National Security (State Threats) Bill

Lord Alton of Liverpool Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 30th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, this amendment is in my name and those of the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Foster, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, who has other relevant amendments in this group. Amendment 1 is a probing amendment that enables the Minister to clarify the exact breadth of the intention in the Bill—a Bill that I welcome, and I regret I was not able to be here at Second Reading to say so. The Bill is designed to address the threat posed by foreign state-linked organisations that operate here in the UK.

My amendment relates in particular to the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, whose office manager, Bill Yuen, was recently convicted and sentenced to eight years in prison under the National Security Act 2023 for helping to run a CCP surveillance operation from its premises. The existence of this office dates back to the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office Act 1996, passed on the premise that Hong Kong was meaningfully autonomous from Beijing. “One country, two systems” was meant to mean that separate legal, economic and administrative systems would be permitted in Hong Kong, albeit as part of China. Any such pre-1997 autonomy or even post-1997 freedoms are clearly no longer the case, yet somehow the office survives, supposedly independent of the Chinese embassy but with at least one of its staff acting on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party.

This has involved surveillance of some of our own citizens and of Hong Kong dissidents resident in the UK. Indeed, Regina Ip, former convenor of Hong Kong’s Executive Council, even claimed that it was legal for the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office to gather intelligence on activists. Both sorts of surveillance are surely intolerable.

Perhaps it is possible to describe activity against UK citizens as activity involving a threat by a foreign state and therefore a threat to the safety or interests of the UK as defined in the Bill, but what about similar actions affecting Hong Kong citizens? Would they be covered if some foreign policy threat activity included espionage, given that surveillance of UK residents would be reported back to China? I assume it would count as espionage, especially as the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office funded Bill Yuen’s legal costs and its salaried staff attended most of the trial at the Old Bailey to show support for him, even while the office enjoyed the privilege confirmed by Parliament in the hopeful days of 1996.

The Bill is to deal with the threat posed by foreign state-linked organisations operating in the UK. The Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office is a foreign state-linked organisation and is operating here in London. We should protect our citizens from its activities but also protect UK residents who are classified as dissident activists by the Chinese state, some of whom have bounties on their heads. I hope, in response, my noble friend the Minister can provide some assurance that this body and its nefarious activities would be in scope of the Bill’s intent. I beg to move.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. This builds on the Private Notice Question which she placed before your Lordships’ House and indeed on our Second Reading debate last week where the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, which, as the noble Baroness has rightly said, is a relic of the past, became the centre of our interest because of some of those who worked there being convicted of being involved in espionage on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party regime in Beijing. That is why it is entirely relevant to this Bill and why it is good that the noble Baroness has placed Amendment 1, this probing amendment, before your Lordships’ Committee.

I have a few points I would like to make on that amendment before turning to my own Amendments 3 and 4, which deal with slightly different questions but are also linked to the malign activities of the Chinese Communist Party regime in the UK. Amendment 3 deals with transnational repression, and Amendment 4 deals with the activities of the United Front, which is not a state but works in line with the wishes and ideology of the Chinese Communist Party. That is why it is problematic in terms of the definitions in the Bill and why I have sought further clarification through my amendments.

I have a few pointers on the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office case, which might be helpful to your Lordships. In May 2024, law enforcement initially arrested 11 individuals across the UK. Only three of those were heavily linked to state funding via the London Hong Kong office referred to by the noble Baroness. Only three were prosecuted under the National Security Act 2023. Two have since been convicted and—as the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, was quite right to remind us during Second Reading last week—were subjected to very lengthy prison sentences. The remaining eight individuals suspected of acting as part of the vigilante team in contact with entities in Hong Kong and targeting an individual on British soil were released without charge.

This case highlights a common practice whereby Chinese and Hong Kong authorities blend private civil disputes, corporate debt collection and local organised crime groups—a point that I heard more about recently at a meeting organised by Tom Tugendhat MP, our former Security Minister, which pointed to the activities of organised crime linked to some of these groups promoting a political ideology. All of those are involved in the execution of transnational repression and jurisdiction overseas while evading national security prosecution.

I have four questions I would like to put the Minister on Amendment 1 before turning to those other two amendments. I am sorry they have been grouped together, but I think it is for the convenience of the House. I hope the House will therefore forgive me if I spend a bit of time speaking to the other two amendments, but here are my questions to build on what the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, has said already.

First, of the 11 individuals initially arrested by counterterrorism police in connection with the hostile tracking of a Hong Kong resident in Yorkshire, eight were subsequently released without trial. Can the Minister inform the House how many of those eight have since left the United Kingdom and whether any have returned to the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China or the Hong Kong special administrative region, thereby placing themselves beyond the reach of British justice?

Secondly, is the Minister confident that counterterrorism and the Crown Prosecution Service—the CPS—possess the immediate capacity to process massive backlogs of foreign language evidence quickly enough to meet custody time limits? That has been an issue relevant to these prosecutions. Specifically, was a lack of rapid security-vetted translation capacity a contributing factor in the decision to release the other eight suspects without pressing charges?

Thirdly, is the Minister satisfied that our law enforcement agencies, including the NCA—the National Crime Agency—and regional special branches have the required resources to effectively monitor and map the nexus between Chinese state authorities, overseas proxy organisations and private contractors operating inside the United Kingdom?

Fourthly, what steps are the Government taking to bolster the China capabilities of UK law enforcement? Specifically, are we investing in the recruitment and training of security-vetted interpreters, fluent not just in Mandarin and Cantonese but in crucial dialects such as Hokkien and Fuzhou dialects, to effectively monitor and respond to issues related to transnational state repression and organised crime? This was referred to during the meeting that Tom Tugendhat MP organised in the House Commons recently and which, as I say, I was able to attend.

Let me turn to Amendment 3. I do not want to go on too much about this amendment, because I was able to have a very helpful and constructive meeting with the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, yesterday. I say at the outset that I will not press your Lordships to divide on this amendment, in the light of the very helpful assurances which he gave me yesterday. But I will just recap. On 26 February, I initiated a debate on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which I have the privilege to chair, about our report on transnational repression. It was a thorough debate and the Minister replied in his courteous manner. However, his reply did not meet all of the questions which we raised in that debate, or indeed in the report. I returned to it on 21 May, during the King’s Speech debate, and subsequently in a balloted debate that I won, which was secured for 4 June and which dealt with atrocity crimes. This is also an amendment which Alicia Kearns, Member of Parliament, raised in the House of Commons during its six-hour consideration of the Bill.

Without dwelling too much on procedural issues, I think all of us who have been around this place and have had the privilege to serve in both Houses know that to give the House of Commons only six hours of debate on a major Bill of this importance, and then to come to your Lordships and do all the remaining stages in one day flat, as we are doing today—Committee, Report and Third Reading—is clearly absurd, given that this is based on Jonathan Hall’s excellent report of 11 months ago, as is the idea that we have not had time during that period to debate some of these questions. Furthermore, it cannot be right that the Home Affairs Select Committee was unable to take evidence on the Bill, even though it requested it, or that my own committee, which wanted to scrutinise the Bill, was left to just write a letter to the Minister. The Minister has responded to that in his usual courteous way, and I am grateful, but how much better it would have been to have pre-legislative scrutiny and proper consideration of the Bill in the normal way. There are some questions that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, has asked and I am asking, and I know that colleagues from the Conservative Opposition Benches, the Liberal Democrat Benches and elsewhere on the Cross Benches have legitimate questions to ask about the Bill.

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[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I was pleased to co-sign the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. All the amendments in this group—Amendments 1, 3 and 4 in particular—are expressing frustration with the limited scope of the Bill. Perhaps the Minister might be able to give an idea as to whether the national security Bill that was heralded in the King’s Speech will be able to pick up some of these themes, if we are not successful in persuading the Government today to make amendments to this state threats Bill.

There is a feeling of concern that some threats that have been experienced, or that are pretty obvious, are not being sufficiently dealt with by the Government. This is particularly in relation to China, where we have been urged to wake up and not be naive about the underwater crocodile. Whether the Government are being naive or shaped by other considerations towards China, there is a feeling that there appears to be so much going on—demonstrated in the recent trial concerning the staff of the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, and otherwise instanced by the transnational repression towards residents of this country from Hong Kong who are being persecuted by the Chinese state, while they are supposedly under the protection of this country and this Government, which is intolerable—that we need to wake up and smell the coffee in relation to China.

I would like to hear some reassurances from the Minister that if he cannot take up some of these points in this Bill, the Government will take them up in the forthcoming national security Bill, which is intended to:

“Consolidate the Government’s approach to countering state threats to align more closely with the approach to countering terrorism”.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

I strongly agree with the points that the noble Baroness has just been making. She has referenced the plight of people living in the United Kingdom who now have bounties on their heads. Will she take the opportunity to highlight specifically the case of Chloe Cheung, who was 14 when she took part in pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong and now has a 1 million Hong Kong dollar bounty on her head and is fearful of being dragged in—as some were, and attempts were made to drag others, to the Chinese consulate in Manchester in order to intimidate them? These are not illusions. There are many frightened Hong Kongers in the UK worried about the direct attacks that are being made upon them. I thank the noble Baroness for raising the general point.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Not at all. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for all the work that he has done on this topic, both individually and as chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I had the pleasure of meeting Chloe Cheung and some of her colleagues, and became even more aware of the threats they are under. It is intolerable that people to whom we have rightly given protection and residence are facing these kinds of huge, life-threatening threats from a foreign state. So far, we are not feeling reassured that this Bill is going to cover these threats.

There is a feeling among many of us that we want to hear robust pledges from the Government, even if, for whatever reason, they now want to get the Bill through incredibly quickly, having—to the bemusement of some of us—taken over a year to get to the point. They now want to rush it all through, but so be it. There is unfinished business in the Bill. If it is not dealt with today, it needs to be dealt with as soon as possible in the forthcoming national security Bill: the transnational repression, the proxy networks, the issues with the capacity of our police forces to cope with these threats, the foreign language capacity, the resources, and, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, called it, the “China capability”. We risk being looked at as a laughing stock if our state and its law enforcement institutions are not able to cope with the threat being directed towards our state and the people living here. So I hope that, even if the Minister does not accept some of these amendments, he will tell us that no stone will be left unturned in the coverage of the national security Bill that we are expecting.

My noble friend Lady Doocey gave a very powerful justification of her own amendment on superintelligent AI. She certainly frightened me, in as far as I understood much of it. I am a bit behind the curve on AI, it has to be said, so she will have to give me a tutorial. But, to be serious, she rightly stressed all the threats and the Bill covers only a bit of this territory. We need to hear from the Government much stronger and more comprehensive responses to all the threats that are being sponsored by foreign countries towards us and the people who live here.

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[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions and comments and for the broad support for the Bill from the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames.

I shall start on the issue that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron has raised. This Bill is a result of a Labour manifesto commitment. It is a result of a commission we gave to Jonathan Hall KC to examine these areas in October 2024. He produced a report for the Government which they have examined in detail, and they have given commitments in this House to bring forward legislation at the earliest opportunity. This is the earliest opportunity. In giving time for discussions with the Official Opposition, the Liberal Democrats, the Cross Benches and noble Lords such as the noble Lords, Lord Alton, Lord Anderson and others, I have tried to make sure that we get this Bill right. It has had a fast track, agreed with the Opposition. It was put through the House of Commons in one day. We agreed to have Second Reading in one day and now all remaining stages of the Bill today. I have tried to support the Opposition to achieve their objectives. I have to say to the noble Lord that I have been very clear, open and honest in private conversations about what I can do and what I cannot do. What I have said to him I can do I have tried to do. As we shall see in later amendments, the Government have tried to assist other noble Lords.

I have also been very clear about what I cannot do. What I cannot do are things that dilute or damage the basic principle of this Bill, which is to give my right honourable friend the Home Secretary the power to undertake some designatory actions, which have been called for by His Majesty’s loyal Opposition, the Liberal Democrats and others in this House and in other places, against a number of potential state threats. That is why we fast-tracked the Bill: so that this House and others can give powers for the Secretary of State to consider it.

The noble Lord and I get on well—we have friendly discussion; we have discussions inside and outside this House—but I reject wholly his allegations today that we have not engaged on this Bill. It is worth putting that on the record; we have to put these things on the record occasionally.

The noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, raised specific questions on a number of matters. If he will allow, they need reflection and are not material to the amendments before us today, although they are tangential and important. I cannot give him definitive answers today on the four questions that he raised, but I will write to him on them.

A number of noble Lords also raised the national security Bill that is coming up shortly. I refer all those noble Lords to the King’s Speech 2026. The King’s Speech document contains four pages of detail on the national security Bill and about what we intend to do; the gracious Speech has announced that. Again, I cannot give noble Lords a date for its introduction, nor can I go above what has been said in the gracious Speech, but noble Lords need to know clearly that there will be a security Bill and that the gracious Speech’s objectives will be met. I refer noble Lords to that.

I thank my noble friend Lady Hayter for her Amendment 1. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for speaking to that amendment. I hope I can reassure my noble friend that not only was the National Security Act 2023 landmark legislation but it modernised the Government’s approach to dealing with the state threat activities that she mentioned by repealing the Official Secrets Act 1911 and the offences therein and modernising those offences as a whole.

The espionage offence was at Section 1 of the 1911 Act and the espionage activity that it dealt with is now comprehensively dealt with in various offences found in Part 1 of the National Security Act 2023. These include the espionage offences referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster. A number of other offences are in that Act. They protect key locations and key aspects of the state against foreign activity. They include the offence of assisting a foreign intelligence service. That offence at Section 3 of the Act has already proved invaluable in countering espionage and has led to recent convictions for serious offences in relation to those who acted for the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, to which noble Lords have recently referred.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, described China in colourful terms which were echoed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady D’Souza, the noble Lords, Lord Alton of Liverpool and Lord Shinkwin, and my noble friend Lord Beamish, from his experience on the Intelligence and Security Committee. They all raised the issue of China. I am clear on this. China poses a series of threats to the UK in national security terms, from cyber attacks, foreign interference, espionage, democratic institution interference and transnational repression, which are to be condemned. Protecting our security is non-negotiable, but we have to engage with China where there are clear UK global interests. Indeed, this engagement allows us to raise issues of concern—in which we occasionally have common interests.

I hope I can reassure my noble friend that the espionage activity that she has mentioned in Amendment 1 is covered completely. With those assurances, I hope that she can withdraw her amendment in due course.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

Just before the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, leaves that point—and he will know that I have raised this before—it was one of the points raised in the Joint Committee on Human Rights report, which identified China as the principal threat when it comes to transnational repression, more than any other state. We puzzled over why, therefore, Iran and Russia are in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, but China is not. I know that the Minister will say, “We continue to look at this”, but will he give us some idea of how long it will take before we get a real answer to that question?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am afraid the noble Lord will have to accept the answer I give him every time he raises this issue, which is that we keep these matters under review. If the Home Secretary believes that the power should be exercised, she will exercise it alongside the Foreign Secretary and other Ministers. I cannot give him the answer to that question now, for the reasons he knows. I hope he understands that.

The noble Lord’s Amendment 3 proposes new types of conduct to be treated as foreign power activity. As I understand it, this would supplement but not supplant the existing meaning of Section 33 of the National Security Act 2023 when making designations. I am entirely sympathetic to the aim of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, of making the UK a harder target for transnational repression. He will know it is a matter the Government take seriously and that we continue to make concrete progress, including on the helpful recommendations from the noble Lord’s own committee, the JCHR, and the detailed inquiry. This includes the continued implementation of the National Security Act 2023, the recent successful prosecutions I referred to a moment ago, the introduction of police training, practical guidance, a national protective security agency and a range of other matters.

Where a person carries out such activity with the intention of materially assisting a foreign intelligence service, it would already fall within the scope of foreign power threat activity. I think that is right and that the link back to the definition that Parliament agreed in passing the National Security Act 2023 is entirely appropriate.

Given the evolving nature of the threat and absence of an internationally agreed definition of transnational repression, we believe the broad approach recommended by the Defending Democracy Taskforce, coupled with the powers in the National Security Act and wider criminal law, is better suited to protecting potential victims. As I have said to the noble Lord outside the Chamber, I am happy to write to him by what I will term close of play in this House, 23 July, with further details of how we will respond on those matters accordingly.

I thank the noble Lord for Amendment 4, which touches on a significant issue. Outside of the Chamber, contrary to the assertions of the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, I have tried to meet the objectives and to talk to the noble Lord in a constructive way. The foreign power condition is a core component of existing offences in Part 1 of the National Security Act 2023. I will explain how we will deal with the foreign power condition and its interpretation, which I hope will reassure the noble Lord.

In my view, the foreign power condition can be met. Let me be clear that it is not necessary for a person to be tasked or directed by a foreign power in order for their actions to constitute foreign power threat activity. Under the National Security Act 2023, where a person acts for the purposes of advancing or giving effect to the policy of a foreign power, the foreign power condition can already be satisfied. In intending to promote or fulfil the published policy of another state through their conduct, a person is likely to at least intend to benefit a foreign power. It is important to add that the meaning of foreign power under Section 32 of the National Security Act 2023 is not limited to foreign Governments and their constituent parts. It is broad enough to include a range of agencies, including the type of agency that the noble Lord has mentioned and the governing political party of a foreign Government.

I am happy to put beyond doubt that activities inspired by the policy of a foreign power, including the governing political party of a state, would fall within the current definition of foreign power threat activity in the National Security Act 2023. I draw the noble Lord’s attention to the fact that the National Security Act 2023 was drafted with the intention of capturing the full range of state threat activity. I have looked at the matter extremely carefully and consulted with legal advisers in the Home Office, as well as operational partners. If it helps put the matter beyond doubt for the noble Lord, including for the purpose of interpretation by the courts, I can assure the Committee that interference activity motivated by the policy of the governing party of a state is prosecutable under the National Security Act 2023.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

I thank the Minister for giving that assurance. As he said, it puts it beyond doubt. It would enable that to be referred to in a court of law, should such a prosecution occur. I regard that as very significant progress, and I am grateful to the Minister.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My view is that there are powers there. However, in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, I am saying that we will ask the independent reviewer to examine whether we need to make any changes. That is the settlement I am trying to reach today. If there are other points I want to add to that, I will contact the noble Lord by letter or email afterwards. That is the settlement I am trying to put on the record for all parties today, to get this aspect of the Bill agreed and the amendments not pressed.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

The urgency of dealing with the question of AI was emphasised by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and, of course, by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, to whose excellent amendment I am a signatory. The Joint Committee on Human Rights is about to complete a further investigation into AI and human rights. I hope that, along with all the other referrals the Minister is going to make to the independent commissioner, he might ensure that the findings of that Joint Committee, which we anticipate will be published before the Summer Recess, will also be drawn to his attention.

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[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I am grateful for that clarification. It makes things much easier and will shorten the debate. The point that I was going to make, in respect of the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, is that designated bodies are different from terrorist organisations, because they may be exercising public functions in certain countries. For that reason, there are a number of British nationals who will have to engage with the designated bodies for perfectly legitimate reasons. Most of the examples that we have dealt with concern precisely that scenario: that is, cases of British nationals providing humanitarian assistance, journalists or those involved in conflict resolution.

But we should not lose sight of the possibility that even businesses could find themselves caught by these offences but for the reasonable excuse defence, which has now been accepted. There may, for example, be British businesses operating in Iran for perfectly legitimate reasons that will have to sell an investment and will have to obtain information from a designated body as part of that process. There may be British-Iranian dual nationals who have to, in the same way, accept or obtain information because they have to renew a passport or such other things. The reasonable defence excuse, which has now been cast in sufficiently wide terms, captures those situations. I am a little bit unclear about Section 17B, but the Section 17B offence concerns me a bit less because it already contains an important provision, UK-related activities, so does not come with as much of a risk of inappropriate application as Section 17C. With that, I welcome the Government’s concession on both of these aspects.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 22 in the group in my name and the name of my noble friend Lady D’Souza. It touches on the issues that my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich raised in his remarks. I am very pleased with the progress that we have made around humanitarian organisations.

During the Second Reading debate last week, I specifically referred to the position of the International Committee of the Red Cross and said that it would passing strange if the united desire of this House to designate organisations such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps could be used to impede the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross. I specifically referred to an amendment to the Bill which it asked should be moved. I tabled it in due course and it is on the Order Paper.

During our very helpful meeting yesterday, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, responded to another point that I raised with him and that I had also raised in correspondence with my noble friend Lord Anderson over the weekend concerning the position of journalists. I was struck by representations made by the admirable Alex Crawford from Sky News, who had given evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights during our inquiry into the activities of ISIS. The noble Lord will recall that I have raised with him the failure to prosecute any of the 400 ISIS members who committed genocide against Yazidis in northern Iraq and northern Syria and who have returned to this country. Not one of them has been prosecuted for crimes against humanity or the crime of genocide.

Alex Crawford went into the camps inside Syria and Iraq and very bravely interviewed some of the insurgents who were there, and she came to give evidence to our committee. She asked, “Would that mean, under the terms of this legislation, that I could be prosecuted for working to establish information and knowledge by going in directly to deal with a proscribed organisation?” I would like further clarity, just for the record and to put it beyond doubt, for people such as Alex Crawford, Lyse Doucet or many others. Last week, I referred to Kate Adie, who stood in Tiananmen Square at the time of the massacres that occurred there. Would someone like that also be placing themselves at risk under the legislation? Let us put that beyond doubt. I know that it is not the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Hanson. During our discussions yesterday, I felt that we made very significant progress in dealing with that.

I will just briefly refer to the position of the IRGC. This is not just about NGOs. The IRGC, as we all know, has to do some very delicate, sensitive and confidential work, sometimes engaging directly in places where there are organisations that we have proscribed or that we will, in the future, designate. Much of this can be funded by the United Kingdom, pursuant to the Geneva conventions, and this can include the provision of medical care of the wounded and sick. So, the idea that this could proscribe such groups solely to secure humanitarian access to civilian populations and detain persons—

[Baroness Northover (LD)]

My Lords, I think the noble Lord means the International Committee of the Red Cross.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

I do indeed—there are too many acronyms flying around at the moment, and it is rather late in the day. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness.