(1 day, 11 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
New clause 4—Review of the Feasibility of Two Court Sittings per day—
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 12 months beginning on the day on which this Act comes into force, lay before Parliament an independent report into the feasibility of conducting two trials per day in designated court rooms (‘the Scheme’).
(2) The scheme would allow for proceedings in a Crown Court to consist of—
(a) a morning session, commencing at 09:00 and concluding at 13:00; and
(b) an afternoon session, commencing at 14:00 and concluding at 18:00.
(3) A report under subsection (1) must assess the impact of the scheme—
(a) on the efficiency and timeliness of court proceedings;
(b) on the availability of judges, legal practitioners, and court staff;
(c) the potential impact on defendants, victims, and witnesses; and
(d) the cost and resource implications of the scheme.
(4) The Lord Chancellor must, within three months of the laying of the report under subsection (1), publish a response.
(5) The response must include proposals for a pilot scheme based on the findings of the report including the proposed scope and duration of any such pilot.”
This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to commission and lay before Parliament an independent report on the feasibility of introducing two court sittings per day in designated courtrooms, including an assessment of its impact on efficiency, resources, and court users, and to set out the Government’s intended next steps.
New clause 5—Targets for Backlog Reduction—
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within six months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, set and publish annual targets for the reduction of the Crown Court backlog in England and Wales.
(2) There must be a target for the—
(a) overall reduction of the Crown Court backlog in England and Wales, and
(b) reduction of the backlog in each different HMCTS region.
(3) The Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament an annual report on progress against these targets.
(4) Any report under subsection (3) must include any steps taken to address the failure to meet the targets.”
This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to set and publish targets for reducing court backlogs and to report annually to Parliament on progress.
New clause 13—Report on the effect of the Act on public trust and participation in the criminal justice system—
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must commission a report on the effect of the provisions of the Act on public trust and participation in the judicial system.
(2) A report under this section must—
(a) include consideration of the effect of the provisions of the Act on—
(i) witness participation;
(ii) the effect of these reforms on public confidence and trust in the criminal justice system;
(iii) the effect of these provisions on BAME engagement with and trust of the criminal justice system;
(b) contain recommendations for further provision, or changes to delivery of provision under this Act, to increase the levels of each criterion set out in subparagraphs (2)(a)(i) to (2)(a)(iii).
(3) Within twelve months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament—
(a) a copy of a report under this section,
(b) the Lord Chancellor’s response to recommendations made by that report.”
This new clause would require the Lord Chancellor to commission, lay, and respond to a report on the effect of the Bill on public trust in the criminal justice system.
New clause 17—Review of Efficiencies in the Criminal Justice System—
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 24 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, conduct a review on the impact of the provisions of this Act on the efficiency of the criminal justice system.
(2) The review under subsection (1) must, in particular, consider the impact on the efficiency of the criminal justice system of—
(a) the provisions of this Act;
(b) The wider criminal justice system;
(c) the standard of delivery by court contract providers, including PECS contractors;
(d) the condition of the courts estate; and
(e) the use of technology.
(3) In considering ‘efficiency’, the review must consider the impact on—
(a) delays,
(b) backlogs, and
(c) the experience of victims and witnesses.
(4) The Secretary of State must lay a report on the review before Parliament.
(5) The report under subsection (4) must include recommendations for further legislative or administrative changes to improve the efficiency of the criminal justice system.”
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to review and report on whether the Act has improved the efficiency of the criminal justice system, including impacts on delays, backlogs, and the experience of victims and witnesses.
New clause 22—Remote Court Participation: Strategy—
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backlog (‘the strategy’).
(2) The strategy must include—
(a) an assessment of the current use of remote proceedings;
(b) an evaluation of the impact of remote proceedings on the speed of case disposal and the overall reduction of the outstanding caseload;
(c) recommendations on how the principle of open justice can be upheld with the increased use of remote proceedings;
(d) criteria for determining the suitability of proceedings for different forms of remote participation; and
(e) provisions for the security, reliability, and resilience of digital systems used in remote proceedings.
(3) The Secretary of State must, at intervals of no more than 24 months following the laying of the strategy, lay before Parliament a report on progress made against the strategy.
(4) The progress report must consider—
(a) the extent to which the strategy has been implemented;
(b) the impact on the criminal case backlog, including any measures by which that impact has been assessed; and
(c) any further legislative or budgetary provisions to ensure the effectiveness of remote proceedings.
(5) For the purposes of this section, ‘remote proceedings’ means any proceedings in which one or more participants attend by way of live video or audio link.”
This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to publish a formal strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backload in the criminal justice system.
New clause 32—Commencement dependent on independent review of racial disproportionality—
“(1) This section applies in relation to the commencement of Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act.
(2) The provisions inserted by Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act may not be brought into force unless the conditions in subsections (3) to (6) have been met.
(3) The Secretary of State must commission an independent review into racial disproportionality arising from—
(a) the changes to jurisdiction powers and procedures in the Magistrates’ Courts under Part 1; and
(b) the operation of trial-allocation decisions under Part 1.
(4) As soon as reasonably practicable after completing a review under this section, the reviewer must send a report on its outcome to the Secretary of State.
(5) On receiving a report under subsection (4), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before both Houses of Parliament.
(6) As soon as reasonably practicable, the Secretary of State must—
(a) prepare and publish a strategy setting out the measures the Secretary of State intends to take in consequence of the review’s findings; and
(b) implement those measures in full before Clauses 1 to 7 may be brought into force.”
This new clause introduces a duty to commission an independent review into racial disproportionality arising from the changes to jurisdiction, powers and procedures in the magistrates’ courts, and from the operation of the new trial-allocation provisions in Clauses 1 to 7 of the Bill.
New clause 33—Commencement dependent on review of differential impact on classes of persons—
“(1) This section applies in relation to the commencement of Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act.
(2) The provisions inserted by Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act may not be brought into force unless the conditions in subsections (3) to (7) have been met.
(3) The Secretary of State must commission an independent review on whether, and the extent to which—
(a) the changes to jurisdiction powers and procedures in the Magistrates’ Courts under Part 1; and
(b) the operation of trial-allocation decisions under Part 1,
are likely to have a disproportionate impact on particular classes of persons.
(4) The review under subsection (3) must consider—
(a) the extent to which, as a result of the provisions in subsections (3)(a) and (b), defendants in criminal proceedings are eligible for legal aid;
(b) whether persons of limited financial means are likely to be affected differently from other defendants as a result of those provisions; and
(c) the projected number of defendants who, as a result of those provisions, are likely to be unrepresented.
(5) As soon as reasonably practicable after completing a review under this section, the reviewer must send a report on its findings to the Secretary of State.
(6) On receiving a report under subsection (5), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before both Houses of Parliament.
(7) As soon as reasonably practicable, the Secretary of State must—
(a) publish a strategy setting out the measures the Secretary of State intends to take in consequence of the review’s findings; and
(b) implement those measures in full before Clauses 1 to 7 may be brought into force.”
This new clause introduces a duty to conduct an independent review of whether Clause 1 to 7 of the Bill give rise to disproportionate impacts on particular classes of persons.
Amendment 15, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert
“, subject to the provisions of subsection (3A).
(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations under subsection (3) relating to the following sections until he has published a response to the recommendation of Part II of Independent Review of the Criminal Courts—
(a) Section 1 (Removal of right to elect trial on indictment);
(b) Section 2 (Written indication of guilty plea: removal of right to object to venue);
(c) Section 3 (Trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation);
(d) Section 4 (Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases);
(e) Section 5 (Consequential amendments relating to sections 3 and 4).
(f) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts)
(g) Section 7 (Appeals from magistrates’ courts)”.
This amendment would make the publication of the Government response to Part II of the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts a precondition of Clause 1 to 7 of this Bill coming into force.
Amendment 59, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert
“, subject to the provisions of subsection (3A).
(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations under subsection (3) relating to the sections set out under subsection (3B) until he has taken reasonable steps to increase Crown Court sitting capacity, including but not limited to—
(a) using buildings not currently in use as courts to hear cases where cells are not needed, and
(b) reducing lost sitting days as a result of late guilty pleas and prison transport delays.
(3B) The sections referenced in subsection (3A) are—
(a) Section 1 (Removal of right to elect trial on indictment);
(b) Section 2 (Written indication of guilty plea: removal of right to object to venue);
(c) Section 3 (Trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation);
(d) Section 4 (Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases);
(e) Section 5 (Consequential amendments relating to sections 3 and 4).
(f) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts)
(g) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts)”.
This amendment would ensure that sections 1 to 7 of the Act could not be commenced until the Lord Chancellor has used alternative means to increase Crown Court sitting capacity.
Amendment 35, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert—
“(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make a statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (3) bringing sections 1 to 7 into force until the conditions in subsection (3B) are met.
(3B) The conditions are that—
(a) the Lord Chancellor has provided funding for at least 130,000 sitting days in the Crown Court in the financial year following the coming into force of this Act,
(b) HM Courts and Tribunals Service has made an assessment that the Crown Court has, so far as possible, used the allocation of sitting days provided under subsection (3B)(a), and
(c) the Lord Chancellor has made a statement to the House of Commons that the funding provided under subsection (3B)(a) has not reduced the number of cases pending trial in the Crown Court compared to the start of the financial year.”
This amendment prevents the provisions in sections 1 to 7 from coming into force until the Lord Chancellor has provided funding for 130,000 sittings days in the Crown Court; HMCTS has assessed that the Crown Court has used its allocation of sitting days; and the Lord Chancellor has made a statement to the House that this has not reduced the backlog.
Amendment 36, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert—
“(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make a statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (3) bringing sections 1 to 7 into force until he has—
(a) undertaken a consultation on the potential benefits of introducing extended sitting hours in the Crown Court, and
(b) laid before Parliament a report on the outcome of the consultation.
(3B) The consultation under subsection (3A) must consider—
(a) potential rates of fees and renumeration for legal professionals and court staff working extended hours, and
(b) the availability of HM Courts and Tribunal Service staff.”
This amendment would ensure that sections 1 to 7 of the Act did not come into force until the Lord Chancellor had reviewed how to increase sitting hours in the Crown Court.
Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq. New clauses 32 and 33 can be considered almost part and parcel of each other. Our earlier discussion of new clause 29 involved a similar issue, but these new clauses are much more specific.
New clause 32 would introduce a duty to commission an independent review of racial disproportionality arising from the changes to jurisdiction powers and procedures in the magistrates court, and from the operation of the new trial-allocation provisions in clauses 1 to 7. The Government’s equality impact assessment of the proposal to restrict access to jury trial refers many times to the lack of evidence that the proposals in the Bill have a racist or discriminatory outcome, but the impact assessment does not refer once the Secretary of State’s own 2017 review, which showed reduced racial disparities in jury trial outcomes. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.
The new clause would mandate a full review of racial disproportionality before the changes are made. At a time when trust in the justice system among the black, Asian and minority ethnic community is already low, why rush through these changes before we have the full picture?
New clause 33 would introduce a duty to conduct an independent review of whether clauses 1 to 7 give rise to disproportionate impacts on particular classes of person. It is welcome that, in December last year, the Government announced a £92 million investment in criminal legal aid, after years of neglect. However, it will take a while for that investment to have an impact on the disproportionate outcomes across the criminal justice system for working-class defendants, young males and, in particular, vulnerable people.
Juries are hailed as the fairest component of the legal system, and are widely accepted as more likely to provide an equitable outcome than the judiciary, who are still overwhelmingly privately educated and from particular backgrounds. One of the big issues—this applies to new clause 32 as well as to new clause 33—is that joint enterprise is often used as a dragnet for marginalised and vulnerable communities, impacting not just black people but neurodivergent and working-class communities.
For those who may not be fully aware, a 2016 Supreme Court decision recognised that joint enterprise had been used wrongly for the past three decades. Despite that, little has changed. Very few appeals have been accepted, and there is significant evidence of the continued misuse of joint enterprise. This fills prisons with people of no risk to the public, who are labelled as murderers when they have not killed anyone—an expensive travesty of justice. They are often sent to jail or given longer sentences than they should have received on the basis of assisting or encouraging a crime. They are found guilty by association.
In our criminal justice system, joint enterprise essentially means that if someone has aided, abetted, counselled or procured the commission of an offence, they can be found guilty of an offence committed by someone else. However, the role they have played may vary, and the sentencing powers often reflect that. In reality, a lot of bystanders or people watching, or people who may have known one of the parties but did not take part in the crime, will also end up getting convicted. There has been an attempt to rectify that with a private Member’s Bill, but so far nothing has happened.
Some miscarriages of justice have been challenged, and some cases have received further examination. Dr Nisha Waller of the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies states that
“joint enterprise laws are vague and wide in scope, causing systemic injustice, including overcriminalisation, overpunishment, discriminatory outcomes, and convictions where there is no compelling evidence of intent”
or even
“a defendant’s physical contribution”.
Dr Waller’s research shows that the current law is flawed and that it
“encourages…the police and Crown Prosecution Service to charge suspects based on poor-quality evidence…highly speculative prosecution case theory to take precedence over…evidentiary foundations…the use of gang narratives and vague concepts such as ‘in it together’ to construct collective intent.”
She says it allows for a lot of young people to be stereotyped and criminalised, and recommends that
“the scope of secondary liability law needs to be narrowed in favour of a clearer and safer legal framework.”
One reason why it is important to address this issue, in conjunction with new clauses 32 and 33, is that the very people who would be affected by the new clauses are the people who are affected by the law on joint enterprise. I pay tribute to Joint Enterprise Not Guilty by Association, which has been doing tremendous work in this area for many years.
The most recent research by Appeal, which has been monitoring joint enterprise in court cases, concluded:
“There is a clear departure from what the law of complicity should be”
and that:
“Secondary liability is often diluted to little more than association, suspicion, and story.”
It says:
“Prosecution narrative strategy has replaced evidential clarity…meaning joint enterprise trials are often not a truth-seeking process.”
It concludes that the way joint enterprise laws are currently used is
“producing injustice at scale”
and that:
“Public money is being used to stage justice, rather than deliver it.”
Research by Becky Clarke and Patrick Williams at Manchester Metropolitan University shows that nearly £250 million is spent on prosecuting defendants in joint enterprise cases every year. The total future punishment of the 1,088 people convicted under joint enterprise cases each year costs the taxpayer £1.2 billion.
Finally, the report “In Their Own Words”, which is based on a series of family listening days organised by JENGbA, detailed the devastating impact of joint enterprise convictions on families and friends—
Yasmin Qureshi
I take your ruling and guidance, Dr Huq. I was trying to explain it because the disparities are important and the issue does affect people. I ask the Government to think about new clauses 32 and 33, because they will hopefully have an impact on joint enterprise. I will not press them to a vote.
The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)
This group contains a number of new clauses, and I want to make sure that I address all the principal themes.
New clause 5, tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester, relates to publishing targets for reducing court backlogs. It would require the Lord Chancellor to set and publish targets for reducing court backlogs, and to report annually to Parliament on progress. It is important to note that the Ministry of Justice and His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service are downstream Departments, by which I mean that we are subject to demand pressures that are not fully within our control as they are driven by additional arrests and charging decisions. We have published our central demand forecasts, on which the Department’s impact assessment and modelling is based, but the fluctuation and uncertainty in demand makes it particularly challenging for us to set a fixed, specific target.
In the absence of credible reforms, targets will not achieve much. I can tell the hon. Member for Chichester in general terms that we want to get back to a sustainable position. Some Members have referred to reverting to our position before the covid pandemic, which was when we saw the exponential rise in the backlogs. However, I do not want to put a figure on it, because that would simply not be achievable, and having targets that we know we cannot achieve is setting ourselves up to fail, and it lacks credibility.
In the independent review of the criminal courts, Sir Brian Leveson made a series of recommendations related to how performance management and accountability across the criminal justice system could be strengthened. We are looking carefully at those recommendations, particularly in respect of whether we ought to establish a performance oversight board, in addition to the governance forum that already exists. Sir Brian recommends that such a board should monitor and report on the performance of local criminal justice boards and publish a shared set of performance measures. As I have said, we will be publishing our response to the second part of Sir Brian’s review shortly.
Performance management, and monitoring our success in reducing the court backlogs, is essential. Within Parliament, we have the scrutiny provided not only by shadow Justice Ministers, as well as all parliamentarians, but by the Justice Committee, which provides rigorous scrutiny on a cross-party basis. Of course, we also have the regular, frequent publication of Crown court data. Although those targets are not specified, no one is pushing at them harder than the Ministry of Justice and myself, and that is what the Bill primarily targets. However, we do not think that it is necessary to publish specific targets in the legislation, and I ask the hon. Member for Chichester not to press new clause 5 to a vote.
New clause 17, and to some extent new clause 13, touches on efficiencies. It suggests that we ought to review efficiencies before we embark on reform. Indeed, the hon. Member for Reigate and others have made this argument during the debate: do the efficiency first, and see whether it works, before engaging in reform. I want to address that argument head on. We have been clear from the start that there is no silver bullet or simple panacea to the backlog. The insight of the independent review of the criminal courts is that we need investment, efficiencies and reform, and we are not ducking the need to drive efficiencies. One of the areas where I think we all agree is the fact that the system is incredibly inefficient, and the backlog itself compounds that inefficiency, but we are not waiting for legislation to drive at that efficiency reform.
A number of other Members and I have mentioned relevant measures, and I want to touch on a few. For example, the blitz courts have been in operation in London since April, and I am going to visit one in a couple of weeks. That highly effective model of very aggressive listing has had success in the past, and it is being used to drive down certain case types in the backlog, such as assault against an emergency worker. We also need a consistent and clear approach to national listing, such as using the AI listing assistant that I referred to earlier.
We are gripping the issue of prisoner delivery right across the country. Lord Timpson and I have established an oversight board, bringing together representatives of His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service, His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, and the prisoner escort and custody service. It is a year-long project—a sprint, as it were—to look at how we can drive improved performance under the existing contract, and how we can imbed digital solutions to make that run much more efficiently.
Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)
I appreciate the work the Minister is doing with the Prisons Minister. Can she explore something that has been reflected to me by court staff and judges working in the system? The PECS contract will say that it is delivering 99% of prisoners on time, and refer to the data that shows how many times PECS has delayed a case. But, because of the way we record the data in HMCTS, if a judge knows that the prisoner is not going to arrive until 11 am, they will make a decision not to sit until 12 pm. That is recorded as a judge’s decision, rather than reflecting that the reason for the delay is that the defendant has not been delivered to the court on time. Will the Minister take that away and work out whether there is a way of analysing and scrutinising the data slightly differently from how the PECS contract will try to explain it?
Sarah Sackman
The hon. Lady makes a fair point. There is a mismatch between the performance data that PECS has recorded and the qualitative evidence that one hears from barristers and the judicial office as to the time that is being lost because prisoners are not being produced on time. One of the things we discussed in the first meeting of the oversight board was that we need to have a shared understanding of the data and how we capture it.
Another important theme, which we will come to in respect of another new clause, is remote hearings. Clearly, while we absolutely need to improve and speed up the operation of prisoner transport, and initiatives like opening up bus lanes are all to the good, we also have a demand issue. If we want to reduce the demand for prisoner transport, unless it is needed to further the interests of justice, one way to alleviate some of the pressure is to make greater use of remote hearings. This kind of cross-agency working and grip, with ministerial attention, as well as taking soundings and engaging with the Bar, which sees the effects every day, is going to be really important.
We are expanding case-progression functions and case co-ordinators to every Crown court; introducing staff with delegated judicial powers to focus on progressing cases; and sorting out problems that would otherwise take up judges’ time and reduce the hearing time that we spoke about earlier. All those things are under way and will drive at the problem. But I want to be honest with the hon. Member for Reigate, and others who maintain the argument that we should make the efficiencies and have the uncapped sitting days and the investment before we trouble ourselves with reform.
I am a realist, and when I look right across Government, questions of efficiency and productivity challenge our public services all the time. Of course we want our systems to be more efficient, and so we should—the taxpayer deserves nothing less—but we have the insight of the independent review, and our own modelling, which assumes that we have maximalist investment coupled with 5% efficiency gains year on year, and those two things together will not reduce the backlog. They temper it and dampen it down, but they do not cut into it. Assuming efficiency gains above 5% year on year would be optimistic for the system. If it were easy to do, previous Governments would no doubt have achieved it. I am not going to assume more than a 5% efficiency gain, because to do so would be setting ourselves up to fail.
This is probably the area where I take issue with the Institute for Government, because although it accepts, in broad terms, the time savings that can be made through our reform package—I understand that Members will say, “The assumptions are highly uncertain” and all the rest of it—it assumes that we can revert to the efficiency levels that existed pre-pandemic. It essentially assumes an efficiency gain of between 18% and 20% practically overnight, and I simply do not think that that is achievable.
Of course we want to drive improvements in prisoner transfer. Of course we hope that case co-ordinators will get the systems going through, and that blitz courts will work, particularly in London, where things are most acute. But I am not prepared to assume that all that will cumulatively amount to efficiency gains of more than 5% year on year, because we have all seen the lessons, not just from the criminal justice system but right across public services, in respect of how difficult efficiencies are to achieve.
That is why we are pulling every lever—not just the investment or the efficiency drive but the structural reforms—so that the investment is going into a reformed, modernised system that takes the decision to reallocate work to the magistrates court, where we know that cases are dealt with in a more timely and proportionate fashion, and out of the Crown court. That is what all these reforms amount to.
I know the establishment of the Crown court bench division keeps being cited because it will make a 2% saving, but we estimate that the package of measures taken together will make a 20% saving, because of the combined effect of the changes to magistrates courts’ sentencing powers and the magistrates retaining more work. We are pulling every lever because, when we combine all three levers, that will get the backlog down in the timeframe that the Deputy Prime Minister has set out in his various statements.
Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
It is wonderful to hear the Minister’s enthusiasm for the changes, but if she is so confident that they will deliver that benefit, why was she not willing to start with a pilot, or even agree to a sunset clause?
Sarah Sackman
I do have confidence in the changes. Look at the levers in the Government’s gift: we can get more money for the system—tick. We can try to drive performance and govern the system to be more efficient—we are doing everything we can, but I refuse to be over-optimistic about that. The other lever I can pull is reform, based on the recommendations we have had. The hon. Lady asks me why we are not piloting, being more cautious or waiting for the efficiencies to work themselves through the system rather than running all these things in parallel, and I simply say: look at the crisis we are in, and look at the extent of the problem.
If I were to wait for that 5% to play out year on year, even with maximalist investment, I cannot say that we would get the backlog down in 20 or 30 years. I do not know if we would ever get it back down, because our modelling shows that it is insufficient. That is the conclusion that Sir Brian Leveson drew and it is supported by our impact assessment. It is why we have to act for the people stuck in the system now, with their cases being listed until 2030.
I have drawn on healthcare analogies a number of times in this debate, as have others. The NHS, for example, is an institution that always needs more funding—we are all living longer, and some of the conditions we are facing are more and more complex—but we do not keep pouring money into an unreformed system. Here, we are saying, “Let’s reform the system, get it working better and more efficiently, and give it a chance to succeed by equipping it not just with the investment in terms of sitting days, but with the capital investment, too.”
This is not, I hope, an enthusiastic strategy. I call it the kitchen-sink strategy, because I am trying to throw everything at it to achieve the real-time goal of bringing down these backlogs. When we announced these plans and the timeframe for when we expected to see the backlogs come down, even with these bold and radical plans, the argument I was met with was, “My goodness, you’re not getting the backlog down until 2035,” and we are pushing to see if we can make that date sooner and pulling at every lever we have.
I understand that this Department is going to be judged on whether we turn the corner on the backlog in this Parliament, and whether we see it start to come down in enough time, so that victims of crime and defendants on remand can start to feel it in this Parliament and certainly early into the next. That is the essay question I set myself, and we asked for a comprehensive, evidence-based answer from an independent review. It told us that we could not pick and choose our levers; we need to use all three, and that is what these measures are designed to drive at. That is the best explanation I can give for why we say that, while efficiency and investment are hugely important and necessary, they alone are not sufficient. We need the reforms in clauses 1 to 10.
New clauses 32 and 33, which were tabled by my hon. Friends the Members for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson) and for Bolton South and Walkden, rightly highlight the disparities in outcomes that we see across our criminal justice system, and the questions about the trust and confidence that many minoritised communities have in the system. We had a constructive debate on this issue last week, generated by new clause 29, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington.
As I said then, the Government are listening carefully, not only to the Committee but to stakeholders that represent those communities impacted every day by questions of racial inequality in the criminal justice system. We remain committed, during a later stage of the Bill’s passage, to tabling a Government amendment on a review that will cover all the things that we believe are necessary, including consideration of the impacts of our criminal justice system not just on black and minority ethnic groups but on those from working-class backgrounds. Given that commitment, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden not to press the new clauses to a vote.
New clause 13 touches on efficiencies, on which I have already set out my arguments, and also addresses questions of public trust in the system. A theme of our debates has been the importance of public trust in our criminal justice system. Even those who do not directly interface with the criminal justice system need to know that it works and is there if they need it.
There are two essential elements to sustaining public trust, the first of which is transparency. We have spoken about this a lot, and I know the hon. Member for Chichester has tabled further new clauses on transcripts. We have spoken a lot about transcripts and the recordings of proceedings in both the magistrates court and the Crown court. I think that opening up the process and making it intelligible to the public is so important, as well as the provision of reasons by judges in the Crown court bench division. Those are all ways in which transparency can play an important part in maintaining public trust.
However, there is another element of public trust: people trust systems that work. If a system ceases to work and breaks down—if someone who reports an assault that they experienced on their way home from the underground station is told that they will receive a court date that is one or two years away—that is the sort of thing that corrodes trust. We can think of myriad ways in which it can happen, but I would suggest that a state failing to deliver the very basics of timely justice is corrosive of trust.
That is why what I am trying to do is not just about efficacy, or being able to say that we now have a properly run criminal justice system; it is about trust and legitimacy. Those questions of trust are true, irrespective of someone’s social background. We say again that the new clause is not necessary, but those questions around public trust in our system are writ large through the Government’s mission, not just in our approach to this legislation, but in our entire approach to restoring our criminal justice system to the state it needs to be in.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I thank the Minister for her comprehensive response to this group of amendments. We have talked heavily about efficiencies: the shadow Opposition and the Liberal Democrats have put forward alternative measures to improve efficiencies that were not explored in Leveson’s report. I asked Sir Brian if he had explored the concept of doing two trials a day. He said, “No, that wasn’t really something that I looked at.” But he was quite open to it. We had the same conversation that it seems the Minister had with him, where he said, “I used to be able to get through two trials in a day.” We know that that world does not exist any more.
Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)
Interestingly, we have been told all along that this is about the complexity of cases, yet the evidence is that the number of hours that things have been looked at has shrunk. To me, that is a much bigger issue. If we have fewer hours in a day to operate, of course it is going to take longer to get through complex cases.
Jess Brown-Fuller
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. It is a worrying trend that the number of hours that are being used efficiently in Crown courts every day seems to be decreasing year on year.
The Minister spoke about not wanting to necessarily set a target. I agree with her: sometimes putting an arbitrary number on something does not actually reflect the situation. The previous Government attempted to do that, setting a target in 2019 to get the backlog down to a certain number. That does not always reflect the fact that the backlog could be a caseload 30,000 of the most complex cases that will take an incredibly long time to get to. Instead, we should look at the average time that it takes to get from charge to trial, and monitor whether we can bring that number down.
When I have talked about bringing that report to Parliament in new clause 5, it is not necessarily to say, “It was 80,000 and now it is 79,500,” because that does not reflect how long people are going to actually wait to have their cases heard. It is far more about the experiences of all of those people going through the system.
With regard to having reports established every year, the Minister spoke passionately, as she always does, about wanting to make sure that the reforms genuinely make a difference. But the Deputy Prime Minister has said that, even with all the reforms coming in together, he does not expect to see the backlog fall before the end of the Parliament. We need to be able to look at where the data is taking us every year, track what the backlog is doing, track the sorts of cases that are getting stuck in the backlog, and then scrutinise that, so that if there are other levers that can be pulled—whether they are things that have been suggested by me or by the shadow Minister—we have the opportunity to come back and review those things.
I am glad that the Minister recognises that trust in the criminal justice system is low anyway. It is not where it should be. I have said it before: the justice system is inextricably linked with how people view democracy. When trust in democracy is low, there is distrust in institutions, policing and the way our courts work. As cross-party parliamentarians, we have a duty to improve trust in all those systems. I worry that the measures in clauses 1 to 7 will not do that, but will erode trust.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 7 would require the Lord Chancellor to lay before Parliament a strategy for victim-led case management in relation to criminal court proceedings. The Government have highlighted the challenges that victims face in their briefings on the Bill’s provisions in both the media and the Chamber. As we all know, it is victims who have been affected by the horrendous backlogs that we see today, and I have no doubt that the unacceptable delays will have caused victims of crime to step away or choose not to pursue the criminal justice route at all.
Dr Mullan
I wish to speak briefly in support of the principle that different approaches to case management and ways of working are making a difference in a number of areas. The Committee has had extensive back and forth about the fact that backlogs are actually coming down in certain locations. There has been debate about whether that is just a seasonal trend that we see at some points in the year; we will have to wait to see whether that is the case.
We have also spoken about the approach to case management in Liverpool, and this morning I read out various statistics from other courts that are bringing the backlogs down. I think new clause 7 drives at the same point; other measures are already showing benefits before the passage of this legislation, and we should prioritise them.
Sarah Sackman
Let me begin, as we all have in this Committee, by acknowledging the challenges that victims face in accessing the information and support they need. We have talked about the Government’s drive to centre victims in the criminal justice process.
I have a couple of things to say in response to new clause 7. First, there is lots of work under way. For example, on 5 February this year we launched a consultation on a new victims code to ensure that we get the foundations right for victims. Through the connecting criminal justice data programme, we are aiming to strengthen data sharing by seeing how we can both track and share that data with victims, as appropriate. We have published statutory guidance on independent sexual violence advisers and independent domestic violence advisers, recommending best practice for those roles. Of course, we have also begun to roll out the independent legal adviser service for rape victims. We have also undertaken consistent engagement; I met the Victims’ Commissioner just yesterday to discuss some of the ways in which we can marshal the over £500 billion-worth of investment that the Government have made in victims services, so that we can ensure that we have a victim-centred approach.
Case management is ultimately a matter for the judiciary, but taking into account the impact that delays in processes have on victims will of course form an important part of that. I would say that a publication strategy is not a matter best addressed through primary legislation, but I understand the thrust behind the hon. Lady’s proposal, and it is one that we would agree with.
Jess Brown-Fuller
The Minister mentions the increased funding to victims support services, which I know is a really important arm of what the Government are trying to achieve. I would just caution that some of the victims support services that I have spoken to have said that, because of the length of the backlogs and the delays in the current system, the increase in funding has only allowed them to maintain the status quo, because they are now supporting people for much longer, and they are trying to make sure that they stay engaged in the process. It has not allowed them to change up their practices or introduce some of the best practice that they would like to see, just because of the length of time for which they are now supporting victims through the system. I just wanted to get that on the record.
Sarah Sackman
I absolutely recognise what the hon. Lady says. That is why I come back to this: swifter justice for victims is the guiding principle behind all these reforms. As she says, the longer people are stuck waiting for their day in court, the longer they need to be supported. It becomes a vicious cycle, because we must expend more resource on victim support to keep them engaged in the process. It is not just that we do that for longer; it gets harder the longer they are stuck in the backlog. I very much agree with her: I would rather that money were redeployed to enhance what those victim support agencies can do. I do not think primary legislation is the vehicle for it, but I absolutely agree with the sentiment. I urge her to withdraw her new clause.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I am pleased the Minister recognises the Government must go a long way to do more for victims, but it is getting harder for services such as victim support to manage an ever-increasing caseload. I am keen to press this new clause to a vote, because the idea of victim-led case management, which many of the courts are keen to adopt, is a key tenet of improving victims’ experience in the system.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 9—Judicial training: violence against women and girls—
“(1) Any member of the judiciary who may be assigned to proceedings for a trial on indictment without a jury must have access to training on matters relating to violence against women and girls.
(2) Training provided under subsection (1) must cover—
(a) the nature and dynamics of violence against women and girls, including—
(i) domestic abuse,
(ii) sexual violence,
(iii) coercive control, and
(iv) so-called honour-based abuse;
(b) best practice in hearing cases involving violence against women and girls, including ensuring fair and trauma-informed proceedings.
(3) The Lord Chancellor must by regulations specify how often members of the judiciary must undertake such training.
(4) The Lord Chancellor must lay an annual report before Parliament on the provision and uptake of training provided under this section.”
This new clause requires the provision of training for the judiciary focused on violence against women and girls.
New clause 10—Judicial training: domestic abuse—
“(1) Any member of the judiciary who may be assigned to proceedings for a trial on indictment without a jury must have access to training on matters relating to domestic abuse.
(2) Training provided under subsection (1) must cover—
(a) the nature and dynamics of domestic abuse, including physical, emotional, psychological, sexual, and economic abuse, as well as controlling or coercive behaviour;
(b) best practice in the management of cases involving domestic abuse, including ensuring fair and trauma-informed proceedings.
(3) The Lord Chancellor must by regulations specify how often members of the judiciary must undertake such training.
(4) The Lord Chancellor must lay an annual report before Parliament on the provision and uptake of training provided under this section.”
This new clause requires the provision of training for the judiciary focused on domestic abuse.
New clause 30—Duty to provide trauma-informed training—
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must ensure that appropriate training is made mandatory for members of all court staff working in the criminal courts on best practice in relation to victims' trauma.
(2) Training under subsection (1) must include—
(a) the nature, prevalence, and impact of domestic abuse, coercive and controlling behaviour, and rape and serious sexual offences (‘RASSO’);
(b) the dynamics and psychological effects of trauma on parties and witnesses involved in proceedings;
(c) the identification and appropriate handling of cases involving domestic abuse, coercive and controlling behaviour, and RASSO offences;
(d) the ways in which trauma may affect memory, communication, behaviour, and engagement with court proceedings;
(e) best practices for reducing retraumatisation within court and tribunals settings.
(3) Training provided under this section must—
(a) on initial appointment to a role within a court, and at regular intervals thereafter;
(b) reflect current best practice and be informed by up-to-date research and guidance;
(c) be developed in consultation with appropriate experts, including specialist support organisations and persons with lived experience of abuse and trauma.
(4) The Lord Chancellor must keep the training under review and revise it as appropriate.
(5) The Lord Chancellor must publish guidance on the implementation of this section.”
This new clause would require the Lord Chancellor to ensure that members of the court staff working in the criminal courts receive mandatory, consistent training on trauma-informed practice to improve understanding of how trauma affects victims’ evidence, behaviour, and engagement with court proceedings.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Me again. The new clauses would require provision for the training of the judiciary and, under new clause 30, for court staff. Each of these clauses focuses on a different area. New clause 8 focuses on discrimination against ethnic minorities, including racial bias and the impact on judicial decision making. New clause 9 requires the provision of training for the judiciary focused on violence against women and girls. New clause 10 requires the provision of training for the judiciary focused on domestic abuse. New clause 30 requires the Lord Chancellor to ensure that all members of court staff working in the criminal justice system receive mandatory and consistent training on trauma-informed practices, to improve understanding of how trauma affects victims’ experience, behaviour and engagement with court proceedings.
The reasons for the new clauses—they are tabled for basically every part of justice legislation—are that there is real frustration among organisations and charities working in the criminal justice space that Parliament does not have the ability to legislate for the judiciary to have mandatory training. How do we square the circle of all those campaign organisations sounding the alarm and saying that, in order for us to make these very serious changes in moving to judge-alone trials, we must ensure that judges approach them with trauma-informed practices in mind?
That was raised in the evidence session by Farah Nazeer from Women’s Aid. When we asked her, “What would you need to see in order for this Bill to give you the confidence that victims will have a better experience and women will be better supported through the criminal justice system?” she said:
“One is training for the entirety of the court staff, because the stories that we hear and the experiences that we support women and children through are frankly appalling. The staff are not trauma-informed and there is no understanding of what a victim is going through. The courts are weaponised and survivors are brought back to the courts repeatedly. It is an appalling process. No policy area that you work on at Women’s Aid is a picnic, but this is the worst.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 27, Q53.]
In the same evidence session, Claire Waxman, the Victims’ Commissioner, said:
“I have made that point for years, regardless of these reforms. We have to improve and get reassurance around judicial training, including training on cultural competency, on understanding bias and prejudice and on the dynamics of abuse. We still see issues around coercive control, post-separation abuse and stalking. I need to be reassured that judges are being trained to the level that will give assurances to victims and to myself that they understand what is coming in front of them.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 14, Q25.]
I know that there has been significant progress, and that the organisation Fair Hearing has worked closely with the judiciary to do training about violence against women and girls and to make sure that judges are trauma-informed in their practice, but it is not mandatory. One comment that stuck with me from the evidence session was from Charlotte, one of the victims who presented evidence. She noted, of her judge:
“She said that, because I waited eight months to report, I was unreliable, and that I had clearly spoken to other victims of domestic abuse, so I knew what to say. Those comments really stuck by me.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 26, Q51.]
The very concept that a judge looks at somebody who is trying to share their experiences and says, “Well, they’ve just trained for this,” is pretty appalling. It causes me to doubt that all judges are engaging in the judiciary training as effectively as they could be.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
I seek clarity on whether the new clause would apply to all judges or just to those in the criminal courts. In the family court the idea is to bring in expertise around the sort of issues that she talks about from agencies—such as the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service, and even social services—in which there are lots of trained people, but that system does not always ensure that the judge is best placed to make a good decision, as we have seen in evidence. Will the hon. Lady clarify that point?
Jess Brown-Fuller
The feeling of the organisations and charities that I have spoken to is that everybody in the judiciary should have the opportunity to go through trauma-informed training and training around violence against women and girls, around coercive control and around recognising and identifying racial bias so we can make sure that every victim is confident—whether they are going through the criminal or the family justice system—that everybody they will come in contact with understands them and the additional support that they may require.
I am sure that the Minister will say that the Government cannot mandate training because the judiciary are independent. New clause 30 aims to make sure that members of court staff, who are employed by His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, receive mandatory and consistent training on trauma-informed practice because they are the people who will support victims and witnesses through the criminal justice system. We clearly need to change our approach. In the evidence session, witnesses described an environment that is hostile to witnesses; we need one that stands up for their interests. Our new clause 30 should be the bare minimum across the courts estate, and represents a position supported by a number of organisations.
Sarah Sackman
I entirely agree that training, in all the respects that the hon. Member for Chichester speaks about, is key, whether it is training on equal treatment or on a trauma-informed approach to rape and serious sexual offences, or specific training pertaining to domestic abuse and identification of coercive and controlling behaviour, or to ensure the consistent application of special measures and evaluation of expert input into trauma-informed practice.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I thank the Minister for her remarks. I am still keen to see progress to ensure that everybody in the judiciary has that mandatory training. As we start to accept that domestic abuse so often plays a part in our criminal justice system—both for defendants and witnesses—and with the Government having made great strides in introducing a domestic abuse identifier for those who cannot be sentenced for a crime of domestic abuse, I think that having specially ticketed judges is something that we need to move away from. Instead, we should make sure that all judges have that special ticket, because they never know if they are hearing a case where a witness is taking somebody to court based on one thing but other things might be going on in the background. Having that trauma-informed training is really important and I will be seeking to push this new clause to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 27—Pilot of trial allocation reforms (No. 2)—
(1) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations bringing sections 1 to 5 of this Act into force unless he has first made arrangements for a pilot scheme for the provision of those sections in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).
(2) A pilot scheme must—
(a) be for the purpose of trialling all provisions of sections 1 to 5 of this Act;
(b) be for such a period as the Lord Chancellor may by regulations specify, provided that the period under paragraph (a) is met;
(c) take place in at least one location in England and Wales as the Lord Chancellor may by regulations specify.
(3) Within 12 months of the conclusion of the pilot scheme under subsection (2), the Lord Chancellor must—
(a) assess the impact of the pilot scheme on—
(i) the timeliness of the disposal of cases included in the pilot scheme,
(ii) appeal rates relating to those cases,
(iii) the outcomes of those cases,
(iv) defendants’ access to trial by jury, and
(v) public confidence in the criminal justice system; and
(b) Lay before Parliament a report on the assessment under paragraph (a).”
This new clause would require the Government to pilot the removal of the right to elect trial by jury before national implementation, and to report to Parliament on its impact.
Amendment 16, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert—
“, subject to the provisions of subsection (3A).
(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations under subsection (3) relating to the following sections until the pilot in accordance of section [Pilot of trial allocation reforms (No. 2)] has been concluded—
(a) Section 1 (Removal of right to elect trial on indictment);
(b) Section 2 (Written indication of guilty plea: removal of right to object to venue);
(c) Section 3 (Trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation);
(d) Section 4 (Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases);
(e) Section 5 (Consequential amendments relating to sections 3 and 4);
(f) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts);
(g) Section 7 (Appeals from magistrates’ courts).”
This amendment is consequential on NC11.
Amendment 60, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert—
“, subject to the provisions of subsection (3A).
(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations under subsection (3) relating to the following sections until the pilot in accordance of section [Pilot of trial allocation reforms (No. 2)] has been concluded—
(a) Section 1 (Removal of right to elect trial on indictment);
(b) Section 2 (Written indication of guilty plea: removal of right to object to venue);
(c) Section 3 (Trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation);
(d) Section 4 (Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases);
(e) Section 5 (Consequential amendments relating to sections 3 and 4).”
This amendment is consequential on NC27.
Jess Brown-Fuller
The new clause is consequential on amendment 16. Amendment 16 would require the Government to pilot the removal of the right to elect trial by jury before national implementation and report to Parliament on its impact.
The design of these reforms has not been tested in practice, and there are many different estimations of their impact on the backlog. The Institute for Government’s modelling suggests that that is likely to be around a 7% to 10% reduction in total time taken in the courtroom, with just 1.5% to 2.5% of that coming from the introduction of judge-only trials in the Crown court bench division. The Government’s impact assessment indicates an expected saving of 27,000 Crown court sitting days. That is based on the fact that cases heard in the bench division will reduce the time per hearing by 20%.
That 20% figure is an estimate that Sir Brian Leveson uses in part 1 of his independent report of the criminal courts. He is explicit that, should the Ministry of Justice
“consider pursuing this course of action, it may wish to consider undertaking further detailed analysis in order to understand the potential time-saving fully.”
That figure is based on a different package of reforms. Sir Brian includes the reclassification of some offences and the removal of the right to elect for some low-level figures.
The Government have used the 20% figure as a starting point, which is problematic. It is the number that informs their modelling, but there is no concrete data to prove that this would be the case. Policymaking must always be evidence-led. That imperative is even more urgent when such legislative reforms restrict fundamental rights. Time savings must be considered holistically. With no juries in the bench division, judges will have to provide a reasoned judgment for their decision. The Bill stipulates that this judgment must state the specific reasons for the conviction or acquittal. That represents a change from traditional jury trials, where juries do not provide written or spoken reasons for their verdict. The composition of these judgments will be time consuming for judges, who will have to ensure that their conclusions are legally tight. If the Government truly believe that the reforms laid out in the Bill will genuinely reduce the backlog, they should prove it before making a change to our justice system that we will never see reversed.
Sarah Sackman
We are not going to do a pilot, not because piloting is not a good idea per se, but because a pilot would necessitate legislation, which is why the hon. Lady has proposed it in this way, and because it would lead to a criminal justice system with different models running in parallel. That is okay—that happens with pilots and trying new things, I understand that—but fundamentally we are not piloting the changes to courts because of the extent of the crisis we are in.
We need to bear down on the backlogs. We are satisfied that we have the evidence that the package of reforms will deliver significant time savings in the Crown court to achieve those efficiencies. We think we have struck the right balance between access to jury trial and speeding up the courts. For that reason, we maintain that we do not need to do a pilot here.
We do not have anything against piloting per se, but in a world in which the demands on our criminal justice system are changing, we must keep up. We have thought long and hard, based on independent review. I would suggest that that is an evidence base.
Jess Brown-Fuller
If the Government will not agree to a pilot or to a report that would allow us to scrutinise whether the changes that they have introduced in the Bill actually make a difference to the Crown court, how are Labour and opposition MPs able to scrutinise whether these changes have made a fundamental difference to the backlog, especially if a sunset clause, which I am sure we will get on to shortly, is not included?
I totally recognise Sir Brian Leveson’s eminence and experience—he is right to point that out and has written a very comprehensive report—but people with thousands of years of combined experience within the criminal justice system are saying this will do nothing to reduce the backlog. I therefore would like the Minister’s guidance on how Members from across the House are supposed to scrutinise these decisions to see if they make a difference, if the Government will not agree to things like pilots or reports.
Sarah Sackman
I do not accept that the vast majority of the changes we are introducing are unprecedented; in the main, we are shifting caseload from the Crown court to the magistrates court, and we already have a way of testing that. Trials for either-way offences, some of which are already retained in the magistrates court, give us a direct comparison. People can elect the Crown court, and we can see that those retained in the magistrates court are dealt with more promptly.
We also saw evidence from international comparators, as well as from experienced judges. We think these are the right measures, and not only to deal with the backlog; they also have a normative basis in striking the right balance between defendant’s rights and those of complainants and victims. We think that is right. I understand that the Opposition disagree, but we think, based on the expert review we were provided with, that this is the right package. We do not think there is a need for a pilot, nor is there a need for a sunset clause.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I would still like to press my new clause to a vote, because having a pilot we can refer to, as in the earlier two-trials model, is really important. We should be data and evidence led as a Parliament.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would give victims a right to receive, free of charge, court transcripts on judicial summings-up and bail decisions relevant to their case. It would require that transcripts be provided within 14 days of a request and clarify that this right would applies whether or not the victim gave evidence in the case.
We spoke earlier in Committee about the important role of court transcripts. I recognise the challenges that the Government have in rolling out large-scale reforms to the way that we currently do court transcripts. The new clause is slightly more limited in its scope, because it specifically calls for transcripts on judicial summings-up and bail decisions relevant to the victim’s case. I know that the Government are doing a great deal in trying to move the dial on making sure that we slowly get to the point where everybody has access to court transcripts. As a spokesperson for an opposition party, I will continue to put pressure on the Government wherever I can to try and push them to go further and faster in this regard. I will not press the new clause to a vote.
Dr Mullan
I rise to speak briefly in support of the new clause. Whenever we talk about narrowed elements of a transcript, I always think to myself that, in giving these remarks, the judge will hopefully have written them down and not be doing these sorts of things off the top of their head. That is why I struggle to understand why these more limited elements are not more meaningful and easily available.
If a judge does not happen to write these sorts of things down, I do not think it will be much to ask them to do so and to make it so that the transcript can be quickly and easily checked. I appreciate that the hon. Member for Chichester will not press the new clause to a vote, but as she mentioned, in any opportunity we get we should push the issue of transcripts. It is particularly important in relation to, as we will come to talk about, the unduly lenient sentence scheme, because all these things would help somebody, in theory, to give an appeal a shot. If they do not have that sort of thing, it is much more difficult.
Sarah Sackman
The hon. Member for Chichester rightly acknowledges the significant amount of work that the Government are currently undertaking in this space, and we had an opportunity to debate that in Committee earlier.
In relation to the new clause, it might be worth briefly explaining why such an extension would not provide significant benefits compared with the systems already in place. In relation to bail decisions, a transcript of the hearing is rarely informative for victims. What victims need and want to know, and what the victims code already requires, is for victims to be informed of the outcome of the bail hearing and any conditions imposed. Those updates are already provided to victims by victim witness care units within five working days. We are currently exploring how responsibilities under the code are being met by the relevant service providers and how to better support them in the delivery of the code. To strengthen that further, once commenced, the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 will introduce a compliance framework, requiring criminal justice bodies to keep their performance against the code under review.
Transcripts of judicial summings-up are unlikely to add significant value for many victims. Those remarks are given before the jury begins to deliberate and are intended to guide them by summarising the evidence and setting out the relevant law. They are not, and cannot be, a reflection of the jury’s decision. Without the full context of the trial, they may risk causing confusion rather than providing clarity. Before being released, summings-up must be manually reviewed to ensure that they are accurate. That, too, is resource intensive. In looking at where we can roll out making transcripts available at either low or no cost, we must target those areas that add value for the public and victims.
As I said when we discussed this last Thursday, we are focused on driving improvement for the longer term. That is why we are undertaking a study in the use of AI to transcribe court hearings. The findings will identify what is possible from AI transcription in a Crown court setting, in considering how to make the provision of transcripts more cost-effective. I think we are in a good place. As the hon. Member for Chichester says, there is more to do, and the Government would be grateful for work across the House to see how we can drive greater transparency in transcription in our Crown courts, but I urge her to withdraw her new clause.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I am happy to withdraw the new clause, on the basis that the Government continue to work on the measures that they have already introduced. Let me quickly put on the record the work of my hon. Friend the Member for Richmond Park (Sarah Olney), who has been campaigning for access to court transcripts for many years. She is delighted that we are now seeing progress. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 13
Report on the effect of the Act on public trust and participation in the criminal justice system
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must commission a report on the effect of the provisions of the Act on public trust and participation in the judicial system.
(2) A report under this section must—
(a) include consideration of the effect of the provisions of the Act on—
(i) witness participation;
(ii) the effect of these reforms on public confidence and trust in the criminal justice system;
(iii) the effect of these provisions on BAME engagement with and trust of the criminal justice system;
(b) contain recommendations for further provision, or changes to delivery of provision under this Act, to increase the levels of each criterion set out in subparagraphs (2)(a)(i) to (2)(a)(iii).
(3) Within twelve months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament—
(a) a copy of a report under this section,
(b) the Lord Chancellor’s response to recommendations made by that report.”—(Jess Brown-Fuller.)
This new clause would require the Lord Chancellor to commission, lay, and respond to a report on the effect of the Bill on public trust in the criminal justice system.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 24—Expiry of sections 1 to 7—
“(1) Sections 1 to 7 of this Act expire three months after the date on which the condition in subsection (2) is met.
(2) The condition is that number of cases awaiting trial in the Crown Court has been below pre-pandemic level in each of the previous four quarterly reporting periods.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) the number of cases awaiting trial in the Crown Court is that which is calculated by HM Courts and Tribunals Service.”
This new clause sunsets sections 1 to 7 of this Act so that they will not longer be in force once the court backlog has been resolved.
Jess Brown-Fuller
The new clause is a sunset clause that would require a report on the effectiveness of certain provisions of the Bill. If the report found that the provisions were not effective, the Secretary of State would have to bring forward regulations to repeal them; if it found that they were effective, the Secretary of State would have to set a deadline for their repeal and a return to full jury trials.
The design of these reforms has not been tested in practice. There are many different estimations of their impact on the backlog, and if they are shown to not be effective, they must not continue. If they prove to be effective at reducing the backlog, full jury trials could be reinstated when the backlog is reduced and we are working at a level that the criminal justice system can cope with.
Dr Mullan
My new clause 24 and new clause 18 in the name of the hon. Member for Chichester seek to achieve a similar outcome. Although there is broad agreement that the backlog is a challenging issue that must be addressed, we believe that any measure that curtails jury trial rights in such a significant—and, I would say, unprecedented—way should be proportionate to the problem it seeks to solve and be used only for as long as absolutely necessary while we are presented with this problem. Therefore, we propose a sunset clause to ensure that the powers expire once the court backlog has returned to pre-pandemic levels for a sustained period.
A sunset clause is a measure in a statute that provides for a law or specific provisions to cease to be effective after a predetermined date, or once a specific condition is met, unless Parliament takes further action to renew them. Although they have experienced a resurgence in recent decades as a tool for managing extraordinary or controversial measures, sunset clauses have been employed by Parliament since at least 1500. Historically and in contemporary practice, they serve vital democratic functions. They are used to facilitate the passage of controversial legislation by assuring critics and the public that the measures are temporary, rather than a permanent erosion. They act as a safeguard for democracy, particularly when emergency legislation is required, by preventing the normalisation of extraordinary powers.
Furthermore, sunset clauses create a more formal trigger for post-legislative scrutiny, forcing both the Executive and the legislature to revisit their assumptions and evaluate whether a law has been effective before deciding whether to prolong its life. The Terrorism Act 2006 and the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 both utilise sunsetting or recurring renewal requirements to ensure ongoing parliamentary oversight. More recently, sunset clauses were used in covid-19 legislation to ensure that restrictive measures did not extend longer than necessary. The UK Coronavirus Act 2020 contained a two-year sunset clause and a requirement for six-monthly reviews to determine whether temporary provisions should expire early.
When considering radical changes to our trial system during a time of crisis, we should look to our history for a more direct precedent. During world war two, a period when our continued existence as a free nation was genuinely uncertain, the Government of the day did not choose to radically cut down the use of jury trials or erode the right of the citizen to elect to be judged by their peers. Instead, they reduced the number of jurors from 12 to seven. Importantly, that was a temporary adjustment. As soon as the Nazi threat was defeated, the Government of the day restored the number of jurors to 12. That demonstrates a principled understanding that emergency measures taken in response to a temporary crisis should be reversed once that crisis is resolved.
In contrast, the measures before us today regarding the erosion of jury trials and the abolition of the right to elect are drafted as permanent changes to our statute book, with no built-in mechanism for their reversal once the backlog is managed again. As I have said, that is a significant departure from the most closely related historical example of what we did during even the darkest days of the 1940s.
Our sunset clause would tie the duration of these reforms to the very problem they are intended to fix. The Government’s case is that these are necessary, backlog-driven measures, and it is entirely consistent to state that they should expire once that backlog is brought down to a more historically normal level, which we define as the pre-pandemic level—a level that the system was able to manage sufficiently, if not perfectly, without the need for structural erosion of the right to a jury.
Sarah Sackman
The Committee will not be surprised to hear that the Government do not support a sunset clause, for two primary reasons. First, these reforms address a challenge in our system that not only is acute—because of the crisis, which we inherited from the previous Government, that has been allowed to run out of control—but has long-term drivers, meaning that the demand pressures on our court system are not going away.
Of course we want to get the backlog down to a sustainable level, but that will not alleviate the challenges, described in the independent review of the criminal courts, presented by the changing patterns of crime; the procedural safeguards in our system, which mean that trials take longer; advancing technology; and the types of evidence that need to be dealt with. All that contributes to a demand pressure that will be sustained, and Government forecasting shows that that demand will continue to grow. Even once we have the backlogs under control, we will need these reforms to maintain an improved, sustainable position as part of the modernised rebalancing of the workload between Crown court and magistrates court, which is supported not just by the authors of the independent review but by the likes of Lord Ian Burnett, an experienced Lord Chief Justice, who spoke about this in his evidence.
Secondly, as colleagues well know, Parliament is sovereign. We are bringing these reforms forward because we believe they are the right measures to tackle a crisis and modernise our system. People have heard me say this time and again, and I stand by it, but this is about turning a crisis into an opportunity. I have spoken about the ways in which we have seized the opportunity to modernise our system and make it fairer and more sustainable. If future Parliaments think that we did not get it right, they can no doubt pass legislation to change it.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Yasmin Qureshi
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause is, in some respects, fairly self-explanatory, in that it provides that cases should not go to the Crown court without being trial-ready. In essence, it is a safeguard —we could call it an oversight amendment—that is linked to the jury trial reforms in the Bill.
The rationale behind the new clause is to reflect concern that the Government are making significant changes by removing or restricting jury trials without strong evidence of impact. It aims to introduce caution, likely through a review, limits or accountability mechanisms. In that respect it is similar to the approach in new clause 27, about piloting, but it is more about ongoing scrutiny than delaying implementation.
We are trying to say to the Government: “If you are going to do this, please prove that it works and build in the safeguards.” That aligns with the position of the Bar Council and others in the light of the argument regarding jury trials. It fits with the fact that the Government are trying to make structural change, but we say that, before they do that structural change, they should look at all these things before cases are sent up to the Crown court. I will not be pressing the new clause to a vote.
Sarah Sackman
Our understanding is that the new clause seeks to improve efficiency by requiring cases to be trial-ready before they are sent to the Crown court. I will explain very briefly how a case is currently prepared for trial in the Crown court and why it is important that that preparation takes place before a judge in the Crown court, as early as possible.
All criminal cases begin in the magistrates court, and indictable offences such as murder must, by law, be sent to the Crown court at the first hearing, after the magistrates have dealt with matters such as identification and bail or remand. At the plea and trial preparation hearing in the Crown court, a professional judge examines the issues between the parties, such as evidence and disclosure issues, and sets a timeline for trial preparation, as well as the trial date. It is also at that point that a formal plea is entered in the Crown court.
There are clear statutory expectations on parties, set out in the criminal procedure rules, to be proactive in case management, and judges are experienced in managing timeliness through enforcement action. However, we recognise that there is always more that can be done, which is why we have effected the roll-out of case co-ordinators in our Crown court to drive case progression. Magistrates are not similarly trained in managing trials on indictment, and we do not think they would be an effective equivalent to a Crown court judge in determining these matters before they reach the Crown court. Requiring cases to be held back until they are considered “ready” prior to being sent to the Crown court would, we believe, risk introducing further delay for the most serious offences.
In addition, retaining such serious cases for longer in the magistrates court could have several unintended consequences, including additional pressures on custody time limits and delays in accessing special measures—measures that enable vulnerable and intimidated witnesses to give pre-recorded evidence at an early stage. Those protections are available across the Crown court but are not all available in the magistrates court, so delaying transfer to the Crown court would delay access to them for some victims and witnesses, potentially undermining the quality of their evidence. The new clause would, in practice, introduce delays into the court system and delay the progression of the most serious cases. For that reason, I urge my hon. Friend to withdraw it.
Yasmin Qureshi
I thank the Minister for her response. I have made my points—throughout the Committee’s proceedings, I have been making points about the issue of jury trials—and I will not add anything further. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 22
Remote Court Participation: Strategy
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backlog (‘the strategy’).
(2) The strategy must include—
(a) an assessment of the current use of remote proceedings;
(b) an evaluation of the impact of remote proceedings on the speed of case disposal and the overall reduction of the outstanding caseload;
(c) recommendations on how the principle of open justice can be upheld with the increased use of remote proceedings;
(d) criteria for determining the suitability of proceedings for different forms of remote participation; and
(e) provisions for the security, reliability, and resilience of digital systems used in remote proceedings.
(3) The Secretary of State must, at intervals of no more than 24 months following the laying of the strategy, lay before Parliament a report on progress made against the strategy.
(4) The progress report must consider—
(a) the extent to which the strategy has been implemented;
(b) the impact on the criminal case backlog, including any measures by which that impact has been assessed; and
(c) any further legislative or budgetary provisions to ensure the effectiveness of remote proceedings.
(5) For the purposes of this section, ‘remote proceedings’ means any proceedings in which one or more participants attend by way of live video or audio link.”—(Jess Brown-Fuller.)
This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to publish a formal strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backload in the criminal justice system.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time
Dr Mullan
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
If you will indulge me, Dr Huq, I want to congratulate the hon. Member for Rugby on the news that he has been appointed as a trade envoy. We can all recognise that he has put an enormous amount of work into that. The Opposition think that he is amazing at selling the unsellable; he does it all the time. If he has British products to sell, he will be amazing at it. He should just double check that he is going to the south of Korea, rather than the north.
As we have said before, we are debating a Bill that represents one of the most significant reconfigurations of our criminal justice system in modern history, and it is therefore unsurprising that we feel that other contingent parts of the system need to be considered in that light and adjusted accordingly. As we expand the reach and punitive power of the magistrates courts, we must ensure that our procedural safeguards in both directions keep pace with that expansion. That is the core purpose of new clause 26, which proposes to extend the unduly lenient sentence scheme to triable either-way offences, which will now be increasingly retained and sentenced at the summary level. If we can trust magistrates with the power to deprive a citizen of their liberty for up to two years, the public must have the assurance that there is a mechanism to correct sentencing decisions that fall in the other direction by being unduly lenient.
The Government have occasionally attempted to reframe their reforms as affecting only low-level or petty crimes such as shoplifting, but the reality of the triable either-way category is very different from that. As the Criminal Bar Association and JUSTICE have pointed out, some of the offences that will be almost exclusively in the jurisdiction of the magistrates courts include unlawful wounding, actual bodily harm and, as we have discussed, even some sexual assault cases. Those are offences where the impact on the victims can be very significant. For some time, I have been aware of dissatisfaction in many ways with the punitive element of our justice system, and whether it sufficiently punishes perpetrators in a way that victims and the wider public would consider to be justice. That is one of the reasons why the unduly lenient sentence scheme exists.
In the Crown court, sentencing outcomes are subject to the oversight of the Attorney General’s office through the unduly lenient sentences scheme. It is an essential safety valve that helps contribute to public confidence by allowing the public—it has always been open to the public—and, most importantly for me, victims and family members to refer unduly lenient sentences for consideration by the Court of Appeal. As I have talked about previously, I have made it use of it and so have other Members of the House, so it is important. It would be illogical to allow offences with the same potential gap in public confidence in the outcome to be without this equivalent safeguard, simply because the Government have decided to change the likely venue of trial in so many of these cases.
The need for the extension is further underscored by the evidence on the rate of appeal of sentences from the perspective of defendants. About 47% of appeals against sentences from the magistrates courts result in a change. Those figures are not marginal; they indicate that the lower courts fall into meaningful error in nearly half of the cases where they are challenged. That is from the perspective of the defendant—that is, the person found guilty—appealing the sentence. There is nothing to suggest that, if victims were given a similar opportunity to challenge sentences, no similar rate of error would be found from their perspective. That is, at the very least, of equal importance to someone who has campaigned significantly on behalf of victims in sentencing. For me, it is probably the more important of the two.
Historically, one of the primary arguments against extending the ULS scheme to magistrates courts was a practical one: there was no comprehensive record of the proceedings and sentencing decisions were often delivered without the detailed recorded remarks that characterised the Crown court. However, the Bill fundamentally changes that landscape. Schedule 2 introduces proposed reforms to introduce a mandatory requirement for audio recording and the provision of transcripts in the magistrates court. The Government are making this change to support their new appeal model, recognising that a fair system cannot function without an accurate record of what was said and decided. This move towards digital transparency is a game changer for sentencing accountability for victims as well.
As the Minister herself noted, sunshine is the best disinfectant. Once we have a reliable audio record of the sentencing remarks and the mitigations offered, the logistical barriers to reviewing a sentence for undue leniency from a victim’s perspective and that of the wider public falls away. We will, for the first time, have the infrastructure to allow the Office of the Attorney General to scrutinise sentences with the same precision applied to the Crown court. We should use this new capability to ensure that the sentencing code is applied fairly. Extended sentencing powers must be matched with extended accountability. If a magistrate is given power more akin to a judge, then they must be subject to the same oversight of their sentencing decisions. New clause 6 is not about creating more work for the Court of Appeal; it is about ensuring that, as we redraw the boundaries of our legal system, we do not leave victims of serious crime behind in a two-tier justice system where leniency cannot be corrected.
In summary, the proposals to extend the ULS scheme to either-way offences is a necessary and proportionate response to the Government’s radical restructuring of the trial process. Magistrates will soon be passing sentence on much more serious offences where the interest of victims will be of even greater concern. The record is improving to allow this to happen at the same time and it is common sense that there is consistency. I do not think there is a rational basis for excluding more serious offences from the ULS scheme simply because of the venue.
We should not wait for a high-profile case where a victim is concerned and able to seek redress in the way that they might in the Crown court. I ask the Minister to be proactive. I can understand that the Minister would perhaps argue for a more gradual approach—and perhaps not applying it to every single case might be a compromise that the Minister could bring forward. Perhaps it should be for the more serious of these less-serious, more-serious cases. However, I certainly think that we can have some kind of progress.
Sarah Sackman
I thank the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle for this new clause on the unduly lenient sentencing scheme. The ULS scheme is an exceptional power, reserved for the most serious cases, that applies only to offences passed in the Crown court. One of the things that we have seen—this is not an unwelcome development—is its expanded use. What started as an exceptional power used in a handful of exceptional cases has grown in usage as members of the public, their representatives and others who have either experienced crime, or have loved ones who have, take up the ULS scheme in greater numbers. In 2025, the Office of the Attorney General assessed around 1,500 cases.
It is important to focus on what the ULS scheme is and what it is not. It is a legal backstop that rightly sets a hard test. Someone simply not agreeing with or taking issue with the sentence handed down to a particular offender is not, of itself, a basis for challenging it. One needs to show that there has been a gross error in the application of the sentencing guidelines, and that the sentence is manifestly inadequate given the seriousness of the offence.
I understand the points that the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle is making. I would, though, draw attention to the fact that the Law Commission is currently undertaking a review of criminal appeals, which includes looking at reforms to the unduly lenient sentencing scheme. The Law Commission is due to publish its report in autumn 2026. I suggest that that is an appropriate moment to look at the operation of the scheme and at what is suggested in the new clause about its current operation as it applies in the Crown court, rather than pre-empting what that report might say and how the Government might think about the scheme’s potential extension to the magistrates court.
I cannot support the new clause at the moment, as it would in effect significantly alter the scope and operation of a power that is supposed to be exceptional. It would make the exceptional the norm. It would entail administrative burdens and goes against the grain of what was intended when the scheme was first conceived. However, I look forward to seeing the Law Commission’s work. That will be the appropriate moment to re-examine how the scheme operates and how it operates in a reformed system. I urge the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle to withdraw the new clause.
Dr Mullan
The Minister opened her remarks by saying that the scheme applies only to certain cases in the Crown court. The point that the Opposition make is that it will no longer apply to some of the cases to which it would apply now. The Minister has given figures. If the scheme is configured in the right way, and sufficiently constrained to just pick up those cases that are moving, it should not necessarily lead to any increase in the number of cases referred, so I do not accept her argument.
I would not expect the Minister to know this—she has given a single set of figures—but I would be interested in the historical trend, and the number of applications in the preceding few years. It would be helpful if she could give those figures. I also want to make clear—I have been quite clear about this with other stuff that we have done on the ULS scheme—I think it is unusual that the scheme is available to absolutely anybody. I would be open to any expansion or modification being constrained just to victims and family members. I think that I have made that clear in relation to other reforms.
That brings me to the Minister’s point about the Law Commission. That was the answer I was given repeatedly over very many months by the Victims Minister as to why the Government would not make reforms to the scheme, yet they accepted such reforms last week as a result of pressure. If the Minister insists that that is the route forward, I ask her to write to the commission. I point out the reforms that the Minister is making, which will not have been in the terms of reference for the Law Commission. At the point at which it started that work, the reforms were not even on the operating table, so it is important that the Government write to the commission and make clear that they would welcome it expanding the matters that it is considering to include this question, which would have been novel to them at the point of that undertaking.
I have learned from our experience with the other element of the ULS that, I am afraid, one should just keep pushing and pushing on such issues, so I will put the new clause to a vote. However, I have given some points on which I ask the Minister to go away and reflect to determine whether there is a way forward that can be satisfactory to both sides of the House at some point in future proceedings.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 35, which I tabled last week after a conversation with the Victims’ Commissioner, would reinstate an inspectorate body for the criminal courts in England and Wales. The Courts Act 2003 introduced His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Court Administration, which was established in 2005. The inspectorate was then closed in 2010, with the then Government arguing that audits of HMCTS, combined with the inspection regimes of the current justice inspectorates and the National Audit Office, negated the need for HMICA. However, a 2022 Justice Committee report found that that argument had not stood the test of time, and it called for the re-establishment of an inspectorate body. The report stated:
“A Courts’ Inspectorate, which is independent from Government, could make a substantial difference to the accountability and transparency of the justice system. It could use inspections and the promised improvements to the quality of the data to make recommendations that can inform policy and guidance in both criminal and civil justice. An inspectorate could also help to monitor the use of technology in the courts.”
This is a really important time to introduce the additional level of having a courts’ inspectorate, especially when the use of technology will play a much larger role in the criminal justice system, as well as the quality of the data coming out, which the Committee has debated various times. The proposal was backed by Andrew Cayley KC, then chief inspector for the Crown Prosecution Service. He favoured an even broader court inspection regime to scrutinise the operation of the disjointed parts of the system, particularly regarding the listing of cases. The re-establishment of a courts inspectorate was also recommended by Sir Brian Leveson in part 2 of his independent review of the criminal courts; it was recommendation 58. While there are four criminal justice inspectorates, Sir Brian notes:
“There is, however, no one body that is responsible for the inspection of the criminal courts in England and Wales.”
Due to limitations to the scope of this Bill, our new clause proposes a criminal courts inspectorate that would inspect and report on the administration and operation of the criminal courts. The new clause stipulates that that inspectorate must have
“particular regard to the experience of witnesses and victims”
when assessing
“the efficiency, effectiveness and accessibility of those courts”.
An inspectorate would identify inefficiencies and monitor victims’ experience in the system.
When debating an earlier group, the Minister mentioned what I think she called a public governance board that she is exploring. It would be helpful if she could outline whether she sees my new clause as different from that, or whether she is looking to create an additional level of inspection and scrutiny in the criminal courts system.
Dr Mullan
As I have alluded to several times, the Conservative party is considering more broadly how we tackle judicial accountability in all its different elements. It would be premature for us to settle on this new clause if, as the hon. Member for Chichester pointed out, it had to be necessarily narrow to fit in the Bill. On that basis we will not vote for it. We are not against it as an idea, but we need greater time to think about accountability and performance in the justice system in a more comprehensive way.
Sarah Sackman
I agree with the sentiment behind the new clause to ensure that we are monitoring efficiency, effectiveness and performance across our criminal courts system. However, as the shadow Justice Minister just said, the best mechanisms for holding the system to account in terms of performance and judicial accountability merit greater reflection. We are taking the time to consider the IRCC’s recommendations. The hon. Member for Chichester alluded to the history, and that there has previously been an inspectorate of court administration; that of course ceased operation under the coalition Government, who found it unnecessary at the time.
Jess Brown-Fuller
The Minister is absolutely right that it ceased operation, but the report that led to that decision was published under a Labour Government. Does she recognise that that report was actually tabled in 2009, and that it was the coalition Government that carried out the function of the report that the Labour Government put forward?
Sarah Sackman
I think the hon. Member thinks that I rose to make some really brilliant, devastating party political point. I did not; I was just rehearsing the history of how we got here. At the time, the view was taken by those who finally took the axe to the inspectorate that it did not represent value for money and was not working in an effective way. I make that point to say that, if we are going to have an inspectorate that does some of the things we want it to do, or whatever system we alight on, we all want to ensure that it represents value for money and drives better performance. Clearly, the Government of the day did not think that it did.
No inspectorate would have scope to scrutinise judicial decisions. It is also important to say—there have been improvements in this regard—that extensive operational data and metrics, which everyone is welcome to look at, provide an insight into the performance of our criminal courts, whether in terms of case timeliness, conviction rates or sentencing outcomes. That is exactly as it should be.
At this point, my focus is on driving reform, modernisation and the proper delivery of the investment that we are making, rather than on the inspection landscape, but I do not disagree with the sentiment that lies behind the hon. Member for Chichester’s new clause. Getting the mechanism right and taking our time to think about what form it should take, and how it could be properly resourced and as effective as we want it to be is something that we all want to take our time over, so I urge the hon. Member to withdraw her new clause.
Jess Brown-Fuller
In the tradition of the last five days in Committee, I will push the new clause to a vote because I would like to see greater scrutiny of the way that our court system functions.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Sarah Sackman
These clauses are in part 3 of the general provisions of the Bill. They provide the position on the commencement of measures in the Bill, the powers to make consequential, transitional and other provisions in connection with the coming into force of the provisions of the Bill, and the Bill’s territorial extent and short title.
Clause 21 is a technical clause that will allow the Secretary of State to make any further consequential amendments or legislative changes where required to implement the provisions in the Bill. Clause 22 creates a power to allow the Lord Chancellor to make “transitional or saving provisions” by regulation
“in connection with the coming into force of any provision of this Act.”
Clause 23 will allow the Secretary of State to, by regulation, amend the Sentencing Act 2020, so as to specify the cases or purpose for which the amendment or repeal made by the Bill has effect.
Clause 24 allows for regulations under statutory instrument to be made under the Bill once it becomes an Act. The Bill contains nine delegated powers; we have considered the scope and extent of those powers carefully and have taken the decision to include them only where it is necessary, in respect of particularly technical or detailed areas, or to allow flexibility for our legislation to remain up to date and be responsive to changes.
Clause 25 sets out the extent of the Bill. All measures apply to England and Wales only, save in respect of four areas: section 7; section 18(6) and subsection (7); sections 10(4) and 11(8); and part 3. Those four areas have UK-wide extent, except for sections 10(4) and 11(8), which have the same extent at the Armed Forces Act 2006, so that they extend to the UK, the Isle of Man and British overseas territories except Gibraltar.
Clause 26 states that the measures in the Bill will be commenced via regulations on the day that the Secretary of State appoints apart from clauses 21 to 25 and clause 27, which come into force on the day on which the Act is passed, and section 6 and section 20, which come into force at the end of a period of two months beginning with the day on which the Bill is passed. Finally, clause 27 states that the Bill
“may be cited as the Courts and Tribunals Act 2026”
once it becomes an Act of Parliament.
I thank all members of the Committee for the spirit in which they have engaged over the last five days. Some may know the famous line, “I fought the law and the law won.” Some may also know that I have been developing a Spotify soundtrack to get me through the Committee, inspired by some of the interventions. Everyone has not only made this stage constructive and engaging, but given the Government a lot of food for thought as we take the Bill through to the next stage. It will be all the stronger for the contributions that have been made, so I thank everyone for that.
Dr Mullan
I have just one remark to make. I draw the Committee’s attention to the submission we received from the circuit in Wales. Clause 25 is about the territorial extent of the Bill, and the circuit pointed out that it feels the Welsh system has been unfairly caught up in these reforms, which it does not think are applicable in terms of the need to reduce waiting times. It is important that the Committee makes note of the evidence that was submitted to us.
I join the Minister in thanking everybody for their time and deep concentration when listening to the exchanges throughout. I thank the Clerks who have assisted us over the many days, including during a late sitting. I thank the House staff in that regard, and I thank the Minister for the constructive manner in which she has engaged with feedback and proposals from this side of the House.
Sarah Sackman
I commend clauses 21 to 27 to the Committee. I did not specifically mention the House staff and all our wonderful Chairs. I add my thanks to everybody for their hard work. I also thank my team of officials—those watching at home and those in the room—who have worked very hard.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 22 to 27 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Bill, as amended, to be reported.