Unpaid Carers

Stephen Kinnock Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd September 2024 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)]

I thank the hon. Member for North East Fife (Wendy Chamberlain) for securing this debate on this critical issue. As she rightly stated, it touches the lives of millions of people across our country, and I agree that it requires our full attention.

I want to start by paying tribute to our unpaid carers and young carers, who play such an important role in our communities. They give so much to others, and I want to take a moment to thank them for the enormous contribution that they make. Let us also recognise and appreciate the work that the hon. Member has accomplished in bringing about the Carer’s Leave Act last year. It is an important piece of legislation, which takes a significant step towards helping unpaid carers juggle work and their caring responsibilities. As she will be aware, this Government are committed to reviewing the implementation of carer’s leave and to examining all the benefits of introducing paid carer’s leave.

This Government are also committed to ensuring that families have the support that they need. We want to ensure that families are better able to look after their own health and wellbeing, not just that of those they care for. We are aware of the importance of unpaid carers having a break from caring. The better care fund includes funding that can be used for unpaid carer’s support, including short breaks and respite services for carers.

I have heard the calls for a cross-Government carer’s strategy. This must be addressed in the wider context of the urgent need for a renewed vision for adult social care. As part of that renewed vision we will consider how best to support unpaid carers, because the reality is that our adult social care system is facing immense challenges. Too many people, including unpaid carers, are left navigating a complex and often inadequate system to secure the support they need. Reports of inconsistent service standards, chronic staff shortages and a lack of dignity in care must drive us to action. Everyone deserves the chance to live independently and with dignity. Our approach is to create a sustainable health and care system built on national standards, but tailored to local needs.

However, we must be clear about the appalling economic circumstances we have inherited. We take very seriously our responsibility to deal with the £22 billion black hole that has been left to us by the previous Administration. As a result we have had to make, and will continue to have to make, some difficult decisions, but that in no way diminishes our commitment to reforming adult social care. It will not be easy, but we are committed to taking the steps needed to build a national care service.

I also recognise that many unpaid carers can face challenges balancing employment with caring. The Government’s plan to make work pay sets out a significant and ambitious agenda to ensure workplace rights are fit for a modern economy. That includes empowering working people who provide unpaid care. Flexible working can play a vital role in enabling carers to stay in work alongside those they support. Making flexible working pay, the default from day one for all workers except where it is not reasonably feasible, is a key element of our plan to make work pay.

We must also ensure that carers are supported by the benefits system. We know there has been an increase carer’s allowance overpayments. We are keen to establish all the facts to understand fully what has gone wrong. Once we have done that, we will set out a plan to make it right. The Department for Work and Pensions is progressing an enhanced notification strategy as part of its existing commitment to improve customer engagement and make better use of data provided by His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, building on its existing communications with customers. It is considering all forms of targeted contact to find the most effective and efficient solution to encourage claimants to contact the DWP about changes in their income. This will help claimants understand when they may have received an earnings-related overpayment or are at risk of doing so. Indeed, the Minister for Social Security and Disability, my right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham (Sir Stephen Timms) recently met Carers UK and individual carers to hear their views and experiences. That is key to helping us to establish the facts and make more informed decisions. More broadly, the DWP will keep the carer’s allowance under review to see whether it is continuing to meet its objectives. The previous Work and Pensions Committee made a number of recommendations for changing the rules. We will respond to those recommendations in due course.

Our goal must be centred on reform. We are committed to building consensus for the longer-term reforms that are needed to create a sustainable national care service that our entire country can be proud of.

[Rachel Blake (Cities of London and Westminster) (Lab/Co-op)]

Does the Minister agree that informal networks, such as the City of London Carers, provide a vital way for unpaid carers to keep in touch with each other and understand what services might be available through the adult social care system?

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. She is absolutely right that many such networks, often informal, play a vital role in the community in providing that support and peer-to-peer support. So often unpaid carers can end up feeling quite isolated. Informal networks like the one she describes are vital and I commend the work of that network in achieving the objectives we all want to see.

[Jim Shannon]

The Minister outlines the need for reform. I think many of us in the Chamber would like compassion and understanding to be key to that. Reforms are okay, but they need compassion and understanding to make them work.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. He has reminded the House that caring for friends and family is an important part of what it means to be human. It is at the heart of the desire to support one’s community, as well as one’s friends and family.

We must always approach this issue with compassion. We know that we have certain constraints as a Government in terms of what we are able to do, but I can assure the hon. Member that we are absolutely committed to fixing what is, broadly speaking, a broken system; indeed, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care has described the health and social care system as broken. We have to fix the foundations of that system, and unpaid carers are absolutely part of those foundations. We also have to ensure that unpaid carers have a strong voice in the consensus that we want to build around fixing the system. We know that if we are to build a national care service of which our entire country can be proud, we will need those reforms, but they must truly embody person-centred care and the role played by unpaid carers. To achieve that, I will engage with my counterparts across Government, with unpaid carers and with sector partners such as Carers UK and Carers Trust to ensure that their voices are heard.

I know that many of us were profoundly moved by the experiences of caring shared by the right hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Ed Davey) during the general election campaign. As we have heard this evening, this is a subject of great significance for, and close to the heart of, Members on both sides of the House—including, of course, the hon. Member for North East Fife. I look forward to engaging with colleagues throughout the House on a cross-party basis, because we know that the consensus we need to build transcends narrow party political partisan divides. This is about building a system that is truly fit for the future, and fit for the country in which we live. So let us forge ahead together with the promise of that future in which unpaid carers are visible, valued and supported.

Question put and agreed to.

Adult Social Care Workforce

Stephen Kinnock Excerpts

Tuesday 30th July 2024 Written Statements

[The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)]

This Government are being honest about the appalling economic circumstances we inherited, and take seriously their responsibility to help manage down overall fiscal pressures in 2024-25. As a result, we have decided that the adult social care training and development fund proposed by the last Government, decisions around which had been suspended since the announcement of the election, will not be continued.

While the adult social care training and development fund will not be taken forward, we still intend to provide funding for adult social care learning and development, with the budget maintained at the level we spent last year. Further details about how and when this would be administered will be shared in due course. We also confirm that we will continue to develop a care workforce pathway—the new national career structure—for adult social care and that, linked to this, a new level 2 care certificate qualification has been developed and launched. In addition, the commitment to Oliver McGowan mandatory training and supporting the sector to deliver this remains.

We are committed in our support for the adult social care workforce. Our long-term plans will include a new deal for care workers through a fair pay agreement. We will also take steps to create a national care service underpinned by national standards, with the aim of delivering consistency of care across the country.

[HCWS50]

Oral Answers to Questions

Stephen Kinnock Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd July 2024 Commons Chamber

[Steff Aquarone (North Norfolk) (LD)]

2. What steps his Department plans to take to improve access to NHS dentists.

[The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question and welcome him to his place. Thanks to what the Conservative party has done to NHS dentistry over the past 14 years, a staggering 13 million people are unable to see a dentist. I know that the hon. Gentleman represents the constituency that has the lowest number of dentists per head in the entire country. Our rescue plan will provide 700,000 more urgent dental appointments and recruit dentists to areas that need them. We will rebuild the service for the longer term by reforming the dental contract.

[Steff Aquarone]

As the Minister has alluded to, we in North Norfolk have suffered in particular from unallocated units of dental treatment being moved to other parts of the country. The integrated care board has been told that it will have to return this year’s unused money to the Treasury. Will the Minister commit to protecting unallocated dental funds in my constituency?

[Stephen Kinnock]

As my right hon. Friend the Health Secretary stated, on the Monday after the general election, he met the British Dental Association to look at a range of issues around the long-term NHS contract. That is an ongoing dialogue—it includes units of dental activity, of course—and we need to ensure that we have the negotiations rapidly. We will work at pace to address some of those long-term issues, but let us not forget that the Conservative party allowed the NHS contract to atrophy and took NHS dentistry to the brink of collapse in our country.

[Claire Hazelgrove (Filton and Bradley Stoke) (Lab)]

I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care and his fantastic team on taking their new place on the Government Front Bench. I also thank my right hon. Friend for his advocacy in the last Parliament for people across my constituency who lack dental access.

What assurances can the Minister provide that the important issues of infrastructure and housing will be linked together? As we look to build those much-needed 1.5 million homes across the country, it is vital to make sure that we do not have more dental deserts and that we have the infrastructure we need. How will he work in a cross-departmental way to ensure we achieve that?

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank my hon. Friend for her question, and warmly welcome her to her place and congratulate her on her election. The key aspects of our dental rescue plan include 700,000 more appointments through extra funding that we will generate by cracking down on tax dodgers and closing other loopholes. We will incentivise new graduate dentists to come to areas that are underserved to ensure that we plug the gaps—there will be golden hellos to make that happen. We are also working hard on things like supervised toothbrushing for three to five-year-olds, because prevention is always better than cure.

[Bill Esterson (Sefton Central) (Lab)]

3. Whether his Department plans to provide capital funding for a new health centre at Maghull in Sefton Central constituency.

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[George Freeman (Mid Norfolk) (Con)]

8. If he will make an assessment of the potential merits of requiring newly-qualified dentists to work for the NHS for a set period of time.

[The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman and congratulate him on his survival instincts in getting re-elected to this place.

NHS dentistry needs urgent action thanks to 14 years of chaos, failure and neglect. Our rescue plan will get NHS dentistry back on its feet, followed by contract reform to make NHS dentistry more attractive. A consultation for a tie-in to NHS dentistry for graduate dentists closed on 18 July and we are now considering the responses. The Government position on this proposal will be set out in due course and I will keep the House updated on this matter.

[George Freeman]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that answer and congratulate him and his colleague the Secretary of State on their appointments. All of us who are serious about the health service and the need for reform, about which the Secretary of State has spoken, have their back in pushing for reform. The hon. Gentleman has his moment of triumph, but may I gently encourage him to reach out and build a cross-party coalition of support for serious reform? The NHS is broken not by Tory cuts but by years—[Interruption.] For years we have been pouring money in; it needs to modernise for the 21st-century.

In the spirit of which, on dentistry, may I encourage the Front-Bench team to reach out and have a meeting—a rainbow coalition meeting including the new hon. Members for Norwich North (Alice Macdonald) and for North Norfolk (Steff Aquarone)—of all MPs in Norfolk, which has suffered more than most counties? We desperately need that University of East Anglia dental school.

[Stephen Kinnock]

The hon. Gentleman was doing so well at the start, and then he kind of blew it a bit towards the end. It is absolutely right that we put country before party, and we will work with whoever has the best interests of rebuilding our public services at heart. The issue that he raises specifically sounds interesting. What I would say is that unless we get the bigger picture sorted, and unless we make NHS work pay for dentists, we will not be able to rebuild the NHS dentistry system that we should be cherishing and seeking to reform. I am of course always open to conversations with him.

[Rachael Maskell (York Central) (Lab/Co-op)]

Just 39.2% of my constituents were able to access an NHS dentist over the past two years. That is an absolute disgrace, but the Health and Social Care Committee put together a report into NHS dentistry, setting out a blueprint for how to resolve the challenges, including access, looking at tie-ins and ensuring that we get more dentists registered. Will the Minister look at that report and follow its recommendations?

[Stephen Kinnock]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on her re-election; it is wonderful to see her back in her place. She is absolutely right that the tie-in consultation deadline was 18 July. We are considering those responses with an open mind. On the broader issues that she mentions, our rescue plan is 700,000 more appointments, incentives for new graduates to go to under-served areas, reform of the dental contract and making work pay for dentists. That plan is at the heart of the reforms that she mentioned and that is what we will be doing.

[Mohammad Yasin (Bedford) (Lab)]

9. What assessment he has made of the adequacy of access to NHS mental health services.

[Tim Roca (Macclesfield) (Lab)]

20. What assessment he has made of the adequacy of access to NHS mental health services.

[The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Mohammad Yasin) on his re-election and my hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Tim Roca) on his election. More than a million people with mental health issues are not getting the support they need. This Government will fix our broken NHS. That will include recruiting 8,500 mental health workers, including specialist mental health professionals in every school and rolling out young futures hubs in every community. As announced in the Gracious Speech, we are bringing forward legislation to modernise the Mental Health Act 1983, which is a hugely significant step that has been warmly welcomed by service users, campaigners and, indeed, the former Conservative Prime Minister Theresa May.

[Mohammad Yasin]

I welcome the Minister to his place. Funding to bring desperately needed in-patient mental health services back to Bedford has been sitting in the accounts of our local mental health trust for years, but it cannot be used because of the previous Government’s capital expenditure limits. Will the Minister therefore meet me to discuss a way forward to get this urgently needed mental health facility back in Bedford, so that my constituents do not have to travel miles to access this vital service?

[Stephen Kinnock]

I know that my hon. Friend has been campaigning with great passion and conviction on this issue for some time, and I am in no doubt that his integrated care board will have listened carefully to every word that he has said today. I would be pleased to meet him so that we can discuss this matter in greater detail.

[Tim Roca]

The Prime Minister has been clear that the Government will make, unlike their predecessor, evidence-based policy. While the NHS has made some high-level progress, the figures for those waiting for mental health elective care remains unacceptably high, but the data is incomplete. Does the Minister agree that comprehensive data is crucial if we are to serve the patients we care about?

[Stephen Kinnock]

I welcome my hon. Friend warmly to his place. I hope he will not mind if I use this analogy, which is that you cannot make a prescription unless you have the diagnosis, and you cannot make policy on the hoof. We cannot have the chaos, neglect and failure that we have seen from the Conservatives for the past 14 years because they have not made policy based on evidence and data. I am absolutely on board with what my hon. Friend says, and I would be more than happy to discuss it with him further at his convenience.

[Mr Richard Holden (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I welcome those on the Opposition Front Bench to their roles and those on the Government Front Bench to their new roles. One of the things that we did very well over the past few years on a cross-party basis was tackling the disparity between mental and physical health. Since 2018, £4.7 billion extra has gone into NHS mental health services. Will the Government commit to that going forward and ensure that the proportion of funding towards mental health services will increase in the coming years?

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his question, but he appears to be living in a parallel universe. We are in the midst of a mental health crisis as a result of 14 years of Tory chaos, neglect and failure. We have a plan, with 8,500 more mental health workers, young futures walk-in hubs, specialist mental health support for young people and mental health specialists dealing with talking therapies. Of course, we will also introduce legislation following the Gracious Speech to deal with helping people who have more severe conditions. That is a plan of action with which I hope we can once again make our country proud of how we deal with this extremely serious issue.

[Sarah Dyke (Glastonbury and Somerton) (LD)]

Mental health pressures in the farming community are rising, with the Farm Safety Foundation survey finding that 95% of farmers under 40 agree that poor mental health is the biggest hidden problem facing the industry. Will the Minister work with colleagues in the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs to improve access to NHS mental health services in rural areas and support the continued roll-out of rural health hubs?

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank the hon. Lady for raising that extremely important question. We are indeed looking at that issue through our 10-year plan for the future vision of our health service. Issues around isolation and the huge pressure on what are often family businesses are creating tremendous strains for that community. We take that seriously and will of course work with our colleagues in DEFRA to address it.

[Dr Ben Spencer (Runnymede and Weybridge) (Con)]

May I congratulate those on the Government Front Bench on their appointments? I should declare that I am a former NHS consultant psychiatrist, my wife is an NHS doctor and I participated in the Wessely Mental Health Act review. While I no longer have a licence to practise, I may gently correct the Minister in that it is possible to provide a prescription without a diagnosis. [Laughter.]

The Opposition are pleased that the Government intend to build on the work of Conservative Governments, kick-started by the former Member for Maidenhead, to reform the Mental Health Act 1983. We will work constructively with them to make such legislation as effective, fair and compassionate as possible. With that in mind, does the Minister intend to make changes to the code of practice to the Mental Health Act now so that non-statutory changes and protections can be enacted while the Bill works its way through Parliament?

[Stephen Kinnock]

I welcome the shadow Minister to his place and congratulate him on his appointment. It is a little bit rich to receive a question like that, given that the Conservatives had 14 years to address the issue; I have been in this position for 16 days. If he looks at the plan that we are bringing forward, he will see that we have more ambition and more boldness in our plans than what we have seen in the last 14 years. We will introduce legislation that will address those extremely important issues for people who have some of the more severe conditions.

To the shadow Minister’s specific point on a code of practice, the first step will be to see the legislative process moving forward. But, of course, we remain open to looking at any solution or reform that will help to address this extremely important issue.

[Cat Smith (Lancaster and Wyre) (Lab)]

10. What recent progress his Department has made on the new hospital programme.

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[Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)]

T5. I congratulate the Secretary of State on his position. Yesterday’s NHS data showed that we have among the highest incidences of dementia in the world, with something like 500,000 cases just in England. I appreciate that this is early days, 16 days in, but does the Minister have any idea why that may be, and what can be done about it?

[The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)]

I thank my hon. Friend for that question and welcome him to his place. This issue is personal for me, and I am sure it is for many others across this House. A number of potential new disease-modifying drugs for Alzheimer’s are in the pipeline, including lecanemab and donanemab. We are committed to ensuring that clinically effective and cost-effective medicines reach patients in a timely and safe way. The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence is appraising lecanemab and donanemab to determine whether they will be made available in the NHS.

[Simon Hoare (North Dorset) (Con)]

Nearly 10 children a month die from brain tumours, and I know that the public health Minister takes this issue seriously. He was familiar with the work of the Brain Tumour Charity’s HeadSmart campaign. Will he agree to meet me and my fierce campaigner constituent Sacha Langton-Gilks, who lost her son to a brain tumour, to discuss how NHS England could be persuaded to do more to inform and educate parents to identify the symptoms, so that collectively we can reduce the number of deaths?

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[Wendy Chamberlain (North East Fife) (LD)]

My constituents have struggled to get pre-diagnosis ADHD and autism support for their young daughters. We cannot diagnose children at a very young age, but that does not mean that families do not need help. Can the Minister confirm what engagement he will have with support organisations such as the National Autistic Society to ensure that best practice means that families are not struggling for support?

[Stephen Kinnock]

I welcome the hon. Lady to her place. She raises a vital issue. We have a plan for improving mental health services, including 8,500 more mental health workers. Autism is, of course, a vital part of that, and I will be more than happy to meet her to discuss further how we might be able to take it forward.

Covid-19 Update

Stephen Kinnock Excerpts

Monday 29th November 2021 Commons Chamber

[Sajid Javid]

We will keep that issue under review. My hon. Friend is right to speak, as hon. Members across the House have done, about the importance of South Africa’s handling the matter in such a professional and exemplary way. It might reassure him to know that in the G7 meeting that I chaired earlier, we agreed unanimously about that issue and about the importance of continuing to work with and support South Africa.

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)]

We know that if the Government just sit back and wait for the development of new vaccines for new variants, we will be left at the back of the queue, because the industry will always go to the highest bidder, such as the EU or the US. Back in April, Clive Dix, the outgoing head of the vaccine taskforce, sent the Government a specific proposal about setting up a new taskforce to fast-track the development of new vaccines for new variants. Yesterday, Mr Dix revealed that the Government completely failed to respond to his proposal. Can the Secretary of State explain why the Government have chosen to ignore Mr Dix’s expert advice?

[Sajid Javid]

I do not think it would be correct to say that the Government have ignored the advice that the hon. Gentleman refers to. I also think it would be incorrect to say that when it comes to vaccines, the Government are somehow going to sit back and wait. I mentioned earlier the huge expansion of the vaccine programme, on the back of advice from the JCVI, and the fact that the UK already has the supply to meet it. The reason we have that is that we have a fantastic vaccine taskforce—better than in any other country in the world.

Menopause (Support and Services) Bill

Stephen Kinnock Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 29th October 2021 Commons Chamber

[Carolyn Harris]

I certainly do. Very many businesses—really big players in their fields—have contacted me and asked for advice on how they can move forward. What I say to them all is, “Don’t have a policy that is left in a filing cabinet that reflects a tick box. Have a policy that reflects your workforce and what women need and is intended to help them.” I visited several big companies that are really good employers and I have seen the all-singing, all-dancing menopause policy that does all but make a cup of tea, but when I asked the staff, “How is the menopause policy working for you?”, their response was, “I didn’t know we had one.” It cannot be a tick box; it has to be relevant.

Other employers need to take heed of the likes of Timpson—I repeat that James Timpson walks on water, as I said in this Chamber last week—in prioritising the welfare of its staff who are experiencing symptoms of the perimenopause or menopause. There are other big companies, such as PricewaterhouseCoopers, Bristol Myers Squibb and Tesco, that do good work—I could go on, but I know that the right hon. Member for Romsey and Southampton North (Caroline Nokes), who chairs the Women and Equalities Committee, will talk about that.

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)]

I pay tribute to the amazing campaign that my hon. Friend is running. The Bill is making such an important contribution; I think we all sign up to being menopause warriors and menopause revolutionaries. To add to the point about employers, does she see a role for trade unions in promoting the excellent ideas that are in the Bill? Can she give some examples of how we as MPs and menopause warriors could do more in our constituencies to encourage employers and trade unions to take these ideas forward?

[Carolyn Harris]

I have always thought of my hon. Friend as being Amazonian in his warrior status. I am sure that when he has his photograph taken later today with the lovely Penny Lancaster, he will prove to be Amazonian. In his constituency, the Community union is doing fantastic work with Tata Steel, which has welcomed in the union to hold menopause coffee mornings with the women in its workforce, who, let us not forget, are working in a very male-dominated arena. If they can do it, so many others can. My hon. Friend the Member for Newport East (Jessica Morden) has the Llanwern steelworks in her area, and it, too, is welcoming the Community union’s coffee mornings. I urge both my colleagues to attend one of those to share experience and listen.

Almost 80% of menopausal women are in work, with most planning to work for many more years. However, three quarters report that they are considering reducing their hours and one in four are giving up their jobs because they are finding it too difficult to balance their work life with their symptoms. Our careers should not stop when our periods stop. Whether our jobs are physically or mentally demanding, small adjustments could make all the difference. My hope is that employers listening to this debate will make those adjustments and take pride in the fact that they are menopause-friendly workplaces.

National Security and Investment Bill

Stephen Kinnock Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Wednesday 20th January 2021 Commons Chamber

The Bill is so close to doing all that that I will support it whatever the Minister does, but I do hope he will think about adopting new clause 4. As he has seen, it has cross-party support, and has been tabled with great respect for his work and the work of the civil servants he has pulled together to draft the Bill. He has done a fantastic job of it. I very much hope that he will look at the new clause, consider its merits and pull it together. We know the dangers; we have only to look at the silencing of people like Jack Ma of Ant Group, and the intervention in various other businesses around the world by some of the state-owned enterprises that are now sniffing around British businesses, to see that the risk is sadly real. I hope the Minister will look at the new clause, and will use all the extraordinary experience and skill that he has at his fingertips—many of us wish that we had it—to consider where we go and how to do this best.

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab) [V]]

It is always a pleasure to follow the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, who is doing sterling work in an area of increasing concern to this House and our country; the impact of hostile state actors plays an increasingly important part in how we think about our country’s place in the world. He is doing outstanding work in thought leadership and political leadership in that context.

It was a privilege to serve on the Bill Committee, and it has been a real privilege to work with my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah), who has led the team in an exemplary manner. She has been assiduous in the scrutiny of the Bill and in bringing us together around the amendments—more than 30 of them, I think—that we tabled in Committee.

Unfortunately, while I have huge respect for the Minister in charge of the Bill, he chose not to integrate any of our amendments into the Bill, which is a pity because, as my hon. Friend just pointed out from the Dispatch Box, we have approached the Bill in a spirit of constructive engagement with the Government. We wish to see its substance put in place as rapidly as possible; it is long overdue. It is a pity that that spirit was not reciprocated by the Government when it came to some of our amendments, which we genuinely tabled not for any partisan reasons, but to try to improve the Bill as much as we could.

However, we are where we are. We are through Committee, and we are looking at the Bill as it is. As has been mentioned, we heard from experts in Committee, including the former head of MI6, Richard Dearlove, and Charlie Parton, one of the leading experts on China, and their contributions were enlightening. It is worth touching on what they talked to us about, because it sets out the backdrop against which the Bill is being put on to the statute book.

I will mention two of the key takeaways from that evidence. First, the impact of covid on the ability of the British economy and businesses to withstand a hostile foreign takeover is deeply troubling; it increases their vulnerability. It feels very much like we are out on choppy waters in a relatively difficult economic climate, and are relatively isolated, of course, having left the European Union. We need to ensure that we do all we can to hold on to our strategic national assets. We should not allow them to be snapped up by investment vehicles and businesses that are sniffing around, to use the term of the hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), our business sector, potentially taking over businesses in a way that would be deeply damaging to our economy and national security.

The second key trend that was highlighted was, of course, the rise of China. It was made very clear by Mr Dearlove, Mr Parton and others that successive Governments since 2010 have been profoundly naive and complacent about how we respond to the rise of China. We had the so-called golden era, which was supposed to be about economic integration, and supposed to lead to China beginning to align with the rules and norms of the international rules-based order. Clearly, the opposite has happened, and as a result of that naivety and complacency, we find ourselves very exposed, and in a position that could lead to the undermining of our sovereign capabilities. The Bill is being introduced against that backdrop.

I will speak in favour of new clause 5, which is really important, and on which I worked with colleagues, including my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central, but first I will talk about the Bill’s intentions, and whether it will achieve its goals. The Bill seeks to protect Britain’s national security from the threats posed by hostile business takeovers, and by investment vehicles that are not aligned with the UK’s values and interests, and are potentially even actively hostile and seeking to cause harm to our country. However, there is potentially a flaw at the heart of the Bill. A key part of our national security is our economic security; indeed, I would argue that it is a foundation stone of our national security. It underpins our long-term national security, in the sense that if we lose control of key parts of our economy, it leads to an undermining of our sovereignty, our sovereign capability, and our prosperity. That has a knock-on effect on our resilience and our national security.

We need to put our sovereign capabilities at the heart of the Bill, and ensure that when the Government do national security assessments, they look at long-term, strategic, structural threats in addition to the more immediate threats to our national security of espionage, intellectual property theft, and a range of others.

That is why in Committee I honed in on two issues that I felt were most critical: our critical national infrastructure, and enterprises and investment vehicles that have clear links and allegiance to other states. On the first point, the Bill unfortunately neglects to define critical national infrastructure. The Government consultation lists 17 sectors that might come under the national security regime’s mandatory notification process, but it does not list and define critical national infrastructure as an asset class in itself.

There is a difference between the list of 17 sectors in the Bill and the 13 sectors that the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, which is of course a Government body, defines as critical national infrastructure. The missing five sectors are chemicals, defence, finance, health and water, which I would argue are crucial to our national interest. Potentially hostile foreign takeovers in those crucial sectors should give all of us, and certainly the Government, pause for thought. Those sectors form the basis of the safety and security of every citizen of our country, so I strongly recommend that critical national infrastructure be defined as an asset class in the Bill, and that the gap be closed between those 13 sectors and the 17 listed in the Bill.

Our critical national infrastructure of course needs protecting. Sir Richard Dearlove, in response to my question in Committee about including a defintion of critical national infrastructure, said:

“I would certainly see that as advantageous, because it defines a clear area where you start and from which you can make judgments”.––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, Tuesday 24 November 2020; c. 24, Q31.]

The truth is that we have failed to protect these critical national assets for a decade. Just look at the involvement of Chinese-based investment vehicles in our water, energy and nuclear sectors. This is a serious problem that needs to be fixed urgently. It is also part of the laissez-faire approach that successive Governments have taken since 2010. It leads to a short-term business culture that opens the door to acquisitions, and to our having by far the highest number of successful hostile takeover bids of any advanced economy in the world—certainly as defined by the OECD.

Our strategic assets have too often been flogged off to the highest bidder. The case of Arm—a jewel in the crown of British tech—has been mentioned by several hon. Members; it is, of course, in the process of being sold off to NVIDIA. Huawei acquired the Centre for Integrated Photonics and of course DeepMind was sold to Google; I absolutely agree with the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, who said that that was one of the most egregious decisions taken by a Government in recent political history.

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[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

Order. Could I interrupt the hon. Gentleman to say that we have quite a few more speakers? We do have a fair amount of time, but I am hoping that speakers will take about 10 minutes, and he has now taken 15, so I hope that he might be bringing his remarks to a close before too long.

[Stephen Kinnock]

With apologies, Madam Deputy Speaker, I am indeed finishing now.

Protecting our national security is just one element of protecting, nurturing and developing the sectors that are vital for the future. Technology sovereignty will be the defining issue of the coming decade. The economic dislocation we have seen from covid means that the case for action is stronger and more urgent than ever.

[Jamie Stone (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD) [V]]

I shall heed your remarks, Madam Deputy Speaker, and try to keep my contribution short. In truth, I have not been involved thus far in this Bill, but I am my party’s defence spokesman and I therefore take a view on it.

Given the constituency I represent at the very top of the British mainland—north coast, east coast and west coast—I intuit from what I see that the Russian navy is no stranger to those waters. Therefore, the defence of the realm is in my mind personally as well as in speaking in the Commons. As I have said many times before, we do, alas and alack, live in a world where there are states that are not about the best interests of the United Kingdom. As other speakers have said, we see the Chinese threat and we see the Russian threat. It is within that context that I say what I say.

I want to make three or four very general points; as I say, I will try to be fairly speedy. The first is about the amendment that seeks to place an annual security report before the Intelligence and Security Committee. Yes, we have heard that the Government are proposing to bring in something similar to this amendment in the upper House, but it would be no bad thing for us to agree on it at this stage, and then let us see what the Government come back with if they decide not to accept it. In recent days, we have seen on the other side of the Atlantic the whole notion of parliamentary democracy come under some challenge. Here in the mother of Parliaments, the idea of Parliament as supreme and of reports brought back to Parliament is very much a part of our democracy. It is a vital mechanism in securing the way we do things nationally and our freedoms.

On the Chinese point, the sale of DeepMind to Google, and Arm, which will go to NVIDIA in due course, is regrettable, to say the least. Let us make no mistake: this is a quite deliberate act by China and other Governments who are hostile to us. At the end of the day, there are front organisations that are trying to get a grip on cherry-picking those parts of the British economy that are fundamental to our workings. That is extremely dangerous, to say the least.

The scope of the public interest test is important to the Liberal Democrats, as we have been saying for a long time. First and foremost, this Bill, which I support entirely, is important to the safety of the realm—to protecting British interests—but at some stage I would like the public interest test to be broadened out. Mention has been made of China. We know how incredibly badly the Chinese are treating their Muslim minority in the west of the country. It amounts to something approaching genocide: let us not muck about with this. When companies buy up a British company or business, I would like the public interest test to be applied, for instance, on child labour and on modern slavery. The trade deals should be examined in that context as well. At the end of the day—we have said it many times in the House of Commons and the House of Lords—we disapprove entirely of the way in which the Chinese have treated the Uyghurs. We have to try to take action to try to influence that. If we can stymie a trade deal on that front, that might be a very good move for the future.

I have discovered—it is a curious factor during my three years in the Commons—that on defence matters there is often broad agreement across the House, which is very encouraging. The idea of constructive opposition is important, and what comes back from the upper House will be of extraordinary interest. I hope that the lesson has been learned, and that when the Bill is enacted there will be a sensible approach to stopping the repetition of DeepMind and the sale of Arm. I give huge credit to the Chairmen of the Foreign Affairs Committee and of the Intelligence and Security Committee, who have worked assiduously, as have their Committees, on a cross-party basis, to protect the best interests of our nation. There I shall conclude my remarks.

National Security and Investment Bill (Sixth sitting)

Stephen Kinnock Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 1st December 2020 Public Bill Committees

Several countries give a sense of the factors that might guide national security reviews, which is really what we are asking for here, without excluding areas from the definition. The US FIRRMA legislation—Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act 2018—provides for a “sense of Congress” on six factors: countries of specific concern; critical infrastructure, energy asset, critical material; history of US law compliance; control of US industries that affect US capability and capacity to meet national security requirements, which is very important; involvement of personally identifying information; and potential new cybersecurity vulnerabilities. The amendment seeks to encourage the Secretary of State to do likewise.

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)]

Just to add to the argument that my hon. Friend is making in her very eloquent manner, this is also about having a smart approach to regulation, whereby we do not take a one-size-fits-all approach but recognise that there is a hierarchy of risks. By pointing out in the definition of national security what key factors make up that definition, we will point both the business community and the Secretary of State to that hierarchy of risks and make sure that there is additional screening, monitoring and assessment of those risks where they are considered to be higher because they contain the factors in the definition.

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. As a past employee of a regulator, Ofcom, he really appeals to my sense of regulatory best practice in speaking as he does about the importance of smart regulation that is not tied to narrowly defined legalistic definitions of national security but allows, as he says, a hierarchy of assessment of the different interests. We all need to take responsibility for doing everything we can to ensure that kind of smart judgment can be made by small businesses. We encourage giving as much guidance as possible—I see the Minister nodding, so I hope that he will be receptive to the amendment.

Finally, amendment 9 would mandate Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy unit resourcing updates. I will speak briefly to amendment 9, because I know that other hon. Members wish to speak to it. This amendment provides that a statement from the Secretary of State about the exercise of call-in power may include details of the resources allocated to reviews of national security within BEIS.

The driving thought behind this, again, is to ensure that the Secretary of State’s life is made as easy as possible by consistently looking at the resources available to do this very complex and difficult job, particularly given that we are transitioning, as one witness put it, from a standing start to potentially thousands of notifications.

[Sam Tarry (Ilford South) (Lab)]

It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship so soon again, Sir Graham. Following on from the eloquent exposition of those last two amendments by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central, I would like to focus on amendment 9. The amendment is simple. It tries to help the Government help themselves.

Amendment 9 provides that a statement from the Secretary of State about the exercise of a call-in power may include details of the resources allocated through reviews of national security within BEIS. We know that this is a significant and large change that the Department will have to absorb. For that to be effective—in whatever state the Bill ends up passing through Parliament—there will clearly be a need for proper resource allocation and for Parliament to scrutinise that process.

The Bill transforms the UK’s merger control processes. It locates the merger control processes away from the Competition and Markets Authority, which is a new development. The CMA had a history of experience of overseeing those sorts of processes. At the moment, there is no such expertise in BEIS.

While massively expanding the scope of the intervention, as my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central said, moving from only 12 national security interventions in 18 years to potentially over 1,800 is such a significant step change, so it will be important for Parliament to have the ability to monitor that. It is unprecedented. The Government have neither a precedent nor a plan—none has come forward with the notes to this Bill—to assure the House of how the shift will be managed. That is why we felt it was important to put forward this amendment.

I believe this amendment has support on both sides of the House. Crucially, hon. Members across the House have raised legitimate concerns about the capacity and capability that will be required to manage this major shift. My colleague from the Transport Committee, Greg Clark, said,

“It is an enormous challenge for the Department to set up a new unit, especially since the current regime…has dealt with a very small number of transactions each year.”—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 228.]

Similarly, James Wild said,

“It is crucial that the structures and resources are put in place to ensure that the timetables for review and assessment in the Bill are actually met.”—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 266.]

I think both of those points are extremely pertinent.

I do not see this as a controversial amendment. I think it is important to allow the Bill, once passed, to function effectively and with proper oversight. It also provides the appropriate scrutiny, ensuring that this critical part of our national and economic security functions effectively and efficiently. I am sure that in amendments to come we will debate where the balance should be between economic freedoms and our responsibility to safeguard our citizens. But clearly, on the simple idea put forward in this amendment, the Government will have to be transparent about the capability and capacity of BEIS on investment security, as many other countries around the world do.

[Stephen Kinnock]

My hon. Friend is setting out the case very well. To add to that argument, this is also about reassuring us as Members of Parliament. A Bill is all very well—it puts it all down on paper—but what really matters is putting it into practice. How does the implementation work? The investment security unit will be the key place for that. We need assurance that that crucial part of this process will have the capability to deliver. The amendment we are putting forward is also an assurance amendment—that when Parliament votes this Bill through, we can be assured that the implementation capability will be there.

[Sam Tarry]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. As we have shaped our own Bill, we have been learning about regimes in other countries and comparing and contrasting provisions. For example, in the US—we have heard evidence on this from Michael Leiter earlier in the week—they look in detail at only around 240 cases, and then they look at 100 in a short form. We are saying that will have up to 1,800, and at the moment we do not have any guidance on what would be a more detailed and thorough investigation. Clearly, we need to have confidence about the amount of resources and about the fact that the Department has proper oversight of that and has been doing things properly.

This is not just about making our country the most attractive destination to do business; it is also about ensuring that we have the resources in place so that we do not slip up. We do not want another Huawei situation. We do not to be in a place where we do not have the resources, and where the former head of MI6 has to come to our evidence session and say that successive Governments have placed too much emphasis on building the economy at the expense of our security.

One of the evidence sessions last week touched on the idea of moving from just a few dozen cases to 1,000-plus being investigated. We do not know exactly when those cases will come. If there is suddenly a glut of cases at the same time, we need to make sure that the resources are there to deal with all of them. In that way, we will not have smaller companies, in particular, which are not getting the media coverage that some companies have had, falling through the net. As we know, very small, innovative technology companies sometimes develop some very radical forward-thinking technologies, and we might not even notice that they have been bought out or taken over by a state-owned business or by a business that is aligned closely with another state that may not share British values or interests.

I will leave it there, Sir Graham. This is about helping the Government to help themselves, allowing Parliament to have oversight and ensuring that the resources are in place, so that we get this right and do not have to revisit it after a calamity in a few years’ time.

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[Nadhim Zahawi]

I am pleased to speak to this group of amendments, which relate to clause 3. This clause provides for a statement to be published by the Secretary of State, setting out how he expects to exercise the call-in power. Clause 1 requires that this statement is published before the power may be used. There are three amendments in this grouping—amendments 1, 2 and 9—and I will speak to each of them in turn.

I advise the Committee that we have interpreted amendment 1, including with regard to the Members’ explanatory statement, as seeking to amend clause 3(1) rather than 3(3). The effect of this amendment, as we believe it was intended, is to require the Secretary of State to publish the statement. As I set out on Second Reading, the Government are committed to providing as much clarity and predictability as possible for business when it comes to the use of the new investment screening regime that is provided for by this Bill. The proposed statement will provide valuable information to businesses and investors, and help them to determine whether they should submit a notification about their trigger event. Indeed, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament, publish and not withdraw the statement before the call-in power may be used. In effect, this means that the Secretary of State will need to have published a statement to use the call-in power, which is crucial to the regime.

Of course, as the security landscape changes over time, he may wish to publish an updated statement at a future point; this will need to go through the same consultation and parliamentary procedure as the original statement before it can take its place. I assure hon. Members that the Secretary of State has neither the intention nor the power to run this regime without having first published a statement.

I will now turn briefly to amendment 2, which would allow for the Secretary of State to include a definition of national security in the statement provided for by clause 3. The Secretary of State’s powers under the Bill are expressly predicated on investigating and addressing risks to national security. When exercising these powers, the Secretary of State is required to proceed on the basis that national security is strictly about the security of our nation. That is because what national security means is a question of law, which has already been answered by the highest courts of the land as being the security of our nation.

The Secretary of State will obviously need to comply with the law when exercising the powers in the Bill. There is therefore no need to define what national security means in the Bill. As Dr Ashley Lenihan—a fellow at the Centre for International Studies at the London School of Economics, who was quoted earlier by the shadow Minister—mentioned in last week’s evidence session:

“What we have seen is that most foreign direct investment regimes of this nature all refer to national security. I do not know of a single one that actually defines it or limits itself to a particular definition”.––[Official Report, National Security and Infrastructure Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 38, Q42.]

Furthermore, as national security is a term used in the Bill, it would in any event not be appropriate for the Secretary of State to define the scope of the term in the statement; the statement is not legislation and is not subject to approval by Parliament.

Wanting to understand the Government’s aims and expectations for these powers is entirely reasonable—there is no discussion about that. However, I refer the Committee to the comments of Michael Leiter, a partner at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom LLP, who told us that he would consider that

“it is a bit of a fool’s errand”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 49, Q55.]

to define national security. Instead, the statement will set out how the Secretary of State expects to use the call-in power, and we plan to include details of the types of national security risks in which the Secretary of State is especially interested.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I just want to come back on the point the Minister made about other regimes not using a definition of national security. The United States Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act provides a sense of congress on six factors: countries of special concern; critical infrastructure, energy assets and critical materials; history of compliance with US laws; control of US industries that affect US capability and capacity to meet national security requirements; involvement of personally identifiable information; and potential new cyber-security vulnerabilities. In his comments, the Minister said that no other regime includes a definition of national security, but that sounds like a definition of national security to me.

[Nadhim Zahawi]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Aberavon for his comments. I was quoting from the evidence that Dr Ashley Lenihan provided. She said:

“I do not know of a single one that actually defines it or limits itself to a particular definition,”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 38 Q42.]

if that is what he was referring to.

Instead, what I am trying to share with the Committee is that the statement will set out how the Secretary of State expects to use the call-in power. Within that, we plan to include details of the types of national security risks in which the Secretary of State is especially interested. These include certain sectors of the economy and types of acquisitions relating to entities and assets that may raise concern. I think I have said enough on that.

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[Nadhim Zahawi]

Let us take the example given by the hon. Member of Nortel collaborating with Huawei or any other entity. They have to satisfy themselves that if they wish to acquire something else in future, they will effectively have to go through the same process of national security clearance. Collaboration between entities or in academia are covered under the separate guidance, including from the agencies, on who they collaborate with, but I think that is a different issue. Once an asset is created that has a national security implication for the United Kingdom, the Bill comes into play.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordingly agreed to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Notifiable acquisitions

[Stephen Kinnock]

I beg to move amendment 6, in clause 6, page 4, line 27, at end insert—

‘(4A) The Secretary of State must have regard to the protection of critical national infrastructure when making regulations under this section.’

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to have regard to the protection of critical national infrastructure when making notifiable acquisition regulations.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Graham. I congratulate the Minister on his recent appointment as the vaccine tsar. I must say, he is taking multi-tasking to a whole new level, and we wish him well.

I rise to speak in favour of amendment 6, which is closely related to amendments 7 and 8. Sir Graham, should I speak to amendments 7 and 8 as well now, or to amendment 6 alone?

[The Chair]

Just amendment 6.

[Stephen Kinnock]

Thank you, Sir Graham.

Before we go down into the weeds of it, it is worth taking a step back and thinking about the fundamental purpose of the Bill. The amendments are informed by that fundamental purpose, because we wish to be constructive and to support the Bill, but also to improve it. We feel that if our amendments are not accepted, it will be a real missed opportunity to achieve something even better. We can take this Bill from good to great—an objective I am sure the Minister would support.

The aim needs to be around national security, yes, but also about economic resilience, because underlying economic resilience is actually what is required for our national security. The two are fundamentally intertwined. To build that resilience, we need sovereign capability. We need, as a country, to have a business culture based on purpose, rather than on fast bucks and short termism. We need resilience so that we are a country with a healthy and viable manufacturing sector that enables us to export more, because we would argue that the persistent trade deficit we face as a country has an impact on our national security. We also need to develop that sovereign capability. As the covid crisis has demonstrated, we have ended up being far too exposed to highly extended supply chains, many of which go through countries that are not our natural allies. That has left us lacking in resilience. The Bill is about managing risk, and our risk levels are far too high because of the economic model we have fallen into.

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[The Chair]

I was not proposing anything; the hon. Gentleman was.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank the hon. Member for Clwyd South for his intervention. I take that point absolutely, but I think it is important sometimes to go back to the mindset we have around this legislation. The Opposition feel that there are opportunities to strengthen the Bill. Every single Bill that the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy puts forward should be informed by that need to strengthen our sovereign capability and make us less reliant on risky supply chains, and to be somewhat more realistic about the way that the world and globalisation work. It really was just contextual, but I do take the hon. Member’s point that we should remain within those parameters. I think the mindset is really important.

On the issue of exposure to highly extended supply chains and the way in which we have had the floodgates open for hostile foreign takeovers, this country has the highest number of hostile foreign takeovers in the entire OECD. That really speaks volumes about our economic model.

In terms of relations with China, the Bill is not an anti-China Bill as such, but we all know that the key economic development of the last few decades has been the rise of China. The reality is that we have been naïve and complacent in the way we have dealt with China. Previous Prime Ministers announced a so-called golden era, whereby we were going to open our markets to China, the Chinese were going to do the same, and they would gradually align with the international rules-based order, its norms and even its values, some thought.

That has been an unmitigated disaster. None of that has happened. In fact, what we have seen is that the benefits of the golden era have flowed almost exclusively from west to east. We are still running a £19 billion trade deficit with China and we are still seeing extremely hostile political acts, not least what is happening in Hong Kong and the persecution of the Uyghur people in Xinjiang. Both economically and politically, the strategy has failed.

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[Chi Onwurah]

My hon. Friend is making an excellent point. In addition to the critical issue of the state of many small businesses after covid, there is Brexit. The low value of the pound means that our distressed assets will be cheaper on the global market.

[Stephen Kinnock]

My hon. Friend makes a crucial point. As we have constantly said, this is about risk and the hierarchy of risks we face. Risk is always sensitive to what is happening in terms of the global economic outlook. As she rightly points out, Brexit and leaving the transition period will be a seismic event for our country. It will have a massive impact on our currency and the strength of the pound. Combining that with the covid situation means that we have to be careful. We have to be vigilant and ensure that we defend our national interest. That is why it is important that our mindset involves taking a holistic view of our national interest, particularly in the turbulent times in which we find ourselves. This is fundamentally about saying that our national security is not for sale. Our national security does not have a price tag, and it has to be the primary consideration.

With those contextual comments in mind, I move on to amendment 6, which considers a particular aspect of our economy. It focuses on the asset side of the ledger in terms of this Bill—namely, critical national infrastructure. Our amendment would require the Secretary of State to have regard to the protection of critical national infrastructure when making notifiable acquisition regulations. Going back to China, it is remarkable how much of our critical national infrastructure is in the hands of Chinese enterprises or state-backed investment vehicles. This is happening now, right under our noses, and needs to be taken into account in discussing this amendment.

In essence, our amendment offers a way to ensure that critical national infrastructure is given particular and extra consideration in the national security and investment assessments within the regime. Given that the Bill fails to define national security, it does not, by definition, reference critical national infrastructure.

To drill down further, the Government’s consultation on the Bill lists the 17 sectors that might come under the regime’s mandatory notification process, but it does not explicitly list the UK’s critical national infrastructure. In fact, there is not a direct overlap. Five sectors are not included in the 17 that are in the consultation, but they are in our critical national infrastructure. The 17 range from advanced materials, advanced robotics, artificial intelligence, civil nuclear, communications, computing hardware, critical suppliers to Government, critical suppliers to the emergency services, cryptographic authentication, data infrastructure, data infrastructure, defence, energy, engineering biology, military and dual use, quantum technology, satellite and space technologies, to transport. However, the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure defines 13 areas as critical national infrastructure, including several sectors that are not included in the 17: food, Government more broadly––not just critical suppliers––health, space and water.

If we look at the impact of the pandemic and think about what critical national infrastructure means, we see that the 17 sectors are already out of date. Given our experience with covid and the concerns about food supply, that is clearly an issue we need to examine closely. Water is crucial to our wellbeing as a nation, yet it is not included in the 17. Our amendment argues that critical national infrastructure should be taken as an asset class. If defined as an asset class, the landscape moves and the definitions of sectors move, but there is clarity about critical national infrastructure always being within the scope of the Bill.

[Matt Western]

As always, my hon. Friend makes important points. To amplify those, if we had been sitting down and writing this Bill 10 years ago, which would have been a pretty good thing to have done, with hindsight––

[Matt Western]

I think I chose my time horizon pretty well. Had we been doing so, we may not have been considering these 17 categories, traffic light systems, underground systems, public transport or railway infrastructure in a way that we have to nowadays because we understand just how interconnected things are. We understand what the threats and risks are from these sorts of investments from possibly rogue organisations, states or businesses.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank my hon. Friend. This is genuinely not an attempt to make a party political point. There is no doubt that we should have seen the impact of the rise of China long before 2010. This is something that has been going on for a long time. President Xi Jinping was appointed in 2013 and there has been a qualitative shift in China’s outlook and the way in which it is engaging with the world. There is an increasingly aggressive and assertive set of economic policies. One of the experts said that the objective is to dominate the global technology scene. That is an explicit objective in the Made in China 2025 vision that the President and the Chinese Communist party adhere to. While we are not trying to make party political points here, a lot has changed in the last seven years.

[Dr Whitehead]

Does my hon. Friend consider that had these provisions, as amended, been in place in, say, 2015, the Government would not have signed the Secretary of State’s investment agreement with the Chinese state nuclear corporation, giving it control of a nuclear power plant and the right to build its own reactor, staff it with its own staff and run it entirely according to its own interest? Does he think that it was perhaps naive to do that? Might greater protection have been afforded for future deals under this sort of arrangement?

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[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank my hon. Friend. His intervention is telling because it points to a fundamental failing at the heart of Government in terms of being joined up and credible. We cannot condemn aspects of China’s activity and its increasingly assertive behaviour —potential military threats to Taiwan, and sabre-rattling in the South China sea—while opening up our nuclear energy capability to that same hostile foreign actor. Security is about our credibility, resilience and ability to stand strong and united, because we know that the Chinese Communist party will exploit weakness and division. Consistency is vital—consistency and security are two sides of the same coin.

To answer my hon. Friend’s question, I profoundly and sincerely hope that the investment to which he refers would not have passed this test. Frankly, if it had passed this test, the Bill would end up not being worth the paper it is written on. This is about the implementation of the Bill and the Government’s capability to stand up for our national security and critical national infrastructure, which is at the heart of the amendment.

It is worth pointing out that the Intelligence and Security Committee defines our critical national infra- structure as

“certain ‘critical’ elements of infrastructure, the loss or comprise of which would have a major detrimental impact on the availability or integrity of essential services, leading to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of life.”

I am convinced that no Member present would argue with that definition or against putting those considerations at the heart of what Parliament and the Government stand for.

We must include critical national infrastructure. It would follow best practice—our allies the United States and Canada both include critical national infrastructure in their list of key factors to assess as part of national security, so we would not be reinventing the wheel but simply following best practice. In the expert witness sessions, I asked Sir Richard Dearlove specifically whether he thought that a definition of critical national infrastructure should be included in the Bill. He said:

“I would certainly see that as advantageous, because it defines a clear area where you start and from which you can make judgments”.––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 24, Q31.]

As I said the start of my comments, sovereign capability is what this is really about, and our sovereign capability is profoundly undermined by the fact that so much of our critical national infrastructure is not in our own hands. Supply chains are over-extended and often depend on actors that perhaps 10 years ago we did not see as we do now, which has to be taken into account. I urge hon. Members to consider the amendment seriously, because it goes to the heart of what Parliament and Government should be about.

[Nadhim Zahawi]

Amendment 6 would require the Secretary of State to have regard to the protection of critical national infrastructure when making notifiable acquisition regulations. I welcome the intention of the hon. Member for Aberavon to ensure that the protection of critical national infrastructure is considered by the Secretary of State. Indeed, I take it as a ringing endorsement of the approach the Government have taken in clause 6 to define the specific sectors and activities subject to mandatory notification clearance.

As the hon. Gentleman will know, we intend to introduce regulations under the clause once the Bill has received Royal Assent, and we are currently consulting on the sector definitions, which cover much of the critical national infrastructure that he quite rightly shared with the Committee, including energy, civil, nuclear, transport, communications and defence. We are publicly consulting, in particular with sector experts, the legal profession, business and investment communities, to ensure that those definitions provide clarity and certainty, and are focused on the specific parts of sectors and activities that can pose risks to our national security. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that, in developing any notifiable acquisition regulations, the Secretary of State will always take into account the national security needs of the country within the critical national infrastructure sectors, the advanced technology sectors and the wider economy.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank the Minister for giving way; he is being very generous. Does he not see the advantage of including this point on the face of the Bill? It makes an important statement—it is a political statement, really—about the need to ensure that, whatever the regulations say, critical national infrastructure is embedded in the Bill.

[Nadhim Zahawi]

I hear what the hon. Gentleman says. The word that slightly worries businesses is “political” statement. I think that that is a concern. I think his intention is right, and the reason why we have taken the route of mandatory notification for the 17 sectors is precisely the point he makes. I assure him that the Secretary of State will always take into account the national security needs of the country within the critical national infrastructure sectors. Indeed, the hon. Gentleman will recall that the Government introduced a statutory instrument to include health in the Enterprise Act 2002 when the covid pandemic hit.

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[Nadhim Zahawi]

I am grateful to you, Sir Graham, for refocusing our attention on the amendment. Suffice it to say that national security is always taken into account when it comes to nuclear or energy, as it was at the time of those agreements. The point I am trying to make is that we must be flexible to ensure that the new regime can adapt to the threats of tomorrow. That is the right approach to ensure that we can keep this country safe. Of course, any such regulations will be subject to parliamentary approval through the draft affirmative procedure, giving Members of this House and the other place the opportunity to ensure that the mandatory notification and clearance regime works effectively. As such, I cannot accept the amendment and I hope that the hon. Member for Aberavon will seek leave to withdraw it.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank the Minister, but I am afraid that we will have to push the amendment to a Division, because it is so fundamental to how we see the purpose of the Bill. We have heard lots of assurances today along the lines of, “Trust us. We are on the right track. We get it.” I hope the Minister will forgive us, but we prefer the “trust but verify” model. Therefore, we think that this provision should be in the Bill, and I will have to press the amendment to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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Control of entities

[Stephen Kinnock]

I beg to move amendment 7, in clause 8, page 6, line 38, at end insert—

“(10) The fifth case is where the acquisition involves state-owned entities or investors originating in a country of risk to UK national security and creates any change of influence.”

This amendment would mean that any acquisition involving state-owned entities or investors originating in a country of risk to UK national security and creating a change of influence would count as a person gaining control of a qualifying entity.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 8, in clause 8, page 6, line 38, at end insert—

“(10) The fifth case is where the acquisition involves changes to material influence in industries critical to the UK’s capability and capacity to maintain national security, including economic security.”

This amendment would mean that any acquisition which involves changes to material influence in industries critical to national security would count as a person gaining control of a qualifying entity.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I am very happy to have the opportunity to set out what we are trying to achieve with this amendment. While the previous amendment was very much about protecting our assets, this one focuses on the characteristics of the acquirer. It is absolutely clear that any successful screening regime has to be based on a solid understanding of both aspects—both the asset and the acquirer—and that both are equally vital to the successful implementation of the regime.

Harking back to the debate we had about an earlier amendment, the objective here has to be smart regulation. What do we mean by that? If we try to catch everything, we end up catching nothing. We have to prioritise. We have to have a screening system that has a smart, nuanced and well-informed understanding of risk, both in terms of the prioritisation of our assets and the prioritisation of understanding the characteristics of the acquirer. It is on that basis that we prioritise action, and when our investment security unit needs to intervene.

The amendment is focused very much on the characteristics of the acquirer. It is about ensuring that we guard ourselves against the influence of foreign powers that wish to do harm to our country—those that have an agenda. The Minister said earlier that companies get a bit worried when we use the term “political”, but national security is a fundamentally political consideration, because it is about our political analysis of the threat from hostile foreign actors and our understanding of what the national interest is in a holistic sense. We have to give that political leadership. We cannot expect the business community to take that decision for us; we have to give a lead on understanding where the investment is coming from and what the characteristics of the company or investment vehicle are. Fundamentally, going by the old adage that he who pays the piper chooses the tune, where there are state-owned and state-backed entities, it is absolutely clear who is paying the piper and who is choosing to the tune.

The amendment we have tabled would mean that any acquisition involving state-owned entities or investors originating in a country of risk to UK national security—a fundamentally political calculation—and creating a change of influence would count as a person gaining control of a qualifying entity. By including state-owned enterprises explicitly on the face of the Bill, we would be ensuring particular regard to the issue even where shareholding levels are low.

We understand the thresholds for trigger events, but what we are saying is that when the characteristics of the acquirer ring particular alarm bells, that should apply regardless of the shareholding level that is being considered by the acquirer. We know the threat from state-owned enterprises is disproportionate; that is why we are recommending a kind of disproportionate action in this amendment, to address the reality of the characteristics and to ensure that we are carefully guarding against potentially malign actors.

Again, this is not a new concept. Other countries use it in their regimes, and we are simply proposing that we follow suit and have a smarter strategy and approach to regulation at the moment. The clarity that we need, of course, is from understanding that where allied states are involved and the transactions are efficiently screened for approval there is little cause for concern, but with this amendment, even small and discrete investments from hostile states and from state-backed entities within those states would be fully captured.

Let us turn to the expert evidence that we received, particularly from Michael Leiter, the legal expert and lawyer, who said:

“With respect to sovereign wealth funds or state-controlled investments, there is a perfectly good argument that yes, the standard of review might be…more rigorous.”—[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 48, Q54.]

Let us be absolutely clear: we do sometimes see so-called private takeovers, where often the state-backed entity is rather obscured within the ownership structure. They are carried out by companies and investment vehicles that are in fact a front for authoritarian state actors, who have wider political, national security and geopolitical agendas and whose values are frequently at odds with ours.

A recent obvious example is the attempt by an investment vehicle backed by the Chinese state to take over Imagination Technologies. The company was the target of a hostile foreign takeover attempt, and that investment vehicle had direct links to the Chinese state. Then there are even more obvious examples, to which my hon. Friends the Members for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and for Southampton, Test have referred, particularly around Hinkley and Bradwell, where there is a clear ownership structure coming directly from the Chinese state.

We must also recognise the broader agenda with things such as China’s belt and road initiative, which is about creating debt-trap diplomacy. It is about building influence by entering other economies in such a major way that those economies effectively become dependent on the Chinese state. Of course, that comes with lots of strings attached, and it is part of the deal that those countries are not able or permitted to speak out when the Chinese state behaves in ways that we would not find acceptable. I hope that the Government and the Minister will seriously consider the amendment, because the characteristics of the acquirer must be taken into account if we are to have a smart regulation system that prioritises and does what the Bill sets out to do.

[Nadhim Zahawi]

This group of amendments would provide for certain cases to count as a person gaining control of a qualifying entity. The amendments are to clause 8, which defines the circumstances in which a person gains control of a qualifying entity for the purpose of the Bill.

Amendment 7 would ensure, as the hon. Member for Aberavon mentioned, that any acquisition involving state-owned entities or investors originating in a country of risk to UK national security and creating a change of influence would count as a person gaining control of a qualifying entity for the purposes of the Bill. I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s intention to ensure that national security is comprehensively protected. I reassure him that the Bill provides no carve-out or special treatment for state-owned entities or overseas investors where they acquire control of a qualifying entity or asset. They will be subject to the mandatory notification requirements in the same way as any other acquirer, and the Secretary of State will have the power to scrutinise any acquisition of control by such parties where the legal test for call-in is met. That includes the acquisition of material influence over the policy of the entity.

However, the Government have been clear that the regime is nationally agnostic, and that each acquisition will be considered on a case-by-case basis. The draft statement of policy published alongside the Bill simply states that the regime will not

“regard state-owned entities, sovereign wealth funds—or other entities affiliated with foreign states—as being inherently more likely to pose a national security risk.”

I strongly believe that this is the right approach. We must recognise that many such organisations have full operational independence in pursuing long-term investment strategies with the objective of economic return, raising no national security risks.

Moreover, the clause already sets out the circumstances that constitute control of an entity based on levels of shareholding and voting rights and material influence. Amendments such as this could, for example, capture increases of equity stakes at any level, even though many could not realistically be expected to give rise to a national security risk. Developing a list of countries of risk would likely be a moving feast that would quickly become out of date in response to changing geopolitics and would most likely harm Britain’s diplomatic relations and place in the world, giving rise to a chilling effect on investment in these shores.

Amendment 8 would create a new case of a person gaining control of a qualifying entity for “changes to material influence” in industries critical to the UK’s capability and capacity to maintain national security, including economic security. Once more, I welcome the emerging cross-party consensus that the Bill must capture more subjective acquisitions of control, rather than solely levels of shares and voting rights. I reassure the hon. Gentleman that acquisitions of material influence over the policy of an entity are very much in the scope of the Bill. That applies within the 17 sectors but also to the wider economy. Parties can notify the Secretary of State of a trigger event concerning the acquisition of a material influence, and he will have the power to proactively call in such a case if the legal test is met.

I should clarify that material influence is not a scale. It is the lowest level of control that can be acquired over a qualifying entity, which captures acquisitions of smaller stakes or other rights or interests in entities, such as board representation rights. As such, it is not immediately clear to me what circumstances such an amendment would bring into the scope of the Bill, given that it would capture changes to material influence. None the less, I admire the ingenuity of the hon. Gentleman’s seeking, at least in part, to define national security through the amendment and its explicit reference to economic security. As he will know, the Bill does not define national security, and, as I said on Second Reading, I think that is a real strength, not a weakness.

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[Nadhim Zahawi]

I think that the Bill is proportionate and I think that national security is not dependent on a particular country. Malignant actors come from different nationalities. The Committee heard from a number of experts last week the reasons for not defining national security, not least because it might limit the Secretary of State from being able to respond to new and emerging threats that did not fall within the definitions set out in statute. For these reasons I cannot accept these amendments, and I would gently encourage the hon. Member for Aberavon to withdraw them.

[Stephen Kinnock]

rose—

[Nadhim Zahawi]

Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment in his intervention.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank the Minister for giving way—sort of. One of the key sentences in the Government’s statement of policy intent is in the section on acquirers, which says:

“Clearly, national security risks are most likely to arise when acquirers are hostile to the UK’s national security, or when they owe allegiance to hostile states or organisations.”

I recognise that the statement of policy intent is a draft, but clearly somebody in government thought it a good idea to put that sentence in there, and I absolutely agree with it. It is therefore very difficult to understand the disconnect that appears to exist between the Bill, which is agnostic on different national actors, and the statement of policy intent, which explicitly talks about when acquirers

“owe allegiance to hostile states or organisations.”

On that basis, the amendment touches on a crucial issue and we shall be pushing it to a Division.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nadhim Zahawi]

I do not wish to keep repeating myself, but I have set out the reasons why I cannot accept these amendments. I would again gently encourage the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment, but I suspect we will be heading to a Division.

[Stephen Kinnock]

We are moving back and forth here. As I set out, the issues around the characteristics of the acquirer are so important to ensuring that we have a smart approach and the sentence within the statement of policy intent is so absolutely spot on that we will push the amendment to a Division to show our support for that section of the statement.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

National Security and Investment Bill (Fifth sitting)

Stephen Kinnock Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 1st December 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Chi Onwurah]

The hon. Member makes an important point that goes to the heart of our concerns. I do not wish to detain the Committee for too long on this, but it is important to discuss the way in which the skills and resources of our national security services, who do so much to keep us safe and secure, will be used to work with the Department to identify potential triggers for a call-in. Some guidance will be given in the statement issued by the Secretary of State, and we will debate that shortly, but what was mentioned many times yesterday during the debate on the Telecommunications (Security) Bill was the capacity and the need for institutions such as our Intelligence and Security Committee to have a more concrete role. Not all of their expertise and knowledge can be in the public domain. As we heard yesterday, the Committee first issued concerns about Huawei back in 2013. If, back in 2013, the business Department had been able to benefit from that expertise, knowledge and insight the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport would be in a different position today.

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)]

As my hon. Friend rightly says, the fundamental purpose of our amendment is to ensure that the screening process takes place upstream so that the multi-agency and highly technical capability of intelligence agencies and the Ministry of Defence can be deployed in advance of the Secretary of State—who otherwise may be in a state of isolation—making an initial decision about whether there is a trigger event or whether action is required. The amendment would ensure that the screening process is done by multiple agencies that can then give the Secretary of State advice that is well informed and rooted in an understanding of the risk that we face.

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank my hon. Friend for putting it so clearly, and I hope that addresses the concerns of the hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine. We want the screening process to benefit from the knowledge of our intelligence agencies and others before the Secretary of State calls it in. Our national security depends on having those robust contributions from across Government and the agencies in guiding decisions. In some cases, this may rely on the established sensitive channels of information and access and communications that have marked the work of the Intelligence and Security Committee. That is the best way to guard our national security, relying on our world-leading intelligence agencies, diplomatic service and our civil service expertise across Departments and not just on a single Secretary of State.

During the evidence sessions last week, we heard from an academic expert witness that institutional capacity in this area usually involves a multi-agency review body. We heard from the former head of MI6 that

“the co-ordination of Government Departments is one of the really big challenges”.––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 23, Q25.]

I am sure everyone who heard Sir Richard Dearlove’s evidence was struck that his years at MI6 had clearly taught him that this is a big challenge and that it is important to have co-ordinated and organised multi-agency input. We heard from the recent head of the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre that the new body

“needs to be broadly based and multidisciplinary.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 26 November 2020; c. 85, Q103.]

The consensus of academic and intelligence service experience is that we need an approach that includes different agencies upstream of the calling decision.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chi Onwurah]

I welcome this debate. If by that the hon. Member is asking whether I think human rights have a relationship to national security, that was very well debated yesterday in relation to the Telecommunications (Security) Bill. A number of his colleagues strongly made the point that there is a relationship between modern-day slavery and our national interest and national security. I do not have the expertise to identify what the agency should be. The Low Pay Commission is not an organisation that I had considered, but I am happy to take his advocacy for its being part of this multidisciplinary approach.

[Stephen Kinnock]

My hon. Friend is being incredibly generous. Not wishing to second-guess some of the scepticism that we may be picking up from the Government Benches—[Interruption.]

[The Chair]

Order. Can we have just one meeting?

[Stephen Kinnock]

Thank you, Mr Twigg. As I was saying, not wishing to second-guess the scepticism that I may be picking up from Government Members, one reason I support the amendment is that I think it brings additional focus to the process. Without a clear definition of what national security is in the Bill, and a clear institutional capacity for the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State will be left with an open-ended process. By having a multi-agency, strong institutional capacity we will streamline the process. Our amendment is about cutting bureaucracy out of the process, and streamlining and focusing it. I hope that hon. Members will consider that when they take their sceptical approach.

[Chi Onwurah]

As always, I am immensely grateful to my hon. Friend, who does well to remind us that part of the underlying issue, which we will debate later, is the lack of any definition of national security. Rather than just considering the scepticism, let me focus on what we are trying to do. Given the lack of any definition of national security, is it not right that it should not be left to the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy to decide what the key issues are on national security? Fundamentally, I think that is the question that Committee members must consider.

The amendment seeks to fill the gap that expert advice and international precedence highlight. It enshrines credible decision making in law and, in doing so, protects our security and gives businesses confidence that the decision to call in has been grounded in evidence and expertise, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, who will find certain provisions of the legislation most burdensome and who may have the most to lose from lengthy processes once the call-in procedure happens—the hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine referred to those processes. It grounds a mechanism for effective accountability for the call-in decisions of the Secretary of State.

Amendment 4, which would amend clause 4, has a similar aim. It would require the Secretary of State to consult with the Intelligence and Security Committee before publishing a statement under section 3, which sets out the scope and nature of how the Secretary of State would exercise the call-in powers. That statement would include details of sectors that might especially pose risks, details of trigger events and details of factors that the Secretary of State would consider in deciding whether to act. It would also include details of the BEIS unit’s resourcing, if amendment 9 were agreed to.

The measures are a seismic shift in terms of the UK’s approach to mergers and acquisitions and it gives significant powers and discretion to the Secretary of State. It suggests that the Government may publish a statement setting out the scope of the call-in powers. As part of our discussion this morning, we have talked about the way in which security threats evolve over time in the light of technological change—for example, security threats that we did not recognise in the past led to the Huawei debacle—and also, importantly, in the light of political changes, so it is understandable that our understanding of some of those changes will be imperfect and will rely on sensitive information. However, the critical point is that the fact that there will be change and its sensitivity should not preclude the need for accountability.

In other areas of national security, the Intelligence and Security Committee holds Government to account through proper scrutiny and with access to sensitive information. I refer again to the debates on the Telecommunications (Security) Bill and the Second Reading of this Bill, where members of the Intelligence and Security Committee demonstrated their understanding of the key issues around national security and their ability to make a contribution—I think it is fair to say that they are very willing to make a contribution. It is only right that we bring the same level of scrutiny to measures in this Bill, on matters of critical national security. The amendment would bring the scrutiny of the Intelligence and Security Committee to changes in the Secretary of State’s call-in powers, ensuring that these major powers consistently act to protect our national security.

Scrutiny is especially needed in this area. We have had the Enterprise Act since 2002, but there have been only 12 national security cases under it. That speaks very clearly to the lack of experience and an acute need for scrutiny as we now move up to almost 2,000 annual cases. Several witnesses in our evidence sessions emphasised that we were going from effectively zero—a standing start—to Formula 1 performance levels, and that as such, we needed to ensure that we put in place the resources, the expertise and the support to enable that to be effective and not unnecessarily impede our business, our economy and our foreign investment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chi Onwurah]

I welcome the hon. Lady’s intervention. It is great to have scientific knowledge in Committee and in the House. I welcome the contributions and scrutiny that a scientific background can bring. She is right that there is a tension. The technological environment is fantastic and innovative, with its start-up and enterprise culture. We have great centres of development and innovation, from Cambridge to Newcastle. I am sure hon. Members can mention other centres of great technological development that lead to lots of local start-ups in different areas. All or many of them may be caught by the provisions of the Bill, and that is a concern, but our amendments have been tabled to put in place parliamentary scrutiny.

Parliamentary scrutiny of the call-in process should be, as my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon said, upstream of the actual call-in notification. This is about the definitions of the sectors to ensure upstream scrutiny. Small businesses, particularly start-ups, seek finance, often foreign investment. There are enough barriers in their way and we do not want to create more unnecessarily, but our amendments are about clarifying and ensuring the robustness of the definitions before they hit the coalface of our small businesses and start-ups, whose interests I want to protect. The Opposition are champions of small businesses, are we not?

[Stephen Kinnock]

Indeed we are. My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I reiterate that what we propose is, through consultation, removing bottlenecks—the key word in the intervention from hon. Member for South Ribble. By improving consultation and ensuring that we have the best possible expertise, we will make the Secretary of State’s life easier, not more difficult. It is about removing bottlenecks, not adding them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chi Onwurah]

I am struggling to see how that would happen. How would Parliament, after the Bill becomes law, decide that the Intelligence and Security Committee, as opposed to or in addition to the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, should have a role. How would that happen in practice?

[Stephen Kinnock]

There are plenty of examples of Select Committees getting involved in the upstream work of Government—for example, giving feedback on White Papers. Parliament and its Select Committees consistently get involved in the work of Government in that context.

[Mark Garnier]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

Yes, indeed. The hon. Member is quite correct to draw attention to clause 22, which concerns false or misleading information. It relates to where someone has, at the time of the trigger event, concealed or misled or sought to deceive those concerned with the trigger event about the nature of the event. I would suggest that that is a different case from what we are trying to establish today. It is not that anyone has tried to deceive anybody or maliciously mislead anybody at the time of the trigger event, but new material may come to light or become available within five years of the initial trigger event that might cause a further call-in notice to be introduced. According to the definition set out in the Bill, that looks like it might not be possible.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank my hon. Friend for giving way, and he is being very generous in doing so. He rightly talks about new material or information, but what about the evolving nature of geopolitical threats? There may well be countries that are not considered to be hostile actors now, but political changes one, two or three years down the line could have a massive impact on whether we see that country as a threat to national security. It could become a hostile actor.

[Dr Whitehead]

My hon. Friend makes an important point, which was reflected in the evidence sessions on this Bill. I want to dwell on that briefly, because he makes a really important point. These matters are evolving. Not only that, but the nature of databases evolves. The nature of what we do and do not find out evolves. There are circumstances—my hon. Friend mentioned a particularly important one—where the Secretary of State could be excessively curtailed in the diligent pursuit of his role in terms of call-ins and trigger events if no amendment is made to this clause.

The expert evidence we received from Dr Ashley Lenihan of the Centre for International Studies at the London School of Economics gave rise to a couple of important considerations in terms of how evolving circumstances or new information might be important. Dr Lenihan made a very important point, similar to that made by my hon. Friend, when she stated:

“Dealing with the kind of evolving and emerging threats we see in terms of novel investments from countries such as China, Russia and Venezuela needs the flexibility to look at retroactively and potentially unwind transactions that the Secretary of State and the investment security unit were not even aware of.” ––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, Tuesday 24 November; c. 34, Q36.]

Speaking of existing databases, Dr Lenihan also stated:

“They do not cover asset transactions; they do not cover real estate transactions, which are of increasing concern, especially for espionage purposes.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, Tuesday 24 November; c. 35, Q36.]

I note that there has been a lot of concern in the United States more recently about real estate purchases in strategic locations, which may give rise to espionage or other national security concerns. As Dr Lenihan emphasises, existing databases do not cover such arrangements but might do in the future and might find it necessary to do so in the future. Under those circumstances, new information could well come to light.

Dr Lenihan also gave an interesting example—this is not strictly in line with our considerations today—of how information might come to light in a way not easily anticipated by those doing the initial call-in notice and trigger event. She referred to the purchase in the United States of a US cloud computing company, 3Leaf, which had gone bankrupt. Huawei—as it happened—quietly bought up the assets, employees and patents of that bankrupt company. That was not noticed at the time by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States regulators, because they did not pay attention to bankrupt companies, as opposed companies that continued to operate. That went quietly unnoticed, uncommented and unactioned until, Dr Lenihan informed us, a Government staffer happened to notice on his LinkedIn account that someone he thought had been partially running 3Leaf was listed as a consultant for 3Leaf for Huawei. He thought to himself, “How can this be?” Only through his attention and reporting back was that acquisition unravelled in the United States. No one was providing malicious information or seeking to mislead at the time. It was just that new information came to light, in that instance through surprising mechanisms. However, an important issue came before regulators and the security services. That emphasises that clause 22, important though it is, does not cover those sorts of circumstances and eventualities.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

Could the Minister say a little more about what the problem is with not having the Minister’s or the Secretary of State’s hands tied? Our amendment simply says that if information comes to light that creates cause for concern, the Secretary of State may, if he or she so wishes, look into it again. It is not an obligation; it simply makes sure that the option is there.

[Nadhim Zahawi]

I was going to address that at the end of my remarks, but I will touch on it briefly and hopefully reiterate it at the end. It is about certainty and proportionality. Everything we are doing by legislating in this way has an impact on businesses and the certainty of attracting investment and growing, as the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central, reminded us in her opening speech.

As I was saying, a draft of the statement was published alongside the Bill. Following commencement, if parties involved in trigger events are concerned about them being called in, they will be able to remove any doubt about this by notifying the Secretary of State of their event. They will then be entitled to receive a quick and binding decision on whether the Secretary of State will call in the event.

I will turn briefly to amendment 10, which seeks to extend the Secretary of State’s power to issue a call-in notice in respect of a trigger event that has previously been called in when no new material information becomes available within five years of the trigger event. After a trigger event is called in, the Secretary of State has—

Covid-19

Stephen Kinnock Excerpts

Monday 16th March 2020 Commons Chamber

[Matt Hancock]

It is as soon as possible. There are so many things that we need to get on with, and this is one of them.

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend the Member for Leicester East (Claudia Webbe) referred earlier to reports that the private health industry is planning to charge the NHS £2.4 million a day for the rental of 8,000 beds. Does the Secretary of State really feel that that is the right way to go, given that this is a national effort and that we are all in this together? What steps will he be taking to ensure that private health providers are doing their bit?

[Matt Hancock]

I do think it is the right way to go, to make sure that private sector capacity is urgently available to address this crisis. It is a matter of all working together to deliver.

Contaminated Blood

Stephen Kinnock Excerpts

Tuesday 12th April 2016 Commons Chamber

[Jonathan Reynolds (Stalybridge and Hyde) (Lab/Co-op)]

I am extremely grateful to you, Mr Speaker, for giving me the opportunity to speak in this debate today and to the Backbench Business Committee for allowing such an important issue to be brought before the House. I add my praise to my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) for her outstanding leadership. As a member of the all-party group on haemophilia and contaminated blood, I feel strongly that it is right that the House consider this matter and that more should be done. I also feel that it would be unconscionable if any reform that did come about actually reduced the support currently being received by people who have been victims of this appalling episode in the history of our public health system.

As we have heard, between the mid-1970s and the late 1980s, 4,670 people with haemophilia were infected with hepatitis C through their NHS treatment and the transfusion of contaminated blood. Of those, 1,243 people with haemophilia were also exposed to HIV. Almost half of those infected with hepatitis C, and almost three quarters co-infected with HIV and hepatitis C, have since died. Many have experienced poverty and discrimination as a result of their infections. For so many of the victims, the simplest of daily tasks can become difficult and, in some situations, frightening. Such a scenario can be seen in the life of one of my own constituents, Mr Michael Gee, with whom I have worked on this issue since I first met him at a constituency surgery in 2013. Alongside many other victims, Michael has travelled to be here today to listen to this debate. The determination to be here is testament to the importance of these decisions. I pay tribute to Michael and to everyone else who is here today and who has been placed in a similar situation.

As a young boy, Michael was accidentally scalded when reaching for a pan of boiling water on the cooker while his mother was making dinner. Rushed to hospital, he underwent a number of blood transfusions. Due to the shortage of blood donors, the Government of the day had purchased blood supplies from abroad, and one of the bags used contained contaminated blood.

Michael was diagnosed with hepatitis C in 1987, and it is a condition that he has had to live with throughout his adult life. Hepatitis C causes chronic fatigue, organ damage as well as significant cognitive impairment and damage to the auto-immune system causing arthritis and muscle problems. There are also a whole range of significant practical everyday problems. Hepatitis C sufferers, for instance, struggle to get mortgages or proper insurance.

Michael is now a father, and due to the nature of his condition he is restricted in his interaction with his own child. Terrified that an open wound could transfer his virus, he often has to wear gloves to put his mind at ease, and keep the safety of his children paramount. Such a scenario is difficult to comprehend for any of us who are parents and we would not wish to see anyone placed in that position.

I do not think that any Government have done enough on this matter. In 2009, the Department of Health reviewed the support for the victims of the disaster, but 80% of those who were infected with hepatitis C were excluded from the financial help. That was on the grounds that their illness was considered to be at stage 1. They had been categorised as stage 1 because they could not prove a certain stage of liver disease. To make things even more unfair, there were serious differences in the help given to people with HIV and people with hepatitis C. One of the biggest and most obvious anomalies was the fact that if someone with HIV died their spouse could apply for ongoing financial support, albeit means-tested, but if someone with hepatitis C died their partner received nothing.

The entire support system is inadequate, and is administered by a multitude of charitable trusts with different rules and criteria, which makes it harder to access. In 2016, the Government are in danger of repeating the errors of the past and once again letting down the victims and their families. Last month, victims of the disaster received letters from the Department of Health consulting them on reforms that could leave some of them up to £7,000 a year worse off. This is not acceptable, and it must not be allowed to happen.

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend mentioned the impact on families. My constituents, David and Vincent Farrugia, tragically lost their father Barry after he contracted HIV and hepatitis C from contaminated blood. The families and the bereaved are not included in the consultation—there is no provision for children, dependants or bereaved families. Does my hon. Friend agree that children and dependants who are now adults should be included in the consultation?

[Jonathan Reynolds]

I agree with my hon. Friend. When we learn the details of these cases it is clear that people’s entire lives have been grievously affected, and it is only right that everyone associated with those injured parties is given the opportunity to take part in the remedy that is required. I would point out to the Department of Health that almost all of the victims of this disaster were infected at least 30 years ago, and there is substantial research evidence showing that by now they have suffered significant damage to their health and earning potential. That must be taken into consideration.

The cap proposed by the Government on annual payments once again shows the lack of compassion and reasonableness faced by these people. The fact that infected spouses will stop receiving payments is grossly unfair. The Prime Minister apologised in the House to the victims last year for what they had had to endure, saying that it was

“difficult to imagine the feelings of unfairness that people must feel”—[Official Report, 21 March 2015; Vol. 594, c. 1423.]

Given the latest proposals, do not those words now ring somewhat hollow? The chilling truth of this tragedy is that about half of the estimated 5,000 haemophiliacs who were infected have died without ever seeing justice.

I would ask all Members in the Chamber to think not only of those affected, such as Michael, but of the victims’ families, who rely on financial support, which provides the security and stability they need and deserve, and which we as Members of this House have a duty to protect. This is one of the worst episodes in the history of public healthcare and the NHS. Any sense of natural justice leads, I believe, to the conclusion that it must be addressed. We cannot give these people back their health or their dignity, but we can give them closure. We can give them proper financial support—and, frankly, it is time we did.