National Security (State Threats) Bill

Max Wilkinson Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 17th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Shabana Mahmood]

I do not think that the activities that the hon. Lady mentioned are caught by the Bill. We have been clear in the explanatory notes to the Bill—I refer her to paragraphs 37 and 43—that diplomatic activity, and indeed humanitarian activity, will not be caught by any of the Bill’s measures. We do not want to create a regime with lots of exemptions as that would enable hostile states to try to play games with our legal framework by dressing up front organisations. I reassure her that the measures in the Bill will not apply to any humanitarian organisation going about its business as a humanitarian organisation.

If there is any doubt, I refer hon. Members to subsection (6)(d) of proposed new section 17B, which makes it clear that anything that has essentially been approved by the UK, or is part of an agreement to which the UK is a party, will not be caught. If humanitarian organisations are concerned, I urge them to talk to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office—as the hon. Lady well knows, that happens regularly in the humanitarian sector. The combination of all those provisions will ensure that the activity that she wants to see continue, as I do, will not be caught by the Bill’s measures.

I understand that there is some consternation from the Opposition about what I might be intending to say in the rest of my speech. If that is so, let me say first that we might not have needed an unnecessary vote on the programme motion, but I will make quick progress as I explain the thinking behind the measures.

Clause 1 also introduces a new designated body condition. Under the National Security Act, it can be difficult to secure a prosecution, as a link must be proved that runs all the way from the individual to a foreign power, but through the designated body condition more organisations will be brought to justice.

On the so-called support offence, clause 2 sets out new offences related to those new designated bodies. Again, it amends the National Security Act, adding new sections 17A to 17C. The first offence is supporting a designated body, which covers inviting or expressing support and arranging, managing or addressing a meeting in support of a designated body. The offence will be triggered when the reason for the supportive act is to prejudice the safety and interests of the United Kingdom in what is known as a prohibited purpose test, echoing the National Security Act.

Let me say again that it should be noted that there will be occasions when individuals and organisations have to engage with some designated state actors. The new designation regime will ensure that diplomats can work on behalf of this country and that humanitarian organisations can continue their lifesaving work.

The second offence is to assist a designated body. It will become an offence to materially assist a designated organisation. That includes both directly assisting such an organisation and assisting a proxy organisation acting on its behalf.

[Max Wilkinson (Cheltenham) (LD)]

To build on the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Monica Harding), if a humanitarian organisation were forced to make payment to a designated organisation to do its humanitarian work, would that lead it to fall foul of the Bill, or is the Home Secretary confirming that it would not be liable to prosecution?

[Shabana Mahmood]

That conduct would not be caught. Again, I point the hon. Member to proposed new section 17B, where the combination of subsection (6)(b) and subsection (4) ensures that the work of NGOs is not caught by the tests set out. We have had specific advice on that point from the Office of Parliamentary Counsel, I have discussed it at length with the Attorney General’s Office, and Law Officers have had a look at it. We believe that the way in which the Bill is constructed does not catch humanitarian activities. It is not intended to do so, and we have made it clear in the explanatory notes that it will not do so. Our reading of how the Bill is constructed means that it will not do so.

Let me move on to the third offence in clause 2, which is of obtaining a material benefit from a designated body. An individual is outlawed from receiving a payment or a gift from a designated body either on their own behalf or on behalf of someone else. The very act of making the agreement would also constitute a crime even if no money were exchanged and no service were provided. That would cover a hacker hired to carry out a cyber-attack, a criminal gang commissioned to conduct arson attacks on British soil and a gang recruiting thugs to do their state-directed dirty work. Those two offences—assisting and benefiting from a designated body—would carry prison terms of up to 14 years alongside the sentences they may receive for any other illegal activity conducted, with sabotage and espionage offences carrying life sentences.

To trigger the offences of assisting a designated body and of obtaining benefit from a designated body, an individual must know that they are aiding a body that has been designated or, crucially, ought reasonably to know that they are doing so. Ignorance is therefore not a defence. If a reasonable person should have been able to surmise who would benefit from such an attack, the individual will be prosecuted despite their professed ignorance. The new powers are significant—

--- Later in debate ---

[Max Wilkinson (Cheltenham) (LD)]

I want to begin by making clear that the Liberal Democrats support the Bill. Our country faces co-ordinated hostile campaigns by state-sponsored and state-linked actors who actively undermine our democracy, terrorise our citizens and erode our core values. The Home Secretary has referenced Iran, China and Russia; we know that in future there will be others.

The convictions that we have seen in recent days for Russian-linked attacks on our Prime Minister underline the imperative that we act with urgency. The two men convicted of these attacks were recruited online by a Russian-speaking handler, and a BBC investigation found evidence that the handler has links to the Russian regime. GCHQ director Anne Keast-Butler recently warned us of the rising threat from Russia. She referenced Russia targeting critical infrastructure, our democratic processes, supply chains and public trust, as the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) referenced. Sir Richard Moore, the former head of MI6, has warned that Putin is using sabotage, cyber-attacks and arson to be

“disruptive, distracting and intimidating to those of us who are supporting Ukraine”.

The Bill is an important step towards ensuring that our security and law enforcement agencies have the powers they need to identify, disrupt and deter those who seek to threaten the safety, sovereignty and democratic integrity of the United Kingdom. The cases and incidents referenced by the Home Secretary form part of a broader and deeply worrying pattern of events that seek to undermine our freedoms and our liberal democracy. It is right that we take measures today to better defend ourselves.

The reality is that threats to the United Kingdom from foreign states are evolving rapidly. They are no longer confined to traditional espionage; today, they include foreign interference in our political system, cyber-operations, disinformation campaigns, sabotage and, at the most extreme, assassination attempts. In the past year alone, individuals have been convicted of spying on Hong Kong dissidents on behalf of China, and a journalist was stabbed on behalf of Iran, in addition to the convictions for the attacks on the property of our Prime Minister.

We have seen convictions of individuals for carrying out an arson attack on a Ukrainian-linked warehouse on behalf of the Russian Wagner Group. As the Home Secretary reminded us, we should not forget that Russian threats predate the invasion of Ukraine. It is now eight years since the chemical weapons attack in Salisbury, which killed Dawn Sturgess, hospitalised others, including the Skripals, and had the potential to harm thousands more due to the potency of the chemical agent used. Foreign powers are increasingly outsourcing operations to proxies and state-linked organisations. The evolving threat landscape exposes a critical gap in our legal framework.

The Liberal Democrats have long called for decisive action to tackle the threat posed by hostile state actors, including the IRGC. Time and again, we have been disappointed by the failure of successive Governments to act with the required speed. The previous Conservative Government referenced the threat and suggested that they would act, but ultimately they did not. Even after Jonathan Hall KC recommended these powers over a year ago, progress has been regrettably slow, as the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns), said.

Meanwhile, the threat has not stood still. While the Government may be preoccupied with questions about leadership, the responsibility in this House is clear, and it is a positive that despite that, the Government are bringing forward the legislation today. We must now act to protect the safety and freedoms of the people we serve and the integrity of our democracy, because when it comes to matters of national security, the unity in the House today is something that we should welcome.

Existing counter-terrorism legislation was never designed to deal with hostile state actors, as Jonathan Hall KC said. He concluded that there are strong grounds for introducing a new classification power that is equivalent to proscription but specifically designed to address state threats. Crucially, he noted that such a power should sit alongside existing tools, such as sanctions, rather than attempt to replace or distort counter-terrorism law.

The Bill provides a framework to address those challenges. It gives the Government the tools they need to keep pace with an increasingly complex and hostile international environment, and it equips the Government to address future threats from state actors if and when they arise. That is reassuring, particularly given the behaviour that the Home Secretary referenced earlier from the three states mentioned, but of course there will be others in future.

Of course, as the Bill progresses quickly today, it will be right for this House to scrutinise its provisions carefully, particularly to ensure that safeguards and oversight are put in place and that matters of proportionality are addressed. But the Liberal Democrats will support the Bill today. We hope that it will pass and make swift progress.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Oliver Dowden]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. Separatism makes a country weaker, and there is no doubt that our enemies will encourage it. The example that he cited, which I also saw, is very telling of exactly that.

[Max Wilkinson]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for giving way; he is being very generous with his time. On the use of AI on social media to disrupt, is he also concerned about what happens on X, where unidentified and unidentifiable accounts—sometimes bots, sometimes accounts using a dinosaur or other avatar—seek to stoke hatred on our streets against Jewish people, Muslims and others, and against British values? I am very concerned about that. I have been criticised by members of the Conservative party on the internet for raising this point, but I wonder if he shares my concern.

[Sir Oliver Dowden]

I have great respect for Elon Musk’s ingenuity when it comes to trying to send a man to Mars and set up a colony there. I am slightly more dubious about the activities in relation to X, but that platform should be subject to the same legislation as all others.

As for this Bill, the question is whether the designation regime will be agile enough to deal with not only traditional organisations, but cyber-units, hackers for hire, front companies, AI-enabled threat and state-threat networks, and commercial entities that materially assist hostile state activity. This Bill will not solve the problem of state threats on its own, but it is an important and necessary addition, because the reality is that today’s threat is hybrid; state power, ideology, cyber-capability, organised crime and artificial intelligence are increasingly overlapping. That is the challenge before us all. The law must keep pace with this, and the Bill is an important step along the line.