Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 29th November 2024 Commons Chamber

[Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)]

I beg to move, that the Bill be now read a Second time.

Thank you, Mr Speaker, and thank you to everyone who is attending this hugely significant debate. It is a privilege to open the debate on the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill, a piece of legislation that would give dying people, under stringent criteria, choice, autonomy and dignity at the end of their lives. I welcome the debate on this hugely important issue.

Let me say to colleagues across the House, particularly new colleagues, that I know this is not easy—it certainly has not been easy for me—but if any of us wanted an easy life, I am afraid we are in the wrong place. It is our job to address complex issues and make difficult decisions. I know that for many people this is a very difficult decision, but our job is also to address the issues that matter to people. After nearly a decade since the subject was debated on the Floor of the House, many would say that the debate is long overdue.

For my part, I have tried incredibly hard to ensure that the tone of the debate has been—and continues to be—robust, of course, but most importantly respectful and compassionate. I am pleased that, for the most part, that has been the case. I can be confident that that same tone of respect and compassion will be adopted by colleagues today, whatever views they hold. That is particularly important as we have people in the Public Gallery who have a strong personal interest in this issue. They hold a range of views. Some of them have lost loved ones in difficult and traumatic circumstances, and others are themselves terminally ill.

I want to pay a huge and heartfelt tribute to those families and to every single person who has contacted me about this issue, and in many cases shared their own very personal stories of loss and death. I know from my own personal experience of grief that telling your story over and over again takes energy, courage and strength. I am incredibly grateful to them all. It is their voices and their stories that have inspired me.

Such stories are difficult to hear, but it is vital that they are heard as they are at the heart of the debate. They show that the law is failing people. Where that is the case, we have a duty to do what is right to fix it. Those here today or watching at home are dealing with the real consequences of the failings of the current system. I will start by recounting just a few of their stories.

Warwick was married to his wife Ann for nearly 40 years. She had terminal peritoneal cancer, which meant that she could not breathe properly. She spent four days gasping and choking, remaining awake throughout despite being given the maximum dose of sedatives. She eventually died of suffocation. She had begged Warwick to end her life, but as he stood over her with a pillow he could not do what she asked as he did not want that to be her final memory of him. Ann had excellent palliative care, but it simply could not ease her suffering.

Tim fell in love at first sight when he met his wife Louise—he proposed after just three days. But Louise got cancer, twice, and at the end, the morphine simply could not control her pain. In desperation, she managed to smash a small glass bottle and tried to take her own life, not realising that her toddler daughter had got into bed with her. Tim found her. He says,

“You get to a point where you stop praying for a miracle and start praying for mercy.”

Former police officer James waved is mum off as she embarked on her final trip, to Dignitas. She had terminal vasculitis. James desperately wanted to accompany his mum and hold her hand during her final moments, but he knew, because of his job as a police officer, that it was just not possible. Indeed, she insisted that he must not go with her, so she went alone—no one to hold her hand, and no proper goodbye or funeral. Those are just a few examples of the heartbreaking reality and human suffering that far too many people experience as a result of the status quo. the public know this.

I have always been keen to ensure that my politics stays rooted in the world beyond Westminster. It is clear that public opinion is very much in favour of a change in the law. Polling shows consistently that around 75% of people would like to see the legalisation of assisted dying for terminally ill, mentally competent adults. These findings are significant, but it may not be that surprising that most people believe, as I do, that we should all have the right to make the choices and decisions we want about our own bodies. Let us be clear: we are not talking about a choice between life or death; we are talking about giving dying people a choice of how to die.

Let us examine what that choice currently looks like. I do not have a legal background but I have always been driven by a strong sense of injustice. If I see a problem, I will do everything I can to try to solve it. Indeed, in this job, we all do that every week and every day, whether here in Parliament or in our constituencies. When four former directors of public prosecutions, including the Prime Minister, two former presidents of the Supreme Court and many lawyers all agree that the law needs to change, surely we have a duty to do something about it.

Intentionally helping another person to end their life is currently illegal under the Suicide Act 1961, and carries a maximum prison sentence of 14 years. This includes family and friends helping someone who is terminally ill to die, both in the UK and overseas. Existing guidance does not stop people from being investigated by the police, adding fear, guilt and further trauma to grieving families. The law is not clear, and it does not protect individuals, families or medical professionals. That drives people to very desperate measures.

What about coercion? Senior King’s Counsel have said:

“There is currently no established system for identifying abuse or coercion in advance of a person’s death or for helping vulnerable people to make end of life decisions.”

[Kevin McKenna (Sittingbourne and Sheppey) (Lab)]

I have been a nurse for more than a quarter of a century, and in that time I have worked mostly in intensive care as a specialist. I have worked with compassionate and skilled, well-trained clinicians who have been taught to spot coercion—it is fundamental to our practice. Does my hon. Friend agree that it is wrong to suggest that clinicians cannot spot coercion in these cases?

[Kim Leadbeater]

My hon. Friend makes a very important point. I thank him for it, and for his years of service as a nurse. I have spoken to many medical professionals about this issue, and they say that this is part of their job. They are very skilled and they work closely with patients, particularly dying patients, to assess their needs and to have those difficult and delicate conversations. As the KCs said, at the moment we check for coercion in cases where people have taken their own lives—when someone is dead. The Bill would make coercion a criminal offence with a sentence of up to 14 years.

Surely, by putting a legal framework around this difficult situation, we will provide an extra level of safeguarding. One psychotherapist, who is terminally ill herself, said to me recently that coercion happens when things are hidden away. The Bill would bring things out into the open. Surely, that must be safer for everyone. Let us look at what the absence of a robust legal framework looks like.

[Simon Hoare (North Dorset) (Con)]

I thank the hon. Lady for giving the House the time to debate the Bill this morning. She references coercion, and I understand her point about the two medics, but medics will not be able to see or hear everything at all times. People will not be put beyond challenge, because subsequent to the death, if a relative claims coercion of another relative, investigation will remain. I am entirely unclear how, without peradventure, two clinicians can claim that there had been no coercion at any point.

[Kim Leadbeater]

The hon. Gentleman has made the point for me: within a robust system, we will check for coercion, but we do not have any of that now. At the moment, the person will be definitely be dead. We have to look at the status quo. Putting in layers of safeguarding and checking for coercion must be better than the system that we have now.

[Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)]

Colleagues are right to raise questions around coercion. I hosted a phone-in on LBC where people rang in and said, “I feel like I have to end my life because I recognise how difficult it is for my family to see me suffering.” The limit in the Bill, however, is that someone must have only six months to live according to two doctors and a judge, which I genuinely believe massively reduces the risk of coercion. Are we really saying that people are so desperate to bump off their families that if they were told that they had six months to live, they would escalate the process and do it sooner?

[Kim Leadbeater]

The hon. Lady makes an excellent point—she is absolutely right. The very strict criteria in the Bill add extra layers of safeguarding, which, again, we just do not have at the moment.

[Richard Burgon (Leeds East) (Ind)]

I have the deepest respect for my hon. Friend, but one thing that concerns me is societal or systemic coercion. At the moment, elderly people in our society pay thousands of pounds a month to be in a care home. What reassurances can my hon. Friend give that an elderly person in a care home who has been given six months to live would not think to themselves, “I’m a burden. I have been given six months to live. If I end my life now, I can save my family between £25,000 and £55,000”? That really concerns me.

[Kim Leadbeater]

As I have said, at the moment, we have no idea whether that person would take action because we are not having those conversations. By getting two medical professionals and a High Court judge involved, we would be putting this out in the open. Evidence from other jurisdictions shows clearly that coercion tends to happen the other way; what tends to happen is that families try to prevent the person from making the choice of an assisted death.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Kim Leadbeater]

I will take one more intervention.

[Wera Hobhouse (Bath) (LD)]

Is it not the case that the conversations that patients will have with doctors will bring out whether they have been coerced or are suffering intolerably? The criteria are about suffering, not whether somebody worries that they are a burden.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I agree absolutely. Those conversations, which are not taking place at the moment, are very important. I will make some progress.

There has rightly been a lot of discussion about palliative care in recent weeks, and I am convinced that a significant amount of that discussion would not have taken place without the introduction of the Bill. It is a long overdue conversation, and I am very pleased to see it happening.

I have met with the Association for Palliative Medicine, Hospice UK, Sue Ryder and Marie Curie, and last week I was delighted to attend the inaugural meeting of the all-party parliamentary group for hospices. I also attended the fantastic Kirkwood hospice, which serves my constituency of Spen Valley. I pay tribute to the dedicated staff and volunteers across the country in the palliative care sector, who do some of the most vital work in society. We must do more to support them, and I look forward to working with the Government and colleagues across the House in that important endeavour. That is why I have included in the Bill a requirement for the Secretary of State to report to the House on the availability, quality and distribution of palliative care.

Of course, assisted dying is not a substitute for palliative care—it is not an either/or. We have some of the best palliative care in the world in this country, and, when it can meet the needs of terminally ill people, it is second to none. However, when it cannot, surely the choice of an assisted death should be one component of a holistic approach to end of life care.

The comprehensive report by the Health and Social Care Committee, published earlier this year, found no indications of palliative care deteriorating in quality or provision in places where assisted dying had been introduced.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

Ever mindful of what the hon. Lady has said about the criteria, I remind her that Belgium started off with a simple project like the one she refers to but it deteriorated and expanded to include sufferers of dementia and under-18s—children. What guarantees do we have that this legislation will not end up with a situation like that in Belgium, in which case anything goes? Is that what the hon. Lady wants? I do not want that. Does she?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention, but let us be very, very clear. Huge amounts of research has been done by the Health and Social Care Committee, and indeed by myself and others. The model being proposed here is nothing like what happens in Belgium. It is nothing like what happens in Canada. There are strict, stringent criteria, and if the House chooses to pass the Bill, those criteria cannot be changed.

[Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con)]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for giving way and congratulate her on the measured way in which she has conducted this debate over the last few weeks. Whatever side of the House and whatever side of the debate, I would like to recognise that—it is not always the case. But is it not the case that the Bill crosses a new and irreversible medical red line for doctors and nurses? Is it not the case that in other Bills we have seen in this House over the years, the safeguards invariably become obsolete over time, and so the safeguards in this Bill, however well meant, should be seen as temporary safeguards and not immutable safeguards?

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[Kim Leadbeater]

Absolutely not. I respectfully disagree with the right hon. Gentleman. In countries where a Bill of this nature has been implemented, the safeguards have been in place and the boundaries have never changed. I will come on to talk about that.

[Sir Oliver Dowden (Hertsmere) (Con)]

rose—

[Kim Leadbeater]

I will take one more intervention and then I must make some progress.

[Sir Oliver Dowden]

I thank the hon. Lady for giving way. I have a great deal of sympathy for the arguments she is making. However, we have seen, time and again, excessive judicial activism taking the words in this House and expanding their meaning into places we had not foreseen. What reassurances can she give that the words in her Bill will be respected by the judiciary and that we will not find ourselves in a decade’s time in a totally different place that this House did not intend?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention. The courts have repeatedly put this issue back to Parliament. This is not their domain. This is the legislation. There are strict criteria.

Coming back to palliative care, in situations where pain simply cannot be managed, the result is deaths that are so horrific that the person themselves can spend hours, and in some cases days, in unimaginable pain as they die. I want to bring the debate back to the issue that we are trying to solve. For their loved ones, no matter how many joyful and happy memories they have, they also have the trauma that comes from watching someone you love die in unbearable agony and fear. That memory stays with them forever.

Rebecca’s mum Fiona developed metastatic brain cancer at the age of 69. She had very good palliative care, but her pain could not be managed, and she died begging and screaming for assistance to end her suffering. Her family and the medical team treating her cried beside her bedside as it took her 10 days to die.

Lucy’s husband Tom was 47, a music teacher with a young son. He had bile duct cancer which obstructed his bowel, resulting in an agonising death. Tom vomited faecal matter for five hours before he ultimately inhaled the faeces and died. He was vomiting so violently that he could not be sedated and was conscious throughout. Lucy pleaded with the doctors to help. The doctor treating him said there was nothing he could do. His family say that the look of horror on his face as he died will never leave them. Lucy now has post-traumatic stress disorder, which is quite common for families who lose loved ones in such harrowing circumstances.

[Rachel Taylor (North Warwickshire and Bedworth) (Lab)]

I thank my hon. Friend for the powerful and moving stories she is telling. A constituent of mine watched her mum suffer from pancreatic cancer. Unable to keep any food down, she basically starved to death. Does my hon. Friend agree that that is no way to see a loved one die? Does she also agree that we did not come into this place to shy away from difficult choices, but to listen to our constituents and make better laws for everyone?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention, and I am so sorry to hear that story from her constituency. We all have stories from all our constituencies, and she is absolutely right that we are here to make difficult decisions. On her example there, I have been astonished by the number of people who have been in touch with me to tell me about the terminally ill loved ones who have starved themselves to death out of desperation—something that takes far longer than we may imagine and is just horrific for everyone involved. That is currently legal, and doctors are required to assist the patient through this agonising process. How can we allow that, but not a compassionate and humane assisted death?

[Blair McDougall (East Renfrewshire) (Lab)]

I join the right hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard) in commending my hon. Friend for the way she has made sure that this binary debate has not been a polarising one. I started the debate where she is now, but I have moved to opposing the Bill by the stories I have heard of disabled people who have had “do not resuscitate” put on their medical records without their permission, or who have been stopped by strangers in the street and been told, “You would be better off dead.” I know she will say that we are voting on the specifics of her Bill, but we are also voting on a principle. Does she agree that there should be a precautionary approach, and does she honestly believe the legislative process gives us the time to be sure that we are making the right decision?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention and I will come on to some of those points later in my speech. Let us be very clear: the title of the Bill refers to terminally ill adults, not disabled people or elderly people, as another hon. Member referred to. The criteria are very clear.

I come back to the status quo, which is the problem we are trying to address. If people want to avoid the trauma of some of the harrowing circumstances I have described, they can have an assisted death—just not in this country. If they have £10,000 or £15,000, they can make the trip to Switzerland or elsewhere but, because of the current legal position, it is often a deeply distressing and very lonely experience, shrouded in secrecy, with people feeling like criminals as the fear of prosecution hangs over them.

Ilana’s husband Crispin had late-stage motor neurone disease. He was paralysed, and Ilana is a wheelchair user, but at his request she took him on a traumatic and difficult journey to Switzerland. She describes the intense stress and anxiety she felt due to the total secrecy of their plan—and we can only imagine what the journey home was like, on her own, with an empty seat beside her.

There are also those terminally ill people who take matters into their own hands. Gareth’s father Norman served in the Welsh Guards. He was a strong man, but his final five years were full of pain and discomfort. He had prostate cancer, which he lived with for 15 years. He was given good initial hormone therapy and chemo, but the cancer spread everywhere and the pain could not be eased. One day, when it all became too much, he went into his garden with the gun he owned and shot himself. Gareth’s sister rushed to his house and found him. Gareth said his father just wanted the pain to stop.

Then there is Peter, from Mirfield in my own constituency, who stopped me in a car park a couple of weeks ago to tell me the harrowing story of his beloved wife, who was diagnosed with metastatic cancer aged 52. The treatment was ineffective and her symptoms were unbearable. She took an overdose of her medication, and Peter found her and took her to hospital. She recovered and he brought her home, but the following day she made another attempt to take her own life, in a way that is too awful to describe. Peter found her dead, and he spent the next eight hours being questioned by the police.

It is estimated that more than 600 terminally ill people take their own lives every year. Often patients will store up medication. Josh, a 33-year-old from Huddersfield went to coach his local kids’ rugby team one Saturday and came back to tell his mum all about it. He found her dead. Lisa, who was terminally ill, had stored up her medication and taken her own life.

Our former colleague Paul Blomfield, the previous MP for Sheffield Central, has campaigned tirelessly on this issue since his dad Harry took his own life in 2014, alone in his garage, after being diagnosed with inoperable lung cancer. Language matters: Harry was not suicidal; he loved life, but he had watched too many of his friends have lingering, degrading deaths and he did not want that for himself. But, like the others, he could not tell Paul and his family of his plan, as they would have been complicit and could have faced prosecution. How many precious days and weeks did Harry miss out on as a result of having to take action while he was still physically able to do so? Hearing these stories is not easy, but it is important.

[Lloyd Hatton (South Dorset) (Lab)]

What I have been struck by in recent weeks as I have listened to Members from across the House is the clear agreement that the current situation is neither sustainable nor dignified. Almost everyone in this House agrees that the status quo is unacceptable in terms of dignity, palliative care and end of life. Given that, does my hon. Friend agree that today’s debate is about how we depart from the unacceptable situation that we currently face? Is today’s vote not the first stage of an important discussion about we improve the end of life for hundreds and hundreds of people across this country?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I wholeheartedly agree. I am setting out what we are dealing with now. This cannot be right, and surely we have a duty to do something about it.

[Wendy Morton (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I am going to make some progress, if that is okay.

Some of the most important voices in this debate are, of course, those of people currently living with a terminal illness. Having a terminal diagnosis is perhaps one of those situations where it is very hard, if not impossible, to know how we would feel. I have met many terminally ill people over recent weeks and every one of them is in my thoughts today.

Sophie, who is here today, was diagnosed with stage 4 secondary breast cancer, which has spread to her lungs, liver and pelvis. She is allergic to opioids, so she knows that her pain is very unlikely to be able to be managed. She has a 17-year-old daughter. All she asks is to have the choice to say goodbye to her daughter at a time of her choosing, in circumstances that she can have some control over, and for her daughter to be able to remember her as the vibrant, positive woman she is.

Nathaniel, who also joins us today, has stage 4 incurable bowel cancer, which is now in his liver and brain. Like many of us, Nat says that he does not know whether he would choose an assisted death or not, but he simply cannot understand why anyone would want to deny him the choice. He says:

“I wish to live as fully as I can and for as long as possible. But when the time comes”,

Nat also wants

“the right to die with dignity and compassion”.

Another very emotional lady came up to me at a recent interfaith event. She and her husband thanked me for putting the Bill forward. She said, “Kim, I am a proud Christian and I am guided by my faith. But I also have terminal cancer and I want the right to choose a compassionate death.”

There has been much discussion about the views of people who hold religious beliefs. I fully respect those beliefs and do not intend to say much more about this, other than that I know there are a range of views within faith communities. Indeed, some of the most powerful conversations that I have had have been with people of faith, including in my own constituency. People of different religions have said that although they would not choose an assisted death for themselves or their family, who are they to stop someone else who may want to make that choice?

[Barry Gardiner (Brent West) (Lab)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I will make some progress, if I may. I hope that I have set out the problem that clearly exists. Now allow me to set out how the Bill can address that problem and, most importantly, do so safely and effectively.

If the Bill were to become law, it would contain the most robust and strongest set of safeguards and protections in the world. Very strict eligibility criteria and multiple layers of checks and safeguards are embedded in the Bill, none of which, as we have seen, exist at the moment. I made a conscious decision to name it the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill, rather than anything else. That title can never be changed and ensures that only adults who were dying would ever come within its scope. As such, the Bill is not about people choosing between life and death; it is about giving dying people with six months or less to live autonomy about how they die and the choice to shorten their deaths.

The Bill does not apply to people with mental health conditions. It does not apply to the elderly. It does not apply to people with chronic health conditions, and it does not apply to disabled people, unless, of course, they have a terminal illness, in which case they would and should be entitled to the same rights as anyone else.

[Daisy Cooper (St Albans) (LD)]

One group of people who are not often talked about are the learning disabled. Clause 9(3)(b) says that if an assessing doctor has any doubt as to the capacity of the person, they may refer them for a further psychiatric assessment. If the Bill is voted through today, will the hon. Member engage in a debate about whether that language should be strengthened from “may” to “must” and whether the training and experience required of the assessor should be strengthened as well?

[Kim Leadbeater]

The hon. Lady makes an excellent point and highlights a community who we must consider in light of the Bill. I would absolutely be open to that conversation in Committee; it is a very valid point.

There are different views within the disabled community. As Professor of Disability Research, Sir Tom Shakespeare says that it is unacceptable that people with disabilities continue to face social stigma and inequalities, but that it would be a mistake to conclude that we should oppose legalising assisted dying for terminally ill people until those wider problems are fixed. He says that it is paternalistic and wrong to imply that inequalities will be resolved by reducing choices, and that a clear, transparent legal framework for end-of-life choice is better for everyone. He is right. There is, of course, still work to do in the fight for equality for people with disabilities, but once again it is not an either/or. I will campaign alongside many others in this place for those rights, but I will also campaign for the rights of terminally ill people, because their rights are as important as anybody else’s rights.

[Barry Gardiner]

I have huge respect for the hon. Lady for the way that she has conducted this debate over the last few weeks. My concern is that she has focused today on the individual and the individual choice, but we are here to legislate for society as a whole. In legislating, what we are saying if we pass the Bill is that it is okay to take that choice—[Interruption]—and there will be some people who have six months of their life to go who will then feel, “Ought I to do this? Is this something that I now should do?” That brings into play a whole set of considerations—“Is it better for my family? Is it financially better for my family?”—in ways that, at the moment, are out of scope. Rather than simply focusing on the individual suffering, which we all recognise is acute, we must broaden the debate to the impact that the legislation will have on society as a whole.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention. I suggest that the Bill will give society a much better approach towards end of life. We are already hearing conversations about dying and death which I do not think we have heard enough in this country. We have to take a holistic view. Indeed, that is what happens in other countries and other jurisdictions. Having those deep and meaningful conversations about death and dying is really important. My hon. Friend’s comments bring me on nicely to the protections and safeguards in the Bill.

[Mr Toby Perkins (Chesterfield) (Lab)]

A decade ago, I voted against a similar Bill, because I felt that perhaps it was not perfect and there were more things that I needed to know. My hon. Friend is right that we have not talked about death for the 10 years since or considered any legislation. The truth is that if we vote against her Bill today, it will be the end of the conversation once again for another decade.

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[Kim Leadbeater]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. How many people will go through the situations I have described if it is another 10 years before we address this matter?

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Kim Leadbeater]

I am not going to take any more interventions, I am afraid, because I am conscious that lots of hon. Members want to speak; I know Mr Speaker is conscious of that as well.

Under the Bill, any terminally ill person who wants to be considered for an assisted death would have to undertake a thorough and robust process involving two doctors and a High Court judge. No other jurisdiction in the world has those layers of safeguarding. The person requesting assistance must have mental capacity and a settled wish at every stage. That means they must repeatedly demonstrate that they understand the information relevant to their decision, the ability to retain that information, and to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision. We know that capacity can fluctuate which is why it is assessed at every step of the process.

[Melanie Ward (Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy) (Lab)]

On that point, will my hon. Friend give way?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I am sorry but I am not going to take any interventions, as I need to make progress.

The court must speak to one of the doctors and can hear from anybody else they deem necessary. If there is any evidence of coercion, the court will not approve the request, and if evidence emerges subsequently, the court order could be revoked. It is also important to note that the person can change their mind at any time, with periods of reflection built in. Having consulted at the highest levels in the judiciary and the medical profession, I know that they can and will fulfil those safeguarding responsibilities and that they have the expertise to do so.

Let us be clear: as my hon. Friend the Member for Sittingbourne and Sheppey (Kevin McKenna) said earlier, this is not brand new territory for doctors. Doctors, working in partnership with other clinicians, are already required to manage complexity in end-of-life decision making. I followed the request of the British Medical Association that doctors should be under no obligation whatsoever to participate, but if they do participate, they will receive appropriate training and support. Doctors should be able to use their professional judgment when and if a conversation takes place, taking their cue from the patient, as they do for many other issues. I welcome that patient-centred approach. Many doctors feel the change in the law would safeguard clinicians and patients by making everything explicit.

When it comes to the detail of what assisted dying would look like, we have the benefit of drawing on the experience of 31 jurisdictions around the world. I could talk extensively about the international experience of assisted dying. The Health and Social Care Committee report did a brilliant job of that, and this Bill has looked at best practice as well as models which I and many others would not be comfortable with our having here in England and Wales.

Reflecting on their experience, clinicians in Australia say:

“through deep and meaningful conversations between doctors, patients and their loved ones we can dispel fear, reduce suffering, bring death and dying out of the shadows, and so allow patients and their families a better quality of life and quality of death”.

As one Australian Member of Parliament said:

“We have brought ‘behind-closed-doors’ practices into the open and given dying people meaningful, transparent choices. Crucially none of the fears that were put forward as reasons not to change the law have been realised. The status quo was broken and assisted dying works.”

Evidence from around the world shows that the option of having an assisted death actually lifts the fear that terminally ill people have, and that many never actually use it but are able to make the best of the time they have left due to the comfort and reassurance that it provides.

People talk about a slippery slope, but the Health and Social Care Committee found that not one jurisdiction that has passed laws on the basis of terminal illness has expanded its scope. [Interruption.] That is absolutely true. As the courts here and in Europe have repeatedly made clear, Parliament is sovereign. This Bill could not be made any broader through any judicial process.

Speaking of process, with reference to the Bill, having listened to what I know are genuine concerns of Members about ensuring that we get this legislation right, I commit to the House that if the Bill passes Second Reading today, which I sincerely hope it does, I am minded to move a motion that gives the Bill Committee the power to take oral and written evidence in order to ensure that a thorough approach continues to be taken. That is not normal procedure for a private Member’s Bill, but I think that that is the right thing to do. I also reassure colleagues that the Bill Committee will meet over a number of weeks, meaning that there is ample time for full consideration of the details of the Bill, including amendments. The Committee will be representative of the views and make-up of the House. Let me be clear: that will mean there will be representatives of different parties with a range of views on the Committee.

As the Leader of the House said at the Dispatch Box just yesterday, and has said several times, the Government will, of course, work with me to ensure that the Bill is workable and operable. That will quite rightly take time, and I have included in the Bill a commencement period of up to two years—this is not going to happen overnight. That timeframe can be explored in Committee, as it is more important to get this right than to do it quickly.

In conclusion, for the reasons I have set out, I am very clear that the law needs to change to give terminally ill people choice at the end of life and to protect their loved ones from fear of prosecution. There will be some of us here today who are lucky enough not to have personal experience of this issue, but sadly we know that any one of us could end up in this heartbreaking situation. We are all living longer, which is brilliant, and I have campaigned inside and outside Parliament for a greater focus on prevention and early intervention of illness and disease to keep us fit and healthy for as long as possible, but any one of us or our loved ones could be unfortunate or unlucky enough to receive a terminal diagnosis. I struggle to see how it is fair or just to deny anyone the autonomy, dignity and personal choice of taking control of their final weeks. And the right to choose does not take away the right not to choose. Giving the choice of an assisted death to those who want it would of course not stop anyone who is terminally ill from choosing not to make that choice.

Whatever happens today, I am incredibly proud of the work that my fantastic team and the many campaigners have done on this hugely significant, emotional and sensitive subject. We need to be clear: a vote to take this Bill forward today is not a vote to implement the law tomorrow. It is a vote to continue the debate. It is a vote to subject the Bill to line-by-line scrutiny in Committee, on Report and on Third Reading. Then, of course, the Bill will go to the Lords for what I have no doubt will be further robust debate and scrutiny. This will be a thorough process, focused on one of the most significant issues of our time—an issue that people across the country clearly want us to address, none more so than the many families who are facing the brutal and cruel reality of the status quo. Today is the beginning, not the end, of that process, but the debate can continue only if colleagues join me in the Aye lobby today. I wholeheartedly encourage them to do so, and I commend the Bill to the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Kim Leadbeater]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker. I seek your guidance on correcting the record. I said in my speech that I have consulted with the highest levels of the judiciary and the medical profession. I have received correspondence from the Judicial Office and wish to clarify my earlier comments. Although I have spoken to lawyers and judges, I should not have implied that the serving judiciary have in some way indicated their agreement with the Bill; they have not. The serving judiciary have been very clear that they have made no public comments about the Bill one way or the other. I apologise if I implied anything to the contrary.

[Mr Speaker]

I thank the hon. Lady for correcting the record.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (First sitting)

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st January 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Good afternoon. In the Committee that I was in this morning, someone asked if they could remove their jacket, which seemed unbelievably spartan, but if any Member wishes to do so, they may. We are now sitting in public, so the proceedings at the present are being broadcast. Before we start, I have a couple of preliminary remarks. Please will you all turn off your mobile phones and other noisy electronic devices. I am also asked to remind you that tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings; if you want them, you will have to go outside.

We shall first consider the motion on the amendment paper tabled by the Member in charge of the Bill, Kim Leadbeater, which is to sit in private to consider matters relating to the sittings motion.

[Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee do sit in private to consider matters relating to the sittings motion.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger, and to be here for the first formal meeting of the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Committee. Ahead of the oral evidence sessions next week and the line-by-line scrutiny thereafter, we have two jobs to do this afternoon. One is to confirm the sitting times for the Committee and the other is to confirm the witnesses for oral evidence. Following discussions, I have taken the decision to have some of our sitting today in private. That is normal procedure for discussing witnesses and I think it is the right way to proceed, given that some of those discussions will probably involve conversations about the suitability of witnesses who are not here to speak for themselves. It would be inappropriate to discuss named individuals in such a way. Transparency is of course very important, but so is respecting individuals’ privacy. I hope that is clear to colleagues and to others.

I appreciate that members of the Committee and those viewing our proceedings may wish to know about the purpose and effect of this motion. Most Public Bill Committees are subject to programming, and the Programming Sub-Committee would discuss in private which witnesses to hear from. Similarly, Select Committees discuss in private which witnesses they will hear evidence from. Out of respect for the named individuals that we may call to hear evidence from, I propose that we discuss them informally in private. Once that informal discussion has concluded, the Committee will move back into a public session to formally consider the sittings motion. Any Member who wished to speak about the motion publicly or move an amendment would then be able to do so.

[Danny Kruger (East Wiltshire) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. I look forward very much to the process of this Committee and to working with hon. Members to do what we can to ensure that a good Bill is presented back to the House.

I very much respect the points made by the hon. Member for Spen Valley. Nevertheless, I do have some real objections to the motion, which I encourage Members to oppose. The fact is that this debate was due to be held in public—in fact, people have travelled here in the expectation that they would be able to attend and observe our debate on the sittings motion—but last night, for reasons we do not fully understand, a decision was clearly made to table a motion that we sit in private. I would be grateful to understand why that decision was made so late.

My general point is that there is a clear public interest case. The public should understand why witnesses have been chosen and why other people have not, and if there are concerns about the witnesses, they should be aired publicly. This is the only time that the public are being consulted—that experts from outside Parliament have a chance to contribute to our deliberations. I fail to understand why those discussions cannot be held in public. The only argument that I can imagine—and the hon. Member for Spen Valley made it—is that Members might for some reason be uncivil or speak disrespectfully about potential witnesses, which I do not for a moment believe. I am sure that you, Sir Roger, or the other Chairs will keep us in order throughout our proceedings.

We are here to talk about the overall balance and particular qualifications of the witness list. Looking at the witness list that was presented this morning by the hon. Lady, I have very serious concerns, which should be aired publicly, about the list. It includes eight witnesses from foreign jurisdictions, who are being called to give evidence from abroad; all are supporters of assisted dying in their jurisdictions. There are no people speaking against the operations of assisted dying laws internationally. There are nine lawyers on the list—all of them, with the exception of three who appear to be neutral, in favour of a change in the law. There is not a single lawyer against this Bill. Sir James Munby was suggested, but I understand he has been removed. There might be a perfectly good reason for that, but he has spoken against the Bill.

There is nobody on the list from deaf or disabled people’s organisations, but the UN convention on the rights of persons with disabilities recognises the importance of engaging with such organisations in laws of this nature. With the exception of Dr Jamilla Hussain, there is no one on the witness list who can speak to the equality impacts of assisted dying.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

I look forward to the opportunity to discuss the sittings motion, which I hope we can do publicly. On a general point about process, the Bill was written by a campaign group.

[Kim Leadbeater]

That is not true.

[Danny Kruger]

Well, it had a significant input.

[Kim Leadbeater]

On a point of order, Sir Roger. That is categorically not true. The Bill was written with senior legislative expertise, along with myself as a sitting Member of Parliament and with esteemed colleagues. I take that point of offence quite personally.

[Danny Kruger]

Well, I hope that the hon. Member—

[Danny Kruger]

I apologise, Sir Roger, and I apologise to the hon. Lady for causing offence. I hope she will not be offended when points are made that she disagrees with.

[Kim Leadbeater]

It is a matter of fact.

[Danny Kruger]

I am happy to withdraw the suggestion that the Bill was written by a campaign group, on the basis of the hon. Lady’s assurance that it was written by herself. I hope it is not the case that there was significant input from campaigners. I do not see why there should not have been; I just mention it because the Bill came to us with no formal consultation. There was no impact assessment—

[Kim Leadbeater]

On a point of order, Sir Roger. Surely we are having a conversation about whether we sit in private or not. Can we keep to that matter?

[The Chair]

Forgive me: I am in the Chair and I will decide—but the hon. Lady is absolutely correct. Once again, I am afraid that the hon. Member for East Wiltshire is straying very wide of the motion on the amendment paper. I would be grateful if he would now come to his conclusion so we can start to move forward.

[Danny Kruger]

I absolutely will. In fact, I will finish there. The points I have been trying to make are simply in the light of the fact that if the hon. Lady’s motion is accepted, the public will no longer have the opportunity to hear any of our points on the sittings motion—on the process that we will be decide on.

[Kim Leadbeater]

On a point of order, Sir Roger. That, again, is factually incorrect. We have already said that there will be a private sitting for conversations about individual witnesses, including some that the hon. Gentleman has already started talking about, and then we will open again to the public so that everybody can hear the Committee’s conversations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kim Leadbeater]

I beg to move,

That—

(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 21 January) meet—

(a) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 28 January;

(b) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Wednesday 29 January;

(c) at 11.30 am and 1.00 pm on Thursday 30 January.

(2) during further proceedings on the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill, the Committee do meet on Tuesdays and Wednesdays while the House is sitting at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm.

(3) the Committee shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following Table:

[Naz Shah]

I beg to move manuscript amendment (b), after “General Medical Council”, insert “, Royal College of Psychiatrists”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

Thank you, Sir Roger.

By adding Karon Monaghan KC, an eminent equality and human rights law barrister, amendment (e) would add balance among the lawyers in the Committee. I would also like to add James Munby, or someone from His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, because we need someone who can speak to court capacity issues in relation to the Bill. Professor Katherine Sleeman is a great expert on all these matters.

I am going through the list, and I am unclear what the Australian MP would add. If we remove the other two, there are other pro-AD Australian experts who will speak instead. If we replace those three, who are experts from—

[Kim Leadbeater]

On a point of order, Sir Roger. My hon. Friend has just mentioned two names that are not in her amendment, and I find that slightly confusing.

[Naz Shah]

These are replacements of the words in your paper.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

All the names that the hon. Member for Bradford West has suggested were indeed submitted, I believe, to the hon. Member for Spen Valley ahead of the deadline that she put to us at the end of last month.

[Kim Leadbeater]

On a point of order, Sir Roger. All those names were not submitted.

[Danny Kruger]

The hon. Lady can feel free to intervene on me without troubling the Chair. I stand corrected if that is the case. We only received the final list this morning. It was necessary to make alternative suggestions ahead of that, which was done. I am now supporting the hon. Member for Bradford West in making suggestions for slight adjustments, as she suggests is all that is appropriate at this point. The list is unbalanced. I had to do a very quick analysis, and of the almost 60 names that have been put to us, 38 of them are in favour of the Bill and the principle of assisted dying, whereas there are only 20 who are opposed. There is an inherent imbalance there. It is only a quick analysis that has been done, and we will be able to do more of that subsequent to this sitting, but that is my impression.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I now call the promoter of the Bill. I will then call the mover of the amendment.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I thank colleagues for their time this afternoon. It has been an extremely productive session. I am very proud of the tone of the debate: I think we have done a very good job, as we did on Second Reading, of showing this place in a good light.

I reiterate that there are a range of views in this Bill Committee, in the same way that there are a range of views across the House on this significant and deeply emotive issue. There are a range of views among the witnesses we will hear from, and I spent a huge amount of time ensuring that. Colleagues have given me more than 100 names of people they might like to hear from. I had my own list of people I would like to hear from, and many of them are not on the list of those who will give oral evidence.

I have tried to be extremely balanced, so we will hear from people with a range of views and opinions, but most importantly we will hear from people with expertise. That is the purpose of the Committee: to hear from people who can advise us on the detail of the Bill. We will go through this Bill line by line, and we need to hear from people who can help us to do that. We have some fantastic expertise on the Committee, but for many of us there are areas that we need to learn more about. It is important that the witnesses give us the information to enable us to do that, rather than—as numerous colleagues have said—once again going over the fundamental principles around assisted dying, because we did an excellent job of that on Second Reading.

At the end of our endeavours, we will produce a piece of legislation that will be re-presented to the House, and colleagues will again have the opportunity to vote on it however they see fit. There may be people in this room who vote differently from how they voted on Second Reading; there may be colleagues out there who do likewise, one way or the other.

I am very clear about this Committee’s role, which is to work on the Bill together, collegiately and collaboratively, irrespective of our different views, and re-present it to the House so that the House can continue to do its job. It is not just the Commons; the Lords will also have the opportunity to scrutinise the Bill and table amendments. I have always been open about the fact that this is about us working together. Where the Bill needs to be amended to make it more robust and alleviate people’s concerns, whether that is around coercion or capacity, that is now the Committee’s job. I stand ready to serve and to do that.

We have spent a lot of time this afternoon on this, and quite rightly so. As far as I am concerned, we are now in a position to move forward. I am very happy that we will hear from so many witnesses over several days, and I am happy that I have added more time to that so that we can hear from more witnesses, which I think is important. As colleagues have said, our job now is to get on with this really important piece of work.

[Naz Shah]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, the promoter of this Bill, because she has been very helpful. She has certainly added one of my key witnesses to her list, and I am grateful for that.

I want to respond to some of the points that have been made. One of the biggest issues for me is amendment (b), which would insert “Royal College of Psychiatrists”. My hon. Friend the Member for Ashford made the point that all psychiatrists come under the GMC, but not every member of the GMC is a psychiatrist. That speaks to the issue of coercion, mental health and capacity. That is the expertise that I am looking for in the line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill, and I would really like to hear from the Royal College of Psychiatrists.

I am happy to be guided by you, Sir Roger, because I am new to this process and I have not done a Bill of this nature before, but my only worry with the outside evidence and briefings is that they will not be on the record when we are looking at Hansard and seeing whether they have been taken into account. I would be happy to receive some assurance about that. Yes, we can organise lots of briefings and lots of experts, but does that not defeat the object of having this debate so robustly in the first instance?

The hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough raised the issue of language, and the point about added value. I think that language is correct, because I do want to add value to this debate. I want value added, because it is important for my constituents that when I vote on the Bill on Report, I do so knowing that I have listened to all sides of the debate.

My hon. Friend the Member for Stroud asked whether this is a for-and-against argument. In particular, he said that we do not need to hear from those who are opposed, because we want to strengthen the Bill so that it can go through the House. Although I appreciate the sentiment, I put it to everyone that it is not about getting the Bill through; it is about getting the right information so we can scrutinise whether it is fit to go through the House. For that reason, it is important to hear from those who are opposed. It is naive to think that we only need to hear from people who are in support.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Money)

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Money resolution
Wednesday 22nd January 2025 Commons Chamber

[Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)]

On 29 November last year, in a debate widely described as showing Parliament at its best, this House sent the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill into Committee for scrutiny by a majority of 55. It was the clear will of this place that the Bill should be allowed to proceed, in the knowledge that Members will have further opportunities on Report and beyond to decide whether it should be enacted. For that process to continue, the resolution before us today must pass.

Those who oppose the Bill on principle—something they are absolutely entitled to do—are seeking to suggest that there is something extraordinary or improper about this process, and on that they are simply wrong. This is a standard procedure that comes before this House all the time. Without it, there can be no Bill—that, I humbly suggest, is sadly what some people intend. This is not a blank cheque, as some Members have suggested. The right time to discuss the detail of what expenditure may be required is when we know the final shape of the Bill. At that point, if Members are concerned about the expenditure required, or indeed anything else, they can of course vote as they wish.

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

The hon. Lady says that the right time to discuss the capacity of the judiciary and health service to deliver the Bill is presumably once it has completed its Committee stage, but should the Committee that considers the Bill have the impact assessment that allows it to scrutinise it line by line, mindful of the implications that it might have on our health service and our judiciary?

--- Later in debate ---

[Kim Leadbeater]

I respect the right hon. Gentleman’s question, but I would say that point is slightly out of the scope of the money resolution. However, I think it is a fair point, and I acknowledge that a lot of work is being done, as the Government said it would be, to look at the workability and operability of the Bill. I am working closely with Departments on those issues, and those conversations will continue, alongside the work of the Committee. I hope that provides him with some reassurance.

The other point is that I have never sought to stifle debate on the Bill or this really important issue; quite the contrary. I value it and I welcome it, but I do ask that it continues to be conducted in the same respectful and considered manner as on Second Reading. Where we disagree, let us do so with respect and without questioning each other’s motives or integrity.

[Ruth Cadbury (Brentford and Isleworth) (Lab)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on how she has conducted this important debate. On stifling debate, does she share my hope that there will be no vote against the money resolution, because such a vote would end debate? While there was a strong vote in support of the Bill, there were many strong arguments for amendment and there was opposition. Does she agree that that debate needs to happen as the Bill proceeds and not be stifled and ended today?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend. Having done such a powerful job of debating this issue on Second Reading, it is crucial that we continue that debate in the right manner, as Parliament voted to do. It would be wrong for anything that happens today to put a stop to that debate and those discussions.

Let us not forget that the public are watching our deliberations carefully and that the issue we are discussing means a huge amount to many people. It is extremely serious and, for many, hugely emotive. We owe it to our constituents to treat it with the seriousness it deserves. I ask Members to consider carefully what it would say about us as a Parliament if such an important debate were to be curtailed as a result of procedural manoeuvring, which, sadly, is what I worry is being attempted by some colleagues today.

The money resolution is not about the pros and cons or the detail of the Bill; it will simply allow for proper scrutiny—including of any cost involved—to continue, and mean that the Bill Committee can begin its important work. I urge Members to support the resolution.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[Brian Mathew]

There would be added expense. Social workers are trained in understanding family dynamics, and need desperately to be involved in these situations.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I take that point on board. I had a very productive meeting with the Association of Palliative Care Social Workers yesterday, and we had a useful conversation on that issue.

[Brian Mathew]

I thank the hon. Lady.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Second sitting)

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th January 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Sarah Olney]

Q Can you talk a little bit more about whether you perceive any difficulties in having a definition of terminal illness in the Act? How do you think the medical profession will interpret that?

Professor Whitty: At the extremes —most people are at the extremes—it is very clear what is going to happen. For most people, you can say with confidence, barring some extraordinary accident like being hit by a car on the way out, “You’ll be fine in a year, even though you have heart disease, cancer or whatever.” At the other extreme, there are people who are clearly dying and will die in the next two or three days, and virtually nothing will change that reality.

What we are talking about in the Bill, of course, is a point between those stages, but people will definitely reach a point where there will be an inexorable and, importantly for the Bill, unreversible slide towards a point of death. People can make a reasonable central view, if they are experienced in a particular disease, about when the death is likely to happen, accepting that there is a spread around that. I am sure that the general public and Members of Parliament fully accept that this is not a precise science. This is a central view, and there is a big academic literature around this. Some people will die significantly earlier than they are predicted to; a small number will die very significantly later; and some people will certainly die a bit later or to some degree later. The central view is usually reasonably accurate—that someone is now on a pathway from which there is not going to be a return.

[Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)]

Q Thank you for coming to give evidence this morning, gentlemen. I would like to pick up on coercion and capacity, because they are two really important points in the Bill. I would like to know a little more about the work that doctors and nurses do to check for coercion and assess capacity when patients are making really important decisions and choices at the end of life, but maybe in other contexts as well. The Bill refers to the Mental Capacity Act. That Act is a big piece of legislation, but I am conscious that there is only a short reference to it in the Bill. Is there anything we could add to the Bill that would improve the robustness of the reference to mental capacity? What does it look like now, and is there anything we could add?

Professor Whitty: Duncan, why don’t you take the first bit and I will take the second?

Duncan Burton: In terms of looking for signs of coercion, all of our nursing and clinical staff have safeguarding training, which already looks at things like whether people are under financial coercion or other forms of abuse. That training is already in place and it is extensive across the NHS and social care. If the Bill is passed, we will need to look at how we strengthen that training in relation to spotting the potential signs of coercion in this space as well. Given that that mechanism is already in place, I think that would be an extension, so it is important that we factor that in. I am also mindful, given the scale of colleagues we have working across health and care, that the time between the Bill being passed and its implementation is sufficient that we enable everybody to receive that additional training, if it is required.

Professor Whitty: In terms of strengthening the Bill, as a practitioner, I was relieved that the decision was for the Bill—if it stays this way—to stick with the Mental Capacity Act, and that was for two reasons. First, that Act is used up and down the country by doctors and nurses every day; they know it and they understand it. Although, as you say, it is a large piece of legislation, it is one that people have worked through in practice multiple times. If you ask six or seven doctors, “Does this person have capacity?”, in almost all cases you will get six or seven identical answers, because people are used to using it.

It additionally has the advantage of being tested in the courts. That has gone as far as the Supreme Court, and the various ambiguities that were inevitably in the legislation have been clarified by senior judges. Therefore, to practitioners like me, it feels like a piece of robust and predictable legislation. Within the legislation, it is very important that there are some situations where you will need to call for additional assistance. For example, if someone has a co-existing mental health condition, you will probably want to ask a psychiatrist additionally whether that condition is interfering with the decision taken to the point that someone loses capacity for this very important decision. The level of capacity has to be reasonably high.

My own view is that starting this way is the sensible thing to do. That does not mean there could not be arguments for some additional points, but I cannot immediately—again, as a jobbing doctor—see ones where I think, “This is going to make a big difference.” The fact is that this is founded on a very established bit of well-used and well-recognised legislation.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q To that point, in those conversations where patients are making very serious decisions, it is not uncommon that you would seek additional advice from other professions, such as a psychiatrist or possibly a social worker and other professionals, if you felt there was a need to do so.

Professor Whitty: The further you go up in the seriousness of the decision, the more you would do that. For example, if you were setting a finger that had been broken, you are not going to wait until a psychiatrist has said that you can do that. Within reason, provided that someone gives consent, you will do that. You will be much more cautious about moving forward with things like open heart surgery or deprivation of liberty if you think there is uncertainty. It should be clear. For the majority of people, it is very clear they have capacity or very clear they do not. There is a relatively small—but important—number in the middle where that is less clear and where additional views are relevant, particularly where there is a question of co-existing mental health issues. The fact of the mental health condition does not in itself mean that someone does not have capacity, but what has to be taken into account is, “Do they have the capacity for this decision at this point in time?” That is how the Mental Capacity Act works.

[Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)]

Q The Bill sets out that it should be brought into force within two years. If the intention is to provide assisted dying through the NHS, can the NHS be ready in time to deliver the service equitably and safely? What needs to be deprioritised in order for it do to so?

Professor Whitty: As we have seen in covid, the NHS, like any service, can swing very fast if there is a need for speed. In this case, I think most people in society would say that the key thing is to get this right. Personally, I would rather it was not running against a timeline. You would not want it to drag on forever, because then you have uncertainty for everybody, but I think Duncan and I would both say that two years seems a reasonable starting point. With some things, it might take longer than that to work out how we are going to provide this in the most safe and equitable way—for example, in dealing with minority and other groups. We need to get all that right and, at least at first pass, get it as close to good as we possibly can.

Equally, we may find when we first start using the legislation that there are some things that we had not considered at the beginning, and therefore we need to go back and improve on them because we just had not thought about them in the first way through the gates; that is why I hope that some of the more operational issues are done through secondary legislation and regulation. Inevitably, that is true for many bits of legislation, but it is particularly important here.

I go back to my very first comment: the central person here is an average citizen in their last six months of life. What we do not want is a system very difficult for them to navigate so that they spend their entire last six months of life—if the Bill is passed and they choose to take account of it; they are going to be a minority—stuck in a bureaucratic thicket. We need to keep this simple. My view is that the best safeguards are simple safeguards. Overcomplicating usually makes the safeguard less certain.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Olney]

Q Leading on from Dr Opher’s question about the “must refer” clause, you and Professor Whitty both stress the importance of the relationship between the doctor and the patient, yet there may be doctors who feel very strongly against mentioning assisted dying. Given the existence of clause 4(5) and the “must refer”, do you think there is a danger that there might be doctors who would be reluctant to provide a prognosis of six months or less if they thought that that would make the patient eligible for assisted dying, and that simply was not something they could support?

Dr Green: That is why it is important that doctors should be able to opt out at any stage of this. There are doctors who would find it difficult to do that, and it is important that their position is respected.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q On the point about referral, what happens in the case of abortion? That is one of the closest parallels we can get. If we have a doctor who is not comfortable having that conversation, presumably they cannot just leave that person with nowhere to go.

Dr Green: What would happen is that the doctor would provide the patient—through their receptionist, through leaflets or through a telephone number—with somewhere they could get the information. You cannot just abandon a patient. They have to be sure that the patient has the ability to do what the patient wants to do.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q Exactly, so although the terminology of “refer” might not be quite right, are we saying that we have got to provide that patient with a course of action?

Dr Green: Yes. It is the “referral” word that is problematic for us.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q That is very helpful. Let me turn to when the GMC guidance on arrangements about assistance to die is raised with practitioners. Part of the guidance is that practitioners have to

“respect competent patients’ right to make decisions about their care, including their right to refuse treatment, even if this will lead to their death”.

I am interested in how that fits in with those very difficult conversations. When a patient executes that right to refuse treatment, are those cases logged? Are they monitored or reported on?

Mark Swindells: There was an important piece of case law—I think in the 1990s—that clarified that a patient refusing treatment and subsequently dying is not an act of suicide. You are right that our guidance talks about the importance of a doctor explaining to the patient about the likely course of action in terms of the option for no treatment. Again, that is intertwined with the Mental Capacity Act 2005, and puts a lot of autonomy in the space of the patient, along with the consent case law that we covered before.

On the previous point about referrals, our guidance is similar to what Dr Green was saying: in the case of conscientious objection—for example, on abortion—the important point is that, from the patient perspective, they are not left with nowhere to go. If that assists, that may be a principle that helps and reads across.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q On the point about reporting, where patients take that right to refuse treatment, capacity must be assessed at that point if a patient has said, “Look, I don’t want any more treatment.” That is quite an important point to assess capacity. Are those cases logged and recorded?

Mark Swindells: Yes. It would be important for the patient’s records to cover the points of consent and that the doctor has recorded that they have interacted with the patient that way. I do not believe it is centrally held or collated in any sense like that, but I may be wrong.

[Jake Richards]

Q Dr Green, on subsections (4) and (5) of clause 4 and the information services, as opposed to the referral to a practitioner, I think your point has some weight. In terms of the rest of clause 4 as drafted, it has an opt-in, it gives wide discretion to practitioners and there is no obligation to raise it, so from my understanding of your written evidence, it ticks all the boxes. Is that fair?

Dr Green: Yes, with the exception of the referral.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jack Abbott]

Q My question, which relates to some of the points made earlier, is for Glyn Berry. Your organisation has recommended a new role: the approved palliative care professional. To go into the detail a bit more, you make a number of recommendations on what that role would include, such as ensuring that the person has the mental capacity to make the decision. First, are you therefore saying that this new role should sit alongside the two-doctor process, which has already been outlined in terms of final decision making? If the approved palliative care professional felt, for example, that this person did not have mental capacity, should they be able to, as it were, stop the process?

Secondly, what level of training would that person need in terms of time? We have, for example, been talking about a two-year process. If this new role came into effect, how long would that person need to be trained for to fulfil it adequately? Thirdly, do you have a sense of how many of these professionals we would need to make this a functioning system? Those are three separate questions.

Glyn Berry: To answer the first question, we feel, for the reasons I outlined earlier, that the role of an approved palliative care professional would sit beside the role of clinicians, balancing clinical and social observation and assessment.

In terms of the training, we, as social workers, already have continuous training opportunities to become best interests assessors, practice educators and approved mental health practitioners, so we envisage that the training would very much be along those lines. Doing those roles currently requires a course of training at university.

Our thoughts, at the moment, are that that would be for palliative care social workers, whether they are in charities, trusts or local authorities, or are independent, because that is where things sit with us at the moment and we know our roles. We like to think that it would roll out to other professionals, however, because assessing capacity is not specifically the role of the social worker; other professionals are able to, and do, complete capacity assessments.

It is quite difficult to answer your question in terms of numbers at the moment. If we were talking specifically about palliative care social workers, we currently have around 200 members in our association, but there will be other people out there who are not members and we do not know who they are. It is a role that could expand.

One of our other recommendations is that palliative and end-of-life care, as an aside to your question, is also brought into qualifying roles for people in training, such as doctors, nurses and allied health professionals, as well as social workers. We could see that happening in the future.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q Thank you for coming and giving evidence today, and for meeting with me recently. You both represent organisations that have neutral positions on assisted dying. I am really interested in this multidisciplinary approach that you are talking about, and I think it is a really valuable conversation, so thank you for raising those points.

I want to ask a bit more about what this end-of-life conversation looks like in your experience, because you are absolutely right; of all the people who are spending time with patients in their last few months of life, it is often nurses and palliative care social workers. You have a really important role to play.

I am also interested in what this would look like in reality. There has been talk of a kind of separation of palliative care and assisted dying, but, actually, I think we should be looking to embrace a holistic approach to end-of-life conversations and end-of-life care, which is what has happened in other jurisdictions. You might have a patient who has signed up for assisted dying but never does it because they have good palliative care and they work with their palliative care experts and specialists. Therefore, I think it is important that we do not try to separate these things.

I would like your views on that, but I think that one of the strengths is that having these conversations about death, about dying and about end of life is a really positive thing. Your members have an important role to play in that, so could you talk a little bit about the holistic approach that your members take?

Professor Ranger: You are right regarding the conversations and the care around dying. Having those conversations with people around pain management and symptom management is particularly the role of palliative care nurses. With assisted dying, I think the conversation is sometimes slightly different. It is talking more as a nurse in some ways, because the primary reason that assisted dying is often a discussion is a lack of autonomy, not pain. Therefore, the conversation generally tends to go in a slightly different way.

Symptom control, and being scared of pain, is understandable, and we absolutely have the ability to get that right for people, but when it comes to seeking assisted dying, the primary reason is usually autonomy, rather than pain and fear of dying. Therefore, in a practical way, I think an experienced nurse or doctor will start to gauge the difference in those conversations, because they are different. I think it is about being really clear around those conversations and really listening to what people have to say, and then having a way to be able to ensure that what an individual wants is something that you have got, and that you listen to.

I absolutely agree with Glyn about safeguards and all the things that we absolutely need to make sure are there, but the whole point of assisted dying is not to be paternalistic, but to respect autonomy. Whatever safeguards we put in with that, we have to be really careful not to ignore that right of autonomy, which is primarily what this Bill is trying to preserve.

I think it is about being really vigilant and listening. A primary role of a nurse is not to advocate their personal view, but to really listen to somebody else and to ensure that what they want is pursued. In all that discussion, it is really important that that does not get lost.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q That is incredibly helpful, thank you. You are absolutely right to bring it back to patient autonomy—patient choice—so that, while putting all the safeguards in place, we are very clear that it is their genuine choice based on what they really want to do. It sounds as though you are saying—

[The Chair]

Order. Is there a question there?

[Kim Leadbeater]

Yes. It sounds as though you are saying that your professionals are trained to have those conversations, which is very reassuring. Glyn, do you want to add anything?

Glyn Berry: Just to say that I absolutely agree with Professor Ranger. My experience of working with palliative nurses, and nurses in general, is long, and I have historically had exceptionally positive experiences and continue to do so. I think that we learn from each other, and it is really important that we can have those conversations with the person and ask questions that they might never have been asked before, such as, “What is it that you want?”

Professor Ranger is absolutely right in terms of autonomy and the person having control, because once that diagnosis is given, it can be a downward spiral for a person and they feel that they lose control. Patients and families talk about that—about having no control over what is happening. In effect, that is true in terms of what is happening in the disease or illness trajectory, but it is so important to remind a person that they are still the person that they were before that diagnosis, that they will continue to be that person, and that they still have a voice. In both our roles professionally, and alongside other clinicians, that is what we seek to do all the time. That is why a multidisciplinary team approach is so important.

Ultimately, we could find that, once you have asked all the appropriate questions and you have put potential safeguards in place following conversations, a person may not choose that particular point to end their life—as you mentioned, Kim—and may continue to live to the end of their natural life.

[Sojan Joseph]

Q When the RCN Scotland director gave evidence to the Scottish Parliament during the discussion of the Assisted Dying for Terminally Ill Adults (Scotland) Bill, he expressed the RCN’s concern that there were not sufficient safeguards in place to protect nurses and nursing practice around assisted dying in Scotland. Are you satisfied that the Bill we have before us in England and Wales addresses those concerns, or would you like to see amendments to ensure that the mental health and wellbeing of nurses involved in the process are protected, should the Bill become law?

Professor Ranger: Yes, we would want to see more support and protection for nurses. Of course, in the exploring of assisted dying legislation in Scotland, the second clinical decision maker is a nurse—so it a doctor and a nurse, whereas in England and Wales we are looking at two medically qualified practitioners. We absolutely want to make sure that the skills and support is there for nursing staff, and the ability—as I heard our medical colleagues saying—to not be involved in assisted dying absolutely has to be supported. It cannot be an expectation of the role; it has to be something you choose to proactively take part in as a conscious decision. It cannot ever be just an expectation of a nurse. We are absolutely adamant about that. The Bill cannot just support the needs of medical staff—nursing absolutely has to be included within that, both in skills and support.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Sixth sitting)

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 30th January 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Jack Abbott (Ipswich) (Lab/Co-op)]

Q My question is to you, Mr Greenwich. I understand that in New South Wales—and please do correct me if I am wrong—similarly to the Bill we are proposing, you adopted legalised assisted dying for those who are terminally ill and will die within six months, but you also added an additional criterion, which was within 12 months for a neurodegenerative disease such as motor neurone disease. That element is not proposed in our Bill, but we have heard from other witnesses over previous days about that issue. What reflections might you have regarding that, and why did you add that element into the Bill beyond the six months that we are proposing here?

Alex Greenwich: Thank you very much for your question. At the outset, I will just stress that every jurisdiction should legislate the form of voluntary assisted dying that is appropriate to them. In New South Wales, that was six months for a terminal illness, or 12 months if that terminal illness was a neurodegenerative disorder. We had learned from the other schemes in Australia that that was going to be important because of the decline that occurs in neurodegenerative disorders like motor neurone disease, for example. It was because of that that we went down that path.

Professor Blake: I should add that in Queensland, there is no such distinction in life expectation between other diseases and neurodegenerative diseases. Queensland legislation is different: it sets a 12-month period of expected death, and the reason for that approach was in response to feedback from people living with neurodegenerative disease that they felt that they were being put in a different position to people suffering from, or experiencing, other terminal illnesses. The Queensland Parliament took a different approach to address that particular feedback.

Dr Furst: From South Australia’s perspective, we are similar to New South Wales; we have less than six months for all conditions bar neurodegenerative conditions, which is less than 12 months. As a clinician, personally, I think that 12 months for neurodegenerative conditions is really helpful, because—as you have heard—if you are looking at prognosis and trajectories, with things like cancer, a patient will be going along and then often have quite a steep and rapid decline. That six-month prognosis is quite noticeable, but for patients with conditions like motor neurone disease, their decline can be slow and very distressing to them. Also, when trying to balance the prognosis along with getting them through the process, 12 months is really helpful, so if there was any chance, I would be strongly advocating for that.

[Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)]

Q Thank you to the witnesses for joining us this morning. I would like to address my comments to Alex Greenwich, if I may, but also come back to Dr Furst and Professor Blake.

It is really valuable for us as a Committee to hear your reflections on the experience of the process of passing this legislation. How did you manage to keep that process patient-centred but also take into account the concerns around the broader societal issues, particularly when it comes to equality and human rights—those really important issues? What was that process like, and what are your reflections on it? Also, Dr Furst and Professor Blake, one thing that I feel really strongly about is having really good training around assisted dying, and end-of-life care and choice. Would you like to make any comments on what that looks like?

Alex Greenwich: Thank you very much for that question. I will take you through a little bit of the journey to voluntary assisted dying in New South Wales, what encouraged action, and then the safeguards that we put in place.

The New South Wales coroner had reported to us that there were a number of really horrible suicides of people with terminal illnesses who felt they had no option—that those were cruel and lonely suicides. That was backed up by paramedics and police who would arrive on site. Myself and my parliamentary colleagues decided, “We can do better, and we can regulate in this space.” Voluntary assisted dying in New South Wales is an important form of suicide prevention. What voluntary assisted dying does, in the model that we legislated, is ensure that a person who has a terminal illness and knows that it is going to be a cruel and painful end of their life is instead directed to a doctor—a doctor who will be able to take them through all of their palliative care options, provide and link them with social supports, and give them the choice to have a death that is better than their illness would otherwise provide.

It has been important to make sure that our legislation is limited to that cohort of people who are terminally ill and know they will have a cruel end of life. Our legislation is not about people with anorexia nervosa. It is not about people with a disability. It is not about people who are feeling a burden. It is about a very limited and narrow cohort of people who know that they are going to have a very cruel and painful end of their life, and want that control to know that they can have a death that is better than what their illness would otherwise provide.

We have ensured that decision-making capacity needs to be enduring. We have ensured that a person cannot be under any form of coercion. We ensured that we had a really strong period of implementation, from the time the Bill was passed to 18 months later, when it came into effect, to make sure that our health system and the various doctors required training.

In New South Wales, the experience of voluntary assisted dying is that it has been a form of suicide prevention, and that it has also been, as I explained earlier, very pro-palliative care. As I reflect on our parliamentary debate, it was also one of the first times that our Parliament had grappled with the concept of death. We were very honest about it, and we were very honest in having to admit that we are all going to die, that there are some people with some terminal illnesses who are going to die in a really cruel and painful way, and that we could provide them with an option of control, peace and respect. We believe, and our annual reports into our legislation indicate, that we have been able to provide that. I am happy to answer any further questions, but I will wrap up on that.

Professor Blake: Given that the Western Australia legislation has been in force rather longer than the other jurisdictions that have been talked about today, we have had the opportunity to reflect upon it—I am speaking here as a lawyer; I assume that is why I have been invited to talk—and that has revealed some of the very good things about the working of the legislation, but also some of the challenges that have emerged.

As Dr Furst has said, the legislation in all Australian jurisdictions varies slightly, but it follows a particular legislative model, and is highly prescriptive. It requires a number of requests and, in Western Australia, assessment by two different practitioners. In Western Australia, there is no judicial double-checking of that process. Although I note that that is contemplated within the UK law, that is not something that we have found to be necessary or even appropriate in Western Australia, and I think that would be the case in other Australian jurisdictions.

One of the issues we have experienced is that there is a struggle to get people to take up the training, whether that be medical practitioners or nurse practitioners. One of the thoughts around that has been the very prescriptive nature of the model, which requires a lot of work on the part of the practitioners. It is worth bearing in mind when looking at your piece of legislation that the more prescriptive it is, the more work it requires on the part of practitioners, and that is a lot of work. We need those people to undergo the training in order that the process is done properly and all the safeguards that are included within the legislation—and they are extensive—are respected. That is something to bear in mind.

We have prescriptive provisions around capacity and voluntariness and lack of coercion. I would add that we also have a requirement around residency. If we are looking at when the legislation has come before a tribunal or judicial body, the only circumstance—in Western Australia, at least—where it has come before the tribunal, which is the State Administrative Tribunal, has been where the practitioner has regarded the patient as not eligible on the grounds of not fulfilling the residency requirements. There has been no other ground on which a matter has been taken to a judicial body.

You asked about the training. That is an essential requirement for practitioners who are involved in making assessments and in the whole process. It is intrinsic to the operation of the Act. The feedback I have heard is aligned with what Dr Furst has said—that no divisions have arisen within the practitioners here, and that those who have chosen to do the training are indeed very valued and very much appreciated by the people who have accessed the scheme.

I will say two more things about the regulation. One is that in the report that has been handed down, the only negative feedback has been about delays. That has been identified as being due to a lack of education among health professionals. One of the recommendations of the report is that education really needs to increase so that people’s journey on VAD is not unnecessarily delayed and, perhaps, their wishes are not able to be granted.

The second thing is on conscientious objectors: 13.7% of applications for VAD in Western Australia from 2023 to 2024 were declined on the basis of conscientious objection. But in Western Australia, unlike some other Australian jurisdictions, if a practitioner declines to become involved in the process, they are required by law to give the patient an information sheet outlining options around voluntary assisted dying. That is actually mandated in the legislation.

I have probably said enough for now, so I will hand over to Chloe.

Dr Furst: I completely agree with Meredith that the training is fundamental. For most jurisdictions, it probably takes a full day. It is often an in-person event followed by an exam, which you have to pass. In South Australia, we had a whole lot of mandatory questions that you actually had to pass to be eligible, to make sure that you were upholding the legislation.

This is so different from anything else in medicine. In any other part of medicine that I practise, if I see a process that I think can be improved—if I see efficiencies that can be made or bits of the system that are not adding to patient care—I can choose to adapt the process as I see fit to give the patient the care that I want to give or that is compatible with what the patient wishes. That is so different from voluntary assisted dying, where, as Meredith said, it is so legislated, down to who can be a witness for various documents. As a doctor, the amount of documentation that is required for voluntary assisted dying is second to nothing. We just do not do that kind of documentation in any other areas of medicine. So it is quite different, and it really does require being quite precise around that documentation and making sure that you are meeting all the timeframes and guidelines. The training is hugely important in terms of the operational component.

There is also the training around end of life and conversations, and how you support the patient and the families. That is a lot harder to teach. That is, I guess, why people will fall into this, and why a large number of palliative care doctors will do it—because it is already second nature to them or they already have the relationship with the patient and they see these conversations as something they are good at and good at facilitating.

So there are two parts of that training that are really important, and then, as Meredith said, there is also the training we need to be giving to the rest of our workforce, and really all health practitioners. A patient might ask the social worker, the orderly or the dietician about assisted dying, and they have to know how they can respond and how they can connect that individual to the right practitioner. That is really important. We have done a lot of work in South Australia, as all the other jurisdictions have, around upskilling the whole workforce, because this is everyone’s role and job.

I also wanted to speak briefly on what we in South Australia call the gag clause. In South Australia and Victoria, we are not allowed to bring up voluntary assisted dying with patients, and that is really, really problematic. From my perspective, it leads to poor provision of care. In medicine, when I am talking to a patient, in every other area, if they needed treatment, I would be obliged, and it would be good practice, to tell them about all the treatment options that are available to them. If someone had cancer, I would want to be telling them about good palliative care, potentially surgery, and radiotherapy and chemotherapy, yet voluntary assisted dying is the one thing we are not allowed to talk about and is taken off the menu. Some people may not know that voluntary assisted dying is available to them. They might be waiting for me as the doctor to bring it up to them. I have brought up every other option for them; why am I not able to talk about voluntary assisted dying? I just think it is really important that we do not stigmatise voluntary assisted dying and that we see it as a valid option for people.

Professor Blake: To add to what Chloe said, in Western Australia practitioners can raise voluntary assisted dying as long as it is in association with other end-of-life choices, but the way the legislation is worded is confusing, so one of the recommendations in the most recent report is that that be removed altogether so that voluntary assisted dying is treated like any other treatment option. As Chloe indicated, the evidence was that treating voluntary assisted dying differently can compromise the whole end-of-life journey, because it interferes with discussion of other end-of-life options. The strong recommendation from the board is that it be removed altogether and that voluntary assisted dying be treated just like any other appropriate treatment option so that the patient has a true choice.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eighth sitting)

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 11th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Thank you. I call Kim Leadbeater.

[Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)]

Further to those points of order, Ms McVey. I take on board people’s comments. There’s no two ways about it; this is a considerable amount of work for members of the Bill Committee to undertake. As has been alluded to, there are a wide range of amendments being proposed. The job of the Committee is to take evidence, look at those amendments, discuss and debate them, and then vote accordingly. That is the process that we are all here to undertake.

[The Chair]

Thank you. Let us start.

Clause 1

Assisted dying

[Kim Leadbeater]

I beg to move amendment 178, in clause 1, page 1, line 3, after “person” insert “in England or Wales”.

This amendment provides that only persons in England or Wales may be provided with assistance in accordance with the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 179, in clause 1, page 1, line 13, after “provided” insert “in England or Wales”.

This amendment limits the assistance that may be provided in accordance with the Bill to assistance in England or Wales.

Amendment 180, in clause 1, page 1, line 20, at end insert—

“(3) The steps to be taken under sections 5, 7, 8 and 13 must be taken—

(a) when the terminally ill person is in England or Wales, and

(b) in the case of the steps under sections 7 and 8, by persons in England or Wales.”

This amendment provides that steps under clauses 5, 7, 8 and 13 must be taken by and in respect of persons in England or Wales.

Amendment 182, in clause 4, page 2, line 21, after “person” insert “in England or Wales”.

This amendment limits subsection (3) to cases where the person is in England or Wales.

Amendment 193, in clause 7, page 4, line 8, at end insert—

“(ca) is in England and Wales,”.

This amendment, which is consequential on Amendment 178, provides that the coordinating doctor must ascertain whether, in their opinion, the person who made the first declaration is in England and Wales.

[Kim Leadbeater]

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey, in this very important stage in the consideration and detailed scrutiny of the Bill.

We are discussing assisted dying for terminally ill adults who have a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life, and who have not been subjected to coercion or pressure from anybody else to do so. These are very serious matters and deserve serious consideration, which is why I was determined that this Bill should have an unprecedented level of scrutiny. We have heard from a range of over 50 witnesses with differing views on the Bill and have received written evidence from many, many more.

I am grateful to everyone who has contributed in such a thoughtful and constructive way. It has been widely remarked—and I wholeheartedly agree—that the Second Reading debate on 29 November last year, when the House approved the principle of the Bill by a majority of 55, showed Parliament at its best. I hope and believe that this Committee, as it goes through the Bill line by line, will do so in the same considered, respectful and measured manner.

[Danny Kruger]

I completely endorse that last point made by the hon. Lady. Does she remember how many Members on Second Reading—including, I think, herself—made reference to the judicial stage of the process and specifically to the High Court judge? Over 60 colleagues have stated on the record that they voted for the Bill on Second Reading because of that safeguard. Does she acknowledge that point?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I do acknowledge that point—absolutely, as I have acknowledged, the role of a High Court judge is really important in this process. That role will remain with the amendment I have tabled. It will also take account of the very clear evidence we received during the oral evidence sessions from psychiatrists, social workers and other professionals who feel that they have an important role to play in this process. Indeed, I heard the hon. Gentleman say he agreed with that on the radio this morning. It is very important that we hear from those experts. There is no point in having witnesses if we do not listen to what they have to say.

[The Chair]

Order. I remind Members that they should keep to the amendments being debated.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Thank you, Ms McVey.

I hope and believe that the Committee will take the same considered, respectful approach that we have taken previously. We have been asked by the House to look at where the Bill can be improved and to amend it, so that Parliament can be presented with a piece of legislation that is robust and workable in order to meet the objectives it is designed to achieve. Most—if not all—the amendments tabled in my name, have been drafted with the help of parliamentary counsel and officials in both the Department of Health and Social Care and the Ministry of Justice. The Government are committed to making the Bill workable and operable, while maintaining a position of neutrality.

I am grateful for the tremendous hard work that has gone into this to make a well-drafted Bill even better. I know the Ministers on the Committee, although remaining neutral, will be here to explain, where necessary, why some drafting amendments were needed to meet their duty to the statute book. There is an old adage that says too many cooks spoil the broth. That may not exactly be parliamentary language, but we will have to bear it in mind as we go along. Over 300 amendments have been tabled—most of them with the intention of improving and strengthening the Bill. I thank all MPs, whether members of the Committee or not, for the time and effort they have put in.

We have a responsibility to maintain the integrity and coherence of the Bill as a whole, so it is evident that we will not be able to accept all amendments. Indeed, we may find ourselves rejecting amendments that sound entirely reasonable in themselves and that undoubtedly come from a good place, but that are perhaps better addressed elsewhere in the drafting. Others might have unintended consequences or create a degree of ambiguity or uncertainty that could undermine the legal authority of the legislation. That might be very good for the pockets of lawyers, but it does not make for good law.

[The Chair]

Order. I remind the Member that although a brief introduction is acceptable, we should be talking to the amendments in this group.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Absolutely, Ms McVey—thank you for allowing me to make some introductory comments.

Amendments 178 to 180, 182 and 193 simply clarify that only persons in England and Wales may be provided with assistance in accordance with the Act, and only medical practitioners in England and Wales can carry out the required roles at each stage of the process. Hopefully, this is a nice straightforward one to get us started.

[The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley for her introductory comments. The Government will continue to remain neutral on the Bill and do not hold a position on assisted dying. I want to make it clear that I, along with the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Finchley and Golders Green, are speaking in Committee not as Members of Parliament, but as Government Ministers responsible for ensuring that the Bill, if passed, is effective, legally robust and workable.

To that end, we have been working closely with the hon. Member for Spen Valley and, where changes have been mutually agreed on by herself and the Government, we will offer a technical, factual explanation for the amendments. Therefore, I will not be offering up a Government view on the merits of any proposed changes put forward by other Members, but I will make brief remarks on an amendment’s legal and practical impact to assist Members in undertaking line-by-line scrutiny.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Olney]

Yes, that is exactly what I am aiming to do. The hon. Member makes an excellent point. There is a wide variety of views on this, but in actual fact, much as I do not wish to question Professor Sir Chris Whitty, and I acknowledge his seniority as the chief medical officer, he was very much the outlier on this. Everybody else who gave evidence on the sufficiency of the Mental Capacity Act to determine someone’s capability to make this decision for themselves cast doubt on the idea that the Mental Capacity Act was the right way of doing it.

[Kim Leadbeater]

That is not quite accurate. I think we did have other witnesses who absolutely said that they had confidence in the Mental Capacity Act, and I will speak about them in this debate.

[Sarah Olney]

I look forward to the hon. Lady’s further comments, but as I said, the psychiatrists were very clear that they did not believe that this was a sufficient safeguard, and we should acknowledge that.

I was unable to put my question to Alex Ruck Keene KC during the oral evidence session, but he kindly agreed to give further evidence in writing in response to a letter I sent to him later that day. That exchange of letters has been published as written evidence. It was his position that, in actual fact, Professor Sir Chris Whitty misinterpreted the Mental Capacity Act when he gave evidence. There is no such requirement in the Mental Capacity Act that states that the more serious the decision, the greater the level of capacity that someone needs to have. Mr Ruck Keene’s view is that that was the common law prior to the Mental Capacity Act coming into force, whereas in actual fact the Mental Capacity Act does not require that the more serious the decision, the more capacity someone needs to be judged to have.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

My hon. Friend makes a valid point. I have concerns about public confidence in the Bill without that additional safeguard, as this is such a consequential decision, but of course any advance directive would be predicated on having gone through those two stages first before capacity is lost. I feel that on this occasion additional tightening is necessary so that the public can be confident that a robust process has been gone through.

The MCA is a tried and tested piece of legislation used by practitioners up and down the country. The hon. Member for Stroud uses it every day in his practice; I have to say that I did not, but I was not consenting patients for surgery every day. Every time I did so, however, I had those conversations. Capacity lies on a spectrum: if I am doing major abdominal surgery, the level of capacity required to make a decision will be much greater than if I am removing a small bump or lump on an arm.

As well as having been tried and tested by medical practitioners, the MCA has been tested in the courts, as the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge said. It has been right up to the highest court in this land, it has been robustly tested and it has been found to be good legislation. The risk we now face is that it will be replaced not only with a new legal concept, but with an entirely different process for assessing capacity in this setting. Although there may be good intentions to improve the system, that will only add to the folly of it and overcomplicate the issue.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I am sorry that it has taken me a while to find the relevant provision of the Bill. The discussion on the advance directive is a really interesting one, and I am glad that we are having it. Is the hon. Member reassured that clause 18(4) is very clear that on the day that assistance is provided to a patient, a doctor has to assess once again their capacity to make the decision to end their own life, check again that there is a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life, and indeed check everything again on the day, including capacity? I believe that that will negate the issue around the advance directive.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

The hon. Member makes a reasonable point. I agree with her on many issues, but on this issue I have some reservations. Clause 18(4) says:

“The coordinating doctor must be satisfied, at the time the approved substance is provided, that the person to whom it is provided…has capacity…has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life”.

Of course, under the wording of section 26(1) of the Mental Capacity Act, that decision can be made at an earlier time and deemed to have currency, once capacity has been lost, for its enactment at a later date. I think that there could be a minor tightening of the wording or reassurances from Government to address that, but it is an important point to raise and air.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

That is one of the additional safeguards in the Bill. This Bill has more in-built safeguards than any similar piece of legislation across the world. I think the hon. Gentleman makes a valid point: when a doctor has concerns about somebody’s mental state, they can escalate the case and seek further, specialist opinion.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I will make some progress, if I may, because I think I have indulged your patience for far too long, Ms McVey.

I am cautious about introducing this new test. I may not have persuaded everyone, but I have set out my reasons. We risk making the system overcomplicated. We would move away from the well-established mechanism under the Mental Capacity Act and into tiger country, with untried and untested systems that the courts have not considered, which will inevitably lead to challenge. There is no need to do that, because we already have robust mechanisms in place and doing so will merely lead to ambiguity and potential complications.

This is not me reaching this conclusion in isolation. Of course, there will always be voices on different sides of the debate, and we can frame the evidence we have heard to favour one set of arguments over another. However, I am significantly persuaded by the chief medical officer, given his wide experience as not just a clinician but a public policymaker. In his evidence to the Committee on 28 January, he said:

“It is not clear to me what problem people are trying to solve by doing that,”

—he means moving away from the Mental Capacity Act—

“given that the Mental Capacity Act clearly makes the point that the more severe the decision, the greater the degree of capacity that has to be assumed before people can actually take that decision.” ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 37, Q14.]

It is that foundation that we are building on, and it is central to how these things operate in practice.

Although I understand the position of the hon. Member for Richmond Park, and I have a degree of sympathy with those who support the amendments, I invite them to reflect, in the time we have left for this debate, on whether the amendments achieve their stated aim. Do they make the Bill better or do they make it more complicated and convoluted? I say that they make it more convoluted and that, despite the best of intentions, they should not be supported.

[Daniel Francis]

My hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge knows I am an ally on many of these issues, but I will humbly disagree with her on some matters. I am not a lawyer or a doctor, but like many people here I speak from lived experience. I speak as the parent of a learning-disabled child, so I see the kinds of decisions that have to be made day to day, and the kinds of arguments and conversations that have to be had with people who presume that my child has more or less capacity than she has. Believe me, that is a constant, daily battle for me and my wife.

My daughter has 12 words and a severe sight impairment, which makes it very difficult for her to make some of her decisions, as well as other complexities—predominantly her cerebral palsy, which caused a brain injury at birth. Therefore, in my own way, although I am not a lawyer or a doctor, I have become a bit of an expert on some of the capacity issues that people encounter day by day. This morning, as I do most mornings, I read to her the three choices for her breakfast. I give her a bit of time to think about them and then I repeat them. We get yes or no to those three choices, and that is the choice she makes. Because of her severe sight impairment, when I put those three options in front of her, I have to lift them up in front of my face so that she can see them; if I put them much lower down, she would not be able to see them and make a choice. She would be able to make the choice through pointing if it was within a certain range.

I have doctors calling my wife and me all the time, asking to have a conversation with my daughter, despite their having read the notes saying that she is an 11-year-old with 12 words and a severe sight impairment. I therefore query—I will refer to some of the oral evidence in a moment—how well some aspects of the Mental Capacity Act are currently being carried out. Equally, I deal with people who suggest that she has a greater level of capacity than she does.

I accept—I have had this conversation with the hon. Member for Spen Valley on a number of occasions—that this legislation would not be applicable to my daughter. However, we heard in evidence from Mencap that the vast majority of people with learning disabilities in this country are not in the same position. They are living their day-to-day lives, living in supported accommodation and making the kinds of decision we have discussed in this debate, such as buying coffee and going to the bank.

As a result of my 20 years as a councillor, and in the last 11 years since our children were born, I have become involved with a number of local disability charities, and I know the decisions that people make when their child is at that transition age. They are trying to understand the complexity of taking a power of attorney for a child, as well as other decision-making issues. I spend a lot of time with parents who do not put those measures in place, because they do not understand the complexity in terms of age. We could therefore have a young adult relying on doctors who do not know them and on a judge—I have not seen an amendment on that issue, so I am still talking about a judge—to make a decision about capacity.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I do not particularly have a question to ask my hon. Friend, but I want to pay tribute to him for engaging so positively with the scrutiny of the Bill and for the very personal experience he has shared with the Committee. I reassure him that I will do everything I can to work with him, as I have so far through this process, because his fears are real, and I hear them. We have a job to do through the Bill to solve the problems that exist for people who are dying, but we do not want to create other problems. I am happy to continue to work with him to ensure that we address as much of that as we can through the Committee.

[Daniel Francis]

I thank the Member in charge for her comments. That is the conversation we had when she invited me to join the Committee, and we will continue to have conversations as amendments come forward.

My concern is about some aspects of the Mental Capacity Act, which was not written for these scenarios, and the hon. Member for Richmond Park talked in particular about the statutory principles in it. I am not an expert on these issues, and my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud behind me is more of an expert on some of them. However, there is no obligation in the code of practice under the Act to consult carers involved in a person’s life. The code says:

“if it is practical and appropriate to do so, consult other people for their views about the person’s best interests”.

Therefore, given the way the Act and the code of practice are worded, there is no obligation in the scenarios I am discussing.

There is another issue I was going to raise before I took that intervention. Mencap does considerable hard work. At my local branch, there are many people whose parents are in their 70s and 80s and have cared for their child all their life. I am not being rude, but their child, who is in their 40s or 50s, does feel like a burden to their parents. They know the obligation their parents have to care for them for their whole life. I ask Members to consider what the Mental Capacity Act says: those adults are at a level of capacity to make decisions, but they have been supported in those decisions all their lives and do not—

--- Later in debate ---

“I really liked what you said yesterday; we need gold standard training. The thought yesterday about what happens with capacity made me think straight away about cases in the last few months where we, as a palliative care team, thought that someone had capacity, and the other team did not.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 194, Q254.]

[Kim Leadbeater]

My hon. Friend cites some interesting observations from the oral evidence, and I welcome his doing so. I draw his attention to my amendments 186 and 198, which look at the training. This is something I feel passionately about. If the Bill were to pass, having gold standard training would be vital, as I said during that sitting. I will do whatever I can to embed that in the Bill, and I will certainly consider what that will look like in the instances that we are discussing.

[Daniel Francis]

I welcome that commitment and look forward to that discussion in due course.

Dr Hussain went on to say:

“Ultimately, I do not think the Mental Capacity Act and safeguarding training are fit for purpose.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 199, Q260.]

Professor Owen said:

“That conveys questionable confidence in the consent processes, of which mental capacity is part, in relation to the decision to end one’s life. It is significant evidence about the confidence that is out there among experienced practitioners.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 228, Q290.]

Dr Price said:

“I…refer back to Professor Gareth Owen’s oral submission, thinking about the purpose that the Mental Capacity Act was drawn up for and the fact that decisions about the ending of life were not one of the originally designed functions of it. We would need to think carefully about how that would then translate into a decision that was specifically about the capacity to end one’s life.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 268, Q349.]

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[Danny Kruger]

The hon. Gentleman’s intervention helps me to explain my point more clearly, which is that the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park builds on the terms of the Mental Capacity Act. It recognises the value of the terms, which have been well established in case law through the MCA—the ability to understand, use and weigh the relevant information.

The key difference is the word “fully”. The case law around the MCA allows for somebody to be deemed capacitous even though their judgment might be impaired. What is proposed in the new clause is the closing of that lacuna, so that it would not be possible for someone to get an assisted death if their judgment was impaired. That is the key difference.

It is also important to exclude the MCA because of the thicket of complications that it would entail. We have heard about the importance of simplification. A much simpler and better way to do the entirely novel thing that we are proposing, which is to authorise assisted suicide by the state, is to have a new definition.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Danny Kruger]

The hon. Lady does not like my terminology.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I do struggle with that terminology. This is not assisted suicide by the state. The state is not involved. It is the person making an autonomous decision based on their choice at the end of life. I will say on the record that the term “suicide” is not accurate for the cases we are talking about. The people we are dealing with are not suicidal. They very much want to live; they do not want to die, but they are dying. It is important that we have that on the record.

[Danny Kruger]

I think it is totally valid for us to have this argument about terminology periodically. I will repeat the point that we have made before, which is that we are actually amending the Suicide Act 1961—or rather, we are disapplying that Act—in the process set out in the hon. Lady’s Bill. There is no getting away from the fact that we are talking about assisting suicide. I am afraid that I will continue to use the term, and I hope the hon. Lady will forgive me for that.

I am arguing that the MCA is a complicating factor in the process that is being proposed for the Bill; it makes things much more difficult and complicated. The point has already been made—the hon. Member for Richmond Park put it very well—that, in the case for the MCA, a lot of weight is being put on the evidence from Sir Chris Whitty, suggesting that the MCA works very well. I point out that Sir Chris made a significant mistake in his evidence, when he said that

“the more serious the decision, the greater the level of capacity that someone needs to have.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 30, Q3.]

There is no such requirement in the Mental Capacity Act. Of course, we would hope that doctors would take a serious decision more seriously than a trivial one, but there is no such requirement. I cite Alex Ruck Keene KC, who wrote to the hon. Member for Richmond Park after his evidence session; with the greatest of respect to Chris Whitty, the fact that he got that wrong does not inspire confidence in his comments that the Mental Capacity Act is well understood by doctors throughout the country. I very much echo that. We have had so much evidence on how the Mental Capacity Act does not work well in practice that I think it was regrettable for the chief medical to have made the Panglossian observation that every doctor interprets it in exactly the same way and it works perfectly everywhere.

The Mental Capacity Act does not detect coercion. We will discuss coercion more in subsequent debates, but that Act is certainly not the safeguard against it. Professor House made some comments to us about Down’s syndrome and about diagnostic overshadowing. That is a very important concept. I am afraid to say that it is frequently the case, regarding people with severe disabilities, that capacity—or, indeed, incapacity—is not correctly observed because the medical professional will not see beyond the more presenting of their conditions. Observing capacity in someone who does have disabilities is often mistaken; it is harder than it is regarding other people.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

The simple answer is yes, I do. I think it is a causatively different decision. In fact, this whole Bill entails causative differences between those decisions. I will come to that point more in a moment.

Professor Owen made an important point to us regarding capacity. He said:

“You might be talking about a kind of cognitive impairment that has not reached the threshold for a diagnosis of dementia; you might be talking about a kind of mood problem or an anxiety problem that is sub-clinical; or you might be talking about a level of intelligence that is not clinically a learning disability.”

He talked about

“pressure within a family, let us say, which is often not malign in its intentions, but it exists.”

and about situations

“where there is an impairment and also an interpersonal pressure”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 234, Q297.]

Although we are not talking at this point explicitly about coercion and family pressure, the issues around capacity and coercion are nevertheless intertwined, and it is often very difficult for doctors to determine what is really going on. Again, the challenges around capacity are intense.

The point has been made by hon. Members that under clause 9(3)(b), if the second doctor in the process is in doubt about capacity, they “may” refer the person to a psychiatrist, but the clause in fact refers to “a registered medical practitioner” who “has experience of” the assessment of capacity—so not a psychiatrist, but just someone who has experience, whatever that means, of the assessment of capacity. It is not totally obvious what that means. Amendment 365 has been tabled overnight by the hon. Member for Bath (Wera Hobhouse) which would mean that both the first and second doctor, and indeed the court, if we are allowed to have a court process, “must”—not “may”— refer the person to a psychiatrist. That is not just if they are concerned about capacity, by the way. The court, or whoever it is, must conclude that there is no

“impairment of judgment arising from a mental disorder or other condition”.

I very much welcome that amendment and I hope that we will pass that in due course.

[Kim Leadbeater]

On that point about clause 9(3)(b), as I think was mentioned earlier, an amendment has been tabled by the hon. Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper)—an amendment that I would support and I hope the Committee will—that would indeed turn the “may” to a “must”, so that there has to be a referral to a psychiatrist if there is any doubt from either of those doctors.

[Danny Kruger]

That is excellent news. For the first time so far in the course of this debate, we have a strengthening of the Bill from the hon. Member. That is great news—we can chalk that up as a victory, and as good sense breaking out. I am grateful for that. Let’s see what more we can achieve.

The point that I want to make is that we are in the foothills of understanding the effects of depression, cognitive impairment and social pressure on the decision to end life. That is a point made strongly by a series of witnesses to us in both oral and written evidence: we are still very much in the early stages of understanding how capacity interacts with mental illness, disability and coercion. Then, into the mists of vagueness, we are proposing to insert this single clunking, clumsy question: “Is there evidence of incapacity?” I strongly suggest that the abuse of the Mental Capacity Act that we are seeing here is not a way of simplifying the process of ensuring that there are a small number of strong safeguards; it is a great complication of the process and introduces more complexity, as we see from the many additional things that clinicians should consider. That is in direct contradiction to the principle of the Mental Capacity Act, which simply asks the question: “Is there capacity?”

The point has been made that there is more to the Mental Capacity Act than simply the question of capacity. There are concepts of best interests and supporting decision making. As the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge suggested, it is a cumulative process. The Mental Capacity Act entails not only the question of capacity but the consideration of best interests and whether we are supporting the decision making of an individual. I am not sure how those terms apply in a situation of assisted dying. It is not similar or comparable to the sorts of decisions that the MCA is intended to apply to.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting)

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 12th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Rebecca Paul]

That is an important point. Obviously, case law becomes quite important in this. Supporting someone’s decision is very different from encouraging someone who was not in the place of wanting to go through with assisted dying. Again, these things do sometimes end up in the courts, because sometimes it can be a grey line. It is important that we have this protection. Right now, it is an offence to encourage someone to commit suicide, and we need to recognise that. That is the law right now.

[Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)]

The hon. Lady makes an important point. The idea is that the Bill makes an exception to the Suicide Act. I fully support her point about the supportive nature of the conversations that would take place with families. If we use the word “encourage”, we are in danger of lacking clarity. Where is the line between encouragement and support? I would like her to expand on that, if she could.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rebecca Paul]

I completely agree. It is important to recognise that different people will have different views on levels of coercion. I have already quoted some of the witnesses; I found it quite jarring that certain witnesses who had facilitated assisted dying for hundreds—perhaps thousands—of people said that there were no cases of coercion. I find that difficult to believe, although I do not doubt for a second that they believe it.

[Kim Leadbeater]

The witnesses gave evidence in good faith, and I would be uncomfortable if we started to question the validity or truth behind their testimony.

[Rebecca Paul]

Just to clarify, I am not questioning that they were not telling their truth. I completely believe that, from their perspective, they honestly believe they have never seen a case of coercion. Maybe I am more of a glass-half-empty kind of girl than some other people, but I question whether that is really the case. In my 45 years on this planet, I have learned enough about humankind to know that these things do happen, but different people will take different views when it comes to detecting them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rebecca Paul]

Clause 24 decriminalises assistance to commit suicide, in order that assisted dying becomes lawful. It does not specifically decriminalise encouragement, which means that the Suicide Act 1961 still applies if someone were to encourage someone to commit suicide. It would therefore be a crime and have a sentence associated with it. However, the hon. Lady makes a really good point: it would be of great value at the relevant time to hear from the Minister on the legal point I am making. I hope everything I am saying is coherent and sound, but it would be useful to hear from the Minister.

[Kim Leadbeater]

The hon. Lady is doing an amazing job—and taking lots of interventions. As I have always said, I am very open-minded to whatever we need to do to make the Bill more robust. I am not a lawyer, like the hon. Lady—we have lawyers in the room, fortunately, who can provide guidance and assistance in that regard—but what has been made clear to me is that the law needs clarity.

The hon. Lady has already mentioned a couple of times that this change could be described as a lower level of coercion, or it could be argued that there is a lack of clarity there. I think the sentiment is absolutely right, and I really support that, but we need the law to be clear. And if legal colleagues are assuring us that the concept of undue influence would be covered under “coercion”—and I am kind of hearing that—then I think it would be covered. I think that point about the law being clear is really important. Does the hon. Lady agree with that?

--- Later in debate ---

[Rebecca Paul]

I completely agree. If we do not incorporate undue influence, we are at a lower threshold compared with withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. That does not feel to me like the right position, but equally, this is a novel bit of legislation and we need to increase the safeguards further. Obviously, we shall be debating numerous amendments whose purpose is to raise that threshold. It is always very hard—how long is a piece of string?—to know exactly where to set a threshold. Different people have different views. My personal view is that in this Bill the threshold is too low, so we need to raise it by agreeing some of these amendments. So far, none of the amendments that have been suggested has been accepted. I really hope that during this Committee stage we will increase the safeguards.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Hopefully this will be my final point on this subject. I believe there is consensus in the room; no one is saying that undue influence is acceptable. The question is, where does it sit within the Bill in terms of definitions? That is where I would appreciate, along with the hon. Lady, advice from legal experts—and indeed the Minister—around whether we are confident that with the concept of coercion we are including undue influence. Does she agree that that clarity would be helpful?

[Rebecca Paul]

I absolutely agree that such clarity would be very useful. The hon. Member and I both want to ensure that undue influence is captured somewhere; I am less picky about where. As long as it gets covered somewhere in the Bill, that would be an improvement to the Bill, and I hope that everyone would really welcome that. I think everyone recognises the issue. I am not hearing that people are opposed to this; they recognise that there can be more subtle forms of coercion. If we can work together to find the best place for that to go in the Bill, I am very open to that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rebecca Paul]

My hon. Friend’s point goes to the heart of the case, and to the point that I made earlier: it is extremely difficult when the Bill is a moving feast. We are tabling amendments to the Bill as drafted, but if substantial changes are made, that will impact some of what we did earlier.

[Kim Leadbeater]

We are looking at different amendments as the Bill progresses, but a judge would always be involved in criminal offences, which is what we are talking about now.

[Rebecca Paul]

I thank the hon. Member for sharing her view on that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

I thank the hon. Member for her powerful intervention. She is right: that was the article I mentioned. Reading about such stories does have a profound impact.

[Kim Leadbeater]

My hon. Friend is making some powerful and important points about, sadly, a lot of the ills in society, which we all deal with.

Let us take the example of a woman who has a terminal illness and is coerced and pressured by a loved one to end her own life. At the moment, we have no idea whether that has happened, because there is no legal framework around that dreadful situation. The Bill would create a legal framework, so that conversations would be had with that woman prior to that point and, hopefully, that point would never come. She would speak to two doctors, potentially a psychiatrist, and other experts to ensure that that did not happen. At the moment, there is no legal framework around that. The Bill also includes a criminal offence of coercion, for which someone could go to prison for 14 years. At the moment, that just is not there.

[Naz Shah]

I thank my hon. Friend, but I feel that the point is being missed. It is true that there is no framework, but for somebody to get to this point in the first instance they need to have a terminal illness. There is a framework around domestic violence, and domestic violence laws exist for everybody. Frameworks already exist for women fleeing domestic violence, and there is no shortage of attempts to try to get those legal frameworks right across society. That is why we had the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, why we have committed to halving violence against women and girls, and why the Prime Minister made a personal commitment in that regard—and rightly so.

There has already been a test case in which a judge said that medics have an obligation in this context. An hon. Member referred yesterday to assisted dying being a treatment, although I disagree, and we had that conversation later.

--- Later in debate ---

[Juliet Campbell]

To reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud, I understand that the writers, promoter and sponsors of the Bill want it to be as simple as possible. The thought is that if we make it as simple as possible, there is less room for confusion and misinterpretation, but there are times when we can make things so simple that we allow far too much interpretation. Words such as those that the hon. Member for Reigate wants to be put into the Bill are really important. Manipulation is really important. Coercion and pressure are not measures of every type of controlling behaviour that happens to individuals.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I am very supportive of the sentiment behind my hon. Friend’s amendments, and she is making some really good points. Again, the question is about the simplicity of the language that goes in the Bill. The CPS guidelines on coercion and coercive control includes behaviour that is

“highly manipulative such as: ‘love bombing’ where the suspect will intermittently do what appears to be loving acts, seeking to present these as interrupting or negating the course of conduct”,

so there is language in there about manipulation. I hope that provides some reassurance that manipulation is seen to be part of the broader concepts of coercion and coercive control in the eyes of the law.

[Juliet Campbell]

I thank my hon. Friend for looking that up so swiftly. I still think that those additional words need to be included in the Bill. “Coercion” and “pressure” are used as a catch-all for manipulation, but the Bill does not allow people who are using it in their everyday life—doctors, clinicians, nurses and social workers—to understand that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

The hon. Member is absolutely right—undue influence does exist in law, including in laws that have been passed very recently. I recognise that the hon. Member for Rother Valley is not impressed by laws that are more than 10 years old, but I hope he might be satisfied that a law passed last year is sufficiently up to date and modern for him to regard as morally valid. Undue influence is an existing term, and we should apply it in this case.

[Kim Leadbeater]

On that point, and in response to the comment made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West, although I stand to be corrected by my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley, I do not think that he said that undue influence was an archaic term. I think it was the word “encouraged”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

My goodness, 2009 might be in the mists of history for the hon. Member for Rother Valley, but it was the last Labour Government. That is very good to know, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend.

The hon. Member for Spen Valley made the point, which is quite often made in defence of the Bill, that there is currently no framework to spot coercion, therefore the Bill creates greater protections for people. The fact is that, as the hon. Member for Bradford West said, there is no law that currently allows assisted dying, so no framework is necessary to prohibit encouragement or inducement to an assisted death—the opportunity does not exist. I think everyone must acknowledge that, if we pass the Bill, we may open up a new avenue for abuse, and it is necessary that the Bill close it off. That is right and appropriate.

Coercion and abuse no doubt go on and are tragically common, but the answer to that problem is not to legalise assisted suicide and put a regulatory framework around it with limited protections against coercion and influence. We have to deal with the terrible cancer of abuse and coercion that exists in our society, as the hon. Member for Bradford West said. If we are concerned about undue pressure in families, that should be our social mission. If we are to have an assisted dying law, let us make it as strong as possible. As I say, we are potentially opening up a new avenue for abuse within families.

[Kim Leadbeater]

For me, the law needs to change for a number of reasons, and we will talk about some of them as Committee proceedings continue: autonomy, dignity, personal choice and bodily autonomy. In terms of this issue, we heard from families who faced police investigations as a result of a loved one taking their own life. Not only were they dealing with the trauma, grief and loss of their bereavement, but they faced often months and months of police investigation. In the oral evidence sessions, we heard from Pat Malone, who was in that situation after his brother took his own life. Surely the hon. Member has to acknowledge that that is a problem. It is not the only problem, and it is not the only reason for the Bill, but he has to acknowledge that we as legislators have a duty to correct it.

[Danny Kruger]

I am sure that the hon. Lady will acknowledge that those investigations will still happen, because not everybody who commits suicide will be subject to the Bill; not everybody who is terminally ill and wants to take their life with the assistance of their loved ones will be caught under it. I am sure she acknowledges that it is therefore still appropriate to have safeguards against assisted suicide outside the law—in fact, the Bill strengthens those safeguards. Those will still continue. I also regard it as appropriate and necessary to have a law against assisted suicide, for all the reasons that we have been discussing.

The hon. Lady is right that it is appropriate for Parliament or the authorities in general to ensure that cases such as those we have discussed, and that have been powerfully testified to us, are handled sensitively. In an overwhelming number of cases, the police do handle them well and sensitively. It might be that we need to improve the guidance around prosecution, and that is an important question. I certainly do not want the families of people who have taken their own lives to be harassed and chased through the courts, and I think we would all agree on that. In that respect, the guidance for the CPS and the police will always evolve.

[Danny Kruger]

I think that is right. I do not accept the claim that this Bill is somehow a response to the problem of abuse, coercion or the pressure to end life in families. Tragically, in jurisdictions that have an assisted dying law, the number of unassisted suicides—suicides that happen outside of the law—go up, because no law can catch all the people who might want to take their own lives. Thankfully, there is no blanket support for any assisted suicide; all the jurisdictions have some restrictions.

More significantly, if the state said that some people’s lives are not worth living and that it is an acceptable choice for them to end their own life—which is not what the current law says; we have legalised suicide, not actually endorsed it—by passing a law that endorsed the choice of some people to take their own life, we would be sending a signal that we agree that some people’s lives are not worth living. The social consequence of that is clear in the evidence from other jurisdictions: suicide in the general population goes up as a result of an assisted dying law.

[Kim Leadbeater]

On that point, the evidence does not clearly show that there is a direct relationship between those two things; there are other factors and no way of knowing that. On the concept of ending one’s own life and giving people the choice under the provisions of the Bill, what would the hon. Gentleman say to people who frame that concept very differently—as a way to shorten their death? Those terminally ill people, in my experience—I have met many of them now—do not view this as a way of ending their life, because they want to live, but the reality is that they are dying and want to take control of what their death looks like. How would he respond to that?

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Naz Shah]

I completely agree, which is why the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell) is very important. I urge the Committee to accept it, as it would ensure the provision of a palliative care consultation. As my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has always said, it is about having a holistic approach—we need to get back to that.

In the evidence sessions, we heard that palliative care social workers can play a pivotal role in supporting patients. Those from other professions—psychological services, chaplaincy services, physiotherapists, occupational therapists and speech therapists—along with specialist nurses and medics can all contribute to the care of a patient at the end of life. In discussions with palliative care specialists who listened to the debate on 29 November, they were perplexed by the symptoms that were graphically described in the case studies, and cited poor care as the reason for them. Many such symptoms can be controlled, and they were shocked that such examples of poor care were presented as a reason for assisted death, rather than for making good quality palliative care available to all patients.

We further heard evidence, especially from Dr Jamilla Hussain, that access to palliative care is inequitable. We know that those from minoritised communities and from low socioeconomic backgrounds have poorer access to good palliative care, and that people can have poor access depending on where they live, and on the day of the week or the hour of the day. Through this amendment, we want to ensure that everyone who is seeking an assisted death, or who has it suggested to them, as this Bill allows, is able to access a consultation or consultations with a palliative care specialist, who can dispel the myths while supporting them with their end-of-life plan.

[Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend talked about the stories that we heard on Second Reading. Does she acknowledge, as Dr Sarah Cox from the Association for Palliative Medicine said, that there are cases where palliative care cannot meet a patient’s needs? We have a lady in the Public Gallery this morning whose mother had a horrible death, having had ovarian cancer and mouth cancer; she had to have her tongue removed, so she could not eat and drink, and she essentially starved to death. We have to be careful not to dismiss those cases, because they are real stories of real human beings, and we have to acknowledge the limitations of palliative care.

[Naz Shah]

I absolutely agree. Nobody in this Committee, from what I have heard over the weeks of evidence that we have taken, is suggesting in any way that we are dismissive of people who actually need an assisted death and would benefit from the Bill. As I have said previously, and as Dr Jamilla said very clearly, there are some patients who clinically would benefit from an intervention such as an assisted death. I came on to this Bill Committee to ensure we have the best legislation and safeguards in place. The Bill currently does not ensure that people are aware of the options. This amendment would ensure that people have considered all options and can make an informed choice. If there is no requirement to speak to a specialist, I am afraid the Bill would do a disservice to those who might want to use it to seek an assisted death by not presenting them with those options.

In evidence from the representative of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, we heard an example of somebody who was in lots of pain and decided to seek an assisted death, but changed their mind once they understood that their pain could be alleviated. That is what this amendment is about. I urge the Committee to vote for it, because it is fundamental that we enable people to make an informed choice and to understand the services and options available to them.

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[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I do not think that offends the principle at all. Whether I was working within the NHS or the private sector, if a patient requested an onward referral to a different specialist, I would action that. If I did not have the requisite skills or knowledge, or felt that they would be better served by a different speciality, I would refer on to another clinician. I do not see how it would be treated any differently in the NHS than it would be privately. I am afraid that I do not follow that argument.

[Kim Leadbeater]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. I will address the amendments in two different ways. I will start by looking at the technical issues around amendment 281, and then I will look at why I believe, as other colleagues have said, that the amendments are not necessary given what already exists both in the Bill and in terms of good practice in our health service.

First, I worry that amendment 281 will not have the effect that my hon. Friend the Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell) intends. Clause 1(2), to which the amendment relates, provides an overview of the other clauses in the Bill, and therefore cross-refers to sections 5 to 22. Clause 1(2) does not impose duties on persons in and of itself. The duties are set out in the later clauses to which it refers. Adding an additional subsection to clause 1, as proposed by the amendment, would not result in a requirement that the person must meet a palliative care specialist. That is a technical detail to reflect on.

In addition, the term “palliative care specialist” is not a defined term. Palliative medicine is a designated speciality of the General Medical Council, and a doctor can apply to be entered on to the GMC specialist register for the speciality provided that they have the specialist medical qualification, training or experience. However, the current wording of the amendment means that it is not clear whether it is seeking to require the person concerned to meet with one of those specialist doctors, or whether a meeting with another medical professional specialising in palliative care—for example, a specialist palliative care nurse—would suffice. There is no equivalent specialist register for specialist palliative care nurses. It is a technical issue, but an important one.

I also point out that my hon. Friend the Member for York Central has put an incorrect explanatory note with the amendment, which refers to terminal illness. That might just be an error, but I wanted to point that out.

Coming on to the broader grouping of the provisions: as has been said by colleagues, the amendments are tabled with really good intentions by someone who cares passionately about the palliative care sector. But they are not necessary given the process that is already set out by the Bill. Both doctors already have to discuss all treatment options, and must make a referral if they have any doubt about the diagnosis. It is very clear from clauses 4 and 9 that both the co-ordinating doctor and the independent doctor must discuss all treatment options with the patient, so they will have all the options laid out before them. That is really important because we have to think about what happens in reality. This initial discussion, in many cases, may actually take place with a palliative care doctor, and in many cases it will be highly likely, given the nature of the conditions we are talking about, that the patient may already be receiving treatment or advice from a palliative care team.

We seem to have created a narrative where this conversation is happening in isolation. Actually, as other colleagues have alluded to, we have a patient-centred approach in our healthcare. This person does not just suddenly arrive and have this one random conversation. I am sure medical colleagues will correct me if I am wrong, but if a doctor is dealing with a condition of which they have very limited knowledge, one of the first things they would do would be to refer to a specialist.

As is covered in clause 9(3)(a), if the doctor has any

“doubt as to whether the person being assessed is terminally ill,”

they must

“refer the person for assessment by a registered medical practitioner who holds qualifications in or has experience of the diagnosis and management of the illness, disease or condition in question;”

Clause 9(2)(a) also states that both doctors must assess the patient’s

“medical records and make such other enquiries as the assessing doctor considers appropriate;”

They can speak to anyone they want to, and they would in reality—of course that is what they would do. They would not sit there and think, “Oh, I don’t know enough about this condition so I will just keep going.” They would refer to specialists.

It is also really important to acknowledge what goes on at the moment. I was looking at some research last night: NHS England also has comprehensive guidance on personalised palliative and end-of-life care through a comprehensive personalised care model. None of this stops with the introduction of assisted dying as a choice for people. It would continue to happen. Patients are already getting that really good level of care.

[Danny Kruger]

The hon. Lady is making a very good speech about how things should work and how things do work, in many cases, when the NHS does its job brilliantly. First, I want to correct the hon. Lady: subsequent amendments do impose the duty that is consequent to these amendments to clause 1, so it would be an obligation. Surely that is the point to make: what if the doctors are not as brilliant as she suggests? What if there is not an expectation that they should definitely seek expertise that they do not have themselves? To the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate, what if this service is provided outside the NHS by an independent charity or private provider set up explicitly to facilitate people’s assisted death requests, and has no intention of referring people to palliative care if they do not ask for it themselves? Would she be content for a private provider to refer somebody for an assisted death without a palliative care referral?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I do worry about the lack of faith in our professionals. We have medical practitioners on the Committee and we have heard stories of the very good practice that happens, so it concerns me that we are so cynical about our system. Ultimately, we have to put faith in our professionals to do their job and to take that patient-centred approach, as I firmly believe they do. Dr Sarah Cox from the Association for Palliative Medicine said in her evidence to the Committee:

“In clinical practice, we make all these decisions in multi-professional teams…shared decisions are much better quality, much more robust and much safer.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 74, Q90.]

I absolutely agree with her, and that would continue to be the case.

[Naz Shah]

The hon. Member mentioned earlier the idea that this is happening in isolation, but it is her Bill that is saying that it will just be two doctors, not a team of medical professionals.

[Kim Leadbeater]

But it does not say that at all. It actually says that they have to refer, and that they have to consult with other people. That is part of the process. That is exactly what happens now. Professor Aneez Esmail, who is the emeritus professor of general practice at the University of Manchester and who has been a practising GP for over 30 years, told us in his evidence to the Committee:

“In terms of holistic care, currently when I look after dying people I never do it on my own; I am with district nurses, Macmillan nurses, or on call to a palliative care consultant. There is already a team of people looking after dying people…palliative care…works very well and it works in a multidisciplinary way. I think that this legislation will allow a much more open discussion and proper monitoring. It will improve training, guidance and everything else. People say that it will enhance palliative care, and that is what I think will happen.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 171, Q219.]

Indeed, as was referred to by the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley, if we consider the training included in the Bill, which doctors will undergo as part of the introduction of assisted dying, evidence from other jurisdictions shows that these are very detailed conversations where health professionals work together in the same way as they do at the moment in end of life care and decision making. As I have said repeatedly, the training is fundamental. I agree absolutely with Dr Rachel Clarke, who told us:

“If there is one thing that I would say to the Committee regarding making the Bill as robust, strong and safe as possible, it is: please consider seriously the matter of education and training”.––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 71, Q85.]

I agree 100% and I have embedded that in the Bill.

[Sean Woodcock (Banbury) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend quotes Dr Rachel Clarke. I was profoundly moved by her evidence. She was very clear that she wanted to talk about the NHS as it is, not as we would like it to be. Despite the efforts the Government are putting into bringing down waiting lists, there is still extreme time pressure on doctors. There are extreme waiting lists for people to access specialist care, which may impinge on the ability of doctors to carry out what my hon. Friend is asking. Does she accept that?

[Kim Leadbeater]

That brings me on very nicely to my next point, so I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention. At the moment, the Bill accommodates a two-year implementation period, which is really important because it will take time to put the procedures in place: it will take time to train people and it will take time to work holistically with the overall healthcare system. It could end up being longer than two years. If that is the case to put all the robust systems in place—to improve things, and to work holistically with palliative care and other aspects of the NHS—then that is the right thing to do, and I would be open-minded to a conversation about that.

To finish, I also note that the General Medical Council’s “Good medical practice” guide, which is the framework of professional standards, already provides that in providing clinical care a doctor

“must refer a patient to another suitably qualified practitioner when this serves their needs”.

This is what doctors do: they refer if they need extra advice; they take a holistic approach.

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

I just want to quickly point out that we have a check on the conversations that happen in the first stages. In clause 8, which covers the second doctor’s assessment, that second doctor must be satisfied that the individual has a “clear, settled” and, critically, “informed” wish to end their own life. So, there will be a doctor who is verifying that the person is informed properly about their options. My concern about the amendments is that, as the hon. Lady says, we are inserting now a third doctor into a system which, with regard to the panel, will already have three, four or five specialists involved in the assessment of the care.

[Kim Leadbeater]

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. It feeds into comments that have already been made about how difficult we are making the process. I agree that this should be a difficult process—it should be a robust process, with thorough checks, safeguards and balances throughout—but we are in danger of forgetting the dying person at the heart of the process.

[Rebecca Paul]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I am going to finish, if I may.

We need to be really careful that we take a person-centred approach, as happens now. Doctors, medical practitioners and healthcare professionals quite rightly take a holistic patient-centred approach. That approach will be further enhanced by the robust training the Bill incorporates, and by adding the extra layers of safeguards and protection. Really importantly, it would open up conversations about death and dying.

[The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford.

As previously stated, my role, and that of the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Finchley and Golders Green, is not to give a Government view, given that the Government remain neutral on the Bill, but to outline the legal and practical impacts of amendments tabled.

The amendments are intended to add a new step in the process set out in the Bill, requiring consultation with a palliative care specialist. The purpose of amendment 281 is to require a person to have met a palliative care specialist before completing the required steps and assessments to end their life. The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that the person has understood the full range of end of life options available to them. Our assessment suggests that the present drafting, adding a subsection to clause 1(2), would not achieve that effect without further amendments to other clauses in the Bill. The amendment would increase demand on palliative care specialists and, should Members decide to amend the Bill in this way, we would need to work with the NHS and other provider organisations to assess how to operationalise it.

Amendments 298 and 299 would require the co-ordinating doctor to have received confirmation that the person seeking an assisted death has had a consultation with a specialist in palliative medicine about palliative care options before they are able to make a first statement under clause 7(3)(a). That would mean that a co-ordinating doctor would not be able to make a statement following a first assessment, and therefore refer a person to the independent doctor for a second assessment, unless the person had had a consultation about palliative care options with a palliative care specialist. As with previous amendments, the amendment would increase demand for palliative care specialists, and we would need to work with the NHS and other provider organisations to assess how to operationalise it, should hon. Members decide to pass amendments in that area.

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[Naz Shah]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention.

[Kim Leadbeater]

On the point made by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire, the Bill does not replace what already happens, and what Dr Cox was saying was that those conversations are already happening in a multidisciplinary way. We do not take that away.

[Naz Shah]

One of my concerns is that although the Government position in relation to the Bill, as they have said, is neutrality, the Government, in my opinion, have taken a position without an impact assessment, which might suggest that there is some ambiguity. Would the Minister therefore support redrafting potential amendments to include that? If it did specify a doctor or nurse, would the Government then, in their tidying-up, be prepared to accept that amendment?

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[Danny Kruger]

The hon. Gentleman has been on his feet; I appreciate that and am very grateful for his contribution to the debates that we have had.

I simply want to make the point that what the House voted for on Second Reading was the principle of assisted dying. What many members of the public who support the Bill think they are getting is a Bill that is safe—a Bill that is restricted explicitly to people at the very end of their life, who face extreme pain and suffering as they die; who are fully informed of what they are doing; who face no questions of external or indeed internal coercion; who have the absolute ability to understand what they are doing. Those are the things that people want to see in the Bill; those are the things that we have sought to effect through the amendments that we have tabled, and which the Committee has rejected.

Very explicitly, as a result of the rejection of these, I believe, very plainly written amendments, the fact is that under this Bill you can be depressed and suicidal and still regarded as having capacity to have an assisted death. You can be very marginalised—you can be a prisoner, you can be homeless—and still be regarded as eligible. You can have been influenced or encouraged by others and still be eligible. You can do it because you feel a burden. You do not need to be in any kind of pain. You do not need to be in the tiny proportion of cases that palliative care cannot help. As the hon. Member for Spen Valley accepted in the previous sitting, you can seek an assisted death for the sole reason of saving your family money, and you would be granted an assisted death on those grounds. The fact is that in rejecting these amendments, the Committee has decided and has demonstrated that the Bill is much wider than the campaigners portray.

I want to end with this point. I think there are two ways of approaching assisted dying—two essential framings of a Bill to legalise it. One is an autonomy Bill, which simply says that if people seek help to commit suicide, within certain broad parameters they should be able to do so, and there is no question of other people interfering with that choice; if they sign the requisite paperwork, they should be able to have an assisted death. The alternative is what we might call a safeguarding Bill—one where eligibility for the procedure is strictly limited and there are very strong, robust safeguards in place to protect the most vulnerable people.

The hon. Lady, and Members speaking in support of the Bill, have repeatedly emphasised that this is a safeguarding Bill. They want this Bill to be built around safeguards for the vulnerable. They respect the arguments that we make about the dangers that an open-ended assisted dying Bill would create. But the fact is that, as we have seen in the course of the debates on this clause, this is not a safeguarding Bill; it is an autonomy Bill. It is one that allows people to proceed to an assisted death because they want one, if they meet certain very loosely drawn criteria.

[Kim Leadbeater]

The reality is that this Bill is both. Of course it is about personal autonomy, choice and dignity for people who are coming towards the end of their life, but it has to be safeguarded as well. It is both. If I may say so, I think that the hon. Member makes quite an unfair characterisation of the robust, powerful debate that has taken place in Committee during the time that we have spent together. I think it has been extremely well informed. People have listened intently to other points of view and opinions, and it does the Committee a disservice to suggest otherwise.

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[Rebecca Paul]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention, but I respectfully suggest that that is not the case and there is data. Professor David Paton found a 6% increase overall, and interestingly it was 13% for women.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I would be interested to know whether that data shows a link or a direct causation effect.

[Rebecca Paul]

I thank the hon. Lady for raising that point. I think that what has been looked at is the number of unassisted suicides. The hon. Lady makes the good point that obviously we need to look at all the different factors that could be part of that, but I am just making the point that when we look at territories that have introduced assisted dying, we find that at the point at which it is introduced, we generally see, in most territories, an increase in unassisted suicide. I do not think that we should rush to disregard that. We need to recognise that in helping a small group of people at the end of their life, which undoubtedly this Bill will do, there will be a price to be paid. That price will be paid by our young people and other vulnerable groups.

I will not vote in favour of clause 1—I do not think that there will be a Division on it anyway—but I will not oppose it either, for the reasons that my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire set out. I understand that it is the key clause in order for us to progress and continue the debate, which is what Parliament wishes us to do, but I hope that the Committee will be more receptive to improving the safeguards as we progress through the Bill. The amendments really were tabled in good faith. We did our best to write them in a clear way, but obviously the private Member’s Bill process makes that more difficult. This is not a Government Bill, but we are all doing the best we can to table amendments that would improve the safety of the Bill.

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all symptoms of frailty.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I am interested to know where the hon. Member has got the idea that someone is going to scrap the six-month prognosis from.

[Danny Kruger]

Well, if the hon. Lady will say that she will never, at any stage, support a proposal to extend it beyond six months, I will be very glad to hear it. My concern is that we already have amendments tabled to do exactly that, which we will be debating shortly. I hope they will be rejected, but my confident expectation, on the basis of other countries, including the Australians who gave evidence to this Committee, is that the six-month safeguard will soon be seen as a barrier to a human right, because there is indeed no logical basis for such an arbitrary date.

The people who currently deal with the six-month prognosis, in the context of benefits and pensions, campaign that it is arbitrary and unworkable—rightly, I think—so I am afraid that I confidently expect the six-month barrier to be challenged in due course. If the hon. Lady is prepared to say that she would never do that, however, I would be very reassured.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Would the hon. Member agree that the purpose of the Committee is to look at the Bill before us? That is why we are here. I understand his concerns, his reservations and his nervousness about what might happen in future, and that is an important conversation to have, but the purpose of the Committee is to look at the Bill as it stands today; that should be the focus of our deliberations.

[Danny Kruger]

Yes, but I simply state on the record that I believe that this is not the end, but the beginning of a wider Bill that would follow if we passed this one. I am encouraged by what the hon. Lady says, or implies: that she does not want to go further than this Bill.

My plea to the Committee is straightforward. Let us confine eligibility to the people who the campaigners talk about: those with diseases or illnesses that are genuinely terminal. We can do more to strengthen that definition with later amendments, but, first, we have to remove the gaping hole in the fence that is this term “medical condition”. Let us remove that term.

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[Danny Kruger]

Again, I am interested in that, because I would be surprised if that condition were not adequately captured by the term “illness” or “disease”. If not, we should seek further clarification, because we need to be very specific. Illness or disease has been adequate; it is adequate in the current law on terminal illness for eligibility for benefits and pensions. I await clarification on what is added by the term “medical condition”, because my concern is that it opens the door to frailty. Going back to Chris Whitty’s evidence, I am concerned at his suggestion that frailty should be an eligible condition for an assisted death.

I will wrap up shortly so that hon. Members have time to speak to other amendments, but I will quickly refer to amendment 181 tabled by the hon. Member for Spen Valley and amendment 11 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire (Sarah Bool), which attempt to do the same thing as my amendments. They seek to protect disabled or mentally ill people, but they do so explicitly by disapplying the provisions of the Bill for those groups, or they attempt to do so. Only amendment 11 actually does, while amendment 181 fails to do so, in my view.

Let us look at subsection (3), which attempts to protect disabled people and those with mental disorders, but which, on closer inspection, is ineffective or even meaningless. In statutory interpretation, the first phrase,

“For the avoidance of doubt.”

indicates that the subsection does not add anything to the Bill except clarity. It is intended not to change the law that is being enacted by the Bill, but to clarify the meaning of the Bill. My point is that it does not add anything—in fact, it signals that the clause can be disregarded. It is like an explanatory note and not actually relevant to the Bill. Its effect therefore negates the point that it tries to make. In including it, the hon. Lady protests too much and exposes the weakness that the clause fails to overcome. It invites a court to disregard the protection it pretends to offer by stating that that protection has no force except what is elsewhere in the Bill.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I agree with the hon. Member to some degree in terms of the legal drafting. I have been advised that the expression “for the avoidance of doubt” is not generally used in a Bill if the Bill is already clear, which this is—I have been reassured by parliamentary counsel about that—but I was keen, having met disabled people and disability rights activists, to have it very clearly in the Bill that by virtue of having a disability, a mental health condition or a mental disorder, someone would not be in scope of the Bill. It was a very clear drafting decision and I stand by that decision; I think it is the right thing to do so that we are clear who is not covered by the Bill.

[Danny Kruger]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady; it is helpful to understand her thinking. Her amendment is an attempt to further clarify her purpose, which is to communicate that we cannot have an assisted death only because of a mental disorder or a disability. I know that other colleagues will speak to that point more explicitly.

My point is that

“For the avoidance of doubt”

is a massive signal to the courts that the subsection is meaningless. The advice was right that it is not usual to include that phrase, as it signals that nothing is being added. My concern is that it does not add anything, and the inclusion of the word “only” further demonstrates the hollowness of the protection that it purports to offer. The fact is that someone will still be able to get an assisted death because of a physical illness that derives from a mental disorder or disability. That is my concern with the later parts of the clause, but I will leave other Members to make that point.

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[Naz Shah]

Sorry, I mean amendment 11. Thank you, Mr Efford.

I think it will be helpful to spell out what the Bill currently says, and what it would say if amendment 11 were adopted. I will also set why the amendment would provide a much stronger safeguard than amendment 181, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley.

Clause 2(3) states:

“For the avoidance of doubt, a person is not to be considered to be terminally ill by reason only”

—I stress the word “only”—

“of the person having one or both of—

(a) a mental disorder, within the meaning of the Mental Health 1983;

(b) a disability, within the meaning of section 6 of the Equality Act 2010.”

If amendment 11 is agreed to, clause 2(3) will read:

“A person is not to be considered to be terminally ill by reason of the person having one or both of—

(a) a mental disorder, within the meaning of the Mental Health 1983;

(b) a disability, within the meaning of section 6 of the Equality Act 2010.”

That may seem a very small change, but it is an extremely important one.

The Bill, as presented to Parliament on Second Reading, would allow someone to qualify for assisted dying if they had a mental health condition such as anorexia nervosa and a physical condition such as malnutrition. To put it with absolute bluntness, that means that somebody with anorexia nervosa could stop eating until they suffered so badly from malnutrition that two doctors prognose that the patient is likely to die within six months. That person, under the Bill, would then qualify for assisted dying.

[Kim Leadbeater]

This is a really important discussion and I am so glad that we are having it—some brilliant points have been made. As someone who has worked with people with anorexia, I am very aware of the sensitivities of the condition and the issues around it. Would my hon. Friend agree that, as part of this discussion, we have to consider the capacity assessment of people with eating disorders? It is a very serious mental health condition; it would require a lot for somebody with anorexia to pass the capacity threshold for making a decision of this magnitude. It is certainly the sort of instance where I would be very surprised if a doctor did not refer to an eating disorder specialist. Does my hon. Friend agree that we have to look at the condition and how the patient should be cared for holistically?

[The Chair]

Order. I remind hon. Members that there are a set of amendments in the next group about anorexia. Let us not go too far down this road.

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[Kim Leadbeater]

My hon. Friend is making a powerful point. Does she agree that the reporting and data around assisted dying are fundamental? That is why it is important that, if the law is to change in this country, we get that absolutely right. What we propose in the Bill is closest to the laws in Australia, and in my understanding there have been no assisted deaths of people with anorexia in Australia. However, my hon. Friend makes a valid point about the accuracy of reporting; we do not know whether those examples were people with anorexia who happened to have cancer as well. We just do not know, and that is not good enough.

[Naz Shah]

I absolutely agree that if the Bill is to get through Parliament, it has to have those mechanisms and safeguards in place, but I am sure we will come to those later. If we do not know with any reasonable degree of accuracy how many cases there have been worldwide, we cannot say where the majority of such cases have occurred. When we are told that there have been zero assisted deaths of people with anorexia in Australia, I would err on the side of caution—another witness said that there were zero deaths involving coercion.

I understand that my hon. Friend’s amendment 181 also attempts to change clause 2, but the change would still allow people to qualify for an assisted death if they had a mental disorder alongside a physical disorder. I have no doubt that this stems from a compassionate desire not to exclude—for example, someone who has mild depression and a major physical illness—but its effect is to create a major risk for people suffering from both a mental health disorder that affects their eating and a physical disorder caused by not eating. To avoid that risk, the Bill must be much more tightly worded than it was when presented to the House on Second Reading, and it must be much more tightly worded than amendment 181 would make it.

We must make it much harder in the Bill for people to qualify for assisted death by way of having malnutrition caused by an eating disorder. It is a complex problem, and I believe no one amendment will solve it completely. I have submitted two amendments with the aim of making a contribution. Amendment 11 would also make a significant contribution to solving the problem, and I urge all Members to support it.

I turn to amendment 181, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. Although the Acts mentioned in clause 2 define mental illness and disability as being taken from the clear medical model, it is not clear if she is further suggesting that a new definition should be used—for instance, the social model. Someone could have a significant impairment under a social model of disability, and for the purposes of the Bill, not consider themselves to be a disabled person. Therefore, they could qualify for an assisted death, thus rendering the provision of no worth.

It is therefore unclear what my hon. Friend is similarly proposing with regard to mental illness. Amendment 11 is needed to provide assurance that if someone does have a mental illness, then it is tightly defined and would preclude them from being able to access an assisted suicide, in case the reason they are seeking it is the mental illness and not the terminal diagnosis. I will speak further on that later.

If amendment 181 was agreed to, the clause would read that a person is not to be considered terminally ill

“only because they are a person with a disability”.

There are two obvious problems with the amendment. First, the amendment removes references to the Equality Act 2010 and the Mental Health Act, which previously defined who did and did not have a disability or a mental health disorder, but having removed those definitions, it does not then define disability or mental disorder in the Bill. What definition will medical practitioners, and indeed applicants, use to determine who does or does not have a disability or mental disorder?

[Kim Leadbeater]

In terms of the removal of references to the Equality Act, I was not aware when the Bill was initially drafted that cancer is actually classed as a disability. Given the fact that in some countries 70% of assisted deaths are for cancer patients, it would seem ridiculous to exclude cancer patients from having the option of assisted death. I hope that goes some way towards explaining that point.

[Naz Shah]

I thank my hon. Friend for clarifying that—that is really helpful. But where does the amendment leave us in terms of disabled people? I am just trying to understand.

[Kim Leadbeater]

The concepts of a mental disorder and a disability are well understood, and those terms are well used. In the eyes of the law, we would not need to provide a definition of those in the Bill, but the removal of the reference that would include people with cancer is an important thing to do.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Daniel Francis]

I will return to that. I understand what amendment 11 seeks to do, but I think we should have a hybrid, because I do not think either amendment would completely achieve what we want. I will seek the Minister’s advice in due course. I understand the legal advice to my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on this matter, and I understand that all the amendments have been tabled in good faith, but I am concerned about the loopholes that could remain.

We heard on Second Reading that assisted dying will not be available to disabled people, but let us imagine an individual who does not consider themselves to be disabled. If they were diagnosed with cancer tomorrow, our current legislation states that they would be disabled from the point of diagnosis. They could live with that cancer and receive treatment for a considerable time, while continuing to have no other disability. When they receive a six-month prognosis, they would be eligible for assisted dying due to the same disability they have had for a very considerable time, and it would remain the only disability they have had in their entire life. I remain concerned that my hon. Friend’s amendment still talks about disability, potentially leaving that loophole.

[Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend makes an interesting point, but the purpose of the Bill is that a person with a terminal cancer diagnosis and six months left to live would have the choice of assisted death. As we have heard, they might have seen the suffering of relatives with a similar cancer, and they might have seen what their death looked like. I understand that people might disagree, but that is the purpose of the Bill.

[Daniel Francis]

I hear that point but, looking at my postbag, the people who berate me for not supporting the Bill often talk about their loved ones with motor neurone disease or Parkinson’s, which I understand from oral evidence will be exempt. We need to make it clear which disabilities and conditions will be eligible, and I am not sure that the amendments before the Committee nail it down. I am concerned that the wording would lead to potential loopholes and legal challenges.

We should still be concerned about legal review of the Bill, based on indirect disability discrimination. The Equality Act says that indirect discrimination happens when a rule, a policy or even a practice that applies to everyone disadvantages people with a particular disability, compared with people who do not have that disability, where that cannot be shown to be justified as being intended to meet a legitimate objective in a fair, balanced and reasonable way.

If we accepted this amendment to allow the inclusion of cancer and some other disabilities set out in the Equality Act, I believe it would be argued in due course that other disabilities meet the criteria for assisted dying and, despite the promises made to this Committee and to the House in good faith, the loopholes would allow the criteria to be widened.

Other amendments in this group retain the reference to the Equality Act 2010, which could equally result in legal challenges down the line, for the reasons my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley outlined this morning. I am not deliberately being difficult, but I am not sure that any of the amendments would completely achieve what they seek to achieve.

I await the Minister’s view on the matter but, as things stand, I am concerned that we will take the clause back to the House without completely satisfying Members’ aims. By allowing those with cancer to seek assisted dying, there could be a loosening of the rules for other disabilities. I fear there could be manuscript amendments on this matter, but I await the Government’s view on the robustness of these amendments if they were to be accepted.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. She brings us back to the fundamental point made in the Bill, which is that it has to be “an inevitably progressive illness”. Eating disorders do not fall under that definition: that is very clear. I hope that that explanation and the observation that I have made on the other amendments are helpful to members of the Committee in their consideration.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I will keep my comments brief, because we have had a very thorough discussion today. I will first speak briefly to amendment 123, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe. Amendment 123 would change “an inevitably” progressive disease to “a typically” progressive disease. [Interruption.] Is that the next grouping? Oh, I am peaking too soon—my apologies, Mr Dowd.

I will come back to my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe, but let me turn to amendments 399, 400 and 401, on the exclusion of “medical condition”, which the hon. Member for East Wiltshire submitted a few days ago, before the end of the recess. I looked at them over the weekend and was very interested to hear his reasoning for them today. This is the purpose of the Committee; I have listened carefully to what the hon. Gentleman has said, and he has made some valuable points. All along, I have taken the view that this legislation must not only be the strongest anywhere in the world, but be very clear in its intentions and leave no room for ambiguity regarding who is entitled to request assistance under its provisions.

I am very comfortable with the definition of terminal illness in the Bill, but across the world—I have done lots of research into this, as I know other colleagues have—some jurisdictions use the term “medical condition” or, actually, just the term “condition”, and others do not. Many in Australia do, but in New Zealand, for example, which has a similar law to what is being proposed here, “medical conditions” do not feature, nor do they in a number of states in America.

While I do not necessarily think that it would definitely be problematic to include the term “medical condition”, I appreciate the argument that the hon. Gentleman has made. We have to be as cautious as possible to ensure that the Bill achieves its purpose but does not create a lack of clarity. That point has been very well made.

The advice that I have received from officials is that, as the hon. Gentleman suggested, “medical condition” does not have a clear legal definition and could therefore be seen as imprecise. That does worry me. The purpose of the Bill is clear—it is in the title. It is to give choice to terminally ill adults at the end of life. They must have a clear, settled and informed wish, and be expected to die within six months, in circumstances that are inevitably progressive and cannot be reversed by treatment. The hon. Gentleman has, I believe, helped to make that even clearer, and I am grateful to him for doing so.

[Naz Shah]

My hon. Friend is making her points very clearly. The last words of amendment 181 are:

“Nothing in this subsection results in a person not being regarded as terminally ill for the purposes of this Act if (disregarding this subsection) the person meets the conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1).”

Does that not demonstrate that the amendment does not change the test for terminal illness?

[Kim Leadbeater]

My apologies; I am speaking to amendments 399, 400 and 401. I will be happy to come back to that point at the appropriate time, but I first want to finish my comments on those amendments.

As I have said, the hon. Member for East Wiltshire has done a good job this morning of improving the clarity of the issue. That shows that the Committee is doing its job and working effectively. I am therefore open to supporting those amendments.

[Danny Kruger]

I am delighted to hear it. I am grateful to the hon. Lady and to other hon. Members who have indicated their sympathy for the amendment. I look forward to the Division and to the Minister’s decision.

May I follow up on a point made by the hon. Member for Bradford West? I do not know whether the hon. Member for Spen Valley would like to intervene to help me understand the point. Amendment 181 would redraft clause 3(2) to make it clear that a person does not qualify as terminally ill

“only because they are a person with a disability or mental disorder”.

It would add to clause 3(2) the following additional sentence:

“Nothing in this subsection results in a person not being regarded as terminally ill for the purposes of this Act if…the person meets the conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b)”.

Does the hon. Member for Spen Valley agree that that will essentially mean that the clause does nothing? It confirms the terms of eligibility set out earlier in the Bill, and confirms that a person would still be eligible to receive an assisted death if they had conditions that were a consequence of a mental disorder or a disability. If she feels like intervening on me, I would like her to help me understand what that additional sentence adds. To my mind, it negates the purpose of the clause.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rebecca Paul]

I thank the hon. Member for that thoughtful intervention, and I completely concede that it is not entirely clear, and there are different sources that describe it differently, which, for a non-medical person like myself, makes it difficult. There are certain websites, including NHS England, that may reference it as “progressive”, but equally I am sure that there are other sources that do not describe it in the same way. The hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough makes a really good point, and he will see that I quite often talk about things arguably being the case; I am not saying that it definitely is—I am just highlighting that there is a risk, because if people disagree on whether it is progressive, that is when we have an issue. I see this as an opportunity to tighten up any of that potential risk.

I would say the ordinary person on the street would not expect diabetes to ever fall within the definition of a terminal illness, yet there is a risk that it could do, for the reasons I have explained. That means that the drafting of clause 2 is not quite tight enough in my view.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Just before the hon. Lady moves on, we may actually have come to a very sensible position based on the other amendments we have been discussing—amendments 399 to 401. I have done a little bit of googling, and diabetes generally is referred to as a “condition”. It might be referred to in other ways as well, but maybe that would be another reason for us all to support amendments 399 to 401.

[Rebecca Paul]

I thank the hon. Lady for that extremely good news. That would definitely be helpful and provide some reassurance.

Amendments 9 and 10 are essential to ensure that those people who are never intended to eligible for assisted dying under this Bill are kept outside of it. Amendment 9 seeks to ensure that it is not just illnesses that can be reversed by treatment, but illnesses where the progress can be controlled or substantially slowed by treatment, that are ineligible—diabetes being the classic case, which can be slowed and controlled by treatment. Amendment 10 further bolsters that by ensuring that treatments that improve prognosis are not disregarded under clause 2(1)(a).

The problem that we have with clause 2 in its current form is that it fails to distinguish between those who are truly at the end of their life and those who only become terminal if they do not access treatment. There is no requirement for a person to be receiving medical care when their prognosis is assessed, which means that many manageable but irreversible conditions—like diabetes, potentially, and chronic kidney disease—could qualify as terminal if treatment is stopped. Let us take the example of someone with type 1 diabetes, like my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire (Sarah Bool), who tabled these amendments. If she were to stop taking her insulin, she might meet the criteria for terminal illness under the Bill and qualify for an assisted death—I mean, I certainly hope she would not. Without treatment, type 1 diabetes could arguably be an inevitably progressive and irreversible condition that would result in death within weeks or months.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

I agree very strongly with the sentiments expressed by my hon. Friends the Members for Spen Valley and for Penistone and Stocksbridge, and I hope that the Committee can later return to the state of palliative care in this country.

I underline that the matter of the six-month prognosis was not some minor detail on Second Reading; rather, it was a central plank of the arguments made by those who said that we should pass the Bill because its safeguards were the toughest of any assisted dying law in the world. It is less than three months since my hon. Friends spoke those words, and yet we are already discussing an amendment that would remove the six-month prognosis.

[Kim Leadbeater]

We need to be fair to the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, who has said that he will not press the amendment to a Division. Indeed, it would not be something that I would support if he did do so, for the reasons that my hon. Friend has stated. I also think that we need to give him credit for ensuring that the voices of people with neurodegenerative conditions, such as MND, Parkinson’s and Huntingdon’s, are heard. They are an important part of this debate, whatever our views might be on the tightness that is needed in the Bill.

[Naz Shah]

I thank my hon. Friend, and my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge, for making it clear that they would not vote for the amendment. I also thank the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough for bringing forward an amendment that discusses those issues. However, whether it is withdrawn or not, it is an amendment that we are debating and talking to.

The hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, who tabled the amendment, no doubt feels very strongly that the conditions of patients with neurodegenerative diseases make a case for relaxing the six-month prognosis to 12. There may well be a good case for doing so, but we can only consider the case for extending the prognosis to 12 months because of the challenges created by neurodegenerative diseases if we have first considered that extremely complex subject.

We cannot say that the Committee has studied the difficult subject of neurodegenerative diseases and how they would affect the administration of the Bill. We have not heard from witnesses on the subject, and we have not been able to ask them questions. We did solicit evidence on whether neurodegenerative diseases would affect the ability to self-administer lethal drugs, but we have not had time to study the written evidence.

I appreciate that the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough is not going to press the amendment to a Division, which leaves some of what I wrote earlier obsolete. I appreciate the hon. Member’s efforts. We are sent here by our constituents to represent them to the best of our ability. I certainly try to do that, and I know my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley always tries to do that—I have no doubt that the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough and all others are trying to do that. We vow to represent our constituents, and had the amendment gone to a Division I would not have been able to support it, simply because we cannot make those difficult decisions without being properly informed. We cannot make up our minds to change the Bill because of a complex set of diseases.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention. Actually, there is nothing in the Bill that suggests that. We can only imagine and try to empathise as much as we possibly can with any person who has been given a diagnosis of six months to live. In that six-month process, they might not wait; as my hon. Friend, who is a doctor himself, has said, this is about autonomy. They might not wait until they get to a position where there is a lot of suffering; they might not wait to see those six months out. They might decide they do not want to take that risk, when actually they might have lived another 15 years, another year or another two years. That is the point of this amendment.

[Kim Leadbeater]

My hon. Friend is making a powerful speech and it is good to have this debate. May I ask her opinion on two things? One is that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud has alluded to, the research around the world shows that between 30% and 40% of people who sign up for assisted death never actually do it, because they do get better or because the treatment makes their condition manageable—or because they have a death in a different way. What are her thoughts on that? The other thing to point out is the number of people who we know, sadly, are taking their own lives because they are terminally ill at the moment. I go back to the point that I make quite regularly: no one is monitoring that—

[The Chair]

Order. As I said before, these are interventions seeking clarification. They are not mini-speeches.

[Naz Shah]

I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention. If we take that 30% to 40% figure, and the figure—she might correct me if I am wrong here, and I am happy to be corrected—that there are about 600 people on average going to Dignitas, for example—

[Kim Leadbeater]

It is people taking their own lives.

[Naz Shah]

Sorry—would my hon. Friend like to intervene?

[Kim Leadbeater]

Just to clarify, my understanding is that it is between 600 and 700 people who take their own lives; it is suicide.

[Naz Shah]

If we take that number, then that 30% or 40% who do not take that decision is maybe a few hundred people. However, the truth from Professor Sleeman’s evidence is that we are talking about thousands of people who are misdiagnosed every single year. She was talking about 3,516 who lived longer than expected. Yes, I recognise and value my hon. Friend’s comment that 30% or 40% of people do not take up assisted dying, but—perhaps I will talk about this when I move on to the next amendment—there is also a risk. If we go back to the Bill promoter’s intention to make the wording tighter, then surely this is a safeguard that she would support, just to ensure that we are making it as tight as we possibly can.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

Actually, it was the other way around and I am happy to provide a reference to the right hon. Gentleman. Nine cases found lack of capacity, but still not in the best interest. One of the girls was 19 years old. The judge found that they lacked capacity to make decisions about their treatment. The question of whether they had the capacity to decide to end their life is completely different and not something we have asked judges to rule on before. The judge’s ruling clearly implied the capacity to refuse force-feeding even if it resulted in their death. I am happy to provide the references for that. It was against their best interest to force-feed them. Tragically, in nine of the 10 cases the judges accepted that that would inevitably lead to the deaths of those young girls.

My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has repeatedly stressed that her Bill is modelled on the Death with Dignity law in Oregon.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Actually, I have not said that.

[The Chair]

Order. With the greatest respect to Members, this is not a dialogue; this is a debate. This is not chit-chat. It is a very serious issue and interventions of that nature are not helpful.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kim Leadbeater]

On a point of order, Mr Dowd. If something is said that we know not to be correct, what should we do?

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

The hon. Member invites me to suggest that I think it would be possible to draw a safe safeguard. I do not. I think that one month is better than six months, because with one month we can have more accuracy and doctors are more genuinely right when they say that someone is close to death at that point, while six months is much more inaccurate and 12 months is notoriously inaccurate. If we restrict the Bill by using a time limit, that limit should be as close to death as possible in my view.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Does the hon. Member agree that if we were to reduce it to one month, there would be absolutely no way to have the robust process set out in the Bill—or, indeed, I would argue, to have any sort of robust process?

[Danny Kruger]

I accept that, which is why amendment 282 is probing only. It is trying to demonstrate the point. I recognise that even the expedited process is likely to take up to a month to get through, so that would be difficult. Nevertheless, if our intention is to restrict this to people who are literally in their last days, which is frequently what we hear, I think it would be appropriate to restrict the time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention. I am just talking about the amendment to reduce the time from six months to one month. I will come on to the issue of eating and drinking in a second.

As amendment 282 would reduce the time within which the person is expected to die from six months to one month, it would also limit the number of people with a terminal illness who would be eligible for assisted dying under this legislation. Furthermore, there may be very challenging workability issues in delivering a service within one month, given the other time-dependent safeguards elsewhere in the Bill.

Amendment 51 would remove the requirement for the patient to have a six-month prognosis to be defined as “terminally ill”. If agreed to, it would expand the pool of people eligible for lawful assistance to voluntarily end their own life beyond those with a life expectancy of six months or less. In other words, it would remove the timeframe requirement of when death can be reasonably be expected.

Amendment 234 would widen eligibility to include cases of neurodegenerative diseases, illnesses or medical conditions where a person is reasonably expected to die within 12 months. Matters such as this are for the Committee, and ultimately for Parliament, to decide, but it is clear that the effect of the amendment would be to broaden the number of people eligible for lawful assistance to voluntarily end their own life under this legislation.

Amendment 10 would provide that, if treatment exists for a person’s progressive illness, disease or medical condition that alters the overall prognosis of that person’s condition, they are not terminally ill and would not be eligible for assisted dying services.

Amendment 402 would exclude a person who would not otherwise meet the definition of “terminally ill”—namely, being diagnosed with an inevitably progressive illness with six months or less to live—if that person meets that definition as a result of stopping eating or drinking. The effect of the amendment would be to prevent a person from being defined as “terminally ill” as a result of their own actions of stopping eating or drinking, or both. The Government’s analysis suggests that this may also exclude people who are terminally ill under the definitions of the Bill and who are, for various reasons, unwilling or unable to eat or drink. For example, it may include those with conditions such as oesophageal cancers, which could result in their being unable to eat or drink.

Furthermore, it is unclear whether someone who is on intravenous fluids or being fed through a feeding tube would be considered to have stopped eating or drinking under the amendment. I think that addresses the concern expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West, but she is welcome to intervene again if she would like to. The amendment could therefore lead to uncertainty over the person’s eligibility for assistance under the Bill.

The Government have taken a neutral position on the substantive policy questions relevant to how the law in this area could be changed. Questions around the definition of terminal illness and who should be eligible to access voluntary assisted dying under the legislation are matters for the Committee and for Parliament as a whole. However, I hope that these observations are helpful to the Committee in considering the Bill and the amendments tabled by various Members.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Colleagues will be pleased to know that, despite my copious notes, I do not intend to speak for very long, because I believe we have had a very thorough and robust debate on these issues. The Minister makes a valuable point on amendment 402, which I do not think anyone else raised. Coincidentally, it relates to the person in the Public Gallery this morning, whose mum had a horrible form of cancer and had to have her tongue removed. She would have stopped eating or drinking, but it was not a choice; it was an inevitable result of her condition. She would have been excluded from having an assisted death, which I am sure is not the intention of my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West.

We have had an excellent debate and covered a lot of ground. I do not intend to add anything more on this group of amendments. I will only say that if we get a move on, we might be able to get through clause 2 before we close at 5 o’clock.

[Juliet Campbell]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 9, in clause 2, page 1, line 24, after “reversed” insert

“or the progress controlled or substantially slowed”.—(Rebecca Paul.)

This amendment would mean that illness, disease or medical condition etc, the progress of which can be managed or controlled by treatment are not characterised as terminal illness.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 26th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Opher]

I feel that the Committee has been through these points quite extensively. There is clearly a disagreement in our beliefs; I accept that, but it is very important to make the Bill as simple as possible, because that is the best safeguard. I believe that the Mental Capacity Act is the right test for whether people have capacity. I reiterate that if there is a doubt in the clinician’s mind, there should be an avenue to get an expert opinion on capacity.

[Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)]

Is my hon. Friend reassured, as I am, that although we are focusing here on one conversation, we know from the provisions in the Bill that there will be multiple conversations? There will be a doctor, a second doctor, a psychiatrist, and then oversight by an expert panel. It is not just one assessment of capacity; there are multiple occasions. Does that reassure my hon. Friend, and hopefully other colleagues?

[Dr Opher]

It does reassure me, and I think it should reassure other Committee members. Having eight different people doing a capacity assessment is a very thorough safeguard for capacity. We have gone through the arguments many times in this Committee, but I do not feel that changing the polarity of mental capacity will do anything to make patients in this situation any safer. That is why I do not agree with the amendment. For fear of being interrupted any more, I think I will leave it at that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

I really want someone to explain this point to me: how can it make it more unsafe for patients to state the safeguards explicitly? How can it possibly make it harder, or more dangerous, if we specify what—as the hon. Gentleman said—is good practice currently, which the best doctors already do? I greatly respect him and his medical practice, but is he really saying that every doctor conforms perfectly to the GMC guidance? There are obviously clear problems with the way in which some doctors operate, and this is uncharted territory. Surely for the sake of doctors, as well as patients, it would be appropriate to specify explicitly how they should conduct these assessments, what communications they should make and what patients should be properly informed of. I cannot see how that makes it more dangerous.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I want to concur briefly with my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud; I have done a lot of research into this, believe me. We have the GMC, the British Medical Association and organisations that represent medical practitioners. They have very lengthy codes of conduct and behaviour codes. What we cannot do—and I have tried—is to include all that in the Bill, and we have to be cognisant of that in some of the amendments that we make.

[Danny Kruger]

I challenge the hon. Lady, and I would welcome her response to this: we clearly can specify some things that can be done, which is what my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge has done in half a page with amendment 50, which clarifies explicitly what information the patient should receive and what they should properly understand. How does including this list of pieces of information make the Bill more dangerous for patients?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I am not saying that this amendment would make it more dangerous, but it would overcomplicate things. That is the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud was making. We need to have a very clear piece of good law, and I think the Bill already covers the points in amendment 50 and others, which I fully appreciate have been put forward in good faith. It is the clarity of the law that sometimes has to be the focus. I absolutely concur with the hon. Member for East Wiltshire on safeguards, but unfortunately I feel that we will probably never get to a point with the Bill where he is happy with the level of safeguards, and maybe he is prepared to acknowledge that.

[Danny Kruger]

It is unlikely that I would ever vote for an assisted dying law but, if we are going to have one, I want to make it as safe as possible, which we all want. On those terms, in the spirit of a Bill that is going to pass, why not include these specific pieces of information? The hon. Lady says that, while it would not make the Bill more dangerous, it would overcomplicate it. Again, how does it overcomplicate it to add a few clauses specifying information that must be clearly communicated?

--- Later in debate ---

[Sojan Joseph]

I agree that when an independent doctor comes to assess a patient’s capacity and sees them for the very first time, they are more likely to be influenced by the assessment made at the beginning by the doctor who has known them for many days, weeks or months. I agree with my hon. Friend’s argument.

[Kim Leadbeater]

To be clear, the word “independent” means independent of the other doctor, not independent of the patient. The independent doctor could well know the patient. I hope that that clarifies that point.

[Sojan Joseph]

But it could be the other way around. The Bill does not clarify that the second doctor would know the patient at all.

[Kim Leadbeater]

It is not guaranteed.

[Sojan Joseph]

It is not guaranteed. I am grateful for that intervention.

We have talked about training for all registered professionals who will be involved in the capacity assessments. As someone who has carried out that training many times, I draw the attention of the Committee to Dr Rachel—

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Sixteenth sitting)

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 4th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen Kinnock]

The challenge is the dissonance in how the guidance under the Down Syndrome Act, which is currently very close to publication, is directed towards authorities such as trusts, but there is no coverage around individual doctors. At this stage, without seeing a clear distinction between the two or how it would work for individual doctors, the Department’s concern is that it could create confusion as to the obligations on individual medical practitioners under the 2022 Act. I am obviously open to conversations about how to clear that up, but the lacuna between the authorities and the individual doctors is the problem being flagged by the Department.

[Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)]

I take the Minister’s comments on board. Will he agree to a conversation with me and with the right hon. Member for East Hampshire (Damian Hinds), who tabled amendment 368, to take the discussion forward?

[Stephen Kinnock]

I am happy to have conversations with the hon. Lady and other hon. Members, but as things stand it is not clear to the Department or to me how the proposal would work in practice.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

That is for the wider debate. I call Kim Leadbeater.

[Kim Leadbeater]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. The amendments relate to the initial discussions with medical practitioners, and it is important to highlight that clause 4(1) states:

“No registered medical practitioner is under any duty to raise the subject of the provision of assistance in accordance with this Act with a person.”

However, subsection (2) states that

“nothing in subsection (1) prevents a registered medical practitioner exercising their professional judgement”.

Doctors and healthcare professionals, like any other group of people, hold a range of views on assisted dying. We need only reflect on the oral and written evidence to see that. However, the British Medical Association has a neutral position on assisted dying, and its representatives were very clear when I met them, and in oral evidence to the Committee, that they wanted an opt-in model for doctors to provide assisted dying, as well as the right to decline to carry out activities directly related to assisted dying, for any reason. These requests have therefore been incorporated into the Bill.

The BMA was clear in its submission that it opposes amendments 8, 124 and 276, as well as amendment 342, which we will come to later. It said that adding a prohibition or limiting factors in the Bill would

“create uncertainty and legal risks for doctors, which may inhibit effective doctor/patient communication and understanding.”

It welcomed the Bill’s provision that a doctor is not under a duty to raise assisted dying, which it felt was necessary to avoid any suggestion that doctors have a legal duty to raise it. It was concerned that these amendments would remove that provision, leaving doctors in a position of legal uncertainty. It said:

“If doctors are concerned that they may be legally obliged to raise assisted dying with all potentially eligible patients, this will impact on how, when, and by whom the issue is raised…It is essential that decisions about when and how to discuss assisted dying are made on the basis of what is best for the patient—rather than to avoid legal challenge. All patients deserve to have this important and sensitive conversation with a doctor who is confident, competent and happy to have the discussion…Doctors should be able to talk to patients about all reasonable and legally available options; a provision that limits or hinders open discussion about any aspect of death and dying is likely to be detrimental to patient care. Doctors should be trusted to use their professional judgement to decide when and if a discussion about assisted dying would be appropriate, taking their cue from the patient as they do on all other issues.”

That is the BMA’s position, and I agree.

As Duncan Burton, the chief nursing officer for England, said in oral evidence to the Committee,

“it is clear that there is increasing discussion in society around death and dying, and I think that is important. It is important that we have discussions and support people with their choices at the end of life, so anything we can do to increase that is important.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 41, Q22.]

Dr Ryan Spielvogel from California told us:

“People cannot make informed decisions for themselves if they do not know what their options are. While this is top of mind for all of you and for the doctors…even if this Bill becomes law, the general population is still not going to realise that it is an option.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 105, Q143.]

He strongly advised against not allowing doctors to discuss patient choice, because in his experience that really hampers their ability to take care of patients. Dr Jessica Kaan of End of Life Washington reiterated the point:

“It is a huge burden to put on patients and their loved ones if they have to bring it up themselves. I would highly caution against any sort of language that requires that, because it is just not fair to them. They are already going through so much”.––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 106, Q143.]

In the light of our recent discussions, I draw the Committee’s attention to the current BMA guidelines regarding patient requests for assisted dying. Those guidelines will obviously need updating if the law changes, but they are comprehensive and give us a much greater understanding of the approach that doctors take when speaking to terminally ill patients, as well as what these hugely sensitive conversations look like, which is really important to know.

The BMA guidance addresses situations in which patients make an explicit request for doctors’ assistance in or information about ending their life or hastening their death. I will refer to that guidance now. The guidance advises the doctors to

“Explore the patient’s feelings, emotions and thoughts….It might be helpful to discuss their understanding of their condition or their fears and concerns…If you feel that the patient is depressed or suffering from another mental health condition, or would benefit from more support, therapy or counselling should be offered.”

Doctors are also advised to

“Use the opportunity to address those concerns: you should also investigate whether other practical arrangements could help improve the patient’s quality of life. Involve a colleague: you might like to involve a more experienced colleague—making clear to the patient that this is what you will be doing.”

The guidance also talks about involving other sources of support:

“you might like to seek support and input from other members of the healthcare team, such as a specialist palliative care team, colleagues from mental health, or the chaplaincy or voluntary services.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

The hon. Lady says that the GMC states that doctors have an obligation to raise the treatment options before them, and I think that she thinks that this is a treatment option. Surely the obligation is on doctors to raise assisted dying in all cases where it may be an option for the patient. Does the hon. Lady agree that doctors should offer assisted dying when that treatment may be appropriate for the patient?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I agree that, under the provisions of the Bill, the doctor will have a duty to lay out options available to the patient, if they meet the eligibility criteria—absolutely. That is the whole purpose of the Bill.

[Danny Kruger]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for giving me a very clear answer. I just want to be totally clear that we understand each other. Is she saying that every doctor facing a terminally ill patient—someone who is eligible under the Bill—should make clear to them that they have the option of an assisted death?

[Kim Leadbeater]

Well, that is the purpose of clause 4: the doctor has to lay out the options available to the patient as long as all the criteria are met.

We can see from the guidance that currently exists that doctors take a very sensitive and patient-centred approach to end-of-life conversations. If the law were to change, that approach would continue with additional training specifically related to assisted dying, as has been discussed. It would also mean that the issues that doctors currently face around discussing assisted dying would be addressed.

As the BMA says, at the moment

“The law does not provide a clear definition of which actions might constitute assisting or encouraging suicide…What if a patient wishes to travel abroad for assisted dying? While the act of travelling abroad for assisted dying is not illegal, assisting, facilitating, or encouraging someone to do so is a criminal offence…doctors need to be aware of the possibility of legal and professional sanctions if they were to do so.”

I imagine that that must create a real sense of jeopardy for doctors. Similarly, the GMC recognises that doctors will face challenges in

“ensuring that patients do not feel abandoned”,

while ensuring that the advice or information that they provide does not encourage or assist a person to end their own life.

These are very difficult conversations for patients and doctors, but by legalising assisted dying in this country we can give clear guidance through a robust legal framework, and create the thorough, transparent process that is currently lacking. These conversations provide a safeguard while the person is still alive. As the former director of public prosecutions, Sir Max Hill, told the Committee,

“In each of the 27 cases I considered, the deceased individual was already dead, and that is when the scrutiny started. The major advantage of the Bill, if I can put it that way, is that that will be reversed, and scrutiny will be before death.” ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 86, Q111.]

Mark Swindells from the General Medical Council told us:

“We do get inquiries from doctors who are concerned that they are doing the right thing when it might become apparent to them that a patient wants to travel overseas to access assisted dying.” ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 46, Q36.]

Bringing those conversations out into the open has to be better for the patient and the practitioner.

[Lewis Atkinson (Sunderland Central) (Lab)]

With reference to amendment 8, and further to the intervention from the hon. Member for East Wiltshire, can my hon. Friend reflect on the provisions as set out in clause 4(1) and (2), which say that the issue relates to doctors’ professional judgment and that doctors are under no obligation to raise those issues in any situation?

[Kim Leadbeater]

Absolutely. This is about professional judgment, which is what the BMA is really clear about. Doctors have to be able to use their professional judgment. They are not under any obligation to raise the issue, but they are not under any obligation not to raise it. The BMA is really clear about that. I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention.

I welcome amendments 319 and 320 from my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford and I thank him once again for his positive engagement with the Bill. He raises a very valid point about the initial discussion. While the Bill is very clear that it applies only to terminally ill adults over the age of 18, in that someone would have to be over 18 to make the first declaration, it is not clear that the initial discussion could also not happen with someone under the age of 18.

We should not prohibit open conversations with terminally ill young people and their families, as they create openness, transparency and safeguards and provide much-needed support at what most of us can only imagine must be the most difficult time of anyone’s life. However, I think it should be made clear that the actual assisted dying process cannot be embarked upon unless someone is over the age of 18. I have taken advice about how best to incorporate that into the Bill from a drafting perspective. As a result, I have tabled amendment 418, which applies to clause 5, and states that regulations must provide that the first declaration contain, among other things,

“a declaration that they have had a preliminary discussion with a registered medical practitioner, that they were aged 18 or over when they had that discussion, and that they understand the information referred to in section 4(4)(a) to (c) that was provided during that discussion”.

As such, the aim of amendments 319 and 320 is achieved. I hope that that is to the satisfaction of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford.

With regard to amendment 339, I have listened very carefully to the concerns of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, who tabled it, and the evidence from Mencap chief executive Dan Scorer, who suggested that for terminally ill people with learning disabilities

“that initial conversation has to be incredibly well supported and structured…the person should have accessible information in advance of that discussion so that they are fully informed about all their rights in terms of treatment options at end of life”. ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 280.]

I absolutely agree with the intention of the amendment. I am seeking advice on the legal and technical implications, as I believe there is some tightening up that would need to be done around some of the phrasing, such as the concept of “sufficient time” or what would constitute a “supporter”. I therefore cannot support the amendment as it stands, but I am very happy to look at ways to take this forward and to meet my hon. Friend to discuss the amendment, which, quite rightly, gives special consideration to people with autism and learning disabilities. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge is also considering tabling amendments that would have a similar effect; perhaps we could all meet together.

I also reassure my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford that I am considering the involvement of people with learning disabilities, and groups representing them, in the development of guidance and training on assisted dying and end-of-life conversations. As Dan Scorer said,

“people with a learning disability should be involved in the development of that guidance” ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 281.]

I absolutely agree.

Amendment 368, tabled by the right hon. Member for East Hampshire, has been discussed this morning. I sought advice about it as it was new to me. I believe that no statutory guidance has yet been published under the Down Syndrome Act, so we lack detail. That Act resulted from another private Member’s Bill; I am sure we can all agree what an excellent process this is for making important changes to the law. As the Minister said, the amendment is likely to be unworkable for doctors so I cannot support it. I would, however, be very happy to discuss the thoughts of the right hon. Member for East Hampshire and look at how we can meet his objectives—possibly through an addition to new clause 8, which is about the duty to consult and the Secretary of State consulting with the Equality and Human Rights Commission. At that point, the specific needs of not just people with disabilities but those with other protected characteristics will be represented. Alternatively, we could look at the codes of practice in clause 30.

I am happy to take those discussions forward and may even be able to speak to the right hon. Member for East Hampshire at the drop-in session he is doing this week with the National Down Syndrome Policy Group, ahead of Down’s Syndrome Awareness Week.

[Kit Malthouse]

As the hon. Lady will know, a number of our proceedings have been misinterpreted, shall we say, on social media. For complete clarity, with regard to the initial conversation, the Bill leaves to the discretion of the doctor whether it is appropriate to raise the matter, given their knowledge of the patient. They have no obligation to raise it. If the patient themselves indicates a wish to raise the matter, then a doctor is under an obligation to lay out all the options available to that patient. We would not want to leave the outside world with the impression that, in all circumstances, the doctor is obliged to raise the option of assisted dying. It is only when they professionally think it is appropriate or if the patient raises it with them.

[Kim Leadbeater]

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. As I have said, the BMA has been very clear that doctors should use their professional judgment. For example, if they had a patient whom they knew to be deeply religious and who had no interest whatsoever in an assisted death, it is highly unlikely that they would raise the possibility. It is up to them to use their professional judgment to accommodate the wishes of the patient. It has to be a patient-centred approach.

[Danny Kruger]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I am done.

[Sarah Green (Chesham and Amersham) (LD)]

We have had a good debate on the amendments in this group. I do not intend to push amendment 278 to a vote, and I have nothing further to add to my previous remarks. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 8, in clause 4, page 2, line 16, leave out from “practitioner” to end of line 20 and insert

“shall raise the subject of the provision of assistance in accordance with this Act with a person who has not indicated to that or another registered medical practitioner that they wish to seek assistance to end their own life”.—(Daniel Francis.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kim Leadbeater]

I just want to let the hon. Gentleman and the Committee know that I met my hon. Friend the Member for East Thanet last night, and I am delighted to support her amendment 108.

[Danny Kruger]

I am very pleased to hear that. That is very encouraging news, because I have been concerned that the hon. Lady was resting her case on amendments to clause 12, which would not require a palliative care specialist. I am grateful to her for intervening to inform us of that.

Nevertheless, we need to go further. The amendments in the name of the hon. Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell) would require that a specialist, rather than just a GP, leads the initial assessment. The fact is that despite their enormous range of expertise, general practitioners are not qualified or confident in making prognoses of terminal illness. The written evidence from the Association for Palliative Medicine of Great Britain and Ireland cited a 2021 paper showing that over half of GPs were not consistent in how they applied their predictions to different patients. It is important that specialists in the relevant conditions should be involved in these assessments so that patients receive expert input with a lower risk of error.

It is significant that, during the Second Reading debate on 29 November, the House was unanimous in its appreciation of, and praise for, palliative care specialists. It seems strange that their expertise should not be considered essential to a terminally ill person’s consideration for an assisted death. When we look at other countries, we see that it is not an exceptional safeguard. South Australia’s Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2021 specifies:

“Either the coordinating medical practitioner or each consulting medical practitioner must have relevant expertise and experience in the disease, illness or medical condition”—

we are not using that any more—

“expected to cause the death of the person being assessed.”

I urge the Committee to reflect on the South Australia model, which is good in this regard.

I turn to amendment 53, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, and amendment 275, in the name of the hon. Member for Sunderland Central. The Bill currently requires doctors to discuss “available” palliative care options, but that may limit what patients are told. Amendment 275 would provide that patients should be informed of “all appropriate” palliative care alternatives, even if they are not readily available in their local area. We do not want patients choosing assisted dying simply because of unequal geographic provision of palliative care making them unaware of alternatives that could improve their quality of life.

I would go even further in support of amendment 53, which hits the nail on the head. Fundamentally, we have always said that assisted dying should be available only to people who palliative care cannot help. That is what amendment 53 entails: it states that assisted dying should be available only for people for whom the relevant palliative care is actually an option and, if they decline it, that would be their choice.

Finally, I will speak to amendments 425 and 426 in my name, which express the need for a proper multidisciplinary team at the right stage of the assisted dying process. The hon. Member for Spen Valley has emphasised the importance of multidisciplinary teams, and I welcome everything she said. It is very good to get her agreement, through the amendments that she has tabled, that two doctors working alone are not enough to protect and support every patient. I welcome that recognition.

Amendments to clause 12 attempt to fill this gap by introducing the expertise of a psychiatrist and a social worker, but they do not fulfil the role of a multidisciplinary panel. Rachel Clarke, one of the witnesses who told us to consider multidisciplinary assessments, has written subsequent to the amendments being tabled: “A ‘judge plus’ panel”—there will not actually be a judge, so perhaps we should call it a “lawyer plus” panel—

“is not an MDT…the panel’s scrutiny comes only at the end of the process, not at the beginning, when a patient first asks for the intervention of assisted dying. Yet this is a moment of peak vulnerability.”

We will get on to the question of whether a judicial panel should replace a High Court judge, but I emphasise very strongly that the introduction of this process is not the equivalent of having a proper multidisciplinary team considering the application for an assisted death at the appropriate moment.

As the Association for Palliative Medicine said last week, the Bill

“does not align with the standard multi-professional team…decision-making process used across the health service.”

It said that the panel is too distant from the patient and comes too late in the process. It said that the Bill would be stronger if the initial assessments were

“carried within a multi-professional team model”.

It is at the stage we are debating here—in the initial assessments—that the MDT needs to apply. For the record, if it has not been properly noted before, I also state that when the hon. Member for Spen Valley quoted Dr Sarah Cox on the importance of multidisciplinary teams, Dr Cox was not endorsing clause 12, but explicitly arguing for earlier introduction of the multidisciplinary process.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kim Leadbeater]

To be clear on the multidisciplinary approach, the point that I was making in that contribution was that that happens already. We are misrepresenting what goes on in current practice with terminally ill patients if we say that there is not a multidisciplinary approach, as indeed various witnesses told us. It is important to acknowledge that.

[Danny Kruger]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right that that is what witnesses told us, but we need to ensure that it happens in all cases; the purpose of these amendments is to ensure that good practice is universal. In the case of assisted dying, bad practice would be terrible. Of course, good doctors seek the guidance of others and do not operate in isolation, but the Bill would allow them to do so. It is important to ensure that the system lives up to the good practice that she refers to.

Committee members will be glad to hear that I am not going to rehearse the arguments about capacity and coercion, but those concerns are why it is important to have a multidisciplinary team at an early stage. The Committee has rejected all attempts to strengthen the capacity test, but it could at least allow a psychiatrist to have an earlier role in the process of checking for capacity. We heard from multiple witnesses about the importance of doing that, and that is what National Institute for Health and Care Excellence guidance states. As the hon. Lady said, it is good practice, so as Professor House said in his evidence to us, it would not be “a terribly radical thing” to do it.

On coercion, as the social worker Jess Carrington wrote to us:

“The only people who are comprehensively trained to recognise signs of abuse, in particular, coercive control, are social workers.”

According to research by Dr David Ross, doctors suspect less than 5% of cases of elder abuse. I will not rehearse the arguments around coercion, but I hope that the Committee will note that the only way—or the best way; it will not be foolproof—to ensure that coercion is spotted is by having a social worker at the very beginning of the process.

I think that is enough from me, Mr Efford—I am sure you agree.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)]

I rise in support of the amendments, especially amendments 342 and 425. We have discussed various aspects of the Bill, especially capacity, coercion and medical practices, under many previous amendments. As somebody who worked as a mental health nurse for many years, and who worked as part of a multidisciplinary team, I think that amendments 342 and 425 are some of the most important.

Amendment 342 talks about the preliminary conversation with the medical practitioner with whom the patient makes contact. Do we not think that the doctor who knows most about that patient is the best person to have that preliminary discussion? They will have the most information about them. When the patient, who has gone through so much difficulty, goes to their doctor or to a GP who knows them well and says, “I would like to choose the assisted dying pathway,” would that doctor then say, “I do not want to discuss this. Somebody else will.”?

[Kim Leadbeater]

Is my hon. Friend not concerned about the concept of conscientious objection? The BMA strongly opposes amendment 342, because it does not think doctors should be obligated to have that initial conversation if they do not want to.

[Sojan Joseph]

There are other people who support this concept, and they are the people who will be having the conversation—we have both sides of the argument. I believe that the best person to have that preliminary discussion would be the doctor who knows about that patient the most—about their circumstances, prognosis, family situation and pain. We talk about compassionate care, but where is the compassion in here? I am not saying that another doctor would deny that—but I am talking about compassion. Someone going through the most difficult time in their life would have the confidence to talk to the person who knows the most about them, which is why I fully support that the initial discussion should happen with them. I am not saying that they should say yes or no, but they should be talking about the care provisions and options available to the patient. Amendment 342 is one of the most important amendments we will debate.

I will move on to amendment 425. When I tabled amendment 1, my thinking was that a psychiatrist should be involved in these discussions, but I think amendment 425 will safeguard most of the concerns we have discussed in previous sittings. Amendment 425 talks about a “multidisciplinary team” and having a psychiatrist involved as well. Written evidence was sent to us on 29 January by the Royal College of General Practitioners, which recommended that a separate pathway that

“covered every stage of the process would ensure healthcare professionals of multiple disciplines…who wanted to do so could still opt in to provide assisted dying, but this would be arranged through a different pathway.”

The hon. Member for Sunderland Central spoke earlier about how patients may be going through many multidisciplinary teams already, but it could be that none of those multidisciplinary teams have talked with them about assisted dying. They could have been pharmacists or nurses talking about the patient’s care—not assisted dying. We are talking about setting up a multidisciplinary team with a mental health nurse, doctor and social worker who can look in detail at evidence of the patient’s capacity, whether they are choosing it because they feel they are a burden, and whether there is any coercion. I think that is a safeguard for most of the concerns we have discussed in previous sessions. I would love to see a psychiatrist involved, because psychiatrists deal with some of the most challenging patients, including those with suicidal thoughts, on a day-to-day basis. They are the most experienced people to carry out a capacity assessment and, if they are a part of the multidisciplinary team, it will safeguard the Bill.

I strongly support amendment 425 and I urge Members to consider it. It will reassure many people who are concerned about some of the discussions. I know it also talks about giving power to the Secretary of State to formalise who should be part of the multidisciplinary team, which would be a discussion for later. I thank the Committee for giving me the opportunity to speak in support of the amendment.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Seventeenth sitting)

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 4th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Dowd.

When we broke at 11.25 am, I was talking about amendment 108. Clause 4(4) sets out that a registered medical practitioner who conducts the preliminary discussion on assisted dying must, as part of that discussion, explain and discuss

“the person’s diagnosis and prognosis…any treatment available and the likely effect of it…any available palliative, hospice or other care, including symptom management and psychological support.”

Amendment 108 would supplement that with a requirement for the registered medical practitioner also to offer to refer the person to a specialist in palliative, hospice or other such care for the purpose of further discussion.

The amendment would add an additional level of specificity to the preliminary discussion on palliative, hospice or other care, but would not in itself place a duty on the registered medical practitioner to make such a referral, or on the person to accept it. In considering whether the amendment is required, the Committee may wish to note that the General Medical Council’s good medical practice already requires doctors, when providing clinical care, to refer a patient to another suitably qualified practitioner when this serves their needs.

As the Committee is aware, the Government have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on several amendments to ensure that the Bill is legally and operationally workable and reflects her policy objectives. Amendments 183 and 424 are two such amendments.

The purpose of amendment 183 is to emphasise, not change, the existing provisions in the Bill that provide that the preliminary discussion held with the person by a registered medical practitioner must not discuss assisted dying in isolation. Rather, the discussion must reference the matters contained in clause 4(4), including

(a) the person’s diagnosis and prognosis…any treatment available and the likely effect of it…any available palliative, hospice or other care, including symptom management and psychological support.”

Amendment 424 seeks to clarify the meaning of “preliminary discussion” in clause 40, to align that with the description of the discussions in subsections (3) and (4) of clause 4. It is a drafting change. As per subsections (3) and (4), a preliminary discussion takes place between a person seeking the provision of assistance in accordance with the Bill and a medical practitioner, about the requirements that need to be met for such assistance to be provided. The preliminary discussion must include

“the person’s diagnosis and prognosis…any treatment available and the likely effect of it…any available palliative, hospice or other care, including symptom management and psychological support.”

Amendment 425 would introduce a requirement that a person seeking assistance under the Bill is referred to a multidisciplinary team to consider support and care for the person. The Secretary of State may provide regulations to determine what kind of professionals should make up such a team, but the amendment would require that at a minimum each team should include a medical practitioner or nurse, a social worker and a psychiatrist. The obligation to refer to the multidisciplinary team would apply each and every time

“a person indicates to a registered medical practitioner their wish to seek assistance to end their own life in accordance with this Act”,

so there could be multiple referrals. Finally, I note that the amendment might have wider resource implications, including for social workers.

Together, amendments 53 and 54 propose changes to clause 7—rather than clause 4, which we have been considering so far today—the effect of which would be that in carrying out the first doctor’s assessment, the co-ordinating doctor must, in addition to the other requirements, be satisfied that the person has relevant and available palliative care options. As such, the amendments would mean that people are eligible for assistance to voluntarily end their own lives only when they have relevant and available palliative care options. The amendments would create an additional criterion, which may reduce the number of people able to receive an assisted death, linked to the availability of palliative care services to any given individual.

Amendment 426 would prevent the co-ordinating doctor from finalising the first assessment process until they had received confirmation from a multidisciplinary team—as set out in amendment 425—that the person seeking assistance to end their own life had met with the multidisciplinary team. The Committee may wish to note that under the amendment there would be no requirement on the multidisciplinary team to provide that confirmation in a given timeframe. That might lead to delays in the co-ordinating doctor being able to make their statement and onward referral.

Amendment 286 would remove the requirements in paragraphs (a) to (c) of clause 9(2) and insert three new requirements. The three new conditions require the assessing doctor, for both the first and second assessment, to consult specialists in relation to the person’s diagnosis and prognosis, any treatments available and the likely effect of those treatments, and any palliative, hospice or other care, including symptom management and psychological support.

The Committee may wish to note that, as drafted, amendment 286 might have some unintended consequences. That is because by replacing clause 9(2)(a), (b) and (c), it would remove the words

“explain to and discuss with the person being assessed”

at clause 9(2)(b). Consequently, the amendment would remove the requirement for the assessing doctor to have a discussion with the person about the factors currently set out in clause 9(2)(b). The assessing doctors would also not be required to examine the person and their medical records, and to make other inquiries as they consider appropriate.

The amendment could also lead to a significant loss of essential discussion between the assessing doctors and the person seeking assisted dying. The removal of clause 9(2)(b) would eliminate the requirement to explain and discuss the diagnosis and prognosis, treatment options and palliative care. Additionally, the amendment would remove the requirement to discuss the person’s wishes in the event of complications arising in connection with the self-administration of an approved substance, which may be seen as important for fully informed decision making.

I thank the Committee for its attention.

[Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)]

I will try to keep my comments as brief as possible because we have had another very thorough discussion. First, my amendment 424 is, as the Minister said, a simple drafting change in clause 40 that confirms that “preliminary discussion” means a discussion as per clause 4(3).

Amendment 275 from my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central would, in many circumstances, broaden the scope of the conversation that the doctor would have with the patient, and I am happy to support it.

I am also happy to support the very sensible amendment 108 from my hon. Friend the Member for East Thanet (Ms Billington). It is perfectly acceptable to ask the doctor to offer to refer the patient to a specialist, as they would probably do in most cases anyway, but the amendment is for clarity.

I refer colleagues to the comprehensive comments on my amendment 183 earlier in proceedings, and also to the support of the British Medical Association. Following Second Reading, I listened carefully to Members’ concerns about the possibility of doctors only discussing assisted dying with patients. Even though the Bill states that that cannot be the case, for the avoidance of any doubt the amendment emphasises that the initial discussion mentioned in clause 4(3) may not be conducted without also explaining and discussing the matters mentioned in subsection (4). Accordingly, such a preliminary discussion may not be conducted in isolation from an explanation of and discussion about the matters mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c) of that subsection—that is, doctors cannot discuss the option of assisted dying in isolation but only in conjunction with discussion about all other available and appropriate treatment.

Indeed, Andrew Green of the BMA told us that

“some patients find it very difficult to bring up sensitive subjects with their doctors, even when those are the most important thing on their mind.”

He asked us to

“please do not pass legislation that makes it harder for doctors to understand their patients.” ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 42, Q24.]

That concludes my remarks.

[Danny Kruger]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 270, in clause 4, page 2, line 25, at end insert—

“(3A) Before conducting a preliminary discussion under subsection (2) the registered medical practitioner must ensure that the person has no remediable suicide risk factors which pose a significant risk to their life.”—(Danny Kruger.)

This amendment requires that the doctor ensures that there are no remediable suicide risk factors before proceeding to the initial discussion about assisted dying.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

I am happy to have that discussion, to better understand how it might all work in practice.

If amendment 415 is agreed to, it will mean that an assessing doctor making an assessment under subsection (2) must first ensure the provision of adjustments for language and literacy barriers, including the use of interpreters. As with amendment 414, the Committee may want to note the existing standards that all medical practitioners must uphold, which include requirements for the provision of adjustments for language and literacy barriers.

Amendments 416 and 417 would amend clause 30, which states that the Secretary of State may issue codes of practice on a number of matters, including on arrangements for ensuring effective communication and the use of interpreters. The amendments would impose a duty on the Secretary of State to issue one or more codes of practice in connection with arrangements for ensuring effective communication, including the use of interpreters, and to do so within six months of the passing of the Act. The requirement to issue any such code of practice within six months may prove unworkable. Under clause 30, it would be necessary to consult on the code of practice, make regulations to allow for the code of practice to come into force, have the regulations approved by both Houses of Parliament and then issue the code of practice, all within a six-month period after the passing of the Act.

As I have said, the Government will continue to remain neutral on whether or how the law in this area should change. As I have made clear, that is a matter for the Committee and for Parliament as a whole. However, I hope that these observations are helpful to members of the Committee in considering the Bill and the amendments tabled to it.

[Kim Leadbeater]

On amendment 413, from the right hon. Member from Plaid Cymru—with apologies, I will not embarrass myself by trying to pronounce the wonderful name of her constituency—I am very sensitive to issues around devolution. We have had many conversations about it, which I am very happy to continue. The Minister has confirmed, as I understand it, the issue around the Welsh language, in that it would be covered by the Welsh language legislation, which states that individuals in Wales

“should be able to live their lives through the medium of the Welsh language if they choose to do so.”

I am very supportive of that. I am also happy to continue those conversations, where necessary, with the Minister.

I turn to amendments 414 and 415. I think several Members of the Committee have had the same message from my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich, who was clearly struggling to get here on time. I, too, would be happy to move them in his name. They seem very sensible amendments, and I am happy to support them. Along with the GMC’s “Good medical practice”, which sets out the principles, values and standards of professional behaviour expected of doctors, it is a belt-and-braces approach to an issue that is very important, for reasons that several hon. Members have set out.

I cannot support amendments 416 and 417, however, because the timeframe that they would impose would not fit with the rest of the Bill. In reference to the two-year implementation period, that would just not be workable or possible.

[Liz Saville Roberts]

I will not press amendment 413, because I anticipate further conversations on these matters.

Amendment 414 agreed to.

Amendment proposed: 285, in clause 4, page 2, line 28, leave out paragraphs (a) to (c) and insert—

“(a) the person’s diagnosis and prognosis, in consultation with a specialist in the relevant illness, disease or medical condition,

(b) any treatment available and the likely effect of it, in consultation with a specialist in the provision of such treatment,

(c) any palliative, hospice or other care, including symptom management and psychological support, in consultation with a specialist in palliative care.”—(Naz Shah.)

This amendment ensures that a specialist carries out the assessment of the patient, the treatment options available and the palliative care options available, since these may not be known to a doctor coordinating an assisted death.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

I will speak to this group of provisions as one, given that amendments 71 to 80 are consequential on new clause 4. The purpose of these provisions is to create a new statutory body—the assisted dying agency—which has the purpose of co-ordinating requests from people to be considered for assisted dying. The provisions provide for various functions and duties of the agency, including assigning a co-ordinating doctor and an independent doctor to a person seeking assistance to end their own life.

The agency would be responsible for accepting referrals, replacing registered medical practitioners with the roles of assigned co-ordinating doctor and assigned independent doctor, and receiving and recording declarations, statements and cancellations made by co-ordinating doctors, independent doctors and those receiving assistance under the Bill.

That would be a change from the current provisions in the Bill, which place a number of those duties on the individual co-ordinating doctor and independent doctor. One effect of the proposed new clause is that a new agency would have to be established by the Government. If it passed, we would have to work to assess how that might be possible in practice.

I hope my brief remarks are helpful to Committee members in considering the Bill, the amendment and the new clause.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I have nothing to add, other than to agree with the hon. Member for East Wiltshire; I do not think any of us on the Committee are keen on the implementation of the assisted dying agency.

[Danny Kruger]

Will the hon. Member give way?

--- Later in debate ---

[Sean Woodcock]

Amendment 345 was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Anna Dixon); I referred earlier to her record in this area. The amendment would ensure that medical practitioners record and document preliminary discussions with a patient about assisted dying and provide the patient with that information. I welcome the amendments from the Bill’s promoter to make records of the first and second doctor’s assessments. Those safeguard patients and the process. It is important that we have transparency and clarity on such weighty decisions.

Several people raised in their written evidence the importance of good documentation. These amendments meet those concerns. I assume that not including a record of the preliminary discussion is merely an oversight by the Bill’s promoter. The amendment seeks to do what she says she wants to do—protect patients and doctors—by making records of the discussions.

In written evidence TIAB55, Professor Allan House suggested that

“It should be required as it is in all other areas of medical practice, that specific written records are kept of this assessment and of procedures followed to end life—not just the substances used. The written record to be included in the person’s medical record so that it is available to the Medical Examiner. Records also to be available at appraisal to enable assessment of the quality of the process.”

[Kim Leadbeater]

I thank my hon. Friend for his comments. Will he take note of my new clause 19, which is in this group and states that the preliminary discussion has to be recorded?

[Sean Woodcock]

I am grateful for that intervention, which goes to the heart of my next question: why would we record and document later conversations, but not the initial one? That conversation could be one in which coercion takes place and without a record of it happening, patients and doctors are at risk. We have acknowledged that patients can be influenced by their doctors, whether consciously or unconsciously. We also noted how certain groups lack trust in the healthcare system. Dr Jamilla Hussain, in her written evidence, TIAB252, explained that the various inequalities faced by certain communities

“contribute to mistrust in health and social care services”

and that

“minority patients frequently express fear of having their lives shortened by healthcare providers, especially at the end-of-life with medication such as morphine and midazolam.”

In situations where patients are uncertain or lack trust in medical professionals, a record of the initial conversation is important to protect everyone involved. As Professor House stated, documenting the process and making records is common medical practice, so why would we differ here? We must protect patients and doctors, and making clear records at every stage of the process contributes to that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

I think it reflects the fact that, as the Committee has agreed, we are in uncharted territory on a whole range of issues here. I think it is best to think through the implications of every amendment. If it passes, every clause of the Bill will have to be assessed for its potential impact. I have other questions about amendment 297 in my notes. Does it intend to capture only the consultations between the co-ordinating doctor and the patient, or does it intend also to capture conversations with relevant persons other than the person seeking an assisted death? That is not clear from the amendment. What I am saying is that it poses more questions than it answers.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I might be wrong, but my understanding is that a patient could ask for access to their medical records at any point. On the basis that new clause 19 requires the doctor to record a preliminary discussion, presumably, if a patient wanted to see that record, they would be able to.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I agree with my hon. Friend on that point. As I stated at the start of my comments, officials have worked with her on new clause 19, which I think goes a long way to clearing up many of the points that have been raised, including hers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

The Government have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on new clause 19. The Government’s view is that if the Committee accepts it, then that new clause will provide the level of robustness and resilience that the system requires. The Government are not convinced that, on its own, the amendment that my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West is talking about would provide the level of robustness and resilience we would be looking for. As things stand, the choice has been made to work with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on new clause 19, and we are satisfied that that would provide us with the operational integrity we need.

Amendment 302 would require the independent doctor to provide details of the way in which the second assessment was conducted, alongside a written transcript of any consultation to the relevant chief medical officer and the person’s GP. The independent doctor would be required to maintain a copy of that record to provide to the relevant medical examiner.

As I have mentioned, in executing our duty to ensure that the Bill, if passed, is legally robust and workable, the Government have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on new clause 19. The new clause would require a practitioner to include a record of a preliminary discussion having taken place under clause 4. The record of the preliminary discussion must be included in the person’s medical records. Where the medical practitioner is a member of the person’s GP practice, they must make such a record in the person’s medical records as soon as practicable. Where the medical practitioner is not a member of the person’s GP practice, they must, as soon as practicable, provide a written record of the preliminary discussion to a medical practitioner at the person’s GP practice, who will then be required by the new clause to include it in the person’s medical records as soon as practicable.

The Committee may wish to note that amendment 424 would add a definition of “preliminary discussion” to the Bill that would make it clear what discussion medical practitioners would be required by law to record.

That concludes my remarks on this group. I thank the Committee for its attention.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I rise to speak briefly to my new clause 19, which refers to the recording of the preliminary discussion. It would require the practitioner to include in the medical records of the person in question a record of a preliminary discussion under clause 4. The initial discussion with the patient is very important and, as such, should be recorded in their records. I hope that colleagues agree and will support the new clause.

--- Later in debate ---

I therefore support amendment 341, which seeks to remove the requirement to refer and replace it with an obligation to direct the patient to where they can obtain information and have the preliminary discussion. The amendment is in line with the written evidence we have received, so I hope that some Committee members will join me in supporting it.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I thank the hon. Member for those important points. I reassure her, and possibly other Committee members, that I am minded to support amendment 341.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

Amendment 412 would remove the duty in clause 4(5) on a registered medical practitioner who is unwilling or unable to conduct the preliminary discussion to, upon request, refer the person to another practitioner whom the first practitioner believes is willing and able to conduct that discussion. Guidance for medical professionals requires that, where a practitioner objects to performing a procedure, they must refer the patient to a practitioner who can meet their needs.

Amendment 341 removes the duty on a registered medical practitioner who is unwilling or unable to conduct the preliminary discussion to, upon request, refer the person to another registered medical practitioner whom they believe is willing and able to conduct that discussion. The amendment requires the registered medical practitioner who is unwilling or unable to conduct the preliminary discussion with the person to instead ensure that the person is directed to where they can obtain information and have the preliminary discussion.

New clause 13 would introduce a requirement for the Secretary of State to create, via regulations, an independent information and referral service for individuals who are, or may be, eligible under the Bill for assisted dying services. The accompanying amendment 338 would require a registered medical practitioner who is unwilling or unable to conduct the preliminary discussion to direct the person, upon that person’s request, to another registered medical practitioner or to the information and referral service, as set out in the new clause. The effect of this amendment is to remove the obligation in clause 4(5) for the registered medical practitioner to refer the person to another registered medical practitioner whom the first practitioner believes is willing and able to conduct the initial discussion. This amendment would make it more likely for a person seeking assistance to be referred to someone who is unwilling or unable to help. In addition, these amendments could carry an operational impact, as the new service would need to be designed and brought into existence.

Amendment 287 would mean that, if the first practitioner is unable or unwilling to conduct the preliminary discussion, they must, upon request, refer the person to a registered medical practitioner who is qualified to undertake the preliminary discussion. They must also set out palliative medicine options to provide the patient with appropriate end-of-life care, including referring the person to a palliative medicine expert. This amendment removes the duty in clause 4(5) to refer to a practitioner whom the first practitioner believes is willing and able to conduct the preliminary discussion.

As with previous amendments, this language could make it more likely for a person seeking assistance to be referred to someone who is unwilling or unable to help. It is not clear what

“qualified to undertake such a preliminary discussion”

is intended to mean. In addition, the term “palliative care expert” is not a defined term. Palliative medicine is a designated speciality of the General Medical Council and a doctor can apply to be entered on to the GMC specialist register for this speciality, provided they have the specialist medical qualification, training or experience. I hope these observations are helpful, and I thank the Committee for its attention.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I rise to speak to amendments 341, 338 and 412 together, and I welcome the debate on these important amendments. Choice is one of the key tenets of the Bill, primarily—but not exclusively—for terminally ill adults with a limited time to live. Choice is also very important for medical practitioners, and I am very respectful of, and acknowledge the importance of, conscientious objection for doctors. When it comes to assisted dying, I believe that they should also have choice. Indeed, the Bill is written so that they can choose not to participate in the process for any reason. That is the BMA’s view, and I agree with it.

The BMA has a position of neutrality on assisted dying, and there are a range of views within medical professions, as there are within all groups of people. That is why I have adopted its position of an opt-in model for the purposes of the Bill. Nevertheless, the process must remain patient focused at all times, and that means enabling them to have a discussion on such an important matter. It would not be right to rely on online advice or even the best-designed written materials. As we have already established, doctors are used to having sensitive and compassionate discussions with people who are terminally ill, and there can be no substitute for that. While a doctor may not wish to participate themselves, and I fully respect that, they still have a responsibility towards their patients, and that should include ensuring that they can speak to a properly qualified medical practitioner at such a difficult time.

I understand that the BMA and others would not be comfortable with the word “refer”, which I understand to have a special meaning within medical practice. The GMC guidelines use different language. They talk about where a doctor has a conscientious objection, in which case they are advised that they must make sure that arrangements are made for another suitably qualified colleague to take over their role. The BMA’s guidance says that patients must be able to see another doctor, as appropriate, and that it need not always be a formal procedure. It is not, however, sufficient to simply tell the patient to seek a view elsewhere—I agree completely.

The BMA supports amendment 341, which says that a doctor

“must ensure that the person is directed to where they can obtain information and have the preliminary discussion.”

I am therefore happy to support the amendment today and, if it were to need further adjustment, I am very happy to consider alternatives based on existing best practice. I would be very happy to meet with the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, who is herself a doctor, to discuss her thoughts and draw on her considerable medical experience.

[Danny Kruger]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: 341, in clause 4, page 2, line 33, leave out from “subsection (3)” to the end of line 36 and insert

“is not required to refer the person to another medical practitioner but must ensure that the person is directed to where they can obtain information and have the preliminary discussion.”—(Rebecca Paul.)

This amendment would provide that a registered medical practitioner who is unable or unwilling to have the preliminary discussion with a person must provide information to the person about where they can have that discussion, but that this need not take the form of a referral.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

As amendments 125 and 126 are consequential on new clause 7, I shall speak to them as a whole and not in turn. The purpose of the amendments appears to be twofold. First, they seek to restrict the role of medical practitioners who can hold an initial discussion to those who have completed training. That training would be specified by the Secretary of State in regulations and would make them eligible to be listed on the register of assisted dying medical practitioners.

Secondly, the amendments seek to apply the same principle to the co-ordinating or independent doctor. In addition, they would place a duty on the Secretary of State to make regulations that would create the register to sit outside or alongside the current system of registration of medical practitioners and set out the training requirements to be eligible to be listed on the register.

Both sets of regulations are to be subject to the affirmative procedure, and the Secretary of State must consult such persons as they consider appropriate before making them. The regulations making provision for the relevant training requirements must be laid within six months of the passing of this Act. The regulations establishing the register must be laid within 12 months of the passing of the Act.

Although the purpose of the amendments is clear, our assessment suggests that the drafting would not achieve the desired effect, because the register would include only those doctors who have not undertaken the specified training or who have opted out of the assisted dying service. Additionally, the suggested timeframe for laying regulations is unworkable, given the need to work with regulators and the proposed duty to consult. There are also significant operability concerns regarding the creation of a new register for a subset of registered medical practitioners.

I hope that the Committee has found those observations helpful. I thank Members for their attention.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I have nothing to add.

[The Chair]

For clarity, amendment 125 is not being pressed to a Division, as I understand it. If the hon. Member for Broxtowe withdraws amendment 125, there will be an opportunity to vote on amendment 126 and new clause 7 later.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

I have made it clear throughout the debate that I am not offering a Government view on the merits of amendments. My remarks are focused much more on the legal and practical impacts of amendments, to assist Members in undertaking line-by-line scrutiny.

The amendments were tabled by the right hon. Member for South West Wiltshire. They would create a further eligibility requirement of the person seeking assistance under the Bill. Amendment 271 and 272 would limit those eligible to seek assistance to end their own life, in circumstances where their terminal diagnosis was received less than six months prior to the date on which the person signs the first declaration, to those who have received a psychosocial intervention. This would be subject to any exceptions provided for by the Secretary of State in regulations. Amendment 271 does not define what is meant by “received a psychosocial intervention” in relation to their diagnosis.

The term “intervention” is usually employed in the health service to mean the provision of support or treatment. This is different from, for example, an assessment that a clinician might undertake to assess whether an intervention may be required. While there is not a standard definition of psychosocial intervention, we understand it to mean psychosocial interventions such as cognitive behavioural therapy. The amendment could create uncertainty as to what type of treatment a person will need to undergo to satisfy the requirement. If a person who would otherwise seek assistance to end their own life under the Bill is unable to, or does not wish to, receive a psychosocial intervention, unless an exemption applies, they may need to delay starting the assisted dying process until at least six months has elapsed from their terminal diagnosis. That could be challenging in circumstances where the terminal diagnosis has a prognosis of six months or less.

The amendment would also introduce a requirement for people in certain contexts to undergo an intervention that could undermine a person’s autonomy in making their own treatment decisions. Were the amendment made, it would confer a regulation-making power on the Secretary of State to create exceptions to the proposed provisions on psychosocial intervention. Regulations made using this power would be subject to the affirmative procedure. It would also give the Secretary of State the power to issue a code of practice in connection with the form of the psychosocial intervention required.

If the Committee decides to accept the amendment, further consideration would be needed on Report to ensure that it is operationally deliverable, and my earlier comments about the definition of psychosocial intervention and other comments would have to be clarified. The Government would, of course, stand ready to assist were the amendment to pass.

As I said earlier, the Government have taken a neutral position on the substantive policy questions relevant to how the law in this area could be changed—as I have made clear, that is a matter for this Committee and for Parliament as a whole. However, I hope that these observations have been helpful, and thank the Committee for its attention.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I have nothing to add, other than to associate myself with the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central and those of the Minister.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Division 29

Question accordingly negatived.

Ayes: 4

Noes: 16

[Kim Leadbeater]

I beg to move amendment 184, in clause 5, page 3, line 7, leave out “Schedule 1” and insert

“regulations made by the Secretary of State”.

This amendment provides that the form of a first declaration is to be set out in regulations (rather than in Schedule 1).

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 289, in clause 5, page 3, line 11, leave out “another person” and insert “another registered clinician”.

This amendment ensures that the second witness is a registered clinician.

Amendment 418, in clause 5, page 3, line 12, at end insert—

“(2A) Regulations under subsection (2)(a) must provide that the first declaration contains—

(a) the following information—

(i) the person’s full name and address;

(ii) the person’s NHS number;

(iii) contact details for the person’s GP practice;

(b) the following further declarations by the person—

(i) a declaration that they meet the initial conditions for eligibility (see subsection (2B));

(ii) a declaration that they have had a preliminary discussion with a registered medical practitioner, that they were aged 18 or over when they had that discussion, and that they understand the information referred to in section 4(4)(a) to (c) that was provided during that discussion;

section 4(4)(a)

(iii) a declaration that they are content to be assessed, for the purposes of this Act, by medical practitioners;

(iv) a declaration that they are making the first declaration voluntarily and have not been coerced or pressured by any other person into making it;

(v) a declaration that they understand that they may cancel the first declaration at any time.

(2B) In subsection (2A)(b)(i) ‘the initial conditions for eligibility’ are that the person making the declaration—

(a) is aged 18 or over,

(b) is ordinarily resident in England and Wales and has been so resident for at least 12 months, and

(c) is registered with a general medical practice in England or Wales.”

This amendment makes provision about the content of regulations under subsection (2)(a), which will set out the form of the first declaration.

Amendment 277, in clause 5, page 3, line 12, at end insert—

“(2A) A person may not make a first declaration under subsection (1) until 28 days have elapsed, beginning with the day they received a diagnosis of the terminal illness.”

This amendment would mean a person could not make the first declaration until 28 days from the day they received a diagnosis of the terminal illness.

Amendment 420, in clause 7, page 4, line 16, leave out subsection (3) and insert—

“(3) After carrying out the first assessment, the coordinating doctor must—

(a) make a report about the assessment (which must meet the requirements of regulations under subsection (4));

(b) give a copy of the report to—

(i) the person who was assessed (‘the assessed person’),

(ii) if the coordinating doctor is not a practitioner with the person’s GP practice, a registered medical practitioner with that practice, and

(iii) any other person specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State;

(c) if satisfied as to all of the matters mentioned in subsection (2)(a) to (g), refer the assessed person to another registered medical practitioner who meets the requirements of section 8(6) and is able and willing to carry out the second assessment (‘the independent doctor’).

(4) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision about the content and form of the report.

(5) The regulations must provide that the report must—

(a) contain a statement indicating whether the coordinating doctor is satisfied as to all of the matters mentioned in subsection (2)(a) to (g);

(b) contain an explanation of why the coordinating doctor is, or (as the case may be) is not, so satisfied;

(c) contain a statement indicating whether the coordinating doctor is satisfied as to the following—

(i) that a record of the preliminary discussion has been included in the person’s medical records;

(ii) that the making of the first declaration has been recorded in the person’s medical records;

(iii) that the first declaration has not been cancelled;

(d) be signed and dated by the coordinating doctor.”

This amendment requires the coordinating doctor to make a report about the first assessment, and (if satisfied of the matters mentioned in subsection (2)) to refer the person to another practitioner for the second assessment.

Amendment 195, in clause 8, page 4, line 40, leave out “statement” and insert “report”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 420.

Amendment 209, in clause 16, page 11, line 8, leave out paragraphs (b) and (c) and insert—

“(b) a report about the first assessment of a person is made under section 7;

(c) a report about the second assessment of a person is made under section 8;”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendments 420 and 421.

Amendment 220, in clause 34, page 20, line 36, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert—

“(a) a report about the first assessment of a person does not contain a statement indicating that the coordinating doctor is satisfied as to all of the matters mentioned in section 7(2)(a) to (g);

(b) a report about the second assessment of a person does not contain a statement indicating that the independent doctor is satisfied as to all of the matters mentioned in section 8(2)(a) to (e);”

Amendment 421, in clause 8, page 5, line 4, leave out subsection (5) and insert—

“(5) After carrying out the second assessment, the independent doctor must—

(a) make a report about the assessment (which must meet the requirements of regulations under subsection (5A)), and

(b) give a copy of the report to—

(i) the person who was assessed,

(ii) the coordinating doctor,

(iii) if neither the independent doctor nor the coordinating doctor is a practitioner with the person’s GP practice, a registered medical practitioner with that practice, and

(iv) any other person specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(5A) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision about the content and form of the report.

(5B) The regulations must provide that the report must—

(a) contain a statement indicating whether the independent doctor is satisfied as to all of the matters mentioned in subsection (2)(a) to (e);

(b) contain an explanation of why the independent doctor is, or (as the case may be) is not, so satisfied;

(c) contain a statement indicating whether the independent doctor is satisfied as to the following—

(i) that a record of the preliminary discussion has been included in the person’s medical records;

(ii) that the person signed the first declaration;

(iii) that the making of the first declaration has been recorded in the person’s medical records;

(iv) that the first declaration has not been cancelled;

(d) be signed and dated by the independent doctor.”

This amendment provides that the independent doctor must make a report about the second assessment, and makes provision about the report.

Amendment 203, in clause 10, page 6, line 42, at end insert—

“(A1) This section applies where the independent doctor has—

(a) carried out the second assessment, and

(b) made a report stating that they are not satisfied as to all of the matters mentioned in section 8(2)(a) to (e).”

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 421.

Amendment 204, in clause 10, page 6, line 43, leave out from beginning to second “the” in line 44.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 203.

Amendment 329, in clause 13, page 9, line 20, leave out paragraph (a).

This amendment removes the reference to Schedule 4 from the clause and is linked to Amendment 330.

Amendment 207, in clause 13, page 9, line 20, leave out “Schedule 4” and insert

“regulations made by the Secretary of State”.

This amendment provides that the form of a second declaration is to be set out in regulations (rather than in Schedule 4).

Amendment 330, in clause 13, page 9, line 26, at end insert—

“(3A) A second declaration must include the following information—

(a) the name and address of the person;

(b) the NHS number of the person;

(c) the contact details for the general medical practice at which the person is registered;

(d) a declaration by the person that they have made a first declaration under this Act;

(e) a declaration by the person that the assessing doctors have made the appropriate declarations under this Act together with the dates of those declarations;

(f) the details of the declaration made by the High Court or Court of Appeal;

(g) a declaration by the person they are eligible to end their life under this Act;

(h) a declaration by the person that they wish to be provided with assistance to end their own life under this Act;

(i) a declaration by the person that they understand that they must make this second declaration under the Act and that they do so voluntarily and have not been coerced or pressured by any other person into making it.

(j) a declaration that they understand that they can cancel their declaration at any time.

(k) any other information or signed declarations as may be set out by the Secretary of State in regulations.

(3B) Any regulations made under subsection (3A) are subject to the negative procedure.”

This amendment sets out the requirements for the second declaration by the person and is linked to Amendment 329.

Amendment 331, in clause 13, page 9, line 38, leave out paragraph (a).

This amendment removes the reference to Schedule 5 from the Bill.

Amendment 208, in clause 13, page 9, line 38, leave out “Schedule 5” and insert

“regulations made by the Secretary of State”.

This amendment provides that the form of a statement by the coordinating doctor following the making of the second declaration is to be set out in regulations (rather than in Schedule 5).

Amendment 332, in clause 13, page 9, line 41, at end insert—

“(6A) A statement made under subsection (6) must include the following information—

(a) a declaration by the coordinating doctor that the person is terminally ill within the meaning of this Act and the nature of the relevant illness, disease or medical condition,

(b) details of any relevant declaration made by the High Court or Court of Appeal;

(c) a declaration that the coordinating doctor is of the opinion that the person’s death is either likely or unlikely to occur before the end of the period of one month beginning with the day on which the declaration was made by the High Court or Court of Appeal under this Act;

(d) a declaration that the coordinating doctor is satisfied that the requirements of this Act regarding any period of reflection has been met;

(e) a declaration that the person requesting assistance under the Act has the capacity to do so, and that they have a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life;

(f) a declaration that neither the first or second declarations by the person have been cancelled;

(g) any other information or signed declarations as may be set out by the Secretary of State in regulations.

(6B) Any regulations made under subsection (3A) are subject to the negative procedure.”

This amendment sets out the requirements for the second statement by the coordinating doctor and is linked to Amendment 331.

Amendment 333, in clause 21, page 14, line 9, leave out paragraph (a).

This amendment leaves out reference to Schedule 6 and is linked to Amendment 330.

Amendment 214, in clause 21, page 14, line 9, leave out “Schedule 6” and insert

“regulations made by the Secretary of State”.

This amendment provides that the form of a final statement is to be set out in regulations (rather than in Schedule 6).

Amendment 334, in clause 21, page 14, line 10, at end insert—

“(3A) The statement mentioned in subsection (2) must include—

(a) the contact details of the coordinating doctor;

(b) the name, NHS number and medical practice of the person given assistance under the Act;

(c) a declaration that the person was provided with assistance to end their own life in accordance with this Act;

(d) the date of any declarations made by the person under this Act;

(e) the date of any statements made by assessing medical practitioners under this Act;

(f) the details of the advanced and progressive condition the person had;

(g) the approved substance provided;

(h) the date and time of death;

(i) the time between use of the approved substance and death;

(j) any other information or signed declarations as may be set out by the Secretary of State in regulations.

(3B) Any regulations made under subsection (3A) are subject to the negative procedure.”

This amendment sets out the information that must be included in a final statement under this Act and is linked to Amendment 333.

Amendment 403, in schedule 1, page 25, line 25, at end insert—

“7. I have—

1. informed my family of my wish to be provided with assistance to end my life and taken their opinions into consideration

2. decided not to inform my family of my decision

3. no family to inform of my decision”.

Amendment 404, in schedule 4, page 29, line 7, at end insert—

“10. I have—

1. informed my family of my wish to be provided with assistance to end my life and taken their opinions into consideration

2. decided not to inform my family of my decision

3. no family to inform of my decision”.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I rise to support my amendments in this group, which seek to clarify the details that must be included, under regulations, in the first declaration, and the report that is consequent on that declaration. While I believe it was useful on Second Reading for MPs to be aware of the content of the form that the doctor should complete, the advice I have received—with which I agree—is that the details are more appropriately a matter for regulations. There is always a balance to be struck, but it would not be reasonable to expect the House to have to consider changes in primary legislation simply to alter the contents of a declaration, important though the details are.

The proposed changes go further in a way that I believe should greatly reassure the Committee. As we discussed this morning, they make it clear that a person must have been over the age of 18 when the first discussion under the Bill took place. They also require doctors not just to make formal declarations, but to produce reports covering the eligibility of the person to request assistance, the nature of the assessments they have made, their discussions with that person and, crucially, the person’s understanding of those discussions and of what the process entails. This will ensure that all the relevant discussions have been recorded and understood, and that an account of them has been recorded and will be available for future reference. For reporting purposes, if a person applying for assistance is found not to be eligible, that information will be recorded too. I hope the Committee will agree that further safeguards will be put in place as a result, without imposing additional stress or burdens on terminally ill patients during such a different period.

[Kit Malthouse]

I rise to speak in support of amendment 184 and to point out that I have now withdrawn amendments 329 to 334, so we will not vote on them later. Like the hon. Member for Spen Valley, I had thought that although it was sensible at Second Reading to have schedules to the Bill that laid out the forms, they were quite limited and strict in their form, so we needed more flexibility and the opportunity for the House, by regulation, to add content to the required forms in the future. I also wanted to insert a declaration by the person that they had had an initial conversation covering all the factors in the Bill and, critically, that they understood the information that had been presented to them. Amendment 184 would do exactly that.

For Members’ reference, I tabled similar amendments that would have done the same with the other schedules. Following conversations with the hon. Member for Spen Valley, I have now withdrawn them all and amalgamated them into amendments that would do the same as those that she has tabled, along with some additional bits and pieces. Amendment 184 is relatively self-explanatory.

I want to speak against amendment 277, which would impose a time limit of 28 days between diagnosis and the first declaration of a terminal illness. In a lot of circumstances, that would be a very difficult time delay for people to face. As the hon. Member for Bradford West, who tabled the amendment, will know, there are already periods of reflection in the Bill, although it also contains provision for a compressed time limit for those who face imminent death. Particularly for those who are unfortunately diagnosed with certain diseases, adding 28 days will insert a delay at a time when people who are facing what they do not want to face—a horrible death—need as much time as they can to get through the process. For example, if we take together all the factors for people who are sadly diagnosed with pancreatic cancer, the median survival is six to 12 months.

I do not know if the hon. Lady knows this, but pancreatic cancer is a particularly unpleasant cancer, not least because it does not exhibit symptoms in its early stages—people do not know they have it until quite late in its development. Treatment for it is not well advanced, and many people diagnosed with pancreatic cancer sometimes have only weeks to live. The idea that we should make them wait 28 days before they can even start the process seems impractical and, I am sorry to say, cruel to them in many ways. It is worth remembering that this is not a six-month “bang, I go and do it.” Most people who have a terminal illness will begin the application process at six months. Once they have the ability to ask for this service, they will then wait until they decide that their life has come to its end, at the time and place of their choosing. That might be at six months, or it might be at six days. The point of the Bill is to put the power to make that decision in their hands. Although the Bill has periods of reflection—it recognises that people need to sit and think about these things—imposing an absolute 28 days on everybody, without accounting for what stage they are at in their disease and how long they have to live, is not necessarily a sensible amendment, and I will oppose it from that point of view.

I understand the objective of my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire in tabling amendments 403 and 404, which are about informing family. I would hope that those are the sorts of discussions that doctors would have—perhaps one of the doctors on the Committee can tell us. On whether we should put that on the face of the Bill, I have been persistent in trying to make sure that the conversation is not guarded. The amendments ask whether I have any family—I am not quite sure what “family” means. Does it mean my children? Maybe I do not want to tell my children. Does it mean my next of kin? I do not know. Is it distant relatives? Is it my whole family? There are problems with the definition of “family”.

While I will not support the amendment, I understand what my hon. Friend was trying to do. I would hope that those are the kinds of sensitive matters that a doctor would tease out of an individual as they look for the various items that we have put in the Bill to make sure that the person is making the decision on a sound basis as a settled view and has the capacity to do so.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eighteenth sitting)

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 5th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Naz Shah]

I rise to speak to amendment 20, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft (Jess Asato).

The key point for me is that doctors are not specialists in coercive control, but this amendment would give them training to spot abusive and coercive relationships, which are difficult to detect. Domestic abuse and coercive control have a disproportionate effect on women and disabled people, and if doctors just rely on their experience to detect coercive control and abuse, they are more likely to miss cases. Some doctors will be more experienced or more perceptive than others. This amendment is not a perfect safeguard, but it will improve the chances of doctors stopping people being coerced.

The amendment would ensure that co-ordinating doctors must have undertaken training on domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse. It is a significant and distinct amendment. In particular, it addresses the issue of repeated coercive control, which so far has been overlooked in the Bill. I believe that amendments seeking to improve safeguards against coercion that do not address the issue of repeated coercive behaviour are inadequate in protecting vulnerable people, particularly women.

It is regrettable that in our witness sessions we did not hear from any experts on repeat coercive control. Such testimony would have been valuable, helping the Committee to understand why this specific environment puts people at risk with regard to the Bill.

We have already spoken a great deal about coercion in this Committee and other Members have referred to that. We have raised concerns about someone coercing another person into the process of assisted dying in a one-off incident. However, we have not yet discussed the very real issue of repeated coercive control and what it means to live in that environment, nor the implications that the Bill may have for people in those situations.

Dr Hannah Denno submitted written evidence to this Committee. She wrote:

“As a doctor I am not trained to detect coercion, and I do not believe that the Bill pays sufficient attention to the detection of those who are under pressure from themselves or others to end their lives. The Bill describes two independent medical assessments, both can be carried out by doctors who have never previously met or cared for the patient.”

[Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)]

I just want to provide some reassurance to my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West. I have met my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft and today I will support amendment 20, which she has tabled. I hope that provides some reassurance to my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West.

[Naz Shah]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention and I am really grateful that she is supporting the amendment. However, the reason I am making this speech is that I do not think the amendment goes far enough in terms of providing safeguards within the Bill. So, I will make some progress with my speech and then I will address some of the issues that are not addressed in this particular amendment, and set out how we can go further, as well as highlighting some of my concerns.

I return to what Dr Denno wrote in the evidence that she submitted. She wrote that she was:

“not trained to detect coercion”.

And she also wrote that

“Social workers are better placed to screen for coercion but are not mentioned in the Bill.”

Since that submission, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has tabled an amendment that would mandate a social worker to sit on a panel to consider each application for assisted death. However, I am afraid that I must repeat several points about these panels, points that have already been made frequently. These panels are under no obligation to interview the applicant for assisted death in person. Panel members may do so if they have any concerns, but they may not. That makes it harder for panel members to detect possible coercion.

There is also an absence of any mechanism for people who know assisted dying applicants to report any concerns they have that that person is being coerced into this form of action. The panels are not used in that way, which is the way that multidisciplinary panels are used in the NHS to decide on the pathway for a patient. Instead, the panels introduced by my hon. Friend’s amendment would wait until the two doctors have submitted their statements on the applicant and then the panel members would scrutinise those statements. If they spot problems with the way that the doctors have determined that the patient is not being coerced, then, yes, they would call the patient in for more scrutiny. However, they will first have to come to that conclusion without seeing the patient. That is not a very robust safeguard.

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[Kim Leadbeater]

I am in the process of tabling an amendment that would change the panel to that effect, so that it would speak to the patient. Hopefully, that provides some more reassurance for my hon. Friend. I am sure that we are working very effectively through the Committee process to achieve what we all want to see.

[Naz Shah]

I am pleased to hear that my hon. Friend will table further amendments, but I have not seen that amendment, so I cannot speak to it.

I would slightly beg to differ with my hon. Friend in terms of making progress in the way that I would like to have seen. I would just gently remind her that I am not convinced that we are. I think we are making good progress, but I also voted against one clause stand part and had lots of concerns about another one, so we will agree to disagree on that one.

The non-governmental organisation The Other Half observes in its written evidence to this Committee—TIAB 104—that the Bill makes no provision to identify family members who may benefit financially from the death of a patient, and, therefore, the Bill is unable to protect the vulnerable. That is something that I have said before in this Committee.

This amendment makes training in respect of financial abuse mandatory. It is vital that a medical practitioner is trained on how to identify coercion—we can all agree on that—but coercion is different from domestic abuse. Coercion may be relatively obvious to spot, but, in contrast, coercive and controlling behaviour is much less obvious. It can be subtle. It can be hidden, and unexpected to an outsider. It requires much more sensitive questioning and a degree of a doctor-patient relationship to identify. Multiple people have raised that a patient-doctor relationship is important for spotting that, and, currently, there is nothing in the Bill to say that the two independent doctors have to have met the patient before.

That subtle coercion could have happened over years. We have repeatedly heard from people giving evidence that it is really hard to spot, and the reason it is hard to spot is because it is a matter of trust for a patient to be able to tell somebody—for a victim of coercive control to be able to express that. Even recognising that there is subtle coercion going on is hard for victims of that coercion to understand.

If there is domestic violence—again, I say in this Committee that I first campaigned on domestic abuse in the mid-1990s, and I am not convinced that the stats have changed much. I will refer to some more later on, as I make progress, but it takes women, on average, 40 times to leave an abusive partner—40 times—and it took me a long time to leave my abusive forced marriage when I was very young. The coercion that happens is so subtle and, again, when it is repeated coercion, it is hard to even recognise it as a victim, let alone for a professional to be able to see it. Even when a professional may pick up on it, it is acknowledgment from the victim—that they recognise what is happening—that is important, and that often is not the case.

Again, multiple people have raised that the doctor-patient relationship is important, and there is nothing currently in the Bill to ensure that there is a long-standing relationship between the doctor and the patient. Therefore, it is unreasonable to assume that someone in an abusive relationship, or who experiences coercive and controlling behaviour on top of their terminal illness, would be willing and able to disclose that to a stranger, even if that stranger is a doctor.

On top of that, research suggests that a significant proportion of medical staff in the UK do not feel that they have had adequate training to spot domestic abuse. Research by YouGov and the charity SafeLives in 2018-19 found that half of UK healthcare professionals are untrained to spot domestic abuse.

I understand the current difficulty in ensuring that doctors have a prior relationship with patients; it may not be practically possible. In many cases, where patients will know their doctors, or even know them well, it is even more vital that both doctors have been thoroughly trained in spotting coercive-control behaviour.

Like the other Labour MPs on the Committee, I was elected on a manifesto pledge to halve violence against women and girls within the next 10 years. We must not forget that as we scrutinise this legislation; I want my colleagues and I to remain committed to that in this Bill.

This Bill will have particularly grave consequences for women, since we know that domestic abuse disproportionately affects them. The crime survey for England and Wales estimated that 2.3 million people aged 16 years and over experienced domestic abuse in the year ending March 2024. Of those, 1.6 million were women and 712,000 were men. In the same year, there were only 51,183 domestic abuse-related prosecutions—a very small number compared with the number of people who experienced domestic abuse. That is in addition to the abuse of our elderly, on which Age Concern submitted evidence. Those figures demonstrate that we already frequently struggle with bringing domestic abuse cases to prosecution stage. They show that even the dedicated members of our caring professions have trouble detecting domestic abuse. If something is hard, we need to train our doctors to do it.

Our society already diminishes the status of elderly, infirm women and I have concerns that the Bill will further entrench that. We need to be aware of and ensure that we address the problem of mercy killings in the Bill. That issue is distinctly gendered and the Bill as currently worded will have a distinctly gendered impact if we do not address it. In 2024, The Other Half carried out a review of more than 100 UK cases of so-called mercy killings. It found that

“‘mercy killings’ are not the wanted, ‘hastened’ deaths that need assisted dying.”

Instead, the review found that:

“They are overwhelmingly violent domestic homicides of women, by men: and show that our society is still poor at detecting and responding to domestic abuse.”

Some groups are more vulnerable to domestic abuse than others. A higher proportion of people aged 16 and over with a disability—a group that we know is vulnerable in relation to the Bill—experienced domestic abuse in the last year than those without a disability.

The law and Parliament have, unfortunately, taken a very long time to even start adequately responding to these problems. Coercive control was first recognised as a distinct offence in English law only in the Serious Crime Act 2015. As written, the Bill would not mandate training to the doctors whose role it would be to consider assisted dying cases. Of course, no training can be perfect, but to allow the Bill to go forward without ensuring that doctors have training in this complex matter would be negligent. It would mean that we were failing to even try to carry out our responsibilities to protect people, especially women, in abusive and coercive relationships.

I appreciate that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has said that she will accept the amendment, but it does not go far enough. The question is: how do we prevent abusers making use of the Bill if it becomes law? The amendment gives us one way of mitigating that risk to a degree. We already have issues recognising domestic abuse. The amendment cannot perfectly solve that problem, but it would take steps to do so.

We must safeguard vulnerable people who live subject to coercive and controlling behaviour on a daily basis from opting for assisted dying as a result of that environment. Thorough and specific training on spotting that is vital for doctors. I am grateful that my hon. Friend, in accepting the amendment, will ensure that some of that training will be forthcoming. Even one abused person being driven by their abuser to use assisted dying is one too many. I am confident that all hon. Members would agree with me on that deeply important point.

In the last few days, I have been looking at suicide, and one of the issues that has come up is that last year, for the first time in our history, suicide by victims of domestic violence overtook deaths from what we would term intimate partner homicide. In the last two weeks, there have been further reports highlighting that the number of women driven to suicide because of the experience of domestic violence has risen. Tomorrow, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips) will read the name of every woman who has been killed in the last year, as she does every year. Two of those women were my constituents, and many more kill themselves to get away from their abusers.

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[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank the right hon. Lady for that. We go back to the point about the true significance of the 2011 Welsh Government Measure, which sets a basic foundation for the duty of the Welsh Government to ensure that Welsh language provision is provided through the Welsh NHS. There is absolutely no debate about that point; that is nailed on. The question is simply how we ensure, if we are to amend this Bill along the lines that the right hon. Lady suggests, that that does not create a lacuna or confusion in the system. I think we need to sit down and discuss that, to ensure that whatever we propose is watertight.

It may be helpful to note, as in discussion of amendment 413, that regardless of this amendment, under the Welsh Language Measure of 2011 the NHS in Wales has a statutory duty to deliver its services to the public in both Welsh and English. That legislation gives the Welsh language official status in Wales, and the Measure states that individuals in Wales should be able to conduct their lives through the medium of Welsh if they choose to do so. The Welsh Government’s active offer for health is intended to support all staff across NHS Wales to provide a service in Welsh for patients without their having to ask for it.

Under amendment 20, regulations made by the Secretary of State on the necessary training, qualifications and experience of the co-ordinating doctor would be required to include mandatory training relating to domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse. Amendments 185 and 186, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, would require that regulations made by the Secretary of State on the necessary training, qualifications and experience of the co-ordinating doctor covered training related to assessing capacity and whether a person has been coerced or pressured by another person. But I note that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has said, she is minded to support amendment 20, which clearly would ramp up the requirement, as previously discussed.

As I have said, the Government have taken a neutral position on the substantive policy questions relevant to how the law in this area could be changed, but to clarify the intent of the Bill, we have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley in relation to amendments 185 and 186, which would place the Secretary of State under a duty to make regulations regarding the necessary training, qualifications and experience of the co-ordinating doctor. That would include specific training on assessing capacity and assessing whether a person has been subject to coercion or pressure.

I hope that that explanation and those observations have assisted the Committee. I thank hon. Members for their attention.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I rise to speak first to my amendments 185 and 186, which would make important changes to impose a duty on the Secretary of State to make regulations about the training, qualifications and experience required to act as the co-ordinating doctor, as the Minister says. Moving from “may” to “must” would make it a legal requirement that such training take place and would thereby strengthen the Bill. In its present form, the Bill gives the Secretary of State that power to make such regulations but does not legally require him or her to do so.

Amendment 186 would ensure that regulations must include training about

“(a) assessing capacity;

(b) assessing whether a person has been coerced or pressured by any other person.”

Colleagues will appreciate that it is difficult for me to resist the temptation to put the entire training manual in the Bill—we all want to show the thorough approach that has been taken—but doing so would not make for good, clear legislation and can be limited in terms of flexibility and future-proofing. However, given the importance of the matters of capacity and coercion, I felt that it was important that this level of detail be specified in the Bill, because those issues have been at the heart of so many of our deliberations on this hugely sensitive and important issue.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, who tabled amendment (a) to my amendment 186, has made a compelling argument, as always. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge, I have some concerns that the amendment would limit the number of disabled people who are covered and that it would not cover people with mental disorders, but I understand the concerns around autistic people and those with learning disabilities.

I am also mindful, given that people with Down’s syndrome will typically have some form of learning disability, that amendment (a) may help to address some of the concerns that were expressed yesterday about ensuring that the Bill meets their needs and takes them into consideration. I take on board the Minister’s comments about the Health and Care Act 2022, but I am minded to support the amendment and work with my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford and others as necessary to make any further changes as the Bill progresses.

[Jack Abbott (Ipswich) (Lab/Co-op)]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for supporting that amendment. We have often debated the level of detail that should be set out in the Bill. I fully appreciate that she does not want to include the whole training manual; I will not discuss my amendment, which concerns culture and trauma-informed care, because I recognise that it is much too detailed in that respect. However, does she agree that where possible, and where it does not create unintended consequences or loopholes, we should reassure not just colleagues across the House but members of the public, who want to see these sorts of thing on the face of the Bill?

[Kim Leadbeater]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. If the Bill passes, it will be a huge change. We have a duty to the public to show that we are including sufficient detail in the Bill and to provide reassurance in any way we can. To be honest, I would quite like to put the entire training manual in the Bill, but I appreciate that from a legislative perspective that is not possible. However, there are occasions when, for the avoidance of doubt, we should make certain provisions clear on the face of the Bill.

That brings me to amendment 20, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft, who has a huge amount of experience and expertise in the field to which it relates. Her amendment states:

“Regulations under subsection (3)(a) must specify that training in respect of domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse is mandatory.”

At the moment, there are no safeguards for terminally ill victims of domestic abuse, financial abuse or coercive control. That concerns me, and it feeds into the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West.

If a victim of domestic abuse or coercive control—it is often a woman, as we know—is also terminally ill, I can only imagine what a lonely place that is. At the moment, that person is under no supervision. Sadly, there have been instances in which those people have taken their own life. They will continue to be the victims of their incredibly difficult personal circumstances on top of having a terminal illness, which is an absolute tragedy. Opening up the conversation with doctors and healthcare professionals about their circumstances has to be a good thing. It will shed light and transparency on what must be an incredibly difficult situation.

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[Liz Saville Roberts]

Diolch, Gadeirydd. As Professor Emyr Lewis of Aberystwyth University told this Committee in oral evidence, because this Bill is a private Member’s Bill it has not gone through the usual process of engagement with devolved Governments. I recognise that there will be amendments and changes and amendments to amendments, but I can speak to the principle here and we will have to adapt as we move ahead, as we are learning to do in this Committee.

The Wales Act 2017 formally acknowledged the Sewel convention by amending section 107 of the Government of Wales Act 2006 with a declaration stating—this is important—that

“it is recognised that the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Senedd.”

It is in that spirit that work needs to be done to ensure that the devolved legislature in Wales and the complexities of legislating across reserved and devolved matters are fully considered and represented in the Bill. That is what these 28 amendments seek to do.

The use of the term “appropriate authority” does two things. First, in the here and now, it recognises the complexity of which competency lies where and with which Minister or Secretary of State. Secondly, it future-proofs the legislation, which we know is important. If and when there are any changes to devolved powers and competencies, the appropriate authority can move with time with the specifics of who is responsible for what.

Amendment 169 would amend clause 40 to include a definition of “appropriate authority”, the term that is used in my other amendments. It would mean the Secretary of State in relation to England and the Welsh Ministers in relation to Wales, where those powers are devolved rather than reserved. The amendment would provide for my other amendments, which would modify each relevant mention of powers provided to the Secretary of State in the Bill, to supply Welsh Ministers with equivalent powers in Wales.

Amendment 144 would amend clause 5 to allow Welsh Ministers the same powers as the Secretary of State in England to specify the training, qualifications and experience of the medical practitioner representing the co-ordinating doctor, because that matter is devolved to Wales. Amendment 145, similarly, would require Welsh Ministers to consult persons they consider appropriate before making the relevant regulations in Wales.

Amendment 146 would amend clause 6 to allow Welsh Government Ministers equivalent powers to make provision around proof of identity. Amendment 147 would similarly amend clause 8 in relation to the training, qualifications and experience of the independent doctor; we are talking, of course, about the co-ordinating doctor.

And so on, and so on. I assume that hon. Members now understand the purpose of my various amendments. I am more than willing to explain them further if necessary, but otherwise I will skip ahead.

Amendments 155 and 156 would modify clause 30 so that the Welsh Government are provided with a power to issue a code of practice over arrangements in relation to this legislation in Wales. That might be a useful route into further discussions on the specifications of the codes of practice; it might also be significant in discussions with the hon. Member for Spen Valley and the Government about how to recognise legislative differences in safeguarding and the Welsh language.

Amendments 157 and 158 are also important. They would provide Welsh Ministers with the power to make regulations under clause 32 to ensure that assistance is available through the health service in Wales. That is the responsibility of Welsh Ministers. As Committee members know, Senedd Cymru voted against a motion to support an assisted dying law by 26 to 19, with nine abstaining. There are a number of issues of which we need to be aware when bringing an England and Wales law into Wales. To ignore them would be irresponsible; we do so at our peril, frankly, especially given that clauses 33 and 34 will place explicit obligations on Welsh Ministers and the chief medical officer for Wales.

I put it on the record that I am disappointed that the Committee was not able to question the chief medical officer for Wales. I understand that he was invited. As there are matters in the Bill that we do not deal with every day in this place, that would have been useful. The Bill is unprecedented, certainly for a private Member’s Bill, in respect of the support, information and advice that the Committee needs, and that would have been an obvious opportunity for us to receive advice. I understand that the chief medical officer has advised on other pieces of legislation, including vaping, although that was Government legislation.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I can confirm that the chief medical officer for Wales was invited to give evidence. I do not know the circumstances of why he did not. If it is helpful for me or other colleagues to meet him, the offer is definitely open.

[Liz Saville Roberts]

I am grateful for the hon. Lady’s intervention.

Amendments 161 to 165 relate to clauses 35, 37 and 38. Amendments 161 to 163 would provide for the Welsh Government to review the operation of the legislation in Wales, which is vital to understand the specifics of the Welsh context and to learn and adapt as appropriate. To not allow Welsh Ministers that power would be to dismiss the particularities of health policy in Wales, as well as the additional implications of contextual differences. I strongly believe that we require an impact assessment to understand those differences properly within the context of health being devolved to Wales, alongside significant population differences in relation to demographics, age and sickness.

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[The Chair]

For clarity, amendments negatived in Committee, if they are pressed today, can be tabled again on Report. I say that in case the right hon. Lady wished to press the amendment and it was defeated. I hope there was clarity from me on that.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I welcome this important debate about the impact of this potential legislation on Wales. I thank the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd for her valuable contributions. I also welcome the Minister’s commitment to meet the right hon. Lady and me for discussions with parliamentary counsel and the relevant authorities.

This is really important. The criminal justice system covers England and Wales, so it is important for the Bill to do the same, given that it disapplies the Suicide Act in certain very carefully defined circumstances. But health is, of course, devolved and the Welsh Government quite rightly make decisions on the Welsh NHS. I want to make it clear that I recognise that reality and its importance, and I am fully committed to observing the same conventions that the Government would if this were a Government Bill.

As has been said, I am working with UK Government officials to ensure that the right steps are taken at the right time, and I would expect to engage colleagues in the Welsh Government as the Bill progresses. Indeed, I really look forward to doing so and would be happy to visit the Senate if appropriate—although, as Members can tell, I need to work on my Welsh a bit. I look forward to continuing these conversations.

[Liz Saville Roberts]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 359, in clause 5, page 3, line 18, at end insert—

“(ba) who has conducted the preliminary discussion in accordance with section 4,”—(Danny Kruger.)

This amendment requires that the coordinating doctor has conducted a preliminary discussion prior to witnessing the signing of the first declaration.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Danny Kruger]

The amendment speaks to the general confusion we remain in about how the assisted dying law would be implemented and who would operate it. We are in a great cloud of unknowing about whether we are talking about an NHS service or a private service. If there were to be a private service and people were to be paid to deliver it outside the NHS, the amendment would clarify obligations regarding how their remuneration would be recorded.

There is an established precedent for publishing financial interests where there is a potential for a conflict of interest. Senior officials in NHS England, NHS trusts and the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency must declare financial interests—including relationships with pharmaceutical companies—in public registers. Those interests include consultancy fees, gifts, hospitality, shareholdings in pharmaceutical companies or research funding, because there is a concern that those influence drug approvals, procurement and healthcare policy and that there is a risk of bias.

NHS England guidance on managing conflicts of interest encourages the detailed disclosure of significant payments from pharmaceutical companies, often with exact figures or ranges for payments above a £500 threshold. The Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry runs Disclosure UK, which requires pharmaceutical companies to publicly report payments to healthcare professionals and organisations. It would be appropriate to follow this well-established precedent and ensure that people involved in the administration of assisted dying are accountable for the transparency for their remuneration.

Clause 5(3) recognises that there could be a conflict of interest and that there is a risk that someone who is related or might benefit financially may not be a neutral assessor of someone who wishes to die, but clause 40(4), which comes rather late in the Bill—it should be up front—specifies that

“a registered medical practitioner is not to be regarded as benefiting financially or in any other material way from the death of a person by reason only of the practitioner receiving reasonable remuneration for the provision of services”.

Here is where we discover that the Bill does envisage remuneration, but people being remunerated are excluded from the definition of people who financially benefit from the service. To me, that feels dangerous.

Although it has not resolved the question of whether assisted dying is to be an NHS service, the Bill clearly envisages the establishment of a private market for these services, perhaps with a specialist service like Dignitas. Are we content with the Bill’s assertion that remuneration is not a matter for scrutiny? What level of remuneration would we consider reasonable? What level would we consider excessive—remuneration that is capable of influencing a doctor’s thinking? Would they be paid for administering assisted death on a per patient basis, or as a cumulative practice?

As MPs, should we not have some unease at the idea that this could be a highly profitable specialism for private practice? Transparency on what is being charged and who is profiting from the service would help us to understand what is happening in the system that is being established. I suggest that we bring more sunlight into the system, as we do in many other areas.

It is notable that there is little public data on what is charged, or how much revenue assisted dying generates for medical practices, in other countries where assisted dying is a private service. That is regrettable, and I hope we will not replicate that here. We do know that at Dignitas, which is a not-for-profit, the cost for a single patient is between £5,000 and £8,500 in fees alone. What is reasonable remuneration for a practice that provides assisted dying here in the UK? The term is entirely undefined, and I would be grateful for any clarity.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s keenness to get to the debate on clause 32, on the provision of the service—we will come to that in due course—but this conversation is about the amendment. To be clear, there is no expectation that assisted dying would be set up as a private enterprise or service. It would be delivered within the provision of the NHS.

[Danny Kruger]

I am glad to have that suggestion. Clause 32 is extremely broad. It basically empowers the Secretary of State to set up a service in any way they choose, potentially including in the private sector. The hon. Lady says it is not envisaged that would happen, as she is suggesting this should be an NHS service. I am grateful for the clarity, but I wish it were clearer in the Bill.

[Kim Leadbeater]

It will be.

[Danny Kruger]

I am glad to hear we will have more clarity. Having assisted suicide as an NHS service is fraught with enormous risks, along the lines we have discussed and will no doubt continue to discuss. At least we have that clarity. If the hon. Lady is going to rule out private provision and profit making or remuneration of people outside the NHS, I would be grateful for amendments specifying that. That would help to address this question.

My amendments would mean that if there is private provision of assisted suicide, as the Bill currently allows, the public and Parliament could understand who is being paid what, which I think is very appropriate.

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[Danny Kruger]

I am grateful for that clarity, although we now seem to be less clear than we were. I understood the hon. Member for Spen Valley to be saying that there will not be private provision, but my right hon. Friend is saying that there may be.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Danny Kruger]

It would be helpful if the hon. Lady clarified whether private provision will be allowed under the Bill, because I think we have a party split. My right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire supports private provision, but the hon. Lady suggests this should be done only on the NHS.

[Kim Leadbeater]

This service, like many others, will be delivered through a range of providers, as alluded to by the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire. I understand the keenness to have this debate now, but we will come on to it further down the line. The hon. Member for East Wiltshire is right that this is really important.

[Danny Kruger]

It certainly is. Okay, so it could be either. This will be an NHS service, with all the implications for general practice, doctor-patient relations and secondary care and social care, but there will also be an opportunity to deliver it privately, without any clarity or transparency on who is being paid and how.

In answer to my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire, this is different from cosmetic surgery, as even cosmetic surgery is regulated. In many ways, there is more regulation of the administering of Botox than there is in this Bill. The administering of assisted dying is of a significantly different category and gravity. It is appropriate and important that financial interests are clearly revealed and made public, particularly with the new intervention we are creating. If other hon. Members do not support the amendment, what provisions do they propose that would reveal where there may be potential conflicts of interest and how we may regulate this?

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

I agree. Like any other aspect of what doctors and general practitioners do, this service is based on remuneration. They are professionals and should be remunerated as such, so the tariff will be important. It is also important that we do not jump ahead into defining the operating model. As I said, officials are working on this with the Bill’s promoter, and it will be made clear when we get to the relevant clauses.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Hopefully the Minister and other colleagues are reassured that, if the Committee agrees to the introduction of the voluntary assisted dying commission, monitoring will be very intense and reporting will be very robust. That might allay some of the fears that have been raised today.

[Stephen Kinnock]

As I have repeatedly said, the Government are neutral on the fundamental question of the Bill, but we are absolutely committed to ensuring it is workable should it receive Royal Assent. The role of the commission will be pivotal in ensuring that the Bill is workable and that all the necessary monitoring and regulation mechanisms are in place.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twentieth sitting)

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 11th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship again, Sir Roger.

Amendment 301 would prolong the first period of reflection, after which point the independent doctor can conduct the second assessment. In the original draft of the Bill, the first period of reflection is seven days, but the amendment would extend that period to 14 days. That means 14 days would have to pass between the time that the co-ordinating doctor has made their statement following the first assessment, and the independent doctor carrying out the second assessment.

Amendment 317 would increase the duration of the period of reflection before a person may make a second declaration from 14 days to 28 days. It relates to cases where a person’s death is not reasonably expected within one month of the date of the court’s declaration.

Amendments 314 and 315 would increase the duration of the second period of reflection before a person may make a second declaration, in cases where a person’s death is reasonably expected within one month of the date of the court’s declaration, from 48 hours to seven days. They would also introduce a requirement for a mandatory immediate referral for urgent specialist palliative care. The requirement would be introduced into the definition of the second period of reflection. It is unclear what impact it would have on the duration of the period of reflection. The amendments do not say who should be responsible for making the referral or where it should be recorded. The drafting is also ambiguous as to what happens if a person does not consent to such a referral or care.

I hope these observations are helpful to the Committee in considering the Bill and the amendments put forward by various Members. Whether these amendments should form part of the Bill is a matter for the Committee to decide.

[Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)]

I have nothing to add on this group of amendments. I am confident that the Bill as drafted already includes significant periods of reflection. Bearing in mind that we are putting dying people through a very lengthy process already, I remain confident that the periods of reflection are adequate as set out in the Bill.

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

I have a couple of additional comments. We talked last week about the reflection periods. I referred to the fact that when even someone buys something from a shop, they have 28 days to return it; when they are deciding on whether to have an assisted death, there is a great deal more at stake. During that debate, someone asked, “What if someone had a prognosis of just one month?”, but clause 13 has an option for a fast-track process in that situation—the person would be able to access the service in 48 hours.

I beg to differ with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, the Bill’s promoter, who said that we have enough reflection periods in the Bill. Yes, there are reflection periods, but they come after the panel’s decision. The reality is that the NHS is under so much duress, with patients waiting weeks to see their GP for anything other than urgent treatment, that getting an appointment with another GP in seven days is unlikely; it is unlikely to happen given how uncommon that is at the moment. It is right that doctors are able to triage their patients to prioritise those who require medical intervention to keep them well, to prevent hospital admission, or to stop them deteriorating or even dying.

The Government are trying to protect the NHS, and the best way of achieving that is to ensure that medical interventions are provided at the earliest opportunity before a patient deteriorates. In some cases, a medical appointment may need to take priority over an appointment for an assisted death. If someone who is dying has longer—even just a further week—in which to reflect, it removes the pressure from GPs and consultants, and enables them to prioritise properly their patients. It does not build up false expectation in patients that they have a right to a rapid consultation process. Likewise, we know that it can currently take a few weeks for patients to see another consultant, if not months or even over a year. It is therefore more helpful for the patient to have a more realistic period of reflection before moving to the next stage of their assessment.

Issues of such intensity as someone planning to take their own life should not be rushed. We know from all the work that has been undertaken on suicide that other interventions and conversations can help with reflection and reconsideration. It is important that people are given this opportunity. In their first raising the matter with a doctor, the doctor would have provided a lot of information about alternatives to the patient, such as what treatment options would be available. Perhaps they would have had a discussion with a palliative medicine consultant to review their options. There needs to be time for a patient to really reflect on all this new information. If the patient does want to explore assisted dying, there will also be all the conversations about drugs and their impact, which we will come to when we discuss later clauses.

Amendment 317 to clause 13 seeks to increase the reflection period from 14 days to 28 days. I gently suggest that we should have the reflection period before the decision, whether it be by the judge or a panel, to give people the right amount of time to consider; currently, the reflection period is afterwards. This is such a monumental decision that people should be able to contemplate all other options available. As it is, the process is rushed, and a patient could be caught up in the moment of concentrating on getting through the stages. I appreciate that others have suggested that once we have got past that stage, with the paperwork and all those things out of the way, then there is time to reflect. During the process, however, the patient has not had time to consider the options in making their decision. I am not convinced that there is enough reflection during, as opposed to after, the process.

Amendment 314 seeks to increase the reflection period from 48 hours to seven days for patients who have been given a month to live. In that case, seven days is quite adequate time to reflect on the information they have received to make informed choices. If this is about autonomy, which my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has talked about many a time, it is important for people to have choices. To have that autonomy is surely to have the options in front of us and be able to consider them in detail.

In considering whether to sit on this Bill Committee, I slept on the decision. I can usually make instantaneous decisions, but knowing the amount of work, knowing that I was new to the subject, and knowing the things that I knew then—not the things that I know now—it was a big decision for me. I was even thinking about how I would manage the workload. We are talking about something that is not at all comparable. We are talking about somebody who will be taking a decision to potentially exercise the right—if the Bill becomes law—to an assisted death. That is really important for me.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: 195, in clause 8, page 4, line 40, leave out “statement” and insert “report”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 420.

Amendment 421, in clause 8, page 5, line 4, leave out subsection (5) and insert—

“(5) After carrying out the second assessment, the independent doctor must—

(a) make a report about the assessment (which must meet the requirements of regulations under subsection (5A)), and

(b) give a copy of the report to—

(i) the person who was assessed,

(ii) the coordinating doctor,

(iii) if neither the independent doctor nor the coordinating doctor is a practitioner with the person’s GP practice, a registered medical practitioner with that practice, and

(iv) any other person specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(5A) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision about the content and form of the report.

(5B) The regulations must provide that the report must—

(a) contain a statement indicating whether the independent doctor is satisfied as to all of the matters mentioned in subsection (2)(a) to (e);

subsection (2)(a)

(b) contain an explanation of why the independent doctor is, or (as the case may be) is not, so satisfied;

(c) contain a statement indicating whether the independent doctor is satisfied as to the following—

(i) that a record of the preliminary discussion has been included in the person’s medical records;

(ii) that the person signed the first declaration;

(iii) that the making of the first declaration has been recorded in the person’s medical records;

(iv) that the first declaration has not been cancelled;

(d) be signed and dated by the independent doctor.”—(Kim Leadbeater.)

This amendment provides that the independent doctor must make a report about the second assessment, and makes provision about the report.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

Amendment 348 seeks to add an additional requirement to clause 8(5). This would mean that, where the independent doctor is satisfied that the requirements under clause 8(2) have been met, they must

“inform the person’s usual or treating doctor and, where relevant, the doctor who referred the person to the independent doctor, of the outcome of the assessment.”

Some elements of amendment 348 duplicate requirements that already appear in the Bill, such as the requirement in clause 8(5)(b) for the doctor to inform the co-ordinating doctor of the outcome, including providing a copy of the statement.

The amendment would also overlap with the requirements in clause 16 for the co-ordinating doctor to make entries in the person’s medical record that must include the original statement or declaration. Where the co-ordinating doctor is not with the person’s GP practice, they must also give notice to a registered medical practitioner with the person’s GP practice of the outcome of the assessments.

Amendment 303 seeks to prevent a person from seeking multiple second assessments from different independent doctors. It places a requirement on the independent doctor to confirm

“that no other practitioner has undertaken a second assessment for the same person.”

This amendment creates the risk of a medical practitioner inadvertently committing an offence if there is no centralised record-keeping. It may also have the impact of preventing the person seeking assistance from obtaining a second opinion, as provided for in clause 10. Under the amendment, as drafted, it is unclear how this is intended to interact with the possibility of an independent doctor’s becoming unable or unwilling to continue to act as the independent doctor following the second assessment, when an alternative independent doctor may therefore be required.

On amendment 458, as the Bill stands, clause 10 provides that if, following the second assessment, the independent doctor refuses to make the statement confirming that they are satisfied that matters in clause 8(2)(a) to (e) are met, the co-ordinating doctor may refer the person to a different registered medical practitioner who meets the requirements of clause 8(6), and is able and willing to carry out an assessment mentioning clause 8(2). The effect of the amendment is to restrict the circumstances in which the co-ordinating doctor can make a referral under clause 10(1) to a different registered medical practitioner to only when there has been a material change of circumstances. It is not clear from the amendment who is required to establish that there has been a material change in circumstances and/or how that will be proved. That may cause some uncertainty for the co-ordinating doctor.

I now turn to amendment 459. Clause 10 provides that if, following the second assessment, the independent doctor refuses to make the statement that they are satisfied that the person meets the criteria in clause 8(2)(a) to 8(2)(e) when conducting the second assessment, the co-ordinating doctor may, if requested to do so by the person who made the first declaration, refer that person to a different registered medical practitioner who meets the requirements of clause 8(6) and is able and willing to carry out an assessment of the kind mentioned in clause 8(2).

The effect of the amendment is that, where such a referral is made to the registered medical practitioner under clause 10(1), the co-ordinating doctor is required to provide them with the report by the independent doctor setting out their reasons for refusal. If the new registered medical practitioner reaches a different conclusion from the original independent doctor, they must produce a report setting out why they disagree. The two reports must be made available to any subsequent decision maker under the Bill, and to the commissioner. This additional requirement for reports on the reasons for refusal or differences in opinion may make the process of seeking assistance longer and add to capacity demands on co-ordinating and independent doctors.

Turning to amendment 460, clause 10(3) provides that if, following the second assessment, the independent doctor refuses to make the statement mentioned in clause 8(5), the co-ordinating doctor may make one referral for a second opinion. The effect of the amendment is to remove the word “particular” from clause 10(3), which says that only one second opinion may be sought

“In consequence of a particular first declaration made by a person.”

The amendment is unclear and could have several possible effects in practice. For example, it could have the effect of limiting the circumstances in which a referral can be made under clause 10(1) to the first time a person makes a first declaration.

I hope that these observations were helpful to the Committee.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I associate myself with the Minister’s comments regarding the other amendments in the group; however, I listened carefully to the debate on amendment 459 and the points made by the hon. Member for Richmond Park, my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud and the Minister. My view on that amendment has changed: I do think independence is really important in the doctor’s opinions during the normal process that the Bill sets out. However, it is a really fair point to make that if the independent doctor refuses the patient, there needs to be transparency about that, and it is important that everybody involved in the process can see how that decision has been made. That is a really valid point. It is a good example of how this Bill Committee is operating, and should be operating, in that we have been listening to different views and opinions.

I take on board the Minister’s point on capacity. We need to be aware of that. We will hopefully debate the third layer later today. That layer may be a panel of experts who are there to oversee the full picture of the patient journey. For them to see what has happened with the doctors that they have interacted with is very important. Therefore, I am minded to support amendment 459.

[Danny Kruger]

I want to respond to a point made by the hon. Member for Stroud. It is relevant to the whole debate about whether we are talking about a medical treatment at all. He made the point, in respect of the question of a second or subsequent referral to an independent doctor, that it is appropriate in medicine to have second opinions; he said that that is normal in medicine, and he is absolutely right. Indeed, there is nothing to stop a patient seeking a third, fourth or any number of opinions if they want to do that and can get a doctor to consider them. The fact is that what we are discussing here is not a medical diagnosis—that is not what is being asked for when someone goes to see the second doctor, or indeed the first. What they are asking for is permission to proceed with the process.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I am satisfied that the items contained within the clause have been adequately debate. I do not therefore propose to permit a clause stand part debate.

Clause 8, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9

Doctors’ assessments: further provision

[Kim Leadbeater]

I beg to move amendment 201, in clause 9, page 5, line 36, leave out “and their medical records” and insert

“, examine such of their medical records as appear to the assessing doctor to be relevant,”.

This amendment provides that the duty on an assessing doctor to examine a person’s medical records is limited to records appearing to the doctor to be relevant.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 422, in clause 9, page 5, line 36, after “records” insert

“make such enquiries of professionals who are providing or have recently provided health or social care to the person as the assessing doctor considers appropriate,”.

This amendment requires an assessing doctor to make such enquiries of professionals who are providing, or have recently provided, health or social care to the person as the assessing doctor considers appropriate.

Amendment 468, in clause 9, page 5, line 37, at end insert—

“(aa) ask the person why they are seeking an assisted death.”

Amendment 423, in clause 9, page 6, line 20, at end insert—

“(2A) To inform their assessment, the assessing doctor must—

(a) consider whether they should consult a health professional or social care professional with qualifications in, or experience of, a matter relevant to the person being assessed;

(b) consult such a professional if they consider that there is a need to do so.

(2B) Where an assessing doctor consults a professional under subsection (2A)(b), the assessing doctor must give a written record of the consultation to the other assessing doctor.”

This amendment requires the assessing doctor to consider whether they should consult specialist health or social care professionals, and to consult them if they consider there is a need to do so. A record of any consultation must be shared with the other assessing doctor.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Amendment 201 provides that the duty on an assessing doctor to examine a person’s medical records is limited to records appearing to the doctor to be relevant, which makes sense. Amendment 422 requires an assessing doctor to make such inquiries of professionals who are providing, or have recently provided, health or social care to the person as the assessing doctor considers appropriate. Amendment 423 requires the assessing doctor to consider whether they should consult health or social care professionals, and to consult them if they consider there is a need to do so. A record of any consultation must be shared with the other assessing doctor.

The amendments seek to emphasise the importance of taking a holistic and multidisciplinary approach to the assessments by both doctors. The Bill as drafted provides that the assessing doctor must

“make such other enquiries as the assessing doctor considers appropriate”

when making the first and second assessments. With the amendments, I have sought to strengthen that language, by being much more explicit and making specific reference to consulting health and social care professionals. I have done so in response to the evidence we have received from professionals such as nurses and social workers, who often spend a significant amount of time with terminally ill adults.

It is clearly right that the assessing doctors should have access to all relevant details of a person’s medical records. If the records show that the person has recently been receiving health or social care, that may impact their application, so the doctors have to consult the providers of that care. As is the case at all stages in the process, records should be kept of any and all such discussions, and reports should be shared where appropriate.

Taken together, the amendments would ensure that the doctors’ assessments are thorough and comprehensive, and have taken into consideration the views and opinions of any wider health and social care team that may be working with a patient.

[Danny Kruger]

I will speak briefly to each of the amendments in this group. I will allow my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate to speak to the amendment in her name, but I state clearly that I very much support it. In my view, it is very important that the doctor asks the simple question of the patient, “Why do you want an assisted death?” The question is not being asked at the moment.

I respect the points that the hon. Member for Spen Valley has just made about amendment 201, and that the amendment may be intended to focus assessments on the information that is relevant. Nevertheless, it would introduce subjectivity into what is deemed relevant, and by narrowing the scope of the review of patient records, it could unintentionally allow for incomplete assessments, thereby undermining the safeguards that we all want to see. The risk is that potentially crucial medical history, including past mental health concerns, poor coercion indicators or undisclosed diagnoses, might be overlooked.

I call the Committee’s attention to the evidence from the British Geriatrics Society, which raised concerns that the definition of terminal illness in the Bill is often vague and risks misclassification, especially for older patients. Limiting the review of medical records could exacerbate that issue, as doctors may not have a full picture of the patient’s long-term prognosis and their mental health history. The General Medical Council has called for strong regulatory oversight to ensure that eligibility assessments are thorough.

Allowing doctors to determine which records are relevant, without standardised criteria for that judgment in the Bill, risks inconsistency and potential misdiagnosis. The criteria should include diagnosis and prognosis, treatment history, consultation, second opinions and mental health history. Consideration should also be given to disclosures of domestic violence and abuse, or patterns in medical records that might indicate domestic abuse without explicit disclosure, such as frequent visits for unexplained pain, chronic pain complaints, mental health concerns such as anxiety and depression, inconsistent explanations for injuries, and multiple visits to different healthcare providers. All of that should be properly considered by the assessing doctor.

I draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that in the Netherlands, 1% to 2% of assessments annually—a significant number when we consider the volumes we are talking about—are deemed “not careful” under the law. Other countries do not have adequate ability to look into the data, but that is significant, and it is often due to inadequate consultation or documentation. I also draw attention to the fact that in our country, I am afraid to say, the cause of death listed by doctors is too frequently inaccurate. Analysis of postmortems suggests that one in 20 deaths have been wrongly recorded. Clearly, mistakes are made in medical records, and therefore it is particularly appropriate to require doctors to give complete consideration to the full medical history of the patient.

I recognise very much that we are trying to create a Bill that works in practice; nevertheless, I think we can emphasise streamlining and efficiency at the expense of patient safety, and we are doing that here. If we tell doctors that they are only required to sift through records that appear relevant to them—a quick skim of recent notes, a glance at the obvious items in a medical history—that may sound efficient, streamlined and practical, but it is likely to leave the vulnerable exposed, in particular when social workers and psychiatrists are not involved at this early stage, as they plainly should be. No multidisciplinary team is looking at the patient at this stage.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

I will come on to that. I agree with him: amendment 422 is a very helpful amendment, and I support that. It is a very good suggestion that wider consultation should be made, and it is a point that we have been trying to make with amendments throughout. I recognise that that would enhance the safeguards in the Bill—I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman.

Amendment 422 seeks to introduce an additional requirement that the assessing doctor must consider whether to consult health or social care practitioners who are providing, or have recently provided, care to the patient. The amendment is presented as addressing previously expressed concerns, but I regret to say that I feel it is excessively weak. It is a positive step in recognising the issue, but it does not ensure a broader and more informed assessment of a patient’s condition and external influences.

Patients with terminal illnesses often receive care from palliative care teams, social workers or community nurses who might have crucial insights into their wellbeing and the potential external pressures on them. The British Psychological Society has highlighted that mental health and social pressures are often overlooked in assisted dying requests in other countries. Social workers and allied health professionals play a key role in assessing whether a patient feels pressurised due to financial, social or familial burdens. As I have repeatedly said and we will debate further in due course, in my view it is very important that that assessment comes earlier in the process.

We have evidence from doctors—I will not cite it at length—pointing out that independent doctors who refuse assisted dying requests are often ignored, and patients are simply referred to another doctor willing to approve the request, as we have discussed. Consultation with health and social care professionals could act as an additional safeguard against that practice. Although the amendment introduces an obligation to consult other professionals, it leaves it to the discretion of the assessing doctor. It relies on the doctor’s subjective judgment

“if they consider that there is a need”.

I think that is too weak for assisted dying, where consistency is so critical. One doctor might consult a palliative care specialist to explore pain relief options, while another might not, assuming that they understand the patient’s suffering sufficiently. The variability in the Bill—this discretion—undermines fairness and safeguarding.

There is also a lack of accountability in what is a very sensitive process. There is no requirement to document the consideration process, which weakens oversight in a context where errors could be fatal. I respect the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire that we must not police conversations and that being prescriptive may encourage a tick-box approach. I am afraid that we risk that tick-box approach if this amendment is all that we do on this subject. We can imagine a scenario in which a doctor simply makes a note in the record with little underpinning substance.

There is also no obligation to act on the specialist input, so the duty ends at the consultation. There is no requirement to integrate the findings of the additional input that the doctor has received, which is a glaring flaw in what is an irreversible procedure that is being authorised. Finally, there is insufficient rigour for the ethical stakes. This discretionary duty is too weak to catch the difficult cases.

[Kim Leadbeater]

On the hon. Member’s point about recording those consultations, amendment 423 states in its proposed new subsection (2B):

“Where an assessing doctor consults a professional…the assessing doctor must give a written record of the consultation to the other assessing doctor.”So the consultation is recorded.

[Danny Kruger]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right, and that is very welcome. My concern is that there is no obligation to do anything about it. There is no obligation for the doctor to integrate the conclusions of the additional professionals that they have consulted into their treatment. I recognise that that provision is valuable and I welcome the amendments, but I suggest that they do not go far enough.

Let me use a hypothetical example to bring my point home to the Committee. Imagine a woman with terminal lung cancer asking to end her life. Her assessing doctor considers consulting a palliative care specialist for symptom control or a social worker to check on her home life, but decides, “My notes are enough. There’s no need for that.” What if the patient’s pain could be eased with a new approach that the doctor does not know about? What if her family’s pushing her to spare them the burden of her care goes unnoticed without a social worker’s input? The lady might die needlessly or be denied treatment unfairly.

The discretionary duty that the amendment would introduce essentially collapses because it does not force the broader scrutiny that patients deserve. The amendment sees the problem, but it is too feeble: it is too discretionary, too vague and too unenforceable for a choice as profound as assisted dying. While I will support it, I do not think it goes far enough.

Amendment 423 builds on amendment 422 by requiring that if the assessing doctor consults a specialist, a written record of that consultation must be shared, as the hon. Member for Spen Valley just mentioned. It is critical for transparency, consistency and accountability in decision making. In high-stakes cases, such as assisted dying requests, paper trails matter. Without a formal record, one assessing doctor might dismiss concerns raised by another professional without accountability—a point made by the hon. Member for Richmond Park.

As I pointed out in an intervention on the hon. Member for Richmond Park, it is remarkable how few jurisdictions around the world have such safeguards. The American model in Oregon, Washington and California does not track how many doctors a patient consults before finding one willing to approve an assisted dying request, so we do not know the extent of doctor shopping abroad. Canada’s system does not require refusals to be formally documented, making it difficult to assess the patterns of approval. Ensuring that records are available to both assessing doctors would add an extra layer of scrutiny and help to prevent doctor shopping.

However, while the amendment is a step in the right direction, it does not require an independent review of the records. Sir James Munby, the former president of the family division of the High Court, has criticised the lack of procedural rigour in oversight mechanisms, warning that assisted dying laws risk becoming a rubber-stamp exercise if refusals and approvals are not documented with transparency. The Royal College of General Practitioners has called for independent oversight of the entire process, not just a reliance on individual doctors. These amendments would partially address that, but would not fully resolve it.

Amendments 422 and 423 are welcome but otiose: they would simply give doctors permission to do what they should be doing anyway. If they are conscientious, they will do it anyway, and if not, they will not. It is slightly like an illegal gun amnesty: the good guys will not have illegal firearms in the first place, and the bad guys with guns are not going to hand them in voluntarily. I fear that we are requiring good behaviour of good people, and not requiring it of doctors who are not doing their job properly.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-second sitting)

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 12th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)]

I rise to speak to new clauses 17 and 21 and to the four associated amendments. There is a lot to say, so please bear with me, but I will do my best not to repeat myself.

How exactly will the panel operate and function? I appreciate some of the explanations provided by the hon. Member for Spen Valley, and I look forward to hearing from the Minister on the point, but I have concerns about exactly what the panel will do and how it will do it. I will do my best not to repeat what others have said, but I reiterate the concerns as to whether it is indeed a better safeguard than the High Court one that was originally envisaged, given that it will have no full judicial role.

On a practical level, I question whether it is even feasible to find sufficient numbers of psychiatrists and social workers who are able and willing to perform this very burdensome role. As we all know, social workers do an incredibly important job, but people with their skillset are in extremely high demand. The hon. Member has made it clear that she is removing the High Court safeguards not because of the capacity concerns raised in oral evidence in January, but because she believes that this is truly a better and safer model.

I am also concerned that something that was originally meant to bring judicial oversight into the process has been replaced with something that is not judicial. I welcome more involvement from psychiatrists and social workers, who have a key role to play in the process, but I have concerns about whether the panel is the right place for it. Its expertise would be more valuable earlier in the process, when the co-ordinating doctor and the independent doctor are performing their assessments, rather than at the stage with the legal oversight component. A panel’s involvement in a truly multidisciplinary approach during the clinical stage of the assessment process would have been a gold-standard safeguard, but unfortunately that approach was not put on the face of the Bill.

How the panel will operate is an issue of great significance. If we do not flesh out the detail now, when will we? We must have this conversation. I have looked for this information in the new provisions. According to new schedule 2,

“The Commissioner may give guidance about the practice and procedure of panels.”

That is all there is. I cannot see any further information. Disappointingly, it is not even that the commissioner “must” give guidance—it “may”—so the operation of panels may change depending on who is in the role of commissioner. Given that this is a new approach and process, I urge the promoter and the Government to ensure that it is adequately fleshed out to avoid ambiguity.

When I imagine the panel, I am not sure what I am supposed to be imagining. Is it an administrative process—three people checking the papers—or is it more like a court, calling in evidence? Yesterday, the hon. Member for Banbury eloquently set out the practical realities of the new provisions with regard to witnesses. According to new clause 21, the panel “must hear from” at least one of the doctors, but it does not need to question him or her, so what is it exactly that the panel is required to hear? What does “hear” mean, and does it cover anything specific? Does it cover all the items in new clause 21(2), or just some? The new clause does not specify.

It is the same for the patient. The panel just needs to “hear” from him or her; it does not need to question them. As I will come to shortly, in exceptional cases, even the patient will not need to be heard from. Again, I would be grateful to the Justice Minister for clarity on what “hear” means and what she would expect would be covered.

We do know that the panel must be “satisfied” of the relevant matters, yet how it is to be satisfied, and even what that means, is not clear. The only person who must be heard from is either the co-ordinating doctor or the independent doctor—just one person. That may be fine, or it may not, but I put it on the record here, because it is important that we are clear-eyed about it.

Compare the process with an employment tribunal. Someone litigating an employment claim would know well in advance the rules that the tribunal would apply, what test the tribunal would apply to the facts, the legal representation they can have, and how and on what basis they can appeal. That kind of clarity is essential, but I cannot find it in the new clause. I also do not know whether the panel is inquisitorial or adversarial.

[Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)]

I am very happy to clarify that the panel is not adversarial, but inquisitorial and investigative.

[Rebecca Paul]

I thank the hon. Member for that confirmation. Now that I have that clarity, I will skip on.

One aspect of the panel that gives me cause for concern is that the panel would not hear from the patient themselves where there are “exceptional circumstances”. What are exceptional circumstances? The Bill does not say or provide any guidance. Many people with a terminal diagnosis who are seeking assisted dying could consider their circumstances exceptional; many undoubtedly will be too unwell to attend. That means that such panels could be making these decisions based on testimony from only one doctor. I am not for one second suggesting that people on their deathbeds should have to attend a panel—that is the point of exceptional circumstances—but I urge the promoter and Ministers to ensure that the much-need clarity around the meaning of the term is set out in order to reduce ambiguity in this area.

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[Rebecca Paul]

Again, I am not sure I agree that that is what I am here to do today. I think my job is to set out the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed amendment, and I do think that the High Court judge safeguard, on the face of it, was probably safer. I appreciate, value and truly welcome what the new clause attempts to do by bringing in psychiatrists and social workers, but it has come in at the wrong phase of the process. I am not sure we are really getting the value of that expertise at the judicial point; we would have got that value at the clinical stage.

I ask Members to take what I am saying in the good faith that it is meant. My intention is to make sure that the Bill is as safe as possible. I do not profess to have all the answers, but I do have questions, and sometimes it is useful to ask questions, because there are others here who can answer them. I hope that, by asking questions when we are uncertain whether something is the right way forward, we will get a stronger piece of legislation.

[Kim Leadbeater]

The hon. Member is absolutely right that we are here to ask questions, and I appreciate those questions being asked. On what happens earlier in the process, I hope she is reassured by the fact that we will now have compulsory referral to a psychiatrist if there is a doubt about capacity, and we have specified in the Bill doctors consulting other health and social care professionals, to provide for a holistic approach earlier in the process.

[Rebecca Paul]

I absolutely welcome those amendments. I do think they improve the safety of the Bill. As I have mentioned, I would have liked to see a truly multidisciplinary approach. At the moment, we have just included something in the Bill, as the hon. Lady says, stating that a doctor can refer to another specialist if they so wish. I would have liked to see that team pulled together, and that recognised in the Bill—we heard strong oral evidence about that.

[Kim Leadbeater]

The other point I would reiterate is that none of that stops happening. We have heard from professionals and experts that that happens. Someone who has cancer will have a multidisciplinary team around them as part of their natural treatment process. Nothing in the Bill stops that happening.

[Rebecca Paul]

I take that point. In an ideal world where our public services were not under pressure, I might be more reassured, but I am a local councillor, and I am well aware how difficult it is to get social workers involved in all the things that they need to be involved in, because they are spread so thin. The hon. Lady lays out very well how things should work, but when I take off my rose-tinted glasses, I am concerned that they will not work like that in the real world. That is why I always go back to putting things in the Bill, because that forces them to happen—doing so here would force that treatment to happen.

The Committee will be pleased to hear that I now turn to my amendments—but I am afraid there are four of them, so bear with me. Amendment (a) to new clause 17 may be one of the most important amendments that I will speak about. This is something that I feel very passionately about. One of the most important questions we should ask is how the panel might deal with a family member with concerns, for example, that a relative was being coerced. Would the family member be afforded the status of a party to proceedings? Would they have a right to see the relevant documents before the panel? Would they have a right to be informed that a panel was taking place? If they are not a party to proceedings, is their status that of a witness? If they are a witness, do they have the right to observe proceedings when a panel sits in private? Do they have a right to be heard by the panel? Again, I am asking questions. I am not necessarily saying one way or the other what the answer should be, but those are questions I have.

None of this is laid out in the new clauses that we are considering. In fact, I suggest that in the struggle to balance autonomy with the rights of impacted others in the Bill, autonomy is very much winning the fight. I was struck yesterday by various Members setting out their fears that the first a family could know about an assisted death is when they are called upon to make arrangements for the burial. That would be an awful situation, and I strongly believe that families and loved ones should not be cut out of the process without good reason, especially when, no doubt, they will be required to bury the person and pay for it, as I assume the state will not take on that responsibility. I suggest that this point on funeral arrangements and expenses needs further thought as the Bill progresses.

From reading the Bill, all we know is that the panel may

“hear from and question any other person”.

There is no mechanism for family members to have a right to be heard or even to submit information. That needs to be rectified. The panel could reach its conclusions without hearing at all from the family. That is unacceptable. If someone’s mother, father, son or daughter were going in front of an assisted dying panel, that person would at least want to know and be clear about their rights and available options to feed into the process.

We then come to the big issue. What if a mistake is made and a relevant piece of information is not provided to the panel by the people it hears from? My amendment (a) to new clause 17 seeks to help the panel to avoid making the wrong decision, and give time for it to be remedied before the patient is dead.

--- Later in debate ---

To be clear, I am not saying that that is a situation in which an appeal might have been upheld. What Professor Kissane’s story demonstrates is that families can see things very clearly, in a way that professionals, even with training, cannot. Families know the person well, they understand their relationships and they know the subtleties of the situation.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Is the hon. Lady reassured by the fact that, under the Bill, coercion becomes a criminal offence with a serious prison sentence? If any family members are in any doubt as to whether coercion is taking place, it is straightforward: they go to the police.

[Rebecca Paul]

I welcome the hon. Lady’s intervention, but the point I am making is not about coercion; it is about the subtleties in families’ relationships. I was trying to bring to life a situation—sometimes it is families who understand the relationships, the dynamics and the pressure points. It is very hard for professionals to get underneath that.

In a sense, families are the greatest experts, but the process as drafted excludes that expertise. Under my amendment, if a family member had knowledge that could make the difference between life and death, they would be able to apply to the panel. If there had been a clear error in applying the eligibility criteria, the application would be reconsidered. It is true that the panel will be informed by at least one of the doctors and that it has the option of hearing from others. Perhaps the panel will always be incredibly thorough and explore every avenue, but we have to legislate for every situation, including situations that are not ideal.

We can learn a lot from other jurisdictions. In written evidence, the academic Christopher Lyon from the University of York describes his experience in Canada. Dr Lyon writes that his father, who was “openly suicidal” and had a “history of mental illness”, qualified for medical assistance in dying in 2021. In Dr Lyon’s words:

“He was classed as having a ‘foreseeable natural death’ (i.e., terminal illness), my family was told, because he had momentarily skipped some meals at his residence and had an elevated but unremarkable white blood cell (WBC) count that the AD doctor suggested might be an infection that, if untreated, might become lethal, despite being a common side effect of his arthritis medication.”

Dr Lyon says that when he was informed two days before the event, he pushed for an urgent psychiatric assessment to be carried out. Dr Lyon has obtained a copy and says that it is

“full of errors. It claims he wasn’t suicidal, when he had a whole history of suicidality. It states he didn’t think he was depressed, and yet on the list of medications there was listed antidepressants.”

Dr Lyon’s concerns about his father’s prognosis, the assessment and other aspects of the events were widely shared, he says:

“After he died, the provincial regulatory college, police, and even other AD clinicians suggested his death was questionable or even wholly unlawful. However, privacy law and the continuing resistance from the local health authority have so far succeeded in blocking access to his medical records necessary for a full investigation”.

In Ontario, meanwhile, the chief coroner has published a report detailing the assisted death of an anonymous patient, Mr A, who had inflammatory bowel disease. He was unemployed, dependent on his family for housing and financial support, and struggled with alcohol and opioid misuse. He received an assisted death on the basis that his illness was advanced, irreversible and causing intolerable suffering. According to the coroner, the family were not consulted by those involved with processing the application, even though it was recorded that the family expressed concerns. Most members of the death review committee thought that shutting the family out was a mistake. The committee concluded:

“Engagement with family and/or close relations in the MAiD process should aim to be a key component of MAiD practice.”

We can hope that these were exceptional events, but they are the kinds of situation in which a panel might have benefited from a family perspective, which is the reason why I cite them.

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[Rebecca Paul]

I completely agree. While I was preparing my speech, as is often the way, I found myself wishing that I had tabled an amendment to add a legal requirement that the family be able to feed into the panel and share information. Perhaps that is something that can be picked up at a later stage. The nature of the process is that as we debate these things and think about them in detail, other ideas come through.

[Kim Leadbeater]

The hon. Lady mentioned a few moments ago that the family would make such an appeal only if there was new information, but her amendment does not say that, and it has no explanatory statement. Could she clarify what she meant?

[Rebecca Paul]

That comes under subsection (2) of my amendment:

“The Commissioner will allow the application for reconsideration if the Panel’s decision was—

(a) wrong, or

(b) unjust”.

It is implied that the decision is wrong because there is missing information. Missing information is one example; other things would enable an appeal, but the obvious and most likely reason in this instance would be that a certain bit of information had not been shared.

I am not saying that the amendment is perfect in any way. It is set out clearly in guidance on the private Member’s Bill process that amendments will not necessarily be drafted perfectly and that it is incumbent on the Government to take the spirit of what is intended and get the clause to an appropriate place to deliver that. I am happy to work with the Government to ensure that the wording works and is clear. I think the hon. Lady’s point may be that it is unclear; I am happy to work in any way to improve that clarity.

--- Later in debate ---

This Bill is really different from the legislation used in Canada, because Canada requires an applicant to be facing unbearable suffering that cannot be relieved. The Bill before us requires a terminal diagnosis, so it does not open up the question of other kinds of suffering and whether they can be relieved. However, it will certainly confront the panel with the same kind of dilemma: what should be done when an applicant wants an assisted death, not because of illness, but because of personal vulnerability or social issues—housing problems, for instance? The panel will know that, if that person’s housing problems or some other crisis were to be resolved, the desire for an assisted death might diminish or even evaporate. It will nevertheless have to decide whether to issue a certificate confirming eligibility for assisted death.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I might have misheard, but I believe the hon. Member asked what happens when a patient asks for assisted death not as a result of illness. If that was the case, then they would not fall under the criteria of the Bill.

[Rebecca Paul]

I am making a point regarding if a person fitted the diagnosis in that they are terminally unwell, but it is actually the fact that they have got nowhere to live that is really driving the decision rather than the terminal illness. My apologies if that was not clear.

In Oregon there was the case of Barbara Wagner, who had recurring lung cancer. She had been prescribed a drug, Tarceva, which had an excellent record. It increased patients’ one-year survival rate by 45%. Oregon’s state Medicaid provider sent Wagner a letter saying that her insurance plan would not cover the drug, but would cover other options, including assisted dying. Wagner said:

“I got a letter in the mail that basically said if you want to take the pills, we will help you get that from the doctor and we will stand there and watch you die. But we won’t give you the medication to live.”

Those are her own words, not my words. Recently in Australia, similar cases have been reported of people choosing assisted dying because they were put on too long a waiting list for a home care package. One man said of his mother:

“Her pride wouldn’t allow any of her boys to take care of her or to bathe her so she got approved for the assisted dying”,

and a few months ago proceeded with it.

There are many other situations where everyone would benefit from the panel having broader discretion. Think of one of the cases I talked about earlier—and have done throughout the various Committee sessions—where somebody appears to be a possible victim of coercion, or a case where someone with diabetes, for instance, wishes to bring themselves within the six-month definition by stopping treatment, or someone with anorexia brings themselves within the definition by stopping eating and drinking. The capacity safeguard would not defend them. The courts have found that people have capacity to refuse lifesaving treatment, even if their decision is strongly influenced by other factors.

Hon. Members may worry that giving the panel discretion is too open-ended. The truth is that, in our legal system, discretion is the norm. Whether in sentencing guidelines or in custody cases, the law nearly always recognises that sometimes a general rule has to be departed from. If the panel is compelled to make its decisions only by a checklist with no other option, the Bill is saying that the panel is less trustworthy than the courts. If this panel is to be a safeguard, we should be clear about how it functions. It needs to be open to correcting mistakes. It needs to have a clear standard of proof, which will protect people and not just hastily steer them towards assisted death, and it needs a wide degree of discretion if it is truly to be more than a tick-box exercise. I hope the Committee will agree and support these amendments.

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[Daniel Francis]

I thank my hon. Friend for that statistic, which I was not aware of. It relates back to concerns that I have had through the process, particularly on learning disabilities and how a family member finds out during the process what processes would be open to them. In my opinion, it is unclear how the proposed panel fits into our legal system. Again, there are all kinds of quasi-judicial panels that do fit into our legal system, and they have an appeal process, of course. They would normally see two parties in a case. I hear what has been said this morning about Spain. It was put to us in oral evidence from a supporter of the Bill that we should look at that part of the Spanish model about having both sides of the process, although I accept that Spain has a very different legal system from the United Kingdom.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I am interested in exploring the characterisation of the two sides referred to, because this is not about two sides. This is about an individual patient with a terminal illness. I am just interested in how we can explore that a little further.

[Daniel Francis]

I hear that. As my hon. Friend knows, yesterday when there was an amendment on individual autonomy, I voted the same way that she did. But I will put the scenarios that I put in that debate yesterday when I came to my decision. The scenario that I have always considered is: what if the person with a learning disability in their 40s or 50s says, “I want to make the decision to relieve the burden on my parent in their 70s or 80s”, and the parent in their 70s or 80s is not involved in the process, but finds out about the process and there is no way they can intervene in the process? I hear what was said about JR, but there is no way, as is laid out in the Bill, that they can then intervene in the process and say, “There has been a mental capacity assessment, but we think that, given there is a borderline level of capacity, there may have been a position where a doctor has had to, under the Act, assist that decision to be made.” What would be the legal process for the parents in that case? These are the scenarios. As Members know, I am not somebody who opposes the principles of the legislation, but these are the scenarios that have brought me to this place.

[Kim Leadbeater]

The quick answer is that there would be an injunction. I hope my hon. Friend will also be reassured that the panel is coming towards the end of this very long process. In the situation he describes, the patient would have gone through all the other stages with the doctor. I imagine in that situation, in a psychiatric referral, the doctor would have said, “Would you consider speaking to your next of kin?” There are a lot of other stages prior to getting to this point, which I hope provides some reassurance.

[Daniel Francis]

I hear that. As my hon. Friend knows, I supported amendment 6, as she did, and other amendments that strengthen the Bill in that way. I accept the right to autonomy. The hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough gave the example of an appeal in Spain, but I do not think the fact that a religious group was funding the appeal in one case is an excuse for taking that right away, because there will be other people in Spain who have genuine concerns and want to go through the appeal process.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fourth sitting)

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen Kinnock]

I happened to be at a hospice in Stafford yesterday on a ministerial visit and was extremely impressed by the work that the hospice staff were doing on family counselling, and advice and engagement both with the patient and family and loved ones, so the right hon. Gentleman is right that the hospice sector, among others, plays a vital role in that holistic engagement with patients throughout the process.

Amendment 374 requires that the co-ordinating doctor must notify the voluntary assisted dying commissioner where they witness a second declaration and where they make or refuse to make the supporting statement under clause 13(5), and that the commissioner must be provided with a copy of the second declaration and any statement. I hope that those observations were helpful to the Committee.

[Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under you this morning, Ms McVey. My amendments 374 and 471 serve to clarify that the second declaration must be made before it is witnessed—it is a drafting amendment—and to bring clause 13 in line with the reporting requirements elsewhere in the Bill. For the functions of the commissioner to be carried out effectively, including supervising the assisted dying panels and making annual reports on the legislation’s operation, it is essential that all relevant details and reports are made available.

I am unable to support amendment 457, in the name of the hon. Member for Richmond Park. As I said when we started discussing the amendment, I do not fully understand why it has been positioned at this stage in the process. The shorter period of reflection is a recognition that a person’s death is expected within a month, so they literally have a few weeks left of life.

[Sarah Olney (Richmond Park) (LD)]

That was the hon. Member’s response when I made my speech on the amendment in the previous sitting. I have reflected on that over the weekend. I still think that the issue of the voluntary stopping of eating and drinking is a very serious one that ought to be reflected somewhere in the legislation, but she is correct that, at this particular point, we are talking about the second period of reflection already being at an end, so it cannot be hastened in any way by such a measure. Therefore, I will be withdrawing the amendment.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I appreciate that; that is helpful and I thank the hon. Member. As the Minister said, a person whose death is approaching may have stopped eating and drinking for a number of reasons. They may simply be too ill. They may be unable to digest food. It may be that they have lost their appetite, or that they will be even more ill if they eat and drink, so it would seem particularly cruel to intervene on that basis at that point, but I appreciate her comments.

Amendment 316 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for York Central seeks to mandate the action a doctor must take if a patient is likely to die within one month. Like other amendments, it goes against the basic principles that underlie the Bill—that the wishes of the person seeking assistance should be respected. Surely that is even more important than ever as they face their final weeks. As the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire said, palliative care will have been discussed at length throughout the assisted dying process. It is also worth noting, as the hon. Member for East Wiltshire said, that evidence from other jurisdictions with similar laws—Australia and America—shows that between 80% and 90% of people who have gone through the assisted dying process are already receiving palliative care, so I am not minded to support the amendment.

[Sarah Olney]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: 207, in clause 13, page 9, line 20, leave out “Schedule 4” and insert

“regulations made by the Secretary of State”.

This amendment provides that the form of a second declaration is to be set out in regulations (rather than in Schedule 4).

Amendment 470, in clause 13, page 9, line 26, at end insert—

“(3A) Regulations under subsection (3)(a) must provide that a second declaration contains—

(a) the following information—

(i) the person’s full name and address;

(ii) the person’s NHS number;

(iii) contact details for the person’s GP practice;

(iv) specified information about the certificate of eligibility;

(b) the following further declarations by the person—

(i) a declaration that they have made a first declaration and have not cancelled it;

(ii) a declaration that they understand that they must make a second declaration in order for assistance to be provided under this Act;

(iii) a declaration that they are making the second declaration voluntarily and have not been coerced or pressured by any other person into making it;

(iv) a declaration that they understand that they may cancel the second declaration at any time.

In this subsection “specified” means specified in the regulations.”

This amendment provides that regulations about the form of a second declaration must make the provision mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b).

Amendment 471, in clause 13, page 9, line 27, leave out from “if” to “that” in line 28 and insert

“the coordinating doctor is satisfied (immediately before witnessing it)”.

This amendment removes wording which would suggest that a second declaration is made before it is witnessed.

Amendment 208, in clause 13, page 9, line 38, leave out “Schedule 5” and insert

“regulations made by the Secretary of State”.

This amendment provides that the form of a statement by the coordinating doctor following the making of the second declaration is to be set out in regulations (rather than in Schedule 5).

Amendment 472, in clause 13, page 9, line 41, at end insert—

“(6A) Regulations under subsection (6)(a) must provide that a statement under subsection (5) contains—

(a) the following information—

(i) the person’s full name and address;

(ii) the person’s NHS number;

(iii) the coordinating doctor’s full name and work address;

(iv) specified information about the certificate of eligibility;

(b) the following declarations by the coordinating doctor (in addition to a declaration that they are satisfied of all of the matters mentioned in subsection (4)(a) to (d))—

(i) a declaration that they are satisfied that a certificate of eligibility has been granted in respect of the person;

(ii) a declaration that the second declaration was made after the end of the second period for reflection;

(iii) if the second declaration was made before the end of the period mentioned in subsection (2)(a), a declaration that they have the belief mentioned in subsection (2)(b);

(iv) a declaration that they are satisfied that neither the first declaration nor the second declaration has been cancelled.

In this subsection “specified” means specified in the regulations.”

This amendment provides that regulations about the form of a statement under subsection (5) must make the provision mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b).

Amendment 374, in clause 13, page 10, line 2, at end insert—

“(8) Where the coordinating doctor has—

(a) witnessed a second declaration, or

(b) made or refused to make a statement under subsection (5),

the doctor must notify the Commissioner and give them a copy of the second declaration or (as the case may be) any statement under subsection (5).”—(Kim Leadbeater.)

This amendment requires the coordinating doctor to notify the Commissioner of witnessing a second declaration, and of having made or refused to make a statement under clause 13(5).

Clause 13, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 14

Cancellation of declarations

[Kim Leadbeater]

I beg to move amendment 375, in clause 14, page 10, line 9, at end insert—

“(1A) Where notice or an indication is given to the coordinating doctor under subsection (1)(a), the doctor must as soon as practicable notify the Commissioner of the cancellation.”

This amendment requires the coordinating doctor to notify the Commissioner of a cancellation of a first or second declaration.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 376, in clause 14, page 10, line 12, after “doctor” insert “and the Commissioner”.

This amendment requires a practitioner other than the coordinating doctor to notify the Commissioner (as well as the coordinating doctor) of a cancellation of a first or second declaration.

Clause stand part.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I hope that these are a couple of nice, simple amendments. The right of the patient to cancel at any time is obviously really important. It is also important that, for the purpose of monitoring and reporting the process, the commissioner, as proposed, is kept informed at every stage. I hope that the whole Committee can see the necessity of these amendments.

[Danny Kruger]

The hon. Lady is quite right that there is nothing to object to in these amendments or the clause. It is worth stating at this point, though, that in the context of the debate we are having in this Committee, we are moving at some pace. The likelihood is that there will be opportunity for only a five-hour debate on Report—maybe more, but possibly not. This Committee is the time we have to consider in detail the content of the Bill. My concern is that moving too quickly and trying to do too much too soon means that we will miss the opportunity to debate very important aspects of the Bill.

The hon. Lady says that these are “nice, simple” amendments, as if the only thing being discussed here is the paperwork around the declaration. What should we say to patients who decide to cancel their declaration? My concern—I am unaware of any other point when we could appropriately discuss this question—is what happens in the event of a cancellation. What duty of care do doctors have to patients who have decided not to proceed with an assisted death? The Bill does not currently address that question: it imposes no obligation on doctors to follow up in any way after a declaration has been cancelled.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

I am speaking to the group as a whole, which includes clause stand part. I have no objection to the amendments. My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. As I said, the expectation is that the medical professionals involved in the person’s care will have laid out their options clearly. We are to a certain degree trusting in that because amendments to insist on it have been rejected, although I recognise that it will be the clear expectation. He is right that it is hard, as it were, to prove a negative.

Nevertheless, the purpose of my speech at this point is to tease out from the advocates of the Bill what their expectation is. My right hon. Friend has clearly explained his expectation, which is that we are dealing with somebody whose mind is clear, rational, uncluttered by other concerns and entirely free of any undue influences or anxieties about the different choices they might make. Having previously decided in the fullness of their autonomy that they wanted to go through the procedure, they have now decided in the fullness of their autonomy that they want to do the opposite, and we should say, “Fine. We have no further interest in your decision making. It is your choice—you’re on your own.” I am very concerned about the implication of my right hon. Friend’s comments about the sorts of patients who might be involved in the process of assisted dying.

[Kim Leadbeater]

To allay those fears, perhaps the fundamental answer to the question is that those people do not stop being patients—sadly, they do not stop being terminally ill patients. They have just chosen to cancel the declaration, and they will already have wraparound care. To some degree, the hon. Gentleman answered his own question when he said that doctors have a duty of care. That duty of care does not stop because the person has chosen to take this course of action. They will still be cared for by the professionals looking after them.

[Danny Kruger]

Well, we certainly hope so. Nevertheless, that is inconsistent with the doctrine of absolute patient autonomy, which in this circumstance allows a patient to withdraw from the medical treatment, or at least from the support of the medics who had been facilitating their assisted death. They are rightly under no obligation to receive any other sort of care.

Of course, one would assume that in most cases medics will be closely involved in looking after these patients, because they are likely to be very ill. Nevertheless, the Bill has nothing more to say about patients who have just stepped back from the brink of suicide; the medics will have no further obligation to ensure that they will be looked after—except by the GP, as soon as it is practicable for the provider who has just been denied the business of looking after the assisted death to get round to emailing them. If that is seen as sufficient to ensure that those patients will be properly looked after, I beg to differ.

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[Stephen Kinnock]

The Government have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on amendments 375 and 376. The amendments require that where the co-ordinating doctor, or any registered practitioner from the person’s GP practice, receives a notification or indication from the person seeking assistance under the Bill that the person wishes to cancel their first or second declaration, the doctor or practitioner must inform the voluntary assisted dying commissioner as soon as practicable. Where a registered practitioner from the person’s GP practice has received a notification or indication from the person to cancel their first or second declaration, they must also inform the co-ordinating doctor. I hope those observations are helpful to the Committee.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I repeat what I said earlier about what will happen to the patient if they choose to cancel: their care will continue. From a medical practitioner perspective, it is inconceivable that those patients would be abandoned, as the hon. Member for East Wiltshire is suggesting. That would not happen.

I understand that cancellation of the second declaration does not need to be included in clause 14(4) because of when in the process it would happen. The first declaration comes much earlier, so clauses 7 to 9 would be applicable; the second declaration comes further down the process, so does not need to be included. However, I am happy to look at that in further detail and come back to the hon. Member on that, if necessary.

Amendment 375 agreed to.

Amendment made: 376, in clause 14, page 10, line 12, after “doctor” insert “and the Commissioner”.—(Kim Leadbeater.)

This amendment requires a practitioner other than the coordinating doctor to notify the Commissioner (as well as the coordinating doctor) of a cancellation of a first or second declaration.

Clause 14, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15

Signing by proxy

[Daniel Francis (Bexleyheath and Crayford) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 321, in clause 15, page 10, line 33, at end insert—

“(d) the reason why the person was unable to sign their name.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Kim Leadbeater]

My hon. Friend is making a really sensible point and a fair argument, and I am very happy to support the amendment.

[Daniel Francis]

I welcome my hon. Friend’s acceptance of the amendment, and I think she sees the point behind it. It was meant not to be awkward—I do not think I have been at all awkward during this process—but simply to state that, if there were concerns later, the reason why the proxy was required should be there in a transparent way. I commend amendment 321 to the Committee.

[Danny Kruger]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman and I very much support his amendment; it is good to hear that the Bill’s promoter, the hon. Member for Spen Valley, will as well. The hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford has made his points very powerfully, and it is good that we are in agreement.

I also support amendment 431, tabled by the hon. Member for York Central, which would restrict proxies to donees of lasting power of attorney. The point is that somebody who has been through the process of taking on power of attorney has been properly vetted and approved; they are required to demonstrate their fitness for the role and undertake a meaningful duty of care to the person for whom they are a proxy. That strikes me as an appropriate suggestion from the hon. Lady.

Amendment 411, tabled by the hon. Member for Broxtowe, suggests that the phrase

“a person who is of good standing in the community”

should be deleted. I think she is absolutely right to suggest that. I made the point on Second Reading that—

[Kim Leadbeater]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Danny Kruger]

I think the hon. Lady is about to say that her own amendment addresses that point.

[Kim Leadbeater]

My point was that I think amendment 411 has been withdrawn.

[Danny Kruger]

Is that the case? I apologise.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

I would not want to pre-empt the regulations, because clearly that is the point of the process. If this Bill gets Royal Assent, we then move on to making regulations, and I have confidence in the good offices of parliamentary counsel, legal advice and the drafting process. I absolutely agree with the hon. Gentleman, however, that the purpose of those regulations must be to remove ambiguity, not to increase it. I am confident that the system will produce regulations that address his concern.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Does the Minister agree that it will be on the record that we have had this conversation, and that many of us—including myself—have expressed our concerns about the concept of good standing in the community? I would like to think that that will be taken into consideration.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I am acutely conscious that every word we say in this Committee is on the record. My hon. Friend makes a valid point in that context.

The purpose of amendment 253 is to clarify that a person acting as a proxy can both sign and revoke a declaration on behalf of a person seeking assistance under the Bill. This amendment would extend the provisions under clause 15 to a person who is acting as proxy to the person seeking assistance under the Bill, enabling the proxy to act on behalf of the person to cancel their first or second declaration if they are unable to sign their own name by reason of physical impairment, being unable to read or for any other reason. I note that the cancellation of a declaration is governed by clause 14, and the cancellation may be given orally, via writing, or

“in a manner of communication known to be used by the person”.

It does not require the signature of the person seeking assistance under the Bill, so a proxy may not be required for some people in relation to revoking a declaration, even if they have been required under clause 15.

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[Kim Leadbeater]

I will speak first to my amendment 473. It is important to be clear that the role of the proxy is very specific and would be used only in a very limited number of cases, where the patient is not able to sign their own name. That is, however, important when we are talking about terminally ill people who may be physically impaired, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford alluded to.

[Danny Kruger]

I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Lady so soon into her speech. Nevertheless, the clause says that someone can use a proxy when they are unable to sign their name

“by reason of physical impairment, being unable to read or for any other reason”.

Does the hon. Lady acknowledge that that is tantamount to saying that somebody can have a proxy for any reason at all? There is literally no restriction in the clause on the reason for why somebody could have a proxy—anybody could have one.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kim Leadbeater]

That is why amendment 321 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford is really important. We have to put the reason down for why there is a proxy. It depends on personal circumstances and what that patient is going through, so we have to have a bit of flexibility, but they have to be unable to sign their name and they have to explain why they are unable to sign their name.

[Danny Kruger]

I hope that this does not appear pedantic, but we are talking about life and death after all. The patient’s inability to sign their name could be psychological; it is not as if they will have to do a writing test. They simply have to say that they are unable to sign their name, unless the hon. Lady is proposing that there could be some sort of test for that.

I entirely support amendment 321 in the name of the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford about the proxy being obliged to state the reason why—it is good to finally have the question “Why?” being asked in the Bill. Nevertheless, there is no obligation for anything to be done about that reason; someone could give a reason that would be regarded as irrelevant. I respect the intention behind the amendment, but it does not clarify the point that literally anybody could effectively get a proxy to sign their name, having said to the assessing doctor, “I want my friend to sign for me.”

[Kim Leadbeater]

That is the sort of thing that the doctor would explore with the patient. It would happen in a very limited set of circumstances. We have to accommodate people who are physically impaired as a result of their terminal illness, and we have to include that there are a range of circumstances where this might apply. The proxy is being asked not to make any kind of judgment or assessment, but merely to act as an intermediary for the patient if they are unable to sign for themselves. They would have to explain why they are unable to sign for themselves, and the proxy has to be satisfied that the person understands the nature and effect of the making of the declaration.

I thought long and hard about who should and should not be accepted as a proxy. As always, I try to imagine how it would be seen by someone with a terminal illness. As we know, no two people are the same, nor are their circumstances. The hon. Member for East Wiltshire said that surely it should be done by someone the patient knows. The clause defines a proxy as someone the patient has known for two years, which is an important inclusion, but not everyone might have known for two years a person who they are comfortable asking to undertake that role.

I also appreciate the challenges with the wording

“of good standing in the community”.

I will let the hon. Member for East Wiltshire and the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire fight that out among themselves. I am sure we all have our own version of what that means.

I have explored various options and, contrary to the suggestion of the hon. Member for East Wiltshire, I have spent a huge amount of time on this question, because it is very important. Looking at different lists, there is the list of people who can sign the back of someone’s passport. I do not think that would be appropriate, so I moved away from that. I have also looked at much shorter lists. I do think that this question would be part of a consultation; it is really important to get it right, which is why we must have it as part of a consultation. I am content that having the Secretary of State put it in regulations is the right thing to do.

As I said, I am happy to support amendment 321 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford. It is a sensible amendment that makes the reasons for the use of the proxy more transparent. If amendment 253 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke (Claire Hazelgrove) is moved, I am happy to support that too. As the Minister said, a cancellation need not be in writing; it can be made orally or through any other form of communication.

Amendment 321 agreed to.

Amendment made: 473, in clause 15, page 11, line 3, leave out from “person” to end of line and insert

“of a description specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.”—(Kim Leadbeater.)

This amendment provides that persons of a description specified in regulations (rather than persons “of good standing in the community”) may be proxies.

Amendment made: 253, in clause 15, page 11, line 3, at end insert—

“(6) For the purposes of this section “declaration” includes the cancellation of a declaration.”—(Sean Woodcock.)

This would allow a cancellation of the first or second declaration to be signed by a proxy.

Clause 15, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16

Recording of declarations and statements etc

Amendments made: 209, in clause 16, page 11, line 8, leave out paragraphs (b) and (c) and insert—

“(b) a report about the first assessment of a person is made under section 7;

(c) a report about the second assessment of a person is made under section 8;”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendments 420 and 421.

Amendment 377, in clause 16, page 11, line 12, leave out paragraph (d) and insert—

“(d) a certificate of eligibility has been granted in respect of a person;

(da) a panel has refused to grant such a certificate;”.—(Kim Leadbeater.)

This amendment is consequential on NC21.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I beg to move amendment 474, in clause 16, page 11, line 17, at end insert—

“(1A) In this section ‘recordable event’ means an event mentioned in a paragraph of subsection (1).”

This amendment is consequential on amendments 209 and 377.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 475, in clause 16, page 11, line 19, leave out from second “the” to “in” in line 21 and insert

“occurrence of the recordable event”.

This amendment is consequential on amendments 209 and 377.

Amendment 476, in clause 16, page 11, line 24, leave out from “the” to “, and” in line 26 and insert

“occurrence of the recordable event”.

This amendment is consequential on amendments 209 and 377.

Amendment 477, in clause 16, page 11, line 27, leave out from “the” to “in” in line 29 and insert

“occurrence of the recordable event”.

This amendment is consequential on amendments 209 and 377.

Amendment 478, in clause 16, page 11, line 30, leave out from second “a” to end of line 32 and insert

“declaration, report or statement within subsection (1) must include the original declaration, report or statement.”

This amendment is consequential on amendments 209 and 377.

Clause stand part.

[Kim Leadbeater]

The amendments are designed to streamline the drafting of the Bill. Taken together, they create a new definition of a recordable event, namely those events set out in clause 16(1), where declarations and statements are required at any stage of the process. We can all agree that record keeping is essential, so it is necessary to define the events that should be recorded. I commend the amendments to the Committee.

[Danny Kruger]

I very much respect the hon. Lady’s intention, and I support the amendments. On clause 16, however, I must take the opportunity to express a certain concern. The clause applies if, under subsection (1)(b), the co-ordinating doctor

“refuses to make…a statement”

to be entered into the person’s medical records. That is good but, as I understand it, a statement could be made that complies with the Bill but does not put on record, in relation to subsection (2), which requirements the co-ordinating doctor did not believe were satisfied. We have missed an opportunity to have more clarity about which exact requirements have not been met. There is also the eternal question about the co-ordinating doctor’s reasons for reaching that conclusion. I just note the missed opportunity to be a little safer with the drafting.

My more general point is about the importance of effective record keeping and declaration. I thank the hon. Member for Spen Valley, who throughout the whole Bill process has stressed the importance of good data collection and record keeping, which will be vital so that in later years, if the Bill passes, we can judge whether it is working as intended.

I am concerned about going on the evidence of other countries, which is frequently adduced in support of the Bill, particularly in respect of the absence of evidence of coercion, questions around capacity, proper administration of drugs or the support that patients receive. It is often said that concerns are exaggerated or inappropriate, “because look at what happens in other countries”, but let me briefly run through some evidence from abroad.

The fact is that no other country does adequate record keeping. One ambition of the hon. Member for Spen Valley that I really do share is to have a better system of keeping data than in other countries. In Oregon, the most recent annual report demonstrates a whole series of failures in record keeping. Ingestion status was unknown for 25% of the patients prescribed the drugs, so we do not know whether they took the drugs or what the process was. In 72% of cases, it was unknown whether there were complications; we have been talking about how exaggerated my concerns and those of other Members are about complications, but in 72% of cases in Oregon we do not know. In 30% of cases, it was unknown whether a healthcare provider was present. In 44% of cases, the duration between ingestion and death was unknown.

I very much recognise that the intention of the Bill is not to have those sorts of mistake. Indeed, the intention is to ensure that some of them should be impossible, because a doctor should be present and so on. Nevertheless, there is evidence that in other countries that have inspired the Bill, the data is inadequate. I will give a few more examples.

British Columbia has poor documentation, incomplete assessments, recurrent and excessive delays in reporting. In the debate on the last group of amendments, we spoke about the necessity that a doctor be informed if a declaration is cancelled; I am very concerned that that will not happen quickly and that people could fall through the gaps. That is what happens abroad. We have seen evidence from the former Attorney-General of Victoria, Australia, of all sorts of irregularities, with doctors falsely certifying that patients had signed statements and so on.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I do not know the details of the individual cases that the hon. Member speaks about, but he makes a powerful point and we absolutely agree on the importance of recording and monitoring. I know that he voted against the changes at clause 12, but I hope he gets some reassurance from the changes that the commission would bring in. Having the commission and the panels would ensure robust monitoring and reporting. I hope he agrees that that is a positive step.

[Danny Kruger]

I absolutely recognise that the hon. Lady has every intention of insisting that the system works well, that doctors do their job and that good record keeping happens. My concern throughout has been that we have not been robust enough in ensuring that all of that happens.

A huge amount of faith is being placed in the good professional conduct of doctors. Patient autonomy has been stressed, but it often translates into doctor autonomy. We are relying enormously on doctors doing their job well, and we are giving them significant latitude to do their job properly. As we see in other jurisdictions, particularly when assisted suicide becomes normalised and services are established explicitly to provide assisted suicide, we get into a dangerous area in which adequate documentation and reporting might not happen.

I will conclude with evidence from Canada, which is a very comparable country; it has a slightly different mechanism for delivering assisted suicide, but its legal framework is very similar to ours. The Health and Social Care Committee in our last Parliament received evidence from an academic in Canada, Dr Kotalik, who stated that federal regulations had been

“mandating a collection of data from MAID providers”,

just as the Bill will do. However, he noted that

“those legal and regulatory efforts have yet to produce evidence that the program operates as intended. We have no publicly accessible evidence that the eligibility criteria and safeguards prescribed by law were respected and that the Criminal Code has not been transgressed.”

It is fine for us, in this Committee and in Parliament, to specify that all doctors should do their job properly and that all data should be appropriately collected, transmitted and recorded. Nevertheless, as we all know from our casework, the reality is often one of bureaucratic mistakes being made, albeit not with any ill will. Given the volumes that we may well be dealing with, I think it is appropriate to raise significant concerns about the operation of the Bill and the data collection that we seek.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

The purpose of amendments 474 to 478 is to improve the drafting of the Bill by creating a new definition of “recordable event”. Recordable events are the events set out in clause 16(1) related to the recording of declarations and statements.

The amendments would also make consequential changes to clause 16, which refer to the occurrence of the recordable event, as per the new definition, and include reference to a report in addition to a statement or declaration. The reference to a report is consequential on the amendments already agreed by the Committee to clauses 7 and 8.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I have nothing further to add.

Amendment 474 agreed to.

Amendments made: 475, clause 16, page 11, line 19, leave out from second “the” to “in” in line 21 and insert

“occurrence of the recordable event”.

This amendment is consequential on amendments 209 and 377.

Amendment 476, in clause 16, page 11, line 24, leave out from “the” to “, and” in line 26 and insert

“occurrence of the recordable event”.

This amendment is consequential on amendments 209 and 377.

Amendment 477, in clause 16, page 11, line 27, leave out from “the” to “in” in line 29 and insert

“occurrence of the recordable event”.

This amendment is consequential on amendments 209 and 377.

Amendment 478, in clause 16, page 11, line 30, leave out from second “a” to end of line 32 and insert

“declaration, report or statement within subsection (1) must include the original declaration, report or statement.”—(Kim Leadbeater.)

This amendment is consequential on amendments 209 and 377.

Clause 16, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17

Recording of cancellations

[Kim Leadbeater]

I beg to move amendment 479, in clause 17, page 11, line 37, leave out “at” and insert “with”.

This amendment clarifies that a cancellation may be given to a practitioner with the person’s GP practice.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

[Kim Leadbeater]

The amendment, which would clarify the drafting, speaks for itself. The important point is that the record of cancellation be with the GP practice as soon as is practicable. It is not necessary for that to take place physically at the practice, as that could potentially delay its delivery.

[Stephen Kinnock]

Clause 17(2) provides that where a notice or indication regarding a cancellation of a first or second declaration is given to a registered medical practitioner “at” the person’s GP practice, that practitioner must record the cancellation in the person’s medical records as soon as possible. Amendment 479 seeks to clarify that the requirement to record the cancellation applies not just where the cancellation is given to a registered medical practitioner physically at the GP practice, but where the cancellation is given to a registered medical practitioner “with” the person’s GP practice, irrespective of whether the notice was given at the GP practice. I hope that that explanation is helpful.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I commend the amendment to the Committee.

Amendment 479 agreed to.

Clause 17, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18

Provision of assistance

Amendment made: 378, in clause 18, page 12, line 9, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—

“(a) a certificate of eligibility has been granted in respect of a person,”.—(Kim Leadbeater.)

This amendment is consequential on NC21.

[Danny Kruger]

I beg to move amendment 462, in clause 18, page 12, line 20, at end insert—

“(3A) When providing a substance under subsection (3) the coordinating doctor must explain to the person that they do not have to go ahead and self administer the substance and they may still cancel their declaration.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Kim Leadbeater]

The hon. Gentleman is making a powerful speech, and I thank him for the respectful way in which he is doing so. He has given an example of a very personal story; it is also important to remember the other personal stories we have all heard. We have with us today in the Public Gallery family members who have lost loved ones. Catie’s mum went to Dignitas in Switzerland for an assisted death, and her daughter could not go with her. As a family they have suffered to this day as a result of that experience.

We need to be really careful about the language we use around suicide. We have spoken about this before. The cases we have heard of are not people who want to die. They are people who want to live, but they are terminally ill. We need to be really sensitive to that, having heard so many examples of families who have been through these really difficult situations. But the hon. Gentleman makes a very good point, and I am minded to support his amendment because I think it comes from a good place.

[Danny Kruger]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady. I hear what she has said; we have had this conversation before. I am afraid that I do insist on my right to use the English language accurately. What is proposed in the Bill is a carve-out of the Suicide Act, so I regret to say to the hon. Lady that I will continue to describe it in terms that are appropriate to it. I hope I do so with absolute sympathy and respect for the many families who have suffered from the trauma of seeing their loved ones die badly—loved ones who would have wished for an assisted death under the terms of the Bill. I am very glad to hear that the hon. Lady supports my amendment. I do not think it would be any sort of imposition on families for the doctors to let the patient know at the last moment that they have the opportunity to turn back.

[Danny Kruger]

That is absolutely right. We have to think about the no doubt quite turbulent emotions that people will have as they approach the end of their life, and to reiterate their genuine autonomy. They are not on a conveyor belt that they cannot get off until the very last moment—until they have passed through this gateway. The amendment seeks to remind them and, indeed, their families of that. I am afraid we do hear terrible stories of people who have arranged their assisted death: often family members have flown in from abroad, doctors have been summoned and so on, and then they feel they have to proceed because, as the hon. Gentleman says, they feel a burden as it is and do not want to be an annoyance at the end by making everybody wait. I am afraid that is indeed the reason for the amendment. I am pleased to hear that it sounds like it will be accepted, and I am grateful to Members who will support it.

Amendment 463 is the other, more substantial, amendment in my name in this group. It would leave out paragraph (c) of clause 18(6), which says that the doctor can assist the patient

“to ingest or otherwise self-administer the substance.”

Here we are in a lot of difficulty and a grey area. Let me try to unpack the reasons for objecting to paragraph (c). The hon. Member for Spen Valley argued in an interview that there is a “very clear line” between the Bill and euthanasia, which is someone else doing the deed. She said that the act

“has to be the decision of the individual, and it has to be the act of the individual”,

which

“creates that extra level of safeguards and protections”.

I agree with her—it is right that we introduce the additional safeguard of insisting that the patient performs the final act themselves.

I recognise that there is a distinction between euthanasia and assisted suicide, and I support the hon. Lady’s attempt to insist on that distinction in the law. It is another safeguard. But the fact is that there is a blurred line between the two, and I can also understand why many people object to the exclusion of euthanasia—of the fatal act being administered by other people. A doctor from Canada said it was inherently ableist to require the patient to self-administer, and I think that is unarguable. If that is the case, the logical provision would be to enable euthanasia, if one believes in the autonomy of the patient.

I am afraid my strong belief is that the reason why euthanasia has not been proposed in the Bill or by the campaign, which has been led by an organisation that used to call itself the Voluntary Euthanasia Society, is because the campaign has concluded that such a Bill would not pass Parliament and believes—I think correctly—that Members of Parliament and members of the public would object to euthanasia. But the logic of the Bill and of the campaign is actually for euthanasia, if one believes genuinely in autonomy, in equal rights and in not discriminating against people who are physically unable to perform the act themselves.

Despite my efforts, hon. Members have not been able to conceptualise the difference between withdrawing a medical treatment that affects a particular medical condition on the one hand, and administering drugs that annihilate the person on the other. There is a meaningful and important difference between those two things. One is a person declining to use a shield, and the other is the person using a sword against themselves. I think there is a difference there, and I regret that colleagues do not see it.

Where I do not see a difference, however, is between a person injecting themselves and asking someone else to inject them. There are two versions of the death of Saul in the Bible. I think this is the only reference to the Bible that I will make in this whole debate, and I make it partly to show that there is an inconsistency in the Bible—there is not a single Biblical view of these matters. In one account of the death of Saul, having been defeated by the Philistines, he asks his servant to run him through with his sword, but his servant refuses, so he falls on his own sword and kills himself. In the other version, he gets a passing soldier to run him through—to kill him.

To me it does not matter: the inconsistency in the story is interesting historically, but conceptually, logically and morally I do not see the difference. Whether you fall on your own sword or ask someone else to do it to you, it is still a sword, you are still actioning it and you are still responsible, if we recognise that the individual has autonomy. But there is a practical difference. We are talking about assistance to die and the role of another person who supports your decision and helps you to fulfil it, but that results in an obscuring of the practical difference. In practice, as we see in clause 18(6), the assistant comes very close to euthanasia. The role of the assistant, in my view, is closer to that of the soldier who kills Saul than of the servant who refused to do it.

[Kim Leadbeater]

The hon. Member is making an interesting philosophical point with his biblical references. I think the point he may be making is that there might not be any difference for the individual, as the result is sadly the same, but I put it to him that there is quite a significant difference for the other person. If we think about the autonomy of the medical professionals we ask to be involved in the process, there is a strong argument that it would be very different for them to be more involved in the process. Does that makes sense?

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

I thank the hon. Member for East Wiltshire for his amendment, and for speaking in the powerful, sensitive way that he did. I also thank my hon. Friends the Members for Spen Valley and for Banbury, who made interventions.

I did not intend to speak to this amendment, but having heard the hon. Member for East Wiltshire speak so powerfully and sensitively, it is important for me to share a few things. My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has said a couple of times that the difference between people who commit suicide and those who will take this route is that the patients have been given less than six months to live, and that was not a choice. I was a Samaritan for years, because I had two failed suicide attempts in my early years, and since then I have battled with mental health demons all my life because of my experiences. To suggest that there is a difference between someone who gets a terminal illness and wants to take this act and people who want to commit suicide, and to suggest that they are doing it out of choice, is wrong. I felt really emotional when that exchange was happening. The reason why I think it is wrong is that, at the time that I wanted to commit suicide, I did not feel that I had a choice. I could not see a way out.

When I was on those Samaritans phonelines, speaking to people who rang in to unpick their feelings about what was driving them to feel suicidal in that moment, it was not because they want to die, but because they were in circumstances that drove them to feel that they had no option but to commit suicide. In some instances, it takes an amount of courage and bravery to even contemplate that option. To diminish that, which I feel is what has, intentionally or unintentionally, happened on occasion, is really wrong, because I have been there, and it was not easy and it was not because I wanted to die.

[Kim Leadbeater]

My hon. Friend makes a powerful point. I certainly have not heard anyone try to diminish the experience of suicidal people. We probably all have our own stories of loved ones who we have either lost to suicide—I know that I do—or who had very severe mental health issues. The point I would make is that the families I have met who have lost loved ones through assisted dying or a harrowing terminal-illness death have said that they desperately wanted to live. That is the distinction I would make, but I appreciate that my hon. Friend is absolutely right that people with suicidal tendencies and ideation also want to live—they just do not feel they have a choice. It is a very delicate debate to have, but please be assured of my sensitivities to it.

[Naz Shah]

I am genuinely grateful for my hon. Friend’s intervention, because I do not want the Committee—or our constituents—to feel that there is an equivalence. There is not. People who are in that space, who ring the Samaritans helpline to speak to them, all desperately want to live a brilliant life. That is what brings us here: each and every one of us wants to make this place the best it can be, so that our country is the best it can be and all our communities, people and constituents—all members of society—thrive. It is a sensitive debate, but let us be careful not to draw a parallel where there is not one. It was important for me to put that on the record.

I will support the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire because we have already voted down an amendment requiring doctors to simply ask the question why. This speaks to the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury raised: I know, through my experience at the Samaritans, as somebody who has attempted suicide and as somebody who has gone on to chair a charity that leads mental health interventions, how difficult it is for a patient has gone through the process of having had that conversation with their family, who might not necessarily agree, and having convinced them that they are going to take this option because they want autonomy, and fear losing it.

I cannot imagine what it must be like for those people, at that moment, saying their final goodbyes, and the level of potential pressure they face right at the last minute, having spoken to everybody and put their family members, and indeed themselves, through the process. Would they not feel internal pressure on themselves to go through with it? Would they really have the option, and not feel, in a sense, obliged to say, “Yes”? Do we really not want to ask that question?

When we debated the amendment requiring doctors to ask the question why, my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud said that doctors would ask it anyway, but that argument would not work in this instance because doctors would not do this anyway. They would not say, “I am about to give you something—have you changed your mind?”, because by that point they are in a process. The drug, in whatever form it takes, is in the process of being, or will have been, handed over to the person who wants to take that option, so it is not the same. I genuinely hope that the Committee will support the amendment, because it is our last option to make this intervention.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-sixth sitting)

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 19th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen Kinnock]

I agree with the sentiment of the hon. Gentleman’s intervention. The challenge is that the way in which the amendment is drafted could well lead to unintended consequences, because the scope is not clear. If we are not clear what the scope is, it could potentially be exponential.

New clause 23 would prevent regulated care homes and hospices from facing any detrimental consequences for not providing or permitting assistance in accordance with the Bill. This also means that their funding must not be conditional on them providing or permitting such assistance to take place on their premises. As a result, a person who is terminally ill and is residing in a care home or hospice could be asked or required to leave that care home or hospice in order to receive assistance under the Bill, if that care home or hospice provider does not wish to allow assisted dying on their premises.

In such circumstances, the care home or hospice provider would not be able to be placed in any detriment as a result of any action or decision taken. This could engage a person’s right under article 8 of the ECHR. Further, public authorities would not be able to persuade care homes or hospices to provide or permit assistance to take place on their premises by offering additional funding if they agreed to do so. Equally, if a public authority gave funding to care homes or hospice providers in recognition of their agreement to provide or permit assisted dying on their premises, and that provider later decided not to provide or permit the assistance, and spent the funding on other matters, the public authority would not be able to recover the funding if it were given unconditionally.

Clause 23 sets out that no registered medical practitioner or other health professional would be under any duty to participate in the provision of assistance in accordance with the Bill. It also sets out that employees cannot be subject to any detriment by their employer for exercising their right to either participate or not participate in the provision of assistance in accordance with the Bill. Further amendment to the clause will be required on Report to ensure that the opt-out in clause 23(1) and the employment protections in clause 23(2) work effectively alongside the duties imposed on health professionals in other provisions of the Bill as amended in Committee.

I hope those observations were helpful.

[Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)]

Thank you for stepping into the breach this morning, Ms McVey.

Clause 23 provides that there will be no obligation on medical practitioners and health professionals to provide assistance as set out in the assisted dying process. We know doctors and other health professionals hold a variety of views on assisted dying. A significant number are in support of what this Bill sets out to do, and the experience from other jurisdictions is that that number increases once it is seen to be working safely and effectively in practice. Others, of course, would object to being involved at any stage and I am very respectful of that. The Bill is about giving terminally ill people choice and autonomy, but it is absolutely right that the principle of autonomy is extended to registered medical practitioners, health professionals and others.

As such, I turn to amendment 480. I agree with the intention behind the amendment—nobody should have a duty to be involved with the provision of assistance in accordance with the legislation—and I think there is consensus across the Committee on that.

However, I am concerned about the drafting of the amendment, the lack of clarity around being directly or indirectly in the provision of assistance, and the framing of the selective list of activities. I fear that the amendment could have unintended consequences and an impact on continuity of care, and I take on board the Minister’s comments about the significant legal uncertainty that that would create. I therefore cannot support the amendment as drafted but, as I have said, I am happy to work with the hon. Member for East Wiltshire to consider an alternative amendment that would better achieve the aim of ensuring that no one has an obligation to take part in the assisted dying process.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

Obviously, the sentiment that we should work with hospices and let them set their own policy is absolutely right—that is the purpose of the amendment—but does the hon. Lady acknowledge that the Minister just said that if any hospice attempts to prevent assisted dying from taking place on their premises, there will be human rights claims? They can have all the consultations and conversations they want, but unless the Bill specifies that they are allowed to opt out, they will be forced to do it.

[Kim Leadbeater]

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point, and I am aware of the Minister’s comments. This will be part of the discussion as we take it forward. That is why this debate is really powerful.

In their written evidence, the trustees at Willow Burn hospice, based in the UK, told us:

“Our Mission is to deliver hospice care of the highest standard to our patients and those important to them...We also believe that we should support and enable people to make the choices that matter to them.”

They said they had not decided their position on assisted dying and remained

“open minded about possible future actions. We believe this stance is in the best interests of patients and their families and reflects the wishes of our community.”

I welcome that open-minded approach and their commitment

“to put care, compassion and dignity at the heart of everything”

they do. Contrary to what the hon. Member East Wiltshire has said, the picture is not black and white. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich in that regard.

Colleagues may remember the evidence given to the Committee by the CEO of Hospice UK, Toby Porter. He clarified for us that institutions do not function in the same way as individuals when it comes to conscience-influencing decisions. He told us:

“There is this idea that your individual opinion guides everything, but with a hospice charity the opposite is true. As many Members will know because of their own work as trustees, the trustees and leadership of a hospice team are required to put personal opinion and interest to one side and always act in the best interest of the charity’s beneficiaries, who are the population.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 195, Q255.]

It is also important to remember that international experience shows that up to 30% to 40% of patients who sign up to the assisted dying process ultimately do not access it. Palliative care may meet their needs, or they may simply change their mind. However, we also know that the reassurance and comfort that the choice of an assisted death provides alongside other treatment and care is really important to them, and I do not believe that reassurance should be denied to some people because of the institution they happen to be in.

[Kit Malthouse]

The hon. Lady is outlining the issues very effectively. No one, of course, is saying that anybody who works at the hospice that may object has to participate. It may say, “No one here will assist.” We have talked about the importance of place. To a certain extent, I have a right as a tenant in a place where I am resident. It seems that my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire is proposing actively to prevent someone from being able to access this in a place that they choose. That feels to me the wrong balance. I wonder whether that is broadly where she is heading.

[Kim Leadbeater]

The right hon. Gentleman makes an important point. The word that we have used a lot—maybe not enough in some respects—is choice. That is important for individuals, but it is important for institutions as well. Putting an institutional opt-out in the Bill would risk creating confusion and distress for patients and their loved ones, and indeed for staff and volunteers.

[Rebecca Paul]

Does the hon. Lady have any concerns about what this position would mean for the end of life workforce? I know we are here to make law, but we cannot ignore the practical consequences for end of life care. If we do not have this carve-out, we could lose a lot of wonderful and great people who work in end of life care and who feel that they are not able to participate, if the hospice cannot specify.

[Kim Leadbeater]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right to acknowledge the wonderful workforce working in end of life care, but there is a range of views within that workforce and there is the individual opt-out. No one has to be involved in this process if they do not want to be. That is clear in the Bill as it stands. I hope that, working together, we can make that even clearer if needed.

Under the Bill, doctors and health professionals already have the ability to opt out for any reason, wherever they work.

[Naz Shah]

Pharmacies have not been mentioned. Would they have the ability to opt out?

[Kim Leadbeater]

It is a good point. My understanding—the Minister might correct me—is that pharmacists currently are within the definition of health professionals, but if they are not, that is an important point, which would be covered by making the change to ensure that no one is under any duty. However, I will definitely check that.

Mr Porter also said:

“hospices evolved out of the community. They exist because communities wanted better deaths. In the end, it is the job of institutions to evolve to fit the values and laws of society as they evolve, rather than vice versa.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 202, Q264.]

The polling on assisted dying shows significant public support for a change in the law, which is one of the main reasons we are here discussing the issue today. The latest figures from the British social attitudes survey, published just this week by the National Centre for Social Research, show that support at 79%, which is unchanged or slightly up on a decade ago. Although I cannot support these amendments, this is an important debate. I think we have conducted ourselves extremely well over the past 24 hours. I think it is important that we continue the debate respectfully and sensitively.

[Danny Kruger]

I, too, am very grateful to you for rescuing us, Ms McVey; thank you. I also thank the hon. Member for Spen Valley: it is nice to be commended for our good conduct, so I am grateful for that. This has been a very interesting debate, and I thank all hon. Members for participating. I appreciate the fact that we have made some progress in understanding each other and potentially improving the Bill, although I regret the lack of support from the Government Front Bench for the amendments that I have tabled.

Let me just refresh memories on the purpose of my amendments. The Bill promoter has tabled amendments to clauses 24 and 25, which we will come to and which keep the phrase

“providing assistance to a person in accordance with this Act”,

but add to it these two other phrases:

“performing any other function under that Act”

and

“assisting a person seeking to end their own life in accordance with that Act”.

Those amendments expand the protection from criminal and civil liability. They mean that performing any other function under the Act and assisting a person seeking to end their own life, in connection with the doing of anything under the Act, are both protected from criminal and civil liability. But the hon. Lady has not tabled a similar amendment to clause 23, and there is a real risk. The British Medical Association, the Royal Pharmaceutical Society and the Royal College of Nursing, as I mentioned yesterday, have all warned that the protection of conscience clause is limited solely to the final act, rather than applying to all functions under the Act. I appreciate that the hon. Lady expresses a commitment to trying to ensure that we do cover everybody and all appropriate actions and activities that take place, but I suggest that that is what my amendment would do.

In response to the objections to the amendment, I appreciate the sudden interest in precision in drafting.

[Kim Leadbeater]

It is not sudden!

[Danny Kruger]

Well, every time that those on my side of the debate raise detailed, particular points we are told, “Oh, the spirit of the text is clear. We’ll sort that out later. It’ll come in guidance.” We are told that we should not be nitpicking, embroidering and so on. Anyway, I appreciate the attention to detail, and I want to respond to some of the points.

With respect, the Minister made a pretty tendentious suggestion that a doctor could opt in to assisted dying and take part in some of the procedures but then suddenly decide to neglect performing others, and that that would not be negligent. I cannot conceive of any court or tribunal conceding that it would not be negligent not to fulfil the obligations under the Act once the procedure has begun—once the doctor has made commitments and already undertaken activities to progress an assisted dying case.

The hon. Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire objected on the grounds that the amendment might give a gardener or cleaner the right to opt out. Proposed new subsection (1B)(b) of clause 23 actually makes it clear that “ancillary” activities are not protected by the conscience clause, so the gardener would not be off the hook—under the amendment, the gardener would still have to mow the lawn.

I recognise that the drafting might not be perfect, but I emphasise that the PBL “Guide to Making Legislation”—by the secretariat to the Parliamentary Business and Legislation Cabinet Committee—makes it clear that Government should not object to Back-Bench amendments on drafting grounds. If there are issues with particular phrasing that cause the Government or the promoter concern, that can be addressed subsequently, so I regret it if the Minister is using drafting issues to justify a refusal to support these amendments.

On new clause 22 and the issue of premises, which we have discussed very interestingly, a couple of objections have been raised. The first relates to shared ownership schemes, which we are all familiar with, particularly for elderly people. The answer is simple. The corporate owner under a shared ownership scheme is not in occupation. Being in occupation has a particular meaning in land law, and it is not the case here that a tenant genuinely in occupation of their own premises could somehow be denied their right to have an assisted death in their own home because of the freehold arrangement of the premises they occupy.

I am grateful for the indication given by Members, particularly my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire, that there may well be circumstances in which it is appropriate for particular premises to opt out of the obligation to facilitate assisted dying, so that a particular institution would have the right to deny permission for assisted death.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-eighth sitting)

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Sarah Olney]

That is not a prospect I particularly want to reflect on, but it is worth noting that the particular risk in assisted dying services is that, as we heard in oral evidence from the chief medical officer, it is really hard to define, first, whether an illness is going to be terminal and, secondly, that somebody has only six months to live. There is an element of subjective judgment in assessing who is going to be eligible for assisted dying. Aligning subjective judgment to a profit incentive could create a serious ethical minefield.

I want to state absolutely clearly for the record that I am not questioning the ethics of doctors or the ethical standards of doctors or of any of the bodies that represent them in any way at all. My question is merely about introducing a profit incentive to this issue. As I said, this process could be contrasted with something like the provision of abortion services. Abortion services are clearly available only to pregnant women. The fact that the qualification, as it were, for this service is on a rather more subjective basis creates a risk.

Without this amendment, I am concerned that the Bill commodifies the end-of-life process and pushes what should be a sensitive, careful process towards being a transactional one. It also increases the risk that everything becomes focused on facilitating ending the patient’s life rather than supporting the holistic ethos of the NHS in addressing all the patient’s needs. Without the amendment, I worry that the Bill opens a door to the commodification of death, as the hon. Member for East Wiltshire has so graphically anticipated. What should be a careful, compassionate process could slide into something more transactional: a service that is marketed, packaged and sold.

We need look only to the parallel of care homes to see that danger writ large. In England, social care has been quietly overtaken by for-profit providers. Today, 75% of adult care homes, and over 80% of children’s homes, are run for profit—not by design or explicit policy, but by the slow creep of market forces. The Economics Observatory, drawing on studies such as Patwardhan et al. 2022, Barron and West 2017 and Bach-Mortensen et al. 2022, reveals a stark truth: for-profit care, particularly where private equity is involved, consistently delivers worse outcomes.

Similarly, a 2019 BMJ study found that private providers running NHS-funded services had higher rates of complications in procedures such as hip replacements compared with NHS trusts. The focus on cost efficiency can lead to skimping on follow-up care or using less experienced staff. Why does that happen? Profit-seeking behaviour drives cuts to staff, to resources and to time. Now, if we transpose that to assisted dying, let us imagine the pressures on a private provider to trim costs and the pressures on the quality of assessments. How thoroughly are mental health conditions, or the risk that something else might be going on, explored? How great is the depth of attention to medical records? Is what is relevant to the doctor influenced by the ticking clock? Will they tick a box rather than a safeguard?

[Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)]

The hon. Lady said that she is not questioning the ethical judgment and practice of doctors, but the comments she is making suggest otherwise.

[Sarah Olney]

Again, I am talking about the companies that are running the service. I am not questioning the ethics of the doctors involved. I am merely suggesting that the people who are commissioning the doctors to carry out the service will have their own priorities that are not directly related to the safety or welfare of patients.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Olney]

We do not have the model to scrutinise, and we do not know within that whether the first or second co-ordinating doctor will be paid for their services in carrying out those initial assessments. To say that there is no incentive for making the final decision ignores the fact that people might be incentivised for making those initial decisions, where the professional judgment is required and may differ between doctors. That is why there is a risk.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Clause 40(4) is very clear that medical practitioners can receive only “reasonable remuneration” for the provision of services, so it is clear that they cannot make money from the provision of assisted dying. Is the hon. Lady saying that where there is a private provider or one commissioned by the NHS—the model that I have set out in the Bill—there is a financial incentive for doctors to do more hip or knee operations, or other things? That is a question about the model of public and private healthcare as it stands, not about assisted dying.

[Sarah Olney]

On the hon. Member’s comment about clause 40, “reasonable” is a fairly elastic term. We will find in time that the word “reasonable” will come to have its own accepted definition, but it does not preclude a profit margin.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I would argue that it does.

[Sarah Olney]

But the Bill does not say that. It does not say that the payment to the doctor should not include any consideration of profit. Regarding hip operations, someone would have one only if they needed it. My point is that assisted dying is one of a range of options at the end of life being presented here. The concern is that people motivated by profit would be incentivised to push for assisted dying at the expense of other options for the patient that do not attract the same level of reward. That is the issue. It is not a binary decision in the way that most treatments are.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rebecca Paul]

It transformed the quality of life of British citizens at a time of mass unemployment and widespread slums, ensuring free healthcare, in the words of Beveridge, from cradle to grave. The provision of healthcare free at the point of delivery was life-changing and life-prolonging. Although it is far from perfect, we have seen time and time again that as a country we can be very proud of the NHS.

The National Health Service Act 1946 came into effect on 5 July 1948, as a direct consequence of the Beveridge report. Section 1 of the Act states:

“It shall be the duty of the Minister of Health…to promote the establishment in England and Wales of a comprehensive health service designed to secure improvement in the physical and mental health of the people of England and Wales and the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of illness”.

It was set up to help people to get better and live healthy lives, and to give hope in situations where otherwise there would be despair. It was lifesaving and life-changing. New clause 36 turns all that on its head. Subsection (4) states that:

“Regulations under this section may for example provide that specified references in the National Health Service Act 2006 to the health service continued under section 1(1) of that Act include references to commissioned VAD services.”

If this new clause passes, the founding principles of the NHS will be monumentally changed to include helping eligible people to commit suicide. That is what it does.

I want to be really clear that it is entirely possible to support assisted dying—to want to ensure that a small group of people, whom palliative care cannot help, have that assisted dying option—but not to support this new clause, which forces provision of the service through the same channels as normal healthcare. Assisted dying is not a medical treatment or a healthcare service and accordingly there should be a degree of separation.

We should be incredibly cautious about incorporating the service into the NHS. It will forever change the relationship between doctor and patient, breed mistrust and fear, discourage vulnerable groups from seeking the healthcare they need and fundamentally violate the Hippocratic oath. Dr Catherine Day, a senior partner of a large GP practice in Coventry, states:

“Trust lies at the heart of the doctor patient relationship. I believe this trust will be shattered if patients consider that their GP…may think that they should end their life and stop being a drain on our NHS.”

Siwan Seaman, a palliative care consultant said:

“How could a terminally ill patient trust a doctor if they know that the doctor was prescribing medication to the patient in the next bed in a bay or cubicle with the intention of ending their life. Letting these assessments take place alongside other NHS services will irreversibly impact on patients’ trust in healthcare professionals and negatively impact our therapeutic relationship with patients as doctors.”

[Kim Leadbeater]

If the hon. Lady is saying that she would not want to see assisted dying services within the NHS, then where does she think they would sit? Would she support my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley’s suggestion that this should be done by the voluntary sector and charities, or would she suggest the private sector?

[Rebecca Paul]

It is important that there is a degree of separation, but I would say to the hon. Lady that it would have made more sense for her to put forward a proposal that we could evaluate, assess, and identify the upsides and downsides of. It would be much easier for me to then come up with suggestions. It does not make sense to ask me, “What is the solution and how would you do this?”, and for me to lay out the many different ways that this could be done, without having first laid a proposal in front of me.

[Kim Leadbeater]

There is a clause that I have laid before the hon. Lady—that is what we are discussing. I will come on to that in my comments. Since she is clear that she does not think this sits within the NHS, she must have given consideration to where she thinks it should sit, if it were to come into effect.

[Rebecca Paul]

I will come on to some of that, and it goes back to my belief that there should be a degree of separation. I think it should be separate from normal healthcare services and there are multiple ways that we could do that. I regret that we are not specifically debating the various different options, with a proposal in front of us detailing exactly how it would work. I am assuming, from the new clause put forward, that the proposal is for this to go through the NHS as healthcare; that is the only assumption I can make based on what is in front of me in this Bill, because there is no other detail to give me any other impression.

Sarah Davies, a consultant respiratory physician in north Wales, argues for a separate service so that ordinary NHS care is not associated with assisted dying. She said:

“It is already my experience that patients and their families are anxious about limiting treatment when they are dying. Many people believe that symptom control medication, such as those delivered in a syringe-driver to aid symptom control amount to hastening or bringing on death. This perception can hinder the patient’s acceptance of medications which can afford significant alleviation of distressing symptoms.”

I have raised my concerns about providing an assisted dying service alongside and in conjunction with day-to-day healthcare many times over the last few weeks. I think it is a massive mistake both for patients and healthcare staff. It blurs the lines of what a treatment is, increases the risk of bad decisions and, as we heard so powerfully from Dr Jamilla Hussain, it will discourage some of the most vulnerable groups from seeking essential healthcare. We have received so much evidence and it is really important that we take it on board, so I will be quoting some in my speech.

Dr Green of the BMA said:

“It should be set up through a separate service with a degree of separation. We believe that is important for patients, because it would reassure patients who may be anxious about the service that it would not just be part of their normal care… It would reassure doctors, because doctors who did not want to have any part would not feel that it was part of their normal job, whereas the doctors who wanted to go ahead would be assured of having support, emotional support and proper training.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 45, Q32.]

In oral evidence, Professor Preston argued for a separate system and pointed to the Swiss example. She said:

“In covid, we did research in care homes, and there was real concern about ‘do not resuscitate’ orders and emergency care plans that were blanketed across the care homes. Care home staff were traumatised by that, so there are real issues. We know that there are real issues day to day in how people are treated within the NHS. I think it is unconscious—I do not think people are intending it—but we know that people are treated differently and that different things are done. That is partly why we think a system outside that would protect them, because then you are not within the healthcare team that is treating you and giving you advice about such things”.

She went on to talk about the Swiss system, also being adopted in Germany and Austria, which seeks to

“protect these people by keeping it one step removed”

from normal healthcare. She said:

“Most hospitals in Switzerland will not allow assisted dying to occur, because they do not want a lack of trust in their patient group.” ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 246, Q317.]

I therefore support amendment 525, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire, which would amend clause 32 in order not to allow the provision of the assisted dying service to be done through the health service. That would ensure that much-needed degree of separation. In light of what the Bill’s promoter has said, I recognise that there are different ways to do that; I am very open to those different ways, but I need to see that degree of separation from normal healthcare. I also support new amendment (a) to new clause 36, also tabled by my hon. Friend, which does the same thing.

Let me come to the other amendments in this group. Amendments 537 and 528, tabled by the hon. Members for Shipley and for Richmond Park respectively, are important to debate—we have had some good debate on them this morning—as they raise the different ways of delivering an assisted dying service. I have been listening closely to the points made. Amendment 537 would limit the provision of an assisted death to charities rather than to the NHS, and conversely, amendment 528 would limit provision to public authorities only.

I do not have the answer on the best way to do this, and that is why I regret that a royal commission has not been set up to properly investigate and evaluate all the options and recommend the best way forward. Instead, we are here without all the relevant information and expertise available to us, trying to land on the best way to do it. That is not the way to make such an important decision. I can tell the Committee, however, that—like many others, including my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire—I have huge reservations about delivering such a service through the NHS alongside normal healthcare.

I agree with much of the evidence that has already been cited: there should be a degree of separation. The BMA said that assisted dying could be part of the NHS, but should be outside existing care pathways and separate in some way:

“Our view is that assisted dying should not be part of the standard role of doctors or integrated into existing care pathways—it is not something that a doctor can just add to their usual role… The separate service could take the form of a professional network of specially trained doctors from across the country who have chosen to participate, who come together to receive specialised training, guidance, and both practical and emotional support. They would then provide the service within their own locality—for example, in the patient’s usual hospital, or their home. Or it could be a combination of some specialist centres and an outreach facility.”

In its written evidence, the Royal College of General Practitioners also proposed a separate service:

“The establishment of a separate service which covered every stage of the process would ensure healthcare professionals of multiple disciplines (including GPs) who wanted to do so could still opt in to provide assisted dying, but this would be arranged through a different pathway.”

I agree with both bodies that the service should be separated out in some way. It is now apparent that my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer), whose amendments would have created an assisted dying agency, was on the right track. I regret that the Committee did not explore his ideas in any real detail during our proceedings.

We received important written evidence from Robert Twycross, a pioneer of palliative care who sadly died in October, but had given his friend Ariel Dempsey permission to submit it. Dr Dempsey writes:

“Twycross recommends a de-medicalized model in which AD is a separate service, delivered outside of healthcare practice. He argues for a standalone Department for Assisted Dying, separate from the NHS. He writes, ‘Data indicate that the primary reason for a persistent desire for AD is to relieve distress over a perceived loss of autonomy and to experience a sense of personal control over the circumstances of their dying. These are not medical reasons. Thus, for patients fulfilling the legal criteria, a separate AD service should be established. Indeed, this would be the best way to prevent a corrosive effect on medical practice generally.’ ‘Given the widespread disquiet felt by doctors, a law with minimal medical involvement would be the most equitable.’ He suggests, ‘One way to achieve this would be for [AD] to be delegated to a stand-alone Department for Assisted Dying, completely separate from the NHS and with its own budget. Victoria almost achieves this with its combination of Care Navigators, mandatory training for participating doctors, and a separate Voluntary Assisted Dying Statewide Pharmacy Service.’

Twycross emphasizes that hospice and palliative care must be a ‘sanctuary’ for patients – ‘an assisted dying free zone. Even in the absence of AD, some people decline referral to palliative care despite unrelieved pain and/or other distressing symptoms because they fear they will be “drugged to death”…This unfounded fear will most likely be enhanced if AD is legalized, particularly if palliative care is involved’ and result in an overall increase in suffering.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

Diolch yn fawr—thank you very much, Ms McVey. I rise to speak to clause 32 stand part and to new clauses 36 and 37.

It is gratifying that everybody on the Committee has taken so seriously the need to recognise where the powers lie in relation to the Senedd in Wales and Welsh Ministers, and Westminster and the Secretary of State. The evidence we heard from Professor Emyr Lewis is that clause 32 would contravene the Sewel convention by giving the UK Government powers of regulation to provide an assisted dying service in the NHS in Wales.

I am very appreciative of the way in which we have discussed the matter. This is, of course, a private Member’s Bill; by the nature of the subject it is discussing, it is unprecedented since devolution in 1999. As we talk about constitutional matters and the Sewel convention, it is important to remember what we are doing as a Bill Committee: we are trying to make sure that we tease out the questions about the environment in which all these services will be provided, and that we are giving people who are at the most vulnerable time in their life the appropriate protection and the appropriate autonomy. That is what we should always be balancing.

New clause 36, which relates to England, and new clause 37 certainly appear—I use the word with as much generosity as I can—to clarify the responsibilities as between Welsh Ministers and Secretaries of State. My amendments would go through the Bill clause by clause and would then insert a definition into clause 40, rather than making a broad statement as the new clauses do.

Although we have debated the content of new clause 36, I believe strongly that it is not for us in Westminster to specify how Welsh Ministers may make provision for those areas over which they have responsibility. It is appropriate that we have a debate, because that raises awareness of the potential for a legislative consent motion or motions. It is appropriate to have that discussion; it is also appropriate to be aware that there may be a discussion about the commencement date and the implications, which we will address in the debate on a later amendment.

I am looking particularly at Wales, and new clause 37 would do what my amendments were attempting: it would give us future-proofing. The powers that have been granted to the Senedd in Wales are considerably different, and lesser in their extent, than those that have been granted to Scotland and to Northern Ireland. That may well change in future, and new clause 37 would allow for that.

I put it on the record that I await further discussions between Welsh Ministers and the hon. Member for Spen Valley, although I understand that some have already taken place. It is already on the record that UK Ministers, the Secretary of State, the hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham and I will have further discussions as we move ahead. There will be opportunities on Report to do what the Committee is trying to achieve, which is to future-proof the legislation and ensure that it works as effectively as possible.

I welcome the changes that the new clauses would make. Clause 32, as it stands, does not recognise the constitutional arrangements of the United Kingdom, and it is important that we do that.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I thank the right hon. Lady for her constructive and collegiate approach to the Committee, particularly on devolution. I have contacted the Welsh Government and am keen to speak to them when Committee proceedings have finished. They have said that they are happy to do that. I am keen to continue to work with the right hon. Lady and other colleagues on devolution to ensure that we get the Bill right for the people of England and Wales.

[Liz Saville Roberts]

I appreciate the hon. Lady’s comments. I think there is a lesson to be learned. I understand that the legislation is unprecedented in coming through the private Member’s Bill route. After this, we will have to think about how we deal with such legislation because we are feeling our way. I appreciate the opportunity to work with the co-operation of colleagues on something for which there is no road map, but I fear, although I also appreciate, that we are making the road map as we go.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. I have observed two things this morning. First, the reality has really hit home. Are we going to look at the amendment regarding local authorities providing the service? Are we excluding private providers? Are we excluding big firms? A new service has to be designed. Will it be two organisations or one? How will the Bill be delivered? We do not even have that before us, and that concerns me deeply.

[Kim Leadbeater]

As my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central said, it is common practice in healthcare and in the NHS for services to be commissioned in a range of ways. We would not put such a level of detail in the Bill, but it would be normal practice for the Secretary of State to do that commissioning work. My hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West has her own experience of that, I imagine.

[Naz Shah]

Absolutely. As a former commissioner, I am very familiar with commissioning; I commissioned millions of pounds’ worth of services across Bradford when I was in the NHS. The difference is that that was under Government Bills that had pre-consultation, impact assessments and a model that was debated. None of that has happened with this Bill. I agree that in an ideal world the process set out in new clauses 36 and 37 would be the right one, but without an impact assessment and a consultation, I am afraid that I have been left really disheartened.

I am disheartened about something else, too. I thank all Committee members, regardless of the points that they have or have not made, for the way in which the debate has been conducted, both before and during our sittings. On a few occasions, hon. Members have questioned other Members’ reasons for tabling amendments—but to suggest, as has been suggested today, that we are scaremongering, when we are actually going through the detail, is something else.

I am afraid. This is not me scaremongering; this is me being afraid for women who are anorexic. This is a gendered Bill. There are amendments that I support because I want to strengthen the Bill. I genuinely do not think that the Bill, as it stands, has that strength. I feel disheartened that we are talking about what is going to happen on Third Reading and potential votes, when we should be concentrating on the amendments on the selection list.

I oppose the new clauses tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, which would replace clause 32. As my hon. Friend explained, new clause 36 outlines the powers that the Secretary of State for Health would have over voluntary assisted dying services in England. New clause 37 does the same for Wales, but makes changes that are necessary because health is a devolved power. I will concentrate on new clause 36, as I represent a constituency in England.

Put very simply, if new clause 36 is agreed to, it will give the Secretary of State three sorts of power. First, it will give the Health Secretary powers under subsection (4) to, effectively, change the National Health Service Act 2006. Secondly, it will give the Health Secretary powers to set out regulations about how any service, whether public or private, carries out assisted dying services. Thirdly, the Health Secretary will have powers under subsection (1) to commission assisted dying services. As I understand it, the wording means that assisted dying services could be provided directly by the NHS or by private firms working on contract for the NHS. I will discuss those powers in the order in which I mentioned them.

Subsection (4) of new clause 36 says that the Health Secretary may pass regulations that

“may for example provide that specified references in the National Health Service Act 2006 to the health service continued under section 1(1) of that Act include references to commissioned VAD services.”

To make it clear how the new clause works, I will quote from the subsection of the National Health Service Act 2006 that it would affect. It states:

“The Secretary of State must continue the promotion in England of a comprehensive health service designed to secure improvement—

(a) in the physical and mental health of the people of England, and

(b) in the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of physical and mental illness.”

That Act is an adaptation of the original National Health Service Act 1946, section 1(1) of which states:

“It shall be the duty of the Minister of Health…to promote the establishment in England and Wales of a comprehensive health service designed to secure improvement in the physical and mental health of the people of England and Wales and the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of illness”.

The 1946 and 2006 Acts both give the Health Secretary a very clear set of duties that I think we can all support. Those duties have been the basis of how the NHS has been run for the nearly eight decades for which it has existed.

My hon. Friend’s Bill would give the Secretary of State powers to change the duties set out in section 1(1) of the 2006 Act. I ask my hon. Friend and both Ministers why the Bill needs to give the Secretary of State those powers. The only reason I can think of is that someone who was part of the drafting process has pointed out that the Health Secretary’s current duties might be incompatible with assisted dying.

The Health Secretary has duties to secure improvement in the people’s physical and mental health and in the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of physical and mental illness. Someone could bring a legal challenge on the basis that assisted dying does not fit with that duty, and that challenge might well succeed. I think that, to prevent that happening, my hon. Friend has proposed subsection (1) of new clause 36. If there is any other reason why she has suggested that we should give those powers to the Secretary of State, it is important that the Committee understands and hears it.

What is proposed underlines just how major a change the Bill would make. Since the NHS started operations in 1948, we have had a clear understanding of what it is there for. The 2006 Act is little different from the 1946 Act in that respect. For nearly 80 years, we have had an NHS that is there to improve health and to improve the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of illnesses. The fact that we may have to change that shows us that we are taking a very big step indeed. To make such a fundamental change to the NHS, we should have had the best possible evidence and proper consultation, not three days of witness hearings and then hundreds of pieces of written evidence, often published after we had finished discussing the topics to which they relate. That is nowhere near good enough.

The next set of powers that I want to talk about is mentioned in subsection (3) of new clause 36, which says that the Health Secretary

“may by regulations make other provision about voluntary assisted dying services in England (whether or not the services are commissioned VAD services).”

I absolutely accept that if we have assisted dying services in England, the Health Secretary should ensure that they are properly regulated. That will have to include privately provided services as well as those offered on the NHS. However, I must ask: why does the Bill say that the Secretary of State “may” pass such regulations? The best interpretation I can think of is that a future Health Secretary might decide that private firms should provide assisted dying services directly to paying customers rather than via outsourced NHS contracts. In that case, the Health Secretary would need to provide regulations for those private sector services.

If that interpretation is correct, surely we could have tighter wording. For example, the new clause could say that if the Secretary of State decides to allow private firms to provide assisted dying to paying customers, the Secretary of State must make regulations to govern that. I would welcome clarification on the point, because I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley previously accepted an amendment—I think it was amendment 477—

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Report stage
Friday 20th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

It is an honour and a privilege to open the debate on Third Reading of the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill. It has been a long journey to get here, and I do not underestimate the significance of this day. It is not often that we are asked to wrestle with issues of morality, ethics and humanity, but with great privilege in this job comes great responsibility, and never more so than at a time like this.

Benjamin Franklin told us that

“in this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.”

In this House we debate the latter incessantly, but here and in the country as a whole discussing death is something that we tend to shy away from, yet it will come to us all and to all those we love. We all have our own experiences of death, loss and grief. There are good deaths and bad deaths. I, like many, have experienced both.

I appreciate that, for some colleagues, the journey to this point has been a difficult one. I want to pay tribute to the way in which the overwhelming majority of Members have approached the subject. Second Reading back in November was quite rightly seen as an example of Parliament at its best. Contributions from across the Chamber were incredibly powerful, the atmosphere was respectful, and people listened with care. I hope that we will see the same today.

I want to thank you, Mr Speaker, and your team along with the fantastic Clerks and procedural experts who have ensured that parliamentary protocols have been followed and have guided us through the intricacies of what can be a complex parliamentary process—one that is steeped in tradition, but not always easy to follow. Of course, process is important, but it is also important to remember that we are not voting on the merits of parliamentary procedure; we are voting on an issue that matters deeply to our constituents. Indeed, the issue before us is very personal for many people—so many of our constituents, but many of us as well. It is an issue that transcends party politics. I thank colleagues from across the House who have shared their very personal stories with me.

I am grateful to all colleagues who have studied the detail of the Bill. It is essential that we come to a decision based on the content of what it actually says. I have been pleased to work with Members on all sides of the debate to ensure that the legislation is something that Parliament can be proud of—a cogent, workable Bill that has one simple thread running through it: the need to correct the profound injustices of the status quo and to offer a compassionate and safe choice to terminally ill people who want to make it.

I will not go into the amendments in detail, as I know that is not the purpose of this debate, but whether by adding further safeguards and protections for patients through additional training around coercive control, the addition of specialist expertise through the inclusion of multidisciplinary panels, widening the provision for professionals to opt out of the assisted dying process, providing additional employment protections, or prohibiting the advertising of assisted dying, cross-party working has strengthened the Bill.

[Simon Hoare (North Dorset) (Con)]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for giving way. What level of concern does it give her that, between Second Reading and today, a growing canon of professionals and their independent professional bodies have urged great caution about this Bill, not on the principle, but because they are opposed to the details of this Bill and believe it should be defeated?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. I think what he is saying is that people have got different views, and they do have different views; we have different views in this House, and different people in different professions have different views. Every royal college has a neutral position on assisted dying because of that.

I have been pleased to work with Members on all sides of the debate to ensure that this legislation is something that Parliament can be proud of, and the many safeguards in this Bill ensure that only terminally ill patients who are eligible under the strict criteria and want to access assisted dying can do so.

[Wera Hobhouse (Bath) (LD)]

I felt disturbed by quite a lot of the emails that I received from constituents—some of them who are my friends and people I like—implying that we here are either too stupid or careless to care for the most vulnerable. Is it not true that we all do care, whatever decision we make today, and that we have to continue to educate people and tell them what this Bill is about?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I thank the hon. Member for that intervention, and she is absolutely right; the detail does matter. That is why I am so grateful to colleagues who have engaged in the detail. We know that there are different views within the public, and we have to take on board the concerns of vulnerable groups—that is why the safeguards are so important—but I would also say that there is no one more vulnerable than someone who is dying.

[Richard Burgon (Leeds East) (Lab)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I am just going to make some progress.

Patients must have

“an inevitably progressive illness or disease which cannot be reversed by treatment”

and a person is not considered to be terminally ill only because they have a disability or a mental disorder. These clear, strict criteria, plus the multiple capacity assessments, exclude possible serious mental health disorders such as anorexia.

I was also very pleased to support the change advocated for by Marie Curie and Hospice UK, which would ensure an assessment of palliative and end-of-life care as part of the first report on the Act. We know from other countries, in no small part due to the 14-month inquiry by the Health and Social Care Committee, that palliative care and assisted dying can and do work side by side to give terminally ill patients the care and choice they deserve in their final days. It should not be an either/or for dying people, and we need to channel our energies into supporting all options for terminally ill people.

[Calum Miller (Bicester and Woodstock) (LD)]

I am very grateful to the hon. Lady for giving way. As she knows, the leading experts in palliative care have come out to oppose the Bill, and they point to the fact that hospices are underfunded and do not have the same ability to serve patients. I therefore gently question whether we are in a position today to make a judgment that patients truly would have a choice at the end of life.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I thank him for his intervention, but I would say, as I have said previously, that people working in palliative care have a mixed range of views on this subject. I have met with palliative care doctors, and some are very supportive of a change in the law because of the suffering they have seen.

[Richard Burgon]

Will my hon. Friend give way on that particular point?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I am just going to make some progress, if I may. But, as I was saying, it is an either/or decision for us today: either we vote for the safe, effective, workable reform contained in this Bill, or we say that the status quo is acceptable.

Over recent months, I have heard hundreds of stories from people who have lost loved ones in deeply difficult and traumatic circumstances, along with many terminally ill people themselves. I spent some time with some of these families yesterday. They are real people with real stories and they deserve to be heard.

Adil’s terminally ill father took his own life by buying drugs on the dark web. It was his third attempt, and Adil found him in a truly desperate state. He and his sister will never get over that night, nor the police investigation that followed. Katie waved her mum off as she made the lonely and costly journey to Switzerland, where she had a peaceful and dignified death. But the family had no chance to say a proper goodbye and her dad made the journey home grieving and alone.

Others have had to watch their loved ones die harrowing deaths despite receiving excellent end-of-life care. Warwick’s wife Ann, suffering from peritoneal cancer, had the maximum dose of sedative, but it was not enough to stop the choking and suffocation, and she begged him to help her put an end to her suffering. But he did not want her last memory to be of him stood over her with a pillow. There are many, many more such stories.

Perhaps most importantly, I have spoken to terminally ill people themselves. We have spent a lot of time talking about them, but not always with them. Pamela and Sophie both have terminal breast cancer, and they shared their stories yesterday. Pamela is a proud Christian who just wants to have choice when her time comes. Sophie, who is allergic to opioids, wants to ensure that her beautiful daughter has nothing but happy memories of their time together. Not supporting the Bill today is not a neutral act. It is a vote for the status quo. It fills me with despair to think that MPs could be here in another 10 years’ time hearing the same stories.

[Richard Burgon]

I thank my hon. Friend for giving way; she is being very kind. I came into this House supporting the principle of assisted dying, and I thought very carefully before voting against the Bill on Second Reading. There are differing views, but I want to ask my hon. Friend, before MPs put their name not to the principle of assisted dying but to this Bill specifically, why the vast majority of primary care doctors, geriatricians and groups representing people with disabilities, eating disorders and domestic violence are all opposed not to the principle but to this Bill specifically. Some people who are supportive of the principle of assisted dying do not support this specific Bill; can my hon. Friend explain their opposition?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I think we have covered that point already. These are not homogeneous groups of people; they have different views and opinions.

If we look at the inconsistencies in the current law, it just does not make sense. If someone with a terminal illness voluntarily stops eating and drinking, it is legal for them to starve themselves to death. A competent patient has the right to refuse foods and fluids even if they will die. The exercising of that right is sometimes proposed as an alternative to assisted dying. I suppose it could be argued that starving oneself to death is one way of taking control at the end of life, but it is a deeply traumatic experience for the person and their loved ones, and there are people here today who have direct experience of that.

[Melanie Ward (Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy) (Lab)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

--- Later in debate ---

[Kim Leadbeater]

I will make some progress.

We have a system in which it legal for someone to starve themselves to death, which can take days or weeks, but where it is not legal for someone to seek assistance from a doctor to take an approved substance themselves to end their pain or suffering and take back control in their dying days. It is also legal in this country for someone to discharge themselves from medical care or refuse life-sustaining treatment such as ventilation, CPR or antibiotics, as long as they have the mental capacity to do so and are making the decision of their own accord, without harassment from anyone else. Colleagues might think that is fine, and I agree, but there is no requirement for two doctors, a psychiatrist, and a social worker, and there is no lawyer or judge. It is legal, yet what is being proposed in this Bill, with so many more safeguards and protections, is not. It simply does not make sense.

[Dr Ben Spencer (Runnymede and Weybridge) (Con)]

rose—

[Kim Leadbeater]

I am not going to take any more interventions, because lots of people want to speak.

Then there are the criminal offences that the Bill introduces—none of which exist now—including life imprisonment for anyone who induces another person to take the approved substance, and 14 years in prison for coercion, dishonesty or pressure. It is a robust process that goes further than any other piece of legislation in the world, and it is far safer and significantly more compassionate than what we have now.

If we look internationally, there are clear, well-established, safe and compassionate assisted dying laws in existence. On Tuesday I joined doctors from Australia who used three key words repeatedly: choice, control and relief. Dr Greg Mewett has 20 years of experience as a GP and 22 years as a palliative care physician, and he spoke about the thorough approach that he has taken to ensure safety and efficacy of the assisted dying process. Perhaps the most stand-out quote from that session came from Dr Jacky Davis, chair of Healthcare Professionals for Assisted Dying, who said that by introducing assisted dying,

“no more people will die but far fewer people will suffer”.

This is not a choice between living and dying. It is a choice for terminally ill people about how they die. I fully appreciate that some colleagues would never vote for any version of this Bill, and I am respectful of that despite disagreeing with them. However, I say to colleagues who are supportive of a change in the law but are hesitant about whether now is the time, that if we do not vote for a change in the law today, we will have many more years of heartbreaking stories from terminally ill people and their families, of pain and trauma—

[Dame Siobhain McDonagh (Mitcham and Morden) (Lab)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I am going to finish.

There will be stories of suicide attempts, post-traumatic stress disorder, lonely trips to Switzerland, police investigations, and everything else we have all heard of in recent months. As the Commission on Assisted Dying said in 2011, 14 years ago:

“The current legal status of assisted dying [in the UK] is inadequate and incoherent. It outsources a healthcare issue abroad, especially to Dignitas, instead of the Government and Parliament assuming responsibility.”

That was 14 years ago, and we are in exactly the same position today. Things have got to change.

As the Government’s impact assessment states, the Bill will improve equity of choice, ensuring that terminally ill adults from all socioeconomic backgrounds can access end-of-life options within a regulated and safe framework.

I will draw my comments to a close. There are essentially two ways in which we can look at the situation we are in. We can look at it through a legal lens. As legislators, we have a duty to change the law where it is failing, and when the last four Directors of Public Prosecutions tell us that the law needs to change, surely we have a duty to listen. We need scrutiny before people die, not after. Most importantly, there is the human lens, which is how I approach most things. Giving dying people choice about how they die is about compassion, control, dignity and bodily autonomy. Surely we should all have the right—

[Dame Siobhain McDonagh]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I am going to finish shortly.

Surely we should all have the right to decide what happens to our bodies and decide when enough is enough. Of course, giving people the right to choose does not take away the right not to choose.

Today, we can vote with either our hearts or with our heads, but either way, we should end up in the same Lobby. On a compassionate, human level, and as responsible lawmakers, we should support this desperately needed reform, which is rigorous, practical and safe, and which is rooted in the principles that should underpin any legislation: compassion, justice and human dignity.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. I think he might have read some of my speech, which I will carry on with.

I will set out why the Bill is not safe, and speak about the two amendments that I tabled: amendment 14, which we have nodded through today, and amendment 38, which we will not get the chance to vote on. Amendment 14 dealt with the issue of voluntarily stopping eating and drinking, or VSED, which has been used as a “bridge” to assisted death in other jurisdictions. I am pleased that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley accepted that amendment, but let me be very clear: this does not close the anorexia loophole—that was the subject of another amendment. Voluntarily stopping eating and drinking is not what happens to people with anorexia. People with anorexia stop eating and drinking because they have a psychiatric illness. Those are two categorically different issues. I must make it absolutely clear that even though amendment 14 has passed today, it does not address concerns about anorexia or close that loophole.

Members in the other place are already raising the concern that, because this is a private Member’s Bill, they do not believe that they can provide all the necessary safeguards if we give a Third Reading today to a Bill that is not safe to be delivered to the public. At least 60 women with anorexia in multiple countries have died by assisted death when they needed treatment, not help to die. Every one of them was assessed to have capacity by two doctors.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Naz Shah]

I will make some progress.

Hundreds of eating disorder experts, doctors, lawyers, charities, family members and people with lived experience urged Parliament to close this loophole and support amendment 38. As a Committee, we failed to heed their warning. We have now learned that the one remaining amendment that could protect people with eating disorders will not even be voted on.

Our responsibility is to make the Bill safe. We know what happens when politicians think they know better than the experts. Let us make it clear: the Royal College of Psychiatrists, the Royal College of Physicians, the Royal College of Pathologists, palliative care doctors, the British Geriatrics Society, almost every eating disorder charity and almost every disabled people’s group do not support this Bill. That is not because they do not believe in the principle; they are warning us about the dangers of this Bill, and of getting this wrong.

Our job is not to be activists—to fight until our last breath for the principle, whatever shape or form it is delivered in. Of course we believe in causes—that is why each and every one of us is in Parliament—but we legislators must listen to the experts, heed the evidence, scrutinise and debate the ideas that are before us, and deliver for our constituents laws that are safe, workable and effective. We have a proud history; the likes of Florence Nightingale—the lady with the lamp—broke every barrier possible to heal the wounded, provide care for the vulnerable and reduce the chance of death. Those are the principles that our great NHS was founded on. We must ask ourselves whether those fundamental principles will still be intact if the Bill passes. Will they be there to protect those who face a postcode lottery in healthcare and palliative care, the most vulnerable, and those who have faced the greatest hardships in life and feel like a burden? Will those principles be there to protect those who feel like giving up, but whom we could help back up and push towards a better life? Instead, we will be giving them a way to give up, even if they could have survived.

This is the question for all Members: what is the margin of error that we are willing to risk today when it comes to something as serious as death? I urge Members to vote against this Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I will not.

Those are the words that will give powers to Ministers and to the Secretary of State to exercise his or her discretion with the most cursory of oversight from this place.

Let us be absolutely clear on what we are choosing to do. Let us be absolutely clear that it is on us—it is our responsibility—to think not just for those who have options and power, and those who will not be intimidated, but for those who will be. We must think of the weak and vulnerable, to whom the Mother of the House referred, and for the communities in our country who already do not trust the health service, reject vaccination, choose not to come early for cancer diagnoses and already have the worst health outcomes. We need to think of them. Choosing to make that gap greater is not just enabling someone to access care, but actively rejecting others in our community who should seek care but will not because of the fear this will raise in their hearts. We need to think really hard about that.

To those who say that there will be no change and that, “This is it; there can be no further change,” I say that the closest legal equivalent to this legislation is the Canadian legislation. The closest legal equivalent to us is the Canadian Parliament. The closest equivalent to the national health service is the Canadian health system. I therefore give you—

[Kim Leadbeater]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am not giving way. [Interruption.] The hon. Lady has spoken for many hours; I am speaking for five minutes.

The experience of Roger Foley, a Canadian living with a degenerative condition, warns us:

“As Canada has expanded its assisted dying law, I have faced neglect, verbal abuse, and denial of essential care. I’ve been told my care needs are too much work, and my life has been devalued. Worse still, I have been approached and told by healthcare staff to consider opting for Medical Aid in Dying. Instead of offering compassionate support to alleviate my suffering, it is suggested…that I should end my life.”

Sadly, this is not the only example we have heard of this; we have also heard of veterans with post-traumatic stress order and others with limiting conditions. Today, sadly, we have even said that those who merely feel pressure are allowed to access this service.

Members have a real choice today. When that first 18 or 19-year-old—that first individual—goes and asks for this, it will be we who made that decision. It will be on our consciences. It will be a decision that has fundamentally changed the relationship between the individual and the state in a way that can never be reversed.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Report stage
Friday 13th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Mr Speaker]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment (b) to new clause 13, at end insert—

“(5A) The Secretary of State may only approve a device under subsection (5) if the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency has approved the device for that purpose.

(5B) Before making any regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must consult the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency.”

This amendment requires that the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency be consulted before making regulations and that medical devices can only be approved for self-administration if they have been approved by the MHRA.

Amendment (c) to new clause 13, at end insert—

“(5A) Regulations under subsection (5) must forbid the use of any device used for the self-administration of a gas.”

This requires the Secretary of State to forbid the use of medical devices which cause death by the administration of a gas.

Amendment (a) to new clause 13, leave out subsection (7).

This removes the power to make regulations that may make any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament (known as Henry VIII power) from this new clause.

New clause 14—Prohibition on advertising—

“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision prohibiting—

(a) the publication, printing, distribution or designing (anywhere) of advertisements whose purpose or effect is to promote a voluntary assisted dying service;

(b) causing the publication, printing, distribution or designing of such advertisements.

(2) The regulations may contain exceptions (for example, for the provision of certain information to users or providers of services).

(3) Regulations under this section may make any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament.

(4) But regulations under this section—

(a) may not amend this Act, and

(b) must provide that any offence created by the regulations is punishable with a fine.

(5) In this section “voluntary assisted dying service” means—

(a) any service for or in connection with the provision of assistance to a person to end their own life in accordance with this Act, or

(b) any other service provided for the purposes of any of sections 5 to 27.”

This clause imposes a duty to make regulations prohibiting advertisements to promote services relating to voluntary assisted dying under the Bill.

Amendment (b) to new clause 14, in subsection (2), leave out from “exceptions” to the end of subsection (3) and insert—

“( ) for the following—

communication made in reply to a particular request by an individual for information about a voluntary assisted dying service;

(b) communication which is—

(i) intended for health professionals or providers of voluntary assisted dying services, and

(ii) made in a manner and form unlikely to be seen by potential service users.

(3) Regulations under this section may make provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament, but may not amend this Act or the Suicide Act 1961.”

This amendment would limit the exceptions that can be created to the advertising ban set out in NC14 and also provides that regulations cannot amend the Suicide Act 1961, which includes the offence of assisting and encouraging suicide.

Amendment (a) to new clause 14, leave out subsection (3).

This removes the power to make regulations that may make any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament (known as Henry VIII power) from this new clause.

New clause 15—Investigation of deaths etc—

“(1) In section 1 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (duty to investigate certain deaths), after subsection (7) insert—

“(7A) In this Chapter a reference to an “unnatural death” does not include a death caused by the self-administration by the deceased of an approved substance, within the meaning of the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Act 2025, that was provided to the deceased in accordance with that Act.”

(2) In section 20 of that Act (medical certificate of cause of death), after subsection (4) insert—

“(4A) Regulations under subsection (1) may make, in respect of cases where assistance was provided or purportedly provided to the deceased under the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Act 2025—

(a) such provision that is similar to, or that corresponds to, provision mentioned in subsection (1) as the Secretary of State considers appropriate;

(b) such further provision as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(4B) Regulations under subsection (1) must provide that in cases where the cause of death appears, to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person issuing a certificate under the regulations, to be the self-administration by the deceased of an approved substance (within the meaning of the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Act 2025) that was provided to the deceased in accordance with that Act, the certificate must—

(a) state the cause of death to be “assisted death”, and

(b) contain a record of the illness or disease which caused the person to be terminally ill within the meaning of that Act.”

(3) In Schedule 1 to that Act (suspension of investigations etc), in the definition in paragraph 1(6) of “homicide offence”, after paragraph (d) insert—

“(e) an offence under section 31, 32 or 33 of the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Act 2025;”.”

This new clause provides that references in Chapter 1 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (investigations into deaths) to unnatural deaths do not include deaths caused by self-administration of approved substances provided in accordance with the Bill. It makes offences under clauses 31 to 33 “homicide offences” for the purposes of that Act. It also amends the powers in that Act in respect of medical certificates of cause of death.

Amendment (a) to new clause 15, in subsection (1), leave out from “section” to “(medical” in subsection (2) and insert

“20 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009”

This amendment ensures that deaths from assisted dying will still fall within the coroner’s duty to investigate deaths under section 1 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.

New clause 20—Guidance about operation of Act—

“(1) The Secretary of State must issue guidance relating to the operation of this Act.

(2) The guidance need not (but may) relate to matters about which the Welsh Ministers may issue guidance under subsection (4) (“Welsh devolved matters”).

(3) Before issuing guidance under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) the Chief Medical Officer for England,

(b) the Chief Medical Officer for Wales,

(c) such persons with learning disabilities and other persons who have protected characteristics as the Secretary of State considers appropriate,

(d) such persons appearing to represent providers of health or care services, including providers of palliative or end of life care, as the Secretary of State considers appropriate,

(e) if any part of the guidance relates to Welsh devolved matters, the Welsh Ministers, and

(f) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(4) The Welsh Ministers may issue guidance relating to the operation of this Act in Wales, but the guidance must only be about matters within devolved competence.

(5) For this purpose, a matter is “within devolved competence” if provision about it would be within the legislative competence of Senedd Cymru if it were contained in an Act of the Senedd.

(6) Before issuing guidance under subsection (4), the Welsh Ministers must consult—

(a) the Chief Medical Officer for Wales,

(b) the Secretary of State,

(c) such persons with learning disabilities and other persons who have protected characteristics as the Welsh Ministers consider appropriate,

(d) such persons appearing to represent providers of health or care services, including providers of palliative or end of life care, as the Welsh Ministers consider appropriate, and

(e) such other persons as the Welsh Ministers consider appropriate.

(7) When preparing guidance under this section, an appropriate national authority must have regard to the need to provide practical and accessible information, advice and guidance to—

(a) persons (including persons with learning disabilities) requesting or considering requesting assistance to end their own lives;

(b) the next of kin and families of such persons;

(c) the general public.

(8) An appropriate national authority must publish any guidance issued under this section.

(9) In this section—

“appropriate national authority” means the Secretary of State or the Welsh Ministers;

“protected characteristics” has the same meaning as in Part 2 of the Equality Act 2010 (see section 4 of that Act).”

This new clause (which is intended to replace clause 37) makes provision about guidance relating to the operation of the Bill.

New clause 21—Provision about the Welsh language—

“(1) In this section “relevant person” means a person in Wales who wishes to be provided with assistance to end their own life in accordance with this Act.

(2) Subsection (3) applies where the Welsh Ministers make regulations under section 39 (voluntary assisted dying services: Wales).

(3) Regulations under that section must make such provision as the Welsh Ministers consider appropriate for the purpose of ensuring that, where a relevant person indicates that they wish to communicate in Welsh, all reasonable steps are taken to secure that—

(a) communications made by a person providing a voluntary assisted dying service to the relevant person are in Welsh, and

(b) any report about the first or second assessment of the relevant person is in Welsh.

(4) Where a relevant person informs the Commissioner that they wish to communicate in Welsh, the Commissioner must take all reasonable steps to secure that—

(a) communications made by the Commissioner to the relevant person are in Welsh,

(b) each member of the panel to which the relevant person’s case is referred speaks Welsh, and

(c) communications made by that panel to the relevant person are in Welsh,

and any certificate of eligibility issued by that panel must be in Welsh.

(5) Regulations under section 7, 9, 10, 17 or 26 that specify the form of—

(a) a first or second declaration,

(b) a report about the first or second assessment of a person, or

(c) a final statement,

must make provision for the forms to be in Welsh (as well as in English).

(6) Before making regulations in pursuance of subsection (5), the Secretary of State must consult the Welsh Ministers.

(7) In this section—

“panel” and “referred” have the meaning given by paragraph 1 of Schedule 2;

“voluntary assisted dying service” has the meaning given by section 38.”

This new clause (which is intended to replace Clause 47) makes provision about the use of the Welsh language.

New clause 4—Monitoring by Chief Medical Officer—

“(1) The relevant Chief Medical Officer must—

(a) monitor the operation of the Act, including compliance with its provisions and any regulations or code of practice made under it,

(b) investigate, and report to the appropriate national authority on, any matter connected with the operation of the Act which the relevant national authority refers to the relevant Chief Medical Officer, and

(c) submit an annual report to the appropriate national authority on the operation of the Act.

(2) The relevant Chief Medical Officer’s report must include information about the occasions when—

(a) a report about the first assessment of a person does not contain a statement indicating that the coordinating doctor is satisfied as to all of the matters mentioned in section 9(2)(a) to (h),

(b) a report about the second assessment of a person does not contain a statement indicating that the independent doctor is satisfied as to all of the matters mentioned in section 10(2)(a) to (e),

(c) a panel has refused to grant a certificate of eligibility,

(d) the coordinating doctor has refused to make a statement under section 17(6).

(3) An annual report must include information about the application of the Act in relation to—

(a) persons who have protected characteristics, and

(b) any other description of persons specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(4) When preparing an annual report, the relevant Chief Medical Officer must consult—

(a) The Commissioner, and

(b) such persons appearing to the relevant Chief Medical Officer to represent the interests of persons who have protected characteristics as the relevant Chief Medical Officer considers appropriate.

(5) An appropriate national authority must—

(a) publish any report received under this section,

(b) prepare and publish a response to any such report, and

(c) lay before Parliament or Senedd Cymru (as the case may be) a copy of the report and response.

(6) In this section “appropriate national authority” means the Secretary of State or the Welsh Ministers.

(7) In this section “protected characteristics” has the same meaning as in Part 2 of the Equality Act 2010 (see section 4 of that Act).

(8) In this section “relevant Chief Medical Officer” has the meaning given by section 37(5).”

This new clause would require the monitoring, investigation and reporting functions set out in the Bill to be carried out by the Chief Medical Officer instead of the Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner.

New clause 5—Implications for civil procedure rules and probate proceedings—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, publish a report setting out the implications of this Act on—

(a) the civil procedure rules, and

(b) probate proceedings.

(2) The report in subsection (1) must include an analysis of likely consequential changes to the civil procedure rules and probate proceedings in consequence of this Act.”

New clause 6—Board to consult communities—

“(1) The Commissioner must, within six months of being appointed under this Act, appoint a consultation board.

(2) The role of the board is to consult communities in order to report to the Commissioner on the impact of the Act on those communities.

(3) The Board must report to the Commissioner and the Secretary of State every 12 months from its appointment on its findings.

(4) The communities that the Board must consult include people from Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic communities.

(5) The Board may consult other groups in addition to those listed in subsection (4) as it considers appropriate.

(6) The Secretary of State must, within 3 months of receiving a report under subsection (3), lay that report before both Houses of Parliament.”

New clause 19—Collection of statistics—

“(1) The Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner must ensure that the statistics specified in Schedule (Statistics to be collected) are collected.

(2) The Commissioner must publish a yearly report setting out those statistics.

(3) The Secretary of State may, by regulation, vary the contents of Schedule (Statistics to be collected).”

Amendment 13, in clause 4, page 2, line 22, at end insert—

“(2A) A person may not be appointed under subsection (2) unless the appointment has the consent of the Health and Social Care Select Committee of the House of Commons.

(2B) In this section, references to the Health and Social Care Committee shall—

(a) if the name of that Committee is changed, be taken (subject to paragraph (b)) to be references to the Committee by its new name;

(b) if the functions of that Committee at the passing of this Act with respect to matters relating to the provision of assistance under this Act become functions of a different committee of the House of Commons, be taken to be references to the committee by whom the functions for the time being exercisable.”

Amendment 96, in clause 25, page 21, line 5, at end insert—

“(1A) A drug or other substance may only be approved under this Act if the Secretary of State is reasonably of the opinion that there is a scientific consensus that this drug (or other substance) or combination of drugs (or other substances), is effective at ending someone’s life without causing pain or other significant adverse side effects.”

This amendment ensures that drugs can only be approved if the Secretary of State is reasonably of the opinion that there is a scientific consensus that the drug is effective at ending someone’s life without causing pain or other significant adverse side effects.

Amendment 97, page 21, line 5, at end insert—

“(1A) A drug or other substance may only be approved under this Act if it has been licensed by the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency for that purpose.”

This amendment ensures that drugs can only be approved for this purpose if the MHRA has licensed those drugs for that purpose.

Amendment 98, page 21, line 5, at end insert—

“(1A) Nothing in subsection (1) requires the Secretary of State to approve any drugs or other substance if they conclude that there are no appropriate drugs or other substances to approve.”

If the Secretary of State concludes that no drugs or substance is appropriate to be used, then the Secretary of State is not required by subclause 25(1) to approve any.

Amendment 27, page 21, line 7, at end insert—

“(2A) The doses and types of lethal drugs specified in any regulations made under subsection (1) must be licensed by the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency.

(2B) The doses and types of lethal drugs to bring about the person’s death must be recommended by the guidelines of either—

(a) the National Institute of Clinical Excellence, or

(b) the All Wales Medicines Strategy Group in Wales, as appropriate, prior to licensing.”

This amendment will require the doses and types of lethal drugs to be licensed by the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency and to be recommended by either the National Institute of Clinical Excellence or the All Wales Medicines Strategy Group in Wales as appropriate prior to licensing.

Amendment 99, page 21, line 7, at end insert—

“(2A) The Secretary of State may not lay a draft statutory instrument containing (whether alone or with other provision) regulations under subsection (1) before both Houses of Parliament unless they also lay before both Houses a report setting out all relevant information on the likely time to death, complications (including pain) and likely side effect.”

This amendment requires that a report be provided to Parliament setting out the information available on the proposed drugs, including time to death, complications (including pain) and likely side effects. Such a report is required before Parliament votes to approve the drugs or substance. See consequential Amendment 100.

Amendment 69, page 21, line 8, leave out subsection (3) and insert—

“(3) See section (Regulation of approved substances and devices for self-administration) for powers to make provision about—

(a) approved substances, and

(b) devices for use or used in connection with the self-administration of approved substances.”

This is consequential on NC13.

Amendment 53, line 24, leave out clause 34

This amendment is consequential on NC13.

Amendment 54, line 34, leave out clause 35

This amendment is consequential on NC15.

Amendment 19, in clause 36, page 27, line 17, at end insert—

“(ba) how the provisions of this Act relate to the operation of—

(i) the Government’s strategy on suicide prevention,

(ii) the duties on clinicians and others to secure the right to life, including of those at risk of suicide, under paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 2 (Right to Life) set out in Schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998,

(iii) the Mental Health Act 1983,

(iv) deprivation of liberty safeguards as set out in Schedule A1 to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, and

(v) liberty protection safeguards as set out in Schedule AA1 to the Mental Capacity Act 2005.”

Amendment 70, page 27, line 20, at end insert—

“(ca) ensuring effective communication in connection with persons seeking assistance under this Act to end their own lives, including the use of interpreters;”

This amendment provides that a code of practice must be issued covering ensuring effective communication in connection with persons seeking assistance under the Bill.

Amendment 108, page 27, line 31, at end insert—

“(h) how the provisions of this Act, including but not limited to section 23, interact with the provisions of the Abortion Act 1967.”

Amendment 71, page 27, line 35, leave out subsection (3).

This amendment is consequential on amendment 70.

Amendment 20, page 28, line 5, leave out subsection (8) and insert—

“(8) If it appears to a court or tribunal conducting any criminal or civil proceedings that—

(a) a provision of a code, or

(b) a failure to comply with a code,

is relevant to a question arising in the proceedings, the provision or failure must be taken into account in deciding the question.”

Amendment 89, page 28, line 7, leave out clause 37.

This amendment is consequential on NC20.

Amendment 34, in clause 37, page 28, line 14, at end insert—

“(ii) persons from Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic communities and advocate groups representing those communities, and

(iii) representatives of the healthcare sector, including persons who work in hospices.”

Amendment 12, clause 38, page 28, line 36, leave out subsections (4) and (5) and insert—

“(4A) Regulations under subsection (1) may not amend, modify or repeal section 1 of the National Health Service Act 2006.”

This amendment would prevent section 1 of the National Health Service Act 2006, which sets out the purposes of the NHS, from being amended by regulations. Its effect would be to require changes to be made by an Act of Parliament instead.

Amendment 105, page 29, line 4, leave out subsection (6).

Amendment 15, page 29, line 5, at end insert—

“(6A) Regulations under this section must provide that, where a body other than a public authority provides voluntary assisted dying services under subsection (1), that body must publish an annual statement that includes information on the following—

(a) the number of persons to whom the body has provided a preliminary discussion under section 5(3);

(b) the number of to persons whom the body has assessed under section 9(1);

(c) the number of persons whom the body has assessed under section 10(1);

(d) the number of persons to whom assistance has been provided under section 23(2);

(e) the cost and revenue associated with providing such assistance; and

(f) any other matter that the Secretary of State may specify.”

This amendment would require private providers of the services permitted under the Act to publish annual statements of the numbers of people to whom they have provided those services. It would also require them to disclose their associated costs and revenue.

Amendment 92, in clause 39, page 29, line 13, leave out from “Wales” to end of line 14.

Amendment 106, page 29, line 16, leave out subsection (2)(a).

Amendment 107, page 29, line 22, leave out subsection (4)(a).

This amendment and amendment 93 ensure that the power under subsection (3) also covers provision securing that arrangements are made for the provision of services, so far as such provision is outside the legislative competence of the Senedd.

Amendment 93, page 29, line 27, at end insert—

“(b) a reference to provision about voluntary assisted dying services includes in particular provision securing that arrangements are made for the provision of such services.”

See the statement for Amendment 92.

Amendment 29, in clause 40, page 30, line 5, at end insert—

“(5) Any notification to the Commissioner made pursuant to regulations under this section must be forwarded by the Commissioner to the relevant Chief Medical Officer.

(6) The relevant Chief Medical Officer may exercise any power granted to the Commissioner under subsection (2).

(7) In this section “relevant Chief Medical Officer” has the meaning given by section 37(5).”

Amendment 21, in clause 43, page 31, line 15, at end insert—

“(4) For the first reporting period referred to under subsection (2) (a) the report must set out an assessment of the state of health services to persons with palliative and end of life care needs and the implications of this Act on those services.

(5) The report under subsection (4) must, in particular, include an assessment of the availability, quality and distribution of appropriate health services to persons with palliative and end of life care needs, including—

(a) pain and symptom management;

(b) psychological support for those persons and their families;

(c) information about palliative care and how to access it.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care to prepare and publish an assessment of the availability, quality and distribution of palliative and end of life care services as part of the first report on implementation of the Act (to be undertaken within 1 year of the Act being passed). This would mirror the assessment already required as part of the 5 year review of the act.

Amendment 28, page 31, line 32, leave out clause 45.

This amendment is linked to NC4.

Amendment 35, clause 45, page 32, line 20, after “characteristics” insert

“, including persons representing Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic communities,”.

Amendment 36, in clause 46, page 33, line 11, after “disabilities” insert

“, and

(ii) persons from Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic communities”.

Amendment 90, page 33, line 18, leave out clause 47.

This amendment is consequential on NC21.

Amendment 39, in clause 47, page 33, line 19, after “provided” insert “in Wales”.

This amendment specifies that this section applies only to services provided in Wales.

Amendment 40, page 33, line 24, at end insert—

“(2A) Any entity providing a service or fulfilling a function under this Act must take all reasonable steps to ensure the particular health professionals providing a service or fulfilling a function under sections 5, 9,10, 12, 15, and 23 have fluent proficiency in the Welsh language, if the services are to be provided to a person in Welsh under subsection (1).

(2B) For the purposes of subsection (2A), “fluent” includes speaking fluent Welsh in order to enable conversations with the person in Welsh.

(2C) The Commissioner must take all reasonable steps to ensure members of Assisted Dying Panels will, if the person to whom the referral relates has asked for services to be provided in Welsh, when hearing from or questioning that person under section 15(4)(b), do so in Welsh.”

Amendment 103, in clause 50, page 34, line 24, leave out from “under” to end of line 29 and insert

“any provision of this Act unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”

This amendment would require all statutory instruments in the Act, except commencement orders, to be made by the draft affirmative procedure. It is linked with Amendment 104 which creates the power for the Secretary of State to use the made affirmative procedure in cases of emergency.

Amendment 72, page 34, line 24, after “10(9)”, insert—

“(Regulation of approved substances and devices for self-administration),”.

This amendment provides that regulations under NC13 are subject to the draft affirmative procedure.

Amendment 50, page 34, line 24, after “10(9),” insert “(Doctor independence)”.

This amendment makes regulations under NC7 [Doctor independence] subject to the affirmative procedure.

Amendment 100, page 34, line 24, after “10(9),” insert “25(1)”.

This amendment makes regulations under clause 25(1) subject to the draft affirmative procedure. It is consequential on Amendment 99.

Amendment 73, page 34, line 25, leave out “or 39” and insert—

“39, or (prohibition on advertising)”.

This amendment provides that regulations under NC14 are subject to the draft affirmative procedure.

Amendment 88, page 34, line 25, after “39” insert “or (Collection of statistics)”.

This amendment provides that the changes to NS2 should be made by affirmative regulations, and is consequential to NS2.

Amendment 104, page 34, line 32, at end insert—

“(5A) If they reasonably consider it urgent and necessary for the protection of others, the Secretary of State or the Welsh Ministers may dispense with the requirement to lay a draft statutory instrument.”

This amendment is linked with Amendment 103. It creates the power for the Secretary of State to use the made affirmative procedure in cases of emergency (this means that it would come into effect straight away but there would be a vote afterwards).

Amendment 76, in clause 53, page 36, line 12, at beginning insert “Subject as follows,”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 77.

Amendment 77, page 36, line 12, at end insert “only.

(2) Sections (Regulation of approved substances and devices for self-administration), (Prohibition on advertising), 50 and 52, this section, and sections 54 and 55 extend to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

(3) Section (No obligation to provide assistance etc)(8) and Schedule (Protection from detriment) extend to England and Wales and Scotland.”

This amendment provides for NC13 (regulation of approved substances etc) and NC14 (prohibition on advertising), and the general provisions of the Bill, to extend to each part of the United Kingdom; and for NC10 (no obligation to provide assistance etc) and NS1 (protection from detriment) to extend to England and Wales and Scotland.

Amendment (a) to amendment 77, in subsection (2), leave out

“(Regulation of approved substances and devices for self-administration),”.

This would provide that NC13 (regulation of approved substances etc…) does not extend to each part of the United Kingdom and only applies, like most of this Bill, to England and Wales.

Amendment (b) to amendment 77, in subsection (3), leave out “and Scotland”.

This amendment would provide that subsection (8) of NC10 (no obligation to provide assistance) and NS1 (protection from detriment) only extend to England and Wales.

Amendment 42, in clause 54, page 36, line 16, leave out subsections (2) to (5) and insert—

“(2) In relation to England, the provisions of this Act not brought into force by subsection (1) come into force on such day or days as the Secretary of State may by regulations appoint.”

This amendment will mean that, except as provided by subsection (1), provisions of the Bill will only commence in England when the Secretary of State makes a commencement order, and not automatically.

Amendment 37, in clause 54, page 36, line 21, leave out subsection (4) and insert—

“(4) Regulations under this section cannot be made unless the Secretary of State has previously—

(a) made a statement to the effect that in their view the provisions of the Act are compatible with the Convention rights; or

(b) made a statement to the effect that although they are unable to make a statement under subsection (4)(a), the Government nevertheless wishes to proceed with commencing provisions of the Act.

(4A) The statement required by subsection (4) must be laid before both Houses of Parliament.

(4B) A statement under subsection (4)(b) must include the steps the Government plans to take to resolve any incompatibility.”

Amendment 3, page 36, line 22, leave out “four” and insert “three”.

Amendment 94, page 36, line 25, leave out “Wales” and insert—

“sections 39(1) and (2) and (Provision about the Welsh language)(2) and (3) which come into force on such day as the Welsh Ministers may by regulations appoint.”

This amendment provides that the Welsh Ministers have power to commence clauses 39(1) and (2) and NC21(2) and (3), and that other provisions of the Bill come into force in accordance with subsections (1) to (4) of this clause.

Amendment 95, page 36, line 26, leave out subsection (6).

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 94.

New schedule 2—Statistics to be collected—

“Characteristics

1 The Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner must collect the following information about persons requesting assisted dying—

(a) sex,

(b) age,

(c) self-reported ethnicity,

(d) level of education,

(e) Index of Multiple Deprivation based on postcode,

(f) region of residence,

(g) marital status,

(h) living status (alone, with others, in a care home etc),

(i) main condition leading to “terminal illness” fulfilment,

(j) other medical conditions,

(k) other psychiatric / mental health conditions,

(l) presence of physical disability, and

(m) presence of intellectual disability.

Health and Care Support

2 The Commissioner must collect statistics on the following information about health and care support—

(a) whether the person was, before the request—

(i) under a specialist palliative care team, and

(ii) under a psychiatry team,

(b) whether following the request there has been—

(i) referral to specialist palliative care team, and

(ii) referral to psychiatry team following request.

Information about requests

3 The Commissioner must collect statistics on the following information about the requests for assistance—

(a) the main reason for requesting assisted dying,

(b) any other subsidiary reason for requesting assisted dying,

(c) any previous requests for assisted dying from that patient,

(d) time between first request and subsequent request(s),

(e) number of times a second opinion was requested under section 10, and

(f) number of times the second opinion disagreed with the first.

Information about refused requests

4 The Commissioner must collect statistics following information about requests that are refused—

(a) at what stage of the process was the request refused, and

(b) reasons for refusal.

Information about the process

5 The Commissioner must collect statistics on the following information about the process—

(a) time from initial discussion to first declaration,

(b) time from first declaration to first doctor’s assessment,

(c) time from first doctor’s assessment to second doctor’s assessment,

(d) time from second doctor’s assessment to panel approval,

(e) time from panel approval to second declaration,

(f) time from second declaration to provision of assistance to self-administer lethal drugs,

(g) time from panel approval to death (whether by lethal drug or natural causes),

(h) duration of relationship between patient and coordinating doctor at first request, and

(i) use of a proxy and reason for using proxy.

Information about clinicians and pharmacies

6 The Commissioner must collect statistics on the following information about clinicians and pharmacies—

(a) number of clinicians participating, their speciality, and number of assisted deaths each carries out per year, and

(b) number of participating pharmacies; number of times assisted dying drugs are dispensed.

Information about Assisted Dying Panel processes

7 The Commissioner must collect statistics on the following information about Assisted Dying Panel process—

(a) number of applications made,

(b) number of applications granted and rejected,

(c) reasons for rejection,

(d) whether family members informed of proceedings,

(e) whether family members took part in proceedings,

(f) number of requests for reconsideration made,

(g) number of reconsideration requests granted and rejected, and

(h) reasons for granting requests.

Information on approved substances

8 The Commissioner must collect statistics on the following information about the approved substances—

(a) name of drug(s) used for the assisted death,

(b) whether intravenous or oral self-administration is used,

(c) presence and nature of complications following self-administration of drugs (vomiting, regurgitation, seizures, regained consciousness, other),

(d) time from self-administration to loss of consciousness,

(e) time from self-administration to death,

(f) whether emergency services called at any time following self-administration of drugs,

(g) location of death,

(h) health care professionals present at self-administration,

(i) non-professionals present at self-administration,

(j) health care professionals present at death,

(k) non-professionals present at death.”

Amendment 82, in schedule 2, page 41, line 18, leave out sub-paragraph (1) and insert—

“(1) The Judicial Appointments Commission must make arrangements for the appointments to a list of persons eligible to sit as members of panels.”

This amendment requires that panel members be appointed by the Judicial Appointments Commission. It is linked with Amendments 83, 84, 85 and 86.

Amendment 83, page 41, leave out lines 23 to 26 and insert—

“but has not reached the age specified in section 11 (Tenure of office of judges of Senior Courts) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.”

This amendment requires that the legal member of the Panel is someone who holds high judicial office or has held high judicial office but not yet reached the mandatory retirement age. It is linked with Amendments 83, 84, 85, and 86.

Amendment 41, page 41, line 34, at end insert—

“(2A) In Wales, the Commissioner must take all reasonable steps to ensure each member of a panel has fluent proficiency in the Welsh language if services or functions in the Act are to be provided to an individual in Welsh under section 47(1).

(2B) For the purposes of subsection (2A), “fluent” includes speaking fluent Welsh.”

Amendment 84, page 42, line 2, leave out “or deputy judge”.

This amendment ensures that only High Court judges, and not deputy High Court judges, can chair the panel. It is linked with Amendments 83, 84, 85 and 86.

Amendment 85, page 42, line 2, at end insert—

“(4) All judges of the High Court are automatically on the list and will remain so for the duration of their appointment to the High Court.

(5) If they have not already, all persons on the list (whether as a legal member, psychiatrist member, or social care member) must take the judicial oath.”

This amendment makes all High Court judges automatically eligible to chair panels without needing further application and it requires that the non-legal members take the judicial oath before they can sit. It is linked with Amendments 83, 84, 85 and 86.

Amendment 86, page 43, line 5, at end insert—

“(3) Panels shall have the same powers, privileges and authority as the High Court.”

This amendment gives the panel the same powers as the High Court. It is linked with Amendments 83, 84, 85 and 86.

[Kim Leadbeater]

It is a privilege to open today’s debate and to present to the House the amendments tabled in my name, a number of which relate to issues that I promised to return to when they were raised in Committee. All amendments in my name have been drafted with technical advice and expertise from civil servants from the Department of Health and Social Care and the Ministry of Justice, along with the brilliant Government Legal Department and the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, in order to make the Bill workable and to give coherence to the statute book, as confirmed by the Minister for Care, my hon. Friend the Member for Aberafan Maesteg (Stephen Kinnock), and the Minister for Courts and Legal Services, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Finchley and Golders Green (Sarah Sackman), in their recent letter to MPs. Some are technical and drafting amendments, and all are there to strengthen the Bill, so I hope that colleagues will be able to support them, wherever they stand on the principle of assisted dying.

I know that many colleagues wish to speak today, so I will endeavour to speak with brevity. I will speak first to the new clauses that stand in my name, starting with new clause 13. This important new clause and the related amendments would create a regulatory framework and safeguards around the approved substances referred to in the Bill by imposing a duty to make regulations about those substances and a power to make regulations about devices for use in connection with their self-administration.

Amendment 72 provides that the regulations relating to approved substances would be subject to the affirmative procedure, meaning that they must be laid before Parliament and approved by resolution of both Houses, providing important parliamentary oversight. These measures ensure that the substances used in assisted dying are subject to a specific and appropriate regulatory regime.

[Patricia Ferguson (Glasgow West) (Lab)]

I am genuinely looking for clarification. As a former Cabinet Minister in the Scottish Government, I jealously guard the devolution settlement. I wonder how the extension of some of these clauses to include Scotland will be interpreted. What conversations have taken place between my hon. Friend, Scotland’s Lord Advocate and the Scottish Government?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I have taken legal advice from Government officials to ensure that devolution is respected at every stage in proceedings. Where legislation that affects other jurisdictions needs to be amended, those conversations have already started and will continue.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Kim Leadbeater]

No, I am going to make some progress, if that is okay.

The substances that would be used would not be new substances. As we know, assisted dying is available in many other jurisdictions, and there are substances that have been used safely and, in some cases, for many years. Their safety and efficacy has been proven around the world, but they do need to be treated differently, which is the purpose of new clause 13.

[Simon Hoare (North Dorset) (Con)]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Jim Shannon]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I am going to make some progress.

However, it is most likely that these products are already licensed for other purposes. They could well be regulated through the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency and within the Human Medicines Regulations 2012 for the purposes of the Bill, but it is important that time is given—

[Cat Eccles (Stourbridge) (Lab)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I will.

[Cat Eccles]

As an operating department practitioner with more than 20 years of experience, I emphasise that controlling and administering drugs is already a key part of every healthcare professional’s practice. Medicines management is at the front and centre of everything we do when handling drugs. Does my hon. Friend agree that the safeguards added to this Bill, along with the existing frameworks, are more than adequate to deal with this?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I thank my hon. Friend for sharing her expertise, along with other colleagues with medical backgrounds who have worked with me on this amendment.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Kim Leadbeater]

Given what you have said, Mr Speaker, I will make some progress. [Interruption.] A lot of Members wish to speak today.

I now turn to new clause 14 and amendment 73. The new clause imposes a duty to make regulations prohibiting advertising of services related to voluntary assisted dying. This issue was discussed in Committee, following an amendment tabled by the hon. Member for West Worcestershire (Dame Harriett Baldwin). It was proposed that there should be no advertising of assisted dying services. I agree, and there was a consensus on that in the Committee. There were some issues with the previous amendment’s workability, so I gave a commitment to return to the matter on Report—hence the inclusion of this new clause. Amendment 73 provides that regulations under new clause 14 would be subject to the affirmative procedure, providing parliamentary oversight.

[Jim Shannon]

On the evidential basis, on page 15 of today’s edition of The Times there is a story about a gentleman who was born in South Africa and lives in Australia. He has come to London this week for this particular Bill in order to give his story. He was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer and told he had only two weeks to live: he lived for three years and one month, and he is still living. There is a growing evidential basis. He said that he was never afraid to die, but he says that he is afraid of the process of dying, and the hon. Lady is the initiator of that. Will she acknowledge the evidential basis and the importance of this subject? Does she realise that the evidential basis against this Bill is growing?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for the intervention, although I am not sure that it is relevant to the banning of advertising for assisted dying services, which I will try to stay focused on.

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I am afraid that I am going to have to make some progress, based on the number of Members who wish to speak today.

I thank the hon. Member for West Worcestershire and the hon. Member for Reigate (Rebecca Paul) for working with me on amendment 73, and I am very pleased that they support it.

[Dr Ben Spencer (Runnymede and Weybridge) (Con)]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I will not—sorry.

New clause 15 and amendment 54 make changes to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 that the Bill would necessitate. They would insert a new clause into the Act to provide that deaths that occur in accordance with the Bill will be certified by an attending practitioner and medical examiner and will not be subject to a coronial investigation.

[Dr Spencer]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I am afraid not.

Coroners investigate suspicious or violent deaths, or situations in which the cause of death is unknown. Assisted deaths would not fall into these categories, and there would therefore be no need for a default coronial investigation. This will ensure that any unnecessary delays and distress for bereaved families are avoided. These are not unexpected deaths; sadly, they were inevitable.

[Jess Asato (Lowestoft) (Lab)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I will not, I am afraid.

It is the manner and timing of their death about which the patient will make a legal, informed choice, having been thoroughly assessed. As Professor Aneez Esmail has said, “I cannot think of any death that would be the subject of greater scrutiny in advance of the person dying than an assisted death. The process far exceeds the level of safeguarding that is in place for many of the deaths that are, at present, routinely reviewed by medical examiners and not referred to a coroner.” Of course, anyone can report a death—including an assisted death—to the coroner, or indeed to the police, if they have any concerns that it was not carried out in accordance with the Act, and if any offences have been committed, they will be investigated.

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[Ms Polly Billington (East Thanet) (Lab)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I am going to make some progress, I am afraid.

The Secretary of State must also consult providers of health and care services, including palliative and end-of-life care. I am really pleased that Hospice UK is supporting this amendment—it is very important that those voices are heard. The Secretary of State can also consult anyone else they feel to be appropriate, creating a flexible and holistic approach.

Turning to devolution, this long-overdue reform would apply to England and Wales, which share a criminal justice system. Health is a devolved matter, of course, and I have recognised from the outset that the legislation must respect devolution. I am fully committed to observing the same conventions that the Government would if this were a Government Bill. I have worked with UK Government officials to ensure that the right steps are taken at the right time by the right people. I have engaged with colleagues in the Welsh Government—I met the Welsh Health Minister in Cardiff, and there have been ongoing detailed discussions between the two teams of Government officials to ensure the workability of the legislation in both jurisdictions, in line with the devolution settlement.

Amendments 92 to 95 also ensure that the devolution settlement is respected and adhered to. I thank the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Liz Saville Roberts) and the hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham (Sarah Green), not only for their diligent work on the Bill Committee but for working with me on the amendments in relation to Wales, and I thank the Welsh Government for their guidance and support. I hope that colleagues across the House can support these new clauses and amendments.

I now turn to new clause 21, which makes specific provision about the use of the Welsh language. The conversations that happen at the end of a person’s life are extremely personal and should be handled with the utmost sensitivity. It is very important that they are conducted in the best interests of the patient, and a big part of that is using clear communication. In this respect, language matters, so if a patient in Wales has Welsh as their first or preferred language, all efforts should be made to ensure they can communicate with voluntary assisted dying services in Welsh. I committed to this in Committee, and have made good on that commitment.

Turning to amendments 76 and 77, as with any Bill, it is important that the amending legislation secures overall coherence with the statute book. As such, the clauses relating to medicines, advertising and employment protections amend, or confer power to amend, other legislation that currently extends to parts of the UK. Of course, this does not mean the provision of assisted dying, but, for example, they extend the prohibition on advertising to the whole of the UK and apply the employment protections in the Bill to Scotland. That is in line with the guidance I have received from legal experts, and as such I hope all colleagues can support these amendments. If the Bill passes, I will, if necessary, work with other devolved Administrations in the same way as I have worked with the Welsh Government to ensure that devolution is respected.

That concludes the explanations of the amendments tabled in my name. Many colleagues are keen to speak, so I am not going to comment on all the amendments in the group; I will just make two comments about amendments that are not in my name, and allow other people plenty of time to speak.

Amendment 42, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Adam Jogee), would not only try to remove the backstop for the provision of assisted dying in England, but create a number of other issues in relation to commencement. If Parliament chooses to give this choice to terminally ill people, there cannot be a clause in the Bill that would prevent that from being available as soon as it was safe and practicable. But the amendment would remove the four-year backstop. It would also prevent the appointment of the voluntary assisted dying commissioner and create a potential commencement gap between England and Wales. Given that, I have been strongly advised that the amendment would create serious workability issues. I urge colleagues who want an operable Bill to join me in rejecting the amendment.

To finish, I am pleased to support amendment 21, tabled by the hon. Member for Twickenham (Munira Wilson). I thank her for her engagement with the Bill and the amendment, which would require the Secretary of State to prepare and publish an assessment of the availability, quality and distribution of palliative and end-of-life care, as part of the first report on the implementation of the Act, mirroring the assessment already required as part of the five-year review.

Although the Bill seeks to address what in some respects is a very specific issue in terms of the failings of the current law, it has become part of a much-needed broader conversation about death, dying and end-of-life care. We all have our own experiences of death, loss and grief, and we do not talk about them enough. I am really pleased that the Bill has led to many conversations up and down the country; whatever our views, that has to be a positive thing.

[Danny Kruger (East Wiltshire) (Con)]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I have nearly finished.

I have had many such conversations over recent months with those who support the amendment, including with palliative care doctors, nurses, hospice staff, GPs, Hospice UK and Marie Curie. I thank them all for their constructive engagement with the Bill. I cannot imagine that anyone in this place is not truly grateful for the outstanding work done every day by the wonderful people working in palliative and end-of-life care in every one of our constituencies. Many of us, if not most of us, will have personal experience of the kindness and compassion that those people have shown to our own families and friends.

But this is not an either/or conversation. Palliative and end-of-life care and assisted dying can and do work side by side to give terminally ill patients the care and choice that they deserve in their final days. Just as there should not be an either/or for dying people, there should also not be an either/or for us as legislators in having to choose between supporting assisted dying or other end-of-life choices. That is why I am supporting amendment 21: to ensure that in this place we channel our energies into supporting all options available to terminally ill people—something that I have always committed to do.

[Sarah Olney (Richmond Park) (LD)]

It is a privilege to be called at this stage in the debate. My principal reason for voting against the Bill on Second Reading was my concern that vulnerable people would be put at risk. I agreed to serve on the Bill Committee to do what I could to allay my concerns about that issue and address some of the issues raised by others. I do not think that the revised version of the Bill properly or completely reflects the concerns expressed on a multitude of different occasions. Consequently, it does not fully mitigate the risks to vulnerable groups.

We all recognise that decision making of any kind does not take place in a vacuum and that, in all parts of life, we live in a particular context. The Equality Act 2010 recognises that many people face discrimination or unfair treatment as a result of particular characteristics and that reasonable steps should be taken to eliminate that. It was very clear from the oral evidence sessions that particular care has to be taken to assess the context within which people are making the decision to seek an assisted death: if they suffer from a mental illness or eating disorder, if they are from a low-income or ethnic minority background, if they suffer from a disability or if they are in an abusive relationship. Those factors are likely to lead to an increased risk that someone will seek an assisted death that they would not have sought if those factors were not present.

In Committee, I and others made the point that it would have been desirable to have received an equality impact assessment before the detailed work of Committee scrutiny had begun, so that Committee members had a sense of how the proposed legislation would impact groups that we know can suffer disproportionate levels of disadvantage.

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[Paul Waugh]

I agree with the right hon. Gentleman, and there is a wider point here about the Henry VIII powers in the Bill. This would be the third such power added to the Bill since Second Reading. At that stage, it had none. The Attorney General, Lord Hermer, has said that “excessive reliance” on Henry VIII powers

“upsets the proper balance between Parliament and the executive”,

and he is right.

Away from matters of constitutional principle, I am especially concerned about the practical impact of such a power, which would allow a future Secretary of State to change the law as set out in the Suicide Act 1961. This is the Act that contains the offence of encouraging or assisting a suicide. Ministers have confirmed that the Bill leaves the offence in place in all cases except where a medical practitioner assists a person to die under its provisions. We must surely therefore not hand the power to a future Secretary of State to weaken or even abolish that offence without the need for primary legislation. My amendment specifies that the Suicide Act cannot be amended in that way.

I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley recognises that my amendment does not seek to undo or undermine her new clause, but rather to build on it and to ensure that the ban she intends to deliver does not collapse around the loophole at its heart.

[Kim Leadbeater]

My hon. Friend is making a powerful point, and there is consensus across the House about banning the advertising of assisted dying services. His amendment, though, would be slightly limited in that it makes just two exceptions. There would probably need to be a broader piece of work on that, but I commit to working with him if he is interested.

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[John Glen]

It will not surprise my hon. Friend to hear that I agree wholeheartedly. I recognise that that was a major reason that many colleagues gave at earlier points in our discussions and deliberations.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his constructive engagement, but he did not vote for the Bill when it included a High Court judge, and now he is trying to reintroduce a High Court judge. Is there a version of the Bill that he would vote for if it had some sort of judicial oversight other than a commissioner who is a judge or a retired judge, a deputy commissioner who is a judge or a retired judge, and someone on the panel who is a legal expert?

[John Glen]

I have been very clear that I have tabled my amendments in a constructive way to reflect the will that the hon. Lady has expressed, but to recognise the meaningful dilution in the authority of the process and what can reasonably be amended to invigorate it, based on the principles that I think were intended at the outset.

I will revert to the point I was making about the judiciary. They have a commitment to uphold the law, and that should be the standard we are looking for when it comes to matters of life and death. The Judicial Appointments Commission already conducts appointments for all tribunals, including lay members. The Government’s impact assessment compared the panel to the mental health tribunal. All appointments to the mental health tribunal, including the non-legal members, are made by the Judicial Appointments Commission, so this would not be a novel function for it.

Let me move on to amendment 85, which would ensure that all members of the panel have to take the judicial oath if they have not done so already. If other amendments pass, amendment 85 would be necessary only for the non-legal members, and it is crucial for public confidence that the judicial oath is taken.

Amendments 83 and 84 seek to preserve an important element of the Bill as originally presented to the House. They would ensure that the most senior decision-making figure, the chair of the panel, is a High Court judge with all the experience, responsibility and professionalism that that implies. Under these amendments, all High Court judges would be automatically eligible. They would need to be currently serving or at least be below retirement age, and would have to be a judge of the highest authority and not a deputy judge. Members of this House and the public were originally told that this would be a safe Bill precisely because it would have a High Court judge. That was a persuasive promise, and I think there is a way to honour it, even in the new version of the Bill.

I will briefly mention the retirement age, because it is important. It used to be 70, but judges can now continue until they are 75. However, there is no age limit for members of the panel. If we are saying that an 80-year-old retired judge is still with it and is able to decide on matters of life and death, why are they too old to help clear the backlog of criminal cases? That seems to be a meaningful anomaly.

I have been very clear about the purpose of my amendments. I have tabled them in the spirit of trying to strengthen the Bill and return it to what was intended, so that it can meet the expectations of so many Members who supported it at an earlier point.