State Threat Prevention and Investigation Measures: 20 December 2024 to 19 March 2025

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Thursday 3rd July 2025 Written Statements

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

Section 55(1) of the National Security Act 2023 (the 2023 Act) requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of every relevant three-month period on the exercise of their STPIM powers under the Act during that period.

STPIMs were introduced through the 2023 Act and came into force on 20 December 2023. There have been no STPIM cases imposed to date.

[HCWS772]

Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd July 2025 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

I beg to move,

That the draft Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2025, which was laid before this House on 30 June, be approved.

I am grateful to the House for its consideration of this draft order, which will see three distinct groups proscribed: Maniacs Murder Cult, Palestine Action and the Russian Imperial Movement.

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Ind)]

On that point, will the Minister give way?

[Carla Denyer (Bristol Central) (Green)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Dan Jarvis]

I will make a bit of progress, which I do not think is unreasonable.

The proscription of those three organisations will reaffirm the UK’s zero-tolerance approach to terrorism, regardless of its form or underlying ideology.

It may be helpful to set out some background to the proscription power. To proscribe an organisation, the Home Secretary must reasonably believe that it is concerned in terrorism. That means that the organisation commits or participates in terrorism, it prepares for terrorism, it promotes or encourages terrorism, or it is otherwise concerned in terrorism. Some 80 terrorist organisations are currently proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000.

Proscription is, rightly, ideologically neutral: it judges an organisation on its actions and the actions it is willing to deploy in pursuit of its cause. The UK’s definition of terrorism was established in law a quarter of a century ago, and it has stood the test of time and extensive scrutiny since.

[Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)]

On that point, will the Minister give way?

[Dan Jarvis]

I will make a little more progress before giving way.

The definition has three limbs. First, the use or threat of action must reach a certain level of seriousness, such as serious violence or serious damage to property. Secondly, the use or threat must be designed to influence a Government or intimidate the public or a section of the public. Thirdly, the use or threat must be made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause. Successive independent reviewers of terrorism legislation have upheld the UK’s terrorism definition as effective and fit for purpose, even as the threat from terrorism has evolved.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Dan Jarvis]

I will give way in just a moment.

Proscription is one of the most powerful counter-terrorism tools available to Government. Any decision to proscribe is taken with great care and follows rigorous consideration, as noted by Jonathan Hall KC in his report on the operation of the terrorism Acts of 2022.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

I will give way to the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn).

[Jeremy Corbyn]

I am grateful to the Minister. The question that many of us want to put to him is this: why has he linked these three organisations together? He clearly has made a judgment on each of the three organisations independently of each other. I and many others outside, I am sure, think it would be fair if we took individual votes on the three. Many of us are very concerned about the issue facing Palestine Action, and that is the issue we wish to address in the debate.

[Dan Jarvis]

I can say to the right hon. Gentleman that I will move on to that and will explain with real clarity precisely why we have proceeded in the way that we have. I suspect that he has a long memory. I am sure that he will recall that he has voted against proscribing a number of organisations previously, including al-Qaeda in 2001, when the motion was bundled along with 20 other militant organisations, so there is clear precedent for doing this. The reason we seek to do it is to demonstrate that we do not attach any kind of ideological prism with which to seek to make a judgment. The Home Secretary will take a view based on a legal threshold, and that is the basis on which we have proceeded.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I thank the Minister for bringing forward this motion. If it comes to a vote, as some have indicated they wish it to do, my party will support the Government. I come from Northern Ireland, and we understand what it means to have security. It is important to have Government, Ministers, the police, the Army, MI5 and MI6, and they all have a responsibility. In relation to the membership of those organisations, is there a list of those who may be members of Palestine Action, for instance? I do not know where they are—there might be some in this House; if there is, perhaps we would understand. Will they be subject to the ruling and proscription as well?

[Dan Jarvis]

I know that the hon. Gentleman speaks with great authority on these matters, borne out of his extensive experience of dealing with these matters in Northern Ireland. If he is a little patient and if the House allows me to make a bit of progress, I will explain and respond to the point he has raised and the points that other hon. Members seek to raise.

If the House will allow, let me turn to the specific measures before us today, taking each of the proposed additions to the list of proscribed organisations in order. First, there is the Maniacs Murder Cult, also known as MMC, which is an insidious white-supremacist and neo-Nazi organisation operating online and across borders. It aims to encourage individuals to engage in acts of violence against people it perceives to be antisocial, including homeless people, drug addicts and migrants, all to further its own ideology and degrade human society through violence.

The Government assess that MMC commits, prepares for, promotes and encourages acts of terrorism. MMC members and leaders have claimed a number of violent attacks globally that were committed in pursuit of the group’s aims. MMC supplies instructional material that could increase the capability or motivation of an aspiring attacker, including a guide that provides information on how to fatally attack someone with a knife and use a vehicle as a weapon. MMC’s members and non-members share its material and other online content, including videos of violent attacks, to encourage further violence in support of its ideology.

On 22 May, a 21-year-old Georgian national known as Commander Butcher, considered to be one of MMC’s leaders, was extradited to the United States, and he is set to stand trial in New York for soliciting hate crimes and acts of mass violence. As set out in the indictment, he is alleged to have recruited individuals online to promote MMC’s ideologies by committing acts of murder, arson, bombing and mass poisoning in New York—acts targeted at members of ethnic minority groups, homeless people and Jewish schoolchildren. As this case illustrates, MMC has a truly transnational audience, which includes people in the UK. It does not matter where the leaders of this network are based if they are capable of inspiring acts of violence and terror in any country. Vulnerable individuals, such as minors, are particularly exposed to the horrific material MMC publishes and distributes online.

This Government will not stand by and allow the terrorist threat and wider societal harms caused by MMC to persist. Proscribing MMC is key to deterring and diverting individuals from engaging with its violent content, and it sends a clear signal to social media companies to remove MMC’s material from their platforms. The threat posed by MMC must be taken extremely seriously, whether it is inspiring acts of violence against our people or influencing young people to commit those acts. We will not hesitate to take action against such groups to keep our country safe.

[Andrew George (St Ives) (LD)]

I agree with the Minister that MMC clearly meets the threshold for proscription, but when did its actions first come to the attention of the Government? Why have they left it so long to bring forward this order? Why did they leave it until it was politically convenient?

[Dan Jarvis]

I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman has chosen to make that final point. There is no political convenience in what we are seeking to do today. We are seeking to ensure the security of our country, and if he has a little patience, I will further make that case to him and to the House.

Let me turn to Palestine Action. The public attention it has garnered should not be confused with legitimacy, nor should a group formed five years ago be conflated with the legitimate campaign for Palestinian rights and statehood, which has existed in our country and in this House for more than five decades. Let me be clear: the proscription of Palestine Action is not aimed at banning protest that supports Palestine. There are many ways in which people can continue to lawfully express their support for Palestine without being a member or supporter of Palestine Action.

[Zarah Sultana (Coventry South) (Ind)]

The Minister will be aware that the High Court has granted Palestine Action permission for a legal challenge. Rather than the Home Secretary, who is not here, rushing this order through Parliament, should it not be delayed until the judicial process has concluded?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

We are certainly not seeking to rush this through Parliament; these are matters that the Home Secretary and I have considered for some time. There is a clear route to legal challenge, and if an organisation is proscribed, it has the opportunity to pursue that route. That is entirely within the rights of any organisation that is proscribed, and is a matter for them.

Let me make the important point that freedom of expression and assembly are cornerstones of our democracy. They are fundamental rights, and this Government will always respect and protect them. We will always defend the right of the British people to engage in legitimate and peaceful protest, and to stand up for the causes in which they believe.

[Dame Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West) (Lab)]

I often show visitors the statue of Viscount Falkland and its missing spur, removed when a suffragette chained herself to it. I was here when protesters superglued their buttocks to the glass panel above us, causing some scandal and damage. Will the Minister confirm that criminal damage, no matter how creatively or indeed scandalously undertaken, will always be dealt with under criminal law, and not as a terrorist act?

[Dan Jarvis]

I know that my hon. Friend has given this matter serious consideration, and she makes an interesting point. In my remarks, I will seek to evidence to her and others why we have chosen to take this course of action on this group. I hope that when I have made my speech, she will understand why we are proceeding in this way. I was just making a point about the importance of the right to protest. Essential as such rights are, they do not give this group carte blanche to seriously damage property or subject members of the public to fear and violence.

[Ms Diane Abbott (Hackney North and Stoke Newington) (Lab)]

The Minister will be aware that many of us in this Chamber think that Palestine Action is in a different category from the other two organisations that he is seeking to proscribe. Is he aware that several UN special rapporteurs, including those protecting human rights, say that they have told the UK Government that

“acts of protest that damage property, but are not intended to kill or injure people, should not be treated as terrorism”?

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to the Mother of the House, because she makes an important point. Before I respond to it, let me say politely and gently to her and others that my strong sense is that if the actions of the group that we are considering had been conducted by an organisation with different ideological motives, she and some of her colleagues would strongly recommend that the Government proscribed them. [Interruption.] That is, I am afraid, the conclusion I have arrived at.

My right hon. Friend mentioned the United Nations. The Government received a letter from the UN special procedures mandate holders at the end of 2024, and the UK Government provided a full response, which has been published. I gently say to her that national security and keeping the public safe are very much matters for this country, not other organisations.

[Mr Adnan Hussain (Blackburn) (Ind)]

This heavy-handed approach threatens basic freedoms and sets a dangerous precedent for all political dissent in the UK. Does the Minister acknowledge that?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

I do not acknowledge that, and I do not accept the hon. Gentleman’s characterisation of the decision we have taken. If he will listen to what I have to say, I hope he will understand why we are progressing in this way.

The attack at Brize Norton on 20 June has understandably provoked shock and anger in this House and across the country, but it was just the latest episode in Palestine Action’s long history of harmful activity. It has orchestrated a nationwide campaign of attacks that have resulted in serious damage to property and crossed the threshold between direct criminal action and terrorism. I hope that goes some way to responding to the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah) made. Palestine Action members have used violence against people responding at the scene of attacks. For their role in co-ordinated attacks, members of the organisation have been charged with serious offences, including violent disorder, grievous bodily harm with intent and aggravated burglary, which is an offence involving a weapon.

[Clive Lewis (Norwich South) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for giving way, and for some of the things that he has said. Everything he has spoken about could be dealt with under criminal law. My hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah) mentioned the suffragettes. I think we need to give the context of a little bit of history. The suffragettes carried out a campaign of window-smashing, poster and paint defacement, cutting telegraph and railway lines and targeted bombing and arson, but specifically avoided harming people. There is a long history in this country of direct action that pushes the boundaries of our democracy. It is very difficult for all of us, but this is still direct action, not terrorist action.

[Dan Jarvis]

I acknowledge my hon. Friend’s point about history, and it is entirely reasonable context for him and others to raise, but ultimately this Government must respond to events taking place in the here and now. The Government have to make sometimes difficult decisions about what measures are required to keep the public safe. He is absolutely within his rights to make comparisons with other groups, but as I will explain, fundamentally the Home Secretary has to take a view on whether a legal threshold has been crossed, and if it has, she has to make a judgment on whether she wishes to proceed.

[Mr Carmichael]

Will the Minister give way?

[Dan Jarvis]

I must make a bit of progress, because I still have some way to go.

Despite some of its rhetoric, the group’s own materials state that it is not non-violent, and that is echoed in the actions of its members, who have committed atrocious attacks. Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Home Secretary has concluded that Palestine Action is concerned in terrorism and should be proscribed. The House will understand that I am unable to comment on specific intelligence or to go into details about incidents that are sub judice. However, I can provide a summary of the group’s activities, and it is right that I make the position clear to the House.

Since its inception in 2020, Palestine Action has orchestrated and enacted a campaign of direct criminal action against businesses and institutions, including key national infrastructure and defence firms that provide services and supplies that support Ukraine, NATO, our Five Eyes allies and the UK defence industry. Over time, and most notably since the start of 2024, Palestine Action’s activity has increased in frequency and severity. Its targets have broadened to include financial firms, charities, universities and Government buildings. Its methods have become more aggressive, with its members demonstrating a willingness to use violence.

[Mr Carmichael]

Will the Minister give way?

[Dan Jarvis]

I will, but I must then make some progress.

[Mr Carmichael]

The Minister has spoken about some of the history of this, but there is more recent history. The last Government introduced the Public Order Act 2023 to deal with Extinction Rebellion. The Home Secretary, who was then on the Opposition Front Bench, listed all the various crimes that could be dealt with. She said then:

“the Government are extending powers that we would normally make available just for serious violence and terrorism to peaceful protest. Police officers themselves have said that this is, ‘a severe restriction on a person’s rights to protest and in reality, is unworkable’.”—[Official Report, 23 May 2022; Vol. 715, c. 63.]

She was right then, and is wrong today, is she not?

[Dan Jarvis]

I will make a bit of progress, because I hope to answer some of the points that the right hon. Gentleman—[Interruption.] I am about to explain to him that specific recent incidents have informed the decision. I understand why he may not want to listen to that, but I invite him to do so, because the context is very important.

[Zarah Sultana]

Will the Minister give way?

[Dan Jarvis]

No, I will make some progress now.

Palestine Action’s own materials state

“we are not non-violent and we have specific targets”.

The group has a footprint in all 45 policing regions in the UK, and has pledged to escalate its campaign. This disgraceful pattern of activity cannot be allowed to continue. In applying the legislative framework, the Government assess that Palestine Action commits acts of terrorism. In several attacks—

[Ayoub Khan (Birmingham Perry Barr) (Ind)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Dan Jarvis]

I will not give way, because I need to get these important points on the record.

Palestine Action has committed acts of serious damage to property, with the aim of progressing its political cause and intimidating and influencing the public and the Government. These include attacks against Thales in Glasgow in 2022 and against Instro Precision in Kent and Elbit Systems UK in Bristol last year. In such attacks, Palestine Action members have forced entry on to premises while armed with a variety of weapons, and damaged or demolished property, causing millions of pounds’ worth of criminal damage. As the House has heard, Palestine Action members have used violence against people responding at the scene.

During Palestine Action’s attack against the Thales defence factory in Glasgow in 2022, the group caused over £1 million-worth of damage, including to parts that are essential for our submarines. Palestine Action caused panic among staff, who feared for their safety as pyrotechnics and smoke bombs were thrown into the area to which they were evacuating. When passing custodial sentences for the perpetrators, the sheriff said:

“Throwing pyrotechnics at areas where people are being evacuated to cannot be described as non-violent.”

The Government also assess that Palestine Action prepares for terrorism. The organisation has provided practical advice to assist its members in carrying out significant levels of property damage at targets right across the UK. For example, Palestine Action has released an underground manual that encourages its members to create small groups or cells and provides guidance about how to conduct activity against private companies and Government buildings. It explains how to operate covertly to evade arrest and provides a link to a website, also created by Palestine Action, which contains a map of target locations across the UK.

The Government assess that Palestine Action promotes and encourages terrorism, including through the glorification on social media of its attacks involving property damage. Palestine Action’s attacks are not victimless crimes; employees have experienced physical violence, intimidation and harassment, and they have been prevented from entering their place of work. We would not tolerate this activity from organisations motivated by Islamist or extreme right-wing ideology, and we cannot tolerate it from Palestine Action.

By implementing this measure, we will remove Palestine Action’s veil of legitimacy, tackle its financial support, and degrade its efforts to recruit and radicalise people into committing terrorist activity in its name. We must be under no illusion: Palestine Action is not a legitimate protest group. People engaged in lawful protest do not need weapons. People engaged in lawful protest do not throw smoke bombs and fire pyrotechnics around innocent members of the public. And people engaged in lawful protest do not cause millions of pounds’ worth of damage to national security infrastructure, including submarines and defence equipment for NATO. Proscribing Palestine Action will not impinge the right to protest. People have always been able to protest lawfully or express support for Palestine, and they can continue to do so.

I am conscious of the time, so I will briefly turn to the Russian Imperial Movement. RIM is a white supremacist ethno-nationalist organisation that seeks to create a new Russian imperial state. The methods that RIM uses to try to achieve those aims threaten UK, Euro-Atlantic and wider international security and prosperity. RIM conducts combat activity via its paramilitary unit, the Russian Imperial Legion, and has actively fought alongside Russian forces and other pro-Russian right-wing extremist groups in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict. In doing so, the Government assess that it has committed or participated in acts of terrorism.

RIM also prepares for terrorism. It manages a paramilitary training programme known as Partisan, which increases the capabilities of attendees to conduct terrorist attacks. By proscribing RIM, the UK will reinforce our steadfast support for Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression and our commitment to counter future threats from extreme right-wing terrorism in the UK and Europe.

Almost two years ago, it was my task on behalf of what was then His Majesty’s Opposition to strongly support the action taken to proscribe the Wagner Group, an organisation that rightly stood condemned for its acts of indiscriminate violence and terror in Ukraine and elsewhere. I hope the whole House will be as united today as it was on that occasion in endorsing the action taken against the Russian Imperial Movement.

To conclude, the first duty of Government is to keep our country safe. When our collective security and our values are threatened, we will not hesitate to act. Today’s proscriptions will send a clear and unambiguous message that this Parliament stands against terrorism however and wherever it manifests itself. Only in applying the UK’s counter-terrorism framework without bias can we maintain confidence in it. I therefore urge Members to support these proscriptions, and I commend the order to the House.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to all those who have contributed to this debate. The proscription of these three organisations affirms the UK’s zero-tolerance approach to terrorism. To be clear, these proscriptions will not affect anyone’s legitimate and lawful right to protest, whether it is about Palestine, Gaza or anything else.

[John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Ind)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Dan Jarvis]

The Government have to take action when Palestine Action has orchestrated a nationwide campaign of property damage, featuring attacks that have resulted in serious damage to property and crossed the legal threshold—

[John McDonnell]

Will the Minister give way?

[Dan Jarvis]

I will not give way.

[John McDonnell]

Will the Minister give way?

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

Order. I think it is clear that at this point the Minister does not wish to give way. He has until 5.27 pm, so let us see how this progresses.

[Dan Jarvis]

These attacks have resulted in serious damage to property and crossed the legal threshold from direct criminal action into terrorism. Members have used violence against people responding at the scenes of attacks, and have been charged with a series of serious offences, including violent disorder, grievous bodily harm with intent and aggravated burglary, which is an offence involving a weapon. This order would degrade their harmful activity. It will also reduce the threat—particularly to vulnerable individuals—from MMC’s violent content, and it will reinforce our support for Ukraine and our commitment to countering extreme right-wing terrorism in Europe.

[John McDonnell]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker.

--- Later in debate ---

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

That was not a point of order. The Minister may wish to respond—he has a few minutes in which to do so—but that was not a point of order.

[Dan Jarvis]

I am happy to respond directly to the right hon. Gentleman’s point of order. The process of proscription requires this House to agree such action. Should the House do so later this evening, it would then go to the other place, and it would be for the other place to agree the action or not. It would then be for the Home Secretary or myself to sign an order, and that order would then become law at midnight on the night it had been signed.

[John McDonnell]

Will the Minister give way on that point?

[Dan Jarvis]

I am not going to give way to the right hon. Gentleman.

[John McDonnell]

What if I oppose it tomorrow? What if I suggest it is wrong?

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Order. Minister, continue.

[Dan Jarvis]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I do not think the right hon. Gentleman listened to what I said—I just explained to him the process that is in place.

I am grateful to all of those who have considered this matter. This order is a necessary and proportionate step to protect the public and defend our values. That is, after all, the first duty of the state, and under this Government, nothing will matter more. With that, I commend this order to the House.

[Carla Denyer]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker.

Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 30th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

Of all the duties of Government, none matters more than keeping our country safe. It is an awesome task, and one to which we attach the utmost significance, as this House and the public would expect. For people to flourish, they must have confidence that they are safe as they go about their lives. For a society to excel, its values must be protected from harm and its laws upheld. For a nation to thrive, its leaders must be unrelenting in the pursuit of these critical aims. That is why the Prime Minister has made national security a foundation of the plan for change, and it is why we work around the clock with our partners in policing and the security services to keep the United Kingdom and its people safe.

In the face of a complex and evolving threat picture, it is essential that we keep the powers, tools and measures available to us under constant review. Where steps are needed to maintain the safety and security of our country, this Government will not hesitate to act. It is with that intention that we have brought forward this Bill, which, although narrow in its scope and intent, is vital to our ongoing efforts to protect the United Kingdom.

Before I come to the detail of the Bill, I will provide a little bit of background. The British Nationality Act 1981 provides for the removal of an individual’s British citizenship. This is also known as a deprivation of citizenship. Deprivation is an important and effective tool to maintain public safety and preserve national security. It is used in two different situations: where citizenship has been obtained by fraud, or where deprivation is conducive to the public good, which means that it is in the public interest to deprive a person of British citizenship because of their conduct and/or the threat that they pose to the United Kingdom.

[Gareth Snell (Stoke-on-Trent Central) (Lab/Co-op)]

I accept the Minister’s point that this is a very narrow Bill, but is he able to tell the House how many individuals who currently have an appeal that has not yet been heard, and to whom this Bill will ultimately apply, have been deprived of their citizenship?

[Dan Jarvis]

I am happy to do that. If my hon. Friend bears with me for just a couple of moments, I will provide him with the information that he has requested.

In the latter category especially—where deprivation is conducive to the public good—deprivation is used against some of the most dangerous individuals, including terrorists, extremists, and serious and organised criminals. Someone in the UK who has been deprived of their British citizenship no longer has any immigration status, steps may be taken to remove them from the UK, and they may be held in an immigration detention in the interim. If they are overseas, they cannot re-enter the UK using a British passport. In both circumstances, this is clearly an effective way to disrupt the threat posed by dangerous individuals.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

First, I commend the Minister and the Government for bringing forward this Bill. There is no doubt but that it is absolutely necessary. National security is paramount when considering revoking citizenship, as the Minister has outlined, and the Bill is necessary to close a particular loophole and ensure that no person can bypass it.

In Northern Ireland, many people claim both Irish and UK citizenship, as they are able to. I understand that the Bill will make sure their UK citizenship can be revoked, but they will still have the right as an Irish passport holder to travel to Northern Ireland. That is a very peculiar case. I am quite happy if the Minister wants to come back to me on this, but I just want to make sure that no one can get around these measures by using an alternative passport—an Irish passport or whatever it may be—and that Northern Ireland will be under the same laws as the rest of the UK.

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for his intervention, as I always am, and he is absolutely right that it is necessary to close this particular loophole, and that is the purpose of the Bill. He has raised a very interesting example, and I am grateful to him for saying he is happy for me to come back to him. If he lets me reflect on it further, I will respond to him when I make my concluding remarks at the end of the debate.

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

The Minister keeps referring to a “loophole”. In fact, it has been an important principle of British justice that successful appeal equals vindication. This Bill is trying to remove that presumption. That is not a loophole; it is a basic judicial right on which we all rely.

[Dan Jarvis]

Again, if the right hon. Gentleman bears with me, I will come to his specific point in a moment, and if he is not satisfied that I have responded adequately then, I am happy to give way again. I will make some progress.

Deprivation decisions are made following careful consideration of advice from officials and lawyers, and in accordance with international law. Each case is assessed individually. Decisions to deprive, where it is conducive to the public good, are personally taken by the Home Secretary. The power is used sparingly. It complies with the UN convention on the reduction of statelessness, and always comes with a right of appeal.

Turning to the question from my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Gareth Snell), let me give the House a sense of the frequency with which deprivation powers are used. From 2018 to 2023, on average 12 people a year were deprived of their citizenship where it was conducive to the public good. The available period for fraud-related deprivations is slightly different, but from 2018 to 2022 there were an average of 151 cases per year in that category.

Let me turn to the Bill, dealing first with why it is required; I hope this will go some way to responding to the point made by the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse). In a recent case, the Supreme Court decided that, if an appeal against a deprivation decision is successful, the initial deprivation order will have had no effect and the person will be considered as having continued to be a British citizen. This means that people who have been deprived of British citizenship will automatically regain that status before further avenues of appeal have been exhausted by the Home Secretary.

[Deirdre Costigan (Ealing Southall) (Lab)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Dan Jarvis]

I am going to make a little bit of progress, if I may. I will give way in a moment, but I want to address the point that has been raised.

There are very good reasons why the Government may wish to stop citizenship being regained until all appeals are determined, withdrawn or abandoned. These include to prevent someone who is outside the UK and who poses a risk to our national security from returning when a further appeal may be upheld pending the Home Secretary’s decision, or to prevent a person from renouncing their other nationality and putting themselves in a position where, if further appeals are successful, a further deprivation order would not be possible as it would unlawfully render them stateless.

[Gareth Snell]

I thank the Minister for that explanation, but hypothetically there exists a circumstance in which the Home Secretary could deprive an individual of their citizenship, that individual could go for an appeal and have it reinstated, and this law would prevent them from retaining that citizenship and the Department could simply choose not to appeal further. How does the Department ensure that the individual is then allowed to access future appeals to try to regularise their citizenship status?

[Dan Jarvis]

For reasons that I do not understand, my hon. Friend is progressing a hypothetical scenario; I do not know whether it is based on a particular case that he has in mind. I have not personally dealt with such a set of circumstances, but I am happy to look at the matter he has raised.

[Deirdre Costigan]

Southall Community Alliance in my constituency has long been a defender of human rights. Would the Minister confirm to the alliance that this Bill means we will continue to use the power to deprive people of their citizenship very sparingly, and that there will be no changes to the existing right of appeal or any widening of the reasoning under which we would deprive somebody of their citizenship in this country?

[Dan Jarvis]

I can absolutely give my hon. Friend and the organisation in her constituency that assurance. This Bill is very narrowly drawn; it has two clauses.

[Bell Ribeiro-Addy (Clapham and Brixton Hill) (Lab)]

I am confused. If the individuals in question have done something so bad that they have to be deprived of their citizenship, why would we not simply jail them? Why would we need to deprive them of their citizenship?

[Dan Jarvis]

I hope my hon. Friend heard the point I made a moment ago about how the Government have brought forward this legislation in response to a recent Supreme Court decision. Essentially, an appeal against deprivation has resulted in a requirement for us to bring forward this clarification of the law. In response to her and my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing Southall (Deirdre Costigan), this does not represent any widening of the existing arrangements. The right of appeal is completely unaffected by this legislation, which is incredibly narrowly drawn.

[Pete Wishart (Perth and Kinross-shire) (SNP)]

I am sure the Minister understands that due process is important and appreciates that the appeals process must be respected fully. He is intending making people temporarily stateless, so can he guarantee that the appeals process will be speeded up and people will have an opportunity to have their case heard in a timeous manner, so they can have their case resolved, not hanging over them for a long time?

[Dan Jarvis]

The hon. Member is absolutely right about the point of due process. I can say to him and to my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing Southall that these powers are used very sparingly. Each and every individual case is decided on by the Home Secretary. I know that this Home Secretary has—and I am sure previous Home Secretaries have—taken these responsibilities incredibly seriously. Decisions are made carefully, on advice and in accordance with international law, and I am happy to give the hon. Member and others that assurance.

[Kit Malthouse]

Will the Minister give way?

[Dan Jarvis]

Let me make a bit of progress, and then I will happily give way again.

The key point is that deprivation of citizenship on conducive grounds is rightly reserved for those who pose a threat to the UK, or whose conduct involves very high harm. We are talking about some of the most serious cases handled by any Government. Where a loophole is identified in the processes underpinning it, it is the job of any serious and sensible Government to close it, and that is precisely what this Government will do.

Let me turn to the substance of the Bill. The House will note its brevity and narrow scope; it contains just one substantive clause, focused solely on addressing the specific issues that have already been discussed. Its primary objective is to protect the United Kingdom from dangerous people, which includes those who pose a threat to our national security. The Bill will achieve that by preventing those who have been deprived of British citizenship from regaining that status automatically when their appeal is successful, until further appeals have been determined. That will replicate the approach taken on asylum and human rights appeals; in those cases, the effect of an appeal is suspended up to the Court of Appeal and extended to appeals to the Supreme Court.

To be clear, the Bill does not change any existing right of appeal or widen the reasons why a person could be deprived of their citizenship. Should an appeal mounted on behalf of the Government prove unsuccessful, then where there is no possibility of further appeal, British citizenship would be reinstated with immediate and retrospective effect.

[Kit Malthouse]

The Minister keeps referring to a loophole in justice. I do not understand why he cannot see that “innocent until proven guilty” should apply in these cases, as in any other. The idea that my winning an appeal would not automatically mean I was innocent, as it does in every other case, seems a breach of a fundamental tenet. He is also not correct to say that the power is used sparingly. Since 2010, dozens of people have been denied citizenship on the say-so of the Home Secretary, despite there being nothing proven in court. That is what is different about these cases. This is effectively something that is done in secret, behind closed doors, without the facts necessarily being proven in any way. I have a lot of respect for the hon. Gentleman, but this is a case in which we should be even more reliant on due process, rather than trying to legislate judges out of the room, as we are trying to today.

[Dan Jarvis]

I know that the right hon. Gentleman will understand and appreciate, from his time as a Home Office Minister, the huge responsibility that the Government invest in the Home Secretary. The Home Secretary of the day has to make some incredibly difficult, finely balanced judgments. I hope that he would agree that we have to ensure that the Home Secretary, whoever they are, and whatever political party they are from, has the necessary power to make decisions that safeguard the security of our nation. I am certain that he and I agree on that. The Bill essentially ensures that the Government can continue to do that, precisely as the Government whom he served could.

[Bell Ribeiro-Addy]

I thank the Minister for giving way again. I am again completely confused. His specific example at the beginning aside, I still do not understand why, if the individuals concerned pose such a huge threat, other pieces of legislation will not deal with them and keep the public safe. He also pointed to the fact that somebody could win their appeal and he could still wish to deprive them of citizenship. I want to understand the circumstances in which, after someone’s appeal was upheld by a judge, the Minister would still wish to deprive them of their citizenship.

[Dan Jarvis]

Forgive me, but I do not think I said that; I think I said the opposite. I am very happy to discuss the matter further with my hon. Friend. I hope she understands, and I hope I have made it clear, that the Bill is incredibly narrow in its scope. It seeks to take us back to the legal position we were in a matter of months ago, prior to the judgment of the Supreme Court. It does not in any way undermine the right of appeal. If she has further concerns, I am very happy to speak to her, but I can give her an assurance. She is very welcome to look at the Bill. It will not take her very long to read it. It is two clauses, with a single substantive clause, specifically designed to take us back to the legal position we were in just a few months ago. I hope she will be reassured by that.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I have come to this debate without any prior knowledge of what is proposed, so I am making this point as a result of what I have heard so far. Am I right in thinking that what the Minister particularly has in mind is people with dual citizenship who might, for example, have gone abroad to fight for a terrorist organisation, such as ISIS. There would, in such a case, be nothing forbidding us from removing their British citizenship. If they came back, even if they could be convicted of anything at all, they would be imprisoned for only a relatively short time, if at all, and then the security services would probably have to spend many years monitoring them. Is that the sort of scenario the Minister has in mind?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

I am always grateful to the right hon. Gentleman. It is. Perhaps he did not hear me make that point earlier, but I specifically said that one of the reasons for the Bill was to prevent someone who is outside the UK, and who poses a risk to our national security, from returning when a further appeal may be upheld by the Home Secretary’s decision. He is right: that is a potential scenario that we have to guard against, and the Bill will enable us to do that, just as Governments could prior to the ruling of the Supreme Court. I hope he finds that reassuring.

As I set out, deprivation is one of the most powerful tools we have in our ongoing efforts to protect the United Kingdom and its citizens from harm. For it to remain an effective part of our armoury, we need to legislate. Before I finish, I pay tribute to our world-class law enforcement and intelligence agencies. In turbulent and uncertain times, their tireless work to maintain stability and security at home has never been more crucial. They must be supported at every turn, because the safety of our country stands apart from everything else we do. It is the cornerstone of our society, and ensuring that safety is the primary purpose of everyone involved in public service, including in this House. It is a responsibility borne not just by those of us on the Government Benches, but by parliamentarians of all parties. In that spirit, I urge Members to support the Bill, which is required to preserve our national security. I commend it wholeheartedly to the House.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

I call the shadow Minister.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

As I hope the Minister knows, I have devoted much of my adult life to keeping individuals, neighbourhoods, towns, cities and indeed the entire country safe, but I have to confess that I have never been entirely comfortable with the deprivation of citizenship regime. Unfortunately, his Bill, which he is trying to pass off as an innocuous correction, has sparked that sense of unease.

The reason I am uneasy is that, although the objectives that the Minister proposes are laudable, I believe that the cost to our sense of self and the corrosiveness to our sense of citizenship and to the judicial process are perhaps too high. I will not detain the House for too long, but I want to raise three points. We have covered them to a certain extent, but they are worth reiterating.

First, the Minister’s sense is that the Supreme Court has created a loophole; my view is that it has corrected an anomaly. It has long been a tenet of the protections with which the judicial process provides me as an individual that an appeal equals vindication and that it is for my accuser to appeal, on the basis that I remain innocent, even prior to the first action that is taken against me. This regime will reverse that.

The second alarming point is that the legislation is retrospective. As the hon. Member for Makerfield (Josh Simons) asked, there may be a number of cases going through the courts for which this law will have a highly prejudicial impact. The Government are effectively moving the goalposts mid-litigation to get what they want. That, again, is not something we would normally tolerate, and it is a further development of the power.

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. I always enjoy our debates. He says that the Government are moving the goalposts, but does he accept that we are ensuring that we have the same powers to deprive that he had when he was a Home Office Minister?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

It is a pleasure to follow the shadow Minister. I thank all right hon. and hon. Members who have spoken.

As I mentioned right at the beginning, the Bill is extremely narrow in its scope and intent, focusing solely on closing a loophole in the existing deprivation of citizenship process. As I outlined, the Supreme Court decided in a recent case that if an appeal against a deprivation decision is successful, or a deprivation of citizenship order is withdrawn, that initial order will have had no effect and the person will be considered as having continued to be British. That means that people who have been deprived of British citizenship will automatically regain that status before further avenues of appeal have been exhausted.

The Bill will therefore protect the UK from people who pose a threat to our national security by preventing those who have been deprived of British citizenship and are overseas from returning until all appeals have been determined. It will also prevent a person who has been deprived of citizenship on the grounds that it is conducive to the public good from seeking to undermine deprivation action while an appeal in their case remains ongoing by renouncing their other nationality and putting themselves in a position whereby a deprivation order would render them stateless. The Bill does not change any existing right of appeal or widen the reasons for which a person could be deprived of their citizenship. It is crucial that our world-class law enforcement and intelligence agencies have the necessary powers to protect the public and secure our borders.

Let me reflect briefly on the contributions made during the debate. I am very grateful to the Opposition Front Benchers for their support and their speeches. It is always my intention that national security should never be a party political issue. That was the basis on which I approached it in opposition, and that is the basis on which I approach it in government. I am very grateful for the constructive and reasonable way in which they have presented their points today.

I am also grateful to the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart), for her contribution. She took the opportunity, as is absolutely her right, to call for wider reform, and she raised specific concerns about the process and about transparency. The Government believe that the measures in the Bill are necessary and proportionate, but I listened carefully to the points that she made about transparency. The Government believe that there is sufficient oversight and transparency of the use of the deprivation power. The Home Office publishes data in relation to the number of deprivation of citizenship orders, and the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration has the remit to review the power. The ICIBI has conducted independent reviews of the deprivation power, with reports published relatively recently, in 2018 and in 2024.

I also want to take the opportunity to further reassure the hon. Lady that deprivation decisions are made following careful consideration of advice, both from officials and from lawyers and, under this Government—I am sure it was the case under previous Governments as well—strictly in accordance with international law. Each case is assessed individually by the Home Secretary, and decisions to deprive, where it is conducive to the public good, are taken by the Home Secretary, and the Home Secretary alone. The power is used sparingly, it complies with the UN convention on the reduction of statelessness and it always comes with the right to appeal.

My hon. Friend the Member for Makerfield (Josh Simons) made a thoughtful speech, including about what citizenship means, and I know that the House will be grateful for the contribution that he made this evening.

My hon. Friend the Member for Clapham and Brixton Hill (Bell Ribeiro-Addy) raised a number of specific concerns, and I want to do my best to respond to them. The deprivation of citizenship on conducive grounds is rightly reserved for those who pose a threat to the UK or whose conduct involves a very high harm. Deprivation on fraud grounds is for those who obtained their citizenship fraudulently, so were never entitled to it in the first place. Decisions are made following careful consideration of advice from officials and—in respect of conducive deprivations—lawyers, and in accordance with international law, including the UN convention on the reduction of statelessness. The Government take these matters very seriously, and I hope that my hon. Friend will understand that we have to ensure that we have the powers necessary to keep the public safe.

[Bell Ribeiro-Addy]

I hope the Minister understands the assurances I have been asking for. This will be the third time I have asked. I genuinely want to understand why someone who is such a danger to our public cannot be dealt with under other pieces of legislation. At the moment it seems that we cannot even stop them coming into the country because of the existing legislation. He also keeps saying that the Bill does not widen the situation under which people can be deprived of their citizenship, but it does; it does so on the basis that someone can win an appeal and then be told that they are not going to be given their citizenship back because the Government have further rights of appeal. The Bill does widen that situation. We genuinely need those assurances and an understanding as to why such dangerous people cannot be dealt with under other pieces of legislation.

[Dan Jarvis]

I do not agree with my hon. Friend’s second point. This Bill has been very carefully and narrowly drafted, and I do not think it does the things that she has said it does. As to why the Government would seek to use these powers, I hope she understands that we will do everything we possibly can—as I am sure the previous Government did—to keep the public safe and protect them from high-harm individuals such as extremists, terrorists, and serious and organised criminals, and that this Government, as was the case with the previous Government, consider that this is an appropriate, necessary and proportionate way in which to do that. I hope that the public and the House will understand why we are progressing in the way that we are.

The hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer) made a very thoughtful speech. He has clearly thought about this matter long and hard, and he has done the House a great service with his contribution.

I want to reflect briefly on the contribution made by the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse). I enjoy debating these matters with him, and I am genuinely grateful for his contribution. He suggested at one point that he might be an old romantic. I couldn’t possibly comment—but I could possibly say that he has advanced some interesting points. They are not points that the Government agree with, and I hope he does not mind me saying that they are not points that the majority of Members of this House agree with, but he has ensured that this debate has been richer than it would otherwise have been had he not made those contributions.

I hope that the right hon. Gentleman acknowledges that the Government are acting in good faith in order to ensure that we are best placed to keep the country safe. I know that he is not satisfied with the measures that we have brought forward and does not agree with them. That is absolutely his right. I respect his right to make the case in the way that he has, but I would ask him briefly to consider an alternative scenario in which the Government of the day, regardless of their political party, did not put in place the necessary powers to keep the public safe. One can only imagine the criticism that any Government would face, were they not to do that.

[Kit Malthouse]

I can imagine that situation, but I have been an enthusiastic supporter of lots of powers to protect the public from people from whom the Minister cannot remove citizenship. For example, terrorism prevention and investigation measures, or TPIMs—previously control orders—were specifically designed to put restrictions on individuals who presented a danger to the country but from whom the Government could not remove citizenship. If those measures are good enough for those people, why are they not good enough for the people on whom the Minister is conferring second-class citizenship? He must see that this legislation applies only to certain of our citizens, and that they are not the only ones who present a danger to this country.

[Dan Jarvis]

Again, I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his contribution. I do not doubt that if he and I and others sat in a room and sought to design a system, we probably would not end up with the one that we have, but I hope he understands that, given the constraints on parliamentary time and the bandwidth of Government, we are seeking to go back to the position that we had a number of months ago—I know that he did not agree with it then—to ensure that we have the powers that we need so that we are best placed to respond in the circumstances that I have described.

I want briefly to come back to the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon), because I gave him an assurance that I would do so. I can say to him that a dual British-Irish national could be deprived of British citizenship and excluded by the Home Secretary. An Irish national who had been excluded from the UK would then require leave to enter. I hope that responds to his point.

This Bill, although short in length, will have an important impact on the safety of those in our nation. It will ensure that those who pose a threat to the safety and security of our country do not have their citizenship restored until all appeals have been determined. The safety and security of those in our country is the foundation on which everything else is built and, as I have remarked in this House before, for this Government nothing will matter more. With that, I commend the Bill to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time.

Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill: Programme

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),

That the following provisions shall apply to the Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill:

Committal

(1) The Bill shall be committed to a Committee of the whole House.

Proceedings in Committee, on Consideration and on Third Reading

(2) Proceedings in Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion two hours after their commencement.

(3) Any proceedings on Consideration and proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion three hours after the commencement of proceedings in Committee of the whole House.

(4) Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings in Committee of the whole House, to any proceedings on Consideration or to proceedings on Third Reading.

Other proceedings

(5) Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(Martin McCluskey.)

Question agreed to.

Terrorism Legislation: Codes of Practice

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Monday 23rd June 2025 Written Statements

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

On 17 March 2025, the Government initiated a consultation on the codes of practice related to schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. This consultation proposed several changes aimed at clarifying the use of these powers and the rights and protections of individuals subject to them. Additionally, where appropriate, it suggested additional safeguards to ensure the appropriate use of these powers. The consultation concluded on 27 April 2025.

The consultation process included a public consultation, made available on www.gov.uk, that invited comments from police forces, interest groups and the general public on the proposed changes. It also involved virtual events with frontline police officers who are trained and accredited to use schedules 7 and 3, ensuring that the codes, which detail how these powers should be used, are well understood by those who operate them.

The Government have meticulously reviewed the responses received and have today published their response. A copy of the response to the consultation has been placed in the Libraries of both Houses and is available on www.gov.uk.

I am grateful to everyone who participated in this consultation, particularly the frontline officers who attended the Home Office’s events. With the publication of the response, we will proceed to amend the codes through secondary legislation at the next available opportunity.

[HCWS727]

Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Thursday 19th June 2025 Written Statements

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

The Government have today introduced the Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill to the House of Commons.

Removing someone’s British citizenship—also known as deprivation of citizenship—is a vital tool that is used to preserve the UK’s national security. It is used against those who obtained citizenship by fraud and against the most dangerous people, such as terrorists, extremists, and serious organised criminals.

The power to deprive a person of their British citizenship on “conducive to the public good” grounds is used sparingly, complies with the UN convention on the reduction of statelessness, and always comes with a right to appeal. The Home Secretary decides each case personally.

Bill proposals

This Bill is extremely narrow in its scope and intent, focusing solely on closing a loophole in the existing deprivation of citizenship process. The Bill does not change any existing right of appeal or widen the reasons for which a person could be deprived of their citizenship.

In the recent case of N3 and ZA v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Supreme Court decided that if an appeal against a deprivation decision is successful or if a deprivation of citizenship order is withdrawn, the initial order will have had no effect and the person will be considered as having continued to be a British citizen. This means that people who have been deprived of British citizenship will automatically regain that status before further avenues of appeal have been exhausted.

This Bill will amend section 40A of the British Nationality Act 1981 in order to protect the UK from people who pose a threat to national security by preventing those who have been deprived of British citizenship and are overseas from returning until all appeals are determined. It will also prevent a person who has been deprived of citizenship on the grounds that it is conducive to the public good from seeking to undermine deprivation action while an appeal in their case remains ongoing, such as by renouncing their other nationality and putting themselves in a position whereby a deprivation order would render them stateless.

[HCWS720]

Draft Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) (Threshold Amount) (Amendment) Order 2025

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Tuesday 17th June 2025 General Committees

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) (Threshold Amount) (Amendment) Order 2025.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Twigg. With your indulgence, before I address the draft order I want to take the opportunity briefly to congratulate the Treasurer of His Majesty’s Household, my right hon. Friend the Member for Alyn and Deeside, on being awarded a knighthood in the recent birthday honours list. It is hugely well deserved recognition of a quarter of a century of service, and I am sure that the whole Committee will join me in congratulating him. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”]

Driving down money laundering is critical to the Government’s key missions to deliver safer streets and economic growth, and I am determined that the Government will do all they can to bring justice to those seeking to wash their illicit funds through the UK. Close working with the private sector is integral to delivering on that objective. As our first line of defence, the private sector plays a fundamental role both in preventing the UK financial system from being exploited for criminal gain and in detecting suspicious activity where it has occurred.

I am proud that the UK was one of the first countries to establish a financial crime public-private partnership and has set the international standard in this area. Part of a successful public-private partnership is honestly reviewing what has worked in tackling money laundering and what needs to change for us to be more effective. With that objective in mind, and as part of “Economic Crime Plan 2”, the Government, law enforcement and the private sector have worked together to consider how public-private resource can be better directed to maximise our collective impact against the threat.

The draft order is one of the first outputs of that work. It raises the existing financial threshold for two exemptions that apply to principal money laundering offences under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 from £1,000 to £3,000. The uplift in the threshold will enable law enforcement resource to be focused on higher priority reports that provide greater opportunities for asset denial and disruption of criminal activity. It will also free up businesses’ resource to be redirected towards high-value activity that may have a greater impact on the threat. The measure is further expected to reduce the impact on banking customers by reducing instances of legitimate customers being unable to access their accounts, in particular where no further action is taken.

The first exemption applies to acts in operation of an account, such as paying expenses, by deposit-taking bodies, which are essentially banks and building societies, and electronic money and payment institutions. The second exemption applies in the instance of a business in the anti-money laundering regulated sector ending a relationship with a customer and paying away any money or property to the customer. This means that for transactions below the threshold, businesses in the anti-money laundering regulatory sector do not need to submit defence against money laundering suspicious activity reports, known as DAML SARs.

A DAML SAR is submitted to the National Crime Agency by a person proposing to deal with suspected criminal property, which may make them liable for one of the principal money laundering offences under the Proceeds of Crime Act. By submitting a DAML, a person can avoid committing one of the principal money laundering offences by obtaining consent, or deemed consent, for the act they propose to carry out—for example, a customer’s transaction to pay their mortgage. The DAML provides information to the UK Financial Intelligence Unit housed in the National Crime Agency and prevents the business from carrying out the activity referenced in the request until the UKFIU gives a consent decision or seven working days pass, after which the business can assume that it has consent.

In 2023, the threshold was raised to £1,000 due to the rising volume of DAMLs and the regulatory burdens on businesses to submit a DAML SAR, as well as burdens on law enforcement to review and the delay to customers, who must often wait seven days for their transaction to be processed. While the £1,000 threshold has likely contributed to a reduction in DAMLs, evidence shows that the UKFIU continues to receive a large number of low-value DAMLs, only a small proportion of which lead to asset denial opportunities.

Between January and December 2024, approximately 23,000 DAMLs relating to transactions between £1,000 and £3,000 were submitted. Of those, only 182 were refused, equating to 0.1% of all assets denied because of DAMLs in that year. To prevent the loss of information, businesses must still submit an information-only suspicious activity report to the UKFIU where they suspect any and all involvement in money laundering. That duty will not be affected by the draft order.

Having, I hope, covered the key points, I commend the draft order to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

I thank the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Weald of Kent, for the constructive way that she has approached the draft order. These are not contentious or party political matters, and it is right that we debate them in that spirit. I am grateful for her support for the measures and I completely agree with her about the importance of ensuring that we target them, and our resource, as effectively as possible.

The shadow Minister asked, entirely reasonably, about monitoring and review. As she might remember from her own time working at the Home Office, there are processes in place to ensure that these activities are kept under very close watch. I can assure her that, following on from the work done by the previous Government, we will continue to keep these matters under very close review.

Given that I have referenced the previous Government, I want to take the opportunity to commend the right hon. Member for Salisbury for the work that he did and the leadership that he showed in this policy area during his time in government. In particular, I thank him for his work to introduce the economic crime levy. I am sure that he knows this, but it is worth repeating that the levy raises around £100 million per year from the anti-money laundering sector, and it has provided extremely valuable and long-term, sustainable resource for funding measures to tackle money laundering. I am grateful to him for the work that he did in government.

I reiterate in response to the shadow Minister that we will monitor these matters on a regular basis. She will understand why I will not say too much about the technical detail of the work that is done to spot suspicious activity that falls beneath the threshold, but I am sure that she will remember from her time in the Home Office that there are mechanisms in place that seek to prevent people from bending or breaking the rules by behaving in a certain way in relation to transactions below the threshold. I think that she knows what I am referring to.

My hon. Friend the Member for Brent West raised an important point, but I am struggling to remember precisely what it was. Perhaps he will briefly remind me.

[Barry Gardiner]

Of course. I think we all agree that we should have thresholds that are proportionate and do not involve undue bureaucracy while ensuring that money is not badly spent or, indeed, that money that is spent is recovered where it should not have been spent in the first place. Given that we have proportionality in this area, I wondered whether the Minister could enlighten us whether we are looking to do the same in other areas, such as benefit overpayments.

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his question. As a very experienced Member, he will understand that the Home Office is responsible for the Proceeds of Crime Act, and although of course we have conversations with other Departments about other matters, the matter that he mentions is not one that sits within my area of responsibility. No doubt colleagues in the Department that I think he is referring to will listen carefully to his remarks; I am sure that they will be as grateful for them as I am.

I am grateful for all the contributions to the debate. SARs intelligence is a critical tool in our ability to identify, disrupt and recover the money that underpins the most serious and organised crime in the UK. Increasing the threshold to reflect the current landscape is an important step as we seek to improve the effectiveness of the anti-money laundering system, prioritise resources, enable greater disruption of criminal activity and prevent criminals from enjoying the proceeds of their illicit activities. Once again, therefore, I commend the draft order to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Draft Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2025

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Tuesday 10th June 2025 General Committees

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2025.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. The regulations are enabled by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. The IPA provides a framework for the use and oversight of investigatory powers by our intelligence services, law enforcement and other public authorities. It is designed to protect the public by giving law enforcement the tools it needs to prevent and prosecute crime. In this context, it also safeguards the privacy of individuals by setting stringent controls over the way IPA powers are authorised and overseen.

Part 3 of the IPA sets out the public authorities that are permitted to acquire communications data, or CD, and under what statutory purposes CD may be acquired. CD reveals the who, where, when and how of a communication, but not its content, such as what was written or said. CD is routinely used as evidence in upwards of 95% of serious organised crime investigations and has played a significant role in every major terrorism investigation over the past decade. The data is vital evidence in criminal and national security investigations.

The relevant public authorities that are permitted to use CD powers, and that therefore have the authority to make a request to compel CD from telecommunication and postal operators, are listed in schedule 4 to the IPA. As technology and society’s use of technology change, it is important that we adapt and equip public authorities with the capability to prevent criminals from exploiting technology features, hiding their identity, evading detection and putting the public at risk.

The regulations will update the public authorities listed in schedule 4. Updating the schedule ensures that only those public authorities that need powers to acquire CD remain listed in the schedule. In addition to this safeguard, the communications data code of practice provides guidance on the processes associated with making an application to use the power, as well as the safeguards and oversight arrangements that will ensure that the power is used in the intended manner: in a targeted way, and only when necessary and proportionate. The CD code has statutory force, and individuals exercising functions to which the code relates must have regard to it.

Eleven entries will be added to the schedule. The entries relate to the Intellectual Property Office, an executive agency sponsored by the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology; the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency, an executive agency sponsored by the Department for Transport; the Security Industry Authority, an executive non-departmental public body sponsored by the Home Office; NHS Counter Fraud Service Wales, an organisation hosted by the Velindre University NHS Trust; the integrated corporate services counter fraud expert services team in the Department for Business and Trade; the integrated corporate services counter fraud expert services team in the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero; and the counter fraud and investigation team in the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. The following ambulance services will also be added: the South East Coast ambulance service, the North West ambulance service, the West Midlands ambulance service and the East Midlands ambulance service.

Except for the four ambulance trusts I have just mentioned, the public authorities to be added are entirely new entries to the schedule and CD powers. Following their addition to schedule 4, the seven newly added public authorities will be able to apply for an independently approved authorisation via the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office that, if granted, can be used to compel telecommunications and postal operators to disclose CD for the purposes set out within their designation in schedule 4. They will not be given the power to internally authorise CD applications.

The four entries relating to the English ambulance trusts were previously designated in schedule 4 under the umbrella definition of

“An ambulance trust in England”,

which included a total of 10 English ambulance trusts. That definition has been removed and replaced with the four individual entries. Therefore, six English ambulance trusts will be removed from schedule 4 having confirmed with the Home Office that they no longer require CD powers. The four English ambulance trusts remaining in the schedule are the South East Coast ambulance service, the North West ambulance service,  the West Midlands ambulance service and the East Midlands ambulance service. Those trusts will retain their CD powers, including the ability to authorise internal applications. 

The Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust and the Scottish ambulance service board will also be removed from schedule 4, having confirmed with the Home Office that they no longer need to retain their CD powers. The regulations make no change to the Northern Ireland ambulance service or its designation in the schedule. 

The regulations will amend the Insolvency Service’s designation to include the Department for Business and Trade, following machinery of Government changes. There is no change to the Insolvency Service’s ability to acquire CD for the purposes already listed in schedule 4. As part of our effort to ensure the continued operational utility of the IPA, the regulations will make necessary and vital changes to schedule 4.

To conclude, the changes will enable various public authorities to carry out and fulfil their essential statutory duties, including safeguarding the public from national security threats and criminal activity. I therefore commend the regulations to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

First, let me thank the hon. Member for South West Devon for her remarks, which are much appreciated, not least for the constructive tone in which she delivered them. It is important that we ensure there is broad political support for the investigatory powers regime. These are vital powers for our intelligence services, law enforcement and, as we have heard, a number of public authorities. It is absolutely right that we debate these matters and that they are subject to scrutiny in this House. On that basis, I welcome the challenge from Opposition Members, because it behoves the Government to justify the continued need of these powers in the way that we seek. I will say a little more about that in a moment.

The hon. Member for South West Devon asked about the use of powers and consultation with public authorities. She asked for an assurance that adequate, appropriate resources are in place to support the use of the powers, which I can give her. I also say to her that the Home Office, as I am sure was the case under the previous Government, takes such matters incredibly seriously, both in terms of ministerial oversight and the work of officials in the Department. We look very carefully to ensure that the use of powers is necessary, proportionate and appropriate. I assure her that there has been an appropriate level of consultation leading up to these regulations. I am grateful for her broad support of the regulations and of the investigatory powers regime more generally.

The hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam specifically asked about ambulance trusts. I can tell him that the six English ambulance trusts being removed, as well as the Scottish ambulance service and the Welsh ambulance service, made a direct request to the Home Office for removal from schedule 4. For the purposes of clarity, the remaining four English ambulance trusts—the West Midlands ambulance service, the South East Coast ambulance service, the North West ambulance service and the East Midlands ambulance service—and the Northern Ireland ambulance service have not requested removal and therefore remain listed in schedule 4. Only one ambulance trust, the West Midlands ambulance service, responded to object to its removal. I assure him that the Government will continue to review the necessity of communications data powers for all public authorities listed in schedule 4, including these ambulance trusts, to ensure that their inclusion in the schedule remains justified. Basically, we do not want organisations to be listed in the schedule if they are not using the powers.

[Kit Malthouse]

I guess what we are asking is why these four did not respond. Was there communication with them to say, “We haven’t heard from you. Should you have responded? Have you missed it? Is it in the pile?” Six have made the case that they have never used the powers. Four have not responded—I would guess they have not used the powers either but just did not respond. How far did the investigation go? From our point of view, it would be interesting to understand why Birmingham objected. What is the real-life case for which an ambulance service needs this data? Make it live for us, Minister. Give us a story that we can tell our constituents.

[Dan Jarvis]

I genuinely welcome the challenge offered by the right hon. Gentleman; he is right to press us on this. I assure him that there are specific operational reasons why ambulance trusts may wish to retain and use this power. One reason why we have proceeded in the way that we have is that removing public authorities that did not respond to the Home Office’s correspondence from schedule 4 could risk operational errors—for example, ambulance trusts, unaware that they were no longer listed in schedule 4, could continue to make requests for CD without the necessary authorisation. I broadly agree with his points, and I accept that there is a case for further tidying up. I assure the Committee that we will continue to do that, and ensure that the right public authorities, which are using the powers for genuine operational reasons, are listed in schedule 4. I assure him that there are genuine operational reasons—if he will forgive me, I will not go into specific detail—why an ambulance trust might want to exercise these powers. However, I accept his basic point that we will need to look carefully at this and do any further tidying up of the four.

[Luke Taylor]

Does the Minister agree that there is, if not a red flag, potentially a question about why only one ambulance service made a specific request to retain the powers, while others did not respond, or potentially do not have the correct procedures in place to deal with requests of this type and manage the data? That would be a concern for me. Are those that specifically requested to be removed not utilising a power that may well improve their operations, and their ability to serve their residents?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

Again, I am grateful to the hon. Member, because it is an entirely fair challenge. I assure the Committee that the Home Office works very closely with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office—I will say a little more about that in response to the questions of the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire—to ensure that all the entries in schedule 4 remain up to date and reflect those with a requirement or compelling need for the use of CD powers. The consideration of a public authority’s addition to the schedule is entirely based on the operational case, its proposed approach to compliance and its understanding of the appropriate, necessary and proportionate use of the powers. We give these matters very careful consideration, but I will happily reflect further on the point made by the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam with regard to the single ambulance trust.

Let me turn to the points made by the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire about proportionality, which he was right to raise. He will know from his time in government, both as deputy mayor and as a Home Office Minister, about the vital requirement for these powers. As I said in my introductory remarks, communications data is routinely used as evidence in upwards of 95%—that is probably a conservative estimate—of serious organised crime investigations. That is a key statistic. That data has played a significant role in every major terrorism investigation over the past decade. It provides vital evidence in both criminal and national security investigations. At the same time, he is right to make the point that we need to be proportionate in its use: strong powers, yes, but with an absolute requirement for strong oversight as well. I completely understand and am genuinely pleased about what he has said. It is not that often that we get the opportunity to debate these niche but important matters about the role of the commissioner.

The commissioner, Sir Brian Leveson, does an outstanding job. Anyone who knows him is aware that he is, by any metric, an extraordinary character and a true public servant with a wisdom and integrity that are a huge credit to the work that he does. He is incredibly well supported by an excellent team who work hard to ensure appropriate levels of oversight for this regime. We would not be able to operate without the independent oversight that he and his team have carried out for the previous Government and this Government, and will carry out for the next one, without fear or favour. All that said, it continues to be right, of course, for us to look carefully at the structural arrangements in place and, as a still relatively new Government, to satisfy ourselves that they are fit for purpose, that they are appropriately resourced and that the right people are doing what is a difficult and important job.

I give the right hon. Gentleman an absolute assurance that the Home Secretary and I personally take these matters very seriously. I meet Sir Brian and his team regularly, who look carefully at the work we do. But if the right hon. Gentleman or any other Member has any thoughts about how the regime could be tweaked or improved, I will happily have that conversation.

[Kit Malthouse]

I do not want to cast any aspersions on Brian Leveson, whom I know well—not least because he was educated at the same school as I was; obviously, a little before.

The challenge is about proportionality. We all acknowledge the importance of such evidence if we are dealing with serious criminality, violence or terrorism—as I said, 100% of murders are solved with the use of this data—but I guess my concern starts when the powers stray into matters that are primarily commercial, for example. The Intellectual Property Office deals essentially with commercial matters—disputes about patents and intellectual property, and possible fraud thereabouts. It is unlikely that anybody will go to prison as a result of the operation of the Intellectual Property Office, although they might pay a big fine or compensation to somebody.

I guess the issue is where the line is between criminality, violence, terrorism or serious and organised crime, and more commercial matters. Take the Driving and Vehicle Standards Agency: it may be a crime under DVSA regulations to do x, y or z, but the British public would not put that up there with terrorism. That is the proportionality that we are asking about: whether we are straying too far. The Government obviously do not think so, which is why they have put the regulations forward, but I ask the Minister whether he has satisfied himself about the point I am making.

I am sorry to make this slightly long intervention, but my prediction is that we will be here again in 12 months’ time. Suddenly all sorts of organisations will be saying, “D’you know what? It might be useful to have a bit of a fishing trip—we just don’t know. Let’s see if we can persuade the Minister whether, once he has put the Intellectual Property Office in, we can be in as well.”

[Dan Jarvis]

I am genuinely grateful to the right hon. Gentleman, because he raises some important points. Some of us were here a week ago debating a not dissimilar statutory instrument. I had a very constructive debate with a former security Minister on his Benches—the right hon. Gentleman knows him well—and we repeated some of the debate that we had during the passage of the Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Act 2024 in the previous Parliament. We debated precisely the issues that the right hon. Gentleman raises.

I do not disagree with much of what the right hon. Gentleman said, but let me seek to give him a bit of assurance. First, we definitely do not do fishing exercises—as the Minister, I would not consider that remotely appropriate—and we do not do mission creep either. We need to be really careful to ensure that all the public authorities listed have an absolute operational requirement to use the powers.

The right hon. Gentleman’s raised the Intellectual Property Office in his earlier remarks, and helpfully did so again just a moment ago. The Intellectual Property Office engages with law enforcement agencies and other Departments to tackle intellectual property crimes, including those relating to patents, designs, trademarks and copyright, via a multi-agency approach. It also supports investigations to tackle serious organised crime, such as countering counterfeit goods, illegal streaming and associated money laundering offences under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. I take his point, but I hope that in the specific example he raises I am able to assure him that the powers vested in that organisation are necessary and proportionate. I further assure him that I will continue to look very carefully at these matters to satisfy myself that all the public authorities listed have that operational requirement.

Finally, I thought the right hon. Gentleman made a reasonable point about authorisation. I assure him that very careful consideration is given to matters relating to authorisation—I am sure he remembers that from his time in the Department. He raised an interesting example, but I assure him that, as a Minister, I have looked very carefully at the details of this, as have officials. We will satisfy ourselves that matters relating to authorisation are designated at an appropriately senior level. He is right to raise that point. I assure him that the regulations are appropriate, but I will look carefully at them to further satisfy myself that that is the case.

I hope that I have responded reasonably to all the questions, and that I have illustrated the importance of the regulations, which I commend to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That the Committee has considered the draft Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2025.

Draft Investigatory Powers (Codes of Practice, Review of Notices and Technical Advisory Board) Regulations 2025

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd June 2025 General Committees

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Investigatory Powers (Codes of Practice, Review of Notices and Technical Advisory Board) Regulations 2025.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey. Before I address the content of this statutory instrument, I will briefly provide some background. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016, known as the IPA, provides a framework for the use and oversight of investigatory powers by the intelligence services, law enforcement and other public authorities. It helps to safeguard people’s privacy by setting out stringent controls over the way that these powers are authorised and overseen.

The IPA was intentionally drafted in a technology-neutral manner to ensure that public authorities could continue to acquire operationally relevant data as technology evolved. Although that approach has largely withstood, a combination of new communications technologies and the changing threat landscape continues to challenge the effective operation of the IPA. To ensure the legislative regime remained fit for purpose, the Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Act 2024 was introduced by the previous Government and received Royal Assent in April last year. The 2024 Act made a series of targeted changes to the IPA to enable our law enforcement and intelligence agencies to tackle a range of evolving threats in the face of new technologies and increasingly sophisticated terrorist and criminal groups.

I do not intend to cover the changes made by the 2024 Act in detail, as they have already been debated extensively by both Houses. However, I will outline the purpose of the statutory instrument we are debating. It will bring into force three new and five revised codes of practice that provide operational guidance for public authorities to have regard to when exercising their functions under the IPA. As well as including minor updates to ensure consistency, the codes of practice have been revised to reflect the various changes made by the 2024 Act. The statutory instrument and the codes of practice have been informed by a 12-week public consultation, which closed in January this year.

The new codes of practice on bulk personal datasets with a low or no reasonable expectation of privacy and on third-party bulk personal datasets relate to new regimes introduced by the 2024 Act. The new code on the notices regime consolidates guidance from various existing codes into one place. This instrument also contains several provisions relating to the IPA’s notices regime, including the following: defining “relevant change” for the purpose of the new notification notices; introducing timelines for the review of technical capability, data retention, and national security notices; and amending existing regulations in relation to membership of the technical advisory board.

The 2024 Act was designed to uphold national security and to ensure that prevention and detection of the most serious crimes continued to be underpinned by an effective investigatory powers framework. These regulations are an important and necessary step in the implementation of that Act. I therefore commend them to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

Let me first thank the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings for his comments and questions. He said at the outset that he was proud of the role that he played in introducing this important piece of legislation, which dates back to 2016. He is absolutely right to be proud of his work on it, as it continues to deliver very real operational benefits on behalf of the country.

I have greatly enjoyed our exchanges on these matters over the years, both inside and outside the Chamber, not least because while they are incredibly important matters that underpin our national security, they are also quite detailed and complicated. They therefore require a significant amount of knowledge and understanding to comment on in the way that the right hon. Gentleman is able to because of his previous experience and his interest in them.

The right hon. Gentleman made an interesting point about the authority and responsibility vested in the Prime Minister, and I think he nodded towards a process of delegation. I know he will understand that I am incredibly limited in what I can say about that in this forum, although I would be happy to have a further conversation with him on Privy Council terms.

With your indulgence, Ms McVey, I will reflect briefly on some of the conversations and the thinking around the 2024 Act, as there were various discussions about what could and should be done, should the Prime Minister of the day either be temporarily unavailable—potentially through ill health or through travel—or be conflicted because of a personal matter. In truth, we never got into the detail of those slightly difficult but important debates on the Floor of the House. Perhaps that was a good thing, and perhaps it was the most appropriate way to proceed. However, I can give the right hon. Gentleman an absolute assurance that, as he would expect, this Government, this Prime Minister, this Security Minister and this Home Secretary take these matters incredibly seriously, and we will ensure that the relevant delegations are in place so that where difficult decisions need to be made, we can make them in the most timely and effective way.

The right hon. Gentleman made some helpful remarks about the importance of this legislation, and I completely agree with him. He will know from his time in government of the exceptional work that our intelligence services and law enforcement do on our behalf. We owe them a debt of gratitude, and it is on us—as Ministers, as shadow Ministers and as parliamentarians—to ensure that an appropriate legislative framework is in place so that whatever technological advances there are, we can continue to ensure that our law enforcement agencies and our security services do not just have parity with our opponents, but enjoy a competitive advantage. I am grateful to him for the work that he has done, and for the support and advice that he provides.

I think the right hon. Gentleman asked me about the part 7A code of practice. Just to confirm, the code sets out how the new regime provided for under part 7A of the IPA should be implemented, and it provides further detail about the use of bulk personal datasets. As I hope the right hon. Gentleman knows, I would be very happy to discuss any of these matters with him in more detail.

I am also grateful to the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Weald of Kent, for her comments and questions. I know that she speaks with real interest and authority on these matters from her own time working with Government, and I am grateful for the support from her and the shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp) on these matters.

The shadow Minister rightly and understandably raised an important question about the tech companies. As she knows, we take that relationship incredibly seriously. The Government’s preference is always to work closely with technology companies to ensure public safety, but we must also make sure that we have the powers in place for when collaboration is not sufficient; I think she knows what I am talking about. In addition, private companies should not be able to unilaterally remove the use of powers to investigate terrorists when they change how their technology works. She summarised very well and effectively, in a way that I hope we can all agree on, the balance that must be struck between freedom of speech and privacy, and ensuring that the Government always have the tools necessary to keep the public safe.

The shadow Minister made two other helpful and constructive points. The first was on parliamentary oversight, which she was right to raise. If I were seeking to be slightly mischievous—I am not—I would perhaps be tempted to reflect on the lack of prime ministerial leadership in recent years with regard to the Intelligence and Security Committee, which the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings serves on and knows well. The Prime Minister must send a clear signal about the ISC’s importance. It has crucial work to do on behalf of Parliament to scrutinise the work of our intelligence services. By its nature, that detailed work requires Committee members to study the activities of our security services carefully and discreetly. I can absolutely give the hon. Lady an assurance that the Government take that work very seriously, while respecting the independence of the Committee, which answers to Parliament, not the Government.

The shadow Minister’s final point on the process of review was very important. The investigatory powers regime operates in a rapidly changing world. The alarmingly quick rate of technological change means that, as a Government, we have to make sure that the legislative framework continues to adapt to the changing nature of the threat that we face. As part of that process, as she knows, it is incredibly important that we work closely with our allies, including our Five Eyes partners, but the Government have an absolute responsibility to ensure that the investigatory powers regime is fit for purpose. We keep a close eye to ensure that it is, and where we think that updates are required, we will introduce them. I hope very much that that will be a collaborative process, because it is important to me and, I hope, to Opposition Members that we do this in a non-partisan, collaborative way.

I am grateful for Opposition Members’ contributions, and I thank the Committee for its consideration of the regulations. I hope I have set out reasonably clearly that they are necessary to maintain the effectiveness of the UK’s investigatory powers framework, and I commend them to the Committee once more.

Question put and agreed to.

Oral Answers to Questions

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Monday 2nd June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Gurinder Singh Josan (Smethwick) (Lab)]

21. What steps her Department is taking to help protect consumers against fraud.

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

We monitor fraud trends very closely. Fraud is a growing transnational threat that requires urgent action. That is why the Government are developing a new fraud strategy, which covers better collaboration with industry, improved public awareness and improved collaboration with international partners.

[Damian Hinds]

The figures were, of course, coming down, but the incidence of fraud—much of it online—is now back up to a new high. Many factors are involved, but will the Government look at taking further steps, including requiring enhanced intelligence sharing between platforms and banks, and better mandatory user identification on sites such as dating apps and online marketplaces?

[Dan Jarvis]

I know that the right hon. Gentleman takes these matters seriously, but I gently remind the House that under the last Government, Lord Agnew, then Minister with responsibility for countering fraud, literally resigned at the Dispatch Box. Among other things, he accused the Treasury of having “little interest” in the consequences of fraud for our society. It is precisely because of the important points that the right hon. Gentleman raises that a national fraud squad of some 400 new specialist investigators is being recruited. That will be led by the National Crime Agency’s national economic crime centre, working closely with the City of London police. We will do all we can to protect the public from fraud.

[Victoria Collins]

A study last year showed that more than two in five people over 50 had been scammed in the last five years, losing an average of £2,000 in each scam. In half of those cases, the money was never recovered—and that is just at the small end of the scale. Even in the past two weeks, as a result of developments in artificial intelligence, there have been exponential improvements to scams, which are more convincing and realistic than ever before. What is the Home Office doing to protect people, especially the more vulnerable, by informing them about AI scams?

[Dan Jarvis]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right to raise concerns; the numbers that she references are deeply concerning. Combating fraud and beating scammers requires raising public awareness, and I am grateful for the work that she has done on this. I can tell her that the Home Office is working closely with the banking, telecoms, digital and tech sectors to improve systems and share data faster with law enforcement. Over 60 stakeholders from across industry are involved in the development of our new fraud strategy. Public communications, targeted support for the most vulnerable and AI are key parts of our strategy.

[Gurinder Singh Josan]

The Government have outlined a clear ambition to make the UK a global hub for the crypto industry, to support our growth mission. Many of our constituents are already regularly engaging with crypto. What assessment has the Minister made of the crypto sector, and particularly of the steps required to protect consumers and investors while ensuring that we allow the industry to develop?

[Dan Jarvis]

Stability and security remain key to ensuring the health and growth of the UK economy; protecting investors and consumers is central to that. We are continually evolving our capabilities, including by working closely with industry partners to ensure that security is front and centre of the UK’s framework for the crypto sector.

[Luke Myer (Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland) (Lab)]

Facebook Marketplace is responsible for three quarters of the fraud on social media, yet it seems uninterested in doing anything about that. Will the Minister assure the House that he will take Facebook to task, in order to clamp down on that fraud and make sure that consumers are protected?

[Dan Jarvis]

The Online Safety Act 2023 will require tech companies to take measures to prevent fraudulent content on their platforms or face significant fines. Under the Act, the largest firms will be required to do all they can to prevent fraudulent advertising from appearing on their platforms.

[Joe Morris (Hexham) (Lab)]

8. What steps her Department is taking to help tackle violence against women and girls.

Transnational Repression Review

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Wednesday 14th May 2025 Written Statements

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

In response to global reports of incidents of transnational repression (TNR), the defending democracy taskforce has conducted a review into the UK’s response to this phenomenon, focusing on building our understanding of the scale, nature, and impact domestically, as well as making recommendations to strengthen that response. The review—completed in partnership with lead Government Departments, the police and the intelligence services, alongside engagement with victims of TNR—represents a comprehensive deep dive into the issue. This review has recently concluded and in my capacity as taskforce chair, as well as Security Minister, I am updating the House on the UK’s approach to TNR.

The UK recognise TNR as a term to describe certain foreign state-directed crimes against individuals. This activity can take place both physically or online, with examples including intimidation, surveillance, harassment, forced/coerced return, abduction and even assassination at the most serious end of the scale.

Recent instances of conduct described as TNR in the UK include: the targeting of Iran International in 2023; Hong Kong authorities targeting individuals for exercising their right to freedom of expression by issuing bounties under their National Security Law; and the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury in 2018.

The review has found that TNR in the UK tends to be targeted and specific, where perpetrating states particularly focus on individuals whom they perceive as threats or otherwise seek to control, such as vocal critics, dissidents, or activists opposed to their regime. While TNR does not affect large numbers of people across the UK, its impacts can be severe, not only for those directly targeted but also for wider communities, where fear and concern may spread.

The UK’s response to tackling state-directed threats is world leading and our approach has matured considerably, even since the review’s inception. The review has found that the UK has the appropriate tools and system-wide safeguards in place to robustly counter this threat. While we maintain a hard operating environment for those states wishing to conduct TNR, the review makes several recommendations to strengthen the UK’s response even further.



States conducting TNR in the UK cannot act with impunity. The National Security Act attained Royal Assent in December 2023, and this pioneering legislation introduced new and updated powers and offences to ensure that the UK has the tools necessary to disrupt and deter all forms of malign foreign interference, including transnational repression.

The review has examined the work being conducted by the police and intelligence services in relation to TNR and the support provided to those under threat. It has concluded that the continued implementation of, and enforcement in relation to, the National Security Act is of paramount importance if the UK is to remain a challenging operating environment for foreign states looking to control and influence those who oppose them. As the new legislation builds on existing laws and effective practice, police and intelligence services have mature mechanisms in place to continually assess potential threats in the UK. As a result, police and intelligence services take a proactive approach to countering the most acute forms of state-directed threats to individuals, using a wide range of tactics to protect those identified as at risk.

Alongside our comprehensive statutory list of offences, measures and powers, the review has found that the UK has a suite of further tools to hold states accountable. For example, when alerted to instances of TNR, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office deploys the most appropriate diplomatic measures, both publicly and privately, to raise the cost to foreign states of carrying out interference activity. Furthermore, we work closely with likeminded partners through both bilateral and multilateral channels, including the G7 rapid response mechanism and UN, to raise awareness and build our collective resilience to this threat. For example, in June 2024 the UK signed up to a joint statement on TNR at the UN Human Rights Council. This statement outlined our joint understanding on TNR and commitment to tackle this threat together.

In conjunction with the TNR review team, and as I set out in my statement on Iranian state threats on 4 March 2025, the College of Policing has launched training and guidance which is now available for all 45 territorial police forces in the UK. This will enhance the ability of front-line police officers and staff in the identification of state-directed crimes and the actions that can be taken to escalate and mitigate this activity. This training will assist the police as they provide support to those affected by state threats activity and keep people safe. I have recently written to chief constables to emphasise the importance of this training, as increased recognition of state-directed crimes will strengthen our ability to shape our response based on threat.

The review team has also carefully considered how best to encourage reporting and ensure that reports received are treated seriously and dealt with appropriately. In consultation with Counter Terrorism Policing, the review has found that existing mechanisms—999, 101, or at a local police station—together with the new foreign interference training package, are the most effective ways to report state directed crimes and will ensure victims receive the support and protection they need. I appreciate that this is a highly sensitive matter, and there may be some reluctance to report experiences. However, it is crucial for anyone who believes they are a victim of state-directed crimes to report their concerns to the police; reports will be handled sensitively, taken seriously and investigated swiftly in line with UK law.

The UK maintains a hard operating environment for those states wishing to conduct TNR. However, the review makes several recommendations to strengthen the UK’s response even further. Today, I am publishing a guidance page on gov.uk providing those who believe themselves to be at risk of TNR with practical advice for their safety both physically and online. This guidance will complement the work of the police and intelligence services in operationalising relevant powers, including under the National Security Act, and will enable this Government to expand our collaboration with international partners to share information and co-ordinate responses.

The full detail of the review’s recommendations will no doubt be of great interest to states known to perpetrate TNR, so neither the recommendations nor the review itself will be made publicly available. Furthermore, given the sensitive nature of this topic and to preserve the integrity of security arrangements, we will not routinely comment on specific allegations. I would, however, refer to the public statements made by Ken McCallum, the director general of MI5, concerning the complex and interconnected threat environment, including the threats posed by authoritarian regimes whose repression at home increasingly extends to aggression overseas. The review recommends that the UK’s tools and approach remain agile in response to this changing threat environment.

Instances of TNR are a threat to our national security and sovereignty, and seek to undermine the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. This is unacceptable and will not be tolerated, irrespective of the perpetrating country.



Let me reiterate that acts of TNR tend to be targeted and specific; I encourage people to exercise alertness, but crucially they should not live in fear. It is this Government’s priority to ensure the safety and security of those who live here. I am pleased that this comprehensive review has found that the UK has a robust system in place to ensure the protection of the public and has made proportionate recommendations to strengthen our approach further. I would stress again that anyone who believes that they are a victim of a crime directed by a foreign state should contact the police to report their concerns.

The UK will continue to ensure the systems in place to detect, deter and counter transnational repression are robust in keeping people safe.

[HCWS632]