reference to the standards of ordinary decent people. Twelve ordinary jurors are far better placed to decide that than a single judge alone. That goes to the very nature of fraud. Fraud is not merely an accounting or regulatory puzzle; it is an allegation of dishonesty, and dishonesty, by definition, is exactly the sort of question on which the community’s judgment matters. Who should decide dishonesty: a single professional judge, or 12 citizens applying the standards of ordinary life? In a democratic criminal justice system, the answer should remain: the jury.

The evidence that we have does not support the idea that juries are what make these cases collapse, drag on or miscarry. JUSTICE’s written evidence points to the Southwark Crown court data gathered by His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC, showing that the vast majority of fraud cases lasted less than three months, with only one or two per year lasting over three months and only two cases in total lasting over six months. That is important, because it rather punches the myth that these are all endless epics that juries simply cannot understand or follow.

Rivlin’s evidence also says that jury trials compose a discipline that helps to keep fraud trials shorter. Without that discipline, judge-alone trials may end up running as long as, or even longer than, jury trials. More to the point, delays, collapses and miscarriages of justice in fraud are not caused by juries, as shown by R v. Hayes where convictions were quashed because of judicial misdirection, not because of anything the jury did wrong. That strongly refutes the suggestion that juries are the weak link in these cases.

The Government have two problems here: first, they have not shown that such cases are generally too long for juries; secondly, they have not shown that juries are what is causing the failures when these cases go wrong. Unfortunately, that leaves the Government looking rather like they are indulging in ideological hostility to jury trials rather than evidence-based reform.

There is also a wider constitutional point. The Law Society says, and I very much agree, that removing jury trials for serious fraud cases

“would significantly erode the fundamental principle of open justice.”

These are often cases involving major companies, financial institutions, public markets, public money, terrorism financing, bribery and corruption. They are exactly the sort of cases where the public must have confidence that justice has not simply been done inside a closed professional world by one member of that same world.

Fraud and related financial cases often concern the conduct of powerful, well-resourced and sophisticated defendants. In those cases, public confidence matters immensely. A verdict reached by a jury of citizens commands a kind of legitimacy that a judgment by a single judge does not carry in the same way. That is not a criticism of judges, but a recognition of why juries exist in the first place. They are there to not just decide facts but connect the administration of criminal justice to the public itself.

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[Dr Mullan]

If the schedule said complex and lengthy fraud cases, then the Minister might be able to argue that it is constrained, but the schedule is just “Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases”. It actually opens the door to any number of types of offence being added purely because they are complex and lengthy. I think of, for example, the Lucy Letby trial, which was clearly complex and lengthy, but something that clearly needed to have a jury in terms of public confidence. That could end up included by schedule 1.

[Rebecca Paul]

I completely agree with my hon. Friend. What is considered complex and lengthy could be quite subjective. We all know that we are potentially going to end up in the courts over defining exactly what is complex and lengthy. It feels like the Bill is not written clearly enough for us to understand exactly how it will work in reality. Amendment 51 is an important safeguard against those risks.

In his written evidence, His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC notes that the schedule 1 list already

“appears to be arbitrary, perhaps the work of a moment; and it goes beyond anything suggested before. But even that is not the end of it.”

That is because part 2 of the schedule gives the Secretary of State the power by order to add or remove offences. He quotes the explanatory notes to show that offences not related to fraud or financial crime could easily be added in the future. He describes this as

“a mighty step along the way to the end of jury trials.”

That does not strike me as overstatement. The Secretary of State will indeed have this untrammelled power, and we should carefully heed this sober warning from a senior judge.

For similar reasons, the Opposition oppose schedule 1 standing part of the Bill. Schedule 1 is the list that gives clause 4 its reach, and the list is already troubling. It is not confined to a tiny, tightly defined category of unusual mega-fraud; it covers a wider class of economic and financial offences, including money laundering and terrorist funding, and can then be expanded later. If we think the core principle of clause 4 is wrong, then the schedule that operationalises it is wrong too.

Rivlin’s description of the list as “arbitrary” is worth keeping in mind. One of the reasons that schedule 1 is objectionable is that once Parliament accepts the principle that a whole category of serious Crown court cases can be singled out for juryless trial on grounds of length and complexity, the argument for confining the list to that category becomes very hard to sustain. The logic of the thing pushes outward. That is why schedule 1 is dangerous: for not only what it contains now but what it invites later.

I am particularly concerned that there is an ideological push away from jury trials. My concern is that this is only the start, not the end of where the Government want to get to. I urge the Committee to think about this carefully. We are taking important decisions for the future.

[Dr Mullan]

As I have talked about in earlier debates, uniquely in this situation we already know what the Lord Chancellor wanted to do. From leaks, we know that five years was the test, in terms of these proposals. The Opposition are being fair in suggesting that this is potentially the thin end of the wedge.

[Rebecca Paul]

I agree with my hon. Friend, as I normally do.

Finally, there is the obvious practical point that there are better answers available. The Law Society says that reform and investment must be strategic, not piecemeal, and warns against stand-alone measures such as changing from jury trials to judge-only trials without convincing evidence that they will significantly reduce the backlog. It says that Parliament should insist on “detailed modelling” and on understanding the Government’s intentions across the whole package of reform, not just on this isolated measure. The existence of pressure in the system does not prove that every proposed constitutional shortcut is justified. The question is whether the shortcut is necessary. With clause 4, the answer is plainly no. For all those reasons, I oppose clause 4 and schedule 1, and I support amendment 51.

Clause 4 offers a constitutionally serious reduction in jury trials for a tiny claimed benefit of 200 sitting days. The evidence does not show that juries are the cause of delay, collapse or miscarriage in these cases. Fraud cases are not too technical for juries. The key issue is dishonesty, and ordinary citizens are uniquely well placed to judge that. The removal of juries in these cases would damage open justice and public confidence. Schedule 1 gives effect to that flawed principle and then goes further by creating a route to ministerial expansion. Amendment 51 is therefore a sensible and necessary safeguard, but in truth, the better course is simpler still: clause 4 and schedule 1 should not be included in the Bill at all.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I will speak against the inclusion of clause 4. It inserts part 6A in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which will allow complex or lengthy cases to be tried without a jury. My main opposition to the clause is that it is a pointless exercise by the Government that will in no way affect the backlog. The Government’s own impact assessment suggests that the savings will amount to just 200 sitting days per year, which is a tiny fraction—0.18% of the current sitting days. The Government argue that these cases can continue for many months, thereby wasting jurors’ time or putting additional pressure on those called for jury service. However, data from Southwark Crown court, where the majority of fraud and other such cases are heard, shows that only one or two cases per year exceed three months, and only two between 2018 and 2024 went beyond six months.

His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC has argued that jury trials impose discipline, which helps to reduce the length of fraud trials. Without that incentive, judge-alone trials may be as long as or even longer than jury trials. I alluded to this earlier, but jurors decide on issues of dishonesty and fact in these cases, which are not necessarily technical. Twelve jurors are therefore in a much better position to reach a decision.

I also have grave concerns about the terminology of “complex” and “lengthy”. I know the Minister has said that the meaning of complex and lengthy are well understood in the judiciary. I would argue that a lot of people in the legal profession are pushing back against that assertion, and that the Bill does not provide clarity on what they should determine to be complex or lengthy.

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[Rebecca Paul]

My hon. Friend is making some powerful points. Hearing him read out what the law says brings home to me just how terrible this Bill is. Surely everyone can see that there is no clarity how it would work. Rather than there being any clear guidance, it essentially feels as though any judge can have their own view on complexity and length. We will end up with inconsistency and disputes and arguments about the approach. Surely, that could do the opposite of address the backlog by adding additional complexity and confusion to our justice system.

[Joe Robertson]

I agree with my hon. Friend. Indeed, the Bill will basically lead to a complete lottery in decision making, depending on the judge a person gets on the day. I suspect that judges ordinarily do not like vague law or having to provide their own interpretation. They are usually more comfortable if the statute is more precise, or if it is backed by caselaw, but there is no caselaw here.

On the issue of length, we know what the Minister thinks because she has told us in this Bill Committee. I do not criticise her for this opinion, but she thinks a case is long if it is disruptive to the personal or professional life of a juror or their wellbeing. That is her view as to what will make a case lengthy, and I do not criticise her for that, but there is no guidance here for the judge to consider those things—[Interruption.] I paraphrase her—she is welcome to intervene if she disagrees about how I characterise her views on what is lengthy for a juror.

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[Joe Robertson]

Indeed. Might a judge, halfway through a trial, decide that it has suddenly become inappropriate, having heard whatever formal or informal representations are made on that point? Even if there is some objective consensus about how long an ordinary person in this country should be prepared to set aside to serve on a jury, does that in itself make it appropriate that a case should not be heard by a jury?

Even if we could agree, for example, that devoting any more than a month to a jury trial is disruptive to a person’s life, does that automatically make it inappropriate for a case to be heard in a jury trial? No, not at all. If it is inconvenient for someone to sit on a jury for a particular length of time, that does not mean the case is inappropriate for a jury trial. Even the Government are not willing to put a specific time value on that.

[Rebecca Paul]

As my hon. Friend was speaking, it suddenly occurred to me that under our current system, jurors can already make that argument—that if sitting on a jury would be particularly disruptive, they should not have to do so. How does that interact with this measure? It feels like this does not make sense.

[Joe Robertson]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. There are a number of personal and professional circumstances that can enable people to make that argument and get exempted from jury trial or, indeed, not have to sit on the jury in the original case but have it deferred to a more convenient time. She is absolutely right that flexibility for ordinary people in this country is already built into the way that juries are selected.

“Length” is probably the easiest of these three difficult terms; “complexity” is even harder to nail down. How is a judge supposed to decide what level of complexity makes it appropriate to have a jury? I would argue that the more complex a case, in certain circumstances, the more it should be heard by a jury, especially if the complexity relates to what is in the mind of the defendant, rather than, for example, complex financial papers.

Does the involvement of complex financial papers, on its own, necessarily make a trial more complex, if the real issue in the case is whether the defendant intended to be dishonest? As we have already heard with fraud cases, as well as most of the cases in schedule 1, the real issue is not whether something happened; it is the mindset—the legal term would be mens rea—of the person who did that thing. If they did something by accident or unintentionally, depending on the crime, that would often be enough for them to be acquitted. If they did something knowingly, dishonestly or recklessly, also depending on the crime, that would normally be enough for them to be convicted.

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[Sarah Sackman]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central and the hon. Members for Bexhill and Battle and for Chichester for tabling the amendments in this group. In addressing them, I will seek to cover the principal arguments that have framed the debate: first, the impact of the clause on the magistrates court and the suggestion that it carries a risk of overburdening the court; secondly, the critique that because the clause departs from the recommendations of the independent review, somehow it is not a tenable or viable way to proceed; and, thirdly, the procedure through which magistrates courts’ sentencing powers may be varied.

By having the ability to vary magistrates court sentencing powers by statutory instrument using the negative procedure, the Government can respond flexibly to changing circumstances and manage unsustainable pressures on the criminal justice system. Magistrates court sentencing powers have been amended using the negative procedure for this very purpose in the past, including to mitigate pressures on prison capacity in 2023, and to address the Crown court open caseload in 2024.

Requiring changes to magistrates court sentencing powers to be made using the affirmative resolution procedure would constrain the Government’s ability to respond efficiently to pressures across the criminal justice system. It would mean that reductions in magistrates court sentencing powers, such as the 2023 decrease in response to prison capacity pressures, would also be subject to the affirmative procedure. The ability to vary sentencing powers using the negative procedure is an important mechanism, which enables the Government to act with the speed and certainty of timing that the affirmative procedure does not so readily allow.

We consider it proportionate and consistent with existing practice for the level of magistrates court sentencing powers to be adjusted by secondary legislation, within the limits that have already been set by Parliament, using the negative procedure. The negative procedure enables timely adjustments while still ensuring parliamentary scrutiny in the period following the statutory instrument being laid. In that respect, I ask the hon. Members to withdraw their amendments.

On amendment 13, tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester, Sir Brian’s recommendations have, as I have said previously, been critical in informing the Government’s thinking. I do not seek to suggest that clause 6 formed a specific part of his recommendations, but he invited the Government to consider the sorts of measures necessary to address the backlog. As the impact assessment demonstrates, on the Government’s modelling, which has been externally quality assured and verified, extending magistrates court sentencing powers to 18 months would produce a saving of some 8,000 Crown court sitting days. That is hugely significant.

To be candid, part of the reason why the Government are introducing this measure is not simply a vote of confidence in our magistrates court and what we think it can cope with and deliver, but because it will enable us to bring down the backlogs quicker. That is the rationale. Although it is an extension, and goes beyond what was recommended by the independent review, we think that it is justified in the circumstances.

We have therefore decided to introduce powers that would enable magistrates court sentencing powers to be extended either to 18 months or up to 24 months. Those powers provide flexibility to extend magistrates court sentencing powers in the future to respond to changing circumstances and manage unsustainable pressures on the criminal justice system.

The Crown court is facing significant pressures, and many triable either-way cases currently heard and sentenced there can be dealt with fairly and expeditiously in the magistrates courts. Lord Burnett, former Lord Chief Justice, told us in Committee that he had spoken publicly on many occasions about his personal belief that there is need to rebalance the work between the magistrates court and Crown court, and this measure is, in part, a way of doing that.

[Rebecca Paul]

If we are increasing the sentence in the magistrates court, I would imagine the Minister will agree that, in some situations, we are increasing the complexity of the case. For example, a sexual assault case could be quite complicated and require, in order to look after the alleged victim and make sure their wellbeing is managed, four consecutive days of sitting to get that over with. How will the magistrates court do that? They are all volunteers, and quite often they are working. How will this help address the backlog if we are in a situation where those volunteer magistrates are not able to commit to the four consecutive days needed to deal with a complex and sensitive case such as a sexual assault?

[Sarah Sackman]

One of the things we have to in order to successfully deliver this court transformation is properly resource our magistrates court. You have heard me say before about what we need to do to increase magistrates recruitment and the steps that the Government have taken in that regard. We are also increasing the recruitment of district judges who sit within the magistrates court. In reality, many of the serious and longer cases currently within the magistrates court would be heard by more experienced magistrates or a district judge.

We had a discussion earlier in Committee about the desirability of having lay magistrates serve alongside Crown court judges as part of the constitution of the Crown court bench division. I have recognised the merit in that. One of the challenges there is not just the number of magistrates you require, but finding magistrates who can sit in longer trials, which inevitably those would be. I understand what the hon. Member for Reigate said, but we already see on a daily basis how serious and less serious matters in the magistrates court are apportioned in that way. We are hiring up to an additional 80 district judges under our current plans, and they will be able to hear those sorts of cases. Part of the capacity also relies on expanding the number of, and support for, legal advisers, who are also critical to delivery.

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[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak in support of amendment 22 tabled by the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester. This is another element of the Bill that will not survive contact with the Lords. It is quite clearly unfair.

I want to pick up on some of the points that were made. There are key reasons why the amendment is sensible. In other parts of the debate, Government Members have raised the negative impact of cross-examination by defendants, which they do not think is a good thing. They do not think it is a good thing that victims may be cross-examined by defendants, yet they will not support a measure that would reduce the risk of that happening, and it does happen. The context of all the different parts of the clause is important to bear in mind.

[Rebecca Paul]

Does my hon. Friend agree that Government Members and the Minister have spent a lot of time talking about victims being central to all of the changes, so why on earth would they not support the amendment if it is really about protecting victims from being cross-examined?

[Dr Mullan]

The consistent position is that unrepresented defendants can take up more court time and can cross-examine victims, and that is more difficult for victims. As other Members have touched on, this takes place in the context of the other things that we have been unsuccessful in changing this evening. Sentencing powers are increasing and the right to appeal is being watered down. There is a pernicious erosion of the fairness of our courts at the same time as the yardsticks are being essentially changed in relation to access to legal aid.

This is important in the wider context of what is happening with legal aid. The Minister wants to say all the time that the Government are stretching every possible sinew to do everything else they possibly can to improve the backlogs in the courts. Yet we heard in evidence from the Criminal Bar Association and the Bar Council that the £34 million of legal aid announced in December still has not filtered through into the system and is still not available. We are now in April.

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[Joe Robertson]

That is entirely right but, of course, we do not know, because the assessments in respect of the Bill are so light—there is not one on that point. It may or may not at all mean more spending. So many times, the argument on this issue, and on many others, is, “Oh, it doesn’t affect that many cases,” or, “Don’t worry.” Well, it deeply affects the person whose case it is. If a defendant wants to exercise the right that the Government are pulling away, it is hardly an argument for the Government to say, “Well, we’re not pulling that right away from very many people.” For that defendant, the right has been lost.

The same applies to the argument when it is about victims or complainants. The Government are rightly willing to focus an argument on individual victims; they should be prepared to do that for the individual defendants who will lose rights and, in the case of sentences of up to two years, may suddenly no longer be able to access legal aid because the regime is focused on the venue rather than on sentencing power. That should be adjusted not because of what previous Governments have done, but because this Government are moving the goalposts on sentencing powers in the magistrates court, so they should make the matching adjustment when it comes to qualifying for legal aid. For that reason, I do not agree with clause 6.

[Rebecca Paul]

It is a pleasure to start the day with you and end the day with you, Ms Jardine. I am sure you are very much enjoying starting your day with me and ending your day with me, too. [Laughter.] I have just realised how that can be interpreted. My apologies, Ms Jardine; I cannot account for the minds of other Members.

To get back to business, I do not support clause 6 standing part of the Bill. It will expand the Government’s existing power to increase the maximum custodial sentence that a magistrates court can impose for a single either-way offence. The current maximum is 12 months, but the clause will permit Ministers, entirely at their own discretion, to increase that to 18 months or even 24 months. That will affect consecutive sentencing for multiple either-way offences.

The Government have justified the change on the basis that the power is needed so that sentencing limits can be adjusted swiftly to rebalance work between the magistrates courts and the Crown court. The Government estimate that increasing the maximum to 18 months would save 8,000 Crown court sitting days. That all sounds rather neat but, in reality, it is another example of the Government trying to force more serious criminal business into a part of the system designed for swift, relatively low-level justice, and doing so before they have properly shown that the courts can absorb it or that the benefits are worth it.

The first and perhaps most important point is that even Sir Brian Leveson did not recommend the change. Sir Brian said that his recommendation on restricting the right to elect trial by jury was

“contingent upon magistrates’ sentencing powers remaining at the current maximum of 12 months.”

He also recommended that the Government’s ability to amend magistrates’ sentencing powers by statutory instrument be repealed, and that the current 12-month maximum be made permanent.

Clause 6 therefore cannot be said to follow Leveson: it goes beyond him and, on this point, directly contradicts him. That is a serious weakness in the Government’s position. Ministers have repeatedly leaned on Leveson when defending the Bill as a whole, but in this instance he gave no endorsement of what clause 6 will usher in. More than that, he warned us directly against it. It is perfectly valid to ask, “If the very review on which the Government say the Bill is based said that 12 months should remain the ceiling, why are Ministers now seeking the power to raise it to two years?”

Let me briefly touch on a second common-sense point. The move from six to 12 months took effect only for offenders convicted on or after 18 November 2024. In other words, the current system has barely had time to bed in and the Government are already asking Parliament to authorise a further jump to 18 or 24 months. The earlier increase to 12 months was justified as a response to court pressures, and the Government said it would save up to 2,000 sitting days. We have not had anything like enough time to assess properly how that change has worked in practice before Ministers seek power to go dramatically further.

If the Government and the Minister wish to make evidence-based law, they should first show Parliament what the 12-month expansion has actually done: what kinds of cases have been retained, what sentencing patterns have changed, what effect there has been on appeals, what impact there has been on magistrates courts and whether the claimed savings have materialised. Instead, they are asking, through clause 6, for a much broader delegated power, and inviting us to trust that this will all somehow work out later. That is not good enough where a question as fundamental as the administration of good justice is concerned.

The Bar Council puts its objection crisply and, I think, rightly. It says:

“Summary trial is designed for the purpose of dispensing swift justice in low-level cases. The extension of summary justice to cases in which a defendant could receive up to 2 years’ imprisonment…particularly when combined with the removal of a right to elect Crown Court trial, and the removal of a right of automatic appeal”

amounts to a

“comprehensive rolling back of safeguards.”

That is blunt language, but it is hard to disagree with.

Clause 6 will change the kind of cases that summary justice is expected to absorb. The Law Society warns that under the clause magistrates will have the power to impose lengthy custodial sentences for serious offences such as actual bodily harm, grievous bodily harm and possession with intent to supply drugs

“in proceedings that are intended to be quicker”

and less formal than than those in the Crown Court. It warns that this raises the likelihood that

“people will receive longer custodial sentences with fewer safeguards or opportunities to rectify wrongful convictions.”

I will dwell on this point for a moment, as it is something that none of us who have been tasked with scrutinising the Bill in detail should forget. A system designed to be faster, simpler and less formal is being asked to shoulder cases in which the consequences are far more severe. Two years in prison is not some trivial matter: a custodial sentence like that can cost a person their job, their home, their family life, their good name and their future. A justice system that is appropriate for low-level offending cannot be assumed fit for cases that carry that sort of life­changing penalty.

There is then the practical point that clause 6 will not solve the pressure in the system so much as move it around. The change will merely transfer the burden from one overstretched part of the system to another. The Law Society says that the magistrates court already has its own backlog of more than 370,000 cases, and that the Government have shown no convincing plan to deal with the added pressure brought by more serious and complex cases.

JUSTICE makes the same point, and adds an especially telling practical detail drawn from the Institute for Government’s analysis: since magistrates’ sentencing powers were increased from six to 12 months in 2024, only around 30% of sentences in the six-to-12-month band were handed down by magistrates. That suggests a lack of confidence, or a continuing tendency to send more serious cases upwards, which in turn means the Government’s projected savings may not materialise in anything like the way they hope.

If magistrates are already not retaining all the cases that the Government assumed they would after the jump to 12 months, what is the evidence that authorising 18 or 24 months will suddenly transform the position? If cases continue to be sent up, or bounce between jurisdictions, the supposed efficiency gain becomes much more doubtful.

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[Joe Robertson]

The way my hon. Friend articulates the point suggests that the rules are effectively stripping people of the right to legal aid by pushing them down from a court where they currently qualify into a court where they do not. Is that a fair way to characterise it?

[Rebecca Paul]

I agree with my hon. Friend. Frankly, I am shocked that a Labour Government would do that. It is the last thing I expected of a Labour Government.

[Joe Robertson]

I am not shocked by anything a Labour Government do.

[Rebecca Paul]

Perhaps I am more optimistic about these things.

[Sarah Sackman]

On a point of order, Ms Jardine. I ask for your guidance. We hear the rehearsal of a number of the same arguments that we have heard again and again over a long period. Everyone here wants to make progress and wants to scrutinise, but I am not sure there is much merit in hearing the same arguments and, indeed, the same quotes again and again. I seek your guidance on how best to deal with that, Ms Jardine.

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[The Lord Commissioner of His Majesty’s Treasury (Stephen Morgan)]

Yes.

[Rebecca Paul]

Thank you for that guidance, Ms Jardine, but that seems to suggest that we are not allowed ever again in this Bill Committee to bring up the fact that the right to elect for jury trial and rights to legal aid are being removed. Surely we need to be able to talk about that as we go through the Bill.

[The Chair]

You can ask for further advice, but the Clerk tells me that the scope of this debate is clause 6, and when we move on to other clauses, we will debate those clauses.

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[Rebecca Paul]

Thank you for that guidance, Ms Jardine. I would suggest that the legal aid changes are a really important outcome of clause 6. In fact, I think I would come under huge criticism if I made this speech without mentioning legal aid, because I have not raised it at all—well, I did in an earlier speech. I have not raised it at all today.

[The Chair]

It is not for me to say what is a valid point. I was asked for guidance on the scope of this debate, which is clause 6.

[Rebecca Paul]

Thank you for that, Ms Jardine. I reassure you that I will not be speaking for very much longer, but I will cover the last of what I consider to be the important points. Thank you for your guidance and patience.

The Law Society warns that the Bill’s proposals will increase the number of defendants in magistrates courts who are ineligible for legal aid, even though they would currently qualify if their case were heard in the Crown court, because the magistrates court means test is significantly stricter. It notes that duty solicitor numbers have dropped sharply between 2017 and 2025 and that the impact assessment does not properly address

“the disparity between the magistrates’ and Crown Court means tests”.

We know that individuals in full-time, minimum-wage employment may not qualify for legal aid in the magistrates court, and that unrepresented defendants often do not understand charges, and often enter inappropriate pleas, struggle with cross-examination and end up with harsher outcomes. Under the Bill, then, a defendant may face a much more serious case in a summary forum, with a possible sentence of 18 months or two years, yet be less likely to have publicly funded legal representation than they would be if the case were before the Crown court. That simply is not fair.

Even if one were somehow persuaded that giving the magistrates courts the power to impose sentences of 18 or 24 months might in principle be acceptable, we would still have a major objection to how the clause is drafted. It does not simply set the limit and leave it there; it expands the regulation-making power so that the Government may increase the maximum to 18 or 24 months by statutory instrument. The delegated powers memorandum justifies that on the basis that magistrates’ sentencing limits may need to be adjusted swiftly “where operational pressures” require a “rebalancing of work”.

Are we not, then, being asked to hand over a flexible tool that could be used to rebalance criminal jurisdiction by secondary legislation? I could not be more convinced that Parliament should retain oversight of increasing the powers of magistrates. At the very least, any such regulation should be made by affirmative resolution. This is not the sort of decision that should be casually adjustable at ministerial convenience.

For all those reasons, I oppose clause 6 standing part of the Bill. Even Leveson did not recommend this change; on the contrary, he said his wider recommendations were

“contingent upon magistrates’ sentencing powers remaining at…12 months”

and recommended that the power to alter them by statutory instrument “should be repealed”. The move to 12 months has taken effect only recently and has not yet been properly evaluated. The clause will extend summary justice into cases carrying up to two years’ imprisonment, despite the fact that summary justice was designed for lower-level, swifter cases. It will push more serious cases into magistrates courts that are already under strain, and do so in a package that also weakens appeals and intensifies legal aid problems. It risks moving the backlog rather than solving it, and it does so by way of an over-broad delegated power that gives Ministers too much room to reshape criminal jurisdiction by regulation.

The magistracy deserves respect, and nothing I say should be taken as criticism of the many magistrates who serve conscientiously and well, but having respect for magistrates is not the same thing as assuming that every structural burden should now be placed on the summary justice system. The Government have not even begun to make the case for the clause compellingly.

[Sarah Sackman]

Members have asked about the intended impact of the clause. As I explained earlier, the reason why we are making this change is that we have confidence in our magistrates and because it would save a significant number of Crown court sitting days.

This is a tried-and-tested approach: the sentencing power of magistrates courts was raised from six months to 12 months for a single triable either-way offence in May 2022, under the previous Government—Conservatives can look to their own record to see the evidence for what we should do—and a review of the impact between May 2022 and March 2023 confirmed that increasing magistrates sentencing powers had helped to reduce to pressure on the Crown court. In that context, there was a 21% reduction in the number of defendants sent by magistrates courts to the Crown court for sentencing, and a further 6% reduction in the number of theft offences sent for trial to the Crown court by March 2023. That shows how recalibrating sentencing powers—[Laughter.] I did not realise it was that funny, but we are getting into the witching hour, so I am going to be kind to everybody. That reduction is just one of the ways in which we think the clause can assist with the backlogs.

I addressed the points about legal aid in my remarks on amendment 22, tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester. I have set out the justifications both for extending the powers and for the flexible, agile mechanism that the negative procedure affords us.