(2 days, 1 hour ago)
Commons Chamber
Martin Rhodes (Glasgow North) (Lab)
We are working with our allies to counter cyber-threats, most recently using sanctions against Chinese tech companies and Russian cyber criminals. The National Crime Agency has arrested and charged those responsible for the reckless cyber-attack on Transport for London. Our new “lock the door” campaign provides practical ways for organisations to protect themselves from online threats. In the spring, the great city of Glasgow will host CYBERUK, where the Government will launch the national cyber action plan.
Martin Rhodes
I recently chaired a roundtable, which produced a report from Fortinet, a cyber-security firm based in my constituency. The report highlights the opportunities and risks of cyber-resilience as we transition to Great British Railways. Does the Minister agree that more public procurement has a crucial role to play in ensuring that our railways are secure by design and that the Government must keep pace with the evolving cyber-threat to our critical national infrastructure?
I completely agree with my hon. Friend: public procurement is an important tool that ensures the UK’s cyber-security. On Great British Railways, the Department for Transport works with partners across Government and the rail sector to improve the understanding of cyber-risk, and I would be pleased to pass a copy of the report he mentioned to the relevant Minister to ensure that it can be considered as part of that work.
Sarah Russell (Congleton) (Lab)
In November, the Government introduced the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill to protect essential digital services from cyber-attacks and to enable the Government to better respond to new cyber-threats. In the spring, we will publish the national cyber action plan, which will strengthen our resilience, tackle the threats and maximise the opportunities for growth in the cyber sector.
Sarah Russell
I thank the Minister for his answer. We have seen in recent days that Iran is bombing data centres across the middle east, and we are well aware that there have been problems with cyber-attacks by non-state and state-backed actors from Iran. Can the Minister please outline what the Government and the National Cyber Security Centre are doing to deal with the increased threat?
Let me assure my hon. Friend that the Government are absolutely committed to strengthening the UK’s resilience. We have invested in the Government Cyber Co-ordination Centre, a leading cross-Government service that is actively monitoring vulnerabilities and enabling a more effective response to threats. The National Cyber Security Centre is closely monitoring the situation in the middle east, and directly engaging with relevant sectors by providing immediate sector-specific information and advice.
Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)
Peter Swallow (Bracknell) (Lab)
Disinformation by hostile state actors, particularly from Russia, is an immediate and evolving threat characterised by divisive information operations and the manipulation of public discourse. In response, the Government have sanctioned 38 organisations for information warfare since 2024, enforced the Online Safety Act 2023, and built media literacy skills for young people, so that they can engage with information critically. Most recently, the UK sanctioned three foreign information and manipulation targets responsible for destabilising Ukraine and seeking to undermine European democracy.
Peter Swallow
Last week, a representative of Meta appeared before the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and when I pressed him on its role in safeguarding democracy, he was unable to say whether it is doing enough to prevent foreign actors from using social media to undermine our democratic rights and freedoms. This week, we have had the Second Reading of the Representation of the People Bill, which seeks to strengthen our democracy. Does my hon. Friend agree that we need to use this opportunity to get together with social media companies—or rather, to get tougher with them; I only wish we could get together with them—that are not doing enough about foreign interference on their platforms?
I agree with my hon. Friend that social media platforms have a very important role to play in safeguarding our democracy. The foreign interference offence is a priority offence under the Online Safety Act 2023, which places duties on social media platforms to tackle illegal content. It requires platforms to take proactive action to identify and minimise users’ exposure to state-linked interference. However, we will not hesitate to go further to protect our citizens and our democracy from this threat.
Mr Bayo Alaba (Southend East and Rochford) (Lab)
Yesterday, in the light of the new China spy case, I asked the Security Minister to place China on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. He told us that FIRS is “a relatively new tool”, and that the Government
“are seeking to ensure that we can derive the maximum operational capability from it.”—[Official Report, 4 March 2026; Vol. 781, c. 817.]
That is wonderful Whitehall language, but will he please tell us what it means?
The arguments about FIRS are well rehearsed, but I am old enough to remember when Conservative Members said that we would not introduce FIRS. Then they said that we would introduce it later than we had said we would. We introduced FIRS on time, but it is still a relatively new capability. I think that it offers considerable potential, in terms of what it will deliver for our country, but we are looking very closely at how we can ensure its maximum operational capability. I think that is pretty clear in any language.
Well, it is not very clear, because FIRS is three years old. This morning, I spoke to my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat), who established FIRS. When he was establishing it, MI5 told him that it was essential for understanding the operation of the Chinese state in the UK. The enhanced tier would impose mandatory registration and transparency requirements on individuals and organisations in the UK working with Chinese entities. I think most people in this House would now agree that that is entirely necessary. It is there to help our security services protect our country. Please will the Security Minister give us a date by which he will come back to this House to tell us definitively whether he will put China on the enhanced tier, and to set out his explanation?
On a simple point of fact, FIRS is not three years old. When we came into government, FIRS was not a properly developed system. [Interruption.] Opposition Members may groan, but it is a statement of truth that FIRS was not ready to go. This Government got a grip and introduced that tool. It came into force, in effect, on 1 October last year. We have already placed two countries on the enhanced tier. We take these decisions very carefully, but I give the hon. Gentleman a commitment that I will come back, when there is a requirement to do so, and update the House on any further decisions that we seek to make on FIRS.
(3 days, 1 hour ago)
Commons ChamberI appreciate the hon. Member’s concern, but the Chair is not responsible for the content of the statements made by Ministers. Ministers will no doubt update the House when and if appropriate.
(3 days, 1 hour ago)
Commons ChamberWith your permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement regarding three arrests that took place this morning as part of a Counter Terrorism Policing investigation into suspected offences under the National Security Act 2023. I can confirm that this relates to China. I can also confirm that this relates to foreign interference targeting UK democracy.
Mr Speaker, for reasons that you will understand, it would not be appropriate for me to comment on any aspect of what is now a live investigation. It is absolutely critical that we do not hamper the work of the police or prejudice any future legal processes by what we say in this House today.
I would, however, point the House to what Counter Terrorism Policing has just said in its own statement, which is that, this morning, its officers arrested three men as part of an investigation into suspected offences under the National Security Act. All three men were arrested on suspicion of assisting a foreign intelligence service, contrary to section 3 of that Act. Any decision as to whether to proceed with a prosecution would be a matter for the Crown Prosecution Service.
The Government stand resolute in our resolve to counter foreign interference activity targeting the UK from any state actor. The Government have been consistent and unambiguous in our assessment that China presents a series of threats to the United Kingdom. We remain deeply concerned by an increasing pattern of covert activity from Chinese state-linked actors targeting UK democracy. This involves attempts to obtain information on UK policymaking and interfere with our sovereign affairs.
From the November MI5 espionage alert warning about Chinese intelligence officers targeting individuals with access to sensitive information on Parliament and Government to the attempted interference activities of Christine Lee in 2022, this Government will not tolerate it. I can confirm to the House that British officials have formally démarched Chinese counterparts in London and Beijing about these allegations to raise our strong concerns. However, as this is a live investigation, it would not be appropriate to comment further. But let me be clear: if there is proven evidence of attempts by China to interfere with UK sovereign affairs, we will impose severe consequences and hold all actors involved to account.
In the meantime, the Government are taking robust action to ensure that the UK’s democratic institutions and processes are a hard target for this activity. The National Security Act 2023 provides our intelligence agencies and law enforcement with the modern legal tools they need to deter, detect, and disrupt the full range of state threats. The action that Counter Terrorism Policing has been able to take this morning is an example that shows that the legislation working well. The political influence tier of the foreign influence registration scheme under the National Security Act also provides an essential framework for ensuring that those who seek to undermine our democracy are held to account.
I continue to drive across Government the delivery of our counter-political interference and espionage action plan, which I announced to Parliament on 18 November. This is being co-ordinated in strong partnership with the parliamentary security authorities.
Our aim is to forge a cross-party and whole-of-society shield to safeguard UK democracy. This includes strengthening our legal defences, cutting off channels for interference, and supporting those on the frontline of UK politics to recognise, resist and report the threat.
Members should have seen the guidance that the National Protective Security Authority and the National Cyber Security Centre published last year, which included what to look out for in terms of malicious foreign targeting and some basic steps that Members can take to protect themselves. I urge all Members to read carefully through the guidance that was issued. If hon. Members do experience any suspicious or out-of-the-ordinary interactions, whether in person or online, they should report it to the Parliamentary Security Department. The Government will continue to work in collaboration with the Parliament Security Department to set up a range of more tailored, bespoke briefings for those at greatest risk.
In January, I joined the director general of MI5 and the chief executive of the NCSC to brief the chief executives of the UK political parties on the developing threat picture. I can confirm that officials are now focused on developing a programme of work to engage with the UK’s think-tanks and non-profit sector to discuss the threats that they face from foreign interference. Our intent is to work with them to strengthen their resilience, ensuring that their hard-won reputations and networks are not exploited by our adversaries as platforms for covertly influencing UK public discourse and policymaking.
In February, we introduced the Representation of the People Bill, which will further strengthen safeguards against foreign interference through political funding. Our proposed Bill includes introducing tougher rules for donor recipients to conduct risk assessments before accepting donations, as well as increasing the powers of the Electoral Commission to ensure that it has the tools necessary to fulfil its duties.
The Government eagerly await the report of Philip Rycroft, following his independent review of regulations and safeguards against foreign financial interference in UK politics. The review was commissioned to rigorously test the financial safeguards we currently have in place and will specifically consider safeguards against illicit funding streams, including the use of crypto-assets. The review’s findings will be delivered to the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government and me by the end of the month. I confirm that recommendations, where appropriate, will inform the Representation of the People Bill. We are also working on new powers to counter foreign interference, including a proscription-style tool to disrupt proxy organisations undermining our security.
It continues to be in our long-term strategic interest to engage with China. We are engaging with China confidently and pragmatically on areas where engagement is in the UK’s national interest, including climate, global health, trade, scientific research, illegal migration and serious organised crime—to name just a few. But let me be crystal clear: this is not a question of balancing economic and security considerations. We do not trade off security for economic access. Instead, by taking tough steps to keep us secure, we enable ourselves to co-operate in other areas.
We will always challenge any country, including China, that attempts to interfere with or undermine the integrity of our democratic institutions, and we will always prioritise UK national security. That is why the Prime Minister’s visit opened up a direct channel of communication to deliver in the national interest, enabling us to raise frank concerns about activities that impact our national security, including domestic security issues, at the most senior levels of the Chinese system.
I assure Members of the House and the public that further steps can and absolutely will be taken to defend our democracy. The Government are steadfast in our commitment to disrupting and deterring China’s interference activity wherever it takes place. I commend this statement to the House.
Several hon. Members rose—
I thank the Minister for advance sight of his statement, and I appreciate the speed with which he has come to the House today.
Here we are again: another year, another Chinese spy scandal, and the backdrop is the Government’s failed policy of appeasement. The Government must surely be coming to the realisation that unless the United Kingdom stands up to these threats, our country will continue to be treated with disdain. We watched how the Government allowed the Chinese spy case involving Members of this House to collapse. We watched as—despite the interference in our democracy—the Government approved the Chinese mega-embassy in London, and we watched as the Prime Minister went to Beijing, cap in hand, begging for trade deals to mitigate the costs of his own disastrous economic policy. We in the House watched as those things happened; the Chinese state watched, too, and saw that it could act with impunity. The Minister said that there is no trade-off between our economic interests and our democratic and national security interests, but I am afraid that is exactly what has happened.
I understand that the Minister will be unable to say much about the new case, but we all know what we are dealing with here, so I hope he will be clear about the Government’s response. I hope that he will talk a little bit about whether this case touches on Members of the House, because while we have been in the Chamber the BBC and The Guardian have reported that one of those arrested is the spouse of a sitting Labour MP and that another is the spouse of a former Labour MP. Given that that is being reported in the press, will the Minister confirm whether that is true?
Will the Minister also give a cast-iron guarantee to the House that the Government will do everything in their power to prevent this case from collapsing? We have seen this show before. Will he promise that, unlike last time, the Chinese ambassador will be summoned by Ministers and told that aggressive interference in our country and its democracy will no longer be tolerated? Mr Speaker, I should say how right you were to deny that ambassador access to this House.
Will the Minister now commit to placing China on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme? The Minister said that China presents a series of threats, but during the last spy scandal the Government refused to say the crucial words—that China posed a risk to our national security—and they would not publicly accept that China was opposed or hostile to the interests of the United Kingdom. Will he now accept that that position is no longer tenable?
The Minister said that if there is proven evidence of attempts by China to interfere with UK sovereign affairs, the Government will impose severe consequences and hold all actors involved to account. We sincerely hope that is true, but it was not true last time, so here we are again. Unless the Government finally step up, we will be back here time and again.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his response. I am grateful to him for acknowledging the speed at which the Government have sought to make a statement. I know that he and right hon. and hon. Members will understand that there are strict limitations on what I can say about what is obviously now a live police investigation, but I hope that I speak for both sides of the House when I say that these are the most serious matters, which require us as a House to put the protection of our democracy above any political point scoring. That is how we should approach these proceedings.
The hon. Member, for reasons that I understand, sought to critique the Government’s position. I understand why he did that, but I am confident in the Government’s response to this incident and to our wider agenda on countering political interference. Of course, it is right that Members across the House have the opportunity to scrutinise Government policy and ask questions. That is precisely why we have moved at pace to provide an opportunity for them to do so.
I want to give the hon. Member and other right hon. and hon. Members a guarantee that, given the sensitivity of these issues and the obvious need to protect the operational activity of our police and the security services, we will look for other opportunities to provide appropriate briefings to relevant Members across the House by the relevant experts, to ensure that they can be updated in a way that simply cannot be done on the Floor of the House.
The hon. Member asked a number of questions. He will understand that there are strict limits on what I can say, but let me assure him about the seriousness with which we take these matters. I have always believed that the work that takes place across the House, led by Government, to defend our democracy should be a shared endeavour. The defending democracy taskforce was an initiative brought forward by the previous Government, and this Government have invested in it. It is the fulcrum at which we co-ordinate activity across Government and with law enforcement partners, working closely with Mr Speaker and the parliamentary security authorities here in the House, to ensure that our elected representatives are properly protected against the threats that we face. I assure him of the Government’s determination to stand with all Members to ensure that they are properly protected.
The hon. Member knows, because we have had such exchanges on numerous occasions, that matters relating to prosecutions are specifically matters for the Crown Prosecution Service. It is not for Ministers to opine and make judgments from the Dispatch Box, because the CPS is rightly independent of Government. But he does know—as do other hon. Members—how extremely disappointed the Government were that the trial last autumn did not proceed. Clearly, as he will understand, there is a crucial difference in that the charges in that case had been brought under the Official Secrets Act 1911. I am confident that the National Security Act 2023 provides the robust legislation we need to address the threats that we undoubtedly face.
The hon. Member mentioned FIRS, and I understand why he decided to do so. FIRS is an important capability that comes from the National Security Act. It is still a relatively new tool, and we are seeking to ensure that we can derive the maximum operational capability from it. We have not made any final decisions as to whether we will place other countries on the enhanced tier, but we keep that under very close review. As I have made clear, this Government will simply not tolerate attempts to interfere in our democracy. We have already taken tough action to strengthen our defences against foreign interference, and we will not hesitate to take further steps where they are necessary.
I call the Chair of the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy.
I thank the Minister for his immediate update to the House, given the recency of this breaking news. He will know that the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy did its report on the case of Cash and Berry, in which it made certain recommendations. The National Security Act 2023 is now fully in place. That is post the original Official Secrets Act 1911, which related to what was undertaken, allegedly, by Cash and Berry. Would the Minister agree that, given the essence of the grain of rice strategy pursued by China, we could see many more cases such as this, involving intelligence gathering by the Chinese as they seek to undermine our democracy and political system?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend and his Committee for the important work that they do, and I am grateful for their report. He will have seen the comprehensive response from the Government. We want to ensure—and we are doing this—that the United Kingdom is the hardest possible target for those who would seek to interfere in our democracy. That is why we are investing in the processes of the defending democracy taskforce, why we commissioned the Rycroft review and why I announced the counter-political espionage action plan. There is a lot of work taking place across Government, working with law enforcement to ensure that we are protecting our institutions and our elected representatives. I hope that I can convey to my hon. Friend and the House the seriousness with which we take these matters, but I want this to be a shared endeavour, working with parliamentarians of all colours. This affects us all, and the Government are working at pace to stand against the threat.
Lisa Smart (Hazel Grove) (LD)
I thank the Minister for giving me advance sight of the statement, even if at this stage he is rather limited in what he can say. He is entirely right to say that we must continue to allow the police to do their job and to do it well. We remain grateful to all those who are working to keep our country safe, both here in the UK and abroad. It is essential we defend our country and our democracy, including through a robust response by counter-terrorist police.
The arrests this morning highlight the continued reach of foreign interference in the UK, whether it involves spying in its raw sense or the pervasive and persuasive influence of foreign money in our politics. The Government could be doing more to put an end to the clout of foreign money in our democracy, and there is an opportunity to limit the influence of foreign money through the Representation of the People Bill, but as Spotlight on Corruption has made clear, the provisions in the Bill as it stands—looking at company revenue rather than profit—can be easily exploited and far too easily gamed to allow foreign money in. This must stop.
The Security Minister mentioned the foreign influence registration scheme in his statement, but he was unable, not for the first time, to mention any plans to add China to the enhanced tier. How many times must we all come to this House to hear a report of further rounds of arrests under counter-terrorism legislation before this Government take this action? Do the Government plan to review their decision to allow the building of the Chinese mega-embassy, and will they go further to stop foreign money being funnelled into our democracy, including through an absolute donation cap and a ban on those who have worked for foreign regimes from making any donations at all?
Let me take this opportunity—on behalf, I am sure, of all Members in this House—to thank those whose vital work keeps our country safe. They are the best of us, and our national security is underpinned by their endeavours. The hon. Lady makes several important points. She is right to raise concerns about foreign money in our politics. The Government take these concerns incredibly seriously. That is precisely why we have commissioned Philip Rycroft to conduct an independent review into this issue at pace. She might be aware that we debated these matters in Westminster Hall just a couple of weeks ago, when I encouraged her colleague, the hon. Member for Thornbury and Yate (Claire Young), to make formal representations to Mr Rycroft. I am grateful for her confirmation that they have done so. That is very much appreciated, because this is an important body of work that will provide recommendations to the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government and myself in the next couple of weeks, in time to inform the Representation of the People Bill. This is a timely piece of work and a good opportunity to ensure that that Bill provides the protections that we—I think, collectively—want it to.
The hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart) mentioned FIRS, and I understand why. FIRS is a useful tool, but it is still a new tool and we are working to ensure that it provides the maximum operational capability. We are looking carefully at how we can use it to best effect. She also mentioned the embassy; again, I understand why she did so. She knows the Government’s position with regard to the embassy. Again, I am a bit limited in what I can say about that because of ongoing legal proceedings, but I refer her to the remarks that I have made previously. There is a strong national security case for the embassy. She will have noted the letter that was sent to the Government from the directors general of MI5 and GCHQ, and I am confident that this is the right thing to be doing.
Mr Alex Barros-Curtis (Cardiff West) (Lab)
I thank the Minister for his statement and for all the work he does on the defending democracy taskforce. I also put on record my thanks to the law enforcement authorities and national security agencies. From what I have read online, I understand that one of today’s arrests took place in my constituency. My constituents will obviously be concerned to hear that, and I wonder what the Security Minister can say to reassure me and my constituents that the police and all the relevant authorities have the resources needed to keep us safe and to keep our democracy safe. If I am right to assume that what I have read online is correct, will he meet me at the earliest opportunity to discuss this further?
My hon. Friend has raised important points with regard to our democracy on countless occasions, and I am grateful to him for doing so again today. I can assure him that the police have the resources they need to do a difficult and complicated job, and of course I would be happy to meet him at the earliest available opportunity.
The Chinese only represent strength, and for them everything is transactional, so I think the country would rejoice if the Government were to summon the Chinese ambassador and say to him, “This sort of behaviour is intolerable. You cannot build this mega-embassy in just about the most sensitive site in London while you behave like this.” I am not asking about what MI5 and MI6 have said. This is transactional. We must say, “Treat British nationals like Jimmy Lai properly, and don’t spy on us; otherwise, we’re going to pause this embassy until you learn to behave.”
The Father of the House will have heard my introductory remarks, where I made it clear that Chinese officials have been démarched, both here in London and in Beijing. He talks about the transactional nature of the relationship. I hope he will accept that this Government have to, and do, act in the national interest. There are absolutely areas where we need to co-operate with China. I have referenced some, but they also include some areas within the law enforcement space, such as illegal migration, serious organised crime and narcotics trafficking. I honestly think it would be naive of anyone—although I am certainly not saying that the Father of the House was putting forward this view—to say that we should not have some kind of functional working relationship with China, but I was crystal clear in my opening remarks that national security is the first priority of this Government and we will do everything we need to do to safeguard our country and our democracy.
Mr Bayo Alaba (Southend East and Rochford) (Lab)
The conflict in Iran is deeply concerning, and I was glad to see that the Government’s flights are set to leave the middle east tonight. What more can my colleagues and I do to protect those stuck in the region from bad faith actors?
Given the vulnerabilities of Members of Parliament, can I urge the Security Minister to work with the parliamentary authorities not just to pass information to Members but to work proactively with us to ensure that we are all aware of the risks that are posed to us and the steps we need to take to ensure that we are not exposed to interference from foreign states?
The Chair of the Home Affairs Committee is absolutely right. I hope she understands the seriousness with which we take these matters. I spend a lot of time working with the defending democracy taskforce to ensure that we have in place the protections we need. That is not just about elections; it is about our democracy on an enduring basis. The relationship with this House and with Mr Speaker—hon. Members know how seriously Mr Speaker takes these matters—is a close working relationship. I will always make myself available to talk to colleagues about any matter of concern. A significant amount of guidance has been issued over the last few months. I encourage Members of this and the other House to engage with the materials that have been published, and, where they have further concerns, to raise them through the Parliamentary Security Department and with myself.
Mark Sewards (Leeds South West and Morley) (Lab)
I thank the Minister for his update on this difficult case. In his statement, he confirmed that the Government are working on a
“proscription-style tool to disrupt proxy organisations undermining our security.”
When will this tool be ready and does it include the recommendations set out by Jonathan Hall?
My hon. Friend raised this matter with the Foreign Secretary just yesterday, and he is right to do so. He will know that the Government commissioned Jonathan Hall to look at the legislative framework given the concerns we had that there was not an appropriate legislative tool to proscribe a state-backed organisation. Mr Hall has made a number of recommendations, all of which have been accepted by the Government. I am conscious that the Leader of the House is sitting here and will not expect me to talk about matters relating to parliamentary business, but I can give my hon. Friend the assurances he seeks that the Government are seeking to deliver this tool and will seek to bring forward legislation at the earliest available opportunity.
As I hope the Minister would accept, the last trial of those accused of alleged espionage on behalf of China foundered—to put it at its mildest—because of a lack of shared understanding between the Crown Prosecution Service and the Government about the evidence that the Government could properly submit in support of that prosecution. I do not expect him to comment about the specifics of this case, but would he accept that it would be sensible for the Government now to ensure that as this matter develops, no such misunderstanding occurs, and that the relationship between the CPS and the Government is in the right place to ensure that evidential conversations are held early rather than late? Finally, would he accept that it would be sensible for the Intelligence and Security Committee to be kept up to date as this matter develops, given that we meet in private and the risks of prejudicing future prosecutions are lower in our case?
I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Member and share in much of the analysis that he has brought forward. Misunderstandings are never helpful and, under these circumstances, above all else we will ensure that there are no misunderstandings. He knows the disappointment that is felt across Government, and within the agencies and law enforcement, about where we got to back in the autumn. Of course, I give him an absolute assurance and commitment that we will do everything we need to do to ensure that the CPS is able to make a judgment; but, as he will understand, that has to be independent of Government. His point about the ISC is absolutely right. He will understand that events have moved incredibly quickly this morning and that we will want to take a moment later today to reflect on what needs to happen next, but I give him an absolute assurance that we want to work closely with the ISC as part of the process.
I thank the Minister for the update, and I welcome progress made on the counter-political interference and espionage plan. Would the Minister return to the House as appropriate to further update us on that plan?
The counter-political espionage and interference plan draws together numerous important strands of activity across Government and ensures that all that work is properly co-ordinated, and we take that very seriously. I absolutely give my hon. Friend the assurance that he seeks. We will provide updates at the earliest available opportunity, but should he or any other Members have concerns in the meantime, I would be very happy to speak to them.
Edward Morello (West Dorset) (LD)
I praise the work of our police and our security and intelligence services in this case. I thank the Minister for his statement. Like him, I look forward to the publication of the Rycroft report. The Foreign Affairs Committee heard evidence from the Electoral Commission, as did the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. Would the Government consider new clauses to the Representation of the People Bill to widen and strengthen the powers of the Electoral Commission and, importantly, provide it with the necessary funding to properly defend our democracy?
All the points that the hon. Gentleman makes are entirely sound and reasonable. He will understand that we need to wait for the Rycroft review to report; I expect that to be in just a couple of weeks. We very deliberately sequenced it so that it can make recommendations that inform proceedings on the Representation of the People Bill. He knows from contact we have had through the Joint Committee that we take these matters very seriously, and we will want to ensure that we have all the safeguards we need. I am grateful for the confirmation from his Front-Bench spokesman, the hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart), that his party has engaged with that process, and I would be happy to discuss this further with them.
Chris Vince (Harlow) (Lab/Co-op)
I thank my hon. and gallant Friend for the work he does—and did, in his previous career—to ensure that our country and democracy stay safe. Mr Speaker, you will be aware that democracy only happens in this place because of House staff and MPs’ staff, who make a huge difference to us and ensure that we can do our job. How will the Minister protect MPs’ staff and House staff, and ensure their security as well?
I thank my hon. Friend for his question. He has developed something of a knack for finding a good question that most people will have in their mind. I can give him the assurances that he seeks. It is important that we ensure that protections are in place, not only for our elected representatives—those who step forward to serve in this House and in other places—but for their staff, who work so hard and diligently to serve them. We still have a lot of work to do—that work will be led here by Mr Speaker and the Parliamentary Security Department —but the Government will work very closely alongside them, to ensure that they have the support that they need.
The Minister spoke of “severe consequences”. Will he outline what those severe consequences might be? Does he understand that Beijing is unlikely to take that terribly seriously, given what has happened in the recent past? Will the severe consequences include putting on hold plans for the Chinese super-embassy and spy centre, pending the outcome of the Met’s investigation?
The right hon. Gentleman, who is a very experienced Member of this House, will know that, given that we are referring to events that took place just a couple of hours ago, it would be unwise of me to get into further detail. On our response to the threats that we have faced over the last months, I point him to a number of measures that I have referred to. He knows, I hope, how seriously we take these matters. He and I do not agree on the embassy, but I say to him, as I have said to other hon. Members, that there is a clear national security case for the embassy proposal. The directors general of two of the security services have been clear about the national security advantages, as have I. This Government will do everything we need to do to protect our country, our national security and this place. He knows that there is a lot that I cannot say about what we intend to do, but let me be crystal clear: where malign actors—whoever they may be—seek to undermine our democracy, there will be consequences.
Mr Luke Charters (York Outer) (Lab)
I recently visited the Defence Intelligence Academy with the armed forces parliamentary scheme and saw at first hand that our intelligence services are the best in the business. The Government should be praised for increasing the single intelligence account in real terms. Will he commit to keeping the SIA under review, given the increasing threats around political interference, and the threat of state-sponsored terrorism from Iran?
My hon. Friend makes an important point about the SIA. He is right that this Government have ensured that our intelligence services have access to the resources they need in a difficult and challenging world. I give him and the House an assurance that should there be a requirement for additional support, this Government will always ensure that both our police and our intelligence services have the resources they need to do the very difficult job that we ask them to do.
The Government will be well aware that, through the united front, the Chinese Communist party has created a global network of individuals and organisations that act as a political weapon to isolate, neutralise or counter Beijing’s critics. Indeed, a Jamestown Foundation report published this month shows that the UK is one of the four most exposed countries, with over 400 united front-linked organisations identified here. Why do the Government continue to refuse to take the necessary action to protect the nations of these islands by placing China on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme? That scheme may be new, but if it is going to be useful, it needs to be used.
The hon. Gentleman makes some important points. He will have heard what I said about FIRS. It is an important capability, and we need ensure that it is deployed in the right way, but we have introduced a number of measures in recent months to ensure that the United Kingdom is the hardest possible operating environment for those who seek to undermine our democracy. We are doing lots of things that I am unable to talk about, but I give him the assurance that we are taking these matters incredibly seriously, and will do everything that we need to do.
Peter Swallow (Bracknell) (Lab)
I have raised my concerns about foreign interference by Russia and China on many occasions, and today’s events underline why the issue is so important. I welcome the Rycroft review; it is fundamental that we get to the bottom of foreign interference in our politics. My only concern is that because the review will consider financial interference specifically, it may not have the scope to get the full facts. If that proves to be the case, will the Minister do everything in his power to ensure that we have further such work, so that we know the full extent of foreign interference in our democracy, in our elections and in this place?
My hon. Friend is right to raise that point, and he has done so consistently. The Rycroft review provides a very important opportunity to take stock of the threats and challenges, and to work out how best to respond. However, I absolutely give him the assurance that he seeks; I would not want to prejudge the review, but if there are measures that are not included in it, we will of course keep an open mind about what more we need to do. We already have a number of powers, and we need to make sure that we use them to maximum effect, but where there is a requirement for new legislation, new powers or additional resources, we will not hesitate to bring them forward.
As the Minister said, at the heart of this is the question of whether our enemies and malign actors fear the consequences of hostile acts against us. That question is why many of us say that the embassy should be paused. Why would the Chinese be worried about consequences of spying, when this week, another malign actor attempted to kill British armed forces personnel and attacked sovereign territory, but suffered no consequences? What lesson does the Minister think China will take from our failure to defend our own territory from military attack?
The hon. Gentleman raises his concerns, as he is entitled to. It was important—many would not agree—that the Prime Minister went to China to have frank conversations relating to our national security. People should understand that if they seek to commit criminal acts, attack our country or undermine our democracy, there will be consequences. This Government will ensure that this is the hardest operating environment for those people.
Richard Tice (Boston and Skegness) (Reform)
I recently made a submission to the Rycroft review relating my concerns about Chinese communist regime influence on the Labour party. Given that we now understand that the partners of a sitting Labour MP and of a former Labour MP have been arrested today, the Minister will understand why I shall be updating that submission ahead of my meeting with the Rycroft review next week. Will the Minister confirm whether the Rycroft review can take account of these arrests, or will it need to be extended until a decision is made on whether charges are brought?
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for contributing to the Rycroft review, not least because he and a number of his colleagues have expert insight into the consequences of foreign interference. I hope that he has taken the opportunity to reflect on that and fed it into the review. Of course, the review is being conducted independently by Philip Rycroft and will report by the end of this month, so he will absolutely have the time and space to reflect on recent events. It is an important piece of work that will inform Government policy, not least on cracking down on all the foreign money that should not be in our politics—another matter that Reform Members know quite a bit about.
Harriet Cross (Gordon and Buchan) (Con)
China is a risk—we have so much evidence of that—yet the Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero has signed an energy deal with China for co-operation on batteries, offshore wind, cables and inverters. It effectively gives China access to our energy grid—that is a massive risk. Was the Security Minister consulted by the Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero before the deal was signed?
The hon. Lady raises an important point. I can give her and the House the assurance that we have checks and balances in place to ensure that decisions such as the one that she refers to are made in a way that enables our continued national security. We work collaboratively across Government; it is a system that we inherited from the previous Government. We will do everything we can to ensure that we are making informed judgments. Of course, where appropriate, we will make judgments that will aid economic advantage, but underpinning all that will be decisions to ensure that nothing undermines our national security.
Luke Taylor (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)
I join all colleagues in the Chamber in expressing my shock about the news this morning. I am also disgusted that the Chinese state has targeted the partners of sitting and former MPs. From a personal perspective, may I ask the Government and the Minister to ensure that those affected are supported, following this utterly outrageous targeting of those closest to them?
On the practicalities of what this may imply, can the Minister reassure us all that if the inquiry suggests that any information accessed through a sitting or former MP affected the Government’s decision on the Chinese embassy, that decision will be paused, reviewed and potentially reversed?
The hon. Gentleman will understand that I cannot comment on specifics relating to individuals. Along with the director-general of MI5, I recently briefed the chief executives of UK political parties, including the Liberal Democrats. One point made at that briefing was that people who are involved in politics should not take the view that only those who serve in Government or in particular positions of authority and responsibility are targeted. All those involved in the wider political ecosystem are in play here, and that is an important message for people inside and outside this place to understand.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his other point. He knows the Government’s position on the embassy. There is nothing more I can say about that now.
Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)
I know how seriously the Minister takes national security; he will feel keenly any interference with our democracy. However, the news that officials being are démarched will be cold comfort for the 4,500 Hongkongers who live in the borough of Solihull. Can the Minister guarantee that the Chinese ambassador to the UK will be summoned by the Foreign Secretary for an interview without coffee?
The hon. Gentleman is right: I do take these things incredibly seriously. I am grateful for his point about Hongkongers in his constituency. I have personally raised our concerns about arrest warrants and bounties directly with Chinese authorities, and he will have heard what I said earlier about officials being démarched. The Hongkongers make an important contribution to our country. He knows the Government’s position on transnational repression. A lot of work has taken place through the defending democracy taskforce to ensure that people are, and feel, protected, but if he thinks that we should be doing more, I would always be very happy to discuss it with him.
It is a source of concern that two of the three men were arrested in Wales, and that they have close associations with the Labour party. Given that the Senedd goes to the polls in just over two months—in the shadow, of course, of the Nathan Gill scandal—what support will be given to the Electoral Commission to ensure that there are sufficient resources to safeguard those elections against the growing threat of foreign interference?
The right hon. Member is right to raise the importance of the work done by the Electoral Commission. It is a key member of the defending democracy taskforce, and we work closely to ensure that it has the powers it needs to do the difficult job asked of it. She will obviously understand that the Rycroft review and the Representation of the People Bill will not provide legislative change in advance of elections that are taking place in May. That is precisely why we are working closely with the devolved institutions, and we will be having further contact with them over the coming weeks, to ensure that the important elections that are taking place around the country in May do so in a fair and free environment. That is what we all want to see.
Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)
Will the Security Minister confirm whether the partner of the sitting Labour MP arrested on espionage charges of spying for China had a parliamentary pass?
I am disappointed that the hon. Gentleman did not ask me about FIRS, because he has consistently done so and I always enjoy our exchanges. He will understand that I have come here at extremely short notice to provide an update to the House, and I cannot get into the operational details of matters that took place just a few hours ago.
The Minister has said numerous times that the Government always prioritise UK national security, but those words ring hollow whenever we think of the Chinese embassy, and the fact that this Government have granted a mega-embassy close to underground cables carrying highly sensitive data. In the light of these highly concerning developments, surely the Government should show courage, strength and leadership, and with immediate effect revoke that decision in the interest of national security.
With great respect to the hon. Lady—I always listen carefully to what she has to say, because she represents a part of the United Kingdom that I have a long-standing interest in—she is not right in what she says about the embassy. I refer her to comments made by the Intelligence and Security Committee and the director generals of our security services. The arrangement that underpins the Chinese embassy involves the reduction of the diplomatic estate in London from seven sites down to one. I hope that when she looks at it in those terms, she will understand that there are national security advantages from that proposal.
A Member of Parliament’s partner has been accused of spying for China. The Minister has been asked this several times: have the Foreign Secretary or the Home Secretary specifically asked and summoned the ambassador to come to explain themselves, and if not, why not?
The hon. Member will have heard from my opening remarks that Chinese officials have been démarched in both London and Beijing. I hope he will also understand that we are referencing events that happened earlier this morning.
As Home Secretary, I delivered the National Security Act 2023, largely because of the threat posed by China. If media reports are true, does the Minister agree that the perception of conflict of interest, compromise and bias are just as damaging as actual conflict of interest, compromise and bias? Will he reassure the House today that the Labour party will do everything and take appropriate measures to protect the probity of the investigation and maintain public confidence?
Of course the Government will do everything to ensure that the counter-terrorism police and intelligence agencies have whatever they need to conduct this investigation. As the right hon. and learned Lady will understand from her time as Home Secretary, that is conducted independently of Government, and it is not for the Security Minister, the Home Secretary or any Minister to get involved in the business of an investigation. That would not be appropriate, and I hope she would acknowledge that. Let me also say something positive to her. She was Home Secretary when the National Security Act 2023 was introduced, and that vital piece of legislation is making a real difference to our ability to counter those who would seek to do us harm. It is a valuable tool in our armoury, but where there is a view that we need to add more tools to that armoury, we will definitely do so.
Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)
The name of the Labour Member of Parliament whose husband has been arrested is circulating widely via the media. I do not intend to name that Member of Parliament, but if the reports are true, that Member of Parliament sits on a Select Committee that would have sensitive, maybe even secret, information and, through totally legitimate means, has visited a number of our defence sites across the country. Has there been, or will there be, an urgent review of what sensitive information that Member of Parliament might have been party to and, at the appropriate juncture, will the Minister release any correspondence between his Department and that Member of Parliament on things such as the Chinese embassy and other matters relating to China?
On the hon. Gentleman’s first point, he will understand that membership of a Select Committee is not a matter for the Government, but Mr Speaker will have heard the point he raised, as have I. On his second point, he will understand that we are dealing with events that took place a couple of hours ago. I have not seen what is being reported online, because I have obviously been here, but I will give consideration to the matter he has raised.
I thank the Minister very much for his answers. Nobody in this House doubts his commitment to finding answers to ensure that the truth is out and justice is done—I thank him for that; everybody respects it. I highlighted when my constituents raised surveillance by the Chinese Communist party in my constituency, and when the website of the all-party group for international freedom of religion or belief, which I chair, was hacked, and information that highlighted human rights abuses and persecution in China was removed. The Minister has outlined clearly what will happen on the mainland, but Northern Ireland has a porous border with the Republic of Ireland. CCP authorities regularly cross the border going north and south with little or no checks, and its activities in the Republic of Ireland must be watched. What discussions has the Minister had to ensure that the Government of the Republic of Ireland, and the Garda Síochána, work collectively to thwart the CCP wherever it is, especially in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland?
I am grateful to the hon. Member, as always, for his words about our commitment to these matters. I know he shares that commitment, and he has been a tireless champion for the freedom of people to practise their religion. He has raised some important points, and he will understand if I want to reflect on them more closely. We have a close working relationship with the Republic of Ireland, but I will look carefully at what he said and get back to him.
(1 week, 4 days ago)
Written StatementsToday, the unexplained wealth order report for the period 2024 to 2025 will be laid before Parliament. The unexplained wealth order report details the number of unexplained wealth orders made by the High Court in England and Wales during that period, and the number of applications made to that Court by enforcement authorities for such an order.
During this reporting period, five unexplained wealth orders were applied for, all of which were granted. Four orders were applied for by the National Crime Agency and one by the Serious Fraud Office, the first agency other than the NCA to apply for an order.
This is the highest number of unexplained wealth orders applied for in one year since their introduction in 2017. This has, in part, been facilitated by reforms to the orders in the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022, which were designed to increase their use. Unexplained wealth orders are intended for particularly high-value and complex cases, which is reflected in their more limited use, compared to other powers. The wide range of alternative civil and criminal powers available to law enforcement agencies to investigate, search for, and seize assets are more appropriate for use in the majority of cases.
Enforcement agencies continue to review whether cases are suitable for a UWO. Copies of the report will be available in the Vote Office, and it will also be published on www.gov.uk.
[HCWS1355]
(1 week, 5 days ago)
Written CorrectionsThe Government’s first duty, as I hope any Government’s would be, is to keep the country safe. We are absolutely committed to taking all necessary measures to expose and disrupt any attempt to interfere with our sovereign affairs.
That is why on 18 October last year I set out the Government’s counter-political interference and espionage action plan, to ensure that our democracy is the hardest possible target for foreign threat actors.
[Official Report, 9 February 2026; Vol. 780, c. 270WH.]
Written correction submitted by the Minister of State, Cabinet Office, the hon. Member for Barnsley North (Dan Jarvis):
The Government’s first duty, as I hope any Government’s would be, is to keep the country safe. We are absolutely committed to taking all necessary measures to expose and disrupt any attempt to interfere with our sovereign affairs.
That is why on 18 November last year I set out the Government’s counter-political interference and espionage action plan, to ensure that our democracy is the hardest possible target for foreign threat actors.
(3 weeks, 4 days ago)
Written StatementsI wish to update the House on the Government’s plans for the integrated security fund and how funding will be allocated over the next three years—2026-27, 2027-28 and 2028-29—to support delivery of the UK’s national security priorities. 2026/27 2027/28 2028/29 Non-ODA (£m) ODA (£m) Total (£m) Non-ODA (£m) ODA (£m) Total (£m) Non-ODA (£m) ODA (£m) Total (£m) Strategy Boards Asia Pacific 21.5 6.0 27.5 24.0 6.0 30.0 27.0 6.0 33.0 Russia 59.5 75.0 134.5 49.1 76.7 125.8 46.7 79.4 126.1 Middle East and North Africa 37.5 32.0 69.5 30.0 32.0 62.0 25.0 32.0 57.0 Counter-Terrorism 40.0 18.0 58.0 33.0 18.0 51.0 28.0 18.0 46.0 Serious Organised Crime, including Organised Immigration Crime 15.0 17.5 32.5 15.0 19.0 34.0 12.5 19.0 31.5 Biosecurity 15.0 0.0 15.0 15.0 0.0 15.0 15.0 0.0 15.0 Counter-State and Hybrid Threats 20.0 0.0 20.0 20.0 0.0 20.0 18.0 0.0 18.0 Economic Security 12.0 0.0 12.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 8.0 0.0 8.0 Cyber and Tech 113.3 5.2 118.5 102.0 5.5 107.5 95.0 5.5 100.5 Additional Costs Central Capabilities 3.4 0.2 3.6 2.6 0.2 2.8 2.3 0.2 2.5 Exit Costs 2.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Central Administration 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0
As the 2025 national security strategy made clear, threats to British national security and interests are proliferating. Foreign powers plot espionage, sabotage and cyber-attacks on British soil, colluding with criminal groups to achieve their aims. The threat posed by terrorism continues to persist and diversify. Hostile actors seek to undermine and destabilise the international order not only through conflict and aggression, but through hybrid tactics aimed at sowing and exploiting divisions within our societies.
In this increasingly complex and interconnected national security landscape, it is more important than ever that we take an integrated approach to protecting the UK and its people. This year, the ISF has already demonstrated its value in co-ordinating whole-of-Government responses to key threats, providing vital support for the Government of Ukraine’s efforts to oppose Russian aggression and investing in the UK’s own resilience to threats.
Over the next three years, the Government will continue to invest in the ISF as a cross-Government mechanism that can complement the work of individual Departments, while embarking on ambitious reforms to improve its efficiency and to directly align the fund’s work with the Government’s wider national security response and the national security strategy. This will support the ISF to deliver on its core purpose: protecting the UK’s national security domestically and overseas.
Reform
For 2025-26, the ISF delivered a series of structural changes, closing some ISF portfolios and consolidating others to streamline and focus the fund’s efforts. This was part of a phased transition towards a reformed ISF governance structure that will take effect from 2026-27. The second phase of ISF transformation will:
Deliver a more focused ISF strategic framework, concentrating ISF programming on tackling five key areas: Russia; Iran and its proxies; threats emanating from the Asia Pacific region; serious and organised crime, including organised immigration crime; and terrorism. The ISF will also focus on building sovereign capabilities in four areas: cyber and tech; biosecurity; counter state and hybrid threats; and economic security.
From 2026-27 onwards, funding will be allocated and programming overseen by cross-Government boards responsible for delivering the UK’s strategies related to each of the ISF’s nine strategic priorities. This will see an end to bespoke ISF governance arrangements, leading to greater accountability for spending through the ISF and reduced bureaucracy.
Set multi-year allocations to enable more efficient, longer-term programming. To preserve the ISF’s flexibility to respond to a crisis or a change in security priorities, this will be balanced by holding 20% of the allocations in 2027-28 and 2028-29 “at risk” and available for reprioritisation if necessary.
Transfer responsibility for funding the UK’s contributions to UN peacekeeping missions and other multilateral commitments to the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office and the Ministry of Defence. This is in line with the ISF’s sharper strategic focus on UK national security. The ISF will continue to fund wider programming to prevent and/or resolve conflict and instability where there is a direct link to UK national security.
Spending review 2025 allocations
These reforms will enable the ISF to maximise the national security impact of its budget over the SR25 period. This budget totals circa £820 million per year, of which circa £200 million per year is official development assistance. The ISF will transfer circa £250 million per year to the FCDO and the MOD to enable those departments to manage UN peacekeeping and multilateral commitments currently funded by the ISF. The ISF will also transfer a further £30 million, £70 million, and £100 million non-ODA to the Home Office over the three years of SR25 to support national security priorities and safeguard the UK’s homeland security. The ISF’s budget for national security programming will therefore total £545 million, £499 million and £471 million in 2026-27, 2027-28 and 2028-29 respectively.
The ISF will focus programming funding towards the most acute threats to UK national security. This includes increasing the ISF’s investment in its two largest areas of spend: countering Russian aggression, including in Ukraine; and strengthening the cyber and tech capabilities of the UK and our allies. Together, these areas make up 46% of the ISF’s budget in 2026-27. By 2028-29 the ISF will also increase funding by 33% to enable the UK to counter threats emanating from the Asia Pacific region, including engaging safely and securely with China while protecting UK interests, and supporting our partners around the world to do the same. The ISF will also invest in new cross-cutting, domestic counter-state threats programming, which will complement actor-specific international activity to counter Russia and other states.
The ISF’s counter-terrorism allocation will increase from £31 million this year to £58 million in 2026-27, before declining to £46 million by 2028-29. This front-loaded allocation will establish new domestic counter-terrorism capabilities from next year, while providing sufficient funding to maintain existing counter-terrorism activity in Africa and the middle east. In 2026-27, ISF funding on serious organised crime will also rise by circa £10 million from 2025-26 levels, to fund new activity disrupting and dismantling criminal groups facilitating illegal migration to the UK.
Prioritising funding in these areas means that greater fiscal discipline is required elsewhere in the fund. Programming in the middle east will narrow its focus to countering the highest priority threats in the region and to support work to secure a resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict through a negotiated two state solution. The ISF allocation will therefore reduce by 20% by the end of the SR25 period. Following the ISF’s successful maturation of UK sanctions capabilities, which will be funded by Departments’ core budgets from next financial year, the ISF’s allocation to economic security will also reduce from £12 million in 2026-27 to £8 million in 2028-29. The ISF will maintain funding for strengthening UK resilience and preparedness in relation to biosecurity threats at £15 million per year through the SR25 period.
These allocations closely align ISF funding with the priorities of the national security strategy. They balance investment in capabilities to bolster domestic resilience and make the UK a harder target for hostile actors, with overseas activity to promote stability and help allies and friends bolster their own resilience. Together with the reforms to the ISF’s structure and operating model, they will ensure that the ISF is not only more efficient but more impactful in protecting the UK and our partners globally.
[HCWS1322]
(3 weeks, 5 days ago)
Written StatementsSection 55(1) of the National Security Act 2023 requires the Home Secretary to report to Parliament as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of every relevant three-month period on the exercise of their state threat prevention and investigation measures—STPIM—powers under the Act during that period.
STPIMs were introduced through the 2023 Act and came into force on 20 December 2023. There have been no STPIM cases imposed to date.
[HCWS1312]
(3 weeks, 5 days ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler. I begin by thanking my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) for introducing this debate. He did an excellent job of providing the context we need to have a good discussion, and the House owes him a service for the work he has done. I also extend my gratitude to all the hon. Members who have spoken—I will try to reflect on their comments in a moment—and, as others have done, I extend the Government’s gratitude to all those who signed the e-petition that has brought us here today.
This has been a good, timely and useful debate and it provides an important opportunity to strengthen awareness of the threat, and to signal the resolve that exists across the House to confront the work of Russian threat actors. The Government’s first duty, as I hope any Government’s would be, is to keep the country safe. We are absolutely committed to taking all necessary measures to expose and disrupt any attempt to interfere with our sovereign affairs.
That is why on 18 October last year I set out the Government’s counter-political interference and espionage action plan, to ensure that our democracy is the hardest possible target for foreign threat actors. Just last Thursday, I joined the director general of MI5 and the chief executive of the National Cyber Security Centre in briefing the chief executives of the UK political parties on the developing threat picture. On Wednesday last week, I joined the Skills Minister and the directors general of MI5 and the NCSC in hosting nearly 100 representatives from universities and sector bodies to discuss the risks that they face from foreign interference.
I am pleased to announce today that the Government will invest £3 million over the next three years to support the higher education sector to strengthen its resilience. That will include setting up a new foreign interference reporting route for UK universities and co-designing best practice guidance that will help universities to make proportionate, risk-based decisions on the threats to which they are exposed. As part of this work, we will also be considering the role of think-tanks, to which my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk referred specifically, given that they will share many of the same interference risks.
This e-petition calls for a public inquiry into Russian influence in UK democracy. As the Security Minister, I am proud to have the opportunity to work very closely with our intelligence and security agencies, who are working tirelessly to monitor and disrupt Russian threats to UK politics. Those threats range from cyber-espionage operations targeting sensitive or classified information to divisive information operations and attempts to influence UK policymaking through bribery and coercion, as we have seen with the shocking case of Nathan Gill.
Hon. Members will understand that it will not always be appropriate for the Government and our intelligence agencies to publicly reveal the extent of our understanding of Russian operations, due to the obvious importance of protecting the sources of that information and maintaining a competitive advantage over our adversaries. However, the UK Government continue to work tirelessly alongside our allies to expose Russian cyber-threats and information operations targeting democracy in the UK and worldwide. For example, since October 2024, the Government have exposed and sanctioned 38 organisations and individuals responsible for delivering Russian information warfare to undermine global democracies. The guidance that the National Protective Security Authority published in October also specifically highlighted the full range of vectors and tactics that foreign actors, including Russia, are using to target individuals working in UK politics.
Indeed, in the light of the deeply concerning evidence of Russia targeting our democratic system, the Government commissioned Philip Rycroft to deliver an independent review of foreign financial interference in UK politics. The review will primarily focus on foreign interference via funding because that is an area of particular concern. However, to inform his recommendations, Philip Rycroft has been provided with a threat briefing that covers the full range of vectors used by states to target UK politics.
It is the Government’s position that launching a new inquiry at this time would be premature. It would risk prejudging the conclusions of the ongoing review and duplicating its efforts. However, the final report will be presented to the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government and to me by the end of March, after which there will be significant opportunity for further parliamentary scrutiny and debate.
Let me address some of the points that have been raised in this debate. My hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk asked about cryptocurrency tools. As he will know, the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 makes it clear that foreign money is not permitted in UK politics. However, as tactics behind foreign interference operations develop, the Government recognise that our response also needs to evolve. The UK Government therefore reaffirmed their leadership and resolved to stamp out corruption and dodgy money in UK politics through the Home Office’s refreshed anti-corruption strategy. Corrupt insiders and criminal networks will be brought to justice by a strengthened specialist police unit and tougher safeguards across the public sector.
The forthcoming elections Bill will also further strengthen safeguards against covert political funding. Our proposed Bill includes introducing tougher rules for donor recipients to conduct risk assessments before accepting donations, as well as increasing the powers of the Electoral Commission to ensure that it has the tools necessary to fulfil its duties. The Rycroft review into foreign financial interference will assess opportunities for further improvement. Let me just say a word specifically about cryptocurrency, because the Bill specifically includes safeguarding against the potential use of cryptocurrency by foreign actors to obfuscate the source of their donations.
My hon. Friend also asked about media literacy education. Building media literacy skills for young people to critically engage with and assess information from a range of sources is a priority for the Government. Since 2022, the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology has provided £3 million of funding for media-literacy projects that empower users to navigate the online world safely.
My hon. Friend also asked about a dedicated disinformation agency. This issue will always require a co-ordinated, cross-Government effort. DSIT leads the Government’s policy on countering disinformation, but works closely with the national security secretariat in the Cabinet Office. The Home Office is the departmental lead for state threats, working closely with the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, which leads on the Government’s efforts to counter foreign interference. A lot of meaningful activity is taking place across Government.
The hon. Member has only just entered the Chamber, but in an act of generosity, I will give way.
Mike Martin
The Minister is very generous. I have just come from the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, where we were looking at these issues in our inquiry on defending democracy. He has been in front of that inquiry. When will the new elections Bill be coming forward or—perhaps an easier way to ask the question—which will be the first election to take place under the new Bill, protected by the wider measures that he just set out?
I am grateful to the hon. Member for his intervention and for his important work on the Joint Committee. I welcome the scrutiny that it provides, and I assure him of the seriousness with which we take such matters. I think he will have heard the comments that I made specifically about the Rycroft review. The scheduling of the review has been designed to ensure that it reports by the end of March, in order to inform further legislation. It is not for me, as the Security Minister, to talk about the scheduling of further legislation; that is very much a matter for the Leader of the House. That piece of legislation is being led by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, working closely with colleagues across Government.
However, I owe the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells (Mike Martin) a response to the important point that he made about when those legislative tools will impact on our evolving democratic process. I give him an absolute assurance that, working through the defending democracy taskforce, which I chair, we have already done a lot of work in this Parliament to ensure that for the elections that will take place this May in Wales, Scotland or England, and the elections taking place in Northern Ireland in 2027, the local institutions in those areas are as prepared as they possibly can be. There are very close working relationships between central Government and the devolved institutions to ensure that those elections are as free and as reasonably and fairly contested as they possibly can be.
Let me turn to some of the other contributions. The hon. Member for Ceredigion Preseli (Ben Lake) represents a beautiful part of the world, which I know and remember fondly from my time at Aberystwyth University. He rightly and entirely reasonably urged the Government to act at pace and not to waste any time. I repeat the point that I have just made about the Rycroft review: it will report by the end of March in order to inform the legislative agenda, including the elections Bill. Again, however, I give him the same assurance I did earlier: the elections that will take place in Wales are part of a process being led by the defending democracy taskforce to ensure that all the devolved institutions have the support that they need to make sure that the elections take place in the way that we would all want them to. I am working very closely with colleagues in Wales to ensure that that is the case.
My hon. Friend the Member for Kensington and Bayswater (Joe Powell) speaks with great authority on such matters. I am grateful for all his work, including in the all-party parliamentary group. He spoke rightly about the important use of sanctions. He will understand that it would be unwise of me to signal from the Front Bench further intent with regard to such matters, but he has heard the recent words of the Prime Minister, and let me reiterate them: if Roman Abramovich fails to act quickly, we are fully prepared to go to court to enforce the commitment that has been made, if that is necessary.
The hon. Member for North Herefordshire (Dr Chowns) made a number of points, including specific concerns about the conduct of Reform, but also about the EU referendum that took place back in 2016. We completely recognise the enduring and significant threat that Russia poses to our UK democracy. Of course, we are absolutely committed to ensuring that we are well protected against all forms of foreign interference. That is why we are doing work through the defending democracy taskforce; that is why before Christmas I launched the Government’s counter-political interference and espionage action plan; and that is why we have now commissioned an independent review of foreign financial interference in UK politics.
The hon. Member specifically mentioned the ISC, as did a couple of other hon. Members. Reports produced by the Intelligence and Security Committee, including the Russia report, contain highly classified material that could damage the operational capabilities of UK intelligence agencies if published unredacted, so I hope she understands that we have to be very careful with the publication of those reports. She also asked specifically about the elections Bill, which she will understand is an MHCLG lead. The Bill is an important opportunity to strengthen our legislative response to the threats that we face, and we very much welcome her contribution to that process.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Phil Brickell) knows a lot about these matters. I am pleased that he will take the opportunity to engage directly with Philip Rycroft. My hon. Friend raised important points about the funding of Reform; I have to say that it is disappointing that no Reform Members are here to defend their record. Of course, it is absolutely right that all decisions taken by Government are scrutinised not only by this House but by the media: that is important, and I would not have it any other way. But it is also important that those individuals who aspire to serve in the highest office are similarly subjected to meaningful scrutiny. I am pleased that this House has done so this afternoon, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the critique that he helpfully offered.
The hon. Member for Mid Dunbartonshire (Susan Murray) made an important point about the importance of acting in concert with our allies. She is absolutely right: that is why we seek to work very closely with our international partners on these matters. She raised a number of other helpful and constructive points. I believe that some of her questions were being addressed in the statement given to the House by the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister at precisely the moment that she was asking them. I hope she might find a moment later to check the record, and I hope her questions have been answered.
My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) speaks with great authority on these matters. I know that the whole House appreciates his important work to support Ukraine and ensure that our friends and allies prevail in their struggle against Putin’s illegal invasion. I am particularly proud of the cross-party support for that endeavour, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the leadership role that he has played.
The hon. Member for Tewkesbury (Cameron Thomas) was the first but not the only Member to quote Clausewitz; I particularly enjoyed his reference. Like other hon. Members, he raised deeply concerning points about Reform. I have to say that it speaks volumes that not one Reform Member—not even one of their keenly recently recruited Members—is here to respond. That is a great shame. The hon. Member will have heard my response to the point that the hon. Member for North Herefordshire made about the ICS report, but I firmly believe that addressing the issue should be a cross-party endeavour, so I would be happy to discuss the matters further with him.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Oxford East (Anneliese Dodds), made a good point about bots in her excellent contribution, and rightly raised activity in Moldova specifically. She is right to assert the need to ensure that our legislative framework and wider response are geared to the nature of the threat we face now, not the one we faced in the past. I can give her an assurance of how seriously the Government take such matters. She will know that the Government have introduced the cyber-security action plan; I heard the comment from the hon. and gallant Member for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp) about that a moment ago, and I will take it away. I hope that my right hon. Friend is also aware of the work the Cabinet Office is leading on the production of a national cyber action plan.
I know that my right hon. Friend is proud to represent one of our country’s finest universities. She nodded to the particular challenge that has been experienced recently around lawfare. Her point on that was well made, and I am grateful that she welcomes the new reporting route announced by the Government, which is an initial step. We are working towards developing a more proactive advisory service alongside training to support our higher education sector, using the new money we have identified. I am grateful for her contribution.
I very much agree with the analysis and the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff West (Mr Barros-Curtis). It is telling that we have heard from a number of Members from Wales. My hon. Friend emphasised the impact of Nathan Gill’s treachery, which cannot be overestimated; I know that my hon. Friend has raised the issue on several occasions, but I assure him again that the work that the Government lead through the defending democracy taskforce is aligned with our devolved institutions, which—as we have seen recently, not least in the case of Nathan Gill—are just as much on the frontline as those of us in this place. My hon. Friend made some important points about the elections Bill, and of course I agree with his important points about NATO.
Lincoln Jopp
Is the Minister aware that, as a result of actions by the Scottish and Welsh Governments, a loophole has been created whereby people living in Wales and Scotland can now make unlimited political donations to any political party or politician? Is that something that is going to be addressed by the Government?
The hon. and gallant Member makes an important point. I hope that Mr Rycroft is listening, because that is something that he will want to consider. I give an assurance that I will take it away and look at it as well.
My hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli (Dame Nia Griffith) made several important points. She is right that there is nothing new about the use of propaganda. She is also right about the information age that we are now living through. I am pleased that she mentioned Ian Lucas’s book, and I am grateful for the other points that she raised, including an important one about support for members of the LGBT+ community. I assure her of the priority we attach to the issues that she raised.
I am also grateful for the contribution made by the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Thornbury and Yate (Claire Young). I say gently to her that the Rycroft review provides a vital opportunity to look at these issues, so I hope that she and her party will engage. I think there was an invitation, which I reiterate, from my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West to do so, and I hope that she will take it up. It is important that, where we can, we seek to maintain a cross-party consensus on these issues, which is precisely why, along with the director general of MI5, the other day I briefed the political parties on these matters, including the Lib Dems. I hope we can keep that conversation going.
The hon. Member for Spelthorne made a number of reasonable and fair-minded points. He nodded to the Scots Guards without actually mentioning them, so let me do that on his behalf. He also took the opportunity to mention Clausewitz, which was appreciated. I know that he takes these matters seriously. I was pleased to see him at the recent JCNSS meeting, to which the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells has just referred, and at which I gave evidence on national security the other day. He made an important and fair-minded observation about the threat perception. He is broadly right about that.
The hon. Member for Spelthorne will understand that a difficult balance has to be struck, informing the public while not alarming them. He is right that we need to debate these things in this House and more generally, not least because of the grave nature of the threat that we face and the potential requirement—I will be careful about what I say—of public resource that will have to be dedicated to these matters in the years to come. I welcome the comments he made. I hope he would agree—I think he would—that we should work collaboratively across the House on these most important matters. It is in that spirit that I always endeavour to engage with hon. Members.
The threats that the UK and our allies face are immediate and evolving. Russia views our democratic openness as a vulnerability to be exploited. Through the Government’s counter-political interference and espionage action plan, we are equipping everyone, from local councillors to parliamentary staff, with the tools that they need to help to disrupt and detect foreign espionage activity wherever we find it.
This Government’s clear commitments to upholding and restoring trust in standards and integrity in public life are not merely bureaucratic pledges. They are a vital line of defence, ensuring that the UK is not a permissive environment for foreign interference and safeguarding the sovereignty of our democratic future. From the comprehensive powers of the National Security Act 2023 to the protective work of the defending democracy taskforce, we are deploying a whole-of-Government approach to make the UK a much harder target. On this Government’s watch, we will do whatever is required to disrupt and degrade foreign interference operations and keep the British public safe.
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Written StatementsThe first report of the independent review of disclosure and fraud offences —“Disclosure in the Digital Age”—was presented to Parliament in March 2025. Since then, the Home Office, the Attorney General’s Office and the Ministry of Justice have worked together on a joint response to its 45 recommendations. The Government are grateful to Jonathan Fisher KC for his thorough analysis of the criminal disclosure regime.
Building on that foundation, the Government are committed to modernising disclosure so that it is fit for purpose in the digital age. In particular, the review identifies practical opportunities to deploy technology in criminal cases to manage digital material more effectively, reduce administrative burdens and release police time for frontline duties. Any adoption of new tools will be underpinned by robust safeguards and full regard for the rights of the defence and the interests of justice.
The programme of reform is designed to strengthen the justice system as a whole: streamlining investigations and prosecutions, reducing unnecessary bureaucracy and improving consistency across agencies, while maintaining fairness for all parties. Any delivery will be taken forward in partnership with law enforcement bodies, the Crown Prosecution Service and wider criminal justice stakeholders to ensure that changes are workable, proportionate and sustainable in practice.
The Government will publish its full response to the independent review by 20 May 2026, aligned with wider reforms across the criminal justice system. This response will include careful consideration of any linkages to the recommendations made in part two of Sir Brian Leveson’s independent review of the criminal courts on efficiency. Further updates will be provided to the House in due course.
[HCWS1272]
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Commons Chamber
Jayne Kirkham (Truro and Falmouth) (Lab/Co-op)
I was pleased to meet my hon. Friend when I visited Cornwall last week, and to meet the local leaders and first responders who have been working tirelessly to keep their communities safe. In response to Storm Goretti, the Government issued two emergency alerts reaching approximately 500,000 people and urging them to stay indoors due to the severe weather. The resilience action plan outlines how we will strengthen local resilience, which includes better integrating voluntary, community and faith organisations into emergency planning.
Jayne Kirkham
I thank the Minister for his answer. Storm Goretti was a wake-up call for Cornwall and nationally. It tested the resilience of rural and coastal Britain to these extreme weather events. In Cornwall alone, we lost over 1,000 trees and thousands of people were left without power and water. It exposed vulnerabilities, particularly in our communications in rural areas, where mobile and internet connectivity is fragile, hard to restore and not backed up. Would the Minister lead discussions with Science, Innovation and Technology Ministers on how to shore up communications in such circumstances, and consider in his own Department how to advise and make individuals and communities more resilient generally to the increasing number of storms?
Yes, my hon. Friend is right, and I will do that. She knows at first hand the importance of hyper-local resilience planning, and I pay tribute to her work supporting her constituents in recent times. The gov.uk Prepare website already provides advice on steps people can take to prepare for emergencies, including storms and power outages, as well as on some of the points she made. I have heard and understood the points she has raised both today and previously, and I will give them very careful attention.
As I have said many times, I represent one of the largest rural constituencies in the United Kingdom, and Eskdalemuir is one of the most rural parts of that constituency. Constituents there remain extremely concerned about BT’s proposal to switch off analogue lines, given that the area has very poor mobile reception and frequent power cuts. Will the Minister and the Cabinet Office more generally satisfy themselves that the arrangements in place for this switch-off will not impede resilience and will ensure communities such as Eskdalemuir are not cut off during extreme weather events?
I am grateful to the right hon. Member for the important points he raises, and I completely understand and agree with his point about rurality. I have heard the point he made about BT, and I know that the Department has been engaging closely with the company. I will look carefully at what he has to say and come back to him.
Ms Julie Minns (Carlisle) (Lab)
I recently met representatives of Cumbria Council for Voluntary Service and ACTion with Communities in Cumbria to discuss community resilience in Carlisle and north Cumbria. One of the challenges we face in geographically remote areas such as mine is the speed with which local authorities and other agencies are able to deploy staff to close floodgates and shut roads when we have an area affected by flooding. Will the Minister set out what steps the Government are taking to encourage statutory bodies to train and equip community emergency volunteers to carry out those vital tasks?
I can do that, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising it. I know that her constituency has suffered from significant flooding in the past. The Environment Agency, local risk management authorities and the local resilience forum have worked hard to deliver new flood schemes, and improve the warnings and information to communities so that they are better prepared. The Government are considering both regulatory and non-regulatory options to integrate the vital work of the voluntary, community and faith sectors and statutory emergency responders. I will soon be meeting the flooding Minister, the Under-Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Haltemprice (Emma Hardy), to discuss this further.
Andrew George (St Ives) (LD)
I am very grateful to the Minister for coming to Cornwall last week and visiting my constituency, which was noted and very much appreciated. He will know that west Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly took the brunt of Storm Goretti, and we have many lessons to learn, not least the point made by the right hon. Member for Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale (David Mundell) about our—I think, evangelical—faith in modern systems and technologies, which have made us more dependent and less resilient. When we are learning such lessons, will the Minister make sure that it is not simply left to local authorities to do so, but that they are learned across the UK?
I absolutely will. I was very pleased to have the opportunity to spend quite a lot of time with the hon. Gentleman in his beautiful constituency, and to meet his local council colleagues as well as many other stakeholders. I agree with the points he has made. I think the response overall was an effective one, but I am working with Ministers across the Government to ensure that we learn all the lessons from Storm Goretti, and I am keen to work with him and other Members in that endeavour.
Perran Moon (Camborne and Redruth) (Lab)
My constituency of Camborne, Redruth and Hayle is 624th out of 650 constituencies for resilience in mobile communications. It cannot be right that a constituency such as mine is exposed in the way that it was during Storm Goretti, meaning that villages such as Mawnan Smith were completely cut off. Does the Minister agree that we need to review those constituencies where mobile communications are inadequate at the moment?
I was pleased to meet my hon. Friend at the Eden Project on Friday of last week, along with local leaders, to discuss these matters. I agree with his points and I give him an absolute commitment that we will work closely with Government colleagues, local authorities and other stakeholders to ensure that, where there are lessons that need to be learned from this storm, we will learn them.
I can tell the Minister that the promises made by telecoms companies about the withdrawal of copper landlines have not been kept. A recent power outage that covered both Caithness and Orkney left my constituents without any landline connectivity or mobile connectivity, as there was no power to the mobile masts. As well as talking to BT, will the Minister speak to the mobile phone operators and find out why there are not doing what they promised they would do?
Yes, I will. I am looking forward to meeting the right hon. Gentleman soon to discuss these things. It is important to say that we worked closely with mobile phone operators and National Grid Electricity Distribution to get more than 900 engineers out and about reconnecting homes in the south-west, but I have heard the right hon. Gentleman’s points and I look forward to discussing them with him soon.
The Government are absolutely committed to using all available tools to disrupt cyber-threats and to keep the public safe. Our new national cyber action plan will address the evolving cyber-threat and technological opportunities. We are working with partners across Government and law enforcement to deliver real-world impact against cyber-criminals. Through the Crime and Policing Bill, we will introduce measures to empower police to suspend IP addresses and domains being used for serious criminality.
There has been a tendency to offshore much cyber-support, but we are producing excellent cyber-security talent at Ebbw Vale college to protect our digital infrastructure. Will the Minister please outline what is being done to develop our home-grown workforce and security resilience to help reduce the risks from cyber-attacks in future?
My hon. Friend is right, and I am very interested to hear about the course at his local college. Skills are the foundation of the UK’s cyber-security, and the Government are investing £187 million in the TechFirst programme. That initiative will bring digital skills and AI learning into classrooms and communities, and aims to reach 1 million students by 2026 and provide a thousand annual scholarships. Those skills projects will help bridge the gap in our cyber-resilience.
May I thank the Minister for his answers? They are always very helpful. Cyber-crime and fraud are now the most common crime in the UK, accounting for some 50% of all offences and costing the economy billions of pounds per year. Will he please discuss with Cabinet colleagues providing additional funding to ensure that our universities and colleges can provide high-level training in cyber-security, and to ensure—if he does not mind my saying so—that Belfast’s title of cyber-security capital is retained?
I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman, as I always am, for the important points that he raises. I think he knows how seriously we take these issues. He is right to raise the point about skills and education. We are doing a lot of work to support the victims of cyber-crime and providing free guidance, tools and incident response advice through the National Cyber Security Centre, alongside targeted awareness campaigns. I give an assurance of the seriousness with which we take these matters.
Graham Leadbitter (Moray West, Nairn and Strathspey) (SNP)
Caroline Voaden (South Devon) (LD)
The Government’s Prepare website provides emergency preparedness advice to the public, including information about signing up for emergency alerts and warnings and preparing their home for emergencies. By using this advice, including the downloadable household emergency plan, people can improve their emergency preparedness, regardless of the cause of the emergency.
Caroline Voaden
As the Minister will know, a recent gas outage in my constituency left thousands of people without power, many for several days, and Cornwall has recently seen huge disruption from storm Goretti. Those incidents highlight how vulnerable households can be when essential services are disrupted. Given impending climate breakdown and the increasingly uncertain geopolitical environment, will he outline whether the Government are considering any kind of personalised, nationwide information campaign to help people prepare for a crisis? Not everyone will look at the gov.uk website. The Dutch Government have recently sent a 33-page booklet on emergency preparedness to every home in the country, so that people know what they need to do in a crisis.
I am grateful for the points the hon. Lady raises. We look very carefully at what international allies are saying about these matters. I am concerned to hear about the situation in her constituency. The Department for Energy Security and Net Zero works closely with industry, regulators and other stakeholders to improve and maintain the resilience and security of energy infrastructure. When incidents occur, as they have in her constituency—even exceptionally disruptive ones—industry has tried and tested response plans to minimise disruption to customers as quickly as possible. That said, I am keen to further increase our resilience, so if she would like to write to me, I will look closely at what she has to say.
The advice from the previous Government was that households should stockpile three day’s-worth of non-perishable food and water. This week, The Guardian has reported that other European countries are looking at creating strategic food reserves. Can the Minister tell us a little more about his thinking on these issues?
I could, and I welcome my hon. Friend’s interest and expertise in this area. The Government’s Prepare website includes a suggested list of supplies to improve household resilience, including non-perishable food. I take a close interest in the messaging of our partners in Europe on this subject. The Government are committed to ensuring that the whole of society—particularly the most vulnerable—are best prepared for and supported during crises.
Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)
As I made clear in a lengthy and detailed statement to Parliament earlier this week, we will not get into the technical detail of the mitigations. I was reassured to see the letter from the director general of MI5 and the director of GCHQ, in which they pointed out that there are clear security advantages from the proposal. I also sought to make the point that we have agreed with the Chinese Government that there will be a reduction in their current diplomatic footprint from seven sites down to one.
Peter Swallow (Bracknell) (Lab)
Euan Stainbank (Falkirk) (Lab)
The 10-year bus pipeline is yet to be published, and a media report about the investigation by the National Cyber Security Centre and the Department for Transport into kill switches suggests that 700-plus Chinese buses on British roads have remote disabling technology. Can the Minister confirm whether the Government are delaying the publication of the 10-year bus pipeline until the report on Chinese kill switches is concluded?
I believe that my hon. Friend has had a meeting with a Transport Minister to discuss these matters, but I would be very happy to discuss them with him further.
The Assisted Dying for Terminally Ill Adults (Scotland) Bill is still under consideration in the Scottish Parliament and has not been passed, contrary to the views of a number of Members of this House. This week, a number of measures had to be removed from the Bill because they were not compliant with the powers of the Scottish Parliament, but Scottish Ministers suggested that they were in an ongoing discussion with the UK Government about a future section 104 order. Can Ministers update the House on the current discussions with the Scottish Government? And do they agree with me that ultimately—