Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures: 1 June to 31 August 2024

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Wednesday 20th November 2024 Written Statements

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

Section 19(1) of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of every relevant three-month period on the exercise of their TPIM powers under the Act during that period.

The level of information provided will always be subject to slight variations based on operational advice.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures: 1 March to 31 May 2024

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Wednesday 20th November 2024 Written Statements

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

Section 19(1) of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of every relevant three-month period on the exercise of their TPIM powers under the Act during that period.

The level of information provided will always be subject to slight variations based on operational advice.

Draft Criminal Finances Act 2017 and Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 (Consequential Amendments) Regulations 2024

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Wednesday 13th November 2024 General Committees

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Criminal Finances Act 2017 and Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 (Consequential Amendments) Regulations 2024.

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford, and to welcome the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton West, to his place. I spent a very long time on the Opposition Benches in various shadow ministerial roles, so I hope the shadow Minister will take it in the right spirit when I say that I wish him much longevity on the Opposition Front Bench. I note that he has been busy and has already done two statutory instrument Committees since his appointment. Opposition is hard work, as I know all too well. As he settles into his important role as a shadow Home Office Minister, I wish him the very best over the coming months—maybe years. Despite our political differences, I know that we both care deeply about the security and safety of our country. In that spirit, I very much hope to work constructively and in the national interest with all of the shadow Home Office team.

Before I address the contents of the statutory instrument, I will briefly provide some background. The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 contained a wide range of reforms to reduce economic crime and increase transparency over corporate entities conducting business in the UK. This included reforms to enable targeted information sharing to tackle money laundering and remove reporting burdens on businesses. Additionally, the 2023 Act introduced new intelligence-gathering powers for law enforcement and reformed outdated criminal corporate liability laws.

The reforms to the unexplained wealth orders regime, corporate liability laws and targeted information sharing are already in force. More recently, guidance for the new offence of failure to prevent fraud was published last week, on 6 November. The offence itself will come into effect in September next year, allowing organisations to develop their fraud-prevention measures before the offence comes into force.

The 2023 Act also introduced—this is of most relevance to this debate—a new regime to tackle criminal and terrorist cryptoassets. The use of cryptoassets in illegal activity is increasing. When introducing and reviewing legislation, we must consider emerging technologies and how they can be harnessed by criminals to commit crimes or to hide their ill-gotten gains. Under the previous Government, a bespoke regime was included in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to allow the effective seizure of both criminal and terrorist cryptoassets. The regime was included in the 2023 Act to make it easier to confiscate cryptoassets from criminals and to forfeit cryptoassets that are obtained from or intended to be used in either crime or terrorism.

On 26 April, the relevant cryptoassets measures came into force, and the powers are operational in England and Wales. As of the end of October, the new powers have been exercised in more than 80 cases, including cryptoasset seizures or confiscation cases involving cryptoassets. I do not intend to cover the content of the powers themselves, as they were debated extensively by both Houses during the passage of the 2023 Act. I will instead outline briefly the purpose of the statutory instrument and the reason why we are gathered here this morning.

The regulations will make a set of amendments that are consequential on the Criminal Finances Act 2017 and the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023. The regulations address missed consequential amendments to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and ensure that the investigative powers that that Act included —for example, reference to cryptoasset investigations—are included in all necessary sections of the powers in order that they function properly and act in accordance with the policy intention.

The statutory instrument is required to complete the commencement of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023. It will ensure that all the necessary legislation is in place and that there is legal certainty as to how cases will be dealt with. I commend the statutory instrument to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

I thank the shadow Minister for the constructive tone of his remarks. I am very grateful. I was particularly pleased to hear him reference the National Crime Agency, which provides me with a good opportunity to pay tribute to its work in this area. The NCA does not always get the acclaim that I think it deserves. The people who work there are fantastically dedicated public servants and, on matters relating to economic crime, as well as on other matters, they do an extraordinary job to serve the public.

The shadow Minister raised a number of entirely reasonable and constructive points. He pressed me on the need to ensure that the work we are doing sits as part of a broader strategy; I absolutely give him that assurance. I discussed these matters with the Minister at the time when we were in opposition, and we worked on them co-operatively and on a cross-party basis. Matters relating to cryptocurrency and the seizure of such assets and matters relating to economic crime are not matters of party politics. It is my intention to work co-operatively with the shadow Minister and Members from all parties to progress the work we are doing in government.

The shadow Minister rightly made the point about ensuring that the Government’s legislative approach keeps up with emerging technology and with criminals’ developing tactics and techniques. Criminals can be incredibly cunning. It is part of the nature of the way in which they operate, particularly in the field of economic crime, that the rapid rate of technology change and the different measures they employ, very much on an internationalised basis, means that Government and law enforcement agencies must constantly review their approach. We must ensure that we do not just seek to keep pace with criminals but are one step ahead of them.

The shadow Minister made an entirely reasonable point about whether the Government consider it likely that, as a consequence of the changes to the legislation, there will be an increase in arrests and custodial sentences. Rather than give him an answer that is not as considered as I would want it to be, I will write to him on that point. It is an entirely fair question, but one on which I want to take advice. I will get back to him as as soon as possible.

There is nothing more that I can add, other than to thank the Committee for considering the statutory instrument. As I have set out, it is necessary to complete the commencement of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023. I therefore commend it to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Contingent Liability: TPIMS Accommodation Provision

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Tuesday 12th November 2024 Written Statements

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

I have today laid before the House of Commons a departmental minute concerning a new uncapped contingent liability for the Home Office. The liability relates to Home Office approved accommodation for use by individuals subject to terrorism prevention investigation measures orders. This contingent liability will enable the Home Office to secure appropriate accommodation for such cases. Failure to secure accommodation for TPIMs subjects may result in unacceptable risks to national security. These are risks I am not willing to take.

The need for the liability arises due to the limited information that the Government can share with housing suppliers when securing properties for individuals subject to TPIMs and the potential implications for the validity of insurance covering the relevant properties.

Treasury guidance on managing public money requires that Parliament be notified of any novel contingent liabilities. In normal circumstances, notification would be made when Parliament is in Session, however due to the urgency in this case, the liability was made during the period when Parliament was in recess. I am satisfied that this course of action was necessary in the circumstances.

HM Treasury has approved this liability. In the unlikely event the liability was to be called, provision for payment would be sought through the contract with the supplier.

A full departmental minute has been laid before the House of Commons providing more detail on this contingent liability.

[HCWS203]

Failure to Prevent Fraud: Corporate Offence Guidance

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Wednesday 6th November 2024 Written Statements

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

My noble Friend the Minister of State for the Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) has today made the following written ministerial statement:

To strengthen corporate criminal liability a new offence of failure to prevent fraud was included in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023. The offence is intended to hold large organisations to account if they profit from fraud and to drive a culture change towards improved fraud prevention procedures.

The offence will hold corporates to account if they fail to prevent a fraud that benefits them, or in some circumstances, their clients. It is limited to large organisations and partnerships only.

Organisations will have a defence in court if they can prove that they had reasonable procedures in place to prevent the fraud, or if it was not reasonable, in all the circumstances, to have any procedures in place. The Government are required to publish guidance to explain the fraud prevention procedures that organisations should have in place to have a defence in the event of prosecution.

The guidance is similar in structure to the guidance for the existing offences of failure to prevent bribery in the Bribery Act 2010 and failure to prevent the criminal facilitation of tax evasion in the Criminal Finances Act 2017. Most organisations subject to the offence will therefore be familiar with the concepts and approach set out in the guidance.

In developing the guidance, the Home Office has worked closely with prosecutors, regulators and across Government. We have also engaged with industry, including trade professional bodies. The devolved Governments have also been consulted.

The guidance has been published today and is available on www.gov.uk.

To allow organisations to prepare and develop their fraud prevention procedures, Government intend to commence the offence nine months after publication of this guidance.

[HCWS192]

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill (Third sitting)

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 31st October 2024 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Good morning, everybody. I begin with a few preliminary reminders. Please switch electronic devices to silent. No food or drinks are permitted during sittings of the Committee, except for the water provided. Hansard colleagues would be grateful if Members emailed their speaking notes to [e-mail] or, alternatively, passed them to Hansard colleagues in the room.

We now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room and shows how the selected amendments have been grouped for debate. Amendments grouped together are generally on the same or a similar issue. The selection list shows the order of debates. Decisions on each amendment are taken when we come to the clause to which that amendment relates. Decisions on new clauses will be taken once we have completed consideration of the existing clauses of the Bill.

Clause 1

Overview

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dame Siobhain. It is good to see the shadow Minister, the right hon. Member for Tonbridge, in his place. He and I have known each other for a very long time, and as this may be our final exchange—

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge) (Con)]

It will be.

[Dan Jarvis]

Well, as it sounds as though it will be our final exchange, I take this opportunity to thank the right hon. Gentleman for his service and wish him well for the future.

The purpose of clause 1 is to aid the reader of the Bill to understand its content and structure, which I am sure will be a great relief to members of the Committee as we debate the Bill. As the clause provides an overview of the Bill, this seems an appropriate moment to set out a reminder of why we have sought to legislate.

The first responsibility of any Government is to keep the public safe; that is, and will always be, our No. 1 priority. Since the start of 2017, agencies and law enforcement have disrupted 43 late-stage plots, and there have been 15 domestic terror attacks. As the MI5 director general, Ken McCallum, set out last month, this country is today subject to

“the most complex and interconnected threat environment we’ve ever seen.”

As can sadly be seen from recent terrorism incidents, the public may be targeted at a wide range of public venues and spaces. We know, too, that the terror threat has become less predictable and potential attacks harder to detect and investigate. That is why those who run premises and events need to know what they can do, and what they should be doing, to keep the public safe. That view is supported by inquests and inquiries into terror attacks, which have recommended the introduction of legislation to improve the safety and security of public venues. That includes, but is not limited to, monitored recommendation 4 in volume 1 of the Manchester Arena inquiry.

The purpose of the Bill is to ensure that appropriate procedures are in place, or appropriate measures taken, to keep us safe. Wherever people are and whatever they are doing, they deserve to both be and feel safe, ensuring protection of life and of our way of life.

While we recognise that the risks posed by terrorism are already proactively considered for some premises and events, there is a lack of consistency, which needs addressing. The Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill—Martyn’s law—will remedy that inconsistency. The Bill’s proposals have been subject to extensive development, and a draft version of this legislation was subjected to pre-legislative scrutiny under the previous Government. Indeed, the shadow Minister gave evidence to the Home Affairs Committee on that matter.

The Bill that we have brought forward has been adjusted to strike an appropriate balance between protecting the public and avoiding an undue burden on premises. We recognise that a one-size-fits-all approach would not be suitable for all premises and events, which is why, for example, we have adapted the Bill’s requirements to include the “reasonably practicable” test. That will enable those responsible for qualifying premises or events to take into consideration what is within their control and the resources they have available to them, as well as what is suitable and appropriate for their venue.

I take this opportunity to pay tribute once again to Figen Murray, from whom we heard so movingly on Tuesday. She has without doubt been the driving force behind this Bill. I am sure that all Committee members will agree that Figen is an inspiration to us all. With that, I look forward to the exchanges to come in the course of proceedings in this Committee.

[Paul Waugh (Rochdale) (Lab/Co-op)]

I would like to start with something that Figen Murray said this week in her evidence to us, which, as my hon. Friend the Minister said, was incredibly powerful:

“Martyn’s law will save lives.”––[Official Report, Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Public Bill Committee, 29 October 2024; c. 7, Q1.]

That is what she said, and that is what will happen.

As the Minister has pointed out and as Ken McCallum of MI5 has put so powerfully, the number of foiled plots shows that, sadly, the terror threat is not going away but getting more intense. That puts even more of an onus on all of us to keep the public as safe as possible, especially when they are at their most vulnerable —simply going on a night out to enjoy themselves. I think I speak for all members of the Committee when I say how moving it was to hear Figen read out the names of all the individuals who lost their lives in the Manchester Arena bombing.

Like many Greater Manchester MPs, I know that many of my constituents in Rochdale will welcome the Bill, not least because many of them regularly go to the Manchester Arena—indeed, many were present on that awful night in 2017. Brendan Cox put it perfectly when he said that

“nobody wants to have a law named after their child.” ––[Official Report, Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Public Bill Committee, 29 October 2024; c. 8, Q1.]

It is a tribute to both him and Figen that they have turned their own losses into campaigning to make sure that no other families suffer at the hands of terrorists.

We as a Government are also bringing in Awaab’s law, named after two-year-old Awaab Ishak, who died when he was exposed to mould at his family’s home in Rochdale. We are creating new duties on private landlords to make sure that no other child dies in the same way. And, of course, there is the Hillsborough law: a duty of candour on all public bodies to ensure that the state can never again fail to comply with public inquiries or deny bereaved families the right to fair legal funding. What links each of those pieces of legislation is that they have been driven by the sheer determination of individuals—of those who have suffered a loss but are determined to turn that into something positive for others.

As the inquiry into the Manchester Arena bombing found, both the state and the private sector have more to do to make our public venues safer. This Bill at least makes a real start on delivering that change. Andy Burnham was right when he said that Manchester and Greater Manchester have shown resilience since the 2017 bombing. I would add that the city showed similar resilience after the 1996 IRA bombing, turning that awful event into a catalyst for the regeneration that we have all seen since.

With Martyn’s law, we can make our public spaces across the country more resilient. We expect public premises to have a fire safety plan, so it seems obvious to expect them to have plans in place to mitigate the threat of a terror attack. This version of the Bill recognises the need to balance safety with proportionality, while retaining flexibility to amend that proportionality at a later stage if that is needed.

Manchester’s experience of a voluntary version of this Bill has shown that if smaller venues are engaged with and supported in the right way, these changes can help our thriving night-time economy and do not hinder it. But it is simply unacceptable that, for bigger venues in particular, there has been inconsistency on whether they have strong enough security checks. The terrorists will win if they restrict our freedoms to do simple things such as going out to enjoy a concert or show. We can reduce that fear—the fear that all those terrorists feed off—if we make our public venues safer in the way the Bill intends.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

Given that this is the last time I will speak on this Bill Committee, I want to pay tribute to Figen and Brendan for the work they have done.

There is always a danger with such Bills that we put the blame not on the perpetrator but on those who are actually victims. I say that because the businesses that must make provision, pay the cost and bear the burden are also victims of the perpetrators. Let us be absolutely clear: for all that this law lays out the responsibilities on businesses, the true responsibility falls on those perpetrating these attacks.

Today, as Ken McCallum would tell us, the Iranian state is a prime originator, and the Muslim Brotherhood is a feeder, of the evil we see perpetrated. It is the various jihadi extremist organisations that make this country less safe, and different aspects of other political parties also make it more dangerous. We must be absolutely clear that responsibility for the actions we are talking about actually falls not on the businesses but on those who encourage, tolerate and perpetrate terrorism. Let us be absolutely clear today that one of the principal vectors for this violence comes straight out of Tehran and through various organisations that are still operating in this country despite many attempts to close them down.

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful for the contributions made by my hon. Friends the Members for Rochdale, for Dudley and for Macclesfield. I am also grateful for the contribution made by the hon. Member for North Cornwall; the Government appreciate the Liberal Democrat party’s support, and I am happy to work, and have further conversations, with him before Report on the important point that he raised about training.

Finally, I thank the shadow Minister for his comments. I completely agree with his point about responsibility, and he is right. He will know that this new Government take these matters incredibly seriously, and I can give him and the rest of the Committee an absolute assurance that we will not rest in seeking to address the points he made and the concerns he dealt with admirably when he was the Minister.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Qualifying premises

[Tom Tugendhat]

I beg to move amendment 22, in clause 2, page 2, line 11, leave out “200” and insert “300”.

This amendment sets the threshold for qualifying premises at 300 individuals.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for tabling his amendments. Before I turn to them, I will briefly explain why clause 2, which sets out the criteria by which premises are determined to be qualifying premises that fall within scope, is so fundamental.

I recognise that the scope of the Bill—particularly the qualifying thresholds—is an important issue to discuss. Once more, I assure Committee members that the scope of the Bill, including the thresholds, has been developed following detailed discussion with those responsible for premises and with security experts within Government. That has involved hundreds of stakeholder engagement meetings, two public consultations and the important pre-legislative scrutiny process. As a result, the Government’s firm view is that the Bill strikes an appropriate balance between protecting the public and avoiding an undue burden on premises.

Let me turn to the detail of amendments 20 and 21, which were tabled by the right hon. Member. He will be well aware that the Government have increased the qualifying threshold in the Bill from 100 to 200. As he correctly set out, clause 32 provides for the Secretary of State to be able to increase or decrease that figure and the threshold for the enhanced tier. As a result, the number of premises in scope of the Bill, and therefore required to comply, may be increased or decreased.

I assure the right hon. Gentleman and the Committee that that power is narrow, and regulations made under it will be subject to the affirmative procedure before they are made, to ensure the appropriate level of scrutiny by parliamentarians. The power is also limited in that the Secretary of State may not amend the figure to less than 100 in respect of the standard tier or to less than 500 in respect of the enhanced tier. That provides a floor, or absolute minimum number, below which the qualifying threshold cannot go.

The Government’s intention, in having the power in clause 32, is to be equipped to respond to changes in the nature or level of the threat from terrorism. We envisage that the qualifying thresholds would be reduced to either floor in only very limited circumstances, such as the nature of the threat changing significantly. The power therefore provides a necessary lever that can be used, if needed, to ensure that the legislation remains fit for purpose and continues to strike an appropriate balance between protecting the public and avoiding placing an undue burden on premises. The Government do not therefore support the amendments.

Finally, I turn to amendment 22. As I set out during oral evidence, setting a threshold inevitably raises discussion as to whether it is the right figure, and what falls on either side of the threshold will inevitably be questioned. Indeed, the Committee heard a range of views from witnesses giving evidence on Tuesday, many of whom spoke to what they believe the appropriate threshold to be. The discussion included arguments for setting it higher or lower than 200.

Ultimately, the Government have to take a view about what the most appropriate threshold is. After careful consideration of the pre-legislative scrutiny findings and consultation responses, and after taking into account the views of stakeholders and security experts, the Government have decided that 200 is the right judgment.

The amendment changing the figure to 300 would significantly impact the outcomes of the Bill, and particularly what the standard tier seeks to achieve. Furthermore, as we will discuss when we debate clause 5, the standard tier requirements have been redesigned to be relatively simple and low-cost for responsible persons to take forward. They do not require premises to make physical changes.

The Government’s firm view is therefore that 200 represents the right threshold to bring premises into the scope of the Bill. That figure strikes an appropriate balance between protecting the public and imposing a burden on premises. The Government therefore do not support the right hon. Gentleman’s amendment.

[Tim Roca]

I want to speak briefly to the point about thresholds, which has just been discussed. The consultations prior to the Bill were based on a threshold of 100 at the standard tier, and I welcome the ability the Bill gives the Secretary of State to reduce the threshold back to that, should the evidence warrant that. I think Members will be reassured by some of the safeguards the Minister has just talked about, which would have to be in place before any such change happened.

In the protect duty public consultation, half of respondents thought that the threshold should be 100. Moving it to 200 has already taken 100,000 premises out of the scope of the legislation, leaving 180,000 within it. Raising the threshold to 300 would in effect remove the standard tier altogether. Figen has been very clear on this point:

“Raising the threshold of 200 even higher would mean that proportionality would no longer exist”.

She has also pointed out that in her small town of Poynton, in my constituency, a threshold of 200 would already mean that not a single venue is covered by this legislation. A move to 300 would therefore be a mistake and fatal to the purpose of the Bill.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Given the very obvious numbers on the Committee, there is no point in pushing the amendment to a vote, but I still believe that the burden on small businesses is too great. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1

Specified uses of premises

[Dan Jarvis]

I beg to move amendment 10, schedule 1, page 26, line 15, leave out paragraphs 3 and 4 and insert—

“Entertainment and leisure activities

3 Use (other than a use mentioned elsewhere in this Schedule) for the provision of entertainment, leisure or recreation activities of any description, where the activity is principally for the benefit of visiting members of the public.”

This amendment makes general provision about premises used by the public for entertainment, leisure or recreation activities and replaces references to specific types of such activities.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment 11.

[Dan Jarvis]

The amendments in this and the following group seek to ensure that the Bill will work as effectively as intended, including by clarifying and simplifying the definitions of certain uses of premises and certain terms. They are not intended to bring any new premises into scope or to inadvertently bring unintended premises within scope.

Government amendments 10 and 11 simplify schedule 1 by creating a new category of “Entertainment and leisure activities”, which brings together the premises previously captured by paragraphs 3, 4 and 6. That will help to ensure that the legislation and accompanying guidance are simpler to understand for persons potentially within scope of the Bill.

Amendment 10 agreed to.

Amendment made: 11, in schedule 1, page 27, line 10, leave out paragraph 6.—(Dan Jarvis.)

This amendment is consequential on amendment 10.

[Dan Jarvis]

I beg to move amendment 12, in schedule 1, page 29, line 29, at end insert—

“(but see paragraph 4(a) of Schedule 2)”.

This amendment makes clear that paragraph 14 of Schedule 1 (aerodromes) is subject to the exception in paragraph 4(a) of Schedule 2 for premises covered by an aerodrome security plan under the Aviation Security Act 1982.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 13, 14 and 15.

[Dan Jarvis]

Government amendment 12 simply highlights that the term “aerodromes” does not include those covered by the exception in schedule 2 with an aerodrome security plan under the Aviation Security Act 1982.

Government amendment 13 is a technical amendment to ensure that Scottish further education establishments are more appropriately described and to reflect any future changes to relevant Scottish legislation.

Government amendment 14 is a change to clarify that agricultural colleges in Northern Ireland are captured, and Government amendment 15 is a technical change to improve the accuracy of the definition of higher education institutions as applied in Scotland.

Amendment 12 agreed to.

Amendments made: 13, in schedule 1, page 32, line 4, leave out from “listed” to “in” in line 6.

This is a drafting change.

Amendment 14, in schedule 1, page 32, line 13, at end insert—

“or established under section 5 of the Agriculture Act (Northern Ireland) 1949 (c. 2 (N.I.)).”

This amendment provides that paragraph 17 of Schedule 1 covers use of premises for the provision of further education at Northern Ireland agriculture colleges.

Amendment 15, in schedule 1, page 34, line 19, leave out from beginning to “the” in line 22 and insert—

“in Scotland, a higher education institution within the meaning of section 35(1) of”.—(Dan Jarvis.)

This is a drafting change.

[Dan Jarvis]

I beg to move amendment 16, in schedule 1, page 34, line 37, after “to” insert “visiting”.

This amendment clarifies that the use of premises for the provision by a public authority of facilities or services is only relevant for the purposes of Part 1 of the Bill if members of the public visit the premises in connection with those facilities or services.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment 17.

[Dan Jarvis]

Government amendment 16 clarifies that premises used by public authorities for the provision of facilities or services are only in scope if the public visit the premises to use the facilities or receive those services.

Government amendment 17 clarifies that

“visiting members of the public”

includes members of the public who have paid to access, have invitations or passes allowing access to, or are members or guests of a club, association or other body. That more accurately captures the differing arrangements for public access that may be in place at premises in scope, such as private members’ clubs.

Amendment 16 agreed to.

Amendment made: 17, in schedule 1, page 34, line 42, at end insert—

“References to “visiting members of the public”

20 In determining for the purposes of this Schedule whether premises are used by “visiting members of the public”, it is irrelevant that access to the premises may be limited (at all times or particular times) to members of the public who—

(a) have paid to access the premises,

(b) have invitations or passes allowing access, or

(c) are members (or guests of members) of a club, association or other body.”—(Dan Jarvis.)

This amendment contains provision about the meaning of references in Schedule 1 to “visiting members of the public”.

Question proposed, That the schedule, as amended, be the First schedule to the Bill.

[Dan Jarvis]

We have previously spoken at length about the purpose of schedule 1, so I trust that the Committee are suitably satisfied as to why it should stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 1, as amended, accordingly agreed to.

Schedule 2

Excluded premises and events

Question proposed, That the schedule be the Second schedule to the Bill.

[Dan Jarvis]

Schedule 2 specifies certain types of premises that are excluded from the Bill’s scope, which is necessary where there are already similar legislative requirements or protective frameworks in place. This covers, in particular, certain transport premises and premises occupied by Parliament and the devolved legislatures.

Schedule 2 also defines a category of open-air premises that might fall in scope, but where it would be impractical or disproportionately difficult to deliver the requirements given the nature and operation of those premises. The category includes parks and premises used for grassroots sports, which generally do not have controlled access or defined physical boundaries. These premises are therefore excluded, except where they employ individuals to ensure that members of the public have paid to access the premises, or where they have invitations or passes to do so; in cases where entry and exit to the premises are controlled and payment is taken, it is considered that there is a greater capacity and capability to consider reasonably practical procedures and/or measures as required.

Schedule 2 also maintains the provisions in schedule 1 that places of worship and premises used for childcare or primary, secondary or further education fall within the standard tier, meaning that qualifying events cannot occur on those sites.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 2 accordingly agreed to.

Clause 3

Qualifying events

Amendments made: 1, in clause 3, page 2, line 38, leave out “all or part of”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 4.

Amendment 2, in clause 3, page 2, line 41, after “time” insert

“in connection with their use for the event”.

This amendment clarifies that, for the purposes of determining whether Part 1 of the Bill applies to an event, the number of individuals present on premises in connection with the event must be considered.

Amendment 3, in clause 3, page 3, line 2, leave out “all or part of”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 4.

Amendment 4, in clause 3, page 3, line 7, at end insert—

“(2) Where the condition in subsection (1)(e) applies only in relation to one or more parts of the premises at which an event is to be held, for the purposes of this Part treat what is to be held at each such part of the premises as a separate event (to be held at that part).”.—(Dan Jarvis.)

This amendment caters for cases where parts of the premises at which an event is to be held are open to the public generally and other parts are areas for which members of the public will need permission to enter.

Clause 3, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4

Persons responsible for qualifying premises or events

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dan Jarvis]

Clause 4 defines who is responsible for qualifying premises or a qualifying event, and therefore who is responsible for meeting the relevant requirements. With regard to premises, paragraph (a) of subsection (1) provides that:

“a person is responsible for qualifying premises if the person has control of the premises in connection with their relevant Schedule 1 use”,

such as the operator of a hotel.

Subsection (2) sets out what is meant by “relevant Schedule 1 use”. If premises are used for one of the uses specified in schedule 1, that is the relevant use. That is the case even if premises are also used for other purposes not listed in schedule 1. Some premises will be used for more than one of the uses specified in schedule 1. In such cases, it is the person with control over the premises in connection with that principal use who will have to meet the relevant requirements.

Subsection (3) provides a regulation-making power that enables the Secretary of State to provide specific rules as to how the principal use is to be determined. We expect that the principal use will be readily apparent in the vast majority of cases, but the power will ensure that clarity can be provided if and when needed. Principal use is to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Guidance will set out the relevant factors that should be considered when making a determination—for example, taking account of the amount of time for which the premises are used for each type of activity. The regulation-making power can be used if further specific provision is necessary.

On qualifying events, subsection (1)(b) provides that the person responsible is the person who has

“control of the premises at which the event is to be held in connection with their use for the event”—

for example, the organiser of a music festival. The relevant circumstances of the event will need to be considered to determine who the responsible person is. For example, if a concert is to be held in a park, and a company putting on the event has control of an area of the park for the purposes of delivering the concert, that company will be the responsible person. Conversely, if the local authority that operates the park puts on the concert, it will be the responsible person. Where the local authority is not the responsible person, it will still have a duty under clause 8(5) to co-operate with that person to enable them to comply with their requirements.

Subsection (4) specifies that if there is more than one person responsible for qualifying premises, or a qualifying event, they are jointly responsible for ensuring compliance with the Bill’s requirements, and may act jointly in meeting their requirements. In addition, clause 8(2), which we will debate shortly, imposes obligations on the responsible persons to co-ordinate with each other in meeting the requirements. Such a situation will arise when each of the parties has control over parts of the premises in connection with the relevant schedule 1 use. It does not mean, for example, that the multiple tenants of a shopping centre are jointly responsible for the shopping centre as a whole; rather, each will be responsible for their respective premises.

Finally, schedule 1 includes some specific provisions to identify the responsible person for particular types of premises. For example, in the case of a primary or secondary school, paragraph 16 provides that the responsible person will either be the local authority or the governing body of the school. Clause 4(5) provides that those specific provisions apply instead of the general provisions of the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5

Public protection procedures

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dan Jarvis]

Clause 5 places a requirement on those responsible for all qualifying premises and events to put public protection procedures in place, so far as is reasonably practical. This applies to both standard and enhanced duty premises and events. The intention of having such procedures in place is to reduce the risk of physical harm that could be caused to individuals present at qualifying premises and events if an act of terrorism were to occur.

The procedures will help to prepare people working at premises and events to take steps to reduce the risk of harm and move people away from danger. All qualifying premises and events will have to consider how to evacuate, move people to safety, lock down and communicate information. In practice, these procedures focus on simple, low-cost activities such as identifying safe exit routes and lockable doors. The Bill does not require standard duty premises to make physical changes to their sites. Premises must consider the procedures that are appropriate for them.

The procedures that the Bill requires are simple steps to reduce the physical risk to the public from acts of terrorism. They are similar to, but often with key differences from, other legislative procedures. For example, in developing evacuation procedures, those responsible may want to consider safe exit routes for full, partial or phased evacuations, and where they differ from evacuation procedures required by fire safety, such as how they are communicated and where people should congregate. With a focus on ensuring preparedness, security experts advise that these types of procedures are best placed to reduce the risk of physical harm. Qualifying premises will all be different. Further information on how the procedures would apply in practice is provided in the factsheets. Statutory guidance will support the development and implementation of appropriate procedures to allow premises and events to introduce procedures that are right for them, taking into account their circumstances and resources.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

This very simple amendment is in line with the others that I have already spoken about. It would limit the Government’s power to exert extra burdens on small businesses.

[Dan Jarvis]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for tabling this amendment. The Government consider that specifying further measures is an important power for the Secretary of State and must be available to ensure effective protection of the public through these measures.

Having the ability to specify further public protection measures through regulations means that the requirements of the enhanced duty can be amended to reflect changes in the terrorism threat, advances in technological solutions and our response to them. For example, there may be lessons learned from future incidents, further common types of attack may emerge, or best practice may evolve.

The right hon. Gentleman’s amendment would limit the Government’s ability to protect the public and safeguard them from harm. I understand that the intention behind it may relate to fears over the burden that future measures may create. However, the clause is drafted to constrain the power to be exercisable only where it is considered that the further measures will reduce vulnerability to, or the risk of physical harm from, an attack. It is intended to ensure that new requirements are limited to those necessary to protect the public, and remain in line with the overall objectives of the measures under the clause. Given the evolving nature of terrorism and the threat it poses, the Government consider it necessary to include this power, and therefore do not support the amendment.

On amendment 26, the Government consider it important to be able to remove or amend public protection measures from the list in subsection (3). For example, the Government might identify potential amendments to improve the measures through lessons learned and evolving best practice. This power is drafted so that the Secretary of State may remove or amend the types of measures only if they consider that doing so will not either increase the risk of physical harm to individuals or increase the vulnerability of the premises or event to the risk of acts of terrorism. That is in accordance with the overall objectives of the measures within this clause, as stated in subsection (2).

Were we to agree to the amendment, specified measures could be amended or removed without a requirement in the Bill for the Secretary of State to expressly consider how those public protection objectives would be effective in taking away or altering a measure in the list approved by Parliament. The Government do not consider that appropriate and therefore respectfully do not support the right hon. Gentleman’s amendments.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7

Enhanced duty premises and qualifying events: documenting compliance

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dan Jarvis]

Clause 7 places a legislative requirement on those responsible for enhanced duty premises and events to prepare and maintain a document that records their compliance in relation to putting in place procedures, under clause 5, and measures, under clause 6. This is necessary to ensure that premises are able to more easily demonstrate compliance, and the Security Industry Authority is able to assess that against the Bill’s requirements. Many premises will already be documenting similar mitigations in regard to existing security plans for non-legislative purposes—fire safety and health and safety legislation, for example.

Documents should contain statements that relate to the public protection procedures and measures that are implemented, or proposed to be implemented, at their premises or event. Documents should also contain assessments to provide a rationale as to how the proposed procedures and measures will reduce both physical harm to individuals present and vulnerabilities of the premises or event if an attack were to occur.

When complete, the document should contain the totality of the procedures and measures deployed and sufficient detail to enable the authority to assess whether those responsible for premises and events are compliant with the Bill’s requirements. In the first instance, those responsible for enhanced duty premises and events are required to provide the document as soon as reasonably practicable after it is prepared and within 30 days of any subsequent revision.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 8

Requirements to co-ordinate and co-operate

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Amendment 24, in clause 9, page 6, line 19, leave out paragraph (a).—(Tom Tugendhat.)

This amendment prevents the Secretary of State from specifying further matters relating to qualifying premises or a qualifying event on which the responsible person would have to inform the Security Industry Authority.

Clauses 9 and 10 stand part.

[Dan Jarvis]

Clause 8 places a requirement upon certain duty holders to co-ordinate or co-operate with each other when complying with requirements. Subsections (1) and (2) deal with instances whereby there is more than one responsible person, requiring those persons to co-ordinate so far as is reasonably practicable with the requirements imposed upon them. An example of this may be a joint venture between two parties with equal control. The requirement applies to all premises and events within scope of the legislation. It will ensure organisation between mutually invested parties and encourage unified decision making in relation to the requirements placed upon them.

Subsections (3) and (4) concern where one qualifying premises forms part of another. The persons responsible for both premises must so far as is reasonably practicable co-ordinate with each other in complying with the relevant legislative requirements. The purpose of this provision is to ensure that responsible persons in such scenarios, such as a shopping centre, combine efforts or actions to reach mutually effective and compliant outcomes in relation to relevant requirements. That might, for example, entail the shopping centre operator liaising with different units in scope to ensure there is a co-ordinated and effective evacuation plan.

Subsections (5) and (6) concern where a person has some form of control of an enhanced duty premises or event, but is not the responsible person. Where that is the case, they must so far as is reasonably practicable co-operate with each other in complying with the relevant legislative requirements. Examples of persons in control but not the responsible person would be a building owner who has leased the premises to a separate operator, or a landowner who has given permission for a qualifying event to take place on their land. The purpose of this requirement is to assist the responsible person in ensuring that appropriate public protection measures are in place under clause 6. In instances where they require relevant permissions or support from other parties who have some control over the premises, there is a duty placed on such parties to co-operate so far as is reasonably practicable.

Subsection (7) specifies that a requirement under this section does not extend to a requirement imposed by a penalty notice. Those responsible may require co-ordination or co-operation from other duty holders in regards to meeting relevant requirements, including compliance and restriction notices, but this does not extend to penalty notices. If there is a dispute in relation to scenarios of co-ordination or co-operation, clause 11 enables interested persons to apply for certain determinations by a tribunal. The tribunal may be asked to determine whether a person is a responsible person, or the extent to which a person who is not a responsible person has control of the premises. In summary, placing a requirement upon relevant responsible persons and duty holders to co-ordinate or co-operate will further drive compliance with the Bill’s requirements and therefore better protect the public.

I turn briefly to clause 9, which requires those responsible for qualifying premises or events to notify the SIA when they become or cease to be responsible for premises or events. Those responsible for premises or an event must notify the SIA of that responsibility upon commencement of the legislation. If a person becomes responsible for premises or an event after the legislation has commenced, they too must notify the SIA of that. The requirements of the clause will assist the SIA in knowing which premises and events within scope of the legislation are actively demonstrating compliance and so identifying those who are not. The time limit within which notifications must be made will be specified by the Secretary of State in regulations. Clause 9 also sets out that the Secretary of State may, via regulations, specify the form and manner in which notifications must be sent and the information that is required to be included in a notification, such as information about the premises or event and contact details for the responsible person.

Clause 10 places a legislative requirement on those responsible for all enhanced duty premises and qualifying events to designate a senior individual where the responsible person is not an individual. Examples of responsible persons that are not individuals are bodies corporate, limited partnerships and unincorporated associations. The individual undertaking the role must be someone who is involved in the management of, or has some form of control within, the organisation—for example, a director or partner, rather than a lower-level employee. That will help ensure that the individual appointed has appropriate influence and seniority to drive forward compliance with the requirements. The senior individual may delegate actions that relate to the relevant legislative requirements to ensure they are complied with. However, they cannot delegate their overall responsibility for ensuring compliance.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 9 and 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Keir Mather.)

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill (Fourth sitting)

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 31st October 2024 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Edward. Clause 11 will enable an interested person to apply to the tribunal for an independent determination on matters where disagreements may arise. An “interested person” can mean either the Security Industry Authority or a person who has—or, for an event, will have at some point—control of the premises or event to any extent. Interested parties may apply to the tribunal where there are disagreements or a need for clarity on whether a premises or an event are in scope and in which tier they fall, who is responsible for them, and whether a person is required to co-operate with the person responsible for them. A determination by the tribunal will be legally binding.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 12

Role of the Security Industry Authority

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 2—Review of the role of the regulator in oversight of public protection requirements—

“(1) Within 18 months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must lay before each House of Parliament a report reviewing the role of the Security Industry Authority as the regulator.

(2) The report must include a cost-benefit analysis comparing the respective situation for each of the matters listed in subsection (3) on how—

(a) these have been carried out by the Security Industry Authority, and

(b) they might be carried by local authority teams if the regulatory duties were transferred to them.

(3) The issues which must be included in the analysis contained in the report laid under subsection (1) are—

(a) effectiveness in performing investigation and enforcement functions;

(b) relationship and synergies with other locally-based enforcement regimes;

(c) relationship and interaction with existing statutory licensing regimes; and

(d) effectiveness of provision of guidance as part of oversight, adherence and awareness of the new public protection requirements.”

This new clause would require a report reviewing the role of the Security Industry Authority, including a comparative cost-benefit analysis of the regulatory functions being carried out by the Security Industry Authority with those functions being provided alternatively at a local authority level.

Schedule 3.

[Dan Jarvis]

Clause 12 will allow the SIA to effectively operate as the regulator for the Bill by setting out its responsibilities, powers and role. The primary role of the SIA will be to provide support and guidance. However, it is also important that it has the powers necessary to investigate and monitor compliance, so that the legislation can be enforced effectively. Schedule 3 therefore grants powers to authorised inspectors to investigate whether persons responsible for premises or events are contravening or have contravened requirements of the Bill. The schedule outlines their powers to gather information, the use of warrants, their ability to enter premises without a warrant, and supporting offences.

Under the schedule, inspectors will be able to serve information notices to gather relevant information for inspection purposes. The notice could require a person to provide written detail relating to an investigation or to attend an interview. Inspectors may enter premises without a warrant, subject to certain conditions in paragraph 4. However, schedule 3 also provides for inspectors to apply for warrants to enter premises, with paragraph 6 setting out the powers afforded to inspectors once a warrant is issued. The schedule also creates criminal offences for failing to comply with information notices, obstructing authorised inspectors and impersonating inspectors.

Under clause 12, the SIA must prepare guidance about how it will exercise its functions, which must be submitted to the Secretary of State for approval. Approved guidance must then be published and kept subject to review, and revised accordingly as needed. The SIA must also provide advice about the requirements of the Bill, as well as reviewing the effectiveness of the requirements in reducing the risk of harm and the vulnerability of premises and events in scope.

The clause also requires the SIA to comply with requests from the Secretary of State and provide an annual report, which is to be laid before Parliament. The SIA is the appropriate body to undertake this role, due to its years of experience in increasing security standards and ensuring public protection. I hope that the Committee will support clause 12 and schedule 3.

I turn now to new clause 2, tabled by the shadow Minister, the right Member for Tonbridge. Establishing the SIA as the new regulator for this legislation, which is the first of its kind, will take at least 24 months. That is in line with the timeframes taken to establish new regulatory functions in existing bodies over recent years. I am sure he will agree that it would not be possible or fair to judge a new regulator’s performance before the regime has been established. Once the SIA has taken on its new role, it will take time before there is robust data against which to evaluate its performance.

The legislation already establishes several checks and balances on the performance of the SIA, as is standard with arm’s length bodies. They include the production of an annual report on performance, enabling the Secretary of State to issue directions to the SIA, and ensuring that the Secretary of State has the power to appoint board members and approve statutory guidance for publication.

Further to this, I have confidence that the SIA is the right home for the regulator because it already plays an important role in safeguarding the public through its statutory and non-statutory work. With a wealth of experience in inspecting and enforcing legislation, it better protects the public. With the addition of its new function, the SIA will be able to raise security standards for both people and places.

The Home Office will maintain appropriate levels of oversight and accountability to ensure that the regulator is delivered as intended. Once operational, the Secretary of State will closely monitor the performance of the regulator to ensure that it carries out its functions under the Bill effectively. For the reasons that I have set out, the Government do not support the amendment.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge) (Con)]

I tabled the new clause on the SIA for the simple reason that its reputation goes before it. Work that was done in the Department under a previous regime demonstrated that there were alternatives, which we felt would offer not only better value for money but greater ministerial oversight and better accountability to those who are forced to use its services. But clearly, with the Government’s majority, it is for the Minister to decide.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 3 agreed to.

Clause 13

Compliance notices

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 14 to 16 stand part.

[Dan Jarvis]

A successful terrorist attack can have devastating consequences. It is vital to the effective operation of this legislation that the SIA can take action if it believes there is or has been a failure to fulfil the Bill’s requirements. Clauses 13 to 16 will enable it to do so. Clause 13 therefore gives the SIA the ability to issue a compliance notice.

A compliance notice requires the recipient to remedy non-compliance within a certain period and could require specific actions to be taken. For example, a notice could require the recipient to put in place an evacuation procedure within four weeks where no such procedure is already in place.

The SIA must allow a reasonable period for specified steps to be taken, and, before issuing the notice, must give an opportunity for representations to be made. Failure to comply with a compliance notice could lead to the SIA issuing a monetary penalty and, in relation to enhanced duty premises and qualifying events, would be a criminal offence. A person may appeal a compliance notice under clause 16. Due to the risk posed by terrorism, it is important that the SIA has the tools to address non- compliance where guidance and engagement fall short.

Clause 14 provides that the SIA may issue a restriction notice where it believes that appropriate public protection procedures or measures are not in place at an enhanced duty premises or event. The SIA may issue such a notice if it believes that the restrictions specified within it are necessary to protect people from the risk of harm if an attack occurred at or near a premises or event. To reiterate, a restriction notice cannot be issued for standard duty premises. For that reason, it is anticipated that it will be used in exceptional circumstances where immediate action is needed to mitigate the risk.

The notice can require the temporary closure of premises, prohibit an event from taking place, or impose certain restrictions on the premises or event. For example, it could limit the number of people who may attend an event at any one time. The restrictions would apply until appropriate measures are in place, or the notice expires or is withdrawn. A notice cannot last more than six months initially, but is subject to being extended for three months at a time.

I do not wish to pre-empt our debate on later clauses, but it is important to note that the SIA will be able to issue both non-compliance and daily penalties where a restriction notice has not been complied with. Where it is in the public interest, a person may ultimately be prosecuted for breach of a restriction notice, which is an offence under clause 24.

I turn now to clause 15. Once a compliance notice or restriction notice has been issued, it is important that the SIA has the flexibility to vary and withdraw it if needed to reflect positive steps taken by the recipients or to deal with their continuing non-compliance.

The clause also contains several safeguards. First, it specifies that a compliance notice or restriction notice cannot be made more onerous, in order to protect the recipient from changes that are more burdensome. It could therefore be used, for instance, to vary a notice to reduce the requirements in it or to extend the period for complying with it to allow the recipient more time to satisfy it.

The clause also includes the further safeguard that a restriction notice may be varied to extend the period for which it has effect by no more than three months at a time. That must happen before it expires, and only so long as there are reasonable grounds to believe that the reasons for the original notice still apply.

The SIA may also withdraw a compliance or restriction notice where it considers that the notice is no longer required. For example, a restriction notice may not be needed to protect the public from the risk of harm because non-compliance has been rectified or sufficiently reduced. That is what the clause seeks to achieve.

Finally, clause 16 provides a right of appeal against a compliance or restriction notice, or the variation of either notice. An appeal can be brought within 28 days of the notice being given, on the grounds that the decision to give or vary the notice was wholly or partly based on an error of fact, wrong in law, unfair or unreasonable, or for any other reason. Pending the outcome of an appeal, a compliance notice will have no effect unless the tribunal orders otherwise, but given the reasons for issuing a restriction notice, a restriction notice will ordinarily continue to apply.

The clause ensures that enforcement decisions of the SIA are subject to review by an independent judicial body. The tribunal may consider evidence that was not before the SIA at the time of its decision and, where it does not dismiss an appeal, the tribunal will vary or cancel a notice.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 14 to 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17

Penalty notices

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 5 to 7.

Amendment 28, in clause 18, page 13, line 17, leave out “18” and insert “10”.

See explanatory statement to Amendment 30.

Amendment 29, in clause 18, page 13, line 18, leave out from after first “is” to “5%” in line 20.

See explanatory statement to Amendment 30.

Amendment 30, in clause 18, page 13, line 21, at end insert

“up to a maximum amount of £10 million”.

This amendment sets a maximum non-compliance penalty for enhanced duty premises at £10 million.

Government amendment 8.

Clause 18 stand part.

Amendment 27, in clause 19, page 14, line 24, leave out “different” and insert “lower”.

The amendment restricts the Secretary of State to lowering the daily penalties rate for non-compliance by regulation.

Clauses 19 to 23 stand part.

[Dan Jarvis]

This group of clauses sets out the means by which the SIA will be able to issue civil penalties for non-compliance. Although it is intended that the SIA will rely mainly on advice and guidance in the first instance, a credible sanctions regime with suitable monetary penalties is necessary to ensure that the regulator can secure compliance where it identifies serious or persistent non-compliance.

Where a person fails to fulfil a requirement, it is important that the SIA has the ability to issue financial penalties that can reduce the financial benefit of non-compliance. Where a person fails to comply with a compliance notice, restriction notice or information notice, they may be prosecuted for a criminal offence if it is in the public interest. In most cases, however, penalties will likely be the appropriate way of dealing with non-compliance.

Clause 17 enables the SIA to issue a penalty notice if it is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that a person is contravening or has contravened a relevant requirement—for example, if the responsible person for an enhanced duty premises has failed to put in place appropriate public protection measures. A penalty notice will always specify a non-compliance penalty to be paid by the recipient.

The maximum amount of a non-compliance penalty to be imposed by way of a penalty notice is set out in clause 18, which sets the penalty amounts at a level to counter financial gain from non-compliance. The maximum penalty is higher for enhanced duty premises and qualifying events because of the potentially more impactful consequences of non-compliance in the event of an attack.

In most cases, it is anticipated that penalty notices will be used in the event of breach of a compliance or restriction notice, but the Bill allows for a penalty notice to be issued regardless of whether a compliance or restriction notice has been issued. That will provide a powerful deterrent to those who would seek to evade the requirements.

Clause 17 also includes particular provision to ensure that penalty notices are issued fairly. A penalty notice cannot be issued more than once for the same contravention, and payment cannot be required less than 28 days from the issue date.

Government amendments 5 to 8 update the clause in respect of the maximum penalty for failing to attend an interview. Paragraph 3(1)(b) of schedule 3 gives the SIA the power to issue notices to require a person to attend an interview. Notices can be issued to a broad range of individuals, including employees, who the SIA considers may hold relevant information.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clauses 25 and 26 stand part.

[Dan Jarvis]

As I have already said, the Bill gives the SIA powers to take a range of enforcement action, including issuing monetary penalties, to enable it to deal with non-compliance. Such action is anticipated to be the primary method of enforcement, allowing swifter resolution without resorting to criminalisation. However, where civil enforcement is not enough, the public will expect criminal consequences for cases of non-compliance, such as persistent and egregious failures.

Clause 24 makes it a criminal offence to fail to comply with a compliance or restriction notice that has been given in relation to enhanced duty premises or a qualifying event. It will be a defence for the accused in subsequent criminal proceedings to show that they took all reasonable steps to comply with the relevant compliance or restriction notice. The offences are triable either way and, if convicted on indictment, a person will be liable to a sentence of up to 2 years’ imprisonment and/or a fine.

Turning to clause 25, receipt of accurate information will be vital to the effective functioning of the SIA and to ensure that any public safety risks arising from non-compliance can be addressed. Although we expect information to be provided in good faith in the majority of cases, clause 25 makes it a criminal offence to provide false or misleading information where the person either knows that the information they are providing is false or misleading, or is reckless as to whether it is.

That might happen where the responsible person notifies the SIA that they are responsible for qualifying premises but knowingly misleads the SIA as to whether their premises are in the standard or enhanced tier. A person in receipt of an information notice might also give false information to the SIA in responding to that notice. The offence does not criminalise genuine or honest mistakes, such as where a person provides information that proves to be inaccurate but did so in good faith. The offence is triable either way and, if convicted, a person may be liable to a sentence of imprisonment for no more than 2 years and/or a fine. The offence will provide a deterrent and an appropriate punishment for those who purposely provide false or misleading information to the SIA to avoid complying with the requirements or to evade enforcement action.

Clause 26 provides that a person other than the body may also be liable in some cases for a criminal offence committed by the body. The person must be a relevant person in the body or a person purporting to act in that capacity for the body. A relevant person is involved in the management or control of the entity, such as a company director or partner. That ensures that those involved in senior management can be liable for offences committed by the body. Those offences relate to serious misconduct and persistent, egregious non-compliance by the body.

Specifically, a relevant person may be liable alongside the body for the offences of failing to comply with a compliance, restriction or information notice if the body committed the offence with their consent or connivance or as a result of their neglect. They may also be liable where they have consented to, or connived in, the body committing the offences of providing false or misleading information, obstructing an authorised inspector or pretending to be an inspector. The provision is necessary to deter serious non-compliance by ensuring managerial responsibility within bodies. Members of the Committee will no doubt have seen the importance of similar measures in other legislation.

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

I want to make a few points on offences, following our evidence sessions on Tuesday.

Obviously, the situation in the aftermath of a terrorist attack can be very febrile: emotions run high, and media attention can be high. It is human psychology, sadly, to look for someone to blame, and we might have imagined, before we scrutinised the Bill, someone guilty of this offence finding themselves in the eye of that storm. When we questioned Shropshire council representatives on Tuesday, they spoke about the obligations that would be on them if they were the people affected. I was reassured to hear them say that they already felt that burden of responsibility and that this legislation did not impose any further such burden on them.

The legislation refers to non-compliance in general, not non-compliance in the aftermath—that is really important. I thought it would be good to put on record the reassurances we heard on Tuesday on these measures.

Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 25 and 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 27

Guidance

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

Clause 27 will place a duty on the Secretary of State to publish dedicated guidance to assist those in scope of the Bill in understanding how best to fulfil the requirements placed on them. The guidance will be easy to follow, requiring no particular expertise. It will help in determining how many persons may be reasonably expected to be present on the premises, and whether premises or an event are in scope and, if so, in which tier. It will provide guidance around the requirements to be followed, such as what an appropriate evacuation procedure should include or understanding what public protection measures it might be reasonably practicable to have in place at enhanced duty premises.

The published guidance must be laid before Parliament. It must be kept under review and may be revised accordingly. The revised guidance must also be published and laid before Parliament. The guidance may be used by the SIA in providing advice to duty holders and, where the SIA has taken enforcement action, a person will, in proceedings such as an appeal, be able to rely on proof that they have acted in line with the guidance to show that they have not failed to comply with a requirement in the Bill. I should be crystal clear at this point that the Government do not endorse guidance or advice issued by third-party providers. We continue to refer people to the ProtectUK platform and we have factsheets on gov.uk for all guidance and Bill updates.

Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28

Disclosure of information

[Dan Jarvis]

I beg to move amendment 9, in clause 28, page 20, line 1, at end insert—

“(A1) Any person may disclose information to the Security Industry Authority for the purposes of the exercise by the Security Industry Authority of any of its functions under this Part.

(A2) The Security Industry Authority may disclose information held in connection with the exercise of any of its functions under this Part to—

(a) any person for the purposes of the exercise by the Security Industry Authority of any of its functions under this Part;

(b) any person with functions of a public nature for the purposes of the exercise by that person of any of those functions.”

This amendment makes provision about the disclosure of information to, and by, the Security Industry Authority.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

[Dan Jarvis]

Clause 28 provides that any necessary disclosure of information under the Bill will not constitute a breach of obligations of confidence owed by the individual or body making the disclosure. At the same time, the Bill ensures that the disclosure of information under the Bill is in accordance with the requirements of the data protection legislation and any relevant prohibitions in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. The clause provides assurance that disclosures required by the Bill should not contravene data protection and other relevant obligations.

Government amendment 9 ensures that the clause achieves the aims of the Bill. For the SIA to effectively carry out investigation and enforcement, it is vital that it can receive and use relevant information, especially that held by other regulatory and public bodies. Government amendment 9 therefore seeks to ensure that there is a clear and express information-sharing gateway for both the SIA and those who propose to share relevant information with it. The gateway is appropriately limited to either the SIA exchanging information with any person so long as it is for the purposes of the SIA exercising its functions under the Bill, or the SIA sharing information with other public bodies to exercise that body’s existing public functions. In relation to the latter, many of those bodies will derive their relevant functions from statute, but in some limited cases, the public functions will not be statutory, such as for sharing with central Government.

As clause 28 already provides, disclosures required or permitted by the Bill must be in accordance with the data protection legislation and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. That ensures that there will be compliance with the requirements of the Data Protection Act 2018 and UK GDPR. I hope the Committee will support the amendment.

[Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)]

I intend to speak only briefly on the clause. I welcome the data protection assurances given by the Minister. This is an important clause because it allows the SIA to receive and share information by way of disclosures to facilitate the exercising of its functions. This morning the Minister spoke about our security agencies having thwarted 43 late-stage plots. Integral to that would have been the sharing of intelligence. Sadly, that is not always the case, as we saw in Manchester—terror plots do happen.

Time and time again in inquiries following tragic events, whether that is large-scale disasters or children being harmed in the family home, we hear people confirming that things could have been so different if only agencies had shared information and disclosures had been made. Clause 28, as amended, will allow important preventive work to be undertaken and information to be shared. It will only serve to strengthen the SIA’s ability to ensure our safety.

[Dan Jarvis]

I very much thank my hon. Friend for her helpful contribution. I trust that hon. Members agree that these measures should stand part of the Bill.

Amendment 9 agreed to.

Clause 28, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 29

Means of giving notices

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 30 stand part.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

We have already debated clauses 12 to 14 and clause 17, and the compliance restriction penalty and information notices that the SIA will be able to issue to fulfil its investigative and enforcement functions. Clause 29 sets out the valid methods of service by which the SIA can give these notices and to whom. The methods specified are post, email, delivery by hand and leaving a notice at the person’s proper address. That will ensure that the SIA can reach people effectively.

Clause 29 also provides that notices issued to a body corporate, limited partnership and unincorporated association can be validly served on specified persons within those entities. For example, where the notice is issued to a body corporate, it can be served on an officer or member of that body. Such a person could include, but is not limited to, the designated senior individual under clause 10. Issuing notices to such persons will ensure that they are made aware and will reduce opportunities for avoidance or non-compliance.

Clause 30 allows the Secretary of State to make further provision about notices issued under part 1 of the Bill. That includes, in particular, their form and content, and the variation and withdrawal of notices. The relevant notices are compliance notices, restriction notices, penalty notices and information notices. The main provisions for these notices, which we have debated, set out the information that must be included in a valid notice, and how they may be varied or withdrawn. The power for the Secretary of State to make further provisions under clause 30 is considered necessary for adjustments to be made once the legislation is implemented.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 29 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 30 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 31

Civil liability

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dan Jarvis]

The clause prevents a person from bringing a claim in private law against a person responsible for qualifying premises or events for a breach of statutory duty where they have failed to comply with requirements in the Bill. The Government consider it appropriate that means of redress for non-compliance with the new regime should be limited to enforcement by the SIA.

The SIA will have a range of enforcement actions, which are underpinned by some criminal offences, as has already been debated. It is not considered necessary to allow persons to bring private claims for simple non-compliance, such as seeking compensation for the responsible person failing to put in place public protection procedures. However, the inclusion of the clause does not preclude or otherwise affect any right of action that a person may have independently of the bail.

Clause 31 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 32

Powers to amend this Part

[Tom Tugendhat]

I beg to move amendment 23, in clause 32, page 22, line 20, leave out from “for” to “in” in line 21 and insert

“enhanced duty premises to be standard duty premises.”

This amendment prevents standard duty premises from becoming enhanced duty premises at the discretion of the Secretary of State.

[Tom Tugendhat]

This is a simple repetition of the amendments we have made throughout the Bill to alleviate the burden on small businesses and ensure that the balance is appropriate.

[Dan Jarvis]

I again thank the right hon. Gentleman for tabling his amendment. He seeks to remove the provision in the clause that would allow the Secretary of State, via regulations, to make standard duty premises be treated as enhanced duty premises. It would have the effect of limiting the Secretary of State to only being able to provide that premises that would ordinarily be in the enhanced tier be treated as if standard duty premises. That is already the case in the Bill for certain premises, such as places of worship.

As I have explained, the nature and level of the threat from terrorism can evolve and change rapidly, with different behaviours, methods and tactics emerging. It is therefore important that the Government can respond quickly to protect the public if it becomes evident that there is a particular threat to certain types of premises and that the public protection measures in the enhanced tier should be in place there to reduce vulnerability and the risk of harm.

I again reassure the right hon. Gentleman and the Committee that regulations to make amendments to schedule 1 under this power would be subject to the affirmative procedure, requiring the express approval of both Houses of Parliament. For those reasons, the Government cannot support the amendment.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 32 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 33

Interpretation of this Part

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dan Jarvis]

The clause is technical in nature, defining certain terms used throughout the Bill. For example, the clause provides that the meaning of “terrorism” in the Bill is the same as in the Terrorism Act 2000. The clause is necessary to provide the meaning of these terms for the purposes of the Bill.

Clause 33 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 34

Licensing: disclosure of plans of premises

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 4 stand part.

[Dan Jarvis]

Current licensing legislation in England, Wales and Scotland requires that detailed plans for all licensed premises are kept on a register and made available for inspection by the public. These plans include sensitive information, such as CCTV and emergency exit locations, and we know that this information could potentially be utilised for hostile reconnaissance.

To minimise the accessibility of such information to hostile actors, we are amending the Licensing Act 2003, which covers England and Wales, and the Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005 to enable the UK Government to make regulations on the form and content of plans that will be kept on a public licensing register. The regulations will restrict the public disclosure of sensitive information that is likely to be useful to persons committing or preparing acts of terrorism.

Specifically, the regulations will set out that new licence applicants will be required to supply—in addition to the standard detailed plan—a new high-level plan, which will be available for public inspection. This second plan will not include any sensitive information, but will still enable members of the public to see information about licensing applications that might affect them. The standard detailed plan will still be available to licensing authorities and other responsible authorities, including the police and fire authorities, to enable them to make informed licensing decisions.

Schedule 4 provides that plans compliant with clause 34 must accompany premises licence and club premises certificate applications, which will include any variations or amendments. In practice, once the regulations are in effect, this will mean that the two-plan approach will need to be adopted by businesses applying for these licences.

The schedule further sets out that businesses with pre-existing licences may, if they wish to, seek to replace the existing non-compliant plan with a compliant one. The compliant plan would then be placed on the register and thus be available to the public. For the avoidance of doubt, this will not be mandatory for businesses that already have a licence—we are clear that that would not be proportionate. Taken together, these provisions will better protect licensed premises across England, Wales and Scotland.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 4 agreed to.

Clause 35

Regulations

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this, it will be convenient to discuss clause 36 stand part.

[Dan Jarvis]

Briefly, clauses 35 and 36 are general provisions required for the operation of the Bill. Clause 35 sets out the parliamentary procedure accompanying the regulations. Clause 36 details the territorial extent of the Bill: parts 1 and 3 of the Bill extend to England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland; part 2 of the Bill does not extend to Northern Ireland, with part 1 of schedule 4 extending to England and Wales and part 2 of schedule 4 extending to Scotland.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 35 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 36 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 37

Commencement

[Tom Tugendhat]

I beg to move amendment 18, in clause 37, page 25, line 5, after “force” insert “for enhanced duty premises and qualifying events requirements”.

See explanatory statement to NC1.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am afraid that amendment 18 is on the same point we have made throughout, which is about overburdening.

[Dan Jarvis]

Again, I thank the right hon. Gentleman for these amendments. While I completely understand the sentiment underpinning them, the Government do not support them. I would, however, like to assure the Committee that the Government are committed to learning the lessons from implementation, which is why a robust monitoring and evaluation plan to monitor the Bill’s effectiveness is in place. What is more, the Government have already committed to undertaking a thorough post-implementation review, which will assess whether the legislation is meeting its policy objectives, including analysing the costs and impacts on businesses and other premises in scope.

The Government have been clear that, following Royal Assent, we expect there to be an implementation period of at least 24 months, which will allow for the set-up of the regulator, while ensuring sufficient time for those responsible for premises and events in scope to understand their new obligations and to plan and prepare. Detailed guidance will be provided to assist those in scope to prepare for the requirements, as well as extensive communications and engagement with business and organisations.

Furthermore, as I have already set out, the Bill’s requirements in the standard tier are focused on straightforward procedures designed to increase preparedness and reduce the physical risk to the public from acts of terrorism. The procedures are intended to be simple and have no cost, other than staff time, to develop and implement, with no requirement to purchase or install any additional equipment beyond what they already have in place.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 38 stand part.

[Dan Jarvis]

I turn finally to clauses 37 and 38, which are further general provisions. Clause 37 provides that the Bill’s provisions will be commenced via regulations made by the Secretary of State, save for the provisions contained within part 3 and the regulation-making powers in parts 1 and 2 of the Bill, which come into force on the day that the Bill is passed. Clause 38 details how the Bill should be referred to once it has become an Act.

Clause 37 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 38 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

New clause 1 has already been debated and is not being moved. New clause 2 has been debated already, but do you wish to comment on it, Mr Tugendhat?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

With your leave, Sir Edward, I will take this opportunity to thank you for chairing this Committee and to thank all Members on both sides of the House for their contributions, not just today but in proceedings on Tuesday. I will also take the opportunity to say a particular thank you to all those members of my Department who have worked incredibly hard to draw this legislation together, in conjunction with the staff of this House. Their efforts have been very much appreciated. I am grateful for the cross-party nature of what we have achieved as we have progressed the Bill through the House.

[Tom Tugendhat]

It would be churlish of me not to thank you, Sir Edward, for the speed and efficiency with which you have guided us through this. This is also an opportunity to put on the record my thanks to the Minister, who has been a friend for many years—nearly 20 years, actually. It is a wonderful symmetry that, on my last day on the Front Bench for my party, I am doing what I did when we first met, which is scrutinising him.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill (First sitting)

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 29th October 2024 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we begin, I have some rules to announce. Hansard colleagues will be grateful if Members could email speaking notes to [e-mail]. Please switch electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings.

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

I beg to move,

That—

1. the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 29 October) meet—

(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 29 October;

(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 31 October;

(c) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 5 November;

(d) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 12 November;

(e) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 14 November;

(f) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 19 November;

2. the Committee shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following Table:

[The Chair]

Copies of written evidence that the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee Room.

Resolved,

That, at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be heard, the Committee shall sit in private until the witnesses are admitted.—(Dan Jarvis.)

The Committee deliberated in private.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

Q I extend a warm welcome to both witnesses, and I offer you the Committee’s thanks for your evidence this morning. I also take the opportunity to reiterate the tributes that I paid to you both on Second Reading. Your work has been incredibly impressive and inspiring and I know that the whole Committee and the wider House are hugely grateful for it. May I begin at the beginning and ask you both to say why you think we need this legislation and what its impact will be?

Figen Murray: I have taken the liberty of writing something down that I would like to read out, please, if that is okay. I hope that will address some of that.

I begin by thanking absolutely every person who has had any involvement in bringing Martyn’s law to this point. It has been a long five and a half years since the campaign started, and the kindness and support people have extended to us have been quite incredible.

As I sat in Parliament on 14 October for Second Reading, I realised that the relatively long journey that still lies ahead—given all the different steps the legislation must still undergo—will not be an easy one. On Second Reading, my name was mentioned many times and many lovely words were said, but I need people to understand that I would not have progressed much without my co-campaigners, the campaign team, and the incredible support of my husband and my remaining children.

Seven and a half years ago, our life as a family was destroyed forever. I want you to note the word “forever”, as there is no coming back from this. As a family, we are damaged goods. The day Martyn died, something died inside all of us. Do not get me wrong: as a family, we are very close. Individually, however, we all carry our separate emotional scars that are now an integral part of each of us. That will be the case for every family anywhere in the world who has been hit hard by terrorism. Our numbers are growing, sadly. Outwardly, I function at a high level day in, day out, but make no mistake that my heart is in shreds—yet it is my broken heart that drives me to try to stop others from ever having to feel this way.

Coming back to Second Reading, I was buoyed that every party said that they supported the Bill. If security cannot unite us, what can? I welcome the all-party support. On Second Reading, I also heard some concerns about getting the balance right and keeping the Bill proportionate. I agree with that. Right from the start, we said that one size does not fit all, and that the Bill needs to be proportionate. It has never been intended to be burdensome.

My worry is that the increase in the capacity threshold from 100 in the draft Bill to 200 now risks getting the balance wrong. It excludes too many venues. The cost to businesses for Martyn’s law is a drop in the ocean compared with the €43 billion that the Rand Corporation estimated that terrorism cost the UK between 2004 and 2016, or even the £100,000 lost by Mr Fred Foster, a market trader at Borough market, during the attack in 2017.

However, we need to be clear that the risk from terrorism is real. Our terrorism threat level stands at “substantial”, meaning that an attack is likely. Although there have not been any successful terror attacks, it is easy to let complacency creep in. We must not forget that attack methodologies have now changed. People get radicalised and go out an use vehicles, knives, and home-made IEDs—improvised explosive devices—to kill others.

There are currently about 800 active investigations and about 2,500 subjects of interest who are being watched by the authorities as they are linked to terrorism investigations—the aforementioned 800—but there are a further 30,000 individuals who have expressed extreme views that could lead to them committing acts of terrorism. Those figures have not changed over recent years. The geopolitical situation, sadly, also means that extremists exploit the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza to recruit more people to follow their ideology. There is no sign of those figures reducing in the near future.

The director general of MI5, Ken McCallum, has also recently spoken about 43 near misses since 2017. Those are 43 planned attacks that were stopped just in time. Everyone in this room surely must appreciate that sooner or later an attack will not be stopped in time and people will yet again die or be injured or traumatised. There is no room for complacency. The threat is out there and it is real. Terrorists do not care who they kill. They aim to kill, shock and gain notoriety.

We have had attacks such as a planned knife attack on an LGBT community in Cumbria, a knife attack against an MP inside a church hall in Essex, a bomb outside Liverpool women’s hospital, another bomb at a hospital in Leeds, a knife attack in a park in Reading, a knife attack at a conference in London, a knife attack at a high street in London, a firebomb attack at an immigration centre in Dover, a letter bomb delivered to a Scottish university, a knife attack at a railway station in Manchester, and a vehicle attack at a mosque in London. If anyone thinks that where they live is too small or too rural to be targeted, they are wrong. Our experience in this country and around the world shows us that terrorists can strike anywhere.

A lot of venues are already busy preparing and implementing as much as they can. Manchester has trained over 2,500 people in free-of-charge face-to-face ACT training, and businesses and venues across Manchester are implementing the legislation as best as they can. Venues in Manchester are doing that voluntarily because the city was badly hit. People in Manchester understand the risk as they were directly affected, but we need this legislation on the statute books; without it, people will simply not take security seriously.

Security is often seen as low priority as people do not believe their venue is at risk from terrorism. A recent tabletop exercise in Manchester for the standard-tier venues resulted in most venues saying that the cost of implementing measures is either negligible or very low cost or effort, and that it enhanced customer experience as people felt safer.

At Second Reading, a few people worried about liability and the responsibility given to volunteers. Anybody who already has any responsibility for organising or managing community spaces and events already has liabilities under civil law. Martyn’s law will not create additional liabilities—they exist already. What Martyn’s law is more likely to do is to help communities know that they are discharging those responsibilities properly. Volunteers in various venues across the country already voluntarily take on responsibility for fire safety or health and safety, and this would be simply a small add-on. Martyn’s law is asking people at the standard tier to understand how to lock down, how to evacuate, how to invacuate or how to communicate with others. It is as simple as that on the standard tier.

Another concern was around churches and schools. Our children have the right to be protected from harm. Most schools already had lockdown procedures in place, anyway, long before Martyn’s law became a topic. Places of worship are places where people of all faiths should be able to worship freely and without fear. They need to be protected. We have seen attacks on places of worship in countries such as Sri Lanka, New Zealand—in Christchurch—and France. Since the Gaza conflict a lot of synagogues are currently on high alert as the threat is understood.

To sum up, Martyn’s law will save lives. Terrorism is here to stay. The public have a right to be kept as safe as possible when they are out and about enjoying the freedom our country offers. Martyn, Saffie, Nell, Sorrell, Eilidh, Megan, Olivia, Georgina, Courtney, Philip, Kelly, Elaine, Alison, Lisa, Michelle, Wendy, Jane, John, Angelika and Marcin, Chloe and Liam were all out enjoying a great evening that night and had every right to make it safely back home. I absolutely believe that had Martyn’s law been firmly established, they would still be alive now. Please consider what is the right thing to do. I will finish by saying once again that it is time to get this done. Thank you for listening.

Brendan Cox: I would add a couple of things to that; Figen has set it out incredibly powerfully.

As I mentioned in my introduction, I am part of something called Survivors Against Terror, which is a network of about 300 survivors of terror attacks: people that have been bereaved like myself and Figen and people who have themselves been injured in attacks. What draws that network together is a desire to reduce the likelihood of future terror attacks and to reduce the harm that they do. We do that by campaigning for the rights of families to things such as mental health support and compensation, by educating the public on the role they can play in the fight against terrorism, and by campaigning for effective laws that make terror attacks less likely in the future. That is how Figen and I first started working together, right at the start of this campaign.

I got involved for two reasons. First, frankly, I was inspired by Figen and her determination to make something good come out of something that was absolutely horrific, and to make sure that no other family unnecessarily goes through what her and her family have, but also, fundamentally, because the methodology of terrorism has changed, as Figen mentioned. The age of very complex attacks, often directed by people from outside the country and involving the need to assemble a device or to work out how detonators work, gave our security services lots of opportunities to intervene and disrupt terrorism plots. We are now in an age in which people are just using knives or cars, and the way in which we respond to that terror threat has not caught up.

It is impossible for our security services to keep our country safe with this new distributed methodology. We therefore have to have much more of a partnership approach: how can we all play a little role in making each other safer? I think this comes from our experience, but as the network of survivors supporting Figen and her campaign we do not want anybody’s sympathy, we want to make people safer so that these things and the impact they have had on our lives do not happen to anyone else. There is nobody more driven in wanting to defeat terrorism than those who have been directly affected by it.

There are two ways in which terrorists can win. One is by killing and maiming people. The other is by disrupting our way of life—making us live in fear and changing our way of engaging with each other. That is why, right from the start, proportionality has been central to our thinking. We do not want this to change our way of life. We do not want terrorists to win, either by injuring people or by changing our way of life, and that is why right at the heart of this proposal, from the beginning, has been proportionality. We want everybody to be empowered to play a small role in making us all safer. We do not want airport-style security outside village halls, as some of the papers might suggest we want.

The final thing I would say is that nobody wants to have a law named after their child. What we do want to do is to make sure no-one unnecessarily goes through what Figen and her family has. We want to make sure that there is a legislative response to the clamour of action that you have had in every inquiry post-2017, whether into the Manchester attacks or into the London attacks, to say that this is a loophole that has to be closed and now is the moment to close it.

[The Chair]

Shadow Minister, do you have any questions?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We have until 10.20 am for this oral evidence session. Will the witness please introduce himself for the record?

Andy Burnham: I am Andy Burnham, the Mayor of Greater Manchester. As colleagues will know, I left Parliament in 2017, two weeks before the attack at the Manchester Arena, so I have been closely involved with all the developments ever since.

[Dan Jarvis]

Q Good morning, Andy. It is always very good to see you. As the Mayor—perhaps I should call you “Mr Mayor”—you are uniquely well placed not only to understand the impact of the Manchester Arena bombing but, as is often the case in Greater Manchester, to be a real trailblazer in looking at what the impact of Martyn’s law might be on business. Could you say something about what you think will be the impact of the Bill on businesses, based on your experiences in Greater Manchester?

Andy Burnham: Thank you very much, Minister. Before I get to the question, I will say a little more about my background, which has led me up to what I think. I was shadow Home Secretary at the time of the Paris attacks, and those at the Bataclan in particular. If that had happened here, this legislation would already be on the statute book. Obviously, as Figen said, we have lived through the terrible events of 22 May 2017, but in the seven and a half years since, the nature of the threat has changed. I do not think we could have imagined some of the incidents that we have seen since then, such as the terrible loss of a really loved colleague in Southend and the attack in Southport. We would not have expected that. I remember asking Theresa May at the time of the Paris attacks if we were prepared for an attack in an English city—even then we were thinking only of cities; we were not thinking outside of cities. I say that because all that has shaped my thinking over the years.

When Figen first came forward with the concept of this Bill, I took time to think it through with colleagues in our city region. We are part the Resilient Cities Network, which is a group of 100 cities around the world, and we are in the Strong Cities Network, so we are constantly sharing best practice with cities around the world, and it was our view that the lack of a clear set of standards for security in our venues was a real gap. We were conscious, though, that there may be an impact on venues, hence the measures that were brought forward had to be right but proportionate, and I think care has been taken over that.

As you have just heard, Manchester city council has done an exercise working with venues and surveying venues on some of the voluntary things that have already been done in our city region. As you heard a moment ago, the impact is negligible—it is low-cost—but venues also report that they think it has raised standards generally within the organisation and improved the visitor experience. The experience that people have when they visit—their sense of safety when they are in the city—matters a lot to us as a city region and we are working to raise it. We have gone ahead and, if anything, we want to keep going further and raising the bar.

I will finish by saying that my main message to the Committee this morning is that I ask all of you to please ensure that the Bill is not watered down any further—actually, I look to the Committee to strengthen it. Again, I believe that venues with a capacity of 100 to 200 should be covered by the Bill. I do not think it is right that there is no requirement for training within the standard tier; there should be a requirement for staff to take the free ACT training. The message from Greater Manchester is that we continue to support Figen and all the families who lost loved ones on that night. In one way, we support those measures for that emotional reason, and always will, but we also do so from a Resilient Cities perspective. We believe they will only strengthen people’s experience in our city. We think it is in the interest of parents whose kids come into our city to go to the many events that take place every weekend to understand that there is a basic level of security at all the venues across our city region.

[Tim Roca]

Q How have businesses reacted as Manchester has led the way on Martyn’s law? How onerous have they found it? What is the practical experience?

Andy Burnham: That is a fair question. Of course, we have had those conversations. I have been at events—with Figen, actually—with our night-time economy adviser, Sacha Lord, where we have said, “Look, we think we should do this.” Then there have been conversations like, “Well, it’s difficult. The hospitality sector has had challenging times,” but as we have talked it through I think people have come round to the idea that security and safety is one thing that no venue should compromise on, because in some ways that is the first thing to get right. If you get that right, you will get lots of other things right. It is about raising the standard of what the industry does.

There is evidence that the Manchester visitor economy —I know Manchester is not far from your constituency and you probably know it well—has improved over the years and in many ways mirrors the offer that people can find in London, but we have a night-time economy adviser because we want to keep raising the bar. We are not complacent at all. There just has not been an outcry or backlash. People have worked with it. This attack happened in our city: we lost 22 people—young people, mainly, but people of other ages as well—on that night. It is incumbent on us to challenge ourselves about what we do as a city to respond to that, and to recognise that life is changing and the outlying towns and villages of Greater Manchester could see an incident of that kind.

There is a broader point here: speaking as police and crime commissioner for Greater Manchester, I do not believe yet that the country has all of its procedures in place to face what we are experiencing. I say that with reference to fire and rescue services. Currently, it is still not clear what the role of fire and rescue services is in relation to what is called a marauding terrorist attack. How can that be the case? That clearly needs to be addressed. We have done local things, but this legislation should be only the start, in my view, of really ensuring that there are arrangements in place that provide clarity to blue-light services and venues, as well as others, on the basics of responding to an incident. I think there is still work in progress on that point.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Q We have until 10.50 am. Can the witnesses please introduce themselves for the record?

Helen Ball: Good morning. My name is Helen Ball. I am the town clerk of Shrewsbury town council in Shropshire and I am also the chairman of the Society of Local Council Clerks nationally.

Keith Stevens: My name is Keith Stevens and I am the chair of the National Association of Local Councils, which looks after the 10,000 parish and town councils across the country.

[Dan Jarvis]

Q Good morning to you both and thank you for giving evidence to the Committee.

My question is for Councillor Stevens. I know that you have had a long-standing interest in the process. As part of the pre-legislative scrutiny in the previous Parliament, I know that a number of concerns were raised around proportionality and thresholds, and also around the lack of clarity with regard to the regulator. I would be grateful for your view on the changes that have been made to the Bill since. Also, how receptive do you think local councillors will be to those changes?

Keith Stevens: Having heard what has gone before, as a parish councillor I was quite pleased when the threshold was lifted to 200 because that is proportionate. I will give the simple example of my own parish council. The village hall where we hold all our meetings has a capacity of, I think, 190. I have to be honest: we rarely get to 190 people at a parish council meeting. Normally, it is 20 people, including the councillors, as a maximum. That is why raising the threshold to 200 was welcomed by a lot of councils, because it meant that the rules were not quite as strict. However, I do not think that means that parish and town councils will not look at the security of any venue that any event is taking place in. Security is important and we always look at it.

Sorry, what was the second part of the question?

[Dan Jarvis]

Q It was about the extent to which local councillors will be receptive to those changes.

Keith Stevens: I think they are receptive to the changes and I think that local councils and councillors are very supportive of Martyn’s law. They have all seen the things, and most parish councils have quite good relationships with the security services. In my own area, we have regular monthly meetings to talk about the situation; actually, the police often use parish councils almost as the pulse of what is going on in the village. When there were all the problems last year, the police were in contact asking us to let them know whether we had heard any rumours that got off the ground. So, yes—very supportive.

[Sonia Kumar]

Q Do you anticipate that certain types of community events or venues may struggle to meet the requirements due to the nature of their spaces, such as historic venues with limited security options?

Helen Ball: We have had conversations with a lot of parish councils and parish clerks over the last few months. A lot of village halls are quite distinct in where they are, so there is some concern as to how they would actually be able to enact evacuation and lockdown procedures, particularly when you have just got a large room and you may only have one entrance and one exit. There is that level of concern.

A lot of the problems that we have at the moment are more about the fear of the unknown; people have read the Bill and are looking at the worst-case scenario. We have tried to advocate—as a society and also as NALC, as part of our Martyn’s law working group—that it is a bit of a “Keep calm and carry on” situation, and that we can do this. A lot of it is a common-sense approach to security. The sentiment from our society is that the legislation should be welcomed and that regardless of whether there are bandings within certain buildings, we should develop a culture of terrorism awareness.

“What price is a life?” is the other comment that a lot of clerks have said of late. Why would somebody’s life be less important if they were in a building that has 199 people as opposed to 201? It is incumbent upon our sector to try to encourage a better culture.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill (Second sitting)

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Tuesday 29th October 2024 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I apologise, but I may have inadvertently given a date rather than a time. This panel lasts until 2.20 pm.

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

Q24 Assistant Commissioner, good afternoon. Thank you for appearing in front of the Committee today and more generally, thank you to you and your officers for the incredibly important work that you do to keep the public safe. It is hugely appreciated.

I am conscious that some, but not all, members of the Committee have spent quite a lot of time thinking about the nature of the threat that we face. You are supremely well placed, given your experience, to talk about the nature of the threat. I know that there will be limitations on what you can say. However, it would be incredibly helpful for the Committee if, based on your extensive experience of policing, you were able to say something about the nature of the terrorist threat that we face today and how that compares with, say, 10 years ago. Can you also say something about your assessment of the legislation we are dealing with and its benefits?

Matt Jukes: Thank you very much, Minister, and I thank the Committee for the opportunity. Before I move on to the threat, I would like to acknowledge all those who have been directly affected by the reality of terrorism in the UK and particularly to remember the victims of the attacks that have given rise to the movement towards the Bill. I pay particular tribute to Figen Murray for her tireless campaigning to bring us to this point.

The terrorist threat in the UK remains substantial and across the years that I have been involved, we have moved from a situation where people once needed to travel to acquire terrorist training, methodologies and equipment to now being able to carry out that kind of research and reconnaissance and acquire terrorist knowledge from their bedrooms, increasingly driven by the internet. The most pronounced feature of our work of late has been low sophistication actors who are self-initiated. They are sometimes called lone wolves or lone actors, but are in fact often connected to small groups of individuals online and often inspired by terrorist rhetoric, which endures from decades of presence of that kind of material, now in the online space.

We see three principal forms of ideology driving radicalisation and risk. First, there is those who have been inspired by or are directly connected to organisations such as Daesh/ISIS or al-Qaeda—so-called Islamist extremist terrorism. Secondly, we have seen over recent years the growing presence of extreme right-wing terrorism in our casework. Thirdly, there is an increasing number of cases of individuals who are mixed, unclear or unstable in their ideology and who seek inspiration in the material online from a range of different sources, sometimes mixing and moving across those ideologies.

In contrast to the previous decade, where we saw the rise of the Syrian caliphate and travel overseas, in recent years we have seen less travel overseas to carry out acts of terrorism and we have worked incredibly hard internationally and in partnership to reduce the movement of terrorist foreign fighters. One consequence of that has been that all the major terrorist organisations, which seem at times very remote from the UK, speak in terms of attacks being carried out where you are—effectively, if you cannot travel, then you might consider an attack where you are—and we have seen examples of that ideology following through.

The major terrorist organisations, which have been significantly degraded since 2014 and the rise and fall of the Syrian caliphate, should be acknowledged, as the director general of MI5 has said, as being down but not out. Although I have spoken about the numerous, dispersed individuals who are inspired to act on self-initiation, we are seeing signals of growing and re-emerging sophistication in international terrorism. The most obvious instance of that was the Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow earlier this year.

I will finish by scaling all of that. I am fortunate to work with a range of partners, communities, victims and survivors. Our core teams in counter-terrorism policing are currently investigating, in 800 separate cases, thousands of individuals who have expressed some intent to pursue a terrorist cause. Every year, 6,000 to 7,000 people are added to the roster of those who have been referred into the prevention of violent extremism casework through the Prevent lens.

All of that takes us to the question of how to mitigate those threats. We mitigate them through the pursuit of those who are already on our radar effectively, working closely with MI5. We mitigate those risks by trying to get ahead of them, with the prevention of violent extremism through the Prevent programme and elements of deradicalisation. It is absolutely critical that, in the conditions I have just described, we are able to protect the potential targets of terrorism and prepare communities, businesses and society to respond when terrorist events take place.

The terrorist threat now is harder to spot and harder to stop than it has ever been. Therefore, however effective our investigations are, we have to be ready to prepare and protect the potential targets of terrorism. To do that, we think that the proposed measures in the Bill—Martyn’s law—are proportionate, and highly likely to be effective.

We enjoy extremely positive relationships with a range of sectors—they are giving evidence this afternoon—but the measures will move us forward from a mode of co-operation, encouragement and collaboration, to giving communities, customers and society the confidence that there is a base level of preparedness and protection in place in the venues captured by the Bill. While we have enjoyed those relationships, we know there is a great deal of inconsistency around the country, and we would not want to see in any sense a postcode lottery for those who deserve protection.

I will finish with a small illustration. You have probably already heard, and will continue to hear, fear and concerns about the proportionality, cost and scale of the impact of the Bill. Given the terrible events of 2017, it is worth remembering that in Borough market during the London Bridge attack, the simple act of encouraging customers to remain in a premises and locking the door saved lives. At the level of intervention that is proposed in the majority of premises, the simple preparedness of staff to take low-cost or no-cost interventions can absolutely contribute to saving lives in the UK. For that reason, counter-terrorism is full square behind the Bill.

[Kirith Entwistle (Bolton North East) (Lab)]

Q Thank you for your remarks, which are useful to hear. Out of interest, looking back at terrorist attacks that have happened over the years, do you think the Bill could have made a difference if it had been in place?

Matt Jukes: The foundational incident for these conversations is the attack on Manchester Arena in May 2017. The evidence of the inquiry was clear that with a better prepared environment there, responders and those working on the premises could have changed the outcomes, whether by preventing an attack that evening, or mitigating its effects. One factor that has been discussed is that we will only capture a range of premises. We might touch on thresholds, but we might capture a range of premises and not all public spaces. One thing I felt quite confident in judging is that preparing businesses in these different tiers to be more security-minded, preparing people who work in those businesses to be more security aware and planful around the prospects of safety will raise overall the readiness of communities for attack.

Even though some of the attacks that we have seen over recent years have taken place in public spaces in open areas and would not be captured by this legislation, we might have seen trauma kits more readily accessible in adjacent premises. We might have seen people who were travelling to or from work who were more ready to play their part in responding as part of the community response to those incidents, and we might have been able to mitigate some of the risks of the spread of those attacks in the way I described in London bridge.

We know that where it has worked best, a combination of vigilance, preparedness and physical security can all play their part. We absolutely see both deterrent and mitigation of risk. Based on our experience of attacks over recent years, it would have to include those at major events. You are going to hear some more evidence about that. We know that in an enduring sense, major and public events remain a focus of terrorist planning.

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[The Chair]

Thank you all. For this oral evidence session we have until 2.50 pm. Can the witnesses please introduce themselves for the record?

Neil Sharpley: Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Neil Sharpley. I am the chair for the Federation of Small Businesses covering Home Office and Ministry of Justice policy, and so embrace security industry and terrorism aspects as well as crime.

Mike Pearce: Good afternoon, Chair and Committee. My name is Mike Pearce. I am the director of security for Land Securities, otherwise known as Landsec. I am also chair of the Counter Terrorism Business Information Exchange.

John Frost: Good afternoon. I am John Frost, deputy chair of the Counter Terrorism Business Information Exchange. I also head up business continuity and safety at Marks & Spencer and lead the Retailers Business Continuity Association.

[Dan Jarvis]

Q Thank you for attending; we are very grateful, not least because I know the Committee is particularly keen to hear from the business community, and your evidence this afternoon will be helpful to us. My question is for Mr Sharpley. I know you have huge experience in this area and that, as part of the pre-legislative scrutiny process, you appeared as a witness in front of the Home Affairs Committee back in June 2023. At that point, there were some concerns centred around capacity calculations, thresholds and the identity of the regulator. I am sure you will have seen that there have been extensive changes to the legislation over the intervening period. Has the clarity now in place around the types of procedures and measures that business would be required to implement provided some of the assurance you were seeking back in June 2023?

Neil Sharpley: The simple answer to that is yes. The comments we made previously have been taken into account. We think that for any piece of new legislation that is breaking new ground, which we of course support and our own research shows that there is a need for information to be disseminated to businesses about terrorism risk, the threshold has been set at the right level initially. We expect that it will be reviewed in due course as the Bill, or the Act when it becomes that, beds in, but we feel that the parameters have been set correctly at present.

The concerns we expressed previously were about very small venues, community venues, local societies and things of that sort. The one thing that is not touched on in the Bill, which I should perhaps mention initially, is what the role of local authorities should be in helping to achieve the aims of the Bill. We all agree that the aims are to ameliorate the risk as far as terrorism is concerned. I am sure it has been observed before that many open public areas are surrounded by a plethora of smaller businesses, many of which would never be in scope of the Bill but all of which, because of the current threat vectors, might possibly be at risk. My question to you is, should this Bill also contain some provision that requires local authorities to assess the risks of those open areas and to embark on some sort of training exercise in respect of the smaller businesses surrounding them, whether or not they fall within the scope of the Bill in terms of specific obligations? That is something that needs attention and something we have touched on a number of times before, and I think the local authority representative who gave evidence before the Bill was launched also touched on that. It seems to be an area where, especially in smaller towns and cities, a considerable amount of good work could be done to reduce the risk beyond what is currently envisaged within the Bill.

In general terms, we welcome the changes. We think the Bill will take some time to bed in. Businesses will become accustomed to the responsibilities and, in due course, those responsibilities may not be regarded in such an onerous way as they might be regarded now for any new piece of legislation. It may also be possible, with due consultation, to change the parameters, but that is a matter for the future; it is a matter for research and for data, and we need to do what is necessary to ameliorate the risk, not what is unnecessary but looks good in regulatory terms. We need to address the specific risks—the real risks—themselves, rather than create a system that does not target those risks as extensively as I think could be done.

[Tim Roca]

Q Mr Frost, can I ask you to talk a little bit about what the day-to-day impact would be on the stores that you are responsible for, in practical terms?

John Frost: In our organisation, regardless of any capacities, we would adopt an approach across all of our locations. The rationale for that would be that, having suffered incidents of this nature in sites, stores or premises that are below the threshold that has been set out, we would feel that there would be a moral obligation, as well as the legislative obligation, to equip all of our stores. Therefore, we will have our own inspectorate across stores in the enhanced tiers, but we will ensure that our management teams are trained, engaged, educated and equipped proportionately to respond to acts of this nature in every site that we operate in.

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[The Chair]

For this oral evidence session, we will have until 3.10 pm. Could the witnesses please introduce themselves for the record?

Cameron Yorston: Hello everyone, and thank you for having us. I am Cameron Yorston, a director at the Sport and Recreation Alliance.

Max Nicholls: Hi everyone—I am Max Nicholls, policy manager at the Sport and Recreation Alliance.

[Dan Jarvis]

Q Good afternoon, and thank you for appearing in front of the Committee; we appreciate it. I have a couple of reasonably specific questions. What are your views on the proposed changes to the Bill, particularly in relation to the change in capacity calculations, where responsible persons are now being asked to identify the number of people reasonably expected to be on the premises at the same time? We hope that you will welcome that.

Secondly, we would like to get a sense of your views on the proposed changes in relation to the addition of the “reasonably practicable” standard. Again, we hope you will welcome that change. Your sense of those two changes would be very much appreciated.

Max Nicholls: I am happy to take that question. We certainly welcome the flexibility introduced by the change around capacity calculations, the ability to look at things such as historic attendance data and a wider range of measures that may impact how many people are on site. We have some sites in the sport and recreation sector that are quite large in their overall footprint, but which in reality have fairly few people in them at any one time. Previously, there was a concern that if a calculation based purely on footprint was to be introduced, lots of those premises could be drawn into the enhanced tier. We certainly welcome that change and the flexibility around how many people are on site based on the different criteria set out in the briefing note.

Cameron Yorston: The answer to the second question on the introduction of the “reasonably practicable” judgment is that we welcome it entirely. I also wanted to kick off a broader point that we, and the sector more broadly, welcome the intention of the Bill, as the gentlemen before us said. I think everyone can be supportive of the principle of trying to make venues in specific sectors more resilient across the country.

I suspect you will also have heard this throughout the day. What is missing—or rather, where we still need further clarity and guidance—is greater clarity on the practical implementation of the Bill and on how, in practice, that “reasonably practicable” judgment will apply. I am more than happy to elaborate and illustrate with specific examples of where it is not clear that the spirit and intention of the Bill, and those exclusions or measures you reference, will bite in the appropriate way. There is a risk of unintended consequences.

[Sonia Kumar]

Q What unique challenges do you foresee for community-based sports venues, such as the community boxing club in Dudley, in conducting and obtaining regular risk assessments, given the varied events types, participants and demographics?

Max Nicholls: I will make an opening point generally on community sports venues and organisations. Across the country, we have roughly 100,000 grassroots sports clubs; as many on the Committee will be aware, these are predominantly volunteer-run, and do important work in the community to get people active and deliver community cohesion, as well as delivering all these other social benefits driven by participation in sport and physical activity.

We know that there are lots of challenges around recruiting and retaining volunteers, specifically post-covid. One common thing our members tell us is that volunteer recruitment is one of the key barriers to delivering more sport and physical activity. As Cameron alluded to, something we are keen to work with the Committee and Government on, through to the production of guidance, is supporting those volunteers in community-based organisations; we want to understand what their environment requirements are and give them as much information and guidance as possible to support them in the undertaking of their requirements.

As you say, that will look very different in different parts of the country. We represent a huge plethora of sports and recreational activities where the clubs and activities are very different. Having the flexibility to understand what is appropriate and practicable for those different organisations is important.

Cameron Yorston: To add to that briefly, and to reiterate the earlier point, we want to avoid unintended consequences. It is quite hard as at now to envisage all the specific impacts that might emerge from the legislation, given there is clearly a need for greater clarity and guidance.

The overarching point is that we do not want to impose any potentially prohibitive burdens or requirements on volunteers who are already very stretched, as that risks reducing the provision of sport, physical activity and recreation against the backdrop of the country’s wider challenges, such as issues with public health and a struggling NHS. What we do not want to do is inadvertently reduce people’s ability to participate in sport, recreation and physical activity, because there are adverse unintended consequences to that.

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[The Chair]

We have Kate Nicholls OBE, the chief executive of UKHospitality, in the Committee Room with us, and we are joined via Zoom by Mike Kill, the chief executive of the Night Time Industries Association. We have until 3.40 pm for this oral evidence session. Will the witnesses please introduce themselves for the record?

Kate Nicholls: I am Kate Nicholls, chief executive at UKHospitality, the national trade body for hospitality businesses right the way through from a single-site independent pub, bar, nightclub, restaurant or hotel to the largest national chains. Our membership also includes some large event venues and exhibition centres.

Mike Kill: My name is Mike Kill. I am the chief executive of the Night Time Industries Association, which represents businesses that operate in the ecosystem between 6 pm and 6 am. Broadly, we represent pubs, bars, restaurants, clubs, live music venues, events, casinos and the like that operate within that period.

[Dan Jarvis]

Good afternoon to you both. Thank you very much for appearing before the Committee today: you have a particularly valuable insight and we are looking forward to hearing from you.

We heard earlier from Mayor Andy Burnham, who was very positive about the impact that these measures are already having on the hospitality sector in Greater Manchester. I want to get a sense of whether that accords with your analysis of the impact of these measures on the hospitality sector nationally. It was very positive to hear the good news story from Greater Manchester, with the way it has been embraced by the hospitality businesses there, but it would be good to get your sense of whether there should be the same approach right around the country.

Kate Nicholls: I do not think anybody in the hospitality sector or the wider live music and events sector could have experienced the recent incidents we have had—not just in Manchester, but in London—and just sat back and waited for legislation to ensure that our customers, our public and, most importantly, our staff were safe. Since those events, and since the learnings coming out of the inquiry, we have been working collectively with our members to look at how we could take forward this protect duty within the context of our existing licensing regime—the Licensing Act 2003 puts on us a legal obligation to ensure we take account of public safety. As part of that, businesses in city centre locations, in particular, have worked with their local police forces and counter-terrorism to ensure that steps are already being taken to look at measures that could be encompassed within this duty.

I should also say that we are working to ensure that that is taken right down to the very smallest venues and that lessons are learned there, so that we have a basic level of security within the public realm. While Manchester is leading the way, quite unsurprisingly, we are working hard to make sure that we are doing the same thing and carrying out those lessons and delivering that in practice.

[Sonia Kumar]

Q How might the increased security requirements impact staffing for night-time venues, particularly with training and retaining part-time or seasonal workers? I think this question might be better for Mike.

Mike Kill: With regard to the businesses that we represent—particularly some of the small and medium-sized enterprises and businesses that are slightly smaller and, as you can appreciate, on the lower tier—there is, without a doubt, a resonating concern around the cost base given the current economic climate.

A key area of concern for us, because the industry has a high turnover of staff, is that that continual training of staff within that high turnover is going to represent a level of cost. When we looked at things like the impact assessment, we felt that without a doubt, given the infrastructure, systems, processes and considerations at either level—whether on the standard or the enhanced tier—there is a concern that this will be onerous cost-wise, particularly around staffing levels. There is also concern with regard to certain shifts around things like the national living wage, which will drive that forward as well.

From the perspective of the industry, there is still a resonating concern that there will be an undue burden on small venues and community groups in particular, which, in the current economic climate, that could lead to further challenging situations. That is not to take away from the importance of safety; however, the reality is that we have to be honest about our position moving forward. So there are resonating concerns, but people are taking positive steps forward.

Just to reiterate and support Kate’s comments, there has been a very positive reaction to the Bill—it is very well supported. I believe the right action to move forward is happening across the sector as a whole at varying levels, but Manchester is without a doubt leading that, given the circumstances represented there.

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[The Chair]

Are there any other questions for the panel? I want to ensure I do not miss anybody again. If there are no further questions from Members, I thank the witnesses for their evidence.

I understand that we may be so far ahead of ourselves that not all the witnesses for the next panel are here.

[Dan Jarvis]

Dame Siobhain, may I propose that we change the order of the panel of witnesses, while remaining within the provisions of the programme order?

[The Chair]

Does anyone in the Committee object? No.

Examination of Witnesses

Jeremy Leggett gave evidence.

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[The Chair]

I call the Minister.

[Dan Jarvis]

I am happy to pass.

[The Chair]

Okay. I call Tim Roca.

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[The Chair]

Our next witnesses are Jon Collins, chief executive of LIVE, and Melvin Benn, spokesman for the Concert Promoters Association. This is now panel 10 of the oral evidence session, and we have until 4.30 pm. Could the witnesses introduce themselves for the record?

Jon Collins: My name is Jon Collins, and I am the chief executive of LIVE, which is the live music industry body in the UK. We pull together 15 different associations from across live music, including the Music Venue Trust, which represents the smallest music venues in the country, the British Association of Concert Halls, the National Arenas Association—taking us upscale—and the Association of Independent Festivals. The Concert Promoters Association, which Melvin is representing, also sits on my board, alongside representatives from artists, agents, managers and ticket retailers—right the way through.

Melvin Benn: My name is Melvin Benn, and I am the managing Director of Festival Republic. I am here today speaking on behalf of the Concert Promoters Association. Festival Republic is the largest festival producer and promoter in the UK, producing and promoting festivals such as Reading, Leeds, Latitude, Wireless and Wilderness, concert series in Gunnersbury park, Crystal Palace park and Finsbury park and so on.

[Dan Jarvis]

Q Good afternoon to you both, and thank you for appearing in front of the Committee. It is much appreciated. My question is for Mr Collins. First, thank you for your consistent and constructive approach throughout this process, which has been appreciated. On the basis that I suspect you might be asked some more general questions, I wanted to ask you a specific one: how do you see the legislation interacting with the events sector’s already established security procedures?

Jon Collins: Thank you for those comments. We are attempting to be a critical friend to strengthen the Bill as it moves through the House. The first recognition is the role of licensing in our industry. Every one of the venues and festivals I have talked about will have a premises licence, be that for the event or for the venue. There are four objectives under that piece of legislation that relate to public safety, the prevention of crime and disorder and so on. We have concerns about how the requirements under this legislation will or will not align with the licence conditions that our venues and festivals will be operating within.

There is a risk of some potential conflict—particularly as the licensing process is often a multi-year process, where the local authority gets to understand the venue and the festival and comes back year in, year out. There will be the development of security advisory group sessions and the development of an event management plan. That is a long, well-developed process, but now an inspector could potentially visit just before the event and say, “I am not satisfied with all of this; you need to take these steps.” The first thing we would note is that there is no requirement for them to be reasonably practicable in the Bill, whereas the requirement for operators is to take reasonably practicable steps. We think an amendment that adds that expectation to the inspectorate would be useful.

Beyond that, could the guidance for this legislation be mirrored in the section 182 guidance for the Licensing Act 2003 in England and Wales, and its equivalents in other countries and regions? Could we have something in the legislation to say that a requirement from the inspectorate cannot conflict with a licence condition? If there was conflict, if something happened and we had to get into the whys and wherefores, there would potentially be legal considerations there: “Well, I was compliant with this legislation, but you’re saying I am not compliant over here.” There are some challenges there that we think can be addressed as the Bill moves forward and the guidance is created.

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

Q Can I follow up on that? That is very interesting —what would drive that kind of conflict? I am Scottish and represent a Scottish constituency, and sometimes some elements are devolved and some are not, so I know it can be difficult for organisations with a footprint across the UK to follow different regulations. Is that the level of conflict you are talking about, or is it more that they would be speaking at cross purposes and there needs to be harmonisation?

Jon Collins: The Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005 is similar to the 2003 Act in its provisions. It could be, for example, a venue having a condition that says they will search everybody on entry. That will necessarily create a queue outside the premises, but it might be that from a counter-terrorism perspective you need to get everybody inside the premises as quickly as possible. Then you have a direct conflict, and the operator is trying to square that circle.

Melvin Benn: As Jon said, the two licensing Acts in England and Wales and in Scotland are very similar. In Scotland, particularly for outdoor events, licences are done on an annual basis, as opposed to a permanent premises licence as it is in England and Wales.

However, there is potential for conflict where a venue, an annual festival or an annual series of concerts has been in monthly meetings with safety advisory groups and has done all the preparation on the basis of the advice from the safety advisory group—who of course take advice from the local police force and the local CT SecCo, or counter-terrorism security co-ordinator, and so on—and the organisers will have their plan for the evening, or the festival, the weekend, or the next month or six months of the venue, all costed and budgeted, and then the regulator’s representative may come in and say, “I fundamentally disagree with that, and I need you to do this.” It appears that they have supreme powers. Certainly, in the way it is written, as Jon said, there is no factor of reasonableness in it, which we have to have. Parliament expects us to be reasonable in our endeavours, in our searching and so on. This does not have that factor of reasonableness, and it could cause conflict. It could be that the regulator and the safety advisory group have differences of opinion and we get caught in between, with what could be very significant financial penalties, not knowing quite which way to go.

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[The Chair]

I call the Minister to ask a question.

[Dan Jarvis]

I will leave that to others.

[Tim Roca]

Q I worked in higher education, so I know that there are quite a lot of regulators already knocking around. I wondered what your view was about the SIA being designated as the regulator, as far as the legislation is concerned.

Gary Stephen: I am aware that in some parts of the security industry, the SIA has a poor reputation when it comes to the enforcement of licensed premises. But from the information provided to me, and with the creation of a separate entity within the SIA to manage the enforcement of new legislation, it is comforting. Looking at the alternatives, it seems like the most practical and logical appointment on the face of it.

Oral Answers to Questions

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Monday 21st October 2024 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

Fraud accounts for 39% of all crime, according to the England and Wales crime survey, and it was the most common type of crime in the year ending March 2024. It is a crime that destroys lives and we are committed to working with law enforcement and industry to better protect the public and businesses from the fraud threats they face.

[Phil Brickell]

We know that 39% of all reported crime is fraud, and many of those offences are carried out by serious organised crime gangs. The National Crime Agency is tasked with protecting my constituents from foreign origin fraud and serious organised crime, but a recent report from Spotlight on Corruption found that after 14 years of Conservative government the NCA was “on its knees”, spending millions of pounds on consultants and failing to retain investigators. What steps is the Minister taking to ensure that the NCA is able to protect my constituents from financial crime?

[Dan Jarvis]

Let me take this opportunity to pay tribute to the NCA for its operational leadership and its focus on tackling economic crime. Through collaborating with jurisdictions at risk, we make it harder for organised crime groups to target UK victims. The national fraud squad, run by the NCA’s national economic crime centre, and the City of London police, with 400 new officers by next year, have boosted the ability to tackle the highest-harm international offenders. We are working to deliver a workforce strategy to address retention challenges for fraud. This is important work that impacts on all our constituents and it is a priority area for this Government.

[Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con)]

The Minister will know that online harm goes beyond fraud. It can impact people’s lives through suicide sites that signpost people to unregulated sites that lead them to a place none of us want to see them go to. He will know that the European Commission is currently investigating Facebook and Instagram. The United States is introducing the kids online safety Act, which, if it is passed by Congress, will make a huge impact. Why is it left to parents in the United Kingdom—in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, wherever they are—to take their own litigation against these big tech companies? Is it not time the Government did more?

[Dan Jarvis]

We are doing more, and I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that this is a key priority for the Department, not least because 70% of fraud has an international element, particularly online. Approximately one in 18 adults were victims of fraud in the year ending March 2024. The noble Lord Hanson leads on this for the Department, and he and I are working closely with other Government Departments, including the Treasury and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. This is a priority and we need to do more.

[Ruth Cadbury (Brentford and Isleworth) (Lab)]

3. What steps her Department is taking to improve neighbourhood policing.

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[Sir David Davis (Goole and Pocklington) (Con)]

When last year the now Home Secretary called on the then Conservative Government to use counter-terror legislation to proscribe organisations such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, she will remember that I supported her publicly. Since then, Iran and the IRGC have got even more dangerous. Has she changed her mind, and if so, why?

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

I have huge respect for the right hon. Gentleman, but I gently point out that he is asking the Government to do something that the previous Government did not do in 14 years. I can say to him that we are leading work on countering Iranian state threats, making use of the full breadth and expertise of our intelligence services and law enforcement agencies. We keep the list of proscribed organisations under very close review. I can assure him that work continues apace to identify further ways to tackle the threat.

[Jon Pearce (High Peak) (Lab)]

UK universities have experienced a fivefold increase in antisemitic incidents since the 7 October terrorist attacks. At a recent meeting of the Union of Jewish Students, I heard distressing examples of the Iranian regime organising on our campuses and stirring up hatred against Jewish students. Can the Minister tell the House what steps the Department is taking to deal with the threat posed by Tehran here on British soil?

[Dan Jarvis]

We have been clear that the behaviour of the Iranian regime, including the actions of the IRGC, poses a threat to the safety and security of the UK and our allies. The Government continually assess threats to the UK and take the protection of individuals’ rights, freedoms and safety incredibly seriously, wherever those threats may originate.

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[Dave Doogan (Angus and Perthshire Glens) (SNP)]

After a bungled fraud investigation by Renault Crédit International, it, together with Renault-Nissan UK Ltd moved to seize the assets of a business in my constituency, Mackie Motors Brechin Ltd. This cost my constituent half a million pounds and 25% of his order book value. Will the Secretary of State meet me to discuss the finer points of this clearly very dubious act by a UK bank?

[Dan Jarvis]

I am concerned to hear about the case that the hon. Gentleman raises, and I would be happy to meet him to discuss it further.

[Clive Lewis (Norwich South) (Lab)]

I put on record my gratitude to the Home Secretary and her team for releasing the Home Office commissioned report, “The Historical Roots of the Windrush Scandal”, which concluded that 30 years of racist immigration legislation caused the Windrush scandal. Those now on the Opposition Benches spent three years trying to suppress that report. Will the Home Secretary meet me, other MPs and civil society representatives to discuss its recommendations?