Manchester Arena Inquiry: Recommendations 7 and 8
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(2 days ago)
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The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
Today the Government are launching a public consultation relating to the private security industry, specifically on Manchester arena inquiry monitored recommendations MR7 (in-house CCTV operatives should be licensed by the Security Industry Authority) and MR8 (security businesses should be licensed by the Security Industry Authority).
The safety and security of our citizens is the Government’s top priority, and private security operatives play a crucial role in that. They hold positions of responsibility, interact with vulnerable individuals—especially in the night-time economy—and can be first responders to terrorist incidents. It is therefore essential that high standards of regulatory oversight of private security are delivered consistently. This regulatory oversight is provided by the Security Industry Authority through its licensing regime, and the Manchester arena inquiry found that this regime could be extended to improve preparedness.
The consultation is open to the public, and is targeted at security businesses, in-house and SIA-licensed security operatives, in-house employers of security operatives, buyers of security, local and public authorities, and industry associations. It seeks views on a range of options to understand which, if any, should be implemented. These include regulatory and non-regulatory options, aimed at ensuring that any new costs and regulatory burdens are proportionate, consider the impact on business, and are highly effective in improving public safety.
The consultation will run for 12 weeks. A copy of the consultation document and consultation options assessment will be placed in the Libraries of both Houses and published on gov.uk.
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Manchester Arena Inquiry: Consultation on Recommendations 7 and 8
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(5 days ago)
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The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
The Home Office plans to consider options in regards to Manchester arena monitored recommendations 7 and 8 in due course.
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Counter-terrorism Disruptive Powers Report 2024
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(5 days ago)
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The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
I have today published the Counter-terrorism Disruptive Powers Report 2024 (CP 1463). The report has been laid before Parliament and copies will be available in the Vote Office and online on www.gov.uk.
It is important that there is transparency on the use of our counter-terrorism tools. Publishing this report ensures that the public are able to access a guide to the range of powers used to combat terrorist threats to the United Kingdom, the extent of their use and the safeguards and oversight in place to ensure they are used properly.
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Foreign Interference
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(1 week, 2 days ago)
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The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
This has been an excellent debate. I extend my gratitude to the hon. Member for Lewes (James MacCleary) for securing this debate on the pervasive challenge of foreign interference. The hon. Member made a very good speech, in which he spoke knowledgably and authoritatively about the complex nature of the threats we face, which, along with the range of points raised by Members, illustrates the diverse and evolving nature of the foreign interference threat landscape.
In just the last few years, we have seen attempts to influence our political system through: covert donations, as we saw with MI5’s disruptive alert on Christine Lee and the conviction of Reform UK’s leader in Wales, Nathan Gill, for bribery offences in November; the issuing of arrest warrants and bounties by the Hong Kong police on individuals for exercising their freedom of expression; Russian information operations spreading false pro-Kremlin narratives online to undermine support for Ukraine; and the recent and much-publicised concerns about activities in this place. As the Prime Minister said just last week, the Government are clear that China poses national security threats to the UK.
When these threats are left unchecked, they place at risk the things we value most about our country: our democratic values and freedom of expression, and our ability to pursue long-term economic growth. Upholding national security is the first duty of Government, and we continue to take all the measures necessary to disrupt these threats.
As Security Minister, I am deeply committed to using my position to cohere cross-Government efforts to make our country a harder target for these threat actors. The legislative foundation of the UK’s defence against foreign interference lies in the National Security Act 2023. The Act has overhauled our espionage laws and introduced a crucial new foreign interference offence, equipping our security and law enforcement agencies with the tools they need to disrupt state threats in the UK.
The Prime Minister is absolutely committed to strengthening the resilience of our democratic institutions. That is why he renewed the mandate of the defending democracy taskforce, and I am leveraging that taskforce to co-ordinate the delivery of the Government’s counter-political interference and espionage action plan.
Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)
The Minister mentioned the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, of course, appointed Lord Mandelson to be our ambassador in America. For those seven months, someone had politically fatal kompromat on Lord Mandelson. I am not asking the Minister to give away any secrets, but could he tell us that he has personally investigated whether the presence of that kompromat left Lord Mandelson subject to foreign influence, or whether he knows the answer to that question one way or the other?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to the hon. and gallant Member. I would gently say that his intervention is not in keeping with the tone of what has been a good-natured and constructive debate, but he has asked the question and I can give him the assurances he seeks.
The action plan will deliver a protective security campaign to support those at risk to recognise, resist and report attempts of foreign interference, to strengthen existing legislation to mitigate the threat, and to co-ordinate action to disrupt the use of proxy actors. In line with our pledge to strengthen legislation, we are also introducing tougher rules on political donations through the elections Bill in order to protect our democracy. The Government believe that foreign money has no place in the UK’s political system, which is why the law is clear that foreign donations are not permitted. Yet as the tactics and techniques of foreign interference actors evolve, UK rules and safeguards also need to adapt.
Cross-Government work also continues at pace to counter foreign information operations. Our immediate focus is getting the Online Safety Act 2023 implemented quickly and effectively. The foreign interference offence in that Act places clear requirements on platforms to tackle illegal state-linked disinformation targeting the UK and our democratic processes. The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology is also driving a whole-of-society response to strengthening UK resilience against the threat, and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has demonstrated relentless international leadership in imposing costs on Russian state-linked threat actors that seek to undermine our democratic elections and spread malign content through deceptive means.
Peter Swallow
The Minister is setting out the strong action that the Government are taking to target those threats. Does he think that social media companies are doing enough to ensure that their platforms are not being used by Russia and others to undermine democracy?
Dan Jarvis
That is an entirely fair challenge. Like every Member of this House, I suspect, I would like social media companies to do more. I am working closely, through the defending democracy taskforce, with colleagues across Government, including in DSIT, to ensure that that is the case.
Since October 2024, the Government have sanctioned 31 organisations and individuals responsible for delivering Russia’s information warfare. Just yesterday, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary announced a further package of sanctions against five entities and two individuals for their role in attempting to destabilise international democracies and undermine international support to Ukraine through the spread of false and divisive narratives. Efforts are also under way to improve data collection on experiences of transnational repression in the UK and to ensure that victims receive appropriate support.
Hon. Members have made a number of very useful contributions. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr Bailey) brought to bear a generation of service, and spoke powerfully about a number of issues, including the importance of our support for Ukraine. The hon. Member for Dumfries and Galloway (John Cooper) made clear his concerns about the threats from China and elsewhere. I think it fair to say, based on his contribution, that he is not a fan of the First Minister of Scotland. I will look closely at his letter. I was only sorry that today there was no quote from Sun Tzu—maybe next time.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bracknell (Peter Swallow) made a very thoughtful contribution and rightly raised his concerns about Russian attempts to undermine our democracy. Although I did not agree with the comments made by the hon. Member for Dundee Central (Chris Law), who is not in his place, about the nature of the special relationship, I agreed with what he said about Russia and Ukraine. It is absolutely vital that we maintain that cross-party agreement.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Phil Brickell) spoke incredibly well and in a very considered way, as he always does. I am grateful for his words about the publication just this week of the Government’s anti-corruption strategy. I pay tribute to Home Office officials for their work to deliver on that strategy and our commitments. He spoke powerfully and authoritatively about the impact of the Nathan Gill scandal. I am grateful for the work that my hon. Friend does in support of our national security, and I can tell him that the elections Bill will introduce tough new rules on political donations, including cryptoassets.
The hon. Member for North Herefordshire (Dr Chowns) expressed her concern about Reform and sought to clarify her party’s position on NATO membership—although I confess that I am still a bit confused about whether the Greens are in or out. The Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Bicester and Woodstock (Calum Miller), spoke about the threats from China and Russia. He raised a number of entirely reasonable and constructive points. I hope that he will understand that I simply do not have the time to address them all today, but I can assure him of the seriousness with which we take them, and of our absolute commitment to working with him and Members across the House to address them.
Finally, I warmly welcome the hon. Member for Bridlington and The Wolds (Charlie Dewhirst), in what was a very assured debut at the Dispatch Box; no doubt we will be seeing much more of him in that position. He will not be surprised to hear that I did not quite agree with his assessment of the collapse of the recent China trial, but let me say something about the point he made with regard to the embassy. As Members will know, I have to be incredibly careful about what I say, because there is a quasi-judicial process under way, but should the embassy be approved—and that is very much a decision for the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government—it will replace the seven different sites that currently comprise China’s diplomatic footprint. That is one to ponder on further, I think.
To conclude, the threat from foreign interference touches on almost every part of our national life, and this Government are steadfast in their commitment to disrupting these threats while also ensuring that those at the greatest risk are able to recognise, resist and report suspicious activity. From the comprehensive powers of the National Security Act 2023 and the protective work of the defending democracy taskforce to our focused efforts against disinformation, we are deploying a whole-of-Government approach to make the UK a harder target.
This Government’s clear commitment to upholding and restoring trust in standards and integrity in public life are not merely bureaucratic pledges; they are a vital line of defence, ensuring that the UK is not a permissive environment for foreign interference and safeguarding the sovereignty of our democratic future. On this Government’s watch, we will do whatever is required to disrupt, deter and defeat foreign interference, protect our national security and keep the public safe—nothing matters more.
UK Anti-corruption Strategy
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(1 week, 5 days ago)
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The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
Today the Government have published the UK anti-corruption strategy 2025, setting out the Government’s response to tackle the harm that corruption causes to our growth, security and democracy over the next five years.
Corruption harms the UK and its citizens directly. Corruption makes people in the UK poorer and less safe. It undermines confidence in public institutions, damages the UK’s reputation as a trusted place to do business, distorts markets and deters investment. It threatens our national security: corrupt insiders can facilitate organised crime at our borders and in our prisons, and kleptocratic elites overseas seek to exploit our open economy and institutions. In this context of geopolitical instability and accelerating technological change, a clear and concerted strategy is necessary to protect the UK, support long-term economic growth and uphold the integrity of public life. Corruption is a transnational threat that harms our international partners and international interests while fuelling instability overseas: increasing crime, illegal migration and other threats back in the UK.
The strategy is organised around three pillars:
First, it combats corrupt actors and their funds in the UK and overseas. We will strengthen enforcement by expanding the City of London police’s domestic corruption unit and continuing to support the international corruption unit and the international anti-corruption co-ordination centre housed at the National Crime Agency. We will expand the use of sanctions against corrupt actors and their enablers, improve the system-wide response to professional enablers, and pilot the use of artificial intelligence to speed up complex investigations, including within the Serious Fraud Office. We will explore opportunities to reform the UK whistleblowing framework, including through potential financial incentives. We will champion beneficial ownership transparency, including in the UK’s overseas territories and Crown dependencies, to support asset recovery and target corrupt funds.
The strategy also includes reform of the UK’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing supervisory system, consolidating the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing supervisory functions of 22 professional services supervisory bodies. The Financial Conduct Authority will assume responsibility for the supervision of professional services firms, strengthening the UK’s defences against illicit finance and corruption, supporting sustainable growth and simplifying a complex regulatory system.
The second pillar of the strategy tackles vulnerabilities to corruption within UK institutions and systems. We will raise standards in public life by establishing a new ethics and integrity commission, strengthening the business appointments regime and improving the transparency of political donations, including enhanced due diligence requirements. We will bolster integrity in local government through a new statutory local audit office in England and, subject to collective agreement, introduce a mandatory code of conduct for elected local government officials with meaningful sanctions. Across the public sector we will improve vetting, information sharing and insider risk controls in high-risk areas such as policing, borders and prisons, and enhance training and guidance on corruption and procurement.
Thirdly, the strategy sets out plans to deepen our international partnerships aimed at building global resilience to corruption and broader illicit finance. We will host a UK countering illicit finance summit to galvanise collective action against this shared threat; expand our overseas illicit finance network; provide support to partner countries to prevent corruption and implement international standards; and protect and empower civil society and investigative journalism to expose corruption and hold the corrupt to account. We will work multilaterally to protect and enhance implementation of international standards designed to combat corruption and illicit finance.
Delivering these measures will make the UK a harder target for corrupt actors and their funds, improve trust in public life, support investment, and strengthen our national security. These actions will reinforce the UK’s position as a partner of choice for international counterparts sharing our commitment to tackle corruption and illicit finance. The strategy commits the Government to publishing a new anti-money laundering and asset recovery strategy in 2026, alongside the countering illicit finance summit, to complement and extend this work.
Implementation of the strategy will be overseen by Ministers across the Home Office, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, and HM Treasury, supported by the Prime Minister’s anti-corruption champion. We are committed to transparent updates and scrutiny of delivery:
We will publish annual progress updates on gov.uk and provide a written ministerial statement to Parliament each year;
We will undertake and publish two in-depth progress assessments at years 3 and 5 of the strategy; and
We will provide updates on progress to an external engagement group, chaired by the anti-corruption champion, and including civil society, academia, business and parliamentarians.
The UK anti-corruption strategy 2025 has been laid before Parliament as a Command Paper (CP 1454) and is available in the Vote Office and on gov.uk.
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Oral Answers to Questions
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(2 weeks, 2 days ago)
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Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dan Jarvis)
The decision to call in the planning application for the proposed Chinese embassy was made by the former Deputy Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Angela Rayner), in line with the current policy on call-in. The decision is subject to a quasi-judicial process and independent from the rest of Government. No private assurances have been given to the Chinese Government regarding the embassy application.
Sir Edward Leigh
Will the prayers of long-dead medieval monks save us from this hideous mega-embassy, right next to the most totemic building in the United Kingdom, the Tower of London? On 14 January, the then Secretaries of State for the Home Office and the Foreign Office wrote a letter insisting that a condition be made that there should be a wall and public access to the Cistercian medieval monastery on the site. The Chinese, in their arrogant way, are ignoring that. Will the Government stand firm and insist on public access—which, by the way, would be a good way of stopping this awful project?
Dan Jarvis
I can say to the Father of the House that national security is the first duty of this Government, and has been a core priority throughout this process. We have considered the breadth of national security considerations and have publicly outlined the necessary security mitigations that we need in order to support an application. Should the planning decision be approved, the new embassy will replace the seven different sites that currently comprise China’s diplomatic estate.
Gregory Stafford
On Tuesday, my hon. Friend the Member for West Suffolk (Nick Timothy) raised with the Foreign Secretary concerns expressed by the United States, Dutch, Swiss and Swedish Governments regarding the reported presence of data cables running beneath Royal Mint Court. I note that the Cabinet Office has since denied the reports to the press. Will the Minister now provide the clarity that his colleague at the Foreign Office could not, and give a clear yes or no answer to this House as to whether any such cables run beneath or in the vicinity of the site?
Dan Jarvis
I reiterate the point that the Government have considered the breadth of national security considerations. Both the Home Secretary and the Foreign Secretary have been clear about that. We work incredibly closely with our allies, particularly our Five Eyes partners, to ensure our collective national security.
Euan Stainbank (Falkirk) (Lab)
My constituents are concerned about the broader domestic security risk that China is currently posing, beyond the potential implications of its embassy planning application. Considering that Chinese state-subsidised bus manufacturers have gained a rising market share in the UK over the past few years, the Department for Transport and National Cyber Security Centre—
Susan Murray (Mid Dunbartonshire) (LD)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dan Jarvis)
The Government published the resilience action plan in July to set out their strategic approach to improve the UK’s resilience to the full range of risks that we face. One of the actions we have taken is to conduct the largest ever pandemic exercise, which involved all regions and nations of the UK and thousands of participants.
Gideon Amos
From the first ever charts by Captain Cook to real-time digital mapping, the UK Hydrographic Office enables and keeps our Royal Navy safe at sea—operating quite literally under the radar. Will the Minister pay tribute to the hundreds of people in my constituency who work at the office, and will he support a cross-sector approach to energy cables, telecommunication cables and their security, bringing in the University of Plymouth, University Centre Somerset and the Hydrographic Office in my constituency?
Dan Jarvis
I join the hon. Gentleman in paying tribute to the important work of the UK Hydrographic Office and its vital contribution to the UK’s maritime security. The Cabinet Office plays a central role to cohere cross-Government efforts to secure the UK’s undersea infrastructure. Given the growing prominence of this issue, lead Departments are engaging with industry partners, and we will continue this inclusive approach as we support the Royal Navy to take a leading role to secure our undersea infrastructure.
Susan Murray
The Russian spy ship Yantar has been probing our infrastructure in the North sea. While doing so, its crew used high-powered lasers against an RAF plane monitoring their activity, threatening the lives of our pilots. What steps are the Government taking to secure our critical strategic infrastructure in the North sea and to ensure clear and serious consequences for Russia when it carries out aggressive and dangerous military activity off our coasts?
Dan Jarvis
The hon. Lady and the House will understand that I am limited in what I can say in my response, but I can assure her that Russia is a top national security priority for the Government, and UK law enforcement has recently secured a range of convictions in this area. I will have more to say about this later today.
Euan Stainbank (Falkirk) (Lab)
Considering that Chinese state-subsidised manufacturers have gained a rising market share in the UK over the past few years, that the Department for Transport and the National Cyber Security Centre have recently announced an investigation into kill switches in Chinese buses, and that the 10-year bus pipeline is expected imminently, will the Minister be raising our Government’s concerns about Chinese buses directly with the Chinese Government?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to my hon. Friend, not just for his question today, but for the important work that he has done in this particular area, in his constituency and across Scotland. I have listened carefully to what he has had to say this morning, and I would be happy to discuss it with him further.
Daniel Zeichner (Cambridge) (Lab)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dan Jarvis)
Through the national security risk assessment, the Cabinet Office engages closely with the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs to continuously assess risks to the security and resilience of the food sector, as well as interdependencies between critical national infrastructure sectors. The Government have published the results of the first annual public survey on risk and resilience, and we provide resilience advice to the public on gov.uk.
Daniel Zeichner
The UK food system has shown remarkable resistance and flexibility in recent years, but seasoned industry voices are warning that we face new challenges from climatic risk and global instability. I appreciate that this is not just a food production issue, but a cross-Government issue. Can my right hon. Friend say a little more about measures to assess our readiness for these new challenges?
Dan Jarvis
My hon. Friend speaks with great authority on these matters. The Cabinet Office is strongly supportive of the work that DEFRA is undertaking on food security, including mapping critical food supply chain assets to provide a greater understanding of potential vulnerabilities. We have also published the first ever chronic risks analysis to support decision making on longer-term cross-cutting and interconnected risks, such as climate and geopolitical change.
Gerald Jones (Merthyr Tydfil and Aberdare) (Lab)
Andrew Rosindell (Romford) (Con)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dan Jarvis)
The Government recently introduced the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill to strengthen the resilience of UK critical national infrastructure. Yesterday, I visited BT, which has worked with the National Cyber Security Centre to block almost 1 billion attempts to access malicious content in just six months. In spring, the Government will publish a business-first national cyber action plan, and we have already engaged with over 400 stakeholders as part of its development.
Andrew Rosindell
The United Kingdom is increasingly and uniquely vulnerable to malicious cyber-activity targeting national infrastructure and democratic institutions, including Parliament itself. That poses a serious risk to our national security. Experts have warned of a critical data leak, a new scale of severe blackouts, transport disruption and even Government being brought to a halt. What action is the Minister’s Department taking to ensure that the Government are prepared and sufficiently resourced to meet this pernicious national security threat?
Dan Jarvis
I understand why the hon. Gentleman raises this issue, and he is right to do so. The Government take the threats we face incredibly seriously. That is one of the reasons why the Prime Minister took the decision back in September to ensure that the Security Minister sits across both the Cabinet Office and the Home Office, so we are better placed as a Government to co-ordinate our national security response in the areas the hon. Gentleman outlined. I can give him and the House an absolute assurance on the seriousness we attach to these issues. We take them very seriously and we are working at pace to address them.
Bradley Thomas (Bromsgrove) (Con)
Luke Akehurst (North Durham) (Lab)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dan Jarvis)
The resilience action plan sets out how we will lead a conversation with the public on resilience. Our evidence gathering included consultation with organisations that represent disproportionately impacted groups to ensure that our approach to resilience reflects the characteristics of the whole of the UK.
Luke Akehurst
Will the Minister explain to the House the importance of exercises like Pegasus, and outline how Pegasus has supported this Government’s efforts to improve our national resilience for future pandemics?
Dan Jarvis
The Government remain committed to learning the lessons of the covid inquiry to protect and prepare us for the future. In line with the inquiry’s recommendations on pandemic response exercises, Exercise Pegasus has been the largest simulation of a pandemic in UK history, involving Ministers, the devolved Governments and representation from arm’s length bodies. We will communicate the findings and lessons from this exercise in due course, as recommended by the inquiry.
Charlie Maynard (Witney) (LD)
Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dan Jarvis)
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for raising this issue. I will look carefully at what he has said and will be happy to meet to discuss it further.
Mr Luke Charters (York Outer) (Lab)
Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)
Last week, the National Security Adviser was due to appear before the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. Did he? If not, why not?
Dan Jarvis
My understanding is that the National Security Adviser did appear in front of the Committee, but it was a private session.
Callum Anderson (Buckingham and Bletchley) (Lab)
Dawn Sturgess Inquiry
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(2 weeks, 2 days ago)
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The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
With permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will make a statement on the Dawn Sturgess inquiry, which has today published its report.
I start with Dawn Sturgess. The untimely and sudden death of a much-missed mother, partner, daughter, sister and friend is a deeply personal tragedy, and today we keep her and her loved ones in our thoughts and prayers.
On 4 March 2018, Sergei and Yulia Skripal were targeted by the GRU, the Russian military intelligence service. Three GRU agents flew to the UK intent on killing Sergei Skripal. Two agents, known as Alexander Petrov and Ruslan Boshirov, travelled to Salisbury and contaminated the door handle of Sergei’s house with the nerve agent Novichok, with callous and despicable disregard for others who might enter or leave that address. Sergei and Yulia were poisoned, and spent weeks in a critical condition. Others, including Detective Sergeant Nick Bailey, were harmed as they responded to the incident.
On 30 June 2018, Charlie Rowley gave his partner Dawn Sturgess a gift of a Nina Ricci perfume bottle. She sprayed her wrists with the contents. Tragically, the bottle contained Novichok and had been recklessly thrown away by Petrov and Boshirov as they left Salisbury four months earlier. Dawn died at Salisbury hospital on 8 July 2018. An inquest was opened, but it was clear that a proper examination of Dawn Sturgess’s death would require a statutory public inquiry, which has been chaired by Lord Hughes.
Today, after an extensive and painstaking process, the inquiry has published its report. The inquiry has found that those who were involved in the assassination attempt against Sergei Skripal were “morally responsible” for Dawn’s death, and that
“deploying a highly toxic nerve agent in a busy city was an astonishingly reckless act.”
The chair concludes that the operation must have been signed off at the highest level of the Russian state, including by President Putin.
In respect of the emergency services’ treatment of Dawn, the inquiry found that she received “entirely appropriate medical care” but that, tragically, her condition was “unsurvivable”. On preventability, the chair has concluded that the Government’s public health advice following the attack on the Skripals was reasonable. He also found that although there were failings in the management of Sergei Skripal, the risk of assassination by Russian personnel was reasonably assessed and, based on that assessment, he did not need a new identity.
The inquiry has been clear in its findings of responsibility, and we must respond equally unequivocally. I have previously described to hon. Members the acute threat that Russia poses to the UK and our national security. Its recent acts have ranged from murdering Alexander Litvinenko and using a deadly nerve agent in Salisbury to espionage, arson, cyber-attacks and the targeting of UK parliamentarians for interference operations.
Since 2018, the UK has been at the forefront of the response against Russia. In direct response to the poisonings, the then Government expelled 23 undeclared Russian intelligence officers. This triggered the expulsion of over 150 Russian diplomats by 28 countries, including NATO allies. The UK has subsequently committed to prevent the rebuild of Russian intelligence and to remove Russian dirty money in the UK, developed legislative powers to harden the UK’s defences against state threats, and delivered new port and border powers, increased security checks on goods from Russia, and banned Russian-owned or linked aircraft from entering the UK.
The invasion of Ukraine introduced a stark new reality and demonstrated Russia’s intent to undermine European and global security. The UK has led the way in standing by Ukraine and providing unprecedented military, humanitarian and diplomatic support. In total, the UK has committed £21.8 billion for Ukraine and sanctioned over 2,900 individuals, entities and ships. This Government are proud to be at the forefront of the coalition of the willing to support Ukraine in defending its sovereignty and security. This has inevitably made the UK a target for increased hostile activity by Russia. Following an arson attack in east London in May 2024, the then Home Secretary warned of a pattern of Russian malign activities across Europe that had reached UK soil. In response, the UK expelled the Russian defence attaché and removed diplomatic status from Russian properties believed to have been used for intelligence purposes.
We are determined that the UK remains a hard operating environment for the Russian intelligence services. In October last year, we sanctioned three Russian agencies and three senior figures who were attempting to undermine and destabilise Ukraine and its democracy. In July, the UK sanctioned and exposed three GRU units and 18 of its military intelligence officers for the targeting of Yulia Skripal and cyber-operations in support of Putin’s illegal war in Ukraine. Yet we are now grappling with an increasingly reckless methodology. The director general of MI5 recently highlighted Russian state actors turning to proxies “for their dirty work”, and
“recruiting proxies on social media platforms, instructing them via encrypted apps, and offering payment in cryptocurrencies.”
UK law enforcement has secured convictions in several significant cases just this year: six individuals spying for Russia; six men involved in an arson attack on a warehouse supplying Ukraine; an individual who attempted to offer services to Russian intelligence; and a former MEP who accepted bribes to promote pro-Russian narratives in the EU Parliament. These cases serve as a strong reminder for anyone—anyone—seeking to facilitate or undertake hostile activity for Russia on UK soil.
This Government remain committed to providing our law enforcement partners with the tools they need to tackle these threats. We have specified Russia on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme to make it even more challenging to conceal relationships with the Russian state. I can now announce that the Government are going further. Today, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has imposed a further cost on the Russian regime by sanctioning the GRU under the Russia sanctions regime, along with several associated individuals. These sanctions recognise the continued reckless and destabilising activity of the GRU, which seeks to undermine Ukraine, European security and the safety of the United Kingdom. They will include sanctions against eight GRU officers under the cyber sanctions regime and three GRU officers under the Russia sanctions regime who have been implicated in hostile activity across Europe. We are also summoning the Russian ambassador to hold Russia to account for its responsibility for the tragic death of a British citizen.
There has been extensive misinformation and disinformation relating to these horrific and barbaric poisonings. This inquiry has categorically rejected those falsehoods, and this Government continue to reject the lies spread by Russia through its propaganda and paid mouthpieces. I wish—I am sure on behalf of the whole House—to wholeheartedly thank Lord Hughes and his team. This was a considerable task of great importance, and they have collectively approached it with diligence, care and sensitivity. I also want to take this opportunity—I am again sure on behalf of the whole House—to thank the first responders, military personnel, scientists, medical practitioners and all those who responded to the attack. They are the very best of us, and I know that Members right across the House will join me in paying tribute to them for the important work they do to keep us safe.
Dawn Sturgess was the victim of an utterly reckless and dangerous act—a chemical weapons attack perpetrated by Russia on British soil—and the pain and suffering it has caused can never be undone, but we must honour Dawn Sturgess’s memory, uphold truth and justice, and keep everyone in our country safe. I commend this statement to the House.
Chris Philp (Croydon South) (Con)
I thank the Security Minister for advance sight of his statement. Let me set out straightaway that the Opposition of course fully support the Government’s work in keeping our country safe. I think I agree with and support everything the Security Minister said in his statement. I particularly welcome the additional sanctions that he announced on certain members of the Russian security services.
I join the Security Minister in remembering Dawn Sturgess, who lost her life as a result of this reckless and barbaric attack. Leaving highly dangerous chemical weapons lying around was a reckless undertaking by those Russian agents, and Dawn Sturgess’s death lies squarely at their door. I pay tribute to Sergei and Yulia Skripal for the bravery they have shown when faced with targeting by agents of the Russian state, who came to this country specifically with the purpose in mind of killing them.
I also pay tribute to the emergency services and security services, as the Security Minister did, who responded so bravely, and some of whom, such as Detective Sergeant Nick Bailey, were themselves harmed as they responded to the attack. The emergency services and security services, on that day and in the days following, distinguished themselves greatly, and I know the whole House will want to thank them for the work they did.
The chair of the inquiry concluded, as the Security Minister said, that this operation would have been signed off or agreed to at the very highest level of the Russian state by President Putin himself. I think that makes the important point that Russia is a dangerous and hostile state, and that Vladimir Putin is a dangerous and hostile leader—a man who, as this inquiry has found, personally sanctioned the assassination of civilians on British soil.
Of course, the atrocities that the Russian state and President Vladimir Putin have perpetrated are not confined to those we are discussing today. We have seen, on its own soil, the Russian state murder domestic political opponents such as Alexei Navalny. We have seen them shoot down civilian airliners, and we have seen them interfere across Africa. We have seen Putin support former President Assad of Syria in persecuting civilians in Syria, including supporting the use of chemical weapons. So we should be in no doubt at all about the threat that Russia and President Putin pose not just in Russia or Ukraine, but on our soil and across the whole world.
I think there is a lesson there for the way in which we in the west collectively consider the Ukraine conflict, which the Security Minister spoke about. I think the actions we have been discussing are one of many reasons that we in the west should be steadfast and unwavering in our support for Ukraine. The lessons of history are quite clear: appeasement does not work, and showing weakness when faced with aggressive dictators simply emboldens them. I hope people in our Government and other Governments, particularly the American Administration, keep that in mind as they conduct negotiations in the coming days and weeks.
I know that, quite rightly, the Security Minister will not be able to comment on details, but the House would appreciate an update and assurances about the work being done to protect us domestically against Russian threats. He did not mention cyber-threats in his statement —[Interruption.] I do apologise. He did mention them, and we know that Russia repeatedly and deliberately targets both governmental infrastructure and private sector IT infrastructure. So far as he is able to provide one, an update on the work he is leading to counter that would be welcome, as would any indication about whether we are proactively engaged in degrading Russia’s capability in that area. I appreciate that there are severe limitations around what he can say, but any indication he can provide to the House would be very much appreciated.
The lessons we can draw from this episode relate not just to Russia, but to any state where we have intelligence or information that they are engaged in aggressive hostile acts. We know, of course, that it is not just Russia: other states, including China, are engaged in different but potentially equally damaging espionage and other activity on our soil. The lesson that this episode teaches is that we cannot be complacent. We cannot, for example, prioritise economic links above national security. We need to be on the front foot when it comes to these threats.
In that spirit, and drawing that lesson from this episode, perhaps the Security Minister can explain to the House why China is not in the enhanced tier of FIRS, which in my opinion it should be, and why the Government appear to be contemplating granting planning consent for a super embassy for China on a very sensitive site close to sensitive communications infrastructure, and from which it is very likely China will conduct large-scale espionage activities? The lesson that this episode teaches us is that we cannot be complacent, and we must be active and energetic in protecting our national interest.
In general terms, I fully support the direction of travel the Security Minister has set out, and, of course, the Opposition will support him personally and the Government in the work they are doing to keep our country safe.
Dan Jarvis
I thank the shadow Home Secretary for his response and for the tone of it. I am very grateful. I think he will have noted, from my opening remarks, the gravity and seriousness I attach to the matter at hand. I know that he and other Opposition Members will have noted that in my opening statement I spoke seamlessly about the work done by the previous Government and this Government. I believe that standing against Russia and the threat it poses to our national security should be, and is, a shared endeavour across this House. I pay tribute to the work the previous Government did, in 2018 and beyond, in standing against the threat we face. Wherever possible, we should work closely together on it.
The shadow Home Secretary very accurately characterised the nature of the threat. I agree with what he said with regard to Russia and Putin. It is impossible to overstate the seriousness of this attack and the other activity he characterised.
The right hon. Gentleman spoke about Ukraine and I am grateful to him for doing so. Again, I want to take the opportunity to pay tribute to the previous Government for the commitment they made to defending Ukraine. It should be a matter of great pride across the House that, perhaps above almost everything else, it is something that binds this House together. There is a unity of purpose among us all in ensuring that we stand together to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia. I give him and the House an absolute commitment that we will continue the work of the previous Government.
Genuinely, I was really pleased that the right hon. Gentleman asked about cyber, because I am particularly keen to ensure that we co-ordinate our activity across Government as effectively as we possibly can. In truth, it was one reason why the Prime Minister made the machinery of government change back in September so that the Security Minister sits across both the Home Office and the Cabinet Office and can more effectively co-ordinate that work. He will know that the Government introduced the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill just a couple of weeks ago. From a Home Office perspective, we are working hard on the ransomware proposals that we consulted on earlier this year. He was right to make the important point about the work we do with regard to positively degrading the nature of the threats he described. He knows I am very limited in terms of what I can say about that, but I know he will join me in paying tribute to the very important work that the National Cyber Force does.
It did not come as a huge surprise that the shadow Home Secretary—in truth, I do not blame him for doing so—took the opportunity to raise the issue of China. I hope he has had the chance to look at what I said this morning at Cabinet Office oral questions and what I said in response to an urgent question from my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) yesterday with regard to the Government’s position on China. I hope he has had the opportunity to look precisely at what I said about the embassy.
With regard to FIRS, I completely understand the points the shadow Home Secretary made. The Government continue to keep that under very close review and I hope we will have more to say about it in due course.
Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
My thoughts, too, are with the family of Dawn Sturgess.
In 2010, Putin said:
“Traitors will kick the bucket, believe me.”
Post-Litvinenko, how can it be that our country can afford protection for, say, a former Prime Minister such as Liz Truss, but not for an asset such as Sergei Skripal? Yesterday’s story in the i newspaper underlines the issue about Russian agents infiltrating our society, and the points the Minister makes across the board are so well put, but given that, as we have heard, Putin has no concern for life, least of all in his own country, can the Minister confirm that he is working with all Departments across Government to assure the British public of their safety and security?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his contribution and the work he does in chairing the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. The quote he described is chilling. In response to the point he made yesterday about the coverage in the i newspaper, I can give him the assurances he seeks and tell him and the House that we take all national security threats incredibly seriously. The Government have acted decisively by introducing tougher legislation, enforcing sanctions and working closely with our international partners to make the UK one of the most challenging environments for our adversaries to operate in. That continues to be an absolute priority in terms of securing our national security. I am absolutely determined to ensure that the United Kingdom is the hardest possible target for our adversaries.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
Mr Will Forster (Woking) (LD)
I thank the Security Minister for speaking for the whole House when he gave our sincere condolences to Dawn Sturgess’s family, paid tribute to the emergency and security services, and conveyed his thoughts to those affected in the Novichok attack.
Government’s primary role is to keep our country safe. The report into the tragic killing of Dawn Sturgess on the streets of the UK by Russian agents in their attempt to assassinate Sergei Skripal, is damning. The report found Vladimir Putin to be responsible for the death of an innocent British citizen on our shores.
Basic protections were not in place. Sergei was a clear target for Russian state assassins. The inquiry states that he was resettled in the UK under his own name. Russia used that to track him down and MI5 failed to rename him. Can the Minister confirm to the House why the security services left him in an “alarmingly accessible” situation, despite clearly being an identified target of Russian state assassination, including residing in Salisbury in his own name? How have the security services justified to the Minister their apparent failure to implement even basic protective measures, such as CCTV, alarms or secure accommodation? Worryingly for UK security, Putin’s assassins had no trouble locating him. That failure put him at risk, but also exposed the wider public in Salisbury and across the country. That contributed to the death of Dawn, an entirely innocent member of the public.
Last year, the Sturgess family’s legal team described the Skripals as sitting ducks due to failings that should have been foreseen by MI5. Given the preventable deaths and public risk, what accountability measures will the Government take to ensure MI5 protects both vulnerable individuals and the wider public? Considering the threat Russia poses to world security, especially security at home, will the Government finally seize the £30 billion in frozen Russian assets across the UK, including Sutton Place in my constituency?
Finally, the Government need to see the report as a turning point for the threat Russia poses to the UK. Will they launch an investigation into Russian interference in British politics to ensure no more UK politicians, like the former leader of the Reform party in Wales, are bribed with Russian money?
Dan Jarvis
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right about the importance of keeping our country safe. I assure him that we take that incredibly seriously. We will of course look very carefully at the detail of this report. He asked about the accountability mechanisms in Government. I assure him that the Home Secretary and I take our responsibilities to hold the security services to account very seriously indeed—that is a process that the new Home Secretary and I dedicate a significant amount of time to every single week. But we have to be crystal clear that the inquiry’s report states unequivocally that responsibility lies with the Russian state. The chair of the inquiry found that the operation to assassinate Sergei Skripal was authorised at the highest level, and concluded that it would not have taken place without the approval of President Putin. The use of a military-grade nerve agent on British soil was a violation of international law and a truly despicable act, and the responsibility for that lies with Russia, and Russia alone.
The hon. Gentleman asked, entirely reasonably, about the confiscation of sovereign Russian assets. I assure him that we take that incredibly seriously as well. Our priority is to ensure that all the options that we consider with regard to that matter are in line with international law and are economically and financially responsible, but Russia must be held accountable for the terrible damage it has done in Ukraine. We will do whatever we can to ensure that Russia is held accountable and made to pay for its actions.
The hon. Gentleman’s final point was an important one about Russian interference in our democracy. I chair the defending democracy taskforce, which has recently had its mandate renewed by the Prime Minister. These are matters that we take incredibly seriously. We use the taskforce as the fulcrum point across Government to ensure that we have a whole-of-system response that draws together Government Departments and law enforcement, and I assure the hon. Gentleman of the priority that we attach to that work. It is something that I believe should be a cross-party endeavour, so if he or other Members of this House wish to discuss it with me further, I am always very happy to do so.
Luke Myer (Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland) (Lab)
The day a British citizen died on British soil as a result of a Russian attack ought to have been a wake-up call for everyone in this country. I recognise the steps that the previous Government took and that this Government are taking to address that threat. The reality is that Russian planes and ships menace our airs and waters, their cyber-attacks have hit our NHS and councils, including Redcar and Cleveland borough council, and their propaganda has been disseminated by British politicians and online. Does the Security Minister agree that, as far as the British public are concerned, this is not a distant threat elsewhere in the world; it is here and now, affecting them today? Can I also push him specifically on social media disinformation, and what steps he can take, working with the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, to address it in this country?
Dan Jarvis
My hon. Friend is absolutely right about the threat. It is not a distant matter; it quite literally impacts the lives of our citizens every single day. I give him an assurance of how seriously we take these matters. He is also right to raise the issue of misinformation and disinformation. Again, through the defending democracy taskforce, these are matters that we keep under very close review. He is right to mention the important contribution that is required of DSIT. We work very closely with DSIT and other Government Departments on these matters. We keep a constant vigilance. I think that, in truth, there is more that we need to do, and I will have further conversations with ministerial colleagues about that particular matter.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
I call the Member of Parliament for Salisbury.
John Glen (Salisbury) (Con)
I thank the Security Minister for early sight of his statement, and I thank him most warmly for the way in which he has presented the Government’s response this afternoon. As someone who spent a previous life in Salisbury and south Wiltshire, he has served the people of my constituency very well. I am also very pleased with the remarks of the shadow Home Secretary.
Today’s report was written as a consequence of the need to bring clarity and to understand unequivocally who was responsible for what happened in 2018, but it is important to remember the huge impact it had on Salisbury, and the tragedy that befell Dawn Sturgess, Charlie Rowley, Detective Sergeant Nick Bailey, and Yulia and Sergei Skripal. The report is very clear about where culpability lies: it lies with President Putin. Russia was responsible, and Putin as an individual was responsible. He personally ordered what happened in Salisbury, and we should never forget it.
Putin is a ruthless dictator, not someone with whom deals can be done. Contrary to one of the candidates in the general election last year in Salisbury who said that he admired him as a political operator, I do not. I never will. I welcome what the Minister said on additional sanctions, and I encourage him and his successors always to pursue energetically, and with continued vigilance, further such measures as required. I welcome what he said about more sophisticated threats emerging on cyber, and I urge him to extend that to look at what happens with our cloud infrastructure.
I have just one question. Paragraph 6.25 of the report refers to the issue of regular written assessments, which were lacking in terms of the ongoing care of Sergei Skripal. I think that is the only element that needs serious review for individuals like him in future, but I thank the Minister again for the way he has spoken today, which will give huge comfort to my constituents in Salisbury and to the families of those so tragically affected.
Dan Jarvis
I commend the right hon. Gentleman for the dignified and diligent way in which he represented his constituents and his constituency at the time, and for his service since, including today’s. I know that it will be hugely appreciated across the House, and certainly in the great city of Salisbury and across the wider great county of Wiltshire. He is absolutely right: responsibility for this dreadful attack rests at the top of the Russian regime with President Putin. I give the right hon. Gentleman the assurance that he seeks that this Government, and I am sure—I certainly hope—any successor Governments or Ministers, will be incredibly vigilant and pursue whatever measures are required. I have noted the point he made about the cloud, which I think is a good one. On his specific point about regular written assessments, I will take that away and look at it closely. Again, I commend him for his service to the great city of Salisbury.
Sean Woodcock (Banbury) (Lab)
I am grateful to the Minister for his statement and pleased to hear of further sanctions. He stated that Dawn Sturgess was the victim of an utterly reckless and dangerous act. I would go further and call it a heinous crime, the responsibility for which lies with Vladimir Putin, among the many other such crimes for which he is responsible. The Minister also said that we must honour Dawn Sturgess’s memory. My plea to him would be that we do so by never allowing Vladimir Putin to escape responsibility or accountability for the crime that was perpetrated in Salisbury that day.
Dan Jarvis
I completely agree with my hon. Friend, who puts it very well. The greatest legacy, as well as remembering the tragic loss of life in this case, would be to ensure that our collective defences as a country are tightened to the extent that such an attack could never happen again. Of course, the Russian regime will constantly test our defences and we will have to remain incredibly vigilant. It is the responsibility of the Government to ensure that we have the appropriate levels of resource, and that the United Kingdom is the hardest possible operating environment for Russia and its proxies, but he is right to remind us of where responsibility for this heinous act lies: with President Putin.
Danny Kruger (East Wiltshire) (Reform)
I, too, welcome the Minister’s statement, and indeed the additional sanctions that he announced. It is absolutely right that we do everything we can to resist Russia’s attacks on our security and its attempts to suborn our democracy, and I wholeheartedly agree with him. It is obviously right that the traitorous former MEP that the Minister mentioned is now in prison. I speak as the Member representing Amesbury, the town that Dawn Sturgess was in when she took the fatal poison, but it was represented at the time by my constituency neighbour, my right hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury (John Glen). I want to acknowledge his leadership throughout these difficult years for Salisbury and Amesbury.
It appears from the report that the NHS did a good job in its immediate response to the medical emergency that Dawn suffered, but it is also apparent that, when it comes to the wider system of support for the community in Salisbury and Amesbury, the response was somewhat messy—perhaps for perfectly understandable reasons. Can the Minister assure the House that the Government are looking generally at our public safety response in the event of such crises, and can he say what more can be done to ensure that in any future event local communities are properly supported?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to the hon. Member for the very sensible and constructive nature of his remarks. I recognise his service as a Wiltshire MP and his obvious constituency interest in this matter. I also genuinely welcome his condemnation of the treachery that we have seen recently, and I am glad that he made that point. He raises a sensible and constructive point with regard to the NHS, and I can give him the assurances that he seeks regarding the Government’s attention to these matters. One of the reasons why the Prime Minister took the machinery of Government change back in September to ensure that I, as Security Minister, sit across both the Home Office and the Cabinet Office was to maximise the leverage and co-ordination across Government with regard not only to national security policy, but to our resilience, and we have recently undertaken the largest ever resilience exercise across Government. He is right to raise that point. I give him an assurance of the seriousness with which we take these matters. We will, of course, look very carefully at the report’s recommendations in that regard. I am grateful to him for his comments today.
Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con)
The number of Russian spies operating in the UK is the highest it has been since the cold war—not my words but those of the head of Counter Terrorism Policing. I welcome the sanctions today on the GRU, but the Security Minister will know that the United Kingdom is probably regarded as Russia’s No. 1 enemy—not the United States but the United Kingdom. He will also know that there are other agencies that are operating internationally and have an international footprint, such as the FSB and SVR. While noting and recognising the importance of, shall we say, diplomatic reciprocity, what more can be done, to quote him, to have a “hard operating environment” for both those agencies? Are other Russian political dissidents safe here in the United Kingdom?
Finally, on the proliferation of chemical weapons, we know that a chemical agent and a nuclear agent were used in some of the cases outlined today, so given the breakdown in many countries and the security around chemical weapons in those countries—whether in Africa or other parts of the world—how confident is the Minister that the security services are aware of where those chemical weapons might be and where they might be tempted to be deployed?
Dan Jarvis
I am, as always, grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for the expertise and experience that he brings to these matters, not least given his very long-standing service on two relevant Committees in this place. He mentioned Counter Terrorism Policing. Let me take this opportunity to pay tribute to the work that they do. I have a very good and close working relationship with CTP. They do extraordinary work and it is a privilege to stand alongside them. They are exceptional in the work that they do.
It is in part a symptom of the work that the previous Government and this Government have done to make the UK the hardest possible operating environment that increasingly Russia and other malign states are seeking to use criminal proxies to do their bidding and business in the United Kingdom. There is a lot of work taking place, not only across Government but with our allies in Europe, who we are working very closely with, and further afield to ensure that we are best placed to target malign states that are using criminal proxies. The director general of MI5 referenced that in his recent annual lecture on the threats we face.
On the right hon. Member’s point about the UK being a hard target, he will understand better than most that I am very limited in what I can say about that, and that it would be unwise to give detail that would be helpful to our adversaries. However, I can give him an assurance of the seriousness with which we take these matters. He raised an important point about dissidents. It is an issue that I keep under very close review. We make sure that we have the right mechanisms in place to provide security.
The right hon. Member’s point about chemical weapons was well made. We work very closely with our international allies to ensure that we are doing everything that we can to minimise the risk and threat. It is not easy work, and there are no guarantees of its success, but I give an assurance of the seriousness with which we take it. Our approach is to work closely with our allies.
Dave Doogan (Angus and Perthshire Glens) (SNP)
I join the Security Minister in acknowledging the memory of Dawn Sturgess, and the sacrifice made by Dawn’s partner Charlie, Detective Sergeant Nick Bailey and the fearless first responders. In the seven years since this attack, an emboldened Putin has increased his aggression across Europe. Can the Minister assure the House that all the lessons that come out of this inquiry will be acted on in full? Will the UK Government continue to work with our EU partners in standing up to Putin’s aggression in Europe? Will the Government underscore the point that our multilateral defence of the international rules-based order is our strength, and his isolationist aggression will forever be his weakness?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to the hon. Member for his comments, and I can give him the assurances that he seeks. As he will acknowledge, the report was published less than a couple of hours ago, but the Government will look very carefully at its findings. I give him and the House an assurance that where there is a requirement to act, we will not hesitate to do so.
The hon. Member’s point about our EU partners was well made. We value our relationships with our neighbours, EU partners and Five Eyes colleagues, and I recently met members of the G7 to discuss these matters. When it comes to standing up to the threats that we face, we are much stronger when we join up with our international partners, and that is the right approach. I completely agree with what the hon. Member said about the rules-based order; I am sure that all Members of this House do. That is the right approach. Respecting international law and standing with our allies is the best way to defeat Putin.
Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
Have the Government formed a view as to why President Putin—the killer in the Kremlin—chose to target Sergei Skripal after he had been pardoned and exchanged? Nothing that I am saying now derives from my time chairing the Intelligence and Security Committee, but I recall speculation in the press that it was because Mr Skripal had been actively involved with either the British state or the military, or had in some way been, shall we say, active in opposing the Government of the country from which he had been exchanged. If that is the case, surely the conclusion in paragraph 8.18—that the only measures that could have prevented the attack
“would have been such as to hide him completely with an entirely new identity”—
should have been considered. It is rather surprising that it was not. Was Skripal engaged in anything that made him a target?
Dan Jarvis
The right hon. Gentleman knows the very high regard in which I hold him. He has asked me some important questions, but they are not necessarily questions that it would be in the interests of our national security for me to get into in any great detail. I can say that I have formed a view about the motive that underpinned this particular attack, but I am not going to get into it today. The point he made about the detail of the report was also raised by the hon. Member for Woking (Mr Forster). I can give him an assurance that we will go very carefully through the all the detail of the report, and I will consider what he has said today. The conclusion that I draw, which I think is the conclusion that Lord Hughes has drawn, is that responsibility for the attack lies with the Russian state. It is the Government’s responsibility to do everything we can to guard against the threat posed, mindful of the nature of that threat.
Sarah Bool (South Northamptonshire) (Con)
To the extent that he is able, can the Minister please explain what steps he is taking to secure UK commercial ports, given recent reports of individuals with links to the Russian military entering via those routes?
Dan Jarvis
The hon. Lady raises an entirely reasonable point. She will understand that I will not want to get too much into the detail of that. We look at these matters carefully, and we work across Government and with law enforcement and the intelligence agencies on them. Again, one reason why I sit across two Departments is to ensure that our response is co-ordinated as effectively as possible. She is right to raise this issue; we are doing everything we can to counter it.
Robin Swann (South Antrim) (UUP)
The Minister has referred to the threat that Russia poses to UK national security. A former Irish Teachta Dála who was also a deputy chief of an Irish army unit has said:
“If you are looking to affect a western country with extensive assets and poor security culture, then Ireland is ground zero…It is a playground for them.”
He was specifically speaking of Russian intelligence. The Minister has rightly referred to working with EU and international partners. May I seek an assurance that he is also working with the Irish Government and Irish security forces to ensure that the Republic of Ireland does not become a soft way into Northern Ireland and, indeed, the rest of the United Kingdom?
Dan Jarvis
That is an entirely reasonable challenge, and I can give the hon. Gentleman the assurances that he seeks.
Official Secrets Act and Espionage
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(2 weeks, 3 days ago)
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Urgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
(Urgent Question): To ask the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster if he will make a statement on espionage cases and the Official Secrets Act.
The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
I thank my hon. Friend for securing this urgent question, following the deeply disappointing collapse of the prosecution case concerning two individuals charged under the Official Secrets Act 1911. The allegations were hugely concerning, and we recognise and share the public and parliamentary frustration about this outcome. The Government welcomed the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy’s inquiry and the opportunity it provided for parliamentary scrutiny on this important matter, alongside the ongoing review led by the Intelligence and Security Committee.
I will take this opportunity to thank the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, under my hon. Friend’s chairship, for its diligent and rapid work. The Government will now take the time to consider the Committee’s conclusions and recommendations properly, in conjunction with partners referenced in the report, before responding within the two-month timeframe.
However, I am glad that the JCNSS’s report has reinforced two fundamental points that the Government have made throughout. First, and as the Government have been saying for several weeks, the report makes it clear that there was no evidence of attempts by any Minister, special adviser or senior official to interfere with the prosecution. The report states that it found no evidence of improper influence. Despite ongoing questions about a meeting of senior officials that took place on 1 September, chaired by the National Security Adviser, the report clarifies that there was no deliberate effort to obstruct the prosecution.
The first senior Treasury counsel had already made the judgment on the basis of the evidence that charges could not progress by 22 August, more than a week before the meeting took place. We have been consistent throughout on these points, which runs in sharp contrast to our critics, who initially criticised the Government for intervening in the case and then, when it became clear that that was nonsense, criticised us for not intervening in the case.
Secondly, the JCNSS report reinforces a fundamental point that I have made to this House previously: the root cause of the failure of this case was the outdated Official Secrets Act 1911, which predates the first world war. The 1911 Act created an unrealistic test by requiring the prosecution to prove that China was an enemy. The Law Commission had flagged the term “enemy” as being deeply problematic as far back as 2017. The Government will continue to work tirelessly to ensure that we have the most effective structures and processes in place to support law enforcement partners in mitigating and prosecuting foreign espionage wherever we find it.
More importantly, the ongoing disinformation around the collapse of this case has been distracting from the most important issue that we should be focused on: how the Government can work across this House to ensure that Chinese espionage will never be successful in the United Kingdom. As the Prime Minister stated in his speech at the Lady Mayor’s banquet on Monday:
“Protecting national security is our first duty and we will never waver from our efforts to keep the British people safe.”
That is why, on 18 November, I set out a significant number of measures that this Government are taking to counter the threat that China and other state actors pose to UK democracy and society. In line with the JCNSS report, the Government will continue to strengthen our processes and preparedness for future threats, ensuring that we leverage our new security legislation effectively—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
Order. The Minister will know that he should have restricted himself to three minutes for his response. That appears to have been four and a quarter minutes.
Matt Western
I thank the Minister for his comments, and I thank Mr Speaker for granting this urgent question demonstrating the importance of parliamentary security, safety and sovereignty. The case of alleged spying on behalf of China caused widespread concern among the public and Members of both Houses. My Committee, which is comprised of senior Members of both Houses, examined the timeline, and actions and decisions of the Government and the Crown Prosecution Service. While this was a highly unusual inquiry for a Committee to conduct, it was essential that Parliament examined the processes that led to the collapse of the case.
Our inquiry found nothing to suggest a co-ordinated, high-level effort to collapse the prosecution, nor deliberate efforts to obstruct or circumvent constitutional safeguards. However, we did find a process that is beset by confusion and misaligned expectations, and that can, at points, be best described as shambolic. There were systemic failures, and deficiencies in communication, co-ordination and decision making between the Crown Prosecution Service and the Government. Indeed, the episode reflects poorly on the otherwise commendable efforts of public servants to keep our country safe.
Given the conclusions I have just set out, will the Minister give reassurances that the Government will work closely with the CPS to ensure that communications and processes are tightened up, particularly when dealing with cases involving national security? Does the Minister acknowledge that the new National Security Act 2023, while comprehensive, may not entirely cover low-level espionage activity, especially given its structural parallels with the previous legislation? Finally, does the Minister agree that greater support should be given to the deputy National Security Adviser and civil servants acting as witnesses in such cases, to ensure top-level grip on cases with significant public exposure?
Dan Jarvis
As Mr Speaker has rightly acknowledged, these issues require a great deal of scrutiny from Parliament, and the Government are grateful for the opportunity to engage and work closely with Parliament on these matters, not least because they merit careful consideration, alongside decisive action by Ministers and senior officials. The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, led by my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western), plays a vital role in providing that appropriate scrutiny. I say that not just as a Government Minister, but as a former member of his Committee. The same principle applies to the ISC, which does important work. I take this opportunity to thank the Chair and the whole Joint Committee for undertaking this work and publishing a comprehensive report as quickly as they have.
My hon. Friend the Chair highlights some important aspects of the report’s conclusions, recommendations and findings, following the work that the Committee undertook. As I have said, the Government approach this issue, and will consider the Committee’s report, with the utmost seriousness. I can give him the assurance that he seeks that the Government are now carefully considering the findings of the report. I give him and the House an absolute assurance that we will respond within the agreed timeframe. He mentioned a couple of other points that I will respond to briefly now, although I am happy to engage with him in more detail, should he think that necessary.
My hon. Friend mentioned the role of the CPS. He will understand that as a Government Minister, I am incredibly limited in what I can say about the CPS, because it is operationally independent of Government. He makes a fair challenge, and we will look carefully at the report’s findings in this area. He also mentioned the National Security Act 2023. While I am not in any way complacent about that legislation, we are in a much stronger position than we were. We keep these matters under review, and along with colleagues across Government, we are constantly seeking to assure ourselves that the legislative framework is fit for purpose and appropriate. I give him an absolute assurance that we take that incredibly seriously.
Finally, my hon. Friend mentioned the deputy National Security Adviser. Let me take the opportunity again to pay tribute to him for the important work that he does. He is a dedicated public servant, and his contribution to our national security is immense. The Government are grateful for his service, as I am sure is the whole House. I will look carefully at the points that my hon. Friend has made, and we will ensure that they are properly reflected in the response he receives from the Government.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
I call the shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
Order. Before I call the Minister, may I make the point to those on both Front Benches that the Minister responding to an urgent question has three minutes? The Opposition Front Bencher, the hon. Member for Brentwood and Ongar (Alex Burghart), should have taken two minutes, and I should advise the Liberal Democrat spokesperson that she has one minute. I commend the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) for managing to stay well within his two minutes. I call the Minister.
Dan Jarvis
A few moments ago, I spoke of the careful consideration and appropriate scrutiny that this matter deserves. Many Members of both Houses and Members of all parties on the Joint Committee have adopted that view, but I have to say that I am disappointed that the hon. Member for Brentwood and Ongar (Alex Burghart) continues to choose a different approach. He did not seem to want to mention that much of the report refers to the time when his party was in government. Some might have hoped that he would use his contribution today to show a bit of humility, both to the House and to those in our national security community, not least given some of the low-brow political point scoring and baseless accusations that we have heard over the past few weeks.
In the aftermath of the trial’s collapse, some Opposition Members accused Ministers, special advisers and civil servants of improper interference. This report makes it clear that that was baseless and untrue. There were some who suggested that some of our most experienced and most dedicated national security experts set out to deliberately withhold information from prosecutors in order to placate the Chinese Government. This report makes it clear that that was baseless and untrue. There were some who suggested that the Conservatives’ failure to update critical national security legislation was immaterial to the case that was being brought to trial. This report makes it clear that the root cause of the collapse was the years of dither and delay that left outdated, ineffective legislation on the statute book long after we knew that it did not protect our country from the modern threats that we face. Some Opposition Members—although not all of them—were all over the place on that legislation, and were all over the place with regard to China, and some of them, sadly, still are.
On China, as the Prime Minister observed this week,
“We had the golden age of relations under David Cameron and George Osborne, which then flipped to an ice age, that some still advocate”,
but no matter how much Opposition Members may wish it to be so, not engaging with China is no option at all. We have made it clear that we will co-operate where we can, but we will always challenge where we must. When we say that national security is the first priority of this Government, we mean it, and since the trial’s collapse, I have announced a comprehensive package that will help us to tackle the economic, academic, cyber and espionage threats that China presents. The report to which the hon. Member has referred provides further useful thought on how we can best safeguard our national security, and the Government genuinely welcome that constructive feedback. I look forward to engaging with the Committee, and with responsible Members in all parts of the House, as we continue to consider how best to go on protecting our democracy and our nation.
The hon. Member asked me about the minutes—[Interruption.] He is still asking me about the 1 September meeting.
Dan Jarvis
I am going to give the hon. Member the answer. The minutes were provided by the Government to the Intelligence and Security Committee, so there is his answer. He also referred, on several occasions, to the application for the Chinese embassy. Let me explain to him, for the sake of absolute crystal clarity, what the position is with regard to the embassy. I think that will be helpful to other Members as well.
As Members will know, an independent planning decision will be made by the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government by 20 January. National security is the first duty of government, and it has been our core priority throughout this process. The Home Office and the Foreign Office provided views on the security implications of this build throughout the process, and we have been clear about the fact that a decision should not have been taken until we had confirmed that those considerations had been resolved. The letter recently sent to the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government now confirms that all national security issues raised have been addressed. Should the planning decision be approved, the new embassy will replace the seven different sites that currently comprise China’s diplomatic estate in London.
Derek Twigg (Widnes and Halewood) (Lab)
I think that many of us are still somewhat bemused by the fact that somehow, despite the three witness statements, the Crown Prosecution Service thought that it could not go ahead with a prosecution. I welcome much of what my hon. Friend the Minister has said, but I think it would be useful, following the questions asked and the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western), if he agreed to come back to the Committee after the Government has responded to its report and recommendations, so that we can be given a clear timeline for the changes that rightly need to be made.
Dan Jarvis
My hon. Friend will understand that there is nothing more I can add with regard to his point about the Crown Prosecution Service. As for his substantive point about engagement with Committees of this House, let me give him that assurance. I genuinely welcome the constructive scrutiny carried out both by the Committee of which he is a member and the Committee chaired by my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington. I think that they provide a huge amount of value, and I can give my hon. Friend the Member for Widnes and Halewood (Derek Twigg) an absolute assurance of our continued desire to co-operate closely with them.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
Lisa Smart (Hazel Grove) (LD)
The seriousness of the threat that Beijing poses to our national security cannot be overstated. Any attempt by China to interfere in our democracy must be rooted out, and the Government should implement the recommendations of the Committee’s report as a matter of urgency. The work that the National Security Adviser and his deputy are doing is vital to keeping our country safe, but the report is damning, and it describes aspects of the situation as “shambolic”. The Minister has previously mentioned his plans for new powers to counter foreign interference, and I would be grateful if he could provide a timeline for their introduction.
Let me once again urge the Minister to place China on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. If he will not do that today, I wonder whether he might give us a date in the diary—say, a week before the Prime Minister’s visit to Beijing; that may well coincide with the date of an announcement on the planning permission for the mega-embassy—and give the House the clarity that it deserves.
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her serious attention to these matters. I hope she will acknowledge that it was only a couple of weeks ago that I presented the House with a significant package of measures designed specifically to counter the threats that we have debating for a number of months, and I hope she will also acknowledge that it was indeed a significant package of measures, but of course we keep these matters under very close review, and I am certain that the Government will want to introduce further measures in due course.
The hon. Lady raises the issue of FIRS. As I have said to the House previously, there were Opposition Members who did not think that we would introduce FIRS on time, but we did so. It is a valuable tool and adds significant value to our capabilities with regard to our national security, but at the same time we have to very carefully deliberate the addition of more countries to the enhanced tier. We keep that under very close review, and I would be very happy to discuss the matter with her further.
Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith and Chiswick) (Lab)
The Joint Committee, of which I am a member, approached this issue in a non-partisan way, and I agree with the Minister that it is a pity that the Conservatives have not taken the same approach, particularly as it started on their watch. The strong impression that I form from the inquiry is that everyone thought they were doing the right thing, but in reality they were tip-toeing around the issues and staying in their own silos. Whether the Minister agrees with that analysis or not, can he tell us what organisational lessons he has learned that will prevent any repetition of, in his own words, this “deeply disappointing” outcome?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his work on the Joint Committee, and I completely agree with the premise of his point: the Committee considered these matters in a non-partisan way. That is precisely the right approach. It is the approach that I will always seek to undertake, and I know that the majority of Members of this House will proceed in the same way.
My hon. Friend raises an entirely fair and reasonable challenge about the organisational lessons that have been learned as a consequence of this process. All Ministers, whether in this Government or in the previous Government, should have approached these kinds of reports with a degree of humility. Undoubtedly, there are lessons that will need to be identified, learned and implemented as a consequence of recent events. As I know he and the House would expect, the Government need to do that in a measured and considered way. I give him and the Joint Committee an absolute assurance that we will look at the detail of the report very closely indeed, and we will respond within the timeframe that the Committee has set us.
Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
Having previously read out in this Chamber the relevant section of the Official Secrets Act 1911, I am pleased that the report concludes that the decision not to prosecute under the terms of that Act flies in the face of common sense. What also flies in the face of common sense is the Government’s previous position that China poses a range of serious threats but does not constitute a threat itself. Is that still the Government’s position?
Dan Jarvis
The right hon. Gentleman knows that I always listen assiduously to what he has to say, given the experience that he brings to this House. I am certain that he will have looked very carefully at what the Prime Minister said in his Mansion House speech on Monday evening, but on the off-chance that he has not yet had the opportunity to do so, let me tell him and the House the essence of what the Prime Minister said with regard to China, because he very clearly set out the Government’s approach. He said that China
“poses real national security threats to the United Kingdom”,
but that it is
“time for a serious approach, to reject the simplistic binary choice. Neither golden age, nor ice age…So our response will not be driven by fear, nor softened by illusion. It will be grounded in strength, clarity and sober realism.”
I agree with the Prime Minister, and I suspect that most sensible Members of this House do as well.
Dame Meg Hillier (Hackney South and Shoreditch) (Lab/Co-op)
I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) for steering the report through his Joint Committee swiftly and sensitively, and for managing sensitive data. It is a great example of how the Committee corridor can really contribute to transparency for the public, and I look forward to the Government’s response. However, there are sensitive matters that are not covered by the existing scrutiny Committees of this House. I hope that the Minister will, on the basis of this example, be an advocate in Government for the establishment of a new Committee that can cover matters that do not currently have oversight because of their sensitivity.
Dan Jarvis
I completely agree with my hon. Friend’s assessment of the work of the Joint Committee. She is right to say it is a great example of the work of a Select Committee that has constructively contributed a very significant amount of useful information that the Government will now consider in great detail.
My hon. Friend’s second point is about the creation of another Select Committee, and she will understand that that is above my pay grade. I gently point to the fact that the Government want to have a very good, close and constructive relationship with the ISC. It will be for the ISC to take a view, but that may provide a forum for further parliamentary scrutiny of those matters.
Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con)
Although I have huge respect for the Security Minister and, indeed, for the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) and the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy Committee—I sat on that Committee for five years—is it not the case that this statement actually raises more questions? It is not case closed, as there are questions that are still outstanding. That is because the weakness here is that the Joint Committee does not have access to classified material; only the Intelligence and Security Committee does. Having sat on both Committees, I know there is a stark contrast between the types of witnesses who can be called and what the witnesses can actually say. Given the earlier question, will the Minister now commit to review the memorandum of understanding with the Intelligence and Security Committee to ensure that the right questions can be asked of the right Committee at the right time, so that we can have some definitive conclusions on this whole saga?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for the experience that he brings to this House, not least because he has sat on both the Committees to which we have been referring. I slightly take issue with his assessment of what the report does, because the Government are very clear that it emphasises the key arguments that we have been bringing forward over the last couple of weeks.
On the right hon. Gentleman’s second point, he has raised the MOU previously. It is an entirely reasonable point for him to raise, both publicly and privately. Let me take it away and come back to him.
Tulip Siddiq (Hampstead and Highgate) (Lab)
The Security Minister knows very well the case of my constituent, Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe, who is accused of espionage by the Iranian state. In case he needs a reminder, her horrifying ordeal is being dramatised on BBC iPlayer at the moment. The one thing that Nazanin has said to me constantly is that a hostage envoy would have really helped when dealing with her situation. I know this is about dealing with espionage cases from the other side, but for the sake of national security, has the Minister considered having a hostage envoy, as the Ratcliffe family keep raising with me?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the contribution that she has made and for the work that she has done previously. I am joined on the Treasury Bench by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln (Mr Falconer), who listened very carefully to her comments, and has indicated that he would be very happy to discuss them further with her.
Stephen Gethins (Arbroath and Broughty Ferry) (SNP)
May I thank the Minister for his responses today and for the way he is responding to this matter? I know he will be as concerned as the rest of us about descriptions of the process being “shambolic” and the criticism of systemic failures. Can the Minister tell us what has changed? Secondly, what has changed over the past almost four years? Russia’s invasion of Ukraine changed the world profoundly, and China continues to provide assistance to Russia.
Dan Jarvis
That is an entirely fair and reasonable question, and I can give the hon. Gentleman a very straight response. One of the things that has changed is that the Prime Minister—rightly, in my view—conducted a machinery-of-government change in September, which means that, as the Security Minister, I now sit not just in the Home Office, as was the case previously, but in the Cabinet Office. The purpose of that machinery-of-government change is to ensure that we can more effectively co-ordinate national security policy and activity across Government. It is relatively early days, but my analysis today is that that was the right move to make; I think it will enable the Government to make better, more informed and timely decisions in this area. At the same time, I approach these things with a degree of humility. We will look very carefully at the findings of the report and make sure that we consider them. We will look at what changes are necessary, and respond to the Joint Committee and to the House in due course.
Dr Scott Arthur (Edinburgh South West) (Lab)
I thank the Minister for his responses. Throughout this affair, he has remained calm and consistent in answering points that—let’s be honest—have at times been smears from the Conservatives. I think the report from the Joint Committee has found them out, and that is why their Benches are empty today. Rather than hiding, the Conservatives should be here apologising.
Does the Minister welcome the fact that the report makes it clear that the root cause of the case collapsing was the dither and delay from the previous Government? Does he agree with the Prime Minister that that was nothing short of a dereliction of duty when it comes to our national security?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his contribution today and on many previous occasions. The essence of his point is absolutely right. I do regret the tone of some of these debates in recent weeks; some of it has been entirely unnecessary, when we should have been coming together as a House to look at what we can do to ensure that the activity that we allegedly saw here is not able to happen again. That has always been my approach throughout, and it will continue to be my approach as we move forward.
The point my hon. Friend made about the recommendations in the report are absolutely right, and I think it vindicates the basic argument that the Government have sought to bring forward. I say that with humility, because we will want to look carefully at the detail of all the findings and all the recommendations. We will do that over the next number of weeks, and we will take on board lessons where they need to be learned.
James Wild (North West Norfolk) (Con)
The report says that the National Security Adviser, Jonathan Powell, apparently had very “limited” engagement about the case. In contrast, one of his predecessors, Sir Stephen Lovegrove, with whom I worked in the Ministry of Defence, said he
“would have expected to be involved intimately in the provision of the Government evidence”.
Why was Jonathan Powell—and Lord Hermer, for that matter, who is described in the report as being “not proactive”—so passive on a matter of national security and alleged spying on Members of this House?
Dan Jarvis
I honestly do not believe that that is a fair and reasonable characterisation of the role played by the National Security Adviser. The National Security Adviser is an extremely experienced and dedicated public servant, who is dedicating his life to keeping our country safe. The hon. Member, because he is a very well-informed and assured Member of this House, will understand that specific restrictions were placed on the deputy National Security Adviser about what he could do and what he could say. Both the deputy National Security Adviser and the National Security Adviser acted with integrity throughout this process, and I know that the House will be grateful to them for it.
James Naish (Rushcliffe) (Lab)
In the light of the important issues being discussed today about the concerning activities of China in the UK, can I ask the Minister what additional steps he is taking or planning to take to protect Hongkongers, Tibetans and Uyghurs from any form of transnational repression?
Dan Jarvis
I know my hon. Friend takes a very close interest in this subject. I hope he will have seen the very significant package of measures that the Government brought forward a couple of weeks ago. We take issues relating to transnational repression incredibly seriously. We welcome the report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, to which we have responded. Through the defending democracy taskforce, we have conducted a review of transnational repression in our country. I hope he sees that we take these matters very seriously. The notion that any state, whether it be China or any other, would seek to harm or persecute anybody resident in the United Kingdom is totally unacceptable, and the Government have been consistent in making that point.
Richard Tice (Boston and Skegness) (Reform)
This report by the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy is not only damning; it refers to “systemic failures”, “shambolic” aspects and “inadequate” communications. I am particularly struck by paragraphs 41 to 45, which call into question the judgment of the Director of Public Prosecutions. The former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Lord Carlile, described the decision not to proceed with the case as “inexplicable”, and the Committee in paragraph 45 is gentle in saying that it was “surprised” by the decision not to proceed. The question has to be asked: do the Government still have confidence in the Director of Public Prosecutions?
Dan Jarvis
The hon. Member will understand that it would not be appropriate for me, as a Government Minister, to make commentary about the performance of the Director of Public Prosecutions. The CPS and the DPP are operationally independent of Government. The hon. Member will have heard me say that we approach these matters with a degree of humility, and that is the right approach. I gently say to him that he may also want to approach these matters with a degree of humility, given recent events in his own party.
John Cooper (Dumfries and Galloway) (Con)
The Minister and I have clashed over Sun Tzu in the past, but at the risk of riling him again, I want to tell him that Sun Tzu said that sometimes a strategic advantage is to be had by feigning weakness. Every day we fail to add China to the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, that is not us feigning weakness; it is weakness. Is that not the case?
Dan Jarvis
As Christmas approaches, I hope there may be an opportunity for me to have a cup of coffee with the hon. Gentleman, and we can compare our various quotes. I give him an assurance that I never had any concern about his seeking to quote Sun Tzu. My concern was that I think it is possible to find a quote from him that matches any particular argument one wants to progress.
The hon. Member’s substantive point was about FIRS, and he will have heard what I have said today and previously. The Government are looking very closely at whether additional countries should be added to the enhanced tier. When a decision is made about that, we will bring it forward in the usual way.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
First, I thank the Minister very much for his careful and helpful answers to questions. Given the collapse of the recent espionage case and the findings that failures in procedure and co-ordination undermined the prosecution, what specific actions will the Government take to restore confidence in parliamentary security, ensure alleged spy threats are fully investigated and pursue the course of justice so that something similar does not ever happen again?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, as I am always. He made an important point about parliamentary security, and I hope that, as a very dedicated parliamentarian, he will know that the Government take these matters incredibly seriously. That is why we are working very closely with Mr Speaker and this House, through the defending democracy taskforce, to make sure that we have the appropriate mitigations in place to counter the nature of the threat we face.
I hold the hon. Gentleman in very high regard, and I refer him to what the Prime Minister said on Monday. The Prime Minister made an important point that is highly relevant to the question the hon. Gentleman raised:
“Protecting our security is non-negotiable. Our first duty. But by taking tough steps to keep us secure, we enable ourselves to cooperate in other areas.”
I hope he agrees—I know he does—with that.
Jim Allister (North Antrim) (TUV)
Today, the Minister has again said that the reason the case collapsed was the inadequacy of the 1911 Act. That raises this obvious question: how come these two gentlemen were ever charged in the first place? The evidential test at the moment they were charged is exactly the same as the evidential test when the case was dropped, so how did they come to be charged under this Act if it was inadequate? Is it not quite clear that the Act was more than adequate to charge them and more than adequate to convict them?
Dan Jarvis
I am not sure that anybody really thinks that the 1911 Act was appropriate. As the hon. and learned Member will know, because it is a statement of obvious truth, the decision to proceed was taken not under this Government, but under the previous one. All I am able to do in this House is to account for the decisions and actions taken by this Government. What this Government will always do is ensure that we protect our national security. It is our first duty and nothing matters more.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
I thank the Security Minister for his answers this afternoon.
State Threat Prevention and Investigation Measures: 20 March to 19 September 2025
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(3 weeks, 3 days ago)
Written StatementsRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
Section 55(1) of the National Security Act 2023 requires the Home Secretary to report to Parliament as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of every relevant three-month period on the exercise of their STPIM powers under the Act during that period.
STPIMs were introduced through the 2023 Act and came into force on 20 December 2023. There have been no STPIM cases imposed to date.
[HCWS1098]
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures: 1 June 2025 to 31 August 2025
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(3 weeks, 4 days ago)
Written StatementsRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
Section 19(1) of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 requires the Home Secretary to report to Parliament as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of every relevant three-month period on the exercise of their TPIM powers under the Act during that period. TPIM notices in force—as of 31 August 2025 2 Number of new TPIM notices served—during this period 0 TPIM notices in respect of British citizens—as of 31 August 2025 2 TPIM notices extended—during the reporting period 1 TPIM notices revoked—during the reporting period 0 TPIM notices expired—during reporting period 0 TPIM notices revived—during the reporting period 0 Variations made to measures specified in TPIM notices—during the reporting period 2 Applications to vary measures specified in TPIM notices refused—during the reporting period 3 The number of subjects relocated under TPIM legislation —during the reporting period 1
The level of information provided will always be subject to slight variations based on operational advice.
The TPIM Review Group keeps every TPIM notice under regular and formal review. TRG meetings were convened on 11 and 14 August 2025.
[HCWS1096]