Legal Advice: Prorogation

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Wednesday 25th September 2019 Commons Chamber

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Attorney General if he will make a statement about his legal opinion on the advice given to Her Majesty the Queen to prorogue Parliament.

[The Attorney General (Mr Geoffrey Cox)]

As the hon. and learned Lady knows, the Supreme Court gave judgment on this issue yesterday, and that judgment sets out the definitive and final legal position on the advice given to Her Majesty on the Prorogation of Parliament. The Government’s legal view during the case was set out and argued fully before the Supreme Court. The hearing was streamed live and the Government’s written case was, and is, available on the Supreme Court website.

I took a close interest in the case—[Interruption]—and I oversaw the Government’s team of counsel. I have to say that if every time I lost a case I was called upon to resign, I would probably never have had a practice.

The Government accept the judgment and accept that they lost the case. At all times, the Government acted in good faith and in the belief that their approach was both lawful and constitutional. These are complex matters, on which senior and distinguished lawyers will disagree. The divisional court, led by the Lord Chief Justice, as well as Lord Doherty in the outer house of Scotland, agreed with the Government’s position, but we were disappointed that, in the end, the Supreme Court took a different view. Of course, we respect its judgment.

Given the Supreme Court’s judgment, in legal terms the matter is settled, and, as the hon. and learned Lady will know, I am bound by the long-standing convention that the views of the Law Officers are not disclosed outside the Government without their consent. However, I will consider over the coming days whether the public interest might require a greater disclosure of the advice given to the Government on the subject. I am unable to give an undertaking or a promise to the hon. and learned Lady at this point, but the matter is under consideration.

[Joanna Cherry]

I too took a close interest in the case. Let me start by assuring the Attorney General that I am not going to call for his resignation—yet.

Yesterday was a very special day for Scots law and the Scottish legal tradition going back to the declaration of Arbroath that the Government are not above the law. Following in the footsteps of Scotland’s Supreme Court, the UK Supreme Court asserted the rule of law and the separation of powers, and it restored democracy. It is worth emphasising that the decision was unanimous, as was that of Scotland’s Supreme Court, chaired by Scotland’s most senior judge, the Lord President of the Court of Session. Both Courts unanimously found that the decision to advise Her Majesty to prorogue Parliament was unlawful, void and of no effect. However, the question I am interested in is how it came to pass that that was ever allowed to happen.

Redacted documents lodged with the Scottish Court confirmed the suspicion that this was a plan cooked up in No. 10 by the Prime Minister and his special advisers. I want to ask about documents that mysteriously found their way into the public domain yesterday afternoon, when an unredacted version of one of those lodged with the Scottish Court found its way to Sky News and revealed that the Attorney General had said that the advice to prorogue was lawful and that anyone who said otherwise was doing so for political reasons. Knowing the Attorney General, I am sure that his advice was considerably more detailed and nuanced than the three sentences that appear in the unredacted document. Can he tell us whether a legal opinion was made available to the Prime Minister or the Cabinet?

The right hon. Member for Hastings and Rye (Amber Rudd) has said that when she was in the Cabinet, Cabinet Ministers requested to see the advice but it was not handed over. Is that correct? Can the Attorney General tell us what was given to the Prime Minister, if not to the Cabinet? Many of us believe that the Attorney General is being offered up as a fall guy for the Prime Minister’s botched plans. Does he therefore agree that releasing the advice in its entirety will help him avoid being the scapegoat for a plan dreamed up by the Prime Minister and his advisers? Will he give the undertaking, which he hinted he might give, today?

[The Attorney General]

I am extremely grateful to the hon. and learned Lady for her kindness and solicitousness for my welfare. I am particularly attracted by the tempting prospect that she dangles before me, but she will know that I am obliged by the convention to say that I am not permitted to disclose the advice that I may or may not have given to the Government. But I repeat: the matter is under consideration.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Ind)]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that if, in the future, we were unfortunate enough to have a Corbynista Labour Government—[Interruption.] That is obviously not thought to be a very likely prospect, but if that misfortune were to occur, if that Government were to decide to suspend the House for a long period because there was a parliamentary majority against their principal policy, and if that Government also decided that constitutional law was not challenged by that, and challenged the right of the courts to overrule it, the Conservative party would be likely to get very excited. Can my right hon. and learned Friend reassure me that this Supreme Court judgment has settled that matter finally, that this kind of action can never be taken by any future Government and that parliamentary sovereignty therefore remains intact?

[The Attorney General]

I certainly can say to my right hon. and learned Friend that it is important when we reflect on judgments that may be seen to go against the short-term interests of any particular Government that we remember that they stand as precedents and principles for the future. I invite all my hon. Friends to reflect on precisely the situation that my right hon. and learned Friend has set out before the House, which is that this would stand for Governments of a colour of which those on my side would not approve and for their actions too. It is important that when we comment on the decisions of judges we remember that those judges are both impartial and independent, and they are entitled to reach the view that they have reached. We are fortunate in this House to have one of the finest judiciaries, I believe, in the world, and it is important to remember that the principles they set apply to both sides, as my right hon. and learned Friend has said.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds (Torfaen) (Lab)]

I congratulate the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) on securing the urgent question and for her work on this matter. Yesterday’s decision of the Supreme Court—I give credit to all those who brought the cases—was the most damning judicial indictment of a Government in modern times: that the decision to advise Her Majesty the Queen to prorogue Parliament was unlawful.

This Government stand in shame, tendering illegal advice to our monarch and not even able to uphold that most basic and important of principles: abiding by the rule of law. What we know from yesterday’s leaked document is that the Attorney General said that his advice on the question of the law was that this was

“lawful and within the constitution”,

and that any accusations of unlawfulness were “motivated by political considerations”. If that is in any way accurate as to his full advice, he was wrong on both counts. His “close interest” simply was not enough.

I will ask the Attorney General a number of questions. Can he confirm why the Government gave no witness statement to the Court? Indeed, the Court was left in a position where it said:

“No justification for taking action with such an extreme effect has been put before the court”.

Why not? The Attorney General talks about respecting the decision of the judges, but the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster was on the radio this morning saying that he disagrees with the decision. He should tell us which parts of the judgment the Government disagree with. May I give the Attorney General a simple piece of advice for his considerations about the publication of this advice over the next few days—a simple suggestion? Just publish it and make it open to Parliament and the public.

On this Attorney General’s watch, the Government have been found in contempt of Parliament. Now they have been found in contempt of the law. Does he not accept that he does not have a shred of credibility left?

[The Attorney General]

I do not know whether in the hon. Gentleman’s practice at the Bar he felt that just because he had given advice that might not have been upheld by a court he had no credibility. That is an absurd and ridiculous proposition. Furthermore, it was advice that was agreed with by the first instance court in Scotland and by the Lord Chief Justice of England. Is the hon. Gentleman calling for his resignation as well? Is he calling for the resignation of the Master of the Rolls? Is he calling for the resignation of the President of the Queen’s bench division? Is he calling for the resignation of Lord Doherty? [Interruption.]

[Mr Speaker]

Order. If the Attorney General could resume his seat momentarily, I should be deeply obliged to him. The Attorney General has a distinctive and resonant baritone, which is well known throughout the House, but it is a challenge even for him to be fully heard if there is constant catcalling. There will be ample opportunity for colleagues to question and probe the Attorney General—of that they may be assured—but I wish myself to listen to his mellifluous tones.

[The Attorney General]

I will say one thing for the Scottish National party and the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) if I may. Whereas in the hon. Gentleman’s case, no shameless piece of cynical opportunism is left on the floor, the hon. and learned Lady is a lawyer and a Queen’s counsel, and she knows that it is the most puerile and infantile of criticisms to say about a lawyer whose advice has been upheld by courts right the way up to the Supreme Court that somehow or other he should be held culpable for that advice. The fact of the matter is that this advice was sound advice at the time. The court of last resort ultimately disagreed with it, but in doing so it made new law, as it was entirely entitled to do.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Ind)]

I am extremely mindful of the difficult task that my right hon. and learned Friend has as Attorney General in providing advice to Government, and I am sorry if his legal advice has been partially leaked, because he is entitled to give advice in private. Without that, he cannot do his work. I would also say that for him to get the law wrong in an area of difficulty is not necessarily something to be held to his discredit, but he may agree with me that one of the issues in this matter was one of not just law but propriety, and the propriety went to the unconstitutional or constitutional nature of the act of Prorogation itself, in view of the motivation of the Government for doing it. In those circumstances, I was struck by the fact that in the leaked document his opinion is referred to as believing it is constitutional, when I had understood from comments he made as far back, I think, as July, when Prorogation was first being mooted in order to achieve a no-deal Brexit on 31 October, that he considered that such an act would be unconstitutional. I wonder therefore whether this is not one issue that he ought to clarify.

[The Attorney General]

I know that my right hon. and learned Friend will understand that it is not right for the Attorney General or any Cabinet Minister to comment on leaks of matters that occurred within Cabinet, be they accurate or inaccurate—it would set a wholly undesirable precedent—but let me say this. It was being mooted some weeks ago that Parliament might be prorogued from the beginning of September or even earlier until 31 October. I say straightaway to him that if that had been the proposition, I could not have stayed in the Cabinet while it was done.

[Hilary Benn (Leeds Central) (Lab)]

Does the Attorney General believe that yesterday’s judgment of the Supreme Court represented a constitutional coup, and if he does not share that view, could he explain why he thinks it is wrong?

[The Attorney General]

I do not think that it was a constitutional coup. I know the right hon. Gentleman will know that I do not, and I do not believe that anybody does. These things can be said in the heat of rhetorical and poetical licence, but this was a judgment of the Supreme Court of a kind that was clear and definitive. It often happens that Governments lose cases. We did not agree with it, because of course we argued against it, but we accept the ruling of the Supreme Court, and we are proud that we have a country that is capable of giving independent judgments of this kind.

[Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

I welcome the Attorney General’s very clear statement of the importance that he and, I am sure, the whole Government attach to the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. Let me also say to him that many lawyers might well have given exactly the same advice as he did on the weight of precedent. Does he accept, however, that it is most important that the convention that the advice that the Attorney General gives to Government is not leaked and is not disclosed should not be lightly set aside? Would he also perhaps think it rather regrettable that such an important matter, which warrants very careful and calm and considered language and discussion, should be used for the purpose of rather unworthy ad hominem attacks and party political knockabout when so much is at stake?

[The Attorney General]

I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s question. I do of course agree with him that legal advice, and particularly the role of the Attorney General, is always difficult, because one polices and intersects a very difficult line between giving advice of an impartial, and politically impartial, character, and being a political Minister, but I hope that I have endeavoured to do that with all the conscience and candour at my disposal—and when I say to the House, as I do today, “I accept that we lost; we got it wrong on the judgment of the Supreme Court; but it was a respectable view on the law to take, and that view was taken by four of the seven judges who had opined up to the point of the Supreme Court.”

The Supreme Court has made new law. Let us be absolutely clear: from now on, the prerogative power of Her Majesty, advised by the Prime Minister, can be the subject—the justiciable subject—of the court’s control, and that was a judgment that the Supreme Court was perfectly entitled to make. What the implications are for the future of our constitutional arrangements will have to be reflected upon in the coming months and years, but it is never wise to reflect upon a court case and its implications in the immediate aftermath of that case. It will have to be done carefully and deliberately, and this House will have to decide, ultimately, whether these matters and these powers are for this House to regulate and control, or whether they are for the judiciary; but, at the moment, the Supreme Court has spoken, and that is the law.

[Yvette Cooper (Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford) (Lab)]

The Attorney General’s acceptance at that point that the Government got it wrong in this case is very welcome. Will he now advise the Prime Minister and the Government to accept and agree with the content of the Supreme Court’s judgment—not just the obligation to abide by its conclusion—and, in particular, to accept that it is wrong for this Government, or any Government, to seek to prorogue Parliament for five weeks, rather than just for a few days, without giving any reason, let alone, in the words of the Supreme Court, a good reason, to the public, to Parliament, or to the courts?

[The Attorney General]

The judgment is clear. The Government are assessing its short-term and long-term implications now, but the right hon. Lady can be quite certain that they will abide by its ruling, and by the content and implications of its judgment.

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

What limits are there on the powers of the Supreme Court to intervene in how Parliament conducts its business, and what powers are there for it to intervene over the highly political matter of when and how we leave the European Union?

[The Attorney General]

I think I understood my right hon. Friend’s question correctly. The Court in this case was giving its judgment on a particular issue—whether or not Prorogation of this length could be the subject of judicial control and, if so, what was the correct test to apply to that judicial control. It chose to delineate a test that suggests that from now on, a Prorogation of any length must be reasonably justified. The Court included in its analysis the fact that there was before the House, and before the country now, a particularly acute constitutional controversy, which made it even more important that the House should sit. I have to say, and I think there is nothing wrong in venturing to express respectful disagreement, that what that will mean in future is that the Court will be obliged to assess whether or not a particular political controversy is sufficiently serious, excites sufficiently heated controversy, as to warrant the House sitting for any particular length of time; but be that as it may, that is the test that the Court has set, and that is the test that now must be applied.

[Dr Sarah Wollaston (Totnes) (LD)]

What message does the Attorney-General have for his colleagues in government who have been smearing and undermining the Supreme Court judges? Some of this is not done in the heat of the moment: we have been hearing from one journalist that he has been sent copies of articles about Iranian judges, comparing Supreme Court judges to them. Is he going to give an unequivocal message to his colleagues that they should resign if they undermine the Supreme Court’s independence?

[The Attorney General]

The judges do not exist immune from criticism. There is nothing wrong at all in any member of the public, be it a Member of Parliament or otherwise, criticising a court judgment, but what is wrong is that motives of an improper kind should be imputed to any judge in this country. We are defenders of the entire democratic constitution and we must be sure, in everything we say—I agree with the hon. Lady if this is what she means—that we do not impute improper motives. With the judgments, we can be robustly critical; with the motives, we cannot.

[Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

Is it not important, even in the course of argument on matters as important as these, to remember why we have the constitutional conventions that we do, and that Governments are entitled, as any other organisation or individual is, to receive legal advice in private? If they do not, and if those who ask for it to be published get their way, that legal advice will become increasingly guarded, increasingly equivocal and progressively less useful to Government in ministerial decision making; and the consequence of that will be less good legal advice and less good ministerial decision making.

[The Attorney General]

My right hon. and learned Friend has great experience, as does my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) sitting next to him, of the role that I now have the great privilege to occupy. He knows how important confidentiality is to the ability of the Attorney General to give frank, unvarnished and sometimes unwelcome advice to those who are conducting the policy of the Government. So he is quite right. He discharged his functions, as did my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, with great distinction and I am proud to have been a successor of theirs.

[Ms Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman has made it quite clear that the Supreme Court judges had every right to come to the decision they came to, and in fact they came to it unanimously, in an excoriating judgment which should put the Government’s Front Bench to shame. What is his view, therefore, of a Leader of the House who persists in believing, and makes it known that he feels, that the Supreme Court has instituted a constitutional coup? Surely he cannot remain in his post if he has that view.

[The Attorney General]

There is nothing wrong with expressing robust critical views about a judgment. In so far as it imputes an inappropriate or improper motive, then it is wrong. I think it is a question of wording and of being careful with one’s language, but I took that remark, in so far as I saw it reported, simply to be a robust criticism of the judgment and nothing more—to which my right hon. Friend is entitled.

[Sir Oliver Letwin (West Dorset) (Ind)]

I have absolute respect for the integrity and competence of the Attorney General. In the light of what he has told the House this morning, can he guarantee absolutely that—save potentially a few days before a Queen’s Speech—there can be no question of his permitting Her Majesty’s Government to have a Prorogation between now and 31 October this year?

[The Attorney General]

What I can undertake to my right hon. Friend is that there will be no Prorogation that does not comply with the terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court.

[Meg Hillier (Hackney South and Shoreditch) (Lab/Co-op)]

The Attorney General has said that he is going to review whether advice should be published, but in answer to the former Attorney General, the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Jeremy Wright), he upheld and defended the privacy of that legal advice. Can he tell the House the scope of the review he is undertaking? Is it just related to the Government’s defeat in the Supreme Court or will it be drawn more widely?

[The Attorney General]

What I am considering is the public interest, and whether or not there are factors in this case connected closely with the public interest generally that should outweigh the Law Officers’ convention and lead to disclosure, but that is not only my decision. I am in the position, in a rough and approximate way, between a lawyer and his client, and I must ensure that there is proper consultation and proper reflection on what the public interest requires. That is what I have undertaken to the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West to do, and in due course I will make my mind up.

[Sir Christopher Chope (Christchurch) (Con)]

Did it come as a surprise to my right hon. and learned Friend that the Supreme Court ruled that the act of Prorogation was not a proceeding in Parliament? If that is the new law to which he has referred, would it be open to Parliament to change the law back to what we thought it was before?

[The Attorney General]

My hon. Friend asks whether this came as a surprise. Quite a lot about the judgment came as a surprise, but that particular part proceeded from a quite strict, narrow interpretation of the Bill of Rights on what was a proceeding. It was interpreted to apply the protection afforded by the Bill of Rights to the core and essential business of Parliament, and it was held by the Supreme Court that such a proceeding—namely, the execution of the Queen’s Commission in the Lords, in the presence of Mr Speaker and those who attended that proceeding—was not sufficiently close to its core and essential business to attract the protection of the Bill. It would, of course, be open to the House to decide to legislate otherwise, and no doubt that is one of the implications of this judgment that will have to be reflected upon in the coming months and years. I know that there was a widespread view that it was indeed a proceeding in Parliament, but the Supreme Court is as entitled to redefine, or at least to take a view of, its definition of the protection afforded by the Bill of Rights as it is to invent a new legal principle, as it did in this judgment.

[Anna Soubry (Broxtowe) (IGC)]

I am sure many of us would like to congratulate the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) and Gina Miller on making sure that this remains a sovereign Parliament. The hon. Lady asked a question of the Attorney General which he has not answered. She asked him whether he could confirm that the Cabinet or members of the Cabinet—he is a member of that Cabinet —had asked to see his advice but were denied that opportunity. Can he confirm that his advice was requested by fellow members of the Cabinet but was denied?

[The Attorney General]

Let me make it plain that I have never denied any member of the Cabinet any sight of any advice of mine. I am not certain who else asked for that advice and when, but I certainly have never denied it.

[Rory Stewart (Penrith and The Border) (Ind)]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that, rather than being some new-fangled innovative decision, this was a profoundly conservative decision by the Supreme Court, asserting the ancient sovereignty of Parliament, and that fundamentally the principle at stake here is that, of course, neither that Court nor any other court should determine whether Brexit takes place—that decision has been made by the people—but that it is for this House, the only directly elected representatives of the people, to determine the form in which that Brexit happens?

[The Attorney General]

Let me say to my right hon. Friend that the Supreme Court invoked the principle of parliamentary sovereignty and the convention of ministerial accountability to Parliament as a justification for making justiciable the decision to prorogue. That is what it was entitled to do, and it effectively amounts to converting a political convention into a legal rule. That, traditionally, was not thought to be possible; the Supreme Court has decided that it is, and I certainly do not in any way complain with its right to do so. I agree that Parliament has to determine the terms on which we leave, but this Parliament has declined three times to pass a withdrawal Act to which the Opposition had absolutely no objection. [Interruption.]

[Mr Speaker]

Order.

[The Attorney General]

We now have a wide number in this House setting their face against leaving at all. When this Government draw the only logical inference from that position, which is that we must leave therefore without any deal at all, they still sets their face, denying the electorate the chance of having their say in how this matter should be resolved. This Parliament is a dead Parliament. It should no longer sit. It has no moral right to sit on these green Benches, and whatever—[Interruption.]

[Mr Speaker]

Order. The House must come to order. We have a lot of business to transact: there is a further urgent question and there are no fewer, I say for the benefit of those observing, than five ministerial statements. The Attorney General must be heard, and so, I hope, will lots of other people.

[The Attorney General]

They don’t like to hear it, Mr Speaker. They don’t like the truth. Twice they have been asked to let the electorate decide whether they should continue to sit in their seats, while they block 17.4 million people’s votes. This Parliament is a disgrace. Given the opportunity—[Interruption.] Since I am asked, let me tell them the truth. They could vote no confidence at any time, but they are too cowardly to give it a go. They could agree to a motion to allow this House to dissolve, but they are to cowardly to give it a go. This Parliament should have the courage to face the electorate, but it won’t, because so many of them are really all about preventing us from leaving the European Union at all. But the time is coming, Mr Speaker, when even these turkeys won’t be able to prevent Christmas.

[David Hanson (Delyn) (Lab)]

I think the Attorney General will find that the moral right I have to sit in this House is due to an election called by the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), in which she lost 13 seats. I will represent my constituents as long as I sit in this House, and I am elected by the people to do so.

Will the Attorney General tell the House how much taxpayers’ money he has spent on closing down our voice?

[The Attorney General]

All I am suggesting to the right hon. Gentleman is that he give his constituents the chance to elect him again. [Interruption.]

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I say to the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner) that, as a result of my prodigious efforts last week, audiences in New York, Boston and Zurich are now aware that he is the noisiest Member of the House. I always enjoy listening to him, but preferably when he is on his feet rather than in his seat.

[The Attorney General]

If the right hon. Member for Delyn (David Hanson) is so confident that his electorate will consider that his moral right to sit here is so strong, why does he not submit it to them now? All we need—I offer this to the Labour Front Bench—is a one-line Bill, which we could put through with Mr Speaker’s help, to fix the date of a general election by a simple majority, and we could have the election. Why does he not tell his Front Bench to put his confidence in his constituents to the test?

[Mr Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

I wonder if my right hon. and learned Friend, having read the full summary of yesterday’s judgment by the Supreme Court, was also struck by something that seems to be missing within its methodology. When it stood up, it said, for the right of Parliament to hold any Executive to account, at no point did it reference that one of the ways of avoiding or dismissing a Prorogation would have been to pass a vote of no confidence in the Government or to vote for a general election. Does he agree that that would have been a sure-fire way for the Opposition parties to secure an end to any Prorogation and an immediate change of Government, if they so wished, but that they were frightened?

[The Attorney General]

I entirely agree with my right hon. Friend. In our constitution, when a Government can no longer govern because Parliament has withdrawn its assent, the moral and constitutional thing to do is to have the courage of your convictions, which this spineless gang on the Opposition Front Bench do not, and to table a motion of no confidence, but they have not got the guts to table that motion of no confidence because most of them do not want their own leader in power.

[Carol Monaghan (Glasgow North West) (SNP)]

None of us on the SNP Benches is worried about a general election. The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster has suggested that the unanimous verdict of the Supreme Court is the equivalent of the view of just a few academics, and the Leader of the House has described the verdict as a constitutional coup. Unfortunately these views gain traction among members of the public, so will the Attorney General take this opportunity to give a strong statement of support both for the judgment of the Supreme Court and for the importance of the independence of the judiciary?

[The Attorney General]

In answer to the hon. Lady’s last point, I completely and firmly support the independence of our judiciary. In Scotland, in England, in Wales and in Northern Ireland we have one of the finest judiciaries in the world. The fact of the matter is that the Supreme Court gave its judgment, and its judgment must be respected, but that does not prevent robust criticism of the terms of that judgment, which will no doubt be subjected to that criticism—that is onside. What is not onside is the imputation of improper or inappropriate motives.

[Sir Desmond Swayne (New Forest West) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr Duncan Smith) is right: we had notice of the intention to prorogue. With your assistance, Mr Speaker, we could have entertained motions against it, or even a motion of no confidence. So it was a coup, wasn’t it?

[The Attorney General]

I know that my right hon. Friend knows that, when it comes to the judges—though not to this shower on the Opposition Benches—I want to be, if I can, respectful and careful. It is important that we understand that these judges are protectors of all our freedoms and all our rights—

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I do not normally offer stylistic advice to the Attorney General, but his tendency to perambulate while orating is disagreeable to the House. He should face the House with confidence and assurance, and an acknowledgement that the House wishes to hear his every utterance.

[The Attorney General]

I wonder if you, Mr Speaker, in a well-earned retirement, would like to give lessons to Front Benchers. It could be the beginnings of a new and very glorious—or even more glorious—career.

I have now lost my thread entirely—

[Hon. Members]

Sit down!

[The Attorney General]

The Opposition want me to sit down, so I will gratify them and do so.

[Mr Barry Sheerman (Huddersfield) (Lab/Co-op)]

I came into the Chamber today thinking I felt sorry for the Attorney General—I did!—but every word he has uttered today shows no shame, no shame at all. The fact is that this Government cynically manipulated the Prorogation to shut down this House, so that it could not work as a democratic assembly. He knows that that is the truth, and to come here with his barrister’s bluster to obfuscate the truth, and for a man like him, a party like his, and a leader like this Prime Minister to talk about morals and morality is a disgrace.

[The Attorney General]

I am not sure I discerned a question in that marshmallow of rhetoric, but in so far as there was a question, there is an answer. If the hon. Gentleman thinks the Government should no longer be governing, he should tell his leader to bring a motion of no confidence this afternoon and to agree to a simple one-line statute that fixes the election by a simple majority. We would be delighted to meet the right hon. Gentleman wherever he chooses in front of the electorate, who will judge whether the machinations he supports and the devices to which he resorts to make sure that this dead Parliament continues are right or wrong.

[Antoinette Sandbach (Eddisbury) (Ind)]

The Attorney General speaks of moral and constitutional courage. Can he explain to the House why the Government did not have the moral and constitutional courage to file in the Supreme Court a witness statement attesting to the truth of the position that was outlined to the Supreme Court judges?

[The Attorney General]

I cannot comment on matters that are plainly covered not only by the convention but by legal professional privilege, but I say to my hon. Friend that the Government’s position was set out clearly in argument—if she followed it all, she will know it went on for a very long time—and the Supreme Court decided against it. We accept that position.

[Nick Boles (Grantham and Stamford) (Ind)]

Having lost in court, the Attorney General is keen to try his hand at another test—an election. Perhaps I can help him. In paragraph 41 of the unanimous judgment, the Supreme Court refers to

“Two fundamental principles of our constitutional law”,

saying:

“The first is the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty: that laws enacted by the Crown in Parliament are the supreme form of law in our legal system, with which everyone, including the Government, must comply.”

Can the Attorney General confirm that he and the Government will comply with the law known as the Benn Act, recently passed by this Parliament and which has received Royal Assent?

[The Attorney General]

Yes.

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

Is it not the case that, contrary to the shouted opinions from the Opposition Front Bench, the Supreme Court has invented a new constitutional rule, just as Lord Sumption told us on the “Today” programme this morning? Lord Sumption also said that this was a revolution—he described the decision as revolutionary. Is it not the case that—[Interruption.] The hon. Member shouts “shocking”, but it was Lord Sumption who said it. Is it not the case that, prior to this revolutionary decision by the Supreme Court, it is quite likely—indeed probable—that my right hon. and learned Friend’s advice was correct, but the Supreme Court changed the law?

[The Attorney General]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the question. I cannot disclose what advice I gave. The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West, who first asked this urgent question, had that answer, and I am afraid I am going to have to keep giving it today. However, what I would say is that the Supreme Court did indeed, as it overtly and explicitly said, develop the law. It took what was a political convention—hitherto, in all the constitutional textbooks, described as unenforceable by a court—and decided that it would set a test and convert it into a legal principle and legal test. It was perfectly entitled to do that, just as this House will, in the coming months and years, have to reflect on the implications and on whether it is content to leave that position untouched. However, for the moment, that is the law, and the law must be obeyed.

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

Can the Attorney General be very clear? Were the director of legislative affairs, Nikki da Costa, and the Cabinet Secretary, or indeed any other advisers, including in the office of the Leader of the House, asked to make sworn statements in these cases? Did they refuse to do so, and, if so, why?

[The Attorney General]

I simply cannot comment on matters that pertain to the internal preparation of cases, which are covered by legal professional privilege. It is simply not reasonable to ask people to do so, particularly when it relates to individuals. The hon. Gentleman should make no assumptions one way or the other from what I am saying. The fact is that cases are covered by privilege, and that must be respected.

[Vicky Ford (Chelmsford) (Con)]

There are many extremely distinguished and experienced lawyers in this House, but some of us are not lawyers, and many of our constituents are not lawyers, so could my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General explain the situation very clearly? Is this a new law? Does it set a new precedent? If it is a new law and a new precedent, will the Government comply with the new law and the new precedent?

[The Attorney General]

It is a new principle of law, which has been found to exist by the Supreme Court, and where, hitherto, it has not been thought that a court could go. However, the Court is entitled to develop the common law, and that it has done. This does set a precedent; it is binding, unless this House, in due course, considers that it should take action to alter that position.

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

While yesterday’s Supreme Court decision upholding parliamentary sovereignty was extremely welcome, it should never have come to this. Our centuries-old unwritten constitution, based on gentlemen’s agreements, is not fit for purpose when dangerous populists are in office. Will the Attorney General therefore consider urgent proposals for a written constitution, developed with real citizens’ engagement, since our democracy belongs to all of us, not just those who think they are above the law?

[The Attorney General]

I have a degree of sympathy with what the hon. Lady says. I think that, as we depart the European Union, there is ground for thinking again about our constitutional arrangements and how they should be ordered. I think that, in doing so, a widespread public consultation of the kind that she is describing would be essential, because any new constitutional arrangements would have to be sanctioned by the widest possible public support and assent, so I do have some sympathy. No doubt over the coming months and years, this will be a subject of important concern to the House.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Given that three of the most distinguished lawyers in the country, including the Master of the Rolls and the Lord Chief Justice, found in the lower court that the Government’s case was entirely correct, can the Attorney General enlighten puzzled non-lawyers like me as to why not even one out of 11 Supreme Court judges could be found to agree with them?

[The Attorney General]

My right hon. Friend is asking me to look into a crystal ball. Far be it from me to fathom the inscrutable minds of their lordships in the Supreme Court as to why they chose not to dissent if they were minded to dissent, or to agree if they were minded not to agree.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

I for one am delighted that we are sitting, but the Attorney General is absolutely right about one thing: the result of yesterday’s ruling is that all future Prorogations will be justiciable by the courts. The only answer to that, frankly, is legislation by this House. My gentle suggestion is that it might be a good idea if, in the future, Prorogation were only allowed to proceed if there had been a vote in this House in favour of it.

[The Attorney General]

Well, if I may say to the hon. Gentleman, that is as I would expect from him, particularly in his new guise as an aspirant to even higher office—it is constructive, helpful, impartial and a model to us all.

--- Later in debate ---

[Charlie Elphicke (Dover) (Ind)]

In applying this new legal principle that has been created or invented by the Supreme Court, how many Prorogations in the last century would have passed muster to the test that has been created? How can this longest Session of this House since the civil war now be lawfully brought to an end, and a Queen’s Speech lawfully brought forward? Finally, is Royal Assent a proceeding in Parliament?

[The Attorney General]

As to my hon. Friend’s first question, I say that, plainly, if one re-examines the historical records, there is no doubt that there would have been some—possibly quite a few— Prorogations that, under this test, might have had difficulty in passing. For example, Ramsay MacDonald prorogued this Parliament in 1930 for some months, during the course of a minority Government, at a time when the great Wall Street Crash had happened in 1929 and when I have no doubt that some would have said that the House should sit to determine the onset of the great depression and debate those important matters, but the courts looked on—they looked on impassively—as that Labour Government decided to prorogue. It happened again in 1948 and right up into the 1990s when it was said that a Parliament had been prorogued in order to avoid an embarrassing Select Committee inquiry. From now on, when a Prime Minister has to prorogue Parliament, he will have to look at all the Select Committees, see what inquiries they are doing and which Chairmen of which Select Committees might say in a mortally wounded and offended manner, “Why, to prorogue and not to allow my Select Committee to report is a matter of public importance, for which I will go to court and stop the Prorogation.” I do think that this test set by the Supreme Court invites quite a number of significant questions.

[Luciana Berger (Liverpool, Wavertree) (LD)]

The Attorney General has told us that he does not agree with the judgment and that he argued against it. If that is the case and the Attorney General was so convinced that Prorogation was lawful, why did not he and the Government provide a witness statement to the Supreme Court to make that case?

[The Attorney General]

There are all kinds of reasons why, in judicial reviews, witness statements are not given in cases of this kind. I cannot discuss the internal counsels of the preparations of a legal case because, as I am sure the hon. Lady understands, they are covered by the wholly appropriate legal professional privilege.

[John Stevenson (Carlisle) (Con)]

Given that Parliament is at the apex of our constitutional system, does the Attorney General believe that the appointment of Supreme Court judges should receive the formal approval of Parliament?

[The Attorney General]

I understand my hon. Friend’s question and say to him, quite frankly, that I think it is a matter which this House may need to reflect upon in the coming months and years, depending on the status of our constitutional arrangements, as indicated by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas). I do think that we are going to have to look again at our constitutional arrangements, and we should see if we can find some common ground. We need to have a proper consideration of these matters. As we leave the European Union, a great gap opens up, whereby we take away from legal integration all this European Union law, and we need to think about the implications. I therefore agree that there may very well need to be parliamentary scrutiny of judicial appointments in some manner. I have to say that I am not enthusiastic about that, but I understand why my hon. Friend asks.

[Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)]

The Attorney General’s defence today with regard to the Supreme Court judgment appears to be that because the Government won the semi-final, they should have been awarded the trophy. That is not how it works and he should acknowledge that, in the final, the Government lost 11-0. With regard to his call, which repeats the call from the Prime Minister, for the public to break the Brexit deadlock by casting their votes, if he is so keen for a public vote on Brexit, why does he not offer the public the chance to vote on the final Government Brexit deal, however that turns out?

[The Attorney General]

I will tell the right hon. Gentleman why: first, because it would be an insult to the millions of people who voted in the first referendum to have a second one before we had implemented the first. [Interruption.] That is what I think. I know that people disagree, but it is a legitimate point of view. Secondly, the question now of this House is whether the Government are going to be permitted to govern. If the Opposition do not wish to allow the Government to govern, the morally correct thing to do is to seek to have an election. What I object to here is that the Labour party and others have repeatedly sought to block that and to prevent the electorate from having its say, when this Parliament is as dead as dead can be.

[Mr Nigel Evans (Ribble Valley) (Con)]

Following on from that, would the Attorney General accept that the vast majority of people I talk to have great faith in this Government, but have no faith in this remain Parliament? Although there are important legal implications from yesterday’s ruling, the practical implication is that this remain Parliament, which has talked about Brexit for over three and a half years, will now get several more weeks to do what it possibly can to talk about Brexit, but to make absolutely certain that 17.4 million people never get what they voted for.

[The Attorney General]

I wholly understand the strength of feeling of my hon. Friend, and I agree with almost all of it.

[Catherine McKinnell (Newcastle upon Tyne North) (Lab)]

The Attorney General accepts that his legal advice was wrong—that the Government got this wrong. Whether in law or not, it was patently obvious to everybody watching that it was wrong to prorogue Parliament in that way. The United Kingdom Head of State was asked by the Prime Minister to agree to an illegal course of action based on incorrect advice. What does the Attorney General believe should be the consequences for those responsible?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Attorney General]

The same consequences that flow from any good-faith implementation of advice that, at the time, is perfectly respectable and tenable advice, as this was. The fact of the matter is that the Government’s position was that the Prorogation was lawful and it was constitutional. That was the advice that the Government had, it was the advice that they gave to those who asked them, and the Supreme Court has decided we are wrong. We accept that, as I have said. It was a tenable, reasonable and respectable point of view.

[Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

My constituents voted to leave the European Union, and many of them have written to me since yesterday’s judgment concerned about whether that will be delivered. Can my right hon. Friend the Attorney General confirm that there is nothing in this judgment that will prevent us from leaving the EU on 31 October, as they voted for in the referendum?

[The Attorney General]

There is nothing in this judgment that applies directly to the question of our departure from the European Union. As the justices made clear, this was a decision solely on the lawfulness of the Prorogation.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (PC)]

Further to the question by my hon. Friend the Member for Grantham and Stamford (Nick Boles), have the Government been seeking a route not to comply with the Benn Act, as several Ministers have made clear, and has the Attorney General been asked to offer legal advice to that effect?

[The Attorney General]

I cannot answer the last question, as the hon. Gentleman well knows, as Attorneys General have long maintained the convention that we cannot disclose either the fact or content of any advice. But I will deal with the first point. There is no question of this Government not obeying the law. There is a question as to precisely what obligations the law might require of the Government, but once those obligations are ascertained with clarity—and I am not saying that they are not clear; I am just saying that it is a legitimate consideration the Government must go through—the Government will obey them.

[David Tredinnick (Bosworth) (Con)]

Set alongside the decision of the Supreme Court, what force in law does the decision of the British people to leave the European Union have?

[The Attorney General]

The law in relation to the referendum is that it was not binding upon this Parliament. It was binding in every moral sense upon those who promised the British people that it would be implemented, but it was not binding as a matter of law.

[Deidre Brock (Edinburgh North and Leith) (SNP)]

The Attorney General excuses recent comments by Members of this House as simply the expression of robust critical views, but would he agree that in fact those who have been arguing recently that Brexit would give back control to the UK courts and the UK Parliament have now completely U-turned and are actively working to undermine those institutions?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Attorney General]

No, I think that is a ridiculous assertion, in fact. The reality is that what we who believe in leaving the European Union have fought so long for is to return to the United Kingdom the power to chart its own course ungoverned by unelected or other institutions in the European Union. How we arrange our constitutional arrangements is a matter for us, and it should be a matter for us. It should be a matter for the democratic assent of all the people of the United Kingdom. So I do not believe for a moment that this Government or those on this side of the House are trying in any way to avoid that. What we are trying to do is make sure that those powers come back to the British people, where they should reside.

[Andrew Bridgen (North West Leicestershire) (Con)]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that, contrary to the repeated claims of the Prime Minister’s many political opponents that the moment he announced Prorogation, he broke the law, the fact is he did not, because as we all know now, the Supreme Court judgment yesterday set new law?

[The Attorney General]

The Supreme Court judgment said that the Government got the law wrong. We have to accept that, but it is perfectly true that in doing so, it effectively invented or created a new legal principle which hitherto had been a political convention and defined that principle in a new legal test. It is crystal-ball gazing to know whether any court would decide to do that. It did, though the Court below, led by the Lord Chief Justice, concluded that it should not.

[Ian Murray (Edinburgh South) (Lab)]

During the Attorney General’s theatrical rant earlier, he inadvertently forgot to answer the question from my right hon. Friend the Member for Delyn (David Hanson). How much has this Prorogation and all the legal advice and legal consequences cost the UK taxpayer?

[The Attorney General]

I do not know—that is the answer to the question—but if the hon. Gentleman wants to know, he can put down a written question, or I am happy to write to him if he would like. I am very happy to disclose that in due course, once the costs are known. But I say to him that all those costs could have been saved if he had just voted for an election. We could have avoided these cascades of cash falling upon so many lawyers in so many jurisdictions by the simple act of him having the moral guts and not being chicken.

[Dame Cheryl Gillan (Chesham and Amersham) (Con)]

On the subject of taxation, could my right hon. and learned Friend advise me? These legal actions, I believe, have been part-funded by crowdfunding. Will that funding be taxable, and will the tax payable on that crowdfunding have to be paid by the individuals bringing the cases?

[The Attorney General]

I do not believe that it is taxable, but if my right hon. Friend will permit me, I would need to look into it, and if she wishes, I will certainly write to her on the subject.

[Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)]

Earlier this morning, the Attorney General set out again his long-held views about why publishing his advice is not a good idea, so has he requested a leak inquiry to discover who gave documents to Sky News last night? If he has not, is that because he is worried it will unmask machinations in No. 10?

[The Attorney General]

They are not just my long-standing views, as I know the hon. Lady will accept; they are the long-standing views of successive Attorneys General of all Governments over many, many years. As to her second question, I am not aware whether there is a leak inquiry, but these days, I am so used to the porousness of Government that, frankly, I use Cabinet to advertise whenever there is some particular cause that I want to espouse. The reality is that this Government and this Parliament are in a position where we need to go to the electorate, and I urge her to support that as soon as possible, because the only morally right thing to do is subject these debates to the public again.

[Amber Rudd (Hastings and Rye) (Ind)]

I must raise my concerns about the Attorney General constantly saying that this Parliament is dead. This Parliament was elected in 2017. It reflects the divisions in this country, the divisions in our communities and the divisions in our families. The failure is that we have not yet reached a compromise. Many of us long to leave the European Union, as we set out in the referendum, but are frustrated by the fact that we have not been able to find a consensus among the different factions. May I urge the Attorney General to work with colleagues to try to find that compromise and to cease this language of pitting Parliament against the people?

[The Attorney General]

I assure my right hon. Friend that if I had not been driven to this language, I would never have used it. The fact is—[Interruption.] The fact of the matter is that the Opposition will not let the Government govern. They will not do what the Opposition should do in these circumstances, and that is to vote for an election. By any standards, the Government are in a minority. The Order Paper is being taken over from the Government again and again, with no doubt further attempts to come. That is the very definition of a Parliament that will not fulfil its responsibilities, either to let the Queen’s Government be conducted or to opt for a general election. That is why I call this a dead Parliament and I do so advisedly. My right hon. Friend knows that nobody worked harder than I did for compromise. Nobody worked harder than I did to put through the withdrawal agreement that was put before this House. I—and she—worked hard to put this through. I have now reached a sad and heavy conclusion that this Parliament is no longer worth the candle and it should be gone, for any good it is doing.

[Dr Phillip Lee (Bracknell) (LD)]

May I say to the right hon. and learned Gentleman that his approach today should probably have been to show more humility and less levity, because there is widespread sympathy for the difficulty of his position offering legal advice in such challenging circumstances? To build on previous questions, in view of his advice on Prorogation having been found to be unlawful, will he tell the House whether he has been asked by the Prime Minister to proffer advice on whether it would be lawful to ignore the instruction of the Benn Act? The matter of whether or not he has offered advice is not subject to privilege.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Attorney General]

Words fail me; they really do. The hon. Gentleman rises in the full force of his morality, having been elected for one party and sitting on the Benches opposite for another—and with the hon. Member for Totnes (Dr Wollaston), who did the chicken run, or the rat run, before him having said already that she thinks there should be a by-election when Members change their parties—and has the nerve to suggest that somehow I should have affected greater humility. I think he should be on his knees to his own constituents, begging their forgiveness for his betrayal. The fact of the matter is that the question is subject to the Law Officers’ convention as he knows, and I cannot answer him. I suggest that he asks me when he is back here, re-elected by his constituents, as no doubt he has confidence that he will be, and maybe I’ll give him an answer outside.

[Jeremy Lefroy (Stafford) (Con)]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that if Her Majesty’s Government choose to push their prerogative powers to the limit, as they are entitled, if perhaps not well advised, to do, they should both expect the challenge that they have had and the conclusion that has arisen from it? [Interruption.]

[The Attorney General]

I am very sorry but I did not hear a word of that.

[Mr Speaker]

There was a very unattractive rant fest taking place between hon. Members on opposite sides of the House, gesticulating aggressively at each other. It is a very undesirable state of affairs. Let us have a bit of calm and have the question again and the answer, but we want to proceed very quickly.

[Jeremy Lefroy]

You are most generous to hear me again, Mr Speaker. Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that if Her Majesty’s Government wish to push their prerogative powers to the very limit, as they are entitled, if perhaps not always well advised, to do, the kind of consequences we have seen in the past few days are inevitable?

[The Attorney General]

In any situation where constitutional powers are pushed to their limits, strain is bound to be caused. I completely accept that we are in an unprecedented time, when constitutional limits are being pressed on all sides, in this House, by seizing control of Order Papers, by rejecting the opportunity for a general election, and by not letting the Government govern. These are factors that place huge strain upon our constitutional arrangements, and I agree with my hon. Friend that it would be good if we resumed calmer waters, which we no doubt will as I have every faith and confidence in the good sense of this country and, in the end, the good sense of this House to be able to come to a solution. That solution must be, I believe, a general election.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Clive Efford (Eltham) (Lab)]

The Attorney General has tried to take the high moral ground, but I have to wonder what morals were applied by the Government that led to yesterday’s Supreme Court decision. When did he first become aware that the advice given to Her Majesty the Queen, the Speaker of the House and the House itself about the reasons for Prorogation was not true?

[The Attorney General]

In advocacy terms, that is what we used to call a “When did you stop beating your wife?” question. I do not accept the premise of the question. There is no question that the Supreme Court found in any way that any advice that had been given was consciously or knowingly misleading.

[Mr John Whittingdale (Maldon) (Con)]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that there is a judgment that is superior to that of any court’s? That is the judgment of the British people. It has once been given on the question of whether this country should remain a member of the European Union, but it has twice been prevented from being expressed in a vote of this House. Is it not now time that we allow them to give their judgment on this Parliament?

[The Attorney General]

I could not agree more with my right hon. Friend. The time has come. The fact is that this Parliament has no further point. There is no possibility of our governing while this Parliament continues to block everything we do.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Lady Hermon (North Down) (Ind)]

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I have listened very carefully to the Attorney-General—I have not agreed with a fraction of what he has said—but I would like him to answer a specific question. Did it never cross his mind that if the Prime Minister made a ridiculous decision to prorogue Parliament for five weeks in the run-up to Brexit, which is the greatest constitutional change to the UK for years, the courts would rule that to be an unlawful Prorogation of Parliament?

[The Attorney General]

If I were to answer that question—tempting though it is, particularly from the hon. Lady, who is also a friend—I would be transgressing the Law Officers’ convention, because I would be telling her what advice I had or had not given. But if she is asking, “Did it occur to me?”, my answer is that of course it did. Any barrister who enters into litigation without it occurring to him that he might lose is a bit of a nit, isn’t he? Of course it occurred to me that we might lose; it would be ridiculous for it not to occur to me.

[Rehman Chishti (Gillingham and Rainham) (Con)]

Does the Attorney General agree with the view of the overwhelming majority of my constituents that the continued delay in delivering on the result of the referendum by 31 October is leading to a lack of public confidence in our democratic process, and that the only way to resolve that now is to have an election and let the public decide?

[The Attorney General]

I completely agree with my hon. Friend, who has put his finger right on it. This continuing artificial prolongation of this dead Parliament is undermining people’s confidence—[Interruption.] I know why Opposition Members are not doing it; they know they will not survive, but they have to have the courage of their convictions, get on it, and put it to the country.

[Rachael Maskell (York Central) (Lab/Co-op)]

The Attorney General is trying to exonerate his and the Government’s determinations by saying, at the Dispatch Box, that the Supreme Court created new law. Is it not the role of the Supreme Court to interpret existing law, and is that not the action it took?

[The Attorney General]

That is, of course, one function of a court’s role, but a court is perfectly entitled to develop the common law. I do not think there can be any doubt that that is what happened in this case.

[Martin Whitfield (East Lothian) (Lab)]

It is often said that a lawyer who acts for himself has a fool for a client. It is also worrying if the lawyer is not aware of the costs of continuing with the advice. When the Attorney General makes a statement about the costs to the taxpayer, could he include the costs to the House authorities of having to reconvene on 24 hours’ notice and the inconvenience to staff?

[The Attorney General]

May I place on the record, Mr Speaker, my endorsement entirely for your expression of gratitude to the staff of the House? They do an extraordinarily great job. We are deeply grateful to them for that and for the speed with which they have been able to facilitate the resumption of Parliament.

[Angela Smith (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (LD)]

The question remains unanswered of who had sight of the legal advice before the decision was taken, so I ask the Attorney General once again: did the Cabinet and the Prime Minister’s chief adviser, Dominic Cummings, have sight of the legal advice?

[The Attorney General]

The hon. Lady will know that I cannot disclose whether I gave advice or the content of any such advice. It is covered by the Law Officers convention. The question, “Was the advice shown?” presumes that there was advice. It simply contradicts the Law Officers convention. I wish I could answer her question, but I cannot.

[Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)]

I presume that following yesterday’s Supreme Court judgment the Prime Minister got in touch with Buckingham Palace and offered his apology to Her Majesty the Queen for giving unlawful advice. Did the Attorney General speak to the Prime Minister before that conversation took place?

[The Attorney General]

I did not, no.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that any reasonable Attorney General, acting with due care, would query, challenge and perhaps even laugh at any suggestion that five weeks of Prorogation was necessary in order to prepare for a Queen’s Speech?

[The Attorney General]

I think I understood the hon. Gentleman’s question, but I do not agree with its premise.

[Geraint Davies (Swansea West) (Lab/Co-op)]

The Attorney General has accepted the Supreme Court’s judgment that the Government acted illegally in closing down democracy. Does he accept that his fundamental duty is to uphold the rule of law and democracy, not to fan the flames of hatred, pitting the people against the courts and democracy on the road to fascism, as he appears to be doing today by making fun of the Supreme Court and saying that the justices are making things up as they go along? We make the law, they interpret the law, and he and all of us should obey the law.

[The Attorney General]

The hon. Gentleman really needs to listen more closely to what I say. The Supreme Court was perfectly entitled to reach the view it did. It did so by reasoned decision making and it was entirely within the scope of its jurisdiction, but there is no question but that in doing so it developed the common law. That is all I have said, and that is what courts often do.

[Mr Sam Gyimah (East Surrey) (LD)]

It is not fear of the electorate that drives some of us in this House, but our determination to do the right thing by our constituents and the country against a Government who are determined to deliver Brexit at any price. Government Ministers have said today that somehow the judgment handed down by the Supreme Court could be disputed by other parties, but they never say which aspects of it they disagree with and on what basis. When Ministers cast doubt on this judgment, what exactly do they disagree with and why are they saying it in public?

[The Attorney General]

The hon. Gentleman asks why Ministers might contest parts of the judgment. There is nothing wrong with the Government, the hon. Gentleman or any member of the public seeking to argue that parts of the judgment were either mistaken or poorly reasoned. I would not necessarily agree with that, but there is no harm in people doing it, because that is part of democratic debate. What is wrong, and what I deplore and urge all Members of this House not to do, is to impugn the motives of those who make the decisions. These are fine judges who reach their decisions impartially on what they think is the best view of the law. I have no doubt that that is what the Supreme Court did in this case.

I am not going to go into all the areas of the judgment that are fragile or vulnerable to alternative arguments. The arguments of the Government were set out in writing. The judgment of the Lord Chief Justice in the divisional court was brilliantly reasoned and was, in the Government’s view, entirely right, but the Supreme Court chose to disagree with it.

[Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)]

Despite the Prime Minister’s repeated denials, it is obvious from the angry reaction of Brexiteers over the past 24 hours that this attempt at Prorogation was about Brexit and nothing else. Is not the real reason why nobody would testify under oath as to what the Government’s reasons were that nobody, even in Government, believed that the Prime Minister’s reasons were the truth?

[The Attorney General]

If the Prime Minister had wished to prevent this House from debating Brexit, he would have prorogued it from 5 September to 14 October. Is the hon. Gentleman seriously suggesting that the Government were blind to the possibility that in the first few days of resumption after 4 September it was not possible that exactly what happened would happen? If we had wished to close down all debate and prevent the option of legislation, which was ultimately taken by this House with the consent of Mr Speaker, we could have prorogued it from the 5th, but we did not. Furthermore, from 14 October there would have been two and a half more weeks for this House to act. With respect, all this talk about a coup is just nonsense—inflamed political tripe, invented and inflated so that this gang can justify clinging to the Opposition green Benches for another few undeserved weeks. That is what it is all about.

[Ian C. Lucas (Wrexham) (Lab)]

The authors of this failed political trick—the Prime Minister and Dominic Cummings—have form in treating Parliament with contempt. What is truly contemptible and cowardly is Dominic Cummings, who refuses to give evidence to a Select Committee and has been found in contempt of Parliament, hiding behind the skirts of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is supporting an individual who works for the Government but who will not give evidence to a Select Committee. Does the Attorney General think that that is a respectable position?

[The Attorney General]

I am not sure that that is a question for the Attorney General. I am sure the hon. Gentleman can find somebody who is able to deal with it better than I could, but what I will say is that attacking people who cannot answer for themselves in this House is not appropriate and I would not choose to do it myself.

[Alan Brown (Kilmarnock and Loudoun) (SNP)]

Will the Attorney General explain why there was a lack of signed witness statements? Is it the case, as we all know, that civil servants could not defend the indefensible and thought that the Government were at it all along?

[The Attorney General]

As I have said in the past, I cannot answer questions about witness statements or the internal preparations of the Government’s case for this Supreme Court.

[Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)]

The Attorney General says that this Parliament does not want to do any work and does not wish to legislate. He is wrong. We are desperate to legislate on many very important issues, none more so than the Domestic Abuse Bill, on which Members across this place and the other place have worked together for two years. It could easily come before this place and we could get it into law and improve the lives of tens of thousands of people across the country. Will the Attorney General put aside his confected outrage and ask the Leader of the House to schedule for tomorrow and next week the important stages of this crucial Bill?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Attorney General]

I certainly will talk to the Chief Whip about the matter. If there is consent from all parties, we might as well do something while we are waiting for the Opposition to make up their minds to go for an election.

[Patricia Gibson (North Ayrshire and Arran) (SNP)]

The Queen has been misled, the law has been broken and Scotland’s Supreme Court has ruled that the Prime Minister has been less than honest, yet there is not a hint of humility from the Government Benches. What sanctions does the Attorney General think that the Prime Minister’s playing fast and loose with our democratic institutions merit? Is the Attorney General seriously before us today to tell us that the Prime Minister’s position is tenable? Is it not the case that the decent thing for the Prime Minister to do is go?

[The Attorney General]

May I then encourage the hon. Lady to ensure that we vote for the election motion that will come before the House shortly? That way she can try to ensure that what she hopes for will take place. However, I do not agree. The Supreme Court found no impropriety on the part of the Government, the Prime Minister or anybody else.

[Ian Paisley (North Antrim) (DUP)]

Does the Attorney General believe that the judgment has left 17.5 million people feeling more disfranchised than ever? How should the Government and the House repair that damage?

[The Attorney General]

I completely agree. This House’s actions are bringing it into discredit. It is abandoning almost all reasonable precedent. The time has come for a general election, and to resist it is immoral, unparliamentary and undemocratic, but that is the decision that the Opposition have taken. Let us wait and see what the electorate make of it, but I hope they will understand that the Government are trying to fulfil the mandate of those 17.4 million people. We will never cease until we succeed.

[Drew Hendry (Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey) (SNP)]

It is reassuring to see that we are indeed carrying on where we left off. As a senior lawyer, does the Attorney General agree that any attempt to describe the considered, unanimous and unambiguous decision of the Supreme Court as a constitutional coup is nothing more than constitutional bull?

[The Attorney General]

I am not sure I could have put that language in a parliamentary way. The Supreme Court’s decision was legitimate, perfectly reasonable and proper. We should be proud of our judiciary and proud of its independence in all jurisdictions—I apply that to the inner house, the outer house, the divisional court. Lawyers will disagree on some of those complex and fundamental principles, and that is what has happened here.

[Emma Hardy (Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle) (Lab)]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Speaker]

It is open to the Attorney General to respond if he wishes, although he is not obliged to do so.

[The Attorney General]

If I have given offence, I certainly did not mean to. It is an old saying at the Bar, which simply relates to a cross-examination technique of asking a question that presumes the premise. It is the way in which we were taught. If I have given offence, I apologise.

[Mr Speaker]

I thank the Attorney General for responding. It is a matter of extreme sensitivity and it is incredibly important that we are sensitive to the wider implications and interpretation of what we say. Society’s mores change and sometimes one can find that things that one has freely said in the past without causing offence can no longer be said without causing offence, but each Member must make his or her own judgment. The Attorney General made his and he has said what he has said. I thank him for that.

United Kingdom’s Withdrawal from the European Union

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Friday 29th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney General (Mr Geoffrey Cox)]

I beg to move,

That this House notes the European Council Decision of 22 March 2019 taken in agreement with the United Kingdom extending the period under Article 50(3) of the Treaty on European Union, which provides for an extension to the Article 50 period to 22 May 2019 only if the House of Commons approves the Withdrawal Agreement by 29 March 2019; notes that if the House does not do so by that date the Article 50 period will only as a matter of law be extended to 12 April 2019 and that any extension beyond 22 May 2019 would require the UK to bring forward the necessary Day of Poll Order to hold elections to the European Parliament; notes that Article 184 of the Withdrawal Agreement refers to the Political Declaration between the UK and EU agreed on 25 November 2018, but that the EU has stated it remains open to negotiating changes to the Political Declaration; notes that the House is currently undertaking deliberations to identify whether there is a design for the future relationship that commands its support; notes that even should changes be sought to the Political Declaration, leaving the European Union with a deal still requires the Withdrawal Agreement; declares that it wishes to leave the EU with an agreement as soon as possible and does not wish to have a longer extension; therefore approves the Withdrawal Agreement, the Joint Instrument and the Unilateral Declaration laid before the House on 11 March 2019 so that the UK can leave the EU on 22 May 2019; notes that this approval does not by itself meet the requirements of section 13(1)(b) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018; and resolves that it is content to proceed to the next steps of this process, including fulfilling section 13 of this Act.

May I begin by thanking all Members for coming to the House on a Friday, and by apologising for the fact that we have had to convene today? The reasons we are convening today are partly to be found in the fact that today is 29 March, and as this House voted some months and years ago, it was today that should have been the day on which we left the European Union. However, we are—

[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Ind)]

Where we are.

[The Attorney General]

Precisely: we are where we are. I intend not to review how and why we have arrived at this point, but to explain the motion that the Government have placed before the House.

On 21 March, the Council agreed a decision that if the withdrawal agreement is approved, we have a legal right as a country to an extension to 22 May 2019. If this withdrawal agreement is not approved, that extension will expire on 11 April. That means that any other extension that this House might desire to be agreed by the Union would be at its discretion, subject to the veto of 27 leaders. Therefore, by this evening, if the 11 o’clock deadline expires and the agreement has not been approved, that legal right will expire with it.

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

Will the Attorney General give way?

[The Attorney General]

I will in a moment, but not now.

This is, therefore, the last opportunity to take advantage of our legal right. The Government have taken the view that it would have been wrong to allow that time and date to expire without giving this House the opportunity to consider whether it should avail itself of the legal right or whether it should move into a position where any further extension will be at the discretion of the 27 leaders.

[Stephen Doughty]

Will the Attorney General give way on that point?

[The Attorney General]

I am not taking interventions at the moment; I will in due course. [Interruption.] I do not intend to take long. I want to set out clearly the choice before the House today.

The minimum necessary in order to secure this right, which is ours as a matter of law, is that the withdrawal agreement is approved. All negotiated exits from the European Union will require this withdrawal agreement to have been approved. The Union has made it abundantly clear, and the decision—

[Stephen Doughty]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Speaker]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, but that does not require adjudication by the Chair. The Attorney General will have heard the point of order and it is open to him to respond to it or not, as he thinks fit.

[The Attorney General]

I will take interventions. I did not refuse the hon. Gentleman’s; I was just asking whether he would be patient. Let me deal with his point now. The Government were considering asking that the indicative votes process continue this morning, so that we could have brought a motion this afternoon or this evening. That is exactly what the thinking was. There is no desire on the part of this Government to interfere with the process that the House is currently undergoing—on the contrary, the motion acknowledges it and notes it. I will come to it, if I may, in due course.

The minimum necessary to secure our legal right to an extension, therefore, is that this withdrawal agreement be approved. All negotiated exits that any Member of this House might conjecture or dream of will require this withdrawal agreement. Therefore the House has before it a clear choice this morning: it can either approve this withdrawal agreement, knowing that by doing so it secures its right to an extension; or it can decline to do so and know, in doing that, that by next week there will be no right to an extension, that any extension applied for will require some clear indication of the pathway forward and a stable majority behind it, and, thirdly, that it will be subject to the veto of those 27 member states.

That brings me to the motion before the House. This motion sets out clearly that it is not a meaningful vote pursuant to section 13(1)(b) of the Act. It is designed solely to give the opportunity to this House of taking advantage of the right that we have in international law. Indeed, it could not be a vote under section 13(1)(b) precisely because, Mr Speaker, you have ruled—a ruling that the Government fully respect—that a meaningful vote cannot be brought back while it poses the same or substantially the same question to this House.

Therefore, this motion has been designed to comply with your ruling, Mr Speaker, and in complying with that ruling, it cannot comply with the requirements of section 13 of the withdrawal Act. We put before the House the choice that the House faces today. What this choice will bring is certainty to thousands of businesses and millions of individual citizens throughout this country and to 1 million citizens of our country residing in the European Union. That is a not inconsiderable benefit. That certainty will be because, by taking the step of approving the withdrawal agreement today, the House will set out a clear and certain pathway to our departure from the European Union.

Let me come now to the political declaration.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[The Attorney General]

I will not give way now, but I will give way to Members in due course. I want to set out the choice before the House.

As the motion acknowledges, the political declaration is open to change. The Union has accepted that it is open to negotiating change and that it will consent to discuss it, and so the House is undergoing a process at the moment of seeing whether a stable majority can be found for any political solution for the future. Of course, the Government respect that process: they acknowledge that it is continuing and they accept therefore that further steps will be necessary to approve the political declaration in this House.

This House will have to ratify not only the withdrawal agreement, but the political declaration. So the Government will give consideration as to precisely how the full package will be approved with the political declaration. One option will be to introduce the EU withdrawal implementation agreement Bill before this House. If this agreement is approved today, the Government will introduce the Bill within the next few days.

[Ian C. Lucas (Wrexham) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Attorney General for giving way. Does he agree with me that the motion today flatly contradicts the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, which specifically provides that both the political declaration and the withdrawal agreement must be in place before we comply with the Act?

[The Attorney General]

As the motion notes, this is not purporting to be a section 13(1) vote. This is simply designed to afford the House the chance of taking advantage of the legal right established by the Council decision. It is not a vote under section 13. There is nothing unlawful and certainly nothing procedurally improper about it. It is done to afford the House this chance.

[Hilary Benn (Leeds Central) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Attorney General for giving way. I want to ask him about the consequences for any further extension of this motion passing today. If we get until 22 May but in the week leading up to that it becomes clear that we have still not reached agreement on a political declaration, and if we ask the EU for a further extension, is it not likely to say, “I’m sorry—you can’t have one because you did not take part in the European Parliament elections”? Therefore, defeating this motion today will at least give us the chance to make that choice with an extension until 12 April, when we could get a longer extension. We could not get that if we go to 22 May.

[The Attorney General]

I understand the right hon. Gentleman’s point. I say straightaway that the answer is that this is the only right we have to an extension. If we move into next week without securing it, we take the chance that among those 27 leaders there will be vetoes.

The right hon. Gentleman asks me about European parliamentary elections. Plainly, the stated position of the European Union is that we would have to organise and stand in those elections if we went beyond 23 May. Some lawyers, of course, disagree with that stated position and say that it would not be necessary, but that is the stated position of the Union. The point, however, is that we have the opportunity here to embrace certainty.

What the right hon. Gentleman’s prescription would have us do is take a chance on the good will of the 27 member states of the European Union granting us another extension. The withdrawal agreement—everyone knows; the right hon. Gentleman knows—is an essential prerequisite for our departure from the European Union. That may be why he does not want to vote for it. The official Labour position is that it does not disagree or object to a clause or article of the withdrawal agreement. The country looking on must judge this. The Opposition do not object; they have not emitted a peep of disagreement with a single clause or article of that agreement, and their position today is that they intend to vote it down. What kind of cynicism is that?

The opportunity now is for us to embrace the certain legal right of an extension to 22 May. That will give us the opportunity to give certainty to the country and allow the process of reconsideration of the political declaration to take place.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

I am most grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for giving way. I entirely agree that, of course, apart from the dates of 12 April and 22 May, any other extension for a longer period would have to be agreed with the other 27 member states, but was it not made quite clear when the Prime Minister was at the last European Union summit that an extension to 22 May was what was described as a “technical” extension for the purpose simply of bringing about what had been agreed fully and completely in this House? If we extend to 22 May without reaching that conclusion now, we run the serious risk that we will not be able to extend further at that date if we have not completed all parts of both the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration, but if we were to go back now and ask for longer, it would be given to us if we wanted to consider other options.

[The Attorney General]

My right hon. and learned Friend is a very distinguished and able lawyer, but I never knew that he had a crystal ball. The fact of the matter is that the European Union has not agreed to grant any longer extension. It will be subject to the veto of any of the 27, and it would certainly be subject to clear signs in the House that there was a stable majority for an alternative solution, and a stable way to deliver it.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[The Attorney General]

I must make progress, but I will give way, particularly to the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant).

The reason for the motion today, and for the form of the motion, is that it enables the House to secure this legal right. It is the case that the Government make that the agreement is required in any event. Members on the other side do not dispute the requirement for the agreement to be passed, so we invite the House to secure the certainty of the extension; to continue the process of the political declaration reconsiderations; to enable us, by 22 May, to ratify the domestic implementing legislation; and to conclude discussions on the political declaration.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

The Attorney General’s argument is basically that this is a way to guarantee certainty for business in the country. However, if today’s motion is carried, there will be no certainty. The Government will not be able to ratify the treaty—I think that he accepts that they will not be able to do so—and a proper motion will still have to be introduced in this House, and the other House, including both sides. There will still have to be a Bill, which will be the subject of contentious dispute. There is no certainty—if anything, today throws more uncertainty into the process.

[The Attorney General]

There will certainly have to be a Bill. There will have to be a process of ratification in the House, which is why, if it votes for the withdrawal agreement today, it would be surprising if it did not vote to implement the withdrawal agreement. This is the step that we need to take.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[The Attorney General]

May I move on to the withdrawal agreement? First, I will give way briefly to the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Frank Field).

[Frank Field (Birkenhead) (Ind)]

If we pass the motion, given that we have business on Monday to continue to express our preferences, and if Mr Speaker were willing, could we not introduce a motion that captured what we decide today—if that is to accept the divorce settlement—with the motion that the Father of the House, the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), put to us to vote on this week, which came the nearest to being passed, so that we would have the divorce settlement and alternatives, including the customs union?

[The Attorney General]

Plainly, that would be open to the House to do. The problem is that we would have lost the legal right to the extension, so we would apply to the discretion of the Union for it to be granted.

Let me come back to the political declaration, because it is important that I should say a few more words about it. The process that is—

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker. I am seeking to catch the attention of the Attorney General, and wondered whether he might have a loss of hearing or something.

[Mr Speaker]

In my experience, the hon. Gentleman is both noticeable and audible.

[The Attorney General]

I will give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash), but let me complete my remarks on the political declaration. The process is being undergone by the House at the moment. The Government recognise that process and will in due course make decisions on how and if we can implement anything that might emerge from that. The whole point of the political declaration is that it cannot be negotiated with the European Union now.

What the Government are saying—and some amendments were tabled, I think, by the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Gareth Snell)—in connection with the next stage of the political declaration and its negotiation with the European Union is that there will be new mechanisms and new procedures so that the House can be properly consulted and have a role in the manner in which the political declaration, once it is finalised in the House, will be negotiated in that second stage. I can say to the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central—I shall give way to him in a moment—that the Government would have accepted the amendments that he tabled, with others standing in his name.

[Gareth Snell (Stoke-on-Trent Central) (Lab/Co-op)]

I thank the Attorney General for giving way. The amendment that I tabled with colleagues today was very clear. Any process for the House would have to be underpinned by legislation—it would have to form part of a withdrawal agreement implementation Bill, and there would have to be a clear role for the House to agree the future relationship before it was signed off with the European Union. Can he give confirmation at the Dispatch Box, if he introduces the Bill next week, that those measures will be in clear text, in that Bill, in black and white?

[The Attorney General]

We would have accepted the hon. Gentleman’s amendments. Clearly, in terms of the detailed working out of those amendments, in discussion—[Hon. Members: “Ah!”]. No, no, no—hon. Members can table an amendment. If it requires amendment to that legislation, we would obviously consider the detail carefully, but we would be minded to accept such.

[Sir William Cash]

I am most grateful to the Attorney General for giving way. He has referred on a number of occasions to the withdrawal and implementation Bill. He knows, as do the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, the Prime Minister and others, that the European Scrutiny Committee has asked repeatedly over the past month for a draft or a copy of the withdrawal and implementation Bill. He has just said that if the withdrawal agreement goes through, the withdrawal and implementation Bill will follow. If the withdrawal agreement is not approved today, will the withdrawal and implementation Bill come to this House and be introduced in any event?

[The Attorney General]

What I can say to my hon. Friend is that we would certainly give it very careful consideration. We have taken the view up till now that, before the withdrawal agreement is approved, it is premature to publish the Bill. There are certain elements of it that still remain to be finalised. However, as I have said to my hon. Friend privately, the moment we are in a position to publish it, he, as Chairman of the Committee, will be among the first to see it.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[The Attorney General]

I must make some progress. I am very conscious that it is Friday and that we need to move forward as swiftly as we can.

The House can take a single, decisive step today to afford certainty to the millions of people throughout this country who are waiting for it and to have a short—not prolonged—extension that will bring our exit from the European Union to 22 May. There will be no further uncertainty. The political declaration can be resolved in that time. The ratification of the Bill can proceed with any amendments that might be forthcoming in connection with the subsequent negotiating stage.

I submit to the House the responsible thing. I ask the House to consider and reflect carefully, because what we have before us today is the legal right to extend. No other extension is guaranteed; every other extension would require European parliamentary elections, as the right hon. Member for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn) said. We are therefore at an important crossroads for the purposes of this nation’s future and its history, and I urge all Members of his House to embrace this opportunity now, when this withdrawal agreement, in its substance, is in no way objectionable to any Member willing to consider moving forward with it. In those circumstances, what conceivable point can there be now in not embracing this agreement, subject to further discussions on the political declaration? I urge the House to vote for this agreement.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Attorney General]

Will the right hon. Gentleman tell the House how, compliant with the Speaker’s ruling, he would have brought a vote that fulfilled the conditions he has just set out?

[Hilary Benn]

I will readily tell the House—although I will come to this very point later in my speech: the Government could choose, if they wished to, to seek to change the political declaration with the EU. It is because of the Government’s consistent failure to do that, because of its consistent failure to reach out across the House, that they find themselves in the difficulty they have created today. But I shall return to that point a little later.

We cannot separate the withdrawal agreement from the political declaration because both parts are essential to the process. It is like selling your house without having any idea where you are going to live afterwards. We would not have the withdrawal agreement without the political declaration. Article 50(2) refers to

“setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union.”

My hon. Friend the shadow Solicitor General in his brilliant speech quoted the Prime Minister’s the statement on 14 January. I will repeat one small bit of it. She said:

“One cannot be banked”—

referring to the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration—

without the commitments of the other.”—[Official Report, 14 January 2019; Vol. 652, c. 826.]

Yet the motion before the House today explicitly tries to bank the commitments of one without the commitments of the other. I do not see how that can in any way be consistent with what the Prime Minister told the House of Commons on 14 January.

The second reason why I shall vote against the motion is one of the consequences of passing this motion. The aim—the Attorney-General was frank about it—is to gain an extension to 22 May rather than 12 April by satisfying the requirement of article 1 of the European Council decision of 22 March, which stated:

“In the event that the withdrawal agreement is approved by the House of Commons by 29 March 2019 at the latest, the period provided for in article 50(3) of the Treaty of European Union is extended until 22 May 2019.”

The problem, and my intervention on the Attorney General was trying to address this, is that if we passed this motion and got that extension, by the time we got to the week beginning 20 May, if at that moment we have not yet resolved the question of our future political and economic relationship and the UK decided that it needed to apply for a further extension, the EU is almost certain to refuse any such extension on the grounds that we have failed to take part in the European elections. That is because paragraph 10 of the decision of the European Council, which said:

“If the United Kingdom is still a member state on the 23-26 May 2019”—

which we would be if we asked for and were granted an extension beyond 22 May—

“it will be under the obligation to hold the elections to the European Parliament in accordance with Union law. It is to be noted that the United Kingdom would have to give notice of the poll by 12 April 2019 in order to hold such elections.”

Since it would be impossible on 20 May to give notice to hold elections on 23 May, it would be impossible to comply with this requirement. Therefore, what the motion before the House today means is that, if it were carried, it would in effect rule out any possibility of a further extension under article 50 beyond 22 May. So if, at that point, we have not reached agreement on the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration, this motion would mean the UK leaving without a deal on 22 May. The House voted this week by 400 votes to 160 to reject for the third time leaving with no deal. The only other way forward would be to revoke article 50 to buy ourselves a little bit more time, but the Prime Minister has repeatedly told the House that she would refuse to do so.

[Hilary Benn]

That would indeed be the consequence if the motion were passed. I will be perfectly frank with the hon. Gentleman. If there were a way round the problem of participation in the European elections, I think many people in the House would seek to find it, but it is clear that the EU in the form of the Commission and the Council and the legal advice has said that that is not possible, and therefore, in effect this is a no-deal motion.

[The Attorney General]

indicated dissent.

[Hilary Benn]

It is, and for that reason alone it deserves to be defeated.

The last point I want to make is that this Bill is displacement activity on the part of the Government. The Government should be turning their effort and attention to the real issue, which is our future relationship.

[Hilary Benn]

I reciprocate the respect for the Minister, who is doing a very good job, I have to say, in extremely difficult and trying circumstances. But this is half an agreement.

[The Attorney General]

indicated dissent.

[Hilary Benn]

It is. Half an agreement is being presented to the House. The Government should be focusing all their attention on the real problem, on this side of the House, which is the content, or to be more precise the lack of content, of the political declaration.

Withdrawal Agreement: Legal Opinion

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

1st reading: House of Commons
Tuesday 12th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney General (Mr Geoffrey Cox)]

With permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement about my legal opinion on the joint instrument and unilateral declaration concerning the withdrawal agreement published last night.

Last week, I confirmed I would publish my

“legal opinion on any document that is produced and negotiated with the Union.”—[Official Report, 7 March 2019; Vol. 655, c. 1112.]

That has now been laid before the House. This statement summarises the instruments and my opinion of their legal effect.

Last night in Strasbourg, the Prime Minister secured legally binding changes that strengthen and improve the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration. The Government laid three new documents reflecting those changes in the House: first, a joint legally binding instrument on the withdrawal agreement and the protocol on Northern Ireland; secondly, a unilateral declaration by the United Kingdom in relation to the operation of the Northern Ireland protocol; and thirdly, a joint statement to supplement the political declaration. The legal opinion I have provided to the House today focuses on the first two of those documents, which relate to the functioning of the backstop and the efforts of the parties that will be required to supersede it.

Let me say frankly what, in my opinion, these documents do not do. They are not about a situation where, despite the parties properly fulfilling the duties of good faith and best endeavours, they cannot reach an agreement on a future relationship. Such an event, in my opinion, is highly unlikely to occur, and it is in the interests of both the United Kingdom and the European Union to agree a future relationship as quickly as possible. Let me make it clear, however, that were such a situation to occur, the legal risk, as I set it out in my letter of 13 November, remains unchanged. The question for the House is whether in the light of these improvements, as a political judgment, it should now enter into those arrangements.

Let me move on to what the documents do achieve. As I set out in my opinion, the joint instrument puts the commitments in the letter from Presidents Tusk and Juncker of 14 January 2019 into a legally binding form, and provides, in addition, useful clarifications, amplifications of existing obligations, and some new obligations. The instrument confirms that the European Union cannot pursue an objective of trying to trap the UK in the backstop indefinitely. It makes explicit that that would constitute bad faith, which would be the basis of a formal dispute before an arbitration tribunal. That means, ultimately, that the protocol could be suspended if the European Union continued to breach its obligations.

The joint instrument also reflects the United Kingdom’s and the Union’s commitment to work to replace the backstop with alternative arrangements by December 2020, including as set out in the withdrawal agreement. Those commitments include establishing

“immediately following the ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement, a negotiating track for replacing the customs and regulatory alignment in goods elements of the protocol with alternative arrangements.”

If an agreement has not been concluded within one year of the UK’s withdrawal, efforts must be redoubled. [Laughter.]

[Mr Speaker]

Order.

[The Attorney General]

In my view, as a matter of law, the provisions relating to the timing of the efforts to be made in resolving withdrawal agreements make time of the essence in the negotiation of a subsequent agreement. A doctrine with which the lawyers in the House will be familiar is of legal relevance. In my opinion, the provisions of the joint instrument extend beyond mere interpretation of the withdrawal agreement, and represent materially new legal obligations and commitments which enhance its existing terms.

Let me now turn to the unilateral declaration. It records the United Kingdom’s position that, if it were not possible to conclude a subsequent agreement to replace the protocol because of a breach by the Union of its duty of good faith, it would be entitled to take measures to disapply the provisions of the protocol in accordance with the withdrawal agreement’s dispute resolution procedures and article 20, to which I have referred. There is no doubt, in my view, that the clarifications and amplified obligations contained in the joint statement and the unilateral declaration provide a substantive and binding reinforcement of the legal rights available to the UK in the event that the Union were to fail in its duties of good faith and best endeavours.

I have in this statement, and in the letter that I have published today, set out, frankly and candidly, my view of the legal effect of the new instruments that the Government have agreed with the Union. However, the matters of law affecting withdrawal can only inform what is essentially a political decision that each of us must make. This is a question not of the lawfulness of the Government’s action but of the prudence, as a matter of policy and political judgment, of entering into an international agreement on the terms proposed.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds (Torfaen) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Attorney General for his statement and for advance sight of it.

The Attorney General made it clear in his original advice of 13 November on the backstop protocol that:

“In international law the Protocol would endure indefinitely until a superseding agreement took its place, in whole or in part”,

and he was right, because article 178 of the withdrawal agreement is clear that the remedy of suspension of obligations is only ever meant to be temporary to secure compliance to the agreement and not as a gateway to a full exit.

So people quite rightly ask now what has changed. In her Strasbourg statement the Prime Minister said the joint interpretative instrument makes three changes. She said, first, that the UK can challenge the EU in an arbitration panel if the EU is found in breach of good faith and suspend the backstop. But that was already in article 178 of the withdrawal agreement; it is not new. Secondly, the Prime Minister said there is a legal commitment that whatever replaces the backstop does not need to replicate it, but the January letter of Presidents Tusk and Juncker said:

“Any arrangements which supersede the Protocol are not required to replicate its provisions in any respect”;

it is not new. Thirdly, the Prime Minister said it entrenches in legally binding form the commitments made in the exchange of letters with Presidents Tusk and Juncker in January, but on 14 January the Prime Minister told this House:

“My right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General has also written to me today confirming that in the light of the joint response from the Presidents of the European Council and the Commission, these conclusions ‘would have legal force in international law’.”—[Official Report, 14 January 2019; Vol. 652, c. 824.]

That is not new either.

I am going to take the Attorney General at his word, because he said in his Mail on Sunday interview:

“I will not change my opinion unless I’m sure there is no legal risk of us being indefinitely detained in the backstop.”

I am going to be fair to the Attorney General: he has not changed his opinion. Let us read his advice to this House at paragraph 19:

“the legal risk remains unchanged that if through no such demonstrable failure of either party, but simply because of intractable differences, that situation does arise, the United Kingdom would have, at least while the fundamental circumstances remained the same, no internationally lawful means of exiting the Protocol’s arrangements, save by agreement.”

I say to the Attorney General that paragraphs 15 to 19 of his advice constitute seven sentences that destroy the Government’s strategy of recent weeks—that sink the Government’s case that they had any chance of securing a right, under international law, to unilaterally exit the protocol’s arrangements. We have gone from having “a nothing has changed” Prime Minister to having “a nothing has changed” Attorney General.

In fairness to the Attorney General it is not just his view: it is the view of a number of other respected lawyers, including Professor Philippe Sands, Professor Sir David Edward and the Government’s own former counter-terror watchdog, now Lord Anderson QC. The Attorney General knows that speaking about reasonable endeavours and bad faith is one thing, but he can confirm the reality, which is that the new documents do nothing about the situation when the talks with the EU are at a stalemate not because of bad faith, but simply because both sides cannot reach an agreement.

Proving bad faith is extraordinarily difficult, and the Attorney General points that out in paragraph 16 of his own advice. The strongest remedy in this withdrawal agreement, even with this document, remains a temporary suspension. Indeed, we need only look at his own legal advice to see that, at paragraph 9, which speaks of

“suspension of all or parts of the Protocol, including the backstop, until there is satisfactory compliance.”

Trade talks can break down for a variety of reasons. For two parties to act on the basis of their own interests is not bad faith, and the Attorney General knows it. In these circumstances, despite any assurances about the temporary nature of the backstop, the reality is that it can endure indefinitely. Ninety-two days after the Prime Minister abandoned the first meaningful vote, in this Attorney General’s view

“the legal risk remains unchanged”.

What the Attorney General was asked to do, and what the Prime Minister promised in this House on 29 January—to change the text of the withdrawal agreement—simply is not possible. He is a lawyer; he is not a magician. Does not this whole episode of recent weeks show that when national leadership is required, this Prime Minister, as always, puts party before country?

[The Attorney General]

The hon. Gentleman asks me about my opinion. He knows that my opinion is that there is no ultimate unilateral right out of this arrangement. The risk of that continues, but the question is whether it is a likelihood, politically. One thing that we did not hear from him is what the Labour party’s position is on the backstop. Does they accept the backstop? Do they think it is a good thing? If they think it is a good thing, why on earth are they criticising it? Or is this just the usual political opportunism that one expects to hear from the Front Bench of the Labour party?

The hon. Gentleman says to me that there is nothing new in this agreement, but that is not so, and some of the authorities that he has quoted are saying that this morning. There are material new obligations—for example, in relation to alternative arrangements. There is now a heavy emphasis upon a swift and expedited track to negotiate them, and it would be unconscionable if, having made that emphasis and having said that time was of the essence, the European Union simply refused to consider or adopt reasonable proposals relating to alternative arrangements. That is new. What this document does is address the risk that we could be kept in the backstop by the bad faith and deliberate manipulation of the Union. This makes significant reductions in that risk.

I say to the hon. Gentleman that it would be a good thing if we could hear from the Labour party just occasionally not only political shenanigans but some sincere engagement with the real issues that this withdrawal agreement now raises. The question now is: do we assume our responsibilities as a House and allow not only this country—yearning as it is for us to move on—but the entire continent of Europe to move on? To do that, the time has come now to vote for this deal.

[Mr Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

I welcome my right hon. and learned Friend to his place. He has shown absolutely that he is what he should be: an independent adviser to the Government. I congratulate him on that, because that is exactly what he should be. Given the clarity of his advice, I want to ask him a particular question. As he will know, I and others have spent some time looking at and working on alternative arrangements. I would like to clarify exactly what force he thinks those would have. As he said just now, there would be an obligation for the European Union to “consider or adopt” such proposals if they were made in a reasonable way. How does that square with his paragraph 16, in which he says

“it would be highly unlikely that the United Kingdom could take advantage of the remedies available to it for such a breach under the Withdrawal Agreement”?

[The Attorney General]

My right hon. Friend has got paragraph 16 wrong, if I may respectfully say so. What it says was that I advised in the past that that was so. What I now consider, at paragraph 17, is:

“that the legally binding provisions of the Joint Instrument and the content of the Unilateral Declaration reduce the risk”

that we would be held involuntarily and by the bad faith. Why? Because these new provisions make it easier to facilitate an effective claim to the arbitrator that that conduct is being exhibited. Those are cumulative. If one looks at the agreement as a whole, one sees that the obligations on the Union are to treat with urgency the negotiation of alternative arrangements. There is a new obligation that has not existed before in any document that the Union has agreed to, which is that it must aim to do this within 12 months of our withdrawal. That is an important obligation, because it makes time of the essence. If that deadline is passed, as in any legal jurisprudence on such matters relating in a domestic context to breach of contract, for example, that means that the parties must demonstrate that they are intensifying their efforts. If they do not, they could be in breach of their best endeavours obligation.

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)]

I start by saying that I have respect and sympathy for the Attorney General. The role of the law officer is not easy, particularly when he or she is a party political appointment, but he must nevertheless from time to time burst his party’s political bubble in the interests of professional integrity and independence of advice. Make no mistake, that is what the Attorney General has done today.

Today, the emperor has no clothes; none at all—not even a codpiece. For all the yards of flannel in paragraphs 4 to 10 of the Attorney General’s legal opinion and in today’s statement, it is quite clear, as the shadow Attorney General said, from paragraph 19 of the legal opinion that the legal position previously outlined by the Attorney General remains the same. The measures therefore fall very short of what was demanded by the Brady amendment and very short of what was promised to those in the European Research Group, which I am sure will not have been lost upon them or their lawyers.

The withdrawal agreement has not been changed, and that the Attorney General should admit that that is so is not surprising given the weight of legal opinion about the measures overnight. Some Conservative Members will not take my legal opinion for it. I am unsure why, but perhaps they think that a lawyer who is a member of the SNP is not to be trusted. At all events, I am sure that they will put some weight on the opinion of my good friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich, the former Government independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. He provided a detailed opinion overnight—[Interruption.] I hear someone muttering from the Conservative Benches that he is being paid by the people’s vote campaign, but that person ought to be aware that it is the professional duty of any senior counsel to give an objective, dispassionate opinion. Perhaps the person muttering from a sedentary position should not transfer their own motives on to someone as honourable as Lord Anderson.

I will ask the Attorney General whether he agrees with me and with a number of Lord Anderson’s points. Lord Anderson says that the measures obtained by the Prime Minister

“do not allow the UK to terminate the backstop in the event that negotiations over its future relationship with the EU cannot be brought to a satisfactory conclusion”.

That is correct, and I am sure that the Attorney General will agree. Lord Anderson also says that the measures

“do not provide the UK with a right to terminate the backstop at a time of its choosing, or indeed at any time, without the agreement of the EU.”

Lord Anderson is right that there is no unilateral exit here. He then goes on to say:

“The furthest they go is to reiterate the possibility that the backstop might be suspended”—

not got out of, but suspended—

“in extreme circumstances of bad faith on the part of the EU which”

he says

“are highly unlikely to be demonstrated.

Lord Anderson also points out:

“This was already apparent from the Withdrawal Agreement, and had been acknowledged in the Attorney General’s previous legal advice.”

Does the Attorney General agree with all those points in Lord Anderson’s independent, impartial, objective opinion? Does he further agree that in fact nothing has changed and that the Prime Minister has yet again failed to deliver on what she has promised?

[The Attorney General]

What I hope will not be lost on my hon. and right hon. Friends is why the hon. and learned Lady is insisting and pressing upon them the facts and matters that she has just been drawing to their attention. It could be, I wonder, that there is some ulterior motive in her concern about the absence of a unilateral exit mechanism in all circumstances.

Turning to the opinion of Lord Anderson, who is always worthy of the most careful attention and the greatest of respect—as anybody of his distinction should be listened to—I take issue with some of his comments. For example—my opinion sets this out and other lawyers are commenting to that effect this morning—the hon. and learned Lady does no justice to the fact that these measures and improvements do facilitate, and mean that there is a reduction of risk in, our being able to prove and demonstrate bad faith or want of best endeavours. She says that we could not terminate, but there is in fact in my opinion a clear pathway to termination.

As the hon. and learned Lady knows, I wrote in my opinion that if in the circumstance that we got a declaration from the arbitral tribunal that there had been a lack of best endeavours, having regard to the accelerated pace of negotiation which this new agreement now imposes, we could then move to suspend our obligations, if we wished to do so, under the protocol. If that suspension was prolonged, we could invoke article 20 to argue that it was no longer necessary because the inaction of the European Union demonstrated that it must think that it was no longer necessary, and that could lead to termination. It is therefore not entirely true to say that there is no way in which the provisions could be terminated. I say to the hon. and learned Lady that suspension, in these circumstances, is as effective as termination, because the only way in which the EU could restore the position would be for it to come back to the negotiating table with genuinely new proposals.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

I thank my right hon. and learned Friend for his statement. I have no reason to disagree with his conclusion in paragraph 19 of his opinion, and I commend him for standing up for his office and speaking truth to power. However, I have one query about paragraph 7 of his advice, in which he describes the joint instrument as representing

“materially new legal obligations and commitments”.

He will of course be familiar with article 31, paragraph 2 of the Vienna convention, which says that such an instrument can have legal force and be binding only in the sense that the parties cannot later alter or deny what they have agreed and that it is not a treaty in itself. In those circumstances, is it not the case that the breaching of the best endeavours obligation in itself makes no difference? The only difference is if there is bad faith, and that in fact was contained in the original agreement that we signed.

[The Attorney General]

I do not agree with my right hon. and learned Friend, although I listen most carefully to him, as ever. The best endeavours duty was in the withdrawal agreement originally, but what this does is to firm and strengthen the context in which an allegation of best endeavours or bad faith would be made, because it sets an accelerated pace and commits—I am sure that my right hon. and learned Friend has looked or will look at this—the EU to specific operational commitments about how to deliver that obligation. Those are new agreements, and they are couched in the language of agreement. He knows, as a very distinguished lawyer, that one cannot always trust the label; one has to look at the substance.

[Hilary Benn (Leeds Central) (Lab)]

Can the Attorney General confirm that in order to get to the point at which the UK might be able to suspend the Northern Ireland protocol, it would have to, first, persuade the arbitration panel to agree with its case and, secondly, accept that any issue of EU law arising from the case that the UK had argued would have to be referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union and that any ruling of the CJEU on that matter would be binding on the panel, the EU and, most importantly for this discussion, the UK?

[The Attorney General]

Of course I can confirm all those things, which are self-evident in the agreement. May I just point out to the right hon. Gentleman that although I am sure it is a clever forensic point, the circumstance in which a point of European Union law would arise in connection with the best endeavours and bad faith clauses is difficult to envisage? The reality is that it is a straightforward question of fact: is the European Union moving with the urgency and pace, to the procedural timetables and according to the procedural steps that this agreement now enforces?

The right hon. Gentleman is an honest politician, and he cannot look these things in the face and say that they mean nothing. These are important amplifications and clarifications of the duty of best endeavours. I quite agree with him, as I very much doubt we would ever get to an arbitral tribunal, because what these duties, new clarifications and amplifications do is set the framework for people’s conduct within the negotiation. It is about the impact on their behaviour and conduct. Very rare is the case in which one would get to an arbitral tribunal. What matters is the framework of obligations and responsibilities, and those have materially tightened on the European Union.

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

I thank my right hon. and learned Friend for his opinion, which is not only for the Government, I would stress, but for Parliament and for the voters. The substance of the backstop issue to which he has just referred is the legal, constitutional and, therefore, political status of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom, which cannot be put at risk.

My right hon. and learned Friend refers to a reduced risk of the UK being “indefinitely” detained in the protocol, but he adds that, ultimately, there is

“no internationally lawful means of exiting”

unless both the EU and the UK agree. Does he therefore appreciate, on his own terms, that this fundamental legal impediment trumps political considerations and that, therefore, there would be insufficient protection for Northern Ireland to continue as part of the United Kingdom?

[The Attorney General]

I do not agree. My hon. Friend knows we have a difference of opinion, and I hope that he will move towards my position. I still hope that might be so, and I say that because one has to look at the mutual incentives and disincentives for both parties to stay in the arrangement. I made this point in December and, for the reasons I advanced in December and in my November opinion, the incentives or disincentives for the European Union are as profound, if not greater, to get us out of the backstop than to keep us in it. That is what I firmly believe. He may disagree, but that is what I believe.

That is why I have taken the political judgment that this withdrawal agreement needs to be supported but, in saying that, these improvements do make a difference. In the last line of my advice, I say there can be no lawful exit unless there is a fundamental change of circumstance. It is extremely important to remember that there is always a right to terminate a treaty unilaterally if circumstances fundamentally change. There is no question but that we have a right to exit if those circumstances apply.

[Sir Vince Cable (Twickenham) (LD)]

Those of us who remember some infamously politicised legal opinions, as with the Iraq war, will want to acknowledge the Attorney General’s total integrity and independence, but can he explain to a non-lawyer how respect for the international rule of law is enhanced by a unilateral declaration to break it?

[The Attorney General]

The right hon. Gentleman seeks to give with one hand and take with the other. With the greatest of diffidence and respect, he is not quite right. The unilateral declaration is not incompatible with international law. It reserves the United Kingdom’s right to take all measures available to it in circumstances where the talks have broken down as a result of a breach of article 5, which is the good faith duty. It reinforces and further stresses the United Kingdom’s right to take measures to withdraw from the arrangements if there is a breach of good faith.

[Mr David Jones (Clwyd West) (Con)]

My right hon. and learned Friend notes in his opinion that the unilateral declaration is not an agreed document. Can he say whether efforts were made to obtain the agreement of the European Union to that declaration? If so, why was such agreement withheld?

[The Attorney General]

No unilateral declaration is worth the paper it is written on if it is objected to. My understanding is that it is not objected to and that it will be deposited alongside the withdrawal agreement and, therefore, will carry legal weight under article 31 of the Vienna convention.

[Nigel Dodds (Belfast North) (DUP)]

I join others in commending the Attorney General, and I pay tribute to him for his dealings with us and for holding entirely to his word in delivering a totally objective and fair legal analysis and opinion on whatever came back. I pay tribute to him publicly, in addition to what I have said to him privately in that regard.

In relation to reducing the risk of being held in the backstop by the EU acting in bad faith or for want of best endeavours, does the Attorney General agree with paragraph 29 of his previous advice that all the EU

“would have to do to show good faith would be to consider the UK’s proposals, even if they ultimately rejected them. This could go on repeatedly without such conduct giving rise to bad faith or failure”?

If it is not a question of bad faith, and if it is just a question of the two sides not being able to reach agreement, he says in paragraph 19 of today’s legal opinion that the “legal risk remains unchanged”.

We already know what the Irish Government and others see as the ultimate destination for Northern Ireland—the backstop is the bottom line. From what the Attorney General is saying today, provided there is no bad faith, the fact is that Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom could be trapped if the EU does not agree with the United Kingdom to a superseding agreement.

[The Attorney General]

I am extremely grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his question, which I will deal with point by point. First, my opinion has changed in connection to this country’s ability to prove bad faith if it occurred. There is now a new contextual framework for judging whether the other party is using best endeavours or good faith.

Time has been made of the essence in specific connection to negotiating alternative arrangements. A specific work track and a specific timetable are set out, and it would be unconscionable, as I say in my opinion—I forget the paragraph, but the right hon. Gentleman will have it—if having said to this country that it will set up a specific, discrete work track on alternative arrangements, which are defined in this new document as meaning facilitative techniques, technologies and customs procedures, and if having set up a timeline for negotiating those alternative arrangements by saying “12 months, or we must intensify our efforts,” it never agreed to use a single one, and if it refused every proposal reasonably adjusted to its core interests. That would be extraordinary.

I say in my written opinion, and I stand by it, that it would be a potential breach of best endeavours and good faith. Best endeavours are now defined in this joint instrument as requiring the EU to consider adverse interests and matters that are adverse to its interests. Even if these facilitative technological and customs measures were adverse to the EU’s interests, the duty still requires it to consider them. Therefore if there were a pattern of refusal, a systematic refusal, to consider these alternative arrangements, we would have a case before the arbitration panel, and it would be a potentially serious breach of good faith.

I say to the right hon. Gentleman with all candour that I believe that, and he knows I would not say it if I did not mean it. It is there in my written opinion, and I urge him to consider it.

[Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that although any practical lawyer will know that legal risks can seldom be totally eliminated from any agreement of any kind, what the parties must look at is the practical risk of something occurring? Does he not agree that what has been achieved markedly diminishes the practical risk, which is the key consideration we need to bear in mind when looking at the broader context of what is at stake here?

[The Attorney General]

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend; the legal ingredient in any political question must be subordinate, and particularly in connection with this political question. The fact is that there are always legal risks of various kinds. We walk among legal risks all the time—some of us more than others, perhaps—but we do not determine our behaviour by them. We take practical judgments every minute of the day, every day of the week about whether the legal risks we are engaged in are ones that are worth taking. I say to my hon. Friends, as I say to all hon. Members, that we must come to a decision on this question today. I urge the House to consider carefully this: there is no real legal basis to be seriously troubled that the European Union will never reach agreement with us. If it occurs through bad faith, we have further improvements in the deal now. But just because we cannot reach agreement, when the alternative arrangements are now cemented into this deal in a manner they have not been before? I think not, in all candour.

[Stella Creasy (Walthamstow) (Lab/Co-op)]

In layman’s and laywoman’s terms, nothing has changed but something has been added: a year to get the timescale right, and if the Government cannot do that, they are going to try really hard for the next year. It is not possible to unilaterally stop a hard border, but it is possible for the Attorney General single-handedly to admit that all he has done today is amplify, not amend, the original deal that Parliament voted down. To say anything else really is a matter of bad faith.

[The Attorney General]

I know that the hon. Lady knows that I have not attempted to say something—[Interruption.] Of course there has been no amending of the treaty, but there has been a supplementary agreement that amplifies, extends and deepens the obligations within it.

[Stella Creasy]

indicated dissent.

[The Attorney General]

The hon. Lady can shake her head, but she has to look at the wording—at the text. If I have got something wrong, she will no doubt tell me, but the fact is that there are materially new obligations here in relation to the pace and timetable, and in relation to binding legal commitments on alternative arrangements. These set the context against which and within which the duties in respect of bad faith and best endeavours will be measured. That is a significant difference to the deal.

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

Paragraph 23 of the political declaration makes it clear that we would

“build and improve on the single customs territory provided for in the Withdrawal Agreement”.

We know what the EU understands that to mean. In good faith and with best endeavours, it understands it to mean a customs union, as Dan Hannan MEP reminded us earlier. So is it not the case that if we negotiate under this agreement, we will either find ourselves trapped indefinitely in the backstop, because the EU is acting “in good faith”, or have to agree a customs union, contrary to our manifesto?

[The Attorney General]

I simply say to my hon. Friend that I really do not believe so. Why not? Because the commitments now cemented on alternative arrangements, which require a separate negotiating track, with a timetable to negotiate them, are now built in so that, as I have said in my written opinion, it would be extraordinary if the EU declined to adopt any such measures. It would be extraordinary, so I do not accept that the backstop is the base for any future arrangement. Let me give another reason why it is not. Built into the political declaration is an independent free trade policy, and we cannot have an independent free trade policy and have a customs union. Also built into it is no free movement. Does the Labour party support free movement now? It speaks with all sorts of voices. But the political declaration says there is none, and we cannot belong to the single market without free movement. So I say to my hon. Friend that I understand where these fears come from, but we must be bold and courageous, and we must move forward, for the sake of our country.

[Anna Soubry (Broxtowe) (Ind)]

I, too, commend the Attorney General for his work and his efforts. I believe he has acted in all good faith. I also pay tribute to the Prime Minister, because there is no doubt that she has done her best to try to solve this problem and come back with something, but she simply has not been able to, as many of us had predicted. I am an old criminal barrister—[Interruption.] Who said, “Lock her up?” In all seriousness, criminal barristers tend to speak in plain, simple language, because we address juries. Does the Attorney General agree with this simple assessment of the joint instrument, which I have read: it does not change the withdrawal agreement, and it offers no new treaty or obligations at a treaty level? Will he also confirm that this is the end of the road—there are now no more negotiations with the EU, despite all his best efforts and those of the Government?

[The Attorney General]

I do not agree with the right hon. Lady. This instrument will be deposited with the withdrawal agreement, and it contains material new obligations, which are couched in the language of agreement. That represents an agreement between the parties not only about the interpretation, but about specific operational commitments. This has a standing equal to the withdrawal agreement, including in its material commitments, particularly those relating to obligations of an operational character. So I do not agree with her; what she says is not right. We have to look at the substance, not the label.

The right hon. Lady asks whether negotiations are at an end. Yes, they are at an end. This is the moment of decision. We now have to take the fork in the road, and we are going to have to assume our responsibilities for it.

[Mr Owen Paterson (North Shropshire) (Con)]

I congratulate my right hon. and learned Friend on his work, and on the splendid candour of his statement and comments this morning. I also congratulate the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union on getting alternative arrangements and an implementation date into the text. If, however, despite the very best endeavours in negotiations and the very best of faith, agreement is not reached in time for the end of December 2020, what can an independent, sovereign UK do? If a decision is made at the political level that the game is not worth the candle, can the UK walk away?

[The Attorney General]

As my right hon. Friend knows, if the parties, using best endeavours, in complete sincerity with co-operation and good faith, are simply unable to agree anything, not even a few alternative arrangements or a partial agreement—the subsequent agreement referred to in the protocol can of course be a stand-alone agreement—the UK has no unilateral exit right to leave, unless there were a fundamental change of circumstance under article 62 of the Vienna convention on the law of treaties. My right hon Friend knows that, but the question is: is it likely? What this deal has now done is place the burden on the EU to negotiate those alternative arrangements, as a result of his work, in part. I say to him that he should trust in himself, trust in the British people and trust in our ability to deliver a good deal. We can use the new contexts in this agreement, and I believe we will secure a good deal for the Northern Irish border.

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

I thank the Attorney General for his candour and for sticking to his integrity in the advice he has provided, which very much lines up with Lord Anderson’s advice that the backstop may accordingly “endure indefinitely”. Lord Anderson also says that the interpretive declaration is not a

“clearly worded, legally binding, ‘treaty-level’ clause which unambiguously”

overrides the text. The Attorney General has said repeatedly throughout this process that this is about politics, not law, so will he tell us whether at any point over the weekend he offered the Prime Minister preliminary advice that she would not be getting the advice she wanted for the politics of today?

[The Attorney General]

The hon. Gentleman will forgive me for saying that I am afraid I am not permitted by the Law Officers’ convention to say whether I gave advice or what advice that would be.

[Mrs Helen Grant (Maidstone and The Weald) (Con)]

Does the Attorney General agree that in law and in life, it is very rare for any lawyer to give a 100% guarantee on how watertight a particular agreement might be, notwithstanding the fact that that lawyer may well have great confidence in that agreement?

[The Attorney General]

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend on that. With the law, we are not able to put something into a test tube, hold it over a Bunsen burner and, if it turns green, get the answer. The law is a question of judgment, and it is always blended with political considerations or, in a commercial context, with commercial considerations. The preponderance of the two form a single judgment. It is my judgment, as my hon. Friend knows, that this risk is a calculated one, but one that we can now take. I firmly believe that these new improvements make that risk more acceptable and easier for the House to take.

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

May I press the Attorney General on the status of the joint instrument? Last night, the Minister for the Cabinet Office claimed that

“the joint instrument has equal status in law to the withdrawal agreement itself”—[Official Report, 11 March 2019; Vol. 656, c. 132.]

and that they both have

“the status of treaties under international law”.—[Official Report, 11 March 2019; Vol. 656, c. 135.]

However, legal advice that I have seen says:

“The Joint Instrument is not incorporated into the Withdrawal Agreement, it is not a Protocol to the Withdrawal Agreement and it is not a treaty in its own right.”

Will the Attorney General clarify whether the Minister for the Cabinet Office inadvertently misled the House last night?

[The Attorney General]

I would need to see the hon. Lady’s quotation in detail. The position is that if you agree and put your name to a joint instrument of this kind, you are bound by it. You are bound by it as to its interpretation and, if it expresses agreement to specific operational commitments, as this one does, you are bound by it on those, because it is an agreement that you will then carry out those specific commitments. It is an agreement, so we should not get hung up on labels. The question is: what is its substance? It is binding.

[Sir Oliver Heald (North East Hertfordshire) (Con)]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that article 31 of the Vienna convention makes it perfectly clear that this protocol does have legal force, is binding and is of equal status to the treaty? Does he also agree that substantial, legally binding changes have been delivered, and that it is wrong to read just one paragraph of his legal advice—one has to read each paragraph of it? When it comes to paragraph 17 of his advice, my right hon. and learned Friend makes it clear that this is a substantial change in the level of risk.

[The Attorney General]

I think I had better just say that I agree with that one.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

The Attorney General’s argument seems to hinge on this matter of “highly unlikely”. I do not know whether this is his reading of recent history, but it seems to me that everything that I thought was highly unlikely five, six or seven years ago has now come to pass. Should we not be worrying about what may be likely over the next few years? After all, many of the Governments in Europe may change and the European Commission President will certainly change, so the highly unlikely may indeed come to pass. I have a sneaking memory of a conversation that the Attorney General and I had once in the Lobby, around three years ago. I asked him, “Wouldn’t it be a good idea if you should become Attorney General?”, and he said, “Oh no, that’s highly unlikely.” [Laughter.]

--- Later in debate ---

[The Attorney General]

And so it was under that particular Prime Minister! I was telling the hon. Gentleman the complete truth, as I am telling him it now. I have forgotten what the other question was—that was a betrayal of robing room talk. I am so taken aback by that question that I think I had better sit down.

[Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

My right hon. and learned Friend has pointed out that much of what is being said is political as well as legal. Will he therefore set out for the House what penalties might fall upon this country if a future Parliament, which obviously cannot be bound, were to decide to resile from the commitments under the backstop?

[The Attorney General]

Well, my hon. Friend will know that as an Attorney General I simply could not give countenance to the idea that this country would break its international legal obligations. As I have pointed out to the House, there is a right for the United Kingdom to terminate this agreement. If fundamental circumstances change, in the view of the United Kingdom, it would attempt to resolve the matter within the joint committee and it would attempt to resolve it politically, but if, ultimately, with the sovereign right of this House and of the British Government at the time, the United Kingdom took the view that those fundamental circumstances had indeed changed, it would have an undoubted legal right to withdrawal from any treaty.

Let us be clear about these kinds of absolute interpretations of black-letter text. A sovereign state has the right to withdraw if a treaty is no longer compatible with its fundamental interests or, to put it a different way, if fundamental circumstances have changed. I would say that apart from that, of course this country could resile from its commitments, but it would be unwise and it would not be in the tradition of this country to do so. In those circumstances, it is perfectly true that the only remedies the Union would have would be to take countermeasures, and no doubt it would pollute the atmosphere for fruitful relationships between us, which is precisely why this country will never do it, and neither would the European Union.

[Kate Hoey (Vauxhall) (Lab)]

I am not a lawyer, and neither are millions of people watching today. I obviously defer to the Attorney General’s advice, but will he tell people why the United Kingdom, a sovereign country, would think of signing up to anything—we signed up to the European Union and at least there was a way out of it through article 50, although it has taken a long time—that does not allow us simply to say, “This is not working, we are not going to sign up to this and we are leaving”?

[The Attorney General]

We have made a solemn pledge to the people of both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland that the border will be guaranteed never to be a hard border. That required the United Kingdom to say that in all normal circumstances we will not depart from that pledge. I repeat the point that I made to my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg): in the case of a fundamental change of circumstance, which is ultimately the sovereign right of this House and the Government to determine, the United Kingdom could withdraw, pursuant to customary international law. So it is not true to say that there is not ultimately the right of this House and the Government of the country at the time to exercise their discretion to do so in those circumstances. But in every other circumstance, we have said to the people of Northern Ireland, “We will ensure that your lives will be able to continue as they do now at the border.” I say that that act was worthy of this House, worthy of the Government and worthy of the British people, and it is one that is worthy of support.

[Sir Desmond Swayne (New Forest West) (Con)]

My right hon. and learned Friend has just said to my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) that the United Kingdom would never do that, so why did he raise the possibility of our withdrawing from a treaty under the Vienna convention in the first place?

[The Attorney General]

No, no, no. What I said to my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) was that we would not do it in breach of the law. We are permitted, in a case of fundamental change of circumstances, to withdraw by the law. If such a change of circumstance came about—either because of some fundamental political change in Northern Ireland or some fundamental change of circumstance going to the essential basis of the agreement—then we would have the right to withdraw. But in all normal, envisageable and predictable circumstances, particularly while we are negotiating a subsequent agreement to the pace and accelerated timetable that this instrument now requires, we would not do so and it would be wrong to do so—wrong because it would be a breach of our obligations and wrong because this is a law-abiding country.

[Peter Kyle (Hove) (Lab)]

The Attorney General said that it is highly unlikely that through the best endeavours they cannot reach an agreement. For the past four months, the Government have been in Brussels trying to replace the backstop with alternative measures and they have come back empty-handed. The negotiations have not delivered, despite the best endeavours. Is it not the case that the very situation that he describes in two years’ time as being highly unlikely is the situation we are in right now?

[The Attorney General]

No, no, no. We have not been attempting to secure alternative arrangements now. We have been putting forward the fact that, in the future, all those alternative arrangements are likely to exist, so the European Union has responded by saying, “We will set up a new, special negotiating track, we will negotiate with an increased urgency and to a new timetable and we will implement these”—they have defined them—“customs procedures and technologies and so on.” So it is not right to say that the same situation arises now. These systems will be developed over time and that is the purpose of the working group that the Union has agreed to set up with this country.

[Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

I thank the Attorney General for being so patient when I have been working on this unilateral declaration for the past two months and I thank him for including it in the final agreement, but may I ask him a detailed question because the devil is in the detail? There is no doubt, having worked with academic opinion, that a unilateral declaration is absolutely binding as long as it is deposited at the time the treaty is ratified. The unilateral declaration makes it clear that there is nothing to stop the UK leaving the backstop if talks break down, but it has to be a unilateral, conditional, interpretative declaration; that is what international law states. We are signing and agreeing to this withdrawal agreement only on condition—that is why the word “conditional” is important—that, if the talks break down, we can exit. So can the Attorney General now use the word “conditional” to reassure the House?

[The Attorney General]

First, may I say to my right hon. Friend that I am extremely grateful for the dialogue that we have had and he was, in no small part, the author of the seeds of this idea. Much of the material that he and other distinguished lawyers have been able to contribute has led to the proposal that we have now adopted. But I say to him that the unilateral declaration in this case does not need to say “conditional” because it is not objected to by the Union and, if it is not objected to, and the withdrawal agreement is ratified by the Union, it becomes binding.

[Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)]

I hope that the Attorney General can respond to me today without any reference to either his underwear or his genitalia. Last week, he said that we seek

“legally-binding changes to the backstop which ensure that it cannot be indefinite”.

Today, he says that the legal risk remains unchanged. All he is able to offer us is a new work schedule—a sort of glorified to do list. If, as he keeps saying, time is of the essence, has not the Prime Minister wasted the last two months?

[The Attorney General]

I will try to obey the hon. Lady’s strictures about comments that I have made before. May I say to her that that is not quite right? I have said that the legal risk is reduced. The legal risk of being held in the backstop by bad faith or by want of best endeavours has reduced. It has reduced because of significant improvements which, as I have said, set the context and benchmark for the enforceability of those important duties. But it is absolutely true, as she rightly says, that the risk of remaining in the backstop absent any fundamental change of circumstance, if no bad faith or if no want of best endeavours is present, remains the same.

[Dame Caroline Spelman (Meriden) (Con)]

I, too, am not a lawyer, but the Attorney General is doing a very good job of clarifying to me and to the House the important improvements that the negotiating team has brought. A lawyer I know characterised paragraph 19 of his letter as

“a minimal legal risk unlikely to be crystallised”.

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree with that opinion?

[The Attorney General]

Yes, I do. Given what is at stake for the people of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, for the credit and faith of the European Union, which will be on the line, and for our ability to measure its performance against the detailed timetables and procedures that are now in place, I simply do not believe that we will be unable to reach any agreement with them. I repeat: it is perfectly possible to approach this in stages—to agree several agreements. We will be able to agree something over the next two or three years and the first priority, which is set out in this instrument, is the subsequent agreement replacing the backstop.

[Chuka Umunna (Streatham) (Ind)]

My preference would be an arrangement that does not necessitate a backstop. For all the words that the Attorney General has used, is it not the case that none of these things—the joint instrument, the unilateral declaration and the change to the declaration—facilitates an unconditional unilateral withdrawal by the UK from the backstop? More than that, for all the words that he has used, we will still end up paying a divorce bill of more than £50 billion, in part in return for a political declaration that has no legal force whatever. That is the key point.

[The Attorney General]

The hon. Gentleman is not right about that. Under article 184 of the withdrawal agreement, there is a legal duty on the Union and the UK to negotiate a deal that is in line, and according to, the political declaration. He asks, is there any unconditional right to withdraw? With respect, I have answered that question. The only circumstance in which there would be an unconditional right to withdraw is if there were a fundamental change of circumstances pursuant to customary international law.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I commend my right hon. and learned Friend for the way he is pursuing the remit of his office. He is, of course, right that there is a political dimension to the decision that we will all have to make this evening, but may I ask him this question? He has confirmed today that, if there were a fundamental change of circumstances, this country would have the right to walk away from the agreement, but can he also confirm that, if that were to happen and we did walk away, we could take Northern Ireland with us as a member of the United Kingdom, thereby extracting it from the customs union within the EU?

[The Attorney General]

Let me make it clear: the United Kingdom is the United Kingdom, it includes Northern Ireland and there is no circumstance in which the Government of this country, and certainly not a Conservative Government, will ever leave Northern Ireland behind, subject to the obligations under the Belfast agreement. That has been proposed, as my hon. Friend knows. It has been proposed that we should have a termination right for GB only and the Prime Minister explained why that was unacceptable.

[Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)]

The Attorney General says that the joint instrument and the content of the unilateral declaration relating to the withdrawal agreement

“reduce the risk that the United Kingdom could be indefinitely and involuntarily”

held in the backstop in the event of bad faith, but surely that was only ever a very limited risk. Is it not true that the far greater risk of being held in the backstop indefinitely is not as a result of the failure of either party to act in good faith, but because of intractable differences? In such circumstances, is it not right that the people of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland should have the confidence that measures that they can trust will be in place to prevent a hard border, and that the backstop would be exited upon a new agreement being reached? Does not that make perfect sense?

[The Attorney General]

It does make perfect sense. I have to say that I would have preferred to have seen a right of termination, mitigated and graduated, fairly balancing and apportioning risk, and only useable in a last resort, but the Union was not willing to agree to such a reasonable—and what I considered to be moderate—proposal. I agree with the hon. Lady, which is why I voted for the deal. It is sensible that that assurance can be given, and that is why the British Government have given it. I would say, though, that best endeavours is not—particularly now, with the context heightened and the benchmarks tightened—a meaningless duty, because best endeavours requires that a party should consider proposals that are contrary to its interests, and it may have to accept them. A party cannot go on refusing something that requires a reasonable adjustment in its position.

[Richard Drax (South Dorset) (Con)]

Good faith; best endeavours; trust. May I tell my right hon. and learned Friend that they have run out? Many in this country do not trust the EU, and I am sad to say that many in this country do not trust many MPs in this place to deliver what the vote told this country to do. Surely the only option now is to get a clean break, leave on 29 March and get our country back.

[The Attorney General]

I understand my hon. Friend’s frustrations, but I do not agree with his language. I have found those with whom we are doing business in the European Union to be perfectly reasonable and rational people, and I have no complaint about the manner in which negotiations have been conducted—they have always been conducted with cordiality and civility on both sides—so I do not believe that we cannot trust them to reach a deal, because it is in the interests of the Union itself.

[Tom Brake (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD)]

Had the Attorney General been instructed to demonstrate that it is possible to walk away from the backstop by clients at his usual, generous commercial rates, would he have advised them to save their money?

[The Attorney General]

I am not convinced that I fully understood the question, perhaps because I did it too much justice and thought it might be a sensible one. The truth is that I doubt I agree with it.

[Robert Courts (Witney) (Con)]

May I place on the record at the outset that, whatever one may think of the issues at stake, the integrity and honesty of the Attorney General are absolutely above question? I commend him for his approach. Much of this agreement requires consideration of the concept of bad faith, so will he please outline what circumstances would constitute bad faith and how the UK might prove them, bearing in mind that, as he will know, international arbitrators are loth to find that a sovereign state such as the UK or a respected body such as the EU have acted in bad faith? Is it not the case that, were the EU to continue to propose ideas that were in good faith but unacceptable to the UK, such as a customs union, these proposals would not assist us?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Attorney General]

No, I do not agree. The position is more nuanced than that. The pattern of refusing to accept reasonable proposals such as alternative arrangements that could not be said to compromise fundamental interests at the border would be raised immediately—a prima facie question. A pattern of consistent refusal would raise a prima facie question over the best endeavours and good faith clause. As my hon. Friend will have seen, some of these provisions are already in the joint instrument, including systematic conduct, declining to consider, declining to be flexible and declining to consider adverse interests. These best endeavours duties are real duties that are contained in commercial contracts all the time. They are litigated and brought to court, as he will know. We must not allow our fears to run away with us. We need to trust ourselves. We can make the leverage of the backstop as powerful an argument for them not to remain in it as it is for us.

[Mr Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Ind)]

Does not all this hand-wringing over the backstop reflect the hubris of those who thought they could reconcile the irreconcilable—the alchemists who believed that they could conjure up this pretence of Brexit at the same time as a frictionless, open Irish border? Have we not finally reached the end of the road for the spinners, peddlers and blaggers in the leave campaign who stooped to lying about this being the easiest thing in the world?

[The Attorney General]

Of course, claims are made on both sides of the argument in any election or battle before the electorate. I remember some pretty exaggerated ones being made on the hon. Gentleman’s side of the argument, to be frank. If there is a serious point lying beneath that stream of adjectives, I would have to say that I agree with the hon. Gentleman in one respect: the enemy of the interests of this country is dangerous oversimplification of the complexity of the problems that we face. If that is the point that resides beneath his question, I would agree. We cannot underestimate the complexity of separating ourselves from 45 years of organic, legal and other integration with the European Union, but this withdrawal agreement does not underestimate that; it addresses the issues at a complex level, secures rights, and fairly apportions the dues and obligations. It is a deal that we need in order to achieve the first stage of that separation.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

European Union (Withdrawal) Act

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Tuesday 15th January 2019 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney General (Mr Geoffrey Cox)]

I am extremely obliged to you for promoting me, Mr Speaker. Perhaps I can take that as a hint to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister.

[Mr Speaker]

That was of course always part of the intention.

[The Attorney General]

I will suggest the next office you could perhaps promote me to, Mr Speaker.

I am more than conscious that last time I had a prolonged outing in this House the verdict did not go well. [Laughter.] On this occasion, I intend, if I may, to adopt an approach that I hope will be more to the House’s taste. I want to listen to the House’s views, and I shall be as accommodating as possible to the interventions of Members of this House, knowing as I do that many of them have very strong views upon this subject.

I have listened with care to the speeches of Members of this House during the course of last week’s proceedings, and I have been struck by the heartfelt and eloquent expressions of principled opinion that hon. Members have made. I was particularly struck, though I do not think he is in his place this morning, by the speech late last night—I commend you, Mr Speaker, and those who remained here until after 1 o’clock in the morning to complete yesterday’s proceedings—by the hon. Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker). He waited, I think, until midnight or shortly thereafter to begin his speech, and made the most passionate appeal to Members of this House to understand the value of compromise. He told the House that the membership of this place confers on us not only the great privilege of participation in the Government but the responsibilities that go with it.

In the past, when this country has faced these kinds of grave obstacles and impediments to finding a way forward, Members of this place have found the resource within themselves to achieve a compromise and to subordinate their ideal preference—the solution that they would like to see—to that which commands a degree of consensus. It is precisely for that reason that I support the withdrawal agreement—not because I like every element of it but for wholly pragmatic reasons: it is the necessary means to secure our orderly departure and unlock our future outside the European Union.

Since 23 June 2016, we have been on a road that has led us ineluctably to this point. One after another, this House has taken the steps, often by overwhelming majorities, necessary to bring us to the brink of departure, and there are now but two steps to take. The first is this withdrawal agreement. It is the first of the two keys that will unlock our future outside the European Union. It is sometimes said in various circles, I understand, Mr Speaker, that if you are moving from one pressurised atmosphere or environment to another, it is necessary to have an airlock. This withdrawal agreement is the first key that will unlock the airlock and take us into the next stage, where the second key will be the permanent relationship treaty.

[Ian Paisley (North Antrim) (DUP)]

I appreciate the point that the Attorney General has made with regard to the value of compromise. Anyone involved in any significant negotiation knows that compromise, and the timing of it, is absolutely essential. Is he aware of the most recent comments by the retired former Irish ambassador to the EU, a man who worked on behalf of the Republic of Ireland on the Belfast agreement, who said in The Sunday Business Post: “We”—the Irish Government—“were wrong to insist on the backstop—and softening our stance is the only way to prevent ‘no deal’”? Is the Attorney General pushing for that outcome?

[The Attorney General]

Well, of course I would have been infinitely happier if the European Union had not laid down as one of its cardinal negotiating points and principles that there should be a backstop, but it has done that. On the basis of its own guidance to its own negotiating principles, it would have been a demand that it always sought, and we are faced with the position as it now is.

If we take this step of entering this withdrawal agreement, we will then enter a stage where we are to negotiate the second key to unlock our future outside the European Union. What I am commending to the House is that we take this key and we unlock the door to that first chamber—that airlock where we can then settle the permanent relationship that is set out in the political declaration.

[Hilary Benn (Leeds Central) (Lab)]

The Attorney General’s use of the airlock analogy is very striking, but does he realise that the reason many of us will vote against the deal tonight is that on the other side of the second airlock is a complete vacuum about our future relationship with our biggest, nearest and most important trading partner?

[The Attorney General]

I intend to address the very point that the right hon. Gentleman raises, because it is important to distinguish between the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration and the permanent treaties in which the long-term relationship between this country and the European Union will be settled. The political declaration sets the boundaries within which those permanent arrangements will be negotiated. The aims of the withdrawal agreement are to settle the outstanding issues that our departure creates. These are two separate and, importantly, distinguishable functions.

The withdrawal agreement commands across the House, I would submit, with the exception of two areas—the backstop and the political declaration—widespread consensus as to its necessity and its wisdom.

[Frank Field (Birkenhead) (Ind)]

Might I draw the Attorney General’s attention to amendment (n) in my name, which calls on him to be a servant of the House and give his legal judgment on whether undertakings about the backstop and our ability to limit it are binding in law, and therefore actionable in law, internationally? Might he draw our attention to the letter he wrote in consequence—maybe in consequence—to the Prime Minister saying that we actually had that legal basis from the Council’s conclusions on 13 December?

[The Attorney General]

The right hon. Gentleman is of course right to say that I published that letter in the spirit of the conversation I had with him—in the spirit of the Government’s desire to make clear as much information as this House needs to make its judgments.

[Alan Brown (Kilmarnock and Loudoun) (SNP)]

On the backstop, can the Attorney General confirm that fish from Northern Ireland will have tariff-free access into the EU and tariff-free access back to the UK, but fish from Scotland will be subject to tariffs going into the EU, and that therefore Northern Ireland is going to be treated differently from Scotland in the backstop? The Scottish Secretary talked about responsibilities. He said that he would resign if Northern Ireland were given different conditions from Scotland. Is that not the case, and should not the Scottish Secretary consider his position?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Attorney General]

As I understand what the hon. Gentleman said, he has misunderstood. The backstop does not deal with the question of fish at all. It has no policy arrangements—

[Alan Brown]

Will the Attorney General give way?

[The Attorney General]

I am willing to discuss it with the hon. Gentleman later.

[Mr Speaker]

Order. The hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Alan Brown) is rather excitable today. The Attorney General yields to none in his courtesy in the House, but it is not reasonable to expect of him, even with his formidable intellect, the capacity to try to respond to an intervention that he has not heard when he is dealing with one that he has.

[The Attorney General]

I am happy to discuss the matter with the hon. Gentleman afterwards if he wishes.

[Sir Hugo Swire (East Devon) (Con)]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that the non-selection of the amendment in my name and the amendment in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison), the Chairman of the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, makes harder the Government’s challenge this afternoon to convince those of us who are still concerned about the implications of the backstop? What does he think can replace those two amendments?

[The Attorney General]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his question. I have never underestimated the challenge that I face today or the one that the Government face. As I shall come on to say in due course, I have reflected deeply, as he knows, upon the question of the backstop. I have reached the conclusion that it is a risk that it is acceptable to take, even having regard to the perils that it involves if it were to become permanent and the questions that it unquestionably raises in connection with the Union with Northern Ireland.

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

Will the Attorney General confirm that, while the political declaration is aspirational in style, it is not legally binding in international law, but the withdrawal agreement, as a draft international treaty, would be fully binding in international law? Will he also confirm that he is offering the House an embarrassment of riches? After months of debating the backstop, we now have the airlock as well. Are the Government so desperate that they are now offering the House of Commons a buy-one-get-one-free?

[The Attorney General]

My right hon. Friend knows what I mean. The airlock metaphor is indicated to demonstrate the distinction that exists. The withdrawal agreement has been negotiated over thousands of hours and is, as he rightly says, the legally binding text and the only legally binding text. It was only ever empowered under article 50 to deal with historic issues and outstanding matters that otherwise would have catapulted citizens, businesses and Governments into legal uncertainty.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[The Attorney General]

I want to make a bit of progress, because it is important to look at what the withdrawal agreement does.

We should not underestimate the legal complexity of our disentanglement from 45 years of legal integration. It has taken two years and thousands of hours of detailed and arduous negotiation, some of it highly technical, to produce 585 pages of the most minute consideration of the possibilities that no deal would create in legal terms for the millions of people who depend upon the certainty of the legal system and rules to which we have hitherto been subject. It provides for the orderly, predictable and legally certain winding down of our obligations and involvement in the legal systems of the EU. If we do not legislate for that legal certainty, as a matter of law alone, thousands of contracts, transactions, administrative proceedings and judicial proceedings in the European Union and this country will be plunged into legal uncertainty.

It would be the height of irresponsibility for any legislator to contemplate with equanimity such a situation. A litigant in court who was dependent upon having concluded a contract on the basis of EU law and then found themselves suddenly having the rug pulled from under them, not knowing what their legal obligations were, would say to this House, “What are you playing at? What are you doing? You are not children in the playground. You are legislators, and this is your job.”

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[The Attorney General]

I will give way in a moment. I intend to take many interventions in the course of this speech.

We are playing with people’s lives. We are debating the effects of legal continuity. Forty-five years of legal integration have brought our two legal systems into a situation where they are organically linked. To appeal to those who have a medical background, it is the same as if we were to separate from a living organism, with all its arteries and veins, a living organ—a central part from this body politic. We cannot underestimate the complexity of what we are embarked upon doing.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

Will the Attorney General give way?

[The Attorney General]

I cannot resist giving way to the hon. Gentleman.

[Mr Speaker]

The Attorney General, as per usual, is addressing the House with a remarkable combination of the intellect of Einstein and the eloquence of Demosthenes. We are all enjoying it enormously— [Interruption.] Well, I am certainly enjoying it, but I hope he will not cavil if I gently remind him that 71 Members wish to contribute. I know he will tailor his contribution to take account of that important fact.

[Chris Bryant]

The Attorney General is making a good point, which a lot of us agree with—legal uncertainty is the worst possible outcome. That is why some of us are so angry that the vote was taken away from us in December. There is not a single chance of the Government getting the necessary legislation through by 29 March, even if the Attorney General were to get his way today. Can he confirm that if the vote is not won tonight, the Government will have to defer leaving the European Union on 29 March?

[The Attorney General]

The hon. Gentleman knows the affection that I hold for him. It is not “my way”. I understand the heartfelt, passionate and sincere views held on both sides. I listened all last night to the speeches from Members on the Opposition and Government Benches. We must come together now, as mature legislators, to ask ourselves: what are the fundamental objections, if there are any, to this withdrawal agreement? Whether or not it can be done by 29 March does not affect the decision we have to take today, which is: do we opt for order, or do we choose chaos?

[Angus Brendan MacNeil (Na h-Eileanan an Iar) (SNP)]

The Attorney General admitted that there are two problems with the deal. It is a bit like a yachtsman who, when seeing his yacht on the rocks, says, “That anchor chain was great. Only two links were bad.” That is what he is giving the House. It is a disaster, and well he knows it. My second point is that he misunderstood the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Alan Brown). He was not talking about fish being caught, but fish as a commodity once caught. If it is landed in Northern Ireland, it is in a more advantaged position for export to Europe than fish caught and then landed in Scotland for export to Europe. He should recognise that and be straight with my hon. Friend, which I am sure he was trying to be, but he misunderstood the point.

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)]

rose—

[The Attorney General]

I wonder whether I might take the intervention of the hon. and learned Lady.

[Mr Speaker]

Order. In terms of good form, it is the norm for the Minister occupying the Bench or the Member making the speech to offer some response before taking a further intervention. It may be a perfunctory response, but that is the norm.

[The Attorney General]

I apologise, Mr Speaker. I wanted to take the interventions together. If the hon. Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Angus Brendan MacNeil) is referring, in relation to Northern Ireland, to the quota that is to be agreed by the Joint Committee for landing—

[Angus Brendan MacNeil]

When it is caught and then sold.

[The Attorney General]

I would need to examine the issue. I am not certain the hon. Gentleman is right but, again, I have offered to discuss it.

[Joanna Cherry]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman says he is much exercised about legal certainty, so may I ask him about paragraph 2 of his letter yesterday on the exchange of letters? He said that the letters from the Council

“would have legal force in international law and…be relevant and cognisable in the interpretation of the…Agreement…albeit they do not alter the fundamental meanings”

of the withdrawal agreement’s provisions. He, as a senior lawyer, like me will know that in a competition between the letter of assurance and the withdrawal agreement, the withdrawal agreement, as the international treaty, will triumph. That is the case, is it not?

[The Attorney General]

Let me say straightaway, as my letter says, that these assurances, in my view, make a difference to the political question that each of us has to take, but, as I said in the letter, they do not affect the legal equation.

[Nigel Dodds (Belfast North) (DUP)]

On this point about the legal effect and what the Prime Minister said—five weeks ago today, in fact—about legally binding assurances—does not what Attorney General has just said confirm the fact that legally binding assurances have not been achieved? That is the tragedy of where we find ourselves now, after five weeks. In fact, from our point of view, the thing that would have been essential to get this matter through the House with our support was not even asked for, which are the changes that would eliminate the trap of the backstop.

[The Attorney General]

First, let me say to my right hon. Friend, the legal equation remains the same. The assurances are binding in the sense that, in international law, they would be a legally binding interpretative tool. What they do not do is alter the fundamental meaning of the provisions of the withdrawal agreement. In that respect, he is right.

I need to come to the first point that I want to make to the House. Let us examine the rest of the agreement. Do we have—

[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Ind)]

Will the Attorney General give way?

[Mr Shailesh Vara (North West Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

Will the Attorney General give way?

[The Attorney General]

I will in a minute.

Do we have before us—the withdrawal agreement—a sensible settling of these critical historical obligations for continuing transactions to resolve, for millions of people, the legal uncertainty of taking ourselves away from the highly integrated legal system in which we were organically linked and, indeed, part of? The 585 pages—

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[The Attorney General]

I must make some progress. I will take many more interventions.

On the 585 pages, what does the agreement do? First, it secures the rights of 1 million British citizens living in the European Union and of 3 million European Union citizens living in the United Kingdom. What are we to say to them if this House today does not take the advantage of resolving and giving them the certainty of knowing that their position is enshrined in fundamental law?

[Rachel Reeves (Leeds West) (Lab)]

Will the Attorney General give way?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Attorney General]

I will in a moment.

The agreement settles the bills. It legally allows for the orderly completion of these thousands of continuing transactions—judicial proceedings, accounting procedures —that would otherwise be thrown into a legal void. It provides for a period of adjustment for people and for businesses of the next 21 months, extendable up to two years, to allow our businesses and our individual citizens to adjust to the new realities.

That is what I mean by the airlock. It is quite simple: an airlock enables the human body to adjust to the new pressure it will face when it exits the airlock. This period allows the transition and adjustment of this country to enter into the bright new world that we will enter when we leave the European Union. So I say to the House with all due diffidence and respect: we all of us would regard, would we not, these parts of the withdrawal agreement as essential to create the bridge for our departure from the European Union.

[Mr Vara]

My right hon. and learned Friend speaks of the legal complexities of the withdrawal agreement, and he also speaks of a coming together. May I refer him to the advice that he gave to the Prime Minister on 13 November in his capacity as Attorney General? On page 2, paragraph 8, he said:

“for regulatory purposes GB is essentially treated as a third country by NI for goods passing from GB into NI.”

How can he talk about coming together, while his own advice to the Prime Minister talks of anything but?

[The Attorney General]

I understand the force of what my hon. Friend says, but precisely the same prevails in numerous EU countries. For the purposes of regulation, the Canary Islands are treated as a third country to Spain. It is not for the purposes of regulation alone—single market regulations alone. There are examples all around the world of where there are regulatory differences between individual parts of the jurisdiction of sovereign states.

[Lady Hermon (North Down) (Ind)]

On a previous occasion, in early December, in what I thought was a magnificent performance, Attorney General, you used a very striking description of the backstop. You described the backstop as an “instrument of pain”—

[Lady Hermon]

You are quite right, Mr Speaker. The Attorney General described the backstop as an instrument of pain. He said it was

“as much an instrument of pain to the European Union as…to the United Kingdom.”—[Official Report, 3 December 2018; Vol. 650, c. 555.]

That is very strong language indeed—an “instrument of pain” for the European Union. Will the Attorney General take some time to explain that in detail? I think that would be very helpful.

[The Attorney General]

I am immensely obliged to the hon. Lady because that is precisely what I want to move on to.

If we accept, and I urge this House to accept, that effectively 90% of this withdrawal agreement—some 450 of the 585 pages—in fact settles these crucial outstanding matters, which no sensible person could doubt require to be settled in order to effect our departure, that leaves the two grounds of objection that have been advanced—I listen with great care to speeches from Members on the Opposition side of the House—to this agreement and declaration, so may I come to those two grounds? Before I do, I simply say that there are some typical misconceptions about the withdrawal agreement. For example, it is said that the Court of Justice of the European Union retains jurisdiction over our courts once the time-limited obligations have wound down that the withdrawal agreement settles. It does not. It does not. It does not. It does not. How many times do I have to say it to my hon. Friends? [Hon. Members: “More.”] It does not! The fact of the matter is that once—once—these obligations have wound down, the CJEU will have no jurisdiction over the resolution of disputes between individuals, citizens, businesses in our country. This is what our people voted for and we, by adopting this withdrawal agreement, can give it to them.

Secondly, it is said that we will be permanently bound by EU rules. But we will not. The fact of the matter is that the withdrawal agreement’s obligations are inherently time-limited. Once they have wound out, the EU rules will no longer have effect in this country.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

My right hon. and learned Friend is making his case with his usual eloquence, but on that specific point and his point about airlocks, airlocks need exit mechanisms. In the absence of legal certainty that we could unilaterally leave the backstop—my amendment (f) addresses this and I will be pressing it—what certainty is there that the EU does not drag negotiations on, so that we could still, with an extension to the transition period, be discussing these issues in four or five years’ time?

[The Attorney General]

Herein lies the critical question that we all have to confront in connection to the backstop. Before I answer it, however, I will take my hon. Friend’s intervention.

[Charlie Elphicke (Dover) (Con)]

I thank the Attorney General for giving way. While he pauses for breath, may I too take him to the airlock? In travelling through an airlock, it helps to have a supply of air. In this particular case, I would urge conditionality—that we do not agree to write out a cheque for £39 billion of hard-earned taxpayers’ money unless or until a future relationship agreement is agreed that is legally binding. That would give us greater leverage in the negotiation and enable us to deliver serious value for the British taxpayer.

[The Attorney General]

You cannot say to somebody to whom you owe money, “I am not going to pay you my debt unless you give me something else.” It is not attractive, it is not consistent with the honour of this country and it is not consistent with the rule of law. The fact of the matter is that the withdrawal agreement settles those historic obligations.

May I come to the critical question and the challenge that was—

[Mr Peter Bone (Wellingborough) (Con)]

Will the Attorney General give way?

[The Attorney General]

I will do in a moment. Let me get on because time is short and I need to move on.

On the backstop, there is, I would suggest to the House, an inconsistency. There are those who say in this House that the EU will do what is in its interests and that it will, cynically, entrap us in the backstop. They have said—can anybody doubt that this is true?—that the only real thing that is in the best interests of any nation or any organisation of nations is to have cordial relations of good will and co-operation with one’s neighbours. History has taught us that over the centuries. To entrap us in the backstop against the overwhelming political will of this nation would have precisely the opposite effect of cultivating those cordial relations of good will between ourselves and the European Union. Any future relationship will depend on good faith and good will. These assurances, which I accept do not have effect on the legal equation, in my view represent solemn statements of the President, the Council and the Commission, which to breach would be incompatible with the European Union’s continued standing in international relations and forums. But even if—

[Mr Bone]

Will the Attorney General give way on that point?

[The Attorney General]

I must make some progress.

But even if I am wrong about that, let us examine what the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) asked me to look at. What is the position in the backstop? First, the European Union. No Belgian lawyer—there’s a Freudian slip, Mr Speaker. No Belgian fisherman, no French fisherman, no Danish fisherman, no Dutch fisherman will be allowed to point the prow of their trawlers one metre into British waters under the backstop. They will have no access to the rich hunting grounds that for decades they have exploited perfectly lawfully, because the backstop provides them with no legal basis to do so.

I ask the House to reflect. Why does the House think that the rumblings and hollow thunderings of concern are emanating from the counsels of the Quai d’Orsay? They have 10,000 gilets jaunes on the streets of Paris and elsewhere, but if their fishermen are told that they cannot catch a single cod or plaice in the waters of the United Kingdom they will place intense pressure upon the European Union. So I say to the hon. Lady that that fact alone affords a real issue for the member states. But on agriculture, we do not have any further participation in the common agricultural policy under the backstop, and we pay, though we get tariff-free access to the single market, not one penny for that system.

[Anne-Marie Trevelyan (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (Con)]

rose—

[Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

rose—

[The Attorney General]

I must make progress.

I say to my hon. Friends, as I say to Opposition Members, the EU will have to set up entirely different legal and administrative systems in order to set up the customs union that is enshrined within the backstop, yet Britain will pay not one penny of contribution to those complex administrative and technical systems which the EU will, on their side alone, have to finance. How long does the House really think that the EU would wish to go on paying for a bespoke arrangement in which they are paying tens of millions of euros to sustain a customs union that is simply on their own admission a temporary arrangement?

But even if that was wrong, there are the regulatory provisions under the backstop. They are standard non-regression clauses. They exist in free trade agreements all around the world. They provide us with the ability, if we wish to take it, of being flexible about the means by which we achieve the outcomes because all they do is require us to maintain parity of standards with the position we had when we left the European Union. Therefore, it does give us regulatory flexibility if we wish to avail ourselves of it and the European Union is faced with not a penny being paid, with tariff-free access to the customs union, with not having to obey the regulatory law—

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I have been tolerant thus far and I enjoy enormously the performances of the right hon. and learned Gentleman, but this perambulation is very uncommon and irregular. The right hon. and learned Gentleman must face the House. We want to see him and to get directly the benefit of his mellifluous tones.

[The Attorney General]

You upbraid me entirely justly, Mr Speaker, and I apologise.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

Everything the Attorney General says about the backstop may be true, but he knows that many of our hon. Friends are deeply concerned about this and we want an end date. I am not asking him for an answer now, but I see the Prime Minister and the Chief Whip on the Treasury Bench. There is an amendment on the Order Paper that has been selected by Mr Speaker, which could unite the party, or most of it. It is a compromise. If we can have an end date to the backstop, then we can move forward. I do not ask for an answer now, but I beg the Government to consider, over the next six hours, whether they should not accept these amendments because they would try to unlock this process and get it through Parliament.

[The Attorney General]

The amendment that my right hon. Friend has tabled would, in my judgment, not be compatible with our international law obligations. He may know and accept that, but it is certainly my view that it would not be compatible and therefore would be likely not to be seen by the European Union as ratification. It would certainly raise serious question marks over the amendment.

We need to examine the matter without the indulgence of believing that there is any other easy solution. It is sometimes said that the problem with the backstop is that it will not enable us to walk away. That is true, except in this regard: the question is what we would be walking away from. Would the other side regard it as something they would not wish to walk away from, or would it be an embrace that they would like to escape as well? If my hon. and right hon. Friends and Members of the House on both sides come to the conclusion, as I would urge them to do and as I have done after many hours of reflection, that it would be, as the hon. Member for North Down said, an instrument as painful to the European Union as it would be to us, it is a risk, weighed against the other risks, that we should take, if the consequence of not doing so is something worse.

[Mr Bone]

May I take the Attorney General back to some time ago, when he was saying that there was a legal obligation to give £39 billion to the EU, despite the fact that we have been a net contributor of more than £210 billion since the EU started? Will he explain to me on what legal advice he says that, because the House of Lords said there was absolutely no legal obligation?

[The Attorney General]

My hon. Friend is wrong. The House of Lords did not say that. The House of Lords Committee said that there was no obligation in EU law, but that there may well be public international law obligations. The basis of the argument that there are no public international law obligations is in my judgment—I have tested it, as I always do on matters of law, with some very distinguished lawyers with expertise in the field—flimsy at best. The House of Lords Committee did not say there are no public international law obligations.

[Anna Soubry (Broxtowe) (Con)]

Will the Attorney General give way?

[The Attorney General]

I must move on, because the next thing I must deal with is the alternatives.

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

What about giving way to a woman?

[The Attorney General]

I will give way to my right hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry), but first I need to make some progress.

Orderly exit from the European Union would always require a withdrawal agreement along these lines. No alternative option now being canvassed in the House would not require the withdrawal agreement and now the backstop. Let us be clear: whatever solution may be fashioned if this motion and deal are defeated, this withdrawal agreement will have to return in much the same form and with much the same content. Therefore, there is no serious or credible objection that has been advanced by any party to the withdrawal agreement.

It was said last week by the right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) that we should have negotiated a full customs union with a say within the political declaration and then there would have been no need for a backstop, because the agreement could then have been concluded within the transition period. However, he knows, and it is clear, that the European Union is unwilling to and regards itself as bound by its own law not to enter into detailed negotiations on the permanent relationship treaties. The EU was never going to do it, and its own negotiating guidelines said it would not, so there was always going to be this withdrawal agreement, a political declaration setting out a framework and months, if not years, thereafter of detailed negotiation on any final resting place that any political declaration might have.

[Chuka Umunna (Streatham) (Lab)]

Will the Attorney General give way?

[The Attorney General]

I will come to the hon. Gentleman in time. Let us examine the point. The question is what is the basis for the objection to the withdrawal agreement?

[Anna Soubry]

The Attorney General and I are both members of the criminal Bar, although I was never in his league. We both understand the art of negotiation. Someone cannot be a criminal barrister or, indeed, any kind of lawyer unless they understand negotiation. He advances the case for the withdrawal agreement on the basis that it has reached some pragmatic consensus, but I suggest to him that a good negotiation is something that settles things and that a majority can positively support. The problem with this agreement is that it does not settle anything and it does not satisfy the vast majority. In fact, it probably satisfies no one in this House.

[The Attorney General]

I respectfully suggest to my right hon. Friend that that is because the expectations of the withdrawal agreement have been far too unrealistic. [Interruption.] This is a serious issue, and I ask for the indulgence of the House in making what I hope is a serious point, although I have to give way to the hon. Member for Leeds West (Rachel Reeves). If the House does not accept the point, that is fine, but let me at least make it.

The withdrawal agreement and a backstop are the first and necessary precondition of any solution. Members on the Opposition Benches have real concerns about the content of the political declaration and the safeguarding of rights. I listened to Members speak last night about the enshrinement of environmental rights and environmental laws and so on, but the political declaration would never have been able to secure detailed, legally binding text on those matters, which will be discussed and negotiated in the next stage of negotiation. It makes no sense to reject the opportunity of order and certainty now because Members are unhappy that they do not have guarantees about what will be in a future treaty.

What will be in that treaty, governed by the parameters set out by the political declaration that I need to come to in a moment, will be negotiated over the next 21 months. This Government have made a pledge to the House that we will take fully the opinion of the House in all the departmental areas over which the negotiations will take place.

[Stephen Doughty]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Speaker]

The hon. Gentleman is, as always, trying to be helpful, although it was really a point of frustration. The fact is, as I have previously advised the House, that no fewer than 71 hon. and right hon. Members are seeking to catch my eye. There are notable constraints to which I do not wish to add, but of which I feel sure the Attorney General will take account.

[The Attorney General]

I set myself a clear time limit, but I am anxious—[Interruption.] You really cannot win. I am trying to take as many interventions as I can, and I will take that of the hon. Member for Streatham (Chuka Umunna).

[Chuka Umunna]

The Attorney General talks about the danger of setting unrealistic expectations, but it was the Prime Minister sitting next to him who promised in her Lancaster House speech that we would have agreed the future relationship before exit day. Secondly, he makes great play of this implementation period, but it is of no use in some respects if we do not know to what we are transitioning. He knows that we will have a different European Parliament, a different European Council and a different European President, and two other presidents, who will all have changed by the time that the future relationship is due to be settled.

[The Attorney General]

We must start from where we are now. It is easy to say, “We shouldn’t have started from here.” The political declaration sets out clear parameters about the future treaty. First, written into the DNA of the political declaration are two cardinal principles—

[Chuka Umunna]

But it is not a legal document.

[The Attorney General]

It is not a legal document, but no political declaration would ever be a legal document, by definition. Under EU law, we cannot have a finally negotiated text with all the legal detail.

Let me come to the two clear conditions in the political declaration—[Interruption.] I will complete in a few minutes. First, no free movement—

[Rachel Reeves]

Will the Attorney General give way?

[The Attorney General]

Will the hon. Lady forgive me, but I really cannot? Her own colleagues say that I am taking too long, and I must wind up.

The position is that the political declaration includes two clear conditions. First, there will be no free movement. One cannot belong to the single market without participating in the four freedoms, therefore we will have a deal that admits of a spectrum of landing places where we will not belong to the single market.

[Rachel Reeves]

Will the Attorney General give way?

[The Attorney General]

No, I must now make progress.

Secondly, there will be an independent trade policy. One cannot have a customs union—certainly one that is not bespoke—while having an independent trade policy. The Labour Front-Bench team say that they want a customs union with a say. That would be the first time—if it were ever negotiable—that the European Union had allowed a third country to have any say over commercial policy. Therefore, it is a fantasy, a complete fiction.

The Labour Front-Bench team also say that they want a strong single market deal, forming the exact same benefits—

[Rachel Reeves]

Will the Attorney General give way?

[The Attorney General]

No. The same benefits but with no free movement—that is exactly what the Government want. They want a clear, strong, deep relationship with the European Union with no free movement, so I say to Labour hon. Gentlemen and Ladies and—

[Rachel Reeves]

But the Attorney General will not hear this hon. Lady.

[The Attorney General]

All right.

[Rachel Reeves]

I thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way. He has been speaking for almost an hour, and for almost that entire time he has been addressing the concerns of a wing of his party, rather than the concerns of this House. In the past week, two amendments have been passed, neither with the support of the Government—to the Finance Bill and to the business motion—and both those amendments made it clear that the view of this House is to avoid a no-deal Brexit. That is the priority of this House—not the issue of the backstop, which he seems to have been addressing for the past hour. Instead of trying to unite his party, as the right hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) has urged him to do, will the Attorney General try to unite the country, and to do the right thing by it, by ruling out leaving the European Union on 29 March without a deal?

[The Attorney General]

The hon. Lady can eliminate a no deal today; all she has to do is to vote for this one. In reality, it is the height of irresponsibility for the Labour party, which claims to be a party of Government, to plunge millions of our citizens into legal uncertainty of that type because of a factitious, trumped-up basis of opposition, whereas the real strategy is to drive this Government and this House on to the rocks, and to create the maximum chaos and the conditions for a general election—[Interruption.] We know the game, I say—[Interruption.] It is as clear as day—[Interruption.]

[Mr Speaker]

Order. Zen—the House must calm itself. It is an early stage of our proceedings.

[The Attorney General]

I say to the House with the greatest respect, we must seize this opportunity now. This is the key—the first of two—by which we unlock our future outside the European Union. I believe that it is an exciting future. I believe that the opportunity for this House to hold the pen on 40% of our laws, from the environment through to agriculture and fishing, should excite us as an opportunity to do good in this country.

Let us not forget, however, that many outside this House as well as in it wish to frustrate the great end to which the people of this country committed us on 23 June 2016—17.4 million of them in hundreds of constituencies, regardless of party, voted to part company with a political structure that no longer commanded their assent. We should be deeply grateful, because in other ages and other places, such a moment could only have been achieved by means that all of us present would deplore—but we should not underestimate the significance of the moment because it was expressed peacefully by the ballot.

If we approve this agreement, we know that we shall leave the EU on 29 March in an orderly way, and can commence negotiation of the permanent treaties. This agreement and the accompanying political declaration are the two keys that unlock the demand of the electorate that we should repatriate control over vast areas of our laws that hitherto have been in the exclusive legislative competence of the EU. If we do not take that first step, history will judge us harshly, because we will be plunged into uncertainty.

If this vote fails today, those who wish to prevent our departure will seek to promote the conclusion that it is all too difficult and that the Government should ask the electorate to think again. That is why former Prime Ministers and their spin doctors, and all their great panjandrums of the past, are joining the chorus to condemn this deal, for they know that this deal is the key. There is no other. Destroy it—in some form or other, the only practicable deal—and the path to Brexit becomes shrouded in obscurity. If we should be so deceived as to permit that, when historians come to write of this moment, future ages would marvel that the huge repatriation of powers that this agreement entails—over immigration, fisheries, agriculture, the supremacy of our laws and courts—was rejected because somehow it did not seem enough and because of the Northern Ireland backstop.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Clarke]

If I give way to my right hon. Friend, who is a good friend, I shall suddenly find that everyone is leaping up, and I will not keep my word if I start giving way.

The outcome that I wish to see is, as it happens, the same as the Government’s declared outcome. Keeping to the narrower matters of trade and investment, we should keep open borders between the United Kingdom and the rest of the European Union and have trade relationships that are as free and frictionless as we have at the moment. I shall listen to people arguing that that is not in the best interests of the United Kingdom and future generations, but that is an impossible case to make. It is self-evident that we should stay in our present free trade agreement. We cannot have free trade with the rest of the world while becoming protectionist towards continental Europe by erecting new barriers. Nobody said to the electorate at the time of the referendum that the purpose of the whole thing was to raise new barriers to two-way trade and investment.

It seems quite obvious, and factually correct in my opinion, that if we wish to keep open borders—the land border, which happens to be in Ireland, and the sea border around the rest of the British Isles—we will have to be in a customs union and in regulatory alignment with the EU, which would greatly resemble what we call the single market. All this stuff about new technology may come one day when every closed border in the world will vanish, but under WTO rules we have to man the border if there are different tariffs and regulatory requirements on either side. That is where we have got to go, and we will have to tighten things up sooner or later.

The Government keep repeating their red lines, some of which were set out at an early stage long before the people drafting the speeches had the first idea about the process they were about to enter into. Most of the red lines now need to be dropped. The standard line is that we cannot be in a customs union because that would prevent us from having trade agreements with the rest of the world, which is true. We cannot have a common customs barrier enforced around the outside of a zone if one member is punching holes through it and letting things in under different arrangements from other countries. For some, that is meant to be the global future—the bright and shining prospect of our being outside the European Union, which nobody proposed in the referendum. As far as I can see, such things stemmed from a brilliant speech made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip (Boris Johnson), who was praised for putting an optimistic tone on it all. He held out this vision of great countries throughout the world throwing open their markets to us in relief when we left the European Union and offering us better terms than we have spent the last few years obtaining when taking a leading role in negotiating together with the European Union.

Of course, the key agreement that is always cited is the trade agreement that we are going to have with Donald Trump’s America, which is a symbol of the prospects that await us, and China apparently comes next. I have tried in both places. I have been involved in trade discussions with those two countries on and off for the best part of 20 years. They are very protectionist countries, and America was protectionist before President Trump. I led for the Government on negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. The reason why the EU-US deal had the funny title of TTIP was that we could not call it a free trade agreement, because the Americans said that Congress was so hostile to the idea of free trade that we could not talk about such an agreement, so we had to give it another title.

We got nowhere, even under the Obama Administration, because we wanted to open up public procurement and access to services, including financial services, in the United States, and I can tell you that it was completely hopeless trying to open up their markets. We are told that things are different with President Trump, that the hopes for President Trump are a sign of the new golden future that is before us. However, President Trump has no time for WTO rules. He has been breaking them with some considerable vigour, and he will walk out of the WTO sooner or later. His view of trade deals is that he confronts allied partner countries and says that the United States should be allowed to export more to them and that they should stop exporting so much to the United States. He has enforced that on Canada and Mexico, and he is having a good go at enforcing it on China.

President Trump’s only expressed interest in a trade deal with Britain is that we should throw open our markets to American food, which is produced on an almost industrial scale very competitively and in great quantities. That trade deal would require one thing: the abandonment of European food and animal welfare standards that the British actually played a leading part in getting to their present position in the rest of the EU, and the adoption of standards laid down by Congress—the House of Representatives and the Senate—in response to the food lobby. There is no sovereignty in that. Nobody is going to take any notice of the UK lobbying the American Congress on food standards. It is an illusion.

If we had enforced freedom of movement properly before all this, we would not be in this trouble. All the anti-immigrant element of the leave vote was not really about EU workers working here. We were already permitted to make it a condition that people could only come here for a prearranged job, and we were permitted to say that someone would have to leave if they did not find a new job within three months of losing one. Everybody in this House and outside falls over themselves with praise for the EU workers in the national health service and elsewhere, but it is another illusion.

Given the present bizarre position, my view is that we must get on with the real negotiations, because we have not even started them yet. It is not possible to start to map out the closest possible relationship with the EU if we are going to be forced to leave. We are in no position to move on from this bad debate and then sort everything out by 29 March. It is factually impossible not only to get the legislation through but to sort out an alternative to the withdrawal agreement if it is rejected today.

We should extend article 50, but that involves applying to the EU and it implies getting the EU’s consent, which would be quite difficult for any length of time. I advocate revoking article 50, because it is a means of delay. We should revoke it—no one can stop us revoking it —and then invoke it again when we have some consensus and a majority for something. I will vote against it again, but there is a massive majority in this House in favour of invoking article 50.

[The Attorney General]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Clarke]

I will annoy everyone else by giving way this once.

[The Attorney General]

I am admiring my right hon. and learned Friend’s speech minute by minute, but there is one point on which he is wrong. We cannot revoke article 50 unless we provide satisfactory evidence to the European Union that we are cancelling our departure—not suspending it, not pausing it, but cancelling it.

[Mr Clarke]

I have not been in legal practice for 40 years so, if that is the case, I will examine it and look at what authority my right hon. and learned Friend gives me. Would we be prevented permanently thereafter from ever invoking article 50 again? I would like to examine that proposition. If that is the case, we have to extend article 50, but we cannot carry on having this chaotic debate and, in the next 70 days, coming to conclusions that commit this country to a destiny that will have a huge effect on the next generation or two, because we are heading towards leaving with no deal at all, which would be just as catastrophic as he described.

The vast majority of Members of Parliament are flatly against leaving without a deal. For that reason, pragmatism and common sense require us to vote for this withdrawal agreement to try to get back to some sort of orderly progress.

Exiting the EU: Publication of Legal Advice

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Wednesday 5th December 2018 Written Statements

[The Attorney General (Mr Geoffrey Cox)]

Following the motion passed yesterday in the House of Commons, I am today placing in the Libraries of both Houses a copy, in full, of the final advice that I provided to Cabinet on 14 November on the legal effect of the withdrawal agreement.

The action responds to the Humble Address motion of the House of Commons passed on 13 November.

The release of this advice does not set a precedent for any future release of Law Officers’ advice. It remains a fundamental constitutional convention that neither the fact, nor the content, of Law Officers’ advice is disclosed outside Government without the Law Officers’ consent. That convention provides the fullest guarantee that the business of Governments is conducted at all times in the light of thorough and candid legal advice, which may also enter into matters of acute sensitivity to the public interest. The Leader of the House of Commons has asked the Committee of Privileges to inquire into the serious constitutional implications of Humble Address motions in such circumstances and I very much hope that it moves to do so as swiftly as possible.

The constitutional tensions created between the expression of the will of the House of Commons by these means on the one hand, and the public interest in the Law Officers’ convention on the other, are not themselves conducive to the proper conduct of public affairs. It is necessary that the public has confidence in the ability of Government and Parliament to work together at a time of national decision-making of the most profound significance. The standing of the House of Commons is also of prime importance. For these reasons, having tested the will of the House twice, the Government will respect their decision and, in these exceptional circumstances and to resolve for the present those constitutional tensions, they have decided, with my consent, to publish this advice.

It is the Government’s purpose and intention that the House will be enabled to address clearly the policy and political decisions now before it, bearing the national interest in mind.

[HCWS1142]

Withdrawal Agreement: Legal Position

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Monday 3rd December 2018 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney General (Mr Geoffrey Cox)]

It is very good of the Prime Minister to warm up for me today.

With permission, Mr Speaker, I wish to make a statement to the House. I should make clear the context in which I consider that I am to do so today; my statement is intended to inform the debate that is shortly to commence on the motion to approve the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration on the future relationship concluded with the European Union by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister.

It is important to understand how the Law Officers habitually give their advice, which may be a mixture of oral and written communications given at different times during fast-developing events. Ministers are advised by their own departmental lawyers, and the points that arise for consideration of the Law Officers are invariably limited to the relatively few of particular importance to the policy decision of the Government. Therefore, my statement today is complemented by a detailed legal commentary, provided for the purpose of the debate and published this morning, that analyses the effect of the agreement as a whole. That legal commentary has been produced with my oversight and approval, and I commend it to the House as both an accurate examination of the provisions of the agreement and a helpful exposition of some of the salient issues that arise from them.

There is, of course, no want of other sources of helpful commentary available to the House, and in making this statement in these unusual circumstances and in answering any questions that hon. Members may have, I consider that I have a solemn and constitutional duty to this House to advise it on these legal questions objectively and impartially, and to place such legal expertise as I have at its disposal. The historical precedents strongly support that view. The House may be sure that I shall discharge this duty with uncompromising and rigorous fidelity. If this agreement is to pass this House, as I strongly believe it should, I do not believe that it can or should pass under any misapprehension whatsoever as to the legal matters on which that judgment should be based.

It is important to recall that the matters of law affecting the withdrawal can only inform what is essentially a political decision that each of us must make. This is a question not of the lawfulness of the Government’s action but of the prudence, as a matter of policy and political judgment, of entering into an international agreement on the terms proposed. In the time available to me, it is impossible to have covered each of the matters of law that might arise from 585 pages of complicated legal text, and no Attorney General—certainly not this one—can instantly possess the answers to all of the pertinent questions that the skill and ingenuity of hon. Members may devise.

However, I am aware that there are certain parts of the agreement the meaning of which attracts the close and keen interest of the House, and it is to some of these that I now turn: first, the Northern Ireland protocol and some of the other provisions of the withdrawal agreement relevant to it. The protocol would come into force, if needed, on the conclusion of the implementation period on 31 December 2020 unless, pursuant to article 132 of the agreement, both the UK and the EU agreed to a single extension for a fixed time of up to one or two years. By article 1, the protocol confirms that it would affect neither the constitutional status of Northern Ireland nor the principle of consent as set out in the Belfast or Good Friday agreement. The statutory guarantee that a majority in Northern Ireland would be required to consent to a change in its constitutional status as part of the United Kingdom and the associated amendment to the Irish constitution to remove its previous territorial claim remain in place.

Once in force, by article 2.1 of the protocol, the parties would be obliged, in good faith, to use their best endeavours to conclude by 31 December 2020 an agreement that supersedes it. There is a separate but closely related duty on the parties under article 184 to negotiate expeditiously and use best endeavours in good faith to conclude an agreement in line with the political declaration. Having regard to those obligations, by article 1.4 of the protocol, it is expressly agreed not to be intended to establish a permanent relationship but to be temporary. That language reflects the fact that article 50 of the Treaty on European Union does not provide a legal basis in Union law for permanent future arrangements with non-member states.

If either party did not comply with its obligations of good faith after the implementation period, it would be open to them to bring a complaint under the dispute settlement provisions set out in articles 164 to 181 of the agreement. These include independent arbitration. Clear and convincing evidence would be required to establish a breach of that obligation. If the protocol were to come into force, it would continue to apply in international law unless and until it was superseded by the intended subsequent agreement, which achieved the stated objectives of maintaining the necessary conditions for continued north-south co-operation, avoiding a hard border and protecting the Belfast agreement in all its dimensions.

There is therefore no unilateral right for either party to terminate this arrangement. This means that if no superseding agreement can be reached within the implementation period, the protocol would be activated and in international law would subsist even if negotiations had broken down. How likely that is to happen is a political question, to which the answer will no doubt depend partly on the extent to which it is in either party’s interests to remain indefinitely within its arrangements.

Under the protocol, the UK would form with the EU a single customs territory for goods for fiscal or tariff purposes. Accordingly, Northern Ireland would form part of the same customs territory as Great Britain, with no tariffs, quotas or checks on rules of origin between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. However, Northern Ireland would additionally apply defined aspects of the EU’s single market rules relating to the regulation and control of the supply of electricity on the island of Ireland; goods, including cross-border VAT rules; and the EU customs code. Those rules would be enforced as they are now, including preliminary references from Northern Ireland courts to the Court of Justice of the European Union.

By those means, the need for any hard border would be avoided, and goods originating in Northern Ireland would be entitled to free circulation throughout the EU’s single market. In all other respects of its regulatory regime, Northern Ireland would follow the applicable UK legislation, save where those were devolved. By article 7, a Northern Ireland business would also enjoy the same free circulation of its goods throughout the United Kingdom, while its EU competitor—whether situated in the Republic of Ireland or elsewhere in the single market—would not.

I turn to the role of Union law and the CJEU under the withdrawal agreement and within the dispute settlement provisions. It is important to place these provisions in the context of the objectives of the agreement, which is the orderly exit of the UK from the EU for our citizens and businesses. To that end, following the implementation period, the agreement provides for the continued application of Union law in defined and strictly limited respects, where it is necessary or desirable for legal certainty to do so.

Although we will legally leave the EU and cease to be a member state on 29 March 2019, part 4 of the agreement provides for an implementation or transition period of 21 months, which is designed to enable our people and our businesses to adjust to the changes that are coming. During that implementation period, so as to give the time, predictability and continuity that is needed, it is provided that Union law should continue to apply, and the laws, systems and institutions of the EU will have the same role and functions as before.

But on the conclusion of that period, on 31 December 2020, that will come to an end. Thereafter, Union law and the Court of Justice will possess a relevance in the United Kingdom only in so far as it is necessary, in limited and specific areas, for the winding down of the obligations of our relationship of 45 years. For example, the rights of our own citizens living in EU member states and of EU citizens in the United Kingdom are created and defined by Union law. If they are to be preserved in equal measure and with the necessary consistency and certainty, it is inevitable that the mutually protected residence and social security rights of those particular groups of people must continue to be defined by reference to that law. Those rights are provided for in part 2 of the agreement.

Our citizens living in member states throughout the EU will continue, as is natural, to depend for their ultimate protection on the CJEU, while EU citizens living in the United Kingdom will look to the UK independent monitoring authority set up under article 159 and to the UK courts. But they will no longer be able, as now, to require our Supreme Court to refer a question of interpretation of their rights under Union law to the CJEU where the determination of such a question is necessary to resolve a dispute.

Instead, pursuant to article 158, the UK courts, for a fixed period of eight years only, may refer—I repeat, may refer—to the CJEU a question of interpretation of part 2 of the agreement in the interests of achieving consistency in the enforcement of the rights of citizens while the new system is established. After that time, our courts will, pursuant to article 4.5, continue to interpret concepts and provisions of Union law in the areas in which the agreement applies it as they always have, and to have due regard to relevant post-implementation case law where, for example, it may be required for the practical operation of the agreement, such as in regard to the co-ordination of social security rights for the protected EU and UK citizens.

Part 3 deals with the lawful conclusion of judicial and administrative proceedings, transactions, processes and other matters that have arisen or commenced under Union legal frameworks before the end of the implementation period, and to which Union law and the role of institutions must continue to apply for their orderly disposition. It allows a four-year limitation period on the power of the Commission to refer to the Court an alleged breach of an obligation incurred prior to the end of the implementation period.

Part 5 deals with our agreed financial obligations. It provides, under article 160, for Union law and the jurisdiction of the Court to apply beyond the implementation period only for the time and purpose of closing out the UK’s financial obligations and entitlements incurred under Union law, again prior to the end of that period.

All these are inherently time-limited functions, and once they are at an end the Court will have no jurisdiction in relation to disputes involving citizens and businesses in the United Kingdom. A dispute between the EU and the UK about the systemic operation or interpretation of the agreement may be referred by either side to an independent arbitration panel in which the Court has no automatic role, but if the panel needs to and a question of interpretation of Union law is relevant to the dispute, it can ask the Court to resolve that question. It is then for the panel to apply that interpretation to the facts of the dispute, and thus decide how the dispute should be resolved.

The divorce and separation of nations from long and intimate unions, just as of human beings, stirs high emotion and calls for wisdom and forbearance. It calls also for calm and measured evaluation by the House of the terms of the separation agreement in the light of the complexity and difficulty of the task it is intended to achieve. The gradual loosening and removal of the legal ties that have bound us to the European Union for 45 years will take time to work out. This agreement and the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, already passed by the House, allow for the necessary time and legal means for that process to unfold in a peaceful and orderly way.

I am at the disposal of the House to answer questions, in so far as I can, on these and other legal matters. I commend this statement to the House.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds (Torfaen) (Lab)]

I am of course grateful to the Attorney General for his statement, and for advance sight of it, but all Members who are asking questions are at a major disadvantage, because they have not read the legal advice on which the statement is based. That is totally unacceptable when aspects of the Attorney General’s advice have been selectively leaked to the press over the weekend. For example, it has been reported that in a letter to Cabinet Ministers last month, the Attorney General said, in respect of the backstop arrangement,

“The protocol would endure indefinitely”

if trade talks broke down. In his statement, the Attorney General talked about political factors that might, in his view, make the backstop temporary, but in reality, that is not the legal position. Perhaps he can confirm that the legal position is as set out in the letter—that the protocol will “endure indefinitely” if the trade talks break down.

On 13 November in this House, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer)—the shadow Brexit Secretary—and I were very clear on what was being sought: the final, full advice provided by the Attorney General to the Cabinet on any completed withdrawal agreement should be made available to all MPs in good time for the vote on the deal. Offers short of that, including of the Attorney General’s statement today and of a summary made by the Government, were rejected, and the House unanimously passed a motion to that effect. [Interruption.] “Playing games,” shouts the Chancellor. On 13 November, the Conservative party could not get one of its MPs to vote against the motion—not one.

The document that has been produced is, in the Attorney General’s own words, a legal commentary, produced with his oversight and approval. It is not the final legal advice to the Cabinet. Frankly, the explainer produced alongside the withdrawal agreement was longer and more detailed than this document. Is not the reality that the Government do not want MPs to see the full legal advice, for fear of the political consequences?

There is no point whatever in trying to hide behind the Law Officers’ convention. The ministerial code and “Erskine May” are very clear: Ministers have the discretion, under that convention, to make advice available in exceptional circumstances. What circumstances could be more exceptional than these? The economic, political and constitutional integrity of our country is at stake.

I quote paragraph 82 of the legal commentary:

“The Agreement does not contain any provision on its termination. In the absence of such a provision, it is not possible under international law…to withdraw from the Agreement unilaterally.”

A straight question to the Attorney General: can he direct me or the House to any other international treaty to which the UK is party that it has no unilateral right to terminate? Can he even name one?

Furthermore, articles 1.4 and 2.1 of the backstop protocol are clear that its provisions

“shall apply unless…they are superseded, in whole or in part, by a subsequent agreement.”

[Interruption.] No, the “in whole or in part” bit was not commented on in the statement, actually. Put simply, that means that parts of the backstop could become permanent, even in the event of a trade deal being agreed. I ask the Attorney General directly: what is his view on which parts of the backstop arrangement in this protocol are most likely to become permanent?

May I raise with the Attorney General the issue of the impact on the Good Friday agreement? Page 306 of the withdrawal agreement refers to the need for the protocol to be implemented so as to

“maintain the necessary conditions for continued North-South cooperation,”

including the conditions for possible new arrangements in accordance with the 1998 agreement. So can the Attorney General tell the House, in his view: first, which new arrangements he believes would be in accordance with the 1998 Good Friday agreement; and, secondly, which arrangements he believes would not be in accordance with it?

In the first instance, it will be for you, Mr Speaker, to rule on whether there has been an arguable case of contempt for what we on the Opposition Benches believe to be a failure to comply with the motion of 13 November. For the sake of our economy, our jobs and our futures, all possible information should be made available to Members of this House. The Government should do the right thing and make the full advice available. With so much at stake for all our constituents and with eight days to go before the vote on the deal, this House and this country deserve better from this Government.

[The Attorney General]

First, let me say that the hon. Gentleman has far better than any advice I may or may not have given to the Government: he can ask me. All he has to do is ask and he will receive, because I will give him a frank answer. [Interruption.]

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I know the Attorney General is very well able to—[Interruption.] Order. Members must calm themselves. I know the Attorney General is very well able to look after himself, but I simply and gently counsel Members—gently, at this stage—not to yell from a sedentary position in that way. The right hon. and learned Gentleman would not, I am sure, be accustomed to such treatment in a court. If he were subject to it, I think the judge would take a very dim view. [Interruption.] Order. He is entitled to a courteous reception. As the House knows from experience, I will want to hear everyone who wishes to question him. But in the first instance, be calm and behave.

[The Attorney General]

It is very rare for the Attorney General to appear to answer questions in the House on matters of law. I am doing so, so that Opposition and Government Members can have a full, frank and thorough opportunity to ask me, as the Government’s chief legal adviser and as an adviser to the House on constitutional and legal matters, what our legal position is. I assure the House that if questions are asked, I shall answer them candidly.

The hon. Gentleman told me that I had not said anything about the subsistence of the Northern Ireland protocol. Let me make no bones about the Northern Ireland protocol: it will subsist. We are indefinitely committed to it if it comes into force. There is no point in my trying or the Government trying to disguise that fact. The truth, however, is this: what is the political imperative of either entering into it or not entering into it? That is a calculated equation of risk that each Member of this House is going to have to weigh up, and do so against different alternatives.

The hon. Gentleman also mentioned that I should answer whether other treaties are permanent. Hundreds of treaties throughout the world are permanent—treaties on borders, treaties on rivers; the Vienna convention has entire sections on permanent treaties. If the hon. Gentleman wants me to enumerate some, I will write to him with them—I am afraid I do not have them to hand. There is an entire section of the Vienna convention on permanent treaties. The question whether we have a right to terminate under the convention is a matter of construction. Let me make it plain: there is no such right to terminate if the Northern Ireland protocol comes into force. The question of how likely it is to remain in force is a political judgment to be based on factors largely relating, as I have said, to in whose interests it would be to remain in it for longest. [Interruption.]

[Mr Speaker]

I call Mr Kenneth Clarke—[Interruption.] Order. It is rather unseemly for people to yell out, “Is that it?” The Attorney General, to be fair, has given a very full response—[Interruption.] Order. Members can make of it what they will, but in any case, everybody should cheer up now, because we are about to hear from the Father of the House.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)]

Whether that will cheer people up or not, I have no idea.

First, I sincerely congratulate my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General on his masterly exposition of the facts and the law, which put paid to quite a lot of the paranoia and conspiracy theories that have been running around all too often in our European debate.

Secondly, does my right hon. and learned Friend accept that it was central to the Good Friday agreement—the Belfast agreement—that both sides committed themselves timelessly to an open border, and that will be all wrapped up if we ever move to the Northern Ireland protocol? It would be quite shameful if the European Union, the Republic of Ireland or the United Kingdom were given the right unilaterally to terminate that arrangement at a time of their political choosing, so this is perfectly sensible. Does he also agree that both the United Kingdom and the European Union will have reasons to hesitate before going into the protocol—they may prefer to extend the transition agreement—and that neither of the parties will have any political motive for staying indefinitely in that protocol?

In his exposition, I think my right hon. and learned Friend has done what he was trying to do: got rid of all these theories about the ECJ still being involved, as it obviously will have to be, in the rights of British citizens after we leave, and enabled the House to get back to the real political debate that we have to have in the next few days.

[The Attorney General]

I am most grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for his question. The truth of the matter is that the Northern Ireland protocol would represent a solemn commitment to the people of Northern Ireland that this Government will honour and respect the Belfast agreement. I make no bones about it: I would have preferred to have seen a unilateral right of termination in the backstop. I would have preferred to have seen a clause that allowed us to exit if negotiations had broken down irretrievably, but I am prepared to lend my support to this agreement because I do not believe—[Interruption.] I am most grateful for those cheers of applause. I do not believe that we are likely to be entrapped in the backstop permanently. I can give reasons why I say that, but my right hon. and learned Friend has foreshadowed them. So I agree with him: this represents a sensible compromise. It has unattractive and unsatisfactory elements for us, but it is for the House to weigh it up against the potential alternatives and to assess whether it amounts to a calculated risk that this Government and this House should take in these circumstances, weighed up against the realities of the alternatives.

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)]

The binding motion passed by this House on 13 November ordered the production of any legal advice in full, including that provided by the Attorney General, and with a particular focus on the Northern Ireland backstop—not a commentary, but the legal advice in full. The House did not divide. The Government effectively conceded that these were exceptional circumstances and that the normal, very important convention would not apply, so that ship has sailed.

The Attorney General and I are both senior lawyers in our own jurisdictions, so I am sure that he will not want to insult my intelligence or that of the House by pretending that this Command Paper reflects in any way the nuanced advice that he will have given to the Cabinet, focused on particular questions such as those that we saw leaked over the weekend. For example, he just said that it is not his belief that we will be trapped in the backstop permanently, but this House, which has to take the final decision—not the Cabinet—is not interested in his belief; it is interested in his legal opinion. Can he confirm, as a matter of law, that there is nothing to prevent the backstop from becoming the permanent UK-EU relationship in the event that the two sides cannot agree a future economic relationship? That is a matter of law.

Will the Attorney General acknowledge something else? He is a democrat, the Government are democrats; they have gone on incessantly about the will of the people for the last two years and profess to believe in parliamentary sovereignty. We sitting in this House are the representatives of the people, and we voted to see his advice in full, not his commentary, so will he undertake to produce that advice—the sort of nuggets that were leaked over the weekend, but in full—before the rise of the House today, and before tomorrow’s debate, or is he prepared to run the risk of being found in contempt of Parliament merely to protect the Conservative and Unionist party against further internal strife?

[The Attorney General]

I have the greatest respect for the hon. and learned Lady. She has put her case rationally and reasonably, and I will deal with her points one by one. She asked whether there was anything to prevent the protocol from becoming permanent in the event of no agreement. As a matter of international law, no there is not—it would endure indefinitely, pending a future agreement being arranged—but that does not exhaust all the matters of law. As a matter of EU law, it would, in those circumstances, be highly vulnerable to legal challenge. It is widely accepted, including by the EU Commission and taskforce 50, that article 50 is not a sound legal foundation for permanent arrangements between states. If negotiations irretrievably broke down, the protocol would de facto become permanent and therefore seriously challengeable in the Court of Justice of the European Union for being invalid. That legal uncertainty by itself is sufficient to promote to the EU the need to do a deal with us. It would be profoundly detrimental to thousands—indeed millions—of traders throughout the single market. That is one factor that convinces me that this is a risk worth taking.

[Mr Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

I start by welcoming without reservation my right hon. and learned Friend to his position. He knows that I have believed for many years that he should have filled this post.

I welcome my right hon. and learned Friend’s statement. Page 6 of his document refers to what is defined as “good faith”. He mentioned the International Court of Justice, so I hope he will not mind if I quote from one of its judgments referenced in footnote 8. He talked about how long the backstop should last and what defined “good faith”. The judgment states that

“the failure of the Parties to reach agreement, 16 years after the conclusion of”—

earlier negotiations—

“does not itself establish that either Party has breached its obligation to negotiate in good faith.”

As my right hon. and learned Friend knows, his right hon. Friends on the Front Bench one by one have used good faith as their defence for being locked into this problem of the backstop and as their explanation of how we will get out. As a matter of law, is good faith required for best endeavours?

[The Attorney General]

The duty of good faith and to use best endeavours is a legally enforceable duty. There is no doubt that it is difficult to prove—[Interruption]—as I hear from a sedentary position, but that is not to say that it has not been proven. The case reports of the International Court of Justice, as well as arbitral tribunals throughout the world, have recorded decisions where tribunals have found breaches of good faith duties. There would need to be clear and convincing evidence that the breakdown of communication was due to bad faith—I fully accept that—but if the EU refused to engage with us, strung out negotiations in a thoroughly unreasonable way or failed to observe reasonable time limits, those would be hallmarks of a possible case of breach of good faith. It is a meaningful legal obligation.

I remind the House that we are dealing here with the United Kingdom on one hand and the European Union on the other. Their reputations in international forums, and their reputations as a question of international law, are at stake. If you put your name to a solemn legal obligation to negotiate something in good faith within a certain time limit, it is a very serious obligation of which to acquit yourself: it cannot just be played fast and loose with.

[Nigel Dodds (Belfast North) (DUP)]

As the right hon. and learned Gentleman knows, I have the utmost and deepest respect for him in relation to his approach to these issues and the discussions that we have had, but he has said himself that the whole business is deeply unsatisfactory and unattractive, which makes me wonder why he is recommending the agreement. It seems to me that we are now reliant on our learned friends to take cases in international courts, rather than this sovereign Parliament being able to decide when we can get out of these backstop arrangements.

Can the Attorney General confirm what he said—that this is an indefinite arrangement that can be permanent in law, despite what some of his Cabinet colleagues are saying? I do not have time to go into all this, because, as other Members have said, we need to see the actual legal advice as requested by the House—that must happen—but can he also confirm that under article 15 of the Northern Ireland protocol, the Northern Ireland customs arrangements mean that Northern Ireland will form part of the EU customs territory and not the United Kingdom’s, although “a single customs territory” is established between the UK and the EU? Will he confirm that under article 4 of the protocol, there is a new right under international law—one that is not in the Belfast agreement of 1998—for the EU to oversee certain aspects of the implementation of that 1998 agreement?

I have added those detailed points, which I will follow up with the Attorney General in later discussions, but the overall context is, as he has said, a deeply unattractive, unsatisfactory agreement. Rather than recommending it, he needs to recommend that it be rejected.

[The Attorney General]

The right hon. Gentleman has thrown down the gauntlet in asking me to re-examine my support for the agreement. I do not mind confessing to him that I have wrestled with this question, because I am a Unionist and dislike any divergence between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom; but I have had also to take into account first that this is an arrangement that we can avoid, and secondly that if we were in it, it would be as much an instrument of pain to the European Union as it would be to the United Kingdom.

I ask the right hon. Gentleman to think of what the European Union is now accepting. It accepts that Northern Ireland can have free circulation of its goods not only into the single market, but to Great Britain. No other single market trader will have that advantage. Hundreds of single market traders throughout the European Union are going to resent the fact that the goods of a Northern Ireland business situated one mile north of the border can flow smoothly into the single market and smoothly into Great Britain, while theirs cannot. So there are real reasons, which the right hon. Gentleman and I can discuss at greater length, why I do not believe that this will become a permanent solution.

Let us suppose, however, that those negotiations broke down or took an unreasonable length of time. All around the European Union there will be single market traders seeing the benefits that Northern Ireland can have, who will be induced by those benefits to ask, “Should we go on putting up with this uncompetitive arrangement?” And what are they likely to do? Why, they are likely to beat a path to the door of the Commission and the Court, and there to say, “Didn’t you say that article 50 is not a sound legal foundation for this arrangement?” And I tell you frankly, Mr Speaker, they are likely to win.

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

On the issue of precedents, there are five—[Interruption.]

[Sir William Cash]

Thank you, Mr Speaker.

There are five precedents over the past 40 years of full disclosure being made of an Attorney General’s advice for compelling and exceptional reasons in the public interest. Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that he can—as in my view he should—consent on his own independent account as Attorney General under the ministerial code to the full publication of his legal advice given that, as cited in the Queen’s bench division in July 2009, the then Attorney General’s advice on the seminal Factortame case was disclosed, which dealt with the incompatibility of the European Communities Act 1972 with an Act of Parliament, the Merchant Shipping Act 1988, which was then struck down in the courts, analogous to the legal status of the withdrawal treaty in relation to the European Union (Withdrawal) Act passed by this House in 2018, and with which that treaty is incompatible?

[The Attorney General]

This is not a question of the lawfulness of the Government’s action, as it was in the publication of Lord Goldsmith’s advice; this is simply a view on the legal effects of a particular agreement. There are hundreds of lawyers throughout the United Kingdom, I am delighted to say, who could offer a perfectly competent view on this agreement. I cannot see why there is anything exceptional about the current circumstances and about my advice. But let us suppose there were something exceptional about my advice; well, I am here to be asked any question that the Government have also asked, so all that right hon. and hon. Opposition Members have to do is ask and I will give them a frank answer.

[Ms Harriet Harman (Camberwell and Peckham) (Lab)]

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman acknowledge frankly to this House that publishing this paper on the legal position on the withdrawal agreement and his statement to the House today does not represent compliance with the motion of this House that was passed unanimously on 13 November, and does that not represent the following fundamental point of constitutional principle? It would be serious for any Minister to resist a motion of the House, but it is more so for it to be the Attorney General, going along with Government defiance of the House, when his very office is about our constitution—when he is the person in government whose job it is to make sure the rest of them stay within the rules. How can he do that if he himself is acquiescing in breaking them? He has in his statement rightly acknowledged that he has a duty to this House as well as to the Government and that his duties involve giving legal advice to the House. It is in our Standing Orders that he is legal adviser to the Privileges Committee. So how can we have a situation where the Attorney General allows the Government to openly defy the will of the House? The Government have a choice: they can either comply with the motion of the House or seek to change it, but they cannot remain in defiance of it. It is the Attorney General’s responsibility to tell them that; will he?

[The Attorney General]

I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Lady for that question. The truth is that I am caught in an acute clash of constitutional principle. A Minister is obliged to have regard to the public interest and the national interest. Let us suppose I had given any such advice that has been requested by the right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer), and let us suppose that that advice had covered all sorts of matters, including our relationships with foreign states and including arguments that might be deployed in the future—and their strengths and weaknesses—and including matters of acute importance to this country; would it be right for the Attorney General, regardless of the harm to the public interest, to divulge his opinion? I say to the right hon. and learned Lady that it would not. There is no procedure by which this House can have redactions or entertain circumstances in which it could weigh the competing public interest against the interest in disclosure, as a judge would do. She knows what I mean. Therefore, I cannot take a step that I firmly and truly believe would be contrary to the public interest. I ask the House to understand that it is only that consideration that is motivating me and this Government in declining at this stage to break the convention that applies to both sides of the House when they are in government. There is nothing to see here. [Interruption.]

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I gently appeal to colleagues to lower the decibel level. You do not have to look into—[Interruption.] Order, Mr Russell-Moyle. You do not have to look into the crystal ball when you can read the book. The evidence is that I always call colleagues to ask questions, and the Attorney General has indicated his readiness to take those questions, as indeed he must. So you will all get a chance, but please let the answers be heard.

[The Attorney General]

I ask the right hon. and learned Lady to accept that I will give this House a stark, uncompromising and completely frank view on any relevant point of law. I suggest that, if I had given advice, there would be no real significance in that advice being disclosed, because this House has the opportunity to ask me directly.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

My right hon. and learned Friend is to be commended for his statement and for the document that has been produced, which I have to say from my own experience is rather fuller than any advice he might ever have been called upon to produce. First, it might be helpful to the House if he took this opportunity to confirm that there is nothing in this document that is incompatible with any advice that he gave to the Government? I would not expect him to be in a position to endorse any such document if it were at variance in that way. Secondly, turning away from that first principle to the content, might he also wish to comment on the provisions specific to Northern Ireland in paragraphs 25 to 29, which appear to show quite clearly that under the protocol it would be possible to end up with a situation in which there were in fact checks and controls on good passing between Northern Ireland and the rest of Great Britain?

[The Attorney General]

I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend. He will understand that if I were to make that express confirmation, I would by that means be disclosing what advice, if any, I had given. I hope that the House will understand—unless it is to be supposed that I would tailor my advice according to my audience, which I assure the House I would not do—that there is no matter on which hon. Members could ask me a question on which I am likely to have given a different answer to any other party who might have asked me about it in the course of these negotiations. In all candour, therefore, I can say that all the House has to do is ask.

In relation to my right hon. and learned Friend’s second question, it is true that there would be regulatory divergences—as there are within sovereign states throughout the world—between one part of the sovereign territory of the United Kingdom and another, but those divergences could be kept to a minimum. They involve, on my investigation, some 15 forms of product in respect of which checks might have to be carried out at the border. Those 15 forms of product are largely phytosanitary goods in respect of which checks are already carried out in many cases at the ports of Northern Ireland. Therefore, while that border would exist—I find that distasteful myself—the issues are nevertheless mitigable, and the question again is whether that feature should lead us to decline this deal, which I firmly believe is the best way of ensuring that we leave the European Union on 29 March. That is the solemn responsibility that this side of the House—and some on the Opposition side—believed that we had. This is the deal that will ensure that that happens in an orderly way and with legal certainty.

[Hilary Benn (Leeds Central) (Lab)]

I say to the right hon. and learned Gentleman that there is something to see here. If the Government can decide which votes of the House of Commons to respect and which to ignore—as you said when ruling on a point of order on 13 November, Mr Speaker, it was not the opinion of the House of Commons that it wanted the full legal advice to be released, but the will—what does democracy mean in this place?

Now, I have a question for the Attorney General on which I want his legal advice. As he will be aware, the withdrawal agreement is legally binding, but the political declaration is not. Can he draw to the House’s attention a single example in international law of when a failure to act in good faith has successfully compelled one party in a negotiation to reach an agreement as extensive as the one that the Government hope to achieve and that is set out in the political declaration covering trade in goods and services, security, foreign policy, broadcasting, data and co-operation on a wide range of matters? If there is such an example, I would very much like to hear about it.

[The Attorney General]

The right hon. Gentleman points out that we are in a unique situation. There has never been a case in which a country has seceded from the European Union, and there has never been a case in which 45 years of legal integration of a state the size of the United Kingdom has been untangled. That will take time, and it must be done in an orderly way. I will write to the right hon. Gentleman if there are any specific examples to assist me, but the fact of the matter is that I doubt it, which is the frank answer, because we are in this extraordinary and unique situation.

To address the first part of the right hon. Gentleman’s question, I will repeat myself: what does he expect us to do? When he was a member of the Cabinet, if he believed that to take an action would be fundamentally contrary to the public interest of this country, I suspect that he would find that a difficult situation to resolve. The House’s resolution is entitled to the greatest of respect, and the Government and I are inclined to do as much as we can and to go as far as we can, which is why I have come to the House today—it has barely happened more than a few times in the past 50 or so years—to answer the House’s questions. However, I cannot take a step that I believe in conscience would be against the public interest and potentially seriously harmful to a fundamental constitutional principle and the temporal interests of this country in the midst of a negotiation.

[Dominic Raab (Esher and Walton) (Con)]

I welcome the Attorney General’s transparency both in his oral statement to the House and in the Command Paper. First, will he confirm that the article 20 review mechanism necessitates that the EU agrees to the UK exiting the backstop even if the negotiations have dragged on for many years or, indeed, have broken down? Secondly, while the article 50 basis for the backstop is meant to be temporary, it might well take some 10 years for it to be struck down by the European Court of Justice. If he thinks that that is too long, will he give the House his best estimate?

[The Attorney General]

Article 20 permits both sides to consider, even when no final agreement has yet been reached, whether alternative arrangements might suffice to protect the stated objectives of the Northern Ireland protocol. If they do, both sides could agree to put in place those alternative arrangements before any final agreement had been reached.

It is important to remember that, when one says final agreement, it is of course possible, indeed likely, that it may be a series of agreements reached at different times. My answer to my right hon. Friend is that article 20 creates that ability, but it is not a unilateral right of termination. It does not give us a right to walk away. It creates a procedure and obliges the European Union to consider alternative arrangements that are not part of a final deal.

I think my right hon. Friend went on to ask me about article 50 and the time it might take. The period of years he mentions is probably far too long, but it is impossible to say. What one can say is that, long before any case is brought, the pressure bringing those cases to the Court would be telling upon the Governments of the member states and upon the European Union. The legal uncertainty would be intense, and it is a real factor that this House must weigh up in considering whether the protocol is something that it wishes to support.

[Yvette Cooper (Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford) (Lab)]

I am trying to understand the Attorney General’s arguments in answer to earlier questions. He seems to be saying that the Northern Ireland protocol, including the close relationship with the single market and membership of the single customs territory, is such a good deal for UK businesses that EU member states would hate it and would be desperate to bring it to an end as soon as possible. Is that his view? Is that the Government’s view? If so, is he now arguing for us to stay in a single customs territory indefinitely and to keep a close relationship with the single market?

[The Attorney General]

What I do say is that the customs arrangement under the backstop produces the following advantages. We pay not a penny and our goods have free access, in fiscal and tariff terms, to the European Union, yet the regulatory framework that we have to observe is dealt with by way of non-regression clauses that are not enforceable either by the EU institutions or by the arbitration arrangements under the withdrawal agreement. They are policed solely by British courts and British authorities.

In those circumstances, what does it mean? It means that they have split the four freedoms. They have created a situation where we can have the regulatory flexibility that they cannot. They have granted access to the single market for no contribution, without free movement, without signing up to the common fisheries policy and without signing up to the common agricultural policy. For all those reasons, what I say to the right hon. Lady is that if it is painful to us, it will be as painful to them. Where we want to end up is an arrangement that suits us both. This suits neither.

[Sir Michael Fallon (Sevenoaks) (Con)]

With regard to the Northern Ireland protocol and paragraph 11 of the Attorney General’s helpful annex, will he advise us on what might constitute “a clear basis,” as he puts it, for a finding of a breach of duty of good faith?

[The Attorney General]

Evidence of wilful intransigence, evidence of refusal to engage, evidence of refusal to entertain alternative proposals or alternative means of achieving the outcomes that both share: that type of evidence, cumulatively, could amount to a case of bad faith, but each situation is facts-specific. It is not possible to identify beforehand, but those are the kinds of things that would be relevant.

[Kate Hoey (Vauxhall) (Lab)]

The Attorney General has been very honest about the downside of this backstop, and that is even without the legal advice, so we dread what we would actually see in the legal advice, if we could see it.

On Sunday, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland told Northern Ireland’s “Inside Politics” with Mark Davenport that even if the backstop kicks in, Great Britain will stick to the same rules as Northern Ireland. Will the Attorney General have a word with her? She is going around Northern Ireland on a tour and saying some things that are actually not accurate, giving the people of Northern Ireland a very wrong impression about what this agreement means.

[The Attorney General]

The regulatory regime in Great Britain will be a matter entirely for the Government of the United Kingdom. It is permitted and agreed under the protocol that they can maintain their regulatory regime in the way they choose, in which case they could choose to maintain, as I have no doubt they would wish to do, regulatory parity with the position in Northern Ireland. That is all the Secretary of State is saying, and I see nothing controversial in that.

[Sir Oliver Heald (North East Hertfordshire) (Con)]

I commend my right hon. and learned Friend on the statement he has made. Does he agree that in international law concepts of good faith and of using one’s best endeavours are very important, because right at the heart of international law is the idea of a rules-based system that good countries aspire to? Does he agree that it is therefore important both to the UK and to the EU that they should show good faith and should use their best endeavours? Does he also agree that if they did not do so when it came to the point that has just been raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Sevenoaks (Sir Michael Fallon) about paragraph 11 in the references to the protocol, it would be an absolute disaster for either the UK or the EU to be found not to be in good faith?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Attorney General]

I do agree with that; the duty of good faith is a very solemn, well-understood one in international law. It would be an astonishing thing if the EU were not to negotiate in good faith, particularly after the act of good faith that this country, in concluding this agreement, will have committed itself to. So this is not something that can simply be ignored, but I fully accept that it is not a unilateral right of termination and it would not be easy to establish “bad faith” against an organisation of the type of the EU. It would never happen, because I do not believe that the European Union would descend to the kind of behaviour necessary for a bad faith claim to be brought successfully.

[Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)]

On 13 November, did the Attorney General advise the Chief Whip that Government Ministers should vote against the motion—and if not, why not?

[The Attorney General]

I only wish I had the influence that the hon. Lady believes I have. I did not advise the Chief Whip, and I do not suppose he would have taken the advice even if I had given it.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I am about to attempt to achieve the ambition of a lifetime and get a one-word answer out of a lawyer. Is it possible that the UK could find itself locked in backstop forever, against our will?

[The Attorney General]

No.

[Frank Field (Birkenhead) (Ind)]

Does the Attorney General agree that a motion such as the one I have tabled on the Order Paper would give this House sovereignty on when we should leave the backstop, should we enter it, and that as a country we would have a degree of certainty, which he has been able to supply today? If the Government go down in defeat next week, would he suggest that that should be top of the Prime Minister’s negotiating list with the European Union?

[The Attorney General]

I have enormous respect for the right hon. Gentleman and his suggestion, and I realise that other right hon. and hon. Members are considering similar things. I simply say this: what we cannot do is anything that is incompatible with our obligations under the withdrawal agreement. Any amendment to the meaningful vote that would introduce a qualification to our obligations under the agreement would be likely to be viewed by the European Union as a failure to ratify it and would justify non-ratification on its part.

[Frank Field]

But if you fail to get it through the House?

[The Attorney General]

We will be plunged into such great chaotic disorder in the circumstances that the right hon. Gentleman suggests that I very much hope the House will think and reflect carefully before doing that.

[Mr David Jones (Clwyd West) (Con)]

My right hon. and learned Friend has pointed out that the best-endeavours clauses in the withdrawal agreement impose a duty on both sides to proceed with the utmost good faith in seeking to achieve an agreement at some time in the future. He has said also that these are obligations that are judiciable and enforceable. As a practical lawyer advising the House, as he has kindly offered to do, will he tell the House whether this is a matter about which the House should be relaxed? Or should we proceed at our peril?

[The Attorney General]

As my right hon. Friend knows, the job of any lawyer for any client is generally to assist the client to make decisions as to the balance of risk in any decision that they are about to take. There is no question but that the absence of a right of termination of the backstop presents a legal risk. The question whether it is one this House should take is a matter of political and policy judgment that each one of us must grapple with. The House has heard and, for reasons that I am not going here to expatiate upon, I have taken the view that compared with the other courses available to the House, this one is a reasonable, calculated risk to take. Other Members of this House must weigh it up, but that is my view.

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

In response to some questions from Members of this House today, the Attorney General has asserted that in his view it would not be in the public interest to meet the terms of an effective resolution that was passed unanimously by this House. Can the Attorney General really take that view? Was it not incumbent upon him and the Government to vote against that resolution if he thought that it would be against the public interest to publish his advice, as he has asserted today?

[The Attorney General]

I fully understand the hon. Lady’s understandable indignation, because the truth is that we are now in a curious situation in which no vote was passed against that motion. I ask her to reflect on this: let us suppose that the Government had voted against it and lost. What position would that place us in? It would place me in exactly—[Interruption.]

[Mr Speaker]

Order. The hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman) has already asked her question, with considerable force and alacrity. She is now not only inclined to chunter from a sedentary position but seems to be laughing and in a state of some uncontrollable mirth. I advise her to control herself.

[The Attorney General]

If the vote had been lost instead, precisely the same position would pertain, which is that the Attorney General and the Government would be faced with a clash of constitutional principle. Of course the Government wish to do all they can, which is why I am here today to answer as candidly and frankly as possible the questions of the House on any matter about which it wishes to ask, but if I am satisfied and convinced that any disclosure of the kind the House has asked for would be contrary to the national interest, I cannot comply with the House’s request. I urge the House to understand that I am doing everything I can, as are the Government, to fulfil the spirit of the request. No matter upon which this House inquires will be dressed up, disguised or in any way downplayed. Nothing—nothing—will be held back.

[Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

My right hon. and learned Friend has been enormously gracious in being willing to answer any question the House may have on legal matters, and there are many questions that we all have to ask that may not be easy to put in one short question, but unfortunately he does not answer the basic point about denying a motion passed by this House. Saying that in his view it is not in the national interest is not good enough. When the Government lose a vote, they must follow the will of this House under an Humble Address, according to all precedent. It is no longer a matter for the Government to judge; it has been decided by this House, which is a higher authority. I therefore urge my right hon. and learned Friend, in spite of his generosity in answering questions, to go back and release the advice asked for by this House.

[The Attorney General]

Well, of course, when a request comes from the quarter from which it has just come, I will always want to re-examine the assumptions that I have made, but I have to say to my hon. Friend that the problem here is that it cannot be right that the House, by means of such a motion, has the power, blind, to call for any matter that has been discussed in connection with the Government of this country. Where does it end? [Interruption.] Just wait a minute. I am trying to do my best. Where do the limits of this power end? Does it extend to Cabinet minutes? Does it extend to the papers of the secret intelligence service? Is the House, by means of this motion, to command any paper of any kind, central to the interests of this nation, without even being able to check that, by its release, it is causing, or might cause, severe damage to the public interest? I invite my hon. Friend to consider the implications of the absolute rule that he is talking about. It cannot be right and if one looks at previous versions—[Interruption.] If one looks at previous versions of “Erskine May”, one sees that the motion to return is confined to documents of public and official character. If there are good reasons of public policy why those papers should not be disclosed, then the House will either withdraw or rescind its motion.

In this case, I am convinced that to disclose any advice that might have been given would be fundamentally contrary to the interests of this country. [Interruption.] I say to Labour Members that there is no use baying and shouting. What I am trying to do is guard the public interest—that is all. It is time that they grew up and got real. If there were a single item that I thought might be politically embarrassing, I would have no truck with the idea that this advice or any that I might have been given should be disclosed. It is because the public interest is at stake. What part of that proposition is the Labour party incapable of understanding?

[Hon. Members]

More!

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[Caroline Lucas]

Thank you, Mr Speaker.

I was just saying that these proceedings are in danger of descending into farce. The Attorney General repeatedly says that he will subject himself to what he calls full, frank and thorough questioning, but he knows as well as we do that our capacity to do that questioning is seriously undermined by the fact that we do not have the full legal advice in front of us in order to interrogate it. He talks about the national interest. It is precisely because these are issues of national interest that we wish to see the full legal advice. Will he go away and look again at the principle that, in exceptional times, transparency should take precedence, and therefore produce the full legal advice for this House?

[The Attorney General]

In all earnestness, when I gave my statement the hon. Lady will have noticed that I said that the House must understand the process by which the Law Officers give their advice. There may be no such “full legal advice”. Law Officers are consulted ad hoc, on the hoof, in fast-developing circumstances. That is what I said at the beginning of the statement. The fact of the matter is that I am here to answer the hon. Lady’s questions. [Interruption.] Well, then I will see the hon. Lady at any time and at her convenience, when she can ask me any question.

I cannot breach the constitutional convention to a client—in this case, the Government—particularly if I believe, as I do with all candour and sincerity, that it would be contrary to the national interest in the course of a negotiation that might involve discussions about strengths, weaknesses and future strategies. [Interruption.] There was a sedentary comment from the Opposition; this is not arrogance. I wish that I could comply with the request of this House, but if I did, I sincerely believe that it would not be in all our interests. In a court, that matter can be resolved by a judge, but in the procedures of this House—it may very well be that we need to look at those procedures—there is no such arbiter. Therefore, although the House says that I should disclose, I believe that the public interest compels me not to. I am sorry.

[Sir Desmond Swayne (New Forest West) (Con)]

The backstop is in the agreement at the insistence of the EU, and it affords the EU a huge advantage and leverage when it comes to our determination never to be in it when we negotiate the future arrangements, does it not?

[The Attorney General]

The answer is no. If anything, the leverage is in the opposite direction. The French, the Belgians and the Dutch all want access to our coastal waters, but this is outside the backstop’s purview. Therefore, they will want access and we will have to negotiate. We do not have to pay a penny. It is legally uncertain. We have regulatory flexibility in Great Britain. Northern Ireland has free circulation of its goods both to GB and the European Union. My right hon. Friend knows that I support leaving the European Union. If he wants my frank view, I believe that the European Union will be very keen indeed to do a deal with us.

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[Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

The British Government insist that they have the right to take privileged legal advice that remains private between lawyer and client. I recall the Labour Government using the exact same excuse during the Iraq war. In the light of the confessed damage that any Brexit deal will cause, I beg, who is the client? Should not the Attorney General learn from the mistakes of the past, discharge his solemn and constitutional duty as a humble servant of Parliament and of the public, and publish? If not now, when?

[The Attorney General]

First, I point out to the hon. Lady that the advice of Lord Goldsmith was published two years after the event. What the House is now asking is that the advice, if any, given by the Attorney General be published in the middle of the negotiations, where we may still need to deploy many of the arguments connected with the withdrawal agreement in the future. Secondly, the advice of Lord Goldsmith was on a question of the lawfulness of the Government’s action. This is not a question of whether the Government acted lawfully; this is simply a question of whether the Government are acting wisely, on which Members of the House can disagree. There is a fundamental distinction between the position when the advice of Lord Goldsmith was given in 2003 and the advice today.

The advice that the Attorney General and the Law Officers give on a matter such as this could be replicated by any lawyer of reasonable competence. Why, the right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) could pop down to his chambers and find half a dozen lawyers capable of giving the same advice that I might have given on these points—probably better. The truth of the matter—what is so important about my advice?

[Hon. Members]

You’re the Attorney General!

[The Attorney General]

Well, it is very good of the House to attribute such importance to the Attorney General, but the reality is that, in terms of substantive effect, there are hundreds of lawyers who could give this opinion. [Interruption.] Let me finish.

[Mr Speaker]

Order. The hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Liz Saville Roberts) should not rant from a sedentary position. She asked her question with considerable force; let us hear the response.

[The Attorney General]

The Attorney General has a very special role when the lawfulness of the Government’s action is at stake. There, it is true, he occupies a central role, because if he says it is not lawful, the Government cannot act contrary to his advice. But in a case such as this, the essential question before us all is a political question, not a legal one.

[Dame Cheryl Gillan (Chesham and Amersham) (Con)]

On whichever side of the House hon. Members sit, those of us who have been in government know that it is very important that there is safe space in which Law Officers and civil servants can give advice to Ministers. I fear that today we are trying to breach that convention, and that could be very dangerous for our system. It is extraordinary to me that people would prefer to have a piece of paper produced for them that they have clearly been told may contain information that damages the national interest, rather than have the Attorney General before us, who is giving us further and better particulars, and answering all questions in a full, frank and fair way.

[Dame Cheryl Gillan]

Well, Mr Speaker, I was just going to ask the Attorney General to confirm that there is nothing in the written advice that he has not covered today that, if it were revealed, would be damaging to the national interest.

[The Attorney General]

On all points of law about which this House has asked me, or any point arising from the withdrawal agreement, I will give the same view to any person who asks.

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I advise the House that 21 Back Benchers have questioned the Attorney General in 50 minutes. Believe me—I know these things, as I sit in this Chair for many hours and it is my privilege to do so—this is a much slower rate of progress than is customary. I appeal to colleagues to ask short questions and to the Attorney General, whose mellifluous tones I never tire of hearing, to be appropriately pithy in reply.

[Tom Brake (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD)]

Given the precedent set by Lord Goldsmith, whose legal statement was clearly spun and cherry-picked, without seeing the full legal Brexit advice, why should any MP here today believe that this statement is not similarly massaged and designed to bolster the Government’s position and deny MPs on both sides of the House full access to the legal advice that this House has demanded? I am afraid to say that the Attorney General has rather contemptuously and theatrically—as if he were performing “Rumpole of the Bailey”—dismissed us and refused to provide us with the advice.

[The Attorney General]

I can only tell the right hon. Gentleman that I have not massaged the advice. I have given it absolutely as I see it—absolutely starkly. I will give that same advice if anybody asks to come and see me, but I cannot breach the fundamental constitutional principle that I believe it would be contrary to the public interest to break. I can only invite the right hon. Gentleman to accept that I have given this advice as candidly as I possibly can; I cannot say any more if he does not accept that.

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

An amendment was tabled to the Humble Address motion that was highly sympathetic to my right hon. and learned Friend’s position. It was not selected and not passed, but the motion, unamended, was passed. Therefore, whatever he has just argued at the Dispatch Box, the position is as my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) set out—he is under an instruction. If he wishes to change the position in the House of Commons, will he move a motion in this House to support the position that he has just set out?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Attorney General]

I will certainly give my hon. Friend’s point consideration, because that may be one way forward. At the conclusions of today’s proceedings, I shall consider what the position will be, and I shall be writing to Mr Speaker with my conclusions and proposals.

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman says that it would not be in the national interest to share his legal advice with the House. Does he not realise, though, that in just over a week’s time this House is going to have to decide what is in the national interest? How are we supposed to do that when he will not tell us what his legal advice is?

[The Attorney General]

With respect to the right hon. Gentleman, he has had my legal advice. What he has not had is what is in any kind of document that might have been created or my oral advice in any other circumstance, to Government Ministers or to the Cabinet—if such exists. But he has had my legal advice—

[Mr Howarth]

No, I haven’t.

[The Attorney General]

Yes, the right hon. Gentleman has had my advice, and can have it at any other point on matters of law arising from the withdrawal agreement.

[Victoria Prentis (Banbury) (Con)]

Does the Attorney General think that it would have been possible to sign the withdrawal agreement without the inclusion of the backstop?

[The Attorney General]

No.

[David Hanson (Delyn) (Lab)]

I am not a lawyer, so I would welcome the Attorney General’s advice. This House passed a unanimous motion. It was not opposed by him or his Government. It is binding on this House. Could he give me some legal advice as to what my rights are now?

[The Attorney General]

I think the right hon. Gentleman has plenty of opportunities to consult people other than me. Ultimately, what the House will have to decide is whether an Attorney General and a Government who are seeking to protect the public interest are in contempt of its motion when they have sought to comply with the spirit of it to the maximum possible degree, and when they have put their legal adviser at the disposal of the House and instructed him to give full, frank, complete answers to any question asked on the matters of law that any legal advice would have been likely to cover.

[Stephen Crabb (Preseli Pembrokeshire) (Con)]

The Attorney General said that he would rather that there was a unilateral termination clause in the Northern Ireland protocol. Earlier, in the Select Committee on Exiting the European Union, Olly Robbins appeared to concede that one such clause had been drafted and had been tested with EU negotiators, but ultimately not deployed in the negotiations. Could the Attorney General confirm whether he was asked to provide legal advice on a unilateral termination clause and whether the decision not to include it in the negotiations was a political or a legal one?

[The Attorney General]

I cannot. I cannot, without breaching the convention, disclose whether or not I was asked to advise on any particular point. But what I can say is that the question of termination clauses was most certainly raised in the negotiations, but the European Union declined to entertain those termination clauses. It did so because the backstop is envisaged as an absolute guarantee that in all circumstances, including that of no deal, there would be no hard border at the Northern Ireland-Republic of Ireland border. Therefore, to have a termination clause would be a contradiction in terms. It would not be a guarantee if you can walk away from it. That is the decision the House must face—in the light of that, it must decide whether this is an arrangement into which it should, given the alternatives, enter.

[Ian Paisley (North Antrim) (DUP)]

I thank the Attorney General for his absolute candour in how he has presented this to the House this evening, but the stark reality of what he has set out, to any person living in Northern Ireland, is that as a result of Northern Ireland ending up in this backstop, which would be utterly shameful, Northern Ireland would become an annexe of the United Kingdom when it comes to trading relations during the backstop period. I quote to him from the document that he has placed in the Table Office today:

“These provisions apply to measures that affect trade between Great Britain and the EU, but not trade between Northern Ireland and the EU.”

In fact, we would have to comply with another regime. How could any Unionist sign up to that?

[The Attorney General]

The European Union’s original proposal, as the hon. Gentleman will know, was that Northern Ireland should reside in an entirely separate customs territory. The Government took the view that that was wholly and completely unacceptable. Why? Because there is virtually no sovereign state in the world that has separate customs and fiscal tariffs within its own sovereign territory. But there are many nations throughout the world in which different provinces and parts have regulatory divergence. The regulatory divergence in this case can be minimised to an almost, if not wholly, invisible extent. Furthermore, we do not wish, nor expect, to be in this arrangement. Under article 132 we can extend the implementation period, and if we are close to doing a deal, or even reasonably close, no doubt that is a choice that we will have to consider.

I say to hon. Members that I understand entirely their feelings of concern, even distaste, but this is a question affecting the whole United Kingdom and its interests. So vital is the fact that we should have an orderly exit from the European Union that, as people who hold the United Kingdom’s Union at their heart, I would urge them to consider supporting this agreement, for it is our means out of the European Union.

[Nigel Dodds]

For all of us?

[The Attorney General]

It is a means out of the European Union. The limited extent to which Northern Ireland would remain relates to goods only.

[Nigel Dodds]

Agri-goods?

[The Attorney General]

Agri-goods, yes—goods only. So I would urge Members to consider the interests of the United Kingdom. I fully understand the elements of this agreement that are dissatisfactory to them.

[Sir Christopher Chope (Christchurch) (Con)]

My right hon. and learned Friend told my right hon. Friend the Member for Preseli Pembrokeshire (Stephen Crabb) that the European Union is refusing to allow a get-out clause on the permanent backstop, but he has also told us that he does not believe that the permanent backstop is sound in European Union law. Can this matter be resolved by a reference to the European Court of Justice in the same way that the European Court of Justice gave its opinion in relation to the relevance of the Lisbon treaty requirement that the EU should sign up to the European convention on human rights? When it gave its opinion on that, it said that it did not think it was compatible with the EU treaties, despite the fact that it had been signed up to in that particular treaty. Can something similar be done in this case to remove the uncertainty?

[The Attorney General]

There is nothing to prevent a case from being brought to the Court of Justice of the European Union on whether any agreement that is signed by the European Union is compatible with the treaties. But I would point out that, as I said earlier, the time at which the backstop becomes legally vulnerable, or most legally vulnerable, is the time at which it becomes, de facto, not simply temporary but permanent. It is at that point that the problem may crystallise in connection with the use of article 50 to conclude this agreement. The legal uncertainty about knowing whether the backstop would survive such a challenge is one of the factors, I believe, that will impel the European Union to conclude an arrangement with us in expeditious time.

[Thangam Debbonaire (Bristol West) (Lab)]

It appears to me that the Attorney General is treating this House and everyone we represent with a great deal of indifference, at best, and contempt, at worst. So I have to ask him: at what point did he advise the Chief Whip that he would not comply with the terms of the Humble Address? Was it before, during or after the point at which this House expressed its will in support of that Humble Address requiring him to publish full advice?

[The Attorney General]

The decision as to whether a Law Officer’s advice, should any have been given, should be published is a collective decision of the Government. The Attorney General must consent, but first, it is a collective decision of the Government. I hope that that answers the question. I had no discussions with the Chief Whip on this subject. None was sought.

[Vicky Ford (Chelmsford) (Con)]

As someone who was born in Northern Ireland, I hold the Belfast agreement as very precious, because it safeguards my birth right to be accepted as British or Irish or both. On 13 November, I listened closely when the right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) changed his interpretation of the Opposition motion no less than four times. I thank the Attorney General for making it so clear that, in his view, the backstop is not a risk. On a totally separate issue, if we were in the backstop, would we have control of our fishing waters?

[The Attorney General]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for her question. May I say candidly that I did not say it was not a risk? It is a risk, but, weighed against the other risks of utter chaos, losing our departure from the European Union on 29 March or the consequences of so grave a breach of faith with the people of this country as to ignore the outcome of the referendum, I believe it is a risk that we have to take.

Secondly, my hon. Friend asked about fishing. She is right that in the backstop, there would be no access to our waters other than that to which we agreed.

[Catherine West (Hornsey and Wood Green) (Lab)]

The Attorney General has made many references to his passion for Unionism. What legal assessment has he made for different parts of the UK—for example, the devolved Administrations or regions of England—if the Northern Ireland protocol comes into being?

[The Attorney General]

The whole principle of devolution is that there will be divergences between parts of the United Kingdom that are governed by devolved Assemblies. Unfortunately, in Northern Ireland’s case, that devolved Assembly is not at present functioning. Were the institutions functioning, they may well have been given a central role in these matters, because Northern Ireland shares a land border with the European Union and therefore calls for special, specific measures rather than the same considerations that apply to other parts of the European Union.

[Philip Davies (Shipley) (Con)]

The Prime Minister has said on many occasions that if we were to leave without a deal, we would not pay any money over to the European Union. The Chancellor has said on many occasions that we are legally obliged to pay the money over to the European Union. Can the Attorney General tell us what we are legally obliged to pay over to the European Union to leave, and which treaties he is referring to when he gives us that advice?

[The Attorney General]

The position on money is this. The view of the Government, and my view, is that we would have obligations to pay a certain amount of money were we to leave the European Union without a deal. The House of Lords European Union Committee concluded that there would be no obligation under EU law. That is a stronger argument—not necessarily an incontestable one—as to our obligations under EU law, but the Committee also concluded that we might have obligations under public international law, and with that I agree. There is an argument that we would not have an obligation under public international law, but it is an argument unlikely to be accepted by any international tribunal.

My view is therefore that we would owe a presently unquantifiable sum were we to leave the European Union without a deal. It is impossible at this stage to say how much. It is true that the European Union is not a member state and is not a state, and therefore it is unable to take the case to the International Court of Justice. It might therefore be difficult to enforce the public international law obligation that existed. However, I ask the House to reflect on the fact that if this country, acknowledging that such obligations probably exist or do exist, did not pay them, it would be likely to cause the deepest resentment, just as it would to any of us who were unpaid a debt. If we leave a club, we pay the bar bill. If we do not pay the bill, we are not likely to get a lot of consideration from the other side.

[Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)]

I wonder whether the Attorney General can help me. He has said that in exceptional circumstances, legal advice can be disclosed. He has also talked this afternoon about the unique and extraordinary circumstances we are in. What is the difference? Why are we not in exceptional circumstances?

[The Attorney General]

The Attorney General, by definition, is only called upon to advise on matters that are exceptional or in exceptional circumstances. The question here is what requires the advice of the Attorney General to be disclosed. In Lord Goldsmith’s case, the issue was whether the action of the Government was lawful. The action of the Government could not be taken if the Attorney General had not signed off on it, because it would be contrary to the ministerial code.

The circumstance here is that the House has available to it a wide range of highly competent legal advice that is just as good as mine and as those who advise me. There is nothing essential, I suggest to the House, about the advice of the Attorney General being disclosed in this case, but there is something that could lead to severe damage to the public interest. One hon. Lady on the Labour Benches said that I was being arrogant. I am not. I am trying genuinely to protect the public interest. The last thing I want to do is to be at odds with this House. I have been a Member for 13 years. I would very much like to ensure that the House is satisfied, which is why I am here today, answering these questions.

[Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

I am glad that the Attorney General draws a distinction with the Iraq case. Surely the act of withdrawal from the European Union must be lawful, because it is authorised by statute in this case. As to his advice, is not the reality that any lawyer often has to advise as to the difference between a theoretical risk and a practical risk? Do I take it that his assessment is that the likelihood of a theoretical risk being crystallised—namely, because the European Union is prepared to breach international law by breaching the best endeavours and good faith clauses, and at the same time to risk breaching its own Union law by relying on article 50 to form a permanent arrangement, for which it is not envisaged for—is not a realistic one, and therefore he advises that we accept it?

[The Attorney General]

I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s question. As I have said, I think that there is unquestionably a risk. There is a legal risk because there is no unilateral means out of the backstop. The question is with what degree of probability one thinks it would arise. My view is that it is not probable, but other Members will have their own views.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)]

The Attorney General may be familiar with the terms of the so-called Norway-plus option, in which the United Kingdom would join the European economic area via the EFTA pillar and combine that with a customs union. Can he confirm that that arrangement would supersede the backstop, and in that case, the backstop would in fact fall away? Can he also confirm that it is possible to unilaterally come out of the European economic area via article 127 of the EEA agreement, so it enables a unilateral withdrawal?

[The Attorney General]

If an EFTA-style arrangement —of course, a country cannot belong to EFTA if it is a member of a customs union—with a customs union were introduced, I see no reason why it would not satisfy the stated objectives of the backstop in protecting the hard border and north-south co-operation. The hon. Gentleman asked whether the arrangement is terminable. I think it is terminable on 12 months’ notice, but I may be wrong. However, a customs union would fall to be negotiated specifically with the European Union, and one would have to insist upon such a termination clause in that union. That would be a question of agreeing it with the Union.

[Andrew Bridgen (North West Leicestershire) (Con)]

Does the Attorney General agree with Dr Carl Baudenbacher, the recently retired president of the EFTA court, who said,

“This is not a real arbitration tribunal—behind it the ECJ decides everything. This is taken from the Ukraine agreement. It is absolutely unbelievable that a country like the UK, which was the first country to accept independent courts, would subject itself to this”?

[The Attorney General]

I do not accept that characterisation because, in any event, the only things that can be brought before the tribunal are systemic, operational issues to do with the management of the agreement by both sides. The Court cannot get involved, once the winding down has taken place, in the resolution of individual disputes between the citizens and businesses of this country. Members really must understand that. It will be over: the ECJ’s jurisdiction will be finished once the winding down takes place. This is an entirely different situation to resolve disputes between the state of the United Kingdom and the European Union. Where we have agreed to apply European Union law, it makes perfect sense that the EU Court should interpret it, and then it should be applied by the arbitral tribunal. I have to say to my hon. Friend that I see no real fundamental objection to it.

[Ian Murray (Edinburgh South) (Lab)]

There is another strong constitutional principle in this House—that if a motion is brought before the House that the Government disagree with, they use their majority to vote it down. In this case, they did not. It is not in the national interest; it is in the Government’s interest not to produce this legal advice. Will the Attorney General tell the House what legal advice he will give the Cabinet, the Government or, indeed, himself about the principle of not abiding by the will of this House?

[The Attorney General]

It is not such a matter. I must ask the hon. Gentleman to accept that it is not a matter of the Government’s interest. It is a matter of the public interest of this country through a fundamental convention and principle.

[Ian Murray]

That was not my question.

[The Attorney General]

Well, that is what I understood the hon. Gentleman to have asked. With respect, I simply cannot accept that this is being done to protect the Government. It is not; it is being done for one reason only—the public interest. The question for this House is whether the Government, who are trying to protect the public interest, or any individual member of the Government are being contemptuous of the House, when they are driven—he is driven—to this position by a firm and conscientious conviction that it is contrary to the public interest.

[Mrs Anne Main (St Albans) (Con)]

May I suggest that when the Attorney General argued to the right hon. Member for Belfast North (Nigel Dodds) that the differences were merely niggling and almost invisible that that is a bit like suggesting someone is a little bit pregnant? This is a sell-out in terms of the Union, and at what point is our Prime Minister’s pledge that we would not make separate arrangements for any country in the Union going to be sold out, in his argument, in the national interest?

[The Attorney General]

I do not agree with my hon. Friend that this is a sell-out. There is no question but that aspects of it that are both undesirable and unsatisfactory, but this backstop need not ever be triggered, and if we are in, I am confident that we can emerge out of it. It will also produce significant benefits for the people of Northern Ireland—let us not forget that—were it ever to be engaged.

[Chris Williamson (Derby North) (Lab)]

Many commentators and hon. Members believe that the Attorney General is in contempt of Parliament. If that is indeed the conclusion of Parliament, I understand the penalty could include expulsion from this place. Is the Attorney General prepared to be expelled for standing by his refusal to provide the details of the advice he has given, which has been voted for by this House?

[The Attorney General]

I hope the House will reconsider the position. I hope that it will understand that no Attorney General and no Government would wish to place themselves—and certainly not I as Attorney General—in contempt of the House. There is simply nothing of that in my desire or wish, and I would not take this position if I did not feel that that was contrary to all our interests. I stand before the House fully understanding the nature of its concern, not to say indignation; I accept that. It is a deeply unsatisfactory position for any Attorney General or Government to be in.

I am truly sorry that I am not in a position to disclose either the fact or the content of my advice. However, I am doing so not to frustrate the legitimate interests of the Members opposite or Members behind me, but rather and only because I do believe it is against the public interest at a time when we are negotiating and at a time when this involves advice to a Cabinet or might well involve advice to a Cabinet that must, for reasons of fundamental principle, be kept confidential.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

I doubt it, Mr Speaker.

The Attorney General has made it clear that the provisions about the backstop are to address having no hard border and that there would have been no agreement without these backstop provisions being in the agreement. When we are making our political judgment about the potential permanence of or the reasons behind the backstop, what credence should we give to the fact that, although WTO terms suggest there would be a hard border, there is the potential for a waiver under WTO article 9.3 and there is the potential for a national security waiver under article 21? Given that the EU and the Republic have both said they would not put up a hard border, what conclusion are we to come to about their good faith and best endeavours?

[The Attorney General]

My hon. Friend must understand that we cannot look at this simply as a question of the traffic of goods between the Republic and Northern Ireland. The stated objectives are to protect in all its dimensions the integration that has taken place between Northern Ireland and the Republic—in health treatment, in education, in cultural activities—and all these activities are to be protected. The Government of the United Kingdom have made a solemn and good faith pledge to the Republic of Ireland and to the European Union that they will preserve that integration in the interests of the people of Northern Ireland. What we have to do is find a way of doing so that is consistent with the interests of the Union and of the United Kingdom. The backstop is a temporary solution. We will find another, and it will not, except by the consent of the Stormont institutions, have the same problems that the backstop has.

[Ian C. Lucas (Wrexham) (Lab)]

What is the Attorney General’s authority for the proposition that the opinion of a single Member of Parliament, however eminent, can override a decision made by the House of Commons?

[The Attorney General]

I think I have made it plain that I am not seeking to suppose that I can override the decision of the House of Commons. The House has at its disposal—[Interruption.] Hear me out. The House has at its disposal the means by which to enforce its will. It can bring forward a motion of contempt, seek to have that motion passed and seek, through the Committee of Privileges or whichever way it is appropriately done, to impose a sanction. I fully accept that. I do not set myself up contrary to the House; I simply say that I cannot compromise the public interest, and if I had my personal desire—

[Ian C. Lucas]

indicated dissent.

[The Attorney General]

The hon. Gentleman is shaking his head. Why would he not believe me? Does he think I want to be in this position? Does he really think that if there were not some fundamental bar of principle against my disclosing anything I might have given to the Government, I would not immediately volunteer it to him and all hon. Members opposite? I am only doing it to protect us.

[Daniel Kawczynski (Shrewsbury and Atcham) (Con)]

I must press the Attorney General on the answer he gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) on his legal advice about how much we actually do owe the European Union. How can he expect us to vote for this deal if he cannot give us his legal opinion about what we specifically still owe it? Is some of this money going on good will for the possibility, maybe, of a trade agreement?

[The Attorney General]

There is a formula in the agreement for the calculation of our obligations, but it depends on others’ contributions, what particular programmes there are and whether they spend particular sums of money. There is a series of variable factors, which is why we cannot give a firm, clear and precise figure. If my hon. Friend is referring to what may be due after no deal, that would depend on a series of arguments that would be untested except in a court.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

Oddly, I had more sympathy for the Attorney General before today, because he has pushed the House into this situation. He knows perfectly well that the Government chose not to oppose the motion; they accepted it. It is the will of the House. He is, in effect, pushing us to say that he is in contempt of Parliament, because at some point, surely even a Government have to bow the knee to Parliament.

[The Attorney General]

Suppose there was advice, and suppose the advice contained—this is a hypothetical situation—[Interruption.] Well, the same principle applies. Suppose the advice contained information, facts or considerations of the most acute significance for the national interests of this country.

[Chris Bryant]

Oppose the motion.

[The Attorney General]

But one might lose the vote. What then? No Minister could go ahead and harm the nation merely because of a resolution, when the House had not seen the document. In court, there is a mechanism for weighing this, but the House has not seen the document. The motion for a return was traditionally always confined to public and official documents.

[Chris Bryant]

In previous editions of “Erskine May”.

[The Attorney General]

That is because this procedure has been reinvented recently. The truth of the matter is that the House has no power to command documents that are not public and official. That is the constitutional question that the House needs to grapple with.

[Charlie Elphicke (Dover) (Ind)]

May I congratulate my right hon. and learned Friend on the passion with which he has made his submissions to the House today? In the light of his advice, would it be reasonable for the House to invite the Prime Minister to go back to Brussels and ask for termination of the backstop either on a given date, or after the passage of a certain amount of time?

[The Attorney General]

As my hon. Friend knows, that is not a legal question. We have reached a deal. The House must make a judgment on this deal. If it had been possible to secure a unilateral right of termination, it would have been secured. It was not secured because the European Union asked for an absolute guarantee at the Northern Irish border, but has said that it is temporary; that is written into the agreement. It may well be that the word “temporary” is not enforceable, in the sense that this will subsist even in the event of negotiations breaking down, but that is a clear indication that the backstop cannot subsist forever; and, in my view, as a matter of European Union law, it cannot.

[Kevin Brennan (Cardiff West) (Lab)]

This was not just any motion; as the right hon. and learned Gentleman says, it was a motion for a return to release papers under parliamentary privilege. There are two reasons why he is wrong: first, he says of his advice, “There’s nothing to see here,” yet he is trying to argue that by releasing it, he would somehow breach considerations of national and public interest. Secondly, under the ministerial code, he can voluntarily release advice in exceptional circumstances without breaching any considerations of national interests, or any of his deeply held principles. Why does he not follow that logic and do the right thing?

[The Attorney General]

The existence of very rare examples of the Attorney General’s advice being disclosed does not mean that the power ought to be exercised in this case. In the Goldsmith case, it was disclosed two years after the event. We are in the middle of a negotiation.

[Kevin Brennan]

We have finished the negotiations.

[The Attorney General]

No, we have not. The future declaration is to be negotiated, and many of the same arguments will apply.

[Mrs Kemi Badenoch (Saffron Walden) (Con)]

Further to the comments of the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) regarding the customs union, will my right hon. and learned Friend confirm that the future declaration guarantees that the UK will have an independent trade policy, and consequently that our future relationship will not be in the customs union?

[The Attorney General]

I am most grateful to my hon. Friend for that, because it is an important consideration. There are two things of real significance—certainly of real prominence—in the political declaration. First, the European Union has accepted that the final arrangement will involve an independent trade policy. One cannot have an independent trade policy and belong to a conventional customs union. Secondly, there will not be free movement; one cannot belong to the single market without subscribing to the four freedoms, so those set the outer boundaries of any deal that will be done.

[Geraint Davies (Swansea West) (Lab/Co-op)]

The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill empowers the Prime Minister to submit an application under article 50 based on an advisory referendum. If that referendum is found to be illegal, and based on lying and cheating, surely it follows that the advice from that referendum is flawed and that the Prime Minister should withdraw that application. The same would go for a general election result; such findings would require another election.

[The Attorney General]

I hope I heard the hon. Gentleman’s question correctly. I hope he will forgive me—I could not quite hear; other voices were speaking. If the question was on the nature of the referendum result and the suggestion that it was procured by some sort of fraud, I do not agree with that. In any event, a case on that is pending in court, so it would be wrong of me to make any substantial further comment on it, but the policy of the Government is that the referendum result must be honoured, and that is what will happen.

[Chris Philp (Croydon South) (Con)]

The terms of our EU membership say that we have the right to leave unilaterally under article 50. We also have the right to leave the unrelated European convention on human rights. What explanation and assurance can the Attorney General give the House as to why, under the proposed arrangements, we do not have those two rights?

[The Attorney General]

As I have explained, a unilateral right of termination would be inconsistent with a backstop, which is a guarantee that in circumstances where there is not a deal, or during the negotiations for a deal, there will be no hard border, and there will be protection of north-south co-operation. That backstop has to exist, or there will be no deal. As to the ECHR, that is already protected by the Belfast agreement; it is embedded in that agreement, and would have to be preserved for that reason.

[Martin Whitfield (East Lothian) (Lab)]

In paragraph 42 of the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s notes, he confirms that

“During any extended implementation period…the UK would not be part of the Common Agricultural Policy”.

This will, of course, have an effect on Scotland. Can he confirm what legal advice was given with regard to the devolved Government coming out of the common agricultural policy in an extended implementation period?

[The Attorney General]

The CAP is dealt with by the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, and I have no doubt that Government lawyers will have given it advice. I am afraid that I am not in a position to assist the hon. Gentleman with any specific advice on that question at the moment, but I am happy to write to him about it.

[Richard Drax (South Dorset) (Con)]

We have heard of the will of the House tonight; what about the will of the people? They voted to leave the EU in its entirety, not to be half in, half out. I thank my right hon. and learned Friend for his legal advice today, but it is full of ambiguity, as I fear the political interpretation could be in future. This will not breed confidence in our nation.

[The Attorney General]

rose—

[Mr Speaker]

I invite the Attorney General to insert the question mark that I think the hon. Member for South Dorset (Richard Drax) might have intended.

[The Attorney General]

I was puzzled as to what I was to answer. I disagree with my hon. Friend. We will leave legally on 29 March. To get back, we would have to apply for accession under article 49. We will be in a fundamentally different position on 30 March, if we can get there—and we have to get there, because that will honour the verdict given by the British people on 23 June 2016. The best way of ensuring that we do that, whatever the unsatisfactory elements that I accept are involved in this deal, is to take the key to the door of the cell, and get out on 29 March. This deal is the best means of doing that.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

In the Attorney General’s somewhat bombastic responses to hon. Gentlemen and hon. Ladies, he has not addressed the issue to which my right hon. Friend the Member for Belfast North (Nigel Dodds) referred: the backstop down the Irish sea. Will he outline the legal implications of Northern Ireland entering into a customs union with no voice or vote for an indefinite period of time, which to all intents and purposes would create a united Ireland without the mechanism of a border poll, a vote called for within the Belfast agreement?

[The Attorney General]

The hon. Member puts his finger on something that I do regard as being one of the undesirable features of the backstop, which is that there will be rules passed relating to goods. The trade in goods is a narrow field of human and public life, but rules will be passed and the people of Northern Ireland will not have the right of representation in their passage. That is why I think it is essential it should be temporary, why we must strive to make it so, why the extension of the implementation period is a real option in those circumstances, and why I believe, for the reasons I have already given, we can avoid it or avoid it being of any great length.

[Robert Halfon (Harlow) (Con)]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend publish not the whole legal advice, but the legal advice on why we have to give £39 billion to the European Union? He mentioned that there could possibly be an extension to the transition period. Will he set out our legal financial obligations if we do extend the transition period?

[The Attorney General]

There would be financial obligations for extending the implementation of the transition period. They would have to be negotiated at the time. The Joint Committee would consult on them and it would reflect a reasonable proportion or contribution for the period for which we were signing up. In relation to any advice connected with the £39 billion, again my right hon. Friend will understand that I am not at liberty to disclose advice the Government may have received on that matter. I can say that there has been very widespread commentary and discussion on it. I commend to him, for example, the House of Lords European Union Committee.

[Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)]

In attempting to prop up this failing deal, the Prime Minister has reached out to those of us on the Opposition Benches and asked for our support. Does the Attorney General not think that it is a bit rich to ask for our support, given that we will not even be given the courtesy of compliance with the will of this House?

[The Attorney General]

I have said why. I truly wish that I were not in this position and the Government were not in this position. [Interruption.] I do believe it. I do not know what the hon. Member for Cardiff North (Anna McMorrin) is saying. If I did not believe it, I would not be here now saying what I am saying. It is contrary to the public interest; I would be damaging the public interest if I took this decision. I am here to answer the questions of Opposition and Government Members as frankly and candidly as I can. Nothing that I advise today will be different from any other advice that I may or may not have given.

[Maggie Throup (Erewash) (Con)]

Can my right hon. and learned Friend reassure me, as someone without any legal background at all, that I have interpreted the lawyer-client relationship correctly: that it allows for the lawyer to provide impartial and proper legal advice unencumbered by political consideration? Does this convention hold true in relation to the issue we are talking about today?

[The Attorney General]

Yes. My hon. Friend is absolutely right. No lawyer would be worth his salt or any use to his client if he allowed his personal or political views to affect his judgment on matters of law.

[Mr Paul Sweeney (Glasgow North East) (Lab/Co-op)]

The Attorney General has been vehement in his assertion that the release of this information would be detrimental to the public interest. Is it therefore not a matter of regret to him that his Government have not had the basic virtue of consistency in their approach to the Humble Address? Now that contempt proceedings have been initiated by submitting a letter against the Government, what is his legal advice to the Government going to be?

[The Attorney General]

I am afraid I cannot disclose the latter without committing the very sin that I am trying to prevent. Does the hon. Gentleman ask me whether I regret that? Let me be frank: yes, I do. We should have opposed the motion—of course we should have. We should have voted against it. All I can say is that if we had lost on a contested vote, we would be in exactly the same position as we are now in.

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

If we found ourselves in the backstop, we might seek to argue that the European Union had not acted in good faith and had not used best endeavours. Who would appoint the body that would adjudicate on that dispute, and how could we be satisfied that we were going to get a fair hearing?

[The Attorney General]

The governance provisions, set out between articles 167 and 181, provide for 25 independent arbitrators, who are not members of any member state of the European Union or belong to the United Kingdom, to be appointed by both sides as a panel from which an arbitral tribunal can be selected. Ten are to be proposed by the United Kingdom and 10 by the European Union. Five chairmen are then to be proposed by each. If the parties are unable to agree, when a tribunal is formed two are appointed by the UK and two are appointed by the EU. Those four then choose the chairman. If they are unable to decide on a chairman, the permanent court of arbitration will appoint by lot.

[Sandy Martin (Ipswich) (Lab)]

Can the Attorney General tell the House whether he conveyed to the Government Chief Whip, directly or indirectly, his determination not to comply with the Humble Address before the decision was taken not to vote on it?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Attorney General]

I had no discussions with the Chief Whip about the decision to vote or not to vote on this matter. I hope that answers the hon. Gentleman’s question. [Interruption.] Forgive me, Mr Speaker. If I have omitted part of the question, I wonder if the hon. Member could put it again.

[Mr Speaker]

Order. The Attorney General is perfectly at liberty to answer as he thinks fit. He looks quizzically. I say this only by way of interpretation: I think the hon. Gentleman asked whether the right hon. and learned Gentleman had conveyed his views about this matter, directly or indirectly, before the vote on the motion about which we have been speaking this evening. He indicated that he had not spoken or conveyed his views directly. I think the quizzical attitude related to whether there was any indirect communication.

[The Attorney General]

No.

[Mr Speaker]

Thank you.

[Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

My current understanding is that if there is no deal, we will leave with no backstop on 29 March. If the EU and the Republic of Ireland have been content effectively to have a “leave without backstop with two years’ notice period” situation until now, what does the Attorney General think has changed that makes it unacceptable to them now? What does he consider their motivation for that to be? As an aside, can the Attorney General confirm that in extremis the Vienna convention can be used to allow treaties to be broken?

[The Attorney General]

The purpose of the backstop is to give the people of Northern Ireland and the Republic the confidence of knowing that there will not be any retreat from the current integration that has taken place between them over the past 20 years. That is a solemn commitment that is in the interests of Northern Ireland, as well as the Republic of Ireland. The question is how to achieve it. In the interim before another solution is found, which I firmly believe we shall find, this is the solution that would pertain were we ever to have to use it. As to the Vienna convention, there is no provision in the Vienna convention that allows us to terminate a treaty that has no termination clause and that is plainly intended to subsist until another event takes place.

[Jim McMahon (Oldham West and Royton) (Lab/Co-op)]

I hoped today that we would have clarity of thought and calmness of expression, so that we would be all informed on the matter on which we are due to vote next week. I can say that we have not had that. We have had bluster; we have had posturing; and we have had a very clear contradiction. On the one hand we are told that there is nothing to see here, but on the other hand we are told that it would be against the public interest to release information. My question is this: if the House does not have confidence in the Attorney General to deliver the advice in the way that we think is needed, is there any route in the constitution, via the Leader of the House or elsewhere, for us to get alternative, independent legal advice straight to Parliament?

[The Attorney General]

I am very sorry the hon. Member feels that. If I have expressed myself intemperately it is simply because of the questions that I have been asked. I am trying to convey, obviously unsuccessfully, the fact that I am here to justify or to seek to defend this position only because I believe in the public interest. That is the reason why I am saying what I am saying. On all points of law on which I have been asked, I have given my best judgment, my fullest judgment and my starkest judgment about what the situation truly is—as I would give to anybody, including the Government. I assure him that that is the case. That is the complete and full truth. I have given, absolutely candidly, the legal views that I hold on this matter.

[Robert Courts (Witney) (Con)]

I am very grateful for the Attorney General’s indication that article 50 does not provide a legal basis in Union law for permanent future arrangements. Will he give his view on the concern that it might none the less be a basis for arrangements that prove to be indefinite?

[The Attorney General]

No, I do not believe that that is the case. Once it became de facto the subsisting and permanent arrangement, in that there was no prospect of agreement because negotiations had broken down, it would be severely vulnerable to challenge, because it is widely understood that article 50 cannot be a proper basis for any sort of permanent or enduring arrangement. The fact of the matter is that it would be extremely vulnerable to legal challenge.

Points of Order

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Monday 3rd December 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his point of order and for his characteristic courtesy in giving me advance notice of his intention to raise it—[Interruption.] I shall ignore the sedentary chuntering, which is undertaken for no obvious benefit or purpose. I have only just seen the letter to which the hon. Gentleman refers. I shall give it immediate attention when I leave the Chair. Having sat through these exchanges, I intend to come to a rapid decision, which I will convey to the House before it rises tonight, or, if that proves impossible, at the earliest opportunity tomorrow. I hope that that is helpful to colleagues.

[The Attorney General (Mr Geoffrey Cox)]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker. As I indicated during the course of the debate, I had concluded, and I think mentioned, that I will be writing to you this evening, setting out the Government’s proposals in connection with this matter. I wonder if I could invite you to consider that letter, as I am sure you will, in due course this evening.

[Mr Speaker]

Well, I await—[Interruption.] Order. I note what the Attorney General has said, and, of course, I shall be interested to see any letter that he chooses to send to me. It is important that this matter is dealt with in a timely fashion. That is a highly relevant consideration for me to take into account, but I have heard, with respect, what the right hon. and learned Gentleman has said, and I wait to see what emerges.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Speaker]

I feel sure that that will be so.

[The Attorney General]

indicated assent.

[Mr Speaker]

The Attorney General is nodding his assent to that proposition. Just to be clear, the hon. Gentleman is asking whether he can have sight of the Attorney General’s letter, and I think that the Attorney General is signalling that the answer to that is yes.

[The Attorney General]

indicated assent.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker. This is a completely different issue.

Exiting the European Union: Publications

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Monday 3rd December 2018 Written Statements

[The Attorney General (Mr Geoffrey Cox)]

Today I am laying before Parliament the following document:

“EU Exit: Legal position on the Withdrawal Agreement”.

This document sets out the Government’s legal position on the proposed withdrawal agreement and provides a legal commentary, covering each part of the withdrawal agreement and the three protocols.

I will make an oral statement to the House later today.

[HCWS1131]

Criminal Justice System: Disclosure

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Thursday 15th November 2018 Written Statements

[The Attorney General (Mr Geoffrey Cox)]

Today, carrying forward the work of my predecessor, I have published the results of the Government’s review of the efficiency and effectiveness of disclosure in the criminal justice system. This has been laid before Parliament as a Command Paper (Cm 9735), and copies are available in the Vote Office and on gov.uk.

The disclosure of unused material in criminal cases, under the statutory framework of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, is a central pillar of the right to a fair trial and a fundamental part of our criminal justice system in England and Wales. My review of disclosure builds on the operational response by the police and Crown Prosecution Service to the challenges of disclosure under the National Disclosure Improvement Plan. The review sets out the next phase of reforms to deliver sustainable change for the long term.

The review identifies the following cross-system themes and makes recommendations for improvement in respect of each of them:

1. Primary legislation continues to provide an appropriate disclosure regime, but in practice the system is not working as effectively or efficiently as it should;

2. Practical reinforcement of the duty to make reasonable lines of inquiry and apply the disclosure test correctly;

3. Pursuing a fair investigation and considering disclosure obligations from the outset, rather than as an afterthought;

4. Proportionate “frontloading” of disclosure preparation and performance;

5. Early and meaningful engagement with disclosure issues by the defence and the judiciary;

6. Harnessing Technology;

7. Data and Management Information;

8. Continuous, sustained oversight and improvement.

These themes reflect the systemic nature of the management of disclosure and the importance of everyone involved—including the police, prosecutors and the defence community—playing their part effectively.

Cases that are stopped and convictions that are quashed because of serious deficiencies in disclosure are neither fair to the complainant nor the defendant and they undermine public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. However, while there have been too many cases where disclosure failures have occurred, it is not a problem in all cases. Victims should not be afraid to come forward and we must not undermine the progress made in encouraging people to report offences.

In order to ensure the review’s recommendations are followed through, implementation and oversight will happen under the aegis of the Criminal Justice Board.

[HCWS1083]

CPS: Reappointment of Chief Inspector

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Thursday 25th October 2018 Written Statements

[The Attorney General (Mr Geoffrey Cox)]

I am today announcing the reappointment of Kevin McGinty CBE as the Chief Inspector of HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate for a further two years. Mr McGinty was appointed in April 2015 for four years and his contract was due to finish on 31 March 2019.

The Prime Minister has been notified of this reappointment. Also, this role is subject to scrutiny by the Justice Select Committee. The Committee, to which I am most grateful has been consulted and fully supports the reappointment.

[HCWS1032]