(2 days, 14 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIf I may, Ms McVey, I will speak to the issue of the judicial oversight of the panel and the whole of new clause 21. I would like to understand something, and perhaps the Minister or my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley could help me. We have been talking a lot about judicial oversight. My concern is that even if we had judicial oversight, there is no liability if something goes wrong. We would have had judicial oversight, but now we have panel oversight—non-judicial oversight—of the decision. Even then, what if somebody went down the assisted dying route and an issue was raised afterwards? What recourse would anybody—family members and so on—have to hold anybody liable if they did something wrong, including, potentially, the commissioner?
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey.
As my hon. Friend the Minister for Care and I have made clear throughout debate, the Government continue to remain neutral on the Bill and do not have a position on assisted dying. Once again, my remarks will focus on the legal and practical impacts of the amendments, with a view to assisting Committee members. I will first speak to amendments 371 to 373, 377, 378, 381, 388, 390 and 391, new clauses 14, 15, 17 and 21, and new schedules 1 and 2, all tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley.
In executing our duties to ensure that the legislation, if passed, is legally robust and workable, the Government have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley in relation to the amendments, which propose the voluntary assisted dying commission and the panels. They reflect my hon. Friend’s intent to replace the court approval process that is currently set out in the Bill. I confirm that this change was driven not by capacity concerns from within Government, but by the Bill promoter’s policy intent. Let me be clear: the High Court stage could be made to work, but if the Committee and Parliament elect for the commissioner and panel model, the state will work to deliver that.
New clause 14 and consequential amendment 391 would provide for the establishment of a voluntary assisted dying commissioner. In keeping with other appointments of this significance, the commissioner would be appointed by the Prime Minister, and the individual in post must hold or have held office—so it is not sitting judges, but could be a retired judge—as a judge of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal or the High Court.
New clause 14 sets out the central functions of the commissioner, which will be detailed further in new clauses 15 and 17 and new schedule 1. The commissioner would receive documents, including the reports from the co-ordinating doctor and declarations under the legislation, make appointments to the list of persons eligible to sit on assisted dying review panels, and refer cases to those panels, which would replace the role of the High Court in the original draft of the Bill. In addition, the commissioner would have the responsibility for monitoring the Bill’s operation and reporting annually to Parliament, which we will no doubt come to in clause 34. It is important to pause there, because that is one aspect in which the commissioner model is distinct from that of a court or tribunal. It will serve multiple functions, not least the monitoring of the Bill’s operation and reporting on that annually to Parliament.
New schedule 1 contains practical arrangements for the office of the voluntary assisted dying commissioner, as established in new clause 14. In practice, we anticipate that the commissioner’s office will be a non-departmental public body. The establishment of such an office to support the Government-appointed chair or commissioner is common practice for roles of this nature. One such model is the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, which is chaired by a person who is holding or who has held high judicial office. The schedule also introduces the role of a deputy commissioner, who, like the commissioner, must have been appointed by the Prime Minister and hold or have held office as a judge of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal or the High Court.
Both the commissioner and deputy commissioner would be appointed for terms of five years, with their remuneration set by the Secretary of State. The commissioner would have the ability to appoint their own staff, having obtained approval from the Secretary of State in regard to the number of staff, the remuneration and the terms, as well as providing an annual statement of accounts. In the ordinary way, such a public body would be subject to other statutory provisions, not least the Equality Act 2010.
New clause 15 would establish the mechanism for the referral by the voluntary assisted dying commissioner to an assisted dying review panel. When the commissioner receives a first declaration from the person seeking assistance, and reports from the co-ordinating and independent doctors as to their assessments of the person—including a statement by those doctors as to the person’s eligibility for assistance—they would be required to refer the case to a panel as soon as reasonably practical. In practice, the task of organising the work of each panel would fall to the commissioner’s office. The co-ordinating doctor would be required to inform the commissioner where a first or second declaration is cancelled. Where the commissioner is informed of the cancellation of the first declaration, they must not refer the case to a panel, or must inform the panel to disregard the application if already referred.
Amendments 371, 372, 373, 377, 378, 381, 388 and 390 are all consequential amendments on new clause 21, and together establish the mechanism for the consideration of cases by the assisted dying review panels in place of the High Court. Panels would be required to review each case and issue a certificate of eligibility where they are satisfied that all requirements set out in the Bill have been met.
I seek clarification. As drafted, in clause 12(1)(c), the High Court would give
“a declaration that the requirements of this Act have been met”,
but in new clause 21(6)(a), the panel is required to issue a certificate of eligibility, to which the Minister just referred. I seek the Minister’s guidance on whether it is the Government’s view that the High Court declaration has equal weight in law to the certificate of eligibility set out in new clause 21. I ask particularly because that certificate will be relied on for the purposes of suspending the Suicide Act 1961, under which a criminal offence would otherwise have been committed. The certificate of eligibility will need to be relied on to demonstrate that no criminal offence has been committed under that law. Is it the view of the Minister and the Government that a High Court direction, as originally required, can now be fully replaced by, and have equal weight with, a certificate of eligibility?
As I understand it, everything has to be internally coherent in whatever the final draft of the Bill is. Within this structure, because in this case it is a panel that issues the certificate, it is its own sui generis certificate appropriate to this process. The declaration that was referred to in the earlier draft is one that the High Court would normally do. Given that this is on the face of the Bill, and will be in primary legislation, it would have legal force and would, if it were internally coherent with the rest of the legislation, have the legal effect of operating coherently with the criminal offences and, indeed, with the suspension of the Suicide Act, as the hon. Lady just asked. That is my understanding.
My original question was more about whether it has the same legal force as a High Court direction.
My understanding is that it would, yes. If I am wrong about that, I will obviously come back to the Committee and correct it, but my understanding is that it would. They are two different things—one is called a certificate of eligibility and one is a High Court declaration—but in terms of how they operate within this legal scheme, my understanding is that they would have the same legal effect, and they are intended to.
Under new clause 21, the panel must hear from, and may question, the person seeking assistance and the co-ordinating doctor, or the independent doctor, or both. The panel may also hear, and may question, the person’s proxy if that is relevant, and any other person, including those appearing to have relevant knowledge or experience. This could include family members, or other individuals with an interest in the welfare of the person, as well as other experts. The new clause is explicit that the panel must not grant the certificate of eligibility if it is not satisfied that all the requirements have been met. Further consequential amendments introduce references to the certificate of eligibility throughout the Bill. Once the panel has made a decision, it will be required to notify the person seeking assistance, the co-ordinating doctor, the commissioner and any other person specified in the regulations.
As others have pointed out, the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley do not spell out every step of the process or the procedure that the panels would be expected to follow. That is left to secondary legislation, and it will be for the commission and the commissioner to produce their own guidance on how the panels and the panel procedure are intended to be governed and regulated. That is in line with the approach to legislation more broadly, with main objectives typically set out in primary legislation, and secondary policy issues and technical and administrative matters, dealt with through secondary legislation, regulations and guidance.
I believe it is in there. Let me find the relevant provision so that I can refer my hon. Friend to it.
It is a majority vote for the other decisions that a panel may make, but in respect of certification, the decision is unanimous. Paragraph 5(2) of new schedule 2 states:
“Decisions of a panel may be taken by a majority vote”.
Such decisions include whether to hear from an additional expert, or whether further investigation is required in respect of an aspect that the panel may be concerned about, such as coercion or capacity. While those decisions can be taken by a majority vote, in respect of certification and granting a certificate of eligibility, I refer my hon. Friend to paragraph 5(3), which states:
“The panel is to be treated as having decided to refuse to grant a certificate of eligibility if any member votes against a decision to grant such a certificate.”
That is a slightly mealy-mouthed way of saying that if any member of the panel resists the grant of the certificate, no certificate can be issued.
I just want to support the hon. Member for Bradford West. She is absolutely right. It is clearly intended that there should be a unanimous decision but, in fact, as the hon. Lady pointed out, if one of the members decides effectively to abstain, the procedure does go ahead. It is not that they all have to actively support the decision; only two of them have to do that. One of them could have their doubts and sit on their hands, and it would still go ahead.
That might be something that other hon. Members wish to take away with them, whatever the policy intent may have been. In fairness, I do not think that the question of whether there is a requirement to give a positive indication of a decision either way is on the face of the Bill. However, I think that clearly the intention behind paragraph 5(3) of new schedule 2 is that there is unanimity in relation to the grant of an eligibility certificate.
I was once on a planning committee in which one member of the committee voted in favour and all the other members abstained, so the recommendation went through one to zero. Technically, given the way in which new schedule 2 reads to me, that could happen, because one member could vote in favour and two could abstain, and that would therefore be considered unanimous. Will the Minister comment on that?
We are discussing how to construe the provision in paragraph 5 of new schedule 2. I should reiterate that, obviously, it is the promoter’s intent to have—hon. Members may call it what they will—the safeguard of unanimity behind that provision. If there is any feeling that the drafting does not fully reflect that intent, it can be tightened up. However, under of the Bill, there is clearly an intent to have unanimity in respect of the final decision about certification.
It absolutely is the policy intent that there should be a unanimous decision of the panel. If there is any lack of clarity, I am very happy to look into working with official draftspeople to tighten that up.
I thank hon. Members for their interventions.
In respect of the standard that would be applied in order for the panel to be satisfied, in practice, as I was saying, the panel would establish a case on the balance of probability in those circumstances only on the basis of strong evidence. In other words, the more serious the issue to be determined, the closer the scrutiny and the stronger the evidence required.
Introducing a requirement for the panel to be satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt at this stage would create a difference to, or a divergence from, the standard applied by professionals earlier in the process, such as by the doctors in the first and second assessments, and—I think the hon. Member for Reigate acknowledged this in her speech—to ascertain whether, among other things, the person has capacity to make the decision to end their own life, whether they have a clear, settled and informed wish to do so, and that they have not been pressured or coerced. Such a requirement would create the problem of making the application of the Bill incoherent because, of course, if a civil standard has been applied earlier in the process, the higher, criminal bar could never be satisfied at the panel stage. The principal decision is what standard should be applied and, as I have said, the civil standard is used in other end-of-life decisions, but there is also a question of the internal coherence of the Bill.
I thank the Minister for the very clear way in which she is explaining everything. I completely acknowledge what she has just said. As she rightly said, I alluded to the fact that I tried to make the change at an earlier stage, but was unsuccessful, and I am now trying to put it through here. Can the Minister comment on the meaning of “satisfied”? If we are not going to have “beyond reasonable doubt”, can she expand a little on the meaning of “satisfied” and whether she is comfortable that that is clear enough for these purposes?
The answer is yes. I, on behalf of the Government, am satisfied that that would be commonly and well understood by those applying it, and any court construing it, that the standard to be applied is the civil standard. That would be understood by not just the commissioner in terms of laying down the rules for the panels, but the panels themselves. It is important to recall that as Lord Bingham, one of the most distinguished judges that this country has ever produced, once said,
“The civil standard is a flexible standard to be applied with greater or lesser strictness according to the seriousness of what has to be proved”,
and there is no doubt, based on what Parliament has debated, about the utmost seriousness of these issues. To answer the hon. Member’s question, the answer is yes, I think it is clear. That is the Government’s position.
Amendment (b) to new clause 21 would give the panel discretion to refuse to grant a certificate of eligibility where the requirements stated in the Bill are met if it believes there are
“particular circumstances which make it inappropriate for the person”
to be provided with assistance. The Government’s view is that this could risk unpredictability and inconsistency in the panel’s decision making and reduce legal certainty for the person seeking assistance, as well as for the panel.
Amendment (c) to new clause 21 concerns three specific requirements under subsection (2):
“(c) that the person has capacity…(h) that the person has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life”
and
“(i) that the person made the first declaration voluntarily and was not coerced or pressured by any other person”.
The amendment would mean that despite finding that those criteria had been met on the balance of probabilities, the panel could stay proceedings when it believed there was a real risk that they have not been satisfied. As with amendment (b) to new clause 21, this could result in uncertainty for the applicant and in terms of what is required of the panel in its decision making.
As I referred to earlier, in a lot of these decisions, the question of whether somebody has capacity or is being coerced is ultimately a binary decision for each panel member. The person has capacity or they do not. In applying the civil standard with the rigour that Lord Bingham spoke about in the most serious cases in circumstances when the panel or its members identify that there is a real risk, one would expect them to exercise their discretionary powers to seek more evidence to remove that risk and doubt, and if that persists, to refuse and make the binary choice that the person does not have capacity or is being coerced, or vice versa.
Amendment (d) to new clause 21 would require the panel to hear from and question both assessing doctors, as opposed to the requirement that the person must hear from, and may question, one of the doctors, and may hear from and question both. The amendment would also require the panel to hear from and question the person seeking assistance and the person’s proxy when clause 15 applies. Under new clause 21, the panel must hear from and may question the person seeking assistance and would have the ability to hear from and question their proxy.
The amendment would also make it explicit that the panel must consider hearing from and questioning parties interested in the welfare of the person and those involved in the person’s care. Under new clause 21, the panel would have the ability to hear from any other person, which could include family members, caregivers and whomever else it deems appropriate.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Under the Bill as drafted, a panel and the commission are not invested with powers of summons, and the evidence that is heard and requested is not conveyed under oath. It is not a court or a tribunal. Those provisions do not apply, so she is absolutely right. They can make the request, but they cannot compel someone to attend.
Amendment (e) to new clause 21 would make it explicit that, when considered appropriate for medical reasons, the panel would be able to use pre-recorded audio or video material when considering evidence for the purposes of determining a person’s eligibility for assistance. Panel procedure would be set out in guidance issued by the commissioner, which would detail the processes governing the panel process in general, but also for the use of that form of evidence.
New schedule 2, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the. Member for Spen Valley, builds on the new clause 21. The new schedule further details the composition and the intended proceedings of the assisted dying review panels. As we have heard, panels would be formed of three members, including a legal member sitting as chair, a psychiatrist and a social worker.
Thanks to the hon. Member for Richmond Park, we have dealt with the provision on decisions to grant the certificate of eligibility and how they will be determined by members of the panel. We heard from the promoter herself, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, that the intention is that such decisions are unanimous.
The commissioner would be responsible for making appointments to a list of persons eligible to sit as members of the multidisciplinary panels, and for establishing those panels. Under the schedule, the legal member as chair of the panel must hold or have held high judicial office, be one of His Majesty’s counsel—that is a KC—or have been authorised as a temporary judge in the High Court. The psychiatrist member must be a registered medical practitioner and a practising registered psychiatrist, and the social worker member must appear on the register maintained by Social Work England or Social Work Wales.
I think the hon. Lady is right that that is not specified as a requirement. All three panel members would be drawn from the relevant professions and would therefore be subject to the standards pertaining to those professions. In the legal profession, they will be practitioners who are experienced in analysis and reaching decisions based on facts and law. The professional standards for all three regulated professions place a high value not just on integrity, but on impartiality. For the commissioner and for any judges on the panel, the “Guide to Judicial Conduct” makes the principles explicit.
The Minister mentions impartiality. As things stand, the doctors who take part in the process will have made the choice to do so. Would the same yardstick be applied to the panel, or would its members just be appointed? Could they choose not to participate in the process?
I anticipate that members of the professions will apply to be members of the panel. There will have to be a recruitment process, which is something that the commissioner, who is appointed by the Prime Minister, will undertake. I emphasise the point that all the professions, in their different ways—I am obviously most familiar with the legal profession, particularly the Bar—are governed by professional standards that specify the need for and place a high value on not just integrity, but impartiality.
There is no doubt that, as we will see later, the panel would be subject in all its decisions to public law principles, including procedural propriety. The absence of any suggestion of bias—even of the appearance of bias—is an important public law principle. In any event, given the recruitment process, the interviews that would be undertaken and the professional standards to which all these people would be held, I think that they would apply their independent and impartial skills and judgment to the decision making and the assessment of eligibility in a manner appropriate to the task set out in the Bill.
One would expect professionals on the panel to adhere to their professional standards and act with impartiality in ascertaining whether the eligibility criteria have been met. Speaking as the Minister—indeed, even speaking for myself—I have no reason to doubt the independence, impartiality and professionalism of the panel or see any suggestion of bias.
I appreciate that an impact assessment is due to come later, after we have debated whether we should have this system or not. Nevertheless, will the Minister tell the Committee whether officials in her Department or in the Department of Health and Social Care have informed the hon. Member for Spen Valley whether the workforce will have sufficient capacity to provide the professionals required? Has any estimate been made of the number of people who will be required to step forward to take part in these panels?
I note the point that the reason why the proposed High Court stage was dropped was not that Ministry of Justice officials had informed the hon. Member for Spen Valley that the family court system would be overwhelmed. Can the Minister confirm that there was no communication to the hon. Member that the courts would not be able to cope with the demand? That was clearly reported in the media at the time, but can she confirm that it was not the case?
The hon. Gentleman’s first point is a matter for the impact assessment itself. Clearly both Departments have data on the state of the professions, on how many KCs there are in the country and on how many people will be needed to provide the service. As I say, if Parliament wishes it and legislates for it, the state will work to deliver it, but the detail will come in the impact assessment.
On the hon. Gentleman’s second question, as I made clear earlier, the effective shift away from the High Court model in clause 12 to the model in the new clauses has been driven by the policy intent of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. I will not get into the precise chronology of when the matter was raised, but it came from my hon. Friend.
Yesterday, I hotfooted it from the Committee to Justice questions, where I was delighted to see the hon. Member for Reigate. We discussed capacity issues in our Crown courts and civil courts. Those issues are well reported in the media, but there is no connection between them and the policy shift here. If this is what Parliament chooses to legislate, the state will work to deliver it.
It is important to acknowledge that it will be a number of years before this law will be implemented. Hopefully, the Government will continue the fantastic job that they are doing to improve capacity in our courts, so that even if capacity is an issue now, a few years down the line it will not be.
I thank my hon. Friend for that encouragement. The Government’s position throughout the entire process, in so far as we have worked with her on these amendments and others to give effect to her intent, is to ensure that they are workable and operable. If this were not workable, we would not be here discussing it.
There are several examples across Government of judges or senior lawyers and KCs sitting on decision-making panels or in organisations or bodies that sit outside the framework of His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service. We have discussed some examples, such as public inquiries. I say this as the Minister for courts: it speaks to the trust and public confidence in both judges and KCs that when there is a public policy challenge to which many of us as politicians struggle to find a resolution, we so often turn to judge-led and KC-led inquiries to establish either what has happened or how systems can be improved. That is partly because of the impartiality and integrity that they bring to that work. I offer the example of the judicial commissioners who operate on behalf of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and who provide independent authorisation of application for the use of the most intrusive investigatory powers.
We have mentioned inquiries; I have also mentioned Parole Board panels as an example of inquisitorial rather than adversarial panels. They are often multidisciplinary, and many of their members are current or retired judges. They sit and hear issues of the most complex nature, assessing the risk that prisoners may present to the public on release.
I appreciate the Minister’s point about the Parole Board. Does she acknowledge that in the Parole Board example there is the essence of an adversarial system, because the victim is invited to give a statement? The board therefore hears opinions from, as it were, both sides of the case. Who will fulfil that second role in the proposals before the Committee?
I drew the comparison for the purpose of showing where judges and legal experts are deployed in a multidisciplinary forum that is not a court or tribunal. I was not suggesting that there is a straight-line analogy. After all, a Parole Board panel is performing a different function to make a global assessment of risk. That is what it is ultimately doing; it is not strictly speaking an adversarial process in that sense.
The situation that the Bill addresses is that of an individual seeking to establish their eligibility for a right that—if the Act is passed—Parliament will have conferred on those who meet the criteria. It is not an adjudication. It is the panel’s function to assess, through the various conversations and provisions and by interrogating the information that has been provided, whether it is properly satisfied that the eligibility of the person’s election to avail themselves of that right is sound.
I am trying to clarify this for my own benefit, because I am not familiar with some of these procedures. Is there a difference between a High Court judge leading an inquiry or sitting on a panel, using their legal experience to provide advice or recommendations or give an opinion, and having a judge sitting in the High Court, who, under the original wording of clause 12, would be giving a direction? If there is a difference, have we not crossed from one role to the other by introducing a panel rather than a High Court direction? Does that matter for the purposes of the legislation?
To be absolutely clear, what we are discussing reflects the intent of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. It is important to break it down. We have a judge in the role of the commissioner, and the commissioner will set up the framework and guidance for how the panels will operate and will lend their expertise. Our judges often sit on the Civil Procedure Rule Committee, developing the appropriate practice to govern the process in question. In this case, it would be the process of providing the third layer and the assessment whether the eligibility criteria have been met.
The commissioner would also—and this is where the role is distinct from that of a court or tribunal—provide a monitoring and reporting function to Parliament on the operation of the Act. That is a fundamental distinction from the model that we will have if we pursue clause 12, because in that case each application for an assisted death would go to whichever High Court judge happened to be sitting on that day. There would be no requirement for particular expertise on the part of the High Court judge, and that judge would not have to report on the operation of the Act. It is a different model that my hon. Friend has elected.
The situation exists already in Wales. For example, people are prepared to travel in order to facilitate Welsh-medium coroner inquests. There are local authorities such as my own, Gwynedd, that have a requirement that all social workers be able to work in the medium of Welsh. The requirement will already be there, but this is a process of acknowledging those psychiatrists who are able to meet it. It is critical for the Bill, if we are to put the person and their needs first.
I urge the Minister to consider the amendment. We are already familiar with this matter in relation to digital technology and the operations that we already need to put in place to allow people to use their language in Wales. The amendment recognises the dire situation. It recognises the absolute urgency of people who are at the most stressful time in their life being able to use the language that they prefer.
I want to reassure the right hon. Lady about the provisions that will apply even if her amendment is not accepted. The Welsh Language Act 1993 requires public bodies that are either named in the Act or named by Welsh Ministers, and which provide services to the public in Wales, to prepare a Welsh language scheme setting out the steps that the body will take in relation to the use of the Welsh language while providing those services. As I understand it, this approach is used all the time in legal proceedings in Wales.
In an instance in which a party wishes to speak in Welsh at the proceedings, section 22 of the 1993 Act will apply. Any party to the legal proceedings can express themselves in Welsh, at which point a Welsh interpreter would be commissioned to facilitate the discussion. That will happen. That will be the status quo—the backstop, if you like—without the amendment. Requiring all members of the panel to speak fluent Welsh would, in the Government’s view, be a significant operational challenge that could lead to undue delay at the end of life.
I speak only one language and it is definitely not Welsh, even though I did have a stint working in Wales. With any language, things can be lost in translation. When we are talking about something like assisted dying, does the Minister acknowledge that even with very skilled interpreters, there would have to be a suitable level of training to make sure that everything was fully thought through and there were no cracks—that nothing would slip through the net. That is not covered under the Welsh Language Act currently, and that is why the amendment has been tabled. Does she appreciate the severity of that?
]The right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd and the hon. Members for Chesham and Amersham and for Harrogate and Knaresborough have all put their case incredibly powerfully. In emphasising the operational difficulties that the Government have identified, I will make this point. The approach under section 22 of the Welsh Language Act is that the ability to speak in Welsh and have interpretation services is adopted in very serious legal proceedings indeed. The hon. Gentleman is right: we are talking about nuances that can determine civil or criminal liability; those are very serious issues indeed. I am not saying that that is quite as serious as matters of life or death, but getting right the sorts of things that interpreters need to ensure they are getting right, as well as vindicating the person’s ability to express themselves in their mother tongue or their preferred tongue, is something that happens already and would happen under the operation of this legislation.
I wonder whether the Minister appreciates that when it comes to Welsh speakers using their language in the face of the majority language, English, with its status, what we are doing here is putting another barrier in their way: “I am making a nuisance of myself; I have to ask a favour and get interpreters.” That is not what we should be doing with this legislation. We should be putting those people first and making sure that they can express themselves at this most emotional time as effectively as possible. Interpreters should not be in the room with the assisted dying panels. That is fundamentally against the nature of the Bill.
I appreciate the passion and force with which the right hon. Lady makes that point. I have set out the Government’s concerns about deliverability—the operational challenges around delivering what has been suggested. This is a case of applying section 22 of the Welsh Language Act to the commissioner, who under the promoter’s new schedule 2 would be able to give guidance to panels on how exactly they should facilitate exactly what the right hon. Lady is seeking—the ability of the dying person who is seeking an assisted death to express themselves through the Welsh language within those most sensitive of proceedings. There could be facilitation by the commissioner in order to commission an interpreter and assist the person to speak in Welsh.
I appreciate that the right hon. Lady feels that that would create a barrier that is not appropriate to this context, but I think it is a reflection of the fact that certainly the Government are not seeking to stand in the way of people expressing themselves in Welsh. We want to vindicate that. It is in line with our wider commitment to devolution and to working with the devolved Governments in the context of the Bill. The right hon. Lady has made her point forcefully, and no doubt the Committee will come to vote on this amendment, but I have to, on behalf of the Government, acting responsibly, lay out some of the challenges that it would mean to the operability and deliverability of the Bill.
I accept that the Minister is in a difficult position, because she is presenting the case for the Government’s position and cannot take a position herself. I will just gently ask whether she accepts the weariness of Welsh language speakers and campaigners over generations, who have been faced time and again with the same argument—of operational challenges, whatever that issue may be. I suggest to her that perhaps it is time that the Government stopped using that excuse.
I thank the hon. Lady for that intervention. She has heard the Government’s position on the operation of the Bill. As I said, it is important that, in the event that this amendment is not taken forward, the points and the force with which they are made are fed into the commissioner’s modus operandi in order, as far as possible and within what resources allow, to allow people to express themselves in the Welsh language. As I said, I want to put on record our continued commitment to devolution in that context, and to working with the Welsh Government to resolve in a thoughtful and constructive way any of the outstanding legal, technical and constitutional issues that may arise.
Surely many of the constitutional issues that we are discussing should be decided by the Senedd and the Welsh Government. It is a matter of urgency now that we discuss the “appropriate authority”, which is a term used in other legislation. I believe that in the Crime and Policing Bill, “appropriate authority” is used in relation to England and Scotland. We need to have clarity on these decisions as we move ahead.
The right hon. Lady is absolutely right that we do need clarity. As my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has made clear, the intention is for the legislation to apply across both England and Wales, and the model being proposed under these provisions is a single commission. We need to ensure close working to resolve those technical and legal issues.
Amendment (b) to new schedule 2 deals with the issue of the Official Solicitor. It seeks to establish a process through which a person nominated by the Official Solicitor acts as an advocate to the panel. It is important to remind ourselves of the role that the Official Solicitor typically plays. They act as a litigation friend, and where they do act as an advocate to the court, the purpose of that function is to assist courts on a difficult or novel point of law. The focus of the Official Solicitor is in representing adults who lack mental capacity, and children. Both groups are plainly out of the scope of the Bill. The Bill applies to someone who has capacity and who is applying for an assisted death.
The amendment would require a significant and radical change in the function and focus of the Official Solicitor. Under new schedule 2, assisted dying review panels would have their own powers to determine whether the requirements of the Bill had been met, including the ability to hear from and question any other person.
The Minister is being very generous in giving way. I want to understand something. She says that the Official Solicitor is there to help with adults who lack capacity, but in the cases before the Court of Protection of the girls who had anorexia, the judges took a decision that they should not continue to be force-fed. The judges concluded in nine of 10 cases that they lacked capacity, and yet accepted that these girls were inevitably going to die. In that case, would the role of the Official Solicitor not be helpful as a further safeguard?
It is important to look at this issue in the context of what my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley is setting out to do through the legislation, and what the panel’s function is, which is the function that was discussed in the debate. This is not a trial or an inquiry. That is not what is being undertaken by the panel. The panel’s purpose is to ensure that the eligibility criteria process has been followed in a correct, lawful and safe way. As others have pointed out, it is not adversarial, and will not be described as such in the Bill.
All that I am saying on behalf of the Government is that the Official Solicitor’s role is most frequently to assist in court with a difficult or novel point of law when the person cannot do it themselves. Well, we do not have that here. We are not determining points of law; we are determining whether this person has met the eligibility criteria. Secondly, the Official Solicitor’s role is for when individuals lack capacity. In the Bill, by definition, the person who is applying has already satisfied two doctors that they have capacity. Of course, the question of capacity may be something that the panel wishes to explore further—it has the three panel members and the ability to draw on its powers to seek further information to test that—but it is not clear, without altering the current role that the Official Solicitor plays within our legal system, what role they would be serving.
I appreciate the Minister’s position and am grateful for her explanation, but it does not address the central point, which is that nine girls were deemed not to have capacity. Despite all the amendments that have been tabled and the letter from all the charities about anorexia, that has not been addressed. In absence of any impact assessment on one of the issues that most frustrates me, how do the Government conclude that the workability of the Bill is sufficient? Will it work, given that we do not have the protection for those girls who may have anorexia? There is precedent for such girls who did not have capacity. How will the Government safeguard those girls in particular?
I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention. She has brought up that case a number of times in various debates on the Bill. In this context, part of the provision—in terms of the design and operation of the commissioner and the panels to which the various cases are referred—is the development of guidance. If the commissioner deems specific processes appropriate to the consideration of applications for assisted death where anorexia is an issue, that guidance can be developed. Again, that is a matter for the promoter of the Bill, but one might have thought that having a dedicated body in relation to assisted death—which also has the monitoring function that we will come to in clause 34—means the development of expertise in dealing with cases, in particular those especially difficult cases of the nature my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West raises. From a Government point of view, that would not necessarily flow—it is hard to see why it would at all—from the High Court, if we revert to that. That is a distinction between the two models that the Bill’s promoter has explored.
That is another important argument for having the panel. Where a terminally ill person with an eating disorder has been deemed to have capacity by two doctors and—I surmise, as we now have the compulsory referral—a psychiatrist, we will have on the panel another psychiatrist and a social worker. The panel does help to address concerns about capacity. Does the Minister agree?
My hon. Friend has developed her thinking, and the Government have worked with her to reflect that policy intent. I think she is right that the panel is capable of doing just that and it could operate in that way.
Amendment (c) to new schedule 2 relates to the issue of domestic abuse training. It would make the voluntary assisted dying commissioner responsible for ensuring that all panel members had received training on domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse. Persons appointed to the list of eligible panel members would already be qualified in the field of law, psychiatry or social work, and would have done all the training that pertains to receiving a professional qualification in those fields.
In addition, under new schedule 2 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, the commissioner would be able to give guidance to the panels, which could include training requirements, and the panels must have regard to that guidance in the exercise of their functions. That is all I propose to say about that. It might be seen as an example of something that would typically—I am not saying it has to—be left to regulation or the guidance, rather than being in primary legislation.
Amendment (d) to new schedule 2 relates to the panel sitting in private or in public. It seeks to ensure that panels sit in private by default.
I am not sure that my amendment (d) was selected—unfortunately, I missed the deadline—so the Minister does not need to cover it.
I did not wish to say that, but the Minister did. We will come back at 5.10 pm.
(3 days, 14 hours ago)
Commons ChamberThe Government recognise just how important accessing transcripts can be for certain victims. That is why transcripts of sentencing remarks are available free of charge to the families of victims of fatal road offences, murder and manslaughter. It is also why this Government are running a one-year pilot that offers free sentencing remarks to victims of rape and sexual offences. That is due to conclude in May. We are also looking in the round at how we lower the cost of obtaining a court transcript through increased use of technology.
The previous Government launched a pilot scheme to provide free sentencing remarks to victims of sexual violence. However, thousands of eligible survivors only found out about it months after it started. Poor communication meant that victims missed out on the opportunity for some closure. Will the Justice Secretary confirm whether the pilot has been properly evaluated, whether its findings will be made public, and what steps will be taken to improve awareness and accessibility for those who need to use the scheme?
The hon. Member is absolutely right that initially there was not enough uptake. The Government acted to drum up awareness of the scheme precisely because we want to test its effectiveness for victims of rape and serious sexual offences. I reassure her that application numbers are up. We are conducting the evaluation, and once we have the results, we will be able to test whether we can implement the scheme in the future.
The last Government left a mess in every single corner of our justice system—our criminal courts and our civil courts. In the process, they let down not just victims of crime but businesses, employees, employers and children in care; every part of our system was left in a complete mess. That is what we are sorting out, with record Crown court sitting days—a commitment of 110,000 sitting days—and running almost to a maximum across all jurisdictions to bring down the backlog. We are sorting out the mess that we were left with.
I agree with the Minister’s assessment of the previous Conservative Government. However, with more than 382,000 cases still in the backlog for magistrates, have the Government done an assessment of whether that will increase, given the doubled sentencing powers that have been passed down to those courts?
The magistrates court is being run in a sustainable way. We extended the sentencing powers in order to free up capacity in the Crown court, and that has been sustainable, and we are increasing capacity in our magistracy by recruiting an additional 2,000 magistrates from diverse backgrounds every year. But that is why we are looking at system reform, whether in the magistrates court or the Crown courts. We are going to need once-in-a-generation reform, and when Sir Brian Leveson reports back, that is what we will get.
Shockingly, just 4% of rape and sexual offences reported to Derbyshire police in the last year resulted in a charge. When offenders are not prosecuted, victims understandably lose faith in our justice system. What steps has the Minister taken to reduce backlogs in Derbyshire courts so that justice can be served for these despicable crimes?
I am sorry to hear how long victims in my hon. Friend’s constituency are waiting. That is why we are taking urgent action to bear down on the Crown court backlog, not only by increasing sitting days this year, but by committing to record numbers of sitting days next year. Of course that will not be sufficient to bring down the backlog and deliver swifter justice for victims, and that is why we need to hear from Sir Brian Leveson and implement reform in due course.
I am sorry to hear about that tragic case in my hon. Friend’s constituency. Encouraging or assisting suicide is an offence under the Suicide Act 1961, and sending communications that encourage or assist serious self-harm is an offence under the Online Safety Act 2023, but we are going to tighten up the law to address the situation that my hon. Friend has described. Of course, this is about not just the law, but the enforcement of the law as well.
As the Lord Chancellor has said, our priority is delivering swifter justice for victims and bearing down on the Crown court backlog. That is why we have asked Sir Brian Leveson to consider all options, which have to include reclassification of offences and the intermediate court. We have to have a whole-system reform, but I fear that if we were to exclude those options, we would not be gripping the problem.
On several occasions I have met my constituent Beverley, whose son suffered a horrific murder. He was stabbed more than 140 times. She has been desperately attempting to get hold of the court transcripts, but to no avail. Will Ministers please meet me to help this still grieving mum?
I am really horrified to hear of that case. Of course, as I mentioned earlier, the transcript of sentencing remarks should have been made available free of charge, but I am happy to meet my hon. Friend to discuss how transcripts of trials more broadly can be made available.
On Radio 4’s “Today” programme last week, Matthew Ryder KC, who sits as a judge, praised the extreme helpfulness of pre-sentencing reports for passing effective sentences. Will the Secretary of State do as he asks and endorse the importance, value and independence of the Sentencing Council?
What are this Government doing to crack down on unqualified people representing themselves as solicitors?
As the hon. Member well knows, the solicitors profession is highly regulated. We have the Solicitors Regulation Authority, which itself is regulated by the Legal Services Board. All our professionals, whether they are practising in criminal or civil law, are highly respected and highly regulated, and we are indebted to them.
I was shocked to read the Sentencing Council’s response to the Secretary of State last night, with its arrogant tone. As she has said, this Parliament is sovereign, and the fact is that we have given too much power away to these unelected bodies in recent years. Can I reassure her of my support, and can she reassure me that she will not rest until we retain equality before the law?
(1 week, 3 days ago)
Written StatementsThe Ministry of Justice requires an advance to discharge its commitments which are set out in its supplementary estimate 2024-25, published on 11 February 2025 as “HC 655 (Central Government Supply Estimates 2024-25, Supplementary Estimates)”.
This is a temporary cash advance due to the timing of Royal Assent for the Supply and Appropriation (Anticipation and Adjustments) Bill (“the Supply Bill”), and does not reflect an overspend.
Once the Supply Bill achieves Royal Assent the advance will be repaid in full.
Parliamentary approval for additional resources of £300,000,000 will be sought in a supplementary estimate for the Ministry of Justice. Pending that approval, urgent expenditure estimated at £300,000,000 will be met by repayable cash advances from the Contingencies Fund.
[HCWS491]
(1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI absolutely agree that such clarity would be very useful. The hon. Member and I both want to ensure that undue influence is captured somewhere; I am less picky about where. As long as it gets covered somewhere in the Bill, that would be an improvement to the Bill, and I hope that everyone would really welcome that. I think everyone recognises the issue. I am not hearing that people are opposed to this; they recognise that there can be more subtle forms of coercion. If we can work together to find the best place for that to go in the Bill, I am very open to that.
It might help if I offer—with the usual caveat that of course the Government are neutral—the Government’s position with respect to what the hon. Lady has been discussing. It is important to point out that the terms “coercion” and “coercive behaviour” and “pressure” that are used on the face of the Bill appear in existing legislation without statutory definition. In other words, they are given their ordinary meaning and they operate effectively in that manner in the criminal law. The hon. Lady is absolutely right that clause 26, which we shall come to in due course, is a separate matter, but of course it will be important to review the Bill as a whole and to understand the interaction between the different provisions in clause 1, as we trace it through to the criminal offences.
It is the Government’s view that manipulative behaviour or undue influence—the terms that the hon. Lady is using—would come within the normal meaning as understood in case law by the judiciary of the terms “pressure” and “coercion”. In terms of the integrity of the statute book, there is a concern that by adding additional terms, we run the risk of creating confusion, because when it comes to the interpretation of those provisions, judges will be looking to understand and ascertain what Parliament meant by “undue influence” that was not currently covered by coercion. Given that those terms are commonly broadly interpreted, it is the Government’s view that the sorts of behaviours that the hon. Lady is describing—“undue influence”—would be covered by the terms used on the face of the Bill. For simplicity, given that our existing body of law interprets those provisions widely, and to ensure consistent application of the law in this context and other contexts where coercion arises, it is important from the Government’s point of view to retain the Bill’s current wording.
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the hon. Member for South Devon (Caroline Voaden) for securing this debate on an important and emotive subject. I start by saying how sorry I am for the loss that she and her family suffered, and how much I admire her resilience in coming to this House to share her story. That takes a huge amount of courage.
The circumstances in which the hon. Lady and others have lost co-parents are heartbreaking indeed. The Government are determined to ensure that the justice system is better able to support children and families, and particularly mothers who have lost the father of their child.
The hon. Lady helpfully outlined the current process for registering a parent’s name on a birth certificate when that parent has passed away, but it is important to set out precisely how this works. Under section 55A of the Family Law Act 1986, in situations where a child is born to unmarried parents and the father is deceased prior to birth, a declaration of parentage must be issued by the court for paternity to be established. It is right that a fee is attached to this application, but it is important to say that there are mechanisms in place to support those who cannot afford the fee.
The help with fees scheme considers a range of factors, including an applicant’s income, their savings and whether they receive any benefits, so that the fee can be waived in certain circumstances. Once a declaration is issued, the birth can then be re-registered to include the father’s details or, to put it another way and as we have heard, to fill in that blank space.
To recognise the challenges that mothers face when seeking a declaration of parentage, a key intention of the provisions in family proceedings is to make the process as simple as possible in the most difficult of circumstances, while at the same time ensuring that the court has the means to establish parentage if one parent is deceased and is not, of course, able to convey their views themselves.
That process, while we have to emphasise simplicity and ease for those going through the toughest of circumstances, is an important one. It is important because in some cases the process can bear on significant financial implications for others, such as children from previous relationships, and can bear on issues such as nationality and others that touch on the best interests of the child. While ensuring the process is clear and simple to support bereaved parents, the courts must therefore have a process that instils confidence in the important details that a birth certificate contains.
I want to add my congratulations to the hon. Member for South Devon (Caroline Voaden) on securing this incredibly important debate.
The Minister has spoken well on the process involved. If a couple are married when the father dies while the woman is pregnant, it is a relatively simple process to register that person as the father of the child. It is a much more complicated matter for people where the couple are not married. I suggest, and I hope my hon. Friend agrees, that legislation might not have kept pace with societal change and with the reality of how couples now choose to live when they plan families.
My hon. Friend is right to reflect on the growing number of couples in this country who cohabit and for whom marriage is not something they have chosen. It is right, too, that in general the law keeps up, to reflect that sort of societal change. I will come in due course to discuss more widely what the Government are doing in that space. I return, however, to the essential point that while clarity, simplicity and affordability are important in the registration process, particularly to support bereaved parents, we must have a process that instils confidence in what the birth certificate contains.
I thank the hon. Member for South Devon for drawing attention to Widowed and Young’s campaign. As she rightly points out, it does some absolutely amazing work, particularly for those younger people who have tragically lost a spouse or life partner. I can reassure the hon. Member now that the Government take the matter incredibly seriously and we are working hard to improve the family justice system for children and families.
Widowed and Young advocates for a simplified court process. We know that delays in the court process add to the distress when someone is going through bereavement. That can have a significant impact on children and families. We are committed to improving timeliness and reducing the outstanding caseload in the family court. That is why we have set ambitious targets for reducing delays in 2024-25 and have focused on closing the longest-running cases, not least so that can free up court time to deal with precisely the sorts of processes to which the hon. Member draws attention.
To further support those who use the family court, we are committed to improving digital solutions to support families with exploring various options for resolving child arrangement disputes early and away from court whenever possible. That is an area where digital solutions can be brought to bear on the sorts of issues that have been raised today. The Ministry of Justice is working on testing and developing various digital innovations that aim to support users in the private family justice system to help those families find the right information at the right time for them to reach agreements where that is appropriate, and particularly in the sorts of processes and proceedings under focus, which in the vast majority of cases are entirely non-contentious.
Let me turn to the wider issue of cohabitation reform. The subject that the hon. Member for South Devon raises and that others have raised today speak to the broader issues for cohabiting couples in our society who, under existing law, have only limited financial protections compared with those who are married or in a civil partnership. I know that a number of colleagues across the House have written to my Department about this, and my noble friend Lord Ponsonby was pleased to attend a parliamentary roundtable to discuss it last November.
We know that the limited rights and protections available to cohabitants can affect the most vulnerable in our society who are often affected at the most difficult stages in life, such as when a partner dies, or at the point of separation. We know, too, that those limited rights and protections disproportionately affect women, including victims of domestic and economic abuse, as well as their children. With the number of cohabiting couples in the UK having more than doubled over the past 30 years, it is important, as others have said, that law reflects the society in which we now live. That indeed is why the Government set out in our manifesto a commitment to strengthen the rights and protections available to women in cohabiting couples. We will be setting out the next steps on this manifesto commitment—how we intend to implement it—as soon as possible.
The issue raised by the hon. Member for South Devon speaks directly to those challenges that sometimes face parents who are unmarried. I would like to thank her once again for securing this important debate and pay tribute to her bravery in coming forward to talk about it. I hope that this is the start of a conversation. I hope that she and I can discuss in more depth very soon the sorts of changes that might be necessary to better protect people in law, and I look forward to working with her to that end.
While I am on my feet, let me also pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Northfield (Laurence Turner) for the related issue that he raises and let me extend my personal condolences to the family involved. They have been through one of the worst things imaginable in my view. Certainly, processes of administration—of registration—should not be designed to exacerbate that. If he will write to me with that particular case, I would be happy to take a look at it, and I look forward to working with him on how we can address and mitigate the distress of parents of children who die in childbirth.
Once again, let me thank the hon. Member for South Devon for securing this important debate. I look forward to working with her on how we can ameliorate the situation for those for whom she is campaigning.
Question put and agreed to.
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Professor Lewis: A motion was put forward by Julie Morgan that was supported by three or four Members of the Senedd, which was broadly in support not of this specific Bill, but of the purpose of this Bill, and it was defeated, as you say, after a full debate on the Floor of the Senedd. Formally, legally and constitutionally, that is of no consequence, because it was not a legislative consent motion, and of course, as I said earlier, this Parliament is able to do what it likes. It could totally disregard that. Whether that would be a prudent or an appropriate thing to do, or even what one might describe as a constitutionally appropriate thing to do, is another matter.
I think it reinforces the point that there is a significance in making sure that scrutiny of the Bill has a Welsh focus. You might consider, for example, making different provision in Wales. How do you respect what was a democratic vote in the Senedd in Cardiff? Well, you might consider having different commencement provisions—I am not advocating this, it is just an example of what you might do. Commencement of the Bill in Wales might happen in a different way, on the assumption it was passed. You might put that in the hands of Welsh Ministers and the Senedd, just as an example.
Q
You have highlighted in particular the distinctions between health law, which is a devolved matter, and the law on suicide, which currently is not devolved. On the first page of your written evidence, you draw out clauses 32, 31, 33 and 34 in particular as issues that we should focus on in ironing out those legalities. Is there anything else you want to add to that that you think that we as a Government should focus on in our work consulting with the Senedd?
Professor Lewis: I think it is important that both Governments understand how the implementation of what will be a pretty radical change in the law will happen on the ground within the health service and among those who are responsible for delivering social services. I am thinking of issues such as adult safeguarding, which in Wales has its own specific law and is slightly different from the arrangements in England. There are those kinds of nuances between the two territories, and I think it would be prudent to focus on them.
I also think it is wise to bear in mind that Wales has certain statutory bodies whose interests might extend to the Bill. For example, there is the Older People’s Commissioner for Wales, in particular; there is the Future Generations Commissioner for Wales as well. I think it is important that there is some forum, some scope, for those people also to be involved in how this is shaped.
Q
“is not sufficient for the purposes of this Bill.”
Could you expand a little on that and, if you feel able, make some recommendations as to what you think could be sufficient?
Dr Price: Thank you. In answering this, I will also refer back to Professor Gareth Owen’s oral submission, thinking about the purpose that the Mental Capacity Act was drawn up for and the fact that decisions about the ending of life were not one of the originally designed functions of it. We would need to think carefully about how that would then translate into a decision that was specifically about the capacity to end one’s life.
We also need to think about how that would work in practice. When we are thinking about capacity assessments, it is usually related to a treatment or a choice about a treatment or about somebody’s life—for example, changing residence. Psychiatrists and doctors and actually lots of professionals are very used to those sorts of decisions and have gathered a lot of knowledge, expertise and experience around it. This particular decision is something that in this country we do not have knowledge, expertise and experience in, and we therefore need to think about how that would look in practice.
As for advice to the Committee about what that might look like, I think that we need to gather what evidence we have—it is actually very thin—from other jurisdictions that think about capacity as part of this process. I am thinking about my PhD: I visited Oregon and talked to practitioners who were directly involved in these sorts of assessments. They described the process, but they are not using the Mental Capacity Act as their framework. They described a very interpersonal process, which relied on a relationship with the patient, and the better a patient was known, the more a gut feeling-type assessment was used. We need to think here about whether that would be a sufficient conversation to have.
One of the things that I have thought quite a lot about is how we can really understand the workings of a mental capacity assessment, and one of the best ways we can do that is to see who is not permitted to access assisted suicide because of a lack of capacity and what that assessment showed. We do not have data because the assessments for people who were not permitted to do it are not published; we cannot read them, so if this becomes legislation, one of the suggestions that I would have—it is supported by the Royal College of Psychiatrists—is to, with patients’ consent, record capacity assessments to see whether they meet the standard that is necessary. I think it is important to set out the standard necessary and the components needed to be confident about a mental capacity assessment. That will help with standards, but will also help with training, because this is new territory for psychiatry, for medicine, and to be able to think about consistency and reliability, training needs to actually see a transparency in capacity assessments.
On a point of order, Mrs Harris. Yesterday, we heard evidence about the impact of the Bill on different groups with protected characteristics, including age, disability, race and sexual orientation. We heard from the EHRC, an arm’s length body of the Government, that it strongly recommends that a full impact assessment, a human rights assessment and a delegated powers memorandum be undertaken before the Committee begins line-by-line scrutiny.
We have also heard from witnesses about the impact that the Bill will have on disabled people, from Disability Rights UK and others, on black and minority ethnic people, from Dr Jamilla Hussain, from LGBT people, from Baroness Falkner, and on those from a low-income background, from Sam Royston of Marie Curie. We heard from Dr Sarah Cox and Dr Jamilla Hussain that evidence from their work shows that this Bill has a higher probability of pushing minority groups further away from seeking healthcare, while inequality pre-exists. As observed through the pandemic and from available data, minority groups do not always trust that their interests will be best represented in institutions that would enable the facilitation of someone’s death, should this Bill become law.
I therefore believe that on the basis of that advice, so as not to inadvertently widen health inequalities through Bill, it is essential to have health impact assessments. I appreciate that an equality impact assessment will be produced for Report stage, it will not be available for detailed line-by-line scrutiny. When we agreed the timetable for line-by-line scrutiny last Tuesday, we were not aware that this assessment would be produced, given it was first reported to the House during the money resolution last Wednesday. There is a risk that there will be a bigger impact on people with protected characteristics, and this will not be understood fully until the Government have produced the equality impact assessment. As things stand, that means that we will move into line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill on 11 February without a full understanding from the assessment of the impact of the Bill.
I am therefore minded to request a short Adjournment of the Committee so that, as advised, we can receive the assessments before we progress to line-by-line scrutiny. Please will you advise me, Mrs Harris, how I could secure such a motion to adjourn the Committee until we are in receipt of the evidence, as advised by the witnesses yesterday?
Further to that point of order, Mrs Harris. I want to clarify the Government’s position. As the Committee knows, the Government are neutral on the Bill, but once the Committee has concluded its work and prior to Report, we are committed to publishing the ECHR memorandum, a delegated powers memorandum, the economic impact assessment that was committed to during the money resolution debate, and an assessment of the equalities impact of the Bill. In terms of the timing, it is necessary that the impacts that are assessed be of the Bill as it is brought forward. If the Bill is liable to change via amendments proposed by members of this Committee, it is important that we know what it is that we are assessing the impact of. That is why the proposed timing is to publish the impact assessment at that stage. The point is that before Members of the House come to a vote on Report and Third Reading, they will all have before them the impact assessment in respect of equalities and all those other aspects of the Bill.
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberThis Government are committed to supporting victims and survivors of violence against women and girls. These are abhorrent crimes. We are therefore funding the rape and sexual abuse support fund to the tune of £26 million, as well as funding independent domestic and sexual violence advocates. We are also strengthening the powers of the Victims’ Commissioner to improve accountability where those victims’ needs are not being met.
A constituent of mine from Somerset was seriously sexually assaulted in another county more than two years ago. Despite reporting the assault in 2022, she has been given a court date in December 2025. She told me that the legal process, involving both the courts and the relevant police service, has been more traumatising than the incident itself. What better support can we offer women who find themselves stuck in these processes for such lengths of time?
I am terribly sorry to hear about this case. We know that such cases are not isolated, which is why this Government are bearing down on the Crown court backlog; we are increasing the number of Crown court sitting days and increasing magistrates’ sentencing powers to free up capacity in the Crown court, so that we can get swifter justice for victims. We are also investing in the victim transformation programme, through the Crown Prosecution Service, to provide precisely the kind of support that would benefit the hon. Lady’s constituent, keep her engaged in the process, and bring those trial dates forward.
It has been revealed that just 4% of rape and sexual offences reported to Lancashire police in the past year resulted in a charge or summons. What steps will the Ministry take to restore confidence in the criminal justice system for my constituents?
My hon. Friend will know that this Government have a landmark ambition to halve violence against women and girls, and the criminal justice system has an important part to play in that. While setting that priority, whether it is for the CPS or our police, we want to drive charging decisions and drive up the conviction rate. Providing swifter justice for victims is going to require once-in-a-generation reform to bring down the Crown court backlog.
In a recent written parliamentary question, I asked the Government how many domestic abusers there are in prison and what their reoffending rate is. Under the system this Government inherited from the Conservatives, they said that
“It is not possible to robustly calculate the number”.
That is shocking, and is in part because there is no specific offence of domestic abuse in the law to properly reflect and recognise these crimes. My Domestic Abuse (Aggravated Offences) Bill would correct that loophole. When will the Secretary of State honour the commitment she made on “Good Morning Britain” to meet me to discuss my Bill and how we can better protect victims and survivors?
Tackling domestic abuse is a priority for this Government. The Domestic Abuse Act 2021 sets out a broad statutory definition of domestic abuse, which is improving our understanding of the wide range of behaviours that can constitute this abuse. While not constituting a stand-alone offence, domestic abuse is considered an aggravating factor routinely throughout our criminal justice system, and rightly so. That is the reason why that data is not collected, and that is the position we will maintain.
Applications for deputyship to the Court of Protection play a vital role when people need to be able to make decisions for loved ones who lack capacity. It is important to support those people through prompt and efficient processes. His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service has been implementing an improvement plan, driving down waiting times by recruiting more staff, enhancing judicial capacity, digitising application forms, and implementing a new case management system.
One of my constituents has contacted me to ask why he has been waiting nine long months for a decision from the Court of Protection on his deputyship application. He needs to secure the deputyship in order to make crucial decisions for a vulnerable loved one. Another constituent, in a similar position, waited for two months without any acknowledgement that his application was being looked into. Their experiences are not unique; solicitors and judges alike acknowledge the systemic delays plaguing the system. Does the Minister agree that such long delays in processing times are unacceptable, and what does she think is acceptable?
I agree with the hon. Lady that such delays are not acceptable, and I am sorry to hear of the distress that this will have caused. It is right that we continue to invest in our improvement plan and continue to see progress with digitisation. Digitising the application forms is a first step, but we want to see end-to-end digitisation, which we know is resulting in decent progress and has sped up those times over recent months. There is more to do, and we shall do it.
As I have said, the Government are committed to halving violence against women and girls within a decade. It is an important ambition, and the criminal justice system has a vital role to play in it. In November, we launched a pilot promoting domestic abuse protection orders in selected areas, and we have ambitions to roll that out further. We will also introduce independent legal advisers for adult rape victims, ensuring that victims have the legal support that they need and deserve.
Last week, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner found that just 5% of reported domestic abuse results in a conviction. Does the Minister share my concerns that lengthy investigations into non-crime hate incidents are potentially diverting vital resources from the criminal justice system and from prosecuting actual violence against women and girls?
The hon. Member is right to remark on the low charging and conviction rates for domestic abuse. We have an ambition to drive those up. That is why we are putting more funding and more prioritisation into this area and calling on our agencies, whether it is the police or the Crown Prosecution Service, to really focus on it, because right now we are not doing enough for women and girls.
The tragic reality for many women who suffer domestic abuse and then have to go through family court proceedings on top of it is that the presumption of parental contact provides another opportunity for perpetrators of domestic abuse to prolong it. The Government are rightly reviewing this. Will Ministers ensure that we make the most of this opportunity to better protect women who suffer domestic abuse through the family court system?
My hon. Friend is right to make that point. Our family courts should never become sites of retraumatisation for victims of domestic abuse. We are reviewing the presumption, and when we are ready, we will publish the findings and our policy response to that review.
I thank my hon. Friend for his question, and for the campaigning work that he is doing in this area. Journalism is the lifeblood of democracy, and strategic lawsuits against public participation represent an abuse of the legal system; they are used by those with deep pockets to harass and silence journalism. Such behaviour is intolerable. My focus, and the focus of this Government, will be on the implementation of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023, which introduced an early dismissal mechanism and cost protection for SLAPP defendants.
Humanist marriage has been legal in Scotland for 20 years but continues to wait to be legalised in England and Wales. The Law Commission made recommendations two years ago on clarifying the law, but when asked to set out a timetable for action, the Minister in the other place could only respond, “in the fullness of time.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 2 December 2024; Vol. 841, c. 910.]
Can the Minister set out the timetable or, alternatively, say when the Government will make an order to end the long wait for humanist marriage?
I understand that humanists have been campaigning for legally binding humanist weddings. The Government are committed to strengthening the rights and protections available, particularly for women in cohabiting couples. We will look at the Law Commission’s work and publish our response in due course.
May I express how sorry I am to hear of the case of the hon. Gentleman’s constituent? I am happy to write to him—he asks quite a specific question—but it is important that we provide support to all sorts of victims. That is why we have the victims code, which strengthens the power of the Victims’ Commissioner, but I will write to the hon. Gentleman on that specific matter.
Last week, the Court of Appeal overturned a first-instance decision regarding the anonymity of a judge who presided over the tragic Sara Sharif case in the family courts. I do not expect the Minister to comment on individual cases, and it is certainly not about that individual judge, but will the Government use this opportunity to reaffirm our commitment to open justice and press freedom?
As my hon. Friend rightly says, I cannot comment on that specific case, but we adhere to the principle of open justice and transparency in our legal system. That is why we have the publication of sentencing remarks and transcripts, and the broadcasting of many of our hearings, so that the public can see exactly how justice in this country is administered.
We have just witnessed the chair of the Criminal Cases Review Commission being prised out of her job, six months after the Secretary of State described her as
“unable to fulfil her duties”.
When will a new chair be appointed, and will this be accompanied by a wider review of the CCRC, to restore confidence in that damaged organisation?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right to say that we need to restore confidence in the CCRC. That is why we are taking the decision not only to appoint an interim chair to steady the ship but, more importantly, to implement the recommendations of the Henley review so that we can restore confidence in this important institution, particularly in the light of the appalling miscarriage of justice in the case of Andrew Malkinson.
I know that the Justice Secretary is aware of the tragic case of my constituent Sara Sharif. Will she consider reforming family courts and ending the presumption in favour of parental contact despite the fact that there were safeguarding concerns?
That case of that little girl, Sara Sharif, is one of the most tragic of recent times, and I know that that view is shared right across the House. That is why a safeguarding review is under way to look at all the agencies that were involved and should have been protecting that little girl from those who ended up killing her. We are looking at the presumption: there is a review, and we will consider the findings of that review and publish our response in due course.
My constituent, who is a British citizen and the mother of two young children, faces the prospect of being forced to return to Poland to accompany those children under the Hague convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction, having fled escalating domestic abuse. If she does, her inability to speak the language or work will leave her entirely dependent on her abuser, even though he is barred from contacting her. Will the Minister work with me to ensure that domestic abuse is explicitly recognised as a valid defence against return orders of this type?
I thank the hon. Lady for her question, and I invite her to write to me about that specific case, which sounds like it throws up a very difficult set of factual circumstances that I would like the opportunity to consider.
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Alex Ruck Keene: We have capacity, but we also have to make sure that it is settled, informed and voluntary, and that we do not have things like pressure or influence going on. It is important to make it clear that we are not just saying that this is about all the weight going on capacity. For instance, if you have social workers involved—if you have, say, palliative care social workers involved, assuming it is a palliative care situation—they are going to be far better informed about what options might be out there than a doctor, potentially, depending on the doctor. Social workers more generally might well have more expertise in picking up signs of coercion or influence than a doctor, but I do not necessarily want to get into, “Some disciplines are good at X” and “Some disciplines are good at Y”—I have come across brilliant examples and bad examples in both zones.
It is partly about multidisciplinariness and also about the fact that you have more than one person trying to talk it through. When I train, I always try to tell people that 85% of capacity assessments are not all that difficult —they are just made difficult because you do not have time or you are not listening—but 15% are more difficult. I think a lot of these will be in the 15% zone, and in that zone, the more people you can have thinking about it, so long as they have an agreed framework within which to think, the more reliable, transparent and accountable the outcome is going to be.
Q
Sir Nicholas Mostyn: The former.
Q
Sir Nicholas Mostyn: It will have the statements in schedules 1 to 4, signed by both doctors twice. This is where it gets slightly tricky. Is the panel expected to be a ferret and say, “This does not quite chime for me”? The Committee will have to consider how investigative the panel will be, or whether it will purely sit back, be passive and work on the material it has. Of course, under clause 12, it has to hear orally. That might get the alarm bells going, but I believe that the panel should be entitled to call for further evidence if it has concerns. As I say, I have been trying to find out why 10% of cases were rejected by the panel in Spain. There must have been some kind of procurement of further evidence by the panel in order to do that.
Q
Sir Nicholas Mostyn: Article 10 of the Spanish law gives an appeal on a point of law to their high court, so I would have the same, with an appeal on a point of law to the High Court, but only on a point of law.
Alex Ruck Keene: Either way—it would have to be either way. It could not just be against a decision not to approve, logically, because the current model is very odd in saying that you can only appeal one way to the High Court.
Sir Nicholas Mostyn: Yes. Spain gives either side the right to appeal, so I agree with that, but it is confined to a point of law.
Sir Max Hill: I would only add that I wonder whether that is the only route through, namely leaving open a judicial review appellate process, or whether, for example, as we imagine with a number of commissioner-led processes already in this jurisdiction, the panel—or frankly, I suspect, panels, which might sit regionally, chaired perhaps by the retired judiciary—would have an appellate route to a national body, which you could call a national commission, instead of a judicial-review route to the Court.
There are a large number of commissioners, some sitting under the Home Office and some sitting under the Ministry of Justice—in a sense, I was a commissioner when I was the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation—with closely defined powers. There are many others who sit in an enhanced regulatory position—highly qualified individuals. You could describe them as national commissioners, if that is an appropriate term, and they would have superintendence over regional panels, and the power to appoint retired judiciary, perhaps with the assistance of the Official Solicitor, to sit on those regional panels, and then to have an internal appellate mechanism.
Sir Nicholas Mostyn: You have to have an appeals process of some type, because otherwise there will be judicial review. If there is no appeal, there is judicial review—so you have to have an appeal of some type or there will be judicial review.
Sir Max Hill: Yes, I agree.
We have some Members who want to ask more questions; we have about six minutes or so. Jake Richards, you did have a possible question earlier on.
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Written StatementsMy noble Friend, the Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede), has today made the following statement:
My hon. Friend the Minister of State for Housing and Planning (Matthew Pennycook MP) and I are pleased to announce changes to the statutory judicial review process which will help to streamline and speed up infrastructure planning cases.
The delivery of major infrastructure projects is central to the Government’s mission to drive growth and unlock clean power. The largest and most complex of these projects currently require a development consent order (DCO) under the nationally significant infrastructure projects (NSIPs) regime established by the Planning Act 2008.
The number of legal challenges against DCOs has spiked in recent years, with 58% of decisions being subject to legal challenge. Delays to these major projects have serious implications, including holding back the delivery of essential benefits to the country and imposing considerable additional costs on development.
Despite 30 challenges being brought against major infrastructure projects, only four decisions to approve a project have been overturned by the courts. It comes as research shows that, on average, each legal challenge takes 1.4 years to reach a conclusion and the courts have spent over 10,000 working days handling these cases. Such cases impact upon the use of public money, with major road projects paying up to £121 million per scheme due to delays in legal proceedings. While it is fundamental that the public can challenge the lawfulness of Government decisions, there is scope for rebalancing the judicial review process to improve efficiency and reduce delays to NSIPs.
In October, we published Lord Banner’s independent review into the delays to NSIPs caused by legal challenges, which recognised that concerns with the process were well founded and outlined policy options for the Government to consider. Alongside publishing Lord Banner’s report, we launched a call for evidence which sought views on Lord Banner’s ideas. This closed on 30 December. We thank Lord Banner for his work in delivering the review and all those who engaged with the call for evidence.
The Government today confirm that the current permission stage for NSIP judicial reviews will be overhauled. Instead of the current position where a claimant has “three bites of the cherry”—a paper permission stage, an option to renew to an oral permission hearing and, if unsuccessful, a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal—the new process will be streamlined. Hopeless legal challenges will have just one attempt rather than three to challenge a development consent decision.
The current first attempt—known as the paper permission stage—will be scrapped. All applications for permission will go straight to an oral hearing resulting in less cost to the parties. Primary legislation will be changed so that where a judge in an oral hearing at the High Court deems the case totally without merit, it will not be possible to ask the Court of Appeal to reconsider. To ensure ongoing access to justice, a request to appeal second attempt will be allowed for all other cases.
In addition, we will: introduce non-mandatory case management conferences to NSIP judicial reviews; formally designate NSIP judicial reviews as significant planning court claims; and work with the judiciary to introduce target timescales for NSIP judicial reviews in the Court of Appeal and in the Supreme Court.
Taken together, these changes will ensure that the right to challenge NSIP decisions is protected, but with more proportionate and effective processes that give developers and investors greater confidence to get building.
The Government response to the call for evidence on this matter will be published in due course. It will set out how the measures announced today will be taken forward and will provide the Government’s views on the other options which we have considered as part of the call for evidence.
These changes will avoid needless delay, cost and uncertainty for major infrastructure projects, ensuring we can deliver the infrastructure this country needs to drive growth, cut energy bills over time, cut commuting times, and put more money in hard working people’s pockets. These reforms will drive progress of our plan for change by leveraging more investment, supporting more businesses, and getting Britain building.
[HCWS385]
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge (Dr Tidball) for securing this debate on an incredibly important subject. I am deeply sorry about what her constituent, Claire Throssell, has been through. The loss and trauma that Claire and her family have experienced is unimaginable and, frankly, unspeakable. If I can address you directly, Claire, the resilience you have shown in the face of the devastating loss of Jack and Paul is astounding. Your commitment to campaigning and advocating for children and adults who have experienced domestic abuse is inspirational, and you are shaping the national conversation on this issue. I am extremely grateful to my hon. Friend and to you, Claire, for the time you spent with the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd (Alex Davies-Jones), back in November to discuss the presumption and the wider issues surrounding it.
There is no question but that protecting vulnerable children from violence and abuse must always be a first priority for the state, and the family courts have a vital role to play in that mission by protecting children and safeguarding victims of violence against women and girls. What does the statutory presumption we have been discussing do? As currently designed, it has two important aims. The first is to ensure that any parent who poses a risk to their child can be prevented in law from being involved in their child’s life. The second is to ensure that when it is safe, and only when it is safe, to do so, children are able to maintain some form of relationship with their parent after separation.
Under our current law, the child’s welfare is, as it must be, the paramount consideration. This is known as the welfare principle, and it is enshrined in section 1 of the Children Act. The presumption reflects an understanding that, where it is safe, and only where it is safe, to allow it, and where it would be in the best interests of a child’s welfare, both parents being involved in a child’s life is a goal of family justice.
The Children Act sets out this two-stage process, and it is important that we understand what that process is and how it works when family courts come to consider it. First, the court will consider whether a parent can be involved in a child’s life in a way that does not put that child at risk of suffering harm. If it cannot be assured of that, the presumption does not apply. If a parent can be involved in a way that does not put the child at risk of suffering harm, the child will move to the second stage, and the court will consider whether the parent’s involvement would further that child’s welfare. If there is evidence that a parent’s involvement would not further the child’s welfare, the presumption can be rebutted and will not apply to that parent.
My hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge set out the history of how that came to be enshrined in our law. In 2014 the Children Act was amended to introduce the presumption of parental involvement, built on well-established case law in our domestic law and in law enshrined in the European convention on human rights. The intention was to recognise the benefits of both parents being involved in a child’s life.
I appreciate that the Act was amended in 2014, but our understanding of abuse has widened since then to encompass financial, emotional and coercive control—abuse is not limited to just physical violence. In the light of that, is it not time to review the law and change the definition of harm to the child to encompass the wider definition of what we now understand abuse to be?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right that the broader understanding of what can constitute abuse has to be incorporated in how we reflect on and review the presumption. The point made by a number of Members—that family courts must never be locations where victims can be re-traumatised by the legal process itself—is a vital one. It is also important that, at the centre of our family courts and law, the best interests and safety of the child are always the focus of any decision making. If we were to ask any family court judge, they would reiterate that that is the law they apply.
It is right, however, that a review has taken place. The Government understand the concerns that have been so eloquently raised today. As my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge pointed out, the previous Government and the Ministry of Justice conducted a wide-ranging review of private family law proceedings. A harm panel comprising experts analysed submissions of evidence from victims and families from right across the public, publishing a landmark report on private family law. As I said, family courts must never be a tool for domestic abusers to continue to exert their coercive control and abuse over others.
The panel recommended that we review the presumption of parental involvement, because in some cases it is leading to negative and unintended consequences. That review has been undertaken, and the Government will be publishing the findings. At the moment, we are grappling with what the policy implications of those findings will be. It would not be right for me to pre-empt the publication of the findings, but it is on its way. As soon as we can publish it alongside our policy response, we will.
May I ask the Minister for some advice, then? If some of our constituents have found that the family courts process and procedures have led to the re-traumatising of victims, what advice can we offer them? As the Minister eloquently set out, the family courts are not designed to do that, but it does occur.
If that is what is being experienced, it needs to be fed back. His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service has complaints processes and, in my hon. Friend, her constituents have an outstanding advocate to make those points. I will be taking back the lessons that we learn in today’s debate, and it is right that the feedback happens. I will come in a moment to what we are doing, not least through the pathfinder pilot, to reshape and reform our family justice system so that the re-traumatisation does not occur. The progress that we are seeing through the pathfinder pilot, which this Government will extend, is a vital part of that work.
One hears talk about reviews, but it is not enough to simply have a review, and it is important that we act on it. We are not waiting to act. As others have said, this Government have a landmark ambition to halve violence against women and girls within the next 10 years. There is a role for our family courts to play in achieving that wider culture change. Others have made the point that we need joined-up, mission-based Government—
Motion lapsed (Standing Order No. 10(6)).