Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

John Glen Excerpts

Friday 13th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Tony Vaughan]

I am essentially finished.

I urge hon. Members to reject amendment (b) to new clause 14 in its current form, not because we oppose its aim, but because we can and must find a better way to achieve it.

[John Glen (Salisbury) (Con)]

I am grateful to have my first opportunity to contribute on this Bill. It would not be appropriate to dilate on my profound anxieties about it, but I approach these amendments in the spirit of constructive engagement. I rise to speak to linked amendments 82 to 86, which would strengthen the panel by giving it some of the features of the High Court safeguard that was, regrettably, removed.

We heard from the hon. Member for Spen Valley (Kim Leadbeater) that the panel will now be stronger because it includes a broader range of expertise. The argument against that, of course, is that the High Court was a stronger safeguard because it has the powers of a court and the independence of the judiciary. My amendments would mean that we do not have to choose between the two: the panel is part of the Bill, but we can have a better panel if we give it some of the features of the High Court, namely its independence, the calibre of its judges, and its powers as a court.

Amendment 82 would require all panel members to be appointed by the Judicial Appointments Commission, which nominates judges in England and Wales. Currently, the selection of panel members is wholly down to the voluntary assisted dying commissioner. Schedule 2 says:

“The Commissioner must make appointments to a list of persons eligible to sit as members of panels.”

I have absolutely no doubt that the commissioner will be someone of great integrity and experience, but he or she will certainly be a strong advocate of assisted dying, as will those who put themselves forward for the panels. That may create an impression that the VAD commission is a self-selecting group with a particular set of institutional views.

If the system is to command public confidence, I believe that appointments would be best administered by an external body, and the Judicial Appointments Commission is the obvious choice. We in this country trust the judiciary, partly because we know that they represent no set of opinions.

[Danny Kruger]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his amendments. He is absolutely right to say that this country trusts the judges, which is why this House was so enthusiastic about the inclusion of the High Court in the original Bill. Does he agree that by reintroducing proper judicial scrutiny at this stage we would be reverting to the Bill that the House voted for on Second Reading?

[John Glen]

It will not surprise my hon. Friend to hear that I agree wholeheartedly. I recognise that that was a major reason that many colleagues gave at earlier points in our discussions and deliberations.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his constructive engagement, but he did not vote for the Bill when it included a High Court judge, and now he is trying to reintroduce a High Court judge. Is there a version of the Bill that he would vote for if it had some sort of judicial oversight other than a commissioner who is a judge or a retired judge, a deputy commissioner who is a judge or a retired judge, and someone on the panel who is a legal expert?

[John Glen]

I have been very clear that I have tabled my amendments in a constructive way to reflect the will that the hon. Lady has expressed, but to recognise the meaningful dilution in the authority of the process and what can reasonably be amended to invigorate it, based on the principles that I think were intended at the outset.

I will revert to the point I was making about the judiciary. They have a commitment to uphold the law, and that should be the standard we are looking for when it comes to matters of life and death. The Judicial Appointments Commission already conducts appointments for all tribunals, including lay members. The Government’s impact assessment compared the panel to the mental health tribunal. All appointments to the mental health tribunal, including the non-legal members, are made by the Judicial Appointments Commission, so this would not be a novel function for it.

Let me move on to amendment 85, which would ensure that all members of the panel have to take the judicial oath if they have not done so already. If other amendments pass, amendment 85 would be necessary only for the non-legal members, and it is crucial for public confidence that the judicial oath is taken.

Amendments 83 and 84 seek to preserve an important element of the Bill as originally presented to the House. They would ensure that the most senior decision-making figure, the chair of the panel, is a High Court judge with all the experience, responsibility and professionalism that that implies. Under these amendments, all High Court judges would be automatically eligible. They would need to be currently serving or at least be below retirement age, and would have to be a judge of the highest authority and not a deputy judge. Members of this House and the public were originally told that this would be a safe Bill precisely because it would have a High Court judge. That was a persuasive promise, and I think there is a way to honour it, even in the new version of the Bill.

I will briefly mention the retirement age, because it is important. It used to be 70, but judges can now continue until they are 75. However, there is no age limit for members of the panel. If we are saying that an 80-year-old retired judge is still with it and is able to decide on matters of life and death, why are they too old to help clear the backlog of criminal cases? That seems to be a meaningful anomaly.

I have been very clear about the purpose of my amendments. I have tabled them in the spirit of trying to strengthen the Bill and return it to what was intended, so that it can meet the expectations of so many Members who supported it at an earlier point.

[Dr Allison Gardner (Stoke-on-Trent South) (Lab)]

I rise to support a number of new clauses and amendments to the Bill. The common thread running through all of them is a need to address some of the gaps in the safeguards and oversight. Should the Bill pass, I at least want to ensure that we improve its protections and remove some of the risks that it contains.

New clause 4 requires the chief medical officer to monitor the operation of the legislation, rather than depending solely on the assisted dying commissioner. Alongside the requirement for a High Court judge, oversight by the CMO was removed during the Committee stage. This means that, essentially, the assisted dying commissioner would mark their own homework. New clause 4 returns the safeguard of independent oversight, which is sensible given the significant concerns expressed by many experts and organisations, which were often neutral on the principle, but concerned about the Bill. They include the Royal College of Psychiatrists, the Association for Palliative Medicine, the British Geriatrics Society, the Royal College of Physicians and many experts such as Professor James Monckton Smith, a leading criminologist, Baroness Finlay, Parliament’s leading expert on palliative care, Sir David Haslam, former head of the British Medical Association and of the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence—my previous employer—and many more. All have expressed concerns, even when neutral on the principle of the adequacy of the Bill.

Hence new clause 4 requires an annual report to include

“information about the application of the Act in relation to—

persons who have protected characteristics, and

any other description of persons specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.”

I fervently hope that that includes domestic violence victims.

Amendment 13 very sensibly adds the requirement that the commissioner appointment is not the sole remit of the Prime Minister at the time, by requiring the consent of the Health and Social Care Committee. This provides a safeguard against ideological and politically motivated appointments, and I would be very critical of anyone who would want to prevent that.

Amendment 15 addresses the significant concerns about the involvement of private—for profit—providers of assisted dying. There are concerns that, when there is a commercial relationship between providers, there will be a gaming of the system. That risks compromising the relationship between the co-ordinating doctor and the independent doctor. Likewise, the existence of such providers does not allay concerns about doctor shopping, as was raised in the previous debate. Hence amendment 15 will require private providers to be transparent and provide reports on service members, service numbers, costs and revenue.

In previous debates and in the public discourse I have found it very disconcerting that, in response to legitimate concerns, all that we have been offered—as we have seen today—are some promised, unspecified future regulations that will fix the gap—[Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”]