Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Nineteeth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDanny Kruger
Main Page: Danny Kruger (Conservative - East Wiltshire)Department Debates - View all Danny Kruger's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(1 day, 12 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI have nothing further to add in this debate.
In the light of the suggestion from the hon. Member for Spen Valley that there will be further amendments later, when we can discuss the shape of the provision and presumably any remuneration, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 186, in clause 5, page 3, line 23, at end insert—
“(3A) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision about the training, qualifications and experience that a registered medical practitioner must have in order to act as the coordinating doctor.
(3B) The regulations must include training about—
(a) assessing capacity;
(b) assessing whether a person has been coerced or pressured by any other person.
(3C) Subject to that, the regulations may in particular provide that the required training, qualifications or experience is to be determined by a person specified in the regulations.”—(Kim Leadbeater.)
See the statement for Amendment 185.
Amendment made to amendment 186: (a), after
“(b) assessing whether a person has been coerced or pressured by any other person.”
insert
“(c) specific and up-to-date training on reasonable adjustments and safeguards for autistic people and people with a learning disability.”—(Daniel Francis.)
Amendment 186, as amended, agreed to.
I beg to move amendment 187, in clause 5, page 3, line 24, leave out subsection (4).
This amendment is consequential on NC8, which contains a single duty to consult before making regulations under various provisions of the Bill.
This group of amendments is consequential on new clause 8, which would create a single duty for the Secretary of State to consult before making regulations under various provisions of the Bill. It would consolidate the previous requirements to consult in relation to clauses 5, 8 and 19 and expand the duty to cover additional clauses. It would require the Secretary of State to consult the Equality and Human Rights Commission and such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate. The persons to be consulted under subsection (1)(b) must include persons appearing to the Secretary of State to have expertise in matters relating to whether persons have capacity, and persons appearing to the Secretary of State to have expertise in matters relating to whether persons have been coerced.
This is an important strengthening of the Bill. It applies to multiple clauses: clauses 5, 7, 8, 13, 19 and 21. The duty to consult experts, particularly on issues around capacity and assessing for coercion, is an important change that reflects the detailed debate that the Committee has undertaken on those two important issues.
Amendment 233 brings together the various provisions about the procedure for regulations. It would make the regulations to be made under clauses 5 and 8, on training, qualifications and experience, subject to the draft affirmative procedure, so that Parliament has to debate and approve them first. Again, that would strengthen the Bill.
In a sense, this is a technical set of amendments that consolidate the provisions for secondary legislation. However, it reflects the seriousness of a concern that I and others have raised, which is that so much in this Bill will be left to the discretion of Ministers, often through the negative procedure.
It is important to reflect briefly on the questions that we are considering. The hon. Lady has mentioned quite a few of them, but we are talking about the training of doctors; the High Court procedure, if there is one; the substances that may be used in the administration of assisted death; the prescribing of those substances; the registration of deaths; the codes of practice to be introduced; provision through the NHS; notification to the chief medical officers; changing the schedules in the Bill, and so on.
Those are important matters. I recognise that many of them are complicated and technical, and that it is appropriate to leave them to a degree of professional and ministerial discretion. Nevertheless, my great concern, which relates to the parliamentary procedure—you may have a view on this, Mrs Harris—is that we are having this debate without the benefit of a delegated powers memorandum to explain why each power has been taken, the nature of it, the reason for taking the power and the procedure to be selected.
In a recent report on the Bill, the Hansard Society notes that under the Government’s “Guide To Making Legislation”, a delegated powers memorandum would normally be published prior to Second Reading for a private Member’s Bill on issues of conscience on which the Government are neutral. The report explains that a delegated powers memorandum gives
“details of each power in the bill, including its context, its scope, to whom the power is delegated, and the parliamentary scrutiny procedure…the reasons for taking the power; and…why.”
It points out that
“where the responsible department recommends that the Government should support the Private Member’s Bill or remain neutral then a DPM should be produced for consideration by the relevant Cabinet Committee—the Parliamentary Business and Legislation (PBL) Committee—alongside other key documents such as the explanatory notes, a legal issues memorandum, and an impact assessment”.
We have not yet had an impact assessment either.
Order. I ask the hon. Member to speak to the amendments. You have gone out of scope.
I am sorry about that. I am trying to make the point that the amendments would all grant a large number of powers to Ministers through the statutory instrument procedure. That is why I am referring to the Hansard Society report.
I understand, but it would be interesting to know whether the Government have produced a delegated powers memorandum, and when it will be published.
I have four quick points to make about my concerns about the amendments and new clause 8. First, new clause 8 provides that when making the SIs, the Secretary of State must consult the Equality and Human Rights Commission. That is a very positive step, but the other provisions on who should be consulted are, on closer inspection, illusory. The Secretary of State must consult those with expertise on capacity and coercion—that is all great—unless he or she considers that
“it would not be appropriate”.
What the new clause gives with one hand, it takes with the other. It would be good to identify in the Bill who the groups are that the Secretary of State must consult for each power.
Secondly, the vast majority of the SIs made under the Bill, as amended by the amendments, are to be made by the negative procedure. The last time that an SI subject to the negative procedure was annulled by the House of Commons was 1979. The procedure gives only the outward appearance of involving Parliament again. The SIs take effect when signed by the Minister, subject only to a motion of either House to annul them. However, by strong convention the Lords will do no such thing, and the convention in the Commons is that the Government will make time to debate such a motion only if it is put forward by the Opposition Front Bench, and it is at the Government’s discretion.
This being a matter of conscience, it is unlikely that any Opposition Front Bench would be in a position to table such a motion, and no one else has any standing. In practice, that means that there will be no opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny on, which lethal substances may be approved, for example, or on what events should be notified to the chief medical officer. These are not mere details.
Thirdly, on some of the matters addressed in the amendments it is doubtful whether the use of delegated powers is even appropriate, because even if there is a debate and a vote in Parliament, debate on an SI is limited to 90 minutes only and an SI is not amendable. In fact, the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee considered it improper that the Assisted Dying Bill introduced by Baroness Meacher gave the power to the Secretary of State to decide which substances should be allowed to cause death, because it was an inappropriate question for an SI.
Finally, and perhaps most substantially, clause 32 will establish a vast Henry VIII power. It allows Ministers even to amend primary legislation, and those changes would be subject to a simple yes or no vote in the Commons, without the possibility of amendment. It has been suggested in the Hansard Society podcast with the drafter of the Bill that the power is there because provision on the NHS could be made only if section 1 of the National Health Service Act were modified, removing the duty of the Secretary of State to improve the “physical and mental health” of the public. I look forward to seeing whether the amendments that have been promised include that. However, they will not necessarily amend the National Health Service Act, because that could be done under the statutory instruments created in these amendments.
If such a foundational piece of legislation as the National Health Service Act needs to be modified to allow this law to pass, surely it would be better to do it on the face of the Bill. I want to know why a Henry VIII power is needed. I hope that the Government might bring forward the relevant amendments to the Bill so that a Henry VIII power is not needed. I see that the hon. Member for Spen Valley is nodding, which is encouraging.
I stress that the Committee must bear it in mind that this power would exist on the statute book forever, unless the statute is repealed, so any Government could use this power. The last time that a Parliament found its voice to reject an SI by the negative procedure was back in the 1970s. When we come to a decision on amendment 233 and new clause 8, I will seek to make further amendments.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Harris. It would be remiss of me not to comment briefly on new clause 8, given that throughout this process I have consistently raised issues around evidence given by the Equality and Human Rights Commission, and given that new clause 8 states that before making a recommendation the Secretary of State must consult the commission.
I remind hon. Members that the commission has told us that it strongly recommends that
“at the earliest opportunity, Parliament is provided with further information and assurance about the bill’s compatibility with equality and human rights.”
It went on to say that its concerns were that the Bill
“may also particularly impact disabled people. We recognise that this bill is focused on assisted dying for adults who are terminally ill, and does not propose access to assisted dying on the basis of disability or chronic conditions. However, there is not always a clear line between terminal illness and disability. Disabled people can also suffer from terminal illness, and illness may itself amount to a disability.”
It has also stated:
“A vital factor in determining how to manage access to assisted dying will be the concept of mental capacity…It will be important to ensure that all decision-makers involved in the process have a full and clear understanding of the law around mental capacity under the Mental Capacity Act 2005.”
I welcome new clause 8, which is in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, as it would ensure that the Equality and Human Rights Commission is consulted. We await its comments, which hopefully we will have before Report, on whether the concerns that it raised, both in writing before Second Reading and in their oral evidence, have been allayed. However, I welcome this initial commitment, and we will see where that brings us on Report.
I rise to speak to amendments 291, 292 and 293, which were tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell). I do not intend to press them to a vote; they are probing amendments. They all relate to the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley about the identification required of applicants for assisted dying. They do not change those requirements; they take a more logical and businesslike approach to proving that those requirements are met.
Amendment 291 would change the current requirements on identification and require applicants for assisted dying to produce a piece of photo ID and proof of residence in the UK for the previous year. As currently written, clause 6(2) states:
“The person must, at the same time as that declaration is made, provide two forms of proof of identity to the coordinating doctor and the witness mentioned in section 5(2)(c)(ii).”
Subsection (3) states:
“The Secretary of State may, by regulations, make provision about the forms of proof of identity that are acceptable for the purposes of subsection (2).”
Surely that is not tight enough.
In particular, the Bill as written does not specify that either form of proof of identity should be photo ID. That may be a major omission. For much less significant decisions, the law of England and Wales requires at least one form of photographic ID. For example, there is currently a requirement to have photo identity to work on the parliamentary estate, vote, or have a bus pass or railcard. None of those is as important as applying for an assisted death.
I remind hon. Members that assisted death is a process that would end in a person being issued with and then taking a mixture of lethal drugs. In a hospital setting where drugs are dispensed, rigorous processes are undertaken to verify the patient. Drug errors are not uncommon. The previous Health and Social Care Committee’s report into pharmacy witnessed how clinical practice was being improved to reduce drug errors. Given that a lethal dose is dispensed as part of this process, the identification mechanisms are weak and should be addressed in this preliminary stage through the provisions set out in this amendment. It is possible that the wrong person could be prescribed the medication. That would be an extreme case, but we are talking about creating a wholly new power that would relate to life and death. We are talking about making assisted dying available to people who are, in many cases, extremely distressed. People in extreme circumstances will sometimes do extreme things. We should expect some extreme cases and seek to guard against them.
Amendment 291 would provide such a safeguard. The Bill says that to qualify for assisted dying, applicants must have been resident in the UK for at least a year, but it does not ask them to provide any proof of that residence. In such a serious matter, we surely cannot simply accept someone’s word that they live in the UK. Making that a requirement without a test to establish it de-values the importance of the criteria for qualifying.
Amendment 292 would change clause 6(3), which currently reads,
“The Secretary of State may, by regulations, make provision about the forms of proof of identity that are acceptable for the purposes of subsection (2).”
The amendment would change that “may” to a “must”, as the former treats the identification process with reduced seriousness. If the word “may” stays in legislation, there is no obligation to have rigour in the identification process. As drafted, the Bill is more open for abuse.
Amendment 293 seeks to place the regulations concerning identification under the affirmative procedure, which the hon. Member for East Wiltshire mentioned earlier. Assisted dying is so important that no regulations made under it should be drawn using the negative procedure. As Members will know, if a statutory instrument is made under the affirmative procedure, it must be approved by Parliament within a certain timeframe, which is usually 28 or 40 days. If that does not happen, the change to the law made by the statutory instrument will not take place. In the Bill as drafted, these regulations are covered by the negative procedure, which means that if and when the Secretary of State decides to change them, they could go through on the nod unless Members raised an objection. A statutory instrument laid through the negative procedure becomes law on the day the Minister signs it and automatically remains law unless a motion rejecting it is passed by either House within 40 sitting days.
Placing all changes to regulations under the affirmative procedure would ensure that we have scrutiny by Parliament. We should all approve this. Our responsibility for this legislation will not end when and if it becomes an Act of Parliament. These amendments speak to tighter safeguards and parliamentary scrutiny for all new regulations made by the Secretary of State in relation to identity and residence. All hon. Members should support them.
I will quickly echo the points well made by the hon. Member for Bradford West in support of the amendments in the name of the hon. Member for York Central. It is important to specify the form of identity that will be presented. The person presenting themselves for an assisted death needs to be who they say they are. At the moment, the power to specify the forms of proof of identity has no minimum requirements. As written, it does not require the Secretary of State to specify what is acceptable.
Two specific aspects we have to pay particular care to are age and residency. The process must be accessible only to over-18s. I am concerned that we rejected amendments yesterday that would have prevented people under 18 having the conversation. In light of that, it is even more important that we make it clear that people who access assisted death must be adults. We need to ensure that the forms of identity are specified and that Parliament can satisfy itself that they are robust.
We did not reject proposals for the preliminary discussion not to be taken by people under 18. We actually put a clause into the Bill that would ensure that the preliminary discussion was not taken with someone under 18.
That is right. The preliminary discussion will not, but there is nothing to stop the conversation beginning before the person is 18. I know they cannot formally begin the process of an assisted death, but the concern—although I will not revisit the debate—was that the topic should not be raised or discussed with children, and we did not succeed in that.
The proposal is to ensure that we have proper ID—a passport, driving licence or other combined photo ID and proof of age, so a birth certificate must be paired with something if it is to be robust. We think such questions should be reflected more clearly in the Bill. All sorts of ID would not be appropriate, such as student ID, a sworn statement with no underpinning official record and other such things, which we want to avoid.
I was expecting someone else to have spoken in support of amendment 296, but I will be very brief. The tone of the debate so far has been respectful, and it should continue to be so. I hope that this will not be characterised as a personal attack on my hon. Friend the Member for York Central, who tabled the amendment, or anyone else who supports it, but this is a shocking amendment. It is shocking because I doubt that the motives behind it are to improve the Bill or make it safer. In fact, I fear that the motives are to build a political attack to support opposition to the Bill, rather than to be constructive in improving it.
I have come to that conclusion because there is no concept in any other piece of legislation, or in any healthcare guidance in operation, that would ever presuppose that a clinician would undertake a consultation, assessment or meeting that would ever put other patients in danger. I fear that this amendment has been tabled because some people are attempting to assert, perhaps not purposefully or wilfully, that the introduction of an assisted dying system would somehow force clinicians to put other patients at risk. If that is the assertion, that is wrong and—in my view—shocking. It is a shocking indictment on their view of our medical practitioners in the NHS.
The hon. Gentleman is impugning the motivation of his colleague, the hon. Member for York Central, who is herself an experienced practitioner in the NHS. To suggest that she has tabled this amendment improperly is a serious accusation, which I cannot believe that he really wants to make against his colleague. He said that the amendment’s intention is to suggest that assisted dying would cause problems in the NHS, but the explicit terms of the amendment are to ensure that that does not happen. Of course, no practitioner would want to take choices that would prejudice other patients’ care.
Order. Mr Kruger, you are down to speak and you can make your point then. I want interventions to be short.
I was not intending to speak on this amendment, but since you have called me, Mrs Harris, I will quickly respond to the comments of the hon. Member for Rother Valley. I sincerely think that he should withdraw the suggestion that the amendment was made in bad faith and his remarks about the motivation of the hon. Member for York Central. She clearly tabled it only to make the Bill safer, which is the purpose of all the amendments, even if there might be very good reasons to disagree with them, so I regret that attack on her integrity.
On the point that we should simply rely on the integrity of clinicians—although the hon. Member for Rother Valley has not done so in respect of the hon. Member for York Central, who is herself a clinician—of course we do that. Nevertheless, the laws we make and the guidance we introduce send strong signals about priorities. The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that doctors do not feel that the obligations created by the Bill impose a duty on them to prioritise the assisted death procedure over other priorities. In fact, it would give clinicians genuine autonomy and freedom to make their own decisions—obviously, in consultation with colleagues and patients—about the appropriate prioritisation of the treatments and services they are offering.
The hon. Member for Rother Valley made the point that there is, in a sense, an attempt to suggest that the Bill should not become law because of the pressures it could impose on the NHS. I think that such pressures are a valid concern. When we create new laws, we should consider what new burdens they will place on existing services. We should consider whether the new service will be introduced and implemented safely, and its knock-on implications for the wider system.
The point is that the amendment is not about the wider system; it is about a clinician’s individual decision making. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that that is a very different prospect?
Well, that concern for the individual clinician is in the context of their wider obligation to treat their patients well and to manage a resource—their own time—in a way that is equitable to all the patients they have to see. As often in these debates, we are really considering the extent to which we should be putting into the Bill an obligation on doctors to do the job that we hope that they are doing anyway. We do have such rules in the system to clarify what we expect of clinicians, however, and I think they would be appropriate in this case, given the resource requirements—which are unknowable, but with common sense one can see that they will be quite significant—that this new service would entail for many clinicians in the NHS.
If the Government were to introduce legislation to expand the NHS’s role in how it undertakes operations in a certain area, would the hon. Member suggest that similar amendments should be added to that legislation, or it is just about this issue?
There is no rule that can be applied universally in the abstract. All rules take their value from how they are introduced. On the hon. Gentleman’s hypothesis, I do not in principle suggest that every new treatment and every new obligation that is created in the NHS should require laws determining how clinicians prioritise them. In the case of a new service—I am trying not to use the word “treatment”, because I do not accept it as such, but it sounds like it will be treated as an NHS treatment—that is very significant and whose resource implications are unknown, it strikes me as appropriate that, as far as possible, we should be clear that doctors should manage the resource demands placed on them by the Bill in the context of their other obligations to patients.
Can my hon. Friend not see that, as the hon. Member for Rother Valley said, the amendment is based on what could be construed as an offensive assumption: that doctors otherwise might or would? Effectively, it is the legislative equivalent of the “When did you stop beating your wife?” question.
I am afraid to say that we do impose obligations on doctors to do the things that we expect them to do. If that is offensive to doctors, so is all the guidance from the General Medical Council. It might well be argued that the amendment is otiose, because of course we would expect doctors to manage their resource requirements appropriately and to consider other patients. Nevertheless, the point that is being made in defence of the amendment, about which I feel strongly, is that we are creating a new service with unknowable resource implications, with strong parliamentary backing behind it, and with a whole set of guidance that will be created ex nihilo by the Secretary of State and that Parliament will have little control over.
Because we have not seen the amendments on the design of the service, we do not even know what the service will involve and how much work it will take. It is therefore appropriate to specify explicitly that doctors have an obligation to consider the potential impact on other patients.
I understand where my hon. Friend is coming from. To give us fair warning, if the Committee votes the amendment down, how will he portray that publicly? Will he say to the public that the Committee has voted for doctors to harm other patients?
I am grateful for your ruling, Mrs Harris, but I hope you will not mind if I do respond to the question.
Okay. I might address the question at a future point, because the issue of how we reflect on these proceedings outside this place has come up privately.
I do not consider for one second that there is any ill intent behind the amendment, but I am slightly concerned about the language, which is what I think my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley meant. The issue is the suggestion that a doctor would, in any circumstances, jeopardise the care of other patients. We are talking about doctors a lot, and we have the utmost respect for medical practitioners, but I imagine that that would be a worrying concept to have in writing from their perspective.
I respect that point, and it is a fair charge: that doctors would not do this. Nevertheless, as I have been stressing, we are in uncharted territory, and there is a genuine concern about the resource implications of the Bill.
The Bill clarifies and emphasises things in lots of other places—“for the avoidance of doubt” and so on—and the amendment would clarify that the procedure under the Bill would not take precedence in a clinician’s time over other matters that they also consider to be pressing and urgent. That is an appropriate safeguard for doctors.
The problem with the amendment, which has been mentioned before—I will not go as far as my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley and say that it would essentially nullify the Bill—is that it is entirely subjective. It is not guidance or a clear point of reference; it is entirely subjective to each individual doctor.
I am afraid that the English language is rather subjective. The service would rely on guidance or case law that had been built up, although one hopes that there would not have to be court cases in respect of it. The interpretation of the language of the Bill would be the duty of clinicians and, ultimately, NHS trusts and their lawyers.
A lot of the conversations we have had in Committee have been about eliminating the lottery that exists in our healthcare system. What the hon. Gentleman is suggesting will be exactly that: a lottery according to each individual clinician and doctor.
We cannot have it both ways. We cannot give doctors and clinicians autonomy, which the Committee has repeatedly seen as a ground to reject all sorts of obligations that I and others have proposed to ensure that doctors do the job in a specific way, and then suggest the opposite in this instance. I recognise what the hon. Gentleman says, and he may be right that that is inappropriate.
The hon. Lady is absolutely right. We should not forget that doctors are indemnified against any civil claims under the Bill. Nevertheless, they will want to protect themselves against the accusation that they inappropriately prioritised one case over another. That is the purpose of the amendment, and I urge the Committee to support it.
I will finish with this point. I am ashamed to say it, because my party was responsible for the NHS for the 14 years until last year, but the fact is, as Labour Members said frequently when they were in opposition, that there are enormous resource constraints on the frontline in the NHS. I do not think that is inappropriate to consider, when we create a new service, how it might have an impact on existing treatments in the NHS. Leaving aside all the ethical questions, including on coercion and capacity and our concerns in that respect, what will this mean for hard-pressed GPs and clinicians of all sorts on the frontline? What protections can we offer them when they make difficult decisions about whether to support an assisted death application?
I thank the hon. Member for that point. There will absolutely be some occasions where that is the case, but assisted dying is a different pathway—and we have a whole Bill on it, so there will be other formalities and safeguards. We are all here to make sure that rigour is applied to that pathway. With the best will in the world, there will always be more work and pressure, especially time pressure, on doctors. That time pressure will be critical.
I completely agree. The hon. Member for Spen Valley makes the important point that these patients are, indeed, being treated already; one would hope that the palliative care process would continue alongside their application. It is absolutely right that they are being treated, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate says, there would be additional work being done for them. Does she agree that there is also an opposite threat—that the resource being expended on the patient might be less as a result of the assisted death that they get? I am afraid to say that that would introduce a terrible new incentive into the system, as happens elsewhere.
This is a complex issue, and that is why I welcome the debate on this group. There are lots of things that need to be thought through to make sure that, if assisted dying is legalised, we manage it in the most effective way for patients.
I rise to speak briefly to amendment 296. We all know how the NHS operates, how the appointment system works in the NHS and how long people have to wait to see a doctor. I do not think that my hon. Friend the Member for York Central tabled the amendment with any ill thought, but just to highlight the issue. I do not think that the amendment will make the Bill any safer or stronger, or safeguard anything, but the Committee needs to acknowledge it.
I will quote the Royal College of Physicians, which represents 40,000 doctors who primarily work in hospitals, including on palliative care. The Royal College of Physicians took a neutral position on the Bill. In its written evidence, it highlighted,
“We recognise that the ultimate decision on assisted dying rests with society through Parliament, however any changes to the law will significantly affect clinical practice beyond palliative care…Should the law change, the RCP strongly argues that assisted dying must not divert resources from end of life and palliative care provision, which are not currently adequate.”
With amendment 296, my hon. Friend the Member for York Central is trying to get the Committee to acknowledge that some NHS departments work with vacancies of 50 medical professionals. A patient who has been waiting for six months should not have their appointment cancelled because the provision here is prioritised. I think that is what my hon. Friend meant with her amendment, and I commend her thought about wider NHS provision.
I appreciate the point that the hon. Gentleman is making, and that he will not be able to support the amendment, but does he acknowledge that its purpose is to clarify the triage process that needs to be done by doctors? It is a perfectly appropriate request to make of doctors.
I agree. It highlights the point that the impact assessment will be very important here, to see from where the resources are being pulled to provide this. The Committee should acknowledge amendment 296.
I appreciate the hon. Member’s point, and it is very logical that it should only be in the case of doubt, but does he not recognise that in the case of organ donation, it is mandatory? If people have this proper assessment when they are giving an organ, why should they not be asked to have one if they propose to give their life?
That is an interesting point, but we are not discussing organ donation, and we are dealing in a different environment here; the patients we are talking about are about to die, and all we are giving them is the right to control the moment and manner of that death. I acknowledge that using a psychiatrist in organ donation has its benefits, but in this service, getting every patient—who, for example, are frail and ill by definition, because they are about to die—to see a psychiatrist is frankly neither applicable nor appropriate.
It is a very important point. Yes, we are talking about those people, but we are also talking about a different category of people who have a terminal diagnosis of six months or more, and may only be reasonably expected to die within six months. I am not just talking about people at the very end of their life, who are at death’s door; we are talking about people who qualify for the Bill, which is a much larger category of people, so it is appropriate to require them to do this.
I agree with all of this. I think psychological assessment is incredibly important in all patients, and I personally specialise in it from a primary care basis. But we are suggesting here that the two other doctors have no ability to do any sort of psychological assessment, and that is simply not true.
Thank you, Mrs Harris—you really are giving the Minister some exercise during these long sittings.
Amendment 14 likens assisted dying to organ donation. I understand that an organ donor, before the point of independent assessment, has had no other independent assessment, which is in stark contrast to this Bill. The idea that, by failing to support this amendment, we are somehow adopting a weaker framework than for organ donation is patently false.
As the Bill sets out, there are already at least two assessments by independent doctors. As per the amendments we have already agreed, those doctors must have training, as specified by the Secretary of State, on the assessment of capacity and coercion. The rationale behind this amendment is already met, and it is significantly more strenuous than the framework for independent assessment in the event of organ donation.
I am not sure that is right. The amendment insists that this referral and assessment should happen at the earliest stage possible, in the same way as for organ donation. One of the confusions of the Bill is that multiple different conversations could happen. The purpose is to ensure that this conversation with a psychologist or social worker, as per organ donation, happens at the very earliest opportunity.
I disagree with the hon. Gentleman’s reading. The amendment talks about the co-ordinating doctor, as in the first independent assessor, and that is the case in the provisions we have already adopted. Clearly, the co-ordinating doctor may consult—and must consult, as per the amendment we are about to get to—psychiatric or other expertise, if there is any doubt in their mind. Amendment 14 would not bring forward that assessment earlier than elsewhere. I urge hon. Members to bear in mind that the idea that this proposal is somehow weaker than the current human tissue regulations is absolutely false.
On the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West, the amendment does nothing to address coercion by a medical professional who knew the person beforehand. Under the amendment, it is by definition an independent person who has no prior relationship with the person.