Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateSimon Hoare
Main Page: Simon Hoare (Conservative - North Dorset)Department Debates - View all Simon Hoare's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(5 days, 18 hours ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend makes a very important point. I thank him for it, and for his years of service as a nurse. I have spoken to many medical professionals about this issue, and they say that this is part of their job. They are very skilled and they work closely with patients, particularly dying patients, to assess their needs and to have those difficult and delicate conversations. As the KCs said, at the moment we check for coercion in cases where people have taken their own lives—when someone is dead. The Bill would make coercion a criminal offence with a sentence of up to 14 years.
Surely, by putting a legal framework around this difficult situation, we will provide an extra level of safeguarding. One psychotherapist, who is terminally ill herself, said to me recently that coercion happens when things are hidden away. The Bill would bring things out into the open. Surely, that must be safer for everyone. Let us look at what the absence of a robust legal framework looks like.
I thank the hon. Lady for giving the House the time to debate the Bill this morning. She references coercion, and I understand her point about the two medics, but medics will not be able to see or hear everything at all times. People will not be put beyond challenge, because subsequent to the death, if a relative claims coercion of another relative, investigation will remain. I am entirely unclear how, without peradventure, two clinicians can claim that there had been no coercion at any point.
The hon. Gentleman has made the point for me: within a robust system, we will check for coercion, but we do not have any of that now. At the moment, the person will be definitely be dead. We have to look at the status quo. Putting in layers of safeguarding and checking for coercion must be better than the system that we have now.
I am grateful for that intervention.
The assessments have to determine whether the patient is terminally ill, whether they have mental capacity to make the decision, and then whether they have been coerced or pressured into the decision. In many ways the whole issue turns on the question of whether someone is terminally ill. I am afraid that it is a term of great elasticity, almost to the point of meaninglessness. It is well known, as the right hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson) said earlier, that it is impossible for doctors to predict with any accuracy that somebody will die within six months. It is a purely subjective judgment, made in this case by a doctor whose job will be approving assisted deaths. They simply have to determine not whether it is reasonably certain that death will occur, but that it can be reasonably expected—in other words, that it is possible.
The thrust of the Bill, as I understand it, is to ease suffering and pain in a patient who has a diagnosis and will die of the condition that has been diagnosed. But that right could only be exercised within a six-month period, and the pain and discomfort could last a lot longer than that. Has my hon. Friend heard—because I have not—what the importance of six months is? Why not eight, 10 or 12? What would stop people challenging it on the grounds that the dam has been breached, the six months is entirely arbitrary and it could, and indeed should, be extended by negative resolution in a statutory instrument?
My hon. Friend makes the right point, and I am afraid to say that is absolutely the case. The six-month cut-off is completely arbitrary and impossible to determine. It is a line in the sand, and of course it could be challenged, as so much of the Bill could be challenged, on human rights grounds. Every one of the safeguards that has been introduced by the hon. Member for Spen Valley would in fact be a barrier and a discrimination against the new human right that has been awarded to one group but should of course be awarded to all—if the point is conceded in this way.