Oral Answers to Questions
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(3 months ago)
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Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dan Jarvis)
The decision to call in the planning application for the proposed Chinese embassy was made by the former Deputy Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Angela Rayner), in line with the current policy on call-in. The decision is subject to a quasi-judicial process and independent from the rest of Government. No private assurances have been given to the Chinese Government regarding the embassy application.
Sir Edward Leigh
Will the prayers of long-dead medieval monks save us from this hideous mega-embassy, right next to the most totemic building in the United Kingdom, the Tower of London? On 14 January, the then Secretaries of State for the Home Office and the Foreign Office wrote a letter insisting that a condition be made that there should be a wall and public access to the Cistercian medieval monastery on the site. The Chinese, in their arrogant way, are ignoring that. Will the Government stand firm and insist on public access—which, by the way, would be a good way of stopping this awful project?
Dan Jarvis
I can say to the Father of the House that national security is the first duty of this Government, and has been a core priority throughout this process. We have considered the breadth of national security considerations and have publicly outlined the necessary security mitigations that we need in order to support an application. Should the planning decision be approved, the new embassy will replace the seven different sites that currently comprise China’s diplomatic estate.
Gregory Stafford
On Tuesday, my hon. Friend the Member for West Suffolk (Nick Timothy) raised with the Foreign Secretary concerns expressed by the United States, Dutch, Swiss and Swedish Governments regarding the reported presence of data cables running beneath Royal Mint Court. I note that the Cabinet Office has since denied the reports to the press. Will the Minister now provide the clarity that his colleague at the Foreign Office could not, and give a clear yes or no answer to this House as to whether any such cables run beneath or in the vicinity of the site?
Dan Jarvis
I reiterate the point that the Government have considered the breadth of national security considerations. Both the Home Secretary and the Foreign Secretary have been clear about that. We work incredibly closely with our allies, particularly our Five Eyes partners, to ensure our collective national security.
Euan Stainbank (Falkirk) (Lab)
My constituents are concerned about the broader domestic security risk that China is currently posing, beyond the potential implications of its embassy planning application. Considering that Chinese state-subsidised bus manufacturers have gained a rising market share in the UK over the past few years, the Department for Transport and National Cyber Security Centre—
Susan Murray (Mid Dunbartonshire) (LD)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dan Jarvis)
The Government published the resilience action plan in July to set out their strategic approach to improve the UK’s resilience to the full range of risks that we face. One of the actions we have taken is to conduct the largest ever pandemic exercise, which involved all regions and nations of the UK and thousands of participants.
Gideon Amos
From the first ever charts by Captain Cook to real-time digital mapping, the UK Hydrographic Office enables and keeps our Royal Navy safe at sea—operating quite literally under the radar. Will the Minister pay tribute to the hundreds of people in my constituency who work at the office, and will he support a cross-sector approach to energy cables, telecommunication cables and their security, bringing in the University of Plymouth, University Centre Somerset and the Hydrographic Office in my constituency?
Dan Jarvis
I join the hon. Gentleman in paying tribute to the important work of the UK Hydrographic Office and its vital contribution to the UK’s maritime security. The Cabinet Office plays a central role to cohere cross-Government efforts to secure the UK’s undersea infrastructure. Given the growing prominence of this issue, lead Departments are engaging with industry partners, and we will continue this inclusive approach as we support the Royal Navy to take a leading role to secure our undersea infrastructure.
Susan Murray
The Russian spy ship Yantar has been probing our infrastructure in the North sea. While doing so, its crew used high-powered lasers against an RAF plane monitoring their activity, threatening the lives of our pilots. What steps are the Government taking to secure our critical strategic infrastructure in the North sea and to ensure clear and serious consequences for Russia when it carries out aggressive and dangerous military activity off our coasts?
Dan Jarvis
The hon. Lady and the House will understand that I am limited in what I can say in my response, but I can assure her that Russia is a top national security priority for the Government, and UK law enforcement has recently secured a range of convictions in this area. I will have more to say about this later today.
Euan Stainbank (Falkirk) (Lab)
Considering that Chinese state-subsidised manufacturers have gained a rising market share in the UK over the past few years, that the Department for Transport and the National Cyber Security Centre have recently announced an investigation into kill switches in Chinese buses, and that the 10-year bus pipeline is expected imminently, will the Minister be raising our Government’s concerns about Chinese buses directly with the Chinese Government?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to my hon. Friend, not just for his question today, but for the important work that he has done in this particular area, in his constituency and across Scotland. I have listened carefully to what he has had to say this morning, and I would be happy to discuss it with him further.
Daniel Zeichner (Cambridge) (Lab)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dan Jarvis)
Through the national security risk assessment, the Cabinet Office engages closely with the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs to continuously assess risks to the security and resilience of the food sector, as well as interdependencies between critical national infrastructure sectors. The Government have published the results of the first annual public survey on risk and resilience, and we provide resilience advice to the public on gov.uk.
Daniel Zeichner
The UK food system has shown remarkable resistance and flexibility in recent years, but seasoned industry voices are warning that we face new challenges from climatic risk and global instability. I appreciate that this is not just a food production issue, but a cross-Government issue. Can my right hon. Friend say a little more about measures to assess our readiness for these new challenges?
Dan Jarvis
My hon. Friend speaks with great authority on these matters. The Cabinet Office is strongly supportive of the work that DEFRA is undertaking on food security, including mapping critical food supply chain assets to provide a greater understanding of potential vulnerabilities. We have also published the first ever chronic risks analysis to support decision making on longer-term cross-cutting and interconnected risks, such as climate and geopolitical change.
Gerald Jones (Merthyr Tydfil and Aberdare) (Lab)
Andrew Rosindell (Romford) (Con)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dan Jarvis)
The Government recently introduced the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill to strengthen the resilience of UK critical national infrastructure. Yesterday, I visited BT, which has worked with the National Cyber Security Centre to block almost 1 billion attempts to access malicious content in just six months. In spring, the Government will publish a business-first national cyber action plan, and we have already engaged with over 400 stakeholders as part of its development.
Andrew Rosindell
The United Kingdom is increasingly and uniquely vulnerable to malicious cyber-activity targeting national infrastructure and democratic institutions, including Parliament itself. That poses a serious risk to our national security. Experts have warned of a critical data leak, a new scale of severe blackouts, transport disruption and even Government being brought to a halt. What action is the Minister’s Department taking to ensure that the Government are prepared and sufficiently resourced to meet this pernicious national security threat?
Dan Jarvis
I understand why the hon. Gentleman raises this issue, and he is right to do so. The Government take the threats we face incredibly seriously. That is one of the reasons why the Prime Minister took the decision back in September to ensure that the Security Minister sits across both the Cabinet Office and the Home Office, so we are better placed as a Government to co-ordinate our national security response in the areas the hon. Gentleman outlined. I can give him and the House an absolute assurance on the seriousness we attach to these issues. We take them very seriously and we are working at pace to address them.
Bradley Thomas (Bromsgrove) (Con)
Luke Akehurst (North Durham) (Lab)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dan Jarvis)
The resilience action plan sets out how we will lead a conversation with the public on resilience. Our evidence gathering included consultation with organisations that represent disproportionately impacted groups to ensure that our approach to resilience reflects the characteristics of the whole of the UK.
Luke Akehurst
Will the Minister explain to the House the importance of exercises like Pegasus, and outline how Pegasus has supported this Government’s efforts to improve our national resilience for future pandemics?
Dan Jarvis
The Government remain committed to learning the lessons of the covid inquiry to protect and prepare us for the future. In line with the inquiry’s recommendations on pandemic response exercises, Exercise Pegasus has been the largest simulation of a pandemic in UK history, involving Ministers, the devolved Governments and representation from arm’s length bodies. We will communicate the findings and lessons from this exercise in due course, as recommended by the inquiry.
Charlie Maynard (Witney) (LD)
Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dan Jarvis)
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for raising this issue. I will look carefully at what he has said and will be happy to meet to discuss it further.
Mr Luke Charters (York Outer) (Lab)
Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)
Last week, the National Security Adviser was due to appear before the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. Did he? If not, why not?
Dan Jarvis
My understanding is that the National Security Adviser did appear in front of the Committee, but it was a private session.
Callum Anderson (Buckingham and Bletchley) (Lab)
Official Secrets Act and Espionage
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(3 months ago)
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Urgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
(Urgent Question): To ask the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster if he will make a statement on espionage cases and the Official Secrets Act.
The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
I thank my hon. Friend for securing this urgent question, following the deeply disappointing collapse of the prosecution case concerning two individuals charged under the Official Secrets Act 1911. The allegations were hugely concerning, and we recognise and share the public and parliamentary frustration about this outcome. The Government welcomed the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy’s inquiry and the opportunity it provided for parliamentary scrutiny on this important matter, alongside the ongoing review led by the Intelligence and Security Committee.
I will take this opportunity to thank the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, under my hon. Friend’s chairship, for its diligent and rapid work. The Government will now take the time to consider the Committee’s conclusions and recommendations properly, in conjunction with partners referenced in the report, before responding within the two-month timeframe.
However, I am glad that the JCNSS’s report has reinforced two fundamental points that the Government have made throughout. First, and as the Government have been saying for several weeks, the report makes it clear that there was no evidence of attempts by any Minister, special adviser or senior official to interfere with the prosecution. The report states that it found no evidence of improper influence. Despite ongoing questions about a meeting of senior officials that took place on 1 September, chaired by the National Security Adviser, the report clarifies that there was no deliberate effort to obstruct the prosecution.
The first senior Treasury counsel had already made the judgment on the basis of the evidence that charges could not progress by 22 August, more than a week before the meeting took place. We have been consistent throughout on these points, which runs in sharp contrast to our critics, who initially criticised the Government for intervening in the case and then, when it became clear that that was nonsense, criticised us for not intervening in the case.
Secondly, the JCNSS report reinforces a fundamental point that I have made to this House previously: the root cause of the failure of this case was the outdated Official Secrets Act 1911, which predates the first world war. The 1911 Act created an unrealistic test by requiring the prosecution to prove that China was an enemy. The Law Commission had flagged the term “enemy” as being deeply problematic as far back as 2017. The Government will continue to work tirelessly to ensure that we have the most effective structures and processes in place to support law enforcement partners in mitigating and prosecuting foreign espionage wherever we find it.
More importantly, the ongoing disinformation around the collapse of this case has been distracting from the most important issue that we should be focused on: how the Government can work across this House to ensure that Chinese espionage will never be successful in the United Kingdom. As the Prime Minister stated in his speech at the Lady Mayor’s banquet on Monday:
“Protecting national security is our first duty and we will never waver from our efforts to keep the British people safe.”
That is why, on 18 November, I set out a significant number of measures that this Government are taking to counter the threat that China and other state actors pose to UK democracy and society. In line with the JCNSS report, the Government will continue to strengthen our processes and preparedness for future threats, ensuring that we leverage our new security legislation effectively—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
Order. The Minister will know that he should have restricted himself to three minutes for his response. That appears to have been four and a quarter minutes.
Matt Western
I thank the Minister for his comments, and I thank Mr Speaker for granting this urgent question demonstrating the importance of parliamentary security, safety and sovereignty. The case of alleged spying on behalf of China caused widespread concern among the public and Members of both Houses. My Committee, which is comprised of senior Members of both Houses, examined the timeline, and actions and decisions of the Government and the Crown Prosecution Service. While this was a highly unusual inquiry for a Committee to conduct, it was essential that Parliament examined the processes that led to the collapse of the case.
Our inquiry found nothing to suggest a co-ordinated, high-level effort to collapse the prosecution, nor deliberate efforts to obstruct or circumvent constitutional safeguards. However, we did find a process that is beset by confusion and misaligned expectations, and that can, at points, be best described as shambolic. There were systemic failures, and deficiencies in communication, co-ordination and decision making between the Crown Prosecution Service and the Government. Indeed, the episode reflects poorly on the otherwise commendable efforts of public servants to keep our country safe.
Given the conclusions I have just set out, will the Minister give reassurances that the Government will work closely with the CPS to ensure that communications and processes are tightened up, particularly when dealing with cases involving national security? Does the Minister acknowledge that the new National Security Act 2023, while comprehensive, may not entirely cover low-level espionage activity, especially given its structural parallels with the previous legislation? Finally, does the Minister agree that greater support should be given to the deputy National Security Adviser and civil servants acting as witnesses in such cases, to ensure top-level grip on cases with significant public exposure?
Dan Jarvis
As Mr Speaker has rightly acknowledged, these issues require a great deal of scrutiny from Parliament, and the Government are grateful for the opportunity to engage and work closely with Parliament on these matters, not least because they merit careful consideration, alongside decisive action by Ministers and senior officials. The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, led by my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western), plays a vital role in providing that appropriate scrutiny. I say that not just as a Government Minister, but as a former member of his Committee. The same principle applies to the ISC, which does important work. I take this opportunity to thank the Chair and the whole Joint Committee for undertaking this work and publishing a comprehensive report as quickly as they have.
My hon. Friend the Chair highlights some important aspects of the report’s conclusions, recommendations and findings, following the work that the Committee undertook. As I have said, the Government approach this issue, and will consider the Committee’s report, with the utmost seriousness. I can give him the assurance that he seeks that the Government are now carefully considering the findings of the report. I give him and the House an absolute assurance that we will respond within the agreed timeframe. He mentioned a couple of other points that I will respond to briefly now, although I am happy to engage with him in more detail, should he think that necessary.
My hon. Friend mentioned the role of the CPS. He will understand that as a Government Minister, I am incredibly limited in what I can say about the CPS, because it is operationally independent of Government. He makes a fair challenge, and we will look carefully at the report’s findings in this area. He also mentioned the National Security Act 2023. While I am not in any way complacent about that legislation, we are in a much stronger position than we were. We keep these matters under review, and along with colleagues across Government, we are constantly seeking to assure ourselves that the legislative framework is fit for purpose and appropriate. I give him an absolute assurance that we take that incredibly seriously.
Finally, my hon. Friend mentioned the deputy National Security Adviser. Let me take the opportunity again to pay tribute to him for the important work that he does. He is a dedicated public servant, and his contribution to our national security is immense. The Government are grateful for his service, as I am sure is the whole House. I will look carefully at the points that my hon. Friend has made, and we will ensure that they are properly reflected in the response he receives from the Government.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
I call the shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
Order. Before I call the Minister, may I make the point to those on both Front Benches that the Minister responding to an urgent question has three minutes? The Opposition Front Bencher, the hon. Member for Brentwood and Ongar (Alex Burghart), should have taken two minutes, and I should advise the Liberal Democrat spokesperson that she has one minute. I commend the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) for managing to stay well within his two minutes. I call the Minister.
Dan Jarvis
A few moments ago, I spoke of the careful consideration and appropriate scrutiny that this matter deserves. Many Members of both Houses and Members of all parties on the Joint Committee have adopted that view, but I have to say that I am disappointed that the hon. Member for Brentwood and Ongar (Alex Burghart) continues to choose a different approach. He did not seem to want to mention that much of the report refers to the time when his party was in government. Some might have hoped that he would use his contribution today to show a bit of humility, both to the House and to those in our national security community, not least given some of the low-brow political point scoring and baseless accusations that we have heard over the past few weeks.
In the aftermath of the trial’s collapse, some Opposition Members accused Ministers, special advisers and civil servants of improper interference. This report makes it clear that that was baseless and untrue. There were some who suggested that some of our most experienced and most dedicated national security experts set out to deliberately withhold information from prosecutors in order to placate the Chinese Government. This report makes it clear that that was baseless and untrue. There were some who suggested that the Conservatives’ failure to update critical national security legislation was immaterial to the case that was being brought to trial. This report makes it clear that the root cause of the collapse was the years of dither and delay that left outdated, ineffective legislation on the statute book long after we knew that it did not protect our country from the modern threats that we face. Some Opposition Members—although not all of them—were all over the place on that legislation, and were all over the place with regard to China, and some of them, sadly, still are.
On China, as the Prime Minister observed this week,
“We had the golden age of relations under David Cameron and George Osborne, which then flipped to an ice age, that some still advocate”,
but no matter how much Opposition Members may wish it to be so, not engaging with China is no option at all. We have made it clear that we will co-operate where we can, but we will always challenge where we must. When we say that national security is the first priority of this Government, we mean it, and since the trial’s collapse, I have announced a comprehensive package that will help us to tackle the economic, academic, cyber and espionage threats that China presents. The report to which the hon. Member has referred provides further useful thought on how we can best safeguard our national security, and the Government genuinely welcome that constructive feedback. I look forward to engaging with the Committee, and with responsible Members in all parts of the House, as we continue to consider how best to go on protecting our democracy and our nation.
The hon. Member asked me about the minutes—[Interruption.] He is still asking me about the 1 September meeting.
Dan Jarvis
I am going to give the hon. Member the answer. The minutes were provided by the Government to the Intelligence and Security Committee, so there is his answer. He also referred, on several occasions, to the application for the Chinese embassy. Let me explain to him, for the sake of absolute crystal clarity, what the position is with regard to the embassy. I think that will be helpful to other Members as well.
As Members will know, an independent planning decision will be made by the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government by 20 January. National security is the first duty of government, and it has been our core priority throughout this process. The Home Office and the Foreign Office provided views on the security implications of this build throughout the process, and we have been clear about the fact that a decision should not have been taken until we had confirmed that those considerations had been resolved. The letter recently sent to the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government now confirms that all national security issues raised have been addressed. Should the planning decision be approved, the new embassy will replace the seven different sites that currently comprise China’s diplomatic estate in London.
Derek Twigg (Widnes and Halewood) (Lab)
I think that many of us are still somewhat bemused by the fact that somehow, despite the three witness statements, the Crown Prosecution Service thought that it could not go ahead with a prosecution. I welcome much of what my hon. Friend the Minister has said, but I think it would be useful, following the questions asked and the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western), if he agreed to come back to the Committee after the Government has responded to its report and recommendations, so that we can be given a clear timeline for the changes that rightly need to be made.
Dan Jarvis
My hon. Friend will understand that there is nothing more I can add with regard to his point about the Crown Prosecution Service. As for his substantive point about engagement with Committees of this House, let me give him that assurance. I genuinely welcome the constructive scrutiny carried out both by the Committee of which he is a member and the Committee chaired by my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington. I think that they provide a huge amount of value, and I can give my hon. Friend the Member for Widnes and Halewood (Derek Twigg) an absolute assurance of our continued desire to co-operate closely with them.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
Lisa Smart (Hazel Grove) (LD)
The seriousness of the threat that Beijing poses to our national security cannot be overstated. Any attempt by China to interfere in our democracy must be rooted out, and the Government should implement the recommendations of the Committee’s report as a matter of urgency. The work that the National Security Adviser and his deputy are doing is vital to keeping our country safe, but the report is damning, and it describes aspects of the situation as “shambolic”. The Minister has previously mentioned his plans for new powers to counter foreign interference, and I would be grateful if he could provide a timeline for their introduction.
Let me once again urge the Minister to place China on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. If he will not do that today, I wonder whether he might give us a date in the diary—say, a week before the Prime Minister’s visit to Beijing; that may well coincide with the date of an announcement on the planning permission for the mega-embassy—and give the House the clarity that it deserves.
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her serious attention to these matters. I hope she will acknowledge that it was only a couple of weeks ago that I presented the House with a significant package of measures designed specifically to counter the threats that we have debating for a number of months, and I hope she will also acknowledge that it was indeed a significant package of measures, but of course we keep these matters under very close review, and I am certain that the Government will want to introduce further measures in due course.
The hon. Lady raises the issue of FIRS. As I have said to the House previously, there were Opposition Members who did not think that we would introduce FIRS on time, but we did so. It is a valuable tool and adds significant value to our capabilities with regard to our national security, but at the same time we have to very carefully deliberate the addition of more countries to the enhanced tier. We keep that under very close review, and I would be very happy to discuss the matter with her further.
Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith and Chiswick) (Lab)
The Joint Committee, of which I am a member, approached this issue in a non-partisan way, and I agree with the Minister that it is a pity that the Conservatives have not taken the same approach, particularly as it started on their watch. The strong impression that I form from the inquiry is that everyone thought they were doing the right thing, but in reality they were tip-toeing around the issues and staying in their own silos. Whether the Minister agrees with that analysis or not, can he tell us what organisational lessons he has learned that will prevent any repetition of, in his own words, this “deeply disappointing” outcome?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his work on the Joint Committee, and I completely agree with the premise of his point: the Committee considered these matters in a non-partisan way. That is precisely the right approach. It is the approach that I will always seek to undertake, and I know that the majority of Members of this House will proceed in the same way.
My hon. Friend raises an entirely fair and reasonable challenge about the organisational lessons that have been learned as a consequence of this process. All Ministers, whether in this Government or in the previous Government, should have approached these kinds of reports with a degree of humility. Undoubtedly, there are lessons that will need to be identified, learned and implemented as a consequence of recent events. As I know he and the House would expect, the Government need to do that in a measured and considered way. I give him and the Joint Committee an absolute assurance that we will look at the detail of the report very closely indeed, and we will respond within the timeframe that the Committee has set us.
Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
Having previously read out in this Chamber the relevant section of the Official Secrets Act 1911, I am pleased that the report concludes that the decision not to prosecute under the terms of that Act flies in the face of common sense. What also flies in the face of common sense is the Government’s previous position that China poses a range of serious threats but does not constitute a threat itself. Is that still the Government’s position?
Dan Jarvis
The right hon. Gentleman knows that I always listen assiduously to what he has to say, given the experience that he brings to this House. I am certain that he will have looked very carefully at what the Prime Minister said in his Mansion House speech on Monday evening, but on the off-chance that he has not yet had the opportunity to do so, let me tell him and the House the essence of what the Prime Minister said with regard to China, because he very clearly set out the Government’s approach. He said that China
“poses real national security threats to the United Kingdom”,
but that it is
“time for a serious approach, to reject the simplistic binary choice. Neither golden age, nor ice age…So our response will not be driven by fear, nor softened by illusion. It will be grounded in strength, clarity and sober realism.”
I agree with the Prime Minister, and I suspect that most sensible Members of this House do as well.
Dame Meg Hillier (Hackney South and Shoreditch) (Lab/Co-op)
I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) for steering the report through his Joint Committee swiftly and sensitively, and for managing sensitive data. It is a great example of how the Committee corridor can really contribute to transparency for the public, and I look forward to the Government’s response. However, there are sensitive matters that are not covered by the existing scrutiny Committees of this House. I hope that the Minister will, on the basis of this example, be an advocate in Government for the establishment of a new Committee that can cover matters that do not currently have oversight because of their sensitivity.
Dan Jarvis
I completely agree with my hon. Friend’s assessment of the work of the Joint Committee. She is right to say it is a great example of the work of a Select Committee that has constructively contributed a very significant amount of useful information that the Government will now consider in great detail.
My hon. Friend’s second point is about the creation of another Select Committee, and she will understand that that is above my pay grade. I gently point to the fact that the Government want to have a very good, close and constructive relationship with the ISC. It will be for the ISC to take a view, but that may provide a forum for further parliamentary scrutiny of those matters.
Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con)
Although I have huge respect for the Security Minister and, indeed, for the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) and the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy Committee—I sat on that Committee for five years—is it not the case that this statement actually raises more questions? It is not case closed, as there are questions that are still outstanding. That is because the weakness here is that the Joint Committee does not have access to classified material; only the Intelligence and Security Committee does. Having sat on both Committees, I know there is a stark contrast between the types of witnesses who can be called and what the witnesses can actually say. Given the earlier question, will the Minister now commit to review the memorandum of understanding with the Intelligence and Security Committee to ensure that the right questions can be asked of the right Committee at the right time, so that we can have some definitive conclusions on this whole saga?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for the experience that he brings to this House, not least because he has sat on both the Committees to which we have been referring. I slightly take issue with his assessment of what the report does, because the Government are very clear that it emphasises the key arguments that we have been bringing forward over the last couple of weeks.
On the right hon. Gentleman’s second point, he has raised the MOU previously. It is an entirely reasonable point for him to raise, both publicly and privately. Let me take it away and come back to him.
Tulip Siddiq (Hampstead and Highgate) (Lab)
The Security Minister knows very well the case of my constituent, Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe, who is accused of espionage by the Iranian state. In case he needs a reminder, her horrifying ordeal is being dramatised on BBC iPlayer at the moment. The one thing that Nazanin has said to me constantly is that a hostage envoy would have really helped when dealing with her situation. I know this is about dealing with espionage cases from the other side, but for the sake of national security, has the Minister considered having a hostage envoy, as the Ratcliffe family keep raising with me?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the contribution that she has made and for the work that she has done previously. I am joined on the Treasury Bench by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln (Mr Falconer), who listened very carefully to her comments, and has indicated that he would be very happy to discuss them further with her.
Stephen Gethins (Arbroath and Broughty Ferry) (SNP)
May I thank the Minister for his responses today and for the way he is responding to this matter? I know he will be as concerned as the rest of us about descriptions of the process being “shambolic” and the criticism of systemic failures. Can the Minister tell us what has changed? Secondly, what has changed over the past almost four years? Russia’s invasion of Ukraine changed the world profoundly, and China continues to provide assistance to Russia.
Dan Jarvis
That is an entirely fair and reasonable question, and I can give the hon. Gentleman a very straight response. One of the things that has changed is that the Prime Minister—rightly, in my view—conducted a machinery-of-government change in September, which means that, as the Security Minister, I now sit not just in the Home Office, as was the case previously, but in the Cabinet Office. The purpose of that machinery-of-government change is to ensure that we can more effectively co-ordinate national security policy and activity across Government. It is relatively early days, but my analysis today is that that was the right move to make; I think it will enable the Government to make better, more informed and timely decisions in this area. At the same time, I approach these things with a degree of humility. We will look very carefully at the findings of the report and make sure that we consider them. We will look at what changes are necessary, and respond to the Joint Committee and to the House in due course.
Dr Scott Arthur (Edinburgh South West) (Lab)
I thank the Minister for his responses. Throughout this affair, he has remained calm and consistent in answering points that—let’s be honest—have at times been smears from the Conservatives. I think the report from the Joint Committee has found them out, and that is why their Benches are empty today. Rather than hiding, the Conservatives should be here apologising.
Does the Minister welcome the fact that the report makes it clear that the root cause of the case collapsing was the dither and delay from the previous Government? Does he agree with the Prime Minister that that was nothing short of a dereliction of duty when it comes to our national security?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his contribution today and on many previous occasions. The essence of his point is absolutely right. I do regret the tone of some of these debates in recent weeks; some of it has been entirely unnecessary, when we should have been coming together as a House to look at what we can do to ensure that the activity that we allegedly saw here is not able to happen again. That has always been my approach throughout, and it will continue to be my approach as we move forward.
The point my hon. Friend made about the recommendations in the report are absolutely right, and I think it vindicates the basic argument that the Government have sought to bring forward. I say that with humility, because we will want to look carefully at the detail of all the findings and all the recommendations. We will do that over the next number of weeks, and we will take on board lessons where they need to be learned.
James Wild (North West Norfolk) (Con)
The report says that the National Security Adviser, Jonathan Powell, apparently had very “limited” engagement about the case. In contrast, one of his predecessors, Sir Stephen Lovegrove, with whom I worked in the Ministry of Defence, said he
“would have expected to be involved intimately in the provision of the Government evidence”.
Why was Jonathan Powell—and Lord Hermer, for that matter, who is described in the report as being “not proactive”—so passive on a matter of national security and alleged spying on Members of this House?
Dan Jarvis
I honestly do not believe that that is a fair and reasonable characterisation of the role played by the National Security Adviser. The National Security Adviser is an extremely experienced and dedicated public servant, who is dedicating his life to keeping our country safe. The hon. Member, because he is a very well-informed and assured Member of this House, will understand that specific restrictions were placed on the deputy National Security Adviser about what he could do and what he could say. Both the deputy National Security Adviser and the National Security Adviser acted with integrity throughout this process, and I know that the House will be grateful to them for it.
James Naish (Rushcliffe) (Lab)
In the light of the important issues being discussed today about the concerning activities of China in the UK, can I ask the Minister what additional steps he is taking or planning to take to protect Hongkongers, Tibetans and Uyghurs from any form of transnational repression?
Dan Jarvis
I know my hon. Friend takes a very close interest in this subject. I hope he will have seen the very significant package of measures that the Government brought forward a couple of weeks ago. We take issues relating to transnational repression incredibly seriously. We welcome the report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, to which we have responded. Through the defending democracy taskforce, we have conducted a review of transnational repression in our country. I hope he sees that we take these matters very seriously. The notion that any state, whether it be China or any other, would seek to harm or persecute anybody resident in the United Kingdom is totally unacceptable, and the Government have been consistent in making that point.
Richard Tice (Boston and Skegness) (Reform)
This report by the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy is not only damning; it refers to “systemic failures”, “shambolic” aspects and “inadequate” communications. I am particularly struck by paragraphs 41 to 45, which call into question the judgment of the Director of Public Prosecutions. The former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Lord Carlile, described the decision not to proceed with the case as “inexplicable”, and the Committee in paragraph 45 is gentle in saying that it was “surprised” by the decision not to proceed. The question has to be asked: do the Government still have confidence in the Director of Public Prosecutions?
Dan Jarvis
The hon. Member will understand that it would not be appropriate for me, as a Government Minister, to make commentary about the performance of the Director of Public Prosecutions. The CPS and the DPP are operationally independent of Government. The hon. Member will have heard me say that we approach these matters with a degree of humility, and that is the right approach. I gently say to him that he may also want to approach these matters with a degree of humility, given recent events in his own party.
John Cooper (Dumfries and Galloway) (Con)
The Minister and I have clashed over Sun Tzu in the past, but at the risk of riling him again, I want to tell him that Sun Tzu said that sometimes a strategic advantage is to be had by feigning weakness. Every day we fail to add China to the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, that is not us feigning weakness; it is weakness. Is that not the case?
Dan Jarvis
As Christmas approaches, I hope there may be an opportunity for me to have a cup of coffee with the hon. Gentleman, and we can compare our various quotes. I give him an assurance that I never had any concern about his seeking to quote Sun Tzu. My concern was that I think it is possible to find a quote from him that matches any particular argument one wants to progress.
The hon. Member’s substantive point was about FIRS, and he will have heard what I have said today and previously. The Government are looking very closely at whether additional countries should be added to the enhanced tier. When a decision is made about that, we will bring it forward in the usual way.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
First, I thank the Minister very much for his careful and helpful answers to questions. Given the collapse of the recent espionage case and the findings that failures in procedure and co-ordination undermined the prosecution, what specific actions will the Government take to restore confidence in parliamentary security, ensure alleged spy threats are fully investigated and pursue the course of justice so that something similar does not ever happen again?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, as I am always. He made an important point about parliamentary security, and I hope that, as a very dedicated parliamentarian, he will know that the Government take these matters incredibly seriously. That is why we are working very closely with Mr Speaker and this House, through the defending democracy taskforce, to make sure that we have the appropriate mitigations in place to counter the nature of the threat we face.
I hold the hon. Gentleman in very high regard, and I refer him to what the Prime Minister said on Monday. The Prime Minister made an important point that is highly relevant to the question the hon. Gentleman raised:
“Protecting our security is non-negotiable. Our first duty. But by taking tough steps to keep us secure, we enable ourselves to cooperate in other areas.”
I hope he agrees—I know he does—with that.
Jim Allister (North Antrim) (TUV)
Today, the Minister has again said that the reason the case collapsed was the inadequacy of the 1911 Act. That raises this obvious question: how come these two gentlemen were ever charged in the first place? The evidential test at the moment they were charged is exactly the same as the evidential test when the case was dropped, so how did they come to be charged under this Act if it was inadequate? Is it not quite clear that the Act was more than adequate to charge them and more than adequate to convict them?
Dan Jarvis
I am not sure that anybody really thinks that the 1911 Act was appropriate. As the hon. and learned Member will know, because it is a statement of obvious truth, the decision to proceed was taken not under this Government, but under the previous one. All I am able to do in this House is to account for the decisions and actions taken by this Government. What this Government will always do is ensure that we protect our national security. It is our first duty and nothing matters more.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
I thank the Security Minister for his answers this afternoon.
State Threat Prevention and Investigation Measures: 20 March to 19 September 2025
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(3 months, 1 week ago)
Written StatementsRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
Section 55(1) of the National Security Act 2023 requires the Home Secretary to report to Parliament as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of every relevant three-month period on the exercise of their STPIM powers under the Act during that period.
STPIMs were introduced through the 2023 Act and came into force on 20 December 2023. There have been no STPIM cases imposed to date.
[HCWS1098]
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures: 1 June 2025 to 31 August 2025
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(3 months, 1 week ago)
Written StatementsRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
Section 19(1) of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 requires the Home Secretary to report to Parliament as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of every relevant three-month period on the exercise of their TPIM powers under the Act during that period. TPIM notices in force—as of 31 August 2025 2 Number of new TPIM notices served—during this period 0 TPIM notices in respect of British citizens—as of 31 August 2025 2 TPIM notices extended—during the reporting period 1 TPIM notices revoked—during the reporting period 0 TPIM notices expired—during reporting period 0 TPIM notices revived—during the reporting period 0 Variations made to measures specified in TPIM notices—during the reporting period 2 Applications to vary measures specified in TPIM notices refused—during the reporting period 3 The number of subjects relocated under TPIM legislation —during the reporting period 1
The level of information provided will always be subject to slight variations based on operational advice.
The TPIM Review Group keeps every TPIM notice under regular and formal review. TRG meetings were convened on 11 and 14 August 2025.
[HCWS1096]
National Day for Victims and Survivors of Terrorism
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(3 months, 1 week ago)
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The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
The impact of terrorism is deep and enduring, changing the lives of victims and their loved ones in a moment. Families and communities have suffered immeasurable loss, grief, and physical and emotional harm from terrorist acts. It is crucial that they receive the national recognition they deserve.
Last month we were reminded all too starkly of the devastating impact of terrorism when the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation synagogue in Manchester was abhorrently attacked. Two people were tragically killed, and three others were injured. Today, and always, we stand with the survivors, their loved ones and all those affected by terrorism everywhere.
On 19 March this year, the Government launched a public consultation on the proposal to introduce a national day for victims and survivors of terrorism. This followed a review into the current support provision, which identified the importance of national recognition and acknowledgment of the lived experiences of those affected by terrorism. In my previous written statement to the House, I set out the Government commitment to improving support and recognition for those impacted by terrorism.
Today I am publishing the findings of the consultation, which received 351 responses. I would like to personally thank every single person who took the time to respond—your voice has been heard, and your contribution will make a difference. The consultation demonstrated overwhelming support for the introduction of a national day, with 91% of respondents in favour and 84% strongly supporting the proposal. Respondents highlighted that they would like to use the national day to remember and recognise those impacted by terrorism, help encourage victims and survivors to access support, educate the public and amplify victims’ and survivors’ stories.
The most popular date for the national day was 21 August, with 35% of respondents supporting, aligning with the UN International Day of Remembrance and Tribute to the Victims of Terrorism. While there was no single preferred name, “National Day of Remembrance” and “National Day of Recognition” were the most selected options. Respondents also supported commemorating the day through an annual event held in rotating locations across the UK, and the creation of a dedicated symbol to represent the day.
Although support was strong, some respondents raised concerns, including the potential for triggering trauma, and the safety of victims and the public at events. These concerns will be carefully considered as we develop plans for the national day, to ensure that it is inclusive, respectful and sensitive to the needs of victims and survivors.
As a result of these findings, today I am announcing the introduction of a UK national day for victims and survivors of terrorism on 21 August. An annual commemorative event will be held in a different location each year to reflect the widespread impact of terrorism across the UK, and a dedicated symbol will be developed in consultation with victims and survivors.
The first national day will take place in 2026, and will be observed by an intimate commemoration, supported by engagement with victims and survivors throughout the year to allow them to shape the format of this initial event and future years. This reflects our understanding that victims and survivors not only wish to, but must, play a central role in shaping how the day is commemorated.
We will continue to engage with victims and survivors to finalise the name of the national day and to shape the commemorative activities. These measures form part of the Government’s broader commitment to ensuring that victims and survivors are appropriately recognised, remembered and supported.
Finally, I would like to pay tribute to the victims and survivors whose tireless campaigning has brought us to this pivotal moment. Their strength and determination have driven this progress. They have my sincere thanks, along with all those who contributed to the consultation.
A copy of the consultation response will be placed in the Libraries of both Houses and will also be published on gov.uk.
[HCWS1082]
China Espionage: Government Security Response
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(3 months, 2 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
With your permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement on Chinese espionage targeting UK democratic institutions, and on the Government’s action to counter the breadth of threats posed by China and wider state actors.
Before I begin, let me first pay tribute to the crew member of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Tidesurge who is missing off the coast of the Republic of Ireland. I know that the whole House will join me in sending our very best wishes to the ship’s company, and to their families back home. This tragic incident is a reminder of the sacrifice that members of our armed forces make in the service of our country.
Earlier today, MI5 issued an espionage alert to Members of this House, Members of the other place and parliamentary staff to warn them about ongoing targeting of our democratic institutions by Chinese actors. Before I set out the threat and what we are doing to meet it, let me thank you, Mr Speaker, for your support in issuing the alert, and for your tireless efforts to safeguard the security of this place and the people who serve within it. I encourage all parliamentary colleagues to read the alert, and to get in touch with the Parliamentary Security Department if they have any immediate concerns.
Our intelligence agencies have warned that China is attempting to recruit and cultivate individuals with access to sensitive information about Parliament and the UK Government. MI5 has stated that this activity is being carried out by a group of Chinese intelligence officers—often masked through the use of cover companies or external headhunters. It is not just parliamentarians who should be concerned by this; parliamentary staff, economists, think-tank employees, geopolitical consultants and Government officials have all been targeted for their networks and access to politicians. I urge all parliamentarians and their staff to be wary that China has a low threshold for what information is considered to be of value, and will gather individual pieces of information to build a wider picture.
Let me speak plainly: this activity involves a covert and calculated attempt by a foreign power to interfere with our sovereign affairs in favour of its own interests, and this Government will not tolerate it. It builds on a pattern of activity that we have seen from China, with cyber-operations by Chinese state-affiliated actors targeting parliamentarians’ emails in 2021, attempted foreign interference activity by Christine Lee in 2022, and other more recent cases. We will take all necessary measures to protect our national interests, our citizens and our democratic way of life, including by working with our allies and partners.
The world has changed a great deal since I first stepped forward to serve our country almost 30 years ago, and while some things have changed, some things remain the same. In the various roles I have held since then, I have always believed in the importance of being clear-eyed about the nature of the threats that we face, and about the need to ensure that the tools we use to respond to those threats are kept up to date. This Government’s first duty is to protect our national security, and we will not hesitate to hold all state actors to account.
On 6 November, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary spoke with her Chinese counterpart, Director Wang Yi. She was clear with the Foreign Minister that any activity that threatens UK national security, particularly relating to the UK’s Parliament and democracy, will not be tolerated. Today, I am setting out a comprehensive package of measures that we are taking to disrupt and deter the threats posed by China, as well as by state actors more widely. We are launching a counter political interference and espionage action plan, which is supported by Ministers from across Government and co-ordinated by me. I will set out in detail to the House what that plan will entail.
First, we will strengthen the legislative tools available to Government to disrupt the threat. We will introduce the elections Bill, which will include measures to safeguard against covert political funding. They will include tougher risk assessment rules for donor recipients, and enhanced enforcement powers for the Electoral Commission. I can confirm that we are also working on new powers to counter foreign interference, including a proscription-type tool to disrupt proxy organisations that are undermining our security, and an extension to the maximum penalties for election interference offences.
Secondly, working with the parliamentary security authorities, we are launching a series of protective security campaigns, co-ordinated through the defending democracy taskforce. These will help all those who work in politics to recognise, resist and report suspicious state threat activity. The campaigns, which will build on the guidance that was launched by the National Protective Security Authority in October, will include tailored security briefings for the devolved Governments and for political parties via the parliamentary parties panel by the end of this year, as well as new security guidance in January for all candidates taking part in devolved and local elections in May.
Thirdly, we are building a campaign that uses all levers at the Government’s disposal to degrade the ecosystem of proxy cover companies, organisations and individuals that are being used by foreign states to facilitate interference and espionage targeting our democratic institutions. The National Protective Security Authority, building on its “Think Before You Link” campaign, will strengthen its engagement with professional networking sites to make them a more hostile operating environment for foreign agents.
As Security Minister, I am privileged to see the diligence of the security services, law enforcement and civil servants who work tirelessly, day and night, to keep the UK safe. Noting China’s low threshold for information gathering, this Government are providing the resources needed to protect our national interests. I can announce that the Government have committed to investing £170 million to renew the sovereign encrypted technology that our officials use to do their vital work. This programme of work will help to ensure that sensitive diplomatic, economic, trade, security, law enforcement and policy development arrangements are safeguarded from espionage by any state threat actor.
I can also announce that this Government have completed the removal of surveillance equipment manufactured by companies subject to the national intelligence law of the People’s Republic of China from all sensitive sites we maintain in the UK and around the world. Moreover, we will invest £130 million next year, through the integrated security fund, in building the UK’s resilience against threats posed by states such as China. Among other projects, this investment will build Counter Terrorism Policing’s ability to enforce the National Security Act 2023, and fund the National Cyber Security Centre and the National Protective Security Authority’s work supporting our most critical businesses in protecting their intellectual property. Indeed, the National Protective Security Authority’s work is an important reminder that China poses threats not just to our democratic institutions, but to other sectors. Let me talk briefly about two other sectors in particular.
The first sector is education, which is one of the UK’s most important global assets, in part due to the UK’s steadfast commitment to academic freedom and excellence. There is value for the UK in engagement with China on education. However, operating in today’s uncertain international context presents many challenges for our great universities. It is because of their excellence that states like China are attempting to influence these universities’ independent research, and to interfere with activity on campuses. Ministers have already raised our concerns about this activity with their counterparts in Beijing, and the Office for Students recently issued new guidance to help universities protect the freedoms that their staff and students enjoy. I can announce that as part of our ongoing commitment to working collectively to address these risks, Ministers will host a closed event with vice-chancellors to discuss the risks posed by foreign interference, and to signpost our plans to further increase the sector’s resilience.
Secondly, on advanced manufacturing, the Department for Business and Trade is working to strengthen and scale our new economic security advisory service, which will help businesses navigate economic security issues, such as espionage and intellectual property theft. The service is already engaging with businesses in the advanced manufacturing sector, and as it matures, it will support other sectors of the economy. It will provide a new digital offer, and will assist businesses with complex economic security cases in navigating the support from His Majesty’s Government.
In October, I told the House that this Government remain steadfast in our commitment to disrupting and holding state actors accountable for widescale cyber-espionage operations. We stand ready to go further to disrupt, degrade and protect against the dangerous and unrestrained offensive cyber-ecosystem that China has allowed to take hold. Earlier this year, the NCSC, with international allies, called out three technology companies, based in China, for their global malicious cyber-campaign targeting critical networks. Just last week, we introduced the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill, which will help make it harder to target critical sectors of the economy and the public sector with cyber-attacks, including malicious cyber-activity emanating from China’s territory. The Government will continue to take further action against China-based actors involved in malicious cyber-activity against the UK and our allies. This will form part of a broader campaign that the UK is delivering to disrupt and degrade the dangerous cyber-ecosystem that China has allowed to take hold within its territory. Let me assure hon. Members that we will not shy away from using all the tools at our disposal, including sanctions, as necessary.
Our country has a long and proud history as a seafaring nation that trades with countries around the world that share our way of life, and with those that do not. China is the world’s second-largest economy, and, together with Hong Kong, is the UK’s third-largest trading partner. It is in our long-term strategic interests to continue to engage with China. We must co-operate on issues on which our interests align—climate, global health, trade, scientific research, illegal migration, and serious and organised crime, to name just a few—but we will always challenge any country, including China, that attempts to interfere, influence or undermine the integrity of our democratic institutions, and we will take all measures necessary to protect UK national security. That is why we have taken action today. I am clear that further steps can and absolutely will be taken to disrupt and deter China’s espionage activity, wherever it takes place. We will update our security powers to keep pace with the threat, help those who work in politics to recognise, resist and report the threat, and work with partners across the economy to strengthen their security against the threat.
Our strategy is not just to co-operate. We will engage China where necessary, but we will always act to defend our interests, and challenge where our values are threatened. I commend this statement to the House.
Mr Speaker
The Minister took 14 minutes. This is a very important subject, so I have no problem with that, but it may be helpful to say to the shadow Minister that if she needs more minutes, they are there.
Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)
My heart goes out to the missing crew member, their ship’s company, and their loved ones at home. Let us all hope for good news.
I thank the Minister for advance sight of this statement, and for his time last week, but the revelations today are no surprise. They are the latest in an ever-growing list of actions by the Chinese Communist party to interfere in our sovereign affairs and try to undermine our democracy and our country. The pernicious nature of this threat should not be underestimated. I welcome the Minister’s plans for a new proscription tool to counter foreign interference, and the fact that the Government have completed the work that we started of stripping surveillance equipment manufactured in China from sensitive sites. On education, however, the plans to discuss foreign interference with vice-chancellors are quite inadequate. I have had those discussions, and faced nothing but naivety and intransigence. They are also useless unless the Government are willing to use their teeth to defend those institutions that are under attack.
Earlier this month, Norway and Denmark alerted us to the existence of dual-use kill switches in Chinese-made electric buses. These switches allow China to switch off buses and bring chaos to transport systems. Can the Minister give an update on the investigation of our bus networks, and the chips that have been placed in Ministry of Defence vehicles, which require our members of the armed forces to be silent while travelling around our country in defence of our nation?
On academic freedom, Sheffield Hallam University was blackmailed by Chinese security services into cancelling research on state-sanctioned Uyghur slave labour. What update can the Minister give on the police investigation into that, and the coercive campaign? Will he admit that it was a mistake for his party to cancel our university free speech provisions, and will he convince the Government to reintroduce them, now that the threat is on the front pages of our newspapers? It is only by drawing a red line and taking action to establish some form of deterrence that we will see threats abate.
In the face of this hostility, the Government appear to be delegating difficult conversations to officials. On the collapse of the case against Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry, the Government saw fit only to call in a senior official to have a conversation with a Chinese chargé d’affaires. Last week, Hongkonger Chloe Cheung said that the Government were not keeping her safe. The Government’s response to a bounty being put on her head, and to kidnap notes being delivered to her neighbours, asking them to take her to the Chinese embassy, was the same rhetorical tap on the knuckles. This is insufficient if the Government seriously want to deter further attacks on our country.
We Conservative Members recognise the threat from the Chinese Communist party, and we want to work with the Government, so we have a few suggestions. The Minister today stated that the Chinese Government are using proxy organisations to interfere in, and commit espionage against, our democracy. That is literally why we introduced the foreign influence registration scheme. Instead of carrying out their communications plan and holding the private, closed-door meetings announced today, we urge the Government to put China in the enhanced tier of the FIR scheme. In opposition, Labour supported our National Security Act 2023, yet in government, it refuses to use it as it was designed. That is perverse. Why vote for a defensive tool, only to leave it on the shelf when we are under threat?
The decision on the new Chinese embassy is expected shortly. We would refuse permission for that embassy. If the Government will not, will they at least require the Chinese Government to pay for sensitive underground cables to be re-routed away from the embassy? We hear that multiple Government visits to China are planned before Christmas and the new year. Will those now be cancelled? What message does it send when, despite an attack on this House and our Parliament, Ministers are happily jetting off to stride down red carpets with the Government responsible?
Finally, we need a comprehensive audit of our vulnerabilities across our society and our economy. The recent export controls on critical minerals demonstrate China’s willingness to weaponise its economic heft. We need to know where our vulnerabilities lie, and to increase our resilience accordingly. That means publishing the shelved China audit, because how can an entire civil service base its posture on a document that most will never be allowed to read? It needs to be published. Sensitive parts can be redacted. As for the possibility of the Chinese authorities taking any offence at its contents, the contents are down to their actions, not ours.
We face an acute threat to our democracy, and in the face of that threat, we have yet to see repercussions for the Chinese Communist party. To defend our nation, the Government must have a firm policy of deterrence. Justice was denied last month, but the Government have the tools and the ability to act. When will they take action to make it clear to the Chinese Communist party that it will not get away with attacks on our democracy?
The Government can cancel the Joint Economic and Trade Commission talks, impose sanctions, cancel propaganda visits to China and put the Chinese Communist party in the enhanced foreign influence registration scheme tier. When they do any of those things, the Opposition will be here, ready to help. Until that time, the Chinese Communist party will think that our country is unwilling to deter future acts of hostility and unwilling to defend our democracy or our country.
Dan Jarvis
It is good to see the hon. Lady in her place. I am grateful for her comments today and for the contact that we have had recently. I hope she knows that this is a conversation that I want to continue to have with her and colleagues on the Opposition Benches. We take very seriously the points she has made today and on countless other occasions.
Let me try to provide the hon. Lady with some reassurance; if I am not able to do so, I would be happy to meet her again in the very near future. As she will understand, there are sensitivities that mean it is more difficult to get into the detail of some things, but let me see what I can say to try to provide some assurances.
The package that we have announced today is, by any metric, comprehensive, although I have been clear about the Government’s willingness to go further when and where that is required. The measures we have announced today will help us to tackle economic, academic, cyber and espionage threats that we face from China and other state actors. The impact of the measures will be immediate, but, as I say, we will not hesitate to go further where necessary; when we say that national security is the first priority of this Government, we take that incredibly seriously.
The hon. Lady is right that the threats we face from China require actions not words, but I gently reiterate some of the announcements that we have confirmed today. The work that we are taking forward will be co-ordinated by the Cabinet Office and me as part of a new counter-political interference and espionage plan; that will be the fulcrum point for co-ordinating activity right across Government and across law enforcement. She will have heard what I have said about the new guidance briefings that will be issued to Members of this House, the devolved Assemblies and candidates standing for election next May.
We are also putting our money where our mouth is. We have announced £170 million specifically towards renewing our sovereign encrypted technical capability and another £130 million on projects such as building the capacity of counter-terrorism police, working with the NCSC and the NPSA to protect intellectual property.
I have also referenced, as the hon. Lady did, the removal of surveillance equipment manufactured by companies subject to China’s national intelligence law—work that I absolutely acknowledge began under the previous Government. I am pleased to confirm that we have completed that process today. I have issued a written ministerial statement with further detail on that. There is also an important legislative angle to all this, which is why we introduced the new Cyber Security and Resilience Bill just last week, and why I give an assurance that we will introduce the elections Bill at the earliest available opportunity.
All these measures are important in their own right, but they are more important when they are brought together. In the end, though—I think the hon. Lady will agree with this—what really matters is our mindset, and our mindset is born of an absolute desire to work collaboratively across this place to protect our country and all the people who live here. Will that involve making some tough choices? Yes; the truth of the matter is that it will involve making some tough choices. The previous Government made some tough choices, and this Government will have to make tough choices. Like all our G7 counterparts, we will engage with those choices in a clear-eyed way. I do not think any serious Member of this House thinks that we should not be engaging with China—the debate is around the nature of the engagement.
The hon. Lady made some important points, and if I am not able to address them adequately, I will come back to her. She raised the importance of education and academic freedoms; I completely agree with her on that. She referenced Sheffield Hallam University specifically. She will understand that because of ongoing active inquiries into the matter, it would not be appropriate to comment on the specifics of what has allegedly happened at Sheffield Hallam. However, her points are well made, and I give her an absolute assurance that we take them incredibly seriously.
It did not come as a huge surprise to me that the hon. Lady also raised the issue of FIRS. She will remember that FIRS is a product of the National Security Act 2023. Some Members of this House said that we would not introduce FIRS at all; then, when we confirmed that we were going to introduce it, they said that we would not be able to do so by 1 July. I gave a categorical assurance that we would introduce it by 1 July, and we did. We are looking closely at whether it is necessary to make further additions to the enhanced tier, but I can say to the hon. Lady that no decision has yet been made with regard to China specifically.
The hon. Lady also asked me about the embassy. There has been much discussion about that matter in this place, and we are moving towards a point of decision. She will understand that that is not a decision for me; it will be made by the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government in a quasi-judicial capacity. As a consequence of that, I am limited in what I can say. However, as I have said previously, I can say that national security has been the core priority throughout.
The hon. Lady spoke about visits to China. I would take a different view to her characterisation of those visits: I think it is important that members of this Government—Ministers and senior Ministers—engage with our counterparts in China, as it is only by engaging that we are provided with an opportunity to deliver tough and consistent messages. I can categorically assure her that any Minister or official who travels from this country to China will deliver a series of strong and coherent messages aligned with the messages that I have delivered to the House today.
The hon. Lady also asked about the audit. She will know that the previous Foreign Secretary gave a statement in this House about the China audit, but I will look carefully at the specific points she has made.
In concluding my response to the hon. Lady, I hope that she knows how seriously we take these matters, and I assure her categorically that I am very happy to work collaboratively with her and colleagues on the Opposition Benches to ensure that we secure the right outcome for the country.
John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Lab)
I, too, send my condolences to the family of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary member who has been lost. The RFA is unique in that it is largely civilian-crewed by members of the RMT trade union, working alongside Royal Navy personnel. They work as a very professional, tight family; any loss like this will be a real blow to them.
I wish to raise the issue of the security of Chinese nationals and others in this country. Two weeks ago I was at a demonstration on behalf of Lee Cheuk-yan—our colleague, the former general secretary of the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions and founder of the Labour party in Hong Kong—who has been in prison now for four years. At those demonstrations, there is always a fear of the monitoring of demonstrators and particularly for the security of Chinese nationals in this country. I would welcome the Minister’s view on what further action could be taken to reassure people that, in the exercise of their democratic rights in this country, they do not become vulnerable to any actions by the Chinese state here.
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, not least for his opening remarks, which I know will have been shared by the whole House. He raises an important point about transnational repression. The Government take these matters incredibly seriously. We have relatively recently completed a very significant piece of work looking at the issue of transnational repression through the defending democracy taskforce. The Government are absolutely crystal clear that it is completely unacceptable for China—or any other country, for that matter—to target individuals resident in this country.
I recently met members of the Hong Kong community, who raised significant concerns about their being targeted. I was clear to them, as I am clear to my right hon. Friend, that none of that activity is remotely acceptable to the Government, and that we will do everything we can to ensure both that the individuals he refers to are kept safe and that they feel as though they are being kept safe.
Mr Speaker
I come to the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, who obviously has some extra time allocated as well.
Lisa Smart (Hazel Grove) (LD)
I am grateful to the Minister, as always, for advance sight of the statement. The news that the CCP is waging a campaign to infiltrate our Parliament is deeply offensive to our sovereignty, though perhaps it is not surprising to those who have been paying attention to the recent collapsed espionage case and the uncovering of interference at a UK university. The attempts to corrupt our democracy and Government must be rooted out.
We therefore welcome the counter-political interference and espionage action plan as a first step. It is absolutely right that the Government implement those measures to challenge Beijing’s espionage capabilities in the UK and the transnational repression it exports to our shores. New measures to disrupt proxy organisations, new penalties for election interference and the removal of potentially compromised surveillance equipment have our full backing. However, in the face of persistent, flagrant transgressions by the CCP, the plan by itself is not sufficient.
Beijing has tried to bully our Government, most recently on permission for the proposed new Chinese embassy at Tower Bridge, warning of consequences if the Government do not approve the plans. Beijing has oppressed and intimidated British nationals. We cannot afford to shy away from this challenge and leave key, pressing issues unresolved. I note the Minister’s comments about the Chinese mega-embassy. May I put on record my party’s repeated call to urge the Government to block the plan, to show that attempts to intimidate will be firmly rebuked? I further note the Minister’s comments about FIRS. Will he update the House on his current thinking about when he might come back with a decision to add China to the scheme’s enhanced tier?
The Minister said that the forthcoming elections Bill will include measures
“to safeguard against covert political funding…tougher risk assessment rules for donor recipients and enhanced enforcement powers for the Electoral Commission.”
This is a good opportunity. Will the Minister confirm that that will include donations via cryptocurrency and the associated transparency concerns? Will he also confirm that there will be new risk assessment rules and enforcement powers for donations funnelled through third-party organisations such as think-tanks?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her broad welcoming of the plan. She makes a number of points, including several about which she has consistently raised concerns in the Chamber and with me outside it. Let me say to her and to other Members that, with regard to the embassy and any other area of policy, nobody will intimidate members of this Government to do anything other than what is in our country’s national interests.
I understand why certain hon. Members want to refer to the embassy as a “super-embassy” or by other descriptive terms. The judgment will have to be made by the Secretary of State, but I, along with other ministerial colleagues, have been crystal clear that national security is and will remain a core priority throughout this process. There have been various comments and points made by people inside and outside this House on the national security implications of the embassy that are not correct. It is a quasi-judicial matter and I am limited in what I can say, but I reiterate the assurance about the importance of the national security elements underpinning any decision.
On the elections Bill, the hon. Lady made some important and valid points. She will understand that that piece of legislation sits with another Government Department. I am sure the Department will have heard her points, but if it has not, I will represent those points on her behalf.
Abtisam Mohamed (Sheffield Central) (Lab)
Sheffield Hallam University in my constituency is home to internationally respected researchers, including Professor Laura Murphy, whose excellent work on forced labour in China has been met with coercion, intimidation and attempts at interference linked to the Chinese state. At a time when universities are increasingly financially vulnerable due to a sharp decline in international student numbers, the risk of hostile states exploiting that vulnerability is growing. I welcome the closed event for vice-chancellors to address those concerns. Will the Minister explain whether that event will explore how academics such as Professor Murphy will be protected from being silenced, and will more robust support be provided to universities that are left exposed to pressure, intimidation and undue influence?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to my hon. Friend. Sheffield is a great city, and she will know better than anyone that it is blessed with two outstanding academic institutions. She knows that as the local MP, and I know that from my time spent as the regional mayor. For reasons that I know she will understand, because there remain active inquiries into this matter, I am limited in what I can say about the specifics. I can say more generally that any attempt by any foreign state to intimidate and coerce universities to limit free speech and academic freedoms in the UK will not be tolerated. The Government made that clear to Beijing after learning of the case.
The new Office for Students recently issued guidance to make it explicit that universities should not tolerate attempts by foreign states to suppress academic freedom. I am pleased that she welcomes the closed event with vice-chancellors. We will make sure that both the vice-chancellors from the city of Sheffield are invited to attend. I am happy to discuss these matters further with her.
Dame Karen Bradley (Staffordshire Moorlands) (Con)
Does the Minister consider that China represents a current threat to this country? Will he also expand on the work his officials are doing with the Members and Members’ Staff Services Team to remove potential security weaknesses, not just from this building but from MPs’ constituency offices and our homes?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to the Chair of the Select Committee, as I always am. On her second point, let me come back to her. She raises a valid concern and, rather than give her a response now, let me consider the facts of the case and I will come back to her with a more considered response.
On her first point, I fear that I will disappoint her and maybe some other Conservative Members by not diverting from the policy that the Government have previously confirmed in this place. The Government fully recognise that China poses a series of threats to UK national security in the form of cyber-attacks, foreign interference and espionage targeting our democratic institutions, including the transnational oppression of Hongkongers in this country. That is why we have made the announcements that we have and why we will continue to do everything that we can to guard against that threat.
Mr Alex Barros-Curtis (Cardiff West) (Lab)
I thank the Minister for his statement and put on record my tribute to the missing crew member, those searching for them and all those who keep us safe.
I welcome the package of measures that the Minister has set out today. With the news about the networking sites, while not new, it is important to keep the risk elevated and to remind those potentially affected of that. He knows, because we have conversed about this regularly, that I take an interest in the defending democracy taskforce. Will he therefore say a little bit more about the series of protective security campaigns that will be co-ordinated through it? I suggest that as part of the outreach to all the different stakeholders that he has mentioned, the taskforce gives thought to some sort of centralised toolkit that pulls together all the guidance and information, which is evergreen and constantly updated, to ensure that all affected stakeholders, in and outside this place, have it at their fingertips so we can keep ourselves safe from people who are a threat to us.
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his comments today and for his previous points about the importance of the defending democracy taskforce. It was not a given that the Government would necessarily continue in the way that the previous Government and the previous Security Minister, the right hon. Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat), had invested in the taskforce. However, I took the view, on good advice from my predecessor, that that was the best way—the fulcrum—to co-ordinate that activity across Government. I think he was right about that. That is why we have really invested in it as a process, that is why it is truly wired across Government and law enforcement, that is why the Prime Minister recently renewed its mandate and that is why I personally invest a significant amount of time in it every single day. I believe in its work and I believe that it provides the right forum to lead that work, including the kind of work that my hon. Friend mentioned.
The protective security campaigns are really important because, while most right hon. and hon. Members are sensible and diligent Members of this House, we have to ensure that everybody who might be at threat or at risk has the information that they need in order to make informed decisions. That is why, on a number of fronts, we will up our game and ensure that all the necessary information is provided to the people who need it. My hon. Friend’s point about the toolkit is a really good one, and I will take it away, consider it and come back to him. I am grateful to him for his contribution.
Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge) (Con)
I shall begin, if I may, by saying to the Minister: you’re welcome. It is a pleasure to hear his statement today and to hear the areas where he is taking things forward. I particularly welcome the update on connected devices. There are a few other areas where connected devices are very real. My hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) spoke from the Dispatch Box about vehicles, which are intelligence-gathering platforms on wheels when they are made in Beijing and shipped over here, and there is a whole series of other areas where we are seeing this level of threat continue and deepen.
The Minister also spoke about the fact that we need a relationship with China, and I do not disagree with him on that, but it is somewhat insulting when the Chancellor goes to Beijing and comes back with £600 million of investment over five years. Frankly, that is peanuts. Chinese foreign direct investment in the UK is less than 0.2%, according to the Government’s own trade and investment figures. We need to look at where we can compensate for that dependency, perhaps by increasing US FDI by 1%, which would be almost double the Chinese investment. We need to look around the world at alternatives. We also need to be clear eyed about the threats, and I reiterate the point that my hon. Friend made from the Dispatch Box: we need to place China on the enhanced tier of FIRS.
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his points and the advice that he has offered previously. His points about connected devices and vehicles are well made, and I can give him an absolute assurance that we consider them very carefully. He made a point about engagement and referenced the Chancellor’s visit. I can assure him that all Ministers and officials who visit China will deliver a coherent and strong set of messages about our concerns with regard to our national security. I said earlier that the Foreign Secretary had spoken specifically about these matters with her Chinese counterpart on 6 November. She was absolutely clear with the Foreign Minister that any activity that threatens UK national security would not be tolerated, so I can give the right hon. Gentleman and the House an absolute assurance that, even where there are engagement activities that might, on the face of it, relate to other areas of Government business, there will be a consistency about the messaging.
The right hon. Gentleman will know, though, from his time in government that in addition to the areas of co-operation and areas where there is a requirement to engage that I listed earlier, both within departmental responsibilities that sit in the Home Office, there is often merit in engaging with China on a range of matters that are not necessarily particularly well understood. We need to have that constructive engagement with the country, but it needs to be underpinned by a desire to enhance and preserve our national security, and that is the approach that I will always take.
Emily Darlington (Milton Keynes Central) (Lab)
First, I thank the Minister for the strength of his message about our efforts to stop the transnational repression of our constituents, including the Hongkongers in Milton Keynes. Can we continue to have a dialogue about how my constituents continue to feel unsafe in the UK? I want to raise an issue that goes alongside the Speaker’s Conference, which is how we protect and defend our democracy in the online world, particularly from foreign state actors and their proxies and non-state actors who use the online environment to destabilise our democracy. Will the Minister meet me to talk about the amendments that I am preparing for the elections Bill to ensure that we protect ourselves from online threats just as much as we do from offline threats?
Dan Jarvis
Let me reiterate what I said previously about how completely unacceptable it is that any transnational repression takes place in this country. The Government will continue to stand with and support members of the Hong Kong community who have relocated here to the UK. My hon. Friend is right to raise the important work done by the Speaker’s Conference. At the most recent meeting of the defending democracy taskforce, we looked carefully at the recommendations. A lot of positive work has been done, and we want to work closely with Mr Speaker to deliver where we can on the recommendations.
My hon. Friend is also right to raise the importance of the online environment, and these are conversations that I am having with colleagues across Government, including in the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. On her point about a meeting, she will understand that that particular piece of legislation is a Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government lead, but I will make sure that she gets a meeting with the relevant Minister, whether that is myself or a colleague in the other Department.
Clive Jones (Wokingham) (LD)
In Wokingham, we have a really strong Hong Kong community, and they tell me regularly how concerned they are about the growing threat of Chinese espionage and China’s influence in our politics. Many of them have bounties levied on their heads. What is the Minister doing to ease the concerns in our Hong Kong community, especially among my constituents, and what is he doing to protect them and our institutions?
Dan Jarvis
That is an entirely fair and reasonable point. Let me give the hon. Gentleman a reassurance, further to what I have already said today and on other occasions. The Government will continue to stand with and support members of the Hong Kong community who have relocated here to the UK. I recently met members of that community myself, specifically to discuss their concerns. The defending democracy taskforce is doing a lot of work on our response to transnational repression, but if the hon. Gentleman has any further concerns, I would be happy to meet him to discuss them further.
Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
Do the Government accept that China is a bad faith actor whose basic technique can be summed up by a single phrase: buy influence and build dependency? Is that not exactly what has happened in our universities?
Dan Jarvis
The right hon. Gentleman speaks with great authority on this matter, and he will know that I am limited in the way in which I can describe the nature of the relationship. I have given him the characterisation that I think is appropriate. We have to be pragmatic in the world that we live in. We have to do what we can to secure our national security, while at the same time ensuring that we are engaging in a way that is advantageous to our country and our economy. Any Government—the previous one and this one—have to balance those sometimes competing interests, but this Government will do it in a way that always ensures that we safeguard our national security.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)
I have great respect for the Minister. However, listening to what he has said today about the China espionage case, which follows the collapsed spy case, the Christine Lee case and the other spying that took place here in the House, does he not look back and think that it is peculiar? We now have Hongkongers here in the UK with bounties on their heads who are being threatened daily by China and dragged into illegal police stations. He talked about all the other things: threats to our democracy, threats to our industry, cyber threats through the internet of things, threats to our universities, and threats to our MPs who are sanctioned and who have to face these challenges daily. Does that not make a mockery of the idea that China is not a continuing threat, and of the fact that it is not in the upper tier of FIRS, as my hon. Friend the shadow Minister called for? Surely it is time for that to happen. The No. 1 priority for a Government is the defence of the realm. Balancing priorities does not trump defence of the realm.
Dan Jarvis
I have a lot of respect for the right hon. Gentleman, who has engaged with these matters consistently for a number of years, and rightly so. We have today announced a comprehensive set of measures, but I have been clear about the Government’s willingness to go further where required. I have also been clear on this and previous occasions about the nature of the threat and the Government’s concerns about it. He is right that the defence of the realm is the most important job of any Government, but we must also be honest about the fact that we need to engage with China. We must therefore engage on our terms and in a way that is advantageous to us.
I know that the right hon. Gentleman has a long-standing interest in the embassy, and he knows what my response about that will be. I understand his point about FIRS; he will have heard the response that I have already given. I hope that, despite the concerns he has expressed, he acknowledges that we take these matters seriously and are doing everything we can to address the nature of the threat.
Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)
I welcome a great deal of what the Minister said in his statement. As I am sure he agrees, just as we know that China can simultaneously represent a national security threat and economic opportunity, China knows it too. That means that—even if it were not the right thing to do in and of itself, which of course it is—standing up for our national security is unlikely to prejudice any international trading relationship that we seek to pursue with China, because China respects strength.
May I ask the Minister for help on one specific question in relation to the embassy? I know that he respects the role of the Intelligence and Security Committee. He knows that that Committee is relied upon by this House to provide judgment on matters in which intelligence is involved and the House cannot do so itself. The embassy is clearly one such matter. If the Government seek to make a decision on that before Christmas—he may not be able to say whether that is still the case—will he ensure that the ISC has all the material we need to make a judgment on behalf of the House? As yet, we do not have it.
Dan Jarvis
I often find myself in violent agreement with the right hon. and learned Gentleman, who makes good points in a reasonable way. It is not necessarily for me to talk about the nature of our diplomatic relationship with China, because, as he will understand, that is an issue on which the Foreign Office leads, but he is right in his characterisation of our approach. I believe in being straight with this House and with the countries that we deal with. He is right that it does not in any way disadvantage us to be straightforward and strong. That is why I have chosen the language that I have used today very carefully to indicate the strength of feeling about the nature of the threat that we face.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman made an entirely reasonable point about the embassy. I will not bore him and the House with further discussion about it being a quasi-judicial decision that will be made by the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, although that is clearly the case. There is an important role for the ISC in considering the nature of the decision. At the appropriate moment, when we are able to do so, I will ensure that his Committee is properly briefed on that issue.
Christine Jardine (Edinburgh West) (LD)
I welcome the Minister’s comments and repeat the calls for China to be added to FIRS. I have specific concerns about Edinburgh and Scotland in general. One relates to our energy security given the continuing lack of clarity about what is to happen to Mingyang and whether, if it is to take part in the construction of the offshore wind farm in the North sea, mitigations will be in place to prevent it from having on/off switches.
We have a large Chinese consulate in Edinburgh West. My constituents are concerned about the size of the dishes on the roof and about activity there. Having myself been subjected to filming while speaking at a Hong Kong rally, I am concerned about the security of Hong Kong nationals in Edinburgh. With the Scottish elections coming up next year, can the Minister reassure me that there have been discussions with the devolved authorities to ensure that they are aware of the continued and increasing threat posed by Chinese espionage?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to the hon. Lady, who makes important points about her great city. I can give her an assurance that there is such engagement, but I will reflect on the points that she makes and consider whether we need to do more. She will acknowledge that I referred specifically to the devolved Assemblies in my opening remarks, but if she thinks that we could and should be doing more, I would be very happy to have that conversation with her.
Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)
This is a welcome statement from the Security Minister, whom I hold in high regard, as does the House. He will be familiar with the report on China produced by the ISC—of which I was and remain a member—which dealt with exactly the matters that he has described: the widespread penetration of our universities, the theft of intellectual property and the attempt to compromise our democratic institutions. Will he add to his list a review of contracts with China—public sector contracts, Government contracts and so on—particularly those relating to sensitive matters? He said that he was a plain-speaking man, so, mindful of the collapse of the recent trial, will he do the simple task of saying from the Dispatch Box that China is a threat to our national security?
Dan Jarvis
I am always grateful to the right hon. Gentleman—one of my predecessors—for his contributions, to which I listen very carefully. On his final point, he knows precisely what the Government’s line is with regard to China. He makes a good point about the contribution of the ISC. I hope that members of that Committee understand and recognise the importance that we attach to their work. We intend to have regular contact with the Committee, including in the near future. He makes an entirely reasonable point about contracts; I will take that away, undertake to look at it and come back to him privately with a response.
Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)
I welcome the package and the Minister’s commitment to continued engagement with Beijing, but does he share my view that one cannot reason with a tiger when one’s head is in its mouth? We are rapidly approaching that position because of the stranglehold that China has on this country by virtue of our reliance on critical minerals and rare earths. As he seeks to strengthen our position, will he ensure that we diversify our ability to gain access to those critical elements, thus ensuring that China respects this country rather than sees us as weaklings—a situation that would of course deteriorate further in the event that, God forbid, China controls Taiwan?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman, as I always am. I am conscious that I have now been joined on the Treasury Bench by the Foreign Secretary, so I will have to be extremely careful about how I characterise the relationship with China. I hope it will provide some reassurance to the right hon. Gentleman if I say that the Government will bring forward a critical minerals strategy. It will be led by the Department for Business and Trade but there will be significant input from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. I hope that he understands how seriously we take these matters. I understand why he characterises the relationship in the way that he does, but I know that, as a former Minister himself, he will understand that there is a degree of practical reality about how we manage that relationship. Yes, we ensure that we underpin our national security, but we must engage in other areas. It is important that we do that in a clear-eyed way, and that is how the Government will proceed.
Several hon. Members rose—
Chris Law (Dundee Central) (SNP)
Our devolved nations, local authorities and educational institutions are not being made adequately aware of the risks that China poses, as is evidenced in Sunday’s report by David Leask. The Minister has mentioned briefings with devolved Governments, guidance for candidates and a closed event with university vice-chancellors, but will he ensure that those are not one-off events, and that they will be continual and offer up-to-date information from this day forward? Will he meet me and the SNP group urgently?
Dan Jarvis
I can give the hon. Member the assurance he seeks in terms of our desire to work closely with the devolved Administrations. That is absolutely the way in which I want to proceed, as I said in response to the hon. Member for Edinburgh West (Christine Jardine) a moment ago. Of course I would be happy to meet with him and his group.
Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con)
Is it not clear that the threat from China is becoming deeper, wider and more serious? While I welcome the Security Minister’s statement, it does not have a single deterrent in it, as was highlighted by the shadow Security Minister. I want to be helpful to the Minister. He mentioned the encrypted system that he will introduce and fund. Will he consider reviewing Government security classifications policy, so that we can have a review of Government papers that are classified but also of the threat to this place? He mentioned China’s low threshold. Would he consider reclassifying confidential, pre-publication Select Committee inquiry documents, so that any leaking of those documents—as with the leaking of Government documents by civil servants—has a far tougher sanction?
Dan Jarvis
The right hon. Member makes an important point about leaking, which is something I take very seriously as the Minister responsible for the Government security group. I can give him an assurance. I hope that the package of measures we have brought forward conveys the strength of feeling and how seriously we take these issues. As he always does, he made a number of other really useful and constructive points. Rather than come back to him now, I will look carefully at them and consider them further.
Richard Tice (Boston and Skegness) (Reform)
It is not a coincidence that, just a few weeks after the collapse of the China spy case, MI5 is issuing this major espionage alert. China smells weakness. With regard to the embassy, while the Minister says it is a decision for another Minister, the reality is that it is a strategically important decision by this Government on behalf of the British people. Does he understand that the British people will be shocked if planning consent is granted, and China will again smell weakness?
Dan Jarvis
This is a strong package of measures we have announced today, but I have also been crystal clear about our determination to act further where necessary. That is the right approach. It will mean we are best able to guard our national security, while at the same time engaging with China on other areas of policy, including illegal migration.
Alison Griffiths (Bognor Regis and Littlehampton) (Con)
The Minister stresses the importance of mindset, so can he tell me whether it was a failure of mindset that underpinned the failure to secure the prosecution of two alleged Chinese agents? Why should parliamentarians now trust that he has the mindset to keep us safe?
Dan Jarvis
As I said in the House yesterday, and as I hope the hon. Lady and other Members will understand, those decisions were not taken by the Government; they were taken independently by the Crown Prosecution Service, which is rightly independent of Government. The Government have today brought forward a strong package of measures, and I hope that she and her colleagues will support them.
Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)
I have previously mentioned that the Joint Committee on Human Rights report on transnational repression specifically singled out China for having the most comprehensive TNR campaign in the UK of any country. The report called for China to be on the enhanced tier of FIRS. If all the actions the Chinese Government are taking—the espionage, the bounties on people’s heads and the clear attempts to subvert democracy—do not qualify them to be on that enhanced tier, does that not undermine the scheme?
Dan Jarvis
First, let me say that I very much appreciate the work of the hon. Member’s Committee, and specifically the report it published on transnational repression, to which we responded fully. I understand why he makes the point about FIRS. He knows what the Government’s position is at this particular moment, and I spelt it out earlier: FIRS is an important tool, and we will carefully consider how best to use it.
John Cooper (Dumfries and Galloway) (Con)
The Chinese general Sun Tzu said that
“the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.”
Are we not presenting an opportunity for defeat when members of our military ride around in Chinese cars, and why on earth are this Government facilitating secretive trade trips to Beijing for members of the Scottish Government?
Dan Jarvis
Sun Tzu said a number of things, and perhaps they lend themselves to a debate all of its own. I am not aware of the specific point the hon. Member made, but I am happy to look into it if that would be helpful.
Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)
According to media reports, administrators at Sheffield Hallam University told a professor of Chinese studies that she would have to abandon her research. That followed a separate defamation lawsuit against Sheffield Hallam University, as was reported by the BBC. I appreciate that the Minister cannot comment on the specifics of that case, but will the Government do more to support universities in resisting so-called SLAPPs—strategic lawsuits against public participation?
Dan Jarvis
It is worth my being clear about the importance this Government attach to academic freedom. We are incredibly proud of our universities, and as a Yorkshire MP, I am incredibly proud of Sheffield Hallam University, as I am of Sheffield University. That is, in part, why we made these announcements today and why we will be holding an event that provides a very good opportunity to engage with vice-chancellors, look carefully at the nature of the challenges they are facing and support them in responding to those challenges.
Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)
Madam Deputy Speaker,
“The hon. Gentleman knows the answer: we are looking carefully at whether other countries should be added to the enhanced tier, but we will take that decision in due course and bring it forward in the normal way.”—[Official Report, 20 October 2025; Vol. 773, c. 638.]
That is what the Security Minister said when I asked him for the fourth time last month why China is not included within the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. So I will ask the Minister for the fifth time in as many months, and I am hoping he will offer some clarity this time. Given the range of measures he has just announced, what would it take for the Government to deem China to be a threat, and when will he assess whether China should be added to the enhanced tier?
Dan Jarvis
I admire the hon. Gentleman’s perseverance and patience on this issue. Unfortunately, I am going to disappoint him by referring him to the answer I gave previously.
Jim Allister (North Antrim) (TUV)
May I take the Minister back to devolved issues? In the case of Northern Ireland, international trade, quite rightly, is a reserved matter, yet last Wednesday in Belfast, the Chinese Government, no less, hosted a major investment conference in collaboration with the local Department for the Economy, with 120 Chinese companies, including Huawei, ZTE and BYD. At the conclusion of it, they signed a strategic co-operation framework agreement with Invest NI. How is that possible when international trade is a reserved matter? Will this Government finally closely examine the operation of the Stormont Executive and their collaborations with China?
Dan Jarvis
I was in the hon. and learned Member’s part of the world just a couple of weeks ago. We take very seriously the importance of engaging with the devolved Administrations. I will look carefully at the points he has made and reflect on them, and if he wants to discuss them further, I would be happy to do that.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
I thank the Minister for his statement; we are greatly encouraged by the steps the Government are taking. I chair an all-party parliamentary group—some Members here are members of it—and we had our website hacked and stories replaced. I have also had conversations that were under surveillance by the Chinese Government while in Northern Ireland, so I am glad the Minister has acknowledged this wide-scale threat. While pouring moneys into security is good, there must be a ramification for trade outcomes where Chinese agents are involved in espionage. The mishandling of the recent court case can never be repeated, and the Government must send the message that our language is set, our defences are raised, and we are not to be trifled with by any foreign powers, certainly not by the Chinese Government.
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to the hon. Member, as I always am. I hope he sees the commitment this Government have to ensuring that we are best equipped to engage with the nature of the threats we face. That is precisely why I brought forward this package of measures and why I have been crystal clear about the requirement potentially to go further in certain areas. I hope he sees—if he does not, let me give him an assurance—how seriously we take these matters and our desire to work with Members right across the House and with the devolved Administrations, to do everything we can to guard against the nature of the threat, while at the same time ensuring we engage in a way that is in our national interest.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
I thank the Security Minister for his statement.
Integrated Security Fund: Allocations for Financial Year 2025-26
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(3 months, 2 weeks ago)
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The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
I wish to update the House on the integrated security fund’s initial regional and thematic allocations for this financial year—2025-26. This builds on the ISF’s 2024-25 annual report, which was published on www.gov.uk on 30 October. Non-ODA Allocated (£m) ODA Allocated (£m) Total Allocation (£m) Total ISF Budget 621.82 233.00 854.82 Continuing Portfolios Africa 18.68 38.56 57.24 Counter Terrorism 18.00 13.00 31.00 Cyber and Tech 93.70 5.30 99.00 Eastern Europe and Central Asia 35.23 55.00 90.23 Economic deterrence initiative 17.50 0.00 17.50 Information threats and influence 15.00 0.00 15.00 Middle East and North Africa and Iran 40.29 40.29 80.58 Migration 7.00 3.00 10.00 Serious and organised crime 7.95 16.40 24.35 Western Balkans 7.00 17.00 24.00 Non-discretionary peacekeeping 205.32 42.21 247.21 AU mission Somalia (AUSSOM/ATMIS) 25.00 0.00 25.00 Op TOSCA 12.20 0.00 12.20 Central administration costs 13.00 0.00 13.00 Exit costs 4.00 0.00 4.00 New Portfolios Biosecurity 15.00 0.00 15.00 Gender and National Security 4.00 0.85 4.85 Small-scale standalone programmes 10.00 1.65 11.65 Discretionary peacekeeping 0.55 0.00 0.55 Transfer to FCDO Overseas territories* 13.95 3.95 17.90 Closed Portfolios Afghanistan and Pakistan 0.05 0.00 0.05 Americas 0.00 0.00 0.00 Gender, peace and security 0.00 0.00 0.00 India and India Ocean 0.00 0.00 0.00 Multilateral Strategy 0.44 0.25 0.69 National Security and Communications Team 0.03 0.00 0.03 South-East Asia and Pacific 0.000 0.00 0.00 State threats 4.13 0.00 4.13 Total ISF Allocations** 568.02 237.46 805.48
The ISF is a cross-Government fund, designed to tackle the highest-priority threats to the UK’s national security at home and overseas. It supports delivery of the national security strategy.
ISF 2025-26 Allocations
In 2025-26, the ISF has allocated £854.82 million, of which £233.00 million is overseas development assistance, and £621.82 million is non-ODA (table 1).
In 2025-26, the ISF will build on its first year of operation by continuing to invest in the UK’s top national security priorities. This includes a combination of activity to both strengthen domestic resilience and security and support our partners and protect British interests overseas. The ISF continues to prioritise support to Ukraine and other partners in eastern Europe and the western Balkans in the face of Russian aggression and hostile state interference. This includes vital stabilisation work for communities near the frontline in Ukraine, as well as activity to strengthen our partners’ capabilities to counter misinformation and cyber-attacks.
The ISF is also investing in bolstering the UK’s own resilience to these threats and in capabilities to improve the economic security of both the UK and our allies through the ISF’s economic deterrence initiative. The ISF will continue to deliver programming to promote stability and security in the middle east and Africa, where instability results in a direct threat to UK national security interests. This is complemented by the fund’s work to address non-state threats, like serious and organised crime and terrorism.
In 2025-26, the ISF has undergone structural reform, including the consolidation of its thematic and geographic portfolios to improve efficiency and streamline the ISF’s work. The changes made for 2025-26 represent a transition towards a revised and simplified governance structure that is due to be implemented over the spending review 2025 period. Allocations for the remainder of the SR25 period will be announced in due course.
Table 1: Indicative ISF Funding Allocations 2025-2026
N.B. the indicative table below omits references to activity and associated budgets exempt from publication. It also provides for a small over-allocation to reflect the fact that underspends can arise when delivering new programming, and to ensure full use of the ISF’s allocated budget over the financial year.
* Programming in the Overseas Territories has returned to FCDO to support in 2025-26.
** Some closing ISF Portfolios received transition support from the ISF in 2025-26.
[HCWS1066]
China-manufactured Surveillance Equipment: Sensitive Sites
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(3 months, 2 weeks ago)
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The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
The Government continue to take the security of their systems and physical infrastructure extremely seriously. In November 2022, the previous Administration instructed all Government Departments to cease deployment of surveillance equipment on their sensitive sites where it is manufactured by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People’s Republic of China. They also committed to providing an annual update on the matter to Parliament.
This Government have continued the work at pace, and I am pleased to confirm that all sensitive Government sites originally identified with such equipment have now finished their replacement work.
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Prevent Programme
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(3 months, 3 weeks ago)
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The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
On Thursday 6 November, the Home Office published official statistics for “Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme from April 2024 to March 2025”. Prevent is a key part of Contest, the national counter-terrorism strategy, and aims to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. It has supported nearly 6,000 people to move away from a pathway to radicalisation since 2015 and plays a vital role in safeguarding those most vulnerable in our communities.
Key statistics
In the year ending 31 March 2025, the Prevent programme experienced a significant increase in activity, with 8,778 referrals recorded, compared to 6,922 between April 2023 and March 2024. This represents a 27% rise compared to the previous year and marks the highest annual total since records began in 2015. Of these referrals, 1,472 were adopted as Channel cases, accounting for 17% of all referrals. This proportion is notably higher than the 7% recorded last year. As set out in the full publication, changes in methodology mean that caution should be exercised when making direct comparisons with previous years.
Looking at the nature of concerns raised, 21% of referrals were related to extreme right-wing radicalisation (1,798 cases), while 10% were associated with Islamist extremism (870 cases). A substantial proportion of referrals—34%—concerned individuals for whom no specific ideology was identified.
The UK terrorism threat level has remained substantial, with Islamist extremism the most significant threat, followed by extreme right-wing terrorism. Of those concerns related to Islamist extremism, 26% were adopted into Channel for support the year ending March 2025, an increase from 13% last year. While the increased number of adoptions is welcome, we recognise that given the prevalence of this threat type, Prevent must go further to build awareness and understanding so that people can identify and refer Islamist extremist concerns.
We continue to see an increase in concerns regarding those that have a fascination with extreme violence or mass casualty attacks. The tragic attack in Southport last year demonstrates the very real threat from non-ideological extreme violence, and the increase in referrals of this type to Prevent shows the vigilance of frontline professionals in identifying and reporting these concerns.
It is vital that Prevent remains threat agnostic so that it can deal with the full range of threats we face. As an early intervention programme, Prevent is in a position to intervene and provide support to anybody who is on a pathway to radicalisation. While the presence of ideology is clearly an important factor, Prevent must not limit its scope to cases where a terrorist ideology has clearly already taken hold.
Under this Government a range of steps have been taken to improve the ability of frontline professionals subject to the Prevent duty to spot the signs of radicalisation.
A new Prevent assessment framework was rolled out in September 2024 to support CT police to strengthen the quality and consistency of decision-making on all Prevent referrals.
In November 2024, we launched a new ideology training programme for frontline staff such as teachers and healthcare workers. This will help them to identify extremist ideologies, including Islamist extremism, and to refer people they are concerned about into Prevent for further support.
The role of independent Prevent commissioner was created in December 2024, to provide additional scrutiny and oversight of Prevent policy and delivery.
In September 2025, the Home Office issued new guidance which clarified Prevent thresholds for practitioners, following recommendations made the independent Prevent commissioner.
As the nature of radicalisation evolves, it is essential that Prevent can effectively tackle the threat we see today. The Home Office will continue to work with partners including counter-terrorism police, local authorities, health and education to ensure that Prevent can offer support to the right people, where they are at risk of being drawn into terrorism.
[HCWS1045]
Telecoms Fraud Charter
Dan Jarvis Excerpts(4 months ago)
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The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
My noble Friend the Minister of State, Home Office, Lord Hanson of Flint, has today made the following written ministerial statement:
Today, I am pleased to inform the House that we are publishing the second Telecoms Fraud Charter.
The Telecoms Fraud Charter sets out a series of ambitious fraud prevention commitments from major consumer and business telecommunications providers operating across the UK.
These commitments represent a significant step forward in further strengthening the telecommunications sector’s response to fraud, addressing some of the most prevalent and harmful scams perpetrated via voice and text channels. Measures include enhanced protections against the spoofing of legitimate network numbers, improved filtering to block scam calls and messages before they reach consumers, and the introduction of new rules to ensure quicker resolution of fraud cases by telecoms providers.
Further detail will be published online, but the charter will contain actions focusing on:
Cross-industry data sharing to improve the detection and disruption of fraud;
Strengthening SMS protections to block scam texts and reduce abuse of messaging platforms;
Preventing scam calls and spoofing through technical upgrades to the network;
Improving customer awareness through clearer guidance and public education campaigns;
Better support for victims, including new fraud resolution deadlines;
Improved collaboration with industry and law enforcement to drive intelligence sharing and co-ordinated enforcement.
Telecoms providers have made notable strides in recent years in addressing fraud, supported by technological innovation and strengthened collaboration with Government and law enforcement agencies. However, those signing this charter have shown a clear commitment to go further and faster to prevent fraud, acting with urgency and ambition.
I welcome their proactive approach and commend their dedication to safeguarding consumers from fraudulent activity. Government stand firmly alongside the sector in this fight. We will continue to convene, support, and challenge all partners to go further and faster, holding them to account for the commitments they make in this charter. Together, we can make the UK a hostile environment for fraudsters and a safer place for everyone.
The Telecoms Fraud Charter will be published on www.gov.uk on 5 November.
[HCWS1022]