National Security (State Threats) Bill

2nd reading
Tuesday 23rd June 2026 Lords Chamber

Second Reading

16:04

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

That the Bill be now read a second time.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, it is my pleasure to open the debate on what is a vital Bill. I will start with the importance of the Bill and what it will achieve. I am pleased to have had an opportunity to discuss the content, direction and purpose of the Bill with a number of noble Lords outside the Chamber, and I am happy to have further discussions between now and later stages next week if Members so wish.

State threats are overt or covert actions by foreign Governments that fall below armed conflict but go beyond legitimate diplomacy to harm UK interests. They present a persistent and evolving risk to the United Kingdom and our allies, manifesting across a wide spectrum of activity, including interference in democratic processes, acquisition of sensitive information, threats to public safety, and disruption of economic security. Noble Lords will know that certain states have both the intent and the capability to conduct such activity to advance their objectives. This activity is often opportunistic, adaptive, increasingly integrated across multiple domains, and combining physical, cyber, economic and information tools. The threats are both evolving and enduring, and our legislation must keep pace.

In December 2024, the former Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, commissioned Jonathan Hall KC, in his capacity as the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation, to conduct a review into the tools available in terrorism legislation and how they may be applied to the problem of state threats. I place on record, on behalf of this House, our thanks to Jonathan Hall KC for his work. He proposed that we should legislate to create a state threats power equivalent to proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000. Noble Lords will be aware of those powers as we have, within the last year, designated a number of organisations under that Act. This Bill delivers on that proposal and will strengthen the Government’s ability to disrupt hostile intelligence services and their proxies by adapting counterterrorism tools to tackle state-based security threats to the UK.

The Bill will create a new power for the Secretary of State, in this case the Home Secretary, to designate organisations involved in foreign power threat activity, modelled on proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000. It introduces new criminal offences of supporting, assisting or obtaining benefits from designated bodies and will enable proxy organisations to be treated, in practice, like foreign intelligence services, making it easier to prosecute those acting on their behalf.

The Bill will strengthen the overall national security framework, so that the United Kingdom becomes a more difficult operating environment for foreign intelligence services and those state-linked proxies. Individuals acting for a designated body will feel the full force of our national security legislation and the accompanying offences, some of which will carry a life sentence. Designation will send a clear public signal to designated bodies that those prepared to assist them in their malign behaviour will not be tolerated.

In developing this legislation, we have worked closely with the police and the security and intelligence agencies. It has been a year in gestation, and I know from Question Time, Statements and elsewhere that noble Lords feel that that has been too long, but this is vital legislation and it is important to get it right. The Bill gives our operational partners the powers they need, and it does so in a way that reflects the differences between state and non-state actors. Jonathan Hall himself has said of the Bill, “It does the job”.

The Bill has come to us today from the House of Commons, where I know there was debate regarding some of its provisions. I will, if I may, use this Second Reading opening speech to address why I think the Bill is the right thing to do, and to address some of the comments around the Bill as a whole. There was debate in the House of Commons regarding possible amendments to the Bill. I assure people across this House that such amendments are not necessary and that the Bill as drafted does the job required. If the Government are to exercise the powers in the Bill promptly, a swift but thoroughly scrutinised passage through this House will, I suggest, prove beneficial. I will provide noble Lords with reassurances today to enable that passage to take place.

I particularly want to address three points in the Bill as currently drafted. The first is the prohibited purpose test, which is applied to the support offence in Clause 2. The Bill makes it an offence to express support for a designated body, including by arranging a meeting to be addressed by a member of a designated body, when that support is for a prohibited purpose. Clause 2 goes on to define a prohibited purpose as a purpose that

“is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

We have had some comment on that from Members, both in discussions I have had and in the House of Commons. There have been suggestions that the prohibited purpose test should be removed from the Bill on the basis that no such test applies to the support offences in the Terrorism Act. I suggest that is to misunderstand the differences between state entities and terror organisations. While proscription under the Terrorism Act aims to ban the existence of an organisation, that cannot and must not be the case with this Bill. Even when a state entity presents a threat to the UK, there will still be cases in which there are legitimate reasons for engaging with that entity. Indeed, such engagement will often be in the UK’s interests as a whole, through British diplomats or NGOs doing vital work on conflict resolution or to deliver humanitarian aid. To remove the prohibited purpose test would be to criminalise such activity.

Secondly, there has also been some discussion that the Bill does not go far enough to criminalise individuals who provide assistance to designated bodies in relation to overseas activities. New Section 17B makes it an offence to provide such assistance when the activity undertaken is

“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

Although there has been discussion on this both in the House of Commons and in formal discussions I have had, it will mean that an individual in the UK who assists a designated body in hostile activity towards an ally, with a recognisable adverse effect on the UK, would be committing a crime under the Bill.

The Bill does not extend the UK’s criminal jurisdiction over all other acts anywhere in the world, irrespective of whether they affect the UK. It is an important principle of international law that there are reasonable limits to that jurisdiction, but where activities are contrary to our interests, this offence will bite. It is in line with the equivalent offences in the National Security Act. If we were to go further, we would not only go beyond what our operational partners have asked for; we would also push the limits of international law. I suggest that the Bill has the balance right on this issue.

Thirdly, there has been some comment and discussion in Parliament, and outside, in relation to the debate on so-called self-directed acts—that is to say, acts that are inspired by state threat actors but not directed by them. I assure noble Lords that such acts are caught within the offences in the Bill. Specifically, the offence at new Section 17B of providing material assistance to a designated body requires that a person intends their actions to assist that body. They do not have to be tasked or directed by the body for which they are working for the offence to apply.

New Section 33B also introduces the designated body condition to the National Security Act. This means that when a person acts with the intention to benefit a designated body, they may also engage the offences under that Act. This includes offences such as obtaining or disclosing protected information and sabotage, which both carry life sentences. Again, this does not need any tasking from the designated body. I hope that addresses noble Lords’ concerns and removes any doubt in their minds.

There has been considerable discussion on specific bodies that might or might not be designated under this Bill. I noticed an amendment in the House of Commons to proscribe the IRGC directly, and I have experienced a lot of pressure about that in this House as well. There have been calls for the Government to commit to designating Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. I hope I can explain to noble Lords that while this Bill is being discussed, I cannot give that commitment today. The powers in the Bill are vital; their exercise will have profound implications for the UK’s foreign policy and our national security. It is right that Parliament should set the legal framework for the use of those powers and will be asked to endorse their use through the affirmative procedure, as the Bill provides. It is also right that it should be for the Secretary of State, on the advice of expert evidence, and in some cases sensitive intelligence, to determine whether the use of these powers is necessary.

I will not today pre-empt decisions that have yet to be taken in relation to a law that has yet to be passed. But I give the House a cast-iron assurance that where the Secretary of State judges it necessary, she will use these powers, if they receive Royal Assent, and she will not hesitate to do so. I am confident that noble Lords will hold me to account on that point. The sooner the Bill is on the statute book, the sooner the powers within it can be used. The Bill remains a vehicle for the Home Secretary to determine whether a state threat designation is required on any body post Royal Assent.

We have had some discussion in Parliament around the speed on this. The Government are committed to a fast track on the Bill. That commitment reflects the urgent need to close a legislative gap. It also reflects the interest in this House and in our society in ensuring that government has the powers to deal with those state entities that threaten our national security. It was in response to a series of heinous antisemitic arson attacks in north London that the Prime Minister committed to bringing the Bill forward within weeks. We put it in the gracious Speech in May and brought it forward in both Houses at the earliest opportunity. I want to see it passed by both Houses at the earliest opportunity, so that we can get on with examining the requirements of using these powers as appropriate.

In our manifesto, we committed to take the approach used to deal with terrorism and to adapt it to deal with state-based security threats. The Bill does just that and fulfils a manifesto commitment. Ultimately, at stake is the purpose we are all sent here to advance, the most important thing we can do as a Government and a Parliament: to ensure the security of our nation and all who live in it.

I pay tribute to the men and women of our police and security services. Their work could not matter more, particularly at this dangerous time. As well as thanking them, we must support them to tackle the threats we face in a dangerous and uncertain world. To give that support, we need to equip them with the new and necessary powers in this legislation.

There is a wealth of experience across this House. I look forward to the further scrutiny that noble Lords will provide both today and next week, if the Bill is read a second time. We have a strong list of speakers today who will provide that fruitful debate. I suggest to the House that the urgency of our national security demands that the Bill be passed, giving the Home Secretary the powers to make assessments and use these powers at the earliest opportunity, where those threats exist. I beg to move.

16:18

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by welcoming at long last the Government’s decision to bring this legislation forward. I say “at long last” advisedly and not as mere partisan point-scoring. This House will recall that the Opposition pressed the Government on no fewer than three separate occasions during the passage of the Crime and Policing Act in the previous Session to proscribe the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. On three occasions, the House voted in favour of our amendments; on three occasions, the Government voted against them. Ministers resisted, delayed and demurred until, ultimately, the weight of public pressure, the urging of the Jewish community and the reality of what is happening on our streets became impossible to ignore. The Prime Minister made his announcement and here we are.

We do not begrudge the Government their change of position; we welcome it. The direction of travel is right, and this side of the House wants to see the Bill pass. But the circumstances of its arrival matter, because they help explain the deficiencies in the Bill as drafted. This legislation draws directly from the recommendations of Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, whose report was published 14 months ago. Yet we are now told that this is so urgent that the Government will not consider any amendments, which is highly disappointing, given that the Bill before us today contains gaps that, if not rectified, risk rendering its central purpose unenforceable— I will come to those in a moment.

We must be frank about the threat we face. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is a distinct threat. It is an organisation that has been active on British soil, targeting British citizens and funding terrorism across the world. In October 2024, Ken McCallum, the director-general of the Security Service, said that MI5 and the police had responded to 20 Iran-backed plots since January 2022 involving

“potentially lethal threats to British citizens”.

In May 2025, three Iranian men were charged under the National Security Act after a major counterterrorism investigation, and prosecutors said that one of the men had carried out surveillance, reconnaissance and online research with the aim of committing serious violence against a person in Britain. In March this year, we saw the horrific arson attack on Jewish ambulances in Golders Green, responsibility for which was claimed by an Iran-aligned group.

The IRGC funnels billions of dollars to terrorist proxies worldwide. It gifts rockets and advanced weaponry to Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis. It manages thousands of fighters operating across multiple continents. It co-ordinates assassinations, kidnappings and sabotage operations, including here in the United Kingdom. Therefore, it is entirely right that the law should treat association with, and support for, the IRGC as a criminal matter. That is what this Bill sets out to do and why we support its intentions.

However, good intentions poorly executed create only the illusion of security. I must be candid with the House: as drafted, the Bill contains at least four significant vulnerabilities that we believe must be addressed before it leaves this place. The first is the “prohibited purpose” requirement. The provisions in Clause 2 are modelled on Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000, the provision that makes it an offence to invite support for a proscribed terrorist organisation. However, the Government have introduced an additional element that does not appear in the Terrorism Act: a requirement that the support be given for a “prohibited purpose”, which is defined as conduct that is

“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

I ask the Minister a simple question that I hope he will answer directly: what form of support for the IRGC do the Government consider to be beneficial to the United Kingdom? What type of assistance to the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism could possibly be regarded as in our national interests? If the answer is none—as it self-evidently must be—then why does this additional evidential standard exist at all?

What this provision creates in practice is a perverse hierarchy of culpability. Under the Bill, a prosecution against an individual for supporting the IRGC would require proof that their support was prejudicial to the United Kingdom. However, if that same individual were supporting one of the IRGC’s terrorist proxies—Hamas, Hezbollah or the Houthis—they would face a lower bar to prosecution under existing terrorism legislation. The organisation responsible for inspiring, organising, arming and financing those groups would receive greater legal protection than the groups themselves. That cannot be the Government’s intention. I hope that the Minister will listen and bring his own amendment to this effect; if not, I most certainly will.

The second concern relates to an omission of provisions on uniforms and insignia. Under Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, as amended by the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, it is an offence to display in a public place

“an item of clothing, or … any other article, in such a way … as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation”.

It is also an offence to publish an “image” of such an article or item of clothing. That is the provision used to remove Hamas flags from our streets and to seize Hezbollah insignia. The Bill contains no equivalent provision whatever. If the IRGC is designated under this legislation, its symbols, insignia and flags could be displayed openly in public with complete legal impunity. There is a gap in the legislation that is so obvious and damaging to public confidence that its presence in the Bill is difficult to explain.

I believe that the Government are of the view that this would somehow be inappropriate for this legislation. I wholly disagree. The Bill applies only to a UK person. We are not trying to ban Iranians displaying such insignia in Iran—of course we cannot do that—but why should anyone in the United Kingdom be permitted to wave the flag or wear the uniform of an organisation that we have deemed to be a threat worthy of designation under this legislation?

The third gap relates to the dissemination of publications and materials. Since 2006, it has been an offence under the Terrorism Act to disseminate terrorist publications. These are publications that encourage, glorify or provide practical assistance for acts of terrorism. That standard has been part of our counterterrorism framework for nearly two decades. This Bill makes no equivalent provision for designated hostile state bodies. Materials promoting, glorifying or facilitating the activities of designated groups could be distributed without triggering criminal liability. This is not a minor technical omission; it is a failure to apply a basic and well-established standard of counterterrorism law to a new category of threat.

The fourth and final concern is the absence of a preparatory conduct offence. The Bill as drafted captures those who assist, support or receive money from a designated group; it does not capture those who are in the process of planning to do so. Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006 addresses this gap in the terrorism context, making it clear that preparation for terrorist action is itself an offence. By the time someone has completed an act of support for a terrorist organisation, the damage may already be done. Catching people in the preparatory stages is operationally essential for our security services. As the Bill stands, an individual who has taken concrete steps towards assisting the IRGC cannot be prosecuted unless and until the act itself is complete. They cannot be prosecuted for those acts because preparatory acts are not covered by any of offences in the Bill. That is a vulnerability that we do not have in our terrorism legislation. It is a vulnerability we should not introduce here.

I will make one final point. I have read Hansard and looked at the response from the new Security Minister to my honourable friend Alicia Kearns in the other place, and I must say that I found it wanting. The Security Minister said:

“There are a couple of themes that run through my response to the hon. Lady’s amendments. The first is that it is not possible to treat a state body the same as a terrorist organisation, because one cannot abolish a state body”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/6/26; col. 922.]


This argument does not stand. Proscription does not abolish a terrorist group. Hamas is a proscribed group of the United Kingdom, yet we all know it still exists in the Middle East. Daesh was not defeated because the British Government had proscribed it. Would anyone argue that Palestine Action does not exist now that it has been proscribed?

The purpose of proscription is not to abolish a group but to degrade its ability to operate in the United Kingdom by prohibiting all forms of association with and support for it. That is precisely what the Government say they intend to do with designation under this Bill. Therefore, the reality is that proscription and designation are not really as different as the Minister would have us believe. Given that was the Government’s main justification for rejecting my honourable friend’s amendments last week, I hope they will rethink their objections.

The rushed nature of the Bill’s drafting is, I regret to say, visible in the legislation. When a Government spend months resisting legislation, then reverse course under political pressure and move quickly to announce a Bill, the risk of corners being cut is very real. We see the evidence of that here. None of our concerns is insurmountable. In each case, the amendments would bring this legislation into conformity with the counter- terrorism framework it is explicitly based on.

As I have just outlined, there is no reason why this should not happen. The threat from the IRGC—and, indeed, other state-linked groups—is present, documented and ongoing. The House has an obligation to ensure that when legislation is passed in response to that threat, it is legislation that works, is watertight and enforceable, and does not permit those who support one of the world’s most dangerous organisations to slip through its gaps. We support the Bill. We want to see it on our statute book, but we will not allow the urgency of the cause to excuse the inadequacy of the drafting. We will table amendments in Committee and we look forward to constructive engagement with Ministers.

16:29

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, the Liberal Democrats support the principles of the Bill. We have been clear that we also want this legislation on the statute book and we will not seek to hold it up. We fully recognise the unprecedented security challenges that we face, confronting more serious and less predictable threats than at any time since the Cold War. In 2025 alone, MI5 reported a 35% increase in state threat activity on the previous year, including more than 20 Iran-backed plots to kidnap or kill on British soil. We are in accord with the Government. This activity must be stopped.

However, while we will not obstruct the Bill, our support is not a blank cheque for lawmaking. The Bill was introduced just 13 days ago and was rushed through the other place in less than six hours. That begs the question: why did it take 14 months to act on recommendations from Jonathan Hall KC, which were accepted in full in May 2025? To ask this House to deliver a watertight defence in a single afternoon is a tall order and risks the Bill being seen as a rapid answer rather than a complete answer. Such accelerated progress risks important areas not being properly covered or provisions having unintended consequences.

Good legislation also involves scrutiny and input from outside Parliament. The media and experts from a wide range of professional fields are normally critical in improving a Bill. However, the speed of this Bill’s passage runs a real risk that much-needed external scrutiny will be missed.

The Bill addresses a critical gap. Looking to existing terrorism laws to deal with state organs was, in the words of the independent reviewer,

“shopping in the wrong department”.

By creating a power to designate bodies involved in “foreign power threat activity”, the Bill creates the right tool to penalise the proxies and hired guns that foreign powers use to carry out sabotage on UK soil.

The litmus test for the Bill will be the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—the IRGC. My noble friend Lord Marks has constantly argued that if the IRGC was not in power in Tehran, it would be universally recognised as a terrorist organisation. Yet, as drafted, this Bill is gentler on the IRGC than our laws are on the terrorists it funds.

We must also ensure that these powers have teeth in the global financial system. My noble friend Lord Purvis noted on 11 June that these groups operate through complex commercial, financial and now digital trade routes. We must use this Bill to trigger robust investigations by Companies House and the Financial Reporting Council to unmask front companies and starve designated organisations of UK-origin funds. However, I remain a bit concerned by the Minister’s comment that a UK connection of some sort is required for designation. In an era of digital interference, when state-backed proxies can target our citizens and sabotage our interests from behind a screen thousands of miles away, we must ensure that this requirement does not become a loophole. We need an assurance that this Bill is equipped for the era of digital interference, ensuring that hostile actors cannot evade designation simply by operating entirely from abroad via digital means.

We must also listen to the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Development Committee. They warn that new Section 17B is so broad that it could unintentionally criminalise impartial humanitarian aid. Ministerial “intent” is not a legal safeguard. We need an express exemption on the face of the Bill for impartial humanitarian organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, acting in accordance with international humanitarian law. Anything less leaves our aid workers at the mercy of a 14-year prison sentence for simply delivering life-saving medicine.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights has identified another trap. Clause 1 currently allows for designation without even establishing a link to a foreign power for certain acts, such as those under Section 4 of the 2023 Act. That is both too weak against our enemies and too broad for a free society.

On future-proofing, the director-general of MI5 has rightly warned of the next frontier: autonomous AI systems that may evade effective human control. The Government’s own AI Scenarios 2030 report admits that such systems could cause “existential harms” without intervention. I will be moving a specific amendment in committee to ensure that “foreign power threat activity” captures the development of super-intelligent AI capabilities by a foreign power.

Finally, because this is a fast-track Bill, we must have a 12-month statutory review of its adequacy. We also need the safeguard that any removal of a designation must be approved by votes in both Houses. Parliamentary oversight must exist at the end of a designation, not just the beginning.

As I said, we will not hold this Bill up, but we will seek to amend it. We are talking about individuals who actively assist hostile states in sabotaging our nation. We owe the citizens and residents who are being specifically targeted by these lethal plots more than just sincere intentions; we owe them a law that holds up in the courtroom and at the border. We look forward to a rigorous, if brief, Committee stage.

16:35

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I support the Bill, based as it is on a proposal from my admirable successor as independent reviewer, Jonathan Hall KC. It is regrettable that the Bill is being brought forward more than a year after his recommendation, yet in a manner that telescopes and truncates the debate in both Houses. How much more useful and productive it would have been to have seen a draft Bill, its scrutiny unrestrained by tight deadlines and positions already taken.

My remarks today are aimed not at what the Bill intends to do but at the law which, I am afraid, it exemplifies: the law of unintended consequences. Two of the new offences, in proposed new Sections 17B and 17C, have the potential to damage conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and humanitarian activity—endeavours in which this country excels—in parts of the world controlled by bodies liable to designation. I shall explain briefly why that is and how I think the problem might be resolved.

I declare a non-pecuniary interest as a chair of Inter Mediate, an independent peacemaking charity founded in 2011 by Jonathan Powell, who is now, of course, the Government’s National Security Adviser. Inter Mediate’s staff work discreetly at the highest political levels to support complex negotiations and conflict resolution in some of the most troubled parts of the world. It will not surprise noble Lords to learn that work of that kind requires intensive dialogue with brutal and unpleasant regimes to which it may be difficult, even impossible, for western Governments to speak.

I am also grateful to the International Committee of the Red Cross and the various peacebuilding and humanitarian organisations, from Conciliation Resources to Save the Children and the Halo Trust, that have approached me with their concerns in relation to this issue. I thank the Minister and his Bill team for our discussions on this issue since the Bill was published two weeks ago.

What do I mean by the “unintended consequences” of the Bill? Take proposed new Section 17C, which is about obtaining, accepting, agreeing to accept or retaining material benefits from a designated body. That is an offence punishable by 14 years in prison—quite right, too, in the cases highlighted in the Explanatory Notes: a business assisting a hostile state with new military technology or a contract criminal who knew, or should have known, where his fee was coming from.

However, “material benefits” are defined in proposed new Section 17C(3) with remarkable breadth. They include

“financial benefits, anything which has the potential to result in a financial benefit, and information”.

Taking that definition at face value, the likes of Inter Mediate could contravene criminal law by accepting information from a designated body as to that body’s objectives or negotiating stance. The defence of reasonable excuse in proposed new subsection (7) applies only to the retention of information; there is no such defence for agreeing to accept information or accepting it. There is a protection for public servants in proposed new subsection (8)(b), but not for charities or churches, which often have reach that Governments do not. One thinks of a charity such as the Halo Trust. Wishing to clear a minefield, it asks the IRGC, once designated, where the mines were laid. That, too, on a plain reading of proposed new Section 17C, would constitute the criminal offence of agreeing to accept information—although only 10 years in prison for that one.

Section 17B, as the noble Baroness has said, presents similar problems. Humanitarian organisations are not usually exempt from paying taxes, duties and fees to establish and maintain their operations in a country or territory—for example, tax on staff salaries, import duties on aid items and visa fees. It is at least arguable that anything which swells the coffers of a designated organisation will be of material assistance to the activities of that organisation locally or, by subsection (4)(a), in the United Kingdom. Bluntly, it helps to pay for them. That legally prudent interpretation risks blunting the aid effort where it is most needed and criminalising those who would seek to provide it.

The Minister will remind us that the CPS prosecutes only in cases where that is in the public interest and that for these offences, the additional consent of the Attorney-General will be required. In other words, “Don’t worry: it may never happen”. However, with respect, and as anybody familiar with these sectors well knows, reliance on the wise exercise of such discretions, though important, is not a sufficient answer.

Charitable trustees, of whom I suspect that there are quite a few in the Chamber, are properly cautious about signing off on activity which could expose us or our staff to the criminal law. So, to a still greater extent, are bank compliance departments, insurers and suppliers of humanitarian aid—all essential to the activities of those operating in these fields. The experience of NGOs in conflict zones is that banks and others are highly risk-averse. Why would they take the reputational risk of getting involved with potential criminality, even if only on paper? That is precisely why Parliament has expressly excluded those engaged in humanitarian activity from at least one comparable criminal offence—the designated area offence in Section 58B of the Terrorism Act 2000.

We have a week to sort this out. The Explanatory Notes, as they stand, are not sufficient, for reasons that I do not have time to get into. A clear statement from the Minister that Sections 17B and 17C are not intended to operate as I have suggested would be a start. An explicit reference to Pepper v Hart could be a useful signal to prosecutors and judges. Also helpful at a more general level would be an undertaking to co-operate through the established tri-sector group dialogue in amending the applicable guidance and a clear and unqualified statement that the new offences are not intended to apply to bona fide organisations engaged in conflict prevention, conflict resolution or, in the words of the Explanatory Notes,

“humanitarian assistance or other activities that support basic human needs”.

These are sticking plasters, but it will take amendment to remove the chilling effect and place the matter beyond doubt. Though I shall listen with great care, as I always do, to what the Minister has to say, I fear that this is an issue to which we shall have to come back in Committee.

16:43

[Lord Pickles (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord. I very much look forward to hearing him develop those points in Committee.

Let me begin directly. Legislation of this kind is long overdue. As the Library briefing makes clear, the character of state threats has evolved over the years, and this legislation is necessary. It is not a criticism directed solely at this Government; successive Administrations have recognised the problem with reasonable clarity but have often been slow in delivering the remedy. We identify the threat, hesitate on the response and find ourselves, once again, playing catch-up. This Bill is an attempt to close that gap. It is necessary and welcome.

There is much within it that merits support: the updating of offences; the introduction of a foreign influence registration scheme; and the broader recognition, reflected in the Library material and other briefings, that hostile activity now spans a wide spectrum—it is no longer confined to classical espionage but extends into influence operations, economic pressure, covert funding and a steady shaping of information environments.

However, necessity should not be mistaken for sufficiency. My concern is that the Bill, while well-intended, is framed too much around the threats that we already understand rather than those that are evolving. Hostile actors adapt quickly. They learn from our frameworks and adjust their methods accordingly. If we legislate narrowly or too rigidly, we will find that the law is outpaced almost as soon as it is enacted. We cannot afford, once again, to legislate in arrears.

The reality is that modern state threats are often indirect. They are mediated through networks, proxies, front organisations and aligned movements that provide distance and deniability. Influence is rarely crude; it is incremental, sustained and frequently embedded within legitimate structures. That presents a challenge which the Bill does not fully meet. In particular, it requires us to take seriously the role of transnational ideological networks that may intersect with state interests, whether formally or informally.

The arguments advanced by my noble friend Lord Godson in his recent article in the Spectator are both relevant and necessary to engage with. He draws attention to the way in which the Muslim Brotherhood operates less as a single organisation and more as a diffuse and adaptive network: a movement with affiliated bodies, overlapping structures and a capacity to project influence across civic, educational and political space. This strength lies not in overt confrontation but in persistence, organisation and reach over time. The point is not to collapse this into a simplistic category of state threat but to recognise that boundaries between state and non-state activity are often porous, and that serious actors are adept at operating across these boundaries.

Other countries have begun to engage with this reality. France and Austria, among them, have examined how such movements function, how they influence institutions and what risks they may pose to democratic resilience over the longer term. In the United Kingdom, our approach has been more cautious—arguably, too cautious—and the Bill reflects this caution. It is anchored firmly in the concept of state attribution which, while understandable, has created a limitation. If influence is exercised through networks that fall just outside that definition, a framework confined to it risks overlooking a significant part of the threat.

To be clear, this is not part of an argument for indiscriminate measures or broad-brush conclusions. It is an argument for clarity and completeness, to ensure that our understanding of modern threats is sufficiently wide, and that our response is capable of addressing them. At present, the alignment is not yet fully achieved. This is why the next stages of the Bill are so important.

As has already been demonstrated in another place, there is real scope to strengthen and redefine the framework. In particular, it is reasonable to apply three basic tests. First, flexibility: can the Bill adapt to new forms of threat without the need to repeat primary legislation? Secondly, scope: does it adequately capture indirect as well as direct forms of hostile influence? And, thirdly, clarity: are the definitions and mechanisms sufficiently precise to be both effective and enforceable?

If the Bill falls short against these tests, amendment is not an obstruction; it is responsible lawmaking. Those who seek to undermine open societies are neither static nor unsophisticated. They study our systems, identify ambiguities and exploit gaps with consistency and patience. If our legislative response is too narrow or too cautious, it will not be enough. The Bill is an important step forward, but it must also be a durable one. I believe that the Bill can be improved and that we can future-proof it, widen its scope where necessary and ensure that it addresses not only direct state action but the broader ecosystem in which influence is exercised. In conclusion, our task is simple: not to follow threat but to get ahead of threat and to stay there.

16:51

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

I welcome the Bill. The fact that we need it less than three years after the passing of the National Security Act demonstrates the evolving threat that this country faces.

In 2020 the Intelligence and Security Committee, which I chair, published its ground-breaking Russia report. I gently remind the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that it took three years for the then Government to implement most of the recommendations in that report, including the FIRS. Since then, we have produced in 2023 our report on China and in 2025 our report on Iran, and all pose a threat to UK security. The playbook they use is very similar: sabotage, cyber attacks, intimidation of the diaspora, misinformation, kidnapping, assassination in some cases—all carried out not just in this country but across Europe. Many examples can be found in open source material. Their strategy is not only well thought out but well funded. It is to undermine the trust in government, increase social division, weaken the rules-based order and, in Russia’s case, try to limit our support for Ukraine.

After the attack in Salisbury, thanks to the efforts of our security services and our international partners, we have made the operating environment in the UK and across Europe far more difficult for these actors. That is why they have gone to using proxies. Again, it is not just about acts of sabotage. There have been good examples across Europe, such as shopping centres in Poland being attacked. Earlier this year I was in Latvia, where the railway system is attacked on a daily basis—not because it is breaking down but because people are being paid to disrupt the network. We have seen Iran using organised crime networks across Europe to assassinate those who oppose the regime. We have also seen, closer to home, the example of the former leader of Reform UK in Wales, Nathan Gill, who was paid by the Russians to put out a positive image of Russia and to undermine the West’s support for Ukraine.

This is a very difficult environment for law enforcement and security services to act in. For example, it might not be evident straightaway that acts of sabotage are being supported by foreign actors. We saw the case last year of the attack on a warehouse in east London that was being used to store supplies for Ukraine.

Will this threat increase and is it going away? No, it is not going away. I argue that it will increase. Certainly, in Russia, as Putin comes under more pressure, this is a low-risk element in trying to undermine the West. We do not know what is going to happen next in Iran in terms of the fallout from the war, but again this is a low-risk strategy for Iran because it can deny involvement in many of these attacks or misinformation campaigns, whether they are attacking warehouses in east London and synagogues or posting antisemitic rhetoric online. We also have increasing activity by the Chinese, who are targeting universities and looking for trade secrets, something that the Bill will take on. Will this Bill be the end of it? Will that be it? No, it will not. I think we will be coming back. As our adversaries react and adapt, we will have to come back for more.

There is an issue that the previous Government ignored, even though they gave a commitment on it: the review of the Official Secrets Act 1989. The problem I have with this legislation is that there is now going to be a huge disparity between 14 years for an offence under this legislation and two years for an offence under the Official Secrets Act. The review was promised in 2019 but shelved, and I urge the Government to revisit it.

It is often said that democracy is fragile. It is. It has to be nurtured. We have to ensure that in any legislation such as this we get the balance right between protecting our nation and its citizens and the rights of individuals. As chair of the ISC and a member of the ISC for nearly 10 years, I see the regular reporting on what is happening: the attacks not just in this country but across Europe. I think we need to have an honest public conversation about the threats. In his report, the reviewer said that statistics should be published. I think we need to publish them, whether in his annual report or in the ISC’s annual report.

I come to the issues around designation. Reference has been made to the IRGC. This was covered in our Iran report. Yes, the current legislation is not fit for purpose and I think this is a way forward, but I stress to individuals who are calling to put the IRGC in the Bill that that is not the way we operate because proscription is done independent of politics on a threat-based assessment. I think it will meet that threshold, and I hope we can see a movement forward.

I will just touch on some of the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. I agree with him that there are concerns. We need to alleviate them; it is about getting the right balance between protecting our nation from harm and making sure that those who are doing good in the world are protected as well. There are instances where Governments, NGOs and others have to deal with some very nasty people. That is a fact of life. I have to say—it might not be very popular in this debate—that on occasion NGOs and Governments have to be involved even with individuals linked to the IRGC.

This is a movement forward. Will it be the final say on this situation? No, it will not. This is going to be an ever-increasing issue that we will have to come back to, and the Government will have to be agile to react to it. Finally, like my noble friend I say thank you to the members of our security services and the police who keep us safe 365 days of the year.

16:59

[Lord Barrow (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak after the noble Lord, Lord Beamish. We have had many conversations about national security over the years and have not always agreed, but he knows what he is talking about, and I agree with him on this Bill. This is a necessary Bill, and the sense of urgency is necessary too. As others have said, the National Security Act 2023 was a big step forward. I welcome the cross-party approach that we had to that and have to national security matters generally. It is a huge help, including for those to whom we have already paid tribute in our services, our operating partners and the police.

However, threats change, our enemies adapt, and we must respond; as others have said, we must do so at pace and not get left behind. There has already been reference to Sir Ken McCallum’s comment that he saw a 35% increase in the number of individuals being investigated for involvement in state threat activity. I remember once being told off by a Prime Minister for “beguilingly precise” statistics, but the picture is what I recognise, including from my time as National Security Adviser and my time reading all the intelligence. We need to respond.

As I am sure those who know him would agree, Sir Ken is the sort of person who would tell you, in the same calm, professional tone, that you had won the lottery or that your house had burned down. We must not let that professionalism mask the day in, day out reality of what we are facing in terms of the threat to this country. That is why I support the Bill. I also support those who talk about the need for a national conversation about that threat; we need that in order to have the basis for taking our legislation forward. We need to respond to this evolving and increasing threat from state actors and their proxies.

I commend Jonathan Hall KC. We should remind ourselves that he is our independent reviewer. All across the House there is respect and support for what he has said. He has shown us a way forward and I commend him, not least because this is really difficult, as we have already heard. We cannot simply cut and paste from terrorism to state actors. I also commend the fact that operational partners have been involved in framing the Bill. In my view, the Bill will bring real and direct operational benefits. That is what it is about, and that is what we should support.

I listened with great interest to my noble friend Lord Anderson. Like others, I have been contacted by NGOs concerned about the effect of this legislation. I thank them for raising those concerns and I pay tribute to them for their extraordinary, brave work in the most dangerous and difficult circumstances. Clearly, they have to engage with actors who do not have our best interests at heart; that is what it takes to operate in those places.

I thank the Minister and his team for the briefings that have allowed some of us to raise these concerns. It is clear to me that the Bill is designed to meet that challenge through the concept that the offence is committed only by conduct

“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

There is an intent element to this as well. Legitimate humanitarian assistance would not fall foul of this test.

There are other safeguards too, but I encourage the Government to continue discussions with the NGOs to see whether anything more could be done through guidance, including for the CPS. I agree with my noble friend Lord Anderson about the use of a tri-sector approach as well. I see the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, listening, so I await further legal analysis in this respect, but I would not support an amendment creating an exemption. Surely that would be a loophole that our opponents would seek to use. I think it would put the NGOs in a place of greater danger. But let us continue the conversation and see what we can do.

I also understand the motivation of those who have called for putting a particular actor on the face of the Bill, but I do not agree. In my experience, national security legislation should be as actor-agnostic as possible. It should create the framework through which the Government can act with the best intelligence, advice, involvement and engagement with the operating partners as possible. I do say to the Minister that, if the Government should get their way, as I hope they will, and fast-track this legislation successfully, there will be an expectation in this House, and more generally, of rapid action in exercising these powers with the same sense of urgency and purpose as in pursuing the Bill itself.

I have one question for the Minister, and this goes to a point that the noble Baroness made about a 12-month review. Since this is a Bill amending Part 1 of the National Security Act, as I read it, I understand that the independent reviewer will be required to carry out an annual review of these provisions. Can the Minister confirm that? That would allow for us to respond quickly if there are deficiencies—and they could be on either side of the debate. Indeed, it may not be that we have got this wrong but that our opponents will move and react, so we need to know quickly whether there is more that we should do in this area and take it upon ourselves to respond accordingly. I would be grateful to hear from the Minister on that.

In conclusion, we all know that we cannot legislate away the threats to our country, but we should do what we can as quickly as possible to try to keep pace with evolving threats. I therefore support getting the Bill passed by the Summer Recess. I would welcome any improvements, but not at the cost of delay. Let us do what we can now. We will do the best that we can in the time that we have available to us, and, as the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, and others have said, we will for sure be coming back to this issue in the future because the threats will not go away. They will continue to evolve.

17:05

[Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Barrow. I agree with his comments. Like him, I welcome the Bill, and, like him, I think we have been waiting a long time for it. It is not just that it seems to have taken the Government a long time to get going on the issue; it is that real life affects those who are at risk, not only the Jewish community but certainly and definitely that community, so we need to get on with this legislation, and I am therefore among those who do not support further delay.

The points made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—for me, they introduce a new element, but one that quite clearly has real force—require us to try to get a balance between, on the one hand, contact with organisations of which we deeply disapprove and whose activities are malign, but for purposes that serve our interests and which are for the general good, and, on the other, not creating loopholes by inventing, if I can put it that way, motives that would lead to the courts excusing their conduct. It is not difficult to see that a defence could make it quite difficult for the prosecution to land its point if there is an argument in court about motivation and it has to prove that it was for a prohibited purpose. One thing that we need to concentrate on in the short time we have is getting some careful drafting into the legislation to get the balance right.

The Minister said, and I see his point, that he could not guarantee that this legislation would actually lead to the proscription of the IRGC. All I can say is that, in the real world, if it does not lead to that, there is something very wrong. I would expect to see that happen. We do live, I think, in the real world, not in one that is composed of nicer situations than actually prevail.

On the prohibited purpose requirement, as I say, it is obvious that we need careful drafting, but that applies also to the provision on prosecution regarding the risk of people planning activities in this country for malign activity abroad. Again, it is not difficult to see that, unless it is possible to land the point, the defence will have quite a good time arguing about motive. When this legislation is passed, we must not get into a situation where it turns out to be a great deal less effective than it should have been because we put into it clauses that enabled the defence of these individuals to make a monkey, if I can put it that way, of the legislation that we put in place.

Finally, I think it was my noble friend Lord Pickles who made an important point about future-proofing. We should try to include in this legislation individuals who are not directed by or acting under the influence of an organisation but who are themselves motivated to support state organisations, so that we can also convict them. If one looks at current terrorist activity, it is very clear that the self-motivated individual is a feature of the threat scene. It is important that we should try to include people acting on their own authority in this legislation. It is an important Bill. I support getting it through but I hope we will not do this at the expense of getting the provisions and the balance of the legislation right.

17:11

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, who has such deep expertise in this area. I support this Bill which, as others have said, is long overdue, and draw attention to my membership of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy—a point to which I will return.

It hardly needs repeating that we live in a deeply dangerous and volatile world and face an array of rapidly evolving threats to our national security. Geopolitics is rapidly changing and we must be ready to respond and place the national security of the country at the top of our agenda. As we have already heard, this Bill builds on the National Security Act 2023 and is intended to strengthen the UK’s ability to deter, detect and disrupt threats from foreign states and their proxies, including by introducing a new power to designate bodies involved in foreign power threat activity.

We have also heard that the Bill follows the review by the independent reviewer Jonathan Hall KC into whether existing terrorism powers could be used to address these state threats. Well over a year ago, he found that the terrorism proscription charges would not be appropriate, so instead we have this legislation which will now designate bodies, including proxies, and be applied to bodies such as the IRGC or the Wagner Group.

The geopolitical context is stark. We face very different threats from Russia, China and Iran and must be able to respond to them all individually. It is not a case of one size fits all. Tactics being employed include attempted and actual assassinations, cyber attacks on major British companies and institutions—Marks & Spencer being a case in point—espionage, disinformation campaigns and foreign interference in the UK’s political system. Along with other noble Lords on all Benches, I am sure, I was simply appalled when it was confirmed that Russian proxies set the Prime Minister’s house and car on fire. Our very democracy and the values we hold dear are under threat as never before.

Shocking as that was, it was not an isolated event. We have already heard from others who have quoted the remarks of Ken McCallum, the director general of MI5 who, last year, pointed out that state threats had risen by over one-third and are now equal to or even greater than the threat of terrorism. Back in May 2024, the director general of GCHQ said that the service devoted

“more resource to China than any other single mission”

and that:

“China poses a genuine and increasing cyber risk to the UK”.


Clearly, that deployment of resources is necessary, but it is chilling none the less when you consider that this is a country we also try to court as an economic partner. This twin-track approach, in my view, is fraught with danger and I ask the Minister to set out more clearly the Government’s position in relation to China.

While I share the concerns that have been raised across the House about rushing a Bill through so quickly without adequate scrutiny, I well understand that we need to take action quickly, particularly on being able to designate the IRGC, which has long been the architect of brutal domestic repression, as well as a threat to UK security and the safety of Iranian and Jewish communities across Britain. That is the reason why this legislation should, frankly, have been introduced earlier in the Parliament, so we will need to ensure that there is appropriate post-legislative scrutiny and a statutory review after one year, as proposed by my noble friend Lady Doocey.

This legislation is very relevant and builds on the work carried out by the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. As a committee, we have raised concerns about the Russian state using proxy actors to commit sabotage in the UK—that was in our inquiry on the national security strategy—and on internet cables and landing stations, which were part of our subsea cable inquiry. It is also very relevant to the current inquiry that we are conducting on options for punitive deterrence against Russia and trying to impose upstream costs and constraints. I hope that the Government will continue to work closely with the Joint Committee on all these issues.

I would like to finish with a few questions for the Minister. First, it is my hope that the Bill will help with disrupting proxy activity. It appears to reduce the need to prove a chain of connection all the way back to the intelligence services: as long as the Government can prove a link to the proscribed proxy organisation, which might be an organised crime group or some front organisation, apparently that would facilitate a prosecution. Can the Minister assure me that I have got that point correct?

Secondly, the International Institute for Strategic Studies has estimated that 600 Russian officials were expelled by NATO states after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, of whom 400 are thought to be intelligence operatives. As I think the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, pointed out, Russian services have now reportedly adapted to using proxies, organised crime groups and freelancers, likely increasing both flexibility and deniability, but at the cost of decreasing operational professionalism. While much of the discussion around the Bill focuses on Iran at the moment, following threats and arson attacks, can the Minister say whether he feels that these measures will directly assist in our work regarding Russia, which I have just spoken about?

It is relevant that the International Institute for Strategic Studies report, which was published before the Bill, also makes the important point that the ultimate source of aggressive activity is often the intelligence officer running the operation. Arresting the proxy actors might mean that the intelligence officers just find new proxies. How confident is the Minister that intelligence officers from Russia and elsewhere will be deterred by this Bill, or will they simply, as has been suggested, remain untouchable?

Finally, I very much share the concerns that have been raised by my noble friend Lady Doocey, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and others, about unintended consequences, specifically the impact on humanitarian organisations and charities. Is the Minister able to give me an assurance that the offences relating to designated bodies do not apply to the activities of impartial humanitarian organisations that are acting and working in accordance with international law?

17:19

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, no one should be under any illusion about the dangers facing the United Kingdom, principally from Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. Whether it is assassins hunting down and murdering Alexander Litvinenko, or attempting to kill Sergei Skripal in Salisbury; the attack on the Prime Minister’s London home; the hate-driven scourge of antisemitism; cyber attacks—recall North Korea’s crippling cyber attack on the National Health Service in 2017—hacking and false narratives poisoning minds through social media; the presence of Chinese spies, even inside the Government and Parliament, with two more sentenced last week; or bounties on the heads of British residents and coercive sanctions on parliamentarians, it is clear that these are dangerous times.

I have the honour to chair the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Across several reports, we have highlighted threats to both national security and the human rights of our citizens—two sides of the same coin. We condemned the failure to bring to justice 400 British citizens who enlisted in ISIS, committed genocide against Yazidis and other minorities in northern Iraq, and then returned to the United Kingdom. Not one of them has been prosecuted for genocide or crimes against humanity. How many of them have the Government assessed as a future security threat?

As we have heard, MI5’s chief says that threats have risen by more than a third in a single year, with over 20 Iranian-inspired plots to kill, maim or kidnap on our sovereign territory. Perhaps more than anything else, the depredations of that barbaric Iranian dictatorship have been reflected in our debate today and driven the need for these new measures. Having been sanctioned by Iran in October 2022, along with the noble Lord, Lord Polak, and others, I might be forgiven for saying—as the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, said earlier—that this Bill has been a long time coming.

Back in April 2001, I initiated the first of several debates, dozens of Parliamentary Questions and many cross-party meetings about Iran’s egregious violations of human rights, its nuclear threat, its proclaimed wish to eradicate the State of Israel, its export of terror, and the pernicious role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, both here and in Iran. In the 2025 JCHR report on transnational repression, which was debated in your Lordships’ House on 26 February, we highlighted appalling attacks on pro-democracy activists and journalists, some of whom had been forced to flee the country and one of whom had been left bleeding on the street after an attempted assassination. Even if we cannot go as far as Sweden, where TNR is defined and illegal, I would like transnational repression to appear on the face of the Bill, at least as an aggravating factor.

Since its foundation in 1979, the Iranian regime has been based on two pillars: domestic oppression and the export of terrorism and chaos abroad. Death sentences issued by the revolutionary courts have led to endless waves of executions—some 2,159 in the last 12 months. Let us also recall the death of 22 year-old Mahsa Amini, who was arrested by the morality police for wearing clothes that had been disapproved of by the theocratic regime.

In 2023, I spoke in favour of the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that called for the proscription of the IRGC, and I was happy to support the Opposition when they moved similar amendments. I recognise that there is a difference between proscription and designation, and I welcome the steps taken in this Bill, but may I ask the Minister about the letter that was sent to him on 26 June by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and which was referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey? It was sent to the Home Secretary with a copy sent to the Minister. Today, I received a response from the Minister; I am grateful to him for that, but it arrived only about two hours ago. I would be grateful if he would agree to place copies in the Libraries of both Houses and circulate it to everyone who has participated in today’s debate. The response the Government have sent is important, because it deals effectively with some of the points raised by the JCHR probing the power to designate a body on the basis that it involved “foreign power threat activity”, despite there being no link in these circumstances between that body and any foreign power. We ask that consideration be given to an amendment to ensure that, under new Section 33A, only activity linked to a foreign power can be relied upon to satisfy the test for designation. We also asked about “Assisting a designated body”, about “Obtaining … material benefits from a designated body”, and for greater clarity on the “safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

It was suggested in the House of Commons that there is inconsistency in the thresholds and a more lenient treatment of hostile states than of terrorists—it has been referred to during our debate today as well. Is that so and can it be remedied? I want also to ask about the point raised by my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich and others in the debate about humanitarian organisations operating where state-linked actors exercise territorial control. I draw the attention of the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, to the letter that was sent to the Home Secretary by the chair of the International Development Select Committee, the admirable Sarah Champion MP.

In a letter to me, the International Red Cross asked for an amendment so that

“The offences established in Section 17 shall not apply to exclusively humanitarian activities carried out by impartial humanitarian organisations in accordance with international law”.


I echo the remarks of others and hope that issue might be addressed before next Tuesday. It would be passing strange if Red Cross humanitarian work were to be compromised while more than 13 organisations masquerading as charities can stoke the fires of hatred and threaten community cohesion. Why are we not using this Bill to take powers to close them down?

And what about China, a point referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and others? Recall the collapsed spy case and last week’s convictions of CCP regime spies. The Bill should enable Ministers to close the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, a point I referred to yesterday in Questions. It is a spy hub, a cat’s cradle of spies and malign actors; we should have a power to close it down.

Ten months after the JCHR’s unanimous recommendation to put China on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, which we do for Russia and Iran, it has not happened. Will trade deals always trump security, human rights and even genocide? The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, referred to the point the head of GCHQ made about

“a genuine and increasing cyber risk”

—her words—and how GCHQ devotes

“more resource to China than any other … mission”,

while Parliament has been warned of infiltration of our universities and threats to our liberties via mass surveillance from Hikvision and other cameras. Chinese-made EVs incorporating Chinese cellular modules, along with SIM cards or software, raise significant espionage and national security concerns, with internet-connected vehicles described as a hostile state’s “smartphone on wheels”.

The Joint Committee is currently looking at AI and human rights. I hope the Government are also looking at the way that AI and software and internet powers can be used to undermine our public debates and indeed our security. I hope that before next Tuesday, we can have the opportunity—more than the six hours that was provided in the House of Commons—to debate these questions. I hope we will be able to come to some agreement around some of the concerns that remain.

17:28

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I too support the Bill and commend the Government for bringing forward this long-awaited legislation. I join others in paying tribute to Jonathan Hall KC, who has done much of the work that has paved the way for this legislation, both as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and as Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation. As he repeatedly pointed out, we cannot deal with state threats, including state terrorism, by simply using the same approach that we have used for terrorism legislation. There are political, diplomatic and legal differences.

One of the key legal reasons why state threats need a different approach is that state officials enjoy immunity from criminal jurisdiction in our courts in respect of their official conduct. I suspect that immunity is one of the main reasons why the Government decided that we cannot have a straightforward membership offence which mirrors the offence under general terrorism legislation.

My questions are about the scope of some of the offences, and in particular new Section 17B of the National Security Act 2023, the offence of “Assisting a designated body”, which would be introduced by Clause 2. To understand the reach of the offences, it may be helpful to test them against some examples, and I have two.

The first is that of an IRGC plotter based in Tehran who has co-ordinated attacks by proxies in the United Kingdom. If that IRGC plotter happened to fly to the United Kingdom, or to another country from which he could be extradited to the United Kingdom, what, if any, conduct would we say has taken place in the United Kingdom for the purposes of the new Section 17B offence? Section 17B will criminalise the provision of assistance to a designated body in carrying out UK-related activities. Subsection (5) provides that the offence

“will apply to conduct outside the United Kingdom but applies to conduct taking place wholly outside the United Kingdon only if the person engaging in the conduct is a UK person”,

or acts on behalf of the Crown or holds office for the Crown.

In my example, the person is not a UK national and does not act on behalf of the Crown, and that person will presumably say that, in those circumstances, his conduct, such as it was, took place wholly outside the UK, so the offence does not apply. They would be able to rely on the judgment of the Supreme Court in El Khouri which dealt, in the context of extradition, with the definition of the word “conduct”. The Supreme Court held that

“the word ‘conduct’ would normally and naturally be understood as a synonym for acts done by the requested person in the specified location and not as including effects (whether intended or not) felt in that location of acts done somewhere else. A compelling reason is needed to interpret ‘conduct’ as bearing such an abnormally wide meaning”.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is here. The Supreme Court dealt with one of his speeches in another case, that of Cando Armas, in which the noble and learned Lord had taken a different approach. If that had prevailed, we would not have the problem we will have under Section 17B in my example.

It is true that in my example, the person may be relying on, or invoking, immunity, but immunity is quite specific to the facts. That person may not have been a state official, or a former state official, so in the facts of the case they may not be able to invoke immunity successfully but, in any event, immunity is a separate issue and it is not a reason for limiting the definition of the offence. Thus, on the question of the scope of Section 17B, assuming that all the work had taken place in Iran—outside the UK—what would we say is the conduct that has taken place in the UK, so that we can potentially prosecute that person under Section 17B?

My second question on scope concerns the definition of “UK-related activities”. The offence of assisting a designated body is committed if the person intends that conduct materially to assist a designated body in carrying out UK-related activities, which are defined in subsection (5) as

“activities taking place in the United Kingdom”

and

“activities taking place outside the United Kingdom which are prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

Let us take another example: that of a person who is based in the United Kingdom and engages in the conduct of assisting the designated body in the UK, but the activities the designated body is pursuing are activities against an ally of the UK, be it Ukraine, the UAE or Israel. The Government will argue—the Minister referred to this in his opening remarks—that the UK-related activity would include activity against our friends and allies. However, if I understood him correctly, he also said that it would still be necessary for there to be some “recognisable effect” in the UK. I think he mentioned that international law requires—I am still a bit confused about this—certain jurisdictional links between the exercise of criminal jurisdiction and the state. However, in this case, there is an obvious link: the conduct would have taken place in the United Kingdom. The person in question would have done the planning and provided the support to the designated body in the UK, and then the designated body’s activities would have targeted one of our allies. As I understand the position under international law, there is already a sufficient nexus with the UK territory for us to take action against such an individual, so why would a further nexus be necessary? It is an important question, because it will define the extent to which we will be able to use this legislation against individuals who will use the United Kingdom as a base for planning activities against allies abroad.

In closing, I raise the question of the time allocated to this Bill. There is broad support for it, and we all agree it has to be put on the statute book quite quickly, but some points have emerged that require further discussion. In addition to those I have raised, I want to explore the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. We have only two days to table amendments and then just one day to debate them. I very much hope, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, said, that we are going to have a long session next week to debate the amendments.

17:36

[Baroness Verma (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome this Bill and look forward to making sure that its passage is as quick as the Minister wants, but of course, there will be amendments that need to be addressed.

I want to focus on two or three questions that I will put directly to the Minister. My concern is around AI, which the noble Lord, Lord Alton, raised. The use in this country of AI in two or three areas really concerns me. The social contract between the people and the state has broken down quite a lot in recent years. Technologies are being used through people born and brought up here to attack their own country. Can the Minister explore the way we protect our critical infrastructure? How do we ensure that those who manage and run it are well-versed in how to protect it, and that internal or external influences do not attack our country and bring it to a standstill? The energy sector is a prime target, but we have seen attacks on Marks & Spencer and on hospitals. These attacks can be carried out by people sitting in our own country, using artificial intelligence and other means to get into our systems.

This takes me to the other point I want the Minister to consider. Given that we are outsourcing so much of our work to other countries, how do we make sure that, while we are not directly impacted in the UK, information that belongs to the people of this country is not being targeted by foreign actors outside the country, in places where we are utilising outsourcing?

Finally, I am concerned about how we ensure that information is being protected, and how this legislation is going to work. Proscribed groups such as the IRGC and others are beginning to use people in this country as their proxies. My worry is that we have failed to proscribe them simply on the basis of arguments that have never made sense to me—I know the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and I agree on this. Time and again, people have been attacked on our soil by the Islamic guard, and we have failed to proscribe it and to protect our own nationals here.

It is about trying to understand why we have not got to that stage yet, not just with that grouping but with others that are now taking shelter under the umbrella of where we have not proscribed. Other groups are now beginning to utilise their own proxies, and I am afraid that those proxies are going by the wayside at the moment, because our attention is not on them. It is too much focused on China and Russia, when other actors are beginning to also come into our systems and utilise our young people in particular, through technologies. We must be very careful.

I have come in on this debate only because we get caught up in the matter of the day and fail to see the wider issues bubbling underneath in all our communities. The Minister knows that I raise this with him here often, and every time I see him outside the Chamber. Communities that we know have issues bubbling are very vulnerable to the sorts of attacks we are trying to protect against here. This is an ideal time—in this legislation—to make sure that we also cover those.

17:41

[Baroness Dacres of Lewisham (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Verma. I welcome the opportunity to speak on the Bill.

The first duty of any Government is to ensure the safety and security of the people they serve. In an increasingly uncertain world, where hostile state activity can take many forms, from espionage and cyber attacks to foreign interference and intimidation, it is right that Parliament considers how best to respond to those threats.

I therefore support the principles behind the Bill and the Government’s determination to ensure that those acting on behalf of hostile foreign powers cannot undermine our national security, our way of life or the safety of the people living in our country. The threats posed by hostile states are real and evolving. They can affect individuals, communities and our democratic institutions, and it is right that the Government respond to them.

As the Bill progresses, I hope we will also recognise the importance of community trust and cohesion in strengthening our response to those threats. Many of our towns and cities are home to vibrant diaspora communities with deep family, cultural and historical connections across the world. These communities make an enormous contribution to our society, economy and public life.

It is important to recognise that diaspora communities can themselves be the target of intimidation, harassment and surveillance by hostile foreign actors. Indeed, some diaspora communities are among those most directly affected by hostile state activity, with individuals and groups experiencing attempts at coercion, interference and intimidation here in the United Kingdom.

Given that the Bill introduces powers to designate organisations linked to hostile foreign state activity, it is important that legitimate diaspora organisations, community groups, charities and cultural bodies have confidence that they will not be inadvertently affected by those powers. That is why it is so important that measures designed to protect national security do not create fear or uncertainty among law-abiding communities.

Trust is hard won and easily lost, particularly in communities that may already feel vulnerable to intimidation or interference. Experience has shown us that however well-intentioned legislation may be, we must always remain alert to unintended consequences, particularly where community confidence and trust are concerned. Where concerns are identified, there should be a willingness to listen, engage and act swiftly to address them.

The overwhelming majority of people maintain family, cultural, charitable or professional links overseas entirely legitimately. We must ensure that there is a clear distinction between those legitimate activities and the actions of individuals or organisations acting on behalf of hostile states. Can my noble friend the Minister say more about the safeguards that will ensure that legitimate community organisations and diaspora groups are not inadvertently affected by these powers? What steps will the Government take to listen, engage and act swiftly should unintended consequences emerge?

I support the aims of the Bill and look forward to following its progress through this House.

17:45

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Dacres. She was absolutely right to remind us that the Bill is not an esoteric subject, nor is it part of some kind of sophisticated spy novel, but that, rather, it affects potentially every citizen in this country, and that is why it is so important. As she said, it is the first duty of government to protect its citizens from harm, and that is exactly what is being done by the delivery of the Bill. Therefore, in principle, and in most of its content, I support the Bill entirely.

I am very grateful to Jonathan Hall KC, my successor-but-three as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation —how to feel old in one sentence—who has done an excellent job. On the subject of Jonathan Hall, I remind noble Lords who have called for a review after 12 months that he is in fact required by law to give a review after 12 months, so that amendment is entirely unnecessary, with great respect to those who suggested it.

I remind noble Lords, too, that every Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, and Jonathan Hall in his current role as Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation, can of his own volition and motion create a report at any time. My successor as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, my noble friend Lord Anderson, his successor, and Jonathan Hall and I have all done exactly that, or at least made moves to do exactly that, and have obtained proportionate and helpful reactions from government when that has arisen. The reassurance provided by having an Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation, who does much the same as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation—and at the moment is the same person—gives great reassurance.

In relation to the content of the Bill in detail, I do not want to repeat what was said by my noble friends Lord Anderson and Lord Verdirame about some of it. Much of my noble friend Lord Anderson’s suggestion about the need to review proposed new Section 17C of the National Security Act 2023 can be covered very simply, probably by removing five words—

“by virtue of retaining a benefit”—

from the amended proposed new Section 17C(7), but that will be a matter for consideration in Committee.

I regret that the Bill has taken quite a long time to reach the Floor of the House, but I am bound to reflect after 40-odd years in one or other House of this place that there is an awful lot of “glass houses” about those complaints. There is not a Government who have not been guilty of serious delays, and much longer delays than this. We should not waste time on matters of that kind; we should simply get on with it. My own view is that we need two Committee days. If we have two Committee days, we will complete the necessary amendments to the Bill without difficulty and with proper debate. If we need one day, then I agree: let us make it a very long day and get the work done.

State threats in recent years have been described in detail by Sir Ken McCallum, the MI5 Director-General. He reminded us in October 2025 that we had seen

“a 35% increase in the number of individuals”

being investigated

“for involvement in state threat activity”,

in one year. That is a matter for real concern and reflects remarks made by my noble friend Lord Alton.

I will also reflect something that my noble friend Lord Barrow and the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, said on what I shall call the subtlety of what we are doing. One should not assume that this is simply extending counterterrorism legislation; there is much more subtlety to this subject than that, as my noble friend pointed out. We cannot simply cut and paste from counter- terrorism legislation in order to deal with countering state threats, because they are different in nature. They have been defined—very well, in my view—by MI5 as covering

“overt or covert actions by foreign governments which fall short of direct armed conflict with the UK but go beyond peaceful diplomacy and expected statecraft to harm or threaten the safety or interests of the UK or our allies”.

In the Terrorism Act 2000, the definition of terrorism is much simpler than that. This is a much more complicated subject. There is a view—it is one that I, and perhaps others here, share—that designation under this Bill is much more suitable to deal with the IRGC than proscription under the Terrorism Acts, because those subtle arts referred to in that MI5 description are needed to deal with organisations such as the IRGC.

I turn to the question of charities and other independent organisations. I have a great deal of sympathy with what they do, but—as my noble friend Lord Anderson has heard me say privately on many occasions; I know he is bored of me doing so—I do not think that we should overlook the importance of the discretion of the Director of Public Prosecutions and, in this Bill, the Attorney-General not to prosecute. It is an extremely important protection, which is used on public interest grounds and has been used fairly frequently, although it does not arise in what one might call ordinary crime.

I hope that we can deal with the Bill in short order and that we can keep our mind on the issue we are trying to deal with and not muddle it up with straight- forward terrorism, which is much more straightforward than this. We must take into account the need for subtle, clever and extremely able members of the various services that protect us to be able to talk, where necessary, with people who are implicit in doing terrible things, so that members of our services may make the world a more peaceful place and our country one in which the citizens are safe.

17:53

[Baroness Northover (LD)]

My Lords, national security is, of course, a fundamental responsibility of government. We all recognise that the nature of security threats has changed significantly. We know that we need to step up our military preparedness, but we now also increasingly face challenges such as cyber attacks, foreign interference in democratic processes and indirect covert operations. We need not only to build national resilience but to tackle such threats and others as they evolve. We all share that aim.

Jonathan Hall KC was asked to identify gaps in our legislation, and the Government aim to tackle some of these in this fast-track Bill. The Government have had over a year in which to address these gaps, yet they came forward with this Bill only in the past few weeks and expect it to be rushed through Parliament. That is rarely a recipe for good legislation, so it is vital that we examine it carefully to ensure that there are no unintended consequences—a concern that many noble Lords have already flagged.

As I read the Bill, I wondered whether some of the people potentially implicated in recent attacks would be covered; the Bill covers those who would or should know for whom they might be working. There is a new development whereby young men in particular are being recruited online for tempting cash payments to take photos of venues or even to carry out attacks. They never think that foreign state involvement might lie behind these activities. Some have termed these actors “useful idiots”. In some ways, they are similar to drug mules, as the consequences of their actions—and the question of who is asking them to do things—are far from their minds, as their focus is simply the financial reward. Will such so-called useful idiots be caught by this legislation? We know the use of such proxies is increasing, giving deniability.

Then there are other areas where people may be inadvertently included. In my view, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has decimated the Government’s current response on humanitarian work. I am very glad to see that the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, is listening to this debate.

The chair of the International Development Committee, Sarah Champion, has urged the Home Secretary to amend the Bill over concerns that it has negative implications for humanitarian organisations. The IDC wants to see

“an express humanitarian exemption making clear that offences relating to designated bodies do not apply to the activities of impartial humanitarian organisations acting in accordance with international humanitarian law”.

The IDC points out:

“Humanitarian organisations often operate in areas where state-linked actors exercise territorial control. In such contexts, engagement with all parties to a conflict may be necessary to secure access to affected populations, obtain security guarantees, maintain staff safety, and deliver life-saving assistance”.


The committee also notes that

“the Bill creates offences of supporting a designated body, assisting a designated body, and obtaining or accepting material benefits from a designated body”.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, notes that simply getting information on where landmines might have been laid could fall foul of this legislation.

The Minister in the Commons stressed that the offences are not intended to criminalise conduct relating to humanitarian assistance, but as my colleague in the Commons, Monica Harding, noted, although safeguards for humanitarian operations are in the Explanatory Notes for the Bill, they are not in the Bill itself. Bond, the Halo Trust, the International Committee of the Red Cross and others argue that there is a risk here that this may have, at the very least, a chilling effect on their work. Among other challenges, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, noted, broadly framed offences may lead banks, suppliers, donors and others to refuse to assist, as they do not want to take on the risk.

I heard what the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, said about the defence used by NGOs in court, but the last thing that they wish to do is end up in an expensive court case. They will seek to avoid that by avoiding the work. I also heard what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said about them not being prosecuted, but they are likely to try to avoid that risk, so they will not undertake that work.

I understand the reaction of the Minister in the Commons—that the Government do not want an exclusion to be exploited by malign actors. The noble Lord, Lord Barrow, referred to that. However, there are diplomatic exclusions in the Bill, so there are ways of doing that. Therefore, I hope that the Government are giving thought to how they could amend the Bill, to make sure that humanitarian organisations are equally and explicitly protected. Certainly, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, mentioned, a Pepper v Hart statement would be useful, but will NGOs know the significance of that or even look at our debates, which is where they would have to pick up the references to a Pepper v Hart protection? An amendment would be much safer.

To return to the challenge of drawing up legislation in a rush, however worthy the aim, I was struck by what Alicia Kearns said in the Commons:

“We must not write a law for the IRGC alone. We are writing a law for every hostile state organ that comes after it, and the next may look nothing like the last”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/6/26; col. 870.]


I am also puzzled that—and Alicia Kearns pointed this out—under the Bill, unlike other terrorism legislation, people cannot be charged until they have committed an act, rather than when they are planning such an act. The noble Lord on the Conservative Benches made reference to this. Is there a reason for this, and if it is inadvertent, will it be addressed?

As we did in the Commons and as my noble friends have emphasised here, we support the intentions of the Bill; we recognise that we face attacks by state-sponsored and state-linked actors who actively seek to undermine our democracy. This is now widespread across the democratic world, where Russia, for example, wishes to create instability in the UK, across the EU and NATO, and beyond. Just look at its recent actions in the various elections in Romania, Moldova, Armenia, and Hungary. Threats to the UK from foreign states are indeed evolving rapidly. With people receiving their news via social media, and social media platforms amplifying division and disagreement, this is likely only to intensify.

As we are asked to fast-track the Bill, it is important that we look at its potential limitations. I am glad that the Minister says he is willing to work across the House to address these concerns, and I hope that we can therefore get robust legislation on the statute book and that he really means what he says about working with us to try to resolve some of these problems.

18:01

[Baroness Helic (Con)]

My Lords, no one can be under any illusion about the nature of the threats we face. Other noble Lords have spoken about this in some detail, so I will not be repeating that. It is right that the Government seek to update our laws in response. I pay tribute to Jonathan Hall KC, whose careful review has identified areas where the law requires strengthening. The Bill introduces significant offences relating to organisations associated with foreign state threats. I welcome the Government’s clear intention to close loopholes, address the use of proxy actors and strengthen deterrence.

However, in pursuing those objectives, I have three concerns. First, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has already pointed out, we must not create uncertainty for those who work for and serve an altogether different purpose. Humanitarian organisations and development agencies, including conflict resolution experts, operate in some of the most fragile and dangerous environments in the world. I have seen the value of their work first-hand, not only as a supporter of their work but as a recipient of their aid when my own family was displaced by conflict.

Humanitarian work is often challenging and uncomfortable. In conflict zones, engagement with de facto authorities is frequently unavoidable in order to negotiate access to civilian populations, obtain permits, rent premises, pay utility charges, employ local staff or secure safe passage through territory controlled by actors humanitarian organisations neither support nor endorse. Without such engagement, the most vulnerable people may receive no assistance at all. Today, many organisations are concerned that this legislation could have unintended consequences. The ICRC has warned that aspects of the Bill are drafted broadly enough that routine humanitarian activities could fall within its scope. As others have pointed out, similar concerns have been raised by the International Development Committee. Humanitarian organisations do not seek to weaken our ability to counter hostile activity. They seek clarity that they can continue to provide vital, life-saving assistance.

Ministers have offered assurances that the Bill is intended to distinguish between hostile conduct and legitimate humanitarian engagement. I welcome those assurances, and do not doubt the sincerity with which they have been given, yet there is an important distinction between assurance and certainty. Courts interpret statutes, not ministerial statements or footnotes. We have seen before that where Parliament relies on assurances rather than clear statutory language, uncertainty can persist for years. I refer here to my own amendment on parental alienation and judicial colleges. I was given all sorts of assurances that Ministers and the Government would work with judicial colleges, but nothing ever happened. It really takes time: people change, Ministers go and Governments go. If it is not written in the law, it means nothing. It can be a lovely intention, but it does not produce the desired effect, so I just want to draw the Minister’s attention to that: it happens.

My second concern is how the protections identified by Ministers would work in practice. Ministers have referred to provisions concerning agreements with the Government. However, if those provisions are to safeguard humanitarian action, much more information is needed about how organisations would seek, obtain and rely upon such arrangements. Experience from sanctions and counterterrorism regimes shows that ambiguity can have far-reaching consequences. Even where aid agencies are confident that their activities are lawful, the institutions on which they depend may decide that the risks are way too great. This can lead to the withdrawal of banking facilities, delays in transferring funds and obstructions to the delivery of assistance where it is needed most. While it is clearly not the intention of the Bill to catch organisations such as these, their experience of similar legislation is that, for as long as there remains even a paper risk of criminal liability, charitable trustees will act cautiously. No one can blame them for that.

There is also the wider problem of de-risking by banks and financial institutions. The net effect is likely to be a reduction in vital work in some of the world’s most troubled countries, including humanitarian relief and conflict resolution efforts, both of which depend upon necessary dealings with state bodies that may be designated under the Bill. Ultimately, civilians bear the consequences: aid arrives late, access is reduced and suffering is prolonged. These are not hypothetical concerns; they have been documented repeatedly across humanitarian operations around the world.

Such an approach would not be novel. As others have mentioned, Jonathan Hall KC has previously highlighted the tension that can arise between national security legislation and humanitarian action, drawing attention to the principles reflected in UN Security Council Resolution 2664. The United Kingdom played a leading role in securing that resolution and should show the same leadership here. Humanitarian action and national security are not opposing concepts. Conflict, displacement and humanitarian crises can fuel instability and create conditions in which wider security threats flourish. The Government’s own strategic assessments recognise that reality.

My third concern is one of consistency. The Bill rightly acknowledges that threats to security may be advanced indirectly through proxies, coercion and conduct that undermines international norms. If we accept that proposition, we should apply the same standards consistently. States that obstruct humanitarian access, contribute to instability or disregard international humanitarian law should be subject to scrutiny, irrespective of whether they are competitors, adversaries or allies. The credibility of a rules-based international order depends on that consistency.

The Bill seeks to address a genuine and pressing threat, and I support that objective. However, if humanitarian activity is not intended to be caught by these provisions, that protection should be stated clearly in the Bill. Doing so would provide certainty, support compliance with international humanitarian law, and help ensure that measures designed to counter hostile state activity do not inadvertently hinder those working to save lives, protect civilians and uphold human dignity in the most challenging circumstances.

18:08

[Baroness D’Souza (CB)]

My Lords, I think this is the first time ever that I have followed the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, and I am delighted to do so.

I begin by thanking the Minister and his officials for meeting some of us and going through the Bill in detail. I welcome the Bill, as so many others do, but continue to believe that there is a lack of clarity on some important issues and that this may result in unintended consequences—a very well-rehearsed phrase in the context of this debate. The points that I would have wished to make have been eloquently reiterated by many of your Lordships, notably my noble friend Lord Anderson, so I am going to cut to the chase in a minute, although I would add that some of the points that have been made repeatedly are so serious that they bear repetition.

My main concern remains the danger that humanitarian organisations could fall foul of a future law that forbids supporting or assisting a designated body or obtaining material benefits from such a body. As we have heard, designated bodies could include emergency assistance and/or development aid bodies, peacebuilding bodies and demining organisations which deal with sensitive material—as indeed does Inter Mediate. These entities regularly communicate with foreign government departments that are likely, under the terms of the Bill, to be designated. One example given by the Norwegian Refugee Council concerned a tax rebate rightfully owed to it by the Iranian Government.

Another concern is the stringent bank requirements surrounding the sending of funds to dubious foreign government departments—which, again, we have heard from many different Peers. The banks, which have a low risk threshold, as is the case with suppliers, donors and trustees, have made it increasingly clear that they do not accept verbal assurances and demand explicit protection to be on the face of the Bill.

The Home Secretary in the other place cited new Section 17B(6)(b) as providing the necessary protection. She assured the House that anything that has been approved by the UK would not be caught and urged humanitarian organisations to talk to the FCDO—which they already do, at length and frequently. However, the Bill as it stands does not make it clear what exactly will be covered or how such an arrangement could be confirmed or sought. Emergency responses require licences, if operating under current sanctions, that necessarily take time: for example, humanitarian action following the earthquake in Myanmar in early 2025 took over a year to negotiate, by which time most people affected by the earthquake had either not survived or had recovered.

Furthermore, any doubts about the legality of communications with designated bodies will have if not a chilling then certainly a delaying effect on humanitarian action—which the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, referred to—and on the transfer of resources. No trustee of a charitable organisation will be happy to risk the reputation of a charity, or even legal action, unless there are clear terms of engagement. Moreover, the courts, if it got to that stage, would not be bound by the Explanatory Notes, which are subject to interpretation.

The Bill targets state bodies, and this implies that whole ministries could well become designated: for example, the interior ministry of a country subject to severe UK sanctions such as Iran. Humanitarian organisations of many different kinds necessarily have to deal with ministries to obtain official agreements to operate in a country, and to receive licences and work permits. These take time and, should a humanitarian organisation be refused permission and subsequently make an application to the Secretary of State to exercise his or her power under Section 33A to remove the designation status, this would take even longer, with no guarantee that the Secretary of State would find in the organisation’s favour.

Again, the Minister in the other place, responding to this concern, cited the “prohibited purpose” clause, which has been discussed and which serves as an additional safeguard that protects legitimate conduct, in that it requires any conduct to be prejudicial to the safety or interest of the UK—although it is not necessary for the individual involved to know that a body is designated for the offence to apply, which seems somewhat odd.

I trust that the Minister accepted our concerns at the meeting that we recently held and undertook to look again at the Bill following its completion in the other place. However, the Bill remains unamended, and our concerns have not, so far, been fully addressed.

18:14

[Lord Polak (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza.

I was not entirely persuaded that this Bill was strictly necessary. I remind the House that Hezbollah is part of the Lebanese Government, and for many years that fact was cited as a reason not to proscribe the organisation in its entirety. Yet in 2019, Hezbollah was fully proscribed without the need for new primary legislation. However, I accept that the threats posed by hostile threats and their proxies are real, and for that reason I support the Bill.

For years, hostile states have sought to undermine our democracy and intimidate and threaten communities within the United Kingdom. The Jewish community has lived with this reality for decades. Synagogues, schools and community centres have required extraordinary levels of security. Families have become accustomed to armed protection outside places of worship. My own grandchildren are growing up believing that security barriers and guards are simply part of Jewish life in Britain. That is not normal, nor should it ever be accepted as normal. Allow me to thank the police, the security services, the CST and Shomrim, which have protected and protect the community—but they should all be doing other things.

The Iranian regime has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use intimidation, proxies, surveillance and violence against those it regards as its enemies. It has exported instability, extremism and fear far beyond its borders. These threats are real, persistent and increasingly visible on our streets. The fact that many of these threats have been directed at the Jewish community and members of the Iranian community should never have led us to regard them as matters affecting only one particular group. The principle at stake is far broader. A hostile state willing to target one group of British citizens is a hostile state willing to challenge the security of our country as a whole. When it seeks to spread fear within our communities, it is attacking the fabric of our society, and that is why I welcome the Bill.

As the Minister said, because the legislation is so important, it is equally important that we get it right. The Iranian regime has consistently demonstrated an ability to adapt its methods, operate through proxies, exploit legal ambiguities and maintain plausible deniability. The challenge we face is, therefore, not simply one of identifying a hostile state but of ensuring that our legislative response is capable of addressing the full range of methods through which that state seeks to advance its interests. For that reason, I am concerned that there are areas in the Bill that do not go far enough.

As drafted, there appears to be a higher threshold for prosecution of designated state threat than exists under terrorism legislation. There are also legitimate questions about whether activities planned in the United Kingdom but carried out overseas would always be captured by the offences contained in the Bill. Likewise, as hostile states increasingly rely on propaganda, online influence and indirect encouragement, we must ensure that those who act in furtherance of a hostile state’s objectives cannot escape accountability simply because they were inspired rather than directly tasked.

Iran’s activities are not confined to formal state actors or uniformed operatives. They encompass proxies, criminal networks, online radicalisation, covert influence and individuals recruited or encouraged to act at arm’s length from the regime itself. If our legislation does not truly reflect that reality, we risk creating opportunities for hostile actors to exploit the very gaps we are trying to close.

Nor should we view these issues solely through the lens of Iran. The purpose of the Bill is not merely to respond to one hostile state, however pressing that may be; it is to establish a framework capable of protecting the United Kingdom from future hostile states whose methods may differ, evolve and become more sophisticated over time. As others have said, legislation that is drafted too narrowly may address today’s threats while leaving us exposed to tomorrow’s.

In that regard, I pay tribute to the work of the honourable Member for Rutland and Stamford, Alicia Kearns MP, who tabled a number of constructive amendments in the other place. I would be grateful if the Minister could address just two of them. Following on from the words of my noble friend Lord Davies, on the question of uniforms, insignia and propaganda, if a state-backed organisation such as the IRGC were to be designated under this regime, why would it not be an offence to display its insignia on Britain’s streets and to glorify it online, mirroring the provisions in Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000? If we recognise that such organisations seek not only to operate abroad but to cultivate support networks here at home, we must address the propaganda that sustains them.

Secondly, on travel document seizure powers, Jonathan Hall KC supported in his review the case for allowing the police to seize the passports and other travel documents of those who are suspected of assisting designated organisations. If the Government accept the threat posed by individuals facilitating or supporting hostile state activity, why will they not provide the police with these powers now? Why defer such an important safeguard to future legislation when the opportunity exists now? There is always a temptation to prioritise speed over scrutiny when confronted with an urgent threat—although we have been calling this matter “urgent” for many years—but the effectiveness of the Bill will be judged not by how quickly it passes through Parliament but by whether it gives our security services and law enforcement the tools needed to confront the threats that exist.

If there are areas where the Bill can be strengthened, we should strengthen it. If there are provisions that fall short of the standards Parliament has previously deemed necessary in the fields of counterterrorism and national security, we should examine them carefully. If amendments are needed to ensure that hostile state activity is met with the full force of law, we should not hesitate to make them. I suggest that the choice before us is not whether to support or scrutinise the Bill. We must now do both. For that reason, I support the Bill and look forward to ensuring that it emerges from this House stronger than it arrived.

18:22

[Baroness Gill (Lab)]

My Lords, we have already heard a lot about how our adversaries are looking at the UK and seeing a permissive environment for causing chaos, as well as recruiting foot soldiers on the same social media platforms they use to manipulate the British people—which, incidentally, they have been doing for years.

This subversion is not new. It has been grinding away at our democracy since well before the Brexit referendum. Some of us remember it vividly. I remember scrolling through my feeds years ago and receiving highly targeted anti-EU questionnaires on social media. Platforms such as Facebook were not just places to connect: they were actively weaponised to push anti-EU propaganda in order to manufacture chaos and systematically shatter public trust in not just the EU but the United Kingdom’s core institutions. What we are seeing today is simply the terrifying escalation of that campaign.

According to the briefing by the House of Lords Library, MI5 has just dropped a metric confirming that investigations into hostile state activity have skyrocketed by 35% in a single year. This is no longer just a quiet war of digital propaganda: the line between foreign espionage and domestic terror has evaporated completely.

First, let us look at how our adversaries have moved from online manipulation to physical violence. It should come as absolutely no surprise that our major political parties, most vital companies and public infrastructure are being targeted relentlessly, but let us discard the illusion that these are ad hoc attacks by random, frustrated individuals. These are highly co-ordinated campaigns by hostile state actors whose focus and objectives are to undermine Britain’s power, credibility and influence on the global stage. Look at what Russia is doing today. It has moved from manipulating algorithms to hiring street criminals. It sits safely behind keyboards, hops on to social media platforms and encrypted apps, and recruits cheap local proxies, such as the six Bulgarian nationals who were convicted in May 2025, paying them in cryptocurrency to carry out dirty operations on British soil.

How far is it willing to go? Look no further than the shocking reports of a steady stream of Russian-commissioned arson attacks targeting the private properties and vehicles of our own Prime Minister, Sir Keir Starmer. If it is willing to put a torch to the Prime Minister’s personal property in order to spark domestic fear, what will prevent it targeting anyone else? At the same time, Russia continues to deploy massive, automated networks of sponsored bots—expanding the very digital warfare that polluted our social media feeds a decade ago—all of them calibrated to pump out venomous disinformation, trigger panic and actively incite civil unrest in our towns and cities.

Secondly, we have to talk about the direct physical terror being unleashed on British citizens. Many noble Lords have already spoken about how Iran has become so emboldened. In just 12 months, MI5 had to hunt down and stop more than 20 separate, potentially lethal, plots backed by Iran. Following the outbreak of conflict in the Middle East in early 2026, those threats directly hit our streets. We have seen a wave of targeted, terrifying attacks on Iranian dissidents and our Jewish communities. Much has also been said about the IRGC, which, as has been noted, is hiring local thugs as foot soldiers to terrorise Jewish neighbourhoods, in effect dragging foreign conflicts directly on to British soil in order to settle scores.

Thirdly, we are letting our intellectual and economic future be plundered in broad daylight. China is running an incredibly sophisticated “total society” operation against the UK. Through its massive, sweeping cyber breaches and aggressive campaigns to lure away UK academic experts, our cutting-edge technology is being drained away. It is exploiting our supply chains, university partnerships and FDI in order to steal commercial secrets and feed them straight into its own military and economic machines.

Therefore, this Bill—the National Security (State Threats) Bill—should be welcomed by this House. But I want to ask the Minister a couple of questions. First, how exactly do the Government intend to pierce the veil of the encrypted apps, cryptocurrency networks and automated bot networks that Russia is using to build its criminal proxy network? Secondly, when Iran co-ordinates lethal plots against our Jewish communities and China systematically plunders our universities, what is our concrete, immediate diplomatic and economic retaliation?

I say to those who want more time and want to deliberate that, today, the United Kingdom faces an aggressive, relentless surge in covert state threats. These are hostile operations planned by foreign Governments that stop just short of a declaration of war, but their objectives are identical: to sabotage our safety, bleed out our economic prosperity and shatter our democratic freedoms. That is why the Bill is a crucial step, and I support it.

18:30

[Lord Shinkwin (Con) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Gill, in what has been an informative, if alarming, debate—alarming because it has highlighted the degree to which the freedoms which my grandparents’ generation fought and died for are now under grave threat. The need for this Bill underlines how much the social context has changed, as my noble friend Lady Verma alluded to. I doubt that the older generation could have anticipated just how strong a sense of entitlement to those freedoms their great-grandchildren would develop. It is as if their great-grandparents’ sacrifice, made in blood, sweat and tears, was ancient history, something that belonged in a Hollywood blockbuster, but which was irrelevant to today’s apparently so much more sophisticated world.

I suspect that, having made that sacrifice in order that we might be free from the racist, genocidal, Jew-hating Nazis, my grandparents’ generation would appreciate far more than we do the trouble we are in and the urgency of getting the measures in this Bill, and perhaps others, on to the statute book. They would see the extent to which the threat to our democracy posed by hostile states’ use of proxies and malign non-state actors is exacerbated by society’s privileged, desensitised indifference to the danger they pose.

The Lord Privy Seal said shortly before we began this debate that the public do not appreciate the threat. I agree with her, but I would go further. I fear that some are in denial, desperately clinging to a delusion that peace is permanent, that the welfare state is inviolable and that deterrence does not matter enough to justify the necessary recalibration of resources. Meanwhile, hostile states and their proxies exploit our weakness ruthlessly and insidiously, turning those hard-won freedoms that we take for granted against us.

Take racism as an example. This country outlawed racism based, among other criteria, on ethnic origin, 61 years ago. Yet our enemies cynically weaponise democracy, exploiting demonstrations featuring pernicious racist chants as if they were somehow a celebration of democratic rights rather than a concerted attempt by some to single out and intimidate a particular race—our Jewish brothers and sisters—and thereby undermine our social and cultural cohesion. Shamefully, we let them do it. We let them undermine a crucial aspect of our democracy, supposedly in the name of democracy.

I welcome this Bill because it goes some way to addressing the threat we face. My question is whether it goes far enough. Are its measures truly commensurate with the scale of that threat? I will not rehearse the points already made, but I join with those who wonder whether it takes into account sufficiently the rise of what could be termed “hatred for hire”, such as we saw in the arson attacks on the Jewish community ambulances and the attack on the Prime Minister’s former home, which the noble Baroness, Lady Gill, mentioned.

I close with three points. The first is a thank you to our wonderful security services, who work so hard within difficult democratic constraints to keep us safe, particularly in our case as parliamentarians. The second is to highlight the importance of pre-emption as a means of prevention. One only has to consider that the odious Chinese Communist Party regime operated a secret police hub here in London to spy on and intimidate Hong Kong dissidents to know that in some cases, our enemies are running rings around us. Their aggression and hostile intent are palpable. I ask the Minister, who we all appreciate is dedicated to ensuring the safety and security of our country, whether he is absolutely sure that the powers in this Bill are sufficiently aggressive and pre-emptive in return.

My final point is this. Is the Minister confident that the Bill takes account of the incredibly unstable context in which we consider it? The Hormuz sell-out seems to be unravelling as we speak. A previously reliable partner is becoming reliably unreliable, yet some would say that we are still tripping over ourselves to observe legal niceties. I fear that we make our enemies laugh. I hope that our combined determination to close any gaps in the Bill, mentioned during this debate, will ensure that they have no reason to laugh at us—either today or in the future.

18:38

[Lord Docherty of Milngavie (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, and other noble Lords. I thank the Minister for the measured and thoughtful way in which he introduced Second Reading. As many have said, there is no more important issue facing our country than our national security and, more broadly, our defence.

We are living in the most dangerous period in Europe since the 1930s. That is not hyperbole or geographic sophistry. I studied at the Rostov technical institute in 1990, during the collapse of the Soviet Union. In Rostov, on the bank of the River Don, our hosts would proudly point to the other bank and tell us, “That is where Europe starts”. We might have said that it is where Europe ends. But that is where a war in Europe between Ukraine and Russia has now lasted longer, for each country, than in both world wars.

That Russia is a hostile state with few if any sympathies for western democratic norms or our liberal institutions is beyond doubt. That we live in a dangerous world that is getting more dangerous is also beyond doubt. As has been mentioned many times, the director-general of MI5 has openly reported a substantial increase in the number of investigations of state threat activities. As the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and others, have mentioned, the convictions just last week of a Romanian and a Ukrainian national for arson on property connected to our Prime Minister shows how emboldened bad actors have become.

I know that the Minister will not wish to name individual organisations which may fall within the remit of the Bill. However, we also know that Iran and its proxies are increasingly active. That state actors and their proxies are attempting to commission surveillance, sabotage, arson, theft or physical violence is manifest and self-evident. The review of counter- terrorism legislation carried out by Jonathan Hall KC has set out the need for a Bill such as this clearly, as so many noble Lords have said.

There are several areas in the Bill which describe the critical issue of finance in relation to potential offences. An offence can be made when financial assistance is provided by a designated body or where financial assistance is provided to a designated body, either directly or indirectly. That financial benefit will, as has been mentioned, almost always take the form of cryptocurrency. Cryptocurrency is now the payment method of choice for criminal gangs, hostile state actors and it appears, for reasons known only to itself, for the Reform party. With payments made to wallet addresses and not individuals, without the involvement of banks, these payments are, as we know, far harder to subject to anti-money laundering rules or sanctions compliance. Some cryptocurrency products are specifically designed to avoid detection. In my view, the legitimate use of crypto is becoming increasingly difficult to defend.

A parallel can be drawn between social media and cryptocurrencies. The first smartphone was launched in 2007, and you could argue that social media, as we understand it today, came into being a year later with the launch of the App Store. Only now, 18 years later, are we seeing a concerted effort across jurisdictions to try to address the harmful effects of social media on children using smartphones, relying less on the professed good faith of big tech and other providers—rather, through comprehensive regulation and even prohibition. Future generations will look back on our handing over smartphones unregulated to children in the same way today we look at photos of Victorian children smoking a pipe. They will ask, “What were they thinking?”

The year 2008 was also when a seminal and anonymous paper was published, setting out the rationale for cryptocurrency. The first cryptocurrency was created the following year. Social media and cryptocurrencies are essentially the same age. Is it not also time for a similar concerted approach to regulate crypto more effectively and make it less obviously useful to criminals and bad actors, or will future generations ask, “What were they thinking?” What steps are the Government taking to ensure that the individuals responsible for cryptocurrencies used by any organisation or person designated under the Bill will be held accountable? Are there any more general plans on crypto regulation being made much more effective?

No one should be above the law or beyond its reach. The security and defence of the country is our first priority, as many noble Lords have said. For that reason, I strongly welcome the Bill and the provisions contained within it.

18:44

[Lord Walney (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow that thoughtful speech from the noble Lord, Lord Docherty. There is one person who I wish we could have heard from today: our dear friend Meta, Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale. She was such an extraordinary expert on these issues for many years in the House and in her career as an intelligence officer. We said goodbye to her at a very moving funeral last Friday in Glasgow. I was gathering memories and stories about Meta, and one that is pertinent to share just now is when she gave a speech, I think in Tel Aviv, on Iran. This erudite, softly spoken woman, who everyone really wanted to be their great-aunt, gently said that the IRGC

“must be eliminated—and I really do mean eliminated”.

My friend recalled the jaw of the British ambassador next to him dropping as she said that.

Those words are pertinent, because I really hope that the Minister will listen to that and agree to be a little bit more Meta on this Bill. Although I welcome it like everybody else, it does not achieve the Government’s and Jonathan Hall’s stated aim of an equivalent measure to terrorist proscription. It is weaker in an array of respects; there are excuses provided by the Government for each, but the cumulative effect is a significantly weaker regime.

The noble Lord, Lord Polak, made a pertinent point about Hezbollah. Unlike the majority of noble Lords who have spoken—including learned noble Lords with much greater experience on the subject of terrorism—who appear to have accepted Jonathan Hall’s analysis, I still question why we cannot take the approach that we did in 2019 with Hezbollah and which the US, Canada, Australia and the European Union have taken in fully proscribing the IRGC as a terrorist organisation.

That said, we are where we are. We are going to get the Bill on to the statute book, apparently with extraordinary speed. Despite us having asked for this and the Government having thought about it for more than 14 months, I really hope that they will agree to take an extra day or so to strengthen the Bill, rather than railroading a weaker measure through to the Commons. I am afraid one would have to assume, if the Government maintain this speed of timetable, that they are doing it as an excuse to get a weaker Bill on the statute book rather than taking that a couple of extra days potentially to strengthen it.

The Government talked about the system of immunity and the Vienna convention demanding a higher bar as reasons for some of these measures not matching terrorist proscription. However, we are not proscribing Tehran here; we are prosecuting operatives who are using all the tools of terrorism to do their work. Perhaps this points to the need for the IRGC to be treated as a conventional terrorist organisation, unlike some of the other organisations to which this legislation may end up applying. Although I take the argument that, in many circumstances, you would not wish to fully treat the people who are operating as part of a state enterprise as terrorist operatives, it is the case that the IRGC has been, effectively, a full-blown terrorist organisation under our very eyes for many years. It would send a strong signal to treat it as such, with all the authority and the taboo which would surround even those state officials. They would try to claim diplomatic immunity, but we would say that the way this organisation operates is so heinous that they deserve the full force of terrorism law. I hope the Government are open to strengthening the approach.

In Committee, I intend to explore the approach to the displaying of insignia, the dissemination of publications and self-directing promotion of the group. My preference would be simply to put that on to the statute book. I would like also to explore the prospect of a flexible, discretionary approach to be applied to particular organisations by the Secretary of State through regulation. I hope that is an issue that we can get into in Committee.

18:50

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, as my noble friends have said, we on these Benches strongly support the Bill, but with some caveats about process, scope and drafting. We felt bafflement and frustration as this Government—and indeed the last one—failed to act on the very obvious threat from the IRGC. The Conservative Government promised to in 2023 but did not deliver in office. But we then accepted that the tool of proscription had to be replaced by a new formula of designation for state bodies, although I note what the noble Lord, Lord Polak, said about Hezbollah, which was interesting. Jonathan Hall KC’s report was delivered over a year ago, and now, having dragged their feet, the Government want to rush the Bill through at unseemly speed, and at the possible expense of precision. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, suggested, understandably, that a draft Bill might have been preferable.

As the Minister said in his introduction, state threats are “both evolving and enduring”. The Bill needs to be scrutinised and stress-tested sufficiently in Committee that it produces lasting but nimble legislation, which is capable of future adaptation. We know that we are experiencing the equivalent of terrorist acts emanating from states such as Iran and Russia, in sabotage, physical attacks, arson, firebombing and propaganda—with Jewish communities often targeted, shamefully—as well as from China in spying, harassment and death threats to Hong Kong pro-democracy activists. Often proxies are used for these nefarious activities, in parallel with espionage and cyber threats from state intelligence agencies.

The Bill must be fit for designation of foreign power entities backed by any state. However, the IRGC is the clearest and most obvious one. These Benches therefore envisage seeking to amend the Bill so as to ensure, on its face, that IRGC designation is properly pursued within one month. This is an urgent priority. If not the IRGC, and not in this Bill, then who and when? The Minister made encouraging noises about designation for the IRGC, but no commitment. A commitment is needed—not the wiggle room that one suspects some bits of Government still seem to want.

We also wish to extend the offence of material assistance to a designated body to include the setting up and use of companies or trusts to hide the true ownership of assets belonging to that body, and we will explore that in Committee. My noble friend Lady Doocey also sought clarity that organisations could not escape the Bill’s net by operating from abroad in this digital world. She also suggested that foreign state threats in the Bill should be capable of including superintelligent AI tools.

Many noble Lords referred to humanitarian activities, conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts. Some of this activity requires, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, put it,

“intensive dialogue with brutal and unpleasant regimes to which it may be difficult … for western Governments to speak”.

I think we all accept that.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies, explained the Opposition’s objection to the prohibited purpose offence having the limitation of being

“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

One problem with removing this limitation is that it might expose the activities of humanitarian and peace- building organisations to criminalisation. Indeed, the fact that this limitation of the offence, or defence to it, does not appear in proposed new Sections 17B or 17C on assisting or material benefits, but only in proposed new Section 17A on supporting a foreign power entity, illustrates perhaps the worries raised by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, my noble friends Lady Tyler and Lady Northover, and others.

Other organisations besides the IRGC are in our minds. The Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office has been mentioned in the debate, and it was debated yesterday. No doubt it was once an office that did what it said on the tin, but it now seems to be an extension of the transnational repression perpetrated by China.

The noble Lord, Lord Pickles, also raised the issue of organisations which might pose a threat but do not fit the definition of state-sponsored threats, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. One could, no doubt, think of others.

All noble Lords who have spoken have welcomed the Bill as an important step forward but will seek to ensure that it is watertight but adaptable, durable but not inflexible. We have a task before us in Committee. The Government would do well to benefit from all the expertise which has been on display in the Chamber today—and to listen and to incorporate changes where justified. As well as legal, diplomatic and other expertise, we are fortunate to have heard from not one, but two, former Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation, in the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, as well as the chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee. Let us draw on all the skills and talents to perfect the Bill. The Government would be making a mistake if they were just to rush through without listening to all the very well-intended suggestions for amendments that have been made.

18:57

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by thanking all noble Lords from across your Lordships’ House who have contributed to this thoughtful and stimulating debate. It is a great privilege to give the closing speech for the Opposition Benches, having heard from many noble Lords with a huge amount of expertise and experience in the legal, security and ISC sectors.

Before reflecting on the specific provisions in the Bill we would like to see refined, it is worth outlining the context in which your Lordships have received this legislation. The Opposition Benches have long recognised the growing threat posed by hostile state actors and their proxies, and we wholeheartedly support the aim of strengthening the tools available to protect the UK’s national security. Of course, we support the general principles of the Bill and concur with the motivations behind it.

I accept that the Bill goes beyond the IRGC. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, gave a long list of both threats and, sadly, events in the UK in recent years. The Bill rightly should cover state threats in general, but the IRGC is obviously and rightly the first target of the Bill. It is undeniable that the legislative provisions here should have been brought before Parliament long before now.

For many months, noble Lords from across your Lordships’ House have repeatedly called for stronger action against the IRGC, most recently in the Committee and Report stages of the Crime and Policing Bill, where time and again calls were made from many different quarters for proscription of the IRGC or an equivalent. Those calls were resisted, amendments were opposed, arguments were dismissed; the opinion of the House was tested but ignored. Yet we now find ourselves considering a Bill whose principal and primary purpose is to establish a legislative framework through which organisations such as the IRGC may be designated. That raises the question: if the Government accept the need for such a framework, why has action not been taken sooner? The threats posed by the Iranian regime and the IRGC did not suddenly emerge in recent weeks. Had the Government listened to arguments that were made in this Chamber months ago, Parliament would not now be scrutinising significant national security legislation to such compressed timescales. That matters because legislation must be more than well intentioned, it must be effective; where Parliament identifies legislative gaps or ambiguities, it is our duty to address them.

It is in that spirit that we approach this Bill, and it is in that spirit that I wish to address and emphasise a few of the concerns that my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower raised. The first is the prohibited purpose test. As it stands, Clause 2 enables hostile state proxies to receive greater protection than terrorist organisations, because it imposes a greater a burden on the prosecution than the Terrorism Act 2000. Pausing there, the point has been made most powerfully by the noble Lords, Lord Barrow and Lord Carlile, that we should not expect to simply cut and paste the Terrorism Act into this Bill. I acknowledge that, but the Terrorism Act remains the blueprint, and throughout Jonathan Hall’s report, he uses the phrase “equivalent to powers in the Terrorism Act” again and again. I appreciate the need for subtlety, which the noble Lord, Lord Carlile called for, but, while the threats may be different, these are analogous statutory regimes. They are equivalents. The regime in this Bill should not be weaker than the Terrorism Act and any differences should have a clear rationale.

Returning to Clause 2, there are two conditions for the offence of supporting a designated body. They are inviting support for or expressing a belief that is supportive of a designated body and—this is the additional part—a requirement that support was given for a prohibited purpose that was prejudicial to the safety of the UK. The additional requirement that prosecutors must prove conduct as well as the defendant’s prohibited purpose creates an additional evidential burden. It makes it harder to prosecute and harder to secure a conviction, as well as adding another layer of bureaucracy in a process that should be fair but streamlined. As I have said, much of this Bill has been drafted with Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000 as the blueprint, yet there is no similar provision in the Terrorism Act.

Turning secondly to preparatory conduct, there is a gap in the Bill as drafted in the prevention and prosecution of hostile activity before actual harm takes place. The purpose of national security legislation is to punish hostile activity and prevent it occurring. The Bill focuses primarily on completed acts of support, assistance or financial benefit to a designated body, and that leaves a gap, because it may be entirely feasible that law enforcement agencies are aware of an individual actively preparing to assist a designated organisation but lack the power to intervene until further steps have been taken. That is particularly concerning given the nature of modern hostile state activity, which often relies on recruitment, facilitation, planning and preparation long before any substantive offence is committed.

Parliament has long recognised that challenge in other areas of national security. The Terrorism Act contains a range of preparatory and precursor offences, and it reflects the principle that intervention at the earliest possible stage is often necessary to protect the public and safeguard national security. If the Government believe that designated organisations pose a sufficient threat to warrant the creation of this new designation regime, it is difficult to understand why similar preventive principles should not apply. In the other place, the Government said that the Bill had been deliberately drafted as a targeted and narrowly focused piece of legislation. Ministers stated that the Bill was intended to be narrow, but did not explain why this gap remains. The Bill being narrow does not necessarily mean it is complete. I hope that the Minister will clarify this point, because national security legislation is most effective when it enables disruption and prevention, as well as prosecution after the event.

Thirdly, on uniforms and insignia, the Bill creates an inconsistency with existing national security legislation by failing to address uniforms and insignia associated with designated organisations. It has been established in Parliament that support for dangerous organisations is not demonstrated solely through direct assistance or financial support. We know that uniforms and insignia can be used to demonstrate allegiance to a hostile organisation, they can intimidate communities and political opponents, and they can promote and legitimise dangerous organisations. Section 13 of the Terrorism Act makes it an offence to wear clothing or display articles in circumstances that arouse reasonable suspicion that an individual is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation, yet no equivalent provision appears in this Bill. That creates the illogical situation whereby Parliament can determine that an organisation presents a sufficient threat to warrant designation, but public displays of support for the same organisation remain lawful. The Government’s argument is essentially that designated organisations are different from terrorist organisations, but this again does not answer the central question. Why should organisations deemed sufficiently dangerous to be designated under this legislation be subject to weaker restrictions than terrorist organisations?

In closing, I reiterate that the concerns that my noble friend Lord Davies and I have raised are not objections to the principles of the Bill: rather, they are attempts to ensure that the framework we establish is as effective as possible. Legitimate questions have been raised during the course of this debate about the operation of particular provisions and the gaps that remain in the legislation. Narrowness is not a substitute for completeness. If there are weaknesses that can be addressed, Parliament must address them now. We should not leave them to be discovered later, in the course of prosecutions under this legislation. I thank the Government for finally bringing forward legislation in this area, but the task before your Lordships is not simply to welcome the Bill but to improve it. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

19:07

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the 24 noble Lords who have spoken in the debate, and I am particularly grateful, if I may say so, for the contributions from the Front Benches of HM loyal Opposition and the Liberal Democrats, the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Doocey, who gave broad support to the Bill but raised important questions—as did other noble Lords—which I will seek to respond to during the course of this debate.

I pay tribute also to Lady Ramsay of Cartvale, who contributed to this House right up to very recently. The comments from the noble Lord, Lord Walney, were welcome.

I start by reminding the House that this legislation was a manifesto commitment. According to Members today, it is long overdue or has been rushed. I am trying my best to find a happy medium that says that a manifesto commitment was put in place and the Home Secretary commissioned Jonathan Hall KC to produce a report three or four months after the commitment in the manifesto was ratified by the electorate. We commissioned that report. The report was produced to this Government in May or June last year. We have had time to consider that report. Colleagues in the House will know that last year’s parliamentary Session was very busy and crammed, and we wanted to bring legislation forward at the first opportunity. At the first opportunity, in the gracious Speech, we brought forward this legislation, and we have brought it forward now to give a framework—again I say to the House—for the Home Secretary to be able to act on that framework in very short order if Royal Assent is achieved. So, whether it is rushed or long overdue, I hope the House will have patience that we are trying to do the right thing to deal with severe threats.

I noted particularly that the noble Lord, Lord Pickles, said we had to stay ahead of the threats. I accept that in full. We had my noble friend Lord Beamish speaking from the ISC perspective. My noble friends Lady Gill and Lady Dacres of Lewisham, the noble Lord, Lord Barrow, who speaks with great experience, the noble Baronesses, Lady Taylor of Enfield and Lady Verma, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, all pointed to the important fact that the director-general of MI5 has said to the Government, the House and the public that state threats have increased by 35%. So we need to take action, we understand we need to take action and we need to do it in a way that maintains the cohesion of the community, as the noble Baroness has said.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Polak, that his personal experience is one that should not be acceptable to society as a whole. His grandchildren should not fear walking to school or face barriers that my grandchildren do not face just because, although we were both born in the same city, we have different cultural and religious backgrounds. His grandchildren should not face threats for those reasons. The impacts on individuals should be in our minds in all that we do to progress this Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, reminded us of the freedoms for which our grandparents and great-grandparents fought; they are important in all that we do.

A number of major issues have been raised; I will try to deal with each in turn. They include the IRGC, self-evidently, as well as issues with other nations; the preparatory act issue; the prohibited purpose issue; uniforms and insignia; the humanitarian issue, which a lot of noble Lords have spoken to in detail; the issue of a review; and a series of other issues that I will try to touch on if time allows.

The House has tempted me to talk about individual nations: China, Russia and, indeed, Iran. I will explain to the House again that the Bill is a framework through which the Home Secretary can take action, on advice, via the affirmative resolution procedure—to go to the point mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey—for designation of any particular body.

The IRGC has been mentioned, in particular, by the noble Lords, Lord Davies, Lord Beamish, Lord Barrow, Lord Walney and Lord Alton of Liverpool, as well as by the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey, Lady Neville-Jones, Lady Tyler of Enfield and Lady Verma. I understand those concerns. That is why we have put sanctions on the IRGC and taken a range of measures against IRGC members already. However, the powers under this Bill are a framework for the Home Secretary to look at the significant implications that this will have for national security and for foreign policy. Parliament should set a framework about how these powers are used.

I say to all those who have raised the IRGC in particular that the Government understand that absolutely but, if the Bill receives Royal Assent, the framework will be for the Home Secretary to determine how and when this power is used. Again, I come back to the point that there will be an affirmative instrument in the event of any designation being proposed, but I will not comment on the IRGC in particular. As I have explained privately to both Front-Benchers, the hybridity of this Bill, with the IRGC included, would damage early on its capability to take these matters forward. I hope that we can look at the power in the Bill without, at the moment, looking at how it will be used.

The second issue, which was raised by the Opposition Front Bench in particular and which I understand, was about the preparatory conduct offence. I argue that this additional offence is not needed. Preparatory conduct is an offence in the existing National Security Act under Section 18, and that offence applies to specific offences, including spying, espionage, entering a prohibited place for a prejudicial purpose and sabotage. It also covers acts of violence, serious risk and issues impacting on members of the public in the UK. I argue that such an offence is not needed in this Bill. We may end up having a debate in Committee on that but I just want to say that to the noble Lords.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, mentioned the prohibited purpose test in his opening remarks. It had been suggested that this test, which applies to the support offence in new Section 17A, is unnecessary and should be removed. I reiterate that doing so would criminalise legitimate humanitarian aid activity. The inclusion of this test reflects that there will be occasions—even though we might not like it—where UK persons need to have legitimate dealings with a state entity. That will be so whether it is a British diplomat or an NGO delivering humanitarian aid. To remove that would, in my view, be very difficult and challenging. Again, we may revisit that in Committee, but I hope that we can accept those arguments for the moment.

There has also been a question about overseas activity. It was suggested the Bill does not go far enough in the support offence as it applies to overseas activity. It is claimed that the offence should reapply to assisting a designated body in any activity overseas. Again, we can reflect on this in the next few days, but I suggest that such an amendment would be unnecessary. The noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, touched on this. I will come back to his point in a moment, but new Section 17B, to be introduced by Clause 2, will make it an offence to “assist a designated body” in its overseas activity where those activities are

“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

To give a concrete example, a UK person assisting a designated body in its efforts to disrupt the military supply chain of an ally would commit an offence, because the ally is still an ally; that is the key necessary test. Similarly, the Bill already deals with those who are inspired by state actors to commit self-directed acts. That is because the offences at new Sections 17A and 17B do not require there to be any direction or tasking from a designated body, only an intention to support that body.

The fourth issue that has been raised is the important issue of criminalising the wearing of uniforms and insignia. We asked Jonathan Hall KC to review this area of legislation. His report, which was independently produced, made it clear why it was necessary to take a different approach for state bodies. It would impact on legitimate engagement with a designated state body, which would need to continue, for example, on diplomatic channels. Like it or not, that is the reality of the world at large. We have instead crafted the support offence to ensure that it would capture conduct that was calculated to advance the harmful activities of the designated body. This would include the use of insignia and publication of images to support the designated body where the person wears, displays or publishes for a purpose that is prejudicial to the UK—again, that key legal test.

In touching on that area, I return to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Polak, about passport seizure. We are committed to legislating on that. We are going to do it; we are just not going to do it in this Bill, which is a specifically designed piece of legislation to give powers to the Home Secretary. We will have further national security legislation later in his Parliament.

A number of noble Lords mentioned humanitarian aid. I will focus on that in detail as it is an important issue. In particular, the noble Lords, Lord Barrow, Lord Alton of Liverpool and Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, raised these issues. I assure noble Lords that we have crafted the Bill to ensure that legitimate activities, such as diplomacy and activities that support basic human needs, are not caught within the offences. The key test here is that support for a designated body or overseas activities by the body must be

“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

Our officials have already talked with a number of NGOs. Ministers will meet with the Red Cross very shortly to listen to its concerns and we are satisfied that the tests in the Bill properly protect legitimate humanitarian assistance. The noble Baronesses, Lady Helic, Lady D’Souza, Lady Northover and Lady Tyler of Enfield, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, all raised this issue.

I will try to help the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, by covering Pepper v Hart. Receipt of information by an aid worker would not be criminalised by this Bill. “Information” in the Bill does not mean any information, as is clear from the preceding words. It has to possess an inherent value that enriches the recipient. I am happy to make a Pepper v Hart statement that new Section 17C does not apply. Likewise, I am happy to confirm that new Sections 17A and 17B will not criminalise legitimate humanitarian aid, as that is not contrary to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, mentioned, there is a legal backstop on this, in that the security decisions on those prosecutions are ultimately taken by the Attorney-General in these areas.

I also do not want to create a blanket exemption that could be easily exploited by state actors. That is an important issue. I have a genuine concern that exemptions could potentially create a relatively simple loophole for hostile actors to exploit, but I reassure all those who have spoken on this issue that it is not the intention of the Bill to criminalise the provision of legitimate humanitarian aid, and that is not the effect of the offences as drafted. This was clearly set out by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary in the other House last week, and we will of course look at this in detail.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

The Minister has referred a number of times to humanitarian aid and to diplomacy. Of course diplomats have a special defence or exemption of their own, but he has not said anything about those engaged in the prevention or resolution of conflict. I wonder if he would like to associate them with the statements he has made about humanitarian aid.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am happy to do that, but I want to give clarity on these matters. If the noble Lord will allow me, given that that has been raised separately, I will write to him with an assurance on that and share that with both Opposition Front Benches so that they are aware of that. I want to give absolute legal clarity, as the noble Lord would expect, on these matters.

[Baroness Northover (LD)]

When is the Minister intending to meet the Red Cross?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Life and diaries are fluid, but it will be before Committee, Report and Third Reading of the Bill next week. So it will not be after that. It will be before that. As we speak, representations and diaries are being co-ordinated. I will leave it at that.

The sixth vital point, which was raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Tyler of Enfield, and the noble Lords, Lord Barrow and Lord Carlile, is the issue of whether there will be a review. That is a valid and significant point but, as has been pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, the National Security Act 2023 already gives the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation the right to oversight and mandates them to carry out an annual review of the operations of the provisions of the Bill. I hope that is sufficient to head off at the pass an amendment on this issue, not because an amendment would be right or wrong or unnecessary but because the Bill is already covered by the National Security Act on those particular points.

The noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, mentioned in passing the question whether the offence of assisting a designated body would not capture non-UK nationals. I say to him that a non-UK national planning an attack in the UK from overseas would be materially assisting activities taking place in the UK. It is the activities of the designated body, such as an attack in the UK, that determine whether assistance is captured. The Bill also introduces the designated body condition, which allows the existing National Security Act offences to apply to activity linked to designated bodies, not just to foreign states.

The noble Lord, Lord Alton, continues, correctly, to chew at my ankles about the issue of transnational repression. I would argue that the Bill will make it easier to achieve prosecutions where there is a designated body, such as a proxy organisation, involved in transnational repression. We will continue, as I said yesterday in our Statement, to try to tackle transnational repression in a number of ways.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

I am grateful for the opportunity to chew at the noble Minister’s ankles again. I want to ask him specifically whether he will continue the discussions that the Security Minister’s office has been having about the United Front Work Department that acts on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party, which would not be covered by the terms of the Bill. Although I agree that he would not want to put actors on the face of the Bill, the generic issues that it involves should be there. Perhaps he could also take the opportunity of confirming whether he will circulate the reply that he has sent to me on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to Members who have spoken in today’s debate.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Absolutely. I will make sure that the reply I gave to the noble Lord in recent times is sent out, because this is moving at a fast pace and we are trying to get the matter sorted. I will do that for the noble Lord, and I will refer the points that he has made to the Security Minister.

My noble friend Lady Dacres rightly mentioned the question of diaspora. The power is actor agnostic and applies equally to all individuals in the UK, so we are not targeting any particular diaspora. It targets conduct that is carried out for a purpose prejudicial to the UK’s safety.

The question of—I use this phrase guardedly—“useful idiots” was quoted by the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and echoed by my noble friend Lady Gill. The new offences concern various thresholds for criminals to be caught. For example, criminals can be caught by the offence of assisting a designated body where they ought to know that their conduct is materially existing a designated body. However, it is also important to put on the record for the noble Baroness that criminals do not need to know that a group has been designated for offences to be committed. I hope that deals with the issue of “useful idiots”—I call them terrorists, but “useful idiots” is also a reasonable phrase that we can attribute to them.

My noble friend Lady Gill and the noble Lord, Lord Docherty of Milngavie, mentioned the issue of how cryptocurrency used by designated bodies or individuals can be held more accountable. The Government have already committed to tackling all forms of economic crime, including the misuse of crypto assets. All UK crypto asset firms are now required to register with the Financial Conduct Authority to comply with money-laundering legislation. We have also strengthened law enforcement through the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act, and we are now going to go further with the introduction of further measures, including the Financial Conduct Authority delivering a new crypto asset regulatory regime, UK crypto asset firms being required to conduct due diligence and the financial services Bill 2026 introducing targeted powers to allow more crypto asset recovery powers.

I am trying to cover all the points that noble Lords have mentioned in the time available, and I hope I have done so, but I will read Hansard and, if there are further points, I will respond to them. What I want to do, and this is the key point, is get the Bill through to Royal Assent so the Home Secretary can determine how she uses its powers to deal with the issues that have been raised on the Floor of the House today. That is an important measure. I want to ensure that, between now and next Tuesday, we deal with those points and get a consensus to pass the Bill, make it an Act, get it to His Majesty the King to give Royal Assent and then, as a matter of some urgency, determine how we tackle the many threats that are facing this country at the moment.

I thank noble Lords for their engagement and the expertise that they have brought to this debate today. Ultimately, I commend the Bill for Second Reading, and I hope that the House will support it tonight.

Bill read a second time and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.