National Security (State Threats) Bill

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

2nd reading
Tuesday 23rd June 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

That the Bill be now read a second time.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, it is my pleasure to open the debate on what is a vital Bill. I will start with the importance of the Bill and what it will achieve. I am pleased to have had an opportunity to discuss the content, direction and purpose of the Bill with a number of noble Lords outside the Chamber, and I am happy to have further discussions between now and later stages next week if Members so wish.

State threats are overt or covert actions by foreign Governments that fall below armed conflict but go beyond legitimate diplomacy to harm UK interests. They present a persistent and evolving risk to the United Kingdom and our allies, manifesting across a wide spectrum of activity, including interference in democratic processes, acquisition of sensitive information, threats to public safety, and disruption of economic security. Noble Lords will know that certain states have both the intent and the capability to conduct such activity to advance their objectives. This activity is often opportunistic, adaptive, increasingly integrated across multiple domains, and combining physical, cyber, economic and information tools. The threats are both evolving and enduring, and our legislation must keep pace.

In December 2024, the former Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, commissioned Jonathan Hall KC, in his capacity as the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation, to conduct a review into the tools available in terrorism legislation and how they may be applied to the problem of state threats. I place on record, on behalf of this House, our thanks to Jonathan Hall KC for his work. He proposed that we should legislate to create a state threats power equivalent to proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000. Noble Lords will be aware of those powers as we have, within the last year, designated a number of organisations under that Act. This Bill delivers on that proposal and will strengthen the Government’s ability to disrupt hostile intelligence services and their proxies by adapting counterterrorism tools to tackle state-based security threats to the UK.

The Bill will create a new power for the Secretary of State, in this case the Home Secretary, to designate organisations involved in foreign power threat activity, modelled on proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000. It introduces new criminal offences of supporting, assisting or obtaining benefits from designated bodies and will enable proxy organisations to be treated, in practice, like foreign intelligence services, making it easier to prosecute those acting on their behalf.

The Bill will strengthen the overall national security framework, so that the United Kingdom becomes a more difficult operating environment for foreign intelligence services and those state-linked proxies. Individuals acting for a designated body will feel the full force of our national security legislation and the accompanying offences, some of which will carry a life sentence. Designation will send a clear public signal to designated bodies that those prepared to assist them in their malign behaviour will not be tolerated.

In developing this legislation, we have worked closely with the police and the security and intelligence agencies. It has been a year in gestation, and I know from Question Time, Statements and elsewhere that noble Lords feel that that has been too long, but this is vital legislation and it is important to get it right. The Bill gives our operational partners the powers they need, and it does so in a way that reflects the differences between state and non-state actors. Jonathan Hall himself has said of the Bill, “It does the job”.

The Bill has come to us today from the House of Commons, where I know there was debate regarding some of its provisions. I will, if I may, use this Second Reading opening speech to address why I think the Bill is the right thing to do, and to address some of the comments around the Bill as a whole. There was debate in the House of Commons regarding possible amendments to the Bill. I assure people across this House that such amendments are not necessary and that the Bill as drafted does the job required. If the Government are to exercise the powers in the Bill promptly, a swift but thoroughly scrutinised passage through this House will, I suggest, prove beneficial. I will provide noble Lords with reassurances today to enable that passage to take place.

I particularly want to address three points in the Bill as currently drafted. The first is the prohibited purpose test, which is applied to the support offence in Clause 2. The Bill makes it an offence to express support for a designated body, including by arranging a meeting to be addressed by a member of a designated body, when that support is for a prohibited purpose. Clause 2 goes on to define a prohibited purpose as a purpose that

“is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

We have had some comment on that from Members, both in discussions I have had and in the House of Commons. There have been suggestions that the prohibited purpose test should be removed from the Bill on the basis that no such test applies to the support offences in the Terrorism Act. I suggest that is to misunderstand the differences between state entities and terror organisations. While proscription under the Terrorism Act aims to ban the existence of an organisation, that cannot and must not be the case with this Bill. Even when a state entity presents a threat to the UK, there will still be cases in which there are legitimate reasons for engaging with that entity. Indeed, such engagement will often be in the UK’s interests as a whole, through British diplomats or NGOs doing vital work on conflict resolution or to deliver humanitarian aid. To remove the prohibited purpose test would be to criminalise such activity.

Secondly, there has also been some discussion that the Bill does not go far enough to criminalise individuals who provide assistance to designated bodies in relation to overseas activities. New Section 17B makes it an offence to provide such assistance when the activity undertaken is

“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

Although there has been discussion on this both in the House of Commons and in formal discussions I have had, it will mean that an individual in the UK who assists a designated body in hostile activity towards an ally, with a recognisable adverse effect on the UK, would be committing a crime under the Bill.

The Bill does not extend the UK’s criminal jurisdiction over all other acts anywhere in the world, irrespective of whether they affect the UK. It is an important principle of international law that there are reasonable limits to that jurisdiction, but where activities are contrary to our interests, this offence will bite. It is in line with the equivalent offences in the National Security Act. If we were to go further, we would not only go beyond what our operational partners have asked for; we would also push the limits of international law. I suggest that the Bill has the balance right on this issue.

Thirdly, there has been some comment and discussion in Parliament, and outside, in relation to the debate on so-called self-directed acts—that is to say, acts that are inspired by state threat actors but not directed by them. I assure noble Lords that such acts are caught within the offences in the Bill. Specifically, the offence at new Section 17B of providing material assistance to a designated body requires that a person intends their actions to assist that body. They do not have to be tasked or directed by the body for which they are working for the offence to apply.

New Section 33B also introduces the designated body condition to the National Security Act. This means that when a person acts with the intention to benefit a designated body, they may also engage the offences under that Act. This includes offences such as obtaining or disclosing protected information and sabotage, which both carry life sentences. Again, this does not need any tasking from the designated body. I hope that addresses noble Lords’ concerns and removes any doubt in their minds.

There has been considerable discussion on specific bodies that might or might not be designated under this Bill. I noticed an amendment in the House of Commons to proscribe the IRGC directly, and I have experienced a lot of pressure about that in this House as well. There have been calls for the Government to commit to designating Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. I hope I can explain to noble Lords that while this Bill is being discussed, I cannot give that commitment today. The powers in the Bill are vital; their exercise will have profound implications for the UK’s foreign policy and our national security. It is right that Parliament should set the legal framework for the use of those powers and will be asked to endorse their use through the affirmative procedure, as the Bill provides. It is also right that it should be for the Secretary of State, on the advice of expert evidence, and in some cases sensitive intelligence, to determine whether the use of these powers is necessary.

I will not today pre-empt decisions that have yet to be taken in relation to a law that has yet to be passed. But I give the House a cast-iron assurance that where the Secretary of State judges it necessary, she will use these powers, if they receive Royal Assent, and she will not hesitate to do so. I am confident that noble Lords will hold me to account on that point. The sooner the Bill is on the statute book, the sooner the powers within it can be used. The Bill remains a vehicle for the Home Secretary to determine whether a state threat designation is required on any body post Royal Assent.

We have had some discussion in Parliament around the speed on this. The Government are committed to a fast track on the Bill. That commitment reflects the urgent need to close a legislative gap. It also reflects the interest in this House and in our society in ensuring that government has the powers to deal with those state entities that threaten our national security. It was in response to a series of heinous antisemitic arson attacks in north London that the Prime Minister committed to bringing the Bill forward within weeks. We put it in the gracious Speech in May and brought it forward in both Houses at the earliest opportunity. I want to see it passed by both Houses at the earliest opportunity, so that we can get on with examining the requirements of using these powers as appropriate.

In our manifesto, we committed to take the approach used to deal with terrorism and to adapt it to deal with state-based security threats. The Bill does just that and fulfils a manifesto commitment. Ultimately, at stake is the purpose we are all sent here to advance, the most important thing we can do as a Government and a Parliament: to ensure the security of our nation and all who live in it.

I pay tribute to the men and women of our police and security services. Their work could not matter more, particularly at this dangerous time. As well as thanking them, we must support them to tackle the threats we face in a dangerous and uncertain world. To give that support, we need to equip them with the new and necessary powers in this legislation.

There is a wealth of experience across this House. I look forward to the further scrutiny that noble Lords will provide both today and next week, if the Bill is read a second time. We have a strong list of speakers today who will provide that fruitful debate. I suggest to the House that the urgency of our national security demands that the Bill be passed, giving the Home Secretary the powers to make assessments and use these powers at the earliest opportunity, where those threats exist. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the 24 noble Lords who have spoken in the debate, and I am particularly grateful, if I may say so, for the contributions from the Front Benches of HM loyal Opposition and the Liberal Democrats, the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Doocey, who gave broad support to the Bill but raised important questions—as did other noble Lords—which I will seek to respond to during the course of this debate.

I pay tribute also to Lady Ramsay of Cartvale, who contributed to this House right up to very recently. The comments from the noble Lord, Lord Walney, were welcome.

I start by reminding the House that this legislation was a manifesto commitment. According to Members today, it is long overdue or has been rushed. I am trying my best to find a happy medium that says that a manifesto commitment was put in place and the Home Secretary commissioned Jonathan Hall KC to produce a report three or four months after the commitment in the manifesto was ratified by the electorate. We commissioned that report. The report was produced to this Government in May or June last year. We have had time to consider that report. Colleagues in the House will know that last year’s parliamentary Session was very busy and crammed, and we wanted to bring legislation forward at the first opportunity. At the first opportunity, in the gracious Speech, we brought forward this legislation, and we have brought it forward now to give a framework—again I say to the House—for the Home Secretary to be able to act on that framework in very short order if Royal Assent is achieved. So, whether it is rushed or long overdue, I hope the House will have patience that we are trying to do the right thing to deal with severe threats.

I noted particularly that the noble Lord, Lord Pickles, said we had to stay ahead of the threats. I accept that in full. We had my noble friend Lord Beamish speaking from the ISC perspective. My noble friends Lady Gill and Lady Dacres of Lewisham, the noble Lord, Lord Barrow, who speaks with great experience, the noble Baronesses, Lady Taylor of Enfield and Lady Verma, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, all pointed to the important fact that the director-general of MI5 has said to the Government, the House and the public that state threats have increased by 35%. So we need to take action, we understand we need to take action and we need to do it in a way that maintains the cohesion of the community, as the noble Baroness has said.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Polak, that his personal experience is one that should not be acceptable to society as a whole. His grandchildren should not fear walking to school or face barriers that my grandchildren do not face just because, although we were both born in the same city, we have different cultural and religious backgrounds. His grandchildren should not face threats for those reasons. The impacts on individuals should be in our minds in all that we do to progress this Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, reminded us of the freedoms for which our grandparents and great-grandparents fought; they are important in all that we do.

A number of major issues have been raised; I will try to deal with each in turn. They include the IRGC, self-evidently, as well as issues with other nations; the preparatory act issue; the prohibited purpose issue; uniforms and insignia; the humanitarian issue, which a lot of noble Lords have spoken to in detail; the issue of a review; and a series of other issues that I will try to touch on if time allows.

The House has tempted me to talk about individual nations: China, Russia and, indeed, Iran. I will explain to the House again that the Bill is a framework through which the Home Secretary can take action, on advice, via the affirmative resolution procedure—to go to the point mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey—for designation of any particular body.

The IRGC has been mentioned, in particular, by the noble Lords, Lord Davies, Lord Beamish, Lord Barrow, Lord Walney and Lord Alton of Liverpool, as well as by the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey, Lady Neville-Jones, Lady Tyler of Enfield and Lady Verma. I understand those concerns. That is why we have put sanctions on the IRGC and taken a range of measures against IRGC members already. However, the powers under this Bill are a framework for the Home Secretary to look at the significant implications that this will have for national security and for foreign policy. Parliament should set a framework about how these powers are used.

I say to all those who have raised the IRGC in particular that the Government understand that absolutely but, if the Bill receives Royal Assent, the framework will be for the Home Secretary to determine how and when this power is used. Again, I come back to the point that there will be an affirmative instrument in the event of any designation being proposed, but I will not comment on the IRGC in particular. As I have explained privately to both Front-Benchers, the hybridity of this Bill, with the IRGC included, would damage early on its capability to take these matters forward. I hope that we can look at the power in the Bill without, at the moment, looking at how it will be used.

The second issue, which was raised by the Opposition Front Bench in particular and which I understand, was about the preparatory conduct offence. I argue that this additional offence is not needed. Preparatory conduct is an offence in the existing National Security Act under Section 18, and that offence applies to specific offences, including spying, espionage, entering a prohibited place for a prejudicial purpose and sabotage. It also covers acts of violence, serious risk and issues impacting on members of the public in the UK. I argue that such an offence is not needed in this Bill. We may end up having a debate in Committee on that but I just want to say that to the noble Lords.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, mentioned the prohibited purpose test in his opening remarks. It had been suggested that this test, which applies to the support offence in new Section 17A, is unnecessary and should be removed. I reiterate that doing so would criminalise legitimate humanitarian aid activity. The inclusion of this test reflects that there will be occasions—even though we might not like it—where UK persons need to have legitimate dealings with a state entity. That will be so whether it is a British diplomat or an NGO delivering humanitarian aid. To remove that would, in my view, be very difficult and challenging. Again, we may revisit that in Committee, but I hope that we can accept those arguments for the moment.

There has also been a question about overseas activity. It was suggested the Bill does not go far enough in the support offence as it applies to overseas activity. It is claimed that the offence should reapply to assisting a designated body in any activity overseas. Again, we can reflect on this in the next few days, but I suggest that such an amendment would be unnecessary. The noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, touched on this. I will come back to his point in a moment, but new Section 17B, to be introduced by Clause 2, will make it an offence to “assist a designated body” in its overseas activity where those activities are

“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

To give a concrete example, a UK person assisting a designated body in its efforts to disrupt the military supply chain of an ally would commit an offence, because the ally is still an ally; that is the key necessary test. Similarly, the Bill already deals with those who are inspired by state actors to commit self-directed acts. That is because the offences at new Sections 17A and 17B do not require there to be any direction or tasking from a designated body, only an intention to support that body.

The fourth issue that has been raised is the important issue of criminalising the wearing of uniforms and insignia. We asked Jonathan Hall KC to review this area of legislation. His report, which was independently produced, made it clear why it was necessary to take a different approach for state bodies. It would impact on legitimate engagement with a designated state body, which would need to continue, for example, on diplomatic channels. Like it or not, that is the reality of the world at large. We have instead crafted the support offence to ensure that it would capture conduct that was calculated to advance the harmful activities of the designated body. This would include the use of insignia and publication of images to support the designated body where the person wears, displays or publishes for a purpose that is prejudicial to the UK—again, that key legal test.

In touching on that area, I return to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Polak, about passport seizure. We are committed to legislating on that. We are going to do it; we are just not going to do it in this Bill, which is a specifically designed piece of legislation to give powers to the Home Secretary. We will have further national security legislation later in his Parliament.

A number of noble Lords mentioned humanitarian aid. I will focus on that in detail as it is an important issue. In particular, the noble Lords, Lord Barrow, Lord Alton of Liverpool and Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, raised these issues. I assure noble Lords that we have crafted the Bill to ensure that legitimate activities, such as diplomacy and activities that support basic human needs, are not caught within the offences. The key test here is that support for a designated body or overseas activities by the body must be

“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

Our officials have already talked with a number of NGOs. Ministers will meet with the Red Cross very shortly to listen to its concerns and we are satisfied that the tests in the Bill properly protect legitimate humanitarian assistance. The noble Baronesses, Lady Helic, Lady D’Souza, Lady Northover and Lady Tyler of Enfield, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, all raised this issue.

I will try to help the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, by covering Pepper v Hart. Receipt of information by an aid worker would not be criminalised by this Bill. “Information” in the Bill does not mean any information, as is clear from the preceding words. It has to possess an inherent value that enriches the recipient. I am happy to make a Pepper v Hart statement that new Section 17C does not apply. Likewise, I am happy to confirm that new Sections 17A and 17B will not criminalise legitimate humanitarian aid, as that is not contrary to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, mentioned, there is a legal backstop on this, in that the security decisions on those prosecutions are ultimately taken by the Attorney-General in these areas.

I also do not want to create a blanket exemption that could be easily exploited by state actors. That is an important issue. I have a genuine concern that exemptions could potentially create a relatively simple loophole for hostile actors to exploit, but I reassure all those who have spoken on this issue that it is not the intention of the Bill to criminalise the provision of legitimate humanitarian aid, and that is not the effect of the offences as drafted. This was clearly set out by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary in the other House last week, and we will of course look at this in detail.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

The Minister has referred a number of times to humanitarian aid and to diplomacy. Of course diplomats have a special defence or exemption of their own, but he has not said anything about those engaged in the prevention or resolution of conflict. I wonder if he would like to associate them with the statements he has made about humanitarian aid.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am happy to do that, but I want to give clarity on these matters. If the noble Lord will allow me, given that that has been raised separately, I will write to him with an assurance on that and share that with both Opposition Front Benches so that they are aware of that. I want to give absolute legal clarity, as the noble Lord would expect, on these matters.

[Baroness Northover (LD)]

When is the Minister intending to meet the Red Cross?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Life and diaries are fluid, but it will be before Committee, Report and Third Reading of the Bill next week. So it will not be after that. It will be before that. As we speak, representations and diaries are being co-ordinated. I will leave it at that.

The sixth vital point, which was raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Tyler of Enfield, and the noble Lords, Lord Barrow and Lord Carlile, is the issue of whether there will be a review. That is a valid and significant point but, as has been pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, the National Security Act 2023 already gives the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation the right to oversight and mandates them to carry out an annual review of the operations of the provisions of the Bill. I hope that is sufficient to head off at the pass an amendment on this issue, not because an amendment would be right or wrong or unnecessary but because the Bill is already covered by the National Security Act on those particular points.

The noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, mentioned in passing the question whether the offence of assisting a designated body would not capture non-UK nationals. I say to him that a non-UK national planning an attack in the UK from overseas would be materially assisting activities taking place in the UK. It is the activities of the designated body, such as an attack in the UK, that determine whether assistance is captured. The Bill also introduces the designated body condition, which allows the existing National Security Act offences to apply to activity linked to designated bodies, not just to foreign states.

The noble Lord, Lord Alton, continues, correctly, to chew at my ankles about the issue of transnational repression. I would argue that the Bill will make it easier to achieve prosecutions where there is a designated body, such as a proxy organisation, involved in transnational repression. We will continue, as I said yesterday in our Statement, to try to tackle transnational repression in a number of ways.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

I am grateful for the opportunity to chew at the noble Minister’s ankles again. I want to ask him specifically whether he will continue the discussions that the Security Minister’s office has been having about the United Front Work Department that acts on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party, which would not be covered by the terms of the Bill. Although I agree that he would not want to put actors on the face of the Bill, the generic issues that it involves should be there. Perhaps he could also take the opportunity of confirming whether he will circulate the reply that he has sent to me on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to Members who have spoken in today’s debate.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Absolutely. I will make sure that the reply I gave to the noble Lord in recent times is sent out, because this is moving at a fast pace and we are trying to get the matter sorted. I will do that for the noble Lord, and I will refer the points that he has made to the Security Minister.

My noble friend Lady Dacres rightly mentioned the question of diaspora. The power is actor agnostic and applies equally to all individuals in the UK, so we are not targeting any particular diaspora. It targets conduct that is carried out for a purpose prejudicial to the UK’s safety.

The question of—I use this phrase guardedly—“useful idiots” was quoted by the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and echoed by my noble friend Lady Gill. The new offences concern various thresholds for criminals to be caught. For example, criminals can be caught by the offence of assisting a designated body where they ought to know that their conduct is materially existing a designated body. However, it is also important to put on the record for the noble Baroness that criminals do not need to know that a group has been designated for offences to be committed. I hope that deals with the issue of “useful idiots”—I call them terrorists, but “useful idiots” is also a reasonable phrase that we can attribute to them.

My noble friend Lady Gill and the noble Lord, Lord Docherty of Milngavie, mentioned the issue of how cryptocurrency used by designated bodies or individuals can be held more accountable. The Government have already committed to tackling all forms of economic crime, including the misuse of crypto assets. All UK crypto asset firms are now required to register with the Financial Conduct Authority to comply with money-laundering legislation. We have also strengthened law enforcement through the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act, and we are now going to go further with the introduction of further measures, including the Financial Conduct Authority delivering a new crypto asset regulatory regime, UK crypto asset firms being required to conduct due diligence and the financial services Bill 2026 introducing targeted powers to allow more crypto asset recovery powers.

I am trying to cover all the points that noble Lords have mentioned in the time available, and I hope I have done so, but I will read Hansard and, if there are further points, I will respond to them. What I want to do, and this is the key point, is get the Bill through to Royal Assent so the Home Secretary can determine how she uses its powers to deal with the issues that have been raised on the Floor of the House today. That is an important measure. I want to ensure that, between now and next Tuesday, we deal with those points and get a consensus to pass the Bill, make it an Act, get it to His Majesty the King to give Royal Assent and then, as a matter of some urgency, determine how we tackle the many threats that are facing this country at the moment.

I thank noble Lords for their engagement and the expertise that they have brought to this debate today. Ultimately, I commend the Bill for Second Reading, and I hope that the House will support it tonight.

Bill read a second time and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.