Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fifth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDanny Kruger
Main Page: Danny Kruger (Conservative - East Wiltshire)Department Debates - View all Danny Kruger's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(2 days, 11 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI am grateful to my hon. Friend. I was simply asking what causes him to object to physician-administered assistance to die. If he supports the principle of assisted suicide and believes in doctor autonomy, why does he not think that doctors should be able to administer the fatal dose?
This gets to the root of how the law has operated in another jurisdiction, Switzerland, where Dignitas has managed this scenario over the past 40 years or so. The key—these are the words that its own guidance uses—is ensuring that the power of control remains with the person seeking the assisted death. That provides the individual who is making the choice with the ultimate autonomy at the end in controlling the circumstances and the manner in which they pass.
I have set out why I feel that although amendment 463 arises from good intentions, it would not achieve what is intended. There is a real risk that the constraints that adopting the amendment would create would lead to the regrettable unintended consequence of individuals being forced to have an assisted death at an earlier stage than they would otherwise have wished.
I can deal with amendments 497 and 498 in short order. They would tighten up the Bill by providing greater clarity around the circumstances in which the substance would be removed from the presence of the individual who had previously indicated a wish to have an assisted death. Amendment 497 specifies that the individual would need to set out to the co-ordinating doctor that they no longer desired to go through with the process. In my view, that is eminently sensible. Amendment 498 elaborates on the Bill to provide greater clarity to those who will be operating it. It will make it a much more workable piece of legislation. I support both amendments.
I will pretty much repeat what I have just said to my hon. Friend the Member for Ashford. There is a dividing line, as the Government see it, between assistance and administration. There is a dividing line between making the patient comfortable, enabling the procedure to take place, and the doctor actually putting the substance into the body of the patient. From the Government’s point of view, simply from the position of having a picture of the process in our mind, that dividing line is clear enough in the drafting of the clause.
I am grateful that the Minister is allowing us to push him on this, because it is crucial. This is the moment beyond which there is no return. He thinks that helping a patient to sit up would be within the scope of the clause. Does he think that holding the patient’s hand and tipping a cup of pills into their mouth would be consistent with the clause?
My interpretation is that it would not be, because if someone were actually tipping the pills into the mouth of the patient, they would be going through the act of putting the substance into the patient. This Bill is founded on the principle of self-administration. However, there are acts such as helping the patient to sit up that are not direct administration but assistance enabling it to take place. That is where the distinction lies.
That is helpful, but if the patient were holding the cup and the doctor held their hand to help them tip it into their mouth, it is not clear to me at what point assistance would end and self-administration would begin. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain that. What about the scenario in which the patient’s finger is on the plunger of a syringe and the doctor assists by putting their finger on top of the patient’s and assists them to press the button, adding a little force to that being given by the patient? Does he regard that as within the scope of self-administration, or does that cross the line into directly administering the procedure?
I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. The hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley pointed out earlier that the scenario that he has just described would constitute more than assistance; it would be moving into administration by the doctor, rather than self-administration. I think that that aligns with the Government’s view, so I refer the hon. Member for East Wiltshire to those comments from the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley, who has far more clinical experience than I do.
I am grateful for that, and I will leave it there, but does the Minister agree that it is incredibly difficult to distinguish who is administering the treatment in that scenario? If both their hands are on the instrument, whatever it is—a cup, a syringe or a button on a computer screen—it is very hard to know who has actually delivered the final act.
What is hard to do in this Committee is imagine and agree on how many different scenarios there can be. Every circumstance and every individual experience will be different, so it is difficult for us to envision all the different scenarios. Nothing about this is easy, of course. We would not have been sitting in this Bill Committee for hours on end if it were all easy, but from the Government’s point of view there is a clear enough distinction between assistance and self-administration. As long as we are clear on those basic principles, we feel that that gives enough safety to the Bill and enough clarity around the process.
I propose to press both my amendments to a vote if necessary.
Amendment 462 agreed to.
Amendment made: 496, in clause 18, page 12, line 28, after “professionals” insert “, and such other persons,”.—(Kim Leadbeater.)
This amendment provides that the coordinating doctor may be accompanied by such persons (other than health professionals) as the doctor considers necessary.
On a point of order, Sir Roger. I am sorry if I missed it, but are we not going to debate amendment 496?
I put the Question and nobody spoke. I am afraid the moment has passed. Under this Chairman, you have to be fleet of foot.
Clearly! Fair enough.
Amendment proposed: 463, in clause 18, page 12, line 34, leave out paragraph (c)—(Danny Kruger.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I rise to oppose amendments 350 to 352, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Gedling (Michael Payne). They would allow the co-ordinating doctor to provide additional assistance to administer the substance in the presence of an independent witness, in some circumstances. Those circumstances would be when, as amendment 350 says, the doctor determines that the person is
“permanently and irreversibly unable to self-administer”
the lethal substance because of an inability to swallow or the loss of use of the limbs. The amendments do not spell out what the additional assistance would be, but I think it is reasonable to believe that it refers to the doctor injecting the lethal substance into a person’s circulatory system.
My hon. Friend’s amendments comes from genuine concern about the situation that some people may well find themselves in. Some people who might otherwise qualify for assisted dying under the Bill might be unable to swallow or inject the lethal drugs. We should all respect the feeling that lies behind the amendments, but we should reject them. If we pass them, we will have accepted that doctors can help people who have qualified for assisted dying to prepare to inject themselves with lethal drugs or swallow them. The Bill does not say that doctors can do that. I do not know whether the House would have voted for the Bill on Second Reading if it had, but that is beside the point—it was not part of the Bill. If we were ever to consider taking such a radical step, we should only do so after hearing as much evidence as possible on why and how this might be necessary. I urge the Committee to oppose the amendment.
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Lady; I very much agree with her points. I also pay tribute to the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, who spoke with his now customary intellectual clarity and moral constituency. He believes in autonomy, and he is doing what he can to resolve the essential contradiction in the Bill, which is designed to enable people to end their lives at their own discretion. He recognises that some of the safeguards in the Bill, which of course I do support, nevertheless represent barriers to what we are now suggesting is a human right, and that that human right will be restricted to a limited number of people, according to the Bill.
It is my view that the pressure, momentum or inherent direction of travel that the Bill sets us on will necessarily result in these sorts of amendments to the legislation in due course, whether in the form of subsequent amendments passed through legislation, the guidance that is issued, or indeed the practice of doctors. As I tried to explain in my comments on the previous group, my concern is that the Bill allows for quite a wide degree of discretion, naturally and necessarily enough, in the form of doctors interpreting their ability to assist in ways that respect the autonomy of patients, but are, in fact, a step beyond what the Bill—quite rightly, in my view—seeks to allow.
The hon. Member mentioned that down the line the Bill could be changed through guidance. I do not think there would be any scope or ability to do that. Does he agree that that point might be a little bit beyond what we all think might be possible under the terms of guidance?
I hope the hon. Gentleman is right. Nevertheless, one of my concerns about the Bill is that we are leaving enormous areas of clinical practice, and regulated conduct for the professionals involved in assisted suicide, to be performed under guidance that is still to be set out and that it is the job of future Ministers to determine.
I pay tribute to the hon. Gentleman, because he has correctly identified a group of patients for whom the drafted Bill may present obstacles to the fulfilment of their wish for an assisted death. My belief is that the ability to assist will probably cover almost anybody who wants it and has found a doctor who wants to help them, but the hon. Gentleman is right that there are some groups for whom that might be more of a challenge than others. I think the answer we are going to get—it is one made by hon. Members in the debate already—is that technology will fix it, and I fear it will, because I think we are going to find ourselves in a world in which it is perfectly possible for the administration of death to be enabled through some kind of technological device, which somebody with the most limited physical mobility will nevertheless be able to activate.
I fear the insistence that we have on self-administration. Although we can all acknowledge, as referenced in the previous debate, the conceptual difference between administration and self-administration, we do have this idea that we are individuals cut off from each other and that there is an essential gap between us and other people. At the very end of life, though—in the moments that we are considering and legislating for—that distinction is void, because we are intimately connected with other people, as per the clauses that we are debating. I fear that we are going to find ourselves in a world in which a laptop will be set up and even a movement as small as the blink of an eyelid by the patient will be enough to trigger what will be called “self-administration” of the fatal dose.
I oppose this group of amendments, moved by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, because I do not believe in assisted suicide. I do not understand why other supporters of the Bill are not following the hon. Gentleman’s lead, and acknowledging that if we believe in autonomy and assisted suicide, of course we should enable patients to have the final act performed upon them, rather than insisting on this arbitrary distinction that it is possible to insist on self-administration in all cases.
It is clear that the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough is trying to create equity, which we all understand. We need to think about the patient on the one hand, but also the doctors, nurses and medical practitioners involved. Does my hon. Friend agree that we need to think about the obligation and impact of such amendments on them?
Yes. We discussed this briefly this morning. There is an important consideration about the effect on medical staff involved in the administration of assisted suicide, and we have to make sure that those who do not want to participate are properly insulated from any sort of obligation, which I know is the intention of the Bill’s promoter, the hon. Member for Spen Valley. Nevertheless, I am concerned about the knock-on effect of participation in assisted suicide spreading across a practice. I agree with my hon. Friend that we have to be mindful of the impact on doctors. The more we widen the scope—as logic compels us to do, as the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough suggests—the more it is about not just discretion, but an obligation on doctors to approve.
We need to think about the conversation that doctors will be required to have with patients who are expressing that wish. If the Bill is widely drawn, as it would be if we were to accept these amendments, there is more opportunity for a doctor to feel compelled to assent to a request.
The hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough is clearly trying to right what he believes to be an inherent injustice in the Bill, but is the hon. Member for East Wiltshire concerned, as I am, that if the amendment were to pass, it would take the debate from a place of being about assisted dying towards what many people would term euthanasia? That is not something that the House in any way endorsed by voting for the Bill on Second Reading.
I am absolutely certain that if the amendment had been in the original Bill, the Bill would not have passed Second Reading, because it would have validated the argument that many of us made that the implication of assisted suicide is euthanasia. The distinction between them, while valid in the abstract, does not apply in practice, and that distinction will be quickly overridden in time. I agree with the hon. Gentleman.
Although I have certain sympathies with these amendments, I do not feel that they are necessary or desirable. They are not necessary because of the provisions that are already stipulated in clause 18(6)(b), which provides the co-ordinating doctor with the ability to prepare
“a medical device which will enable that person to self-administer the substance”.
That subsection, in effect, negates the scenario that is put forward in amendment 350 around dysphagia or the loss of a limb. It would permit, for example, the use of a nasogastric tube or a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy feeding tube to be used for the administration of the substance in the case of dysphagia. In the case of the functional loss of limbs, as was discussed in the debate on the previous group, a range of assisted technologies are available that would remove the barriers that that would present.
Beyond the necessity, or lack of necessity, of these amendments, I fear that they create legal uncertainty, which is clearly undesirable and, in this instance, could have a serious and significant unintended consequence through the amendments’ interaction with clause 24. Subsection (3) of that clause inserts proposed new section 2AA of the Suicide Act 1961, which is an exemption to that Act in respect of the assistance provided under this Bill. In effect, proposed new section 2AA disapplies sections 2(1) and 2A(1) of the Suicide Act where the provision of assistance is done in accordance with the Bill. Those sections specifically relate to an act
“capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another person”.
Introducing the concept of additional assistance, as these amendments would, creates a legal uncertainty. The word “additional” creates a further concept that is beyond assistance but is, thus far, ill defined. Would it go as far as, for example, the clinician taking full control of administering the substance? It is entirely unclear. It would therefore place the clinician in an invidious position as to what it would mean for them to provide additional assistance in such circumstances. As I read the interplay between the Suicide Act and the proposed legislation, the clinician would not then be exempt by virtue of clause 24(3), leaving them open to prosecution under the Act.
I am grateful for that; I particularly respect my hon. Friend’s concern to protect the doctors from any confusion in the law they might be operating under. Just to take him back to the question of technology resolving what I regard as an insuperable problem—the difference between assistance and administration—is it my understanding that my hon. Friend would oppose a patient’s being able to ask a doctor to administer a lethal drug to him or her, but that he would support a patient’s being able to ask a computer to administer a lethal drug to him or her? Would he accept the computer performing the act at the patient’s request?
My hon. Friend hits the nail on the head, because it is the patient who is driving the decision. They are making that act by activating the electronic device—the computer or whatever it may be in terms of assistive technology—but they have the power and control over that decision-making process, which is completely distinct from a clinician doing that act. It is distinct because it is activated by the patient—by the person making that decision—and that is why I draw the distinction. My hon. Friend may not agree, but that is my rationale for drawing a distinction between the two.
I will keep it short and sweet. I had not intended to push the amendments to a vote and will not be doing so. A lot of important points have been raised. Irrespective of whether the amendments were going to be pushed to a vote or would have been successful, it is important that we listen to and take into account the voices of people with different diseases who might wish to access an assisted death. We must also take into account the evidence that organisations have submitted, because it is important that those voices are heard too. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 435, in clause 18, page 13, line 6, at end insert—
“(9A) Where the procedure has failed, the coordinating doctor must escalate the care of the person by making the appropriate referral to emergency medical services.”
This amendment would require the doctor to escalate the care of the person in cases in which the procedure fails.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 429, in clause 18, page 13, line 7, leave out subsection (10).
Amendment 436, in clause 18, page 13, line 8, after “provided” insert—
“(10A) If complications occur as a result of the provision of assistance the coordinating doctor must—
(a) make a detailed record of the complications in the patient’s medical records,
(b) make a declaration on the final statement issued under section 21, and
(c) make a report to the relevant Chief Medical Officer and the Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner.”
This amendment would require the coordinating doctor to record any complications in the patient’s medical records, to make a declaration on the final statement issued under section 21, and make a report to the relevant Chief Medical Officer and the Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner.
Amendment 464, in clause 18, page 13, line 8, at end insert—
“(10A) If the person loses consciousness and it appears to the coordinating doctor that the procedure is failing, the coordinating doctor—
(a) must not do anything with the intention of causing the person’s death, and
(b) must seek to revive the person.”
Amendment 532, in clause 18, page 13, line 12, at end insert—
“(12) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision about what the coordinating doctor is legally permitted to do if it is determined by the coordinating doctor that the procedure has failed.
(13) The regulations under subsection (12) must include what specific actions can legally be taken by the coordinating doctor if—
(a) there is a greatly prolonged time to death,
(b) the person has been rendered unconscious, or rendered unfit to make a second attempt at self-administration, but has not died, or
(c) the person is otherwise undergoing complications.”
Amendment 533, in clause 18, page 13, line 12, at end insert—
“(12) For the purposes of subsections (2) to (11), the Secretary of State must, by regulations, specify where the provision of assistance under this Act may take place.
(13) Before making regulations under subsection (12), the Secretary of State must consult such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(14) The persons to be consulted under subsection (12A) may include—
(a) persons requesting or considering requesting assistance to end their own lives, and
(b) professionals working in palliative and end-of-life care, including hospice staff, and
(c) persons from disadvantaged and marginalised communities, and
(d) registered medical professionals and other healthcare professionals.”
Amendment 430, in clause 30, page 18, line 30, at end insert—
“(da) responding to unexpected complications that arise in relation to the administration of the approved substance under section 18, including when the procedure fails;”
Amendment 255, in schedule 6, page 32, line 13, at end insert—
This would add the means of administration to the final statement set out in Schedule 6.
I am supportive of all the amendments in this grouping, including amendment 255 in the name of the hon. Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke (Claire Hazelgrove) about the importance of recording the means of administration of the substance. We have discussed that a bit, and I think it is important to include it. The amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford are also important, as they insist on the actual physical presence of a doctor while the treatment is being carried out. His amendments also suggest that there should be a code of practice about what should happen when things go wrong; I want to go further than that, but I do approve of that measure.
On amendments 532 and 533, tabled by the hon. Member for Ipswich, I again support in principle the requirement—although there is a little too much regulation by the Secretary of State, in my view—that we be clear about where the act should take place and make provision about what the co-ordinating doctor is legally permitted to do if they determine that the procedure has failed. That is the point I really want to discuss; the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell), and the amendment that I tabled, would impose an obligation on the co-ordinating doctor to provide assistance if the procedure fails.
Let me take a moment to explain to the Committee how important it is that we recognise the genuine risk of that eventuality in the case of assisted suicide being performed. There is significant evidence—even given the lack of adequate data collection and the paucity of record keeping, with over half of assisted deaths not properly recorded at all in many places—that in places such as Oregon, which is one of the worst offenders when it comes to data collection, there are significant rates of complication. These can be difficulty with ingesting the drugs, regurgitation and seizures. As I said, 72% of deaths do not record whether complications have occurred, but among the quarter that do, there are significant rates of complication.
Sometimes death can take days, and there can be a long time of unconsciousness. The Committee has heard from me and others in previous debates about the extent to which there is real concern about the actual experience of the administration of assisted death. But it is striking how ill-defined the current Bill is on the point about complications, compared to jurisdictions where such laws are in operation. In other countries, there is clear guidance in law for what should be done. In the Netherlands, euthanasia is recommended when assisted suicide seems to be failing; in Canada, doctors are likewise given licence to administer the death themselves if it fails. The Committee has decided not to proceed down that road. Nevertheless, the question arises as to what on earth patients should do.
To the point that we are talking about a small or non-existent population group—those we might have to worry will experience complications after the administration of fatal drugs—I refer back to a previous debate, when the hon. Member for Stroud, referring to me, said:
“The hon. Gentleman is bringing up lots of rather horrible stories about assisted death. That is why, in Australia, Switzerland and Holland, they have decided, instead of using the regime that he is talking about, to use pentobarbital…One of the reasons why Dignitas uses it is that it is so effective and it does not have those effects.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 11 March 2025; c. 925.]
Having looked into the issue and consulted other medics, I am afraid that the fact is that the safety of pentobarbital is highly contested. It has been debated in litigation in the United States because of its use as a death penalty drug. The executioners who used it said that the deaths were peaceful and akin to falling asleep, but lawyers for inmates on death row have said that
“pentobarbital caused flash pulmonary edema, in which fluid rushes through quickly disintegrating membranes into lungs and airways, causing pain akin to being suffocated or drowned.”
That is evidence from professionals who have examined the effect of pentobarbital on deceased people.
The anesthesiologist Joel Zivot of Emory University hospital in the United States testified to the Canadian Senate on the subject of assisted suicide drugs. He said that when he researched the autopsies of those executed by lethal injection, he stumbled on an alarming discovery:
“When I looked at the autopsies, to my surprise, I found that, in most of the cases, the individuals who had been executed by pentobarbital had fluid congested in their lungs. The lungs of these individuals were twice the normal weight, full of water. Now, the only way that this could have happened would have been as a direct consequence of the pentobarbital that was injected into these individuals.”
What is the relevance of that for assisted dying?
I am not aware of the situation in America, but is the hon. Gentleman not reassured that the evidence from Dignitas, which we all now have access to, says that there have been
“no cases of failure at Dignitas using this medication”?
Let me come on to that, because I am not aware of any evidence from Dignitas that disputes the assertion that is being made—certainly none that would meet the concerns raised by the genuine evidence of the effect of pentobarbital on death row patients. Again, the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. I do not think that Dignitas has supplied evidence to contradict the point that I am making.
For the hon. Gentleman’s reference, I believe that the evidence is TIAB 425.
I am grateful to the hon. Lady. Let me let me look that up later. I am happy to exchange data, because this is clearly something we should be trying to get right.
Nevertheless, I want to try to explain why I am suggesting that we have a problem with the drugs that are used in assisted dying and that it has been suggested we use here. Let me continue the quote from Dr Zivot:
“When one watches an execution, it’s not clear that this is happening”—
meaning that it looks like a peaceful, painless death. He continues:
“There is not much to see. Executions, like, I imagine, medical assistance in dying, are a rather bloodless event; not much can be seen outwardly. But the autopsies revealed a very disturbing and surprising finding.”
He makes the point that that is particularly disturbing, given that assisted dying often uses a paralysing drug, which induces the impression of peace and calm in the patient, when in fact something else might be going on below the surface.
To conclude my quote from Dr Zivot, he says:
“To claim that this is a death that is peaceful, well, it can be nothing else because now a person is unable to move in any way, but whether or not they have any conscious experience of what is happening is unknown…it should be clear to the Canadian public that the kind of death that they will experience…will be something other than the way it is represented. It could be exceedingly painful and more akin to drowning.”
I cannot judge whether Dr Zivot is right, but we should be very wary of any claims that there is a simple answer to the question surrounding lethal drugs. To the point made by the hon. Lady, and I think by the hon. Member for Stroud, there is no evidence in the many reports from Dignitas, which has a regime very similar to the one we are imagining here—I will certainly look at the evidence mentioned made by the hon. Lady—that contradicts the concerns raised by Dr Zivot.
Does this not show that clinical documentation is very important? We debated the issue in Committee earlier, when we talked about professionals being required to complete all relevant documentation. Maybe we are missing certain data because these things are not clearly documented in other places. Should we not take from that the learning that if we go ahead with this proposal, we should have proper documentation and make it clear to the clinician what they should and should not document?
I entirely agree that there is great concern about the lack of evidence in countries on which we are constantly relying for evidence of why this proposal is safe. I have suggested that, from the quite limited evidence we have, that it may not be safe. The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that if we are to proceed, we need to be extremely strict about data collection.
To the hon. Gentleman’s point about making it clear to clinicians what drugs they are permitted to use, we also need to have a proper regime of clearing and approving those drugs. In earlier clauses, we debated the imperative on the NHS, the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency and the Department of Health to properly authorise the specifics of what drugs will be used. It is not clear at the moment what those would be, and I very much agree that we need to be clearer on that.
I finish with a reference to an earlier debate, in which it was suggested, on the basis of the Australian example, that there is no evidence of complications. The hon. Member for Stroud talked about horrible stories from the United States and Canada. He also referred to Australia, where there is apparently no evidence of problems. In fact, I understand that of the six states, only Western Australia records complications, and it does so in relation only to practitioner administration—when the doctor administers the drug—which we do not propose to do here. It does not record complications in relation to self-administration, which is what the Bill proposes. In Western Australia, complications have been reported in 4.3% of cases involving practitioner administration. Again, we are dealing with the great mystery and enigma of how death happens with assisted suicide, and it is certainly unclear what we should do about it.
Following the intervention of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, I have just looked at some of the evidence, and it does not cite any papers. In effect, the evidence says the effect can be seen in three documentaries. Nor does it explain why Dr Zivot’s concerns are scientifically accurate. Does the hon. Gentleman want to speak to that?
There is great anxiety about the validity of much of the evidence in this space. I have great respect for the work of Dr Zivot, because nothing else gets us close to understanding the actual effect of these drugs, once somebody has died.
In response to the intervention of my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West, the evidence from Dignitas is really clear: there have been no cases of failure when using this medication.
My strong suspicion is that this is because the evidence is not being accurately collected or reported. With Dignitas and in all these jurisdictions, as the hon. Lady has acknowledged, there are significant failures of data and record keeping. Obviously, it is very much in Dignitas’s interest not to collect and certainly not to publicise evidence of things going wrong. However, that clearly happens in jurisdictions where data is properly collected.
I recognise that the written evidence, particularly TIAB 425, says there have not been any failures at Dignitas, but it does not cite any published, let alone peer-reviewed, research, nor does it challenge the analysis of scientists such as Dr Zivot. That remains a grey area.
Actually, if we did an autopsy on any person who has died, pulmonary oedema would almost certainly be found because that is what happens in death—the heart stops and the lungs fill with fluid. I would also like to correct the idea that there is neuromuscular paralysis with pentobarbital. There is no way that barbiturates act in that way. All they do is sedate and put the person to sleep, and death comes afterwards.
I was not suggesting that pentobarbital has a paralytic effect. Often in assisted dying, a paralytic is administered first as part of the cocktail of drugs. Subsequently, we discover that while the patient may have appeared entirely calm, sleeping peacefully, significant trauma may have been occurring beneath the surface.
I defer to the hon. Member’s knowledge, but my understanding from the scientific evidence I have read, and that medics have given to me, is that the extent to which people executed by lethal injection, by pentobarbital, have their lungs fill with fluid is peculiar—it is remarkable. They effectively drown beneath their peaceful exterior.
I intend to press amendment 464 to a vote, and I intend to support other amendments in this group. Although I support the aspiration of amendment 532 to make provision for what to do in the event of a procedure’s failure, I think it gives too much leeway to the Secretary of State, so I will oppose that amendment. I think the amendments that the hon. Member for York Central and I have tabled are preferable.
To make the obvious case for those amendments, and as I said in a previous debate, there are three choices in the event of failure. The first is to ignore the plain signs of distress, of things going wrong and of the patient suffering, which is clearly a failure of the doctor’s duty of care. The second is to expedite the death, which we have decided would be illegal under the Bill. Therefore, the only option is to revive the patient and escalate treatment, rather than actively or passively facilitate their death.
I hope Members will agree that, on the rare occasions when assisted suicide goes wrong, it is right that the patient is immediately revived and taken to hospital, or for the doctor to take whatever action is necessary. I am interested to understand why those amendments should not be supported.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger. I will speak to amendments 429 and 430 in my name. During oral evidence, we discussed the issues in subsections (9) and (10) of clause 18 and whether there is a contradiction. Subsection (9) states that the co-ordinating doctor
“must remain with the person”
and subsection (10) says:
“For the purposes of subsection (9), the coordinating doctor need not be in the same room as the person”.
We also discussed how that works in other jurisdictions. My amendment 429 would deal with that conflict. If the Bill were to become law, that conflict could be queried.
We also need to consider the possibility of complications. Clearly, if there are complications and the doctor is not in the same room, they would not necessarily be aware of those complications. I accept that, in some normal circumstances, doctors and medical professionals are not present in the room at the time of death; at other times, they are present. The amendment would mean that if something were to go wrong and someone was having a painful reaction to the drugs, the doctor would be there to see and help.
I do not understand what the Bill means when it says the doctor does not have to be in the same room. How far away would the doctor have to be? One subsection says the doctor has to remain with the person, and the following subsection says they do not have to be in the same room. If the Bill were to pass, we would be asking doctors to do something that is unprecedented. If the person were to suffer complications such as seizures or vomiting, or if they were exhibiting signs of distress, it appears that the doctor should be present. Members may think this could encroach on a patient’s privacy, but I think there is a discrepancy between the two subsections.
On amendment 430, I am conscious that my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich has tabled a similar amendment. The intention of my amendment is to ensure there are regulations in responding to any unexpected complications that arise in relation to the administration of the approved substance, including when the procedure fails. I am conscious that if a doctor intervenes, they could end up in breach of the Suicide Act 1961. I therefore left the wording in that vein, as I understand that we will receive more information in due course.
Again, we received oral evidence from a number of people that what a doctor is meant to do in the event of unexpected complications is a matter of concern from both a legal and a medical perspective. We know from the evidence received from other jurisdictions that—I accept in a small minority of cases—there can be complications or the death can take much longer than expected. We also received evidence that, on rare occasions, death can take days.
Amendment 430 would show we have thought about those circumstances and provided for them by giving doctors a code of practice to refer to, rather than being left in the dark if a difficult situation arises at the time of death. We must not find ourselves in a circumstance in which doctors and patients are unprepared. It is important for us to think through, provide for and safeguard against all possible scenarios, however rare they might be. Of course, we would not want them to happen, but in some circumstances they might, and we would not want there to be a legal hole. Accepting the amendment would mean the Secretary of State has the opportunity to provide a code of practice for such circumstances. I hope hon. Members will be able to support the amendments in my name.
I rise to speak to amendments 532 and 533, standing in my name, and in support of amendments 429 and 430, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford. I appreciate that my amendments are similar to amendment 430. They go a little bit further, but probably not as far as we have previously discussed in the Committee.
I totally understand the concerns about the Bill being overly prescriptive about the regulations that could be passed down to the doctors making such decisions. However, it is important that we enable the Secretary of State to provide guidance, in addition to GMC regulations, on what the co-ordinating doctor must do if the procedure has failed. At the moment, the Bill simply states:
“The coordinating doctor must remain with the person until”
that time. However, I appreciate that amendment 429, if passed, would cover that issue.
Clause 9 states:
“The assessing doctor must…discuss with the person their wishes in the event of complications arising in connection with the self-administration of an approved substance under section 18”.
However, the Bill as drafted is not clear about what a doctor is legally permitted to do in the event of such complications. That is particularly important, as the Bill expressly states that the final act of administration must be taken by the person themselves. Therefore, the Bill as it stands stipulates that the doctor must discuss the patient’s wishes in the event of complications without stipulating what actions the doctor can take in such an event and thus what the patient’s options actually are.
There is a gap in the Bill and a lack of clarity on that critical issue, which has been raised frequently in both written and, to an extent, oral evidence. Dr Alexandra Mullock argued that, as
“the Bill would only permit”
a doctor only to assist in the patient’s self-administering a substance,
“administering drugs to end the life of a patient who might be unconscious (but not dying) is not permitted.”
She also raised the possibility that a patient might regain consciousness, but
“be too ill to make a second attempt”
at self-administration. What should a doctor do if that occurs? Unless the Secretary of State clarifies what a doctor can do in that situation—my amendment would not do that; it would merely give the Secretary of State direction to do so—the co-ordinating director could be placed in a difficult position.
Professor Alex Ruck Keene argued that the Bill as it stands could lead to the potential for medical professionals to be “required to stand by”, yet without being able to take steps to respond to complications so as to ensure that the process is completed. I fully appreciate that all doctors would use their good training, common sense and years of extensive practice to make a best-case judgment, and we would always support them in that, but the Bill has the unintended consequence of not giving doctors true cover in that area.
Dr Mullock also asked what should occur if the patient survives a procedure, “but is badly affected”. What treatment should be provided? Should the patient be moved to hospital? Should the patient be sedated or made comfortable until a natural death occurs, or should the doctor be able to take steps for the patient to die following the initial failed attempt? We need answers to those questions. Amendment 532 does not seek to answer them, but it would stipulate that the Secretary of State must do so at a certain point.
The hon. Gentleman is making an excellent speech, setting out the gap at the heart of the Bill. Does he agree—I think that he does, as he has just explained it—that there are quite straightforward choices: to expedite a death, which is illegal; to do nothing, which is inhumane; or to treat, revive or resuscitate? Why does he think that should not be clearer in the Bill? Why does he want to leave it for the Secretary of State to determine that in the future? Why do we as Parliament not get to decide what the right options should be?
I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s question. In short, the answer is because we are not medical professionals. [Interruption.] Well, some members of the Committee are medical professionals, but not all of us are. I do not think that it is for the Committee to make a judgment on whether to put that in the Bill. I am happy and comfortable to leave such a directive and further recommendations, in addition to the GMC guidance, as further work to do in the coming months and years ahead of the Bill’s implementation. I think that is a healthy and strong thing to do. This is an important compromise to some of the conversations we have had in this Committee over the weeks. The amendment seeks to give a clear direction that these sorts of regulations and procedures should be stipulated at some point down the line.
The hon. Gentleman suggests that this is something that should be left to the medics. Nevertheless, here we are legislating for medics to be able to administer lethal drugs to people; we are responsible for what happens subsequent to the administration. Let me put this another way: does the hon. Gentleman foresee any scenario in which the guidance from the Secretary of State could be anything other than that the patient should be revived and helped to live in the circumstances where there are clearly complications under way? What else could be the appropriate direction given by the Secretary of State?
I appreciate the point that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make. We have discussed this point at length, across a range of subject areas, but we cannot legislate for every single permutation that could possibly happen. That could be about the initial conversations, when the patient is given a terminal diagnosis. Where do those conversations leave us? Clearly there will be a number of different scenarios, which could occur to various degrees.
I do not think it is possible to legislate for every single eventuality. I do not believe that whether to revive or not revive will be so black and white; it will completely depend on the scenario at that particular moment in time. Therefore, further work would need to be done over the coming months and years before the final introduction of the Bill. I believe that it is important to allow the time for that work to happen alongside the existing guidance as it stands.
I do not seek in my amendment to stipulate exactly what every single permutation might be—indeed, that could run to many pages and beyond. The amendment seeks to empower the Secretary of State and the Department to make sure that those eventualities, and the concerns that the hon. Member for East Wiltshire has raised, are covered by regulations over time.
In my view, the failure to provide a clear answer to these questions is an oversight. Data from Oregon shows that it is unfortunately not totally uncommon for patients to suffer complications following the administration of a lethal substance. In 2023, of the 102 patients for whom we have data on whether they suffered complications—out of a total of 367 patients who died by assisted death in Oregon in that year—10 suffered complications. That is just under 10% of the patients we have data for.
Of those 10, eight had difficulty ingesting the substance or regurgitated it. One suffered a seizure, and for one we have no data of what complications occurred. If I may say so to the hon. Member for East Wiltshire, that goes back to the variances that I referred to. It is not as simple as whether to resuscitate or otherwise. There are a number of different factors. Although that is a relatively small sample size, it shows the diversity of the challenges ahead.
In Oregon, information about complications is reported only when a physician or another healthcare provider is present at the time of death, which means that we evidently have less data on this issue than is desirable. However, despite the small sample size, that data would put the complication rate at one in 10. It would not be a completely uncommon occurrence for patients to experience complications following the administration of a lethal substance, although it would be rare.
I thank my hon. Friend for the question; I agree that 10% is a statistically reasonable figure and should be noted, which is part of the reason for my amendment. However, this is still relatively uncommon from the small sample sizes we have. For example, while it is important to refer to the Oregon example, the sample size is only 100 people, so we should always keep that in context. Will fewer people choose to go down that path because they feel, for example, there is potentially a small chance they might struggle to ingest the substance? To be perfectly honest with my hon. Friend, that will completely be their personal choice, and it is really important that, in every stage of the process, we are very clear with those looking to go down this path about what those eventualities might be.
Everyone will take their own personal opinion about that, but we want to be very clear about any risks that might come about, and we have already stipulated that this will be part of the process. Everyone should be very clear about the process—what it will look like and the associated risks. Many people will look at this and still say, “This is the path for me”, but that of course will be their own judgment.
I wonder whether, in the hon. Gentleman’s view, it might be appropriate for the Secretary of State, when framing the guidance he requests, to leave it to a doctor’s discretion. Would that be an appropriate outcome that he would be happy with? My concern is that we will end up with a Bill that has a blank space when it comes to what should be done in the event of complications, as it does currently, and that the Secretary of State might find it equally confusing and unclear and might be reluctant to specify too precisely what should be done in the range of different circumstances that the hon. Gentleman has mentioned. Will we not end up with a further passing of the buck to clinicians to make that decision? Given that, is it not even more appropriate at this stage for us to give a direction to the Secretary of State stipulating that, whatever the guidance will be, it is entirely inappropriate for a doctor to expedite the death of the patient in any way?
In the case of this Secretary of State, he is more than happy, as we have seen in the last week or so, to take decision making back in-house and make them himself as well, although that is perhaps a separate political point.
Absolutely, I know. I am sure the Committee supports him as well.
I would also point the hon. Gentleman to proposed new subsection (13), which my amendment 532 would introduce, saying what “specific actions” can legally be taken, for example, if
“there is a greatly prolonged time to death”,
the person has been “rendered unconscious” or
“the person is otherwise undergoing complications.”
That quite clearly states that we expect the Secretary of State, through this amendment, to take specific co-ordination actions on that. Under proposed new subsection (12) alone, the Secretary of State would have to make provision on that, which could lead to what the hon. Gentleman is alluding to. However, what I propose in proposed new subsection is very clear: that we would expect specific actions from the Secretary of State in that area.
I have used the statistic of 10%; we might find additional statistics from different jurisdictions that put that figure slightly higher or slightly lower. The point I am trying to make is that this is a relatively uncommon occurrence; none the less, this is an area of the Bill that we can make stronger with additional provisions.
I will make some progress on amendment 532. I have made the basis of my point and want to get on to amendment 533. As I have said, amendment 532 seeks to provide clarity on what doctors can do if the procedure fails or is failing by stipulating that the Secretary of State must specify in regulations what actions the co-ordinating doctor can legally take if there is a prolonged time to death; if the person has been rendered unconscious or unfit to make a second attempt at self-administration, but has not died; or if the person is undergoing complications following the initial attempt.
While there is existing GMC guidance, if no further guidance comes forward in the coming years, we risk placing some doctors in an incredibly difficult position. We always say that we should abide by good practice and the experience of many doctors, but additional cover is no bad thing. We need to say what doctors are legally permitted to do in the event of a patient undergoing severe complications. Leaving aside the doctors, that presents a risk to the patient, who may suffer needlessly and intolerably because the co-ordinating doctor does not know what they are legally allowed to do and is thus seeking to avoid legal ramifications of actions. We do not want them to take steps to respond to those complications or support the patient to die in a painful manner.
I will speak briefly to my amendment 533, which is about where assisted dying can take place. The Committee has already touched on that, and I do not want the Bill to be too prescriptive, which is why I have not stipulated exactly where the locations should be. However, this question was raised a number of times in the submitted written evidence. It is incredibly important that we address this question to ensure that assisted dying takes place at a certain location and does not have a detrimental effect on that location or community, and that the implementation of assisted dying does not exacerbate existing healthcare inequalities or deepen the mistrust of the healthcare system that exists among some ethnic minority communities in particular.
We have a duty to ensure that anyone seeking an assisted death under the Bill feels that it is safe to do so, is able to experience the positives of assisted dying and is not traumatised or retraumatised by the process. That is not possible if assisted dying takes place in settings in which people feel unsafe, which they feel unable to control or in which they have no agency. The amendment seeks to ensure that the question of where assisted dying can take place is properly addressed and that the possible impacts of assisted dying taking place at any particular location are fully considered. Only then can we address and mitigate its possible detrimental impacts.
That is a particularly important point because the criterion in the Bill that the doctor must remain with the patient until they have died realistically precludes assisted dying taking place at home, as there may be a prolonged time to death. As my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley said, 86% of patients in Western Australia died within the hour, but 14% took longer than that. To use another comparison, in Oregon, 87.7% of those who died via an assisted death in 2023 did so at home. If we are essentially precluding assisted dying from taking place at home because of the stipulation that a doctor has to be in attendance, we must answer the question of where it can take place.
In written evidence, Sue Ryder and the National Care Forum cited concerns about the impact on the wellbeing of staff and the other residents of hospices and accommodation-based services, should assisted dying take place within those communities. Dr Jamilla Hussain, in arguing that the question of where assisted dying could take place needed to be addressed, stated that her consultations with
“ethnic minority groups across Bradford highlighted the risk that AD could significantly deepen mistrust in healthcare services, including but not limited to palliative care.”
She argued that that needed to be considered when determining where assisted dying would take place, and because of that it would be preferable to avoid
“healthcare settings that these communities rely on, such as hospitals and hospices.”
Again, amendment 533 does not seek to specify where assisted dying should take place—I think further work is possibly needed over the coming months and years before this policy is potentially implemented—or to prohibit any particular location, I must add. The rationale behind the amendment is to ensure that through extensive consultation with relevant parties, the possible impacts of assisted dying taking place at any particular location are fully and comprehensively considered, and thereby any potential harm is addressed and mitigated against.
I was just finishing, but the hon. Gentleman has timed it perfectly, so I will.
I think the hon. Gentleman is right about this one. Does he agree that the hospices that have written to us have a very valid point of concern that they might be required to facilitate assisted dying on their premises, even if many members of staff or other residents do not wish that to happen? Does he agree that it is important that we protect hospices from having to have anything to do with assisted dying?
I thank my hon. Friend for his sensitive and clear worry. But it is important to note that we would not in any circumstances try to do something that would finish someone’s life after they had been given their self-take medicine, because that is against the law. In the Bill we have made a clear distinction between the doctor—a euthanasian, if you like—taking the life, and the patient taking medicine that finishes life. What we need to do is simply support the patient. If, as my hon. Friend suggests, they are in pain we would give them a morphine drip, which is in common use in terminal care. I absolutely respect what he says, but the same treatment principles would be in place as in terminal care.
Even in terminal care, when it is understood that a patient is close to death, doctors would surely not overlook a patient for whom an assisted death is clearly failing. The hon. Gentleman suggests that it would be inappropriate to—and that he would never—call an ambulance, or send a patient to A&E; I wonder whether he also means that he would never seek to revive a patient or bring them back to life, as it were, if they were experiencing complications. To his often-repeated suggestion that there is no difference between this and normal medical treatment, there is an enormous difference. Doctors administer lethal drugs to a patient, and are then also supposed to be somehow caring for the patient in the traditional way that doctors should. These things are inherently incompatible, and there is a choice between the two : is the doctor helping the patient to die, or is he helping them to live? That questions remains, and does he not acknowledge that there will be circumstances where it would be appropriate to revive the patient, and seek to support them as if they were living?
I almost agreed with the hon. Gentleman earlier, when he asked at one point, should we not just leave this to doctors?
One of the key things the hon. Gentleman said is that the doctor administers the drug. This is self-administered, first of all, so that is a very clear line. However, also, in a case of terminal care—this is what I am trying to get across to the Committee—we know the patient is dying, and therefore if they are becoming worse we simply do things to make them comfortable, and we do not try to revive them, because they are dying. It is important that we realise that this is a very different medical situation from normal care, and that it actually needs very different skills as a doctor. Here, a doctor is not trying to prolong life, but trying to make a death as comfortable as possible.
That is why I support the Bill—because I think it will enhance a comfortable death. I wanted to make it clear that that is normal practice now in terminal care: we do not revive a patient with a terminal diagnosis who is in terminal care, but we make them comfortable.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right and articulated that better than I was managing to.
We are not necessarily talking about someone who is dying right here and now in consequence of the drugs they have taken—we could be talking about someone who is many months away from their death. The scenario we are envisaging is that fatal drugs —poisonous drugs—have been administered to the patient’s body and we are asking doctors to be normal doctors in that scenario. In a genuinely normal scenario of doctors being doctors, they would attempt to revive the patient and to save their life in that circumstance. If the parallel is with the last moments of someone’s natural death, the doctor’s job is simply to make them comfortable, but that it is not the scenario. The scenario is some months away from their natural death, when they have months to live. They may not even be exhibiting extreme illness—they may just have a terminal disease. If they have been given fatal drugs, what on earth is the doctor to do in the scenario where the drugs are not working? Surely that is a question for all of us, rather than just leaving it up to the doctors.
I disagree. As clause 9 makes clear, the doctor will have had a conversation with the patient about their wishes in advance, in exactly the same way as a surgeon would have a conversation with a patient in advance of high-risk surgery—
I am not going to take any further interventions; I am going to answer this point and make some progress.
The surgeon would say, “If this procedure fails, would you wish me to attempt resuscitation? Would you wish to be put on a support system?” The hon. Gentleman misunderstands current practice on consultation with patients, in advance of procedures, about their wishes, which is where there is significant established evidence.
I am going to finish on this point.
On amendment 533, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich, I suspect that, in dealing with a later clause, we will have a conversation about issues around hospices and care homes, but again I find the requirements under the amendment unduly onerous. As my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud and others have said, often people’s preferred place of death is at home. Are we really saying that the Secretary of State would specify addresses or the nature of places where these procedures should take place?
My hon. Friend will have noted that a number of amendments have been drafted in collaboration with the Bill’s promoter, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. I think that demonstrates that when the Government have seen a lacuna, a lack of clarity or ambiguities in the Bill, officials, along with the Justice Minister, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Finchley and Golders Green, and I, have worked with my hon. Friend to table amendments to tighten up the Bill. We are doing that in areas where we feel that ambiguity exists. However, when we feel that the Bill, as drafted, does not give rise to such concerns, our position on the amendments is according to our position vis-à-vis the current wording of the Bill.
The Minister said that the Government find it impossible to understand the word “complications” —that it is too complex and full of ambiguity. Yet in clause 9 of the Bill, we have that very word. The suggestion is that the doctor should
“discuss with the person their wishes in the event of complications”.
Is that unclear? If not, what is the difficulty with specifying “complications” in clause 30?
The challenge with amendment 436 is that the policy intent is not as clear as it is in clause 9. That clause is about conversations in advance of decisions about committing to the procedure, whereas when it comes to complications that have arisen in a rapid and fast-moving situation, the view of the Government is that it is adequate to rely on the professional judgment of the medical practitioner to take the decision that best suits that situation.
One is a conversation that can be explored between the clinician and the patient in advance, in a managed environment; the dialogue can take place in a considered manner. The second situation is one in which there is a particular physical manifestation and it is up to the clinician to take a rapid position and to decide, according to all the elements that they usually use, such as the GMC’s “Good medical practice”, other codes of practice and their own professional judgment.
The Minister suggests that it is appropriate for the patient to give some advance indication of what should be done in the event of complications, but that it would not be right for Parliament, too, to give advance direction of the sorts of responses that would be appropriate in the circumstances.
I am afraid that I do not understand the Minister’s distinction. Either it is possible to set in advance the sorts of responses that would be appropriate in the event of complications—the word “complications” is already in the Bill, so is clearly acceptable—or it is not. In the event of complications arising when the patient has not given clear instructions in advance, surely it is appropriate for the doctor to be able to rely on guidance, whether that is in the Bill or set out by the Secretary of State subsequently.
There needs to be clarity about what to do because, to repeat the point, this is not normal medicine—a fatal drug has been introduced into the body. That is not a normal medical situation in which a doctor just uses their clinical judgment; the only appropriate clinical judgment in such circumstances is to attempt to save the patient’s life, because that is what doctors are supposed to do. But we are telling them that they have been allowed to help a patient to die artificially. In that circumstance, what are they supposed to do when that is clearly not working?
I thank colleagues for a thorough discussion of a group of interesting and important amendments. Amendment 429, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, would require the doctor to remain in the same room as the person. I respectfully disagree with my hon. Friend on that point. If a person is literally in the last few minutes and moments of their life, it should be up to them to decide who is in the room with them. In some cases, that might be the doctor, but I suspect that in many cases it would be loved ones and close family members.
We have had a thorough discussion of the range of amendments that look at how we deal with complications. My view is that amendment 430 would do what needs to be done. We need the Bill to show that this has been considered, and the logical place for that would be clause 30, on codes of practice. I am happy to support that amendment when the time comes to vote on it.
The Minister suggested that there will be a code of practice, but clause 30 says that there “may” be a code of practice. Does the hon. Member accept that there might not be one and that, even if there were, the only obligation on professionals would be to have regard to such a code? There is a big difference between that and a stipulation in the Bill.
I believe that amendment 447, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central, would change the “may” to a “must”. I am minded to support it for that very reason.
Amendment 532, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich, comes from a good place as is meant to be a way of trying to help the doctor, but I worry, as medical colleagues have commented during our deliberations, that it could create more of a problem for the doctor in that it would remove flexibility and the use of their clinical judgment and expertise. It always worries me when we are considering putting that level of detail in the Bill.
The challenge would be in whether the co-ordinating doctor would be able to take actions that were not listed. I worry that a list would be quite restrictive. Amendment 430, which would look at the code of practice, would achieve something in a less restrictive way, which is why I am minded to support it.
We have had a really interesting discussion about amendment 533, and we will probably come further down the line to discuss where patients should have the choice to have an assisted death. I am not entirely sure how the amendment would work, which is why I am not minded to support it.
I am slightly concerned about the terminology and am not sure what the definition of “disadvantaged and marginalised communities” would be for the purposes of the amendment. I refer my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich to new clause 8—the duty to consult—bearing in mind that there will be a long period of consultation before the Bill, if it passes, is enacted.
The Minister referred to amendment 255, which I think will fall as it refers to a schedule that has been removed from the Bill.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I have nothing to add.
Amendment 408 agreed to.
Amendments made: 210, in clause 19, page 13, line 22, at end insert—
“(2A) Regulations under subsection (2)(b) may in particular provide that the required training, qualifications or experience is to be determined by a person specified in the regulations.”
This amendment enables regulations under subsection (2)(b) to provide that the required training, qualifications or experience is to be determined by a person specified in the regulations.
Amendment 499, in clause 19, page 13, line 25, at end insert—
“(3A) Where a registered medical practitioner who is authorised under subsection (1) is not satisfied of all of the matters mentioned in section 18(4), they must notify the coordinating doctor immediately.”
This amendment provides that where a practitioner authorised under clause 19(1) is not satisfied of all of the matters mentioned in clause 18(4), they must immediately notify the coordinating doctor.
Amendment 211, in clause 19, page 13, line 31, leave out subsection (5).—(Kim Leadbeater.)
See the statement for Amendment 187.
Amendment made: 22, in clause 19, page 13, line 32, at end insert—
“(5A) Regulations under subsection (2)(b) must specify that training in respect of domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse is mandatory.”—(Naz Shah.)
This amendment would require that, in the event of the coordinating doctor authorising another registered medical practitioner to provide assistance under the Act, that other registered medical practitioner must also have undertaken training on domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse.
Amendment made: 212, in clause 19, page 13, line 33, leave out subsection (6).—(Kim Leadbeater.)
See the statement for Amendment 188.
Clause 19, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 20
Meaning of “approved substance”
I beg to move amendment 409, in clause 20, page 13, line 35, leave out from “specify” to “for” and insert—
“two or more drugs or other substances with different techniques of administration”.
The amendment requires that the Secretary of State specifies two or more drugs or other substances, which have different techniques of administration.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 465, in clause 20, page 13, line 36, at end insert—
“(1A) A drug may only be approved under this Act if it has been approved by the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency for that purpose.”
Amendment 466, in clause 20, page 13, line 36, at end insert—
“(1A) A drug may only be approved under this Act if the Secretary of State is reasonably of the opinion that there is a scientific consensus that this drug or combination of drugs, is effective at ending someone’s life without causing pain.”
Amendment 437, in clause 20, page 13, line 38, at end insert—
“(2A) The doses and types of lethal drugs specified in any regulations made under subsection (1) must be licensed by the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency.”
This amendment would require that any drugs and doses to bring an end to someone’s life under the Act be licensed by the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency.
Amendment 438, in clause 20, page 13, line 38, at end insert—
“(2A) The doses and types of lethal drugs to bring about the person’s death must be recommended by either the National Institute of Clinical Excellence or the All Wales Medicines Strategy Group in Wales’ guidelines as appropriate prior to licensing.”
This amendment will require the doses and types of lethal drugs must be recommended by either the National Institute of Clinical Excellence or the All Wales Medicines Strategy Group in Wales as appropriate.
Amendment 467, in clause 20, page 13, line 38, at end insert—
“(2A) Regulations under subsection (1) are subject to the affirmative procedure and when tabling the draft of the statutory instrument the Secretary of State must at the same time lay before both Houses of Parliament a report setting out all relevant information on the likely time to death, complications and likely side effect.”
Amendment 482, in clause 20, page 13, line 39, leave out “negative” and insert “affirmative”.
Clause stand part.
I rise to speak primarily to the amendments in my name and those in the name of the hon. Member for York Central with respect to the regulations for the approval of the approved substances—the drugs that will be used in the procedure of assisted death.
My amendment 465 states:
“A drug may only be approved under this Act if it has been approved by the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency”.
Amendment 437 in the name of the hon. Member for York Central would achieve a similar objective. My amendment 466 would require that the drugs
“may only be approved under this Act if the Secretary of State is reasonably of the opinion that there is a scientific consensus that this drug or combination of drugs, is effective at ending someone’s life without causing pain.”
I also support amendment 482 in the name of the hon. Member for York Central, which would move the approval of the regulations to the affirmative procedure.
Those who support this Bill argue that death through the administration of lethal drugs offers dignity and the avoidance of suffering. If that is to be the case, the drugs used must be effectively regulated and life must be ended effectively and without pain. The amendments I have mentioned specify the role of the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency; in my view, to leave this entirely in the hands of the Secretary of State, as clause 20 does, is quite an extraordinary step. It feels remarkable that the Bill as drafted leaves this enormous question to the Secretary of State.
[Peter Dowd in the Chair]
Good afternoon, Mr Dowd; it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship.
Throughout the Bill, important questions are left to regulations made subsequently by the Secretary of State. I think that is inappropriate here. When patients are prescribed medicines, in most cases the medicine will be licensed by the MHRA for use for the treatment of the particular condition. Patients can be assured that the medicine has been evaluated by the MHRA to ensure that it meets safety and efficacy standards. The MHRA reviews clinical trial data, inspects manufacturing facilities, monitors post-market safety and conducts independent quality testing so that there is regulation of medicine.
I have two concerns with my own amendments here; they might have occurred to other hon. Members, too, if they are paying attention. First, I do not accept that the procedure we are debating here is in fact healthcare. The question then arises, “Why are you proposing that the healthcare regulator would oversee the administration of the drugs?” My response to that is, “Well, somebody’s got to do it.” In fact, we are talking about substances that might be used in a medical setting, that would be appropriate in other medical settings, and that will have an effect on the body comparable to that for which they are licensed for medicine. Obviously, the intention is the direct opposite: they are licensed for genuine medicine and healthcare in order to preserve life and treat symptoms, but the intention here is to eliminate life without reference to symptoms.
Nevertheless, the only appropriate authority in our country is the MHRA—unless we were to conceive of another new body that would have that specific responsibility. However, that body would have the same obligations that the MHRA does to ensure that the substance is safe, paradoxically, in the sense of not causing unwanted side effects or distress to the patient.
The second objection—there is no reason why hon. Members present would know about it, but I have spoken in the main Chamber before about my concerns about the MHRA—is that, while I have just cited all the work that the MHRA is supposed to do in the regulation of medicines and healthcare products, I am afraid it does not do that job well. I do not want to give the Committee the impression that I think we have a perfect regulator; I think we have a very imperfect regulator in all sorts of ways.
In fact, the hon. Member for Stroud and I have participated in debates on the regulation of antidepressants and addiction-forming prescribed drugs, an important debate in which he and I are on the same side. There is genuine concern about the way the health regulator operates—we will not get into covid vaccines and other things at this moment; we have enough on our plate.
Nevertheless, despite the problems with the MHRA and the fact that I do not want to give the impression that I am concluding that assisted suicide is in fact healthcare, somebody has to do this. We cannot allow a situation in which the patient takes an overdose of a drug with no controls to ensure that the drug meets quality standards and does the job that it is meant to do. A tablet that is licensed for prescription or sale would need to have a minimum level of purity of the active substance, and to be free from other substances and contaminants that might cause unpleasant side effects or reactions. Without regulation, there is a risk that the drug may fail to work as intended or may induce unwanted side effects, such as those that we are all concerned about.
The question is: what safety standards should apply to an approved substance used for the purpose of assisted dying? A drug used to bring about death is not curing or preventing disease, or alleviating symptoms to improve death.
We had some discussion earlier about how we will potentially be assisting dying in people’s own homes—that was not previously known to us; we thought it would be always in clinical settings—so medication will be transported from where it is stored as a controlled drug, in a hospital setting, to the patient’s home. Does the hon. Gentleman think that it is important that we have clear guidance as to how we store this medication?
I entirely agree. The regulations need to specify not only what drugs may be approved, but, as the hon. Gentleman suggests, how they should be stored and transported. I would expect that to be part of the package of regulations under the Bill.
As I have stated, I do not accept that we are talking about healthcare here; nevertheless, we are using products that are comparable to health products. The MHRA would need to significantly adapt its work in order to identify the most effective drug to cause what we currently perceive as harm—namely, the death of a patient. I recognise that that would be a significant change of remit and work for the MHRA, but we need to do it. One of the reasons that we need regulation of approved substances is to help ensure that falsified versions of the drug—drugs that do not have a licence for use in assisted dying—cannot enter the market. Such drugs may not be effective and could cause distress to those ending their lives and their families. I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify whether, in his view, clause 20 is sufficient to establish the necessary regulatory regime, or whether further legislation will be needed.
We had evidence from Greg Lawton, and other pharmacists, who wrote to the Committee to suggest that the approved substances would not legally come within the definition of a “medicinal product”, so medicines law, the protections associated with medicines and the MHRA licensing process might not apply. If that is the case, what do we do about it? We need a new licensing regime to ensure that the MHRA is able to properly regulate the substances, or, potentially, another regulatory agency would need to be established to do the job.
The Committee needs to make sure that there is a process that applies to approved substances used for assisted dying. It is not necessarily the case that a product licensed for treating a medical condition could not be used to bring about death—it is not the case that we cannot use any drug that is currently used for genuine health treatment—but it would not be being used as a medicine, so medicines law may not apply to its use for that purpose. There is an ambiguity, and I would be grateful for clarity on it.
The amendments that I am supporting would ensure that the MHRA had approved the drug for the specific purpose of ending someone’s life, and that there was scientific consensus that the drug would be effective for that purpose. The MHRA, in the marketing authorisation for the approved substance, would define the dosage of the drug required to bring about death. It would also ensure that specific considerations and warnings were placed in the product licence.
For example, some patients have allergies to certain drugs. If they decide to end their own life, that should be brought about as a result of the effect of the drug, not an unintended allergic reaction to it. Some patients would not be able to take drugs orally and might need to have the drug administered through a tube into the stomach, so different formulations would need to be available. Some drugs may need to be administered by injection. Patients may be unable to do the injection themselves, as we have discussed. Even if the patient is physically capable, injection techniques require proper training, and that needs to be considered when licensing drugs for assisted dying if the patient is responsible for self-administration.
There will be further considerations when deciding what drugs can be used. Patients will have a right to know what to expect. If they take the drug orally, how long will they have to wait before they die? Will they lose consciousness first? If so, how long will that take? Could there be some side effects or reactions after taking the drug, such as seizures or choking, that the family or carers will have to deal with? Can the drug be taken at home—that relates to the point that the hon. Member for Ashford made—or must it be used in a clinical setting? We have suggested that it could be used at home, so questions about transportation arise. Is a combination of drugs required? If so, in what order should they be taken? What happens if the patient passes out before taking the entire concoction of drugs? Has the drug formulation been optimised for the purpose of assisted dying, so that it reaches maximum blood levels as quickly as possible?
All these sorts of questions are appropriate for medical regulators. The MHRA could ensure that the patient information leaflet, and the warnings associated with it, given with the drug when it is prescribed prompt doctors to think about what drugs are most suitable for the patient and to provide information to the patient about what to expect.
Parliament must have oversight. It must bear responsibility for the kinds of deaths that it approves. Both Houses of Parliament should approve the statutory instrument. To inform that decision, the Secretary of State should provide all relevant information on the likely time to death, and on complications and side effects. When the state is creating a regime that will end lives, there must be maximum transparency and accountability, yet the Bill provides that this will be done by a negative statutory instrument. In other words, Parliament will get a say on the regulations only if the Leader of the Opposition prays against them—that is the process for a negative SI. That is the only circumstance under which the Government would make time for a debate and a vote on a negative SI. Given that this is an issue of conscience, I find it inconceivable that the Leader of the Opposition would want to take a position on it and so pray against it to trigger a proper debate. I think it is highly likely that Parliament would never get a say on this crucial issue because of the use of the negative procedure.
That situation has been recognised repeatedly as being unacceptable. When Lord Falconer introduced his Assisted Dying Bill to the House of Lords in 2014, it too provided for a negative SI power on this matter. The highly respected House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee—we do not have an equivalent Committee in the Commons, but it sits over Parliament—said that it did not consider either the power or the procedure in the Falconer Bill to be appropriate, yet that is the procedure that we are being presented with here.
In 2021, when Baroness Meacher introduced her Assisted Dying Bill to the House of Lords, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee again issued a report, in which it said:
“In the interests of clarity and transparency on such important issues of public policy, the matters that are in due course to be dealt with under clause 4(7) by negative regulations should in our view be spelled out in detail on the face of the Bill from the outset. Accordingly, the Bill should contain a definitive list of medicines, and details of the manner and conditions under which such medicines are to be dispensed, stored, transported, used and destroyed. The power to amend such matters should be a matter for regulations subject to the affirmative procedure.”
We then come to Lord Falconer’s 2024 Assisted Dying for Terminally Ill Adults Bill, which he withdrew following the introduction of this Bill by the hon. Member for Spen Valley. That Bill in part took on that feedback from the Lords Committee. Although it did not provide a list of medicines, it did at least provide that the power to specify the drugs would be through the affirmative procedure.
The Hansard Society, which is non-partisan and neutral on assisted dying, has issued a critical report on this power. It says:
“MPs may wish to enquire why Kim Leadbeater has chosen not to adopt the scrutiny procedure set out in the 2024 bill, but has preferred that proposed in the 2014 and 2021 incarnations of the bill, despite the advice to the contrary of the Delegated Powers Committee.”
I would be grateful to learn from the hon. Lady why she has chosen this procedure.
It might be objected that the list that I am requesting might need to be modified quickly and that the affirmative procedure—having a parliamentary vote—would be an obstacle to doing that. The Hansard Society anticipated that objection. It said that
“this could be addressed by making provision for the use of the ‘made affirmative’ procedure in urgent cases where the Secretary of State wishes to remove a substance from the approved list and is of the opinion that it is necessary to do so immediately in order to prevent adverse medical events or failed assisted deaths. This would mean Ministers could act expeditiously but Parliament would have to debate and approve – albeit retrospectively – the change in the list. Whilst not perfect it would provide more opportunity for oversight than that offered by the negative scrutiny procedure.”
It seems to me that there is no justification for this vital matter to be regulated under the negative procedure. Too much power and responsibility is being given to Ministers subsequent to the passage of the Bill— if that is what happens. My amendment 467 would ensure that Parliament has a meaningful say, through the affirmative procedure, and that a report is published as part of that process setting out the expected efficacy of the drugs that will be used. I hope that the Committee will support it.
My hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire eloquently covered most of the things I would have said.
We have probably not spoken enough to date about the impact on pharmacists, but we are getting to the point in the Bill where it is really important that we take on board the written evidence and feedback that we are hearing from them. The Royal Pharmaceutical Society said:
“In dispensing a prescription, a pharmacist assumes a proportion of the responsibility for that prescription and therefore must be assured that all legal requirements are in place and that it is entirely appropriate for the patient. The link to the clinical assessment of eligibility criteria is essential and therefore the prescriber should always be one of the assessors. In addition to the usual practice of checking that the prescription fulfils the necessary legal requirement, pharmacists must have full access to the patient’s diagnosis and assisted dying care plan.”
That raises a few valid and interesting points that we need to take on board to ensure that pharmacists can do their jobs in line with the regulations and laws they are subject to, which are ultimately there to maintain patient safety.
I support amendment 466, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire, which would ensure that the Secretary of State must be of the opinion that there is scientific consensus that the drug is effective without causing pain. I am of the view that the Secretary of State is probably the right place for that responsibility to sit. One reason for that, which my hon. Friend spoke about, is that I am not sure that the MHRA is the right regulating body for that. I am no expert on this, and I am open to hearing the debate, but the MHRA’s remit covers medicines and healthcare products, so there is a question about whether legally the responsibility falls to it. If it does not, do we set up another body, or do we adjust its remit so that it is covered? I have reservations about doing anything that would merge assisted dying into normal healthcare, but I have laid that out many times over the weeks, so I will not go over that.
My understanding is that, on top of all the things my hon. Friend set out, the MHRA’s role is to give marketing authorisation for the promotion and advertising of medicine. Once that has been given, reams of regulations and compliance must be done, including in respect of the labelling of medicine. I believe it would have to be put on packaging that a medicine could be used for assisted dying. We need to get clarity on that from experts in the field, so that we fully understand it. If that is the case, how do we feel about making it clear that said medicines, potentially out in the market, could be used for assisted dying? I suggest there could be some significant downsides to such clear labelling. That is something for us all to think about. I wanted to raise those important points.
The hon. Lady puts her finger on the tension—my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate and I expressed it as well—about whether it is appropriate to give the health regulator responsibility for regulating a product that is about not health, but death. Does the hon. Lady agree that no other agency would be appropriate, given the skills she has set out? The purpose of these lethal drugs is to kill the patient; nevertheless, it is appropriate that we consider them in terms of not only that objective but their potential side effects. The purpose is not one of healthcare, but the product is very close to a healthcare intervention. Therefore, despite all our anxieties, it feels appropriate for the healthcare regulator to oversee this.
I absolutely agree and share those concerns. This is important. I appreciate that we have had this debate for many days now. Is this a healthcare intervention? Is it a treatment? What words should we apply? In this instance, when it comes to drugs, there are potential side effects. We have seen that they do not work everywhere and that they create complications. We have just debated whether a doctor should be in the room, outside the room or round the corner, as well as whether they should be visible or able to see what is going on. Ultimately, this is about the drugs. Having looked at the issue, I genuinely cannot imagine anything but the MHRA in this role. Are we really going to set up something completely new, outside our health service, that regulates drugs, their side effects and the potential implications?
My hon. Friend clearly speaks with expertise. There are other regulators, but the reason why I support amendment 465 is that the MHRA is an institution that we trust and that has the expertise. My understanding—my hon. Friend might be able to tell me differently—is that, of the regulators, the MHRA is the body that does the ultimate rubber-stamping and gives our country confidence in the national health service.
The hon. Lady is right that there is no other agency that is appropriate. The difficulty is that the MHRA is itself highly conflicted—we will come in due course to discuss the role of the profit motive in this mooted procedure—and the big problem is that it is overwhelmingly funded by the pharmaceutical companies. We have to ensure that there is no hint of corruption in the system, but I agree with the hon. Lady that the only way to do this is through that agency, but perhaps after reform.
I thank the hon. Member for his intervention.
We should be using the world-class pharmaceutical regulator we already have to oversee the drugs that will be used for assisted dying, and I urge all Committee members to support the amendment, which is a very important safeguard.
My view is that this is very clearly a matter for the Secretary of State, but with expert clinical and medical guidance. These are the people who should be making the decisions about such drugs. The evidence about this type of medication exists. As part of the commencement period and the consultation period, I anticipate there will be wide consultation about the drugs that are available. I think it is best left with the Secretary of State, so I would leave the clause unamended.
I will press amendments 465 to 467, but not amendment 409. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Before we continue, let me make a point about the process for tonight. We are not far off a vote in the main Chamber: it may happen in the next half-hour. There may be four or five votes, including a potential Division on Third Reading of the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill. No doubt people will need a comfort break, so my intention is that when the Division bell rings, we will suspend for an hour and 15 minutes. I am not saying that that will absolutely the right period, but it is as good as we can judge at this stage.
Amendment proposed: 465, in clause 20, page 13, line 36, at end insert—
“(1A) A drug may only be approved under this Act if it has been approved by the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency for that purpose.”—(Danny Kruger.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Amendment 379 would ensure that the co-ordinating doctor provides the commissioner with a copy of their final statement in cases in which the person has successfully been provided with assistance to end their life in accordance with the Bill. That is an important part of the reporting procedures and of the role of the commissioner. If agreed to, the amendment will ensure a robust recording and monitoring process for assisted dying.
Amendment 500 provides that regulations about the form of the final statement must make the provision mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (i) of proposed new subsection (3A). It builds on my amendment 214, which would amend subsection (3)(a) to require that the form of the final statement must be set out in
“regulations made by the Secretary of State”.
This is another way of ensuring robust and thorough reporting.
I thank the hon. Lady for explaining the purpose of the amendments. Amendment 500 specifies the information that a final statement must contain. Will she clarify why there is no requirement to record any details of what happened once the drugs were administered, other than the time between the use of the approved substance and death?
In this debate, we have acknowledged the importance of record keeping. If the intention is to maintain public confidence in the system, should there not be some provision to record whether complications happen and what complications there were? This skirting of the issue of complications is concerning. We have ruled out explicitly informing patients of the risk of complications.
I do not think that anyone has ruled out discussing complications. Clause 9 makes it clear that the doctor has a very clear discussion with the patient about what will happen if they proceed with an assisted death.
I am sorry; I mis-spoke. I should have said that we have ruled out clarifying the expectations of what doctors should do in the event of an assisted death, and whether or not that is specified by the patient.
Earlier today, the Committee again ruled out specifying what the obligations on doctors are if complications arise, whatever the patient has discussed earlier. With this amendment, we now seem to be ruling out gathering any information about what happened, which is surely vital not just for safeguarding but to develop good practice in the operation of the Bill, a point that the hon. Member for Ashford made earlier. There is too much silence in the Bill, between the taking of the substance and death, on what happens if there are complications, what is permitted and, now, what is recorded. Amendment 439, in the name of the hon. Member for York Central, attempts to address that point. I hope that the Committee will accept it.
I rise to speak to amendment 439, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central, which would amend clause 21 such that the relevant body would provide the chief medical officer and the commissioner with the full set of documents relating to a person who had undergone assisted dying. The relevant body would be the co-ordinating doctor if that person were a practitioner with the person’s GP practice. If the co-ordinating doctor did not meet that condition, the person’s GP practice would have the responsibility of sending those documents.
Those documents would be the person’s full medical records, court records and all documentation relating to assessments and procedures relating to the person’s assisted death. I note that “court record” refers to the Bill before we agreed to the amendments and new clauses that replace the High Court procedure with a panel system. We should be able to slightly tweak the wording to reflect that when we tidy up the Bill. That is what the amendment does. Let me say a little about why it does so and how it would make the Bill stronger.
The key aim is to ensure proper public oversight of any assisted dying scheme. The Bill creates the role of the voluntary assisted dying commissioner, who will look at and report on the workings of the system, appoint panel members and be the final court of appeal, so to speak. Those are far too many powers to give to one person, but if we are giving the commissioner a duty to report on how the system works, they should have the best possible information. It is only right that the information also be sent to the chief medical officer for England or for Wales, as appropriate; they are both very senior public officials and experienced doctors.
My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has tabled amendment 382, which, to quote the explanatory statement,
“provides for monitoring, investigation and reporting functions under Clause 34 to be carried out by the Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner (instead of the Chief Medical Officers for England and for Wales).”
I will have more to say on that amendment when we come to it, but removing the chief medical officer from the monitoring, investigation and reporting functions is not a good idea.
What use could the commissioner and the chief medical officers make of the data provided under amendment 439? Let me give some practical examples. If there were reported instances of a person experiencing discomfort or pain as a result of taking the medication, that would be of interest to the CMO and the assisted dying commissioner. It could trigger a further exploration of the titration of medication used in the procedure. As another example, let us think about what could happen if a family raised concerns about a person receiving assisted dying despite lacking capacity or being coerced. The CMO and assisted dying commissioner could use the information provided to investigate those allegations.
The amendment will ensure that the assisted dying commissioner and the chief medical officer receive detailed qualitative as well as quantitative data on people who have received assisted deaths. It is an important step towards making sure that the assisted dying scheme receives proper, well-informed scrutiny. In turn, that scrutiny will make it less likely that the scheme will allow abuses or ignore serious problems. I urge hon. Members to support the amendment.
I rise to speak to amendment 440, which stands in the name of the hon. Member for York Central. I echo the points made by the hon. Member for Banbury. Surely it is the case that the interventions made by a medical practitioner in response to the procedure failing, and the timing of those interventions, must be properly recorded. Should the procedure fail, the need for record keeping is of significant importance, as with all medical record keeping.
The doctor with the patient should write up the notes, including the times at which they reacted negatively to the procedure, the amount of medication that they consumed, any side effects and any action taken. That is good practice. In other jurisdictions there has been poor record keeping, as I mentioned, when things have not gone according to plan. We do not fully understand what happened in those instances or, more generally, the prevalence of complications in those jurisdictions. That information will be vital if further interventions are required, including emergency care.
Clause 22 deals with two situations: if the person decides not to take the substance or if the procedure fails—the phrase “Other matters to be recorded in medical records” seems a rather innocuous title for a clause that deals with such situations. In fact, I think that is the only mention of the procedure failing in the whole Bill. However, the clause, and amendment 380, simply require the co-ordinating doctor to notify the commissioner that it has happened as soon as practicable. Do we have any sense of when the doctor should judge the procedure to have failed? I would be grateful if the Minister or the promoter could offer a definition of procedural failure. What does that actually mean?
That question arises in other jurisdictions that have assisted dying laws. A 2019 paper by the Canadian Association of MAiD Assessors and Providers said:
“There is no clear cut-off for what constitutes ‘delayed time to death’ or ‘failed oral MAID’.”
At what point does a delayed time to death yield to failure? That question is not just abstract for us; it is a philosophical question in other contexts, but we are required to answer it. That paper goes on to suggest that
“clinicians should decide with patients in advance at what point they will consider inserting an IV and completing the provision”,
which is a rather euphemistic term but we know what it means. That is legal in Canada, but it would not be here, so what happens?
In written evidence, Dr Alexandra Mullock, who is a senior lecturer in medical law and co-director of the Centre for Social Ethics and Policy at the University of Manchester, pointed out:
“The Bill is silent on the precise obligations of the doctor if the procedure fails.”
Clause 18(9)(a)(ii) states that the doctor must remain with the person, but what the doctor should be permitted to do, either in relation to aiding recovery or supporting the person to die after the initial attempt has failed, is unclear. She said:
“During my work with the Nuffield Citizen’s Jury, the issue of what happens if the drugs do not end the person’s life was raised within the evidence presented to the jury, and this became a point of concern for several jurors.”
She also said:
“By not addressing this question within the Bill, it allows doctors to exercise clinical discretion, however, it is arguably legally and ethically preferable to clarify the position and address public concern by including a clause that covers this problem.”
I hope that is helpful.
I will end by referencing the hon. Member for York Central, who tabled amendment 440 and made the case very powerfully. She said that should the procedure fail, the need for record keeping is of significant importance, as with all medical record keeping. I have already said that, but we cannot have too much of the hon. Member for York Central.
Amendment 380 is one that the Government have worked on with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. As the Bill currently stands, clause 22 sets out that where a person decides not to take an approved substance provided under clause 18 or where the procedure fails, the co-ordinating doctor must record that that has happened in the person’s medical record or inform a registered medical practitioner with the person’s GP practice. The amendment would require that in those circumstances, the voluntary assisted dying commissioner must also be notified.
I turn to amendment 440. As I have just mentioned, clause 22 provides that the co-ordinating doctor is required either to record in the person’s medical records or inform a medical practitioner registered at that person’s GP practice if the person has decided not to take the substance or the procedure has failed.
The amendment increases the requirements on the co-ordinating doctor to document in such cases any interventions made by a medical practitioner and the timing of those interventions. The requirement on the co-ordinating doctor to record interventions following a failed procedure is open-ended in time, which could lead to operational challenges. For example, the co-ordinating doctor would remain obliged to record the medical interventions made by others in response to the procedure failing, even if those interventions took place weeks or months after the event itself. I hope that those observations have been helpful to the Committee.