National Security (State Threats) Bill (Allocation of Time)
Wednesday 17th June 2026
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate National Security (State Threats) Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Committee of the whole House Amendments as at 17 June 2026 - (17 Jun 2026)
13:38 - The House divided: - Ayes: 233 / Noes: 94 - Question accordingly agreed to.
Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)
Let me be clear from the outset that the Opposition support the Bill and want it on the statute book, but we cannot support the manner in which the Government are seeking to pass it. This motion, for something that seeks to make a permanent change to the criminal law of our country, was laid only late on Tuesday, and with it the Government are seeking to drive through every single stage in one afternoon. The months of debate that the Bill should have had are gone, and the line-by-line scrutiny and votes on amendments in Committee have all been taken away, so the first test of this law will be in a court room, where it may well collapse. The case for these powers was made well over a year ago. The House does not exist to waive through legislation; it exists to test it and to find weaknesses before our enemies do. A motion that forbids us that duty does not strengthen the Bill but imperils it. Therefore, with regret, we will seek to divide the House.
The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Shabana Mahmood)
I will be brief in my remarks. I regret the approach taken by the official Opposition. They know full well that this is a very tightly constructed Bill that takes forward a specific set of recommendations made by the independent reviewer of terrorism and state threats legislation. It will be fully scrutinised by this House and the other place. The reason for moving quickly, as the hon. Lady well knows, is because we need the wider power to designate bodies, which we will debate in due course, so that we can move quickly, given the threats the country faces. The need for speed, I believe, is made by recent events, and I think the Government are doing the right thing. I ask her to think again. Of course, if we must divide then so be it, but I would have expected better from someone with her experience.
Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)
Will the Home Secretary give way?
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
Do any other Members wish to contribute? I call Sir Jeremy Wright.
Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)
I am bound to say that the Home Secretary, for whom I have huge respect, is wrong to suggest that she cannot take interventions because of a lack of time—she has decided that there is a lack of time. I want to make one simple point to her, which my hon. Friend on the Opposition Front Bench has adverted to. Jonathan Hall KC produced an excellent report, most of which we will all agree with, but he did that in May last year. The Home Secretary cannot have it both ways. Either this is a desperately urgent matter, in which case the Government should have brought forward legislation long before now, or it is not, in which case we should have longer than a day to consider it, should we not?
Question put.
National Security (State Threats) Bill
Wednesday 17th June 2026
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate National Security (State Threats) Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Committee of the whole House Amendments as at 17 June 2026 - (17 Jun 2026)
The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Shabana Mahmood)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
The first responsibility of a state is to protect its citizens. The security of our nation is the basis upon which our democracy, our prosperity and our way of life depend. If a state cannot guarantee the safety of its people, every other promise it makes rings hollow. Today we debate a relatively short Bill, but its brevity should not be mistaken for unimportance; it is essential to meeting the sacred responsibility of protecting this country and our fellow citizens.
This Bill comes at a time when the need is great. We live in an increasingly dangerous world—one in which many of our old assumptions no longer hold. The boundaries between war and peace have blurred; the tactics employed by hostile actors have become more sophisticated, more deniable and more insidious; and the threat has grown in scale. The director general of MI5 recently revealed that the number of individuals under investigation for state threat activity had grown by more than a third in the space of a year. After many years in which the Security Service was focused overwhelmingly on counter-terror work, it must now also respond to threats from foreign powers that are greater in number than at any time in a generation.
The nature of the threats posed by foreign powers will be known by many in this House. We have seen physical threats against individuals and property; we have witnessed attempts to interfere in and influence our democracy; and we have experienced cyber-attacks targeting both the state and the private sector that disrupt critical infrastructure and compromise sensitive data. The source of these state threats has come predominantly, although not exclusively, from three countries: Russia, China and Iran. I should emphasise that the threats from each present differently, both in scope and nature, and I will take each in turn.
The Russian state, as we know all too well, is responsible for deaths on British soil. What began with the murder of Alexander Litvinenko was repeated in Salisbury with the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal. The Russian state’s wanton disregard for human life was evident in the risks it was happy to pose to British citizens, which led, tragically, to the death of Dawn Sturgess—an innocent British woman killed by the Russian state.
Putin’s Russia has also sought to influence our politics, as demonstrated by the guilty plea by Nathan Gill, Reform UK’s former leader in Wales, who accepted bribes for peddling pro-Kremlin narratives. Russia is also a prolific and malevolent force in cyber-space. A recent targeting of politicians, journalists, universities and civil society organisations was disrupted by our security services in December 2025, resulting in the sanctioning of eight Russian cyber-intelligence officers.
As you know, Madam Deputy Speaker, our approach to China is nuanced: we will co-operate where we can and challenge where we must. There are areas on which we will engage with China, including the economy, the environment and, indeed, on certain shared security challenges. Choosing not to engage with China is no choice at all. However, national security is the first duty of Government, and China does pose real national security threats to the United Kingdom. We have seen cyber-attacks, foreign interference, and espionage targeted at our institutions. Just days ago, MI5 and fellow Five Eyes members issued an alert warning of the threat posed by China’s military intelligence services. The Hong Kong police force has also encouraged transnational repression on our soil against a community to whom we are proud to have given sanctuary.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
I commend the Minister for bringing forward this legislation. I am concerned on behalf of my constituents of Chinese descent who still have families living in Hong Kong and China and who are still subject to persecution and human rights issues. The pursuit of my constituents by Chinese officials in Belfast and elsewhere in Northern Ireland has to be stopped. What can the Minister do through this legislation to stop the pursuit by Chinese officials—clandestinely, or in whatever way it may be—of my constituents, who are law-abiding citizens, just because they happen to be Chinese and just because happen to have relatives in Hong Kong?
Shabana Mahmood
Both the National Security Act 2023 and the measures we are debating today will ensure that we have the strongest suite of measures available to us to take action against those who come after people on our soil, including dissidents from other regimes and people to whom we have given sanctuary. Transnational repression will be caught by the measures in this Bill.
Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con)
As the Home Secretary will know, this is the fifth or sixth national security-related Bill in the past few years—the most Bills on national security issues that we have seen in any Parliament. She will also know that the UK intelligence community has more powers as a result of these Bills, as well as bigger budgets and more responsibilities than ever before. I commend all those serving in our agencies for their distinguished service. However, I am concerned that there are parts of Government that are currently not covered by aspects of the oversight of our intelligence community by the Intelligence and Security Committee. I commend the excellent members of that Committee; I am a former member, so I can commend them in the House today.
It is absolutely vital that the intelligence services have independent oversight. Unfortunately, the legislation that oversees the ISC is 30 years old and 10 years old. We are having all these national security Bills, but we do not have commensurate Bills to improve oversight and accountability of our intelligence agencies. It needs to change, because we cannot have an echo chamber in the UK intelligence community. There needs to be parliamentary oversight with the power of sanction—summons and sanction. At the moment there is no power.
Shabana Mahmood
Let me first associate myself with the right hon. Gentleman’s tribute to the excellent work and service of all those in our United Kingdom intelligence community, wherever they serve, and indeed all those who serve and put their lives at risk in order to keep the rest of us safe. I also pay tribute to the tremendous work done by the Intelligence and Security Committee—one of Parliament’s most august Committees—to provide vital scrutiny of our legal frameworks in this important area.
I must say to the right hon. Gentleman that, personally, as someone who signs warrants every day that are subject to both Secretary of State decision and judicial decision, I think that we have a legal framework that is sufficiently robust to provide oversight, without getting into the operational choices that must be made. Of course, these matters are always kept under review, and I take that review process seriously. If there are proposals that he wishes to make, I would be happy to discuss them with him.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
On oversight, will the Secretary of State confirm that proposed new section 33G of the National Security Act 2023, which would be added by clause 3, is not intended to limit access to justice, or prevent challenges through the courts to future decisions made under human rights principles? That seems to me to be a measure that her Government would not want to bequeath to future Governments, who might misuse the legislation.
Shabana Mahmood
I do not agree with the hon. Lady’s construction of
proposed new section 33G, but I am sure that we can pick up that point in Committee, when we do line-by-line scrutiny. The Bill is intended to be read alongside all our other pieces of international and human rights legislation, and the Bill is compliant with our domestic and international human rights obligations.
Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Your Party)
The Bill gives considerably more powers to the Home Secretary and the Government, so it results in greater Executive power. Further to earlier interventions, is she not concerned that the Executive, and this branch of the Executive, are to have much greater power, but there is no commensurate increase in bodies’ accountability to Parliament for deciding what organisations and which individuals are to be sanctioned, and what the system will be for making those decisions? We have been through this process many times, going right back to the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in the 1970s. Does she not feel that there is a danger of our moving too far away from parliamentary and public accountability for the very important decision to deny liberty to various individuals, who will have difficulty challenging that legally?
Shabana Mahmood
I disagree with the right hon. Gentleman almost entirely. The Executive have a responsibility to protect and maintain this country’s national security, and we have to move when we see that hostile actors are employing new methods to put our people and interests at risk. We have seen an increase in hostile activity from those who are not directly related to foreign powers, but have a relationship with them. That is why we are bringing forward the designated body condition in the Bill. It rather sounds as if he questions the basis for us having counter-terror legislation, or this legislation, at all. I disagree with him on that. I think we have a suitable legal framework, under both the Terrorism Act 2000 and this new Bill, to deal with all the threats that this country faces, including those that are emerging as new ways for people to put our citizens at risk.
Let me turn to the threat posed by Iran. We are debating this Bill in the shadow of a recent surge in hostile activity by the Iranian state. In just a single year, MI5 has tracked and disrupted over 20 potentially lethal Iranian plots. These have targeted dissidents, media organisations and critics of the Iranian regime, and they pose a real and enduring threat to our Jewish community here at home.
Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge) (Con)
The right hon. Lady has already spoken powerfully about attacks on politicians, and the Prime Minister’s home was recently attacked. One point she has not raised, but hopefully will come to, is the nature of the media engagement that follows attacks. Lies and distortions have been used to suggest all number of different abuses by the Prime Minister—all of them false—when this was simply a Russian-paid attack on his home. Does she agree that it is not just Russia that is doing this? PressTV and anybody who has taken money from it have been active participants in the hate-filled propaganda that we see spreading, online and offline, in our country, encouraging murder and attacks on Jewish people, and attacks on our entire democracy.
Shabana Mahmood
The right hon. Gentleman is right. It is incumbent on all parliamentarians to reflect on the platforms we appear on, and what those platforms are seeking to do. There will always be a balance to be struck with freedom of speech and other matters, but where activities lead people to fall foul of the law, they will be pursued with the full force of the law—whether that is this Bill, the National Security Act 2023, or any other part of our criminal legislation framework.
On the attacks on the Prime Minister’s home, let me just say, factually, what happened in the criminal justice system. It was not part of the prosecution’s case that there was any additional direction of that activity. That was not part of the evidence. I would not want to let that stand without making that clear about the prosecution.
Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)
The Home Secretary will know that I am an admirer of hers, and we tend to agree about much. We certainly agree about the threat posed by Iran. She will be familiar with the report produced by the Intelligence and Security Committee, of which I am pleased to be a member—indeed, I am basking in the glory of the compliments that the ISC has already received—which said:
“Iran poses a wide-ranging, persistent and unpredictable threat to the UK, UK nationals, and UK interests. Iran has a high appetite for risk when conducting offensive activity and”—
this is the critical point—
“its intelligence services are ferociously well-resourced with significant areas of asymmetric strength.”
Iran is a particular threat, and the Home Secretary will well understand that the way it uses its intelligence services is entirely different from the way that we see our intelligence services in this country. I have no doubt that she is mindful of that fact in relation to the Bill. I see this Bill as quite closely associated with how we deal with Iran. Will the Home Secretary comment on that?
On a point raised by the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) and my right hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard), one way of dealing with oversight would be for the ISC to be pre-briefed by a Minister when proscription was considered, rather than it having to play catch up afterwards.
Shabana Mahmood
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his contribution. The Bill seeks to create the legal framework by which designations will be made in future. The Bill will hopefully be approved quickly by Parliament, and I will seek to move forward with designations as quickly as possible, to deal with the threats that I am discussing in the House today.
I hope that the right hon. Gentleman would agree that the fact that I have spent some time considering the different nature of the threat posed by these three states in particular shows that we are very alive to the ways in which they use their unique positions to pose a threat to us in the United Kingdom. He is right about the way in which Iran operates; it is different from how Russia and China operate. The Government have to be alive to the different type of risks posed by these three countries in particular. At the moment, those countries account for a large proportion of the hostile activities that are monitored by our security services, but those activities are not exclusive to those three countries.
On matters of oversight, I will repeat my starting position. I do think that our current framework is robust and has stood the test of time. Of course, things change, and we would review the framework all the time anyway. I repeat my general offer—I suspect that I am making it to the whole of the ISC, given how well represented it is in this debate—of a conversation to pick up any concerns that its members have. The Minister for Security and I will make sure that we consider any additional proposals fully, but I am mindful that we do not want a position in which the Government cannot act quickly, or to over-regulate what is necessarily an Executive function, as speed is often of the essence. With that understood, a sensible conversation is always welcome.
In relation to Iran, Members will be aware that two men await trial under the National Security Act for the surveillance of Jewish sites. While investigations remain ongoing, the police are exploring potential links between Iran and the spate of arson attacks directed at our Jewish community in London. Faced with this intolerable hostility, our nation has bolstered its defences. The National Security Act, brought forward by the previous Government and supported by Labour, rightly commanded support from both sides of the House. It has given our authorities new tools and provided the legal underpinning for a series of complex and sensitive investigations, and it has secured important convictions, including of two men for gathering information and conducting surveillance to assist the Chinese state.
In addition, the foreign influence registration scheme has been in force for close to a year. Russia and Iran are placed on its enhanced tier. Anyone now conducting activity on behalf of those states faces a clear choice: identify themselves and register their activity, or face the prospect of prison.
Sanctions remain a vital tool in our action against hostile states. The UK now has more than 550 sanctions against Iranian-linked individuals and organisations, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in its entirety. Through measures like these, we have made this country a harder target. However, as we improve our defences, our adversaries respond and change their behaviour to pose new threats to our country. That has been particularly evident in the rising use of proxy groups—criminal gangs, professional enablers and front companies that do the bidding of a foreign power, against the interests of this country, in exchange for money.
There has long been a desire to ban state-linked organisations from operating in this country, and to target those who facilitate them. That is why the Government made a manifesto commitment to deal with state-backed domestic security threats in the same way that we tackle terrorism. The question was how to create the right legal power to do so. My predecessor, now the Foreign Secretary, tasked Jonathan Hall KC, the Government’s independent reviewer of terrorism and state threats legislation, with answering that question.
Mark Pritchard
I am grateful to the Home Secretary for giving way again; she has been generous. Does she believe that the Bill sufficiently covers the areas of non-state actors and non-kinetic activity, which are being used more and more?
Shabana Mahmood
The combination of what we already have on the statute book in the National Security Act and this Bill means that all aspects of that activity will be covered. It obviously depends on how the activity presents. The Bill closes the loophole where a designated body is responsible. Where proxy groups are responsible, they will be caught by the measures in the Bill, and that activity will be liable to both prosecution and conviction.
Jonathan Hall KC examined whether tools available in our current terrorism legislation might be emulated or adapted to address state threats. He determined that we could not use the existing terror legislation to proscribe a state entity. He memorably described that as
“shopping in the wrong department.”
He said:
“For the Secretary of State to have or purport to have power to prohibit the existence of foreign State entities would be well beyond what Parliament could have intended”
when it passed the Terrorism Act. He went on to conclude that applying the power to a state entity would
“appear to overstep the boundaries of the principle of non-intervention at international law.”
Instead, he proposed a new regime: a power equivalent to proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000, but specifically designed to tackle state and state-linked organisations. Through this legislation, we seek to bring that new power into law.
I will now take the House through the Bill in some detail. Clause 1 introduces a power for the Home Secretary to designate a body. It will insert new section 33A into the National Security Act 2023. Such a designation will be possible if the Home Secretary believes that a body is, or has been, involved in foreign power threat activity and that designation is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.
The definition of a body is purposefully wide; it cannot be targeted at individuals, but it can be targeted at a wide range of organisations, including foreign intelligence services, mercenary groups, front companies and criminal networks. The power to designate is of critical importance.
Monica Harding (Esher and Walton) (LD)
The Bill’s offences are broad enough to inadvertently criminalise routine humanitarian operations, which could pose a significant problem for non-governmental organisations operating in countries where state institutions or public bodies could become designated bodies. Although safeguards for humanitarian operations are in the explanatory notes, they are not in the Bill. Will the Secretary of State think about putting those into the Bill?
Shabana Mahmood
I do not think that the activities that the hon. Lady mentioned are caught by the Bill. We have been clear in the explanatory notes to the Bill—I refer her to paragraphs 37 and 43—that diplomatic activity, and indeed humanitarian activity, will not be caught by any of the Bill’s measures. We do not want to create a regime with lots of exemptions as that would enable hostile states to try to play games with our legal framework by dressing up front organisations. I reassure her that the measures in the Bill will not apply to any humanitarian organisation going about its business as a humanitarian organisation.
If there is any doubt, I refer hon. Members to subsection (6)(d) of proposed new section 17B, which makes it clear that anything that has essentially been approved by the UK, or is part of an agreement to which the UK is a party, will not be caught. If humanitarian organisations are concerned, I urge them to talk to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office—as the hon. Lady well knows, that happens regularly in the humanitarian sector. The combination of all those provisions will ensure that the activity that she wants to see continue, as I do, will not be caught by the Bill’s measures.
I understand that there is some consternation from the Opposition about what I might be intending to say in the rest of my speech. If that is so, let me say first that we might not have needed an unnecessary vote on the programme motion, but I will make quick progress as I explain the thinking behind the measures.
Clause 1 also introduces a new designated body condition. Under the National Security Act, it can be difficult to secure a prosecution, as a link must be proved that runs all the way from the individual to a foreign power, but through the designated body condition more organisations will be brought to justice.
On the so-called support offence, clause 2 sets out new offences related to those new designated bodies. Again, it amends the National Security Act, adding new sections 17A to 17C. The first offence is supporting a designated body, which covers inviting or expressing support and arranging, managing or addressing a meeting in support of a designated body. The offence will be triggered when the reason for the supportive act is to prejudice the safety and interests of the United Kingdom in what is known as a prohibited purpose test, echoing the National Security Act.
Let me say again that it should be noted that there will be occasions when individuals and organisations have to engage with some designated state actors. The new designation regime will ensure that diplomats can work on behalf of this country and that humanitarian organisations can continue their lifesaving work.
The second offence is to assist a designated body. It will become an offence to materially assist a designated organisation. That includes both directly assisting such an organisation and assisting a proxy organisation acting on its behalf.
Max Wilkinson (Cheltenham) (LD)
To build on the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Monica Harding), if a humanitarian organisation were forced to make payment to a designated organisation to do its humanitarian work, would that lead it to fall foul of the Bill, or is the Home Secretary confirming that it would not be liable to prosecution?
Shabana Mahmood
That conduct would not be caught. Again, I point the hon. Member to proposed new section 17B, where the combination of subsection (6)(b) and subsection (4) ensures that the work of NGOs is not caught by the tests set out. We have had specific advice on that point from the Office of Parliamentary Counsel, I have discussed it at length with the Attorney General’s Office, and Law Officers have had a look at it. We believe that the way in which the Bill is constructed does not catch humanitarian activities. It is not intended to do so, and we have made it clear in the explanatory notes that it will not do so. Our reading of how the Bill is constructed means that it will not do so.
Let me move on to the third offence in clause 2, which is of obtaining a material benefit from a designated body. An individual is outlawed from receiving a payment or a gift from a designated body either on their own behalf or on behalf of someone else. The very act of making the agreement would also constitute a crime even if no money were exchanged and no service were provided. That would cover a hacker hired to carry out a cyber-attack, a criminal gang commissioned to conduct arson attacks on British soil and a gang recruiting thugs to do their state-directed dirty work. Those two offences—assisting and benefiting from a designated body—would carry prison terms of up to 14 years alongside the sentences they may receive for any other illegal activity conducted, with sabotage and espionage offences carrying life sentences.
To trigger the offences of assisting a designated body and of obtaining benefit from a designated body, an individual must know that they are aiding a body that has been designated or, crucially, ought reasonably to know that they are doing so. Ignorance is therefore not a defence. If a reasonable person should have been able to surmise who would benefit from such an attack, the individual will be prosecuted despite their professed ignorance. The new powers are significant—
Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)
I was going to ask the Home Secretary later but, as she has raised the matter, perhaps I can ask her this now. On proposed new section 17C of the National Security Act and, indeed, in respect of other parts of the Bill, the knowledge of the person who may be committing an offence becomes important. Can the Home Secretary clarify—because the language in the Bill is potentially ambiguous—that the knowledge required of the person in question is that the body they are supporting or being remunerated by is a designated body? The language could be read simply to mean that the individual needs to know that the body they are supporting is a particular body, not necessarily that they know that that body has been designated. Can the Home Secretary be clear that the language refers to knowledge of designation, not simply knowledge of the particular institution or body that the individual is supporting or being remunerated by?
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
Before the Home Secretary responds, I remind the House that many people wish to contribute and it is just a four-hour debate.
Shabana Mahmood
Let me be very clear: it is the former of the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s points. On the construction of knowing or “ought reasonably to know”, obviously the “ought reasonably to know” is both a subjective test of what was known and then an objective test as to what it is reasonable to surmise based on that knowledge. We think that captures exactly the kind of activity that I hope all of us in the House can agree should meet the test for criminal sanction.
Let me make progress quicker than perhaps others might have wanted. As I have noted already, the genesis for the Bill comes from the excellent work of Jonathan Hall KC, whom I thank for the work he has completed. In May 2025, he made further recommendations regarding gaps in our state-threats legislation. The Government have accepted all his recommendations in full, and we will legislate for them all in due course, but, in the interests of the pace at which we are required to bring this vital legislation forward, that will not happen in this Bill. As was set out in the King’s Speech, there will be further national security legislation in this Session.
Every day, our intelligence agencies and their law enforcement colleagues make this country safer for their presence. They do so, however, facing a rising challenge. The threat from terrorism is growing and, at the same time, we face foreign powers acting with greater hostility than we have seen at any time since the cold war. In the face of the growing threat, it is essential that we equip those we expect to protect us with the tools they need to do the job at the moment that they need them the most. The need for the Bill is therefore great. It gives us a new and powerful tool to tackle hostile states and those who act on their behalf.
I end with a request to the House. We do not just require this Bill; we require it as quickly as possible. For that reason, the Government have promised to fast-track the legislation through both Houses. While we must debate it fully and rigorously, and I know that we will, I hope we can work together in the pursuit of a shared ideal, and one that is greater than our political differences: our solemn duty to protect our country. I hope that, today, the whole House can unite around the first and most sacred responsibility of us all. With that, I commend the Bill to the House.
Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)
We support the ambitions in the Bill, we want the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to be designated, and we want the Bill on the statute book, so the Government will find no enemies on our Benches today—only an Opposition determined to ensure that this law protects our people and our country. That is not a cause that belongs to those on one side of the House alone.
The Government are right to bring forward this legislation, but they must now have the courage to get it right. The head of MI5 warned us that state-based threats have risen by more than a third in a single year, and that since 2022 our security services have disrupted more than 20 Iran-backed plots to kidnap or kill on British soil. That is 20 plots in our country, and against people who came to this country precisely because they believed it lay beyond the reach of the regimes they had fled.
There is a national emergency of antisemitism in our country. Jewish families, many of whose parents and grandparents came to these shores fleeing persecution, now find themselves looking over their shoulders once more. They have endured threats, intimidation and violence on a scale that this House swore we would never see again, and Jewish lives have become smaller. The Bill is a step towards ending that, because much of the activity is fomented, funded and directed from beyond our borders.
In the face of that national emergency, and attacks on our Jewish communities, a Bill that confronts hostile state activity on British soil is not just welcome but overdue, because a hostile state is not a gang or a terrorist cell. It poses a different challenge, operating through proxies, the hired gun and the useful idiot, recruited to sow chaos on our streets—but all backed by a foreign state with a flag, an embassy, a seat at the United Nations, and resources beyond the reach of most terrorist groups. That is what makes this Bill so difficult, and why it demands such care.
If the Bill is found wanting, it will handicap our police and the security services in their work—work that is largely unseen and for which they are too rarely thanked. Those officers deserve a Parliament ready and willing to give them the tools required for the task. That is what the Bill is for and why, in principle, it is right.
But—I am sure the whole House heard the “But” coming—the Bill has gaping deficiencies. It was laid in the House at the end of last Tuesday, and the Government want to carry out all its stages in one sitting by the end of today. A law on how we confront the gravest threat, short of outright and declared war, is being published, debated and railroaded through in a matter of days. That is a serious point, not a procedural complaint, because if we get the scrutiny wrong, our country will pay the price. We exist to find the weaknesses before our enemies do, and the Bill is meant to protect more people.
More than a year ago, Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, set out in detail why this sort of legislation was needed, and the Government accepted all his recommendations. But then we saw nothing for a year. When the House is told there is no time to get this right, let me be clear that there was time—14 months, to be exact. There was not the will to use it, until a single day was chosen for reasons that have nothing to do with the tempo of the threat.
I have called for this legislation for years, so no one will accuse us of wishing to delay it, but I say to the Secretary of State with complete candour that the threat did not arrive in a hurry and it will not be beaten by rushing today. There is no prize for being first to the statute book with a law that fails in the first courtroom that tests it. A Bill passed fast but built wrong is not a blow to hostile states; it is a gift to them. That is why we have tabled 13 amendments, not one of them to stall the Bill or to blunt it, but all to better protect us.
I will take the House through the amendments in Committee, but let me now name the gravest gaps, so that we go into this first debate with our eyes open. First, extraordinarily, the Bill is gentler on hostile states than the law currently is on terrorists. Under the Bill as drafted, to convict a person who, for example, supports the IRGC, the Crown must clear a hurdle that it does not face when prosecuting someone for support for the very terrorist groups that the IRGC arms and funds. The IRGC, the world’s biggest sponsor of terrorism, is being handed protection in law that the terror proxy is denied. I can find no version of that argument that survives being said out loud.
It should not be harder to prosecute the body that trains, funds and directs the terrorists than to prosecute the terrorist themselves. The provision on “prohibited purpose” sets a higher threshold, which lawyers for hostile actors will delight in. There is no reason beneficial to the UK for anyone to be engaging with the IRGC, so our amendments would simply bring the offence in line with the Terrorism Act 2000, from which it was copied and then weakened by the Government. The Secretary of State has just said that she wants hostile states to be treated the same way as terrorists, but that is not the case in this legislation.
Secondly, the Bill risks making Britain a launchpad for hostile acts against our friends—a state terror hub. A cell that conspires here, be it in Manchester or London, while directing its activity at Baghdad, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels or even Hong Kong will slip the net because the harm was meant for another state’s streets and not ours—it is not prejudicial to the safety of the UK. That is not just a hole in our law but an affront to our allies. Britain will not become a safe harbour for plots against our friends due to inaction from our side, and that is why we have tabled an amendment to close that gap.
Thirdly, as drafted, the Bill does not give the police the power to stop state-backed threats before they are enacted and therefore to secure a prosecution. Our terrorism law lets us intervene while an attack is still being planned, and that is among the most important powers our counter-terrorism police have. This Bill has no equivalent, so we could be powerless to charge a person who plans to assist the IRGC or another terrorist state organ unless they act. Our security services do not wish to clear up after plots; they wish to stop them and prosecute beforehand.
Fourthly, the Bill has not learned the hardest lesson of the last 20 years, which is that the most common danger that our security services have to deal with is no longer the directed plot but the lone individual who absorbs a hostile body’s propaganda and acts on it without specific direction. A hostile state brings sophistication and reach to its propaganda, yet the Bill catches only those commissioned and instructed, rather than those who are inspired by the climate created by the hostile state. It guards us against the plot that is ordered, but leaves us open to one for which no order has been given.
I will press the detail of these points in Committee, but I raise them now because they go to the heart of whether the Bill will work. I am afraid that Foreign Office lawyers, Home Office lawyers and Home Office officials have been unable to reassure me on any of these points. In fact, their answer—[Interruption.] If the Home Secretary wishes to intervene and clarify where I am wrong, she is very welcome to, but her own officials have said that it is “likely” the Bill may cope with these issues. I am not interested in “likely”. If someone is a traitor and they betray our country by supporting a hostile state, I want to make sure that they will be able to be prosecuted. Not one Government official has been able to reassure me or say that our concerns are wrong. I am glad that the Home Secretary of State finds that amusing. She is still very welcome to intervene.
Mark Pritchard
The shadow Minister is making an excellent contribution, as always, and I completely agree with her. I support the Bill, but I think it is thin. I also support the former Attorney General, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), and the comments about legal ambiguity. That runs through the whole Bill.
The Home Secretary talked about diplomatic cover, saying that diplomats will not be affected by this, yet it is public knowledge that intelligence officers from certain countries operate under diplomatic cover. For example, if an intelligence officer from an embassy in the United Kingdom gave a great big bag of cash to a small criminal—I will not mention where they might be from—and said, “Go and commit some sabotage,” or “Go and commit some arson,” how would that be prosecuted in the courts? How is the Crown Prosecution Service going to disaggregate that? It would have to say, “This bit we can prosecute, but the other bit, the important bit, we cannot.”
Alicia Kearns
The reality is that an individual such as that would not be captured, because they would have diplomatic protections under the Vienna conventions. I admit that I have not been able to find an amendment that would correct that. That is why we have scrutiny of the House, because the shadow Front Bench is not the sole arbiter of where the gaps are. We would have been able to do this if we had had more time.
However, I will use this as a chance to touch on the fact that there is a protection in the Bill that if a person acts
“for or on behalf of, or holds office under, the Crown, or is in Crown employment”,
they are protected against any interactions they may have with the IRGC. However, there is a slight concern, because that is followed by:
“(whether or not they engage in the conduct in that capacity).”
We would all like to say, hand on heart, that no one who works for our country as a civil servant—a Crown servant—would ever betray us, but technically, under this legislation, we could not prosecute anyone who did so, even if they did so outside their official capacity and were therefore genuinely working to abet another organisation. Again, if the Home Secretary would like to clarify how we would prosecute rogue civil servants, I would be happy to take an intervention from her—but there isn’t one.
The Government decided that it was wise to attempt to pass such vital legislation in just one day, but we think that scrutiny is important because the Bill needs to work as well as it can. It is littered with omissions. I have already set out some of them. Additionally, Jonathan Hall said that we should give powers to the police to strip passports at the border, but the Government have not included that. It was proposed that there should be serious police protection orders, but they have removed them. We are gifting defences to would-be perpetrators, and the Bill should not be left as it is. These examples are only the gaping holes I could find in the two and a half days and late nights that I was given to find issues and table amendments.
There is one more thing that the Government and the House must hold in mind as we fix our gaze on Tehran. This power is rightly organisation agnostic. We must not write a law for the IRGC alone. We are writing a law for every hostile state organ that comes after it, and the next may look nothing like the last. I think of the United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist party, of whose reach I have spoken often, and I hope the day comes when the Government turn this power on it. I doubt that that will happen, but I set out that ambition. That day will come only if we build this Bill for the second designation, the third and the fourth.
As drafted, this legislation has been written with a single, already sanctioned organisation in mind, and that shows. There is no reference to sanctions read-across in the Bill because the IRGC is already sanctioned. The Government said, “We don’t need to do a read-across for sanctions because the IRGC is already sanctioned.” I am not just looking at the IRGC. There are more organisations that will need to be designated in future. The law must fit not just one adversary but all. Otherwise, it is a single-use power dressed up as a meaningful law.
We support the principle of this Bill without reservation, and we will support it on Second Reading, but we will support it in the right way, with scrutiny, attention and determination to ensure that a rushed process does not result in us not meeting the scale of the threats we now face. It is vital that the Government engage today in good faith and listen to Members on all sides. Their failure so far to accept any amendments does not give me cause for optimism, but there is still time for them to accept some. The delay of the last 14 months should not be undone by haste today, because a half-built Bill will not redeem that time; it will simply compound the danger.
Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
The world has clearly entered a new era of geopolitical volatility, with technology and strategic competition for resources driving an increasingly contested and competing world. This has not just happened since July 2024. It has been on the horizon for a good many years, and that intensifying and escalating rivalry between states is now the new normal. The United Kingdom must adapt to this new world, not cling to a dying world order, and this Bill is the latest recognition from the Government that they must and will adapt and respond, and that they will always put the national security of the UK first.
Today, I will centre my remarks on the state threats we face, on the Bill and on the wider response that is needed to tackle those state threats. The three greatest state threats facing the United Kingdom are from Russia, China and Iran, and they each pose a distinct and unique threat. Only this week it has been confirmed that Russian proxies set the Prime Minister’s house and car on fire. We need to urgently grasp the seriousness of that. It was abhorrent political violence targeted against the elected leader of the United Kingdom—our country—but that was not all. The individuals spread disinformation, whipped up community tensions and paid for far right posters to be put up and for “Stop Islam” graffiti to be sprayed. We must not tolerate this. That was not an isolated event. We have heard about the assassination of Litvinenko, the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal, the attack on the warehouse in east London in March 2024 by the Wagner Group and many other suspicious attacks on these shores. These include the cyber-attacks on Jaguar Land Rover, on Marks & Spencer and on the British Library, which still has not recovered from the attack several years ago.
In October 2025, the director general of MI5, Ken McCallum, said that state threats had risen by a third over a year and were now equal to or even greater than the threat of terrorism. In the last year alone, there has been a 35% increase in state threat activity. For example, between 2022 and 2025, the UK prevented 20 Iran-backed plots, all of which were potentially lethal threats. Meanwhile, Chinese espionage and cyber-attacks are a continual threat. With China’s thousand grains of sand theory, every piece of information, no matter how small or seemingly unimportant, is of value. In May 2024, the director of GCHQ said that the service
“devotes more resource to China than any other single mission”
and that China poses a
“genuine and increasing cyber risk”
to the UK.
Those three countries present three different ideologies and three different strategies, but they all represent an intensifying and rapidly evolving threat to the United Kingdom. The Bill is another important step following the critically important National Security Act 2023 to protect the United Kingdom from these state threats. It will introduce a new power to designate bodies involved in foreign power threat activity, as we have heard, and create a new offence of supporting, assisting or benefiting from designated bodies. Of course, that follows the review by Jonathan Hall KC into whether existing terrorism powers could be used to address state threats. He found that the terrorism proscription charges would not be appropriate, so instead this legislation will now designate bodies, including proxies, such as the IRGC or the Wagner Group.
It was clear from the inquiry by the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy into the China spy case that while the 2023 Act was a big step forward, the ever-evolving threat landscape means that it would need to evolve, be improved upon and be amended, just as we are doing today. I am pleased that the Government have taken up the recommendation and acted in the national interest. The designation of certain bodies should and must send a clear message to our adversaries that the person will be held responsible for it, with a maximum of 14 years in prison for such an offence.
It is slightly unusual for a Bill to be expedited in this way, but I recognise the urgency and thank the Department for its continued engagement with the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. However, I do have one area of concern. The impact assessment outlines a potential long-term consequence that I would like to focus on. The assessment says that a long-term impact may be “Detrimental impact of foreign policy objectives/bilateral relationships”.
On the risks to bilateral relationships, my immediate thought is, of course, China. The Chinese state does not take kindly to accusations of espionage, as we saw with the collapsed China spy case whereby, under the last Conservative Government, the deputy National Security Adviser was unable to describe China as the enemy due to Government policy, despite the security threat—this tricky tightrope that we continue to have to walk. We have to engage with China. Its economic might and, quite frankly, our dependence on it, which we have to reduce in the long term, means that ignoring China is not an option, but how does the Minister plan to mitigate the risk to our national security while avoiding damaging that relationship? It seems that the contradiction here is yet to be fully resolved. Could the Minister assure me that there are clear contingency plans for an incident like that and that all civil servants, police forces and intelligence services are clear on the Government’s position regarding China?
I am pleased that this Labour Government have already taken a raft of measures to keep us secure and safe, with today being the latest piece of legislation to meet the moment. Of course, there will be other piece of legislation because the threats will become greater and even more diverse. The Representation of the People Bill, the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill and the Bill before us are all interlinked and should be seen as a co-ordinated effort, but there is more to be done.
We need to explain this very real threat to the public and build resilience in our institutions and businesses, and throughout the country for each and every individual. We need a national conversation with the public because the Government cannot do this alone. In this new era of state threats, legislation is crucial, and the Government have an integral role in keeping us all safe, but so does the public. We need to explain that and not shy away from the realities before us.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
Max Wilkinson (Cheltenham) (LD)
I want to begin by making clear that the Liberal Democrats support the Bill. Our country faces co-ordinated hostile campaigns by state-sponsored and state-linked actors who actively undermine our democracy, terrorise our citizens and erode our core values. The Home Secretary has referenced Iran, China and Russia; we know that in future there will be others.
The convictions that we have seen in recent days for Russian-linked attacks on our Prime Minister underline the imperative that we act with urgency. The two men convicted of these attacks were recruited online by a Russian-speaking handler, and a BBC investigation found evidence that the handler has links to the Russian regime. GCHQ director Anne Keast-Butler recently warned us of the rising threat from Russia. She referenced Russia targeting critical infrastructure, our democratic processes, supply chains and public trust, as the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) referenced. Sir Richard Moore, the former head of MI6, has warned that Putin is using sabotage, cyber-attacks and arson to be
“disruptive, distracting and intimidating to those of us who are supporting Ukraine”.
The Bill is an important step towards ensuring that our security and law enforcement agencies have the powers they need to identify, disrupt and deter those who seek to threaten the safety, sovereignty and democratic integrity of the United Kingdom. The cases and incidents referenced by the Home Secretary form part of a broader and deeply worrying pattern of events that seek to undermine our freedoms and our liberal democracy. It is right that we take measures today to better defend ourselves.
The reality is that threats to the United Kingdom from foreign states are evolving rapidly. They are no longer confined to traditional espionage; today, they include foreign interference in our political system, cyber-operations, disinformation campaigns, sabotage and, at the most extreme, assassination attempts. In the past year alone, individuals have been convicted of spying on Hong Kong dissidents on behalf of China, and a journalist was stabbed on behalf of Iran, in addition to the convictions for the attacks on the property of our Prime Minister.
We have seen convictions of individuals for carrying out an arson attack on a Ukrainian-linked warehouse on behalf of the Russian Wagner Group. As the Home Secretary reminded us, we should not forget that Russian threats predate the invasion of Ukraine. It is now eight years since the chemical weapons attack in Salisbury, which killed Dawn Sturgess, hospitalised others, including the Skripals, and had the potential to harm thousands more due to the potency of the chemical agent used. Foreign powers are increasingly outsourcing operations to proxies and state-linked organisations. The evolving threat landscape exposes a critical gap in our legal framework.
The Liberal Democrats have long called for decisive action to tackle the threat posed by hostile state actors, including the IRGC. Time and again, we have been disappointed by the failure of successive Governments to act with the required speed. The previous Conservative Government referenced the threat and suggested that they would act, but ultimately they did not. Even after Jonathan Hall KC recommended these powers over a year ago, progress has been regrettably slow, as the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns), said.
Meanwhile, the threat has not stood still. While the Government may be preoccupied with questions about leadership, the responsibility in this House is clear, and it is a positive that despite that, the Government are bringing forward the legislation today. We must now act to protect the safety and freedoms of the people we serve and the integrity of our democracy, because when it comes to matters of national security, the unity in the House today is something that we should welcome.
Existing counter-terrorism legislation was never designed to deal with hostile state actors, as Jonathan Hall KC said. He concluded that there are strong grounds for introducing a new classification power that is equivalent to proscription but specifically designed to address state threats. Crucially, he noted that such a power should sit alongside existing tools, such as sanctions, rather than attempt to replace or distort counter-terrorism law.
The Bill provides a framework to address those challenges. It gives the Government the tools they need to keep pace with an increasingly complex and hostile international environment, and it equips the Government to address future threats from state actors if and when they arise. That is reassuring, particularly given the behaviour that the Home Secretary referenced earlier from the three states mentioned, but of course there will be others in future.
Of course, as the Bill progresses quickly today, it will be right for this House to scrutinise its provisions carefully, particularly to ensure that safeguards and oversight are put in place and that matters of proportionality are addressed. But the Liberal Democrats will support the Bill today. We hope that it will pass and make swift progress.
Mr Alex Barros-Curtis (Cardiff West) (Lab)
I want to begin by acknowledging what many colleagues across this House will believe: when a Government ask Parliament to extend their powers in the name of national security, scrutiny is not obstruction; it is our duty, as has been said already on the Opposition and Government sides. Civil liberties, the right to dissent, and the freedom to campaign, to report and to advocate—these are the very values that distinguish us from the states whose hostile activities this Bill is designed to confront. I know the Government understand that and, equally, I know that colleagues across the House will hold these expectations firmly.
The threat facing the United Kingdom from hostile foreign states and their proxies is very real—we have heard some examples already in today’s debate—and it is growing, and our existing legal framework has not kept pace with it. I want to take the opportunity to endorse strongly what my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) said about the need for us to have a public conversation about the very real dangers that our democracy faces.
In 2025, the director general of MI5, Sir Ken McCallum, reported a 35% increase in state threat activity from the previous year. Over that same period, MI5 tracked more than 20 potentially lethal Iran-backed plots on British soil. We have seen espionage threatening and targeting our Parliament, our universities and our critical national infrastructure. We have seen arson, surveillance and physical violence commissioned by foreign states, and we have seen those states hide behind proxies precisely because our current laws make it easier for them to do so.
Following the start of the conflict between Iran and the US and Israel in February, there have been a number of attacks on Iranian and Jewish targets in the UK thought to be linked to Iranian proxy groups. Those include an attempted arson attack at the London premises of Iran International—a Persian language news channel opposed to the regime in Tehran—an arson attack on a synagogue in Finchley, and the stabbing of two Jewish men in Golders Green.
In a statement on tackling antisemitism on 5 May this year, the Prime Minister acknowledged that one line of inquiry was whether a foreign state had been behind some of these attacks. He said that such “malign threats” from Iran or other states “will not be tolerated” and that the Government would fast-track legislation to deal with them. The Bill before us today is a result of that commitment and it is something that I fully support.
As has been said, the National Security Act 2023 was a significant step forward, but as Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of state threats legislation, concluded in his May 2025 report, there remain gaps, particularly in our ability to disrupt proxy organisations acting on behalf of foreign powers, and the Bill seeks to fill those gaps. At its heart, as has been discussed, is a new designation power for the Home Secretary, equivalent to the proscription power that exists for terrorist organisations under the Terrorism Act 2000, but applied to bodies engaged in state threat activity. Crucially, the Bill also covers the aliases and proxy names through which hostile states so often seek to obscure their operations.
These are serious powers and they must come with serious safeguards. The Bill has been drafted to be compatible with the European convention on human rights, and particularly article 10 on freedom of expression, and I welcome that, but compatibility is a floor and not a ceiling. I urge my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary to ensure that the definitions of “support” and “assistance” are applied with precision and proportionality, because the offences created in the Bill can, by their nature, reach into areas of ordinary civic life, including journalism, academic research and political advocacy.
I also want to raise a particular Welsh dimension. As well as the security services who work day and night to keep us safe, so too do our armed forces and our police officers. As the Bill progresses, I wish to place on the record my continued support for capital city policing status for Cardiff, with the resources to match the unique security and civic responsibilities that come with being a capital city. I urge my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary to engage seriously with that as the legislation progresses and comes into force.
Our constituents ask us to take tough decisions and to ensure that we exercise our judgment responsibly to ensure that our nation is protected. I believe that the measures in the Bill, taken together, will help to keep my constituents safe as it will make the operating environment for foreign intelligence services and their proxies much tougher. I support the Bill because the threats it addresses are real and demand a response. I do so with clear expectations that designation powers are used, as has been said, on solid evidence and building on established legal frameworks, that enforcement is proportionate and that civil liberties are treated as central to the legitimacy of the law, not as an afterthought.
My constituents will be reassured to understand that the Bill provides that designation decisions will be agreed by Parliament, that it will be annually reviewed for efficacy by the independent reviewer of state threats legislation, and that individuals will have clear rights of appeal and access to independent review. These are important and welcome safeguards.
We can be strong against those who threaten us, but we can also be strong in defence of the democratic values they are trying to undermine. The Bill, properly applied, will do all those things, and it is for those reasons that I am supporting it today.
Dame Karen Bradley (Staffordshire Moorlands) (Con)
I rise to make some brief comments about this legislation. I agree fully with what the Government are trying to achieve; I just do not agree with the way they are doing it. I will not repeat the arguments for why we need the legislation, as we have heard them from both sides of the House and I agree fully with what has been said. I benefited from the national security measures when I was in government, as I am sure will the new Minister for Security—I welcome her to her place.
When we need to pass this kind of legislation, there is a consensus across the House, but we need time to properly scrutinise it. I say gently to the Minister for Security that the business managers could have set aside more time for Second Reading and perhaps a general debate to follow, with then some time in Committee to scrutinise the Bill properly, looking at amendments and deciding what might improve the Bill. It would be better for everybody if they knew that the Bill had been properly stress-tested.
I say to the Security Minister and to the Home Secretary, who is no longer in her place, that I genuinely want them to succeed. I am not somebody who wants to see Ministers fail because we are from different parties. I benefited from that when I sat on the Treasury Bench and had similar support from the Opposition, but I never expected the Opposition just to accept that what I was saying was correct and accurate; I always expected there to be scrutiny, and I welcomed it. The report by Jonathan Hall was published over 12 months ago, so there is no need to pass the Bill in one day. It could have been introduced and considered at many times over the past 14 months.
When I was Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, I frequently had to take legislation through in one day, because devolved matters could not be considered in Stormont while there was no Executive. When we took legislation through in one day, we spent a lot of time working with the Opposition and interested stakeholders to ensure that they understood why we were taking it through and what it meant, and to listen to them about where improvements could be made.
I regret enormously that the Home Affairs Committee, which I chair, has been offered only a briefing on the legislation after today, so our Committee members will not be briefed by officials until after the Bill has passed all stages in this House. That is very disappointing. It is a shame that the Home Secretary is so far refusing to appear before the Committee before the summer recess for her regular session. I deeply regret that and I warn the Security Minister that the Committee will look at this in detail, because we need to make sure that scrutiny has happened.
The Security Minister will recall that during the covid pandemic we did not always have time to scrutinise the legislation that the Government were taking through. As a member of the governing party, I was concerned about that, but as an Opposition Member, she was incredibly concerned about the lack of scrutiny, and it has to be said that the Government did not always get things right.
Having made those points, I have a couple of questions for the Minister about the substance of the Bill. First, I am not clear about how the various regimes—sanctions designation, the FIRS regime and proscription, which does not apply in many cases—are going to work together, so it would be helpful to understand how she envisages these issues fitting together. I appreciate that she is new to her role and she may be asking her officials the same questions, but it is important that we test the new provisions against the reality of what has been going on in the world. We must check that they will actually work and that the Crown Prosecution Service will be prepared to take cases, because it is only worth having this legislation if law enforcement and others are prepared to use it and legal action comes from it.
My final point is about future-proofing. We have talked about evolving threats. The fact that the Government are introducing the Bill three years after the National Security Act 2023, which my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat) took through when he was Security Minister, shows how threats evolve. I know that he will have done as much as was possible at that time, but things have evolved. How confident is the Minister that the Bill is future-proof? How confident is she that the powers that I am sure this House will end up giving to the Secretary of State today will not be misused if, in the future, there is someone else sitting in the Home Office as Home Secretary? That person may have a different agenda and may not agree with the consensus that there is in this place today, and they may want to use these powers for ill. Is the Minister confident that these powers cannot be misused in the future?
Luke Akehurst (North Durham) (Lab)
I pay tribute to the previous Security Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley North (Dan Jarvis), for his tireless work to get us to this position, debating a much-needed Bill to tackle the state threats we face. As our new Defence Secretary, he will continue to hear from me—perhaps even more than before—on the need to match the urgency with which we are dealing with hostile states in today’s legislation, with the largest possible uplift in defence spending.
I welcome the new Security Minister to her place. She is a long-standing friend and ally of mine from our time together on the Labour party’s national executive committee, as indeed is the Home Secretary, who is no longer in her place but who gave an excellent speech to introduce the Bill. I welcome the Security Minister to her position and look forward to her bringing her wealth of experience to the debate.
I have been campaigning for the Government to take more action against the Iranian regime and its proxies and their activities in the UK for many years. I refer the House to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests; before being elected to this House, I campaigned on this issue in my then employment as director of the organisation We Believe in Israel.
I wrote to the Home Office last year, calling on it to follow Australia’s lead in designating organisations such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as state sponsors of terrorism. The Bill clearly is not intended to specify particular states, although three states and particular organisations have been mentioned, but it gives the Government the powers to facilitate such a move. The Bill itself and any proscription measures—[Interruption.] Sorry—we are not supposed to call them proscription measures. The Bill itself and any measures that it takes to deal with such organisations have my wholehearted support.
I was elected on a Labour manifesto that recognised the key duty of Government to keep their people and the country safe. That foundational pillar ought to motivate every Member of the House to support the proposed legislation we are debating. This Bill is a necessary response to the growing and evolving threat posed by hostile states to our freedom, our democracy and our way of life. According to the director general of MI5, MI5 tracked more than 20 potentially lethal Iranian-backed plots in 2024. The IRGC is Tehran’s prime weapon in exerting influence here in the UK and in many other countries. That influence has targeted the British Jewish community to devastating effect. We have seen proxy groups carrying out a horrific spate of arson attacks designed to terrorise our Jewish communities and normalise antisemitic hate. These are not just attacks on British Jews; they are attacks on the values that we all hold dear as a nation.
Jewish community leaders, including the Chief Rabbi, have demanded robust action to take on the threat that Iran’s proxy campaign of terror poses to British Jews. Today, our Labour Government are heeding those demands and continuing to stand with Britain’s Jewish community. This Bill empowers Ministers to disrupt and deter the activities of state and state-linked entities, as well as those working with them, that target and terrorise British civilians. Such a power was recommended by the independent reviewer of state threats legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, as the best way for the Government to achieve their manifesto commitment of dealing with terrorism and adopting legislation to deal with state-based security threats.
As Jonathan Hall KC has made clear, traditional proscription is not the appropriate way to deal with state-linked entities due to the constraints of international law, which prevents the British state from banning the existence of a foreign state entity. As someone who has previously called for IRGC proscription to be considered, I am confident that this measure goes just as far as proscription to prevent hostile foreign actors from advancing their malign interests here in the UK. It gives Ministers flexible powers to target these organisations without legal constraints that hold us back from taking the right action under existing frameworks.
The Bill does not designate any organisations as state threats to national security. Instead, it will give the power to Ministers to make any decisions based on the intelligence to which they have access. I am aware that the Government do not comment on individual proscription decisions, but I would like to take this opportunity to call on the Government—hopefully for the final time—to use a designation against the IRGC to keep British Jews and Iranian refugees and dissidents resident in the UK safe, and to clamp down on the brutal and oppressive machinery of the Iranian regime.
The legislation before us is not just bad news for Iran; other hostile countries will be set back by the Government’s robust action. The Secretary of State mentioned actions by Russia and China. It was less than a decade ago that Russian operatives carried out a Novichok attack here on British soil. More recently, just two years ago, the Wagner Group, which was already proscribed as a terrorist organisation, co-ordinated an arson attack on a warehouse providing critical aid to our gallant allies in Ukraine.
Just this week, it was revealed that appalling arson attacks on the Prime Minister’s home were linked to Russian actors. Whatever other disagreements we may have, I know the House will stand united on this matter, with the Prime Minister and against what a former MI6 chief has described as attempts by Vladimir Putin to intimidate British people on British soil.
Across the world, regimes with values diametrically opposed to our tolerant, democratic society clearly want to make the United Kingdom and its citizens suffer for our values and the role that we play in supporting countries such as Ukraine. Wherever that threat arises, the Government have a duty to defend against it, and today they are stepping up to the plate and doing just that.
This legislation is a welcome step forward in equipping the Government to handle the dangerous threats faced in Britain in 2026. By supporting this Bill, we are supporting the safety of British citizens, particularly British Jews, and opposing a tyrannical regime that is hellbent on disrupting our way of life. It gives us the tools to confront those who seek to terrorise, divide and harm our society, and I urge colleagues across the House to support it.
Sir Oliver Dowden (Hertsmere) (Con)
I pretty much wholeheartedly endorse everything said by the hon. Member for North Durham (Luke Akehurst). Let me begin by declaring my interests, as set out in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, including those relating to my role as the chair of the United Arab Emirates all-party parliamentary group.
I will not restate the arguments for this legislation in the first place, as they have been made eloquently by many other Members. Suffice it to say that we have seen in our lifetimes the nature of the threats facing the United Kingdom evolve from being primarily state-based, to terrorist-based after 9/11 and 7/7, and to the hybrid of grey zone warfare that we are all familiar with. Many of us struggled with and sought to address that issue when we were in government, not least when I was the Deputy Prime Minister. I sought to co-ordinate across national resilience and security and international relations. I worked closely with Members of this House, including the former Security Minister, my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat).
Given that this is a debate on Second Reading, I wish instead to use the limited time available to me to make three points in relation to the application of the powers under the Bill—and, indeed, the inability to use powers under the Bill. The first point relates to Iran and the IRGC. As Members will know, for many years this House has debated whether and how to deal with the IRGC. The essence of the problem has always been that it is not just a conventional non-state terrorist organisation; it is part of the Iranian state, but it also operates through military structures, intelligence functions, cyber-capabilities, proxy militia and criminal intermediaries. As I read this Bill, and as the Government have strongly indicated, I think that is precisely the sort of body or network of bodies that this legislation appears designed to address. This really does matter, for the reasons set out by the hon. Member for North Durham.
In Hertsmere, I have the privilege of representing one of the largest Jewish communities in the country. For that community, this is not just an abstract debate about legal architecture; it is real. It is about whether people feel safe at synagogue. It is about whether parents feel confident in sending their children to Jewish schools. It is about whether community centres, charities and places of worship can operate without fear.
The Jewish community has long seen the malign role of Iran and its proxies. After the terrible spate of recent attacks, they live in a different world—one in which fear and intimidation have deepened and intensified near to breaking point. I therefore hope that the Government genuinely understand that fear and that they will use the powers granted by the legislation to act and to act fast.
The second area I will touch on relates to the question of ideological movements that may intersect with state-threat activity. I urge the Government not to treat ideological extremism, particularly Islamist extremism and state-threat activity, as entirely separate worlds. We know that the hatred unleashed on the streets of this country often finds its source in Islamist extremists, who have nothing but contempt for the values of this country but who are adept at using our openness and our institutions to undermine us. In that way, a mutual interest is created between this hateful ideology and hostile states. We have foreign funding, ideological influence, proxy activity and hostile state interests overlapping. This Bill rightly targets foreign states and agents, but we must look at the broader ecosystem too.
Dame Karen Bradley
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. The Select Committee recently looked at new forms of radicalisation and extremism, and we were very struck by how things can be looked at through an ideological lens or not, and that sometimes things fall through the cracks in the middle because they are not looked at as a whole. Does he agree that the Bill could present an opportunity to address that issue?
Sir Oliver Dowden
I totally agree, and it is dangerous for this country that there is a mutuality of interests among extremists who do not share our values and hostile states who are opposed to us. This Bill should seek to deal with that overlap. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood is in certain places backed by foreign states and has an equally subversive agenda here in the UK. Although its relationship with violence on our streets is often more subtle and obscured, the threat to our social cohesion and democratic fabric is no less severe. We have seen in recent months the United States Government designate various regional branches of the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist organisations, and an excellent article by Lord Godson highlighted today how many European states are taking steps to address this issue. The west is waking up to this reality and we in this country cannot afford to lag behind.
Sir John Hayes
This situation is worsened, of course, by the values we seek to defend being used against us. Fair-minded British people want to believe that every side deserves a hearing, so we afford to some groups that do not deserve it a kind of equivalence—on one hand we have the west and Britain and America, and on the other hand we have these other groups. That equivalence is entirely bogus of course, because we are defending an open society and they are seeking to close it.
Sir Oliver Dowden
My right hon. Friend is of course entirely correct. Members on the Labour Back Benches are, given their presence in the Chamber for this debate, at the more hawkish and national security end of the left-wing spectrum, but there are elements of the liberal left who succumb to that equivalence argument and it is profoundly dangerous.
The 2015 review of the Muslim Brotherhood concluded that membership of, association with, or influence by the Muslim Brotherhood should be considered a possible indicator of extremism. A decade later, in the current far more dangerous geopolitical environment, we need to look again at that assessment. That is why I continue to believe that the Government should take up the opportunity to do so. Some of our closest allies have done so and indeed have taken a much more robust approach. For example, the United Arab Emirates has designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation. We should ask ourselves why a country such as the UAE has such concerns about the radicalisation of its own students in our mosques that they are restricting their study here. The test under this Bill is rightly a foreign powers threat test, and there may well be other avenues for addressing this issue, but none the less I make the point that where an ideological body or a body linked to an ideological movement is acting to the benefit of a hostile state, this regime, alongside others, should apply.
Finally, I would like to address the future-proofing of this legislation, which has been touched on by some Members. Just as threat actors have evolved, so too have their methods, and foreign powers and their proxies no longer exclusively rely on the old-school methods of human surveillance, forged documents and so on. They can deploy bots that distort the democratic debate, as we have seen; ransomware to cripple business; cyber-attacks to disrupt public services; and deepfakes to impersonate trusted public figures. That list goes on, and AI will accelerate all of that—a point I made at the UN General Assembly ahead of the Bletchley Park AI safety summit. Cross-Government co-ordination to address this issue is more urgent than ever.
In this country we cannot just look at state threats purely in a physical silo, detached from the digital domain. Hostile states will use AI to automate reconnaissance, scale spear phishing, identify vulnerabilities, and so on. A criminal who once needed specialist skills may increasingly be able to purchase or access those capabilities through AI-enabled tools, and hostile states that once needed sophisticated cyber-units may be able to outsource, automate or accelerate parts of that work. Many Members will be familiar with the concerns and indeed opportunities surrounding Claude Mythos and its advanced cyber-capable AI models. That is a warning to us, but it is a warning of much more to come in this space.
Gordon McKee (Glasgow South) (Lab)
The right hon. Gentleman is making an important point. As AI develops, the threshold for non-state actors to conduct cyber, physical and other attacks against our democracy is lowered further, and that is happening almost weekly. Does he agree that we need to move quickly on this legislation, and on the effective regulation of artificial intelligence?
Sir Oliver Dowden
I totally agree with the hon. Member, and that is why we Opposition Members support the legislation. On AI, we can all see these challenges coming. We need to work cross-party and support the Government in finding ways to address them, because this is essentially the challenge of our age. Of course, AI will be able to strengthen our defences, but we should not be naive; the same tool that helps a defender to patch faster will of course also enable an attacker to breach faster. We have seen this with hostile states. Russia has already integrated cyber-sabotage, propaganda and deniable proxy activity into its campaign against the west. The same can be said for North Korea, which has not been touched on much in this debate, and Iran.
Tom Tugendhat
The internet outage in Iran knocked out a large percentage—5% or 10%, depending on who we believe—of Scottish separatist sites on social media. Do we genuinely believe that Iran is the only country seeking to weaponise social media? On one account, for example, someone claimed to be a nurse from Glasgow, but was fluent in Persian. Is it not likely that China and North Korea are doing exactly the same thing?
Sir Oliver Dowden
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. Separatism makes a country weaker, and there is no doubt that our enemies will encourage it. The example that he cited, which I also saw, is very telling of exactly that.
Max Wilkinson
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for giving way; he is being very generous with his time. On the use of AI on social media to disrupt, is he also concerned about what happens on X, where unidentified and unidentifiable accounts—sometimes bots, sometimes accounts using a dinosaur or other avatar—seek to stoke hatred on our streets against Jewish people, Muslims and others, and against British values? I am very concerned about that. I have been criticised by members of the Conservative party on the internet for raising this point, but I wonder if he shares my concern.
Sir Oliver Dowden
I have great respect for Elon Musk’s ingenuity when it comes to trying to send a man to Mars and set up a colony there. I am slightly more dubious about the activities in relation to X, but that platform should be subject to the same legislation as all others.
As for this Bill, the question is whether the designation regime will be agile enough to deal with not only traditional organisations, but cyber-units, hackers for hire, front companies, AI-enabled threat and state-threat networks, and commercial entities that materially assist hostile state activity. This Bill will not solve the problem of state threats on its own, but it is an important and necessary addition, because the reality is that today’s threat is hybrid; state power, ideology, cyber-capability, organised crime and artificial intelligence are increasingly overlapping. That is the challenge before us all. The law must keep pace with this, and the Bill is an important step along the line.
Alan Strickland (Newton Aycliffe and Spennymoor) (Lab)
I strongly support the change to the law being proposed today, to better protect our nation and our fellow citizens from those working for foreign states that want to disrupt and attack our way of life. While there has been debate today about the timeline, I personally welcome the swift and decisive approach being taken to protecting our national security. As we have heard from colleagues across the House, state-backed threats are evolving incredibly rapidly, so it is critical that legislation passed by this House adapts at the same speed and keeps pace with the complex threat environment. If that puts me at the hawkish end of the political spectrum, to use the words of the right hon. Member for Hertsmere (Sir Oliver Dowden), that is a badge I will wear with pride. Hopefully, through our discussions today, the House can send the clearest possible message: anyone who supports those backed by hostile states, glorifies or promotes their messages of hate, or is in the pay of foreign states that wish us ill can and should expect to face the full force of the British law. The Government and this House must always take firm action to defend our way of life and protect our citizens.
Why is this Bill so important? As we heard eloquently from my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western), there is clear evidence that hostile states are actively trying to undermine our society by paying proxies to bring violence to the streets of Britain. We have seen this in the attacks on Iranian dissidents by criminal groups linked to Iran’s security services; in the attacks on Jewish volunteer ambulance services in London, for which an Islamist terror group with links to the Iranian regime has publicly claimed responsibility; and in the attacks on Ukrainian-linked property and the Prime Minister’s private residence by proxies linked to the Russian state. These acts are appalling, shocking and unacceptable. That is why I am pleased that, in addition to introducing the measures that we are discussing today, the UK Government and 23 other countries issued a joint statement on 10 June that condemned the egregious actions we have seen across Europe, North America and Australia by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and other organisations. As the statement said powerfully,
“Attempts to kill, kidnap, harass, intimidate, or otherwise attack people on our soil, undermines national sovereignty and international norms. These actions must stop immediately.”
What action must we take to tackle these serious and growing threats? As Members across the House have set out, the Bill before us seeks to give our law enforcement agencies and security services greater powers and flexibility to address these serious matters. The Bill includes three new offences related to supporting, assisting, or receiving benefits from activists or organisations that are threatening the UK. As colleagues have said, it builds on existing legislation dealing with non-state terror groups, following the recommendations of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation.
In a small way, I have seen for myself the growing challenges that we face in the wider threat environment. I am a member of the armed forces parliamentary scheme, which involved the Royal Air Force last year and the Royal Navy this year. Together with colleagues from across the House, I have had the privilege of meeting senior military and security personnel at home and abroad. Having visited operational bases here at home, and been briefed by British and NATO force leaders in Europe, it is clear to me just how complex and rapidly evolving the range of threats we face in our country is. It is clear that conflicts on foreign shores are playing out on British soil. It is clear that the range and sophistication of the attacks we face—physical attacks, cyber-attacks and interference in democracy—have grown. It is clear that the military, the security services, the police and other law enforcement bodies needs to work in an increasingly sophisticated way to deal with those hybrid threats. It is clear that hostile activities from state and non-state actors are increasingly linked, and that our laws must evolve quickly to give those tasked with defending us the tools that they need in the modern age.
Before I conclude, I will raise some issues with the Minister; I would be very grateful if she would address them in her closing remarks. The first picks up a point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington, and by other Members, about public knowledge. The tactics that we have been discussing are intentionally hybrid and hidden; they are designed to complicate and obfuscate, and in some cases, it takes our security services many months to work out exactly what is going on, and to give confident public statements. As right hon. and hon. Members across this House have said, it is critical that we can better explain the nature of the threat to our citizens, residents and constituents, so that the significant investment that we are making in our military and security services is understood, but also so that citizens can help defend themselves and this country, including from individual cyber-attacks and other measures.
My second question, which draws on a point made by the right hon. Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley), is about integration. Given the complexity of what we face and the need for the police, the military, the security services and others—not just in our country, but across allied nations—to work together in a much more sophisticated way, are we confident that those organisations have the necessary resources, and is the Minister confident that they have the freedom to break down bureaucratic silos and work across organisational boundaries to get this done?
I hope that across the House today, we can be clear that state-backed aggression, attacks and disruption are not just attacks on people, property and organisations, as appalling as those things are; they are attacks on our way of life, on our values, and on democracy itself. I hope we can unite to show that we will take action—decisive action—and will take it today.
Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)
I think we agree about the threat we face and about its scale. We do not need to spend the four hours allocated for this debate sharing that agreement, as the hon. Member for Cardiff West (Mr Barros-Curtis) rightly said. Our job is to scrutinise the Government’s proposed response to the threat, and that is what I want to do with my time. It is especially important to do that when the timescale for consideration of the legislation is compressed, as it is today.
I have huge sympathy with those who have spoken about the IRGC, but I would counsel against using this legislation to make the final decision about its proscription or designation. I do not want to steal the Minister’s lines, but I suspect that she will say to us, rightly, that it is important that we do not set a precedent, under this new system, of making designations in primary legislation, rather than by ministerial decision. There is an important procedural point there, which it will be necessary to maintain if we want to defend the flexibility that I think the Government are seeking in this legislation.
However, it is right to reflect on the problem that the Government are seeking to solve. The problem is clearly the gaps that they, and many of us, perceive in the proscription regime under the Terrorism Act, which does not enable them to deal with damaging behaviour by entities, including state entities, that are not captured by the proscription regime. That is the problem that Jonathan Hall identified in his report, and the problem that the Government are seeking to remedy through this legislation. They have made it clear that their objective is to present a regime that is broadly equivalent—the Government have used the word “equivalent” in their publications relating to this Bill—to the proscription regime. I want to explore that a little, to understand exactly how the Bill is going to deliver on its objectives.
I will start, as the Bill does, with the grounds for designation. The Bill is clear that in order to designate a body under this legislation, the Secretary of State must reasonably believe that it is, or has been, involved in what is described as “foreign power threat activity”, and then must consider that
“designating the body is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”
It is important to understand what foreign power threat activity is. It is defined in section 33 of the National Security Act 2023 as
“the commission, preparation or instigation of acts or threats”,
which are set out in subsection (3), and include obtaining or disclosing protected information or trade secrets, assisting a foreign intelligence service, entering a prohibited place, sabotage, general foreign interference and obtaining material benefits from a foreign intelligence service. Section 33 goes on to specify other acts:
“serious violence against another person…endanger the life of another person, or…create a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public.”
I set that out in detail because it is important to understand that for designation to be attached to a relevant body, it must have been involved in that sort of serious harmful activity. That is what would justify designation in the mind of the relevant Secretary of State: the body’s activities must be considered to be different from those of a normal state or other body engaged in its normal business.
In the explanatory notes, the Government give examples of things that might result in designation, such as, in paragraph 21,
“a foreign intelligence service obtaining protected information and inspecting sensitive defence or intelligence sites in the UK…a mercenary group carrying out acts of serious violence on behalf of a foreign power”,
or,
“a network preparing to carry out sabotage or threatening to commit acts that create a serious risk to the health and safety of the public”.
I set all that out because the Bill creates an offence of supporting a designated body, but in the construction of that offence, it is clear that the Government do not believe that all acts or expressions of support for a designated body are sufficient for that criminal liability. I want to understand why not.
Sir John Hayes
I hesitate to interrupt the flow of my right hon. and learned Friend, but the key point is legitimacy, as he and I have discussed. A state can be conducting legitimate activity by definition, whereas the bodies that have been proscribed previously are never legitimate implicitly. It is a difficult tightrope for Governments to walk, and that is why historically they have tended not to defer to a place where they chose to proscribed state bodies, because the implication is for the state as a whole. Where states take a “whole-state approach”—China being a good example—it is hard to walk that tightrope.
Sir Jeremy Wright
My right hon. Friend and Committee colleague is right in what he says, and I will come back to how and why we distinguish what the Bill proposes from the proscription regime.
On what is required to prove at least one of the criminal offences set out in this Bill, clause 2 introduces a new offence under a proposed new section 17A of the National Security Act 2023. The offence involves support for a designated body, but only if such support is given for “a prohibited purpose”, which proposed new section 17A(4) sets out is
“a purpose that the person knows, or having regard to other matters known to them ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”
That is an additional element that the prosecution must prove. That will undoubtedly make this offence more difficult to obtain convictions under, and there may be good reason for that, but if there is, I want to understand what it is.
I make two observations on the Government’s chosen approach in relation to that specific proposed new offence. The first is that this is not equivalent to proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000. I use that expression because that is the wording the Government have used in setting out their aspirations with the Bill. Although the Government intend designation to be similar to proscription in many respects—I accept it cannot be in all respects—proscription does not require an additional motive for someone who supports a proscribed organisation, but merely that they support the proscribed organisation and know that that is what they are doing. No additional motive, demonstrating some kind of animus against the welfare of the United Kingdom, is needed, and that is an important distinction.
The Government may say that the reason for that difference is to protect those who are engaging with a legitimate entity in a way that, just as my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) says, can never be possible with a proscribed terrorist organisation. In that case, however, I am struggling a little with the purpose and effect of designation itself. Surely the point of designation in the Bill is to move an organisation from the acceptable column into the unacceptable column. Surely the list of reasons why someone might be designated, which I read out earlier, is there to show us that those organisations, when they are doing those things, should not be worthy of support of any kind; but that is not, I think, where this legislation leaves us.
Alicia Kearns
That is precisely the point that I made in my opening speech. The Government are saying that it is not legitimate to engage with these bodies. Of course they want a carve-out to protect Crown servants, but that is explicitly included in the Bill. What they are doing, essentially, is creating a carve-out whereby people could say that it was legitimate for them to engage with the IRGC, and that somehow it would not be inherently dangerous or unbeneficial to engage with it. We are creating a threshold that I do not believe the courts will be able to meet, so we will not get the prosecutions that the Bill is designed to create.
Sir Jeremy Wright
I will come to exactly that point about the carve-outs. It is, I think, evident from a close reading of the Bill that the Government’s approach to the first of the new offences it creates differs from their approach to the next two. I want to understand from the Minister for Security—and this is my second observation—why that difference exists. I should say at this point that it is a great pleasure to see the Minister, the hon. Member for Wallasey (Dame Angela Eagle), in her place. As a distinguished former member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, she knows about these matters. However, I am also conscious that she has only just arrived. I hope I am setting out these specific concerns in a way that will give her two chances to answer them, on Second Reading and in Committee. If she is concerned about the lack of time between the two, she has no one to blame but her own colleagues—but we will come back to that.
As I was saying, my second observation relates to precisely the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns). There is a difference between the way in which the Bill sets out the first of the new offences and the way in which it approaches the other. For example, new section 17B, which amends the National Security Act, creates the offence of “Assisting a designated body”, while new section 17C creates the offence of
“Obtaining…material benefits from a designated body”.
Neither of those requires the additional motive of acting with a prohibited purpose. Instead, both allow for defences to be raised by those accused to establish that they were acting for a proper purpose. That would, of course, include not giving carte blanche to anyone who works for the British Government to behave as they wish, but if that person is acting within the purposes of their public appointment, it would offer them the chance to raise that defence, and would also offer opportunities to present a defence of acting in compliance with a UK legal obligation. I simply want to understand from the Minister why that approach was not taken in relation to the offence of supporting a designated body, because that would have been an attractive way forward.
Perhaps the Government will say that the prohibited purpose requirement matches some of the offences in the National Security Act, where they are carried out for or on behalf of a foreign power, but the National Security Act definition includes any foreign power, benign or malign. This, of course, is different, because a designated body has already been designated by the Secretary of State as a body that is— if I can use unparliamentary language—up to no good, and should therefore, in my view, be in a different category. Perhaps we have already established that demonstrating that they were acting innocently in support of it would be a high bar for any potential defendant to meet. It would be helpful to understand the Minister’s view on that.
Let me finish where I started. I agree with the purpose of the Bill; I think we all do, and it is clearly important for the Government to plug an evident gap in our legislative armoury. However, we must be certain that the way in which the Government are approaching the plugging of that gap is the right way, and that all these parts of the Bill fit together—not least, as we heard from the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley), with other parts of the sanctions and other regimes. It is that process that I hope the Minister will be able to deal with, either when she winds up this part of the debate or subsequently in Committee.
Mark Sewards (Leeds South West and Morley) (Lab)
I start by commending the Government for the speed with which they have brought forward this legislation. I understand the charges made by the Opposition about the amount of time available to debate the Bill, but the House will recall that when the Prime Minister spoke to Jewish communities following certain attacks this year, he promised not only that the IRGC would be proscribed, but that this legislation would be brought forward and accelerated. That was just prior to the April recess, the local elections and the King’s Speech, so there has not been too much parliamentary time between then and now, and he has fulfilled at least one of his promises by bringing forward the legislation.
Alicia Kearns
I have been very clear that we must stand by our Jewish communities. Yesterday, I sat down with the Jewish Leadership Council, the Community Security Trust and representatives of other organisations. They do not recognise the need to rush this Bill through the House, and they want us to scrutinise it in order to close the gaps that we discussed in that meeting. Although I wish we could have acted sooner, and I fully support the Bill and want to get it done, they want to get it done right, so that we do not have the gaps that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) has just set out.
Mark Sewards
I appreciate what the hon. Lady says, and I am glad to hear that she has been meeting those organisations. The Prime Minister made two promises, and this Bill fulfils one of them. Proscribing the IRGC is the other, and I will come to that in a moment.
This Bill captures the sophistication of the entities that it seeks to target: those groups operating under alternative names and front organisations. It targets them to ensure that they are unable to exploit any potential loopholes. Creating the new power of designation—which is almost equivalent to proscription but not quite the same, as we have heard in this debate—is absolutely welcome. The Bill also makes supporting designated bodies for a prohibited purpose—including arranging meetings, professing support for them or materially assisting their activities in the UK—a serious criminal offence. I am grateful to the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, the Prime Minister and the previous Security Minister for enduring my endless questions about this issue, both in this House and in private. I am very appreciative that the Bill does what I have been asking for it to do, and what many other Members of this House have been asking for it to do. I am also very pleased that offences will carry substantial penalties, including sentences of up to 14 years, which is absolutely the right move.
I appreciate what the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) said about this being primary legislation, and he is right to say that today’s discussion has to be about the content of the Bill, not the bodies that we seek to proscribe through it. I absolutely take his point, and he set out a very eloquent argument about what he sees as the problems with the legislation. However, given the impact of the IRGC on this country and on the communities I speak to, I want to take this opportunity to set out not only why this legislation should pass through its Commons stages today, but why it should be used to proscribe the IRGC as soon as possible, as I will not have many further opportunities to do so.
There is no clearer threat to the UK and the British Jewish community than that posed by the IRGC. We know that the IRGC directs terror abroad, and we know it funds Hezbollah, the Houthis and Hamas. We know that it brutally crushes dissent at home in Iran and murdered more than 30,000 people in the January protests, and it continues to repress its people as well as cut off internet access, which makes us unable to update the figures and to know what is truly going on in some parts of the country. We know that the IRGC is a clear and present danger to Britain’s national security. It plans terror attacks here, it tries to radicalise people here, and it promotes extremism here.
I pay tribute to our security services for all the work they have done to protect us against the IRGC and others. As we know, MI5 confirmed last October that it had identified more than 20 potentially lethal plots, backed by Iran, in the previous year alone. On that point, I want to focus my remarks on the threat that the IRGC poses to the Jewish community in this country. As the Chief Rabbi said in April, our fellow citizens are facing a sustained campaign of violence and intimidation. We know that Jews have been stabbed on the streets of Golders Green. We know that Finchley Reform synagogue, Kenton United synagogue, and Jewish organisations and charities have all been targeted. We know that ambulances belonging to Hatzola, an organisation that serves the entire community, were burned.
Police investigations are ongoing, and it would not be appropriate for me to comment on all the specific circumstances of each case, but we know that paid proxies are operating here. We also know that the US Department of Justice has identified paid proxies operating in our country that are directly linked to the IRGC, and the threat is not contained to Britain, with a number of attacks across Europe in recent months. The threat is not disputable. Senior intelligence figures such as the former head of MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove, have stated clearly that the IRGC poses a threat to the British Jewish community, and that threat is of long standing. Over the past decade, we have seen growing evidence of Iranian efforts to radicalise young people here. Senior IRGC commanders have addressed student audiences and urged them to
“raise the flag of the Islamic Revolution, Islam and martyrdom”,
and calling on them to join an “apocalyptic war”.
Tom Tugendhat
The hon. Member is making an extremely powerful speech—I do not find a word I disagree with—and I am very grateful to him for making it. However, this again shows why it would have been rather helpful to have a bit longer on this, because a small amendment around the use of slogans or the wearing of varieties of designated military insignia—IRGC or Hezbollah insignia in this case, but different things in other cases—would have been useful. Sadly, the way this is being rushed through makes that almost impossible. Would he agree?
Mark Sewards
I am certain that we will get on to the point the right hon. Member has raised in Committee, which is coming up soon. I do think those items are worth discussing, and that such scrutiny will be possible during the next stage. I would also take this opportunity to commend him, because he warned that Iran was recruiting criminal gangs to spy on the Jewish community. I think that was three years ago, and the threat has only got worse since. The reason why I am making this speech is that I want to underline the need to proscribe, or rather to designate, the IRGC as soon as this Bill receives Royal Assent.
Mr Barros-Curtis
I take the points, particularly from the Opposition, about the speed at which we are proceeding on the Bill today. However, does my hon. Friend—by the way, he is giving an excellent speech—agree that, as we have 17 more working days in this place before recess, time is of the essence? To go back to the points made earlier, we want to get this through both Houses and on to the statute book before the summer.
Mark Sewards
I could not agree more with my hon. Friend’s excellent point. I do not want to repeat myself too much, but the Prime Minister made this promise to the communities involved, and this is the perfect time to accelerate and get the Bill through Parliament before we get to the summer recess, so that we are not dealing with it in September, October or November.
To deter, counter and thwart Iran’s malign activities, we must take this firm action now, in line with my hon. Friend’s intervention, and this Bill will enable us to do so. As was said in the opening speeches, the Government have rightly ramped up sanctions against Tehran, targeting both the IRGC’s architects of repression at home and the pro-regime oligarchs overseas who enjoy the very freedoms that they deny to the Iranian people at home. However, sanctions alone cannot and have not curtailed the IRGC’s nefarious activities in the UK. Crucially, while sanctions primarily target an organisation’s or an individual’s financial activities, only designation as described in this Bill will allow us to criminalise those who are members, supporters or agents of a terrorist organisation.
Tom Tugendhat
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that there is a real concern, particularly given what is going on in the Persian gulf at the moment, that when the Iranian Government were last given access to vast amounts of cash about 10 years ago, they used that money to murder Syrians, Iraqis, Yemenis and, in fact, anybody else they could get their hands on, and to boost their propaganda arms? That did enormous harm not just to the Jewish community—he is quite right to highlight the Jewish community—but to the UK and the whole of western civilisation, including the French, the Germans and many others. Does he not agree with me that the suggestion that billions of dollars may be handed over to the Iranian regime raises concerns that it will be equipped for a new round?
Mark Sewards
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his powerful intervention. To be crystal clear, although we are talking about designation today and that gets into issues that are not covered by the Bill, I have serious concerns about the position the IRGC will be in following any potential peace deal. Peace is always welcome, of course it is—when people stop killing each other that should always be welcome—but the IRGC is the world’s No. 1 sponsor of terrorism. It being in a position of power? I can never be comfortable with that.
Sanctions alone cannot have the impact we want. The Bill allows us to designate those individuals who are operating in the UK. It also allows us to designate their supporters and anyone who chooses to support this terrorist organisation. And let us be in no doubt: the IRGC instigates and stokes terror, it funds terror, it directs terror. The IRGC is a terrorist organisation. It is the terror arm of the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism. Only this legislation will allow us to protect the British people from its nefarious activities on our shores. I commend the Government for bringing it forward. I commend the Prime Minister for keeping his promise. I ask him to keep the second one and proscribe and designate the IRGC.
Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)
The “2026 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community” states:
“The global security environment is becoming more complex.”
That complexity is being fed by the increasing sophistication of our adversaries. My right hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Sir Oliver Dowden) talked about AI and the impact it may have in adding to that complexity and deepening the threat.
It is not just the US agencies that have come to that conclusion. The director general of MI5, in the speech referred to by the hon. Member for Leeds South West and Morley (Mark Sewards), said:
“My teams are routinely uncovering attempts by state actors to commission surveillance, sabotage, arson or physical violence right here in the UK.”
These adversaries, far from being remote, are real and present on the streets of our constituencies. That is why the Government’s attempts to improve the tools at the disposal of Ministers are welcome. It is why all the considerations made by Governments, of whatever hue, that are sufficient to deal with that rapidly changing threat deserve the hearing they are receiving. That is not an unqualified level of support—I shall explain my qualifications in due course—but in essence it is right that the Government look again at the legislative framework associated with keeping us safe.
There is a weakness in democracies that is not shared by most of our enemies. That weakness is that legislation passes through this House and is scrutinised, debated and considered. That takes time. Our adversaries can, at will and at a whim, change their approach. Keeping pace with that change is difficult in an open and free society. That very openness and freedom is, of course, what we are here to promote and, indeed, to defend.
The director general of MI5 went on to speak about the various enemies we face. For example, when he spoke of Russia, he said that the police have
“disrupted a steady stream of surveillance plots with hostile intent”
from the Russian state. He went on to speak about Iran. He said:
“Iran’s autocratic regime is likewise frantically trying to silence its opponents around the world, including in the UK.”
The hon. Member for Leeds South West and Morley spoke about the number of plots that have been tracked in a single year. The director general went on to say:
“The UK was among the first to call out this wave of…transnational aggression”,
but in fact the problem is worldwide. On China, he said that
“clandestine technology transfer…efforts to overtly influence UK public life…harassment and intimidation of opponents”
are all features of Chinese activity here. Because China adopts a whole-state approach, it is not possible to separate the cause—China’s determination to undermine us—and its effect, in terms of the mechanism it uses to do that.
None of that is a surprise to those who have sat on the Intelligence and Security Committee. As Members will know, it commissioned a report into Russia, before I was a member, and then, while I have had the privilege of serving on the Committee, reports into China and Iran. Our China report says that:
“The fact that China is a strategic threat is not news…China’s state intelligence apparatus—almost certainly the largest in the world, with hundreds of thousands of civil intelligence officers (leaving aside their military capability)—targets the UK and its interests prolifically and aggressively.”
The Chinese are particularly enthusiastic about their activities in high-tech industries and academia. Their ability to gain a head start in the economy is partly as a result of their infiltration of the knowledge sector, their theft of innovation, and the ability to persuade, frankly, naive—I am choosing my words carefully, as I was going to say witless—individualsto be party to the theft of intellectual property.
China is active in its attempts to do harm across the world, and particularly in Britain, as the Government recognises. This and previous Governments have also long recognised that we need to update legislation to deal with that changing and increasingly complex threat—indeed, I note that both my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat), present in the Chamber, and I were Security Ministers in previous Governments. The attempts by China to gain technological dominance, the attempts by Iran to infiltrate institutions, and the perpetual attempts by Russia, both in cyber-space and elsewhere, to undermine Britain’s interests and industry are clear.
The Bill is part of a fitting response to those threats, but there are questions that I want to address, some of which amplify the remarks of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), who sits with me on the ISC. There is an important matter for the Government to deal with about the relationship between the Bill and the Terrorism Act 2006, in particular, as my right hon. and learned Friend said, proposed new section 17A to the National Security Act 2023.
Essentially, the Government are creating a higher bar than that which applies in existing legislation. As was set out in the speech by my right hon. and learned Friend, we need to understand why that higher bar exists in the proposed legislation, and how it will be crossed. The purpose of the legislation is clear, but in practice it will only work if it can be supported in the courts. Designation will undoubtedly be challenged, so it has to stand up to the test of legal scrutiny. I have doubts as to whether the double bar that will be required to make designation practically possible can be straightforwardly met. Some more commentary from the Government on that would be helpful.
I would also be interested to know why a different approach has been taken for designation itself, and why there is no discretionary power in the Bill for the Home Secretary to take action promptly—such action will sometimes be necessary—as she can in respect of proscription. As I know from my time as Security Minister—the Minister, too, will know this—it is sometimes necessary to act quickly on proscription because circumstances demand it. The Bill does not allow that level of discretion and flexibility, and I think the House has every reason to wonder why.
In addition, the new statutory test for designation appears to introduce this cumulative two-pronged approach. We understand that proving that designation will protect and safeguard the interests of the UK is necessary, but that is not necessary in the case of proscription in the same way—at least, not in specific terms—and I wonder why the Government have chosen to adopt a different approach in that respect.
There are a series of quite technical challenges to the Government over whether this well-intended legislation—which I think enjoys broad support across the House, from those who understand the scale of the threats that I have briefly outlined—will work in practice. I hope that the Minister, during the course of our considerations this afternoon, will be able to address some of those matters, particularly in relation to proposed new section 17A.
The chief of the Secret Intelligence Service said recently:
“We are now operating in a space between peace and war. This is not a temporary state or a gradual, inevitable evolution. Our world is being actively remade, with profound implications for national and international security.”
She concluded:
“It also means everyone in society really understanding the world we are in—a world where terrorists plot against us, where our enemies fearmonger, bully and manipulate, and the front line is everywhere. Online, on our streets, in our supply chains, in the minds and on the screens of our citizens. We must all stand together against this.”
That means, of course, defending our values at every opportunity, in this House and beyond it; it means recognising that there is no ethical or moral equivalence between those who seek to do us harm and those who seek to defend us—whatever some of those who are either naive or malevolent might tell us—and it means being responsive to that threat, in the way that this legislation is intended to be, by having adequate resources for our security and intelligence services, and the right powers too. This Bill is an attempt to get those powers in place in order to protect us all. I wish it well, but I also press the Government to ensure that it is as effective as it needs to be.
Kevin Bonavia (Stevenage) (Lab)
As everybody in this House knows full well, protecting our national security is always the first duty of any Government, and we have heard a consensus on that today. The reality today is that the threat from hostile foreign powers and the proxies on which they rely has grown significantly in both scale and complexity. We cannot make the mistake of thinking that the threat is theoretical; it is real, it is evolving, and it is happening right here in our very own country. We have heard many examples of that today.
A lot of the focus has rightly been on the IRGC. Time and again, where we have said, “That organisation should be proscribed,” we have heard, “Can’t touch the IRGC, I’m afraid.” We have struggled with that. I am very pleased that our Government are today holding on to the Prime Minister’s promise that we will make good our defence of our country from organisations such as the IRGC.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds South West and Morley (Mark Sewards) eloquently set out, the IRGC is at the moment—it could change in future—the prime example of a state-backed organisation. It was initially set up to defend the Islamic Republic of Iran, but what kind of defence is that? Iran is hardly a friendly power to us—it has an extreme ideology, and it seeks not just to defend its own country but to export that ideology across the world, including to our own shores, as it has done time and again. This legislation seeks to end that. We have had debates in which it has been argued, “Well, is it the equivalent of proscription, and what does the test of knowledge mean?” Those questions are right, and I am sure that the Minister will respond, either in this debate on Second Reading or later in today’s proceedings.
What I want to get across is how real the threat is. Everybody here in the Chamber gets it—I hope we do—but my big worry is that our fellow citizens in the wider United Kingdom have not necessarily got it yet. It begins with someone thinking, “I read something online that doesn’t seem right”, and then they are taken down a pathway, and behind that pathway are hostile threats—the IRGC and others.
As legislators, we have to make use of the legislative tools to try to catch up with that, but I think we also have another job: we are not just legislators but representatives and communicators. I really hope that this Bill passes, but whatever happens, we have an obligation to say to our fellow citizens, “Be vigilant. Be resilient.”
Organisations, whether the IRGC or others, will not present themselves for what they really are. They will hide behind the proxies we have heard about today and do all they can to take the people of this country and use them, either knowingly or as dupes, for their nefarious ends—and we do not always know what those nefarious ends are. Whatever the country may be—Iran in this case—those ends are not consistent with our values. We have heard about differences of views or opinion, but in this case they are not of moral equivalence. I totally agree with that point. We in this country rightly struggle to make sure that other voices are heard, but at the same time we ensure that everyone is protected. That is certainly not the case in countries like Iran, Russia or China.
Let us pass this Bill today, but let us not stop there.
Sir John Hayes
The hon. Gentleman is building to a crescendo, so I wanted to intervene before he sits down. The vigilance he calls for, which echoes what I said about us coming together to make a strong case for our values and to defend them against those who assail us, is going to become more difficult because of artificial intelligence—my right hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Sir Oliver Dowden) made a telling contribution in that respect. It is really important that we are not so fascinated by the novelty of innovation that we wait too long to regulate AI. It took us 25 years in this House to work out that the internet might have malign effects. Finally, the last Government introduced the Online Safety Act 2023, and this Government have now taken that further—quite rightly. For heaven’s sake, let us understand the risks that this poses in weakening the very resilience that the hon. Gentleman has called for.
Kevin Bonavia
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention. He makes a powerful point on AI. I was about to set out that we are already engaged in new legislative tools in this regard, including the Representation of the People Bill and the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill, which passed through this place yesterday. But we cannot just say “Right, job done; We’ve given the Government as much flexibility as we can, so let them now get on with it.” It will hit the wall, and we do not know as of today just how powerful AI in its widest forms can be.
I have thought a bit about AI and about how in many ways in this place we are always catching up. Occasionally, we make laws that push society forward—we have made some great social reforms through legislation—which is great. However, too often we are reacting to a problem that has grown out of control. Our procedures in this place will not necessarily work in the future with things like AI. That is not a debate for today. However, I take the right hon. Gentleman’s point strongly in mind.
Although I support the Bill, I make the point that it is part of a much broader governmental, parliamentary and—I hope—whole-society approach. When we think about the tools that the Government need, from what I have seen the Bill will give the Government of the day broad-ranging powers, but I hope and pray that this Government, or any future Government, know full well that they will have to move far quicker than before to do what is needed. We as legislators in this place must be willing to support that Government in doing the job in hand. I support the Bill and hope that, as a result, it will make our country safer for all our communities.
Bob Blackman (Harrow East) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Stevenage (Kevin Bonavia), who made a thoughtful speech on the threats we all face. I listened carefully to the Home Secretary’s speech and those made by colleagues across the Chamber. I noticed that the Home Secretary was careful not to name any organisations that will be caught by the Bill—and quite right, too, because as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) made clear, the Home Secretary will need to make decisions after it has been enacted. But a number of issues of concern have clearly been raised during the debate, and I want to raise some others that do not appear to be caught by this legislation.
I am concerned that we have had no pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill, and indeed that we will have only a small amount of time in Committee, relatively speaking, to consider the large number of amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns). The Home Secretary made it clear that this is one piece of legislation and that further legislation may well follow, which assures me to a certain extent that some of the potential gaps in this legislation can be picked up at a later date—or they may be picked up when the other place considers the Bill.
I do not know any state-sponsored organisations in Russia or China that would be caught by the Bill, but I do know that the IRGC will definitely be caught by it. In doing a bit of research prior to the debate, I noted that I first raised the threat from Iran back in June 2010, a month after I had been elected to this place. Indeed, Iran has posed a threat to the middle east for many years, and it has not reduced; in fact, it has increased.
In March 2011, I first called for the UK to put pressure on the Iranians to stop arming Hezbollah—here we are, 15 years later, reaping the rewards in the war between Israel and Lebanon—and I am told that I have raised the subject of Iran 56 times in debates or questions since I have been a Member of Parliament. I declare my interests in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests as co-chairman of the all-party parliamentary group on UK-Israel and chairman of British Committee for Iran Freedom, which opposes the current theocratic regime in Iran.
The hon. Member for Stevenage raised the founding of the IRGC back in 1979. I was at university when the Islamic revolution came to Iran. The IRGC was set up to make sure the revolution continued—and how they have brutally made sure that that has been the case through many activities ever since.
We need to understand that the IRGC is not just a military force but a method of repression around the globe, including in the UK. In Iran, the IRGC holds political prisoners and imprisons activists. Any movement in opposition to the regime faces persecution, prosecution and death sentences. Today, there are members of the Iranian opposition on death row in Iran simply because they object to the regime. That is one of the reasons why we have to look at how this organisation acts.
More than 2,000 executions have taken place since President Pezeshkian took office—that is a short period of time. I know, Madam Deputy Speaker, that that is not necessarily the subject of the debate, but we have to emphasise the threat that the organisation poses to this country.
Of course, the IRGC’s activity extends beyond Iran and across other national borders. People might wonder what it has done. There is concern that there is a gap in this legislation when it comes to diplomats. Back in 2018, I was going to an Iranian opposition conference in Paris. An Iranian diplomat in Belgium used a diplomatic bag to transfer a bomb to Brussels to be put in the hands of terrorists, so that they could then take it to the conference that I was due to attend. That diplomat was tried in the Belgian courts, found guilty and imprisoned. If the same thing happened here, presumably that diplomat would get off scot-free, because such activity is not mentioned in this legislation. The diplomat was eventually freed in a prisoner exchange with Iran and returned to Iran as a hero. That is one of the gaps in the Bill.
We understand the direct threat to our country and, indeed, to the dissidents and those in the resistance movement in this country. They have suffered their headquarters being firebombed; very brave individuals who call things out through journalism have been forced to leave this country because we could no longer defend them; and opposition figures have been threatened by the IRGC. We cannot just recognise that; we have to do something about it.
I led the debate in this place on proscribing the IRGC more than 10 years ago. I heard the excuses then: “We can’t do anything because they are a state actor,” and, “The Americans want us to continue to co-operate with Tehran so that there is continuous dialogue between the two countries.” I heard all the excuses. I could not convince my party’s Government that we should do the right thing. This Government’s Members promised to do it when they were in opposition, and I applaud the Bill as a step in the right direction.
The IRGC is the head of the snake that controls terrorism around the world. We have rightly proscribed Hamas, Hezbollah and other terrorist organisations, but the IRGC continues to exist. I recall the fact that, on or around 2 October 2023, there was a meeting where the IRGC either gave permission for or ordered Hamas to attack Israel. We saw the devastation that then took place in Israel, and we have seen what has happened with the wars since.
Last Thursday, I had the opportunity to visit the Nova exhibition, which I recommend all colleagues visit. It is very personal for the individuals involved. I had the opportunity to listen to and speak to a survivor. Those terrorist operations were inspired and ordered by the IRGC and directly communicated from Iran. That is the threat posed not only to Israel, but to UK citizens. People from around the world went to that festival just to hear music, dance and have good company. That threat can come to this country unless we take action. We should be clear, and I hope the Minister will be clear, that in proscribing or taking action against any organisation, we are not taking action against the Iranian people. We are taking action against the regime and the IRGC, and the way in which they have consistently operated.
We know that protest movements in this country and across Europe have been threatened by the IRGC in all sorts of guises. We are behind the curve, because the United States, the European Union and many other countries including Canada have proscribed the IRGC in its entirety. Individual members of the theocratic regime that runs Iran own multimillion-pound properties in London. They do not occupy them, but they keep them as assets to be used. We know that Iranian diplomats have operated in this country to stir up trouble, threaten people of the Jewish religion and cause all sorts of concerns for other colleagues.
Sir John Hayes
My hon. Friend is right to draw attention to Iranian activity in Britain. In the report that our Committee produced on that, we said:
“The Iranian Intelligence Services have shown that they are willing and able—often through third-party agents—to attempt assassination within the UK, and kidnap from the UK…There have been at least 15 attempts at murder or kidnap against British nationals or UK-based individuals since the beginning of 2022.”
Bob Blackman
I thank my right hon. Friend for that intervention.
Another issue, which the Committee also referred to, was that certain charities in this country are linked to or directed and funded by Tehran. At least 13 charities are under investigation by the Charity Commission. I have asked continually for action from the Government and the Charity Commission to close down those charities to prevent them from acting against the interests of this country. At the moment, there is a lack of action and co-ordination, and it is not clear to me that this legislation will catch those charities, or whether there is sufficient legislation to do so. I would appreciate the Minister addressing that issue.
Alicia Kearns
One of the powers that the Government could look to take—outside this Bill, because it is not within its scope—would be to give the Charity Commission the power to wind up a charity. It currently does not have that power, but we can be absolutely certain that states are creating brand new charities across our country specifically to infiltrate them. That might be my hon. Friend’s best course of action to get that done, and I am sure he would have the full support of most of the House for it.
Bob Blackman
It is clear that this is one of a series of actions that need to be taken. If we had had the opportunity to give the Bill pre-legislative scrutiny, suggestions could have been made to increase its scope to deal with these issues once and for all.
It is pretty clear to me that action needs to be taken to defend our people and the people who come here fleeing the Iranian republic. Following this legislation, we look forward to the proscription of the IRGC or whatever sanction we are going to take, as well as specific sanctions against the commanders. The assets of the IRGC and its various bodies should be frozen and subject to enhanced security, and we look forward to seeing protections for the Iranian dissidents and opposition figures living in Britain.
Let us make sure that we send a clear message. Members of all parties agree that this legislation is necessary, but further legislation is also necessary. This Bill could be improved, provided the Government were willing to listen to the proposals that my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) has put forward. I hope that we will hear those arguments in Committee and ensure that the Government take note of that. I also hope that, if the Government do not act today, they will agree to act in the future on the sensible proposals that my hon. Friend has made.
This is a moral and national security necessity. We know that operatives from Iran, whether it is the IRGC or other state-based organisations, are taking action right now on our university campuses to stir up trouble and antisemitism. They are taking direct action, as has been said, against Jewish businesses, synagogues and, indeed, even now places where Jewish people live. That is absolutely unacceptable, and the people responsible obviously have to be brought to justice, but the organisations that they are part of must also be brought to justice and prevented from operating. All we can do is pass this legislation and hope that the Home Secretary can take the necessary decisions.
I draw attention to one final issue: the operation of the communications. The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting is a propaganda arm of the regime. It is tied directly to the IRGC. It is not clear to me that it will be caught by the provisions of the Bill. It has a hub in Acton in west London, and it actively airs threats against Iranian dissidents and against the Jewish community. That operation should be closed down straightaway, and I hope the Home Secretary will take the necessary action to do so.
I look forward to the responses from the Minister. I know she is new in the job, but I also know that she has the best interests of the security of this country at heart, and I wish her well in carrying out those duties.
Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge) (Con)
I am grateful to be called. I welcome the Minister to her place. It is a great job—I enjoyed it, and I have no doubt that she will, too. Though she may have shorter fingernails at the end of the day than she started with, it is worth it for the opportunity to serve with some of the finest people in our Government. The intelligence services and the police that she will be working with are truly exceptional, and it is worth putting on the record the gratitude of the whole House for what they do.
Yesterday was the 10th anniversary of the death of my friend Jo Cox, and many of us have been wearing white roses in memory of her. When we last met, Jo and I were in one of the Committee rooms working on a report together entitled, “The Cost of Doing Nothing”. What we were talking about in that report was the action in Syria, the way in which the extremism in that country had torn it apart and how we had not acted in ways that we felt we should have done. I welcome very much what the Government are doing today, because they are demonstrating another response: they are not willing to stand aside and watch as the country gets torn apart in different ways. I will make criticisms in a moment, but I would first just like to place on the record my gratitude for the way in which the Government have approached this legislation. I agree with the broad sweep of it; I just wish they had given it a little bit more time, and I understand that the Minister will almost certainly agree with me.
Unusually, I would like to praise the hon. Member for Leeds South West and Morley (Mark Sewards). He made an absolutely outstanding speech and spoke brilliantly, not just for this whole House but for the country, on the threat to a particular community, which is actually a threat to us all. It is absolutely true that in too many ways the Jewish community are the canary in the coalmine of any society. When we see Jews under threat, when we see Jewish homes frightened, when we see Jewish sites vandalised—as sadly we are seeing too much—we know what is coming, and what is coming is not pretty.
But let us get back to the Bill because, while it is welcome, it makes that tragic error that we often make in this place—I know we made this error in our time as well—which is to seek the rapid answer rather than the complete one. In doing so, the Bill misses very slightly the challenge that is bound to come, because I am afraid that we do know what will come. By the way, I will no doubt support the Minister when she decides to use the powers, because she will be well advised by the teams we both know so well, but we know that when an organisation is designated, it will lawyer up, go to court and challenge her, and we will find ourselves going around the houses.
This is where I confess a failure of my own. One of the organisations that I sought to work on was the Islamic Centre of England. That organisation has the same connection to Islam that Christian organisations that claim the crusader cross, and that far-right baggage, have to the church of Christ. Let us be absolutely clear: it is a vile political organisation dressing itself up as a religious movement—there is nothing religious about it all—yet that organisation enjoys charitable status, as my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East (Bob Blackman) identified, and sadly, despite irregularities in its business and the way that it operates, it is still able to operate.
Let me list a couple more such organisations. Darul Hikma has praised Qasem Soleimani, the late head of the IRGC, whose death is certainly not mourned here, and it praised 7 October and the IRGC. The Abrar Islamic Foundation has praised Hezbollah and Hamas, and has run antisemitic and homophobic events. There are also the Ahl al-Bait Society Scotland—sadly, this reaches across the whole of the United Kingdom—Ahlulbayt Islamic Mission and Al-Ikhlas. They have all run, in various different ways, sessions praising the IRGC and supportive of Qasem Soleimani, which is entirely against not just the interests of the United Kingdom, but very particularly the interests of the Muslin community in the United Kingdom. Let us be absolutely clear about what the natural consequence of this will be: it will stir up sectarian and religious hatred. As the hon. Member for Leeds South West and Morley mentioned, we are first seeing the effect in the Jewish community—of course we are—but we all know where this will lead.
There are those of us who value all communities in our society, as I know the Home Secretary does, and who want Islam treated exactly the same as any religion. I think we Catholics are the only ones who are still lawfully discriminated against, but given that that excludes us only from the monarchy, I think we can be pretty comfortable with our position. Those of us who want to see all religions treated equally know that we simply cannot have poison poured into a few ears and pretend that does not happen.
I mentioned PressTV today, as well as the vile rumours being spread about the Prime Minister and others by Russia Today, among others, to show that we need to be conscious of what we are dealing with. Let us be quite clear: this is not a freedom of speech issue. This is no more a freedom of speech issue than the invasion of a hostile army is a right-to-roam issue. This is fundamentally about the deliberate actions of a state organisation—either the Russian, Chinese or Iranian state—to undermine us and tear us apart.
Sir John Hayes
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for giving way. Many people say that he was the second best Conservative Security Minister, and I tend to agree with that. Might he continue to build the bridges that have already been formed across the House during this debate by inviting the Minister, when she winds up, to re-examine the charitable status of a whole range of organisations that have intimate connections with the Chinese, Iranian or Russian state, as a parallel exercise to the consideration of this legislation? That would seem to me to be a sensible move that we could agree today.
Tom Tugendhat
My right hon. Friend, demonstrating why he leads the list of Security Ministers past and present, pre-empts me; I was coming to China. Here I declare various interests. I am a patron of United Against Nuclear Iran, an organisation that campaigns, just as the Government do, and as everybody does, against Iran having nuclear weapons. I am not sure that it is a contentious organisation to be a member of; I hope it is universally supported. Also, I am sanctioned by the Chinese, Russian and Iranian states. I want to highlight some of the issues that we are dealing with that have not quite come through in the debate so far.
Let us be honest: this Bill is shaped around the IRGC. It is shaped around a state organisation—a part of the Iranian constitutional structure—that is behaving like a terrorist group, because it is the sponsor of terrorism around the world. However, it is not alone; for example, we know that the so-called little green men who operated in Crimea were actually part of the Russian armed forces. There are Russian groups, such as the Wagner Group, that act as state-sponsored terrorist organisations in countries such as Mali. I am looking at the Home Secretary, here: I hope that those groups will be encapsulated in the Bill. It certainly reads as though it will cover them.
Let us look a little more directly at one question. There is an organisation that should be captured in this Bill but I suspect will not be: TikTok. The Home Secretary may wonder why I raise TikTok, so let me be quite clear. There are many social media platforms around the world, and I am not going to pretend that many of them are any better than a cesspit. They tend to encourage various forms of hatred. As an aside, when I meet people who have posted on those platforms in the flesh at constituency events, it turns out that they are absolutely charming people who would never be quite so rude to one’s face, but they are utterly vile online. That is quite remarkable, but there we go. I mention TikTok for this reason: other social media platforms respond to the triggers involved in advertising. Effectively, they respond to the interests of their shareholders. They may or may not like the product, but we know what they are doing. Unlike other platforms, which are edited for profit, TikTok is edited for effect. That is the difference.
Let us look at the TikTok effect after 7 October, for example. It did not push a particular ideology. It did not try to tell us, as the Soviets did in the 1920s, that more tractors were being produced in Minsk than in Manchester, or wherever. It does not seek to tell us that something is better; it seeks to tell us that there is nothing there—that it is all about hatred and division. It seeks to promote a horrific outcome that some people want, which is effectively a destroyed, torn-apart state that is hostile to itself. I am afraid that is what TikTok is doing, and not by accident. Its algorithm is controlled by the Ministry of State Security, through the Chinese Communist party, in Shenzhen. It is not based anywhere else. That algorithm effectively acts as an editor—just as a newspaper editor would. It quite deliberately promotes not one side, but both sides. If one side is promoted, we may get persuasion, but we still get unity. If both sides are promoted, we get division, anger, hostility and rage. I do not think that the Bill touches on that issue, but I urge the Minister to have a look at it in months to come.
There was a time, 20 or 30 years ago, when we would have said that a state-sponsored organisation was fundamentally human and needed people. It would have needed agents—someone to hire the car, rent the room or whatever it happened to be—but that is not true today. These organisations do not need to cross the border; they can write the code, programme the algorithm, watch the fire start, and shape it. Sadly, we have seen such division inspired in the Home Secretary’s own community, between Indian-origin and Pakistani-origin communities. We have seen the same fire being lit, not because China particularly sides with one side or the other—it does not—but because it just wants hostility in the UK, and this issue is a dividing line. When we look at the designation of organisations, we must remember that those organisations include businesses.
I support this Bill, and I am very grateful to the Minister and the Home Secretary for bringing it to the House. I very much envy the Minister her place, and I am sure that she will enjoy her role.
Alicia Kearns
I welcome the Minister to her place for the first time, and I wish her every success in a vital role in our country and in the Government.
Let me end where I began. We support this Bill and will not push its Second Reading to a vote, because its principle is sound. The power is overdue, and the Government are right to seek it, but let the House be in no doubt about what is being asked of us today. We are asked to take a Bill that was laid before Parliament only last week, and progress it through all stages in just one day. It is what the House would normally do over months. However, the threat is permanent. Haste is temporary, but the harm can be enduring. Our enemies will study and exploit that asymmetry, because bad laws made quickly are not easily redeemed, and the effect may be felt for years in courtrooms in cases that collapse, and in the quiet calculations of the very people we are trying to deter.
Let me be clear about what is and what is not in question. I do not doubt the Government’s good faith. I do not doubt for one moment that the Ministers want to make our country safe, but good faith is not a working law, and good intentions do not disrupt plots. A Bill that reaches the statute book but fails in the courtroom is worse than no Bill at all, because it lets us tell ourselves that we have acted, while the threat goes untouched. The people hunted by proxies on our streets, and by hostile states, are owed more than sincerity; they are owed a law that holds in the police station, in the courtroom and at the border on the day it is tested.
I know what the answer will be—that gaps can be dealt with on another day, in some future Bill, but this House has heard that before, and we have learned what “another day” means. I never took my Government’s word when they said that to me, as anyone will know who watched me damned well refuse to take it when I was Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee. I will not take it today, because “another day” is where good intentions are sent to be forgotten, and the country does not get to tell the assassin at the journalist’s door that the relevant clause is pencilled for the next Session. We have the Bill before us today, and we have amendments before us today; the only thing we are being asked to leave for later is the part that makes this Bill effective.
I want to touch on the speeches made, starting with that by the hon. Member for Cardiff West (Mr Barros-Curtis), who rightly spoke about the importance of civil liberties. Our amendments would give clarity on some aspects of that issue, particularly the flying of flags and the wearing of uniforms. The Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley), was absolutely right to say that there has been insufficient scrutiny thus far. I am surprised that her Committee was offered a briefing only once this Bill had completed its passage through the House. I was offered a briefing only once, three days after the deadline for amendments had passed; however, we were able to rectify that. She is also right to raise questions about future misuse—an issue that I did not have time to go into, so I am grateful to her for touching on that.
The hon. Member for North Durham (Luke Akehurst), who I am sure will return to the Chamber in due course, touched on the Australian model. Under one of our amendments, assisting a designated body, or accepting money or any sort of benefit from it, would carry a sentence of up to 25 years. We believe that the sentence for supporting such a body, which is 14 years or a fine, should be increased for those actively assisting it, or receiving material benefit from it.
My good friend my right hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Sir Oliver Dowden) rightly set out the experience of our Jewish communities. They are terrified and they are suffering, and this Bill will go some way towards helping them. He also rightly touched on the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood is difficult to address, because it is not an organisation, although some like to talk about it as if it was. It must be tackled in the same way as an ideology such as Nazism, and we must find a way of dealing with it, because those who subscribe to its ideology are using funds to undermine this country. I also welcome his managing to include a discussion around AI in this debate. I thank the hon. Member for Leeds South West and Morley (Mark Sewards) for raising the point about our need to stand by our Jewish communities.
My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) was absolutely right about concerns around the need for engagement with the IRGC or similar bodies to be for “a prohibited purpose”. There is no good reason for that threshold at this point. He pointed out that there is a very clear distinction in the legislation between supporting on the one hand, and assisting or receiving material benefit on the other. The Government must explain why they are treating those separately.
It was a pleasure to listen to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East (Bob Blackman), who has been clear-eyed for a long time about the threat from the IRGC and the Iranians. He is particularly right to raise concerns about charities and the way in which they are exploited. The openness of our society is a strength, but of course it also provides more points of entry for those seeking to harm us. He also rightly touched on the impact on our Jewish communities, as so many on both sides of the House did. It is because of that impact that our amendment requiring prosecution of those who fly flags or wear uniforms in support of these organisations must be considered. Even last weekend, we saw people marching through Jewish communities, flying the flags of proscribed organisations to intimidate and scare.
I thank my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat) for once again sharing the work he did with Jo Cox—I know that they were very good friends. I think we all remember where we were when we heard of her brutal murder, and this House has less heart as a result of her loss. My right hon. and gallant Friend was absolutely right to mention the Islamic Centre of England—we must give the Charity Commission the power to shut down such organisations. He was also right to touch on TikTok; few have as much expertise as he does in this area. It is a weaponised platform. China does not allow its own children to have access to it, and countries such as India have taken action to say that they will not have it in their country. We must protect our country.
I now turn to the difficulty that the Government can no longer escape. The gaps in this Bill have been named; we will discuss them in more detail shortly in Committee, but they are on the amendment paper. If they are waved away tonight, not in ignorance but in full knowledge, no one will be able to call this haste any longer; it will have become a decision. It will be a decision to put in place weaker powers against hostile states than those we already hold against the terrorists those states fund, to leave a plot that is merely planned beyond the reach of the law, and to let inspired attackers fall through a gap that our terrorism law rightly closed two decades ago. It will, I fear, be a decision made to suit a timetable that has everything to do with internal party politics, rather than the threat. It will not be the Prime Minister’s decision alone—it will belong to every Member who walks through the Lobby to oppose the amendments tonight.
I say directly to Government Members, to all those who have spoken so powerfully—I thank every Member for being so clear-eyed about the threats that the IRGC, the Chinese, the Russians and the North Koreans pose to our country—that they did not campaign for so long for a Bill containing these powers just for them to fall at the first legal hurdle. They did not demand action against hostile states just to hand them a gentler regime than we use for terrorists. The amendments before them are not Opposition traps; they are the protections we need, and I think many Government Members feel in their gut that they are needed. I came to this place because national security had been my career—tackling terrorist groups such as Daesh and tackling the Russian Government. I stand by the offer I made to the Government, in the spirit I always make it. I am not here to frustrate this Bill; I am here to complete it. Take the amendments and lay them as Government amendments, or lay them in the Lords. We do not want to make this party political; we just want to close the holes in the Bill. Accepting an amendment that ends the absurdity of having a higher bar for the sponsor than for the terrorist is the right thing to do.
In Committee, I will take the House through all 13 amendments we have tabled, clause by clause, to highlight what stands between the Bill in its current state and what it should be. It is not ideology, not a desire to delay, and not politics; it is time that was not given. Strip away the procedure: two years from now, there will be a prosecution, and we need to ensure that we do not allow a defendant to be freed by words written in haste. In the end, this is not about us, the timetable, or whose name sits at the top of the amendment paper—it is about protecting our people and giving our police what they need. I support the Bill, which is why I have spent hours and hours over the past week trying to get it right. I urge the Government to work cross-party, accept our amendments—be it here or in the other place—and ensure we give our police and prosecutors the power that we all know they will not fully have without those amendments.
The Minister for Security (Dame Angela Eagle)
I thank all right hon. and hon. Members who have spoken in today’s Second Reading debate. We have had a very powerful and relevant debate, with a great deal of expertise in the Chamber from both sides of the House.
State threats are overt or covert actions by foreign Governments that fall below the level of armed conflict, but go beyond legitimate diplomacy to harm UK interests. They present a persistent and evolving risk to the UK and our allies, and that evolution and the hybrid nature of the threats we face today has come across in all the many excellent contributions we have heard from Members on both sides of the House. There is cross-party recognition that the threats we are dealing with are increasingly complex, and rapidly changing and evolving. They manifest across a wide spectrum of activity, including interference in democratic processes, acquisition of sensitive information, threats to public safety and disruption of economic security. We all know—it has been mentioned by many hon. and right hon. Members—that certain states have the intent and capability to conduct such activity to advance their objectives. We have talked about Iran, Russia and China. Such activity is often opportunistic. It is adaptive, and it is increasingly integrated across multiple domains, combining physical, cyber, economic and international tools. Increasingly, as has been pointed out, it involves new and emerging tools such as AI, as well as TikTok, cyber, AI and a range of other things.
In December 2024, the former Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract, Castleford and Knottingley (Yvette Cooper), commissioned the independent reviewer of state threats legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, to conduct a review into the tools available in terrorism legislation to see how they might be applied to the problem of state threats. He proposed that there should be legislation to create a state threats power equivalent to that of proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000, and although the Bill does not deliver the recommendations of the entire Jonathan Hall report, it does deliver that proposal. To that extent, it is a narrow, not a comprehensive Bill. It is important that Members from all parts of the House understand that that is what the Bill does.
Rather than trying to shoehorn everything else into this Bill, it is important that we understand the nature of the Bill and what it actually does. It strengthens the Government’s ability to disrupt hostile intelligence services and their proxies by adapting counter-terrorism tools to tackle state-based security threats to the UK. It seeks to close that loophole. It creates a new power for the Secretary of State to designate organisations involved in foreign power threat activity, modelled on the Terrorism Act 2000. It introduces three new criminal offences of supporting, assisting or obtaining benefits from designated bodies. The Bill will enable proxy organisations to be treated in practice like foreign intelligence services, making it easier to prosecute those acting on their behalf. It strengthens the overall national security framework so that the UK becomes a more difficult operating environment for foreign intelligence services and their state-linked proxies.
Individuals acting for a designated body will feel the full force of our national security legislation and the potential accompanying prison sentences of up to 14 years. Designation will send a clear public signal to bodies and those prepared to assist them that their malign behaviour will not be tolerated in the UK. Our manifesto committed to adapt the approach used for dealing with terrorism to state-based security threats, and that is precisely what the Bill does.
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) is a passionate responder at the Dispatch Box, and her interest in this area and her commitment to getting it right are clear. The Government have been working on this legislation since Jonathan Hall made his recommendation. The Prime Minister, in the light of the arson incidents that we saw in north London earlier this year, gave a firm commitment to legislate in a matter of weeks, and we are doing just that to close this loophole on state or proxy-based threats.
To be clear, this legislation is no less robust than the Terrorism Act 2000. As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary said, Jonathan Hall said that using terror legislation is
“shopping in the wrong department”.
This Bill will ensure that we are shopping in the right department.
Sir John Hayes
I accept what Jonathan Hall said, but what he did not say was that a higher statutory bar was needed to achieve a prosecution. What worries some of us, including my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) and me, is that the addition of that will make it quite hard to achieve a prosecution under the proposed law, not least because the Bill suggests that there must be a criminal purpose—an illicit purpose—involved in the association with a designated body. Will the Minister address that specific point?
Dame Angela Eagle
I think that there are some necessary differences between a terrorist organisation and a state-influenced or state proxy organisation, which the differences between the Bill and the National Security Act—which deals with terrorism—seek to bring out. Jonathan Hall said that the Bill “does the job” in closing that loophole. He also told the House that he thought it would be harder to achieve the prosecutions for designated organisations than those for terrorist organisations. The Bill builds on a tried and tested series of measures in the National Security Act, and we have developed it closely with operational partners. It does the job. We do not believe that it is tougher to get appropriate prosecutions up and running in this context.
Tom Tugendhat
No one, I think, respects Jonathan Hall more than we do. He has done an exceptional job for this country in many different ways. He is a man of the highest integrity and the greatest intellect, and we are very lucky to have him.
Given that it seems unlikely that the Home Secretary or the Minister will accept amendments today—I am sorry about that, but I heard their views—will the Minister engage in a conversation between now and the Bill’s passage through the House of Lords? There is a moment when we could introduce amendments that we feel would be of assistance to the Government and, in fact, would make us all stronger.
Dame Angela Eagle
I am more than happy to create a circumstance in which we can do that. I think there have been some misunderstandings about what protections are offered in the Bill, and some of the amendments seek to address gaps that are not actually there. However, I am more than happy to deal with that, and I will be in touch with the right hon. Gentleman to organise it before the Bill goes to the House of Lords.
The hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) said that the Bill did not take into account activity outside the UK. She was wrong to say that that was not covered. The offences capture activity outside the UK where it is contrary to the safety or interests of the UK, and case law has made it clear that the definition of “safety and interests of the UK” is wide. As I have said, we have worked closely with operational partners to shape the Bill, and we are confident that it will provide the powers that are needed. There have been successful prosecutions under the National Security Act, which demonstrates that powers of this kind work.
Alicia Kearns
Yes, the law specifically covers UK citizens who then travel abroad to commit a crime in support of these proscribed groups. However, it explicitly states that that does not apply if they are planning the crimes here in the UK and they happen abroad, unless it is prejudicial to the safety of the UK. It would be very straightforward for a lawyer to argue that something that takes place in Iraq is not prejudicial to the safety of the UK.
When I met Foreign Office and Home Office lawyers last night, they said it was “likely” that that would be captured. I said, “I recognise that ‘likely’ is hopeful, but it is not absolute.” [Interruption.] The Minister will be able to answer in a moment. I am formally repeating the conversation that I had, a conversation that was requested, in which I was told that this was “likely”. That is very different from saying, “We will be able to prosecute, and we must be able to do so.” We should be wanting to pass clarifying amendments to put additional protections into law so that it is watertight, to ensure that the actions of anyone in Manchester planning something abroad will definitely be captured.
Dame Angela Eagle
I suspect that lawyers often use words like “likely”, because they are very rarely ready to commit to “absolutely”. Perhaps we need to deal with some of this in more detail in Committee, but we are assured that overseas activity will be covered in the interactions of this Bill, and case law makes that more likely.
I am loath to go through in detail the Committee-style points that were made during the debate. What I will say is that designation is the closest we can get to state-inspired and connected proxies or organisations, so that we can prevent them from behaving in the way that they are behaving on our streets day in, day out. A designation will allow us to ensure that we capture and prosecute the malign activity in which hybrid and state actors involve themselves, so this Bill closes the gap that Jonathan Hall discovered in the National Security Act.
We wish to get the Bill on the statute book so that we can deal with the rising threats on our streets, which many Members on both sides of the House mentioned in their Second Reading speeches. I am extremely grateful that all Front Benchers support the Bill and will not vote against it, and I look forward to dealing with some of the amendments in much greater detail in Committee. I urge the House to give this Bill a Second Reading.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time; to stand committed to a Committee of the whole House (Order, this day).
National Security (State Threats) Bill
Wednesday 17th June 2026
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate National Security (State Threats) Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Committee of the whole House Amendments as at 17 June 2026 - (17 Jun 2026)
18:07 - divided: - Ayes: 85 / Noes: 317 - Question accordingly negatived.
18:21 - divided: - Ayes: 143 / Noes: 249 - Question accordingly negatived.
18:32 - The Committee divided: - Ayes: 135 / Noes: 258 - Question accordingly negatived.
18:44 - The House divided: - Ayes: 144 / Noes: 244 - Question accordingly negatived.
Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 16, page 2, line 12, at end insert—
“33AA Conduct relevant to designation
(1) For the purposes of section 33A, a body is to be regarded as involved in foreign power threat activity if the Secretary of State reasonably believes that the body is, or has been, involved in—
(a) transnational repression;
(b) abusive lawfare;
(c) sanctions evasion connected to a foreign power, a designated body or foreign power threat activity;
(d) the concealment, movement or control of assets for or on behalf of a foreign power or a body acting for or on behalf of a foreign power; or
(e) conduct which enables, facilitates, assists or conceals any activity falling within paragraphs (a) to (d).
(2) For the purposes of this section, “transnational repression” means conduct carried out by, for, or on behalf of, or with the intention of benefiting, a foreign power, where the conduct has the purpose, or effect, of intimidating, coercing, punishing, silencing, controlling or retaliating against—
(a) a person in the United Kingdom;
(b) a United Kingdom national;
(c) a person resident in the United Kingdom;
(d) a person with a substantial connection to the United Kingdom; or
(e) a family member, associate or representative of a person falling within paragraphs (a) to (d).
(3) Conduct falling within subsection (2) includes, but is not limited to—
(a) surveillance, harassment, intimidation, threats or coercion;
(b) threats or reprisals against family members or associates overseas;
(c) forced return, attempted forced return, abduction or attempted abduction;
(d) misuse of criminal, civil, immigration, extradition or administrative processes;
(e) misuse of Interpol notices or other international police cooperation mechanisms;
(f) targeting of journalists, activists, human rights defenders, lawyers, political opponents, dissidents, whistleblowers or members of diaspora communities; and
(g) conduct intended to conceal, enable or facilitate any activity falling within paragraphs (a) to (f).
(4) For the purposes of this section, “abusive lawfare” means the use, or threatened use, of legal, regulatory, administrative, criminal, civil, immigration, extradition or other proceedings where the predominant purpose, or one of the predominant purposes, is to—
(a) intimidate, silence, punish or deter a person from engaging in public interest speech, journalism, advocacy, democratic participation or human rights work;
(b) deter investigation or scrutiny of corruption, human rights abuses, sanctions evasion, hostile state activity or foreign power threat activity;
(c) impose disproportionate cost, delay, pressure or reputational harm on the target; or
(d) protect, conceal or advance the interests of a foreign power or a body acting for or on behalf of a foreign power.
(5) Proceedings, or threatened proceedings, are not abusive merely because they are brought by, or on behalf of, a foreign power, or a person connected to a foreign power.
(6) For the purposes of this section, “sanctions evasion” means conduct which has the purpose, or effect, of enabling or facilitating the evasion, circumvention or frustration of—
(a) sanctions imposed under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018;
(b) asset-freezing measures;
(c) trade sanctions;
(d) export controls;
(e) immigration restrictions;
(f) public procurement restrictions; or
(g) any other restrictive measure imposed by or under an enactment for the purpose of protecting the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.
(7) Nothing in this section is to be read as preventing legal advice, representation or advocacy, provided that such activity is not undertaken for the purpose of facilitating foreign power threat activity, transnational repression, sanctions evasion, abusive lawfare or the concealment of assets connected to a designated body.”
This amendment would specify categories of conduct that may be regarded as involvement in foreign power threat activity for the purposes of designation.
The First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Judith Cummins)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 15, page 2, line 42, at end insert—
“33C Mandatory review following designation
(1) Where regulations are made under section 33A designating a body, the Secretary of State must, within 30 days of the regulations being made, conduct a review of whether further action should be taken in relation to—
(a) the designated body;
(b) any person who owns or controls the designated body;
(c) any person owned or controlled by the designated body;
(d) any officer, employee, agent, member or representative of the designated body;
(e) any person acting for or on behalf of the designated body;
(f) any person who materially assists the designated body; and
(g) any person who provides funds, economic resources, professional services, goods, technology or other material support to the designated body.
(2) The review under subsection (1) must consider whether it is appropriate to take, recommend or request action including—
(a) designation under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018;
(b) asset-freezing measures;
(c) travel bans or other immigration restrictions;
(d) director disqualification;
(e) public procurement exclusion;
(f) civil recovery, restraint, freezing or forfeiture action;
(g) referral to Companies House, the National Crime Agency, the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, the Financial Conduct Authority, the Solicitors Regulation Authority, the Bar Standards Board, HM Revenue and Customs, the Charity Commission, the Electoral Commission or any other relevant authority;
(h) enhanced beneficial ownership checks;
(i) enhanced reporting requirements; and
(j) any other action necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.
(3) In conducting a review under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the Treasury;
(b) the Secretary of State responsible for foreign, Commonwealth and development affairs;
(c) the National Crime Agency; and
(d) any other Minister of the Crown or public authority as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(4) Within 30 days of a body being designated under section 33A, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a statement confirming—
(a) that the review required by this section has been conducted;
(b) what categories of action listed in subsection (2) have been considered;
(c) whether any such action has been taken, recommended or requested; and
(d) where no such action has been taken, recommended or requested, the reasons for that decision.
(5) A statement under subsection (4) may omit information where the Secretary of State considers that publication of that information would be contrary to the interests of national security, international relations, the prevention or detection of serious crime, or the protection of ongoing legal proceedings.
(6) The Secretary of State must keep under review whether further action under subsection (2) is required in relation to a designated body and persons connected to it.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State, within 30 days of designating a body, to review whether further action should be taken against the body and persons connected to it, and to lay a statement of the outcome before Parliament.
Clause stand part.
Amendment 3, in clause 2, page 3, line 8, leave out from “body” until end of line 9.
This amendment and Amendments 4 to 6 would remove the additional defence of supporting a designated body for a non-prohibited purpose.
Amendment 4, page 3, line 16, leave out from “body” until end of line 17.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 3.
Amendment 5, page 3, line 21, leave out from “body” until end of line 22.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 3.
Amendment 6, page 3, leave out lines 23 to 25.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 3.
Amendment 1, page 4, line 23, at end insert—
“(3A) The conduct specified in subsection (3) includes establishing, administering or maintaining a company, trust, partnership or similar arrangement which conceals, or is intended to conceal, the beneficial ownership of assets connected with a designated body.”
Amendment 8, page 4, line 27, after “United Kingdom” insert
“or are conducted outside, but were planned from within, the United Kingdom”.
Amendment 7, page 5, line 15, leave out “14” and insert “25”.
This amendment would increase the maximum sentence for assisting a designated body from 14 years to 25 years imprisonment.
Amendment 11, page 6, leave out lines 21 to 23.
This amendment would remove the defence of reasonable excuse for retaining a material benefit provided by or on behalf of a designated body.
Amendment 12, page 6, line 38, leave out “(7) or”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 11.
Amendment 9, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“17D Uniform and publication of images in relation to a designated body
(1) A person in a public place commits an offence if he—
(a) wears an item of clothing, or
(b) wears, carries or displays an article
in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a supporter of a designated body.
(2) A person commits an offence if the person publishes an image of—
(a) an item of clothing, or
(b) any other article,
in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a supporter of a designated body.
(3) In subsection (2) the reference to an image is a reference to a still or moving image (produced by any means).
(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale (or both).
(5) A constable may seize an item of clothing or any other article if the constable—
(a) reasonably suspects that it is evidence in relation to an offence under subsection (1), and
(b) is satisfied that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent the evidence being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed.
(6) In connection with exercising the power in subsection (5), a constable may require a person to remove the item of clothing or other article if the person is wearing it.
(7) But the powers conferred by subsections (5) and (6) may not be exercised so as to seize, or require a person to remove, an item of clothing being worn next to the skin or immediately over a garment being worn as underwear.”
This amendment would create an offence of wearing or displaying in public, or publishing an image of, an article in a way that arouses reasonable suspicion that a person is a supporter of a designated body.
Amendment 10, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“17D Preparation of acts relating to a designated body
(1) A person commits an offence if, with the intention of—
(a) committing an offence under section 17A, 17B or 17C, or
(b) assisting another to commit such an offence,
the person engages in any conduct in preparation for giving effect to the intention.
(2) It is irrelevant for the purposes of subsection (1) whether the intention and preparations relate to one or more particular offences, offences of a particular description, or such offences generally.
(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or a fine (or both).”
This amendment would create an offence of engaging in conduct in preparation for committing, or assisting another to commit, an offence relating to a designated body.
Amendment 13, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“17D Self-directing acts in support of a designated body
(1) A person commits an offence if the person engages in conduct of any kind which is—
(a) inspired by the ideology, actions, and self-promotion of a designated body, and
(b) prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.
(2) A person commits an offence if the person—
(a) engages in UK-related activities that are likely to assist the stated, or assumed, aims of a designated body, and
(b) knows, or having regard to other matters known to them ought to reasonably to know, that their activities are likely to assist the stated, or assumed, aims of a designated body.
(3) UK-related activities” means—
(a) activities taking place in the United Kingdom;
(b) activities taking place outside the United Kingdom which are prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.
(4) Subsections (1) and (2) apply to conduct outside the United Kingdom, but apply to conduct taking place wholly outside the United Kingdom only if the person engaging in the conduct—
(ab) is a UK person, or
(b) acts for or on behalf of, or holds office under, the Crown, or is in Crown employment (whether or not they engage in the conduct in that capacity).
(5) In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence to show that the person engaged in the conduct in question—
(a) in compliance with a legal obligation under the law of the United Kingdom which is not a legal obligation under private law,
(b) in the case of a person having functions of a public nature under the law of the United Kingdom, for the purposes of those functions,
(c) as a lawyer carrying on a legal activity, or
(d) in accordance with, or in relation to Uk-related activities carried out in accordance with, an agreement or arrangement to which—
(i) the United Kingdom was a party, or
(ii) any person acting for, or on behalf of, or holding office under, the Crown was (in that capacity) a party.
(6) A person is taken to have shown a matter mentioned in subsection (5) if—
(a) sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and
(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(7) A person who commits an office under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or a fine (or both).
(8) The following terms have the same meaning as in section 3—
“Crown employment” ;
“financial benefit” ;
The “law of the United Kingdom”;
“lawyer” ;
“legal activity” ;
“UK person” .”
This amendment creates a new offence of undertaking conduct harmful or prejudicial to UK interests that is inspired by a designated body, rather than actively commissioned on behalf of a designated body.
Amendment 14, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“17D Dissemination of publications relating to a designated body
(1) A person commits an offence if the person engages in conduct falling within subsection (2) and, at the time of doing so—
(a) intends an effect of the conduct to be a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to support, or to provide assistance to, a designated body, or
(b) is reckless as to whether the conduct has that effect.
(2) A person engages in conduct falling within this subsection if the person—
(a) distributes or circulates a publication relating to a designated body;
(b) gives, sells or lends such a publication;
(c) offers such a publication for sale or loan;
(d) provides a service to others that enables them to obtain, read, listen to or look at such a publication, or to acquire it by means of a gift, sale or loan;
(e) transmits the contents of such a publication electronically; or
(f) has such a publication in the person's possession with a view to its becoming the subject of conduct falling within any of paragraphs (a) to (e).
(3) For the purposes of this section a publication relates to a designated body if matter contained in it is likely to be understood by a reasonable person as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to support, or to provide assistance to, a designated body.
(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to show that—
(a) the matter by reference to which the publication was treated as relating to a designated body neither expressed the person's views nor had the person's endorsement, and
(b) it was clear, in all the circumstances of the conduct, that the matter did not express the person's views and did not have the person's endorsement.
(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or a fine (or both).”
This amendment would create an offence of disseminating, or possessing with a view to disseminating, a publication that encourages support for or assistance to a designated body.
Clause 2 stand part.
Amendment 2, in clause 3, page 7, line 27, at end insert—
“(5) Regulations under subsection (3) may not be made unless a draft of the statutory instrument containing them has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”
This amendment ensures that any regulation under section 33C made by the Secretary of State to remove a designation is subject to the draft affirmative procedure.
Clauses 3 to 8 stand part.
New clause 3—Designation of the IRGC—
“(1) The Secretary of State must take reasonable steps to lay before Parliament regulations under the provisions of this Act to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a body involved in foreign power threat activity.
(2) Before laying such regulations, the Secretary of State must be satisfied that the IRGC fulfils the conditions set out in Section 1 of this Act.
(3) The regulations specified in subsection (1) should be laid before Parliament within a month of this Act coming into force.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to take reasonable steps to bring forward regulations designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) within a month of this Act coming into force.
New clause 4—Assessment of the adequacy of the powers contained in the Act—
“(1) Within twelve months of passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must commission the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation or another such person performing a similar function to produce a report on the adequacy of the powers contained in this Act.
(2) The report specified in subsection (1) must consider the effectiveness of the Act’s powers in tackling the threat posed by state-backed and state-linked actors to the security of the United Kingdom.
(3) The report specified in subsection (1) must include any proposals for legislative changes to the provisions of the Act as are considered necessary by the Independent Reviewer.
(4) As soon as receiving the report, and no later than three months after receiving it, the Secretary of State must lay the report before both Houses of Parliament.
(5) Within three months of laying the report before Parliament, the Secretary of State must publish a response to the report and to any recommendations made by the Independent Reviewer.”
This new clause would require the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation to assess the adequacy of the powers introduced by this Act twelve months after its passing.
New clause 5—Seizure of Passports etc from Person Suspected of Assisting a Designated Body—
“(1) This section applies in the case of a person at a port in Great Britain, Northern Ireland, or in the border area, if a constable has reasonable grounds to suspect that the person—
(a) is there with the intention of leaving Great Britain or Northern Ireland for the purpose of assisting a designated body outside the United Kingdom; or
(b) has arrived in Great Britain or Northern Ireland with the intention of leaving it soon for that purpose.
(2) The constable may—
(a) exercise any of the powers in sub-paragraph (4) in the case of the person, or
(b) direct a qualified officer to do so.
(3) A qualified officer must (if able to do so) comply with any direction given by a constable under sub-paragraph (2)(b).
(4) The powers are—
(a) to require the person to hand over all travel documents in the person’s possession to the constable or (as the case may be) the qualified officer;
(b) to search for travel documents relating to the person and to take possession of any that the constable or officer finds;
(c) to inspect any travel document relating to the person; and
(d) to retain any travel document relating to the person that is lawfully in the possession of the constable or officer.
(5) The power in sub-paragraph (4)(b) is a power to search—
(a) the person;
(b) anything that the person has with him or her; and
(c) any vehicle in which the officer believes the person to have been travelling or to be about to travel.
(6) A constable or qualified officer—
(a) may stop a person or vehicle for the purpose of exercising a power in sub-paragraph (4)(a) or (b);
(b) may if necessary use reasonable force for the purpose of exercising a power in sub-paragraph (4)(a) or (b); and
(c) may authorise a person to carry out on the constable's or officer's behalf a search under sub-paragraph (4)(b).
(7) A constable or qualified officer exercising a power in sub-paragraph (4)(a) or (b) must tell the person that—
(a) the person is suspected of intending to leave Great Britain or (as the case may be) the United Kingdom for the purpose of assisting a designated body, and
(b) the constable or officer is therefore entitled under this Schedule to exercise the power.
(8) Where a travel document relating to the person is in the possession of an immigration officer or customs official (whether a qualified officer or not), the constable may direct the officer or official—
(a) to pass the document to a constable as soon as practicable, and
(b) in the meantime to retain it,
the officer or official must comply with any such direction.”
This new clause would replicate existing powers to seize travel documents from individuals suspected of terrorism, applying those powers in relation to individuals suspected of assisting a designated body
New clause 6—Police powers to apply for serious crime prevention orders in designation cases—
“(1) The Serious Crime Act 2007 is amended as follows.
(2) In Section 8, after subsection (2)(a) insert—
“(ab) it is an application for an order under section 1 that is related to an offence committed under section 2 of the National Security (State Threats) Act 2026.””
This new clause allows police to apply for serious crime prevention orders in relation to offences committed under this Act.
New clause 7—Sanctions—
“(1) The Secretary of State may make regulations under the provisions of Section 1 of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 to subject any—
(a) body designated under the National Security (State Threats) Act 2026, or
(b) a person who commits an offence under section (2) of that Act
to any available sanction within that Act.”
This new clause would ensure that any body designated under this Act, or any person who commits an offence under this Act, may be subject to the sanctions regime set out in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018.
The schedule.
Alicia Kearns
We have tabled 13 amendments, not to frustrate the Bill but to give it the necessary teeth. This Bill is soft where it should be hard, silent where it should speak, and blind where it should see. It is soft because, as drafted, it sets a higher bar to prosecute a person who supports the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps than a person who supports the terrorists whom the IRGC funds and commands; it is silent because whole categories of hostile conduct that our terrorism laws have criminalised for 20 years are simply missing; and it is blind because it has been written for one organisation on one timetable, with almost no provision for future designations. Good will is not enough, and we must close the holes that our enemies will exploit.
The Government have lifted much of this legislation from section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000, yet they have added something that does not appear in the terrorism offence: a requirement that support was given for a prohibited purpose that was prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United Kingdom. Let me ask the Minister the simple question that this Bill invites: what level of support for the IRGC do the Government consider beneficial to the United Kingdom? The IRGC is the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism, and if she agrees that there is no level of support for it that is beneficial to the UK, we can simply remove the prohibited purpose. She has just said from the Dispatch Box that she agrees that there is absolutely none, so let us act and amend the Bill.
Under the Bill as drafted, to convict someone who supports the IRGC the prosecution must prove that their support was prejudicial to the safety or interest of the UK—an additional threshold—but that requirement does not exist in terrorism law. To convict someone who supports Hamas, Hezbollah or the Houthis—the proxies that the IRGC arms and funds—there is no such hurdle, so the body that inspires, organises arms and funds the terrorists is handed a protection in law that the terrorist himself is denied. That is the difference between a prosecution that succeeds and one that never gets off the ground, and I know something about prosecutions that fail at the last moment. Our amendment 3 simply removes the extra defence and brings this offence into line with the terrorism law from which it is drawn.
I recognise that the Government may seek to argue that state entities enjoy protections in international law that terrorists do not, that we must set a higher bar than in equivalent terrorism legislation and that acting prejudicially to the UK’s interests is a reasonable test. However, state immunity protects the Iranian state from being sued or prosecuted in our courts, and it has nothing to do with the British resident who chooses to fund or promote the IRGC. We are not prosecuting Tehran; we are prosecuting the person here who does its work. The proposition that the Minister is left defending is that supporting the world’s biggest sponsor of terrorism should be harder to prosecute than supporting the groups it sponsors. That is not a higher bar; it is international lawyers tying the hands of Ministers who are meant to be keeping us safe.
On amendments 11 and 12, the same instinct to protect where we should prosecute runs through subsection (7) of proposed new section 17C, which makes a reasonable excuse a defence for accepting and keeping a material benefit from a designated body. That is not necessary, because there are already protections in the Bill for, for example, a lawyer or somebody who has no ability to know that funds were being taken. I recognise that such a provision is in the National Security Act 2023, but that is not a reason to repeat a weakness, and we have an opportunity to fix it. There is no excuse for keeping a hostile state’s money—not in this Bill and not in the Act it leans on.
The sentencing gets the gravity backwards. As drafted, supporting a designated body and actively assisting one carries the same maximum sentence of 14 years or a fine.
Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)
Before my hon. Friend moves on to fines, the issue she has raised, and which I raised earlier, seems to be crucial. It is true that Jonathan Hall, as the Minister said on Second Reading, recognised that the approach to a terrorist organisation was different from the approach to a state. Nevertheless, creating this higher bar whereby to secure a successful prosecution it must be established that the individual concerned was acting on behalf of the designated body for a prohibited purpose—connection with the body alone is not sufficient—seems to me to make prosecution less likely rather than more likely. If international law is at the heart of that—the fear of appeals, and so on and so forth—we need to hear that from the Minister, and the case needs to be a highly persuasive, because it seems to me that the Government are making their lives more difficult, rather than easier.
Alicia Kearns
That is exactly the crux of the point I made in my speech on Second Reading. We should not set a higher threshold, because we will see prosecutions collapse for exactly that reason. We need to be arming prosecutors to go and get the justice that our country needs to better protect us.
Turning to the maximum sentence of 14 years, actively doing a hostile state organ’s work—moving its money, carrying its information, committing violence on its behalf—is graver than just supporting it. It is a kind of treason, and I suspect most British people would call it that. We urge the Government to consider having a higher potential sentence for actively working with or receiving material benefit from a designated body. Amendment 7 would therefore raise that maximum sentence from 14 years to 25 years. That figure is not plucked from the air; it matches the Australian regime under which the IRGC was listed last November. As I have said, the Government may argue that the 14 year maximum sentence is taken from the NSA 2023, but let us raise the maximum sentence in both. After all, we are talking about treason.
On amendment 10, I turn from where the Bill is too soft to where it says nothing at all. This is one of the gaps about which the Government have offered no answer, and I have looked hard for one. Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006 makes preparing an act of terrorism an offence, but this Bill contains no equivalent. As the Bill is drafted, a person can plan to assist a designated organ—to be straightforward, let us talk about the IRGC—and unless and until they commit the act, they have committed no offence at all under this Bill. However, the entire purpose of national security work is to prevent and disrupt before harm is done, not to see the plot and clear it up afterwards. We would not tolerate that vulnerability in terrorism law and we should not invent it here. Amendment 10 closes that gap, and lets police and prosecutors act while a plot is still on the drawing board. If the Minister believes preparation is already caught elsewhere, I would welcome her showing me where, but I have yet to be shown that in the briefings I have had.
Amendment 13 recognises that the gap left by preparation is widened by a second omission: self-directed and inspired actors. The Bill misses entirely the person who is never directly commissioned or directed, but who absorbs a hostile state’s propaganda and acts on it alone. Twenty years of counter-terrorism has taught us this lesson at a terrible cost. The gravest or most likely threat is no longer the directed plot, but the individual radicalised online who acts on their own. Hostile states bring the resources, reach and sophistication of states to that propaganda, arguably with a greater inspiring power than any terrorist group can muster. We saw that with the bots that screamed for independence in Scotland and fell silent the moment Tehran’s internet went down, something my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat) raised in his speech earlier. That is just a small insight into the ways they are invested in turning us against each other. A Bill that catches only the commissioned and directed is fighting the last war and leaving us dangerously exposed to the next. Amendment 13 captures those inspired to act by a designated body, but not directed by them.
I turn now to the most dangerous omission of all, which we touched on in the wind-ups on Second Reading, and the omission that would worry our allies and partners, which amendment 8 seeks to address. As drafted, the Bill captures activity in the UK and activity abroad that is “prejudicial” to the UK. It does not catch activity planned here on British soil to be perpetrated abroad where there is no ability to prove that it is prejudicial to the interests of the UK where there is no harm to the UK. Activity by the IRGC in France, Iran or Bosnia, or by the Chinese in Hong Kong, may not be directly prejudicial to the interests of the UK, so again we are adding an unnecessary threshold. But if it is perpetrated here, be it in Manchester, London or anywhere else, we must be able to prosecute those responsible.
In plain terms, the gap was turning the UK into a base for state terrorism: a cell here in Britain planning a campaign of intimidation against a journalist in Dublin on behalf of the IRGC, or a network running sabotage operations in Germany. Arrested and charged, their defence writes itself. If the act was not to take place here in the UK, you cannot argue that it was prejudicial to UK safety. The law does not like ambiguity. We should not leave prosecutors having to argue that an attack on Dublin or Berlin was also somehow an attack on London. Amendment 8 closes that gap directly, so that planning hostile activity from British soil is caught wherever that activity is aimed. If the Government are confident that that scope is already reached, they lose nothing by putting it beyond doubt. Far better to write the law clearly today than to watch a case fall apart on that very point.
The next omission is propaganda itself. Since 2006, it has been an offence to disseminate publications that promote terrorism. The Bill extends no equivalent protection against the propaganda of designated states. We have heard colleagues today talk about publications such as Press TV which, shamefully, former Members of this House appear on and are paid to have shows on. Two of the principal weapons of hostile states are the propaganda that recruits and the disinformation that divides. The Chinese Communist party pushes propaganda and disinformation through the United Front Work Department. I hope these powers will reach it one day, but amendment 14 brings designated bodies within the same standard applied to terrorist publications for 20 years, because I do not in any way think that the Government think that IRGC propaganda should have more latitude than that of a proscribed terrorist group.
Next is an omission that many living in our country, especially our Jewish community, will find the most difficult. Under section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, it is an offence to display in public the insignia of a proscribed organisation. It is the power that we rely on to take Hamas flags, Hezbollah banners and the symbols of Hizb ut-Tahrir off our streets. The Bill as drafted contains no equivalent provision whatever, so if the amendment is not accepted by the Government, either now or in the other place, the flag of the IRGC may fly lawfully on a British street, glorifying every stabbing, every attack on our Jewish communities, every kidnap plot and every assassination attempt that the regime has directed here. How do we look the people who are being hunted in the eye and tell them that the banner of their hunter is welcome on our streets?
The Government may say that criminalising the display of state symbols brings lawful state activity under UK criminal law, contrary to diplomatic convention, and that by reciprocity, hostile states could criminalise the Union Jack and UK uniforms abroad, exposing our personnel and dual nationals. I have taken the time to consider that. Yes, state immunity protects foreign states in our courts, but it should not and does not dictate what a resident of this country may do on British pavements.
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dame Angela Eagle)
I have to commend the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) for doing her homework. I wish to explain why we do not think these amendments are needed at the moment.
There are a couple of themes that run through my response to the hon. Lady’s amendments. The first is that it is not possible to treat a state body the same as a terrorist organisation, because one cannot abolish a state body. One has to think about the differences between the two, which is why we have called the measure closing the loophole in this Bill designation, rather than proscription. It is also the case that we clearly have other international obligations, both under international law, for the sovereignty of individual states, and under diplomatic law, with the Vienna convention, so that we can enable diplomatic relations or other arrangements with states that we might not approve of particularly. Within that difference lie some of the different approaches in the Bill and in the hon. Lady’s amendments.
The other common theme, which perhaps divides us in our approach to the Bill, as well as explaining the differences and why we will not be accepting the hon. Lady’s amendments, is that we are not trying to put all of Jonathan Hall’s recommendations on to the statute book in this Bill. As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary said in her opening remarks, we have accepted all the recommendations in Jonathan Hall’s report and will be legislating for them subsequently. What we wish to do with this quite narrow Bill is close that loophole with state-sponsored or proxy organisations as quickly as possible so that we can deal with the rising threats present on our streets as we speak. It may help to bear those two things in mind as I lay out the Government’s position regarding the amendments that the hon. Lady has just spoken to.
Through amendments 3 to 6, the hon. Lady seeks to remove the prohibited purpose test. The test is there precisely to cover the difference in treatment between terrorist organisations and states, which we cannot proscribe and with which we may have to have some kind of arrangements. While the Bill is modelled on the provisions in the Terrorism Act 2000, it has to reflect the realities of dealing with state entities. That is what the prohibited purpose test is about. There may be some cases where UK persons need to have legitimate dealings with a state entity; it might be a British diplomat or a non-governmental organisation delivering humanitarian aid. The prohibited purpose test is necessary to protect legitimate conduct without creating loopholes that can be exploited by hostile actors.
Sir John Hayes
I am glad that the Minister has addressed that point, because it was raised by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) and I on Second Reading. Surely the counter-argument is that it will be a sure defence when prosecutions are brought; it will be much harder to secure a conviction, because the necessity to prove a purpose will be tested beyond measure. The association with a state-sponsored organisation such as, for example, the IRGC is ipso facto proof, surely, of guilt.
Dame Angela Eagle
Action that is prejudicial to the safety and interests of the UK is the test that we are talking about. If one were delivering humanitarian aid and had to deal with part of a state that we did not particularly approve of, that would not be prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. It would be in line with what the UK wished to do, but if it were prejudicial, because it was hostile activity, the test would be passed.
Alicia Kearns
The Minister gives the example of a diplomat, and she is right that our diplomats in Tehran will need to engage with the IRGC—it is nonsense to suggest that they would not be able to do so—but that is why there is a specific exception for that in the Bill. Proposed new section 17A(5) refers to a person who
“acts for or on behalf of, or holds office under, the Crown, or is in Crown employment (whether or not they engage in the conduct in that capacity).”
As I have mentioned, I am concerned that that means that anyone who is a traitor and works for the civil service would have protections under any circumstances, but it means that we do not need that additional threshold, because diplomats are already specifically protected in the Bill at another point.
Dame Angela Eagle
It is not only diplomats. It may well be NGOs delivering humanitarian aid and people who have to come across states or their designated proxies in particular cases.
Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)
We need to be clear about which provisions relate to which offences. The offence that I think the Minister has heard concern expressed about, and to which amendment 3 relates, is the offence under proposed new section 17A of the National Security Act 2023—in other words, the offence of supporting a designated organisation. The provisions that relate to protections for those who are acting on behalf of the UK state apply to the other two offences, not to the 17A offence, do they not?
The Minister is of course right that there is a difference between the way in which the UK state needs to interact with another state entity and the way in which it needs to interact with a terrorist entity, but these offences relate to individuals not to states or, indeed, the designated body. We are talking about offences that might be charged against individuals who are themselves accused of supporting that designated body.
Is not the point here—the point has been made several times—that we are setting up an additional hurdle in order to prosecute successfully for an offence of supporting a designated body? As the Minister heard me say on Second Reading, what I am concerned to understand is why that is not duplication, in effect, of the designation process itself, which distinguishes an innocent, perfectly rational state body from one that is up to no good for all the ways described in the designation process. Why do we need the prohibited purposes test in addition to the designation process?
Dame Angela Eagle
I think it is to cover all potential actions that individuals may undertake that are okay; they can assure themselves that an activity is okay, even if it involves a designated state, if it is not prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. Many humanitarian organisations are worried about being inadvertently caught in the designation process, and the prohibited purpose test is there to give assurance in those contexts.
Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)
Earlier today, I and other members of the Foreign Affairs Committee met the head of the International Committee of the Red Cross’s regional delegation to the UK. The ICRC makes the point that while it is not a non-governmental organisation, it needs access to state actors on both sides of a conflict. I am curious about whether the prohibited purpose test is specifically looking to protect NGOs and organisations such as the ICRC, or whether it is also to do with compliance with international law, such as the European convention on human rights.
Dame Angela Eagle
The Bill does accord with the European convention on human rights, international law and all our obligations. The prohibited purpose test is there precisely to give assurance to bodies like the one that the hon. Member mentioned, so that there will not be any dubiety about whether they can engage with the organisations that they must work with as part of their core job.
Alan Gemmell (Central Ayrshire) (Lab)
May I put on record my thanks to the Home Secretary and the team for the speed with which they have addressed the major issues in the Bill? I also thank the Home Secretary for making it clear on Second Reading that the Bill’s provisions will not apply to humanitarian organisations.
Sir Jeremy Wright
I am extremely grateful to the Minister for giving way again. I hope she accepts that I am genuinely trying to ensure that I have understood correctly how the test is supposed to work. I would be grateful if she also addressed the other point that I raised. I understand her argument that the intention is to ensure that, for example, those at NGO level who might engage with a designated body are not held criminally accountable for doing so. However, she will recognise that the Bill deals differently with the offences of assisting or obtaining a material benefit from a designated body. In those cases, there is provision for the defence that she has outlined, but that approach is not taken in relation to supporting a designated body. Can she explain why we have that difference?
Dame Angela Eagle
I think it is about consistency. The Bill was drafted to try to mirror—albeit in a slightly different context—the Terrorism Act provisions, while fitting into the National Security Act’s provisions, so that we do not have a complicated range of tests.
Amendment 7 relates to defences and sentencing. Essentially, the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) wishes to increase the prison sentence for actively assisting to 25 years from the current 14 years. The idea is that 14 years would very much fit in with the sentences under the National Security Act, and we would not end up with a complex range of sentences for quite similar offences. One could increase both, if we were minded to do so, but the point about the introduction of designation in the Bill is that it is trying to fit into the National Security Act, which has been working quite well, rather than our having a whole range of different sentences for very similar offences.
Alicia Kearns
I fully recognise the Minister’s point that she is trying to align the provisions with those in the National Security Act, but as per my argument earlier, let us improve the National Security Act while we are at it. The Minister says that the question is whether she is minded to make the change; I say she should be minded to. If someone actively assists or materially benefits from a hostile state while committing treason, it is absolutely right that they should get a tougher sentence than that for just flying a flag or supporting a hostile state. Those acts are still heinous, but a far worse crime has been committed. I ask the Minister to consider making the change when the Bill is in the Lords.
Dame Angela Eagle
I note the hon. Lady’s point.
Amendment 10 would
“create an offence of engaging in conduct in preparation for committing, or assisting another to commit, an offence relating to a designated body.”
It is not necessary, because a person who engages in conduct of any kind, including preparatory conduct, that is intended to assist a designated body in carrying out UK-related activities would be caught by the Bill’s provisions.
The hon. Lady talked about what she called a loophole; she said that the Bill does not cover attacks inspired by a designated body. Her amendment 13 would create a new offence for self-directed acts inspired by a designated body, but we do not believe it is necessary. The test for the assisting offence in proposed new section 17B of the National Security Act is whether conduct is intended to assist a designated organisation, or whether the person ought to have known that their conduct was likely to assist the organisation. The person does not need to be tasked or directed by the organisation to commit the offence, so those who are inspired to do things, rather than being asked or told to do things by the designated body, are caught.
With amendment 8, the hon. Lady seeks to capture conduct that occurs outside the UK but is planned within the UK. Again, we believe it is unnecessary. If planning takes place in the UK, it is already caught in the Bill, under the offence in proposed new section 17B of assisting a designated body. That offence refers to conduct of any kind, and it will be an offence to plan something in the UK that takes place outside the UK if it materially assists a designated body in carrying out activities that are prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK—the prohibited purpose test. That could cover someone in the UK who assists a designated body in its work, done overseas, to target an ally of the UK, so the amendment is unnecessary.
Amendment 14 would create an offence relating to the dissemination of publications that encourage support for a designated body. The conduct that the amendment seeks to address is already covered by the new offence of supporting a designated body.
I think the hon. Lady wanted people to be criminalised for wearing clothing or displaying flags or similar symbols linked to a designated body. The Bill does not ban the wearing or carrying of an image, because we cannot ban what might be worn by a foreign diplomat, but if somebody is supporting or promoting the hostile activities of a proscribed body in any way, they will be caught by the new support offence. I hope that assures the hon. Lady that that issue is covered.
New clauses 5 and 6 would give effect to other recommendations made by Jonathan Hall by creating new powers to seize travel documents, and to allow police to apply for serious crime prevention orders in relation to offences committed under this legislation. We are committed to legislating on those recommendations and, as my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary announced on Second Reading, we will do so as soon as parliamentary time allows.
The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Caroline Nokes)
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
Max Wilkinson (Cheltenham) (LD)
I want to begin by restating that Liberal Democrats support this Bill. We have long called for action to tackle the threat posed by the IRGC, and we have repeatedly been disappointed by slow progress. The Bill represents a positive step, and a rare moment of agreement on a principle across this House. When it comes to important matters of national security, this is a desirable outcome.
The UK is increasingly targeted by hostile state-backed groups, and the IRGC has been involved in such activity, as we know. Attacks on Britain’s Jewish community in recent months have laid bare the clear and ongoing threat to that community, and also to UK national security. The uptick in antisemitism and the threats against our national security continue, regardless of the politics in this House, and we must bear that in mind when we act urgently to protect Jewish communities. That is why I urge Members across the House to support new clause 3 on the designation of the IRGC. This will provide, after long delays, much-needed certainty for the Jewish community and others that the Government will act at pace by bringing forward regulations within a month of this legislation passing.
Mark Sewards (Leeds South West and Morley) (Lab)
The hon. Gentleman will know that I have called for the proscription of the IRGC numerous times in this House, and that it is something I absolutely want, but does he not accept that we have to pass this legislation, set the framework up and allow the Home Secretary to make an evidence-based decision before proscription is brought into effect? Should he not withdraw this new clause, and allow due process to take its course?
Max Wilkinson
I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. The new clause will not be withdrawn. The sentiment is shared between us, and I think we should appreciate that.
New clause 3 reflects the Government’s stated intention to move by the summer recess, and it ensures that this commitment will be honoured in practice; that would give much reassurance to those watching from outside the House. Importantly, the new clause does not force the Home Secretary to designate the IRGC prematurely; it would have to do so only in line with the coming into force of the rest of the Bill. It does not override due process; nor does it lower the evidential threshold required under the legislation. It ensures that the intelligence gathering and preparatory work necessary for designation are treated as an urgent priority, rather than something that can be continually delayed. This urgency is long overdue.
Liberal Democrats will also support new clause 4, which provides for an independent post-legislative review within 12 months of this legislation passing. This is a crucial safeguard. The Bill introduces significant new powers, and it is essential that their effectiveness and proportionality are independently assessed.
Alicia Kearns
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to want this. However, there is already a requirement under law for Jonathan Hall, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, to review all terrorism legislation and related legislation, including the National Security Act 2023—which this would fall under—every single year, and to report back to Parliament. Hopefully the hon. Gentleman will be reassured that this is already covered in law, and that there is a specific requirement.
Max Wilkinson
The hon. Lady knows much more about this than I do, and I bow to her greater knowledge.
The Home Secretary gave a reassurance on Second Reading that humanitarian organisations would not find their work being criminalised, and the Security Minister has just touched on that point as well. We welcome that further reassurance on the official record, but I have no doubt that the point will be further explored elsewhere when the Bill moves on. I am sure that Members from across the House will agree that the accelerated passage of the Bill through Parliament, which will limit the amount of scrutiny it receives, heightens the imperative for independent post-legislative scrutiny, which may be useful to the Government.
Similarly, we will support amendment 2, which ensures that any decision to remove a designation is subject to the draft affirmative procedure. Again, speed is a factor in this Bill’s passage, as the official Opposition have mentioned a number of times today, and it is likely that this will not be needed in the short to medium term. However, parliamentary oversight should apply not just at the point of designation, but at the point of removal. It is vital that there should be adequate parliamentary scrutiny if a future Home Secretary should seek to remove a designation, and this amendment will enshrine that mechanism.
We also support amendment 1, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for North Norfolk (Steff Aquarone). This amendment closes a critical loophole by making it an offence to use corporate structures to conceal assets belonging to designated individuals or organisations. It would strengthen enforcement against the murky structures which many Members of this House have long opposed. I urge Ministers to consider the merits of the amendment, even if it does not reach a Division today.
The Liberal Democrats will support amendment 8. The Bill refers to “UK-related activities”, but fails to account for activities that are conducted overseas but planned from within the UK. It cannot be right that groups planning attacks on our allies and neighbours are sheltered from the law by this oversight. These actors do not respect traditional borders and so our laws must adequately adapt to meet the challenge. The amendment would close that loophole and, in doing so, strengthen the Bill.
John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Lab)
I declare an interest that I chair, and have done for about five years, a group called Solidarity with the Iranian Workers’ Movement Committee. We formed officially about five years ago and have been working for about 10 or 15 years. It is a group of Iranian refugees and trade unionists in this country, and we have tried to provide solidarity and campaign on human rights issues, focused on trade unionists in Iran. We started informally around the Tehran bus workers’ dispute, if people can remember that taking place, because a lot of the trade unionists we worked with were subsequently arrested and detained, and some were executed. That brought us together in solidarity.
On new clause 3, we have been raising time and again the proscription of the IRGC and have expressed our disappointment at the lack of action by the Government. I understand why the legislation is brought forward, and I hope that it will be brought through effectively and with the impact that we want, particularly on that organisation. Members will remember that we worked with the National Union of Journalists. In this country, the IRGC targeted journalists in particular, and a broadcasting station in Chiswick had to depart and operate from New York for a period.
Although I support the intentions of the legislation, may I also express my reservations about it? I have been in this place long enough to have experience of legislation that has come through not with undue haste, but with haste, and it is in that legislation that we usually make mistakes because we have not taken into account others’ views about the impacts. What worried me was that the explanatory notes—the Secretary of State asked us to look at them in some detail—made clear:
“Given the pace at which this legislation was developed, outside groups have not been engaged on the specifics in the Bill.”
A range of organisations are now expressing concern, such as the Red Cross, and that worries me. That is why rushing a Bill through in one day is precipitous. I am worried that as a result of that, we will legislate poorly. When I say “poorly”, I am referring to incursions on people’s rights; I do not mean the right to in any way defend the organisations or states that many hon. Members referred to on Second Reading, but people’s right to express solidarity with some organisations or even countries in struggle, which we have had in the past.
To cite an example, I am a member of the Cuba Solidarity Campaign. Trump is now targeting Cuba and has designated it as a terrorist state. Under the Government’s proposals, for an organisation to be designated there are two factors, which were set out on Second Reading. First, a body has to have been
“involved in foreign power threat activity”,
as set out in proposed new section 33A of the National Security Act 2023 and in the Bill’s explanatory notes. One of those activities is foreign interference in elections. Secondly, the Secretary of State may designate a body if they believe that
“is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”
In the coming months, even until the next general election if necessary, I will be working in solidarity, through the Cuba Solidarity Campaign, with the current Cuban Government. I will be working to influence that election to ensure that a Government are elected that prevent the hostile attack by the US on Cuba, so that will be seen as foreign interference in an election.
Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con)
The right hon. Gentleman references Cuba in the context of this legislation. The United States has elections—whether they elect the right president or not, is a matter for the Americans—but the Cuban people do not have that luxury. On direct or indirect threats to the United Kingdom’s interests—this is indirect threat—he will know that many Cuban nationals have been sent to Ukraine to fight in Russia’s illegal war. They are killing Ukrainian soldiers and aiding and abetting the bombing of civilians. Putin is losing, but if he did win, Cuba would have been aiding a regime that is not in our national security interest.
John McDonnell
Well, QED. There we have it. Under the Bill, as members of the Cuba Solidarity Campaign, I and many other hon. Members will be committing an offence—
Dame Angela Eagle
I have a great deal of respect for my right hon. Friend, as he knows, but in order for that to be the case, this Government would have to decide to designate the Cuba Solidarity Campaign. Obviously I cannot talk about what may or may not be designated should the Bill get on the statute book, but I think he is winding himself up into a bit of a tight knot.
John McDonnell
I am grateful for the Minister’s consideration of my mental health, et cetera. The designation covers “foreign interference in elections” and we will be campaigning to maintain solidarity with Cuba itself. On the second designation—
“is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”—
in our current trade negotiations with the United States, we are taking decisions about the “interests” of the UK as interpreted by the US. So I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that when we introduce such legislation, we must discern what could be the worst that could happen and how could it go wrong? We are opening up an opportunity for things to go wrong. I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary would not designate the Cuba Solidarity Campaign, but in a certain situation, certain Administrations would. By not including sufficient protections in the legislation we are, unwittingly, opening the door to its being used to designate organisations, and therefore individuals, as breaking the law, with significant penalties imposed. That is why the rush to legislation is my concern. If we are not engaging with outside bodies that could be in the specifics of the legislation, as the explanatory notes say, that is where we will make mistakes.
What consultations or discussions have been had with some of the organisations campaigning on the international implications of what is happening, particularly regarding the role of the US. What discussions have taken place? There could be ramifications well beyond what we all agree on today with regard to the designation of the IRGC and others that, at this moment, could be specifically designated as advancers of terrorism.
Andy McDonald (Middlesbrough and Thornaby East) (Lab)
I note the definition on activities being
“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”,
but does my right hon. Friend agree that we are getting into some tortuous territory? It could be properly argued that it is in the interests of the United Kingdom to seek to uphold basic human rights and have international humanitarian law observed consistently. That is in our collective and global interests, but we could find ourselves in situations where actors who we currently class as our allies, such as in the example he has given, use organisations to undermine that very principle. Is that not an example of how we need to think this legislation through?
John McDonnell
There is a consideration that needs to be properly debated and given the time to be debated. My specific point is that if the US moves against Cuba and imposes and demands a wider trade ban, for example, the argument could be made that we are undermining our own interests if we do not co-operate with the US. That argument has been used in the trade negotiations so far. Under this legislation, we could have an organisation designated specifically around trying to break that blockade. That is my worry.
That leads me on to a minor point about designation. At the moment, designation is made through the affirmative procedure, which brings a statutory instrument before the House that we can vote for or against; we cannot amend it. What we saw under the proscription process, particularly with Palestine Action, was that the statutory instrument came before us with a bloc of 20 organisations. We had to vote for it or against it; we could not distinguish in voting between any of those organisations.
I ask the Government to consider that when we deal with this matter, it should be dealt with through the super-affirmative procedure, rather than the affirmative procedure. In the super-affirmative procedure, there is a process of consultation in which individual organisations can be dealt with, rather than dealing with organisations en bloc. In that way, we could take a more considered decision about the individual roles and aspects of organisations that the Government are designating.
I hope the Government will consider that process better, because it would reassure us more that this legislation will be effective and will not have the sweeping consequences that bloc proscription has brought so far. We have seen maybe 3,000 people going through our courts simply for holding up a poster with regard to Palestine Action.
Steff Aquarone (North Norfolk) (LD)
I will speak to my amendment 1, which I am very pleased has the most supporters of any amendment before us today.
Amendment 1 would make an offence of the concealment of beneficial ownership relating to a designated organisation and the establishment and maintenance of that concealment of finance and assets. In simpler terms, it would crack down on the professional enablers working to hide the ownership of assets for a designated group by clarifying that that is the same as providing them with a material benefit. These groups rely on hiding their money, and opaque financial systems only help them to do that. By extending liability to those who make that opacity possible, we limit the ability of designated groups to continue to benefit from their assets and finances.
Amendment 1 makes it clear that financial transparency is a national security issue. The opaque systems, all too often in overseas territories and Crown dependencies, and those who enable their use, are assisting nations and organisations that want to do our country harm. Designating these state-backed groups is vital. We have seen the issues they cause across the country: targeting our institutions, targeting those who speak out against regimes, and directing acts designed to target and strike fear into our Jewish communities.
Dame Angela Eagle
New clause 3, tabled by the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Max Wilkinson), would require the Secretary of State to bring forward regulations designating the IRGC within a month of this Act coming into force, but the exercise of these powers under this Bill will have significant implications for national security and foreign policy, and it is right that they should be exercised independently by the Secretary of State on the basis of expert advice, including from the security and intelligence agencies. That is what this Bill allows, and putting these designations on the face of the Bill would be a very difficult way to effect the change, so the way to do this is the way that the Bill sets out.
The hon. Member for Cheltenham’s new clause 4, which would
“require the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation to assess the adequacy of the powers introduced by this Act twelve months after its passing”,
is already essentially covered by the Bill’s provisions, because they would be subject to part 3 of the National Security Act. The independent reviewer of state threats legislation has to carry out an annual review into the operation of its provisions, and is also empowered by part 1 of that Act to review any other such things he or she sees fit. Amendment 2 would require the draft affirmative procedure to be used for regulations removing a designation. He is right that such regulations should receive the proper parliamentary scrutiny, and the Bill already provides that such regulations are subject to the draft affirmative procedure. The use of the negative procedure is limited to very minor technical changes, such as the addition of aliases.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) asked whether it would be possible to proscribe a particular group, and gave a particular example. The test is whether the body is engaged in “foreign power threat activity”; it is a high bar, and it targets organisations that pose a real threat to the UK. I cannot imagine for one minute that my right hon. Friend would be involved in any of those.
Amendment 1, tabled by the hon. Member for North Norfolk (Steff Aquarone), would provide further examples of conduct that would be considered a material benefit, and he spoke about what those might be. Obtaining material benefits from a foreign intelligence service is an existing offence under section 17 of the National Security Act, so I do not think the further examples of conduct in amendment 1 are needed, as that conduct is already caught by the provisions in the Bill.
Alicia Kearns
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2
Offences relating to designated bodies
Amendment proposed: 3, page 3, line 8, leave out from “body” until end of line 9.—(Alicia Kearns.)
This amendment and Amendments 4 to 6 would remove the additional defence of supporting a designated body for a non-prohibited purpose.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Dame Angela Eagle
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
This Bill will create crucial new powers to allow the Government to keep pace with the evolving threat picture that Members from all parties referred to in the previous debates. The Bill will now move on to the other place, where I am sure colleagues will give it rigorous scrutiny while ensuring that its passage continues as smoothly as possible.
Alicia Kearns
The Bill asks how our country confronts the greatest threat it faces: states that behave like terrorists. We support the Bill, and have today set out its weaknesses—the places where, as drafted, it is found wanting. We tabled 13 amendments and new clauses, with not one designed to delay the Bill, not one designed to wreck it and, tonight, not one accepted—not a clause, not a line, not one additional defence for our country. There are two ways for a Government to show their contempt for the House: they may deny it time or deny it influence. They may rush this House or overrule it. This Government have chosen both.
Mark Sewards
Does the hon. Lady not accept that Jonathan Hall, whom Members on all sides of the House respect, backs the Bill as a narrow and focused measure to designate state threats?
Alicia Kearns
I am not sure that anyone has disputed that Jonathan Hall backs the Bill. I had a lengthy call with him to discuss the gaps in the Bill, which I am sure the hon. Gentleman has not had. I will not share a private conversation, but I encourage the hon. Gentleman to have a similar call with Jonathan Hall to discuss those gaps.
We are here in this place to find the gaps while they can still be mended. That is the whole of our purpose, but we were not permitted to fulfil it today because scrutiny was declined. I have to admit that it feels like our suggestions were not even given due consideration. So I must tell the House what in the Bill now leaves this Chamber unaltered. The sponsor remains more gently treated in law than the proxies that it arms. The world’s largest sponsor of terrorism keeps a protection denied to its terrorist proxies.
The self-directed actor—the lone individual that our terrorism law learned to tackle, at great and terrible cost, two decades ago—will fall through a gap that we were forbidden to close. Britain may be used as a base from which to plot against our friends in Dublin, Berlin or Brussels, or even those in Hong Kong and Tehran.
The flag of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps may still be flown, lawfully, on a British street, glorifying every threat against our Jewish communities that the regime has directed here. [Interruption.] The Minister may say, “Not necessarily,” but she specifically ruled out our amendment on the basis that we should not prevent members of the Iranian diplomatic corps from wearing uniforms here. The Bill does not apply to members of the diplomatic corps; it applies specifically to UK persons. That is therefore still the case and there is no protection against seeing those flags walked past Jewish people’s homes. In Committee, I asked the Government how we look the people the regime has hunted in the eye and tell them that the banner of the hunter is still welcome on our streets. Tonight, I have no answer to offer them.
A law passed in good faith but built wrongly fails as surely as one that is passed in bad faith. When a prosecution comes, it will turn not on the speeches given today, the Government’s good intentions or our warnings, but on what a defendant did. When that day comes and there is a gap that was identified in this House today that could have been closed in an afternoon, let the record show that it could have been mended.
The Bill now passes to the other place, and I have every confidence that their lordships will give it the scrutiny it deserves. We will not oppose the Bill tonight. We will support it, not because it delivers the full protections it should, but because a flawed shield is still a shield of some form and the men and women that the Bill is designed to protect cannot be left with nothing. We support it, having placed on the record of this House what was refused and whose hand refused it. The threat we face is patient, it is ruthless and it will not be deterred by a law that we were too rushed to finish and that the Government were too proud to mend.
I have supported this Bill at every stage, and it is because of that that I lament what the Bill could have been and that the House was given a single afternoon to try to get it right. I hope this Bill is as watertight as the Government assert, but if they wish to be absolute and to remove risk or ambiguities, we ask those in the other place to shut down any risk that the shield this aims to be might let even one traitor succeed in harming our nation. I hope they will do that on the basis of the way we have put forward our amendments: in the national interest.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
Max Wilkinson
This has been an exercise in efficient democracy today, and I have enjoyed all six or so hours of it. Now, the Bill has passed this House and it proceeds to the other place. When it has completed its journey, I hope that the Government will move forward and designate the IRGC as soon as possible, according to the timetable they have stated they aspire to. That is something that those on all sides of the House have aspired to for some time, and it will make our country a safer place, particularly for our Jewish communities.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.
National Security (State Threats) Bill
Thursday 18th June 2026
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate National Security (State Threats) Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Committee of the whole House Amendments as at 17 June 2026 - (17 Jun 2026)
National Security (State Threats) Bill
Tuesday 23rd June 2026
(1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate National Security (State Threats) Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Committee of the whole House Amendments as at 17 June 2026 - (17 Jun 2026)
Lord Hanson of Flint
That the Bill be now read a second time.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, it is my pleasure to open the debate on what is a vital Bill. I will start with the importance of the Bill and what it will achieve. I am pleased to have had an opportunity to discuss the content, direction and purpose of the Bill with a number of noble Lords outside the Chamber, and I am happy to have further discussions between now and later stages next week if Members so wish.
State threats are overt or covert actions by foreign Governments that fall below armed conflict but go beyond legitimate diplomacy to harm UK interests. They present a persistent and evolving risk to the United Kingdom and our allies, manifesting across a wide spectrum of activity, including interference in democratic processes, acquisition of sensitive information, threats to public safety, and disruption of economic security. Noble Lords will know that certain states have both the intent and the capability to conduct such activity to advance their objectives. This activity is often opportunistic, adaptive, increasingly integrated across multiple domains, and combining physical, cyber, economic and information tools. The threats are both evolving and enduring, and our legislation must keep pace.
In December 2024, the former Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, commissioned Jonathan Hall KC, in his capacity as the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation, to conduct a review into the tools available in terrorism legislation and how they may be applied to the problem of state threats. I place on record, on behalf of this House, our thanks to Jonathan Hall KC for his work. He proposed that we should legislate to create a state threats power equivalent to proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000. Noble Lords will be aware of those powers as we have, within the last year, designated a number of organisations under that Act. This Bill delivers on that proposal and will strengthen the Government’s ability to disrupt hostile intelligence services and their proxies by adapting counterterrorism tools to tackle state-based security threats to the UK.
The Bill will create a new power for the Secretary of State, in this case the Home Secretary, to designate organisations involved in foreign power threat activity, modelled on proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000. It introduces new criminal offences of supporting, assisting or obtaining benefits from designated bodies and will enable proxy organisations to be treated, in practice, like foreign intelligence services, making it easier to prosecute those acting on their behalf.
The Bill will strengthen the overall national security framework, so that the United Kingdom becomes a more difficult operating environment for foreign intelligence services and those state-linked proxies. Individuals acting for a designated body will feel the full force of our national security legislation and the accompanying offences, some of which will carry a life sentence. Designation will send a clear public signal to designated bodies that those prepared to assist them in their malign behaviour will not be tolerated.
In developing this legislation, we have worked closely with the police and the security and intelligence agencies. It has been a year in gestation, and I know from Question Time, Statements and elsewhere that noble Lords feel that that has been too long, but this is vital legislation and it is important to get it right. The Bill gives our operational partners the powers they need, and it does so in a way that reflects the differences between state and non-state actors. Jonathan Hall himself has said of the Bill, “It does the job”.
The Bill has come to us today from the House of Commons, where I know there was debate regarding some of its provisions. I will, if I may, use this Second Reading opening speech to address why I think the Bill is the right thing to do, and to address some of the comments around the Bill as a whole. There was debate in the House of Commons regarding possible amendments to the Bill. I assure people across this House that such amendments are not necessary and that the Bill as drafted does the job required. If the Government are to exercise the powers in the Bill promptly, a swift but thoroughly scrutinised passage through this House will, I suggest, prove beneficial. I will provide noble Lords with reassurances today to enable that passage to take place.
I particularly want to address three points in the Bill as currently drafted. The first is the prohibited purpose test, which is applied to the support offence in Clause 2. The Bill makes it an offence to express support for a designated body, including by arranging a meeting to be addressed by a member of a designated body, when that support is for a prohibited purpose. Clause 2 goes on to define a prohibited purpose as a purpose that
“is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.
We have had some comment on that from Members, both in discussions I have had and in the House of Commons. There have been suggestions that the prohibited purpose test should be removed from the Bill on the basis that no such test applies to the support offences in the Terrorism Act. I suggest that is to misunderstand the differences between state entities and terror organisations. While proscription under the Terrorism Act aims to ban the existence of an organisation, that cannot and must not be the case with this Bill. Even when a state entity presents a threat to the UK, there will still be cases in which there are legitimate reasons for engaging with that entity. Indeed, such engagement will often be in the UK’s interests as a whole, through British diplomats or NGOs doing vital work on conflict resolution or to deliver humanitarian aid. To remove the prohibited purpose test would be to criminalise such activity.
Secondly, there has also been some discussion that the Bill does not go far enough to criminalise individuals who provide assistance to designated bodies in relation to overseas activities. New Section 17B makes it an offence to provide such assistance when the activity undertaken is
“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.
Although there has been discussion on this both in the House of Commons and in formal discussions I have had, it will mean that an individual in the UK who assists a designated body in hostile activity towards an ally, with a recognisable adverse effect on the UK, would be committing a crime under the Bill.
The Bill does not extend the UK’s criminal jurisdiction over all other acts anywhere in the world, irrespective of whether they affect the UK. It is an important principle of international law that there are reasonable limits to that jurisdiction, but where activities are contrary to our interests, this offence will bite. It is in line with the equivalent offences in the National Security Act. If we were to go further, we would not only go beyond what our operational partners have asked for; we would also push the limits of international law. I suggest that the Bill has the balance right on this issue.
Thirdly, there has been some comment and discussion in Parliament, and outside, in relation to the debate on so-called self-directed acts—that is to say, acts that are inspired by state threat actors but not directed by them. I assure noble Lords that such acts are caught within the offences in the Bill. Specifically, the offence at new Section 17B of providing material assistance to a designated body requires that a person intends their actions to assist that body. They do not have to be tasked or directed by the body for which they are working for the offence to apply.
New Section 33B also introduces the designated body condition to the National Security Act. This means that when a person acts with the intention to benefit a designated body, they may also engage the offences under that Act. This includes offences such as obtaining or disclosing protected information and sabotage, which both carry life sentences. Again, this does not need any tasking from the designated body. I hope that addresses noble Lords’ concerns and removes any doubt in their minds.
There has been considerable discussion on specific bodies that might or might not be designated under this Bill. I noticed an amendment in the House of Commons to proscribe the IRGC directly, and I have experienced a lot of pressure about that in this House as well. There have been calls for the Government to commit to designating Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. I hope I can explain to noble Lords that while this Bill is being discussed, I cannot give that commitment today. The powers in the Bill are vital; their exercise will have profound implications for the UK’s foreign policy and our national security. It is right that Parliament should set the legal framework for the use of those powers and will be asked to endorse their use through the affirmative procedure, as the Bill provides. It is also right that it should be for the Secretary of State, on the advice of expert evidence, and in some cases sensitive intelligence, to determine whether the use of these powers is necessary.
I will not today pre-empt decisions that have yet to be taken in relation to a law that has yet to be passed. But I give the House a cast-iron assurance that where the Secretary of State judges it necessary, she will use these powers, if they receive Royal Assent, and she will not hesitate to do so. I am confident that noble Lords will hold me to account on that point. The sooner the Bill is on the statute book, the sooner the powers within it can be used. The Bill remains a vehicle for the Home Secretary to determine whether a state threat designation is required on any body post Royal Assent.
We have had some discussion in Parliament around the speed on this. The Government are committed to a fast track on the Bill. That commitment reflects the urgent need to close a legislative gap. It also reflects the interest in this House and in our society in ensuring that government has the powers to deal with those state entities that threaten our national security. It was in response to a series of heinous antisemitic arson attacks in north London that the Prime Minister committed to bringing the Bill forward within weeks. We put it in the gracious Speech in May and brought it forward in both Houses at the earliest opportunity. I want to see it passed by both Houses at the earliest opportunity, so that we can get on with examining the requirements of using these powers as appropriate.
In our manifesto, we committed to take the approach used to deal with terrorism and to adapt it to deal with state-based security threats. The Bill does just that and fulfils a manifesto commitment. Ultimately, at stake is the purpose we are all sent here to advance, the most important thing we can do as a Government and a Parliament: to ensure the security of our nation and all who live in it.
I pay tribute to the men and women of our police and security services. Their work could not matter more, particularly at this dangerous time. As well as thanking them, we must support them to tackle the threats we face in a dangerous and uncertain world. To give that support, we need to equip them with the new and necessary powers in this legislation.
There is a wealth of experience across this House. I look forward to the further scrutiny that noble Lords will provide both today and next week, if the Bill is read a second time. We have a strong list of speakers today who will provide that fruitful debate. I suggest to the House that the urgency of our national security demands that the Bill be passed, giving the Home Secretary the powers to make assessments and use these powers at the earliest opportunity, where those threats exist. I beg to move.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I begin by welcoming at long last the Government’s decision to bring this legislation forward. I say “at long last” advisedly and not as mere partisan point-scoring. This House will recall that the Opposition pressed the Government on no fewer than three separate occasions during the passage of the Crime and Policing Act in the previous Session to proscribe the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. On three occasions, the House voted in favour of our amendments; on three occasions, the Government voted against them. Ministers resisted, delayed and demurred until, ultimately, the weight of public pressure, the urging of the Jewish community and the reality of what is happening on our streets became impossible to ignore. The Prime Minister made his announcement and here we are.
We do not begrudge the Government their change of position; we welcome it. The direction of travel is right, and this side of the House wants to see the Bill pass. But the circumstances of its arrival matter, because they help explain the deficiencies in the Bill as drafted. This legislation draws directly from the recommendations of Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, whose report was published 14 months ago. Yet we are now told that this is so urgent that the Government will not consider any amendments, which is highly disappointing, given that the Bill before us today contains gaps that, if not rectified, risk rendering its central purpose unenforceable— I will come to those in a moment.
We must be frank about the threat we face. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is a distinct threat. It is an organisation that has been active on British soil, targeting British citizens and funding terrorism across the world. In October 2024, Ken McCallum, the director-general of the Security Service, said that MI5 and the police had responded to 20 Iran-backed plots since January 2022 involving
“potentially lethal threats to British citizens”.
In May 2025, three Iranian men were charged under the National Security Act after a major counterterrorism investigation, and prosecutors said that one of the men had carried out surveillance, reconnaissance and online research with the aim of committing serious violence against a person in Britain. In March this year, we saw the horrific arson attack on Jewish ambulances in Golders Green, responsibility for which was claimed by an Iran-aligned group.
The IRGC funnels billions of dollars to terrorist proxies worldwide. It gifts rockets and advanced weaponry to Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis. It manages thousands of fighters operating across multiple continents. It co-ordinates assassinations, kidnappings and sabotage operations, including here in the United Kingdom. Therefore, it is entirely right that the law should treat association with, and support for, the IRGC as a criminal matter. That is what this Bill sets out to do and why we support its intentions.
However, good intentions poorly executed create only the illusion of security. I must be candid with the House: as drafted, the Bill contains at least four significant vulnerabilities that we believe must be addressed before it leaves this place. The first is the “prohibited purpose” requirement. The provisions in Clause 2 are modelled on Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000, the provision that makes it an offence to invite support for a proscribed terrorist organisation. However, the Government have introduced an additional element that does not appear in the Terrorism Act: a requirement that the support be given for a “prohibited purpose”, which is defined as conduct that is
“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.
I ask the Minister a simple question that I hope he will answer directly: what form of support for the IRGC do the Government consider to be beneficial to the United Kingdom? What type of assistance to the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism could possibly be regarded as in our national interests? If the answer is none—as it self-evidently must be—then why does this additional evidential standard exist at all?
What this provision creates in practice is a perverse hierarchy of culpability. Under the Bill, a prosecution against an individual for supporting the IRGC would require proof that their support was prejudicial to the United Kingdom. However, if that same individual were supporting one of the IRGC’s terrorist proxies—Hamas, Hezbollah or the Houthis—they would face a lower bar to prosecution under existing terrorism legislation. The organisation responsible for inspiring, organising, arming and financing those groups would receive greater legal protection than the groups themselves. That cannot be the Government’s intention. I hope that the Minister will listen and bring his own amendment to this effect; if not, I most certainly will.
The second concern relates to an omission of provisions on uniforms and insignia. Under Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, as amended by the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, it is an offence to display in a public place
“an item of clothing, or … any other article, in such a way … as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation”.
It is also an offence to publish an “image” of such an article or item of clothing. That is the provision used to remove Hamas flags from our streets and to seize Hezbollah insignia. The Bill contains no equivalent provision whatever. If the IRGC is designated under this legislation, its symbols, insignia and flags could be displayed openly in public with complete legal impunity. There is a gap in the legislation that is so obvious and damaging to public confidence that its presence in the Bill is difficult to explain.
I believe that the Government are of the view that this would somehow be inappropriate for this legislation. I wholly disagree. The Bill applies only to a UK person. We are not trying to ban Iranians displaying such insignia in Iran—of course we cannot do that—but why should anyone in the United Kingdom be permitted to wave the flag or wear the uniform of an organisation that we have deemed to be a threat worthy of designation under this legislation?
The third gap relates to the dissemination of publications and materials. Since 2006, it has been an offence under the Terrorism Act to disseminate terrorist publications. These are publications that encourage, glorify or provide practical assistance for acts of terrorism. That standard has been part of our counterterrorism framework for nearly two decades. This Bill makes no equivalent provision for designated hostile state bodies. Materials promoting, glorifying or facilitating the activities of designated groups could be distributed without triggering criminal liability. This is not a minor technical omission; it is a failure to apply a basic and well-established standard of counterterrorism law to a new category of threat.
The fourth and final concern is the absence of a preparatory conduct offence. The Bill as drafted captures those who assist, support or receive money from a designated group; it does not capture those who are in the process of planning to do so. Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006 addresses this gap in the terrorism context, making it clear that preparation for terrorist action is itself an offence. By the time someone has completed an act of support for a terrorist organisation, the damage may already be done. Catching people in the preparatory stages is operationally essential for our security services. As the Bill stands, an individual who has taken concrete steps towards assisting the IRGC cannot be prosecuted unless and until the act itself is complete. They cannot be prosecuted for those acts because preparatory acts are not covered by any of offences in the Bill. That is a vulnerability that we do not have in our terrorism legislation. It is a vulnerability we should not introduce here.
I will make one final point. I have read Hansard and looked at the response from the new Security Minister to my honourable friend Alicia Kearns in the other place, and I must say that I found it wanting. The Security Minister said:
“There are a couple of themes that run through my response to the hon. Lady’s amendments. The first is that it is not possible to treat a state body the same as a terrorist organisation, because one cannot abolish a state body”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/6/26; col. 922.]
This argument does not stand. Proscription does not abolish a terrorist group. Hamas is a proscribed group of the United Kingdom, yet we all know it still exists in the Middle East. Daesh was not defeated because the British Government had proscribed it. Would anyone argue that Palestine Action does not exist now that it has been proscribed?
The purpose of proscription is not to abolish a group but to degrade its ability to operate in the United Kingdom by prohibiting all forms of association with and support for it. That is precisely what the Government say they intend to do with designation under this Bill. Therefore, the reality is that proscription and designation are not really as different as the Minister would have us believe. Given that was the Government’s main justification for rejecting my honourable friend’s amendments last week, I hope they will rethink their objections.
The rushed nature of the Bill’s drafting is, I regret to say, visible in the legislation. When a Government spend months resisting legislation, then reverse course under political pressure and move quickly to announce a Bill, the risk of corners being cut is very real. We see the evidence of that here. None of our concerns is insurmountable. In each case, the amendments would bring this legislation into conformity with the counter- terrorism framework it is explicitly based on.
As I have just outlined, there is no reason why this should not happen. The threat from the IRGC—and, indeed, other state-linked groups—is present, documented and ongoing. The House has an obligation to ensure that when legislation is passed in response to that threat, it is legislation that works, is watertight and enforceable, and does not permit those who support one of the world’s most dangerous organisations to slip through its gaps. We support the Bill. We want to see it on our statute book, but we will not allow the urgency of the cause to excuse the inadequacy of the drafting. We will table amendments in Committee and we look forward to constructive engagement with Ministers.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, the Liberal Democrats support the principles of the Bill. We have been clear that we also want this legislation on the statute book and we will not seek to hold it up. We fully recognise the unprecedented security challenges that we face, confronting more serious and less predictable threats than at any time since the Cold War. In 2025 alone, MI5 reported a 35% increase in state threat activity on the previous year, including more than 20 Iran-backed plots to kidnap or kill on British soil. We are in accord with the Government. This activity must be stopped.
However, while we will not obstruct the Bill, our support is not a blank cheque for lawmaking. The Bill was introduced just 13 days ago and was rushed through the other place in less than six hours. That begs the question: why did it take 14 months to act on recommendations from Jonathan Hall KC, which were accepted in full in May 2025? To ask this House to deliver a watertight defence in a single afternoon is a tall order and risks the Bill being seen as a rapid answer rather than a complete answer. Such accelerated progress risks important areas not being properly covered or provisions having unintended consequences.
Good legislation also involves scrutiny and input from outside Parliament. The media and experts from a wide range of professional fields are normally critical in improving a Bill. However, the speed of this Bill’s passage runs a real risk that much-needed external scrutiny will be missed.
The Bill addresses a critical gap. Looking to existing terrorism laws to deal with state organs was, in the words of the independent reviewer,
“shopping in the wrong department”.
By creating a power to designate bodies involved in “foreign power threat activity”, the Bill creates the right tool to penalise the proxies and hired guns that foreign powers use to carry out sabotage on UK soil.
The litmus test for the Bill will be the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—the IRGC. My noble friend Lord Marks has constantly argued that if the IRGC was not in power in Tehran, it would be universally recognised as a terrorist organisation. Yet, as drafted, this Bill is gentler on the IRGC than our laws are on the terrorists it funds.
We must also ensure that these powers have teeth in the global financial system. My noble friend Lord Purvis noted on 11 June that these groups operate through complex commercial, financial and now digital trade routes. We must use this Bill to trigger robust investigations by Companies House and the Financial Reporting Council to unmask front companies and starve designated organisations of UK-origin funds. However, I remain a bit concerned by the Minister’s comment that a UK connection of some sort is required for designation. In an era of digital interference, when state-backed proxies can target our citizens and sabotage our interests from behind a screen thousands of miles away, we must ensure that this requirement does not become a loophole. We need an assurance that this Bill is equipped for the era of digital interference, ensuring that hostile actors cannot evade designation simply by operating entirely from abroad via digital means.
We must also listen to the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Development Committee. They warn that new Section 17B is so broad that it could unintentionally criminalise impartial humanitarian aid. Ministerial “intent” is not a legal safeguard. We need an express exemption on the face of the Bill for impartial humanitarian organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, acting in accordance with international humanitarian law. Anything less leaves our aid workers at the mercy of a 14-year prison sentence for simply delivering life-saving medicine.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights has identified another trap. Clause 1 currently allows for designation without even establishing a link to a foreign power for certain acts, such as those under Section 4 of the 2023 Act. That is both too weak against our enemies and too broad for a free society.
On future-proofing, the director-general of MI5 has rightly warned of the next frontier: autonomous AI systems that may evade effective human control. The Government’s own AI Scenarios 2030 report admits that such systems could cause “existential harms” without intervention. I will be moving a specific amendment in committee to ensure that “foreign power threat activity” captures the development of super-intelligent AI capabilities by a foreign power.
Finally, because this is a fast-track Bill, we must have a 12-month statutory review of its adequacy. We also need the safeguard that any removal of a designation must be approved by votes in both Houses. Parliamentary oversight must exist at the end of a designation, not just the beginning.
As I said, we will not hold this Bill up, but we will seek to amend it. We are talking about individuals who actively assist hostile states in sabotaging our nation. We owe the citizens and residents who are being specifically targeted by these lethal plots more than just sincere intentions; we owe them a law that holds up in the courtroom and at the border. We look forward to a rigorous, if brief, Committee stage.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
My Lords, I support the Bill, based as it is on a proposal from my admirable successor as independent reviewer, Jonathan Hall KC. It is regrettable that the Bill is being brought forward more than a year after his recommendation, yet in a manner that telescopes and truncates the debate in both Houses. How much more useful and productive it would have been to have seen a draft Bill, its scrutiny unrestrained by tight deadlines and positions already taken.
My remarks today are aimed not at what the Bill intends to do but at the law which, I am afraid, it exemplifies: the law of unintended consequences. Two of the new offences, in proposed new Sections 17B and 17C, have the potential to damage conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and humanitarian activity—endeavours in which this country excels—in parts of the world controlled by bodies liable to designation. I shall explain briefly why that is and how I think the problem might be resolved.
I declare a non-pecuniary interest as a chair of Inter Mediate, an independent peacemaking charity founded in 2011 by Jonathan Powell, who is now, of course, the Government’s National Security Adviser. Inter Mediate’s staff work discreetly at the highest political levels to support complex negotiations and conflict resolution in some of the most troubled parts of the world. It will not surprise noble Lords to learn that work of that kind requires intensive dialogue with brutal and unpleasant regimes to which it may be difficult, even impossible, for western Governments to speak.
I am also grateful to the International Committee of the Red Cross and the various peacebuilding and humanitarian organisations, from Conciliation Resources to Save the Children and the Halo Trust, that have approached me with their concerns in relation to this issue. I thank the Minister and his Bill team for our discussions on this issue since the Bill was published two weeks ago.
What do I mean by the “unintended consequences” of the Bill? Take proposed new Section 17C, which is about obtaining, accepting, agreeing to accept or retaining material benefits from a designated body. That is an offence punishable by 14 years in prison—quite right, too, in the cases highlighted in the Explanatory Notes: a business assisting a hostile state with new military technology or a contract criminal who knew, or should have known, where his fee was coming from.
However, “material benefits” are defined in proposed new Section 17C(3) with remarkable breadth. They include
“financial benefits, anything which has the potential to result in a financial benefit, and information”.
Taking that definition at face value, the likes of Inter Mediate could contravene criminal law by accepting information from a designated body as to that body’s objectives or negotiating stance. The defence of reasonable excuse in proposed new subsection (7) applies only to the retention of information; there is no such defence for agreeing to accept information or accepting it. There is a protection for public servants in proposed new subsection (8)(b), but not for charities or churches, which often have reach that Governments do not. One thinks of a charity such as the Halo Trust. Wishing to clear a minefield, it asks the IRGC, once designated, where the mines were laid. That, too, on a plain reading of proposed new Section 17C, would constitute the criminal offence of agreeing to accept information—although only 10 years in prison for that one.
Section 17B, as the noble Baroness has said, presents similar problems. Humanitarian organisations are not usually exempt from paying taxes, duties and fees to establish and maintain their operations in a country or territory—for example, tax on staff salaries, import duties on aid items and visa fees. It is at least arguable that anything which swells the coffers of a designated organisation will be of material assistance to the activities of that organisation locally or, by subsection (4)(a), in the United Kingdom. Bluntly, it helps to pay for them. That legally prudent interpretation risks blunting the aid effort where it is most needed and criminalising those who would seek to provide it.
The Minister will remind us that the CPS prosecutes only in cases where that is in the public interest and that for these offences, the additional consent of the Attorney-General will be required. In other words, “Don’t worry: it may never happen”. However, with respect, and as anybody familiar with these sectors well knows, reliance on the wise exercise of such discretions, though important, is not a sufficient answer.
Charitable trustees, of whom I suspect that there are quite a few in the Chamber, are properly cautious about signing off on activity which could expose us or our staff to the criminal law. So, to a still greater extent, are bank compliance departments, insurers and suppliers of humanitarian aid—all essential to the activities of those operating in these fields. The experience of NGOs in conflict zones is that banks and others are highly risk-averse. Why would they take the reputational risk of getting involved with potential criminality, even if only on paper? That is precisely why Parliament has expressly excluded those engaged in humanitarian activity from at least one comparable criminal offence—the designated area offence in Section 58B of the Terrorism Act 2000.
We have a week to sort this out. The Explanatory Notes, as they stand, are not sufficient, for reasons that I do not have time to get into. A clear statement from the Minister that Sections 17B and 17C are not intended to operate as I have suggested would be a start. An explicit reference to Pepper v Hart could be a useful signal to prosecutors and judges. Also helpful at a more general level would be an undertaking to co-operate through the established tri-sector group dialogue in amending the applicable guidance and a clear and unqualified statement that the new offences are not intended to apply to bona fide organisations engaged in conflict prevention, conflict resolution or, in the words of the Explanatory Notes,
“humanitarian assistance or other activities that support basic human needs”.
These are sticking plasters, but it will take amendment to remove the chilling effect and place the matter beyond doubt. Though I shall listen with great care, as I always do, to what the Minister has to say, I fear that this is an issue to which we shall have to come back in Committee.
Lord Pickles (Con)
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord. I very much look forward to hearing him develop those points in Committee.
Let me begin directly. Legislation of this kind is long overdue. As the Library briefing makes clear, the character of state threats has evolved over the years, and this legislation is necessary. It is not a criticism directed solely at this Government; successive Administrations have recognised the problem with reasonable clarity but have often been slow in delivering the remedy. We identify the threat, hesitate on the response and find ourselves, once again, playing catch-up. This Bill is an attempt to close that gap. It is necessary and welcome.
There is much within it that merits support: the updating of offences; the introduction of a foreign influence registration scheme; and the broader recognition, reflected in the Library material and other briefings, that hostile activity now spans a wide spectrum—it is no longer confined to classical espionage but extends into influence operations, economic pressure, covert funding and a steady shaping of information environments.
However, necessity should not be mistaken for sufficiency. My concern is that the Bill, while well-intended, is framed too much around the threats that we already understand rather than those that are evolving. Hostile actors adapt quickly. They learn from our frameworks and adjust their methods accordingly. If we legislate narrowly or too rigidly, we will find that the law is outpaced almost as soon as it is enacted. We cannot afford, once again, to legislate in arrears.
The reality is that modern state threats are often indirect. They are mediated through networks, proxies, front organisations and aligned movements that provide distance and deniability. Influence is rarely crude; it is incremental, sustained and frequently embedded within legitimate structures. That presents a challenge which the Bill does not fully meet. In particular, it requires us to take seriously the role of transnational ideological networks that may intersect with state interests, whether formally or informally.
The arguments advanced by my noble friend Lord Godson in his recent article in the Spectator are both relevant and necessary to engage with. He draws attention to the way in which the Muslim Brotherhood operates less as a single organisation and more as a diffuse and adaptive network: a movement with affiliated bodies, overlapping structures and a capacity to project influence across civic, educational and political space. This strength lies not in overt confrontation but in persistence, organisation and reach over time. The point is not to collapse this into a simplistic category of state threat but to recognise that boundaries between state and non-state activity are often porous, and that serious actors are adept at operating across these boundaries.
Other countries have begun to engage with this reality. France and Austria, among them, have examined how such movements function, how they influence institutions and what risks they may pose to democratic resilience over the longer term. In the United Kingdom, our approach has been more cautious—arguably, too cautious—and the Bill reflects this caution. It is anchored firmly in the concept of state attribution which, while understandable, has created a limitation. If influence is exercised through networks that fall just outside that definition, a framework confined to it risks overlooking a significant part of the threat.
To be clear, this is not part of an argument for indiscriminate measures or broad-brush conclusions. It is an argument for clarity and completeness, to ensure that our understanding of modern threats is sufficiently wide, and that our response is capable of addressing them. At present, the alignment is not yet fully achieved. This is why the next stages of the Bill are so important.
As has already been demonstrated in another place, there is real scope to strengthen and redefine the framework. In particular, it is reasonable to apply three basic tests. First, flexibility: can the Bill adapt to new forms of threat without the need to repeat primary legislation? Secondly, scope: does it adequately capture indirect as well as direct forms of hostile influence? And, thirdly, clarity: are the definitions and mechanisms sufficiently precise to be both effective and enforceable?
If the Bill falls short against these tests, amendment is not an obstruction; it is responsible lawmaking. Those who seek to undermine open societies are neither static nor unsophisticated. They study our systems, identify ambiguities and exploit gaps with consistency and patience. If our legislative response is too narrow or too cautious, it will not be enough. The Bill is an important step forward, but it must also be a durable one. I believe that the Bill can be improved and that we can future-proof it, widen its scope where necessary and ensure that it addresses not only direct state action but the broader ecosystem in which influence is exercised. In conclusion, our task is simple: not to follow threat but to get ahead of threat and to stay there.
Lord Beamish (Lab)
I welcome the Bill. The fact that we need it less than three years after the passing of the National Security Act demonstrates the evolving threat that this country faces.
In 2020 the Intelligence and Security Committee, which I chair, published its ground-breaking Russia report. I gently remind the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that it took three years for the then Government to implement most of the recommendations in that report, including the FIRS. Since then, we have produced in 2023 our report on China and in 2025 our report on Iran, and all pose a threat to UK security. The playbook they use is very similar: sabotage, cyber attacks, intimidation of the diaspora, misinformation, kidnapping, assassination in some cases—all carried out not just in this country but across Europe. Many examples can be found in open source material. Their strategy is not only well thought out but well funded. It is to undermine the trust in government, increase social division, weaken the rules-based order and, in Russia’s case, try to limit our support for Ukraine.
After the attack in Salisbury, thanks to the efforts of our security services and our international partners, we have made the operating environment in the UK and across Europe far more difficult for these actors. That is why they have gone to using proxies. Again, it is not just about acts of sabotage. There have been good examples across Europe, such as shopping centres in Poland being attacked. Earlier this year I was in Latvia, where the railway system is attacked on a daily basis—not because it is breaking down but because people are being paid to disrupt the network. We have seen Iran using organised crime networks across Europe to assassinate those who oppose the regime. We have also seen, closer to home, the example of the former leader of Reform UK in Wales, Nathan Gill, who was paid by the Russians to put out a positive image of Russia and to undermine the West’s support for Ukraine.
This is a very difficult environment for law enforcement and security services to act in. For example, it might not be evident straightaway that acts of sabotage are being supported by foreign actors. We saw the case last year of the attack on a warehouse in east London that was being used to store supplies for Ukraine.
Will this threat increase and is it going away? No, it is not going away. I argue that it will increase. Certainly, in Russia, as Putin comes under more pressure, this is a low-risk element in trying to undermine the West. We do not know what is going to happen next in Iran in terms of the fallout from the war, but again this is a low-risk strategy for Iran because it can deny involvement in many of these attacks or misinformation campaigns, whether they are attacking warehouses in east London and synagogues or posting antisemitic rhetoric online. We also have increasing activity by the Chinese, who are targeting universities and looking for trade secrets, something that the Bill will take on. Will this Bill be the end of it? Will that be it? No, it will not. I think we will be coming back. As our adversaries react and adapt, we will have to come back for more.
There is an issue that the previous Government ignored, even though they gave a commitment on it: the review of the Official Secrets Act 1989. The problem I have with this legislation is that there is now going to be a huge disparity between 14 years for an offence under this legislation and two years for an offence under the Official Secrets Act. The review was promised in 2019 but shelved, and I urge the Government to revisit it.
It is often said that democracy is fragile. It is. It has to be nurtured. We have to ensure that in any legislation such as this we get the balance right between protecting our nation and its citizens and the rights of individuals. As chair of the ISC and a member of the ISC for nearly 10 years, I see the regular reporting on what is happening: the attacks not just in this country but across Europe. I think we need to have an honest public conversation about the threats. In his report, the reviewer said that statistics should be published. I think we need to publish them, whether in his annual report or in the ISC’s annual report.
I come to the issues around designation. Reference has been made to the IRGC. This was covered in our Iran report. Yes, the current legislation is not fit for purpose and I think this is a way forward, but I stress to individuals who are calling to put the IRGC in the Bill that that is not the way we operate because proscription is done independent of politics on a threat-based assessment. I think it will meet that threshold, and I hope we can see a movement forward.
I will just touch on some of the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. I agree with him that there are concerns. We need to alleviate them; it is about getting the right balance between protecting our nation from harm and making sure that those who are doing good in the world are protected as well. There are instances where Governments, NGOs and others have to deal with some very nasty people. That is a fact of life. I have to say—it might not be very popular in this debate—that on occasion NGOs and Governments have to be involved even with individuals linked to the IRGC.
This is a movement forward. Will it be the final say on this situation? No, it will not. This is going to be an ever-increasing issue that we will have to come back to, and the Government will have to be agile to react to it. Finally, like my noble friend I say thank you to the members of our security services and the police who keep us safe 365 days of the year.
Lord Barrow (CB)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak after the noble Lord, Lord Beamish. We have had many conversations about national security over the years and have not always agreed, but he knows what he is talking about, and I agree with him on this Bill. This is a necessary Bill, and the sense of urgency is necessary too. As others have said, the National Security Act 2023 was a big step forward. I welcome the cross-party approach that we had to that and have to national security matters generally. It is a huge help, including for those to whom we have already paid tribute in our services, our operating partners and the police.
However, threats change, our enemies adapt, and we must respond; as others have said, we must do so at pace and not get left behind. There has already been reference to Sir Ken McCallum’s comment that he saw a 35% increase in the number of individuals being investigated for involvement in state threat activity. I remember once being told off by a Prime Minister for “beguilingly precise” statistics, but the picture is what I recognise, including from my time as National Security Adviser and my time reading all the intelligence. We need to respond.
As I am sure those who know him would agree, Sir Ken is the sort of person who would tell you, in the same calm, professional tone, that you had won the lottery or that your house had burned down. We must not let that professionalism mask the day in, day out reality of what we are facing in terms of the threat to this country. That is why I support the Bill. I also support those who talk about the need for a national conversation about that threat; we need that in order to have the basis for taking our legislation forward. We need to respond to this evolving and increasing threat from state actors and their proxies.
I commend Jonathan Hall KC. We should remind ourselves that he is our independent reviewer. All across the House there is respect and support for what he has said. He has shown us a way forward and I commend him, not least because this is really difficult, as we have already heard. We cannot simply cut and paste from terrorism to state actors. I also commend the fact that operational partners have been involved in framing the Bill. In my view, the Bill will bring real and direct operational benefits. That is what it is about, and that is what we should support.
I listened with great interest to my noble friend Lord Anderson. Like others, I have been contacted by NGOs concerned about the effect of this legislation. I thank them for raising those concerns and I pay tribute to them for their extraordinary, brave work in the most dangerous and difficult circumstances. Clearly, they have to engage with actors who do not have our best interests at heart; that is what it takes to operate in those places.
I thank the Minister and his team for the briefings that have allowed some of us to raise these concerns. It is clear to me that the Bill is designed to meet that challenge through the concept that the offence is committed only by conduct
“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.
There is an intent element to this as well. Legitimate humanitarian assistance would not fall foul of this test.
There are other safeguards too, but I encourage the Government to continue discussions with the NGOs to see whether anything more could be done through guidance, including for the CPS. I agree with my noble friend Lord Anderson about the use of a tri-sector approach as well. I see the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, listening, so I await further legal analysis in this respect, but I would not support an amendment creating an exemption. Surely that would be a loophole that our opponents would seek to use. I think it would put the NGOs in a place of greater danger. But let us continue the conversation and see what we can do.
I also understand the motivation of those who have called for putting a particular actor on the face of the Bill, but I do not agree. In my experience, national security legislation should be as actor-agnostic as possible. It should create the framework through which the Government can act with the best intelligence, advice, involvement and engagement with the operating partners as possible. I do say to the Minister that, if the Government should get their way, as I hope they will, and fast-track this legislation successfully, there will be an expectation in this House, and more generally, of rapid action in exercising these powers with the same sense of urgency and purpose as in pursuing the Bill itself.
I have one question for the Minister, and this goes to a point that the noble Baroness made about a 12-month review. Since this is a Bill amending Part 1 of the National Security Act, as I read it, I understand that the independent reviewer will be required to carry out an annual review of these provisions. Can the Minister confirm that? That would allow for us to respond quickly if there are deficiencies—and they could be on either side of the debate. Indeed, it may not be that we have got this wrong but that our opponents will move and react, so we need to know quickly whether there is more that we should do in this area and take it upon ourselves to respond accordingly. I would be grateful to hear from the Minister on that.
In conclusion, we all know that we cannot legislate away the threats to our country, but we should do what we can as quickly as possible to try to keep pace with evolving threats. I therefore support getting the Bill passed by the Summer Recess. I would welcome any improvements, but not at the cost of delay. Let us do what we can now. We will do the best that we can in the time that we have available to us, and, as the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, and others have said, we will for sure be coming back to this issue in the future because the threats will not go away. They will continue to evolve.
Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Barrow. I agree with his comments. Like him, I welcome the Bill, and, like him, I think we have been waiting a long time for it. It is not just that it seems to have taken the Government a long time to get going on the issue; it is that real life affects those who are at risk, not only the Jewish community but certainly and definitely that community, so we need to get on with this legislation, and I am therefore among those who do not support further delay.
The points made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—for me, they introduce a new element, but one that quite clearly has real force—require us to try to get a balance between, on the one hand, contact with organisations of which we deeply disapprove and whose activities are malign, but for purposes that serve our interests and which are for the general good, and, on the other, not creating loopholes by inventing, if I can put it that way, motives that would lead to the courts excusing their conduct. It is not difficult to see that a defence could make it quite difficult for the prosecution to land its point if there is an argument in court about motivation and it has to prove that it was for a prohibited purpose. One thing that we need to concentrate on in the short time we have is getting some careful drafting into the legislation to get the balance right.
The Minister said, and I see his point, that he could not guarantee that this legislation would actually lead to the proscription of the IRGC. All I can say is that, in the real world, if it does not lead to that, there is something very wrong. I would expect to see that happen. We do live, I think, in the real world, not in one that is composed of nicer situations than actually prevail.
On the prohibited purpose requirement, as I say, it is obvious that we need careful drafting, but that applies also to the provision on prosecution regarding the risk of people planning activities in this country for malign activity abroad. Again, it is not difficult to see that, unless it is possible to land the point, the defence will have quite a good time arguing about motive. When this legislation is passed, we must not get into a situation where it turns out to be a great deal less effective than it should have been because we put into it clauses that enabled the defence of these individuals to make a monkey, if I can put it that way, of the legislation that we put in place.
Finally, I think it was my noble friend Lord Pickles who made an important point about future-proofing. We should try to include in this legislation individuals who are not directed by or acting under the influence of an organisation but who are themselves motivated to support state organisations, so that we can also convict them. If one looks at current terrorist activity, it is very clear that the self-motivated individual is a feature of the threat scene. It is important that we should try to include people acting on their own authority in this legislation. It is an important Bill. I support getting it through but I hope we will not do this at the expense of getting the provisions and the balance of the legislation right.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, who has such deep expertise in this area. I support this Bill which, as others have said, is long overdue, and draw attention to my membership of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy—a point to which I will return.
It hardly needs repeating that we live in a deeply dangerous and volatile world and face an array of rapidly evolving threats to our national security. Geopolitics is rapidly changing and we must be ready to respond and place the national security of the country at the top of our agenda. As we have already heard, this Bill builds on the National Security Act 2023 and is intended to strengthen the UK’s ability to deter, detect and disrupt threats from foreign states and their proxies, including by introducing a new power to designate bodies involved in foreign power threat activity.
We have also heard that the Bill follows the review by the independent reviewer Jonathan Hall KC into whether existing terrorism powers could be used to address these state threats. Well over a year ago, he found that the terrorism proscription charges would not be appropriate, so instead we have this legislation which will now designate bodies, including proxies, and be applied to bodies such as the IRGC or the Wagner Group.
The geopolitical context is stark. We face very different threats from Russia, China and Iran and must be able to respond to them all individually. It is not a case of one size fits all. Tactics being employed include attempted and actual assassinations, cyber attacks on major British companies and institutions—Marks & Spencer being a case in point—espionage, disinformation campaigns and foreign interference in the UK’s political system. Along with other noble Lords on all Benches, I am sure, I was simply appalled when it was confirmed that Russian proxies set the Prime Minister’s house and car on fire. Our very democracy and the values we hold dear are under threat as never before.
Shocking as that was, it was not an isolated event. We have already heard from others who have quoted the remarks of Ken McCallum, the director general of MI5 who, last year, pointed out that state threats had risen by over one-third and are now equal to or even greater than the threat of terrorism. Back in May 2024, the director general of GCHQ said that the service devoted
“more resource to China than any other single mission”
and that:
“China poses a genuine and increasing cyber risk to the UK”.
Clearly, that deployment of resources is necessary, but it is chilling none the less when you consider that this is a country we also try to court as an economic partner. This twin-track approach, in my view, is fraught with danger and I ask the Minister to set out more clearly the Government’s position in relation to China.
While I share the concerns that have been raised across the House about rushing a Bill through so quickly without adequate scrutiny, I well understand that we need to take action quickly, particularly on being able to designate the IRGC, which has long been the architect of brutal domestic repression, as well as a threat to UK security and the safety of Iranian and Jewish communities across Britain. That is the reason why this legislation should, frankly, have been introduced earlier in the Parliament, so we will need to ensure that there is appropriate post-legislative scrutiny and a statutory review after one year, as proposed by my noble friend Lady Doocey.
This legislation is very relevant and builds on the work carried out by the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. As a committee, we have raised concerns about the Russian state using proxy actors to commit sabotage in the UK—that was in our inquiry on the national security strategy—and on internet cables and landing stations, which were part of our subsea cable inquiry. It is also very relevant to the current inquiry that we are conducting on options for punitive deterrence against Russia and trying to impose upstream costs and constraints. I hope that the Government will continue to work closely with the Joint Committee on all these issues.
I would like to finish with a few questions for the Minister. First, it is my hope that the Bill will help with disrupting proxy activity. It appears to reduce the need to prove a chain of connection all the way back to the intelligence services: as long as the Government can prove a link to the proscribed proxy organisation, which might be an organised crime group or some front organisation, apparently that would facilitate a prosecution. Can the Minister assure me that I have got that point correct?
Secondly, the International Institute for Strategic Studies has estimated that 600 Russian officials were expelled by NATO states after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, of whom 400 are thought to be intelligence operatives. As I think the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, pointed out, Russian services have now reportedly adapted to using proxies, organised crime groups and freelancers, likely increasing both flexibility and deniability, but at the cost of decreasing operational professionalism. While much of the discussion around the Bill focuses on Iran at the moment, following threats and arson attacks, can the Minister say whether he feels that these measures will directly assist in our work regarding Russia, which I have just spoken about?
It is relevant that the International Institute for Strategic Studies report, which was published before the Bill, also makes the important point that the ultimate source of aggressive activity is often the intelligence officer running the operation. Arresting the proxy actors might mean that the intelligence officers just find new proxies. How confident is the Minister that intelligence officers from Russia and elsewhere will be deterred by this Bill, or will they simply, as has been suggested, remain untouchable?
Finally, I very much share the concerns that have been raised by my noble friend Lady Doocey, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and others, about unintended consequences, specifically the impact on humanitarian organisations and charities. Is the Minister able to give me an assurance that the offences relating to designated bodies do not apply to the activities of impartial humanitarian organisations that are acting and working in accordance with international law?
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, no one should be under any illusion about the dangers facing the United Kingdom, principally from Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. Whether it is assassins hunting down and murdering Alexander Litvinenko, or attempting to kill Sergei Skripal in Salisbury; the attack on the Prime Minister’s London home; the hate-driven scourge of antisemitism; cyber attacks—recall North Korea’s crippling cyber attack on the National Health Service in 2017—hacking and false narratives poisoning minds through social media; the presence of Chinese spies, even inside the Government and Parliament, with two more sentenced last week; or bounties on the heads of British residents and coercive sanctions on parliamentarians, it is clear that these are dangerous times.
I have the honour to chair the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Across several reports, we have highlighted threats to both national security and the human rights of our citizens—two sides of the same coin. We condemned the failure to bring to justice 400 British citizens who enlisted in ISIS, committed genocide against Yazidis and other minorities in northern Iraq, and then returned to the United Kingdom. Not one of them has been prosecuted for genocide or crimes against humanity. How many of them have the Government assessed as a future security threat?
As we have heard, MI5’s chief says that threats have risen by more than a third in a single year, with over 20 Iranian-inspired plots to kill, maim or kidnap on our sovereign territory. Perhaps more than anything else, the depredations of that barbaric Iranian dictatorship have been reflected in our debate today and driven the need for these new measures. Having been sanctioned by Iran in October 2022, along with the noble Lord, Lord Polak, and others, I might be forgiven for saying—as the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, said earlier—that this Bill has been a long time coming.
Back in April 2001, I initiated the first of several debates, dozens of Parliamentary Questions and many cross-party meetings about Iran’s egregious violations of human rights, its nuclear threat, its proclaimed wish to eradicate the State of Israel, its export of terror, and the pernicious role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, both here and in Iran. In the 2025 JCHR report on transnational repression, which was debated in your Lordships’ House on 26 February, we highlighted appalling attacks on pro-democracy activists and journalists, some of whom had been forced to flee the country and one of whom had been left bleeding on the street after an attempted assassination. Even if we cannot go as far as Sweden, where TNR is defined and illegal, I would like transnational repression to appear on the face of the Bill, at least as an aggravating factor.
Since its foundation in 1979, the Iranian regime has been based on two pillars: domestic oppression and the export of terrorism and chaos abroad. Death sentences issued by the revolutionary courts have led to endless waves of executions—some 2,159 in the last 12 months. Let us also recall the death of 22 year-old Mahsa Amini, who was arrested by the morality police for wearing clothes that had been disapproved of by the theocratic regime.
In 2023, I spoke in favour of the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that called for the proscription of the IRGC, and I was happy to support the Opposition when they moved similar amendments. I recognise that there is a difference between proscription and designation, and I welcome the steps taken in this Bill, but may I ask the Minister about the letter that was sent to him on 26 June by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and which was referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey? It was sent to the Home Secretary with a copy sent to the Minister. Today, I received a response from the Minister; I am grateful to him for that, but it arrived only about two hours ago. I would be grateful if he would agree to place copies in the Libraries of both Houses and circulate it to everyone who has participated in today’s debate. The response the Government have sent is important, because it deals effectively with some of the points raised by the JCHR probing the power to designate a body on the basis that it involved “foreign power threat activity”, despite there being no link in these circumstances between that body and any foreign power. We ask that consideration be given to an amendment to ensure that, under new Section 33A, only activity linked to a foreign power can be relied upon to satisfy the test for designation. We also asked about “Assisting a designated body”, about “Obtaining … material benefits from a designated body”, and for greater clarity on the “safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.
It was suggested in the House of Commons that there is inconsistency in the thresholds and a more lenient treatment of hostile states than of terrorists—it has been referred to during our debate today as well. Is that so and can it be remedied? I want also to ask about the point raised by my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich and others in the debate about humanitarian organisations operating where state-linked actors exercise territorial control. I draw the attention of the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, to the letter that was sent to the Home Secretary by the chair of the International Development Select Committee, the admirable Sarah Champion MP.
In a letter to me, the International Red Cross asked for an amendment so that
“The offences established in Section 17 shall not apply to exclusively humanitarian activities carried out by impartial humanitarian organisations in accordance with international law”.
I echo the remarks of others and hope that issue might be addressed before next Tuesday. It would be passing strange if Red Cross humanitarian work were to be compromised while more than 13 organisations masquerading as charities can stoke the fires of hatred and threaten community cohesion. Why are we not using this Bill to take powers to close them down?
And what about China, a point referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and others? Recall the collapsed spy case and last week’s convictions of CCP regime spies. The Bill should enable Ministers to close the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, a point I referred to yesterday in Questions. It is a spy hub, a cat’s cradle of spies and malign actors; we should have a power to close it down.
Ten months after the JCHR’s unanimous recommendation to put China on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, which we do for Russia and Iran, it has not happened. Will trade deals always trump security, human rights and even genocide? The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, referred to the point the head of GCHQ made about
“a genuine and increasing cyber risk”
—her words—and how GCHQ devotes
“more resource to China than any other … mission”,
while Parliament has been warned of infiltration of our universities and threats to our liberties via mass surveillance from Hikvision and other cameras. Chinese-made EVs incorporating Chinese cellular modules, along with SIM cards or software, raise significant espionage and national security concerns, with internet-connected vehicles described as a hostile state’s “smartphone on wheels”.
The Joint Committee is currently looking at AI and human rights. I hope the Government are also looking at the way that AI and software and internet powers can be used to undermine our public debates and indeed our security. I hope that before next Tuesday, we can have the opportunity—more than the six hours that was provided in the House of Commons—to debate these questions. I hope we will be able to come to some agreement around some of the concerns that remain.
Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I too support the Bill and commend the Government for bringing forward this long-awaited legislation. I join others in paying tribute to Jonathan Hall KC, who has done much of the work that has paved the way for this legislation, both as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and as Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation. As he repeatedly pointed out, we cannot deal with state threats, including state terrorism, by simply using the same approach that we have used for terrorism legislation. There are political, diplomatic and legal differences.
One of the key legal reasons why state threats need a different approach is that state officials enjoy immunity from criminal jurisdiction in our courts in respect of their official conduct. I suspect that immunity is one of the main reasons why the Government decided that we cannot have a straightforward membership offence which mirrors the offence under general terrorism legislation.
My questions are about the scope of some of the offences, and in particular new Section 17B of the National Security Act 2023, the offence of “Assisting a designated body”, which would be introduced by Clause 2. To understand the reach of the offences, it may be helpful to test them against some examples, and I have two.
The first is that of an IRGC plotter based in Tehran who has co-ordinated attacks by proxies in the United Kingdom. If that IRGC plotter happened to fly to the United Kingdom, or to another country from which he could be extradited to the United Kingdom, what, if any, conduct would we say has taken place in the United Kingdom for the purposes of the new Section 17B offence? Section 17B will criminalise the provision of assistance to a designated body in carrying out UK-related activities. Subsection (5) provides that the offence
“will apply to conduct outside the United Kingdom but applies to conduct taking place wholly outside the United Kingdon only if the person engaging in the conduct is a UK person”,
or acts on behalf of the Crown or holds office for the Crown.
In my example, the person is not a UK national and does not act on behalf of the Crown, and that person will presumably say that, in those circumstances, his conduct, such as it was, took place wholly outside the UK, so the offence does not apply. They would be able to rely on the judgment of the Supreme Court in El Khouri which dealt, in the context of extradition, with the definition of the word “conduct”. The Supreme Court held that
“the word ‘conduct’ would normally and naturally be understood as a synonym for acts done by the requested person in the specified location and not as including effects (whether intended or not) felt in that location of acts done somewhere else. A compelling reason is needed to interpret ‘conduct’ as bearing such an abnormally wide meaning”.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is here. The Supreme Court dealt with one of his speeches in another case, that of Cando Armas, in which the noble and learned Lord had taken a different approach. If that had prevailed, we would not have the problem we will have under Section 17B in my example.
It is true that in my example, the person may be relying on, or invoking, immunity, but immunity is quite specific to the facts. That person may not have been a state official, or a former state official, so in the facts of the case they may not be able to invoke immunity successfully but, in any event, immunity is a separate issue and it is not a reason for limiting the definition of the offence. Thus, on the question of the scope of Section 17B, assuming that all the work had taken place in Iran—outside the UK—what would we say is the conduct that has taken place in the UK, so that we can potentially prosecute that person under Section 17B?
My second question on scope concerns the definition of “UK-related activities”. The offence of assisting a designated body is committed if the person intends that conduct materially to assist a designated body in carrying out UK-related activities, which are defined in subsection (5) as
“activities taking place in the United Kingdom”
and
“activities taking place outside the United Kingdom which are prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.
Let us take another example: that of a person who is based in the United Kingdom and engages in the conduct of assisting the designated body in the UK, but the activities the designated body is pursuing are activities against an ally of the UK, be it Ukraine, the UAE or Israel. The Government will argue—the Minister referred to this in his opening remarks—that the UK-related activity would include activity against our friends and allies. However, if I understood him correctly, he also said that it would still be necessary for there to be some “recognisable effect” in the UK. I think he mentioned that international law requires—I am still a bit confused about this—certain jurisdictional links between the exercise of criminal jurisdiction and the state. However, in this case, there is an obvious link: the conduct would have taken place in the United Kingdom. The person in question would have done the planning and provided the support to the designated body in the UK, and then the designated body’s activities would have targeted one of our allies. As I understand the position under international law, there is already a sufficient nexus with the UK territory for us to take action against such an individual, so why would a further nexus be necessary? It is an important question, because it will define the extent to which we will be able to use this legislation against individuals who will use the United Kingdom as a base for planning activities against allies abroad.
In closing, I raise the question of the time allocated to this Bill. There is broad support for it, and we all agree it has to be put on the statute book quite quickly, but some points have emerged that require further discussion. In addition to those I have raised, I want to explore the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. We have only two days to table amendments and then just one day to debate them. I very much hope, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, said, that we are going to have a long session next week to debate the amendments.
Baroness Verma (Con)
My Lords, I welcome this Bill and look forward to making sure that its passage is as quick as the Minister wants, but of course, there will be amendments that need to be addressed.
I want to focus on two or three questions that I will put directly to the Minister. My concern is around AI, which the noble Lord, Lord Alton, raised. The use in this country of AI in two or three areas really concerns me. The social contract between the people and the state has broken down quite a lot in recent years. Technologies are being used through people born and brought up here to attack their own country. Can the Minister explore the way we protect our critical infrastructure? How do we ensure that those who manage and run it are well-versed in how to protect it, and that internal or external influences do not attack our country and bring it to a standstill? The energy sector is a prime target, but we have seen attacks on Marks & Spencer and on hospitals. These attacks can be carried out by people sitting in our own country, using artificial intelligence and other means to get into our systems.
This takes me to the other point I want the Minister to consider. Given that we are outsourcing so much of our work to other countries, how do we make sure that, while we are not directly impacted in the UK, information that belongs to the people of this country is not being targeted by foreign actors outside the country, in places where we are utilising outsourcing?
Finally, I am concerned about how we ensure that information is being protected, and how this legislation is going to work. Proscribed groups such as the IRGC and others are beginning to use people in this country as their proxies. My worry is that we have failed to proscribe them simply on the basis of arguments that have never made sense to me—I know the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and I agree on this. Time and again, people have been attacked on our soil by the Islamic guard, and we have failed to proscribe it and to protect our own nationals here.
It is about trying to understand why we have not got to that stage yet, not just with that grouping but with others that are now taking shelter under the umbrella of where we have not proscribed. Other groups are now beginning to utilise their own proxies, and I am afraid that those proxies are going by the wayside at the moment, because our attention is not on them. It is too much focused on China and Russia, when other actors are beginning to also come into our systems and utilise our young people in particular, through technologies. We must be very careful.
I have come in on this debate only because we get caught up in the matter of the day and fail to see the wider issues bubbling underneath in all our communities. The Minister knows that I raise this with him here often, and every time I see him outside the Chamber. Communities that we know have issues bubbling are very vulnerable to the sorts of attacks we are trying to protect against here. This is an ideal time—in this legislation—to make sure that we also cover those.
Baroness Dacres of Lewisham (Lab)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Verma. I welcome the opportunity to speak on the Bill.
The first duty of any Government is to ensure the safety and security of the people they serve. In an increasingly uncertain world, where hostile state activity can take many forms, from espionage and cyber attacks to foreign interference and intimidation, it is right that Parliament considers how best to respond to those threats.
I therefore support the principles behind the Bill and the Government’s determination to ensure that those acting on behalf of hostile foreign powers cannot undermine our national security, our way of life or the safety of the people living in our country. The threats posed by hostile states are real and evolving. They can affect individuals, communities and our democratic institutions, and it is right that the Government respond to them.
As the Bill progresses, I hope we will also recognise the importance of community trust and cohesion in strengthening our response to those threats. Many of our towns and cities are home to vibrant diaspora communities with deep family, cultural and historical connections across the world. These communities make an enormous contribution to our society, economy and public life.
It is important to recognise that diaspora communities can themselves be the target of intimidation, harassment and surveillance by hostile foreign actors. Indeed, some diaspora communities are among those most directly affected by hostile state activity, with individuals and groups experiencing attempts at coercion, interference and intimidation here in the United Kingdom.
Given that the Bill introduces powers to designate organisations linked to hostile foreign state activity, it is important that legitimate diaspora organisations, community groups, charities and cultural bodies have confidence that they will not be inadvertently affected by those powers. That is why it is so important that measures designed to protect national security do not create fear or uncertainty among law-abiding communities.
Trust is hard won and easily lost, particularly in communities that may already feel vulnerable to intimidation or interference. Experience has shown us that however well-intentioned legislation may be, we must always remain alert to unintended consequences, particularly where community confidence and trust are concerned. Where concerns are identified, there should be a willingness to listen, engage and act swiftly to address them.
The overwhelming majority of people maintain family, cultural, charitable or professional links overseas entirely legitimately. We must ensure that there is a clear distinction between those legitimate activities and the actions of individuals or organisations acting on behalf of hostile states. Can my noble friend the Minister say more about the safeguards that will ensure that legitimate community organisations and diaspora groups are not inadvertently affected by these powers? What steps will the Government take to listen, engage and act swiftly should unintended consequences emerge?
I support the aims of the Bill and look forward to following its progress through this House.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Dacres. She was absolutely right to remind us that the Bill is not an esoteric subject, nor is it part of some kind of sophisticated spy novel, but that, rather, it affects potentially every citizen in this country, and that is why it is so important. As she said, it is the first duty of government to protect its citizens from harm, and that is exactly what is being done by the delivery of the Bill. Therefore, in principle, and in most of its content, I support the Bill entirely.
I am very grateful to Jonathan Hall KC, my successor-but-three as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation —how to feel old in one sentence—who has done an excellent job. On the subject of Jonathan Hall, I remind noble Lords who have called for a review after 12 months that he is in fact required by law to give a review after 12 months, so that amendment is entirely unnecessary, with great respect to those who suggested it.
I remind noble Lords, too, that every Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, and Jonathan Hall in his current role as Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation, can of his own volition and motion create a report at any time. My successor as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, my noble friend Lord Anderson, his successor, and Jonathan Hall and I have all done exactly that, or at least made moves to do exactly that, and have obtained proportionate and helpful reactions from government when that has arisen. The reassurance provided by having an Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation, who does much the same as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation—and at the moment is the same person—gives great reassurance.
In relation to the content of the Bill in detail, I do not want to repeat what was said by my noble friends Lord Anderson and Lord Verdirame about some of it. Much of my noble friend Lord Anderson’s suggestion about the need to review proposed new Section 17C of the National Security Act 2023 can be covered very simply, probably by removing five words—
“by virtue of retaining a benefit”—
from the amended proposed new Section 17C(7), but that will be a matter for consideration in Committee.
I regret that the Bill has taken quite a long time to reach the Floor of the House, but I am bound to reflect after 40-odd years in one or other House of this place that there is an awful lot of “glass houses” about those complaints. There is not a Government who have not been guilty of serious delays, and much longer delays than this. We should not waste time on matters of that kind; we should simply get on with it. My own view is that we need two Committee days. If we have two Committee days, we will complete the necessary amendments to the Bill without difficulty and with proper debate. If we need one day, then I agree: let us make it a very long day and get the work done.
State threats in recent years have been described in detail by Sir Ken McCallum, the MI5 Director-General. He reminded us in October 2025 that we had seen
“a 35% increase in the number of individuals”
being investigated
“for involvement in state threat activity”,
in one year. That is a matter for real concern and reflects remarks made by my noble friend Lord Alton.
I will also reflect something that my noble friend Lord Barrow and the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, said on what I shall call the subtlety of what we are doing. One should not assume that this is simply extending counterterrorism legislation; there is much more subtlety to this subject than that, as my noble friend pointed out. We cannot simply cut and paste from counter- terrorism legislation in order to deal with countering state threats, because they are different in nature. They have been defined—very well, in my view—by MI5 as covering
“overt or covert actions by foreign governments which fall short of direct armed conflict with the UK but go beyond peaceful diplomacy and expected statecraft to harm or threaten the safety or interests of the UK or our allies”.
In the Terrorism Act 2000, the definition of terrorism is much simpler than that. This is a much more complicated subject. There is a view—it is one that I, and perhaps others here, share—that designation under this Bill is much more suitable to deal with the IRGC than proscription under the Terrorism Acts, because those subtle arts referred to in that MI5 description are needed to deal with organisations such as the IRGC.
I turn to the question of charities and other independent organisations. I have a great deal of sympathy with what they do, but—as my noble friend Lord Anderson has heard me say privately on many occasions; I know he is bored of me doing so—I do not think that we should overlook the importance of the discretion of the Director of Public Prosecutions and, in this Bill, the Attorney-General not to prosecute. It is an extremely important protection, which is used on public interest grounds and has been used fairly frequently, although it does not arise in what one might call ordinary crime.
I hope that we can deal with the Bill in short order and that we can keep our mind on the issue we are trying to deal with and not muddle it up with straight- forward terrorism, which is much more straightforward than this. We must take into account the need for subtle, clever and extremely able members of the various services that protect us to be able to talk, where necessary, with people who are implicit in doing terrible things, so that members of our services may make the world a more peaceful place and our country one in which the citizens are safe.
Baroness Northover (LD)
My Lords, national security is, of course, a fundamental responsibility of government. We all recognise that the nature of security threats has changed significantly. We know that we need to step up our military preparedness, but we now also increasingly face challenges such as cyber attacks, foreign interference in democratic processes and indirect covert operations. We need not only to build national resilience but to tackle such threats and others as they evolve. We all share that aim.
Jonathan Hall KC was asked to identify gaps in our legislation, and the Government aim to tackle some of these in this fast-track Bill. The Government have had over a year in which to address these gaps, yet they came forward with this Bill only in the past few weeks and expect it to be rushed through Parliament. That is rarely a recipe for good legislation, so it is vital that we examine it carefully to ensure that there are no unintended consequences—a concern that many noble Lords have already flagged.
As I read the Bill, I wondered whether some of the people potentially implicated in recent attacks would be covered; the Bill covers those who would or should know for whom they might be working. There is a new development whereby young men in particular are being recruited online for tempting cash payments to take photos of venues or even to carry out attacks. They never think that foreign state involvement might lie behind these activities. Some have termed these actors “useful idiots”. In some ways, they are similar to drug mules, as the consequences of their actions—and the question of who is asking them to do things—are far from their minds, as their focus is simply the financial reward. Will such so-called useful idiots be caught by this legislation? We know the use of such proxies is increasing, giving deniability.
Then there are other areas where people may be inadvertently included. In my view, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has decimated the Government’s current response on humanitarian work. I am very glad to see that the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, is listening to this debate.
The chair of the International Development Committee, Sarah Champion, has urged the Home Secretary to amend the Bill over concerns that it has negative implications for humanitarian organisations. The IDC wants to see
“an express humanitarian exemption making clear that offences relating to designated bodies do not apply to the activities of impartial humanitarian organisations acting in accordance with international humanitarian law”.
The IDC points out:
“Humanitarian organisations often operate in areas where state-linked actors exercise territorial control. In such contexts, engagement with all parties to a conflict may be necessary to secure access to affected populations, obtain security guarantees, maintain staff safety, and deliver life-saving assistance”.
The committee also notes that
“the Bill creates offences of supporting a designated body, assisting a designated body, and obtaining or accepting material benefits from a designated body”.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, notes that simply getting information on where landmines might have been laid could fall foul of this legislation.
The Minister in the Commons stressed that the offences are not intended to criminalise conduct relating to humanitarian assistance, but as my colleague in the Commons, Monica Harding, noted, although safeguards for humanitarian operations are in the Explanatory Notes for the Bill, they are not in the Bill itself. Bond, the Halo Trust, the International Committee of the Red Cross and others argue that there is a risk here that this may have, at the very least, a chilling effect on their work. Among other challenges, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, noted, broadly framed offences may lead banks, suppliers, donors and others to refuse to assist, as they do not want to take on the risk.
I heard what the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, said about the defence used by NGOs in court, but the last thing that they wish to do is end up in an expensive court case. They will seek to avoid that by avoiding the work. I also heard what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said about them not being prosecuted, but they are likely to try to avoid that risk, so they will not undertake that work.
I understand the reaction of the Minister in the Commons—that the Government do not want an exclusion to be exploited by malign actors. The noble Lord, Lord Barrow, referred to that. However, there are diplomatic exclusions in the Bill, so there are ways of doing that. Therefore, I hope that the Government are giving thought to how they could amend the Bill, to make sure that humanitarian organisations are equally and explicitly protected. Certainly, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, mentioned, a Pepper v Hart statement would be useful, but will NGOs know the significance of that or even look at our debates, which is where they would have to pick up the references to a Pepper v Hart protection? An amendment would be much safer.
To return to the challenge of drawing up legislation in a rush, however worthy the aim, I was struck by what Alicia Kearns said in the Commons:
“We must not write a law for the IRGC alone. We are writing a law for every hostile state organ that comes after it, and the next may look nothing like the last”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/6/26; col. 870.]
I am also puzzled that—and Alicia Kearns pointed this out—under the Bill, unlike other terrorism legislation, people cannot be charged until they have committed an act, rather than when they are planning such an act. The noble Lord on the Conservative Benches made reference to this. Is there a reason for this, and if it is inadvertent, will it be addressed?
As we did in the Commons and as my noble friends have emphasised here, we support the intentions of the Bill; we recognise that we face attacks by state-sponsored and state-linked actors who actively seek to undermine our democracy. This is now widespread across the democratic world, where Russia, for example, wishes to create instability in the UK, across the EU and NATO, and beyond. Just look at its recent actions in the various elections in Romania, Moldova, Armenia, and Hungary. Threats to the UK from foreign states are indeed evolving rapidly. With people receiving their news via social media, and social media platforms amplifying division and disagreement, this is likely only to intensify.
As we are asked to fast-track the Bill, it is important that we look at its potential limitations. I am glad that the Minister says he is willing to work across the House to address these concerns, and I hope that we can therefore get robust legislation on the statute book and that he really means what he says about working with us to try to resolve some of these problems.
Baroness Helic (Con)
My Lords, no one can be under any illusion about the nature of the threats we face. Other noble Lords have spoken about this in some detail, so I will not be repeating that. It is right that the Government seek to update our laws in response. I pay tribute to Jonathan Hall KC, whose careful review has identified areas where the law requires strengthening. The Bill introduces significant offences relating to organisations associated with foreign state threats. I welcome the Government’s clear intention to close loopholes, address the use of proxy actors and strengthen deterrence.
However, in pursuing those objectives, I have three concerns. First, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has already pointed out, we must not create uncertainty for those who work for and serve an altogether different purpose. Humanitarian organisations and development agencies, including conflict resolution experts, operate in some of the most fragile and dangerous environments in the world. I have seen the value of their work first-hand, not only as a supporter of their work but as a recipient of their aid when my own family was displaced by conflict.
Humanitarian work is often challenging and uncomfortable. In conflict zones, engagement with de facto authorities is frequently unavoidable in order to negotiate access to civilian populations, obtain permits, rent premises, pay utility charges, employ local staff or secure safe passage through territory controlled by actors humanitarian organisations neither support nor endorse. Without such engagement, the most vulnerable people may receive no assistance at all. Today, many organisations are concerned that this legislation could have unintended consequences. The ICRC has warned that aspects of the Bill are drafted broadly enough that routine humanitarian activities could fall within its scope. As others have pointed out, similar concerns have been raised by the International Development Committee. Humanitarian organisations do not seek to weaken our ability to counter hostile activity. They seek clarity that they can continue to provide vital, life-saving assistance.
Ministers have offered assurances that the Bill is intended to distinguish between hostile conduct and legitimate humanitarian engagement. I welcome those assurances, and do not doubt the sincerity with which they have been given, yet there is an important distinction between assurance and certainty. Courts interpret statutes, not ministerial statements or footnotes. We have seen before that where Parliament relies on assurances rather than clear statutory language, uncertainty can persist for years. I refer here to my own amendment on parental alienation and judicial colleges. I was given all sorts of assurances that Ministers and the Government would work with judicial colleges, but nothing ever happened. It really takes time: people change, Ministers go and Governments go. If it is not written in the law, it means nothing. It can be a lovely intention, but it does not produce the desired effect, so I just want to draw the Minister’s attention to that: it happens.
My second concern is how the protections identified by Ministers would work in practice. Ministers have referred to provisions concerning agreements with the Government. However, if those provisions are to safeguard humanitarian action, much more information is needed about how organisations would seek, obtain and rely upon such arrangements. Experience from sanctions and counterterrorism regimes shows that ambiguity can have far-reaching consequences. Even where aid agencies are confident that their activities are lawful, the institutions on which they depend may decide that the risks are way too great. This can lead to the withdrawal of banking facilities, delays in transferring funds and obstructions to the delivery of assistance where it is needed most. While it is clearly not the intention of the Bill to catch organisations such as these, their experience of similar legislation is that, for as long as there remains even a paper risk of criminal liability, charitable trustees will act cautiously. No one can blame them for that.
There is also the wider problem of de-risking by banks and financial institutions. The net effect is likely to be a reduction in vital work in some of the world’s most troubled countries, including humanitarian relief and conflict resolution efforts, both of which depend upon necessary dealings with state bodies that may be designated under the Bill. Ultimately, civilians bear the consequences: aid arrives late, access is reduced and suffering is prolonged. These are not hypothetical concerns; they have been documented repeatedly across humanitarian operations around the world.
Such an approach would not be novel. As others have mentioned, Jonathan Hall KC has previously highlighted the tension that can arise between national security legislation and humanitarian action, drawing attention to the principles reflected in UN Security Council Resolution 2664. The United Kingdom played a leading role in securing that resolution and should show the same leadership here. Humanitarian action and national security are not opposing concepts. Conflict, displacement and humanitarian crises can fuel instability and create conditions in which wider security threats flourish. The Government’s own strategic assessments recognise that reality.
My third concern is one of consistency. The Bill rightly acknowledges that threats to security may be advanced indirectly through proxies, coercion and conduct that undermines international norms. If we accept that proposition, we should apply the same standards consistently. States that obstruct humanitarian access, contribute to instability or disregard international humanitarian law should be subject to scrutiny, irrespective of whether they are competitors, adversaries or allies. The credibility of a rules-based international order depends on that consistency.
The Bill seeks to address a genuine and pressing threat, and I support that objective. However, if humanitarian activity is not intended to be caught by these provisions, that protection should be stated clearly in the Bill. Doing so would provide certainty, support compliance with international humanitarian law, and help ensure that measures designed to counter hostile state activity do not inadvertently hinder those working to save lives, protect civilians and uphold human dignity in the most challenging circumstances.
Baroness D’Souza (CB)
My Lords, I think this is the first time ever that I have followed the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, and I am delighted to do so.
I begin by thanking the Minister and his officials for meeting some of us and going through the Bill in detail. I welcome the Bill, as so many others do, but continue to believe that there is a lack of clarity on some important issues and that this may result in unintended consequences—a very well-rehearsed phrase in the context of this debate. The points that I would have wished to make have been eloquently reiterated by many of your Lordships, notably my noble friend Lord Anderson, so I am going to cut to the chase in a minute, although I would add that some of the points that have been made repeatedly are so serious that they bear repetition.
My main concern remains the danger that humanitarian organisations could fall foul of a future law that forbids supporting or assisting a designated body or obtaining material benefits from such a body. As we have heard, designated bodies could include emergency assistance and/or development aid bodies, peacebuilding bodies and demining organisations which deal with sensitive material—as indeed does Inter Mediate. These entities regularly communicate with foreign government departments that are likely, under the terms of the Bill, to be designated. One example given by the Norwegian Refugee Council concerned a tax rebate rightfully owed to it by the Iranian Government.
Another concern is the stringent bank requirements surrounding the sending of funds to dubious foreign government departments—which, again, we have heard from many different Peers. The banks, which have a low risk threshold, as is the case with suppliers, donors and trustees, have made it increasingly clear that they do not accept verbal assurances and demand explicit protection to be on the face of the Bill.
The Home Secretary in the other place cited new Section 17B(6)(b) as providing the necessary protection. She assured the House that anything that has been approved by the UK would not be caught and urged humanitarian organisations to talk to the FCDO—which they already do, at length and frequently. However, the Bill as it stands does not make it clear what exactly will be covered or how such an arrangement could be confirmed or sought. Emergency responses require licences, if operating under current sanctions, that necessarily take time: for example, humanitarian action following the earthquake in Myanmar in early 2025 took over a year to negotiate, by which time most people affected by the earthquake had either not survived or had recovered.
Furthermore, any doubts about the legality of communications with designated bodies will have if not a chilling then certainly a delaying effect on humanitarian action—which the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, referred to—and on the transfer of resources. No trustee of a charitable organisation will be happy to risk the reputation of a charity, or even legal action, unless there are clear terms of engagement. Moreover, the courts, if it got to that stage, would not be bound by the Explanatory Notes, which are subject to interpretation.
The Bill targets state bodies, and this implies that whole ministries could well become designated: for example, the interior ministry of a country subject to severe UK sanctions such as Iran. Humanitarian organisations of many different kinds necessarily have to deal with ministries to obtain official agreements to operate in a country, and to receive licences and work permits. These take time and, should a humanitarian organisation be refused permission and subsequently make an application to the Secretary of State to exercise his or her power under Section 33A to remove the designation status, this would take even longer, with no guarantee that the Secretary of State would find in the organisation’s favour.
Again, the Minister in the other place, responding to this concern, cited the “prohibited purpose” clause, which has been discussed and which serves as an additional safeguard that protects legitimate conduct, in that it requires any conduct to be prejudicial to the safety or interest of the UK—although it is not necessary for the individual involved to know that a body is designated for the offence to apply, which seems somewhat odd.
I trust that the Minister accepted our concerns at the meeting that we recently held and undertook to look again at the Bill following its completion in the other place. However, the Bill remains unamended, and our concerns have not, so far, been fully addressed.
Lord Polak (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza.
I was not entirely persuaded that this Bill was strictly necessary. I remind the House that Hezbollah is part of the Lebanese Government, and for many years that fact was cited as a reason not to proscribe the organisation in its entirety. Yet in 2019, Hezbollah was fully proscribed without the need for new primary legislation. However, I accept that the threats posed by hostile threats and their proxies are real, and for that reason I support the Bill.
For years, hostile states have sought to undermine our democracy and intimidate and threaten communities within the United Kingdom. The Jewish community has lived with this reality for decades. Synagogues, schools and community centres have required extraordinary levels of security. Families have become accustomed to armed protection outside places of worship. My own grandchildren are growing up believing that security barriers and guards are simply part of Jewish life in Britain. That is not normal, nor should it ever be accepted as normal. Allow me to thank the police, the security services, the CST and Shomrim, which have protected and protect the community—but they should all be doing other things.
The Iranian regime has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use intimidation, proxies, surveillance and violence against those it regards as its enemies. It has exported instability, extremism and fear far beyond its borders. These threats are real, persistent and increasingly visible on our streets. The fact that many of these threats have been directed at the Jewish community and members of the Iranian community should never have led us to regard them as matters affecting only one particular group. The principle at stake is far broader. A hostile state willing to target one group of British citizens is a hostile state willing to challenge the security of our country as a whole. When it seeks to spread fear within our communities, it is attacking the fabric of our society, and that is why I welcome the Bill.
As the Minister said, because the legislation is so important, it is equally important that we get it right. The Iranian regime has consistently demonstrated an ability to adapt its methods, operate through proxies, exploit legal ambiguities and maintain plausible deniability. The challenge we face is, therefore, not simply one of identifying a hostile state but of ensuring that our legislative response is capable of addressing the full range of methods through which that state seeks to advance its interests. For that reason, I am concerned that there are areas in the Bill that do not go far enough.
As drafted, there appears to be a higher threshold for prosecution of designated state threat than exists under terrorism legislation. There are also legitimate questions about whether activities planned in the United Kingdom but carried out overseas would always be captured by the offences contained in the Bill. Likewise, as hostile states increasingly rely on propaganda, online influence and indirect encouragement, we must ensure that those who act in furtherance of a hostile state’s objectives cannot escape accountability simply because they were inspired rather than directly tasked.
Iran’s activities are not confined to formal state actors or uniformed operatives. They encompass proxies, criminal networks, online radicalisation, covert influence and individuals recruited or encouraged to act at arm’s length from the regime itself. If our legislation does not truly reflect that reality, we risk creating opportunities for hostile actors to exploit the very gaps we are trying to close.
Nor should we view these issues solely through the lens of Iran. The purpose of the Bill is not merely to respond to one hostile state, however pressing that may be; it is to establish a framework capable of protecting the United Kingdom from future hostile states whose methods may differ, evolve and become more sophisticated over time. As others have said, legislation that is drafted too narrowly may address today’s threats while leaving us exposed to tomorrow’s.
In that regard, I pay tribute to the work of the honourable Member for Rutland and Stamford, Alicia Kearns MP, who tabled a number of constructive amendments in the other place. I would be grateful if the Minister could address just two of them. Following on from the words of my noble friend Lord Davies, on the question of uniforms, insignia and propaganda, if a state-backed organisation such as the IRGC were to be designated under this regime, why would it not be an offence to display its insignia on Britain’s streets and to glorify it online, mirroring the provisions in Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000? If we recognise that such organisations seek not only to operate abroad but to cultivate support networks here at home, we must address the propaganda that sustains them.
Secondly, on travel document seizure powers, Jonathan Hall KC supported in his review the case for allowing the police to seize the passports and other travel documents of those who are suspected of assisting designated organisations. If the Government accept the threat posed by individuals facilitating or supporting hostile state activity, why will they not provide the police with these powers now? Why defer such an important safeguard to future legislation when the opportunity exists now? There is always a temptation to prioritise speed over scrutiny when confronted with an urgent threat—although we have been calling this matter “urgent” for many years—but the effectiveness of the Bill will be judged not by how quickly it passes through Parliament but by whether it gives our security services and law enforcement the tools needed to confront the threats that exist.
If there are areas where the Bill can be strengthened, we should strengthen it. If there are provisions that fall short of the standards Parliament has previously deemed necessary in the fields of counterterrorism and national security, we should examine them carefully. If amendments are needed to ensure that hostile state activity is met with the full force of law, we should not hesitate to make them. I suggest that the choice before us is not whether to support or scrutinise the Bill. We must now do both. For that reason, I support the Bill and look forward to ensuring that it emerges from this House stronger than it arrived.
Baroness Gill (Lab)
My Lords, we have already heard a lot about how our adversaries are looking at the UK and seeing a permissive environment for causing chaos, as well as recruiting foot soldiers on the same social media platforms they use to manipulate the British people—which, incidentally, they have been doing for years.
This subversion is not new. It has been grinding away at our democracy since well before the Brexit referendum. Some of us remember it vividly. I remember scrolling through my feeds years ago and receiving highly targeted anti-EU questionnaires on social media. Platforms such as Facebook were not just places to connect: they were actively weaponised to push anti-EU propaganda in order to manufacture chaos and systematically shatter public trust in not just the EU but the United Kingdom’s core institutions. What we are seeing today is simply the terrifying escalation of that campaign.
According to the briefing by the House of Lords Library, MI5 has just dropped a metric confirming that investigations into hostile state activity have skyrocketed by 35% in a single year. This is no longer just a quiet war of digital propaganda: the line between foreign espionage and domestic terror has evaporated completely.
First, let us look at how our adversaries have moved from online manipulation to physical violence. It should come as absolutely no surprise that our major political parties, most vital companies and public infrastructure are being targeted relentlessly, but let us discard the illusion that these are ad hoc attacks by random, frustrated individuals. These are highly co-ordinated campaigns by hostile state actors whose focus and objectives are to undermine Britain’s power, credibility and influence on the global stage. Look at what Russia is doing today. It has moved from manipulating algorithms to hiring street criminals. It sits safely behind keyboards, hops on to social media platforms and encrypted apps, and recruits cheap local proxies, such as the six Bulgarian nationals who were convicted in May 2025, paying them in cryptocurrency to carry out dirty operations on British soil.
How far is it willing to go? Look no further than the shocking reports of a steady stream of Russian-commissioned arson attacks targeting the private properties and vehicles of our own Prime Minister, Sir Keir Starmer. If it is willing to put a torch to the Prime Minister’s personal property in order to spark domestic fear, what will prevent it targeting anyone else? At the same time, Russia continues to deploy massive, automated networks of sponsored bots—expanding the very digital warfare that polluted our social media feeds a decade ago—all of them calibrated to pump out venomous disinformation, trigger panic and actively incite civil unrest in our towns and cities.
Secondly, we have to talk about the direct physical terror being unleashed on British citizens. Many noble Lords have already spoken about how Iran has become so emboldened. In just 12 months, MI5 had to hunt down and stop more than 20 separate, potentially lethal, plots backed by Iran. Following the outbreak of conflict in the Middle East in early 2026, those threats directly hit our streets. We have seen a wave of targeted, terrifying attacks on Iranian dissidents and our Jewish communities. Much has also been said about the IRGC, which, as has been noted, is hiring local thugs as foot soldiers to terrorise Jewish neighbourhoods, in effect dragging foreign conflicts directly on to British soil in order to settle scores.
Thirdly, we are letting our intellectual and economic future be plundered in broad daylight. China is running an incredibly sophisticated “total society” operation against the UK. Through its massive, sweeping cyber breaches and aggressive campaigns to lure away UK academic experts, our cutting-edge technology is being drained away. It is exploiting our supply chains, university partnerships and FDI in order to steal commercial secrets and feed them straight into its own military and economic machines.
Therefore, this Bill—the National Security (State Threats) Bill—should be welcomed by this House. But I want to ask the Minister a couple of questions. First, how exactly do the Government intend to pierce the veil of the encrypted apps, cryptocurrency networks and automated bot networks that Russia is using to build its criminal proxy network? Secondly, when Iran co-ordinates lethal plots against our Jewish communities and China systematically plunders our universities, what is our concrete, immediate diplomatic and economic retaliation?
I say to those who want more time and want to deliberate that, today, the United Kingdom faces an aggressive, relentless surge in covert state threats. These are hostile operations planned by foreign Governments that stop just short of a declaration of war, but their objectives are identical: to sabotage our safety, bleed out our economic prosperity and shatter our democratic freedoms. That is why the Bill is a crucial step, and I support it.
Lord Shinkwin (Con) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Gill, in what has been an informative, if alarming, debate—alarming because it has highlighted the degree to which the freedoms which my grandparents’ generation fought and died for are now under grave threat. The need for this Bill underlines how much the social context has changed, as my noble friend Lady Verma alluded to. I doubt that the older generation could have anticipated just how strong a sense of entitlement to those freedoms their great-grandchildren would develop. It is as if their great-grandparents’ sacrifice, made in blood, sweat and tears, was ancient history, something that belonged in a Hollywood blockbuster, but which was irrelevant to today’s apparently so much more sophisticated world.
I suspect that, having made that sacrifice in order that we might be free from the racist, genocidal, Jew-hating Nazis, my grandparents’ generation would appreciate far more than we do the trouble we are in and the urgency of getting the measures in this Bill, and perhaps others, on to the statute book. They would see the extent to which the threat to our democracy posed by hostile states’ use of proxies and malign non-state actors is exacerbated by society’s privileged, desensitised indifference to the danger they pose.
The Lord Privy Seal said shortly before we began this debate that the public do not appreciate the threat. I agree with her, but I would go further. I fear that some are in denial, desperately clinging to a delusion that peace is permanent, that the welfare state is inviolable and that deterrence does not matter enough to justify the necessary recalibration of resources. Meanwhile, hostile states and their proxies exploit our weakness ruthlessly and insidiously, turning those hard-won freedoms that we take for granted against us.
Take racism as an example. This country outlawed racism based, among other criteria, on ethnic origin, 61 years ago. Yet our enemies cynically weaponise democracy, exploiting demonstrations featuring pernicious racist chants as if they were somehow a celebration of democratic rights rather than a concerted attempt by some to single out and intimidate a particular race—our Jewish brothers and sisters—and thereby undermine our social and cultural cohesion. Shamefully, we let them do it. We let them undermine a crucial aspect of our democracy, supposedly in the name of democracy.
I welcome this Bill because it goes some way to addressing the threat we face. My question is whether it goes far enough. Are its measures truly commensurate with the scale of that threat? I will not rehearse the points already made, but I join with those who wonder whether it takes into account sufficiently the rise of what could be termed “hatred for hire”, such as we saw in the arson attacks on the Jewish community ambulances and the attack on the Prime Minister’s former home, which the noble Baroness, Lady Gill, mentioned.
I close with three points. The first is a thank you to our wonderful security services, who work so hard within difficult democratic constraints to keep us safe, particularly in our case as parliamentarians. The second is to highlight the importance of pre-emption as a means of prevention. One only has to consider that the odious Chinese Communist Party regime operated a secret police hub here in London to spy on and intimidate Hong Kong dissidents to know that in some cases, our enemies are running rings around us. Their aggression and hostile intent are palpable. I ask the Minister, who we all appreciate is dedicated to ensuring the safety and security of our country, whether he is absolutely sure that the powers in this Bill are sufficiently aggressive and pre-emptive in return.
My final point is this. Is the Minister confident that the Bill takes account of the incredibly unstable context in which we consider it? The Hormuz sell-out seems to be unravelling as we speak. A previously reliable partner is becoming reliably unreliable, yet some would say that we are still tripping over ourselves to observe legal niceties. I fear that we make our enemies laugh. I hope that our combined determination to close any gaps in the Bill, mentioned during this debate, will ensure that they have no reason to laugh at us—either today or in the future.
Lord Docherty of Milngavie (Non-Afl)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, and other noble Lords. I thank the Minister for the measured and thoughtful way in which he introduced Second Reading. As many have said, there is no more important issue facing our country than our national security and, more broadly, our defence.
We are living in the most dangerous period in Europe since the 1930s. That is not hyperbole or geographic sophistry. I studied at the Rostov technical institute in 1990, during the collapse of the Soviet Union. In Rostov, on the bank of the River Don, our hosts would proudly point to the other bank and tell us, “That is where Europe starts”. We might have said that it is where Europe ends. But that is where a war in Europe between Ukraine and Russia has now lasted longer, for each country, than in both world wars.
That Russia is a hostile state with few if any sympathies for western democratic norms or our liberal institutions is beyond doubt. That we live in a dangerous world that is getting more dangerous is also beyond doubt. As has been mentioned many times, the director-general of MI5 has openly reported a substantial increase in the number of investigations of state threat activities. As the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and others, have mentioned, the convictions just last week of a Romanian and a Ukrainian national for arson on property connected to our Prime Minister shows how emboldened bad actors have become.
I know that the Minister will not wish to name individual organisations which may fall within the remit of the Bill. However, we also know that Iran and its proxies are increasingly active. That state actors and their proxies are attempting to commission surveillance, sabotage, arson, theft or physical violence is manifest and self-evident. The review of counter- terrorism legislation carried out by Jonathan Hall KC has set out the need for a Bill such as this clearly, as so many noble Lords have said.
There are several areas in the Bill which describe the critical issue of finance in relation to potential offences. An offence can be made when financial assistance is provided by a designated body or where financial assistance is provided to a designated body, either directly or indirectly. That financial benefit will, as has been mentioned, almost always take the form of cryptocurrency. Cryptocurrency is now the payment method of choice for criminal gangs, hostile state actors and it appears, for reasons known only to itself, for the Reform party. With payments made to wallet addresses and not individuals, without the involvement of banks, these payments are, as we know, far harder to subject to anti-money laundering rules or sanctions compliance. Some cryptocurrency products are specifically designed to avoid detection. In my view, the legitimate use of crypto is becoming increasingly difficult to defend.
A parallel can be drawn between social media and cryptocurrencies. The first smartphone was launched in 2007, and you could argue that social media, as we understand it today, came into being a year later with the launch of the App Store. Only now, 18 years later, are we seeing a concerted effort across jurisdictions to try to address the harmful effects of social media on children using smartphones, relying less on the professed good faith of big tech and other providers—rather, through comprehensive regulation and even prohibition. Future generations will look back on our handing over smartphones unregulated to children in the same way today we look at photos of Victorian children smoking a pipe. They will ask, “What were they thinking?”
The year 2008 was also when a seminal and anonymous paper was published, setting out the rationale for cryptocurrency. The first cryptocurrency was created the following year. Social media and cryptocurrencies are essentially the same age. Is it not also time for a similar concerted approach to regulate crypto more effectively and make it less obviously useful to criminals and bad actors, or will future generations ask, “What were they thinking?” What steps are the Government taking to ensure that the individuals responsible for cryptocurrencies used by any organisation or person designated under the Bill will be held accountable? Are there any more general plans on crypto regulation being made much more effective?
No one should be above the law or beyond its reach. The security and defence of the country is our first priority, as many noble Lords have said. For that reason, I strongly welcome the Bill and the provisions contained within it.
Lord Walney (CB)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow that thoughtful speech from the noble Lord, Lord Docherty. There is one person who I wish we could have heard from today: our dear friend Meta, Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale. She was such an extraordinary expert on these issues for many years in the House and in her career as an intelligence officer. We said goodbye to her at a very moving funeral last Friday in Glasgow. I was gathering memories and stories about Meta, and one that is pertinent to share just now is when she gave a speech, I think in Tel Aviv, on Iran. This erudite, softly spoken woman, who everyone really wanted to be their great-aunt, gently said that the IRGC
“must be eliminated—and I really do mean eliminated”.
My friend recalled the jaw of the British ambassador next to him dropping as she said that.
Those words are pertinent, because I really hope that the Minister will listen to that and agree to be a little bit more Meta on this Bill. Although I welcome it like everybody else, it does not achieve the Government’s and Jonathan Hall’s stated aim of an equivalent measure to terrorist proscription. It is weaker in an array of respects; there are excuses provided by the Government for each, but the cumulative effect is a significantly weaker regime.
The noble Lord, Lord Polak, made a pertinent point about Hezbollah. Unlike the majority of noble Lords who have spoken—including learned noble Lords with much greater experience on the subject of terrorism—who appear to have accepted Jonathan Hall’s analysis, I still question why we cannot take the approach that we did in 2019 with Hezbollah and which the US, Canada, Australia and the European Union have taken in fully proscribing the IRGC as a terrorist organisation.
That said, we are where we are. We are going to get the Bill on to the statute book, apparently with extraordinary speed. Despite us having asked for this and the Government having thought about it for more than 14 months, I really hope that they will agree to take an extra day or so to strengthen the Bill, rather than railroading a weaker measure through to the Commons. I am afraid one would have to assume, if the Government maintain this speed of timetable, that they are doing it as an excuse to get a weaker Bill on the statute book rather than taking that a couple of extra days potentially to strengthen it.
The Government talked about the system of immunity and the Vienna convention demanding a higher bar as reasons for some of these measures not matching terrorist proscription. However, we are not proscribing Tehran here; we are prosecuting operatives who are using all the tools of terrorism to do their work. Perhaps this points to the need for the IRGC to be treated as a conventional terrorist organisation, unlike some of the other organisations to which this legislation may end up applying. Although I take the argument that, in many circumstances, you would not wish to fully treat the people who are operating as part of a state enterprise as terrorist operatives, it is the case that the IRGC has been, effectively, a full-blown terrorist organisation under our very eyes for many years. It would send a strong signal to treat it as such, with all the authority and the taboo which would surround even those state officials. They would try to claim diplomatic immunity, but we would say that the way this organisation operates is so heinous that they deserve the full force of terrorism law. I hope the Government are open to strengthening the approach.
In Committee, I intend to explore the approach to the displaying of insignia, the dissemination of publications and self-directing promotion of the group. My preference would be simply to put that on to the statute book. I would like also to explore the prospect of a flexible, discretionary approach to be applied to particular organisations by the Secretary of State through regulation. I hope that is an issue that we can get into in Committee.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, as my noble friends have said, we on these Benches strongly support the Bill, but with some caveats about process, scope and drafting. We felt bafflement and frustration as this Government—and indeed the last one—failed to act on the very obvious threat from the IRGC. The Conservative Government promised to in 2023 but did not deliver in office. But we then accepted that the tool of proscription had to be replaced by a new formula of designation for state bodies, although I note what the noble Lord, Lord Polak, said about Hezbollah, which was interesting. Jonathan Hall KC’s report was delivered over a year ago, and now, having dragged their feet, the Government want to rush the Bill through at unseemly speed, and at the possible expense of precision. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, suggested, understandably, that a draft Bill might have been preferable.
As the Minister said in his introduction, state threats are “both evolving and enduring”. The Bill needs to be scrutinised and stress-tested sufficiently in Committee that it produces lasting but nimble legislation, which is capable of future adaptation. We know that we are experiencing the equivalent of terrorist acts emanating from states such as Iran and Russia, in sabotage, physical attacks, arson, firebombing and propaganda—with Jewish communities often targeted, shamefully—as well as from China in spying, harassment and death threats to Hong Kong pro-democracy activists. Often proxies are used for these nefarious activities, in parallel with espionage and cyber threats from state intelligence agencies.
The Bill must be fit for designation of foreign power entities backed by any state. However, the IRGC is the clearest and most obvious one. These Benches therefore envisage seeking to amend the Bill so as to ensure, on its face, that IRGC designation is properly pursued within one month. This is an urgent priority. If not the IRGC, and not in this Bill, then who and when? The Minister made encouraging noises about designation for the IRGC, but no commitment. A commitment is needed—not the wiggle room that one suspects some bits of Government still seem to want.
We also wish to extend the offence of material assistance to a designated body to include the setting up and use of companies or trusts to hide the true ownership of assets belonging to that body, and we will explore that in Committee. My noble friend Lady Doocey also sought clarity that organisations could not escape the Bill’s net by operating from abroad in this digital world. She also suggested that foreign state threats in the Bill should be capable of including superintelligent AI tools.
Many noble Lords referred to humanitarian activities, conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts. Some of this activity requires, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, put it,
“intensive dialogue with brutal and unpleasant regimes to which it may be difficult … for western Governments to speak”.
I think we all accept that.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, explained the Opposition’s objection to the prohibited purpose offence having the limitation of being
“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.
One problem with removing this limitation is that it might expose the activities of humanitarian and peace- building organisations to criminalisation. Indeed, the fact that this limitation of the offence, or defence to it, does not appear in proposed new Sections 17B or 17C on assisting or material benefits, but only in proposed new Section 17A on supporting a foreign power entity, illustrates perhaps the worries raised by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, my noble friends Lady Tyler and Lady Northover, and others.
Other organisations besides the IRGC are in our minds. The Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office has been mentioned in the debate, and it was debated yesterday. No doubt it was once an office that did what it said on the tin, but it now seems to be an extension of the transnational repression perpetrated by China.
The noble Lord, Lord Pickles, also raised the issue of organisations which might pose a threat but do not fit the definition of state-sponsored threats, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. One could, no doubt, think of others.
All noble Lords who have spoken have welcomed the Bill as an important step forward but will seek to ensure that it is watertight but adaptable, durable but not inflexible. We have a task before us in Committee. The Government would do well to benefit from all the expertise which has been on display in the Chamber today—and to listen and to incorporate changes where justified. As well as legal, diplomatic and other expertise, we are fortunate to have heard from not one, but two, former Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation, in the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, as well as the chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee. Let us draw on all the skills and talents to perfect the Bill. The Government would be making a mistake if they were just to rush through without listening to all the very well-intended suggestions for amendments that have been made.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I begin by thanking all noble Lords from across your Lordships’ House who have contributed to this thoughtful and stimulating debate. It is a great privilege to give the closing speech for the Opposition Benches, having heard from many noble Lords with a huge amount of expertise and experience in the legal, security and ISC sectors.
Before reflecting on the specific provisions in the Bill we would like to see refined, it is worth outlining the context in which your Lordships have received this legislation. The Opposition Benches have long recognised the growing threat posed by hostile state actors and their proxies, and we wholeheartedly support the aim of strengthening the tools available to protect the UK’s national security. Of course, we support the general principles of the Bill and concur with the motivations behind it.
I accept that the Bill goes beyond the IRGC. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, gave a long list of both threats and, sadly, events in the UK in recent years. The Bill rightly should cover state threats in general, but the IRGC is obviously and rightly the first target of the Bill. It is undeniable that the legislative provisions here should have been brought before Parliament long before now.
For many months, noble Lords from across your Lordships’ House have repeatedly called for stronger action against the IRGC, most recently in the Committee and Report stages of the Crime and Policing Bill, where time and again calls were made from many different quarters for proscription of the IRGC or an equivalent. Those calls were resisted, amendments were opposed, arguments were dismissed; the opinion of the House was tested but ignored. Yet we now find ourselves considering a Bill whose principal and primary purpose is to establish a legislative framework through which organisations such as the IRGC may be designated. That raises the question: if the Government accept the need for such a framework, why has action not been taken sooner? The threats posed by the Iranian regime and the IRGC did not suddenly emerge in recent weeks. Had the Government listened to arguments that were made in this Chamber months ago, Parliament would not now be scrutinising significant national security legislation to such compressed timescales. That matters because legislation must be more than well intentioned, it must be effective; where Parliament identifies legislative gaps or ambiguities, it is our duty to address them.
It is in that spirit that we approach this Bill, and it is in that spirit that I wish to address and emphasise a few of the concerns that my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower raised. The first is the prohibited purpose test. As it stands, Clause 2 enables hostile state proxies to receive greater protection than terrorist organisations, because it imposes a greater a burden on the prosecution than the Terrorism Act 2000. Pausing there, the point has been made most powerfully by the noble Lords, Lord Barrow and Lord Carlile, that we should not expect to simply cut and paste the Terrorism Act into this Bill. I acknowledge that, but the Terrorism Act remains the blueprint, and throughout Jonathan Hall’s report, he uses the phrase “equivalent to powers in the Terrorism Act” again and again. I appreciate the need for subtlety, which the noble Lord, Lord Carlile called for, but, while the threats may be different, these are analogous statutory regimes. They are equivalents. The regime in this Bill should not be weaker than the Terrorism Act and any differences should have a clear rationale.
Returning to Clause 2, there are two conditions for the offence of supporting a designated body. They are inviting support for or expressing a belief that is supportive of a designated body and—this is the additional part—a requirement that support was given for a prohibited purpose that was prejudicial to the safety of the UK. The additional requirement that prosecutors must prove conduct as well as the defendant’s prohibited purpose creates an additional evidential burden. It makes it harder to prosecute and harder to secure a conviction, as well as adding another layer of bureaucracy in a process that should be fair but streamlined. As I have said, much of this Bill has been drafted with Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000 as the blueprint, yet there is no similar provision in the Terrorism Act.
Turning secondly to preparatory conduct, there is a gap in the Bill as drafted in the prevention and prosecution of hostile activity before actual harm takes place. The purpose of national security legislation is to punish hostile activity and prevent it occurring. The Bill focuses primarily on completed acts of support, assistance or financial benefit to a designated body, and that leaves a gap, because it may be entirely feasible that law enforcement agencies are aware of an individual actively preparing to assist a designated organisation but lack the power to intervene until further steps have been taken. That is particularly concerning given the nature of modern hostile state activity, which often relies on recruitment, facilitation, planning and preparation long before any substantive offence is committed.
Parliament has long recognised that challenge in other areas of national security. The Terrorism Act contains a range of preparatory and precursor offences, and it reflects the principle that intervention at the earliest possible stage is often necessary to protect the public and safeguard national security. If the Government believe that designated organisations pose a sufficient threat to warrant the creation of this new designation regime, it is difficult to understand why similar preventive principles should not apply. In the other place, the Government said that the Bill had been deliberately drafted as a targeted and narrowly focused piece of legislation. Ministers stated that the Bill was intended to be narrow, but did not explain why this gap remains. The Bill being narrow does not necessarily mean it is complete. I hope that the Minister will clarify this point, because national security legislation is most effective when it enables disruption and prevention, as well as prosecution after the event.
Thirdly, on uniforms and insignia, the Bill creates an inconsistency with existing national security legislation by failing to address uniforms and insignia associated with designated organisations. It has been established in Parliament that support for dangerous organisations is not demonstrated solely through direct assistance or financial support. We know that uniforms and insignia can be used to demonstrate allegiance to a hostile organisation, they can intimidate communities and political opponents, and they can promote and legitimise dangerous organisations. Section 13 of the Terrorism Act makes it an offence to wear clothing or display articles in circumstances that arouse reasonable suspicion that an individual is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation, yet no equivalent provision appears in this Bill. That creates the illogical situation whereby Parliament can determine that an organisation presents a sufficient threat to warrant designation, but public displays of support for the same organisation remain lawful. The Government’s argument is essentially that designated organisations are different from terrorist organisations, but this again does not answer the central question. Why should organisations deemed sufficiently dangerous to be designated under this legislation be subject to weaker restrictions than terrorist organisations?
In closing, I reiterate that the concerns that my noble friend Lord Davies and I have raised are not objections to the principles of the Bill: rather, they are attempts to ensure that the framework we establish is as effective as possible. Legitimate questions have been raised during the course of this debate about the operation of particular provisions and the gaps that remain in the legislation. Narrowness is not a substitute for completeness. If there are weaknesses that can be addressed, Parliament must address them now. We should not leave them to be discovered later, in the course of prosecutions under this legislation. I thank the Government for finally bringing forward legislation in this area, but the task before your Lordships is not simply to welcome the Bill but to improve it. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the 24 noble Lords who have spoken in the debate, and I am particularly grateful, if I may say so, for the contributions from the Front Benches of HM loyal Opposition and the Liberal Democrats, the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Doocey, who gave broad support to the Bill but raised important questions—as did other noble Lords—which I will seek to respond to during the course of this debate.
I pay tribute also to Lady Ramsay of Cartvale, who contributed to this House right up to very recently. The comments from the noble Lord, Lord Walney, were welcome.
I start by reminding the House that this legislation was a manifesto commitment. According to Members today, it is long overdue or has been rushed. I am trying my best to find a happy medium that says that a manifesto commitment was put in place and the Home Secretary commissioned Jonathan Hall KC to produce a report three or four months after the commitment in the manifesto was ratified by the electorate. We commissioned that report. The report was produced to this Government in May or June last year. We have had time to consider that report. Colleagues in the House will know that last year’s parliamentary Session was very busy and crammed, and we wanted to bring legislation forward at the first opportunity. At the first opportunity, in the gracious Speech, we brought forward this legislation, and we have brought it forward now to give a framework—again I say to the House—for the Home Secretary to be able to act on that framework in very short order if Royal Assent is achieved. So, whether it is rushed or long overdue, I hope the House will have patience that we are trying to do the right thing to deal with severe threats.
I noted particularly that the noble Lord, Lord Pickles, said we had to stay ahead of the threats. I accept that in full. We had my noble friend Lord Beamish speaking from the ISC perspective. My noble friends Lady Gill and Lady Dacres of Lewisham, the noble Lord, Lord Barrow, who speaks with great experience, the noble Baronesses, Lady Taylor of Enfield and Lady Verma, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, all pointed to the important fact that the director-general of MI5 has said to the Government, the House and the public that state threats have increased by 35%. So we need to take action, we understand we need to take action and we need to do it in a way that maintains the cohesion of the community, as the noble Baroness has said.
I say to the noble Lord, Lord Polak, that his personal experience is one that should not be acceptable to society as a whole. His grandchildren should not fear walking to school or face barriers that my grandchildren do not face just because, although we were both born in the same city, we have different cultural and religious backgrounds. His grandchildren should not face threats for those reasons. The impacts on individuals should be in our minds in all that we do to progress this Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, reminded us of the freedoms for which our grandparents and great-grandparents fought; they are important in all that we do.
A number of major issues have been raised; I will try to deal with each in turn. They include the IRGC, self-evidently, as well as issues with other nations; the preparatory act issue; the prohibited purpose issue; uniforms and insignia; the humanitarian issue, which a lot of noble Lords have spoken to in detail; the issue of a review; and a series of other issues that I will try to touch on if time allows.
The House has tempted me to talk about individual nations: China, Russia and, indeed, Iran. I will explain to the House again that the Bill is a framework through which the Home Secretary can take action, on advice, via the affirmative resolution procedure—to go to the point mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey—for designation of any particular body.
The IRGC has been mentioned, in particular, by the noble Lords, Lord Davies, Lord Beamish, Lord Barrow, Lord Walney and Lord Alton of Liverpool, as well as by the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey, Lady Neville-Jones, Lady Tyler of Enfield and Lady Verma. I understand those concerns. That is why we have put sanctions on the IRGC and taken a range of measures against IRGC members already. However, the powers under this Bill are a framework for the Home Secretary to look at the significant implications that this will have for national security and for foreign policy. Parliament should set a framework about how these powers are used.
I say to all those who have raised the IRGC in particular that the Government understand that absolutely but, if the Bill receives Royal Assent, the framework will be for the Home Secretary to determine how and when this power is used. Again, I come back to the point that there will be an affirmative instrument in the event of any designation being proposed, but I will not comment on the IRGC in particular. As I have explained privately to both Front-Benchers, the hybridity of this Bill, with the IRGC included, would damage early on its capability to take these matters forward. I hope that we can look at the power in the Bill without, at the moment, looking at how it will be used.
The second issue, which was raised by the Opposition Front Bench in particular and which I understand, was about the preparatory conduct offence. I argue that this additional offence is not needed. Preparatory conduct is an offence in the existing National Security Act under Section 18, and that offence applies to specific offences, including spying, espionage, entering a prohibited place for a prejudicial purpose and sabotage. It also covers acts of violence, serious risk and issues impacting on members of the public in the UK. I argue that such an offence is not needed in this Bill. We may end up having a debate in Committee on that but I just want to say that to the noble Lords.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, mentioned the prohibited purpose test in his opening remarks. It had been suggested that this test, which applies to the support offence in new Section 17A, is unnecessary and should be removed. I reiterate that doing so would criminalise legitimate humanitarian aid activity. The inclusion of this test reflects that there will be occasions—even though we might not like it—where UK persons need to have legitimate dealings with a state entity. That will be so whether it is a British diplomat or an NGO delivering humanitarian aid. To remove that would, in my view, be very difficult and challenging. Again, we may revisit that in Committee, but I hope that we can accept those arguments for the moment.
There has also been a question about overseas activity. It was suggested the Bill does not go far enough in the support offence as it applies to overseas activity. It is claimed that the offence should reapply to assisting a designated body in any activity overseas. Again, we can reflect on this in the next few days, but I suggest that such an amendment would be unnecessary. The noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, touched on this. I will come back to his point in a moment, but new Section 17B, to be introduced by Clause 2, will make it an offence to “assist a designated body” in its overseas activity where those activities are
“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.
To give a concrete example, a UK person assisting a designated body in its efforts to disrupt the military supply chain of an ally would commit an offence, because the ally is still an ally; that is the key necessary test. Similarly, the Bill already deals with those who are inspired by state actors to commit self-directed acts. That is because the offences at new Sections 17A and 17B do not require there to be any direction or tasking from a designated body, only an intention to support that body.
The fourth issue that has been raised is the important issue of criminalising the wearing of uniforms and insignia. We asked Jonathan Hall KC to review this area of legislation. His report, which was independently produced, made it clear why it was necessary to take a different approach for state bodies. It would impact on legitimate engagement with a designated state body, which would need to continue, for example, on diplomatic channels. Like it or not, that is the reality of the world at large. We have instead crafted the support offence to ensure that it would capture conduct that was calculated to advance the harmful activities of the designated body. This would include the use of insignia and publication of images to support the designated body where the person wears, displays or publishes for a purpose that is prejudicial to the UK—again, that key legal test.
In touching on that area, I return to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Polak, about passport seizure. We are committed to legislating on that. We are going to do it; we are just not going to do it in this Bill, which is a specifically designed piece of legislation to give powers to the Home Secretary. We will have further national security legislation later in his Parliament.
A number of noble Lords mentioned humanitarian aid. I will focus on that in detail as it is an important issue. In particular, the noble Lords, Lord Barrow, Lord Alton of Liverpool and Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, raised these issues. I assure noble Lords that we have crafted the Bill to ensure that legitimate activities, such as diplomacy and activities that support basic human needs, are not caught within the offences. The key test here is that support for a designated body or overseas activities by the body must be
“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.
Our officials have already talked with a number of NGOs. Ministers will meet with the Red Cross very shortly to listen to its concerns and we are satisfied that the tests in the Bill properly protect legitimate humanitarian assistance. The noble Baronesses, Lady Helic, Lady D’Souza, Lady Northover and Lady Tyler of Enfield, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, all raised this issue.
I will try to help the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, by covering Pepper v Hart. Receipt of information by an aid worker would not be criminalised by this Bill. “Information” in the Bill does not mean any information, as is clear from the preceding words. It has to possess an inherent value that enriches the recipient. I am happy to make a Pepper v Hart statement that new Section 17C does not apply. Likewise, I am happy to confirm that new Sections 17A and 17B will not criminalise legitimate humanitarian aid, as that is not contrary to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, mentioned, there is a legal backstop on this, in that the security decisions on those prosecutions are ultimately taken by the Attorney-General in these areas.
I also do not want to create a blanket exemption that could be easily exploited by state actors. That is an important issue. I have a genuine concern that exemptions could potentially create a relatively simple loophole for hostile actors to exploit, but I reassure all those who have spoken on this issue that it is not the intention of the Bill to criminalise the provision of legitimate humanitarian aid, and that is not the effect of the offences as drafted. This was clearly set out by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary in the other House last week, and we will of course look at this in detail.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
The Minister has referred a number of times to humanitarian aid and to diplomacy. Of course diplomats have a special defence or exemption of their own, but he has not said anything about those engaged in the prevention or resolution of conflict. I wonder if he would like to associate them with the statements he has made about humanitarian aid.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am happy to do that, but I want to give clarity on these matters. If the noble Lord will allow me, given that that has been raised separately, I will write to him with an assurance on that and share that with both Opposition Front Benches so that they are aware of that. I want to give absolute legal clarity, as the noble Lord would expect, on these matters.
Baroness Northover (LD)
When is the Minister intending to meet the Red Cross?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Life and diaries are fluid, but it will be before Committee, Report and Third Reading of the Bill next week. So it will not be after that. It will be before that. As we speak, representations and diaries are being co-ordinated. I will leave it at that.
The sixth vital point, which was raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Tyler of Enfield, and the noble Lords, Lord Barrow and Lord Carlile, is the issue of whether there will be a review. That is a valid and significant point but, as has been pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, the National Security Act 2023 already gives the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation the right to oversight and mandates them to carry out an annual review of the operations of the provisions of the Bill. I hope that is sufficient to head off at the pass an amendment on this issue, not because an amendment would be right or wrong or unnecessary but because the Bill is already covered by the National Security Act on those particular points.
The noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, mentioned in passing the question whether the offence of assisting a designated body would not capture non-UK nationals. I say to him that a non-UK national planning an attack in the UK from overseas would be materially assisting activities taking place in the UK. It is the activities of the designated body, such as an attack in the UK, that determine whether assistance is captured. The Bill also introduces the designated body condition, which allows the existing National Security Act offences to apply to activity linked to designated bodies, not just to foreign states.
The noble Lord, Lord Alton, continues, correctly, to chew at my ankles about the issue of transnational repression. I would argue that the Bill will make it easier to achieve prosecutions where there is a designated body, such as a proxy organisation, involved in transnational repression. We will continue, as I said yesterday in our Statement, to try to tackle transnational repression in a number of ways.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
I am grateful for the opportunity to chew at the noble Minister’s ankles again. I want to ask him specifically whether he will continue the discussions that the Security Minister’s office has been having about the United Front Work Department that acts on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party, which would not be covered by the terms of the Bill. Although I agree that he would not want to put actors on the face of the Bill, the generic issues that it involves should be there. Perhaps he could also take the opportunity of confirming whether he will circulate the reply that he has sent to me on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to Members who have spoken in today’s debate.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Absolutely. I will make sure that the reply I gave to the noble Lord in recent times is sent out, because this is moving at a fast pace and we are trying to get the matter sorted. I will do that for the noble Lord, and I will refer the points that he has made to the Security Minister.
My noble friend Lady Dacres rightly mentioned the question of diaspora. The power is actor agnostic and applies equally to all individuals in the UK, so we are not targeting any particular diaspora. It targets conduct that is carried out for a purpose prejudicial to the UK’s safety.
The question of—I use this phrase guardedly—“useful idiots” was quoted by the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and echoed by my noble friend Lady Gill. The new offences concern various thresholds for criminals to be caught. For example, criminals can be caught by the offence of assisting a designated body where they ought to know that their conduct is materially existing a designated body. However, it is also important to put on the record for the noble Baroness that criminals do not need to know that a group has been designated for offences to be committed. I hope that deals with the issue of “useful idiots”—I call them terrorists, but “useful idiots” is also a reasonable phrase that we can attribute to them.
My noble friend Lady Gill and the noble Lord, Lord Docherty of Milngavie, mentioned the issue of how cryptocurrency used by designated bodies or individuals can be held more accountable. The Government have already committed to tackling all forms of economic crime, including the misuse of crypto assets. All UK crypto asset firms are now required to register with the Financial Conduct Authority to comply with money-laundering legislation. We have also strengthened law enforcement through the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act, and we are now going to go further with the introduction of further measures, including the Financial Conduct Authority delivering a new crypto asset regulatory regime, UK crypto asset firms being required to conduct due diligence and the financial services Bill 2026 introducing targeted powers to allow more crypto asset recovery powers.
I am trying to cover all the points that noble Lords have mentioned in the time available, and I hope I have done so, but I will read Hansard and, if there are further points, I will respond to them. What I want to do, and this is the key point, is get the Bill through to Royal Assent so the Home Secretary can determine how she uses its powers to deal with the issues that have been raised on the Floor of the House today. That is an important measure. I want to ensure that, between now and next Tuesday, we deal with those points and get a consensus to pass the Bill, make it an Act, get it to His Majesty the King to give Royal Assent and then, as a matter of some urgency, determine how we tackle the many threats that are facing this country at the moment.
I thank noble Lords for their engagement and the expertise that they have brought to this debate today. Ultimately, I commend the Bill for Second Reading, and I hope that the House will support it tonight.
National Security (State Threats) Bill
Tuesday 30th June 2026
(4 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate National Security (State Threats) Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 35-I(b) Manuscript amendment for Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (30 Jun 2026)
18:31 - Division on Amendment 20 - Ayes: 150 / Noes: 216 - Amendment 20 disagreed.
Member's explanatory statement
This probing amendment seeks to clarify whether all aspects of espionage are covered by the reference to “foreign power threat activity”, in the light of the recent conviction of two Chinese spies, one of whom worked for the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in London.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, this amendment is in my name and those of the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Foster, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, who has other relevant amendments in this group. Amendment 1 is a probing amendment that enables the Minister to clarify the exact breadth of the intention in the Bill—a Bill that I welcome, and I regret I was not able to be here at Second Reading to say so. The Bill is designed to address the threat posed by foreign state-linked organisations that operate here in the UK.
My amendment relates in particular to the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, whose office manager, Bill Yuen, was recently convicted and sentenced to eight years in prison under the National Security Act 2023 for helping to run a CCP surveillance operation from its premises. The existence of this office dates back to the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office Act 1996, passed on the premise that Hong Kong was meaningfully autonomous from Beijing. “One country, two systems” was meant to mean that separate legal, economic and administrative systems would be permitted in Hong Kong, albeit as part of China. Any such pre-1997 autonomy or even post-1997 freedoms are clearly no longer the case, yet somehow the office survives, supposedly independent of the Chinese embassy but with at least one of its staff acting on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party.
This has involved surveillance of some of our own citizens and of Hong Kong dissidents resident in the UK. Indeed, Regina Ip, former convenor of Hong Kong’s Executive Council, even claimed that it was legal for the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office to gather intelligence on activists. Both sorts of surveillance are surely intolerable.
Perhaps it is possible to describe activity against UK citizens as activity involving a threat by a foreign state and therefore a threat to the safety or interests of the UK as defined in the Bill, but what about similar actions affecting Hong Kong citizens? Would they be covered if some foreign policy threat activity included espionage, given that surveillance of UK residents would be reported back to China? I assume it would count as espionage, especially as the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office funded Bill Yuen’s legal costs and its salaried staff attended most of the trial at the Old Bailey to show support for him, even while the office enjoyed the privilege confirmed by Parliament in the hopeful days of 1996.
The Bill is to deal with the threat posed by foreign state-linked organisations operating in the UK. The Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office is a foreign state-linked organisation and is operating here in London. We should protect our citizens from its activities but also protect UK residents who are classified as dissident activists by the Chinese state, some of whom have bounties on their heads. I hope, in response, my noble friend the Minister can provide some assurance that this body and its nefarious activities would be in scope of the Bill’s intent. I beg to move.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. This builds on the Private Notice Question which she placed before your Lordships’ House and indeed on our Second Reading debate last week where the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, which, as the noble Baroness has rightly said, is a relic of the past, became the centre of our interest because of some of those who worked there being convicted of being involved in espionage on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party regime in Beijing. That is why it is entirely relevant to this Bill and why it is good that the noble Baroness has placed Amendment 1, this probing amendment, before your Lordships’ Committee.
I have a few points I would like to make on that amendment before turning to my own Amendments 3 and 4, which deal with slightly different questions but are also linked to the malign activities of the Chinese Communist Party regime in the UK. Amendment 3 deals with transnational repression, and Amendment 4 deals with the activities of the United Front, which is not a state but works in line with the wishes and ideology of the Chinese Communist Party. That is why it is problematic in terms of the definitions in the Bill and why I have sought further clarification through my amendments.
I have a few pointers on the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office case, which might be helpful to your Lordships. In May 2024, law enforcement initially arrested 11 individuals across the UK. Only three of those were heavily linked to state funding via the London Hong Kong office referred to by the noble Baroness. Only three were prosecuted under the National Security Act 2023. Two have since been convicted and—as the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, was quite right to remind us during Second Reading last week—were subjected to very lengthy prison sentences. The remaining eight individuals suspected of acting as part of the vigilante team in contact with entities in Hong Kong and targeting an individual on British soil were released without charge.
This case highlights a common practice whereby Chinese and Hong Kong authorities blend private civil disputes, corporate debt collection and local organised crime groups—a point that I heard more about recently at a meeting organised by Tom Tugendhat MP, our former Security Minister, which pointed to the activities of organised crime linked to some of these groups promoting a political ideology. All of those are involved in the execution of transnational repression and jurisdiction overseas while evading national security prosecution.
I have four questions I would like to put the Minister on Amendment 1 before turning to those other two amendments. I am sorry they have been grouped together, but I think it is for the convenience of the House. I hope the House will therefore forgive me if I spend a bit of time speaking to the other two amendments, but here are my questions to build on what the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, has said already.
First, of the 11 individuals initially arrested by counterterrorism police in connection with the hostile tracking of a Hong Kong resident in Yorkshire, eight were subsequently released without trial. Can the Minister inform the House how many of those eight have since left the United Kingdom and whether any have returned to the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China or the Hong Kong special administrative region, thereby placing themselves beyond the reach of British justice?
Secondly, is the Minister confident that counterterrorism and the Crown Prosecution Service—the CPS—possess the immediate capacity to process massive backlogs of foreign language evidence quickly enough to meet custody time limits? That has been an issue relevant to these prosecutions. Specifically, was a lack of rapid security-vetted translation capacity a contributing factor in the decision to release the other eight suspects without pressing charges?
Thirdly, is the Minister satisfied that our law enforcement agencies, including the NCA—the National Crime Agency—and regional special branches have the required resources to effectively monitor and map the nexus between Chinese state authorities, overseas proxy organisations and private contractors operating inside the United Kingdom?
Fourthly, what steps are the Government taking to bolster the China capabilities of UK law enforcement? Specifically, are we investing in the recruitment and training of security-vetted interpreters, fluent not just in Mandarin and Cantonese but in crucial dialects such as Hokkien and Fuzhou dialects, to effectively monitor and respond to issues related to transnational state repression and organised crime? This was referred to during the meeting that Tom Tugendhat MP organised in the House Commons recently and which, as I say, I was able to attend.
Let me turn to Amendment 3. I do not want to go on too much about this amendment, because I was able to have a very helpful and constructive meeting with the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, yesterday. I say at the outset that I will not press your Lordships to divide on this amendment, in the light of the very helpful assurances which he gave me yesterday. But I will just recap. On 26 February, I initiated a debate on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which I have the privilege to chair, about our report on transnational repression. It was a thorough debate and the Minister replied in his courteous manner. However, his reply did not meet all of the questions which we raised in that debate, or indeed in the report. I returned to it on 21 May, during the King’s Speech debate, and subsequently in a balloted debate that I won, which was secured for 4 June and which dealt with atrocity crimes. This is also an amendment which Alicia Kearns, Member of Parliament, raised in the House of Commons during its six-hour consideration of the Bill.
Without dwelling too much on procedural issues, I think all of us who have been around this place and have had the privilege to serve in both Houses know that to give the House of Commons only six hours of debate on a major Bill of this importance, and then to come to your Lordships and do all the remaining stages in one day flat, as we are doing today—Committee, Report and Third Reading—is clearly absurd, given that this is based on Jonathan Hall’s excellent report of 11 months ago, as is the idea that we have not had time during that period to debate some of these questions. Furthermore, it cannot be right that the Home Affairs Select Committee was unable to take evidence on the Bill, even though it requested it, or that my own committee, which wanted to scrutinise the Bill, was left to just write a letter to the Minister. The Minister has responded to that in his usual courteous way, and I am grateful, but how much better it would have been to have pre-legislative scrutiny and proper consideration of the Bill in the normal way. There are some questions that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, has asked and I am asking, and I know that colleagues from the Conservative Opposition Benches, the Liberal Democrat Benches and elsewhere on the Cross Benches have legitimate questions to ask about the Bill.
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, for what they said. They both spoke in very measured terms and I wish to support broadly everything that they have said, for two reasons: first, because I agree with them, and, secondly, because I was too late to co-sign their amendments. The only point of difference I have with the noble Lord, Lord Alton, is some thoughts about SLAPPs legislation—I confess that, yes, I am a member of the defamation Bar and I have various views about the questions that lie behind the excitement around the need to introduce SLAPPs legislation, but that is not for today. I broadly agree with the noble Lord and the noble Baroness and give them the encouragement that, simply because a Conservative Member of this House has not signed their amendments, that does not mean that a Conservative does not agree with them.
There is a danger that we can become naive, thinking that because there are, say, 2 billion buyers of toothbrushes in the People’s Republic of China it would be wrong of us to criticise the Chinese Government when they do things, either through their own agencies or through their proxy agencies, to damage the well-being of this country. As the noble Lord, Lord Alton, calmly pointed out, not everything is always as it seems. Therefore, although neither the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, nor the noble Lord, Lord Alton, has threatened a vote on their amendments, I urge my noble friend the Minister—and he is my friend—to bear carefully in mind that when we are dealing with China we are dealing with an underwater crocodile. We can be naive and keep feeding it, and allow it to build bigger and bigger embassies and to spy, either formally or informally, upon the activities of our citizens, and indeed of the expatriate citizens of Hong Kong in this country, and we can allow it to carry on behaving appallingly towards United Kingdom citizens, such as Jimmy Lai, who “live” in Hong Kong, but, if we let another week or month or year pass in which we live in this fog of confusion, we are, I suspect, misleading ourselves and not doing our own citizens or the citizens of other countries any good.
China is not anything other than something that we need to be very careful about. Yes, we can sell 2 billion toothbrushes and we can sell glass, IT or whatever it may be, but I urge the Government to please not allow themselves to think that, when you feed a crocodile, it will wag its tail and say, “Thanks very much”. It will not. It will say, “Thanks for your leg—I’ll have the other leg, and then I’ll have your arm, your other arm and your head”. Meanwhile, people such as Jimmy Lai, who stand up for freedom of expression, are left incarcerated in terrible conditions in Hong Kong.
Let us wake up and realise that we are dealing with adversaries, not with people who wish to do us a favour. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, who has yet to speak, for their amendments, because they are seriously worth considering.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 5, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool. This amendment seeks to ensure that our national security framework is not only addressing the threats of today but is prepared for what the director-general of MI5 has described as “the next frontier”—the potential risks posed by non-human autonomous AI systems. While our current debate focuses largely on human adversaries and their proxies who seek to undermine our national security, we must now also grapple with the emergence of systems capable of evading human oversight and control.
We are drawing a distinction between the AI tools we use today and what experts term artificial superintelligence, or ASI. The amendment defines ASI as a system
“capable of adapting its behaviour, in response to … its … environment, in ways not fully specified in advance by its developers”.
As Lord Browne of Ladyton, a former Secretary of State and expert on non-proliferation, has explained previously, the key distinction is that ASI would be an agent rather than an instrument. While a nuclear weapon cannot improve or replicate itself, or resist being shut down, a superintelligent AI system could, in principle, do all three. We are therefore contemplating a technology that could out-think experts and potentially subvert even our most capable national security apparatus.
This is not science fiction. We have recently seen a leading AI company restrict its latest, most capable model to a small group of major technology infrastructure firms, precisely so that they could use it to identify and close security loopholes that it was able to uncover in the core software and system. Officials are now warning that, in the wrong hands, the same kind of system could dramatically speed up cyber attacks against individual companies and, potentially, the critical infrastructure on which the country depends. That is where we are already today. The next level may be artificial superintelligence, where these systems become much more powerful and the risks in the hands of hostile states or state-sponsored actors are correspondingly greater.
The implications of that decision go further still. The United States Government have now imposed export controls on Mythos, prohibiting its use outside American jurisdiction. That is a remarkable step. A foreign Government have, in effect, decided that a single AI system is too powerful, too consequential and too potentially dangerous to allow unrestricted international deployment. That tells us that at least one major power has concluded that frontier AI capability is now a matter of national security, not only for the country that hosts it but for every country that might seek access to it. If the United States Government are drawing that line, it would be quite extraordinary if we in Parliament are not asking what our own response should be.
The AI Security Institute has warned that our current trajectory risks an irrevocable loss of control over systems that are becoming deeply embedded in our national infrastructure, economy and defence. Yet the AI Security Institute lacks the statutory authority to require disclosure, compel compliance or impose any binding obligations on the companies developing these systems. We have a body that can see the risks but cannot act upon them.
More importantly, the Government’s own AI Scenarios 2030 report, published earlier this month, acknowledges that highly capable AI could give rise to
“serious, potentially even existential harms”,
and, in the absence of effective intervention, highlights autonomous risks in which advanced systems may develop objectives that “resist human control”. My amendment would bring the development of such systems by a foreign power within the definition of “foreign power threat activity” under the National Security Act 2023. It is directed at systems capable of neutralising or subverting our relevant human authorities, which I have defined as our Armed Forces, intelligence services, police and the Government themselves.
Lord Beamish (Lab)
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for the amendments in their names. It is timely to have a debate and to keep raising—as I know the noble Lord, Lord Alton, does regularly—the threat we face from China. The ISC in its China report outlined the very detailed structure which the Chinese state, which has the largest security services in the world, uses not just at home for repression but abroad for undermining other nations’ ability to act, and in persecuting individuals who oppose the Chinese communist regime.
The issue around the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office is an obvious one which has raised concerns. The Bill is needed because whenever we have made the operating environment more difficult for states to use diplomatic cover, they have gone to other lengths. The success in identifying individuals who are using diplomatic cover for other activities shows that our security services are conscious of this. The response to the Salisbury attacks—in this country and across Europe among our allies, where a number of individuals were expelled from Russian embassies because of their links to intelligence services and activities which were not in keeping with their designation under the Vienna convention—certainly proved that point.
The problem I have with Amendment 4, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, is in defining strategy. That would be very difficult in terms of the united front. We all know what our adversaries get up to and what the aims are. The Bill is important because, as the operating environment has become more difficult, they are subcontracting this to individuals. So it is not necessarily about not understanding what the Chinese state is up to—we have a very clear understanding of this, and it is very complex and broad. The other thing the ISC report highlighted is that it is not just the scale but the lengths it goes to, both to intimidate individuals here and across the globe and to suck up information—which many of us might think is pretty irrelevant—for economic purposes and for building up a picture, a matrix, of what is happening in various political systems around the world.
It is good that these issues have been raised, because it throws a spotlight on what is happening not just in terms of China but what both Iran and Russia are doing. As I said at Second Reading, it is important to have that public debate to keep highlighting the dangers this country faces, and I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Alton, on his tenacity in continuing to do this. These dangers are on multiple fronts, whether it is universities being targeted, and individual diaspora members being targeted there, or IP thefts from both companies and universities. This is something that needs constant vigilance.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, I was pleased to co-sign the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. All the amendments in this group—Amendments 1, 3 and 4 in particular—are expressing frustration with the limited scope of the Bill. Perhaps the Minister might be able to give an idea as to whether the national security Bill that was heralded in the King’s Speech will be able to pick up some of these themes, if we are not successful in persuading the Government today to make amendments to this state threats Bill.
There is a feeling of concern that some threats that have been experienced, or that are pretty obvious, are not being sufficiently dealt with by the Government. This is particularly in relation to China, where we have been urged to wake up and not be naive about the underwater crocodile. Whether the Government are being naive or shaped by other considerations towards China, there is a feeling that there appears to be so much going on—demonstrated in the recent trial concerning the staff of the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, and otherwise instanced by the transnational repression towards residents of this country from Hong Kong who are being persecuted by the Chinese state, while they are supposedly under the protection of this country and this Government, which is intolerable—that we need to wake up and smell the coffee in relation to China.
I would like to hear some reassurances from the Minister that if he cannot take up some of these points in this Bill, the Government will take them up in the forthcoming national security Bill, which is intended to:
“Consolidate the Government’s approach to countering state threats to align more closely with the approach to countering terrorism”.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
I strongly agree with the points that the noble Baroness has just been making. She has referenced the plight of people living in the United Kingdom who now have bounties on their heads. Will she take the opportunity to highlight specifically the case of Chloe Cheung, who was 14 when she took part in pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong and now has a 1 million Hong Kong dollar bounty on her head and is fearful of being dragged in—as some were, and attempts were made to drag others, to the Chinese consulate in Manchester in order to intimidate them? These are not illusions. There are many frightened Hong Kongers in the UK worried about the direct attacks that are being made upon them. I thank the noble Baroness for raising the general point.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
Not at all. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for all the work that he has done on this topic, both individually and as chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I had the pleasure of meeting Chloe Cheung and some of her colleagues, and became even more aware of the threats they are under. It is intolerable that people to whom we have rightly given protection and residence are facing these kinds of huge, life-threatening threats from a foreign state. So far, we are not feeling reassured that this Bill is going to cover these threats.
There is a feeling among many of us that we want to hear robust pledges from the Government, even if, for whatever reason, they now want to get the Bill through incredibly quickly, having—to the bemusement of some of us—taken over a year to get to the point. They now want to rush it all through, but so be it. There is unfinished business in the Bill. If it is not dealt with today, it needs to be dealt with as soon as possible in the forthcoming national security Bill: the transnational repression, the proxy networks, the issues with the capacity of our police forces to cope with these threats, the foreign language capacity, the resources, and, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, called it, the “China capability”. We risk being looked at as a laughing stock if our state and its law enforcement institutions are not able to cope with the threat being directed towards our state and the people living here. So I hope that, even if the Minister does not accept some of these amendments, he will tell us that no stone will be left unturned in the coverage of the national security Bill that we are expecting.
My noble friend Lady Doocey gave a very powerful justification of her own amendment on superintelligent AI. She certainly frightened me, in as far as I understood much of it. I am a bit behind the curve on AI, it has to be said, so she will have to give me a tutorial. But, to be serious, she rightly stressed all the threats and the Bill covers only a bit of this territory. We need to hear from the Government much stronger and more comprehensive responses to all the threats that are being sponsored by foreign countries towards us and the people who live here.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I do not want to delay the House for very long. I will just add my voice to Amendment 1, which I added my name to. The Government are very clearly warning about hostile state activity. Therefore, the probing amendment gives the Government and the Minister the opportunity to say that espionage is included in the state threat. The amendment seeks to add it and to give clarity to the clause. However, I hope that the Minister can be very clear that the foreign power threat activity includes espionage. If he is able to say that, it will be very helpful. It is very clear, after the recent case involving the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office—which, as far as I am concerned, should no longer have any status here in London and should be disbanded, but that is for another day—that the British state was penetrated, dissidents have been targeted and, indeed, our colleagues in Parliament have been under surveillance. Therefore, I hope that the Minister will be able to say that in his closing remarks.
Lord Shinkwin (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to the amendments in group 1 in the name of various noble Lords, including, of course, the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool. I say “of course” in tribute to the noble Lord’s indefatigable illumination of the threat posed to this country by the odious Chinese Communist Party regime. I join with the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, in thanking him for his enduring efforts to ensure that we are alive to the CCP’s deliberate, cynical and relentless attempts to undermine our democracy and the West as a whole.
Baroness D'Souza (CB)
My Lords, I will remark briefly on the excellent intervention by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and others, on the sleeping crocodile and toothbrushes. I ask the Minister to say, in summing up, why it is so very difficult for the UK Government to be extremely firm with China on the issues we are discussing today, which involve vast trampling on international norms and human rights. China itself has made it clear that if it wishes to continue trade with the UK, it will do so. China acts in its own best interests. No matter how firm we are on other issues, if it is in China’s interest to trade in toothbrushes or whatever, it will continue to do so. I do not understand why the Government are so reluctant to build and publish a strategy that is extremely and overtly firm regarding the kind of transgressions we are discussing throughout this Bill.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I regret that I was unable to take part on Second Reading owing to a long-standing family commitment, but I am very grateful on behalf of both the Liberal Democrats and many others for the Minister’s engagement with us before Second Reading and since. It has been extremely helpful, and his Bill team have been extremely helpful. The fact that most of the issues we face are now resolved owes a great deal to that commitment.
As was made clear at Second Reading, we support the aim of the Bill, in the light of the advice given to the Government by Jonathan Hall KC that further legislation is needed to enable appropriate action to respond to damaging activity by foreign state actors, as opposed to private bodies, that is prejudicial to the United Kingdom’s security and national interests.
We also understand the urgency of the Bill and the reason why it has been taken, effectively, as emergency legislation. However, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Alton, that the degree of hurry and the haste overall have, sadly, reduced the amount of scrutiny we have been able to give it. The speed does not obviate the need for Parliament, and this House in particular, to give the Bill as much scrutiny as it can in the limited time available. But we do so in the light of the Government’s commitment, given in the King’s Speech, and to which my noble friend Lady Ludford referred, to introduce legislation to tackle the growing threat from foreign state entities and their proxies and to improve the country’s defences against cyber security threats. The Minister has mentioned those again in recent days, and we therefore accept that this Bill is not the end of the story in relation to those commitments, and that its structure requires further development to respond adequately to these ongoing, complex and ever-changing threats.
In this group I will add only briefly to my noble friend Lady Doocey’s careful and comprehensive explanation in her speech on Amendment 5—to which the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and I have added our names—of the dangers of artificial intelligence and superintelligence. Such developments would enable artificial intelligence and superintelligence systems to exacerbate foreign power and foreign state threats. Were Amendment 5 to be passed, they would be specifically subject to the National Security Act. The amendment addresses the particular threat of hostile or potentially hostile foreign state actors and their proxies developing and exploiting these new systems, which are capable, as my noble friend Lady Doocey said, of wreaking untold damage to our national infrastructure and our economic and military interests.
The extent and forms of such damage, the scope of the threats proposed and the potential shape of future attacks are unforeseen and unforeseeable today—and therein lies a great part of their danger. The dangers outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, to our academic life and our universities are all exacerbated by the growth of AI and ASI alongside them. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, in a lighter moment, said that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, had frightened her; well, she has frightened us all, and rightly.
Until this morning, we found the Government’s response to this amendment slightly inadequate. However, following our meeting yesterday with the Minister, the Government have given a strong indication that they recognise the development by foreign powers of highly advanced AI systems that pose risks to our cyber security and our national security. The Government will therefore seek and take into account the views of the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation as to whether amendments to our legislation are necessary to redefine power threat activity accordingly.
That undertaking goes a long way towards meeting our objective. However, I am keen to see—and I hope the Government will add to this—the involvement of others going wider than the independent reviewer. For all that he is widely respected, his term is in any case due to end shortly. But real expert input in this area is necessary, and the Government need to take advantage of it. I would be keen to know that the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament is to be consulted on this issue, and it should have the remit to consult with wider experts on AI development as needed.
As to the need for further legislation on this issue, we need look no further than the statement issued by our Five Eyes allies, including the leaders of our National Cyber Security Centre, on 22 June—only last week. The statement was headed, “The AI shift in cyber risk: why leaders must act now”. It made the urgency clear:
“While AI will help us improve cyber defence over time, it also accelerates the speed, scale, and sophistication of cyber threats.
Frontier AI models are anticipated to exceed current industry expectations, fundamentally transforming both offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. The timeline is not years, it is months”.
This is a threat to take seriously, and we underestimate it at our peril.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. We all agree that the Bill is needed. As we said at Second Reading, the Opposition support the principles behind the Bill and the creation of a designation regime to tackle state threats, most importantly the IRGC. We do, however, feel the need to again make criticisms of how we have reached this point.
When the Government introduced the Bill three weeks ago, the usual channels agreed to fast-track it in both Houses. Part of that agreement was that the Government would work with the Opposition in a constructive manner to ensure that the Bill is the best it can be. My honourable friend Alicia Kearns MP had meetings with officials in the Home Office, informing them of her concerns about gaps in the Bill. My noble friend Lord Davies of Gower sent to the Minister two letters confirming those concerns, the first on 10 June and the second on 17 June. We gave the Government as much advance notice as possible of the amendments we would table, to give them enough time to consider the proposals and reach a reasonable compromise.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions and comments and for the broad support for the Bill from the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames.
I shall start on the issue that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron has raised. This Bill is a result of a Labour manifesto commitment. It is a result of a commission we gave to Jonathan Hall KC to examine these areas in October 2024. He produced a report for the Government which they have examined in detail, and they have given commitments in this House to bring forward legislation at the earliest opportunity. This is the earliest opportunity. In giving time for discussions with the Official Opposition, the Liberal Democrats, the Cross Benches and noble Lords such as the noble Lords, Lord Alton, Lord Anderson and others, I have tried to make sure that we get this Bill right. It has had a fast track, agreed with the Opposition. It was put through the House of Commons in one day. We agreed to have Second Reading in one day and now all remaining stages of the Bill today. I have tried to support the Opposition to achieve their objectives. I have to say to the noble Lord that I have been very clear, open and honest in private conversations about what I can do and what I cannot do. What I have said to him I can do I have tried to do. As we shall see in later amendments, the Government have tried to assist other noble Lords.
I have also been very clear about what I cannot do. What I cannot do are things that dilute or damage the basic principle of this Bill, which is to give my right honourable friend the Home Secretary the power to undertake some designatory actions, which have been called for by His Majesty’s loyal Opposition, the Liberal Democrats and others in this House and in other places, against a number of potential state threats. That is why we fast-tracked the Bill: so that this House and others can give powers for the Secretary of State to consider it.
The noble Lord and I get on well—we have friendly discussion; we have discussions inside and outside this House—but I reject wholly his allegations today that we have not engaged on this Bill. It is worth putting that on the record; we have to put these things on the record occasionally.
The noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, raised specific questions on a number of matters. If he will allow, they need reflection and are not material to the amendments before us today, although they are tangential and important. I cannot give him definitive answers today on the four questions that he raised, but I will write to him on them.
A number of noble Lords also raised the national security Bill that is coming up shortly. I refer all those noble Lords to the King’s Speech 2026. The King’s Speech document contains four pages of detail on the national security Bill and about what we intend to do; the gracious Speech has announced that. Again, I cannot give noble Lords a date for its introduction, nor can I go above what has been said in the gracious Speech, but noble Lords need to know clearly that there will be a security Bill and that the gracious Speech’s objectives will be met. I refer noble Lords to that.
I thank my noble friend Lady Hayter for her Amendment 1. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for speaking to that amendment. I hope I can reassure my noble friend that not only was the National Security Act 2023 landmark legislation but it modernised the Government’s approach to dealing with the state threat activities that she mentioned by repealing the Official Secrets Act 1911 and the offences therein and modernising those offences as a whole.
The espionage offence was at Section 1 of the 1911 Act and the espionage activity that it dealt with is now comprehensively dealt with in various offences found in Part 1 of the National Security Act 2023. These include the espionage offences referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster. A number of other offences are in that Act. They protect key locations and key aspects of the state against foreign activity. They include the offence of assisting a foreign intelligence service. That offence at Section 3 of the Act has already proved invaluable in countering espionage and has led to recent convictions for serious offences in relation to those who acted for the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, to which noble Lords have recently referred.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, described China in colourful terms which were echoed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady D’Souza, the noble Lords, Lord Alton of Liverpool and Lord Shinkwin, and my noble friend Lord Beamish, from his experience on the Intelligence and Security Committee. They all raised the issue of China. I am clear on this. China poses a series of threats to the UK in national security terms, from cyber attacks, foreign interference, espionage, democratic institution interference and transnational repression, which are to be condemned. Protecting our security is non-negotiable, but we have to engage with China where there are clear UK global interests. Indeed, this engagement allows us to raise issues of concern—in which we occasionally have common interests.
I hope I can reassure my noble friend that the espionage activity that she has mentioned in Amendment 1 is covered completely. With those assurances, I hope that she can withdraw her amendment in due course.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
Just before the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, leaves that point—and he will know that I have raised this before—it was one of the points raised in the Joint Committee on Human Rights report, which identified China as the principal threat when it comes to transnational repression, more than any other state. We puzzled over why, therefore, Iran and Russia are in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, but China is not. I know that the Minister will say, “We continue to look at this”, but will he give us some idea of how long it will take before we get a real answer to that question?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am afraid the noble Lord will have to accept the answer I give him every time he raises this issue, which is that we keep these matters under review. If the Home Secretary believes that the power should be exercised, she will exercise it alongside the Foreign Secretary and other Ministers. I cannot give him the answer to that question now, for the reasons he knows. I hope he understands that.
The noble Lord’s Amendment 3 proposes new types of conduct to be treated as foreign power activity. As I understand it, this would supplement but not supplant the existing meaning of Section 33 of the National Security Act 2023 when making designations. I am entirely sympathetic to the aim of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, of making the UK a harder target for transnational repression. He will know it is a matter the Government take seriously and that we continue to make concrete progress, including on the helpful recommendations from the noble Lord’s own committee, the JCHR, and the detailed inquiry. This includes the continued implementation of the National Security Act 2023, the recent successful prosecutions I referred to a moment ago, the introduction of police training, practical guidance, a national protective security agency and a range of other matters.
Where a person carries out such activity with the intention of materially assisting a foreign intelligence service, it would already fall within the scope of foreign power threat activity. I think that is right and that the link back to the definition that Parliament agreed in passing the National Security Act 2023 is entirely appropriate.
Given the evolving nature of the threat and absence of an internationally agreed definition of transnational repression, we believe the broad approach recommended by the Defending Democracy Taskforce, coupled with the powers in the National Security Act and wider criminal law, is better suited to protecting potential victims. As I have said to the noble Lord outside the Chamber, I am happy to write to him by what I will term close of play in this House, 23 July, with further details of how we will respond on those matters accordingly.
I thank the noble Lord for Amendment 4, which touches on a significant issue. Outside of the Chamber, contrary to the assertions of the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, I have tried to meet the objectives and to talk to the noble Lord in a constructive way. The foreign power condition is a core component of existing offences in Part 1 of the National Security Act 2023. I will explain how we will deal with the foreign power condition and its interpretation, which I hope will reassure the noble Lord.
In my view, the foreign power condition can be met. Let me be clear that it is not necessary for a person to be tasked or directed by a foreign power in order for their actions to constitute foreign power threat activity. Under the National Security Act 2023, where a person acts for the purposes of advancing or giving effect to the policy of a foreign power, the foreign power condition can already be satisfied. In intending to promote or fulfil the published policy of another state through their conduct, a person is likely to at least intend to benefit a foreign power. It is important to add that the meaning of foreign power under Section 32 of the National Security Act 2023 is not limited to foreign Governments and their constituent parts. It is broad enough to include a range of agencies, including the type of agency that the noble Lord has mentioned and the governing political party of a foreign Government.
I am happy to put beyond doubt that activities inspired by the policy of a foreign power, including the governing political party of a state, would fall within the current definition of foreign power threat activity in the National Security Act 2023. I draw the noble Lord’s attention to the fact that the National Security Act 2023 was drafted with the intention of capturing the full range of state threat activity. I have looked at the matter extremely carefully and consulted with legal advisers in the Home Office, as well as operational partners. If it helps put the matter beyond doubt for the noble Lord, including for the purpose of interpretation by the courts, I can assure the Committee that interference activity motivated by the policy of the governing party of a state is prosecutable under the National Security Act 2023.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
I thank the Minister for giving that assurance. As he said, it puts it beyond doubt. It would enable that to be referred to in a court of law, should such a prosecution occur. I regard that as very significant progress, and I am grateful to the Minister.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful for that welcome from the noble Lord, Lord Alton.
I will touch on Amendment 5, from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, who—again contrary to what the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, has said— I have tried to engage with a number of times this week, including, at short notice, in discussions across the board. I am trying my best to achieve those objectives.
Amendment 5 seeks to expand the scope of the preparatory conduct offence and the definition of foreign threat activity to incorporate the development of artificial superintelligence. The noble Baroness has a strong point. She is right to identify the risks posed by advanced AI models. As the picture is rapidly evolving, it is vital that the Government step up to this challenge, and we are already trying to do so. We have the AI Security Institute, the most advanced capability of any Government in the world for understanding AI. The National Cyber Security Centre, part of GCHQ, is providing world-leading defensive capabilities. The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill, which is currently progressing through Parliament, will strengthen protections, and we are shortly to produce a national cyber action plan setting out the steps that the Government want to take.
However, I recognise that the noble Baroness has made important points, and I will go as far as I can to reassure her on those issues. The Government recognise that the development by foreign powers of highly advanced artificial intelligence systems poses a risk to our cyber security and our national security. We will therefore—I hope this helps the noble Baroness—ask the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation to expressly consider whether amendments to legislation are necessary to redefine “foreign power threat activity”. Accordingly, we will do that. In response to the points that the noble Baroness has made, it is up to the independent reviewer to consult who they think is necessary, but I anticipate—I hope this is helpful to the noble Baroness—that they may wish to consult with a range of experts, as she has suggested, relating to AI.
My noble friend Lord Beamish is in the Committee today and, while it is a matter for the ISC itself, I am happy that we involve the ISC in that as appropriate. The Government always welcome the views of relevant committees, and I encourage my noble friend Lord Beamish to look at any AI issues if he requires it. I hope that reassures the noble Baroness on the experts that we can bring in, alongside the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation and the ISC examining these important areas. I hope that will help the noble Baroness.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
I apologise for interrupting the Minister in full flow. Can he make the position absolutely clear? He said that, as far as the Government are concerned, on the advice that they have received, Amendment 3 is covered by Section 33 of the 2023 Act. He has put that plainly on the record. Is he also saying that, as far as the Government are concerned, Amendment 5 is covered by Section 18 of the 2023 Act but, if that is not the case and the independent reviewer makes cogent recommendations, the Government will come ready to this House to amend Section 18 of the 2023 Act as necessary? The one thing to remember in the context of the independent reviewer is that the independent reviewer can only tell the Government what he thinks. He cannot amend the law himself. That assurance would be very helpful.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I happily give the noble Lord the assurance that, as I have said, we are trying to ensure that we ask the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation to expressly consider whether amendments to the legislation, as in the area noted by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, are considered. That will be a formal request, involving the independent reviewer making a judgment about who he wishes to call, and that would undoubtedly include, as suggested by the noble Baroness, independent AI experts. My noble friend Lord Beamish, the chair of the ISC, is in the Chamber today and will have heard what has been said. He has had the discussion and the offer has been made to all parties that they at least submit some evidence as part of that process.
I go back to the genesis of the Bill. The Bill is around because there was a manifesto commitment. There was a request to the independent reviewer and he has come up with suggestions. We have introduced the Bill as part of those suggestions, and we have said in response to other areas that His Majesty’s Opposition have pressed us on that we will consider those matters, but we have to do so as part of other, wider Bills. I am saying to the Committee today that this is a defined Bill with a defined purpose. I am trying to ensure that, having listened to the Committee, and as we will discuss in later amendments—
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I will finish this sentence, if I may. As we will discuss in later amendments, we have made some changes to help reflect some of the views that have been put to me. Ultimately, that is the position that I am trying to take.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
May I repeat my second question? Will the Minister confirm that it is the Government’s view that Amendment 5 is covered already by Section 18 of the National Security Act 2023?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My view is that there are powers there. However, in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, I am saying that we will ask the independent reviewer to examine whether we need to make any changes. That is the settlement I am trying to reach today. If there are other points I want to add to that, I will contact the noble Lord by letter or email afterwards. That is the settlement I am trying to put on the record for all parties today, to get this aspect of the Bill agreed and the amendments not pressed.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
The urgency of dealing with the question of AI was emphasised by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and, of course, by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, to whose excellent amendment I am a signatory. The Joint Committee on Human Rights is about to complete a further investigation into AI and human rights. I hope that, along with all the other referrals the Minister is going to make to the independent commissioner, he might ensure that the findings of that Joint Committee, which we anticipate will be published before the Summer Recess, will also be drawn to his attention.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The noble Lord knows that I always welcome the views of the committee, and I will look at them and reflect on them with colleagues. I can probably give a definitive yes to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, on his point; I was hedging my bets, but I think I can give a definitive yes. I hope that helps him in his assessment. I always like to give the House exquisite legal advice on these matters, rather than finding myself having to examine my own comments at a later date. I hope again that, given all the points that have been made, my noble friend will withdraw her amendment and that other noble Lords will not push theirs.
The Committee will notice that I have not spoken to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, or indeed the clause stand part notice from the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, which were in this group, because they have not spoken to them. With that, I hope that my noble friend will respond accordingly.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
I first thank the noble Lords, Lord Alton, Lord Beamish and Lord Shinkwin, for their support. I also thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Foster, and in particular the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, who managed to get Jimmy Lai’s name in, which we always appreciate. I thank my noble friend the Minister for his assurance that espionage is covered.
This is a live issue. The Chief Executive of Hong Kong, John Lee, has said that overseas activists with bounties on their heads will be “pursued for life”. Activists such as Christopher Mung, Ted Hui, Finn Lau and Nathan Law have all been targeted by the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, so what we are asking for is urgent. That is why I support this Bill going as fast as possible and being implemented as quick as possible. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
“(3A) The conduct specified in subsection (3) includes establishing, administering or maintaining a company, trust, partnership or similar arrangement which conceals, or is intended to conceal, the beneficial ownership of assets connected with a designated body.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment makes the concealment of beneficial ownership, and the establishment and maintenance of that concealment of finance and assets relating to a designated organisation, an offence.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
That moved a little faster than I had anticipated, so I now have to move my finger a little faster.
Amendment 9, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Northover, reflects one that was moved in the House of Commons by my honourable friend Steff Aquarone, the Member for North Norfolk. The amendment would include in the offence of assisting a designated body the conduct of establishing or administering a company, trust or partnership, or another body, with the aim of disguising
“the beneficial ownership of assets”
controlled by such a body. The amendment is designed to advance transparency and to penalise the exercise of disguising the real ownership of the assets of bodies designated under this legislation, so that what is sometimes called corporate disguise cannot be used to assist unlawful foreign power threat activity by a designated body, and it would do so by making it an offence under new Section 17B.
As my honourable friend Mr Aquarone put it succinctly in the House of Commons:
“These groups rely on hiding their money, and opaque financial systems only help them to do that”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/6/26; col. 931.]
By extending liability to those who make that opacity possible, we limit the ability of designated groups to continue to benefit from their assets and finances. The Government’s position appears to be, or appeared in the House of Commons to be, that existing mechanisms of financial control are sufficient protection of our national security from the use of disguised assets by designated bodies. The response of the Minister in the other place, Angela Eagle MP, was:
“Obtaining material benefits from a foreign intelligence service is an existing offence under section 17 of the National Security Act”,”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/6/26; col. 934.]
so there was no need in this Bill to criminalise conduct that disguised the assets of designated bodies. I am afraid I disagree with that assessment.
Helping in such a disguise is not the same thing as deriving a material benefit from a foreign intelligence service, the offence with which Ms Eagle was concerned. Mr Aquarone gave a number of examples of egregious conduct by individuals who are the real owners of disguised assets being used to fund foreign state threats from bodies that are likely to be designated when the Bill becomes law. Among other examples, he cited the work by the Times, Bloomberg and Transparency International in exposing the use in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, by an Iranian-Cypriot banker already sanctioned by the UK Government, of disguised assets that may be used to fund the activities of the IRGC, which may become a designated body.
The Minister has responded to a number of questions in respect of which his department has set out ways existing financial controls will prevent, restrict or otherwise impact on conduct designed to hide the assets of designated bodies. The Government have stated that collaboration with Crown dependencies and overseas territories is sufficient to prevent the disguise of assets assisting designated bodies in those jurisdictions; and, further, that our requirements for the register of entities, and for company reporting with Companies House, are sufficiently robust to prevent the disguise of designated bodies’ assets being a threat. I am afraid I doubt that.
Baroness Northover (LD)
My Lords, I speak briefly in support of my noble friend Lord Marks. He has put the case extremely effectively, taking from the amendment tabled by my honourable friend in the other place. Generally speaking, this is an area where there has been much cross-party working by the right honourable Andrew Mitchell, the noble Baroness, Lady Hodge, my noble friend Lady Kramer, and others. I therefore hope that noble Lords will be helpful in responding to this. The Panama papers, and many other sources, have revealed much information that would already have been in the public domain had beneficial ownership been clearer. Therefore, I hope the Minister will join me in supporting this amendment.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, the amendments in this group concern offences relating to the support and assistance of designated bodies. The noble Lord, Lord Walney, has not spoken to his amendments. In this regard, it is worth commenting that these Benches have a lot of sympathy with the principle behind the noble Lord’s amendments—he spoke at Second Reading last week—namely, the fact that a designated body, as a media organ, should not be a potential avenue by which criminals avoid prosecution. It is an issue worthy of consideration. It would be interesting if the Minister could confirm whether the offences proposed by the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Walney, would already be captured by the Bill as drafted.
Amendment 9, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, would make it an offence to conceal beneficial ownership relating to a designated organisation. Again, we on these Benches support the principle behind this amendment. The use, funnelling or concealment of funds to support a designated body should undoubtedly be an offence that is captured by the Bill, and I hope that the Minister can provide assurances that this will be the case. I look forward to his response.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful for the contributions from the noble Lords, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Cameron of Lochiel. The noble Lord, Lord Walney, is not in his place, but his amendments have been referred to. I confirm to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, that the conduct captured in the amendments is already appropriately provided for by the existing provisions in the Bill. Had the noble Lord, Lord Walney, spoken to them, I would have gone into more detail, but that is the principle of the response to date.
I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for his Amendment 9, which intends to specify the concealment of beneficial ownership, and the establishment and maintenance of that concealment of finance and assets related to a designated body, as material assistance. The Government take corruption in all its forms very seriously. We welcome the noble Lord’s focus on this important issue, and the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, for the objectives that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has outlined.
On the noble Lord’s concerns about beneficial ownership, the Government have a strong record on reducing illicit finance, including working with overseas territories and Crown dependencies to do so. The register of overseas entities requires overseas entities that own UK property to register verified information on their beneficial owners with Companies House and to update that information. The Government also produce an annual progress report to Parliament on Companies House reforms, including updates to the register of overseas entities.
The “Assisting a designated body” offence is not limited to financial benefits; providing access to services is already explicitly covered by subsection (3) of the new Section 17B offence. Establishing or running an arrangement to look after a designated body’s assets is a service. Those who do so professionally are often called trust or company service providers. This reflects that there are no specific financial measures in the Bill but they can be applied in all environments. Therefore, the activity that the amendment seeks to address is already within the scope of the new offence.
The amendment is unnecessary in a positive way, in that the Bill is already covering this area, and although the noble Lord has drawn specific attention to this matter, I can explicitly confirm the extent of the provisions of the Bill, and we anticipate that a key utility for this power will be to call out and bear down on the very front companies the noble Lord has referred to which are carrying out foreign power threat activities as proxies for hostile powers. If the noble Lord looks at the Explanatory Notes to the Bill, he will see that that is very clear. I know he will have looked at those in detail, but I reaffirm for other Members of the Committee that the Explanatory Notes are very clear on that point.
If I may, I will follow up in writing to the noble Lord to give some further detail to him and his colleagues regarding the work that the Government are doing to prevent the misuse of beneficial ownership structures and financing of designated bodies more broadly. When I do that, I will place a copy of the letter in the Libraries of both Houses to ensure that all Members have access to my correspondence in due course. It is a matter for the noble Lord, but I think that we have covered these matters. It was very important that he raised them, but I respectfully ask him not to push his amendment; given that his is the last amendment standing in this group, I hope he will withdraw it and allow us to deal with matters by correspondence.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
I am very grateful for the assurances and explanations that the Minister has given. I will not press the amendment to a vote now, but I invite him to consider, between now and the introduction of further legislation, whether there is a complete overlap, so that anybody who helps the disguise of assets, perhaps without knowing that the designated body is the beneficiary of that assistance, will be covered by the offence as it stands, because it seems to me that there is a possible lacuna where new legislation would be helpful. If he would add to his assurance by saying that he will at least consider whether there is such a gap, I would be happier in withdrawing my amendment, which I will seek leave to do in any event. I give him an opportunity to respond to that very specific point.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I give the noble Lord the assurance that we will certainly look at those matters, and I will include that in the correspondence that I send him post the consideration of the Bill.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
I am very grateful and, with that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Northover
“(5A) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to conduct engaged in on behalf of an impartial humanitarian organisation that is necessary to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities that support basic human needs.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would create an exemption from the offence in section 17B of assisting a designated body if the assistance is provided on behalf of an impartial humanitarian organisation.
Baroness Northover (LD)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 11, I will speak also to Amendment 12A, which replaces my original Amendment 12; Amendment 13A, which replaces my original Amendment 13; Amendment 18A, which replaces Amendment 18; Amendment 19A, which replaces Amendment 19; and Amendment 16.
I want to start by acknowledging the huge amount of support and effort that others have put into getting us to where we are now: the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, with his expertise and understanding, Sarah Champion and those associated with the International Development Committee, the International Committee of the Red Cross, other leading NGOs and others, and, from Friday onwards, the Minister and his team. I think that the poor Minister is probably due a full night’s sleep after all this.
I sympathise with the Government and those who drafted this legislation. I understand why they want to act, but we all know, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, pointed out, that acting in haste in drafting legislation can have predictable challenges. For me, therefore, the key is to address the unintended consequences of this short Bill, rather than to seek to move particular areas forward. That will need to wait for the longer Bill that we have been promised in the King’s Speech. It could never be acceptable to say that this legislation must go through unamended, when risks were perceived with it, because we were short of time.
I also note the engagement of Jonathan Hall KC, who published a note on receipt of information on 25 June, suggesting a change to the legislation. It is quite something when such a suggestion is made, given that, in theory, this legislation came directly out of his report. I thank him for being willing to address this, and the Government for listening.
Let us set aside whether or not there should have been such a rush, and make sure that by the end of today we have taken forward a Bill in which there is common agreement about intentions and the protection of the British public and state without, at the same time, throwing out babies with bathwater. In fact, I am mightily keen not to throw out babies, but instead to look after them around the world, which is what humanitarian organisations so bravely do, often in the most challenging circumstances.
I am very grateful to those who signed my amendments—the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Helic and Lady D’Souza—for their support. We had a clear problem as the legislation stood. No one, including the Government, wishes to prevent bona fide humanitarian organisations, working within international humanitarian law, doing their work, whether that is clearing mines, working on conflict resolution or getting aid to vulnerable people, or to block journalists from digging deep to do their work. The dilemma of engaging with those with whom we might otherwise wish to designate or proscribe is clear to the Government, hence the defence for diplomatic engagement.
The Explanatory Notes state that humanitarian work is not designed to be captured by this Bill. While diplomatic protection is in the Bill, humanitarian work, so far, is not. The factsheet on the Bill, published by the Home Office on 9 June, states:
“Legitimate activity, such as diplomatic and humanitarian engagement and journalistic freedoms are protected in the offences which include relevant defences”.
But actually, no: the intention was clearly there, but it was not translated into the Bill. We need to make sure this is rectified.
Amendment 11 provides an exemption, stating that the new provisions
“do not apply to conduct engaged in on behalf of an impartial humanitarian organisation that is necessary to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities that support basic human needs”.
That is the best route to go down, so that this legislation does not have a chilling effect on those in the humanitarian sector, so they fear to act lest they end up in the courts, or their banks or donors do not want to engage for fear of the law. In Yemen, for example, aid agencies have abandoned entire communities because they are working with groups that were blacklisted by the US Government. This then made it too risky to stay.
Amendments 12A and 13A seek to provide a defence for those carrying out humanitarian activities, making it clear that these must be in keeping with internationally recognised principles and standards applicable to such activities. Amendment 16 would mean that an offence in Section 17C on obtaining material benefits would not apply if the benefit was provided to an impartial humanitarian organisation. It provides an exemption.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and I am delighted to add my support to Amendments 12A, 13A, 18A and 19A in her name. The unintended application of the new Sections 17B and 17C to those who carry out humanitarian activities was a danger to which we both spoke at Second Reading, and these amendments go a very long way to laying those concerns to rest.
My own Amendment 17, signed also by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, who is not in his place, has similarly been superseded by Amendment 17A, which I tabled yesterday after discussion with the Minister. It appears in the supplementary list and is accompanied by the minor and consequential manuscript Amendment 18B.
Amendment 17A was floated in the Second Reading speech of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, last Tuesday, tweaked in the note produced by Jonathan Hall KC on Thursday and tabled by me later that day. Three Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation might not be quite as entertaining as the Three Tenors, but we have, I hope, as so often, sung more or less in harmony.
The problem that Amendment 17A seeks to address is the breadth of Section 17C, which prohibits obtaining material benefits from a designated body. Section 17C(3) defines material benefits as including not only
“anything which has the potential to result in a financial benefit”,
but additionally, and separately, the unqualified word “information”. The Minister sought to assist by suggesting at Second Reading that the transfer of information was caught by the prohibition only when it possesses
“an inherent value that enriches the recipient”.—[Official Report, 23/6/26; col. 614.]
Although I am as keen on gift horses as the next person, and while I appreciate the helpful spirit in which the Minister’s interpretation was put forward, I must confess that it is not one in which I would feel complete confidence as an advocate.
The starting point of Section 17C is that any receipt of information from or on behalf of a designated body is a criminal offence. Diplomats and other public servants have a defence. There is another defence of reasonable excuse in Section 17C(7), but this operates as a defence only to the charge of retaining the material benefit, not to a charge of obtaining it, accepting it or agreeing to accept it. That is the hole this amendment fills where information is concerned. It protects those who are not diplomats but who none the less have a legitimate interest in soliciting or obtaining information from a designated body.
Those engaged in humanitarian activity will now be protected by Amendment 18A. I mentioned at Second Reading the HALO Trust, which could otherwise have been at risk for asking a designated body where the mines were laid. But Amendment 17A remains vital for those who are neither diplomats nor engaged in humanitarian activity. I spoke at Second Reading of a small number of reputable organisations which enter into dialogue with bodies susceptible to designation for the purposes of conflict prevention and resolution. One of those bodies is the charity Inter Mediate, founded by Jonathan Powell, in which I declare a non-pecuniary interest as chair. Such bodies might be described as humanitarian, in which case they are protected by Amendment 18A. But, in case of any doubt, their ability to engage in such dialogues is safeguarded by Amendment 17A.
There are also foreign correspondents, a number of whom I have engaged with in recent days. In order to inform the public as effectively as possible, some of them routinely speak to sources in and around bodies liable to designation. They do not make it their practice to alert government or anyone else to the fact that they are doing so. While they understand that the Attorney-General has a discretion over whether to bring prosecutions, they point, I am afraid, to the abusive exercise of equivalent discretions elsewhere in the common-law world and ask, in the words of the title of Peter Hennessy’s latest book, “Could it happen here?” Prosecutorial discretion is of course a vital safeguard, but it is no substitute for a clear law that neither penalises reasonable behaviour, nor chills those who are associated with it.
These amendments do not weaken this vital Bill, but they avoid its unintended consequences. They give effect to the Government’s unrealised intention, expressed in the factsheet that accompanied the Bill, to include within it defences for humanitarian engagement and journalistic freedoms. I thank the Minister and the Bill team for their courteous and helpful engagement.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I realise that it is unusual to speak this early in the debate, but I just hope the House will bear with me for a second. I believe it is important to give a view on the two sets of amendments that have been moved, so that colleagues will understand where the Government are coming from in any contributions they wish to make.
I recognise the concern raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and also by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, about inadvertently criminalising the provision of legitimate humanitarian aid, and the resulting chilling effect this could have on important work. We have listened to the concerns and we have had extensive discussion outside the Committee. The Government will accept a new defence into Sections 17B and 17C, which is manifested by Amendments 12A, 13A, 18A and 19A, where conduct is carried out for the purpose of carrying out humanitarian activities, which are defined as only those activities carried out in accordance with internationally recognised principles and standards.
I am also grateful again for Amendment 17A from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, which is based on the advice of Jonathan Hall KC, to expand the defence of “reasonable excuse” to cover obtaining, accepting or agreeing to accept information from a designated body. This pragmatic proposal will mean that, where a legitimate humanitarian organisation, such as those mentioned by the noble Lord, or a charity involved in conflict resolution, or indeed a journalist, takes information from a designated body, which could be about the location of landmines, for example, that organisation will not fall foul of the new offence at Section 17C. The amendment that the Government are willing to accept in the form of new Section 17C(7A) is intended to reflect that.
Again, I am happy if any other noble Lords wish to contribute to the debate and make any further points, if the House will allow me at the end of the debate to respond to those points. I thought it important to put on record now that there should be no difference between us. Therefore, the debate, I would hope, is about the importance of this subject, rather than the Government being forced into agreeing any particular amendment or not. With that, I will sit down and allow other noble Lords to contribute, but I hope the Government’s position is now clear.
Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I am grateful for that clarification. It makes things much easier and will shorten the debate. The point that I was going to make, in respect of the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, is that designated bodies are different from terrorist organisations, because they may be exercising public functions in certain countries. For that reason, there are a number of British nationals who will have to engage with the designated bodies for perfectly legitimate reasons. Most of the examples that we have dealt with concern precisely that scenario: that is, cases of British nationals providing humanitarian assistance, journalists or those involved in conflict resolution.
But we should not lose sight of the possibility that even businesses could find themselves caught by these offences but for the reasonable excuse defence, which has now been accepted. There may, for example, be British businesses operating in Iran for perfectly legitimate reasons that will have to sell an investment and will have to obtain information from a designated body as part of that process. There may be British-Iranian dual nationals who have to, in the same way, accept or obtain information because they have to renew a passport or such other things. The reasonable defence excuse, which has now been cast in sufficiently wide terms, captures those situations. I am a little bit unclear about Section 17B, but the Section 17B offence concerns me a bit less because it already contains an important provision, UK-related activities, so does not come with as much of a risk of inappropriate application as Section 17C. With that, I welcome the Government’s concession on both of these aspects.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 22 in the group in my name and the name of my noble friend Lady D’Souza. It touches on the issues that my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich raised in his remarks. I am very pleased with the progress that we have made around humanitarian organisations.
During the Second Reading debate last week, I specifically referred to the position of the International Committee of the Red Cross and said that it would passing strange if the united desire of this House to designate organisations such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps could be used to impede the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross. I specifically referred to an amendment to the Bill which it asked should be moved. I tabled it in due course and it is on the Order Paper.
During our very helpful meeting yesterday, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, responded to another point that I raised with him and that I had also raised in correspondence with my noble friend Lord Anderson over the weekend concerning the position of journalists. I was struck by representations made by the admirable Alex Crawford from Sky News, who had given evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights during our inquiry into the activities of ISIS. The noble Lord will recall that I have raised with him the failure to prosecute any of the 400 ISIS members who committed genocide against Yazidis in northern Iraq and northern Syria and who have returned to this country. Not one of them has been prosecuted for crimes against humanity or the crime of genocide.
Alex Crawford went into the camps inside Syria and Iraq and very bravely interviewed some of the insurgents who were there, and she came to give evidence to our committee. She asked, “Would that mean, under the terms of this legislation, that I could be prosecuted for working to establish information and knowledge by going in directly to deal with a proscribed organisation?” I would like further clarity, just for the record and to put it beyond doubt, for people such as Alex Crawford, Lyse Doucet or many others. Last week, I referred to Kate Adie, who stood in Tiananmen Square at the time of the massacres that occurred there. Would someone like that also be placing themselves at risk under the legislation? Let us put that beyond doubt. I know that it is not the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Hanson. During our discussions yesterday, I felt that we made very significant progress in dealing with that.
I will just briefly refer to the position of the IRGC. This is not just about NGOs. The IRGC, as we all know, has to do some very delicate, sensitive and confidential work, sometimes engaging directly in places where there are organisations that we have proscribed or that we will, in the future, designate. Much of this can be funded by the United Kingdom, pursuant to the Geneva conventions, and this can include the provision of medical care of the wounded and sick. So, the idea that this could proscribe such groups solely to secure humanitarian access to civilian populations and detain persons—
Baroness Northover (LD)
My Lords, I think the noble Lord means the International Committee of the Red Cross.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
I do indeed—there are too many acronyms flying around at the moment, and it is rather late in the day. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
My Lords, as a Welsh-born bathroom singer of much practice, I was pleased with my noble friend Lord Anderson when he referred to three tenors. However, your Lordships will have observed that, with the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and his operatic roots, it is now four tenors—and an “alto” as well.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
It took your Lordships quite a long time to get that one.
But seriously, I commend and congratulate my noble friend Lord Anderson and the Minister for the hard work they have done together in the last couple of days. I was attending a wonderful family wedding in Hereford Cathedral yesterday and was being informed, between bits of the service, of what was happening in the discussions. I am very happy with the result. What has been agreed gives sufficient protection for the concerns that have been expressed.
I mentioned at Second Reading my belief that the discretion vested in the DPP and the Attorney-General is a real protection and would be a real protection for those who might be faced with even a suspicion of prosecution in such a case. I think that we have reached a good way to deal with the matters raised by my noble friend Lord Anderson at Second Reading.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. It is vital to our national security that those who assist bodies designated under this Bill are appropriately and effectively punished. The Terrorism Act 2000 has no prohibited purpose condition analogous to that included in the Bill, which we on these Benches believe could be exploited by potential criminals.
As my noble friend Lord Cameron and I argued at Second Reading, the existence of a prohibited purpose requirement will add a large degree of subjectivity and present further evidential barriers for prosecutors in the majority of cases where offenders have no legitimate defence. This argument was also made by Conservative MPs in the other place. We were told, however, by the Government that they were unable to accept our amendment, that no amendments to this Bill would be accepted and that our only chance of engaging in meaningful dialogue was to wait until the next national security Bill, the date for which is unspecified.
It is in that context that I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. Amendments 12A, 13A, 17A, 18A and 19A seek to create a defence for the offences of assisting a designated body or obtaining material benefit from a designated body. I understand the principle behind these amendments. However, we on these Benches worry that
“for the purpose of carrying out humanitarian activities”
is a potentially subjective criterion that may be misinterpreted and expanded by the judiciary or exploited by those seeking to harm the interests of the UK. Equally, the inclusion of a “reasonable excuse” defence for the obtaining of material benefit from designated bodies is a cause for concern. The wording is sufficiently broad that it may encompass excuses that are not intended to be captured. Moreover, the Minister has repeatedly resisted amendments with much tighter wording, arguing that the intention was for this Bill to be drawn as narrowly as possible.
Given the perhaps unhelpful manner that the Government have displayed during the passage of the Bill, I was extremely surprised to see these amendments appear on the supplementary Marshalled List last night. The tabling of amendments at the 11th hour, with minor drafting tweaks, would make the reasonable observer conclude that the Government have been involved in the drafting process. However, I struggle to believe that would be the case, given that the Government have told the Official Opposition on multiple occasions that they were unable to make further policy decisions during the interregnum. Indeed, they were so unwavering in this stance that they were unable to accept even amendments that had been confirmed as government policy, such as that on the seizure of passports. Therefore, I look to the Minister to assure the House that there has been no government involvement in the drafting of amendments in this group. Can he confirm that?
I can only reasonably assume that the Government will therefore be unable to accept the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Northover. If the Government have offered assistance to the Liberal Democrats and are willing to accept the amendments in this group, I have several further questions for the Minister. Why did he inform us that the Government’s hands were tied and that no compromises could be made on the Bill between Second Reading and today? Given that the Conservatives also raised the issue of a defence to the offence of supporting a designated body, why were the Government willing to give preferential treatment and to work with Liberal Democrat Peers, but not the Conservatives? The Government informed us several times that, even with amendments they were sympathetic to, there simply was not enough time to draft them in an acceptable form during the passage of the Bill. Can the Minister now confirm that this was not the case, or did the Home Office increase the capacity of the legislative team over the weekend?
The concerns raised by the amendments in this group are not novel. In the spirit of collaboration, I even wrote to the Minister on 10 June, before Second Reading, outlining the issues on which we wished to work constructively. We were told in no uncertain terms that, on every issue raised, the Government were unable or indeed unwilling to act. The decision therefore to assist in the drafting of amendments that were published the night before Committee is just not satisfactory. It leaves noble Lords with very little time to consider amendments that concern national security and which are an unfortunate attempt at avoiding genuine parliamentary scrutiny. I would be very pleased if the Minister could address these concerns.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
For the avoidance of doubt, I quite like the noble Lord, and we have a good relationship on these matters. I think I have constructive discussions on these matters with both noble Lords opposite. But I want to say to the House that I have been very clear to the noble Lord from His Majesty’s loyal Opposition that there are certain things we can do and there are certain things we cannot. There are some issues we agree with, but not in this Bill, and there are other measures we will return to in future legislation. I have tried to not dilute the central purpose of this Bill, which is to give the Home Secretary a power to designate anybody that she, having taken advice from a range of sources in the Home Office and through agencies, thinks is a threat to the state.
As I have said, the issues the noble Lord has tried to shoehorn into the Bill are ones the Government in part agree with, and we will find a proper mechanism to implement those policies in due course. I did not want to extend the scope of the Bill, nor did I want to put in measures that, in my view, dilute its core purpose. That is why I have not been able to help the noble Lord.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the noble Baroness, Lady Northover—and indeed the Liberal Democrat Front Bench—made points about the unintended consequence of humanitarian, journalistic or other agencies being caught. I have tried, privately and at Second Reading, to give assurances that the Bill as drafted would not lead to those unintended consequences.
But it is perfectly reasonable for a Minister, between Second Reading and Committee, to listen to representations that are made and, as has happened, to have my officials and other Ministers in the department meet a range of humanitarian bodies, and to have respected journalists, such as Alex Crawford and Kate Adie, who were mentioned, raise issues with Members of this House where they are concerned about the impact of a particular Bill; and for us as a Government to reflect on those matters and, when amendments are discussed, to agree, potentially, areas where we can accept them. Yes, I accept that they are checked by Home Office lawyers, because this is the law of the land which the Home Office has to implement, but, with due respect to the noble Lord, I do not think that that is rejecting the things that he said.
I have tried to have a focus on the Bill. In my view, the amendments we have accepted give additional certainty. We thought we had that certainty, but requests were made to give that additional certainty and therefore we have done so. There are amendments in this group that we have not accepted and I cannot accept—I am afraid I am a perpetual disappointment to the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, on his Amendment 22. But, in saying that I cannot accept the amendment he has tabled, I reassure him that the Bill we have crafted is designed to ensure that legitimate activities such as diplomacy and journalism, and activities that support basic human needs, are not caught within its offences.
We have to be alive to the risks of creating blanket exemptions, which could easily be exploited by sophisticated state actors. We have genuine concerns that exemptions could create simple loopholes for hostile actors to exploit. Those hostile actors frequently operate behind front organisations and sometimes shell charities, so a general carve-out would allow those bodies to carry out activities under the guise of relief work. I know the noble Lord does not want that, and he will know that that would not be right. There is a risk that legitimate humanitarian organisations are infiltrated by hostile actors, and, again, we must avoid unintended consequences.
However, I have recognised the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and I said what I said in my earlier introductory remarks, which do not need repeating. I am grateful to the noble Lords for their thoughtful and constructive amendments. They have helped strengthen the Bill and broaden its support, and they have meant that we have been able to tighten in many ways the concerns that were raised and address those properly.
I come back to the final point that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, mentioned. He made some good points; for example, there are things that he said on passports that are important. I agree with him; I have said to him, privately and on the Floor of the House at Second Reading, and I say to him now, that the Government hope they can do those things in this Session of Parliament. But the Bill before us is narrowly defined for a specific purpose, which is one I suspect he supports and which, ultimately, if the Bill can achieve early passage, will be resolved.
In answer to the question on whether the amendments we accept have to go back to the House of Commons, I say yes, that is right, but I am confident they will be agreed. I cannot say when, because I am not the business manager for the House of Commons, but I expect it to be done as soon as possible. If those amendments are accepted here, I have 110% confidence that they will be accepted in the House of Commons. Therefore, the Bill, as amended, with the safeguards that have been sought, can be presented for potential Royal Assent, and the powers that are in it can be exercised by the Home Secretary as a matter of urgency.
I therefore commend the amendments that I have indicated—Amendments 12A, 13A, 17A, 18A and 19A—to the Committee in support of the noble Lords, and I ask the noble Lord, Lord Alton, whether he will allow me to reflect still further on his Amendment 22, as discussed.
Baroness Northover (LD)
I am grateful to the Minister. It is important that we focus on the matter in hand, what the Government are seeking to do, making sure there are no unintended consequences and taking this forward. I hear the concern from the Conservative Front Bench, but I hope that they are able to see the bigger picture of what this was about and what we were seeking to do, which was not party-political in any way. It was simply to try to remedy some defects that we saw. We are grateful that the Government were able to hear that. It was something that was echoed by a number of organisations and lots of experts helping us in this regard. I am glad that in the end that was heard and therefore we have a better, safer Bill without those defects. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Northover
“(e) for the purpose of carrying out humanitarian activities.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with others in the name of Baroness Northover, provides a defence to the section 17B prohibition for the provision of humanitarian activities in accordance with internationally recognised principles and standards.
Baroness Northover
“(7A) For the purposes of subsection (6)(e), the reference to the carrying out of humanitarian activities does not include the carrying out of humanitarian activities in contravention of internationally recognised principles and standards applicable to the carrying out of humanitarian activities.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with others in the name of Baroness Northover, provides a defence to the section 17B prohibition for the provision of humanitarian activities in accordance with internationally recognised principles and standards.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich
“(7A) In proceedings for an offence under subsection (1) or (2) where—(a) the benefit consists of, or includes, information, and(b) the conduct in question relates to that information,it is a defence to show that the person had a reasonable excuse for that conduct.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would create a reasonable excuse defence for obtaining, accepting or agreeing to accept information from or on behalf of a designated body.
Baroness Northover
“(d) for the purpose of carrying out humanitarian activities.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with others in the name of Baroness Northover, provides a defence to the section 17C prohibition for the provision of humanitarian activities in accordance with internationally recognised principles and standards.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on another amendment in Lord Anderson of Ipswich’s name.
Baroness Northover
“(9A) For the purposes of subsection (8)(d), the reference to the carrying out of humanitarian activities does not include the carrying out of humanitarian activities in contravention of internationally recognised principles and standards applicable to the carrying out of humanitarian activities.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with others in the name of Baroness Northover, provides a defence to the section 17C prohibition for the provision of humanitarian activities in accordance with internationally recognised principles and standards.
Lord Davies of Gower
“17D Uniform and publication of images in relation to a designated body(1) A person in a public place commits an offence if the person—(a) wears an item of clothing, or(b) wears, carries or displays an article,in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a supporter of a designated body.(2) A person commits an offence if the person publishes an image of—(a) an item of clothing, or(b) any other article,in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a supporter of a designated body.(3) In subsection (2) the reference to an image is a reference to a still or moving image (produced by any means).(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale (or both).(5) A constable may seize an item of clothing or any other article if the constable— (a) reasonably suspects that it is evidence in relation to an offence under subsection (1), and(b) is satisfied that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent the evidence being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed.(6) In connection with exercising the power in subsection (5), a constable may require a person to remove the item of clothing or other article if the person is wearing it.(7) The powers conferred by subsections (5) and (6) may not be exercised so as to seize, or require a person to remove, an item of clothing being worn next to the skin or immediately over a garment being worn as underwear.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would create an offence of wearing or displaying in public, or publishing an image of, an article in a way that arouses reasonable suspicion that a person is a supporter of a designated body.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I have already made it clear that the way the Government have dealt with this Bill is unfortunate, so I will not dwell on that any longer. The amendments in this group reflect the concerns that the Opposition have raised with the Government on a number of occasions. The Government have told us that they cannot accept any of them for myriad reasons. As I hope I will demonstrate to the Committee, every one of the Government’s arguments will fail at the first hint of scrutiny.
Amendment 20 would create an offence of wearing or displaying in public an article in a way that arouses reasonable suspicion that a person is a supporter of a designated body. This would include those who publish an image of such articles. This amendment seeks to correct the strange situation that could arise under this Bill whereby a state entity may be designated, but it would not be an offence to display its insignia or to glorify it online.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
I am a little concerned by what is meant by an article of clothing. My noble friend will know that the keffiyeh is widely worn on the streets of London and was much associated, when worn by Yasser Arafat, with the PLO. Is there a risk that the wearing of the keffiyeh would be associated with support for a designated body? If there is, we are in very serious trouble.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
I am not well-acquainted with this article of clothing.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
Should it come before a court, the court would have to decide. Further than that I cannot comment, but I take on board what the noble Lord says.
Getting back to what I was saying, such provisions already exist for proscribed organisations under Section 13 of the Terrorism Act. Where the IRGC is designated under this legislation, its insignia and flags could be displayed openly in public with complete legal impunity. Hordes of its supporters could wave IRGC flags on British streets and intimidate members of the Jewish community, and avoid any legal ramifications. This is an obvious legislative gap that is damaging to public confidence.
At Second Reading, the Minister said that banning uniforms would impact legitimate engagement of the designated state body, which would need to continue, for example, on diplomatic channels. I do not buy that argument. We are not legislating for Iran in this Bill; we are legislating for the United Kingdom. The offences do not apply to non-UK persons outside the United Kingdom. My amendments would not criminalise the display of IRGC insignia in Tehran. They would criminalise such acts only in Britain. I contend that, if, for some reason, an Iranian diplomat came to the country for diplomatic negotiations—although I do not believe that that has happened since 1980—it would be perfectly acceptable to require them not to wear an IRGC uniform or insignia.
If noble Lords are not convinced by my arguments then perhaps the following words will help put forward the case for my amendment. For the same reason as penalising support,
“it should also be an offence to display in public a flag or other insignia in such a way as to arouse reasonable suspicion that a person is a member or supporter of a”
foreign intelligence service subject to a statutory alert and liability threat notice. The argument continues:
“This is by parity with section 13 Terrorism Act 2000 which applies only to public displays.”
These were the words of Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation, in his report published last year.
Much of this legislation has been justified by the Government on the grounds that it is rooted in the recommendations made by Jonathan Hall in his independent review. This amendment is a policy recommendation explicitly called for in his review. If the Government believe that his recommendation is grounds for policy justification, why does that not apply to our amendment, or will the Minister say that he believes that Jonathan Hall was wrong to suggest that uniforms should be banned?
This Government have been one categorised and defined by reviews. On countless occasions, across a range of departments, my colleagues and I have been told by the Government that they are waiting for the outcome of a review before taking any decisive action. Well, the review has concluded and Jonathan Hall has been clear, and now the Government have decided that they want to pick and choose which recommendations they would like to take forward. That raises the important question: why bother having the review in the first place?
Amendment 23 would give the police and immigration officers the power to seize the passports of individuals attempting to leave the country to assist a designated body abroad. It would do that by replicating the provisions of Section 1 and Schedule 1 to the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. The amendment details at length the powers available to police and immigration officers to seize passports, and would ensure that the same safeguards in the 2015 Act are in place.
I remind noble Lords that this too was a direct recommendation from Jonathan Hall’s report. He said:
“There is a strong case for enabling speedy action to remove a passport from a person who would otherwise leave the jurisdiction, where there is suspicion of involvement in foreign power threat activity”.
At Second Reading, the Minister stated:
“We are going to do it; we are just not going to do it in this Bill, which is a specifically designed piece of legislation to give powers to the Home Secretary. We will have further national security legislation later in his Parliament”.—[Official Report, 23/6/26; col. 614.].
In our discussions with the Government, they once again said that they agreed with Jonathan Hall KC and that they would do this at some point in this Session. When we asked the Government why, if they had accepted the recommendation, they would not implement it in this Bill, we were simply told that the Home Office did not have enough time to draft the amendment. But the Government have had over a year since Jonathan Hall KC’s report to sort out the policy detail. They have had a year to get the drafting right. Let us be under no illusion about how much time it would actually take them to draft this power. They are not starting from scratch. We already have the framework for the power in law in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, as I have already mentioned. Half the job has already been done.
I have tabled my amendment, which the Minister will know is a more comprehensive version of the amendment tabled in the Commons, to show the Government that it can be done. If the Opposition can draft a comprehensive amendment on past procedure in a few days then surely the Government, with their Civil Service, can do the same.
The other criticism the Government have raised is that the amendment retabled in the Commons was too narrow, as they want the power to be extended further than to just those travelling abroad to assist a designated group. To do that, the Government say they need more time to ensure that this legislative gap is properly addressed, but all the while they prevaricate the legislative gap remains in place. If the Government want a wider power of passport seizure, applying to more offences in the National Security Act, they can bring forward a wider power in future legislation. I would be fine with that, but why will they not accept this narrower power for now as a stopgap while they draft the wider power?
Finally, Amendment 21 seeks to emulate the offence of disseminating terrorist publications in the Terrorism Act 2006. I have heard what the Minister has said about the differences between designating state-linked bodies and proscribing terrorist groups. I accept that there is a difference, but this is an issue where the difference in treatment is not borne out by the facts. The bodies we are dealing with in this threats regime are the very bodies engaging in propaganda to further their nefarious ends. The IRGC distributes materials encouraging others to wage war against the West. For example, the IRGC has founded news outlets, including Sepah News, Tasnim News Agency and Fars News Agency among others. The Seraj Cyberspace Organization serves as a central organisation that recruits and mobilises pro-regime users to conduct online operations for the IRGC. This includes social media campaigns, spreading disinformation online, and fomenting divisions among opposition groups through targeted operations. It has developed an expanded initiative to increase the IRGC’s human capacity online—its so-called soft war officers, who have been particularly active since the anti-regime protests in Iran in 2022 and the Hamas terrorist attacks on 7 October.
Other countries are taking action against the propaganda spread by the IRGC. In May, Europol’s internal referral unit launched co-ordinated action to target the IRGC’s online content after the EU designated it a terrorist organisation. It took down a total of 14,200 posts linked to the group. This operation exposed the enormous extent and reach of the IRGC’s online activities. Europol said:
“The content was spread across mainstream social media platforms as well as streaming services … Propaganda was identified in several languages, including Arabic, Bahasa Indonesia, English, French, Persian, and Spanish. The material ranged from speeches blending religious martyrdom narratives with highly charged political messaging to AI-generated videos glorifying the IRGC and calls to avenge the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei”.
There we have it—AI-generated videos glorifying the IRGC, calls to violence, blogs, recruitment of online operatives and more. The reach of the IRGC’s propaganda and violent material is vast and it is only growing.
I will not accept that designated bodies are different from terrorist groups when it comes to the dissemination of propaganda material. The Government stated that they believed dissemination would fall under the Section 17A offence of inviting support for a designated body. However, the reality is that many publications may not explicitly invite support for, in the limited sense as applied in Section 17A. They may simply glorify the actions and activities of the designated body. I have already given many examples of the myriad ways in which groups like the IRGC disseminate material. If this is the reality then it is abundantly clear that there is a gaping hole in the Bill.
The corresponding terrorism offence that my Amendment 21 is modelled on is contained in Section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006. The offence in new Section 17A of inviting support for a designated body is modelled on the offence in Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000. These two offences were enacted six years apart. It is therefore evident that the Government and Parliament believed in 2005, when the new Terrorism Bill was introduced, that the original Section 12 offence in the 2000 Act was insufficient to deal with the full range of terrorist publications. If they believed otherwise, they would not have sought to create a separate stand-alone offence of dissemination in the 2006 Act. In other words, Parliament has already confirmed its belief that “inviting support for” does not sufficiently cover the wider dissemination of supportive materials. That is clearly evidenced by the arguments from the Government at the time. In 2005 the Minister responsible, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, said that the Government wanted to give law enforcement agencies the tools they needed to tackle a particular mischief: the dissemination of publications in context, which means that they will either encourage terrorism or be of use to terrorists in practical ways. That was a very clear statement.
Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I have added my name in support of Amendment 20 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. As he has explained, Amendment 20 would create an offence mirroring an existing offence in Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Under that section, it is already an offence for a person to wear an item of clothing in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that that person is a supporter of a proscribed terrorist organisation. So we already have that offence in Section 13 of the Terrorism Act in respect of proscribed terrorism organisations; but, unless Amendment 20 is adopted, there will be no similar offence for someone wearing a uniform or displaying the insignia of a designated body.
I agree with those who have said a number of times that state threats call for a different response in some respects from that which we adopt in respect of terrorist organisations, but I do not see why, in respect of this particular offence, a different approach is needed. With this Bill we are trying to protect our public spaces—our public sphere, really—from the influence of malign foreign state organisations and from their attempts to subvert our democratic values and our liberal principles.
The Bill criminalises supporting a designated body but, as the Minister has explained before, it does so on a basis that is more demanding than for the corresponding offence under the Terrorism Act, so it would be challenging to rely on the offence of “supporting” to target the particular conduct Amendment 20 is aimed at. The “supporting” offence requires a prohibited purpose, which is defined as follows:
“that the person knows, or having regard to other matters known to them ought reasonably to know”,
that the purpose
“is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.
Faced with a person wearing the uniform of a designated organisation or carrying the insignia of that organisation in our streets, it would be difficult for the police to apply that test and quickly determine whether the prohibited purpose, which is not a low bar, was satisfied in the specific circumstances. But, if we have an offence such as Amendment 20 would introduce, which mirrors an existing offence under terrorism legislation, that determination could be made more simply and there would be no reason for the police to hesitate.
I hesitate to make comparisons with the 1930s, but I imagine that if we had had this power then, we would have designated the SS and then surely would have expected our police to arrest those wearing SS uniform in public spaces. I do not understand the hesitation the Government have in adopting this amendment, which, as we have heard, has already been recommended by a number of experts. I do not believe that immunity is a good reason. It is already the case that if an Iranian diplomat chooses to wear a Hamas uniform, he cannot be arrested because he enjoys immunity. Even though he would be committing an offence under Section 13 of the Terrorism Act, that diplomat would be able to invoke immunity. If the same person chooses to wear in London an IRGC uniform—if the Government end up designating that organisation—that person would be entitled to immunity. I do not think that immunity is a good reason for not extending this offence to designated organisations. For that reason, I hope that the Government will be able to support the amendment or, at the very least, indicate a willingness to adopt an offence on very similar terms. If the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, is going to divide the Committee on his amendment, he will have my support.
Lord Walney (CB)
My Lords, I too have added my name in support of Amendment 20 and endorse everything my noble friend Lord Verdirame has just said. I will briefly add, for emphasis, that the Government have promised an equivalent power for state-related organisations and without this, one of the key planks would not have an equivalent power.
Finally, if I understood correctly the concern expressed about the keffiyeh at the beginning of speech of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, is that not an article of clothing now commonly associated with a fully proscribed terrorist organisation, Hamas? As has been said, if such legal jeopardy arose, the relevant law does exist—Section 13 of the Terrorism Act. It is not widely used, and the argument would probably be that this headdress was originally about the assertion of Palestinian national identity. It has indeed been co-opted by supporters of Hamas, but it is a separate question which I do not think impinges on whether this amendment ought to be supported.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
My Lords, I hesitate to do so, but I disagree with my two noble friends who have just spoken. Some years ago I was in a supermarket in London and found myself standing next to an approximately 17 year-old young man who was wearing a t-shirt with a swastika on it. He was entitled to wear that if he wished, because it is not unlawful to wear a t-shirt with a swastika on it, however much one disapproves. I turned to the young man and, in a moment of complete foolishness, I suppose, said to him, “Excuse me, but do you realise that 6 million people were murdered by the Nazis on the back of that particular insignia?” He turned to me and said, “Sir, I’m most awfully sorry: I never knew that, and I will never wear this again”. I was surprised that I got away with it and lived to tell the tale, as noble Lords will be sure I have on many occasions.
I do not think that in this Bill, we should be criminalising the mere wearing of such insignia as I have described. This is not a counterterrorism Bill; this is a counter-state threats Bill. We had this discussion at Second Reading and, in my view at least, we are not merely replicating what is in other Acts of Parliament. Further, if somebody wears an insignia and there is a public order disturbance or a racially aggravated public order disturbance, there are plenty of other laws to deal with that activity.
My final reason for objecting to this amendment is one that perhaps some will think trivial. However, if your Lordships were to look at new Section 17B of the 2023 Act, on page 4 of the Bill, between lines 13 and 21 it contains no fewer than four split infinitives in “to materially assist”, to which I object as a matter of principle. I hope that the Minister might agree that they should read “materially to assist” in order to comply with the English language, something I was taught by my foreigner parents to comply with at all times if possible.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, we cannot support these amendments. As we have heard several times, this is emergency legislation, introduced at a time when an urgent response is necessary to the activities of some truly malign state actors and their proxies.
There has been a dangerous escalation in recent months and years, not only of the threats of military and quasi-military attacks, but of cyber attacks on our energy and transport infrastructures and on our economy more widely. Then there has been an appalling outbreak of antisemitic attacks in the UK and abroad, and in allied countries such as Australia. Those attacks have also given occasion, we should remember, to anti-Muslim attacks at home and abroad. Our traditions of tolerance and peaceful co-existence have been, and have certainly seemed, constantly under threat.
Against that background, it has been considered that the mechanisms of proscription under existing terrorism legislation have needed supplementing with the provisions of this Bill concerning malign state-sponsored threats. As the Minister has confirmed, and I do not wish to be repetitive of what has been said many times in the debates today, there is to be further government legislation to tackle the growing threat from foreign state entities and their proxies, and to improve this country’s defences against cyber security threats. The Bill is, in that sense, work in progress.
We do not see the need to tack on to the Bill new offences of wearing items of uniform, dissemination of particular types of publication, or further complex new powers for seizure of passports, all in the last stages of a piece of emergency legislation. There may be a case for some version of some of the measures proposed, under some conditions, after careful later consideration.
I echo some of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, but there are other points about the difficulties we have had with the Terrorism Act and other legislation. I am not sure that I go as far as he does on split infinitives, although my personal preference echoes his. We should not be introducing legislation at this stage which would raise all the issues that have so troubled us under the Terrorism Act. Now is not the time for these measures and this emergency legislation is not the Bill.
Lord Pickles (Con)
My Lords, I normally bow to the views of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, on these matters—I am not entirely sure I understand the point he made about split infinitives—but I am not sure he is right on this occasion; nor was the noble Lord who last spoke. The IRGC, for example, is not simply a military arm of the Iranian state. It also operates through propaganda, symbolism, recruitment and ideological influence. While the Bill addresses the hostile state activity, I do not believe it adequately addresses the ideological dimension.
Noble Lords have spoken about the level of antisemitism, which has been considerably worsened by the number of marches that we have seen display the symbols, flags and uniforms of terrorist organisations. There should be consistency between “designation” and a “proscribed organisation”. Designation should also have practical consequences. It would be very difficult to explain to members of the public why a designated organisation’s flags, insignia and symbols should continue to be displayed in support of that organisation at marches or on the street. Terrorism legislation already recognises the importance of symbols, uniforms and imagery in demonstrating support. This amendment would close a potential gap in the legislation.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for giving the Committee the opportunity to debate these amendments, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for articulating the general position that the Government will take. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, for the comments that he made, which mirror some of the points I will make in my response.
I completely understand why the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower, Lord Pickles—who has just spoken—Lord Walney and Lord Verdirame, wish to pass these amendments. They make a legitimate argument. The Government are clear in their opposition to all forms of terrorist support, particularly in the current context of antisemitism, and there are key issues that the Government wish to take specific action on. I will say a few words about each of the proposed offences in turn.
As has been said, Amendment 20 is modelled on Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which relates to organisations proscribed for being concerned with terrorism. Section 13 has proved to be operationally useful as a strict liability offence, meaning the prosecution does not have to prove an individual’s intention or state of mind. Terrorist organisations seek to recruit others to further their harmful ideologies, and wearing a terrorist uniform or displaying insignia, a flag or a logo are all acts of strength or dominance, if not terror. Section 13 seeks to deny proscribed organisations that oxygen of publicity.
However—this is where I hope I can offer an explanation to the Committee—as was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, for bodies involved in state threat activity, the situation is different. Foreign intelligence services and their proxies largely operate covertly and discreetly. This means that acts of flag waving and wearing a uniform in allegiance to a designated body are less of a concern. Notwithstanding difficulties that may arise with immunity from prosecution, in the event that a state body is designated, the offence could criminalise, among other things, a visiting military attaché, an embassy worker, or a cultural delegation. This could have profound consequences for diplomatic relations, and, where a designated body is a front company that was previously perceived as legitimate, this strict liability offence might punish those who simply fail to remove that body’s branding. Any need for the offence is especially limited, given that the offence of “supporting a designated body” under new Section 17A is wide enough in scope to capture the same activities. I therefore cannot accept Amendment 20.
I shall comment also on Amendment 21, which relates to a new offence:
“Dissemination of publications relating to a designated body”.
It includes a power for constables to seek the removal of internet-based publications. Again, the amendment replicates Sections 2 and 3 of the Terrorism Act 2006, but for designated entities. These offences cover the sale or other dissemination of books or other publications that encourage people to engage in terrorism or provide information that could be useful to terrorists. The Act, as currently constituted, provides a power for police to require the takedown of such material by internet service providers.
Section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006 is designed to criminalise the dissemination of terrorist publications. It was introduced recognising the significant harm that can be caused. This offence purposely is not dependent on an organisation having been proscribed, recognising that terrorist publications may include publications which include and encourage the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism more broadly. In contrast, this Bill focuses on the strengthening of our response to organisations involved in foreign power threat activities that pose an acute threat to the UK and its interests. The threat from publications in this context is, I would suggest, not the same.
Offences in the National Security Act were specifically designed to target threats from state-linked activity, and that Act contains a number of offences that do not appear in terrorism legislation, including assisting a foreign intelligence service. In addition, this Bill includes offences under new Section 17A if a person
“invites support for, or expresses an opinion or belief that is supportive of, a designated body, and does so for a prohibited purpose”.
I contend that this offence is wide enough to capture the dissemination of publications where those requirements are met. A replicated offence in this case is not appropriate or required to address the state threats, and, incidentally, it was not recommended by Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation, who cautioned against directly copying these offences. He said:
“There is no evidence that penalising general encouragement of state threat activity is needed to avert harm to national security”.
Therefore, I suggest to the noble Lord that this amendment is unnecessary: it is not recommended by Jonathan Hall and the powers should not be included in the Bill.
The final amendment is one we have discussed on several occasions, including today. Amendment 23 seeks to give effect to Jonathan Hall KC’s recommendation that the police be given the power to seize passports. Whereas Jonathan Hall KC recommended that the power should be available on the basis of suspected foreign power threat activity, as currently exists for terrorism-related activity, this amendment is more limited in its application. Noble Lords will be aware that the Bill before us covers a range of issues, but as to the proposal in this amendment, I have already given a commitment on several occasions to deliver all Jonathan Hall KC’s recommendations in the report that inspired this Bill, including the question of passport seizure, which Amendment 23 seeks to examine. However, I have been clear that, in doing so, the Bill should focus narrowly on the new proscription-like power to tackle state threats, and it is not the right vehicle for this proposal.
The noble Lord’s Amendment 23 covers pages 14 to 26 of the amendment paper, the Marshalled List that is in front of us today. It takes 13 pages to give implementation to the policy objective of banning passports. I suggest that the noble Lord will probably ask me, at some point, why I will not accept his amendment. He has tabled 13 pages full of detailed points, which he suggests will meet the objective, but I cannot necessarily say to the Committee that they do meet that objective.
On Amendment 23, I told the noble Lord that we will achieve the objective he described in our own time, with proper legal facility. The noble Lord shakes his head, or perhaps I should say he looks quizzically at me: I think he will agree with that. I assure him that we want to meet the objective he set, but not in this Bill. I cannot be any clearer than that. I recognise that, at 13 pages, such provisions require detailed policy work, done in concert with key operational partners. While noble Lords have sensibly drawn their inspiration from the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, it is an assumption that all those provisions are fit for the purpose of the state threats context. The detailed policy work needs to be completed, and we need to ensure that we have operational guidance for partners, to be ready on commencement of the legislation. I am afraid the noble Lord’s Amendment 23 does not meet that objective.
I assure the noble Lord that we are not on different pages on this. The Bill is a specific Bill for a specific purpose and, while I agree with its general direction of travel, Amendment 23 is not fit for purpose. I therefore ask the noble Lord not press Amendments 20, 21 or 23, for the reasons I have outlined. However, should he choose to do so, I invite my noble friends to vote against them.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
I thank the noble Lords, Lord Walney and Lord Verdirame, and my noble friend Lord Pickles, for their support, and I thank the Minister for his response. I listened to what the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Carlile of Berriew, had to say about this. However, I remain unconvinced. The very act of wearing or displaying the insignia of a designated body can intimidate members of our society and damage community cohesion. I do not believe that the Bill, as drafted, offers sufficient safeguards to protect vulnerable individuals and communities who are targeted by foreign state powers.
If an individual wore an IRGC uniform and sat outside a synagogue, any reasonable member of the public would consider this an intimidatory act. However, the threshold for successful prosecution under a Section 17A offence would remain unacceptably high. The individual could argue that the purpose of wearing the uniform was not to express support for the designated body and that it was worn in a satirical context. Even if this extremely subjective intention could be disproved, it would then fall on the prosecution to show that such actions were prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK, which is another subjective and potentially problematic barrier to prosecution.
I suggest that my amendment fixes this glaring loophole. It shuts down any avenues through which those who seek to terrorise others can evade prosecution. There are simply no justifications for why someone in the UK should be wearing or displaying the insignia of a designated state threat. Therefore, in line with Jonathan Hall’s recommendation, we should make it an offence to do so.
Amendment 23 concerns the seizure of passports of those suspected of supporting designated bodies, and this amendment has been unequivocally supported by Jonathan Hall, and is already a power which the police possess when combating terrorism. Let us be clear about this: it is not a new police power. It was a direct recommendation of a government-sanctioned review, and the Government have said that they will commit to implementing this policy. There is therefore no good reason to oppose this amendment, nor is there a logical or practical one.
Although the Government have pledged to implement this power in a future Bill, there are three concerns that remain which have not been assuaged by the Minister. First, any such future Bill will not receive Royal Assent before the Summer Recess. This means that those who support the IRGC will be protected from these police powers for a considerable length of time. What is the point of rushing to designate a group before Parliament concludes, but not giving the police force the necessary teeth to operate effectively?
Secondly, as I have made clear, the Government have perhaps acted in bad faith on this Bill. We on these Benches simply cannot wait for an unspecified date to enact a policy that can be accepted today. Thirdly, the Minister has acknowledged that his party is currently undergoing vast leadership changes. What is government policy today may not be government policy tomorrow.
I turn now to Amendment 21. As stated previously, this amendment would close yet another legislative gap in this Bill.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
There is absolutely no indication from any potential new Prime Minister that any changes to security legislation will be made. The King’s gracious Speech, and this Bill, both stand.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
Amendment 21, as stated previously, would close yet another legislative gap in the Bill, a gap that was recognised 20 years ago and subsequently rectified in the Terrorism Act 2006. I remain unconvinced by the Government’s justification for opposing our amendment. If the Government and Parliament recognised 20 years ago that a specific criminal offence of dissemination was required to address a lacuna in the law in relation to terrorism, surely we must recognise today that it is precisely the same lacuna in this Bill.
If my amendments do not form part of the final Act, I fear that the types of propaganda by designated bodies that I mentioned earlier will be allowed to flourish, that the IRGC will be able to parade in its uniforms and with its flags, and that those seeking to travel abroad to assist the IRGC will not be stopped. If any of these things happen, a crucial test of the Bill— namely, its ability to target and disrupt state threats to the United Kingdom—will have failed.
The Government have shown that they are not willing to take the necessary action to strengthen the Bill. If that is the case, I am left with no choice but to test the opinion of the House.
National Security (State Threats) Bill
Tuesday 30th June 2026
(4 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate National Security (State Threats) Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 35-I(b) Manuscript amendment for Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (30 Jun 2026)
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the officials of the House for the speedy turnaround of the amended Bill. It is a tribute to their dexterity that we have managed to turn this round much quicker than I expected, and our thanks go to them. I thank the officials in the Home Office and all the people behind the Bill who have given advice and support to Ministers on this crucial issue, including the security services and others. I particularly thank my private office, the Bill manager and the Bill team, and all the officials who are here.
I thank the Official Opposition for their courtesy, intensive scrutiny of the Bill and alternative suggestions. I say that to them genuinely, as well as to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on behalf of the Liberal Democrats, and to other colleagues who have spoken, particularly in this case the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Alton, who have been very engaged with this Bill.
This Bill has been done for a purpose, which is to allow my right honourable friend the Secretary of State to have the necessary powers to consider how best to act after the determination of state threats. The Bill, as amended, will now return to the House of Commons where it will be further scrutinised, and where I am confident the amendments made in this House will be accepted. I hope that the Bill will then go for speedy consideration for Royal Assent. On Royal Assent, I assure the House that the Home Secretary will take urgent action to examine state threats and, if necessary, bring forward appropriate measures as soon as possible.
It has been a pleasure to take this Bill through the House over two days. There have been some tensions and discussions, but I hope that, at the end of the day, we are agreed as one that the Bill will be a useful tool for the Secretary of State to help protect this country and its citizens from state threats. I beg to move that the Bill do now pass.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, from these Benches, I reiterate the thanks of all of us to the Minister and his team, both in the House and in the Home Office, and his Bill team generally, for the enormous help that we have had and for engaging with us. From our point of view, we have achieved some significant improvements to the Bill. We believe that the purpose of Bill, of which the noble Lord spoke, has been achieved with great speed and, generally speaking, in good humour. We are therefore happy that the Bill do now pass.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I echo the thanks given by the Minister to the officials of the House for their actions this evening in moving us so quickly to this point. I thank the Minister for, as ever, a courteous, sometimes robust, debate across the Dispatch Box. We have had two intense days debating this Bill. As I said last week, these Benches have always supported the principles of the Bill and supported its passage through Parliament. There are some unfinished areas to which the Minister alluded. We hope to return to those in due course when a new Bill—a wider national security Bill—comes before Parliament. With those brief comments, I too hope that this Bill do now pass.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, from the Cross Benches, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich, myself and my other noble friends, we too would echo the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and of the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, in thanking the Minister for engaging with us. He has been willing to have long private discussions outside of the House to try to find a way forward, to do what he has rightly said is the aim and objective of everyone in this House: to do everything we can to enhance the security of this country against the many threats that we face.
Going forward to the new Bill, which I am sure will already be in preparation, I hope that we will have learned one or two things from this experience. I know that the Minister shares my passion for good governance and pre-legislative scrutiny, for the involvement of Select Committees and for the chance to adequately debate measures as and when they come to the House. I thank him for his courtesy. It is always a pleasure to work with a Minister who not only knows his subject but is passionate about it. We thank him for that and, indeed, his team of officials as well.
National Security (State Threats) Bill (Allocation of Time) (No. 2)
Monday 6th July 2026
(3 weeks, 1 day ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate National Security (State Threats) Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 35-I(b) Manuscript amendment for Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (30 Jun 2026)
National Security (State Threats) Bill
Monday 6th July 2026
(3 weeks, 1 day ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate National Security (State Threats) Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 35-I(b) Manuscript amendment for Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (30 Jun 2026)
19:19 - The House divided: - Ayes: 394 / Noes: 85 - Question accordingly agreed to.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
I can inform the House that nothing in the Lords amendments engages Commons financial privilege.
Clause 2
Offences relating to designated bodies
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dame Angela Eagle)
I beg to move, That this House agrees with Lords amendment 1.
Madam Deputy Speaker
With this it will be convenient to discuss Lords amendments 2 to 6.
Dame Angela Eagle
The first duty of any Government is and will forever be to secure this country and keep all its inhabitants safe. It is a mission that has challenged us relentlessly, but it has grown and evolved in recent years. The threat posed by foreign powers will be known by all here: physical threats against individuals and property; theft of trade secrets; attempts to interfere in and influence our democracy; and cyber-attacks targeting both the state and the private sector that disrupt critical infrastructure and compromise sensitive data.
As the House has heard many times before, the source of those threats has come predominantly, though not exclusively, from three countries: Russia, China and Iran. The threats from each present differently, but those threats are very real, and they are evolving. The Bill before us will strengthen the Government’s ability to disrupt hostile intelligence services and their proxies by adapting counter-terrorism tools to tackle state-based security threats to the UK. In developing this legislation, we have worked closely with the police, security and the intelligence agencies. The Bill gives our operational partners the powers that they need, and it does so in a way that reflects the differences between state and non-state actors. As Jonathan Hall himself has said, this Bill “does the job”.
As the Bill progressed through its stages, the Government listened carefully to the arguments about legitimate humanitarian assistance, as well as concerns expressed by non-governmental organisations and the International Development Committee. The Government’s position remains that the Bill should not criminalise legitimate humanitarian aid work or the important work of journalists and diplomats.
Kim Johnson (Liverpool Riverside) (Lab)
I welcome Lords amendments 1 to 6, which clarify the Bill. However, as the Bill stands, journalists could still face a prison sentence of 10 to 14 years for working with or even approaching sources in hostile Governments. Will the Minister consider pausing the legislation so that we can go back to the drawing board?
Dame Angela Eagle
I do not agree with my hon. Friend’s interpretation of the Bill at all. The threats that we are facing mean that this Bill ought to be on the statute book sooner rather than later, so that we can begin to deal with them.
As I was saying, the Government’s position remains that the Bill should not criminalise legitimate humanitarian aid work or the important work of journalists and diplomats, and it remains our view that the Bill does not have that effect. However, to avoid a potential chilling effect, the Government felt that it was better to accept amendments to the Bill to put that matter beyond doubt. That is why the Government supported amendments 1, 2, 4 and 6, tabled by Baroness Northover in the other place.
Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Your Party)
I am pleased that the Minister is accepting the amendments. This will hopefully give some comfort to journalists in every war zone who are in incredibly precarious situations, where somebody usually accuses them of being terrorists for what they are reporting. The number of journalists killed around the world is rising year on year, so what practical support will the Government be able to give to the journalists or journalists’ unions that face these very real threats?
Dame Angela Eagle
We are very confident that the Bill as it is written does not place journalists in any jeopardy. In fact, these measures allow us to act against those who are conducting harmful activity in the UK, including targeting journalists here in the UK because of their attempts to expose activities in other regimes. The right hon. Gentleman makes a more general point about the jeopardy in which journalists put themselves in war zones, and I would agree that their news reporting is some of the bravest. We all support a free press and journalists’ ability to report in war zones, but I would say respectfully to him that these things are slightly different and he is combining the two issues. We are convinced that this Bill does not and will not put journalists in any more jeopardy in this country—certainly not for reporting.
Baroness Northover tabled amendments 1, 2, 4 and 6 in the other place. They introduce a new defence into the offences at new sections 17B and 17C of the National Security Act 2023, specifically to cover legitimate humanitarian aid activity. This means that non-governmental organisations that have to engage with a designated body in order to carry out legitimate humanitarian activity will benefit from the same protections under the Bill as do UK diplomats.
The Government also supported amendments 3 and 5, which were tabled by Lord Anderson. These amendments were based on the advice of Jonathan Hall KC and also had the support of Lord Carlile. They add a reasonable excuse defence in new section 17C of the 2023 Act for obtaining, accepting or agreeing to accept information from a designated body. This means that where a person has a reasonable excuse for receiving information from a designated body, they benefit from a defence. This might include, for example, a journalist conducting an interview or a charity receiving information on the location of landmines. The Government considered the case for exempting humanitarian NGOs from the offences, but we were advised by our operational partners that this would provide a loophole that hostile actors would seek to exploit, which in turn could make the NGOs themselves a target for infiltration. In fact, that is the case that I made to this Chamber in Committee.
I am grateful to the other place and the International Development Committee for their engagement on this Bill and for the constructive amendments, which have helped strengthen the Bill and broaden its support. The Bill represents an important new addition to our toolkit to address the growing threat from foreign powers. As I said in Committee, my officials have worked closely with operational partners in the creation of this power and the accompanying offences, and our partners are fully supportive of the Bill. It closes a gap, and they have been explicit that it provides them with vital tools capable of addressing the sharpest threats that they are tackling.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
The Government’s decision to allow alterations to this Bill will come as a surprise to many who followed it through its earlier stages. As colleagues in the other place observed, this came as a surprise because, throughout the interregnum, the Government repeatedly informed the official Opposition that they were unable to make further policy decisions. That position even extended to measures confirmed as Government policy, such as passport seizure powers. Given that even fundamental issues relating to countries such as China could not be addressed then, it surprising that we are considering further amendments to this Bill now.
Nevertheless, we are where we are, and we are considering the Government’s amendments on humanitarian activities. I understand the intention behind them. Nobody wants genuine humanitarian organisations that are carrying out vital work in difficult parts of the world to be caught by legislation never intended to target them, but we also have to recognise the reality of the threats that we face. As the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation recently pointed out, hostile states are willing to hide behind legitimate activity. Just as they might exploit legal or journalistic cover, they might also seek to exploit humanitarian cover. That is why the amendment he suggested was narrower than the one before us today.
My concern is that the Government’s wording is capable of broader interpretation, particularly around conduct said to be for the purpose of
“the carrying out of humanitarian activities”.
That risks creating uncertainty and opportunities for abuse. What is striking is that this is not the position the Government took a short time ago. On Report, the Minister made it clear that genuine humanitarian work would not be prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. Indeed, when rejecting amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns), she argued that the prohibited purpose test would protect legitimate conduct without creating loopholes for hostile actors. If that was the Government’s position then, what has changed?
We would be naive to assume that this defence could never be exploited. We have seen hostile states attempt to use charitable organisations as vehicles for influence and interference. The chief executive of the Charity Commission has warned about those risks, and Ministers themselves have highlighted concerns about Iranian-backed charities operating in this country. Members have worked hard to expose those threats. As we strengthen our powers to tackle hostile state activity, we must be careful not to create new opportunities for hostile actors.
This Bill already contains a higher threshold—or safeguards, as some would call them—that creates greater protections for those who support state bodies directing acts of terror, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, than for those who support the terrorist groups that the IRGC funds and directs, such as Hamas and Hezbollah. This threshold, we believe, will make prosecutions far less likely, as the extra hurdle and burden of intent is too high, and necessarily so.
In addition, any prosecution requires the consent of the Attorney General, providing a significant safeguard against inappropriate cases. That makes me question whether these provisions are necessary. I appreciate the Government’s intentions, but our first responsibility is to ensure that this legislation is robust. This Bill exists because the threats posed by hostile states are real and growing. If we are giving our police, intelligence agencies and security services the powers they need to respond, we must ensure that those powers are not weakened by loopholes. For that reason, we remain concerned that these amendments, however well intentioned, risk creating opportunities for hostile actors to evade the measures that the Bill is designed to put in place.
Sarah Champion (Rotherham) (Lab)
I rise to welcome Lords amendments 1 to 6 and to support the progress being made regarding the implications of this Bill on the vital work of the humanitarian sector. I place on record my thanks to Baroness Northover, Lord Alton, Lord Anderson, Baroness Helic and Baroness D’Souza for all their work in the other place. I would also like to pay credit to the courageous NGOs operating on the frontlines of global crises, who I know are following the progress of this Bill carefully to understand how it might impact on their work. With them in mind, I would like to express my regret that measures covering the humanitarian sector do not go further to provide robust, full legal protections.
As Chair of the International Development Committee, I wrote to the Home Office on this matter on 17 June as the sector was facing a terrifying landscape of legal uncertainty. Under the original drafting of the new offences, particularly on assisting or obtaining material benefit from a designated body, humanitarian actors were at risk.
In conflict zones, where state-linked or designated actors hold territorial control, neutral humanitarian organisations are often required to engage in dangerous circumstances. That sometimes means that they must negotiate access, pay routine local utilities or permits, or provide medical care to all sides working in accordance with international humanitarian law. Under the Bill, humanitarian workers could have been prosecuted.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
Mr Will Forster (Woking) (LD)
The Liberal Democrats have supported the principle of the National Security (State Threats) Bill for some time. We know why it must pass, and why it must pass quickly. At present, our country is suffering from co-ordinated attacks from foreign states. Their actions subvert our democracy, intimidate the public and erode our values.
The number of state threat investigations by MI5 has surged by a staggering 48% in the last year alone. Those figures are a stark reminder of the scale of the threat we face. That is not an isolated spike; it is the frontline of an expanding and evolving threat that the United Kingdom faces from both foreign Governments and hostile foreign actors. Chief among them is the increasingly emboldened Iranian regime, which is aggressively asserting itself to undermine our national security.
Since the start of 2022, our security services have responded to 20 Iranian-backed plots, which present a direct and potentially lethal threat to British citizens and UK residents on our own soil. Let us be clear about who Iran is targeting: it is targeting dissidents, media organisations and journalists who have the bravery to report on that regime’s violent oppression. I have spoken to constituents who fled Iran and now live in Woking, and I know that they would support the Bill.
Critically, Iran is also targeting the Jewish community who live in our country. We cannot allow that to happen.
Mr Forster
I am pleased that, for once, we have cross-party consensus on an issue.
However, it has been more than a year since Jonathan Hall KC first recommended the powers contained in the Bill to tackle state-backed and state-linked threats. The Government and this Parliament have been too slow to listen to his concerns.
The Liberal Democrats welcome the fact that the legislation creates the power for state-backed entities to be designated under the National Security Act 2023. On Second Reading, my Liberal Democrat colleagues, including my hon. Friends the Members for Cheltenham (Max Wilkinson) and for Esher and Walton (Monica Harding), raised strong concerns that the offences in the Bill might inadvertently capture the activities of humanitarian workers. Tackling state threats and protecting those who provide vital assistance and support to some of the planet’s most vulnerable people are not and should never be mutually exclusive. I therefore highly commend the amendments tabled by my noble Friend Baroness Northover, as well as by Lord Anderson, in the other place, which we are now considering. They will protect those who carry out humanitarian work, which, as colleagues have said, we never intended the Bill to capture. I am pleased and relieved that the Government are supporting the amendments.
Pete Wishart (Perth and Kinross-shire) (SNP)
Does the hon. Member not think that this shows that we do not properly consider the inadvertent effects of the legislation we pass in this place? We have had useful amendments introduced in the House of Lords, but surely when we are drafting legislation on issues as important as this, we should get it right in the first place. We should not have to rely on hastily drawn up amendments in a Bill’s last stages to put it right.
Mr Forster
I am pleased that my colleagues in the other place drafted the amendments and that the Government support them. Earlier today, we were talking about the Immigration Act 1971. Parliament never intended to protect someone who had been stripped of his British citizenship and committed heinous crimes, but there is a risk that because the legislation was badly drafted in 1971, we cannot do what we all want to do now and deport him.
The intention of legislation is so important, and I am pleased that through the Lords amendments, we have managed to put some meat on the bones of the Government’s legislation to protect vital humanitarian workers. It is so important that we tackle state threats while also protecting those workers. I therefore highly commend the amendments tabled by my colleagues in the other place. I pay tribute in particular to Baroness Northover, whose work with the Government on these amendments deserves our praise. I also thank other colleagues in the other place for their work on the Bill.
Humanitarian workers often work in extremely challenging and unstable areas, and they need to know that the law has their back when they are putting their lives at risk. To provide essential aid, they have to work with a wide variety of local groups. Without the new legal protections, they could easily be penalised simply for doing their jobs. Sometimes, that involves landmine clearance or paying a fee to access a particular zone. We must ensure that our laws do not criminalise aid workers. My noble Friend Baroness Northover’s amendments—Lords amendments 1, 2, 4 and 6—provide a defence for those carrying out humanitarian activities. The amendments ensure that humanitarian organisations will not face significant additional barriers to delivering their invaluable work.
If the Bill passes today—and I hope it does—the Government need to work with urgency to introduce secondary legislation to finally designate the IRGC, as the Liberal Democrats and I have called for. As the summer recess looms, it is clear that such regulations must be made before the House rises on 16 July. Will Minister reassure me and the House that they will?
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
Mr Sewards, normally when a Member is called last, they are under a time limit, but you now have more than an hour.
Mark Sewards
Thank you very much, Madam Deputy Speaker. [Interruption.] The Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for Hamilton and Clyde Valley (Imogen Walker), is making a strange gesture at me, suggesting that perhaps I do not have 60 minutes in which to contribute. I can reassure her and you, Madam Deputy Speaker, that I intend to speak only very briefly.
When I contributed on Second Reading, during the consideration of amendments and on Third Reading, I was convinced by the Government’s argument that the Bill as drafted already contained an exemption that NGOs and humanitarian organisations could take advantage of. I therefore came to the House today keen to listen to the Minister explain the reasoning behind the Government accepting these amendments. I also wanted to hear the reasoning from my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion), who has contributed throughout the passage of the Bill and had thoughts on why that exemption was not enough. Having listened to the reasoning, I am convinced of the need to accept the amendments—they absolutely make sense—but I have some thoughts and follow-up questions for the Minister, which I will go through now.
Lords amendments 1 and 2 are about creating exemptions for humanitarian support, NGOs and the like. They directly affect the part of the Bill that is concerned with assisting designated threats. Assisting a designated state threat should bring with it grave consequences, but at the same time we should not do anything that risks legitimate NGOs stopping their engagement, their involvement and their important work in some of the most difficult regions in the world. It is clear that there needs to be space for them to operate—but, but, but. We know that nefarious state actors will seek to exploit any loophole or advantage to inflict harm on this country. Does the Minister think that amendments 1 and 2 are slightly too loose, or is she confident that designated state threats could not take advantage of the amendments to continue to carry out their actions through other bodies?
I have fewer concerns about Lords amendments 3 to 6. It is right that there should be an exemption for humanitarian bodies to share information with designated state threats when that information relates to, say, the clearance of a minefield. That makes sense and, of course, that exemption should exist.
One of the reasons I am so keen to accept the amendments and see the Bill receive Royal Assent is that it is absolutely essential that we designate the IRGC as the threat that it is to this country. I am under no illusions about Government policy—no announcement will be made at the Dispatch Box today, and rightly so—but I want to take this opportunity to spell out that the IRGC is a threat to the British Jewish community in the UK. If we do not take action to proscribe it now—or, in this case, designate it now—we are risking the safety of our fellow citizens. Let us accept these amendments, pass this Bill and protect our communities.
Madam Deputy Speaker
I call the Minister to wind up. As I said, an hour and 15 minutes is yours.
Dame Angela Eagle
I am grateful for the contributions of all right hon. and hon. Members. The hon. Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers) was worried that we had changed the Bill in a way that would make it less effective, and my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) still made the case for having an exemption rather than a defence for humanitarian assistance. I confirm that in our view the Bill as originally written would have excluded humanitarian assistance completely, because of the primary purpose rule, but we felt that there was some merit in the argument about the chilling effect of not having a defence. That is why we accepted the amendments in the other place, but that is belt and braces—nothing has changed. We are trying to accommodate potentially legitimate worries and chilling effects that might have an effect on the operational effectiveness of some NGOs, even though the law itself would not have caught them.
Sarah Champion
Can the Minister give some assurance that, in the guidance, we will be able to see that in black and white, so that the defence is laid out for all to see?
Dame Angela Eagle
Yes, my hon. Friend may know her Pepper v. Hart, and I have just put it on the record in this House, but obviously I will take a close look at the guidance as it is developed.
The hon. Member for Woking (Mr Forster) made a powerful speech, particularly about the rising level of threat that we face. That is why the Bill needs to be on the statute book as quickly as possible. My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds South West and Morley (Mark Sewards) asked about the designated threats defence. Again, the answer is the same: it is about the chilling effect.
David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)
To return to the point made by the hon. Member for Leeds South West and Morley (Mark Sewards), it is clear that this new piece of legislation could allow hostile states to set up shell charities or hide behind humanitarian cover. As a matter of purely operational wording, does the British state have the ability to actually identify whether that is happening and put a stop to it?
Dame Angela Eagle
I do not want us to go into specific examples, but I can assure the hon. Gentleman that we keep a very close eye on what proxy actors and state actors by proxy are doing in our country. We believe that designation, which is what this quite narrow Bill will allow us to do, will make it much clearer that we know what they are doing. It will make for a harder operating environment for those who wish us ill and are directed by state actors. That is what the legislation is intended to do.
Against a backdrop of growing threat from foreign states and their proxies, including through espionage, interference, sabotage and threats to life, the Bill will strengthen the ability to disrupt hostile intelligence services and their proxies by adapting counter-terrorism tools to tackle state-based security threats in the UK. It will create a new power for the Secretary of State to designate organisations involved in foreign power threat activity, backed up by new criminal offences of supporting, assisting or obtaining benefits from designated bodies.
There has been some concern, both in this House and in the other place, regarding potential unintended consequences, but I reassure the House that the Bill was never intended to, and does not, criminalise genuine humanitarian activity by NGOs or journalists or other legitimate activities. We have listened to the arguments, and it is right to put that matter beyond doubt. The amendments do that. We have worked closely with operational partners, and I am satisfied that these narrow amendments do not weaken the Bill.
The Bill will enable proxy organisations to be treated in practice like foreign intelligence services, making it easier to prosecute those acting on their behalf. Overall, this manifesto commitment will strengthen the national security framework so that the UK becomes a more difficult operating environment for foreign intelligence services and state-linked proxies. With that, I commend the Lords amendments to the House.
Question put, That this House agrees with Lords amendment 1.
Royal Assent
Wednesday 8th July 2026
(2 weeks, 6 days ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate National Security (State Threats) Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 35-I(b) Manuscript amendment for Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (30 Jun 2026)