China Espionage: Government Security Response

Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts

Tuesday 18th November 2025 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

With your permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement on Chinese espionage targeting UK democratic institutions, and on the Government’s action to counter the breadth of threats posed by China and wider state actors.

Before I begin, let me first pay tribute to the crew member of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Tidesurge who is missing off the coast of the Republic of Ireland. I know that the whole House will join me in sending our very best wishes to the ship’s company, and to their families back home. This tragic incident is a reminder of the sacrifice that members of our armed forces make in the service of our country.

Earlier today, MI5 issued an espionage alert to Members of this House, Members of the other place and parliamentary staff to warn them about ongoing targeting of our democratic institutions by Chinese actors. Before I set out the threat and what we are doing to meet it, let me thank you, Mr Speaker, for your support in issuing the alert, and for your tireless efforts to safeguard the security of this place and the people who serve within it. I encourage all parliamentary colleagues to read the alert, and to get in touch with the Parliamentary Security Department if they have any immediate concerns.

Our intelligence agencies have warned that China is attempting to recruit and cultivate individuals with access to sensitive information about Parliament and the UK Government. MI5 has stated that this activity is being carried out by a group of Chinese intelligence officers—often masked through the use of cover companies or external headhunters. It is not just parliamentarians who should be concerned by this; parliamentary staff, economists, think-tank employees, geopolitical consultants and Government officials have all been targeted for their networks and access to politicians. I urge all parliamentarians and their staff to be wary that China has a low threshold for what information is considered to be of value, and will gather individual pieces of information to build a wider picture.

Let me speak plainly: this activity involves a covert and calculated attempt by a foreign power to interfere with our sovereign affairs in favour of its own interests, and this Government will not tolerate it. It builds on a pattern of activity that we have seen from China, with cyber-operations by Chinese state-affiliated actors targeting parliamentarians’ emails in 2021, attempted foreign interference activity by Christine Lee in 2022, and other more recent cases. We will take all necessary measures to protect our national interests, our citizens and our democratic way of life, including by working with our allies and partners.

The world has changed a great deal since I first stepped forward to serve our country almost 30 years ago, and while some things have changed, some things remain the same. In the various roles I have held since then, I have always believed in the importance of being clear-eyed about the nature of the threats that we face, and about the need to ensure that the tools we use to respond to those threats are kept up to date. This Government’s first duty is to protect our national security, and we will not hesitate to hold all state actors to account.

On 6 November, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary spoke with her Chinese counterpart, Director Wang Yi. She was clear with the Foreign Minister that any activity that threatens UK national security, particularly relating to the UK’s Parliament and democracy, will not be tolerated. Today, I am setting out a comprehensive package of measures that we are taking to disrupt and deter the threats posed by China, as well as by state actors more widely. We are launching a counter political interference and espionage action plan, which is supported by Ministers from across Government and co-ordinated by me. I will set out in detail to the House what that plan will entail.

First, we will strengthen the legislative tools available to Government to disrupt the threat. We will introduce the elections Bill, which will include measures to safeguard against covert political funding. They will include tougher risk assessment rules for donor recipients, and enhanced enforcement powers for the Electoral Commission. I can confirm that we are also working on new powers to counter foreign interference, including a proscription-type tool to disrupt proxy organisations that are undermining our security, and an extension to the maximum penalties for election interference offences.

Secondly, working with the parliamentary security authorities, we are launching a series of protective security campaigns, co-ordinated through the defending democracy taskforce. These will help all those who work in politics to recognise, resist and report suspicious state threat activity. The campaigns, which will build on the guidance that was launched by the National Protective Security Authority in October, will include tailored security briefings for the devolved Governments and for political parties via the parliamentary parties panel by the end of this year, as well as new security guidance in January for all candidates taking part in devolved and local elections in May.

Thirdly, we are building a campaign that uses all levers at the Government’s disposal to degrade the ecosystem of proxy cover companies, organisations and individuals that are being used by foreign states to facilitate interference and espionage targeting our democratic institutions. The National Protective Security Authority, building on its “Think Before You Link” campaign, will strengthen its engagement with professional networking sites to make them a more hostile operating environment for foreign agents.

As Security Minister, I am privileged to see the diligence of the security services, law enforcement and civil servants who work tirelessly, day and night, to keep the UK safe. Noting China’s low threshold for information gathering, this Government are providing the resources needed to protect our national interests. I can announce that the Government have committed to investing £170 million to renew the sovereign encrypted technology that our officials use to do their vital work. This programme of work will help to ensure that sensitive diplomatic, economic, trade, security, law enforcement and policy development arrangements are safeguarded from espionage by any state threat actor.

I can also announce that this Government have completed the removal of surveillance equipment manufactured by companies subject to the national intelligence law of the People’s Republic of China from all sensitive sites we maintain in the UK and around the world. Moreover, we will invest £130 million next year, through the integrated security fund, in building the UK’s resilience against threats posed by states such as China. Among other projects, this investment will build Counter Terrorism Policing’s ability to enforce the National Security Act 2023, and fund the National Cyber Security Centre and the National Protective Security Authority’s work supporting our most critical businesses in protecting their intellectual property. Indeed, the National Protective Security Authority’s work is an important reminder that China poses threats not just to our democratic institutions, but to other sectors. Let me talk briefly about two other sectors in particular.

The first sector is education, which is one of the UK’s most important global assets, in part due to the UK’s steadfast commitment to academic freedom and excellence. There is value for the UK in engagement with China on education. However, operating in today’s uncertain international context presents many challenges for our great universities. It is because of their excellence that states like China are attempting to influence these universities’ independent research, and to interfere with activity on campuses. Ministers have already raised our concerns about this activity with their counterparts in Beijing, and the Office for Students recently issued new guidance to help universities protect the freedoms that their staff and students enjoy. I can announce that as part of our ongoing commitment to working collectively to address these risks, Ministers will host a closed event with vice-chancellors to discuss the risks posed by foreign interference, and to signpost our plans to further increase the sector’s resilience.

Secondly, on advanced manufacturing, the Department for Business and Trade is working to strengthen and scale our new economic security advisory service, which will help businesses navigate economic security issues, such as espionage and intellectual property theft. The service is already engaging with businesses in the advanced manufacturing sector, and as it matures, it will support other sectors of the economy. It will provide a new digital offer, and will assist businesses with complex economic security cases in navigating the support from His Majesty’s Government.

In October, I told the House that this Government remain steadfast in our commitment to disrupting and holding state actors accountable for widescale cyber-espionage operations. We stand ready to go further to disrupt, degrade and protect against the dangerous and unrestrained offensive cyber-ecosystem that China has allowed to take hold. Earlier this year, the NCSC, with international allies, called out three technology companies, based in China, for their global malicious cyber-campaign targeting critical networks. Just last week, we introduced the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill, which will help make it harder to target critical sectors of the economy and the public sector with cyber-attacks, including malicious cyber-activity emanating from China’s territory. The Government will continue to take further action against China-based actors involved in malicious cyber-activity against the UK and our allies. This will form part of a broader campaign that the UK is delivering to disrupt and degrade the dangerous cyber-ecosystem that China has allowed to take hold within its territory. Let me assure hon. Members that we will not shy away from using all the tools at our disposal, including sanctions, as necessary.

Our country has a long and proud history as a seafaring nation that trades with countries around the world that share our way of life, and with those that do not. China is the world’s second-largest economy, and, together with Hong Kong, is the UK’s third-largest trading partner. It is in our long-term strategic interests to continue to engage with China. We must co-operate on issues on which our interests align—climate, global health, trade, scientific research, illegal migration, and serious and organised crime, to name just a few—but we will always challenge any country, including China, that attempts to interfere, influence or undermine the integrity of our democratic institutions, and we will take all measures necessary to protect UK national security. That is why we have taken action today. I am clear that further steps can and absolutely will be taken to disrupt and deter China’s espionage activity, wherever it takes place. We will update our security powers to keep pace with the threat, help those who work in politics to recognise, resist and report the threat, and work with partners across the economy to strengthen their security against the threat.

Our strategy is not just to co-operate. We will engage China where necessary, but we will always act to defend our interests, and challenge where our values are threatened. I commend this statement to the House.

[Mr Speaker]

The Minister took 14 minutes. This is a very important subject, so I have no problem with that, but it may be helpful to say to the shadow Minister that if she needs more minutes, they are there.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, not least for his opening remarks, which I know will have been shared by the whole House. He raises an important point about transnational repression. The Government take these matters incredibly seriously. We have relatively recently completed a very significant piece of work looking at the issue of transnational repression through the defending democracy taskforce. The Government are absolutely crystal clear that it is completely unacceptable for China—or any other country, for that matter—to target individuals resident in this country.

I recently met members of the Hong Kong community, who raised significant concerns about their being targeted. I was clear to them, as I am clear to my right hon. Friend, that none of that activity is remotely acceptable to the Government, and that we will do everything we can to ensure both that the individuals he refers to are kept safe and that they feel as though they are being kept safe.

[Mr Speaker]

I come to the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, who obviously has some extra time allocated as well.

[Lisa Smart (Hazel Grove) (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister, as always, for advance sight of the statement. The news that the CCP is waging a campaign to infiltrate our Parliament is deeply offensive to our sovereignty, though perhaps it is not surprising to those who have been paying attention to the recent collapsed espionage case and the uncovering of interference at a UK university. The attempts to corrupt our democracy and Government must be rooted out.

We therefore welcome the counter-political interference and espionage action plan as a first step. It is absolutely right that the Government implement those measures to challenge Beijing’s espionage capabilities in the UK and the transnational repression it exports to our shores. New measures to disrupt proxy organisations, new penalties for election interference and the removal of potentially compromised surveillance equipment have our full backing. However, in the face of persistent, flagrant transgressions by the CCP, the plan by itself is not sufficient.

Beijing has tried to bully our Government, most recently on permission for the proposed new Chinese embassy at Tower Bridge, warning of consequences if the Government do not approve the plans. Beijing has oppressed and intimidated British nationals. We cannot afford to shy away from this challenge and leave key, pressing issues unresolved. I note the Minister’s comments about the Chinese mega-embassy. May I put on record my party’s repeated call to urge the Government to block the plan, to show that attempts to intimidate will be firmly rebuked? I further note the Minister’s comments about FIRS. Will he update the House on his current thinking about when he might come back with a decision to add China to the scheme’s enhanced tier?

The Minister said that the forthcoming elections Bill will include measures

“to safeguard against covert political funding…tougher risk assessment rules for donor recipients and enhanced enforcement powers for the Electoral Commission.”

This is a good opportunity. Will the Minister confirm that that will include donations via cryptocurrency and the associated transparency concerns? Will he also confirm that there will be new risk assessment rules and enforcement powers for donations funnelled through third-party organisations such as think-tanks?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. Sheffield is a great city, and she will know better than anyone that it is blessed with two outstanding academic institutions. She knows that as the local MP, and I know that from my time spent as the regional mayor. For reasons that I know she will understand, because there remain active inquiries into this matter, I am limited in what I can say about the specifics. I can say more generally that any attempt by any foreign state to intimidate and coerce universities to limit free speech and academic freedoms in the UK will not be tolerated. The Government made that clear to Beijing after learning of the case.

The new Office for Students recently issued guidance to make it explicit that universities should not tolerate attempts by foreign states to suppress academic freedom. I am pleased that she welcomes the closed event with vice-chancellors. We will make sure that both the vice-chancellors from the city of Sheffield are invited to attend. I am happy to discuss these matters further with her.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee.

[Dame Karen Bradley (Staffordshire Moorlands) (Con)]

Does the Minister consider that China represents a current threat to this country? Will he also expand on the work his officials are doing with the Members and Members’ Staff Services Team to remove potential security weaknesses, not just from this building but from MPs’ constituency offices and our homes?