(8 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
That this House has considered the Report of the Iraq Inquiry.
I welcome the opportunity to open this first day of debate on the report of the Iraq inquiry. I suspect that, in the circumstances, the world’s eye will not be focused on our proceedings with quite the laser-like intensity that might have been expected when the debate was originally announced.
Let me start by paying tribute to the work of Sir John Chilcot and other members of the inquiry committee, including the late Sir Martin Gilbert, who sadly passed away during the writing of the report. For anyone who has read even just part of this report—I defy anyone to say that they have read the entire thing—it will be clear that the committee has discharged what is a Herculean task thoroughly, fairly, with great rigour and a degree of frankness that will reassure those who feared a whitewash and that ensures there can be no ambiguity about the lessons that need to be learned.
I also want to signal my understanding that the publication of the Chilcot report a week ago will have been a poignant and no doubt difficult moment for the families of those who lost loved ones in Iraq. It is important, even as we examine the detail of the report and conduct this debate, that they know that this House will never forget the sacrifice of the 179 British servicemen and women, as well as the 23 British civilians, who lost their lives during the conflict and its aftermath. We will also never forget the service and the sacrifice of the thousands more who suffered life-changing injuries, and we reaffirm to them today our determination that they will get the care they need for the rest of their lives. I hope that the survivors and the relatives of the fallen alike will have taken comfort from the assiduous and detailed examination of the war to be found in this report. The sacrifice of our service people demands nothing less.
More than 13 years since the invasion of Iraq began, 10 years since the Conservative party and others first called for it, and seven years since the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown finally commissioned it, the Iraq inquiry report sets out to try to answer the crucial questions that have dominated the debate about the war in Iraq and the events that preceded and followed it. Did the United Kingdom decide to go to war on a mistaken or false premise? Were all the decisions leading up to the war and subsequently properly taken and informed by proper consideration of legal advice? Was the operation to invade Iraq properly planned and executed? Did the Government of the day foresee and prepare adequately for the aftermath? Were our armed forces adequately funded and provided with the proper protection and equipment for their task?
Digesting fully the contents of this report will take weeks rather than days. In 13 volumes and 2.6 million words, Sir John and his committee take us in painstaking detail through the decision making in Government between 2001, when the possibility of military action first arose, and 2009, when British combat troops finally departed Iraq. They set out the conclusions that they have reached on some of the central issues that have proved so controversial, including the handling, use and presentation of secret intelligence, and they identify many lessons that should be learned and implemented for the future.
Does the Foreign Secretary accept that a number of us are a bit perplexed at the speed with which this admittedly two-day debate is taking place? As he said, there are 2.6 million words to be read, and for a full understanding it seems to me that today’s debate is a little premature and might have been better left until the autumn.
I suspect that right hon. and hon. Members would have been dismayed if they had not had an opportunity to put on record their reactions to the Chilcot report, albeit necessarily initial reactions. We will no doubt hear in the course of debate whether the concerns that my right hon. Friend expresses are widely shared.
The words of the very first paragraph of the executive summary of the report spell out the enormity of the undertaking and thus the gravity that should have attended all aspects of its preparation and execution:
“In 2003, for the first time since the Second World War, the United Kingdom took part in an opposed invasion and full-scale occupation of a sovereign State–Iraq.”
A reading of Sir John’s report, however, suggests that flaws, errors and omissions abounded. If the House will allow me, I will try to summarise the key findings that he makes.
First, on the question of why the United Kingdom went to war, the two issues central to the case that Tony Blair put forward were Saddam’s failure to comply with the obligations imposed by the UN Security Council between 1991 and 1999, and the message that the international community would send if those obligations were not enforced, and the threat to international peace and security from the weapons of mass destruction that, he argued, were at Saddam’s disposal.
The report identifies an
“ingrained belief of the Government and the intelligence community that Saddam Hussein’s regime retained chemical and biological warfare capabilities, was determined to preserve and if possible enhance its capabilities . . . and was pursuing an active and successful policy of deception and concealment.”
There were good reasons for this belief, given the past actions of Saddam’s regime. His past use of chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians and Iranian military forces, his refusal to comply with the demands of weapons inspectors, and his refusal to comply with UN Security Council resolutions all pointed in that direction. As Sir John set out:
“As late as 17 March, Mr Blair was being advised by the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, the means to deliver them and the capacity to produce them.”
However, as Sir John also says:
“It is now clear that policy on Iraq was made on the basis of flawed intelligence and assessments.”
He finds that
“At no stage was the proposition that Iraq might no longer have chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or programmes identified and examined”
by either the Joint Intelligence Committee or the wider intelligence community.
In the case that he set out to the House of Commons on 18 March 2003, Mr Blair also argued that there was a link between international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and that—I quote from the then Prime Minister’s statement—
“the two together constitute a fundamental assault on our way of life.”—[Official Report, 18 March 2003; Vol. 401, c. 767.]
Sir John finds that
“While it was reasonable for the Government to be concerned about the fusion of proliferation and terrorism, there was no basis in the JIC Assessments to suggest that Iraq itself represented such a threat.”
When it comes to the use and presentation of intelligence, in particular the Government’s dossier on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction published on the day of the Commons debate on 24 September 2002, Sir John finds that
“There is no evidence that intelligence was improperly included in the dossier or that No.10 improperly influenced the text”
and that
“The JIC accepted ownership of the dossier and agreed its content.”
However, he also finds that the judgments presented in Mr Blair’s statement to the House that day and in the dossier
“were presented with a certainty that was not justified.”
The Joint Intelligence Committee, he finds, should have made it clear to Mr Blair that the assessed intelligence had not established beyond doubt either that Iraq had continued to produce chemical or biological weapons, or that efforts to develop nuclear weapons continued.
On the much debated question of the legality of the war, the inquiry has not expressed a view on whether military action was legal. As Sir John says, that could
“only be resolved by a properly constituted and internationally recognised Court.”
The Government are refusing to release confidential advice that Whitehall officials gave to Gordon Brown about the remit of the inquiry. This advice was what made it impossible for Sir John Chilcot to rule on whether the 2003 war was illegal. The Government’s refusal flies in the face of an Information Tribunal ruling which ordered the material’s release, and it means that the public cannot see what options were considered when deciding on the nature and the scope of the inquiry when it was established. Will the Government reconsider their refusal to release that information?
The Government, in considering this report, will look at all these matters, but that is not the answer that Sir John has primarily identified for his decision not to pass any view on whether military action was legal. He says that the inquiry was not constituted in a way, nor did it have the necessary skills or qualifications, to make that decision.
With respect, that is precisely my question. The Information Tribunal has ordered the release of material showing why the remit of the inquiry was so refined. This is not a criticism of Chilcot; it is a criticism of the present Government for refusing to release information about why the scope of the inquiry was restricted and could not look at the legality. That is what the public want to know.
The point I am making is that Sir John himself identifies not the lack of remit, but the lack of qualifications of the members of the inquiry to reach that decision. He says that that could
“only be resolved by a properly constituted and internationally recognised Court.”
The hon. and learned Lady will know that a huge number of documents have been declassified and made available in this process, but clearly it is not possible to declassify every document.
Sir John goes on to find that, although the then Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, advised on 13 March 2003 that there was, on balance, a secure legal basis for military action,
“The circumstances in which it was ultimately decided that there was a legal basis for UK participation were far from satisfactory.”
Sir John, however, is clear that military action was not undertaken as “a last resort”— that there were further diplomatic steps that could have been taken to seek compliance by the Saddam regime—and that by moving to a military solution when the UNSC would not sanction such a development the UK, far from upholding it, was “undermining the Security Council”.
The Foreign Secretary will have seen the comments of Robin Butler before publication of the Chilcot report last week. According to Robin Butler,
“The legality or illegality of the Iraq war was never a question Sir John Chilcot was asked to deal with”,
so why will not the Government release the documents which might give the public and Parliament an insight into why the Chilcot inquiry did not have the remit and was not qualified to deal with the legality question?
The point that I have made already and will make again is that as I understand it Sir John has not identified lack of remit as the reason why he has given no opinion on the legality of the war. He has identified a lack of appropriate skill sets in the inquiry, and he suggested that it should be a matter that is dealt with by a properly constituted and internationally recognised court. As I have said already, the Government in looking at the report of the Iraq inquiry—it will take some time to do that—will consider all these matters, including questions that the right hon. Gentleman is raising about whether any further documents can appropriately be declassified and made available.
Obviously, John Chilcot’s report is masterful in its description of the formal records and the detail, and in the lessons he very wisely draws. However, will the Foreign Secretary, as a politician, look at the political context for a moment? Does he agree that the background was clearly that the Americans and the Blair Government wished to invade Iraq to change the regime and get rid of Saddam Hussein? However, that would have been illegal regime change, so what my right hon. Friend has just gone through—people’s desperate desire to find evidence and to persuade themselves that there were weapons of mass destruction, that Saddam was not co-operating with the inspectors, that there was a risk of terrorism and so on—was mainly, and no doubt subconsciously, motivated by a desire to give the Attorney General some basis on which he could say that this action was legal?
My reading of the inquiry report is that it does indeed identify that regime change as an objective would be illegal in UK law, but I think the suggestion is that, through a process of group-think, the people who were involved in this process came to see regime change as a means to deliver the legitimate objective, which was compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions. A fair reading of the report suggests that that is the process of mind that is being spelled out by Sir John.
I hope I may be able to assist the Foreign Secretary, although whether he will regard it like that is another matter. I perfectly understand what the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) says, and I understand that it is a view that he has held for a long time, but having had the advantage—that he did not—of being in the Cabinet room when these discussions were taking place, can I just tell the Foreign Secretary that, as we got closer and closer to decision time, the then Prime Minister, Mr Blair, stressed on repeated occasions to the Cabinet that the resolution called for Saddam Hussein to comply with the UN inspectors, and if he did so comply, there would be no military action? He pointed out that the downside of that was that this terrible man, who certainly did commit war crimes on a mass scale, would remain in power, but that that was a downside we would have to accept.
I am sure the House is grateful to the right hon. Lady for giving that insight from the frontline, as it were, of where this debate started, but one of the things that comes out very clearly from a reading of the report is the misalignment between the position of the UK Government and the position of the US Government, who clearly were pursuing regime change as an objective, as they were legally entitled to do under their own regime.
On operational planning, it is well recorded that the initial invasion and defeat of Iraqi forces proceeded rapidly. The UK’s armed forces performed extremely well—a fact of which we and they should be proud—despite the changes to the overall invasion plan as a result of the Turkish Government’s decision to refuse access to Iraq’s borders through Turkish territory. In fact, Iraq’s military turned out to be a good deal less formidable than many of us had imagined.
The task that should have been at least as big as preparing for the invasion was preparing for the aftermath. As Tony Blair said before the Liaison Committee in January 2003:
“You do not engage in military conflict that may produce regime change unless you are prepared to follow through and work in the aftermath of that regime change to ensure the country is stable and the people are properly looked after.”
However, Sir John has found that, when the invasion of Iraq began, the UK Government
“was not in a position to conclude that satisfactory plans had been drawn up and preparations made to meet known post-conflict challenges and risks in Iraq”.
Understanding what those challenges were—the need to restore broken infrastructure, administer a state and provide security, including against the threats of internecine violence, terrorism and Iranian influence—did not, as the report clearly states,
“require the benefit of hindsight”.
However, the Government assumed that the US would be responsible for preparing the post-conflict plan, that the plan would be authorised by the UN Security Council and that the UN would play a major post-conflict role, with the international community sharing the post-conflict burden.
The report finds that the Government
“expected not to have to make a substantial commitment to post-conflict administration.”
It concludes that the failure to anticipate and plan for post-conflict challenges in the short-to-medium term increased the risk that the UK would be unable to respond to the unexpected in Iraq, and, in the longer term, reduced the likelihood of achieving the UK’s strategic objectives there.
Let me just bring the Secretary of State back for a second to the point about regime change. Does he agree that it is important that what is said in private should be reflected in Parliament, and vice versa? On 18 March 2003, Tony Blair said to Parliament:
“I have never put the justification for action as regime change.”—[Official Report, 18 March 2003; Vol. 401, c. 772.]
However, in a private note to Bush just a week later, on 26 March, he said:
“That’s why, though Iraq’s WMD is the immediate justification for action, ridding Iraq of Saddam is the real prize.”
It goes without saying that Ministers—indeed, all Members—should be completely truthful in their utterances to Parliament at all times, and the ministerial code makes that clear.
Specifically on the reconstruction effort, Sir John finds that
“the UK failed to plan or prepare for the major reconstruction programme required”
and that lessons that had been learned through previous reviews of post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation
“were not applied in Iraq”.
On the issue of de-ba’athification, Sir John finds that early decisions on the form of de-Ba’athification and its implementation
“had a significant and lasting negative impact on Iraq.”
Limiting de-Ba’athification to the top three tiers, rather than four, of the party would have had the potential to be far less damaging to Iraq’s post-invasion recovery and political stability. The UK chose not to act on its well-founded misgivings about handing over implementation of de-Ba’athification policy to the governing council.
Turning to the equipping and resourcing of British troops, Sir John finds that the Government failed to match resources to the objectives. He records that by undertaking concurrent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Government
“knowingly exceeded the Defence Planning Assumptions.”
At least in part as a consequence, Sir John concludes that the military role ended
“a long way from success.”
Furthermore, he finds that
“delays in providing adequate medium weight Protected Patrol Vehicles and the failure to meet the needs of UK forces...for ISTAR and helicopters should not have been tolerated”
and that the
“MoD was slow in responding to the developing threat from Improvised Explosive Devices.”
At the end of this analysis, Sir John finds plainly that
“the Iraq of 2009 certainly did not meet the UK’s objectives...it fell far short of strategic success.”
These findings relate to decisions taken at that time, and the arrangements and processes in place at the time. It is, therefore, for those who were Ministers at the time to answer for their actions. This Government’s role is not to seek to apportion blame or to revisit those actions; it is to ensure that the lessons identified by Chilcot are learned, and that they have already led to changes or will lead to changes being implemented in the future.
The Government, including previous Administrations, have not stood still while waiting for the findings we have before us today. There were a number of important reviews relating to the invasion and occupation of Iraq before Chilcot, including Lord Butler’s review of intelligence on weapons of mass destruction, Lord Hutton’s inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr David Kelly, and the inquiries of the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee of both Houses. As a result of each, lessons have been identified and changes have been implemented, so a good deal of the work has already been done.
I hear what the Foreign Secretary says about processes, but does he judge that the post-war reconstruction in Libya would give us any confidence that the lessons have been learned from the post-war reconstruction of Iraq?
I think the two things are completely different. In Iraq at the end of the war, Britain was a joint occupying power and shared joint responsibility for the occupation commission. We were in control of the territory, exercising all the functions and responsibility of Government. As a result of the decisions that were taken around Libya, British boots were never on the ground, we were never in control of that country and we were never an occupying power, so we did not have it within our capability to take the actions that we should have done.
Let me summarise the most important lessons that Sir John has drawn in this report. First, taking military action should always be a last resort. Only after exhausting all credible alternatives should we consider taking the country to war. I believe—this is my personal belief—that the political price that has been paid for apparently neglecting this important principle will ensure that future Administrations are unlikely to overlook it.
Secondly, how government is conducted matters. The failures of process, of challenge, and even of proper record-keeping identified by Sir John were serious and widespread. In part to prevent such failures in the future, the Conservative-led coalition Government established the National Security Council in May 2010 to ensure that there is proper, co-ordinated, strategic decision making across the whole of Government. The NSC includes the Chief of the Defence Staff, the heads of the intelligence agencies, and the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, as well as relevant Ministers—and now the Attorney General—alongside senior officials. It is properly supported by a dedicated secretariat led by the national security adviser, ensuring that all parts of the national security apparatus are properly joined up across Whitehall and beyond.
So we now have a system that ensures that decisions on serious security issues are taken on the basis of full papers and proper challenge and discussion, with legal advice fully explained and considered, and proposals stress-tested by Departments, with decisions formally recorded. Having sat on the National Security Council for six years, first as an occasional member, as Transport Secretary, and then permanently as Defence Secretary and now Foreign Secretary, it seems to me highly improbable that the process of conduct of business in relation to this matter through 2002 and 2003, as set out by Chilcot, could be repeated now.
I think that the Foreign Secretary’s last comment was particularly complacent. Looking at, for example, the Attorney General, why is that not an independent appointment? Why do we still allow the Attorney General to be an appointment of the Prime Minister? It should be somebody who is independent and legally qualified in this area, and that certainly was not the case during the Iraq war.
The Attorney General’s office is of course filled with expert lawyers. The Attorney General produces his advice on the basis of the advice provided to him by his expert lawyers. I have no doubt, from my extensive experience of Attorney General advice, both as Defence Secretary and as Foreign Secretary, that it is impartial, fearless, and quite often gives us advice that we perhaps do not like, and we have to change course accordingly, as is appropriate. [Interruption.] No, the hon. Lady is taking a conspiracy theory too far. If we get advice from the Attorney General that steers us away from a course of action, then we move to a different course of action. I can tell her, from my own direct experience—my right hon. Friend the Defence Secretary will have similar examples from the relatively recent past—of advice from the Attorney General causing us to think again and go in a different direction.
It is important to note, is it not, that when sofa government takes place, officials from the Government Legal Service and the Attorney General’s Office are not present to hear the conversations and to give advice where necessary?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is one of the purposes of a more formal process of decision making. I can say from personal experience that Attorney General advice is often complex, and it is necessary to have it in advance of the meeting at which decisions will be discussed and taken so that one can absorb it and consult one’s own departmental lawyers, as a departmental Minister, to explain it, challenge it, or review it further.
The third lesson to draw from the inquiry is that a culture at the heart of Government that welcomes challenge to the conventional wisdom of “the system”, or the strongly held convictions of Ministers, is essential to avoid the sort of group-think that led to what Chilcot describes as
“the ingrained belief…that Saddam Hussein’s regime retained chemical and biological warfare capabilities”.
Inevitably, the culture at the centre of any Government is a product primarily of the climate established by the Prime Minister of the day. Ensuring that people around the NSC table feel free to speak their minds without jeopardising their careers is the greatest contribution a Prime Minister can make. I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Witney (Mr Cameron) for the way in which he has done that over the past six years.
Fourthly, proper planning for the aftermath of any intervention in another country is vital to successfully delivering the overall objective. The failure in London properly to plan for the conflict’s aftermath, fatally combined with the flawed assumption that the Americans must have a plan, when they did not, led inevitably to the chaos that we saw on the ground in Iraq. As we know will be the case in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and again, today, Iraq, when the current conflicts in each end, the challenge of rebuilding effective governance in conflict-torn countries is enormous. Under this Government, we have created the conflict, stability and stabilisation fund—CSSF—with £1 billion a year in it now, rising to £1.3 billion by the end of the spending review period. It builds on the success of the cross-Government stabilisation unit to ensure proper planning and preparedness for post-conflict situations and a capacity for rapid deployment of expert staff anywhere in the world.
The fifth lesson that we draw—one that I feel particularly keenly as a former Defence Secretary—is that our armed forces must always be properly equipped for the tasks we ask them to do. That is why we have instituted quinquennial strategic defence and security reviews to ensure that we commit the level of resources necessary to meet the ambition set out in the national security strategy. Since 2010, we have eliminated the £38 billion black hole we inherited in the defence procurement budget; we have continued to meet the NATO commitment to spend at least 2% of our GDP on defence; and we have set out a 10-year forward defence equipment programme, planning to invest at least £178 billion on new military equipment over the next decade. I am proud of these decisions. But we should be clear today that the decision to send our troops into a pre-planned engagement without the right equipment, in Iraq and later in Afghanistan, was unacceptable and something that no Government should ever allow to happen again.
There are, of course, many more lessons to be drawn from the report of the Iraq inquiry—too many to fit into a single speech—and some of them, I am sure, will be drawn out during the course of the debate today and tomorrow. However, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Witney said in his statement last week, there are also some lessons and conclusions that we could draw, but should avoid drawing. First, we should not dismiss the importance of solidarity with our close friends and allies, the United States, when our common security interests are threatened. As both President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry have reaffirmed in their respective recent visits to London, the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom is special. We share not only culture and history, but fundamental values. America is our principal ally and partner around the world, and our partnership remains vital for our continued security and prosperity. Of course, that does not mean that we should blindly or slavishly follow US foreign policy, or fail to speak frankly and honestly, as close friends should. But we must be clear about the value of the relationship between our two countries, and clear that that value is a legitimate factor to be taken into account in British foreign policy decisions. Protecting and enhancing the special relationship, in itself, makes Britain safer.
Secondly, it would be wrong to conclude that we cannot trust the analysis and judgments of the UK intelligence community. As Foreign Secretary, I know as well as anyone the vital contribution our intelligence agencies make to keeping Britain and the British people safe, and I know the risks they sometimes have to take in order to do so. But intelligence is rarely black and white, and it always comes with a calibrated health warning as to the confidence level the user should attach to it. That places a burden of responsibility on the user when decisions or, indeed, strategic communications are based on intelligence. The reforms that were put in place following the Butler report have, quite properly, separated the process of assessing intelligence from the policy making that flows from it. I believe that our intelligence and policy making machinery today is in much better shape than it was in 2003 as a result of this and other reforms.
Thirdly, we should not conclude that our military lacks capability to intervene successfully around the world. As the Chilcot report highlights, the military invasion of Iraq, despite the problems of planning, was successfully and swiftly completed. It was the failure of policy makers to plan for the aftermath that led to the subsequent deterioration in the security situation.
Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, we must not conclude that military intervention in another country is always wrong. As the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the British intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 and the French-led intervention in Mali in 2014 have shown, there are circumstances in which it is absolutely right and appropriate to intervene. Having commemorated just two days ago the 21st anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre, we must also acknowledge that there have been times in our recent history when the international community should have intervened but did not, with Srebrenica and Rwanda being the most prominent examples.
Despite the risks of action and the failures of the past, Britain must not and will not shrink from military intervention as a last resort when our security is threatened; nor will it resile from its proper role on the world stage. Our commitment to the campaign against Daesh in Iraq and Syria is testament to that resolve. Today the United Kingdom stands united with Iraq in the face of continued terrorism. We will continue to help the Iraqi people as they defeat Daesh, reassert the territorial integrity of their country and seek to build a better future for their children.
There is no greater decision that a Prime Minister and a Cabinet can take than to commit this country to war, to ask our troops to put themselves in harm’s way on our behalf. The decision to invade Iraq and topple its Government in 2003 was among the most controversial in our nation’s recent history. It is right, therefore, that we should seek to learn the lessons from the mistakes that were made, to ensure that they are not repeated in the future.
The report of the Iraq inquiry has been a long time coming, but I think that most agree that it is a thorough, independent and exhaustive piece of work. It does not pull its punches in its analysis, and its conclusions and lessons are clearly drawn and unambiguous. As I set out earlier, I am confident that many of the most important lessons identified in the report have already been learned and the necessary responses already implemented, but in the weeks and months ahead, as we examine the report in greater detail, the Government will look further at whether any additional steps are required.
A decision to wage war is not easily reversible, so it must be carefully and diligently made with proper regard to due process and legal obligations. War itself is, of course, intrinsically dangerous, so it must be properly prepared for and the people fighting it must be properly equipped and protected. The aftermath of war is unpredictable but usually ugly, so it must be meticulously planned for and systematically executed. But, subject to those conditions, we should be clear as a nation that we will not resile from the use of military force to protect our security where all other options have failed.
Sir John has done the nation a great service in pointing the way to ensure the proper, safe and legal use of military force. The rest is up to us.
If this is the Foreign Secretary’s last appearance at the Dispatch Box in his current role, he has made a typically serious and thoughtful speech for his farewell. It behoves all of us to reflect seriously and thoughtfully on the Chilcot report, and the Labour party has a duty to apologise for the mistakes made to all the families of the British servicemen and women and civilian personnel who lost their lives, to all those who suffered life-changing injuries, and to the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians who have died and are still dying today. The Leader of the Opposition has rightly done that.
If there is one grave danger that we face, it is that we will assume that all the lessons of Chilcot have been learned. I listened carefully to the Foreign Secretary, and I am concerned about some of his statements. One draws from them that he assumes that the mistakes made in Iraq cannot be made again. Indeed, the outgoing Prime Minister, in his statement last week, seemed to pick out the same five lessons that the Foreign Secretary mentioned today and said that he felt the lessons had been learned. He seemed to say that the actions that have already been taken, such as the setting up of the National Security Council and the creation of the conflict, stability and security fund, had effectively fixed the problems that arose from the Iraq war.
I will repeat what I actually said. I am confident that many of the most important lessons identified in the report have already been learned and the necessary responses implemented, but in the weeks and months ahead, as we examine the report in greater detail, the Government will look further at whether any additional steps are required.
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for that, because it is important to emphasise that further lessons need to be learned, some of which I hope to address. I will not spend time repeating any of Chilcot’s factual findings, because, looking to the future, we need to consider the lessons and make sure that we do not make any of the same mistakes again. The Secretary of State for Defence will speak later about operational lessons that the military must learn, and it seems to me that there are more lessons than the five that Ministers have outlined so far.
I want to outline some of the points that jump out at us from the report. It seems to me that we have continued to make mistakes during the current Prime Minister’s time in office, and I will explain why.
On the flawed intelligence, although Chilcot finds that no deliberate attempt was made to mislead people, the intelligence on which the war was based was clearly flawed and did not justify the certainty attached to it by the Government. Has that lesson been learned? Last year, the Government asked this House to authorise military action in Syria. By contrast with Iraq in 2003, the military action did not include the deployment of ground troops.
It is important that we look to tomorrow’s problems. Special forces are likely to be used increasingly. On the idea that we will send, for example, special forces into Libya in a training capacity, I agree with the hon. Gentleman about how that might end up a quasi-combat role. Presumably, if the training forces are in Libya, they will be in a camp. They may be in a part of Libya that is allegedly safe, but they will need to be guarded. Who will guard them? We can see how it is possible to slide down a slippery slope. At the moment, although it would be inappropriate in the case of a decision to send special forces or trainers into an area, if we can have parliamentary scrutiny of our secret service—if the behaviour of MI5 and MI6 is at least answerable to a Committee of this House—it is not beyond our wit to allow there to be similar accountability over special forces. I have written about this issue.
It is important to point out that the oversight that the Intelligence and Security Committee, prominent members of which are present, exercises over the intelligence community is always post the fact. The only kind of meaningful oversight over special force deployment of the type that the hon. Lady is talking about would have to be before the fact. That would be a very different proposition.
I am grateful to the Foreign Secretary for making that point. I do not expect special forces, before they are used, to have to go before a Committee of Parliament and get permission, but I do think that there should be some form of accountability and some explanation. It was embarrassing, and it demonstrated the democratic deficit in relation to hybrid warfare, to read in the papers that the King of Jordan was gossiping with Congressmen in America about our special forces, when nobody in this House had officially been told about it. That highlights the democratic deficit in this country. We should learn lessons from Chilcot. We should learn lessons about accountability and about not simply trusting the Executive to get a decision right. We should make sure that there is more accountability, and that we are on our toes. We must be prepared to modernise our structures as necessary to reflect the changing nature of warfare in the 21st century.
Let me go back to my speech. I talked about the development of hybrid warfare and new mechanisms for holding the Executive to account, and I believe that all parties should work together on that. Another point was raised about American-British relations. Chilcot made it clear that American-British relations would not have been harmed had the UK not joined the US-led coalition. Chilcot argues that that was not a basis for joining the invasion. In my view, that is another lesson that we have not learned. In 2013, pressure from the United States played a major role in the Government’s rush to intervene in Syria. It became obvious that the US Administration’s efforts to persuade Congress to back intervention hinged on the Prime Minister’s success in persuading Parliament to do so. Speaking after our House declined to support the action in Syria, the then Defence Secretary—now the Foreign Secretary—said that the vote would “certainly” damage the Anglo-American relationship. In my view, the relationship has endured. We have got over it without any adverse consequences, and it serves as a reminder that our alliance with the United States rests on stronger foundations than an expectation of unquestioning British compliance with American wishes.
I am sorry but the hon. Gentleman has already intervened twice. I am taking a very long time, and I ought to get on with it.
Chilcot says that Tony Blair ignored warnings about the sectarian violence that would sweep Iraq after Saddam fell, and after the appalling loss of life that has followed in Iraq and surrounding countries, we are still very much living with that mistake. Again, has that lesson been learned? If we consider the intervention in Libya, it is clear that it has not been. During the uprising against Gaddafi, armed militias across the country focused their attention on toppling the regime, and the British Government later seemed almost surprised that once that goal had been achieved, those militias turned their fire on each other. Although divisions in Libya were always more tribal than the sectarian divisions in Iraq, the result has been the same. The belief that democratic elections would help to fill the power vacuum proved hopelessly optimistic, when factions that found themselves in the minority simply refused to accept that the result was legitimate.
Had those with knowledge of the country been directly consulted at the time, they would have warned the Government that such things would happen. Had informed and impartial advice been sought out, such warnings were readily available and in the public domain. It was also clear to many experts in the region that if Gaddafi was toppled there was a huge risk of knock-on instability when well-armed, highly trained mercenaries returned to their native countries such as Mali, Niger and Chad. Again, the warnings were there, but such advice was either not heard or not listened to until it was too late. Again, a parallel can be drawn between our intervention in Libya and our understanding of what would happen next and listening to experts, and what happened in our first intervention in Iraq when we did not listen to expertise or pay attention to what was said.
First, the intervention in Libya was at the request of the Arab League, which I suggest would have had an insight into the region and would count as people who knew what was going on. Secondly, although I understand the hon. Lady’s analysis, does that lead to the conclusion that toppling any despot always runs the risk of creating chaos and confusion? That is the nature of despotism. We are five years down the line from ending a 40-year brutal dictatorship in Libya. The game is not over yet, but I predict that Libya will end up a better place than it was under Gaddafi.
It is interesting to hear what the right hon. Gentleman says, but that issue is one of speculation. In my view it is not legal to intervene in a country to topple a regime, and morally we should not intervene in a country unless we have some form of strategy to ensure that the country we leave is in a better state than when we first arrived.
(8 years, 5 months ago)
Commons Chamber3. Whether his Department plans to recruit more trade specialists as a result of the outcome of the EU referendum.
Let me begin by welcoming the hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry) to her new post, along with her compact team—a model, I hope, of improved productivity in the UK economy, although time will tell.
As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister announced last month, the Government are creating a new EU unit which will bring together the brightest and best from Whitehall and the private sector, including lawyers, financial experts and trade experts. The Government are actively seeking to recruit trade specialists, and that includes approaching former civil servants who have retired or moved to the private sector.
I thank the Foreign Secretary for that answer, but can he tell the House how much this is going to cost?
No, not at this stage, but what I can tell the hon. Gentleman is that in the circumstances in which we find ourselves, facing the opportunities we now do, recruitment of trade specialists, whatever that costs us, is likely to be an investment very well worth making.
Is the Foreign Secretary heartened by the fact that since we voted to leave the EU a number of key countries and economies, including India, China and Australia, have approached the UK regarding furthering trade, and how well that compares with the stalled trade talks that have taken many years between the EU and such countries as the US and Canada?
Yes, it is a source of some optimism that a number of significant economies around the world have indicated that they would be open to the idea of trade agreements with the UK, and my hon. Friend makes a point that is very obvious but none the less important: that negotiating a trade deal between two countries is always going to be much easier than negotiating a trade deal between one country and 28 countries.
Last week at the Foreign Affairs Committee Oliver Letwin stated that
“we clearly need a new cadre of highly skilful and highly experienced trade negotiators.”
I hope the Secretary of State sees the irony in the fact that the very best of our trade negotiators are based in Brussels, but can he assure the House that from now on we will indeed bring in the best trade negotiators notwithstanding their nationality?
I think the hon. Lady had in mind the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Mr Letwin). I am not sure I recognised the name she mentioned.
I was puzzling about that myself and am grateful for your clarification, Mr Speaker, and, having had it, I am very happy to answer the hon. Lady’s question. As I said in response to the initial question, we will need to hire significant numbers of trade negotiators and—I said this in the House a couple of weeks ago—I see no reason why we would not hire people who were non-British if they were the best people to do the job. Clearly, one would not want to hire a citizen of another country to negotiate a trade deal with that country, but having entered that caveat, I would hope we put together the best and most capable teams from wherever.
I am sure the Foreign Secretary will agree that the Prime Minister’s trade envoys have played a very important role around the world. As our relationship with the EU changes, will he make representations to ensure that that programme is rolled out across Europe as well?
My hon. Friend raises a good point, and that will of course be an issue for the new Prime Minister as trade envoys are personal appointments of the Prime Minister.
Does the Foreign Secretary agree with the assessment of a former permanent secretary of the Foreign Office that to deal with the legal and political complexities of leaving the EU the Foreign Office will need to double in size?
I absolutely recognise there is a huge and complex task ahead of us in negotiating both our exit from the EU and, perhaps more importantly, the new arrangements Britain will have with the EU 27, but this is a project that will have a limited duration: once the negotiations are completed the task will be done, and I am not sure increasing the size of the Foreign Office will necessarily be the most appropriate way of doing that. Having a specialist unit to deal with this short to medium-term task may well be the most efficient way of delivering the outcome.
The incoming Prime Minister told us yesterday that she intends to make a success of Brexit and part of that is clearly going to be trade talks with countries throughout the world. Has the message already gone out to our embassies and high commissions that even before Brexit happens initial talks about trade should start with other countries?
The message that has gone out is that Britain will need to redouble its efforts in international trade and refocus where the trade is concentrated in the future. I should also make it clear that until we have served an article 50 notice, we remain a full participating member of the European Union. Our ability to negotiate new trade agreements is restricted by the continued application of EU law until we have negotiated our exit from the European Union, so we have to tread a careful path. Of course we can have preliminary discussions, but we must ensure that we remain on the right side of our international obligations at all times.
4. What recent discussions he has had with the Chinese Government on the promotion of human rights in that country.
11. If he will ensure that the Scottish Government are included in negotiations on the withdrawal of the UK from the EU.
As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has said, we must ensure that the interests of all parts of the United Kingdom are properly taken into account as we progress these negotiations. So, as we prepare for talks with the European Union, we will fully involve the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland Governments as well as the Mayor of London, the overseas territories and other regional interests. Officials of the new EU unit, which I mentioned a few minutes ago, will be making contact with counterparts in the devolved Administrations.
While that answer is encouraging, it does not exactly give a lot of detail—much like the plans of the Brexiteers as they went into the referendum. What formal role will the Scottish Government and the other devolved Governments have in the process of formalising Brexit?
As we do with other matters, we will consult the Scottish Government both formally and through informal dialogue, including at senior official level on an ongoing basis.
The Scottish Government have been clear that EU nationals must be a priority. Given their net financial contribution, does the Foreign Secretary agree that EU nationals should be more of a priority than new nuclear weapons? Any new Chancellor should be especially mindful of that.
I am unsure whether the two issues need to be prioritised. They can both be pursued in parallel. The decision to renew our nuclear deterrent is quite separate from the negotiations that we will be having with the EU, including negotiations to ensure the rights of EU nationals living in the UK and the reciprocal rights of UK nationals living in EU countries.
Regardless of whether the Scottish Government are involved in the negotiations, will the Secretary of State confirm that the negotiations are purely about us leaving the EU and not some sort of renegotiation of our terms of membership that will result in a halfway house where we are half-in and half-out of the EU?
Yes, I can confirm that. The next Prime Minister has made it clear that Brexit means Brexit: we will be negotiating our exit from the EU. However, we will of course also seek to negotiate an agreement between the United Kingdom and the EU 27 to regulate our trade and other relationships with the EU.
Does the Foreign Secretary agree that it would be far better for Scotland to play a productive role in securing a new relationship between the UK and the EU, rather than looking to join as a new member, get the euro and put a border across this island?
I strongly agree with my hon. Friend. Scotland’s best future is in a strong United Kingdom, trading effectively with the EU. We saw the case for independence during the previous referendum—it did not stack up at $100 a barrel of oil and it certainly does not stack up at $50 a barrel.
19. The highlands and islands currently benefit from an additional €192 million of transition funding. Given the incoming Prime Minister’s haste to get on with Brexit, will the Secretary of State confirm that the UK Government will guarantee that funding?
Britain is a significant net contributor to the EU, but that contribution includes a significant number of flows to particular regions, areas, projects and bodies within the United Kingdom. We will have to address how the recipients of those flows of funds from Brussels are to be protected in the future and that will be an important part of the negotiations.
20 . Scotland has benefited from access to EU research and a wealth of talented researchers and academics. The Guardian worryingly reported this morning:“Britain’s vote to leave the EU has unleashed a wave of discrimination against UK researchers”.Scottish universities and their staff are concerned. What is the Foreign Secretary’s message to the universities, research staff and workers that benefit from being part of the EU? How will he ensure that Scotland and its interests are protected?
This issue is not just about Scotland; it is much wider than that. I will say two things. First, as long as we are a full member of the EU and are paying the full sub, we must ensure that there is no discrimination against the UK, UK institutions, UK applicants for funding or UK citizens. Secondly, the point of negotiating an arrangement for Britain’s relationship with the EU 27 after we have left the EU is precisely to protect collaborative research, educational projects and cultural exchanges in addition to our important trading relationships.
May I begin by thanking the Foreign Secretary for welcoming me to this new job? It is right to say that we are compact team, but we have the advantage of being made up of two blessed difficult women, and so we are formidable and up for the task. If rumours of promotion are true, this may be my final session with him before he takes another job. It would seem that everyone is in flux. He has a reputation of being a formidable but approachable Minister to shadow, so I will be sorry if our acquaintance is so brief.
The Foreign Secretary rightly said that he has given assurances that he will consult Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, London and Gibraltar on the Government’s negotiating strategy for Brexit prior to triggering article 50. Will those assurances also apply in respect of Her Majesty’s Opposition, to ensure that the needs and concerns of the communities we represent are reflected as the Government develop their negotiating strategy?
First, I am surprised to hear the hon. Lady saying that she expects promotion. I thought that those in the Labour party who were expecting promotion threw their hat in the ring yesterday—perhaps she is going to be a late entrant to that competition. On the substance of her question, of course there will be extensive discussion about all these issues in Parliament. The Opposition will have an opportunity to present their views, and we shall listen carefully to them.
I thank the Secretary of State for that answer, but I was hoping that I would get greater assurance than that and that there would be formal consultation with Her Majesty’s Opposition prior to the start of negotiations. We must avoid the mistakes made by the outgoing Prime Minister before his resignation. He had no proper consultation with Opposition parties, no proper discussion took place and there was a totally artificial timetable. Had the Prime Minister done those things, perhaps he would have got a better and more inclusive deal, the country might not have voted for Brexit and he might not be stepping down tomorrow. Does the Foreign Secretary not accept that the Prime Minister made a mistake and can he guarantee that those mistakes will not be made by the new Prime Minister?
Perhaps I dare say to the hon. Lady that I might have been a bit closer to those negotiations than she was and I can confidently say that engaging with the Opposition would not have affected the outcome.
I am sorry, but the questions and answers are taking too long. [Interruption.] Order. What we need now is a couple of pithy inquiries, not elongated ones.
The whole of Scotland is deeply concerned about the personal future of the Foreign Secretary, given his apocalyptic statements during the recent referendum. For example, he told Chatham House on 2 March that leaving would take longer to negotiate
“than the second world war.”
Will it take longer to negotiate Brexit than the second world war? How would any future Chancellor of the Exchequer deal with such uncertainty?
I think the right hon. Gentleman will recognise that the concern is this: if a future treaty between the United Kingdom and the European Union 27 is deemed to be a mixed competence, it will have to be ratified by 27 national Parliaments. I believe I am right in saying that the shortest time in which that has been done in respect of any EU treaty is just under four years—that is after taking into account the time it takes to negotiate.
That is a yes then. Did the Foreign Secretary see the poll at the weekend carried out by YouGov across European countries? It showed two things: first, that the UK Government were deeply unpopular in every other European country; and, secondly, that massive majorities of the public in every country surveyed were looking forward to an independent Scotland within Europe. Why are the UK Government so unpopular, and why is Scotland so popular in Europe?
I would have thought if there was one lesson to take from the events of the past three weeks, it was, “Do not read polls”.
6. What steps he is taking to support political liberty, freedom of expression and human rights in Bangladesh.
14. What recent assessment he has made of the progress of the international campaign to defeat ISIS/Daesh.
Significant military progress has been made in Iraq, Syria and Libya since my right hon. Friend the Defence Secretary updated the House on 24 May. Iraqi security forces have liberated Falluja. The Syrian Democratic Forces are closing in on Manbij in Syria. In Libya, Misratan forces have pushed Daesh back to the city centre in Sirte, and the Libyan national army is winning the battle against Daesh in Benghazi. We now need to see political progress in Syria, Libya and Iraq to match those military successes.
What initiatives has the Secretary of State undertaken recently to ensure that the international effort concentrates on securing the defeat of Daesh, rather than of the proxies, or the allies, involved in the process?
The hon. Gentleman is referring, I think, to the situation in Syria, where there are two separate battles going on: the civil war between the regime and its opponents, and the battle by the international community against Daesh. We are clear, and always have been clear, that there cannot be lasting success against Daesh unless we resolve the political crisis in Syria and create a regime that is acceptable to the Sunni Muslim population of Syria, giving them an alternative to the appalling offer from Daesh.
Countering Daesh in Libya requires a stable Government and an end to the country’s ongoing civil war. On 19 April, the Secretary of State said that the new Government of National Accord is
“the only legitimate Government of Libya.”—[Official Report, 19 April 2016; Vol. 608, c. 781.]
Will he therefore assure the House that, since the GNA was formed last December, no British support has been provided to any Libyan militia group that is not allied to the GNA, such as those working with former general Khalifa Haftar?
The hon. Lady knows that if we were minded to commit combat forces to activity in Libya, we would first come to the House of Commons. We are working very closely with the Government of National Accord, including talking to them about how we can use exemptions from the UN arms embargo to forge a closer working relationship between militias and that Government. She will be interested to know that later this afternoon I will meet Prime Minister Sarraj here in London.
T1. If he will make a statement on his departmental responsibilities.
My priority is to ensure that we continue to address, head on, Islamist extremism and the threats to the rules-based international system, while at the same time pivoting resources to respond to the major foreign policy challenge of implementing the UK’s decision to leave the EU and negotiating the terms of Britain’s future relationship with the EU 27.
Britain is a global trading nation. What steps have been taken to ensure that our embassies and high commissions around the world are in the best possible position to forge excellent trading deals for the United Kingdom?
As one of my colleagues said earlier, last week we had all our senior people in London for the annual leadership conference, and I clearly set out to them the challenge to the Foreign Office and its network as we move into this new phase where we will seek to redouble our efforts to build trade relationships around the world beyond the European Union. I can tell my hon. Friend, and the House, that I got the resounding response that they are up for that challenge.
Earlier today, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague ruled against Chinese claims to territorial rights in the South China sea, backing a case brought by the Philippines. Does the Secretary of State agree that the PCA’s ruling must be respected, and that any non-compliance by the Chinese Government would not only cause severe reputational damage to China but constitute a serious breach of international law?
The UK’s position has always been, and will remain, that we urge respect for international law and the rules-based international system, and decisions arising from international tribunals. As the hon. Lady will know, the ruling is 501 pages long. It flopped on to my desk just before coming over here to answer questions—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry) is obviously super-efficient; I might test her later. We will study the decision carefully. If the hon. Lady can give me any insight into her understanding of page 432, I would be very grateful.
We take the threat of nuclear proliferation very seriously indeed. We have made huge progress over the past 18 months in shutting down the Iranian nuclear weapons programme. We remain deeply concerned about the programme in North Korea and about the risk of proliferation particularly from North Korea. We work very closely with allies and partners around the world to address that challenge.
T4. Given the upsurge in violence in South Sudan over the weekend, what action have Ministers taken on the situation there?
T6. The Chagos islanders were the first victims of the UK’s nuclear policy, given that their eviction helped the UK get a discount on Polaris. Lords at the Supreme Court now advise that a refusal to permit resettlement may be “irrational, unreasonable or disproportionate”. Will the Secretary of State advise the new Prime Minister of those factors and ask her to make a quick decision on resettlement for the Chagos islanders?
As the hon. Gentleman and the House will know, we have been studying options relating to the British Indian Ocean Territory and the situation of the Chagos islanders. The current Prime Minister has taken a great interest in the issue, but it is clear that it will now fall to the new Prime Minister to make a decision.
The people of Gibraltar feel particularly concerned about pressure from Spain now that we are leaving the European Union. Will the Minister for Europe confirm that their Government will be fully involved in the negotiations, and does he agree that their economy could be given an immediate boost, first, by a free trade agreement between Gibraltar and the UK, and, secondly, by ruling out any redundancies in the civilian, locally employed Ministry of Defence force?
T7. Judicial executions in Iran have more than doubled since 2010 and there have been 2,400 executions since President Rouhani was elected three years ago. What representations have the Government made to the Government of Iran over the execution of children, particularly those such as Fatemeh Salbehi and Jannat Mir, an Afghan boy who was hanged when he was just 14 or 15 years old?
We regularly make representations to the Government of Iran about the widespread abuse of human rights there, including the widespread use of the death sentence and the completely unacceptable practice of imposing death sentences on minors. We will continue to make such representations at every opportunity.
Commonwealth countries are already large investors into the UK. Will the Government continue to work with Commonwealth business groups, such as the Confederation of Indian Industry, to make sure that that track record continues?
T9. May I thank the Foreign Secretary for hosting an event at the Foreign Office yesterday evening to commemorate the 21st anniversary of the massacre at Srebrenica? We all listened in silence to the tales told by survivors of the massacre. Will he join me in saying that it is important not only that we remember Srebrenica, but that we redouble our efforts to show future generations where hate and intolerance can lead?
Yes, of course I will. Anyone who was there last night will have heard the moving testimony of people who survived the terrible events in Srebrenica 21 years ago and their harrowing tales of their experiences and the utterly needless and unjustified slaughter that occurred. The whole purpose of remembering Srebrenica is not just to remember, but to ensure that we apply the lessons and that it can never happen again.
An important economic relationship that we have with India is the Tata Steel UK portfolio. Will the Secretary of State continue to make sure that its protection continues to be at the forefront of our diplomatic relationship with India so that we can continue to have a sustainable steel industry in this country?
I can tell my hon. Friend that this remains a high priority for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills.
Claire Martin died in Italy four years ago due to stab wounds in the neck. Her death was recorded as suicide. Her parents are my constituents, and they need the full weight of the Foreign Office to help them. Support has been lukewarm and half-hearted so far. Will the Minister promise to step things up a gear and help this family?
The anniversary of the Iran nuclear deal falls in two days. Will the Minister update the House on what discussions he is having with his US counterparts on banking sanctions to encourage more British businesses to invest in Iran?
Those discussions continue. I promise that this is not a planted question—[Interruption.] Sorry. What is one of those? The hon. Lady will not know this but there is a meeting this afternoon at Lancaster House between the Iranian Central Bank, the United States Treasury and international banks based in London in an attempt to try to make some progress on this matter so that the people of Iran can start to benefit from the seminal deal that was done a year ago.
Thank you, Mr Speaker. My constituent Nazanin has been detained in Iran for 100 days now, with no access to lawyers and minimal contact with her three-year-old daughter. Will the Minister join me in formally denouncing the actions of the Iranian authorities and make sure that Nazanin and Gabriella are returned to their home in West Hampstead as soon as possible?
We continue to lobby the Iranians regularly about all our consular cases in Iran, including that of Mrs Zaghari-Ratcliffe. I have raised the case a number of times, and, on 4 July, spoke to Foreign Minister Zarif. I subsequently followed that up with a letter. On 18 May, my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), the Minister with responsibility for the middle east, met Mrs Zaghari-Ratcliffe’s family. We will continue to push the Iranians for consular access to her—the challenge is that Iran does not recognise dual nationality—and for more information about the charges that are alleged against her.
From my recent NATO Parliamentary Assembly visit to Kiev, I know that there is palpable fear from the Ukrainians that sanctions may start to be lifted against Russia and President Putin. Does my right hon. Friend agree that that cannot happen until meaningful discussions have taken place on Ukraine’s sovereign borders?
I would go a little further: that cannot happen until Russia has complied with its obligations under the Minsk agreement. At the weekend, in Warsaw, I met the Ukrainian Foreign Minister. My hon. Friend is right that there is concern among Ukrainians that Britain’s departure from the European Union may lead to a weakening of European Union resolve on this issue. I very much hope that that will not be the case, but it is certainly true that we have been one of the leading advocates of a tough line within the European Union.
In the light of the ongoing dreadful events in Sudan, many of us find questionable the context and the content of the UK-Sudan strategic dialogue. What red lines do the UK Government have in that dialogue?
May I join those who are welcoming the fact that a large number of big players in the global economy are queuing up to do bilateral trade deals with the UK? My many Korean constituents would very much like to know whether that includes South Korea, which is a brilliant trade partner with the UK.
Of course, the European Union has an existing free trade agreement with the Republic of Korea. Under that free trade agreement, the UK’s exports to Korea have more than doubled over a very short period of time. Once we are outside the European Union, depending on the details of the arrangements we make with the European Union, we will be ready to enter into new trade agreements with all countries around the world. The UK will remain an outward-facing trading nation, delivering our prosperity by our success around the globe.
What recent discussions, if any, have the Government had with Turkey about its opposition to the Syrian Democratic Forces’ offensive to relieve Manbij, which is a very important strategic battle?
I met my Turkish opposite number and sat next to President Erdogan in the plenary session at the NATO summit in Warsaw at the weekend, and we discussed this issue. Of course, the SDF assault on the Manbij pocket is vital, and it will close a strategic gap and cut off supplies and routes for fighters into Syria in an important way. The Turks’ concern is the role of Kurdish organisations within the SDF, including some that are associated with proscribed organisations. The US is brokering a solution that seeks to reassure the Turks while reinforcing the SDF and their ability to deliver their objectives in Manbij.
(8 years, 5 months ago)
Written StatementsIt is the normal practice when a Government Department proposes to make a gift of a value exceeding £300,000, for the Department concerned to present to the House of Commons a minute giving particulars of the gift and explaining the circumstances; and to refrain from making the gift until 14 parliamentary sitting days after the issue of the minute, except in cases of special urgency.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has today laid a departmental minute proposing the gifting of equipment to Syria Civil Defence and Free Syria Police teams.
The situation in Syria remains extremely fragile. An estimated 250,000 people have been killed since the war began five years ago, many of them innocent civilians. The Assad regime continues to use the most barbaric military methods and tactics available, including the use of indiscriminate artillery fire, chemical weapons and barrel bombs. The UK remains committed to doing all it can to promote a political settlement to end the conflict, to alleviate the humanitarian suffering, and to protect UK national security through countering terrorist and extremist threats.
In March 2015, I laid departmental minutes before the House and issued written statements setting out our plans to gift equipment to Syria Civil Defence and the Free Syrian Police teams operating in opposition-controlled areas of Syria. No objections were received to the gifts and the UK distributed the equipment to both sets of teams along with comprehensive training packages. Civil defence teams have now saved over 50,000 lives by rescuing civilians trapped in damaged buildings, fighting fires and providing emergency first aid. The Free Syrian Police continues its valuable work to keep traffic moving, prevent looting and to support the distribution of humanitarian aid. Other international donors have also contributed to both initiatives.
The UK intends to continue its support to these programmes by increasing their communications capability and mobility of the teams, providing more targeted operational equipment—whether for search and rescue, or tracing explosives—as well as build up the capacity of these organisations to deliver on the ground. The departmental minute laid today sets out our proposal to gift £4 million in equipment to Syria Civil Defence and £4 million in equipment to those operating within the Free Syrian Police. For Syria Civil Defence, the proposed list of equipment includes cutting and rescue tools, personal protective gear including helmets, uniforms, communications equipment, medical supplies, equipment for the disposal of unexploded ordinance, office supplies, vehicles and fire-fighting equipment. For the Free Syrian Police, the proposed list of equipment includes vehicles, communications kit, traffic signs and cones, uniforms and generators. We expect to spend £23.5 million this financial year on both programmes of support in total through the Government’s Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF).
The use of CSSF funds to cover the costs of the gift has been approved by members of the Middle East and North Africa strategic programme board. The gift is being scrutinised to ensure that the provision of this equipment is consistent with export controls and complies with our international obligations. Recipients have been carefully selected to prevent equipment being given to those involved in extremist activities or human rights violations. The risk of diversion is still a real possibility, but we assess that the considerable benefit this equipment would bring to the moderate opposition in Syria greatly outweigh this risk, which we have plans in place to mitigate. There is constant monitoring of the situation on ground, and all equipment transfers are approved by Her Majesty’s Government immediately before delivery. All our assistance is carefully calibrated and legal, is aimed at alleviating human suffering and supporting moderate groups and is regularly monitored and evaluated.
The Treasury has approved the proposal in principle. If, during the period of 14 parliamentary sitting days beginning on the date on which the departmental minute was laid before the House of Commons, a Member signifies an objection by giving notice of a parliamentary question or a motion relating to the minute, or by otherwise raising the matter in the House, final approval of the gift will be withheld pending an examination of the objection.
[HCWS48]
(8 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberI welcome the opportunity to speak in this crucial debate, Mr Speaker, and I consider that the subject matter falls perfectly well within my remit of foreign affairs.
As we approach the final stage of this campaign, it sometimes feels that we have lost sight of the key question that people are supposed to be answering in the polling booths a week tomorrow. That question is not, “Do we like the EU?”, or “Do we agree with everything it does?” It is not, “What message do you want to send the EU?” or even, “What message do you want to send the Government?” It is certainly not, “Is the EU perfect?” I would be the first to say loudly that it is not. This is a straightforward question that requires a clear-eyed, hard-headed analysis and response: “Are we safer, stronger and better off inside a reformed EU or outside it?” As Foreign Secretary, I know as well as anyone the frustrations of decision making by committee of 28 and the compromises that entails, but I also know that we are winning the arguments in Europe and are increasingly influential in shaping its future. I know, too, that we have greater global influence as a result of being a leading member of the world’s largest trading bloc.
The right hon. Gentleman asked the question that we hear all too often: is the EU perfect or imperfect? The reality is that people complain that their council is imperfect. Unbelievably, some people in Scotland even complain that their Government are imperfect. A lot of people definitely complain that Westminster is imperfect. I find that a lot fewer people complain about the EU being imperfect, so can we stop saying that the EU is uniquely imperfect? There are imperfections at all levels of government, and to brand the EU in that way is a problem. The EU is a club for independent countries, which Westminster most certainly is not; it is a family of nations, which this is not.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. He certainly did not hear me claiming that the EU was uniquely imperfect. It is just another imperfect institution among very many, including our own Government, I am certain.
I know that we are safer because we work with other EU member states to tackle the threats of terrorism and organised crime, and I know that we are better off for being part of a market of more than 500 million consumers, with the combined economic weight of a quarter of the world’s GDP, when negotiating trade deals with the rest of the world. I want to dwell on that point, because it is fundamental. We said back in 2010 that our economic security and our national security are two sides of the same coin, and it remains true today. Without economic security, there is no national security. How could we be safer if we could not afford to invest in our nation’s security and defence? How could we be stronger and more influential if our economy was shrinking?
How can the Foreign Secretary say that we are more secure and better off? If we take the fishing industry, for example, the number of fishermen has halved since we joined the EU and the industry has been under a common fisheries policy that has driven us into import dependence on other countries.
I say that because I take a holistic view. I am looking at the interests of the United Kingdom as a whole, taking into account all the pluses and minuses of our EU membership—yes, there are negatives as well as positives—balancing those arguments and reaching a conclusion about the net benefit to this country of being a member of the European Union.
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right that there can be no economic security without national security. Will he tell the House how many of our NATO allies want the United Kingdom to leave the European Union? Many in the Brexit camp invoke Commonwealth leaders. Perhaps he can enlighten the House about how many Commonwealth leaders want the UK to leave the European Union.
My hon. Friend knows very well that the answer to both those questions is zero, but it goes further than that: I have not found any foreign leaders at all urging Britain to leave the European Union and saying that Britain would be a more influential and valuable partner if it left the EU.
I will give way in just a moment, but I need to make some progress, because many Members wish to speak.
The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) set out some of the economic benefits of our continued membership of the EU. By the way, I welcome his candid assessment of the achievements of the SWP over the past four decades—I never thought that I would hear that coming from his mouth. I agree with him that workers’ rights such as paid holidays and maternity and paternity leave are important. However, it is perhaps worth reminding him that it was a Tory-led Government who abolished Labour’s jobs tax and took 3 million of the lowest paid out of income tax altogether, and that it is this Conservative Government who are introducing the statutory national living wage, which addresses his point about the wages of the lowest paid.
It is also worth reminding the hon. Gentleman—the Labour party periodically appears to forget this—that the most fundamental right for any worker is the right to have a job and a pay packet at the end of the month. That is a right that 2.5 million more people enjoy today under a Conservative Government than in 2010 under a Labour Government, which is the result of Conservative fiscal management and Conservative economic reforms. A Tory-led Britain that is a member of the European Union has delivered record levels of employment.
The Foreign Secretary has just referred to the net benefit to the United Kingdom from being in the single market. Will he tell me how a net benefit is actually a UK trade deficit? According to the House of Commons Library and the Office for National Statistics, in our trade in goods and services with the other 27 member states, we had a deficit of no less than £67.8 billion in 2015, which was up £10 billion on the previous year and is escalating. How is that a net benefit?
I shall come to that in a minute, but my hon. Friend dwells like an old-fashioned mercantilist on the trade statistics alone. I suggest to him that there are wider issues at stake about the overall impact on our economy and the benefits of the growth, investment and dynamism that being part of a 500 million-strong market of very wealthy consumers delivers to us.
I have been very happy to campaign in a cross-party way to remain, but as the Foreign Secretary has criticised my party’s record in government, may I ask him whether his Government’s cuts, loaded on to the poorest parts of our country, have made too many people question whether they have anything to lose in the referendum? Their wages have been falling since the crash, which has damaged their confidence in our economy to deliver for them. Does he believe that, when we vote to remain, we need to see real action to help people in the poorest parts of this country?
Yes, but we will do that only by delivering a robust economy that is soundly based and can go forward in the future. The most effective way of doing that is by being part of the European Union.
Our membership of the EU gives us both the freedom to trade in the world’s largest single market—a market of more than 500 million consumers—without tariffs and the bureaucracy of customs barriers, and access to more than 50 other markets besides, through EU free trade agreements. The benefits of being in that single market are clear for us to see: 44% of Britain’s exports go to the EU. How much of that trade would be lost if we put up the shutters and renounced our EU membership? How many businesses and employees who depend on that trade would go to the wall? How long would it take to negotiate a new trade agreement with our European neighbours? What would the terms be? I am prepared to bet that they would be nothing like as favourable as the terms that we have on the inside.
What assessment has the Foreign Secretary’s Department made of the length of time that it would take for the British Government to negotiate not only a trade deal with the European Union, but, as he mentioned, all the free trade deals that currently exist between the EU and other parts of the world, so that we can trade with the rest of the world?
The hon. Gentleman raises a good point, and he will have heard the Prime Minister talking about that very issue only a few moments ago. We can expect that it would take us at least two years to negotiate our exit from the European Union if that was what the British people decided on 23 June. Thereafter, we would have to negotiate a trade deal with the European Union, and then trade deals with the 53 other countries around the world with which the EU has free trade agreements.
There is a small technical hitch, to which I have drawn the House’s attention before: we do not have any trade negotiators, because for the past 40 years the European Union has conducted our trade negotiations for us. It is about not just time but the price that we would have to pay to negotiate that access to the single market from outside. From the evidence of others who have done that, the answer is clear. That price would involve our freedom of movement, acceptance of the entire body of EU regulation, and a whopping sub to boot—all the things that the leave campaign tell us we will escape from—with no say at all in how the rules are made. It would be the worst of all worlds.
On the question of the trade deficit with the EU, which my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) mentioned a moment ago, does the Foreign Secretary agree that were we to exit the single market, the component of EU free trade that would be placed most at risk would be free trade in services, on which we enjoy a £20 billion trade surplus with the EU?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I want to address that important point later in my speech.
Any deal that we achieve with the European Union will almost certainly exclude free access to the market for services, which is something of a problem when services account for almost 80% of our economy.
Let me just make this point, then I will give way again.
By contrast, if we remain inside the EU, we can look forward to a huge dividend from an opening of the market in services over the coming years. The truth is that we have barely scratched the surface when it comes to the EU single market. The single market in goods is well developed, but in the sectors in which the UK is truly market-leading—financial, business, technical and professional services, the digital economy, the creative industries and energy—the potential remains huge, and the EU’s high-value market is the place to realise it.
Has the right hon. Gentleman seen the warnings from Airbus about the threats to future investment in this country? I am talking about more than 6,000 jobs in Alyn and Deeside and 5,000 jobs in Bristol. Does he agree that the Brexit camp think that those are jobs that we can afford to lose?
That question has never been effectively answered—how many jobs are those advocating Britain’s exit from the European Union prepared to sacrifice on the altar of their notion of sovereignty? We have never had a straight answer to that question. What we do have is a range of independent estimates of what that number would be if we voted to leave next Thursday. I shall come to that in a moment.
It is because of the potential for the UK to open up the services market in the European Union that the deal the Prime Minister negotiated in February is so important. We now have a clear political commitment from all 27 other EU member states, plus the Commission, to accelerate the development of that market. These are the sectors in which the UK leads in Europe, and in which an expansion of the single market will disproportionately benefit the United Kingdom over the years ahead.
Does my right hon. Friend recognise that that commitment to a proper completion of the single market in services, added to the completion of a capital markets union, places the United Kingdom in a unique position to develop its world-leading sector, and that it would be mad to walk away from that opportunity?
My hon. Friend is right. That is what I hear from many of my European colleagues: we are about to move from one phase of European Union development into a new phase that is hugely beneficial to the United Kingdom, yet we are talking about walking away from it. Our financial services industry alone currently contributes more than 7% of UK GDP and employs more than 1 million people, two thirds of them outside London, but there is not yet a single market for financial services across the EU. The potential is huge.
A fully functioning digital single marketplace could be worth as much as £330 billion a year to the EU economy, with the UK again set to benefit more than any other country, as the leading digital economy in Europe. By the way, it would be a huge boon for Britain’s digital-savvy consumers, who would be able to shop freely across the digital single marketplace. Individuals are already feeling the benefits of last year’s EU agreement, led by the UK, to end mobile roaming charges, which it is estimated will save UK consumers around £350 million a year, and for years we have all been enjoying the budget airline boom created by EU regulations.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that the reason why the markets had such a shock yesterday was the prospect of us leaving, based on a couple of polls? That £30 billion shock to our financial system hit not just capitalists but the pension funds of hard-working people, which deteriorated. If the prospect of Brexit caused that shock, what on earth would actual Brexit look like?
My hon. Friend is right. We can regard what has been happening in the markets this week as a fore-tremor—a taste of what could be to come if the people of Britain vote to take a leap into the dark on 23 June.
A fully fledged energy union in gas and electricity markets could save £50 billion a year across the EU by 2030, with huge benefits for consumers through their energy bills, as well as making Europe safer from threats of energy blackmail. But it is not just intra-EU trade benefits that our membership delivers. As a member of the world’s largest economic bloc, we benefit directly from being party to EU trade agreements with more than 50 other countries, with terms far more favourable than any that we could have negotiated alone, because of the combined negotiating muscle of an economic bloc with a quarter of the world’s GDP.
Trade is one of the areas where size does matter. Will the Foreign Secretary comment on the attempts to strike a deal between Switzerland and China? We hear much about what the world might be like if we leave the EU. My understanding is that as part of the deal the Chinese are negotiating for full access to the Swiss market, but have told the Swiss that they will have to wait 15 years to get into the Chinese market.
The right hon. Lady is right. The deal on the table between Switzerland and China is deeply asymmetric and deeply unfavourable to the Swiss, but reflects the mismatch in scale between those two marketplaces. Being part of the world’s largest economic bloc allows us to stare squarely into the eyes of Chinese and American interlocutors when negotiating trade deals.
It is a well rehearsed and well understood fact that 44% of the UK’s exports go to the EU, but it is an underestimate because it addresses only exports to the EU. If we take into account the countries with which the EU has a free trade agreement—destinations for another £56 billion of British exports—the figure goes up to 56%, which does not take into account any of the countries with which the EU is negotiating free trade agreements. If we included them, we would be talking about more than 80% of UK exports going either to the EU or to countries with which the EU had trade agreements. At the very least, more than half of Britain’s exports would therefore be at risk if we left the European Union, and it could take a decade or more to put in place new deals with the EU 27 and the 53 other countries with which we have free trade agreements. It is not about choosing between growing our trade with the EU or with the rest of the globe—as the figures show, our EU membership is key to both.
Is not the central absurdity of talking about the EU deficit and the surplus with the rest of the world that our trade with the latter is largely conducted through foreign companies—Japanese car makers and American banks, for example—that base themselves here precisely because we are in the single market? They trade with the whole world—they do not see it as two different places. We as a country should have that attitude.
My hon. Friend is right. The world’s supply chain has globalised itself. If I am honest, when I listen to the arguments of some of our opponents in this debate, although framed in terms of hostility to the European Union, I sometimes wonder whether what I am hearing is hostility to the globalisation of our economy.
What is true for trade is also true for investment—the other side of the coin. The reality is that Britain benefits hugely as a platform for investment from both EU and non-EU countries, many of which see us as a gateway to the rest of the European Union. They come here because of our language, our skills, our flexible labour market and our domestic regulatory environment, but if I talk to foreign companies based in this country—I have lots of them in my constituency, and other Members will be in a similar position—and to others around the world thinking of making that investment decision, it is clear that the single most important factor in the decision making of most of them is our membership of the European Union. Our membership makes Britain a launch pad for doing business with the rest of Europe. Almost three in every four foreign investors cite our access to the European market as a principal reason for investment in the UK. If we lost that access, we would lose the investment. It is as simple as that.
Is my right hon. Friend aware of Ernst and Young’s recent report showing that the UK continues to be the No. 1 destination for foreign direct investment in Europe, with the north-west seeing the biggest increase? Does he agree that a vote to remain would encourage yet further investment in the northern powerhouse and in other regions?
My hon. Friend is right. Treasury analysis shows that the UK is the largest recipient of foreign direct investment in the EU, ahead of Germany and ahead of France. We get almost a fifth of total inward FDI into EU countries—20% of the investment, with less than 12% of the population. I remind the House that every pound of that investment creates jobs in the UK. It is why Australia is a disproportionately large investor here, it is why so many Indian firms use this country as a base, and it is why world leaders, such as President Obama, Prime Minister Abe and Prime Minister Modi, believe we would lose out if we voted to leave the EU.
Will the Foreign Secretary confirm that that is particularly true of Japan and Japanese investment, on which this country relies for new nuclear power generation?
Not just for our new generation of nuclear power, but for a large part of our thriving car industry, which is built and based on our ability to export to the European Union. Japanese investment has transformed the economics of and labour relations in our car industry—it has done wonders for this country. It astonishes me that we would even contemplate undermining the basis on which that investment is made.
I will just make a little progress if my hon. Friend will allow me.
If we left the EU, the practical consequences of lower trade and lower investment would be felt directly by the British people: fewer jobs and higher unemployment. An estimated 3.3 million jobs in the UK—more than one in every 10—are linked to exports to other EU countries, with 250,000 jobs in Scotland, a quarter of a million in the south-west, half a million in the midlands, and 700,000 in the north. How secure will they be if we vote for Brexit next Thursday? How will the spectre of rising unemployment undermine consumer spending and sap business confidence—to blight, once again, those areas of the country that have been in this cycle all too often?
Given the risks to the nations and regions of the United Kingdom that the Foreign Secretary is outlining, and given that the most recent poll shows support for leave in Scotland at only 32%, is he beginning to regret rejecting the SNP’s call for a four-nation lock on the referendum’s outcome?
No, I am not. This is a very important debate, but we have to use the power of persuasion to win it, not tricks. We have a week to make the case—openly and fairly. We need to let the British people decide, and then, as the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington said, whatever their decision and however much we may not like it, we have to accept it, abide by it and implement it, and that is exactly what we will do.
Over 100,000 British businesses export to the EU. The future of every one of them—and of every person who works for them—will be put on hold if next Thursday there is a vote to leave. Will they be able to maintain access to their markets? Will they face tariffs? Will their customers hedge their bets and take their business elsewhere, just in case? It is difficult to see how even the most upbeat Brexiteer could not see that we are likely to face months, years and perhaps a decade of confidence-sapping, investment-eroding, job-destroying uncertainty that will take this country back to the dark days of 2008, and I for one never want to go there again.
Rolls-Royce has a manufacturing facility in my constituency and has made the threat to jobs very clear. Unemployment has fallen 60% since 2010, but that improvement will be put at risk, as highlighted by a CBI report stating that the shock to our economy could cost 950,000 jobs. Does the Foreign Secretary agree that that risk is simply not worth taking?
I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend. It is a risk we do not need to take, and it is a risk that it would be absurd to take. I just cannot believe that after all the grief and pain we have been through in this country to rebuild our economy following the disaster of 2008-09 we are seriously thinking about going back there. That astonishes me.
Economic experts have judged overwhelmingly from the evidence that Britain’s economy will be stronger and more resilient if we remain in the EU. The G7 Finance Ministers, nine out of 10 economists, and independent organisations such as the IMF, the World Bank, the Institute for Fiscal Studies and the World Trade Organisation have expressed the view that the UK will be better off inside the EU.
And not just economists but more than 200 entrepreneurs —founders of household names such as Skype, lastminute.com and innocent drinks—agree. Rarely, if ever, can an issue have united the opinions of everyone from global institutions, through trade unions, to British businesses, large and small. The overwhelming weight of economic and business opinion is clear: Britain is better off in.
Will my right hon. Friend nail from the Dispatch Box the canard that some on the exit side are peddling—that this is just a vehicle for another round of never-ending renegotiations? This is a serious, one-off decision. We will abide by the decision, and it has to be right for the future of our country.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and I am happy to repeat what he says, as the Prime Minister did earlier. The British people will have their say; they will make their decision, and we will implement it. I do not believe that our 27 partners in the EU would say, “Oh, fine, let’s go through all this again,” even if we wanted to. This has to be the deciding point. It is make your mind up time. People have to look at the options bus: a future they know and can predict, with Britain in the European Union—a Britain that has created 2.5 million jobs over the last six years, and a Britain with a growth rate that has outstripped that of every other country in the European Union—or a leap in the dark.
I am going to make some progress now. I want to finish so that others can contribute.
What would be the consequences of a vote to leave? They would be: less trade, of course; lower investment; slower growth; and fewer jobs—less trade, because we would lose our access to the EU single market and to the free trade agreements the EU has; lower investment, because foreign businesses using the UK as a launchpad into the EU would go elsewhere, and UK businesses would be seeking to rebuild their markets, rather than investing for expansion; slower growth, because the economy would effectively be on hold for at least two years, and almost certainly very much longer, while we negotiated the terms of our exit from the EU; and fewer jobs, because, in a climate of such economic uncertainty, few companies would be hiring or expanding their workforce. Indeed, to answer the question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury (Antoinette Sandbach), the director general of the CBI, Carolyn Fairbairn, estimates that, if we left the EU, there would be almost a million fewer jobs in the UK by 2020 and that those under 34 would be hit the hardest.
Let us be clear: an exit negotiation with the EU will be far from the straightforward affair the leave camp is suggesting. We have general elections next year in France and Germany, and I can promise that every single vested interest in both those countries will be seeking to benefit from the British exit. We should expect no favours from those whom we have just snubbed. The Brexit campaign wants us to believe that we could negotiate a better deal for Britain from the outside than the one we actually secured from the inside at a time when the entire European Union was seeking to persuade us to stay. This is simple fantasy. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”] It will not happen.
My right hon. Friend spoke about how companies that export to Europe would be badly affected by leaving the European Union. If we have a Brexit recession, not only will businesses that export to the EU be hit, but almost all businesses will be affected by the loss of investment in the UK and the loss of consumer income. Will not all businesses be affected?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I am afraid that I can predict, on the basis of experience, what will happen. If we get a Brexit vote, markets will go into freefall, business confidence will collapse, business investment will freeze, and consumers will panic and stop spending, and that will have a massive effect across the width and breadth of our economy.
The United Kingdom is, and should remain, an outward-looking trading nation. If we want to remain prosperous, we must move up the value curve, not down it. Britain’s future has to be about higher skills, higher wages and higher investment, not the opposite.
The EU has many failings, and no one is pretending that the reforms negotiated by the Prime Minister should be the last word. If we remain on the inside, we can and should continue to influence the speed and direction of reform. If we step outside, we will continue to be affected by EU rules, but we will have no way of influencing them and no way of reforming the institutions.
The consequences of the decision the British people make on 23 June will reverberate down the generations. This is not a decision to be taken lightly; all our futures depend on it. Now is not the time for reckless risk-taking; it is time for cool, calculated consideration of the facts, the evidence and the expert opinion, and all point to the same conclusion: we are stronger, safer and better off inside a reformed European Union.
(8 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am delighted to open this debate, and congratulate the Opposition on selecting this subject. The security of Britain and the British people, our relations with Europe and the promotion of Britain’s values, including human rights, around the world are at the heart of our foreign policy. One year into this Parliament, the challenges we face to our security, prosperity and values have not diminished—if anything, they are growing.
The threat posed by Daesh and its affiliates continues and has now manifested itself in attacks in European cities. The wider instability in the middle east persists, and the Israel-Palestine question is no nearer to a solution. North Korea has demonstrated its determination to flout international law by developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to deliver them. Russia demonstrates the same determination through its continued destabilisation of Ukraine and its illegal occupation of Crimea. Tensions are rising in the South China sea. The migration crisis in the eastern and central Mediterranean is presenting new challenges to our near neighbours in Europe. As we approach the referendum in just over four weeks’ time, even the theoretical possibility that Britain might vote to leave the European Union is having a chilling effect on economic growth, and on business and consumer confidence. Wherever we look, our world is becoming more dangerous and uncertain.
Against that hazardous global backdrop, some have argued for retrenchment and withdrawal from a global role as the safest option. But we cannot turn our backs. As a trading nation, with one of the largest and most open economies in the world, our security and prosperity depend upon global stability and order. Some 5 million British nationals live overseas, and millions more travel every year. Our trade depends on the sea lanes and airways that are the arteries of global commerce. International engagement and influence are therefore fundamental to maintaining Britain’s security and prosperity.
My right hon. Friend paints a picture of those of us who want to leave the European Union as wanting to retrench. That could not be further from the truth, and I suggest that “Project Fear” is once again going down a very negative path. In leaving, we would have greater freedom to trade and form trade deals with the rest of the world. At the moment we are barred from doing that; as a member of the EU, we cannot form individual international trading agreements.
Never mind “Project Fear”, what about project paranoia? I was not in any way referring to the exit campaigners, but simply observing that some people have suggested retrenchment. As my hon. Friend has taken me in that direction, I will answer his question. We enjoy free trade with 53 nations by virtue of free trade agreements negotiated by the European Union. Those campaigning for exit tell me that if we were to leave the EU we would rapidly negotiate new free trade agreements, with the EU itself and then with the 53 countries with which that Union has free trade agreements. Our experience in the real world is that these agreements take a lot of time to negotiate—the EU-Canada free trade agreement has been seven years in the negotiating and is still not ratified.
Another small problem that my hon. Friend should think about is that we do not actually have any trade negotiators. We would be seeking to negotiate those 53 plus one trade agreements from scratch, because for the past 40 years, for better or worse, the European Union has negotiated all our trade agreements on our behalf. We do not have civil servants experienced in this field of activity.
Has the Foreign Secretary made any assessment of how many additional members of staff would be needed by either his Department or the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills to deal with this problem, or of how many years it would take to train them?
The latter point is more important than the former, if I may say so. It is not simply a question of nipping out and calling up the jobcentre to say, “Could you send us some experienced trade negotiators to hire?” We would literally be starting from scratch. I look across the Atlantic to the world’s largest economy and its trade negotiation team, under Michael Froman; that is an extremely good team, but it is very small and has struggled to carry out two trade negotiations in parallel. I am afraid that the idea that in a matter of months, or even years, we would have negotiated a massive deal with the European Union and 53 separate trade agreements with other countries around the world—before starting on the ambitious expansion programme referred to by my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron)—is, to quote the Prime Minister, “for the birds”.
Is the situation not actually worse than the Foreign Secretary has set out? Many of those countries have signed trade deals with the EU in order to access the single market. Was he as dismayed as I was to hear major proponents of Vote Leave call for us not to rejoin the single market should we leave?
I was indeed astonished to hear leading exit campaigners suggest that we do not want to be part of the single market. Until relatively recently, their position was that we could have it all—be outside but somehow get free and privileged access to the single market. That was never likely to be possible, but it was at least an ambition. Now we are told that we do not want to be part of the single market. I can read that only as a manifesto for the impoverishment of the British people. We know from the Treasury’s own model that we would be looking at a reduction in our standard of living of £4,300 per annum per household by the end of the next decade. As the Prime Minister said yesterday, sometimes we have to deal with recessions and economic pressure from outside, but we should not have to deal with a made-at-home, DIY recession that is entirely self-inflicted. We should avoid that at all costs.
In the spending review and the strategic defence and security review published at the end of last year, we took clear decisions to invest in our security and safeguard our prosperity, to maintain our world class armed forces, to grow our unique security and intelligence agencies—and, through the Investigatory Powers Bill, give them the powers they need to track down terrorists and others who seek to do us harm—and to protect our global diplomatic network by maintaining the budget of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in real terms. All that is underpinned by our decision to meet the NATO target of spending 2% of GDP on defence, and the UN target of spending 0.7% of gross national income on overseas aid, making Britain the only major country in the world that meets both those commitments.
My right hon. Friend mentions diplomatic posts overseas. Will he remind the House how many new diplomatic posts have been opened under this Government and their coalition predecessor in places where we did not previously have diplomatic representation?
My hon. Friend tests me on the exact number. I think that a dozen or more new posts have been opened, but I will write to him with the exact figure. The important point is that we have opened new posts in secondary cities in China—when we talk about secondary cities in China, we mean those with populations of between 5 million and 10 million—and India, as well as reopening posts in countries in Latin America from which we had withdrawn.
The Secretary of State mentioned our commitment to 2% of GDP on defence spending. Will he confirm that had we not transferred £820 million from the pensions budget in another Department, and funds from other Departments, Britain would have fallen below that 2% figure? By that sleight of hand, we have committed to the 2%, but we have not added a single penny to the defence budget, when, as my right hon. Friend said, we face a very dangerous world.
My hon. Friend and I were Defence Ministers in a past life, and there is no sleight of hand. The 2% NATO target is based on NATO definitions, according to which Britain will spend 2% of its GDP on defence. As I am sure he has already found from talking to people in the defence community, the important thing is not the amount spent today, but the long-term commitment to maintain defence spending at 2% of our GDP so that our defence spending rises in line with our prosperity as a nation. That is the right thing for us to do.
My right hon. Friend is right. No NATO rules have been broken—we can argue about whether there was any new money, or whether it was money that we could have counted in the past but did not. Surely the important point is that the 2% is not a target for us: it is a minimum. The last time we faced threats of the sort we face now was in the 1980s, when we spent between 4% and 5% of GDP on defence. We are not talking about ringing church bells over 2%; we need to raise our sights to a higher figure altogether.
My right hon. Friend is right to say that 2% is a minimum commitment. The reassurance that that level of spend gives to our armed forces and the military, and the fact that it is linked to our rising GDP, is important. Equally, this is not just about the amount of money spent, although that it is important; it is about how we spend it to ensure the maximum defence effect.
I will come to the hon. Lady in just a moment.
The first duty of any British Government is to keep our homeland and people safe and secure. Today, threats to that security take two principal forms: the immediate risk of terrorism that is associated with violent extremist Islamism, and Daesh in particular; and the longer term threat from a breakdown of the rules-based international system that has underpinned our safety and prosperity since the end of the cold war.
We are engaged in what the Prime Minister has described as a “generational struggle” against Islamist extremism. It is struggle not against a particular country or organisation but against a poisonous ideology that seeks to corrupt one of the world’s great religions. Terrorist attacks in the last year in Paris, Brussels, the skies over Egypt, on the beaches of Sousse, in Baghdad, Turkey, Lebanon, Pakistan, Nigeria and many other places have demonstrated that the threat from Islamist extremism is global. That threat seeks to undermine our values, democracy and freedom, and it is targeting British citizens and those of our allies.
In spite of the tragic loss of life, we should not overlook the progress we have made in pushing Daesh back in Iraq and Syria, and in undermining its core narrative of the caliphate. The Defence Secretary set out in his statement to the House the leading role that the UK is playing, and the military success that we are achieving in Iraq and Syria. As the tide turns against Daesh, we are turning its own weapons against it and harnessing the power of the internet to expose its lies, challenge its ideology and undermine its claim to be a viable state.
On the humanitarian front, Britain continues to be at the forefront of the international response. We have committed more than £2.3 billion, and at the London conference in February we raised more than $12 billion—the largest amount ever raised in a single day for a humanitarian crisis. At the International Syria Support Group meeting in Vienna last Tuesday, a British proposal to begin UN airdrops to besieged communities in Syria if Assad blocks access was agreed by all parties, including the Russians and Iranians.
Through its leading role in the ISSG, Britain is also at the forefront of the international effort to end the Syrian civil war—a precondition to defeating Daesh and dealing with the migration crisis in Europe. We are clear that we need an inclusive political solution to that conflict, and to get that we need all ISSG members to use their influence to deliver the transitional Government to which they have all signed up—a Government who can provide stability, represent all Syrians, and with whom the international community can work to defeat Daesh.
Does the Foreign Secretary agree that for the threat of the 1 June deadline to be credible, World Food Programme planes need to be protected by member states, or we will need to do the airdrops ourselves? Have the Department for International Development and the Ministry of Defence begun operational planning to enable those airdrops to proceed?
The plan is for the airdrops to be made by the World Food Programme using contracted civilian aircraft. The World Food Programme is already making food airdrops into Deir ez-Zor, the isolated city in the east of Syria, and it has done so successfully without loss to those aircraft. Clearly there are operational aspects that members of the ISSG—particularly the Americans and Russians—are now working through, and we will seek undertakings from the regime. We also know that the Russians have, let us say, significant influence over the operation of the regime’s air defence system, and we expect all members of the ISSG to do everything in their power to ensure that those airdrops are successful and carried out without undue risk to the aircrew.
The Secretary of State will be aware that the Idomeni camp has just been closed, and he referred to the refugee crisis. Is he aware of where those refugees will be placed as an alternative, and are UK officials on the ground to assist with that?
I cannot answer the right hon. Gentleman’s question, but I can tell him that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is heavily engaged in that action and is trying to ensure that those affected are properly cared for and relocated in accommodation that is at least as secure and adequate as their current accommodation.
My right hon. Friend has rightly said many times from the Dispatch Box that President Putin is one of the few people in the world who can do a lot in this situation. With the attacks yesterday on some of the Assad stronghold areas that have not been touched before, what assessment has my right hon. Friend made of Russia’s involvement moving forward and whether we are looking at a new dimension? That area is quite close to some Russian bases.
My hon. Friend is right, and the Russians will be making a constant calculation about how they can extract maximum leverage from their involvement in Syria while minimising their exposure. I suspect that some in the Russian high command and the Kremlin will have been deeply uncomfortable about the fact that yesterday those Daesh attacks were launched in areas that were previously thought to be under rock-solid regime control and close to Russian military facilities. That changes the calculus, but I hope it will add weight to our argument with the Russians that we need to work together to get a successful transition in Syria to a Government who are supported by all Syrians. We must then work together with that Government to defeat the evil that is Daesh.
Progress in our objective of defeating Daesh will only be possible if the barrel bombings end, if the cessation of hostilities is respected, if humanitarian access to besieged communities is granted and if all sides are prepared to negotiate seriously to achieve political transition.
So much for Syria. In Iraq, we will continue to support the efforts of Prime Minister Abadi to steer his country through the dangers it currently faces, and to deliver the political and economic reform the Iraqi people desperately need: national reconciliation, security, stabilisation of areas liberated from Daesh, and the provision of jobs and basic services.
We have always said that winning the fight against Daesh would take time, but we have no doubt of our ultimate success in Iraq, Syria and Libya. However, winning the hearts and minds of tens of millions of young, potentially vulnerable Muslims who see extremism as a credible response to the lack of opportunity many of them face will be a longer-term challenge for us.
Of course, I think everyone agrees that one has to defeat violent and non-violent extremism. On the extremism Bill in the Queen’s Speech, will the Foreign Secretary clarify how it will define when an individual has crossed the threshold of what is acceptable and what is not acceptable, so that communities and enforcement agencies know when to take action? Will there be full consultation with all faith communities?
My hon. Friend hits on a crucial point. The boundary line between acceptable and non-acceptable behaviour is fine and fraught with dangers. It is a minefield. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary intends to put forward some of the Government’s thoughts on this and consult extensively before legislation is introduced. I hope that reassures my hon. Friend.
I agree with much of what the Foreign Secretary says about the complexity of the situation in Syria, Iraq and Libya. Clearly, when there is a complex set of humanitarian, terrorist and other circumstances, we have to act in concert across all areas of our international operation. Let me turn briefly to Yemen, which has been discussed in the House today.
The situation in Yemen is also extremely complex, with huge humanitarian needs and different participants. Whether we like it or not, we are involved in a humanitarian, military and diplomatic capacity, either directly or through our relationship with Saudi Arabia. Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that it is absolutely crucial that we act in concert across all areas of international policy? Will he therefore agree to an independent assessment of the very serious allegations made about the use of cluster munitions and other attacks on civilians, which might undermine our place in that region and that conflict?
I agree with a lot of what the hon. Gentleman says. The specific allegation is that British-made cluster munitions, which will have been made and delivered probably 30 years ago, may have been used. We do not believe that that is the case, but the Ministry of Defence—he will have heard a Defence Minister say this from the Dispatch Box today—is carrying out an urgent investigation. It will look at the evidence and then decide how to move forward. We have a high level of confidence that British-made cluster munitions have not been used in this conflict, but we must of course look at the allegation that has been made, and any evidence presented in support of it, and respond appropriately.
My right hon. Friend mentions Libya. With hindsight, it is clear that after the fall of Gaddafi we did not really give enough support to the Government we then recognised. The place collapsed into anarchy and is a possible base for ISIS. About half an hour ago, the Secretary of State for Defence said we were offering security assistance to the Government we now recognise, if and when they request it. Will the Foreign Secretary tell me whether his Department and other Departments are giving every other possible diplomatic and political support to that Government? Until they can establish themselves as a real Administration capable of delivering services to their public and of winning public support, we run the danger again of having a slightly fictional Government in Tripoli, while the rest of the country falls prey to anarchy or even ISIS.
As I am sure my right hon. and learned Friend would readily agree, hindsight is indeed a wonderful thing. [Interruption.] The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), reminds me that elections were held in Libya after the fall of Gaddafi. It is since then that things have gone wrong.
On support to Prime Minister Sarraj and the Government of national accord, yes, we are providing technical, diplomatic and political assistance. My right hon. and learned Friend will recall that I visited Tripoli a few weeks ago. We are working very closely with Prime Minister Sarraj, both bilaterally and through the European Union. Prime Minister Sarraj was at the meeting in Vienna last Monday in which 20-odd countries got together to discuss how we can best support what that Government are doing.
The situation in Libya is complex, but I think Prime Minister Sarraj is approaching it in the right way— a bottom-up approach. He is not trying to create a Government who can rule Libya in some monolithic fashion, because that is not practical. He is trying to create an umbrella Government within which municipalities are empowered to deliver the services and run the structures that people need. We have considerable experience of that approach—including, indeed, in Syria—working with devolved levels of government in small areas to try to establish good governance from the bottom up. I suspect that that will be a more realistic approach than a top-down approach.
On Libya, can the right hon. Gentleman confirm whether he has had any consultations with the neighbouring country of Algeria? It has great experience of dealing with terrorism and has had huge problems as a result of the instability in Libya. It can be a huge asset and support in stabilising its neighbouring country. Are those consultations taking place?
Yes, I can confirm that to the hon. Lady. I visited Algeria and the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East has visited Algeria. The Algerians are playing a role. That in itself is significant, because for many, many years Algeria took a rather isolationist, non-interventionist approach. As a neighbouring country, it is at risk from what is going on in Libya. It has recognised that and is engaging with the challenge. We are extremely grateful for the support that Algeria—with, as the hon. Lady says, its considerable experience of dealing with a major scale insurgency—is able to deliver.
I am just going to make a little progress, if my hon. Friend will allow me, as he has had one bite of the cherry already.
While we step up the fight against Daesh and Islamist extremism, the old challenge of state-based aggression has not gone away. To our east, Russia’s disregard for international norms, its illegal annexation of Crimea and its continuing destabilisation of eastern Ukraine are echoes of an era that, frankly, most of us thought had passed with the fall of the Berlin wall. They represent a clear threat to the stability of the post-cold war European security order, and, more widely, to the rules-based international system on which an open, free-trading liberal democracy such as ours depends.
As well as violating the sovereign territory of another country and undermining the rules-based system, Russia’s actions in Ukraine have led to the loss of more than 9,000 lives and the displacement of up to 1 million people from their homes. Responsibility for this human misery lies squarely at the door of the Kremlin. It is a direct result of a deliberate policy that seeks to deny the right of independent former Soviet republics to determine their own economic and political destiny. This Government remain clear that Russia must be held to account for its actions. We will work through the EU to keep up the economic pressure with hard-hitting and carefully calibrated sanctions. Those sanctions must remain in place until such time as Russia delivers on the pledges it made at Minsk. In the meantime, we will continue to provide non-lethal support and training to the Ukrainian armed forces. Building on the British military units already rotating through Poland and the Baltic states, we will announce at the NATO summit in Warsaw in June further measures to reassure our eastern allies in the face of this continuing aggression.
At the same time, we will engage with Russia where it is clearly in our national interests to do so. Russia, along with Iran, is one of the two countries that have real influence on the Syrian regime.
As members of the ISSG, they have the principal responsibility for telling Assad that it is time to go. We will continue to work with Russia on Syria and at the UN and to collaborate with it on counter-terrorism, where British lives are potentially at risk, but it will not be business as usual. All nations must know that we cannot and will not look the other way while the rules-based system is repeatedly violated. We look forward to the time when Russia rejoins the community of nations as a partner in upholding international rules, but our eyes are wide open and we know that it might be a long time coming.
As we said in the 2010 strategic defence and security review and again in 2015, Britain’s national security is indivisible from its economic security. We cannot keep people safe if we do not have a strong economy, and vice versa. As we have continued to deal with the economic legacy we inherited—bringing down the deficit and restoring sustainable growth to our economy—we have also been strengthening our diplomatic muscle in emerging economies in order to grow our trade and support jobs here at home. And those efforts are paying off. The state visit by China’s President Xi last year generated £40 billion of commercial deals, helping to create more than 5,000 permanent jobs in this country and more than 20,000 construction-phase jobs. During Prime Minister Modi’s visit in November, UK and Indian businesses agreed deals worth £9 billion. Inward investment from India in 2014-15 created more than 7,000 jobs and safeguarded more than 1,500 others. Since the UK’s free trade deal with the Republic of Korea in 2011, the value of UK exports to Korea has more than doubled.
While we seek to grow our links with the world’s emerging economies, however, our trade and investment relationship with the EU will always be central to our economic success story. As the House knows, the Government’s clear view is that Britain’s continuing prosperity is best served by our remaining a leading member of a reformed EU. Our membership puts us, the No. 2 economic power in the EU, inside the world’s largest single market, with a seat at the decision-making table. It is a market with 500 million consumers and a quarter of the world’s GDP and a market that buys 44% of Britain’s exports.
There is a world of difference between being inside such a market, with tariff-free access as of right, and being outside it, scrabbling around for a deal; between making the rules of the market to protect our interests and being governed by rules designed for the benefit and advantage of others. Our membership safeguards the pound and the Bank of England, and with the deal that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister negotiated in February, our membership keeps us out of Schengen, exempts us from ever-closer union and limits EU migrants’ access to our welfare system. It is the best of both worlds.
The Foreign Secretary and I are good friends but we disagree on this matter. Will he confirm that under this much-vaunted reform deal that the Prime Minister has negotiated, which does not add up to a row of beans, if the UK were to introduce financial measures that we believed to be in the interests of the City of London but which the eurozone deemed to conflict with theirs, we would be obliged either to change our measures or to go to the European Court of Justice for arbitration—and we know that the Court always finds in favour of the acquis communautaire?
We do not know by any means that the ECJ always finds in favour of the Community. Indeed, we have done rather well when challenged in the ECJ. For example, when the European Central Bank disgracefully tried to prevent euro-denominated financial instruments from being cleared in the City of London, we went to the ECJ and won the case, with a clear declaration that the ECB’s proposal was illegal. So I simply do not accept the premise of my Friend’s question.
Further to that point, is not the very essence of the Prime Minister’s deal in Brussels, to which I suggest too little attention has been paid, that it provides a firm guarantee that the UK’s position outside the eurozone will not be used to jeopardise its position within the single market? Is that not a very important safeguard and one that, in the context of the ECJ and any arbitration it has to carry out, will have to be taken into account and has binding force in international law?
My right hon. and learned Friend is absolutely right. Those on the other side of the argument spent a lot of time trying to argue that the agreement did not have binding force in international law, only—eventually—to have to concede that it did. He is absolutely right. The deal that the Prime Minister negotiated is substantive, and if we vote to remain in the EU on 23 June, we will move ahead with the implementation of those measures, which will give Britain not only the advantages, which we already have, that come with membership of a 500-million consumer-strong marketplace but all the additional advantages and assurances that the deal brings.
I know from my meetings with colleagues from across the EU that, whatever people in the House or the country think, our colleagues in Europe cannot believe the deal that we have negotiated. They cannot believe we managed to negotiate the best of both worlds—being in the EU but able to opt out of all the measures we find do not suit our political purposes.
The Foreign Secretary talked about the benefits for our exporters, and that includes the steel industry, which has a huge presence in my constituency and across south Wales. Tomorrow, thousands of steelworkers will march through London, to Parliament, to raise their concerns about what the Government will do to support the steel industry. Does he agree that the very worst thing we can do for the steel industry is to pull out and lose the possibility of our steel industry exporting tariff-free to the rest of Europe?
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right, but it goes further than that. Let us be honest: the steel industry worldwide is facing a crisis. We cannot wish it away, create more demand or just make the excess capacity disappear, but we are always better and more effective at addressing these problems if we do so collectively, and working across the EU is the best way to tackle this very difficult problem.
Britain, in particular, will reap further and disproportionate benefits—some of my colleagues in Europe would say quite unfair benefits—as the EU develops the single markets in services, digital, energy and capital, because all these relatively immature EU single markets are areas in which the UK is the leading economy in Europe. The commitments we have obtained to moving forward rapidly with the further development of those single markets will disproportionately benefit this country and disproportionately create jobs and growth in the UK after our decision on 23 June.
We can only reap those benefits, however, with a renewed democratic mandate from the British people. For four decades, they have been denied their say—and frankly, but for the election of a Conservative Government, they would not be getting a say now. So I welcome the debate and the focus it has brought. It has forced all of us to think hard about the issues and the consequences, now that there is a real decision to be made. I hope that the House can agree on two things—that on 23 June the British people must have their say and that we politicians must respect their decision, whatever it is.
We cannot separate our security and prosperity from the values system in which they are grounded. Countless examples around the world have demonstrated through history that where political competition, the rule of law, respect for human rights, freedom of speech and tolerance of difference are lacking, social, political and economic stability will be vulnerable at best and absent at worst. Conversely, where societies respond to the demand for greater rule of law, respect for human rights and individual freedoms, innovation and entrepreneurialism flourish—the so-called golden thread of mutually reinforcing values.
Of course, we cannot expect in the 21st century to be able simply to impose a one-size-fits-all system across the world. Those days are well and truly over. As our own example has shown, ideas of freedom, democracy and the rule of law need time to take root, and the form they take will depend on where a nation is on its development pathway and on its individual culture and traditions. We can, however, seek to nurture, to encourage and to support countries as they move towards respect for these essential values.
It is the direction of travel that matters. My view is clear: where a nation’s political, social, economic and judicial development is taking it in the right direction towards better governance, stronger rule of law and respect for human rights, we should work with it and support it. Where it is taking it away from those goals, we will call it out, as we have done recently in South Sudan and Burundi.
Most importantly, where countries fall short, we are committed to a pragmatic response that seeks to make a difference rather than disengagement, posturing and empty rhetoric. We have doubled FCO funding for human rights projects to £10 million, putting our money where our mouth is, but more important than that, by mainstreaming our human rights work, we have hard-wired it into everything we do. We have made it an integral part of day-to-day diplomacy—not a bolt-on optional extra. I firmly believe that our approach is yielding real, practical dividends.
Will the Foreign Secretary therefore take the opportunity to disavow the comment made by his permanent secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Simon McDonald, who said that human rights were
“no longer a priority for the UK government”?
Sir Simon has explained that what he was trying to convey was that we are mainstreaming, so we do not have a separate category any longer. We have mainstreamed human rights into our consular, political and mainstream diplomatic work. By doing so, we embed that in a way that is delivering results throughout our agenda.
Does the Foreign Secretary agree that it is a bit rich for British diplomats and politicians to travel the globe lecturing others about human rights when we are about to repeal our own Human Rights Act and some members of the Government of which the right hon. Gentleman is a part wish to withdraw from the European convention on human rights?
No, I do not. Throughout the world, Britain is recognised as an important champion of human rights and a country in which many of the rights taken for granted today across the world originated. I hope we can have a constructive debate about these issues.
Before I conclude, I want to confront head on the notion, which have heard, that the Government are putting economic and trade interests before human rights. Yes, we are serious about increasing our global trade to secure more jobs and greater economic security for the British people, but that does not come at the expense of our values. The deeper and broader our relationships with other countries become, the greater our influence and the easier it is to have frank conversations about issues on which we disagree. Building economic and political relationships helps to build influence and leverage. It is not always visible—progress often takes place behind the scenes—but we should be ruthlessly focused on what works. On the occasions where private influence fails, we can and do speak out publicly. Ultimately, I believe the best way to achieve the positive changes we all want to see on human rights is to engage constructively as part of a comprehensive relationship.
Is the Foreign Secretary seriously telling us that right now our relationship with Saudi Arabia is a case of not putting human rights secondary to economic interest?
I hope that the right hon. Gentleman is around in five, 10 or 15 years’ time, so that we can look back from that vantage point on what is happening now. Something very significant is happening in Saudi Arabia. The “Vision 2030” plan that has been published by the deputy Crown Prince sets out a trajectory for Saudi Arabia’s development, which is inevitably going to change that country. It is not just an economic plan; it is far more than that. If we want to influence the direction of Saudi Arabia’s development, I strongly advise engaging with that project and helping to shape it rather than turning our backs on that country, as many have suggested we should.
We now have decades and decades of experience showing that early intervention to prevent human rights abuses and mass atrocities works. Does the Foreign Secretary feel that his Department, and indeed the whole of government, would benefit from a mass atrocity prevention lens being focused on all policies so that we intervene early and fast to prevent escalation?
What the hon. Lady says is persuasive, but I am trying to think how to operationalise it in a way that is different from what we are already doing. As my hon. Friend reminds me, that is what we thought we were doing in Syria, but unfortunately we have not succeeded in preventing the atrocities that are still going on there. Let me consider further what the hon. Lady has said and perhaps write to her about it.
Under this Government, the UK is making a decisive contribution to the global agenda. We are leading reform in the European Union and, if the British people give their consent, we will continue to drive that reform in the future. We are standing up to Russian aggression, defending the rules-based international system that Russia seeks to undermine and providing military reassurance to our eastern allies who feel so threatened by Russia’s actions.
We are supporting human rights around the world, making it a core part of every diplomat’s work, strengthening the values-based, rule-of-law system upon which our prosperity, our security and our freedoms depend. In an ever-more complex and dangerous world, our diplomats, our military, our intelligence and security services, our police, our border force and many others work tirelessly, day in, day out, to keep us safe. Their achievements often go unsung; the risks they take often go unnoticed, so I want to end by thanking them, on behalf of the whole House and the British people, for the work they do and the remarkable results they deliver.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We should learn from history, and we should recall that Europe has acted as a magnet to countries by offering stability, the rule of law and other values. Despite the occasional irritations and problems that 28 member states trying to reach agreement can cause from time to time, Europe has been a powerful force for good in our continent, and we cast it aside at our peril. I believe we would do so to our regret.
Those are the facts of our membership. We know what membership gives us and we know what it involves. What is the other fact? It is very simply this. The answer to the honest question of what would happen if we left the European Union is that we do not know. We have heard a number of answers from the leave campaign during the debate so far, one of which is that it will all be fine; another is that we will get a better deal outside. We hear a lot of that. I recently took part in a debate in which I heard the argument that nothing needed to change. That is an odd argument, because if nothing needs to change why on earth are they campaigning so hard for us to leave the European Union? So, what will happen if we leave? The honest answer is that we do not know—and there we have it: two facts. We know what remaining in the European Union will involve. We do not know what will happen if we leave.
I do not believe that it is a coincidence that the Foreign Secretary and his predecessor—both of whom it would be fair to describe as having been regarded as Eurosceptics—having now served in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, are campaigning for Britain to remain in the European Union because they have seen at first hand precisely how being a member gives us influence in the world. We should therefore give thanks for the fact that this Government have not one but two departments of education in Whitehall. The first is called the Department for Education and the second is called the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. It is a shame that the Prime Minister has been unable to allow more Conservative Eurosceptics to serve in the FCO and go through its excellent retraining and conversion programme.
Turning to Syria, the House will welcome the renewed commitment in the Gracious Speech to support international efforts to bring peace to this brutalised and war-weary country and its long-suffering people. The civil war has raged for five years. Half the population have fled their homes. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, more than 360,000 have lost their lives, mostly at the hands of President Assad, and Russian airstrikes have killed 1,700 civilians in the past six months alone. The determination of some of those fleeing that destruction to try to make it to Europe, despite the perilous, dangerous journey, shows their utter desperation. While the Government’s offering of humanitarian aid has been exemplary, their offering of a home to those fleeing has not. Time and again, they have fallen short and have had to be shamed and forced into action. The immediate priority, as the Foreign Secretary said, is to enable the next round of peace talks to take place, and the ceasefire has to be observed for that to happen. It is unacceptable for the Assad regime to continue to attack opposition forces when they are expected to sit opposite his representatives at the table to try and negotiate a peaceful solution.
We also need humanitarian access. I was struck when Staffan de Mistura said five days ago how unacceptable it is that “well-fed, grown-up” soldiers blocked the delivery of baby food to the town of Darayya. If access is not significantly and speedily improved, we should use airdrops to reach civilians, and I welcome what the Foreign Secretary said on that a little earlier.
Daesh has taken brutal and cruel advantage of the civil war, and its ideology is spreading across north Africa and other parts of the world. The whole House has agreed that we must stand up to its barbarity. It is good to see reports that its grip, particularly in Iraq, has been weakened in recent months as a result of the efforts of the Iraqis, the peshmerga, and the international military coalition. However, we must also hold it to account for what it has done.
The UK can be proud of our consistent support for the International Criminal Court as a means of dealing with crimes against humanity and war crimes. There is no doubt that Daesh is killing people in Syria and Iraq because of their ethnicity, race and religion and that what it is doing has all the hallmarks of genocide, of crimes against humanity and of war crimes. Look what it has done to the Yazidis. When some Members, of which I was one, sat and listened to a young Yazidi woman describe how Daesh came to her village, killed all the men, murdered her mother, and took her into sexual slavery, we were forced to look into the darkness of human depravity. On 20 April, when the House voted for the Government to refer the crimes immediately to the ICC through the UN Security Council, Ministers abstained, but I hope they will now demonstrate to the House that they are prepared to take that forward. It is important that the evidence is preserved, so that those responsible are held to account in the end.
As we heard earlier today, many across the House have deep concerns about the alleged war crimes committed in Yemen and the hidden humanitarian disaster there. According to Oxfam, 80% of the population urgently need humanitarian assistance, and because of the risks for journalists it is an unreported humanitarian disaster. The Opposition have repeatedly called for an independent inquiry into alleged violations of international humanitarian law and for the Government immediately to suspend all arms sales to Saudi Arabia until an inquiry has taken place. There is mounting evidence of serious breaches of international humanitarian law and a clear risk that British-made weapons are being used, but the Government are burying their head in the sand.
The Foreign Secretary will be well aware of the number of UN officials who have spoken out on the matter, including the Secretary-General, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, the humanitarian coordinator for Yemen, the special advisor on the prevention of genocide, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the special rapporteur on the right to food and the special advisor on the responsibility to protect. I do not need to repeat for the Foreign Secretary’s benefit the words of the UN panel of experts on Yemen’s final report, because part of what it had found was quoted earlier in the debate. UK and EU law could not be clearer. The Government should not grant arms export licences to a country if there is a clear risk that the items might be used in the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law. The Government are simply not taking their responsibilities seriously enough. The answers we received during today’s urgent question do not really bear scrutiny.
I must pick up on that last point. The urgent question related to equipment that has not been manufactured for two and a half decades. There can be no question of any supply of that type of equipment. I do not understand why the right hon. Gentleman makes that point.
I welcome the fact that further inquiries will be made about what Amnesty International has found, but I am making a broader point about repeated allegations of breaches of international humanitarian law. The Government’s response seems to be that they will ask the Saudis to look at the matter and see what they say. It is time for an independent investigation.
It might depend on what aircraft or means was used to deliver it, because we have of course sold a large amount of military equipment to Saudi Arabia. There is mounting evidence of the use of cluster munitions, despite the denials that were reported once again to the House. I think the Foreign Secretary at one point said he believed we have got to a point at which we will have a commitment that such munitions are not being used, but I would like not only to have that commitment from the Saudi authorities but to see an absence of evidence on the ground, given what is being discovered by those who are examining what is occurring in the midst of this terrible conflict.
I welcome the Government’s commitment in their legislative programme to ratify the Hague convention on the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict. We have been calling for that, and it will be an important step forward. I hope it will strengthen the UK’s commitment to the protection of cultural heritage in conflict zones around the world, including, given UNESCO’s concerns, in Yemen and Iraq.
As a member of the UN Security Council, Britain has a special responsibility to stand up for international law and fundamental rights. Indeed, the UK’s security is best protected when we do so, which is why any proposal to repeal the Human Rights Act would damage our reputation and give comfort to those who seek to undermine human rights in their countries. I heard the Foreign Secretary when he talked about what the permanent secretary at the FCO said, but it is troubling when the permanent secretary goes to the Foreign Affairs Committee and says that human rights are
“not one of the top priorities”
in the Department. I say to the Foreign Secretary that if the permanent secretary meant that human rights are being mainstreamed, the message has not been terribly well communicated.
Does the right hon. Gentleman think that Britain did not have a reputation in the world for the protection of human rights before the Human Rights Act?
Of course we had a reputation for that, and I am not saying we did not, but having taken the steps of, first, helping to found the European convention at the end of the second world war and, secondly, putting the Human Rights Act on the statute book, so that people in this country can access those rights without having to make the long journey to the European Court of Human Rights, it is a profound mistake to argue that we should weaken our position. Indeed, there are those who express concern about our membership of the European convention itself, and it is depressing that there are those who argue that, to “offer leadership” to the world, we should resile from the commitments we freely entered into, as some Conservative Members seek to do. [Interruption.] The former Attorney General, the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), nods approvingly in my direction, and I pay tribute to those who are standing up against them.
(8 years, 6 months ago)
Commons Chamber15. What assessment he has made of the likelihood of EU sanctions against Russia being renewed as a result of that country’s recent actions in Crimea and the Donbas.
Russia is failing to fulfil its commitments under the Minsk agreements. Ceasefire violations in the Donbas continue, and these must end. Russia must stop supporting and directing the separatists. Last year, the European Council decided sanctions should be clearly linked to the full implementation of the Minsk agreements. We strongly support the continued application of this robust approach, and we expect that the European Union will extend tier 3 sanctions for a further six months this summer. There are separate sanctions in place relating specifically to Crimea, and our strong view is that they must remain in place while Russia’s illegal annexation continues.
More than 9,000 people have died as a result of hostilities in Ukraine. Given the recent tensions, including over the supply of electricity to Crimea, will the Foreign Secretary tell the House what more can be done to reach peace in the region?
I regret that I have to say to my hon. Friend that it is a long haul of maintaining pressure on Russia—through isolation from the international community and through maintaining the EU sanctions that are in place. At the moment, we have no other tools that are likely to prove effective.
I very much understand the need for sanctions because of Russia’s aggression towards the Ukraine, but one problem is that milk and other dairy products are very much involved in those sanctions, and that is having a dramatic effect in terms of the downward price of dairy products. Is there any way that the food and dairy side of these sanctions can be taken away?
The sanctions my hon. Friend refers to are in fact Russian counter-sanctions that have been imposed against EU producers. I am pleased to be able to tell the House that, despite the sanctions measures Russia has taken in retaliation against EU agricultural producers, agricultural exports from the European Union in 2015 were up by 6%, showing that our producers—Europe-wide producers—are able to address the challenge of Russian sanctions and to find alternative markets elsewhere.
On the Ukraine, does the Secretary of State accept that Russian bombing of Syrian civilians to provoke refugees and possibly to tilt the balance in favour of Brexit is part of a strategy to fragment European resolve on Ukraine? He is frowning—obviously he has not thought about that.
There is definitely a Russian strategy to try to fragment European resolve. It is probably a step too far to suggest that Russia’s engagement in Syria is designed only to apply pressure over Ukraine. Russia has important and historical equities in Syria and is seeking to defend its interests there. But, overall, Russia’s behaviour in Syria and Ukraine gives us deep cause for concern about the established security settlement that we have been used to living with for the last 25 years.
Did the Secretary of State read the Max Hastings article in The Sunday Times this Sunday, in which he expresses deep concern about the threat from Russia and about the way Russia is now preparing to use cyber-methods against Europe and our allies? Will he take action to make sure that this country of ours is prepared to match up to those threats, and will he seek succour from the European Union in doing that?
I did not read the article in The Sunday Times that the hon. Gentleman refers to, but I am very familiar with that author’s views on this subject and very familiar with the problem. We are taking action to strengthen our cyber-defence and, as I announced three years ago when I was Defence Secretary, to create an avowed UK offensive cyber-capability. We are still the only nation that has publicly declared the fact that we are developing an offensive cyber-capability for retaliatory purposes if we are attacked.
The Foreign Affairs Committee was in Russia last week and would certainly agree with the assessment that our relations with Russia are in the deep freeze, as reflected by my right hon. Friend’s rhetoric. Russia appears to be strategically stuck in its position in the global naughty corner of international relations. Do we not need to be thinking about ways in which we might get Russia out of this position, even if it is only a substantial investment in people-to-people links, Chevening scholarships, cultural relations and everything else?
I am pleased to be able to tell my hon. Friend that although our relationships with Russia are in a very difficult phase at the moment and we have suspended most business-as-usual relations, we have maintained our cultural links with Russia and cultural exchanges do continue, including at ministerial level. Russia has its own agenda, and from the point of view of the Kremlin it is not so obvious to me that it will regard its current strategy as failing and in need of revision. Russia is ensuring that the countries that it regards as its near abroad are unable to make free choices about their futures, and I judge that to be the No. 1 priority for the Kremlin.
Does the Foreign Secretary believe that there is any scope for expanding the EU sanctions to include the Russians involved in the murder of Magnitsky and also the Russians involved in the expropriation of $100 billion dollars-worth of shareholders’ money in relation to Yukos?
The right hon. Gentleman will know that the Yukos issue is a matter that is currently before the courts, and there has been a recent decision in this case. We have looked at the options for expanding sanctions to cover other areas, but we found that the individuals who could be targeted are already either, in effect, covered by other measures or would not be affected by the kind of sanctions that we could impose. So, as a Government, we do not see any prospect of expanded sanctions.
Returning to the original question by my hon. Friend the Member for Eastleigh (Mims Davies), does my right hon. Friend agree that there can be no question of EU sanctions or Council of Europe sanctions being lifted until Nadiya Savchenko is unconditionally released, until intervention in Donbas has ceased, and until the future of Crimea is properly and freely determined?
That is our position. Of course, we need to maintain a consensus within the European Union on renewal of sanctions, and that is work that we are continuously engaged in. I am confident that sanctions will be rolled over this summer, but we have to make the case again every six months for continuing those sanctions.
2. What recent discussions he has had with his Bangladeshi counterpart on the protection of human rights in that country.
5. What assessment he has made of the effectiveness of recent steps to reduce migration to Europe through the western Balkans.
Since agreement was reached between the EU and Turkey on additional measures to control migration to Europe, we have seen a very significant reduction in the number of migrants arriving in Greece and transiting through the western Balkans.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that the root cause of the migration pushing people through the Balkans has been the civil war in Syria? Does he agree that this country must certainly never be part of the Schengen area, which could allow people to be pushed to the UK?
I strongly agree with my hon. Friend’s point. Of course we must not be part of the Schengen area. We will not be part of the Schengen area, and thanks to the special arrangements we have negotiated with the European Union, we are able to enjoy the benefits of membership without being forced to take part in the passport-free area.
I would say to my hon. Friend that although the Syrian civil war was clearly the immediate cause of the flow of refugees that Europe faced, primarily last year, statistics show that about 50% of those arriving in Greece are actually not from Syria or the surrounding area but come from further afield. What started as an exodus from the Syrian civil war and the Daesh occupation has become a wider movement of people.
The measures introduced by our European partners—working with other countries, particularly in the former Yugoslavia —such as the civil protection mechanism are starting to have an impact in the region. What further work can be done to share information through Europol to make sure that we really tackle the scourge of smuggling across eastern and central Europe?
The hon. Gentleman is right: sharing information between European security agencies, intelligence agencies and border police is key to breaking the business model of the smugglers. That is one of the key elements to solving this problem. Such people are being exploited by the organised criminal gangs that are taking their money, often for very little in return, and we need to nail them.
On migration to Europe, there has been a great deal of discussion recently about potential new EU member states. Article 49 of the treaty, which deals with countries applying to join the EU, says:
“The applicant State shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously”.
It is therefore clear that each existing member state has a veto. However, this weekend a serving member of the Government went on national television and denied this. One of the seven principles of public life is:
“Holders of public office should be truthful.”
Will the Foreign Secretary therefore take this opportunity to confirm the correct position, as the Prime Minister has already done on Sunday?
Yes, I am very happy to do so. As we have said ad nauseam, everyone single member state has a veto on the accession of any new member state. In our case, any proposal to expand the European Union would require the approval of this House. I can assure the House that those safeguards remain in place and are undiluted, and all my colleagues in the Government should be fully aware of that situation.
6. What recent assessment he has made of the extent of radicalisation in the Palestinian Territories.
10. What progress has been made on implementation of the joint comprehensive plan of action with Iran.
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s most recent report on Iran’s nuclear activities concluded that Iran is complying with its obligations under the JCPOA. We have been working to help British businesses take advantage of new commercial opportunities, and to ensure that Iran benefits from sanctions relief, including seeking to address barriers within the international banking system to both objectives.
Since the signing of the nuclear deal, a religious minority still suffers from systematic persecution. Baha’is and Christians are routinely harassed, arrested and detained, and have received sentences totalling 193 years for simply manifesting their faith. What will the Government do to ensure that the new dawn in relations shines a light on Iran’s human rights abuse of religious freedom?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Iran’s human rights record remains shocking, as does its record of interfering in the affairs of its neighbours in the Gulf. The JCPOA, to which he referred, is a narrowly targeted agreement designed to shut down Iran’s capability to produce a nuclear weapon, and it has been effective in delivering that outcome. We will continue to make representations—I spoke with the Iranian Foreign Minister in Vienna only last week on some specific human rights cases that affect dual nationality British citizens, and we will continue to make such representations.
The Foreign Secretary referred to Iran’s interference in the affairs of neighbouring countries, and he mentioned the Gulf. Will he say something about our Government’s attitude to Iran’s interference in other countries in the region, particularly its role in Iraq and in helping Assad in Syria?
The hon. Gentleman is right. Iran is a significant player in the politics of Iraq, although generally not in a way that is helpful, and it is a significant backer of the Assad regime in Syria, with Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ground forces taking part in action in defence of the regime. Iran is also a member of the International Syria Support Group, and as such it is incumbent on it, as well as on Russia, to apply pressure on Assad to deliver on the commitments made in the Vienna forum..
11. What assessment he has made of the effect of the recent activities of Hamas in Gaza on the middle east peace process.
12. What steps he is taking to eradicate rodents and other vermin in his Department’s Whitehall estate.
The FCO facilities management contract covers pest control activities. However, the continued presence of mice in the FCO main building has given my officials “paws” for thought. After careful consideration, we appointed Palmerston the cat last month as chief mouser to the FCO to complement the work of our contractor. I am pleased to report to the House that he has settled in “purr-fectly” and is performing his duties more than satisfactorily.
I congratulate the Foreign Secretary on following my excellent example in Speaker’s House, where for five years we have had a first-class cat who has done the necessary. Its name, of course, is Order. [Laughter.]
I am sure the whole House will welcome the Prime Minister’s statement, and also the arrival of Palmerston, the FCO’s rodent killer, but there is a serious point here. May I ask my right hon. Friend whether Palmerston has been security cleared or not? He may recall that the Chancellor’s cat, Freya, had access to the Foreign Office and No. 10 Downing Street, and it was thought that she might have been “got at” by a foreign power. May I ask him: has Palmerston been positively vetted by the security service and scanned for bugs by GCHQ? Can my right hon. Friend assure the House, and the more paranoid element of the Brexiters, of Palmerston’s British provenance and that he is not a long-term mole working for the EU Commission?
He is definitely not a mole and I can “cat-egorically” assure my right hon. Friend that Palmerston has been regularly vetted. As for being a sleeper, he is definitely a sleeper—I am told very often in my office. But unlike Freya, who went missing for two years, his attendance record has been 100%. My experts tell me that that pretty much rules out the possibility of him being a Commission employee. I should also tell the House that while Palmerston has so far caught only three mice, his Twitter account, “Diplomog” has attracted 8,158 followers, with a rate of growth that implies he will overtake me by the summer recess.
13. What discussions he has had with his Egyptian counterpart on the human rights situation in that country.
T1. If he will make a statement on his departmental responsibilities.
My priorities for 2016 are the campaign against Daesh in Iraq and Syria, managing our relations with Russia and seeking to protect the rules-based international system, as well as, of course, ensuring Britain’s continued membership of, and leadership in, the EU.
Last year, after the Prime Minister’s historic visit to Jaffna, the UN Human Rights Council passed a consensual resolution on accountability and reconciliation, following the atrocities at the end of the Sir Lankan civil war. When the resolution comes back before the UN in June, will our Government do whatever they can to ensure that Sri Lanka lives up to its promises? Progress to date has been slow to non-existent.
Amnesty International reported this week that unexploded British-made BL-755 cluster submunitions have been found in Hayran, Yemen. We know what these weapons can do, especially to children, who mistake them for toys. Amnesty also reports that on 1 March two children near the village of Fard were herding goats when they found some other cluster bomblets. They played with them until one went off, killing the eight-year-old and severely injuring the 11-year-old. Does the Foreign Secretary regard the use of cluster bombs in civilian areas as a breach of international humanitarian law?
As the right hon. Gentleman knows, the UK has long since given up the use of cluster munitions. Their use or supply is illegal under British law. As the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), said earlier, the weapons described were manufactured decades ago, but the Ministry of Defence is urgently investigating the allegations, and I believe there will be an urgent question on this subject shortly.
I am grateful for that reply. As the House knows, we are a signatory to the convention banning the use of cluster munitions, but sadly Saudi Arabia is not. It is alleged that this particular type of BL-755 was designed to be dropped from one specific jet—the UK-manufactured Tornado used by the Saudi air force. Under the cluster munitions convention, member states should
“make…best efforts to discourage States not party to this Convention from using cluster munitions.”
What steps has the right hon. Gentleman taken to discourage the use of British-made cluster munitions mounted on British-made jets by Saudi Arabia—an ally with which we have extensive military co-operation—and will he now commit to suspending arms sales to Saudi Arabia and to making the strongest possible representations that it must cease the use of cluster munitions in this conflict?
We need to be careful. There is no evidence yet that Saudi Arabia has used cluster munitions. The right hon. Gentleman is right that Saudi Arabia is not a signatory to the convention banning cluster munitions, but nor is the United States. We have always made it clear to the Saudi Arabians that we cannot support the use of cluster munitions in any circumstances, as to do so would be unlawful for Ministers and officials in this country. We believe we have an assurance from Saudi Arabia that cluster munitions have not been used in the conflict, but as I said earlier, the MOD is urgently investigating the allegations. I am sure that my ministerial colleague will have more to say in response to the UQ.
T3. What specific commitments can the Government make to support Burundian civil society organisations in their peace-building efforts in light of the need to foster and strengthen social cohesion among Burundian communities from conflicting political, ethnic and social groups?
As “Project Fear” reaches dizzy new heights, the Prime Minister and certain members of this Government are making clear on a daily basis the potentially disastrous consequences of Scotland and the UK leaving the EU. Given that, will the Secretary of State confirm why this Government have taken our country into such a precarious position?
If the hon. Lady is asking why we are holding a referendum, it is because the British people are entitled to have their say on this important issue. For 40 years, their voice has been ignored, and because we have a Conservative Government, they will now have their say on 23 June. I hope that we politicians will listen to what they say and will accept their verdict.
T8. As chairman of the all-party parliamentary group for the Philippines, may I ask my right hon. Friend to join me in congratulating President Rodrigo Duterte on his victory, wishing him well, and finding a mutually convenient time to meet him?
Can the Secretary of State tell us how remaining in the European Union gives us stronger control in finding solutions to issues such as population migration, which are often caused by conflict and the results of climate change?
Working with our partners in the European Union on such complex and long-term issues clearly reinforces our ability to have effect. In my nearly two years as Foreign Secretary, I have visited more than 70 countries in six continents, and in none of those countries has anyone ever suggested to me that Britain’s voice would be more influential if we were outside the European Union. Quite the opposite: being in the European Union means that our influence is augmented, not diminished.
T9. In 2010, the Prime Minister said: “I am here to make the case for Turkey’s membership of the European Union and to fight for it.” In 2014, he said: “In terms of Turkish membership of the EU, I very much support that.”Is the Foreign Secretary really claiming that we should take it from those words that the Government intend to veto Turkey’s accession to the EU—and, if there is no remote prospect of its joining the EU, why is so much taxpayers’ money being spent on preparing it for accession?
Turkey applied to join the European Union in 1987, and, as the Prime Minister observed—I think—yesterday, given the current rate of progress it will be decades, if not longer, before it gets anywhere near EU membership. However, there is a benefit for us in seeing Turkey on a European-facing path, and thus under pressure to improve human rights and compliance with the rule of law. If we do not keep that path open, we shall not have that leverage.
Ultimately, though, we have a veto. [Interruption.] We have a veto over the terms and conditions on which any applicant country is able to join the European Union, and we have made it absolutely clear that there can be no question of further accessions and access to free movement within the European Union until an applicant country has reached the average level of GDP per capita across the European Union. That means no more poverty gradient in the EU. [Interruption.]
I think we all know that the hon. Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) cannot be vetoed. He never has been, and he never will be.
Earlier questions have referred to the middle east, and to deploring extremism wherever it may be found. Is it not a matter of grave concern that the new Israeli Defence Minister is extremely right-wing and ultra-nationalist? He said last year that what he described as “disloyal” Israeli Arabs should be beheaded. Does that not illustrate how far the Israeli Government have gone in their extremism and their rejection of any idea of a two-state solution, and should that not be condemned?
It is a matter of grave concern. The polarisation of views in Israel/Palestine makes it less likely that we shall be able to achieve the two-state solution that the House and most of the world so ardently crave, and harder for us to do so.
In answer to a written parliamentary question from me, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury reported that on 16 January £657 million of frozen Iranian assets had been unfrozen, and therefore returned to Iran or Iranian citizens. What are the Government doing to monitor those funds and ensure that they are spent correctly, rather than being handed over to terrorists or funding action against British troops?
My hon. Friend asks two separate questions. First, we are committed to the unfreezing of Iranian assets. Some who were opposed to the joint comprehensive plan of action—JCPOA—agreement with Iran suggested that up to $150 billion would flow back to Iran in short order, but to date we think that the process has managed to achieve about $11 billion. Secondly, there are of course international agreements in place to monitor and prevent money laundering and the financing of terrorist organisations, and those apply to Iran as much as to any other country.
What is the Foreign Secretary’s assessment of the growing violations of press freedom in Tunisia?
(8 years, 8 months ago)
Written StatementsI have today laid before Parliament a copy of the 2015 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report on Human Rights and Democracy (CM 9245).
The report focuses on significant human rights country and policy developments overseas in 2015. It sets out how the Government’s three human rights themes (democratic values and the rule of law; strengthening the rules-based international system; and human rights for a stable world) operate in practice, and includes reports on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s 30 human rights priority countries: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Burma, Burundi, Central African Republic, China, Colombia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Libya, Maldives, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Yemen and Zimbabwe.
We have also published today the July-December 2015 updates on our previous 27 priority countries online: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/human- rights-and-democracy-report-2015/human-rights-and-democracy-report-2015.
The full report can be read at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/human-rights-and-democracy-report-2015.
[HCWS684]
(8 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberWith permission, I shall update the House on the current situation in Libya and on what the Government are doing to support the new Libyan Government of national accord.
Yesterday, I visited Tripoli; it was the first time that a British Foreign Secretary had done so since 2011. The fact that the visit was able to take place is a positive sign of the progress made in recent weeks, including in the security situation in and around the capital. During my visit, I met Prime Minister Sarraj and members of the Presidency Council in the naval base that has been the headquarters of the Government of national accord since they relocated to Tripoli on 30 March. I welcomed their commitment to representing all the Libyan people and the progress they have made in establishing the GNA as a Government of the whole of Libya.
I underlined to Prime Minister Sarraj the UK’s support for the GNA as the only legitimate Government of Libya. They have the endorsement of the Libyan political dialogue and the majority of members of the House of Representatives. I believe the Libyan people want them to succeed. We look forward to the House of Representatives completing its formal vote of endorsement in line with its obligations under the Libyan political agreement.
I was encouraged to hear from Prime Minister Sarraj and his Ministers about the steps they are taking to assume control of Government Ministries in Tripoli. After five years of conflict following the overthrow of Gaddafi, the Libyan people are weary of fighting and eager for peace. They want a Government who will start to address the many challenges Libya faces. It is important that the international community works in partnership with the GNA as they continue to consolidate their position and take forward their work to meet the needs of Libyan citizens across the country.
In my meetings, I emphasised the need to keep up momentum on the political process and to deliver practical progress on the ground. I was encouraged to hear that a clear plan was being developed to address some of the immediate challenges: delivering security, tackling Daesh, restoring basic public services, countering people-trafficking, restarting oil production, and getting the economy back on track.
We agreed that delivering security was fundamental to improving the day-to-day lives of the Libyan people and creating an environment for economic reactivation. The security agenda must, of course, be owned and led by the GNA, but the UK, along with other European nations, stands ready to respond to requests from the Libyan Government for assistance in training the Libyan armed forces in order to improve their effectiveness in providing security and in the fight against Daesh. Prime Minister Sarraj and I agreed that we should continue to work closely to establish what those training and technical support requirements were, and what role, if any, the international community could play in helping to meet them.
A number of Members have speculated in recent days that the Government might be on the cusp of committing British troops to Libya in a combat, or combat support, role. I am pleased to have the opportunity to clarify the situation. I am clear about the fact that there is no appetite in Libya for foreign combat troops on the ground. We do not anticipate any requests from the GNA for ground combat forces to take on Daesh or any other armed groups, and we have no plans to deploy troops in such a role. I will, of course, keep the House informed of any plans that we develop in the future in response to requests from the Libyan Government, but the type of mission that we currently envisage would be focused on providing training and technical support, away from any front-line operations.
The Libyan economy is suffering from the effects of years of conflict and the impact of low oil prices. It is clear that the Presidency Council is focused on the immediate need to alleviate the pressures on ordinary Libyans, including those arising from the current squeeze on liquidity in the banking system, the shortfall in power generation and the shortage of basic commodities, as well as the slightly longer-term challenge of ensuring the effective functioning of the key state financial institutions—the Central Bank of Libya, the National Oil Corporation and the Libyan Investment Authority—and the challenge of rebuilding oil production and export capacity. As I said to Prime Minister Sarraj, the UK stands ready to provide whatever technical assistance it can with those issues, in all of which British companies have relevant experience and expertise to share.
As for the migration threat, there is clearly an urgent need to tackle the challenges arising from irregular migration and the organised criminal and terrorist networks that facilitate so much of it. In my discussions, I highlighted our desire to work in close partnership with the GNA to make progress on that issue, including progress in tackling the people-smugglers and traffickers. As part of that initiative, we should look at creating a package of support that could include extending the EU’s naval Operation Sophia and building the capacity of the Libyan coastguard to support, and eventually take over, the operation, but clearly such a package would be implemented only at the invitation of the Libyan Government.
Yesterday I announced that Britain would allocate £10 million for technical support to the GNA in this financial year, to be delivered through the conflict, security and stability fund. The package will support the strengthening of political participation, economic development, and the delivery of capacity in security, justice and defence. We will work closely with the GNA to ensure that that support is channelled into the areas where it can have the greatest effect.
After years of conflict in Libya, the formation of the Government of national accord and their arrival in Tripoli have the potential to mark a real turning point in Libya’s fortunes. The challenges facing the GNA should not be underestimated, and delivering the security and economic development that will allow the Libyan people to realise their country’s huge potential will not be an easy task to fulfil, but the UK, together with many of our international partners, stands ready to assist. It is in all our interests that Prime Minister Sarraj and his Government are able to re-establish security, reactivate the economy, and defeat Daesh in Libya as quickly as possible. I commend this statement to the House.
I thank the Foreign Secretary for giving me advance sight of his statement. The situation in Libya over the past five years has been bloody and dangerous, and it is important to recall that it was Colonel Gaddafi’s brutal and violent response to the protests that erupted early in 2011 that triggered a civil war and United Nations Security Council resolution 1973, which authorised a no-fly zone and action to protect civilians. This House voted to support that action, but since Gaddafi’s fall, Libya has become a land of rival governments awash with rival militias. There is also the growing presence of Daesh and insecurity. Questions have been raised about the focus of this Government, and indeed of the international community, on what followed.
I join the Foreign Secretary in praising the enormous efforts of Libyan politicians, of the United Nations and of Special Representative Martin Kobler to reconcile the competing institutions and encourage them to form a single Government of national unity. I also join him in supporting UN resolution 2259, which has recognised the progress that has been made and called on member states to provide support to the new Government as requested .
We on this side of the House welcome the establishment of the Libyan Government of national accord led by Prime Minister Fayez Sarraj. As the Foreign Secretary said, they face a formidable task in ensuring security, restoring public services, building up the economy and tackling the threat from Daesh, but does he agree that their ability to do so will be determined by the extent to which they can gain support and consent right across Libya as they face the task of re-establishing governance in all parts of the country? Will he set out what assessment he has made of their capacity to do that, particularly in respect of the rival militias? Can he say anything more about the conversations he is having with our allies, including other EU Foreign Ministers, about what further steps could be taken to support stability and peace in Libya? Does he expect there to be a further UN Security Council resolution?
The United Kingdom Government indicated previously that they were not contemplating a British combat mission in Libya. Given the circumstances there, I think that that is the right approach to take, and I am grateful to the Foreign Secretary for confirming again today that the Government have no plans to deploy British troops in such a role. Can he therefore give us a categorical assurance that, were that view to change, any proposal to deploy forces in a combat role would come before this House for a vote?
The Foreign Secretary has, however, spoken about the possibility of providing training for the Libyan military. Did Prime Minister Sarraj ask for specific types of technical or training support during their recent discussions? Does the Foreign Secretary envisage that any such deployment, should it happen, would take place in Libya, or might it involve providing training in a neighbouring country? Will he give an undertaking that he will come to the House before any such deployment takes place and seek its approval as appropriate?
On economic development, we support all efforts by the international community to assist the new Government in improving the lives of their citizens and getting the economy moving again, including through oil production. On migration, is further support being requested by the new Prime Minister, or is that being considered through the EU naval operation in the Mediterranean, Operation Sophia, to enhance Libya’s ability to disrupt criminal human smuggling and people trafficking? The people of Libya have suffered a great deal in recent years, and this moment is enormously important for their future. It is the responsibility of the world community to do all that it can to help the new Government to succeed.
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his response. Let me join in his praise of UN Special Representative Martin Kobler—it was remiss of me not to give that praise myself—who is an absolute dynamo. Since he was appointed, he has literally been shuttling between the parties, groups and power brokers in Libya. It is very much due to his energy and effort that we have got where we are today.
There is a Government of national unity, but we should be clear about Libya’s historical context: it is a country that has traditionally had a high degree of devolution in its governance structure, which is often held together by a strong man at the centre. We now need to find a new model, under which the Government of national accord will be a national umbrella organisation, but Prime Minister Sarraj has made it clear that that will work only if municipalities are empowered and prepared to take on a significant degree of devolution. A devolved model is the only model that will work.
I also need to make it clear that the Libyan Government are in a very early stage of operation. At the moment, the Prime Minister and his Ministers are sitting in a naval base, physically separated from the civil servants who could support them. Yesterday, they retook operational control of three Ministries, which is a good step forward, but it will only be as they are able to re-enter the Ministries and regain working contact with civil servants that they can start to do some of the detailed work. That situation underpins and shapes my answers to some of the right hon. Gentleman’s questions, because he is absolutely right that the GNA can succeed only with the support and consent of the various factions in Libya.
Let me say one other thing by way of scene-setting. When I went to Tripoli yesterday, I was expecting to find the Government incarcerated in a heavily fortified military base, defending against all comers, but that is not the situation. The base is relatively lightly defended, and it was clear that the Prime Minister’s ability to operate there is based on the consent and acquiescence of the militias operating in that part of the capital. He is acutely conscious of the need to build a bottom-up consensus around his activities.
The right hon. Gentleman asked me about the European Union. I returned from Tripoli to Luxembourg last night, where there was a discussion at 28, including Defence Minister colleagues, about future support to Libya, looking at the possibility of extending Operation Sophia in a counter-migration role. No decisions were taken, but the matter is clearly high on the European Union’s agenda. The key will be to develop a package that also addresses Libyan top priorities. The Libyans are focused on migration, but it is in all honesty not their top priority. We have to create an environment in which delivering on Europe’s top priorities also addresses those of the Libyan people.
The right hon. Gentleman asked about a UN Security Council resolution. I have not heard anyone suggest that there is an immediate need for a further resolution. The next moves at the UN will be the granting of some exemptions to the arms embargo, and possibly the unfreezing of some assets to allow the Government to function properly.
The House would of course be consulted were the UK Government to decide at any point that they wanted to insert ground forces, or any forces, in Libya in a combat role. We do not envisage that happening in the current circumstances.
The right hon. Gentleman referred to the situation in which a training deployment is contemplated, and asked me whether we would seek the House’s approval for a training deployment. I should be clear that it is a question not of approval, but of consulting the House and allowing it to express an opinion through a vote, and the history of the past three years shows that the Government will take great notice of that. However, that would not be the case in the event of a training deployment. We have training deployments around the world. In fact, my Ministry of Defence colleagues informed me just before I came to the House that we currently have 16 permanent training deployments. It is not appropriate for the House to be consulted on such a deployment as if it were a combat deployment.
Did the Libyan Prime Minister ask for training support? Not explicitly, but he did indicate that the Libyan Government may well ask the international community for some form of support as they develop their plans. I gained the personal impression that his instinct is very much at the lighter end of the scale. He clearly does not want to be seen to be dependent on foreign support and wants to do as much as possible internally, using Libyan capabilities. Of course, if there is any question of training, we would want to look at the options for training outside Libya, as well as the permissibility of training inside Libya.
I welcome the Foreign Secretary’s statement and last night’s European Council conclusions on Libya. The sanctioning of the Speaker of the House of Representatives is welcome, as he has been a particular obstacle to the formation of the GNA. Also welcome is the commitment that the EU—and, I therefore assume, the British—contribution will be coherent and co-ordinated with other international support under the overall co-ordination of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya. A coherent British contribution will be easier with the consent and understanding of this House. It might need to include, for example, airstrikes on Daesh targets in addition to the training mission to which he alludes.
I counsel the Foreign Secretary that he is dancing on pretty thin ice when it comes to differentiating between a training mission in a combat zone and other missions, and when he talks about not seeking to carry this House’s approval. I notice the language he has used in talking about being away from the frontline of operations. I wonder whether he can say anything more about that. I urge him to continue to try to carry this House with him.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who is right that any kind of international support will be more effective if it is properly co-ordinated. The work of the European Union, the Libya international assistance mission—LIAM—and the UNSMIL planning cell, which is already in operation, should be and will be co-ordinated.
Let me be clear that any proposal to carry out airstrikes in support of a counter-Daesh operation absolutely would trigger the convention that the Government consult the House and allow a vote, through which the House could express its view on the proposed intervention.
I understand my hon. Friend’s concern, which he has expressed several times both in the House and in various newspapers, that the lines between what is a combat mission and what is a training mission could be blurred in situations such as Libya’s, but we are clear that we can make that distinction. I draw his attention to Afghanistan, which is a kinetic theatre if ever there was one, yet our training mission has been successfully conducted there for the past 15 months with great effect. In Iraq, we carry out training activities in an active war zone. There is a big difference between training and advising troops and engaging in combat activities. The Government are extremely mindful of that distinction and of the obligations that they have entered into in respect of consulting the House.
I also praise the work of Martin Kobler and of the British ambassador to Libya, whom I met in Tunis and who has been making the best of a very difficult job. Libya has been an unmitigated disaster for this Government. We even had a sitting US President criticise a sitting UK Prime Minister. A UN official described the UK’s humanitarian efforts as
“paltry bone-throwing from a European country whose bombers reaped so much destruction”.
We do not have a good record on Libya.
Following the questions of the right hon. Member for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn) and the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, who raised a good point as usual, will the Foreign Secretary tell us how much of the mission he envisages taking place on Libyan soil? As for what he calls a training mission, will any deployment of UK troops on Libyan soil be brought to this House for consideration? Given that he can only have meetings in the naval base, how does he envisage a training mission in Libya taking place at the moment? Finally, does he commend the US President’s candour in saying that Libya was his worst mistake, and what does he think has been the Prime Minister’s worst foreign policy mistake?
It is very easy to sit on the Opposition Benches hurling stones, but I am afraid that the world is not a neat and tidy place, and we have to deal with the situations that present themselves. The hon. Gentleman talks about the humanitarian work, but I remind him that, when we intervened in Libya in 2011, it was to prevent an imminent genocide in Benghazi and that that successful intervention saved countless thousands of lives. Libya is a rich country, and we should not forget that—$70-odd billion-worth of Libyan assets outside the country are currently frozen by a UN Security Council resolution. This is about getting the Government in place and then releasing those assets so that the Government can function. Libya is not a country that needs humanitarian assistance in the conventional sense. It needs technical support with good governance, and help to get into a position where we can release its assets to it to enable it to function.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned the British ambassador. I join him in paying tribute to the work of our ambassador, who is currently based in Tunis. He came with me yesterday to Tripoli and it is his fervent desire, as it is mine and Prime Minister Sarraj’s, to reopen the British embassy in Tripoli as soon as we are able to do so. Unfortunately, the location of our current buildings in Tripoli is in a rather less secure part of town, so I cannot promise that that will be imminent, but we will keep the matter under constant review and do it as soon as we can.
The hon. Gentleman asked whether any training mission to Libya would take place on Libyan soil, and I have to say to him, yet again, that there is no training mission, there is no putative training mission and there has been no request for a training mission. I speak as a former Defence Secretary when I say that, if there is a request for such a mission, the military will clearly want to ensure that it is undertaken with the minimum risk possible to UK personnel. Therefore, their first preference would be to do it here, their next preference would be to do it somewhere in the region and their third preference would be to do it in Libya, if it is safe to do so. I assure him that we will spare no effort in trying to ensure that any support we do give to the Libyans will be delivered in a way that represents the least possible risk to the British forces delivering it.
There can be no doubt that our intervention in Libya in 2011 has, as some in this House have suggested, been an unmitigated disaster resulting in many thousands of casualties, the establishment of Daesh and a vicious civil war. Looking forward, given that this country is at a tipping point of its involvement with Libya, given developments on the ground, what lessons can we learn?
My hon. Friend, as so often, asserts as fact that there “can be no doubt” on something that is deeply contentious, and I very much take issue with him. The situation in Libya is very difficult and the situation post-2011 was very messy, but countries in many parts of the world do not function as Britain or Switzerland do, and we have to deal with the real situation on the ground. We should look to the future. We should be positive about this potentially affluent country regaining stability and being able, once again, to function as an effective state, allowing the Libyan people to get on with their business. There is a weariness after five years and a growing sense that, if a properly devolved form of government can be established that co-opts the various militias and regional groupings, this can work.
What assessment has the Foreign Secretary made of the size of Daesh in Libya and its capability, and does he have any idea what its plan is? Is it going to sit tight or move outwards to try to expand into the rest of Libya?
Speaking from memory, I think that our current assessment—the last assessment I have seen—is that there are probably up to about 3,000 Daesh fighters in Libya, of whom a significant number would be foreign fighters. There is a generally accepted view that what Daesh is doing in Libya at the moment is very much a holding operation, seeking to hold an area of ground, possibly as a bolthole if it finds that its freedom of manoeuvre and freedom to operate is coming under intolerable pressure in Syria. There are many pointers to the fact that now is the time to move against Daesh in Libya, while its presence is still relatively thin on the ground and while its operation is very much in a holding phase.
One measure of success of the new Libyan Government will be the creation of a functioning economy and, as a step towards that, a functioning central bank. Can Britain play any role in helping them achieve that?
Yes, and yesterday I offered Prime Minister Sarraj technical support in relation to the central bank, the national oil company and the Libyan Investment Authority. It is a tribute to Libyan resilience and ingenuity that international partners recognise the figures who have continued to run those institutions throughout this period of chaos over the past few years as technically competent and well motivated—they have been doing a good job. Prime Minister Sarraj has now brought the competing appointees—the eastern and the western chairmen of each of those institutions—together to work together and to seek to forge consensus on how the institutions can go forward as truly national institutions on a collaborative basis.
I was interested in what the Foreign Secretary had to say about the current state of Daesh, and how it needs to be contained now and not allowed to spread further. Are we talking to other allies, such as Jordan, about working on training deployments and training up troops? If we do not contain Daesh now in north Africa, it will simply be an expanding problem.
Yes, we are talking to other partners, such as Jordan, about how we can provide support to the Libyan Government. Of course other actors are acting independently; Egypt has a recognised vital interest, because of its long land border with Libya, and some of the problems Egypt has been facing in the Western desert are directly attributable to penetration from Libya. The House will recall the continuing issue of General Haftar, the commander of the Libyan national army. He is an important figure who commands significant military forces in the east but is unacceptable as a command figure to many who are supporting the new Government. That is one of the big challenges Prime Minister Sarraj is facing.
I very much welcome the Foreign Secretary’s statement and, in particular, the reassurances it contains about the use of British troops exclusively in training and mentoring, if that becomes necessary. Does he recall the disaster that was the training of Libyans in the UK? Will he assure the House that those mistakes have been noted and lessons have been learnt, and that, if he does intend to train Libyans in the UK, as his statement suggested, we will not make those mistakes again?
Yes, and we are not the only ones who had a poor experience with seeking to train Libyans outside Libya—the Italians and Bulgarians had similar experiences. Prime Minister Sarraj referred to that yesterday and is acutely conscious of what was not a very glorious episode in Libyan history. The situation on the ground has changed, but clearly we would look for the most effective location for any training. It is probably the case that that would not be in the UK, for climatic reasons as much as for anything else; we need to train people in an environment as close as possible to the one in which they will be operating. As I have said, there has been no request and there is as yet no plan, so I am afraid I cannot impart to the House any more information.
May I welcome the progress that has been made but say that I am disappointed that more has not been offered to deal with the migration crisis? There has been an 80% increase in the number of crossings between Libya and Italy. This time last year, half a million people were waiting in Libya to get to Italy. As we know, the European Union is offering Turkey €3 billion to deal with the migration crisis and offering Libya nothing. What we need is permission to enter Libyan coastal waters in order to stop the people traffickers. Did the Foreign Secretary ask for that permission? When can we have that permission, so that we can deal robustly with people trafficking?
May I say to the right hon. Gentleman, whose question, I am sure, is well motivated, that he is approaching this in exactly the wrong way? We are not likely to get the buy-in we need if we, as a bunch of Europeans, go to Libya and say, “Here’s our priority agenda. What are you going to do about delivering it?” What we must do, and what I suggested to my European colleagues last night that we should do, is package the objectives that we want to achieve with the objectives that are priorities for the Libyans. That is the only way that Prime Minister Sarraj will be able to sell to the Libyan people a package that in any way questions Libya’s territorial sovereignty and that allows foreigners to operate in Libya’s waters. We must be acutely sensitive to the concerns in Libya about foreigners. I am in a rather strange position in that, on the one hand, I have one bunch of people in this House who are primarily concerned to ensure that we do not have any foreigners going into Libya, and, on the other, the right hon. Gentleman who is desperately keen to get some foreign naval forces into its territorial waters. The truth is that we must balance this very carefully and get a package that works for the Libyans as well as for the European agenda.
The Foreign Secretary and the shadow Foreign Secretary speak in grandiloquent terms of Prime Minister Sarraj, a Government of national accord and even a House of Representatives. Any member of the British public watching “News at Ten” last night would have seen our Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister of national accord holed up in a naval base, unable to leave because they control none of the country. Apparently, they now control three ministerial buildings in a country the size of western Europe. Can we have a reality check, please? Can the Government at last realise that their bid to undermine authoritarian leaders such as Saddam Hussein, Gaddafi, who had a deal with the Italian Government to return migrants, and now Assad has just involved the region in death and destruction? Can we just learn the lessons, try and find a strongman, and do what the Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee wants—and what we all want—and find a way of creating some kind of safe haven for migrants to be returned to?
The Chinese have a saying that a journey of 1,000 miles starts with a single step. I urge my hon. Friend to view this process in that context. Self-evidently, I did manage to get out of the naval base in Tripoli yesterday and return to these shores.
My hon. Friend is being a little harsh on Prime Minister Sarraj and what he has achieved. There is a process going on whereby militias—who, only a couple of weeks ago, were threatening to shoot down any aircraft seeking to enter the airport in Tripoli bringing his Government back into the city—are now patrolling the streets outside that naval base and were present on the ground when I landed in Tripoli yesterday. They have recognised and given tentative consent to this Government process to go forward. Its success will depend on Prime Minister Sarraj making the right judgments and being patient enough to bring all the relevant parties with him as he develops a plan for his Government.
I thank the Foreign Secretary for an advance copy of his statement and congratulate him on his recent visit. Given the failure of the past two Labour Administrations to secure adequate compensation for victims of Libya-supplied Semtex in Scotland, England and Northern Ireland—at the same time America was able to get that compensation—will he now indicate that he will redeem this situation and place on the agenda of the Government of national accord and the Prime Minister that compensation will be a key issue that this Government will pursue with the new Administration?
I can confirm that it is already on the agenda. Prime Minister Sarraj is aware of our focus on this issue, but it is a question of timing. At the moment, the Government have not got access to the great majority of their ministries and civil servants. They do not have access to their assets, so it would be premature to make that the No.1 issue. However, this Government are focused on the need to raise and to resolve these issues at the right point in this progression, and Prime Minister Sarraj has already been notified that we will do so.
We have seen a very thoughtful exchange between the Foreign Secretary and his shadow. Although there are flickers of optimism, the atmosphere remains very sombre, not least because, as other Members have pointed out, we have responsibility to a large extent for what has happened in Libya over the past five years. I say to my right hon. Friend, who has dealt with this whole issue of technical and other expertise very skilfully, that the British public would be very reluctant if there were any sense that our expertise was going into helping one side rather than another in what could still be a very bloody civil war. Although I appreciate that these are difficult things and that there are often no good guys on either side, there must be an appreciation that that would be something that would cause angst to the public if we are to have a functioning Libya in the years ahead.
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that. If only it were so simple as there being two sides; there are about 120 sides as far as I can make out. He is absolutely right. Of course we must ensure that our support is targeted at the Government of national accord. We have to look for bright spots. One of the positive things that I take from the situation in Libya is that, by and large, the different factions are not motivated by ideology, particularly by extreme religious ideology, as they are in some of the other conflict zones. A lot of this is to do with traditional money and power interests. It is about people wanting to protect their local fiefdoms and making sure that they and their communities get their share of the wealth of the state. Prime Minister Sarraj is going about this in exactly the right way. He is going with the grain of Libyan society, recognising that reality and trying to build a consensus mechanism around it.
What guarantees can the Secretary of State offer that our key partners, particularly in Europe, have a coherent strategy on good governance and nation building as well as on the vital issues of migration and counter-terrorism? What reassurances did he get this week from the Government of national accord that they have a plan to broaden out what is essentially a UN-backed political deal, so it is not beholden, and therefore vulnerable, to the many rival regional factions?
The most effective step to broaden out the legitimacy of the Government will be the vote in the House of Representatives on the endorsement of the Government. The HOR is committed by the Libyan political agreement to do that, and we hope that it will happen very soon. On the question of our European partners, it is inevitably true that, for 26 of the other 27 EU states, excluding Ireland, migration is at the top of the agenda. It falls to me to urge them, as I urged the Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee, to accept that, if we want to make progress on the matter, we must try to set this in a context that makes sense not just to us, but to the Libyans.
I welcome the progress the Foreign Secretary has outlined and appreciate his point about the practical realities on the ground. With that in mind, the long-term prospects for Libya are clearly linked to its economic prospects, which are in turn largely linked to the prospects of its oil industry. What steps, at this early stage, are UK Trade & Investment and the British Government taking to ensure that UK industry can play its full part in bringing the Libyan oil industry back on to the global market?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Libya has Africa’s largest oil and gas reserves and a population of only 6 million, so, clearly, it is, in per capita terms, a potentially wealthy country. I am glad to report that British companies have traditionally played an important role in Libya’s oil and gas industry, and Prime Minister Sarraj specifically made the point yesterday that BP would be very welcome back in the country. I shall pass that on to BP’s management.
The Foreign Secretary has said that there is no appetite in Libya for foreign combat troops on the ground. Is there any appetite in the Libyan political system for foreign air forces or foreign naval forces operating in Libyan territorial waters?
On the latter point, we have already seen a clear wariness of any suggestion of foreign naval forces operating in Libyan territorial waters, even if the focus is counter-migration rather than counter-Daesh. I cannot rule out—it would be wrong to do so—any future requests for air or naval support for a counter-Daesh operation. I can envisage Prime Minister Sarraj, if his Government are successful, being able to muster enough ground forces to mount an attack on the Daesh stronghold around Sirte which, of course, is a coastal port. It is certainly the case that the Libyans will not be able to develop naval or air assets in any reasonable period of time to support such an operation, and it is quite possible that, from a military point of view, they would seek assistance from outside. Prime Minister Sarraj would have to balance that military imperative with the political issues that would arise if he were to request foreign assistance. There has been no such request and no discussion of such a request, but if it comes, we will consider it. If we think that the UK should participate in such action, we will come to the House and allow it to express an opinion through a vote.
I thank my right hon. Friend for his statement. I know that I might be a lone voice, but I urge him to guard against parliamentary approval for every military intervention we undertake, which is out of keeping with an enemy that moves fast and that we need to go up against. May I ask the Foreign Secretary about a distinct strategy specifically to target Daesh, separate from but complementary to the wider diplomatic peace strategy? One can reinforce the other, but if we wait for the perfect political settlement before we start, we will be waiting forever.
I will treat my hon. Friend’s warning on the use of war powers with the importance it deserves. As he will know, my right hon. Friend the Defence Secretary published a written statement yesterday setting out the Government’s position. We must maintain the operational flexibility we need while ensuring that the House of Commons has proper involvement in any proposed combat deployment.
I am sorry; what else did my hon. Friend ask me?
Before the formation of the Government of national accord, there was discussion among the international community about how we would deal with Daesh if there was no solution on the ground in Libya. We concluded that it would be pretty much impossible for us to do so. I am very pleased that we now have a Government formed in Libya that we can support to do that job.
The UK’s past intervention in Libya has been an unmitigated disaster. The mess we have left behind has caused enormous reputational damage to the United Kingdom and that cannot happen again. Given that we are offering training and technical support to armed forces away from the front line, will the Secretary of State tell me what armed forces we will be training and supporting, given that Libya has myriad competing militias and groups?
Another assertion. I can tell the hon. Gentleman that it was not the view of the people I met yesterday that the intervention in 2011 was an unmitigated disaster. It has rid the country of Gaddafi and averted a genocide. He talks in the present tense about training support, and I say yet again that we are delivering no training support in Libya at present. If any request from the Libyan Government for training support were made, it would be for militia groups that had signed up to the Government of national accord’s security plan and were being incorporated into the Libyan security forces that will be formed from them.
Like the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart), I was struck by the Foreign Secretary’s correct comments that we need to continue to move against Daesh in Libya. What discussions have been held with Gulf state nations about helping that effort?
We do, of course, have continuing discussions with all Gulf states. It is a well-known fact that both Qatar and the UAE have in the past been active in Libya, but it is also fair to say that all Gulf states have been somewhat distracted by the war in Yemen and have not, perhaps, played as active a role recently as they did earlier in the conflict.
Given the turmoil in Libya in the five years and one month since the House of Commons authorised action, does the Secretary of State regret having the UK acquiesce to transferring a mission that was designed under the responsibility to protect to avoid a genocide to one focused on regime change?
This was a complicated situation on the ground and, having embarked on the mission to protect the population of Benghazi against genocide and having had to follow where that took us to protect the population from the retribution that the regime was seeking to vent on it, we did what we had to do. I think we should be proud of having rid Libya of the tyrant Gaddafi, who had effectively dismantled the structure of government in Libya. That is why Libya has had its problems of the past few years—there was no government structure in Libya.
Deploying British troops to Libya, even in a strictly non-combat role, would add significantly to the demands already placed on them. Can the Secretary of State provide any clarity about how many troops would be necessary and when we can expect to learn from the GNA whether British assistance is required?
I am afraid that I cannot, really. I can give a personal view: I would expect that we would be talking about a training mission of the sort of scale of those that we are carrying out in other countries around the world. I therefore would expect there to be between tens and hundreds of trainers, not thousands of trainers.
The Foreign Secretary says that we must tackle Daesh, but Prime Minister Sarraj only operates with the permission of the militia. Does not the Foreign Secretary think that in certain circumstances some of the militia are aligned with malevolent forces, particularly in other parts of the country, and is he not concerned that the militia are at the heart of the Government and of the future process of government? Where will that leave Libya in the future?
I think that there is a misunderstanding about what the militia are. After 2011, Libya fragmented. Every city, every town and every region had its armed forces—armed men who were protecting their communities. That does not make them bad people. They are not extreme Islamists in most cases; they are simply people who have formed home defence units, and they are the only force on the ground. It is not possible to talk about raising new Libyan armed forces that will then take on all the militias—that would be a completely unrealistic project. The only way forward is to co-opt militias into a nascent Libyan armed forces, backed by a political system that is highly devolved and that assures them of autonomy and fair shares of Libya’s wealth for the communities they seek to back.
Further to the point raised by the hon. Member for North Antrim (Ian Paisley) about Libyan-sponsored IRA murder, not only in Northern Ireland but in England, including in this city, while I understand the Foreign Secretary’s comments about timing, given that there is an emerging Government in Libya and that we will at some point be releasing between £7 billion and £8 billion of frozen assets from this country alone, will he and his ministerial team continue to do all they can to get compensation for people and their relatives who have suffered for far too long?
Yes, the assurance that I gave to the hon. Member for North Antrim (Ian Paisley) extends, of course, to the WPC Yvonne Fletcher case.
Last week, on the Floor of the House, with a note of urgent caution, the hon. Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) reminded us of how missions change and about the impact on our armed services, who might have to make decisions on the hoof. I urge the Secretary of State to reflect on that debate and the participation in it.
We are consistently told in this Parliament that NATO is our primary model of defence, yet all we heard about in the statement was the European Union and Europe’s role. I am grateful for the European Union naval deployment and other initiatives by our European partners, who are doing a great job, but if the Libyan Government of national accord makes a request, what role will NATO play in that, given the myriad other organisations and nations involved, from Jordan to Hungary?
May I gently suggest that the hon. Gentleman submits his academic treatise to his PhD adviser?
I thought that the hon. Gentleman was all in favour of the EU doing more. We are very clear. NATO is our principal war-fighting alliance, but we are not talking about war fighting here. We are talking about stabilisation, training and rebuilding, and the European Union and bilateral arrangements delivered by other European countries are absolutely the right way to go about achieving that. It is not a role of NATO.
My right hon. Friend and the whole House will recognise that a peaceful, stable and prosperous Libya is in the interests of the region and of Europe. Can my right hon. Friend flesh out for the House the timetable envisioned for EU discussions to continue and conclude, working closely with the Libyan Government to ensure a positive and proactive response?
That is a good question, but the timetable will have to be determined by what is happening on the Libyan side. At the discussion last night, we were clear that we needed to work up a European Union package. There was mention of Turkey earlier, and the way in which the EU has dealt with Turkey on migration has not escaped the Libyans’ notice, so there will need to be a comprehensive proposal. As soon as it is appropriate to make the Libyan Government aware of what such a package might look like, the ball will then be in their court to decide whether they wish to request support.
When does the Foreign Secretary expect to receive the invitation to provide the support that he mentions? Will he elaborate on the specific mutual objectives and especially the timescales involved? Clearly our troops cannot be involved in open-ended support.
There is a spectrum here. In respect of the hard training of troops at infantry level, I think that we are quite a long way from any request to do that, if such a request comes at all. With regard to structuring military command structures in a civilian-led Ministry of Defence, I think it is quite likely that we will be asked quite soon if we can give some advice about that, but we will probably give such advice from Whitehall.
As part of my role in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, I was in Algeria last week. The Algerian parliamentarians I met have much experience of bringing a country together after the dark decade, and they made it clear that they would like to help the Libyan Government through diplomacy in bringing together, as my right hon. Friend said, perhaps 120 different factions. I think the Algerians have a lot to offer and I know that my right hon. Friend has met the President. Will he ensure that offers of help through non-military intervention are taken as far as possible with the new Libyan Government?
I would be very pleased to hear that the Algerians wanted to provide assistance, based on their own experience of rebuilding a country after a bitter civil war, and I am sure the Libyans would be pleased to receive such an offer.
I trust that the Algerian parliamentarians felt suitably privileged to meet the hon. Member for Elmet and Rothwell (Alec Shelbrooke).
I welcome the £10 million for technical support that the Foreign Secretary referred to, in particular for security, justice and defence. Will he consider that those who have served in the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Police Service of Northern Ireland, who have demonstrated substantial knowledge, experience and ability in Afghanistan, Iraq, Serbia and Bosnia, should be part of the security training that will be offered?
The hon. Gentleman raises a good point. There has been an assumption across the House that any training that we give would have to be provided by UK military personnel. Some of what will be needed will be police training, and perhaps the PSNI in particular could make a contribution to that. It is also quite possible that some of the training—perhaps all training—will be delivered by contractors, and often ex-military personnel working for contractors, rather than by serving military personnel.
The main concern of my constituents in Kettering about Libya is that the country is the main and growing conduit for illegal immigration from safe and unsafe countries in Africa. If the Government of national accord in Libya are unwilling or unable to make this a national priority, and if my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary is unable or unwilling to press the case for how important that is for us, what is the EU plan to prevent this year from being one of a disastrous set of circumstances in which we are about to experience a mass wave of illegal immigration very dangerously across the Mediterranean towards Italy?
To reassure my hon. Friend, the Libyan Government do understand the importance of that issue. They understand the importance for Libya because having organised criminal traffic across its borders undermines Libya’s sovereignty. They also understand the importance of addressing the issue for Libya’s relations with the international community. The point that I was making is that we must put this agenda in the context of the many other immediate challenges facing the Libyan people.
In answer to my hon. Friend’s second question about what the EU is doing in the meantime, EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia—the European naval operation in the Mediterranean—is designed to intercept people seeking to migrate on an irregular basis into the European Union from Libya.
The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime estimated that the illegal migrant trade is worth $255 million to $323 million a year, so the £10 million is a hugely welcome contribution towards stopping that awful trade. Will the right hon. Gentleman confirm that it will also help to plug that gap in Libya’s economy so that its purpose will be positive?
As I have said before, Libya is potentially a rich country. It has significant oil and gas wealth and significant assets, so if the Government can get their assets unfrozen, they will not lack cash. The £10 million is a UK technical assistance fund. It will fund experts, the commissioning of studies and advice to the Libyan Government in the areas that I outlined.
My right hon. Friend will know that the entire region of the Fezzan to the south of Wadi al Shatti is something of a black hole. We do not have a good idea of what is going on there, but we do know that instability and the ready availability of arms have created a threat to the whole of sub-Saharan and west Africa, not only from Daesh, but from Boko Haram, who have armed themselves from the Gaddafi arsenals. Can my right hon. Friend update the House about what the Government are doing to tackle that threat to sub-Saharan and west Africa from Libya?
The Libyan Government are acutely aware of the threat to their sovereignty from the porosity of Libya’s borders to the south and south-west. I am speculating, but that could be one of the areas where the international community is asked for technical support in the future. This is a very, very long border in an unpopulated area that is ideally suited to policing by technical means, rather than by border guards on the ground. My hon. and learned Friend will be reassured to know that Prime Minister Sarraj stated to me very clearly yesterday that although his Government are in Tripoli and the world is focused on Tripoli, he is acutely conscious of the fact that this must be a Government for the east and south of the country, as well as a Government for the west.
May I press the Foreign Secretary further on the question of where Libyan personnel might be trained in future? He will recall the unhappy saga in 2014 when some 2,000 Libyan personnel were trained at the Bassingbourn barracks in Cambridgeshire. That ended very badly, with a series of violent sexual assaults in my city of Cambridge when they were left out unsupervised. Can the right hon. Gentleman reassure residents in Cambridge that there will be no further training of Libyan personnel in Cambridgeshire? Will he also update the House on attempts to get back the £15 million that is left owing from the Libyan authorities after that sad experience?
I was Defence Secretary at the time, so I well remember the plans for training at Bassingbourn. As the hon. Gentleman says, it did not end well, and the Libyans are acutely conscious of that. This would be a very different operation in very different circumstances. There are no plans yet, and there has been no request, so I am afraid that I cannot give the House any further information about what such a training programme might look like or where it would be conducted, but I can give him an assurance that the lessons of what happened at Bassingbourn have been taken on board by the Ministry of Defence and will be properly factored into any future plan.
If spending 13 times as much on bombing Libya as on reconstructing it is not one of the Prime Minister’s worst foreign policy decisions, I wonder whether the Foreign Secretary could tell us what is. Of the £10 million announced today for the conflict security fund, how much will be counted as official development assistance, how much will be counted towards the NATO 2% target, and how much will be counted towards both?
I do not think that Libya qualifies for ODA because of its GDP per capita, but if I am wrong about that I will write to the hon. Gentleman and place a copy of the letter in the Library.
The Foreign Secretary has spoken about the situation in Benghazi in the past, but the situation there remains extremely volatile and serious. Reuters was reporting over the weekend of extensive fighting and suicide attacks carried out by Daesh affiliates. I wonder what discussions he has had about the situation in and around Benghazi and whether he expects any requests for support to deal with operations in that region of Libya.
We did discuss that issue, and we did so in the context of General Haftar and the Libyan national army, which is active in that area. This is one of the challenges that Prime Minister Sarraj faces: one of the most effective military units available is under the command of General Haftar, who is a bête noire for many of the people who support the Government. But at the moment the Government do not have an alternative, and the effectiveness of the petroleum guard force and of the LNA in stemming Daesh attacks is an important part of the Government’s arsenal of defences. In the medium term, however, they will have to get all those units under some form of effective central control.
I am grateful to the Foreign Secretary for advance sight of his statement. We in Plaid Cymru agreed with the 2011 intervention to prevent an imminent large-scale murderous attack on civilians in Benghazi. Later on, in Benghazi itself, the Prime Minister said that we would
“stand with you as you build your democracy and build your country for the future.”
Will the Foreign Secretary guarantee that this time we will fulfil our promises?
That is exactly what we are doing. It has taken a regrettably long time to get from the end of the campaign in 2011 and the overthrow of Colonel Gaddafi to the point where the Libyan people are now seriously starting to seek to rebuild their democracy and their economy, but they are now looking to do so and we will be there to support them.
The idea of Daesh being present in Libya is worrying enough in its own right, but the prospect of them moving their operational headquarters from Iraq and Syria to Libya should be deeply worrying for us all, especially the Secretary of State. What discussions has he had with his Libyan counterparts and with those countries neighbouring Libya on stemming the flow of Islamic militants into the country?
I have had discussions with the Libyans and with the Egyptians and Tunisians, who are very concerned about this. The problem is that the principal route of access into Libya for Daesh militants appears to be by sea, and the Libyans are struggling to control that route with their current resources.
We know from experience elsewhere that in fledgling democracies and troubled states that are rife with armed groups, corruption and conflict often become drivers for each other. We also know that refuge routes are being sought through Libya. In that context, is the Foreign Secretary right to minimise the relevance of a humanitarian and civil contribution, at least in the medium term?
I simply say to the hon. Gentleman that Libya is not a poor country. There are tens of billions of dollars of Libyan assets owned by the Libyan people and available to the Libyan Government once the UN decides to unfreeze them, so I do not believe that Libya needs humanitarian support in the conventional sense. What it absolutely needs is technical support to build the governance structures that will allow the UN to release its own money to it.
Can the Foreign Secretary say something about the use of embedded troops in any future military operation? I appreciate that there is no immediate prospect of that—he has been very clear about that—but would the House be consulted on any British military personnel being embedded within the armed forces of other nations?
The statement that my right hon. Friend the Defence Secretary made yesterday clarified that point. Where troops or personnel are embedded in the military forces of other nations, they are treated as being part of those forces for operational purposes; they are not covered by the commitment we have made to come back to the House. It would be absurd if a British pilot embedded in the US navy, for example, maintaining our carrier base skills ahead of the commissioning of our own carriers in 2018, had to be the subject of a debate in the House of Commons because of some decision taken by the US Government.
In answer to a question last week, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the hon. Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), said that the Government would facilitate a visit of UK victims of terrorism that involved Semtex to Libya in the near future. Now that the Foreign Secretary has gone there, is there any timescale for when we can expect such a visit?
I do not think that the conditions would be right for such a visit right now, and I cannot see exactly what the point would be at this stage. Once the Government of national accord are established in their Ministries, with access to their records and their competent civil servants, and once our ambassador is back in Tripoli, I will certainly be prepared to see what we can do to facilitate such a visit.
(8 years, 8 months ago)
Written StatementsI have today laid before both Houses a paper on the rights and obligations arising under EU law as a result of UK membership of the EU. This paper represents the second and final part of the report that the Government have published to meet the requirement of section 7(1) of the European Union Referendum Act 2015. The first part, “Alternatives to membership: possible models for the United Kingdom outside the European Union”, was published on 2 March 2016. Both parts of the report are now available to read together on the gov.uk website.
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(8 years, 8 months ago)
Written StatementsI am pleased to announce the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) is continuing support for the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD). I am also pleased to inform the House that the Secretary of State for International Development has agreed that the Department for International Development (DFID) will also continue to support WFD.
The FCO will provide £3.5 million to WFD in 2016-17 and plans to provide a similar level of funding in 2017-18. DFID will provide up to £6.5 million to WFD over the next two financial years. Continuation of funding will be subject to WFD’s performance.
WFD is uniquely placed to deploy UK parliamentary and party political expertise to help developing democracies. This funding will ensure WFD is able to continue to implement high-quality programmes to strengthen Parliaments and political party structures.
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