Tuesday 30th June 2026
(1 month ago)
Lords ChamberNational Security (State Threats) Act 2026 View all National Security (State Threats) Act 2026 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 35-I(b) Manuscript amendment for Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (30 Jun 2026)
18:31 - Division on Amendment 20 - Ayes: 150 / Noes: 216 - Amendment 20 disagreed.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions and comments and for the broad support for the Bill from the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames.
I shall start on the issue that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron has raised. This Bill is a result of a Labour manifesto commitment. It is a result of a commission we gave to Jonathan Hall KC to examine these areas in October 2024. He produced a report for the Government which they have examined in detail, and they have given commitments in this House to bring forward legislation at the earliest opportunity. This is the earliest opportunity. In giving time for discussions with the Official Opposition, the Liberal Democrats, the Cross Benches and noble Lords such as the noble Lords, Lord Alton, Lord Anderson and others, I have tried to make sure that we get this Bill right. It has had a fast track, agreed with the Opposition. It was put through the House of Commons in one day. We agreed to have Second Reading in one day and now all remaining stages of the Bill today. I have tried to support the Opposition to achieve their objectives. I have to say to the noble Lord that I have been very clear, open and honest in private conversations about what I can do and what I cannot do. What I have said to him I can do I have tried to do. As we shall see in later amendments, the Government have tried to assist other noble Lords.
I have also been very clear about what I cannot do. What I cannot do are things that dilute or damage the basic principle of this Bill, which is to give my right honourable friend the Home Secretary the power to undertake some designatory actions, which have been called for by His Majesty’s loyal Opposition, the Liberal Democrats and others in this House and in other places, against a number of potential state threats. That is why we fast-tracked the Bill: so that this House and others can give powers for the Secretary of State to consider it.
The noble Lord and I get on well—we have friendly discussion; we have discussions inside and outside this House—but I reject wholly his allegations today that we have not engaged on this Bill. It is worth putting that on the record; we have to put these things on the record occasionally.
The noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, raised specific questions on a number of matters. If he will allow, they need reflection and are not material to the amendments before us today, although they are tangential and important. I cannot give him definitive answers today on the four questions that he raised, but I will write to him on them.
A number of noble Lords also raised the national security Bill that is coming up shortly. I refer all those noble Lords to the King’s Speech 2026. The King’s Speech document contains four pages of detail on the national security Bill and about what we intend to do; the gracious Speech has announced that. Again, I cannot give noble Lords a date for its introduction, nor can I go above what has been said in the gracious Speech, but noble Lords need to know clearly that there will be a security Bill and that the gracious Speech’s objectives will be met. I refer noble Lords to that.
I thank my noble friend Lady Hayter for her Amendment 1. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for speaking to that amendment. I hope I can reassure my noble friend that not only was the National Security Act 2023 landmark legislation but it modernised the Government’s approach to dealing with the state threat activities that she mentioned by repealing the Official Secrets Act 1911 and the offences therein and modernising those offences as a whole.
The espionage offence was at Section 1 of the 1911 Act and the espionage activity that it dealt with is now comprehensively dealt with in various offences found in Part 1 of the National Security Act 2023. These include the espionage offences referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster. A number of other offences are in that Act. They protect key locations and key aspects of the state against foreign activity. They include the offence of assisting a foreign intelligence service. That offence at Section 3 of the Act has already proved invaluable in countering espionage and has led to recent convictions for serious offences in relation to those who acted for the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, to which noble Lords have recently referred.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, described China in colourful terms which were echoed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady D’Souza, the noble Lords, Lord Alton of Liverpool and Lord Shinkwin, and my noble friend Lord Beamish, from his experience on the Intelligence and Security Committee. They all raised the issue of China. I am clear on this. China poses a series of threats to the UK in national security terms, from cyber attacks, foreign interference, espionage, democratic institution interference and transnational repression, which are to be condemned. Protecting our security is non-negotiable, but we have to engage with China where there are clear UK global interests. Indeed, this engagement allows us to raise issues of concern—in which we occasionally have common interests.
I hope I can reassure my noble friend that the espionage activity that she has mentioned in Amendment 1 is covered completely. With those assurances, I hope that she can withdraw her amendment in due course.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
Just before the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, leaves that point—and he will know that I have raised this before—it was one of the points raised in the Joint Committee on Human Rights report, which identified China as the principal threat when it comes to transnational repression, more than any other state. We puzzled over why, therefore, Iran and Russia are in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, but China is not. I know that the Minister will say, “We continue to look at this”, but will he give us some idea of how long it will take before we get a real answer to that question?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am afraid the noble Lord will have to accept the answer I give him every time he raises this issue, which is that we keep these matters under review. If the Home Secretary believes that the power should be exercised, she will exercise it alongside the Foreign Secretary and other Ministers. I cannot give him the answer to that question now, for the reasons he knows. I hope he understands that.
The noble Lord’s Amendment 3 proposes new types of conduct to be treated as foreign power activity. As I understand it, this would supplement but not supplant the existing meaning of Section 33 of the National Security Act 2023 when making designations. I am entirely sympathetic to the aim of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, of making the UK a harder target for transnational repression. He will know it is a matter the Government take seriously and that we continue to make concrete progress, including on the helpful recommendations from the noble Lord’s own committee, the JCHR, and the detailed inquiry. This includes the continued implementation of the National Security Act 2023, the recent successful prosecutions I referred to a moment ago, the introduction of police training, practical guidance, a national protective security agency and a range of other matters.
Where a person carries out such activity with the intention of materially assisting a foreign intelligence service, it would already fall within the scope of foreign power threat activity. I think that is right and that the link back to the definition that Parliament agreed in passing the National Security Act 2023 is entirely appropriate.
Given the evolving nature of the threat and absence of an internationally agreed definition of transnational repression, we believe the broad approach recommended by the Defending Democracy Taskforce, coupled with the powers in the National Security Act and wider criminal law, is better suited to protecting potential victims. As I have said to the noble Lord outside the Chamber, I am happy to write to him by what I will term close of play in this House, 23 July, with further details of how we will respond on those matters accordingly.
I thank the noble Lord for Amendment 4, which touches on a significant issue. Outside of the Chamber, contrary to the assertions of the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, I have tried to meet the objectives and to talk to the noble Lord in a constructive way. The foreign power condition is a core component of existing offences in Part 1 of the National Security Act 2023. I will explain how we will deal with the foreign power condition and its interpretation, which I hope will reassure the noble Lord.
In my view, the foreign power condition can be met. Let me be clear that it is not necessary for a person to be tasked or directed by a foreign power in order for their actions to constitute foreign power threat activity. Under the National Security Act 2023, where a person acts for the purposes of advancing or giving effect to the policy of a foreign power, the foreign power condition can already be satisfied. In intending to promote or fulfil the published policy of another state through their conduct, a person is likely to at least intend to benefit a foreign power. It is important to add that the meaning of foreign power under Section 32 of the National Security Act 2023 is not limited to foreign Governments and their constituent parts. It is broad enough to include a range of agencies, including the type of agency that the noble Lord has mentioned and the governing political party of a foreign Government.
I am happy to put beyond doubt that activities inspired by the policy of a foreign power, including the governing political party of a state, would fall within the current definition of foreign power threat activity in the National Security Act 2023. I draw the noble Lord’s attention to the fact that the National Security Act 2023 was drafted with the intention of capturing the full range of state threat activity. I have looked at the matter extremely carefully and consulted with legal advisers in the Home Office, as well as operational partners. If it helps put the matter beyond doubt for the noble Lord, including for the purpose of interpretation by the courts, I can assure the Committee that interference activity motivated by the policy of the governing party of a state is prosecutable under the National Security Act 2023.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
I thank the Minister for giving that assurance. As he said, it puts it beyond doubt. It would enable that to be referred to in a court of law, should such a prosecution occur. I regard that as very significant progress, and I am grateful to the Minister.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful for that welcome from the noble Lord, Lord Alton.
I will touch on Amendment 5, from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, who—again contrary to what the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, has said— I have tried to engage with a number of times this week, including, at short notice, in discussions across the board. I am trying my best to achieve those objectives.
Amendment 5 seeks to expand the scope of the preparatory conduct offence and the definition of foreign threat activity to incorporate the development of artificial superintelligence. The noble Baroness has a strong point. She is right to identify the risks posed by advanced AI models. As the picture is rapidly evolving, it is vital that the Government step up to this challenge, and we are already trying to do so. We have the AI Security Institute, the most advanced capability of any Government in the world for understanding AI. The National Cyber Security Centre, part of GCHQ, is providing world-leading defensive capabilities. The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill, which is currently progressing through Parliament, will strengthen protections, and we are shortly to produce a national cyber action plan setting out the steps that the Government want to take.
However, I recognise that the noble Baroness has made important points, and I will go as far as I can to reassure her on those issues. The Government recognise that the development by foreign powers of highly advanced artificial intelligence systems poses a risk to our cyber security and our national security. We will therefore—I hope this helps the noble Baroness—ask the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation to expressly consider whether amendments to legislation are necessary to redefine “foreign power threat activity”. Accordingly, we will do that. In response to the points that the noble Baroness has made, it is up to the independent reviewer to consult who they think is necessary, but I anticipate—I hope this is helpful to the noble Baroness—that they may wish to consult with a range of experts, as she has suggested, relating to AI.
My noble friend Lord Beamish is in the Committee today and, while it is a matter for the ISC itself, I am happy that we involve the ISC in that as appropriate. The Government always welcome the views of relevant committees, and I encourage my noble friend Lord Beamish to look at any AI issues if he requires it. I hope that reassures the noble Baroness on the experts that we can bring in, alongside the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation and the ISC examining these important areas. I hope that will help the noble Baroness.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
I apologise for interrupting the Minister in full flow. Can he make the position absolutely clear? He said that, as far as the Government are concerned, on the advice that they have received, Amendment 3 is covered by Section 33 of the 2023 Act. He has put that plainly on the record. Is he also saying that, as far as the Government are concerned, Amendment 5 is covered by Section 18 of the 2023 Act but, if that is not the case and the independent reviewer makes cogent recommendations, the Government will come ready to this House to amend Section 18 of the 2023 Act as necessary? The one thing to remember in the context of the independent reviewer is that the independent reviewer can only tell the Government what he thinks. He cannot amend the law himself. That assurance would be very helpful.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I happily give the noble Lord the assurance that, as I have said, we are trying to ensure that we ask the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation to expressly consider whether amendments to the legislation, as in the area noted by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, are considered. That will be a formal request, involving the independent reviewer making a judgment about who he wishes to call, and that would undoubtedly include, as suggested by the noble Baroness, independent AI experts. My noble friend Lord Beamish, the chair of the ISC, is in the Chamber today and will have heard what has been said. He has had the discussion and the offer has been made to all parties that they at least submit some evidence as part of that process.
I go back to the genesis of the Bill. The Bill is around because there was a manifesto commitment. There was a request to the independent reviewer and he has come up with suggestions. We have introduced the Bill as part of those suggestions, and we have said in response to other areas that His Majesty’s Opposition have pressed us on that we will consider those matters, but we have to do so as part of other, wider Bills. I am saying to the Committee today that this is a defined Bill with a defined purpose. I am trying to ensure that, having listened to the Committee, and as we will discuss in later amendments—
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I will finish this sentence, if I may. As we will discuss in later amendments, we have made some changes to help reflect some of the views that have been put to me. Ultimately, that is the position that I am trying to take.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
May I repeat my second question? Will the Minister confirm that it is the Government’s view that Amendment 5 is covered already by Section 18 of the National Security Act 2023?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My view is that there are powers there. However, in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, I am saying that we will ask the independent reviewer to examine whether we need to make any changes. That is the settlement I am trying to reach today. If there are other points I want to add to that, I will contact the noble Lord by letter or email afterwards. That is the settlement I am trying to put on the record for all parties today, to get this aspect of the Bill agreed and the amendments not pressed.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
The urgency of dealing with the question of AI was emphasised by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and, of course, by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, to whose excellent amendment I am a signatory. The Joint Committee on Human Rights is about to complete a further investigation into AI and human rights. I hope that, along with all the other referrals the Minister is going to make to the independent commissioner, he might ensure that the findings of that Joint Committee, which we anticipate will be published before the Summer Recess, will also be drawn to his attention.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The noble Lord knows that I always welcome the views of the committee, and I will look at them and reflect on them with colleagues. I can probably give a definitive yes to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, on his point; I was hedging my bets, but I think I can give a definitive yes. I hope that helps him in his assessment. I always like to give the House exquisite legal advice on these matters, rather than finding myself having to examine my own comments at a later date. I hope again that, given all the points that have been made, my noble friend will withdraw her amendment and that other noble Lords will not push theirs.
The Committee will notice that I have not spoken to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, or indeed the clause stand part notice from the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, which were in this group, because they have not spoken to them. With that, I hope that my noble friend will respond accordingly.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
I first thank the noble Lords, Lord Alton, Lord Beamish and Lord Shinkwin, for their support. I also thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Foster, and in particular the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, who managed to get Jimmy Lai’s name in, which we always appreciate. I thank my noble friend the Minister for his assurance that espionage is covered.
This is a live issue. The Chief Executive of Hong Kong, John Lee, has said that overseas activists with bounties on their heads will be “pursued for life”. Activists such as Christopher Mung, Ted Hui, Finn Lau and Nathan Law have all been targeted by the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, so what we are asking for is urgent. That is why I support this Bill going as fast as possible and being implemented as quick as possible. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, the amendments in this group concern offences relating to the support and assistance of designated bodies. The noble Lord, Lord Walney, has not spoken to his amendments. In this regard, it is worth commenting that these Benches have a lot of sympathy with the principle behind the noble Lord’s amendments—he spoke at Second Reading last week—namely, the fact that a designated body, as a media organ, should not be a potential avenue by which criminals avoid prosecution. It is an issue worthy of consideration. It would be interesting if the Minister could confirm whether the offences proposed by the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Walney, would already be captured by the Bill as drafted.
Amendment 9, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, would make it an offence to conceal beneficial ownership relating to a designated organisation. Again, we on these Benches support the principle behind this amendment. The use, funnelling or concealment of funds to support a designated body should undoubtedly be an offence that is captured by the Bill, and I hope that the Minister can provide assurances that this will be the case. I look forward to his response.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful for the contributions from the noble Lords, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Cameron of Lochiel. The noble Lord, Lord Walney, is not in his place, but his amendments have been referred to. I confirm to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, that the conduct captured in the amendments is already appropriately provided for by the existing provisions in the Bill. Had the noble Lord, Lord Walney, spoken to them, I would have gone into more detail, but that is the principle of the response to date.
I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for his Amendment 9, which intends to specify the concealment of beneficial ownership, and the establishment and maintenance of that concealment of finance and assets related to a designated body, as material assistance. The Government take corruption in all its forms very seriously. We welcome the noble Lord’s focus on this important issue, and the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, for the objectives that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has outlined.
On the noble Lord’s concerns about beneficial ownership, the Government have a strong record on reducing illicit finance, including working with overseas territories and Crown dependencies to do so. The register of overseas entities requires overseas entities that own UK property to register verified information on their beneficial owners with Companies House and to update that information. The Government also produce an annual progress report to Parliament on Companies House reforms, including updates to the register of overseas entities.
The “Assisting a designated body” offence is not limited to financial benefits; providing access to services is already explicitly covered by subsection (3) of the new Section 17B offence. Establishing or running an arrangement to look after a designated body’s assets is a service. Those who do so professionally are often called trust or company service providers. This reflects that there are no specific financial measures in the Bill but they can be applied in all environments. Therefore, the activity that the amendment seeks to address is already within the scope of the new offence.
The amendment is unnecessary in a positive way, in that the Bill is already covering this area, and although the noble Lord has drawn specific attention to this matter, I can explicitly confirm the extent of the provisions of the Bill, and we anticipate that a key utility for this power will be to call out and bear down on the very front companies the noble Lord has referred to which are carrying out foreign power threat activities as proxies for hostile powers. If the noble Lord looks at the Explanatory Notes to the Bill, he will see that that is very clear. I know he will have looked at those in detail, but I reaffirm for other Members of the Committee that the Explanatory Notes are very clear on that point.
If I may, I will follow up in writing to the noble Lord to give some further detail to him and his colleagues regarding the work that the Government are doing to prevent the misuse of beneficial ownership structures and financing of designated bodies more broadly. When I do that, I will place a copy of the letter in the Libraries of both Houses to ensure that all Members have access to my correspondence in due course. It is a matter for the noble Lord, but I think that we have covered these matters. It was very important that he raised them, but I respectfully ask him not to push his amendment; given that his is the last amendment standing in this group, I hope he will withdraw it and allow us to deal with matters by correspondence.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
I am very grateful for the assurances and explanations that the Minister has given. I will not press the amendment to a vote now, but I invite him to consider, between now and the introduction of further legislation, whether there is a complete overlap, so that anybody who helps the disguise of assets, perhaps without knowing that the designated body is the beneficiary of that assistance, will be covered by the offence as it stands, because it seems to me that there is a possible lacuna where new legislation would be helpful. If he would add to his assurance by saying that he will at least consider whether there is such a gap, I would be happier in withdrawing my amendment, which I will seek leave to do in any event. I give him an opportunity to respond to that very specific point.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I give the noble Lord the assurance that we will certainly look at those matters, and I will include that in the correspondence that I send him post the consideration of the Bill.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
I am very grateful and, with that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and I am delighted to add my support to Amendments 12A, 13A, 18A and 19A in her name. The unintended application of the new Sections 17B and 17C to those who carry out humanitarian activities was a danger to which we both spoke at Second Reading, and these amendments go a very long way to laying those concerns to rest.
My own Amendment 17, signed also by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, who is not in his place, has similarly been superseded by Amendment 17A, which I tabled yesterday after discussion with the Minister. It appears in the supplementary list and is accompanied by the minor and consequential manuscript Amendment 18B.
Amendment 17A was floated in the Second Reading speech of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, last Tuesday, tweaked in the note produced by Jonathan Hall KC on Thursday and tabled by me later that day. Three Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation might not be quite as entertaining as the Three Tenors, but we have, I hope, as so often, sung more or less in harmony.
The problem that Amendment 17A seeks to address is the breadth of Section 17C, which prohibits obtaining material benefits from a designated body. Section 17C(3) defines material benefits as including not only
“anything which has the potential to result in a financial benefit”,
but additionally, and separately, the unqualified word “information”. The Minister sought to assist by suggesting at Second Reading that the transfer of information was caught by the prohibition only when it possesses
“an inherent value that enriches the recipient”.—[Official Report, 23/6/26; col. 614.]
Although I am as keen on gift horses as the next person, and while I appreciate the helpful spirit in which the Minister’s interpretation was put forward, I must confess that it is not one in which I would feel complete confidence as an advocate.
The starting point of Section 17C is that any receipt of information from or on behalf of a designated body is a criminal offence. Diplomats and other public servants have a defence. There is another defence of reasonable excuse in Section 17C(7), but this operates as a defence only to the charge of retaining the material benefit, not to a charge of obtaining it, accepting it or agreeing to accept it. That is the hole this amendment fills where information is concerned. It protects those who are not diplomats but who none the less have a legitimate interest in soliciting or obtaining information from a designated body.
Those engaged in humanitarian activity will now be protected by Amendment 18A. I mentioned at Second Reading the HALO Trust, which could otherwise have been at risk for asking a designated body where the mines were laid. But Amendment 17A remains vital for those who are neither diplomats nor engaged in humanitarian activity. I spoke at Second Reading of a small number of reputable organisations which enter into dialogue with bodies susceptible to designation for the purposes of conflict prevention and resolution. One of those bodies is the charity Inter Mediate, founded by Jonathan Powell, in which I declare a non-pecuniary interest as chair. Such bodies might be described as humanitarian, in which case they are protected by Amendment 18A. But, in case of any doubt, their ability to engage in such dialogues is safeguarded by Amendment 17A.
There are also foreign correspondents, a number of whom I have engaged with in recent days. In order to inform the public as effectively as possible, some of them routinely speak to sources in and around bodies liable to designation. They do not make it their practice to alert government or anyone else to the fact that they are doing so. While they understand that the Attorney-General has a discretion over whether to bring prosecutions, they point, I am afraid, to the abusive exercise of equivalent discretions elsewhere in the common-law world and ask, in the words of the title of Peter Hennessy’s latest book, “Could it happen here?” Prosecutorial discretion is of course a vital safeguard, but it is no substitute for a clear law that neither penalises reasonable behaviour, nor chills those who are associated with it.
These amendments do not weaken this vital Bill, but they avoid its unintended consequences. They give effect to the Government’s unrealised intention, expressed in the factsheet that accompanied the Bill, to include within it defences for humanitarian engagement and journalistic freedoms. I thank the Minister and the Bill team for their courteous and helpful engagement.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I realise that it is unusual to speak this early in the debate, but I just hope the House will bear with me for a second. I believe it is important to give a view on the two sets of amendments that have been moved, so that colleagues will understand where the Government are coming from in any contributions they wish to make.
I recognise the concern raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and also by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, about inadvertently criminalising the provision of legitimate humanitarian aid, and the resulting chilling effect this could have on important work. We have listened to the concerns and we have had extensive discussion outside the Committee. The Government will accept a new defence into Sections 17B and 17C, which is manifested by Amendments 12A, 13A, 18A and 19A, where conduct is carried out for the purpose of carrying out humanitarian activities, which are defined as only those activities carried out in accordance with internationally recognised principles and standards.
I am also grateful again for Amendment 17A from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, which is based on the advice of Jonathan Hall KC, to expand the defence of “reasonable excuse” to cover obtaining, accepting or agreeing to accept information from a designated body. This pragmatic proposal will mean that, where a legitimate humanitarian organisation, such as those mentioned by the noble Lord, or a charity involved in conflict resolution, or indeed a journalist, takes information from a designated body, which could be about the location of landmines, for example, that organisation will not fall foul of the new offence at Section 17C. The amendment that the Government are willing to accept in the form of new Section 17C(7A) is intended to reflect that.
Again, I am happy if any other noble Lords wish to contribute to the debate and make any further points, if the House will allow me at the end of the debate to respond to those points. I thought it important to put on record now that there should be no difference between us. Therefore, the debate, I would hope, is about the importance of this subject, rather than the Government being forced into agreeing any particular amendment or not. With that, I will sit down and allow other noble Lords to contribute, but I hope the Government’s position is now clear.
Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I am grateful for that clarification. It makes things much easier and will shorten the debate. The point that I was going to make, in respect of the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, is that designated bodies are different from terrorist organisations, because they may be exercising public functions in certain countries. For that reason, there are a number of British nationals who will have to engage with the designated bodies for perfectly legitimate reasons. Most of the examples that we have dealt with concern precisely that scenario: that is, cases of British nationals providing humanitarian assistance, journalists or those involved in conflict resolution.
But we should not lose sight of the possibility that even businesses could find themselves caught by these offences but for the reasonable excuse defence, which has now been accepted. There may, for example, be British businesses operating in Iran for perfectly legitimate reasons that will have to sell an investment and will have to obtain information from a designated body as part of that process. There may be British-Iranian dual nationals who have to, in the same way, accept or obtain information because they have to renew a passport or such other things. The reasonable defence excuse, which has now been cast in sufficiently wide terms, captures those situations. I am a little bit unclear about Section 17B, but the Section 17B offence concerns me a bit less because it already contains an important provision, UK-related activities, so does not come with as much of a risk of inappropriate application as Section 17C. With that, I welcome the Government’s concession on both of these aspects.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. It is vital to our national security that those who assist bodies designated under this Bill are appropriately and effectively punished. The Terrorism Act 2000 has no prohibited purpose condition analogous to that included in the Bill, which we on these Benches believe could be exploited by potential criminals.
As my noble friend Lord Cameron and I argued at Second Reading, the existence of a prohibited purpose requirement will add a large degree of subjectivity and present further evidential barriers for prosecutors in the majority of cases where offenders have no legitimate defence. This argument was also made by Conservative MPs in the other place. We were told, however, by the Government that they were unable to accept our amendment, that no amendments to this Bill would be accepted and that our only chance of engaging in meaningful dialogue was to wait until the next national security Bill, the date for which is unspecified.
It is in that context that I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. Amendments 12A, 13A, 17A, 18A and 19A seek to create a defence for the offences of assisting a designated body or obtaining material benefit from a designated body. I understand the principle behind these amendments. However, we on these Benches worry that
“for the purpose of carrying out humanitarian activities”
is a potentially subjective criterion that may be misinterpreted and expanded by the judiciary or exploited by those seeking to harm the interests of the UK. Equally, the inclusion of a “reasonable excuse” defence for the obtaining of material benefit from designated bodies is a cause for concern. The wording is sufficiently broad that it may encompass excuses that are not intended to be captured. Moreover, the Minister has repeatedly resisted amendments with much tighter wording, arguing that the intention was for this Bill to be drawn as narrowly as possible.
Given the perhaps unhelpful manner that the Government have displayed during the passage of the Bill, I was extremely surprised to see these amendments appear on the supplementary Marshalled List last night. The tabling of amendments at the 11th hour, with minor drafting tweaks, would make the reasonable observer conclude that the Government have been involved in the drafting process. However, I struggle to believe that would be the case, given that the Government have told the Official Opposition on multiple occasions that they were unable to make further policy decisions during the interregnum. Indeed, they were so unwavering in this stance that they were unable to accept even amendments that had been confirmed as government policy, such as that on the seizure of passports. Therefore, I look to the Minister to assure the House that there has been no government involvement in the drafting of amendments in this group. Can he confirm that?
I can only reasonably assume that the Government will therefore be unable to accept the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Northover. If the Government have offered assistance to the Liberal Democrats and are willing to accept the amendments in this group, I have several further questions for the Minister. Why did he inform us that the Government’s hands were tied and that no compromises could be made on the Bill between Second Reading and today? Given that the Conservatives also raised the issue of a defence to the offence of supporting a designated body, why were the Government willing to give preferential treatment and to work with Liberal Democrat Peers, but not the Conservatives? The Government informed us several times that, even with amendments they were sympathetic to, there simply was not enough time to draft them in an acceptable form during the passage of the Bill. Can the Minister now confirm that this was not the case, or did the Home Office increase the capacity of the legislative team over the weekend?
The concerns raised by the amendments in this group are not novel. In the spirit of collaboration, I even wrote to the Minister on 10 June, before Second Reading, outlining the issues on which we wished to work constructively. We were told in no uncertain terms that, on every issue raised, the Government were unable or indeed unwilling to act. The decision therefore to assist in the drafting of amendments that were published the night before Committee is just not satisfactory. It leaves noble Lords with very little time to consider amendments that concern national security and which are an unfortunate attempt at avoiding genuine parliamentary scrutiny. I would be very pleased if the Minister could address these concerns.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
For the avoidance of doubt, I quite like the noble Lord, and we have a good relationship on these matters. I think I have constructive discussions on these matters with both noble Lords opposite. But I want to say to the House that I have been very clear to the noble Lord from His Majesty’s loyal Opposition that there are certain things we can do and there are certain things we cannot. There are some issues we agree with, but not in this Bill, and there are other measures we will return to in future legislation. I have tried to not dilute the central purpose of this Bill, which is to give the Home Secretary a power to designate anybody that she, having taken advice from a range of sources in the Home Office and through agencies, thinks is a threat to the state.
As I have said, the issues the noble Lord has tried to shoehorn into the Bill are ones the Government in part agree with, and we will find a proper mechanism to implement those policies in due course. I did not want to extend the scope of the Bill, nor did I want to put in measures that, in my view, dilute its core purpose. That is why I have not been able to help the noble Lord.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the noble Baroness, Lady Northover—and indeed the Liberal Democrat Front Bench—made points about the unintended consequence of humanitarian, journalistic or other agencies being caught. I have tried, privately and at Second Reading, to give assurances that the Bill as drafted would not lead to those unintended consequences.
But it is perfectly reasonable for a Minister, between Second Reading and Committee, to listen to representations that are made and, as has happened, to have my officials and other Ministers in the department meet a range of humanitarian bodies, and to have respected journalists, such as Alex Crawford and Kate Adie, who were mentioned, raise issues with Members of this House where they are concerned about the impact of a particular Bill; and for us as a Government to reflect on those matters and, when amendments are discussed, to agree, potentially, areas where we can accept them. Yes, I accept that they are checked by Home Office lawyers, because this is the law of the land which the Home Office has to implement, but, with due respect to the noble Lord, I do not think that that is rejecting the things that he said.
I have tried to have a focus on the Bill. In my view, the amendments we have accepted give additional certainty. We thought we had that certainty, but requests were made to give that additional certainty and therefore we have done so. There are amendments in this group that we have not accepted and I cannot accept—I am afraid I am a perpetual disappointment to the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, on his Amendment 22. But, in saying that I cannot accept the amendment he has tabled, I reassure him that the Bill we have crafted is designed to ensure that legitimate activities such as diplomacy and journalism, and activities that support basic human needs, are not caught within its offences.
We have to be alive to the risks of creating blanket exemptions, which could easily be exploited by sophisticated state actors. We have genuine concerns that exemptions could create simple loopholes for hostile actors to exploit. Those hostile actors frequently operate behind front organisations and sometimes shell charities, so a general carve-out would allow those bodies to carry out activities under the guise of relief work. I know the noble Lord does not want that, and he will know that that would not be right. There is a risk that legitimate humanitarian organisations are infiltrated by hostile actors, and, again, we must avoid unintended consequences.
However, I have recognised the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and I said what I said in my earlier introductory remarks, which do not need repeating. I am grateful to the noble Lords for their thoughtful and constructive amendments. They have helped strengthen the Bill and broaden its support, and they have meant that we have been able to tighten in many ways the concerns that were raised and address those properly.
I come back to the final point that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, mentioned. He made some good points; for example, there are things that he said on passports that are important. I agree with him; I have said to him, privately and on the Floor of the House at Second Reading, and I say to him now, that the Government hope they can do those things in this Session of Parliament. But the Bill before us is narrowly defined for a specific purpose, which is one I suspect he supports and which, ultimately, if the Bill can achieve early passage, will be resolved.
In answer to the question on whether the amendments we accept have to go back to the House of Commons, I say yes, that is right, but I am confident they will be agreed. I cannot say when, because I am not the business manager for the House of Commons, but I expect it to be done as soon as possible. If those amendments are accepted here, I have 110% confidence that they will be accepted in the House of Commons. Therefore, the Bill, as amended, with the safeguards that have been sought, can be presented for potential Royal Assent, and the powers that are in it can be exercised by the Home Secretary as a matter of urgency.
I therefore commend the amendments that I have indicated—Amendments 12A, 13A, 17A, 18A and 19A—to the Committee in support of the noble Lords, and I ask the noble Lord, Lord Alton, whether he will allow me to reflect still further on his Amendment 22, as discussed.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for giving the Committee the opportunity to debate these amendments, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for articulating the general position that the Government will take. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, for the comments that he made, which mirror some of the points I will make in my response.
I completely understand why the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower, Lord Pickles—who has just spoken—Lord Walney and Lord Verdirame, wish to pass these amendments. They make a legitimate argument. The Government are clear in their opposition to all forms of terrorist support, particularly in the current context of antisemitism, and there are key issues that the Government wish to take specific action on. I will say a few words about each of the proposed offences in turn.
As has been said, Amendment 20 is modelled on Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which relates to organisations proscribed for being concerned with terrorism. Section 13 has proved to be operationally useful as a strict liability offence, meaning the prosecution does not have to prove an individual’s intention or state of mind. Terrorist organisations seek to recruit others to further their harmful ideologies, and wearing a terrorist uniform or displaying insignia, a flag or a logo are all acts of strength or dominance, if not terror. Section 13 seeks to deny proscribed organisations that oxygen of publicity.
However—this is where I hope I can offer an explanation to the Committee—as was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, for bodies involved in state threat activity, the situation is different. Foreign intelligence services and their proxies largely operate covertly and discreetly. This means that acts of flag waving and wearing a uniform in allegiance to a designated body are less of a concern. Notwithstanding difficulties that may arise with immunity from prosecution, in the event that a state body is designated, the offence could criminalise, among other things, a visiting military attaché, an embassy worker, or a cultural delegation. This could have profound consequences for diplomatic relations, and, where a designated body is a front company that was previously perceived as legitimate, this strict liability offence might punish those who simply fail to remove that body’s branding. Any need for the offence is especially limited, given that the offence of “supporting a designated body” under new Section 17A is wide enough in scope to capture the same activities. I therefore cannot accept Amendment 20.
I shall comment also on Amendment 21, which relates to a new offence:
“Dissemination of publications relating to a designated body”.
It includes a power for constables to seek the removal of internet-based publications. Again, the amendment replicates Sections 2 and 3 of the Terrorism Act 2006, but for designated entities. These offences cover the sale or other dissemination of books or other publications that encourage people to engage in terrorism or provide information that could be useful to terrorists. The Act, as currently constituted, provides a power for police to require the takedown of such material by internet service providers.
Section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006 is designed to criminalise the dissemination of terrorist publications. It was introduced recognising the significant harm that can be caused. This offence purposely is not dependent on an organisation having been proscribed, recognising that terrorist publications may include publications which include and encourage the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism more broadly. In contrast, this Bill focuses on the strengthening of our response to organisations involved in foreign power threat activities that pose an acute threat to the UK and its interests. The threat from publications in this context is, I would suggest, not the same.
Offences in the National Security Act were specifically designed to target threats from state-linked activity, and that Act contains a number of offences that do not appear in terrorism legislation, including assisting a foreign intelligence service. In addition, this Bill includes offences under new Section 17A if a person
“invites support for, or expresses an opinion or belief that is supportive of, a designated body, and does so for a prohibited purpose”.
I contend that this offence is wide enough to capture the dissemination of publications where those requirements are met. A replicated offence in this case is not appropriate or required to address the state threats, and, incidentally, it was not recommended by Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation, who cautioned against directly copying these offences. He said:
“There is no evidence that penalising general encouragement of state threat activity is needed to avert harm to national security”.
Therefore, I suggest to the noble Lord that this amendment is unnecessary: it is not recommended by Jonathan Hall and the powers should not be included in the Bill.
The final amendment is one we have discussed on several occasions, including today. Amendment 23 seeks to give effect to Jonathan Hall KC’s recommendation that the police be given the power to seize passports. Whereas Jonathan Hall KC recommended that the power should be available on the basis of suspected foreign power threat activity, as currently exists for terrorism-related activity, this amendment is more limited in its application. Noble Lords will be aware that the Bill before us covers a range of issues, but as to the proposal in this amendment, I have already given a commitment on several occasions to deliver all Jonathan Hall KC’s recommendations in the report that inspired this Bill, including the question of passport seizure, which Amendment 23 seeks to examine. However, I have been clear that, in doing so, the Bill should focus narrowly on the new proscription-like power to tackle state threats, and it is not the right vehicle for this proposal.
The noble Lord’s Amendment 23 covers pages 14 to 26 of the amendment paper, the Marshalled List that is in front of us today. It takes 13 pages to give implementation to the policy objective of banning passports. I suggest that the noble Lord will probably ask me, at some point, why I will not accept his amendment. He has tabled 13 pages full of detailed points, which he suggests will meet the objective, but I cannot necessarily say to the Committee that they do meet that objective.
On Amendment 23, I told the noble Lord that we will achieve the objective he described in our own time, with proper legal facility. The noble Lord shakes his head, or perhaps I should say he looks quizzically at me: I think he will agree with that. I assure him that we want to meet the objective he set, but not in this Bill. I cannot be any clearer than that. I recognise that, at 13 pages, such provisions require detailed policy work, done in concert with key operational partners. While noble Lords have sensibly drawn their inspiration from the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, it is an assumption that all those provisions are fit for the purpose of the state threats context. The detailed policy work needs to be completed, and we need to ensure that we have operational guidance for partners, to be ready on commencement of the legislation. I am afraid the noble Lord’s Amendment 23 does not meet that objective.
I assure the noble Lord that we are not on different pages on this. The Bill is a specific Bill for a specific purpose and, while I agree with its general direction of travel, Amendment 23 is not fit for purpose. I therefore ask the noble Lord not press Amendments 20, 21 or 23, for the reasons I have outlined. However, should he choose to do so, I invite my noble friends to vote against them.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
I thank the noble Lords, Lord Walney and Lord Verdirame, and my noble friend Lord Pickles, for their support, and I thank the Minister for his response. I listened to what the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Carlile of Berriew, had to say about this. However, I remain unconvinced. The very act of wearing or displaying the insignia of a designated body can intimidate members of our society and damage community cohesion. I do not believe that the Bill, as drafted, offers sufficient safeguards to protect vulnerable individuals and communities who are targeted by foreign state powers.
If an individual wore an IRGC uniform and sat outside a synagogue, any reasonable member of the public would consider this an intimidatory act. However, the threshold for successful prosecution under a Section 17A offence would remain unacceptably high. The individual could argue that the purpose of wearing the uniform was not to express support for the designated body and that it was worn in a satirical context. Even if this extremely subjective intention could be disproved, it would then fall on the prosecution to show that such actions were prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK, which is another subjective and potentially problematic barrier to prosecution.
I suggest that my amendment fixes this glaring loophole. It shuts down any avenues through which those who seek to terrorise others can evade prosecution. There are simply no justifications for why someone in the UK should be wearing or displaying the insignia of a designated state threat. Therefore, in line with Jonathan Hall’s recommendation, we should make it an offence to do so.
Amendment 23 concerns the seizure of passports of those suspected of supporting designated bodies, and this amendment has been unequivocally supported by Jonathan Hall, and is already a power which the police possess when combating terrorism. Let us be clear about this: it is not a new police power. It was a direct recommendation of a government-sanctioned review, and the Government have said that they will commit to implementing this policy. There is therefore no good reason to oppose this amendment, nor is there a logical or practical one.
Although the Government have pledged to implement this power in a future Bill, there are three concerns that remain which have not been assuaged by the Minister. First, any such future Bill will not receive Royal Assent before the Summer Recess. This means that those who support the IRGC will be protected from these police powers for a considerable length of time. What is the point of rushing to designate a group before Parliament concludes, but not giving the police force the necessary teeth to operate effectively?
Secondly, as I have made clear, the Government have perhaps acted in bad faith on this Bill. We on these Benches simply cannot wait for an unspecified date to enact a policy that can be accepted today. Thirdly, the Minister has acknowledged that his party is currently undergoing vast leadership changes. What is government policy today may not be government policy tomorrow.
I turn now to Amendment 21. As stated previously, this amendment would close yet another legislative gap in this Bill.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
There is absolutely no indication from any potential new Prime Minister that any changes to security legislation will be made. The King’s gracious Speech, and this Bill, both stand.