Oral Answers to Questions
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(2 days, 17 hours ago)
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Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dan Jarvis)
The decision to call in the planning application for the proposed Chinese embassy was made by the former Deputy Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Angela Rayner), in line with the current policy on call-in. The decision is subject to a quasi-judicial process and independent from the rest of Government. No private assurances have been given to the Chinese Government regarding the embassy application.
Sir Edward Leigh
Will the prayers of long-dead medieval monks save us from this hideous mega-embassy, right next to the most totemic building in the United Kingdom, the Tower of London? On 14 January, the then Secretaries of State for the Home Office and the Foreign Office wrote a letter insisting that a condition be made that there should be a wall and public access to the Cistercian medieval monastery on the site. The Chinese, in their arrogant way, are ignoring that. Will the Government stand firm and insist on public access—which, by the way, would be a good way of stopping this awful project?
Dan Jarvis
I can say to the Father of the House that national security is the first duty of this Government, and has been a core priority throughout this process. We have considered the breadth of national security considerations and have publicly outlined the necessary security mitigations that we need in order to support an application. Should the planning decision be approved, the new embassy will replace the seven different sites that currently comprise China’s diplomatic estate.
Gregory Stafford
On Tuesday, my hon. Friend the Member for West Suffolk (Nick Timothy) raised with the Foreign Secretary concerns expressed by the United States, Dutch, Swiss and Swedish Governments regarding the reported presence of data cables running beneath Royal Mint Court. I note that the Cabinet Office has since denied the reports to the press. Will the Minister now provide the clarity that his colleague at the Foreign Office could not, and give a clear yes or no answer to this House as to whether any such cables run beneath or in the vicinity of the site?
Dan Jarvis
I reiterate the point that the Government have considered the breadth of national security considerations. Both the Home Secretary and the Foreign Secretary have been clear about that. We work incredibly closely with our allies, particularly our Five Eyes partners, to ensure our collective national security.
Euan Stainbank (Falkirk) (Lab)
My constituents are concerned about the broader domestic security risk that China is currently posing, beyond the potential implications of its embassy planning application. Considering that Chinese state-subsidised bus manufacturers have gained a rising market share in the UK over the past few years, the Department for Transport and National Cyber Security Centre—
Susan Murray (Mid Dunbartonshire) (LD)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dan Jarvis)
The Government published the resilience action plan in July to set out their strategic approach to improve the UK’s resilience to the full range of risks that we face. One of the actions we have taken is to conduct the largest ever pandemic exercise, which involved all regions and nations of the UK and thousands of participants.
Gideon Amos
From the first ever charts by Captain Cook to real-time digital mapping, the UK Hydrographic Office enables and keeps our Royal Navy safe at sea—operating quite literally under the radar. Will the Minister pay tribute to the hundreds of people in my constituency who work at the office, and will he support a cross-sector approach to energy cables, telecommunication cables and their security, bringing in the University of Plymouth, University Centre Somerset and the Hydrographic Office in my constituency?
Dan Jarvis
I join the hon. Gentleman in paying tribute to the important work of the UK Hydrographic Office and its vital contribution to the UK’s maritime security. The Cabinet Office plays a central role to cohere cross-Government efforts to secure the UK’s undersea infrastructure. Given the growing prominence of this issue, lead Departments are engaging with industry partners, and we will continue this inclusive approach as we support the Royal Navy to take a leading role to secure our undersea infrastructure.
Susan Murray
The Russian spy ship Yantar has been probing our infrastructure in the North sea. While doing so, its crew used high-powered lasers against an RAF plane monitoring their activity, threatening the lives of our pilots. What steps are the Government taking to secure our critical strategic infrastructure in the North sea and to ensure clear and serious consequences for Russia when it carries out aggressive and dangerous military activity off our coasts?
Dan Jarvis
The hon. Lady and the House will understand that I am limited in what I can say in my response, but I can assure her that Russia is a top national security priority for the Government, and UK law enforcement has recently secured a range of convictions in this area. I will have more to say about this later today.
Euan Stainbank (Falkirk) (Lab)
Considering that Chinese state-subsidised manufacturers have gained a rising market share in the UK over the past few years, that the Department for Transport and the National Cyber Security Centre have recently announced an investigation into kill switches in Chinese buses, and that the 10-year bus pipeline is expected imminently, will the Minister be raising our Government’s concerns about Chinese buses directly with the Chinese Government?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to my hon. Friend, not just for his question today, but for the important work that he has done in this particular area, in his constituency and across Scotland. I have listened carefully to what he has had to say this morning, and I would be happy to discuss it with him further.
Daniel Zeichner (Cambridge) (Lab)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dan Jarvis)
Through the national security risk assessment, the Cabinet Office engages closely with the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs to continuously assess risks to the security and resilience of the food sector, as well as interdependencies between critical national infrastructure sectors. The Government have published the results of the first annual public survey on risk and resilience, and we provide resilience advice to the public on gov.uk.
Daniel Zeichner
The UK food system has shown remarkable resistance and flexibility in recent years, but seasoned industry voices are warning that we face new challenges from climatic risk and global instability. I appreciate that this is not just a food production issue, but a cross-Government issue. Can my right hon. Friend say a little more about measures to assess our readiness for these new challenges?
Dan Jarvis
My hon. Friend speaks with great authority on these matters. The Cabinet Office is strongly supportive of the work that DEFRA is undertaking on food security, including mapping critical food supply chain assets to provide a greater understanding of potential vulnerabilities. We have also published the first ever chronic risks analysis to support decision making on longer-term cross-cutting and interconnected risks, such as climate and geopolitical change.
Gerald Jones (Merthyr Tydfil and Aberdare) (Lab)
Andrew Rosindell (Romford) (Con)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dan Jarvis)
The Government recently introduced the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill to strengthen the resilience of UK critical national infrastructure. Yesterday, I visited BT, which has worked with the National Cyber Security Centre to block almost 1 billion attempts to access malicious content in just six months. In spring, the Government will publish a business-first national cyber action plan, and we have already engaged with over 400 stakeholders as part of its development.
Andrew Rosindell
The United Kingdom is increasingly and uniquely vulnerable to malicious cyber-activity targeting national infrastructure and democratic institutions, including Parliament itself. That poses a serious risk to our national security. Experts have warned of a critical data leak, a new scale of severe blackouts, transport disruption and even Government being brought to a halt. What action is the Minister’s Department taking to ensure that the Government are prepared and sufficiently resourced to meet this pernicious national security threat?
Dan Jarvis
I understand why the hon. Gentleman raises this issue, and he is right to do so. The Government take the threats we face incredibly seriously. That is one of the reasons why the Prime Minister took the decision back in September to ensure that the Security Minister sits across both the Cabinet Office and the Home Office, so we are better placed as a Government to co-ordinate our national security response in the areas the hon. Gentleman outlined. I can give him and the House an absolute assurance on the seriousness we attach to these issues. We take them very seriously and we are working at pace to address them.
Bradley Thomas (Bromsgrove) (Con)
Luke Akehurst (North Durham) (Lab)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dan Jarvis)
The resilience action plan sets out how we will lead a conversation with the public on resilience. Our evidence gathering included consultation with organisations that represent disproportionately impacted groups to ensure that our approach to resilience reflects the characteristics of the whole of the UK.
Luke Akehurst
Will the Minister explain to the House the importance of exercises like Pegasus, and outline how Pegasus has supported this Government’s efforts to improve our national resilience for future pandemics?
Dan Jarvis
The Government remain committed to learning the lessons of the covid inquiry to protect and prepare us for the future. In line with the inquiry’s recommendations on pandemic response exercises, Exercise Pegasus has been the largest simulation of a pandemic in UK history, involving Ministers, the devolved Governments and representation from arm’s length bodies. We will communicate the findings and lessons from this exercise in due course, as recommended by the inquiry.
Charlie Maynard (Witney) (LD)
Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dan Jarvis)
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for raising this issue. I will look carefully at what he has said and will be happy to meet to discuss it further.
Mr Luke Charters (York Outer) (Lab)
Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)
Last week, the National Security Adviser was due to appear before the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. Did he? If not, why not?
Dan Jarvis
My understanding is that the National Security Adviser did appear in front of the Committee, but it was a private session.
Callum Anderson (Buckingham and Bletchley) (Lab)
Dawn Sturgess Inquiry
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(2 days, 17 hours ago)
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The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
With permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will make a statement on the Dawn Sturgess inquiry, which has today published its report.
I start with Dawn Sturgess. The untimely and sudden death of a much-missed mother, partner, daughter, sister and friend is a deeply personal tragedy, and today we keep her and her loved ones in our thoughts and prayers.
On 4 March 2018, Sergei and Yulia Skripal were targeted by the GRU, the Russian military intelligence service. Three GRU agents flew to the UK intent on killing Sergei Skripal. Two agents, known as Alexander Petrov and Ruslan Boshirov, travelled to Salisbury and contaminated the door handle of Sergei’s house with the nerve agent Novichok, with callous and despicable disregard for others who might enter or leave that address. Sergei and Yulia were poisoned, and spent weeks in a critical condition. Others, including Detective Sergeant Nick Bailey, were harmed as they responded to the incident.
On 30 June 2018, Charlie Rowley gave his partner Dawn Sturgess a gift of a Nina Ricci perfume bottle. She sprayed her wrists with the contents. Tragically, the bottle contained Novichok and had been recklessly thrown away by Petrov and Boshirov as they left Salisbury four months earlier. Dawn died at Salisbury hospital on 8 July 2018. An inquest was opened, but it was clear that a proper examination of Dawn Sturgess’s death would require a statutory public inquiry, which has been chaired by Lord Hughes.
Today, after an extensive and painstaking process, the inquiry has published its report. The inquiry has found that those who were involved in the assassination attempt against Sergei Skripal were “morally responsible” for Dawn’s death, and that
“deploying a highly toxic nerve agent in a busy city was an astonishingly reckless act.”
The chair concludes that the operation must have been signed off at the highest level of the Russian state, including by President Putin.
In respect of the emergency services’ treatment of Dawn, the inquiry found that she received “entirely appropriate medical care” but that, tragically, her condition was “unsurvivable”. On preventability, the chair has concluded that the Government’s public health advice following the attack on the Skripals was reasonable. He also found that although there were failings in the management of Sergei Skripal, the risk of assassination by Russian personnel was reasonably assessed and, based on that assessment, he did not need a new identity.
The inquiry has been clear in its findings of responsibility, and we must respond equally unequivocally. I have previously described to hon. Members the acute threat that Russia poses to the UK and our national security. Its recent acts have ranged from murdering Alexander Litvinenko and using a deadly nerve agent in Salisbury to espionage, arson, cyber-attacks and the targeting of UK parliamentarians for interference operations.
Since 2018, the UK has been at the forefront of the response against Russia. In direct response to the poisonings, the then Government expelled 23 undeclared Russian intelligence officers. This triggered the expulsion of over 150 Russian diplomats by 28 countries, including NATO allies. The UK has subsequently committed to prevent the rebuild of Russian intelligence and to remove Russian dirty money in the UK, developed legislative powers to harden the UK’s defences against state threats, and delivered new port and border powers, increased security checks on goods from Russia, and banned Russian-owned or linked aircraft from entering the UK.
The invasion of Ukraine introduced a stark new reality and demonstrated Russia’s intent to undermine European and global security. The UK has led the way in standing by Ukraine and providing unprecedented military, humanitarian and diplomatic support. In total, the UK has committed £21.8 billion for Ukraine and sanctioned over 2,900 individuals, entities and ships. This Government are proud to be at the forefront of the coalition of the willing to support Ukraine in defending its sovereignty and security. This has inevitably made the UK a target for increased hostile activity by Russia. Following an arson attack in east London in May 2024, the then Home Secretary warned of a pattern of Russian malign activities across Europe that had reached UK soil. In response, the UK expelled the Russian defence attaché and removed diplomatic status from Russian properties believed to have been used for intelligence purposes.
We are determined that the UK remains a hard operating environment for the Russian intelligence services. In October last year, we sanctioned three Russian agencies and three senior figures who were attempting to undermine and destabilise Ukraine and its democracy. In July, the UK sanctioned and exposed three GRU units and 18 of its military intelligence officers for the targeting of Yulia Skripal and cyber-operations in support of Putin’s illegal war in Ukraine. Yet we are now grappling with an increasingly reckless methodology. The director general of MI5 recently highlighted Russian state actors turning to proxies “for their dirty work”, and
“recruiting proxies on social media platforms, instructing them via encrypted apps, and offering payment in cryptocurrencies.”
UK law enforcement has secured convictions in several significant cases just this year: six individuals spying for Russia; six men involved in an arson attack on a warehouse supplying Ukraine; an individual who attempted to offer services to Russian intelligence; and a former MEP who accepted bribes to promote pro-Russian narratives in the EU Parliament. These cases serve as a strong reminder for anyone—anyone—seeking to facilitate or undertake hostile activity for Russia on UK soil.
This Government remain committed to providing our law enforcement partners with the tools they need to tackle these threats. We have specified Russia on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme to make it even more challenging to conceal relationships with the Russian state. I can now announce that the Government are going further. Today, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has imposed a further cost on the Russian regime by sanctioning the GRU under the Russia sanctions regime, along with several associated individuals. These sanctions recognise the continued reckless and destabilising activity of the GRU, which seeks to undermine Ukraine, European security and the safety of the United Kingdom. They will include sanctions against eight GRU officers under the cyber sanctions regime and three GRU officers under the Russia sanctions regime who have been implicated in hostile activity across Europe. We are also summoning the Russian ambassador to hold Russia to account for its responsibility for the tragic death of a British citizen.
There has been extensive misinformation and disinformation relating to these horrific and barbaric poisonings. This inquiry has categorically rejected those falsehoods, and this Government continue to reject the lies spread by Russia through its propaganda and paid mouthpieces. I wish—I am sure on behalf of the whole House—to wholeheartedly thank Lord Hughes and his team. This was a considerable task of great importance, and they have collectively approached it with diligence, care and sensitivity. I also want to take this opportunity—I am again sure on behalf of the whole House—to thank the first responders, military personnel, scientists, medical practitioners and all those who responded to the attack. They are the very best of us, and I know that Members right across the House will join me in paying tribute to them for the important work they do to keep us safe.
Dawn Sturgess was the victim of an utterly reckless and dangerous act—a chemical weapons attack perpetrated by Russia on British soil—and the pain and suffering it has caused can never be undone, but we must honour Dawn Sturgess’s memory, uphold truth and justice, and keep everyone in our country safe. I commend this statement to the House.
Chris Philp (Croydon South) (Con)
I thank the Security Minister for advance sight of his statement. Let me set out straightaway that the Opposition of course fully support the Government’s work in keeping our country safe. I think I agree with and support everything the Security Minister said in his statement. I particularly welcome the additional sanctions that he announced on certain members of the Russian security services.
I join the Security Minister in remembering Dawn Sturgess, who lost her life as a result of this reckless and barbaric attack. Leaving highly dangerous chemical weapons lying around was a reckless undertaking by those Russian agents, and Dawn Sturgess’s death lies squarely at their door. I pay tribute to Sergei and Yulia Skripal for the bravery they have shown when faced with targeting by agents of the Russian state, who came to this country specifically with the purpose in mind of killing them.
I also pay tribute to the emergency services and security services, as the Security Minister did, who responded so bravely, and some of whom, such as Detective Sergeant Nick Bailey, were themselves harmed as they responded to the attack. The emergency services and security services, on that day and in the days following, distinguished themselves greatly, and I know the whole House will want to thank them for the work they did.
The chair of the inquiry concluded, as the Security Minister said, that this operation would have been signed off or agreed to at the very highest level of the Russian state by President Putin himself. I think that makes the important point that Russia is a dangerous and hostile state, and that Vladimir Putin is a dangerous and hostile leader—a man who, as this inquiry has found, personally sanctioned the assassination of civilians on British soil.
Of course, the atrocities that the Russian state and President Vladimir Putin have perpetrated are not confined to those we are discussing today. We have seen, on its own soil, the Russian state murder domestic political opponents such as Alexei Navalny. We have seen them shoot down civilian airliners, and we have seen them interfere across Africa. We have seen Putin support former President Assad of Syria in persecuting civilians in Syria, including supporting the use of chemical weapons. So we should be in no doubt at all about the threat that Russia and President Putin pose not just in Russia or Ukraine, but on our soil and across the whole world.
I think there is a lesson there for the way in which we in the west collectively consider the Ukraine conflict, which the Security Minister spoke about. I think the actions we have been discussing are one of many reasons that we in the west should be steadfast and unwavering in our support for Ukraine. The lessons of history are quite clear: appeasement does not work, and showing weakness when faced with aggressive dictators simply emboldens them. I hope people in our Government and other Governments, particularly the American Administration, keep that in mind as they conduct negotiations in the coming days and weeks.
I know that, quite rightly, the Security Minister will not be able to comment on details, but the House would appreciate an update and assurances about the work being done to protect us domestically against Russian threats. He did not mention cyber-threats in his statement —[Interruption.] I do apologise. He did mention them, and we know that Russia repeatedly and deliberately targets both governmental infrastructure and private sector IT infrastructure. So far as he is able to provide one, an update on the work he is leading to counter that would be welcome, as would any indication about whether we are proactively engaged in degrading Russia’s capability in that area. I appreciate that there are severe limitations around what he can say, but any indication he can provide to the House would be very much appreciated.
The lessons we can draw from this episode relate not just to Russia, but to any state where we have intelligence or information that they are engaged in aggressive hostile acts. We know, of course, that it is not just Russia: other states, including China, are engaged in different but potentially equally damaging espionage and other activity on our soil. The lesson that this episode teaches is that we cannot be complacent. We cannot, for example, prioritise economic links above national security. We need to be on the front foot when it comes to these threats.
In that spirit, and drawing that lesson from this episode, perhaps the Security Minister can explain to the House why China is not in the enhanced tier of FIRS, which in my opinion it should be, and why the Government appear to be contemplating granting planning consent for a super embassy for China on a very sensitive site close to sensitive communications infrastructure, and from which it is very likely China will conduct large-scale espionage activities? The lesson that this episode teaches us is that we cannot be complacent, and we must be active and energetic in protecting our national interest.
In general terms, I fully support the direction of travel the Security Minister has set out, and, of course, the Opposition will support him personally and the Government in the work they are doing to keep our country safe.
Dan Jarvis
I thank the shadow Home Secretary for his response and for the tone of it. I am very grateful. I think he will have noted, from my opening remarks, the gravity and seriousness I attach to the matter at hand. I know that he and other Opposition Members will have noted that in my opening statement I spoke seamlessly about the work done by the previous Government and this Government. I believe that standing against Russia and the threat it poses to our national security should be, and is, a shared endeavour across this House. I pay tribute to the work the previous Government did, in 2018 and beyond, in standing against the threat we face. Wherever possible, we should work closely together on it.
The shadow Home Secretary very accurately characterised the nature of the threat. I agree with what he said with regard to Russia and Putin. It is impossible to overstate the seriousness of this attack and the other activity he characterised.
The right hon. Gentleman spoke about Ukraine and I am grateful to him for doing so. Again, I want to take the opportunity to pay tribute to the previous Government for the commitment they made to defending Ukraine. It should be a matter of great pride across the House that, perhaps above almost everything else, it is something that binds this House together. There is a unity of purpose among us all in ensuring that we stand together to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia. I give him and the House an absolute commitment that we will continue the work of the previous Government.
Genuinely, I was really pleased that the right hon. Gentleman asked about cyber, because I am particularly keen to ensure that we co-ordinate our activity across Government as effectively as we possibly can. In truth, it was one reason why the Prime Minister made the machinery of government change back in September so that the Security Minister sits across both the Home Office and the Cabinet Office and can more effectively co-ordinate that work. He will know that the Government introduced the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill just a couple of weeks ago. From a Home Office perspective, we are working hard on the ransomware proposals that we consulted on earlier this year. He was right to make the important point about the work we do with regard to positively degrading the nature of the threats he described. He knows I am very limited in terms of what I can say about that, but I know he will join me in paying tribute to the very important work that the National Cyber Force does.
It did not come as a huge surprise that the shadow Home Secretary—in truth, I do not blame him for doing so—took the opportunity to raise the issue of China. I hope he has had the chance to look at what I said this morning at Cabinet Office oral questions and what I said in response to an urgent question from my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) yesterday with regard to the Government’s position on China. I hope he has had the opportunity to look precisely at what I said about the embassy.
With regard to FIRS, I completely understand the points the shadow Home Secretary made. The Government continue to keep that under very close review and I hope we will have more to say about it in due course.
Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
My thoughts, too, are with the family of Dawn Sturgess.
In 2010, Putin said:
“Traitors will kick the bucket, believe me.”
Post-Litvinenko, how can it be that our country can afford protection for, say, a former Prime Minister such as Liz Truss, but not for an asset such as Sergei Skripal? Yesterday’s story in the i newspaper underlines the issue about Russian agents infiltrating our society, and the points the Minister makes across the board are so well put, but given that, as we have heard, Putin has no concern for life, least of all in his own country, can the Minister confirm that he is working with all Departments across Government to assure the British public of their safety and security?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his contribution and the work he does in chairing the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. The quote he described is chilling. In response to the point he made yesterday about the coverage in the i newspaper, I can give him the assurances he seeks and tell him and the House that we take all national security threats incredibly seriously. The Government have acted decisively by introducing tougher legislation, enforcing sanctions and working closely with our international partners to make the UK one of the most challenging environments for our adversaries to operate in. That continues to be an absolute priority in terms of securing our national security. I am absolutely determined to ensure that the United Kingdom is the hardest possible target for our adversaries.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
Mr Will Forster (Woking) (LD)
I thank the Security Minister for speaking for the whole House when he gave our sincere condolences to Dawn Sturgess’s family, paid tribute to the emergency and security services, and conveyed his thoughts to those affected in the Novichok attack.
Government’s primary role is to keep our country safe. The report into the tragic killing of Dawn Sturgess on the streets of the UK by Russian agents in their attempt to assassinate Sergei Skripal, is damning. The report found Vladimir Putin to be responsible for the death of an innocent British citizen on our shores.
Basic protections were not in place. Sergei was a clear target for Russian state assassins. The inquiry states that he was resettled in the UK under his own name. Russia used that to track him down and MI5 failed to rename him. Can the Minister confirm to the House why the security services left him in an “alarmingly accessible” situation, despite clearly being an identified target of Russian state assassination, including residing in Salisbury in his own name? How have the security services justified to the Minister their apparent failure to implement even basic protective measures, such as CCTV, alarms or secure accommodation? Worryingly for UK security, Putin’s assassins had no trouble locating him. That failure put him at risk, but also exposed the wider public in Salisbury and across the country. That contributed to the death of Dawn, an entirely innocent member of the public.
Last year, the Sturgess family’s legal team described the Skripals as sitting ducks due to failings that should have been foreseen by MI5. Given the preventable deaths and public risk, what accountability measures will the Government take to ensure MI5 protects both vulnerable individuals and the wider public? Considering the threat Russia poses to world security, especially security at home, will the Government finally seize the £30 billion in frozen Russian assets across the UK, including Sutton Place in my constituency?
Finally, the Government need to see the report as a turning point for the threat Russia poses to the UK. Will they launch an investigation into Russian interference in British politics to ensure no more UK politicians, like the former leader of the Reform party in Wales, are bribed with Russian money?
Dan Jarvis
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right about the importance of keeping our country safe. I assure him that we take that incredibly seriously. We will of course look very carefully at the detail of this report. He asked about the accountability mechanisms in Government. I assure him that the Home Secretary and I take our responsibilities to hold the security services to account very seriously indeed—that is a process that the new Home Secretary and I dedicate a significant amount of time to every single week. But we have to be crystal clear that the inquiry’s report states unequivocally that responsibility lies with the Russian state. The chair of the inquiry found that the operation to assassinate Sergei Skripal was authorised at the highest level, and concluded that it would not have taken place without the approval of President Putin. The use of a military-grade nerve agent on British soil was a violation of international law and a truly despicable act, and the responsibility for that lies with Russia, and Russia alone.
The hon. Gentleman asked, entirely reasonably, about the confiscation of sovereign Russian assets. I assure him that we take that incredibly seriously as well. Our priority is to ensure that all the options that we consider with regard to that matter are in line with international law and are economically and financially responsible, but Russia must be held accountable for the terrible damage it has done in Ukraine. We will do whatever we can to ensure that Russia is held accountable and made to pay for its actions.
The hon. Gentleman’s final point was an important one about Russian interference in our democracy. I chair the defending democracy taskforce, which has recently had its mandate renewed by the Prime Minister. These are matters that we take incredibly seriously. We use the taskforce as the fulcrum point across Government to ensure that we have a whole-of-system response that draws together Government Departments and law enforcement, and I assure the hon. Gentleman of the priority that we attach to that work. It is something that I believe should be a cross-party endeavour, so if he or other Members of this House wish to discuss it with me further, I am always very happy to do so.
Luke Myer (Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland) (Lab)
The day a British citizen died on British soil as a result of a Russian attack ought to have been a wake-up call for everyone in this country. I recognise the steps that the previous Government took and that this Government are taking to address that threat. The reality is that Russian planes and ships menace our airs and waters, their cyber-attacks have hit our NHS and councils, including Redcar and Cleveland borough council, and their propaganda has been disseminated by British politicians and online. Does the Security Minister agree that, as far as the British public are concerned, this is not a distant threat elsewhere in the world; it is here and now, affecting them today? Can I also push him specifically on social media disinformation, and what steps he can take, working with the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, to address it in this country?
Dan Jarvis
My hon. Friend is absolutely right about the threat. It is not a distant matter; it quite literally impacts the lives of our citizens every single day. I give him an assurance of how seriously we take these matters. He is also right to raise the issue of misinformation and disinformation. Again, through the defending democracy taskforce, these are matters that we keep under very close review. He is right to mention the important contribution that is required of DSIT. We work very closely with DSIT and other Government Departments on these matters. We keep a constant vigilance. I think that, in truth, there is more that we need to do, and I will have further conversations with ministerial colleagues about that particular matter.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
I call the Member of Parliament for Salisbury.
John Glen (Salisbury) (Con)
I thank the Security Minister for early sight of his statement, and I thank him most warmly for the way in which he has presented the Government’s response this afternoon. As someone who spent a previous life in Salisbury and south Wiltshire, he has served the people of my constituency very well. I am also very pleased with the remarks of the shadow Home Secretary.
Today’s report was written as a consequence of the need to bring clarity and to understand unequivocally who was responsible for what happened in 2018, but it is important to remember the huge impact it had on Salisbury, and the tragedy that befell Dawn Sturgess, Charlie Rowley, Detective Sergeant Nick Bailey, and Yulia and Sergei Skripal. The report is very clear about where culpability lies: it lies with President Putin. Russia was responsible, and Putin as an individual was responsible. He personally ordered what happened in Salisbury, and we should never forget it.
Putin is a ruthless dictator, not someone with whom deals can be done. Contrary to one of the candidates in the general election last year in Salisbury who said that he admired him as a political operator, I do not. I never will. I welcome what the Minister said on additional sanctions, and I encourage him and his successors always to pursue energetically, and with continued vigilance, further such measures as required. I welcome what he said about more sophisticated threats emerging on cyber, and I urge him to extend that to look at what happens with our cloud infrastructure.
I have just one question. Paragraph 6.25 of the report refers to the issue of regular written assessments, which were lacking in terms of the ongoing care of Sergei Skripal. I think that is the only element that needs serious review for individuals like him in future, but I thank the Minister again for the way he has spoken today, which will give huge comfort to my constituents in Salisbury and to the families of those so tragically affected.
Dan Jarvis
I commend the right hon. Gentleman for the dignified and diligent way in which he represented his constituents and his constituency at the time, and for his service since, including today’s. I know that it will be hugely appreciated across the House, and certainly in the great city of Salisbury and across the wider great county of Wiltshire. He is absolutely right: responsibility for this dreadful attack rests at the top of the Russian regime with President Putin. I give the right hon. Gentleman the assurance that he seeks that this Government, and I am sure—I certainly hope—any successor Governments or Ministers, will be incredibly vigilant and pursue whatever measures are required. I have noted the point he made about the cloud, which I think is a good one. On his specific point about regular written assessments, I will take that away and look at it closely. Again, I commend him for his service to the great city of Salisbury.
Sean Woodcock (Banbury) (Lab)
I am grateful to the Minister for his statement and pleased to hear of further sanctions. He stated that Dawn Sturgess was the victim of an utterly reckless and dangerous act. I would go further and call it a heinous crime, the responsibility for which lies with Vladimir Putin, among the many other such crimes for which he is responsible. The Minister also said that we must honour Dawn Sturgess’s memory. My plea to him would be that we do so by never allowing Vladimir Putin to escape responsibility or accountability for the crime that was perpetrated in Salisbury that day.
Dan Jarvis
I completely agree with my hon. Friend, who puts it very well. The greatest legacy, as well as remembering the tragic loss of life in this case, would be to ensure that our collective defences as a country are tightened to the extent that such an attack could never happen again. Of course, the Russian regime will constantly test our defences and we will have to remain incredibly vigilant. It is the responsibility of the Government to ensure that we have the appropriate levels of resource, and that the United Kingdom is the hardest possible operating environment for Russia and its proxies, but he is right to remind us of where responsibility for this heinous act lies: with President Putin.
Danny Kruger (East Wiltshire) (Reform)
I, too, welcome the Minister’s statement, and indeed the additional sanctions that he announced. It is absolutely right that we do everything we can to resist Russia’s attacks on our security and its attempts to suborn our democracy, and I wholeheartedly agree with him. It is obviously right that the traitorous former MEP that the Minister mentioned is now in prison. I speak as the Member representing Amesbury, the town that Dawn Sturgess was in when she took the fatal poison, but it was represented at the time by my constituency neighbour, my right hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury (John Glen). I want to acknowledge his leadership throughout these difficult years for Salisbury and Amesbury.
It appears from the report that the NHS did a good job in its immediate response to the medical emergency that Dawn suffered, but it is also apparent that, when it comes to the wider system of support for the community in Salisbury and Amesbury, the response was somewhat messy—perhaps for perfectly understandable reasons. Can the Minister assure the House that the Government are looking generally at our public safety response in the event of such crises, and can he say what more can be done to ensure that in any future event local communities are properly supported?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to the hon. Member for the very sensible and constructive nature of his remarks. I recognise his service as a Wiltshire MP and his obvious constituency interest in this matter. I also genuinely welcome his condemnation of the treachery that we have seen recently, and I am glad that he made that point. He raises a sensible and constructive point with regard to the NHS, and I can give him the assurances that he seeks regarding the Government’s attention to these matters. One of the reasons why the Prime Minister took the machinery of Government change back in September to ensure that I, as Security Minister, sit across both the Home Office and the Cabinet Office was to maximise the leverage and co-ordination across Government with regard not only to national security policy, but to our resilience, and we have recently undertaken the largest ever resilience exercise across Government. He is right to raise that point. I give him an assurance of the seriousness with which we take these matters. We will, of course, look very carefully at the report’s recommendations in that regard. I am grateful to him for his comments today.
Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con)
The number of Russian spies operating in the UK is the highest it has been since the cold war—not my words but those of the head of Counter Terrorism Policing. I welcome the sanctions today on the GRU, but the Security Minister will know that the United Kingdom is probably regarded as Russia’s No. 1 enemy—not the United States but the United Kingdom. He will also know that there are other agencies that are operating internationally and have an international footprint, such as the FSB and SVR. While noting and recognising the importance of, shall we say, diplomatic reciprocity, what more can be done, to quote him, to have a “hard operating environment” for both those agencies? Are other Russian political dissidents safe here in the United Kingdom?
Finally, on the proliferation of chemical weapons, we know that a chemical agent and a nuclear agent were used in some of the cases outlined today, so given the breakdown in many countries and the security around chemical weapons in those countries—whether in Africa or other parts of the world—how confident is the Minister that the security services are aware of where those chemical weapons might be and where they might be tempted to be deployed?
Dan Jarvis
I am, as always, grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for the expertise and experience that he brings to these matters, not least given his very long-standing service on two relevant Committees in this place. He mentioned Counter Terrorism Policing. Let me take this opportunity to pay tribute to the work that they do. I have a very good and close working relationship with CTP. They do extraordinary work and it is a privilege to stand alongside them. They are exceptional in the work that they do.
It is in part a symptom of the work that the previous Government and this Government have done to make the UK the hardest possible operating environment that increasingly Russia and other malign states are seeking to use criminal proxies to do their bidding and business in the United Kingdom. There is a lot of work taking place, not only across Government but with our allies in Europe, who we are working very closely with, and further afield to ensure that we are best placed to target malign states that are using criminal proxies. The director general of MI5 referenced that in his recent annual lecture on the threats we face.
On the right hon. Member’s point about the UK being a hard target, he will understand better than most that I am very limited in what I can say about that, and that it would be unwise to give detail that would be helpful to our adversaries. However, I can give him an assurance of the seriousness with which we take these matters. He raised an important point about dissidents. It is an issue that I keep under very close review. We make sure that we have the right mechanisms in place to provide security.
The right hon. Member’s point about chemical weapons was well made. We work very closely with our international allies to ensure that we are doing everything that we can to minimise the risk and threat. It is not easy work, and there are no guarantees of its success, but I give an assurance of the seriousness with which we take it. Our approach is to work closely with our allies.
Dave Doogan (Angus and Perthshire Glens) (SNP)
I join the Security Minister in acknowledging the memory of Dawn Sturgess, and the sacrifice made by Dawn’s partner Charlie, Detective Sergeant Nick Bailey and the fearless first responders. In the seven years since this attack, an emboldened Putin has increased his aggression across Europe. Can the Minister assure the House that all the lessons that come out of this inquiry will be acted on in full? Will the UK Government continue to work with our EU partners in standing up to Putin’s aggression in Europe? Will the Government underscore the point that our multilateral defence of the international rules-based order is our strength, and his isolationist aggression will forever be his weakness?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to the hon. Member for his comments, and I can give him the assurances that he seeks. As he will acknowledge, the report was published less than a couple of hours ago, but the Government will look very carefully at its findings. I give him and the House an assurance that where there is a requirement to act, we will not hesitate to do so.
The hon. Member’s point about our EU partners was well made. We value our relationships with our neighbours, EU partners and Five Eyes colleagues, and I recently met members of the G7 to discuss these matters. When it comes to standing up to the threats that we face, we are much stronger when we join up with our international partners, and that is the right approach. I completely agree with what the hon. Member said about the rules-based order; I am sure that all Members of this House do. That is the right approach. Respecting international law and standing with our allies is the best way to defeat Putin.
Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
Have the Government formed a view as to why President Putin—the killer in the Kremlin—chose to target Sergei Skripal after he had been pardoned and exchanged? Nothing that I am saying now derives from my time chairing the Intelligence and Security Committee, but I recall speculation in the press that it was because Mr Skripal had been actively involved with either the British state or the military, or had in some way been, shall we say, active in opposing the Government of the country from which he had been exchanged. If that is the case, surely the conclusion in paragraph 8.18—that the only measures that could have prevented the attack
“would have been such as to hide him completely with an entirely new identity”—
should have been considered. It is rather surprising that it was not. Was Skripal engaged in anything that made him a target?
Dan Jarvis
The right hon. Gentleman knows the very high regard in which I hold him. He has asked me some important questions, but they are not necessarily questions that it would be in the interests of our national security for me to get into in any great detail. I can say that I have formed a view about the motive that underpinned this particular attack, but I am not going to get into it today. The point he made about the detail of the report was also raised by the hon. Member for Woking (Mr Forster). I can give him an assurance that we will go very carefully through the all the detail of the report, and I will consider what he has said today. The conclusion that I draw, which I think is the conclusion that Lord Hughes has drawn, is that responsibility for the attack lies with the Russian state. It is the Government’s responsibility to do everything we can to guard against the threat posed, mindful of the nature of that threat.
Sarah Bool (South Northamptonshire) (Con)
To the extent that he is able, can the Minister please explain what steps he is taking to secure UK commercial ports, given recent reports of individuals with links to the Russian military entering via those routes?
Dan Jarvis
The hon. Lady raises an entirely reasonable point. She will understand that I will not want to get too much into the detail of that. We look at these matters carefully, and we work across Government and with law enforcement and the intelligence agencies on them. Again, one reason why I sit across two Departments is to ensure that our response is co-ordinated as effectively as possible. She is right to raise this issue; we are doing everything we can to counter it.
Robin Swann (South Antrim) (UUP)
The Minister has referred to the threat that Russia poses to UK national security. A former Irish Teachta Dála who was also a deputy chief of an Irish army unit has said:
“If you are looking to affect a western country with extensive assets and poor security culture, then Ireland is ground zero…It is a playground for them.”
He was specifically speaking of Russian intelligence. The Minister has rightly referred to working with EU and international partners. May I seek an assurance that he is also working with the Irish Government and Irish security forces to ensure that the Republic of Ireland does not become a soft way into Northern Ireland and, indeed, the rest of the United Kingdom?
Dan Jarvis
That is an entirely reasonable challenge, and I can give the hon. Gentleman the assurances that he seeks.
State Threat Prevention and Investigation Measures: 20 March to 19 September 2025
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(1 week, 3 days ago)
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The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
Section 55(1) of the National Security Act 2023 requires the Home Secretary to report to Parliament as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of every relevant three-month period on the exercise of their STPIM powers under the Act during that period.
STPIMs were introduced through the 2023 Act and came into force on 20 December 2023. There have been no STPIM cases imposed to date.
[HCWS1098]
National Day for Victims and Survivors of Terrorism
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(1 week, 5 days ago)
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The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
The impact of terrorism is deep and enduring, changing the lives of victims and their loved ones in a moment. Families and communities have suffered immeasurable loss, grief, and physical and emotional harm from terrorist acts. It is crucial that they receive the national recognition they deserve.
Last month we were reminded all too starkly of the devastating impact of terrorism when the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation synagogue in Manchester was abhorrently attacked. Two people were tragically killed, and three others were injured. Today, and always, we stand with the survivors, their loved ones and all those affected by terrorism everywhere.
On 19 March this year, the Government launched a public consultation on the proposal to introduce a national day for victims and survivors of terrorism. This followed a review into the current support provision, which identified the importance of national recognition and acknowledgment of the lived experiences of those affected by terrorism. In my previous written statement to the House, I set out the Government commitment to improving support and recognition for those impacted by terrorism.
Today I am publishing the findings of the consultation, which received 351 responses. I would like to personally thank every single person who took the time to respond—your voice has been heard, and your contribution will make a difference. The consultation demonstrated overwhelming support for the introduction of a national day, with 91% of respondents in favour and 84% strongly supporting the proposal. Respondents highlighted that they would like to use the national day to remember and recognise those impacted by terrorism, help encourage victims and survivors to access support, educate the public and amplify victims’ and survivors’ stories.
The most popular date for the national day was 21 August, with 35% of respondents supporting, aligning with the UN International Day of Remembrance and Tribute to the Victims of Terrorism. While there was no single preferred name, “National Day of Remembrance” and “National Day of Recognition” were the most selected options. Respondents also supported commemorating the day through an annual event held in rotating locations across the UK, and the creation of a dedicated symbol to represent the day.
Although support was strong, some respondents raised concerns, including the potential for triggering trauma, and the safety of victims and the public at events. These concerns will be carefully considered as we develop plans for the national day, to ensure that it is inclusive, respectful and sensitive to the needs of victims and survivors.
As a result of these findings, today I am announcing the introduction of a UK national day for victims and survivors of terrorism on 21 August. An annual commemorative event will be held in a different location each year to reflect the widespread impact of terrorism across the UK, and a dedicated symbol will be developed in consultation with victims and survivors.
The first national day will take place in 2026, and will be observed by an intimate commemoration, supported by engagement with victims and survivors throughout the year to allow them to shape the format of this initial event and future years. This reflects our understanding that victims and survivors not only wish to, but must, play a central role in shaping how the day is commemorated.
We will continue to engage with victims and survivors to finalise the name of the national day and to shape the commemorative activities. These measures form part of the Government’s broader commitment to ensuring that victims and survivors are appropriately recognised, remembered and supported.
Finally, I would like to pay tribute to the victims and survivors whose tireless campaigning has brought us to this pivotal moment. Their strength and determination have driven this progress. They have my sincere thanks, along with all those who contributed to the consultation.
A copy of the consultation response will be placed in the Libraries of both Houses and will also be published on gov.uk.
[HCWS1082]
Prevent Programme
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(3 weeks, 3 days ago)
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The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
On Thursday 6 November, the Home Office published official statistics for “Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme from April 2024 to March 2025”. Prevent is a key part of Contest, the national counter-terrorism strategy, and aims to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. It has supported nearly 6,000 people to move away from a pathway to radicalisation since 2015 and plays a vital role in safeguarding those most vulnerable in our communities.
Key statistics
In the year ending 31 March 2025, the Prevent programme experienced a significant increase in activity, with 8,778 referrals recorded, compared to 6,922 between April 2023 and March 2024. This represents a 27% rise compared to the previous year and marks the highest annual total since records began in 2015. Of these referrals, 1,472 were adopted as Channel cases, accounting for 17% of all referrals. This proportion is notably higher than the 7% recorded last year. As set out in the full publication, changes in methodology mean that caution should be exercised when making direct comparisons with previous years.
Looking at the nature of concerns raised, 21% of referrals were related to extreme right-wing radicalisation (1,798 cases), while 10% were associated with Islamist extremism (870 cases). A substantial proportion of referrals—34%—concerned individuals for whom no specific ideology was identified.
The UK terrorism threat level has remained substantial, with Islamist extremism the most significant threat, followed by extreme right-wing terrorism. Of those concerns related to Islamist extremism, 26% were adopted into Channel for support the year ending March 2025, an increase from 13% last year. While the increased number of adoptions is welcome, we recognise that given the prevalence of this threat type, Prevent must go further to build awareness and understanding so that people can identify and refer Islamist extremist concerns.
We continue to see an increase in concerns regarding those that have a fascination with extreme violence or mass casualty attacks. The tragic attack in Southport last year demonstrates the very real threat from non-ideological extreme violence, and the increase in referrals of this type to Prevent shows the vigilance of frontline professionals in identifying and reporting these concerns.
It is vital that Prevent remains threat agnostic so that it can deal with the full range of threats we face. As an early intervention programme, Prevent is in a position to intervene and provide support to anybody who is on a pathway to radicalisation. While the presence of ideology is clearly an important factor, Prevent must not limit its scope to cases where a terrorist ideology has clearly already taken hold.
Under this Government a range of steps have been taken to improve the ability of frontline professionals subject to the Prevent duty to spot the signs of radicalisation.
A new Prevent assessment framework was rolled out in September 2024 to support CT police to strengthen the quality and consistency of decision-making on all Prevent referrals.
In November 2024, we launched a new ideology training programme for frontline staff such as teachers and healthcare workers. This will help them to identify extremist ideologies, including Islamist extremism, and to refer people they are concerned about into Prevent for further support.
The role of independent Prevent commissioner was created in December 2024, to provide additional scrutiny and oversight of Prevent policy and delivery.
In September 2025, the Home Office issued new guidance which clarified Prevent thresholds for practitioners, following recommendations made the independent Prevent commissioner.
As the nature of radicalisation evolves, it is essential that Prevent can effectively tackle the threat we see today. The Home Office will continue to work with partners including counter-terrorism police, local authorities, health and education to ensure that Prevent can offer support to the right people, where they are at risk of being drawn into terrorism.
[HCWS1045]
Telecoms Fraud Charter
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(1 month ago)
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The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
My noble Friend the Minister of State, Home Office, Lord Hanson of Flint, has today made the following written ministerial statement:
Today, I am pleased to inform the House that we are publishing the second Telecoms Fraud Charter.
The Telecoms Fraud Charter sets out a series of ambitious fraud prevention commitments from major consumer and business telecommunications providers operating across the UK.
These commitments represent a significant step forward in further strengthening the telecommunications sector’s response to fraud, addressing some of the most prevalent and harmful scams perpetrated via voice and text channels. Measures include enhanced protections against the spoofing of legitimate network numbers, improved filtering to block scam calls and messages before they reach consumers, and the introduction of new rules to ensure quicker resolution of fraud cases by telecoms providers.
Further detail will be published online, but the charter will contain actions focusing on:
Cross-industry data sharing to improve the detection and disruption of fraud;
Strengthening SMS protections to block scam texts and reduce abuse of messaging platforms;
Preventing scam calls and spoofing through technical upgrades to the network;
Improving customer awareness through clearer guidance and public education campaigns;
Better support for victims, including new fraud resolution deadlines;
Improved collaboration with industry and law enforcement to drive intelligence sharing and co-ordinated enforcement.
Telecoms providers have made notable strides in recent years in addressing fraud, supported by technological innovation and strengthened collaboration with Government and law enforcement agencies. However, those signing this charter have shown a clear commitment to go further and faster to prevent fraud, acting with urgency and ambition.
I welcome their proactive approach and commend their dedication to safeguarding consumers from fraudulent activity. Government stand firmly alongside the sector in this fight. We will continue to convene, support, and challenge all partners to go further and faster, holding them to account for the commitments they make in this charter. Together, we can make the UK a hostile environment for fraudsters and a safer place for everyone.
The Telecoms Fraud Charter will be published on www.gov.uk on 5 November.
[HCWS1022]
Birmingham Pub Bombings: Request for Public Inquiry
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(1 month ago)
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The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
I wish to update the House on the Government’s consideration of the request for a statutory public inquiry into the events of the 1974 Birmingham pub bombings.
First and foremost, I want to reiterate my deepest sympathies, and the sympathies of the Government, to all the families of those who were brutally murdered, whose lives were changed forever on 21 November 1974. The abhorrent attacks on the Mulberry Bush and the Tavern in the Town public houses, which tragically took 21 innocent lives and injured over 200 others, remain a source of profound grief and heartbreak to everyone affected and to the wider community within the great city of Birmingham, in what was one of this country’s darkest hours.
I would like to pay tribute to Justice4the21 for their continued campaigning, which has been both tireless and dignified. For over five decades, they have sought truth, justice, and accountability, while also grieving for their loved ones. Their unwavering efforts are testament to their remarkable strength, and their continued engagement with the Home Office has been central to our consideration of their request for an inquiry.
I also recognise the many others that have campaigned on this issue including members of the public, community organisations, and fellow parliamentarians. The commitment displayed has been a powerful reflection of the devastating aftermath that these heinous attacks continue to have on the Birmingham community, and I extend my gratitude to all those who have provided contributions.
After very careful consideration, the Government have decided not to establish a public inquiry into the Birmingham pub bombings. While I understand that this will be very disappointing news to the families, it is our firm belief that the Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery can effectively investigate the case, offering the best chance to provide answers to Justice4the21’s questions.
The commission was established exclusively to investigate troubles-related cases and operates independently from Government to consider all the circumstances around troubles-related deaths and serious injuries. To do this, the commission has been granted a wide range of powers to access information—including from Government Departments, the police, and the security and intelligence agencies—in connection with an investigation. In investigations into troubles-related offences, the commission has robust powers, including of arrest and to compel evidence. Its caseload is primarily driven by referrals from victims and their families, with the Guildford pub bombings, the Warrenpoint ambush, the Kingsmill massacre and the M62 coach bombing already referred to it by family members. The commission has the powers, resources, and expertise to support the families in seeking answers to their questions, and I would strongly recommend that anyone else affected by the troubles talk to the commission.
As the House will be aware, on 14 October, the Government introduced the Northern Ireland Troubles Bill. This will put in place a reformed legacy commission, with strengthened governance and new conflict of interest duties, a statutory oversight board to provide accountability, and a statutory advisory group to ensure that the voices of victims and survivors are heard as part of the commission’s work. It also makes provision for enhanced fact-finding powers and a disclosure regime akin to that for public inquiries.
In addition, the Government have published a remedial order to remove the widely rejected immunity scheme that could have offered immunity to those who committed horrific terrorist acts such as the Birmingham pub bombings and which has been found by the courts to be incompatible with the UK’s human rights obligations.
The legislation will also ensure that the cases the commission is currently investigating, or which are referred to it, before our new legislation comes into force, are able to transition smoothly to the new prospective arrangements.
Today I have recommended to the families that they consider referring their case to the commission and discuss how it would approach an investigation. My officials and I will be available to support Justice4the21 as they consider their next steps.
Once again, I would like to thank the families for their advocacy and patience in this matter. I know that the passage of time does not ease the pain, but I want to make clear that the Government recognise the deep trauma that continues to be felt by the victims and loved ones of those killed or injured during the troubles, and we are absolutely committed to supporting everyone who seeks justice and accountability.
[HCWS1008]
China Spying Case
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(1 month, 1 week ago)
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The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
I begin by thanking the Opposition for bringing forward this Opposition day debate, the hon. Member for Brentwood and Ongar (Alex Burghart) for moving this motion, and the shadow Home Secretary for his remarks.
As I have repeatedly set out to the House, the Government are extremely disappointed that this case will not be heard in court. I also share Members’ concerns about the threats that we face from espionage.
Dan Jarvis
I am just going to make a bit of progress. Let me be clear about two things right from the start. First, we would not be discussing this here today had the outdated Official Secrets Act 1911 been replaced sooner. Secondly, it is the responsibility of the CPS and the DPP to bring criminal prosecutions and compile evidence. The statements submitted to the JCNSS confirm that, as does the evidence that the Joint Committee heard yesterday from the Cabinet Secretary and the DNSA.
We have been consistently clear that no Ministers and no special advisers interfered in the provision of evidence under this Government.
Mark Pritchard
Can the Security Minister confirm to the House that the UK Government, at ministerial level and diplomatic level, have not been threatened by the Chinese state about this trial? Has it said, “If this trial goes ahead, there will be consequences”? Is the Minister aware of any discussions or any correspondence, either from the Chinese embassy or directly from Chinese Ministers to ours, that threatens this nation?
Dan Jarvis
I say to the right hon. Gentleman—whom I hold in high regard, not least for the work that he did on the ISC—that I can give him the assurances that he seeks. I can also assure him and the House how seriously this Government take the challenges that we face from countries right around the world.
Let me return to the DNSA’s evidence. As his written evidence makes clear—this is an important point that the House will want to note—from the moment the DNSA’s witness statement was submitted, he was a fully bound witness in criminal proceedings. His evidence had not yet been heard or tested in court, so his witness evidence could not be and was not shared, and this was later confirmed by the CPS.
In this debate and in recent weeks, there have been a number of different, and at times conflicting, claims about this Government’s involvement in the case, and I want to address those claims directly today. At the DNSA’s request, the word “enemy” was removed from the first witness statement during the drafting process, because it did not reflect the Government’s policy at the time. The DNSA made amendments to ensure that his witness statement text reflected his assessment of the strongest elements of the evidential material provided by Counter Terrorism Policing, by demonstrating that the information that was alleged to have been provided was prejudicial to the safety or the interests of the UK.
When CTP approached the DNSA to write a supplementary statement in November 2024, he was specifically asked to comment on whether China posed an active threat to the UK’s national security during the period of 31 December 2021 to 3 February 2023, and to confirm whether that remains the position at the time of writing. That is why paragraph 6 of the second statement references part of the current Government policy towards China.
Dr Luke Evans
The Minister is making a powerful point about the active threat. At this point in time, do the Government perceive China to be an active threat?
Dan Jarvis
As the hon. Gentleman knows—I think I may have even said this to him previously, and certainly to the House—China presents a series of threats to the Government. I will say a little bit more about that.
As time is short, I want to focus on the DNSA and the evidence that he has given, because that is important for the House. The DNSA confirmed to the JCNSS yesterday that he used language from an answer to a parliamentary question in his third statement, in which he provided the current Government’s position as context, as had been requested. The DNSA’s third statement was written in a way that ensured consistency with his first two statements.
For the sake of clarity, I will say it again: the current National Security Adviser had no role in either the substance of the case or the evidence provided. There has been misreporting, speculation and fabrication about the officials’ meeting that the National Security Adviser chaired on 1 September—the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) mentioned it just a moment ago. I can tell him and the House that a meeting of senior officials took place on 1 September to discuss the UK’s relationship with China. The meeting was specifically set up to provide—
Dan Jarvis
Let me just finish my point. I will come back to the right hon. and learned Gentleman if time allows.
The meeting was specifically set up to provide the FCDO with an opportunity to discuss—at an appropriately senior official level; no Ministers attended the meeting—what the approach would be to handling engagement with China across a range of scenarios related to this case, as well as in relation to wider issues that would come up. Those who attended the meeting were operating on the basis that the trial would go ahead at the start of October.
Dan Jarvis
I am going to make a bit of progress, because time is against me.
Meetings such as this are a routine part of the NSA’s role.
Dan Jarvis
I am going to make a bit of progress, because time is against me.
Meetings such as this are a routine part of the National Security Adviser’s role of co-ordinating Departments across Government.
Sir Geoffrey Cox
Will the Minister give way on the question of who was present?
Sir Geoffrey Cox
Why was the Attorney General’s Office represented and present? If the meeting had nothing to do with the case, why was the Attorney General’s Office present through its representative?
Dan Jarvis
Simply because a number of Departments were represented at this meeting, as would normally be the case.
Sir Geoffrey Cox
The Attorney General’s Office has nothing to do with foreign policy.
Dan Jarvis
The right hon. and learned Gentleman served in a Government a number of years ago. I can give him an assurance that this Government work collaboratively across Government with other Departments, and therefore it seems to make perfect sense that other Departments would be represented at such a meeting.
I will try to reflect some of the points that have been made in this debate, including the point from the shadow Home Secretary, who asked specifically about the Home Secretary. I can tell him and the House that no Minister—no Minister in this Government—was involved in any aspect of the production of evidence.
Dan Jarvis
The Liberal Democrats spokesman, the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Max Wilkinson), offered his service as a marriage guidance counsellor. I would advise him not to give up his job.
Dan Jarvis
My hon. Friend the Member for Rugby (John Slinger) nailed the myths, I thought very effectively, in his contribution. The right hon. and learned Member for Torridge and Tavistock (Sir Geoffrey Cox) described his duck. It felt as if his contribution was as much aimed at the DPP and the CPS as at the Government, but it was engaging none the less. My hon. Friend the Member for Rochdale (Paul Waugh) raised important points about some of the critiques that have been levelled, and I agree with him about trying to establish cross-party consensus.
The right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green spoke about the nature and the description of the threats we face from China. Let me say to him that it is completely unacceptable that he and other Members of this House are sanctioned, and I give him an absolute assurance of the seriousness with which this Government take those particular threats. My hon. Friend the Member for Bracknell (Peter Swallow) spoke about transnational repression. He has raised it previously, and I can tell him that the defending democracy taskforce has concluded a review, and the Government have developed a range of support and security mechanisms. Most importantly, however, we condemn any malign activity towards anyone here in the UK.
The right hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard) spoke about the work of the ISC, and he was right to do so. The Government welcome the work of the ISC in looking carefully at the circumstances of this case, as we do the important work of the JCNSS. I thought my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Gareth Snell) made the really important point that, given the concerns that have rightly been expressed right across this House about what has happened, we should be trying to seek to work together and establish a consensus. I thought he made that point very powerfully.
Time is running short, so let me say to the House that national security is the first duty of this Government. That is why we oppose the Opposition’s motion, which would see the release not only of information subject to legal professional privilege, but of information vital to the security of the United Kingdom, including advice to the Prime Minister. Successive Governments, including the previous Government in which the shadow Home Secretary served as a Minister, have maintained that position. This is not a question about parliamentary scrutiny. We welcome the ongoing process with the JCNSS, and we look forward to continuing to work with it, as we do with the ISC. This Government will continue to develop a consistent and pragmatic approach to economic engagement, but without compromising our national security.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
I have a very simple question: if the Minister will not give the minutes of that meeting to the House, will he give them to the Intelligence and Security Committee, which sits in camera?
Dan Jarvis
The Government have given a very clear commitment that we will co-operate and work closely with all of the Committees of this House.
It is precisely because everything this Government do is rooted in the national interest that I say that this Government are extremely disappointed that this case has collapsed. It is right that the matter is being investigated by the appropriate parliamentary Committees, and we look forward to co-operating with that work.
Question put.
Oral Answers to Questions
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(1 month, 1 week ago)
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Michelle Scrogham (Barrow and Furness) (Lab)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dan Jarvis)
The Government are absolutely committed to ensuring that UKSV delivers a security clearance process that is efficient and fit for purpose. Security vetting clearances are being processed within agreed timescales, and UKSV performance is monitored monthly. It is working to ensure that demand for vetting is forecast better.
Michelle Scrogham
The Minister will know how proud we in Barrow are to be building our world-class nuclear submarines. Working in the shipyard requires security clearance, which is provided by UKSV. However, some of my constituents have lost job offers due to the significant delays in receiving clearance. That has a severe impact on those individuals as well as on our ability to deliver the submarines that defend the country. Can the Minister assure me that steps are being taken to speed up the process?
Dan Jarvis
My hon. Friend will know better than anyone that Barrow makes a critical contribution to national security. I can assure her that UKSV continues to undertake a programme of work to improve the efficiency of the vetting process and that further work is ongoing to digitise and improve the automation of processes. If she has any further concerns, I would be happy to discuss them with her.
Danny Beales (Uxbridge and South Ruislip) (Lab)
Sadik Al-Hassan (North Somerset) (Lab)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dan Jarvis)
As the response to module 1 of the covid-19 inquiry made clear, the Cabinet Office is playing a greater role in preparedness for cross-cutting catastrophic risks. Our preparedness for future pandemics has been stepped up through Exercise Pegasus, the largest ever national pandemic response exercise.
Katrina Murray
Last week I had the pleasure of meeting the general manager of one of the major supermarkets in my constituency. We talked about our memories of the early days of the covid pandemic, with the rows and rows of empty shelves. All pandemic planning should build on the lessons learned from the last one, so what role is the retail and logistics sector playing in that?
Dan Jarvis
My hon. Friend is right: businesses that move and sell vital goods are an essential part of any pandemic response. The resilience action plan, which was published in response to module 1 of the covid-19 inquiry, seeks to enable a whole-of-society approach to pandemic resilience. As part of that effort, we invited businesses to participate in the ongoing national pandemic exercise, Exercise Pegasus.
Sadik Al-Hassan
As a pharmacist who worked on the frontline throughout the pandemic, I would like to ask what discussions the Cabinet Office has had with local resilience forums to ensure that areas such as my North Somerset constituency have the local co-ordination structures needed to respond effectively to a future pandemic, particularly given the strain on our community health service?
Dan Jarvis
I thank my hon. Friend for his vital work on the frontline during the pandemic. The Government absolutely recognise that the most complex emergencies impact the whole system. That is why there has been extensive engagement with local partners ahead of Exercise Pegasus. The exercise will test national-to-local co-ordination arrangements, and lessons from the exercise will help strengthen pandemic preparedness at national and local levels.
Mr Andrew Snowden (Fylde) (Con)
During the pandemic, Government agencies, bodies and Departments suddenly discovered ways to comply with GDPR to share significant amounts of data, which was critical to managing the pandemic response. Since then, the shroud of using GDPR as a reason not to share data has once again choked opportunities to solve the big problems facing our society. As part of his work on resilience planning, will the Minister ensure that data is shared with Departments on a day-to-day basis in future, to get around the use of GDPR as a reason not to share it?
Dan Jarvis
The hon. Member makes a sensible and constructive point, and I can give him the assurances he seeks. Since January, increasing our preparedness has included publishing an updated central crisis management doctrine—the Amber Book—as well as launching the biothreats radar to improve data sharing. We have also, as I have said, undertaken the largest ever national pandemic planning exercise.
Alison Hume (Scarborough and Whitby) (Lab)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dan Jarvis)
In July the Government published the resilience action plan, which sets out our strategic vision for a stronger and more resilient United Kingdom. The Government also successfully carried out the second ever national drill of the emergency alert system last month. I am pleased to tell the House that the test reached 96% of cell masts across the country. That is a significant improvement on the first test in April 2023 and indicates that more people are receiving these critical alerts than ever before.
Alison Hume
In August, authorities declared a major incident after a wildfire broke out in Langdale forest and spread dangerously close to RAF Fylingdales, the ballistic missile early warning base. Given the increasing threat that wildfires pose to our security, can the Minister confirm whether he will consider automatically activating a national resilience response in future incidents where critical military infrastructure is under threat?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for her question, and I commend the emergency services and the local community who came together in her constituency to bravely tackle the Langdale moor fire. The risk of wildfires to critical sites is well known to local responders, who plan for such events and can call on central Government for support. The national resilience wild- fire adviser assesses what additional wildfire national capabilities might be needed to increase resilience for future incidents.
Dr Ellie Chowns (North Herefordshire) (Green)
The Government’s own advisers tell us that the climate and nature crisis poses a huge resilience threat to our country. Yet, in an answer to a question on wildfires, the Minister does not even reference that climate change makes them more frequent and severe. What are the Government doing to tackle this huge threat from climate change?
Dan Jarvis
The Government routinely conduct and update assessments on a whole range of threats. On gov.uk, the Government publish the outcome of those assessments in the national risk register and in their chronic risks analysis, including on climate change, biodiversity loss and the impact on our ecosystems.
Alex Burghart (Brentwood and Ongar) (Con)
I would like to take this opportunity to welcome the new Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster to his post. I know that he is one of the most able performers in the Government, and he is now in one of the most important and under- appreciated roles in Government. For the good of the country, I wish him well. He is also the first Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister. We Conservatives congratulate him on how well Downing Street has been run since he took over—we have enjoyed it greatly. Phase 2 is proving to be a real belter.
On the alleged spying on Members of this House, Downing Street has revealed that the Prime Minister became aware on 13 September that the case was about to collapse. When was the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister first told that the trial was unlikely to proceed, and who told him?
Dan Jarvis
I am slightly struggling to make the connection with resilience, Mr Speaker, but I am very happy to respond—
Mr Speaker
Perhaps I can help, then. Security does include the resilience and the security of this House. I can go through it a bit more if need be, but I am sure that the Minister will use his imagination to answer.
Dan Jarvis
Thank you, Mr Speaker. Well, let me tell the hon. Gentleman. The decision not to prosecute was taken independently by the Crown Prosecution Service. The Government were extremely disappointed by that decision and published the deputy National Security Adviser’s three witness statements. All three clearly articulate the very serious threats posed by China. No Minister or special adviser in this Government interfered with the case. I wonder whether Conservative Members could have said the same about their Government.
Alex Burghart
Okay, I will repeat the question for the Security Minister, because either he did not hear it or he chose not to answer it. My question was very specific. We know that the Prime Minister was told on 13 September that the trial was unlikely to proceed—Downing Street has told us that. My question is: when was the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster told, and who told him? He oversees the Cabinet Office’s National Security Secretariat, and he chairs the National Security Council. When was he told?
Jerome Mayhew (Broadland and Fakenham) (Con)
He’s right there! Why doesn’t he answer?
Mr Speaker
Order. We have had one or two little bits of that, Mr Mayhew, and we do not need it. You should know better; you have been here long enough now. I expect a little bit more respect.
Dan Jarvis
For the purposes of transparency, the Prime Minister took the decision to publish the DNSA’s witness statements. He has been crystal clear that no Minister and no special adviser in this Government interfered in any way with the case. I would be very grateful if the hon. Member for Brentwood and Ongar (Alex Burghart) confirmed whether that was the case under the previous Government.
Lisa Smart (Hazel Grove) (LD)
The recent cyber-attack on Jaguar Land Rover is reported to have cost the UK £1.9 billion, making it the most expensive in British history. It follows similar crippling incidents for companies such as M&S and the Co-op. Individual companies are taking their own security decisions, but in our increasingly interdependent world, the impact of those decisions can be felt at national and international levels. Will the Minister update the House on the progress being made in that area under the Government’s resilience action plan, and when does he expect the introduction of the cyber-security and resilience Bill, which was mentioned in last year’s King’s Speech, so that we can assure the British public that such attacks are being treated as a pressing matter of national security?
Dan Jarvis
I am genuinely grateful to the hon. Lady for raising that matter, which is of real concern for the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister and myself. Protecting national security, including by defending against cyber-attacks, is absolutely our first duty, and she is absolutely right to highlight concerns about the attack on Jaguar Land Rover. We take this incredibly seriously. Indeed, my first visit as a Cabinet Office Minister was to the National Cyber Security Centre. I can tell her that the Home Office is progressing a new package of legislative measures to protect UK businesses from ransomware attacks, which, as she knows, are the most harmful cyber- crime facing the UK.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
Ms Julie Minns (Carlisle) (Lab)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dan Jarvis)
I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for her question. We absolutely recognise the impact that the loss of communication services can have on constituencies like hers. The Cabinet Office is responsible for the co-ordination of resilience and crisis management across Government, and I have seen at first hand the diligence and professionalism of crisis teams in Cobra. I would be more than happy to discuss this matter with my hon. Friend further, and to represent her concerns to the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology.
Dr Ellie Chowns (North Herefordshire) (Green)
Gurinder Singh Josan (Smethwick) (Lab)
Dan Jarvis
I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for the work that he does in co-chairing the crypto and digital assets all-party parliamentary group. Financial services are integral to our mission for economic growth, and we are absolutely committed to creating the right conditions for a vibrant, competitive and innovative financial services sector. That is why the Government are proceeding with proposals to create a new financial services regulatory regime for cryptoassets.
Bradley Thomas (Bromsgrove) (Con)
Deproscription of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
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The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
After careful consideration and following extensive consultation across Government and with operational partners, the Government have decided to remove Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham from the list of organisations proscribed under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000. This decision reflects our unwavering support for British interests and commitment to the security of the United Kingdom.
HTS was first proscribed in 2017, having emerged as the principal Islamist militant group in north-west Syria, and was identified as an alias of the proscribed organisation al-Qaeda. Since then, significant developments have taken place in Syria.
In December 2024, forces led by Ahmed Al Sharaa—the former leader of HTS and now President of Syria—toppled former President Assad’s regime, which had been responsible for countless crimes against his own people.
The change in Syria’s Government has clear implications for UK foreign policy and national security objectives.
Despite the defeat of Daesh’s so-called caliphate in 2019 and its continued suppression through the actions of the global coalition against Daesh, the group maintains a significant presence in Syria and continues to pose one of the most serious terrorist threats to the UK, our people and our interests abroad.
The decision to de-proscribe HTS will support our continued efforts to counter Daesh in Syria and reduce the risk to the UK. We welcome the swift and robust response of the Syrian Government, since taking power, to terrorist attacks, including the attack on the Mar Elias church in Damascus in June, and their clear condemnation of such acts.
Strengthening our relationship with the Syrian Government will also help secure our borders by enabling a dialogue to reduce irregular migration from Syria.
A concerning legacy of the Assad regime is the existence of an operational chemical weapons programme in Syria. The de-proscription of HTS will allow the UK to work more closely with the Syrian Government to ensure the declaration and destruction of these weapons. The Syrian Government have committed to protecting chemical weapons sites and ensuring that such weapons are never used again.
While we will ultimately judge them on their actions and not their words, the new Syrian Government have conveyed their strong commitment to working with the UK on shared priorities. President Al Sharaa has made it clear that his focus is on rebuilding a stable, safe and prosperous Syria for all Syrians.
Decisions on de-proscription are not taken lightly. This Government will always put the safety and security of the British people first. This decision is consistent with the Government plan for change and mirrors the decision taken by the United States earlier this year to de-list HTS as a foreign terrorist organisation.
The decision to de-proscribe HTS was supported by a thorough assessment of the cross-Government proscription review group. The group concluded that HTS’s designation as an alias of al-Qaeda is no longer accurate and that de-proscription serves the national interest. Following its de-proscription, the offences relating to proscribed organisations under the Terrorism Act, including those concerning membership and support, will no longer apply to HTS. After this decision is implemented, 83 organisations remain proscribed in the UK.
The Home Secretary reserves the right to review proscription decisions in response to evolving threats. The Government will always act swiftly and decisively in the interests of national security.
This Government’s commitment to the security of the United Kingdom and the safety of its citizens is steadfast.
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