(7 years ago)
Commons ChamberI begin by thanking you for your stewardship of these debates over the past year, Mr Speaker, and I wish you a restful Christmas with your family.
I congratulate the hon. Member for Leeds North East (Fabian Hamilton) on securing today’s debate. It is fitting that we finish by debating such an important issue and fitting that the debate is being led by the hon. Gentleman in his doughty way. He is passionately defending and championing his constituents, who have raised an issue not just of local concern and concern to him, but of national importance. Colleagues who have dealt with tragic cases in their constituencies know that careless or dangerous driving can ruin lives and devastate families. Numerous colleagues from across the House have raised their cases with me, as the hon. Gentleman has done passionately and tenaciously, and with my predecessors who held this portfolio at the Ministry of Justice.
By way of context, road deaths in Britain have been falling over the past 30 years as a result of a whole range of factors, including safer infrastructure, new vehicle technologies, tougher law enforcement and shifting social attitudes—there has been a ground shift in how people think about drink-driving. We should also pay tribute to our precious NHS, which provides far better trauma care than was the case when I was first learning The Highway Code. As a result, casualty figures show a 5% fall from last year alone. However, more than 27,000 people died or were seriously injured on our roads last year. While many of those were tragic accidents, too many of them involve criminal behaviour, whether classified as dangerous or careless driving, or people failing to stop at the scene so that there is proper accountability. Of course, behind each and every collision statistic, each of those 27,000 cases represents an individual story of a life or a family devastated, personal suffering or family trauma.
The hon. Member for Leeds North East is raising one of those tragic cases: the death of cyclist Ian Winterburn, the father of his constituent, Alexandra Wilks. I believe that some of the family are here today, so I extend my personal condolences and deepest sympathies to them, particularly at this delicate time as we approach Christmas. Mr Winterburn was involved in a road traffic incident just over a year ago and, as the hon. Gentleman said, tragically died of his injuries. As the hon. Gentleman will know, as a Justice Minister, I cannot comment on the judicial treatment of the individual case, the decision on prosecution, or the charges brought by the CPS. Those matters are dealt with independently, which is of course right as politicians should not interfere with either prosecutorial or judicial matters. He will know that some of the operational police matters are for his local constabulary or police and crime commissioner.
The hon. Gentleman has raised many questions, and I want to focus on as many of them as I can in the time available. I can talk, as he knows, in general terms about what the Government are doing to ensure the courts have adequate powers to deal with the most serious offences committed on our roads that result in either death or injury. As I think he and the APPG will know, on 16 October the Government published their response to the consultation on driving offences and penalties relating to causing death and serious injury. It concentrated on the most serious driving offences—those that result in death or serious injury—and considered a range of concerns raised in recent years by victims of these crimes and their families, by members of the public, whether individually or as signatories to petitions, and by parliamentarians, both in debates and on behalf of their constituents.
The consultation closed earlier this year and we received 9,000 responses, which I think is close to, if not, a record, showing how widespread is the public interest and concern in this pertinent area of law. It is not one of those esoteric areas of law; it affects people’s daily lives. We considered all the submissions in detail before publishing our response, and in that response we distilled and considered the views and came forward with three specific changes to the law, all of which received overwhelming support in the consultation. I hope the hon. Gentleman will welcome them too. I am always careful about such matters, given the suffering and the fact that justice can go only a small part of the way, but I hope that victims and families find some solace in these measures and that the public see in them a stronger sense of justice.
We propose to give courts additional powers to deal with the most serious cases where life is lost, by increasing the maximum penalty for causing death by dangerous driving from the current 14 years to life imprisonment. That means that in the most serious cases—for example, where an offender has previous convictions for serious crimes, where their behaviour was particularly dangerous or culpable, or where there are multiple victims—offenders could face, depending on the judicial determination, a maximum life sentence.
We also propose to raise the maximum penalty for causing death by careless driving while under the influence of drink or drugs from 14 years to life imprisonment. Although the standard of driving in that category of cases may not amount to dangerous driving per se, we consider that, if combined with a decision to get behind the wheel while under the influence of drink or drugs, the overall seriousness of the offence should be considered the same as for dangerous driving and that the penalty should be the same.
We also propose to close a gap in the law. Currently, the maximum penalty for careless driving is a fine. Not least given some of the anguish the hon. Gentleman reflected in his powerful speech, it is time to consider whether that really is good enough. A fine is the maximum penalty in all cases of careless driving that do not result in death. Even if the driver injures another road user, cyclist or passenger, and even if the incident results in the victim being left with a serious, debilitating or permanent injury, the court can only impose a fine. It seems clear that the law needs to provide a stronger response to careless driving that results in serious injury. We propose, therefore, to create a new offence of causing serious injury by careless driving. This will carry a custodial penalty and sit alongside the existing offence of causing serious injury by dangerous driving. Again, this was supported by those who responded to our consultation earlier this year.
We intend to bring forward these proposals for reform as soon as parliamentary time allows. The Government are determined to clamp down on all dangerous, careless and reckless criminal behaviour on our roads, and it is right that any changes to legislation take account of the Government’s wider proposals for safer roads. We want to make sure that we have a consistent sentencing framework for those who kill or cause serious injury on our roads, and we intend to incorporate the changes I just outlined, along with those that emerge from the review of cycling safety that the Transport Secretary announced back in September and which I am sure the APPG would commend and welcome.
In the time available, I want to touch on some of the wider points the hon. Gentleman raised. He asked about the Sentencing Council, which is obviously independent and is responsible for issuing the guidelines and keeping them under review. A review of the guidelines for motoring offences involving death is on the council’s work plan and has been postponed pending the Government’s consultation and any changes to the law that flow from it. It is, of course, sensible that the guidelines should reflect changes to the law—there is no point reviewing the guidelines if the law is about to change—and new draft guidelines will be subject to full public consultation in due course.
The hon. Gentleman also asked about the distinction between careless driving and dangerous driving, which the APPG also considered. The law, as it currently stands, sets out an objective test designed to compare the driving of a defendant in the specific circumstances of a case with what would be expected of a notionally careful and competent driver.
What amounts to dangerous driving is determined not, as is more normal in criminal law, by considering the driver’s state of mind or intentions, which in the context of driving is often quite difficult to gauge or ascertain, but by examining the nature of the driving itself. In general terms, if the court considers that the driving falls far below the expected standard, and if it would be obvious to a competent and careful driver that the manner of driving was dangerous, the court will find it to have been dangerous driving.
The consultation examined the option of a single bad driving offence, to which the hon. Gentleman referred, and we set out in detail why we are not persuaded of the case for change. Those who propose a single test tend to say it will lead to more convictions and longer sentences—I totally understand the impetus and drive behind that—but, as we explained in the consultation, we do not think that will necessarily be the case, because the maximum penalty for a single offence would have to be broad enough to cover the most serious offences. We have proposed that causing death could result in a life sentence but, in the least serious cases, a driver’s culpability for the death could be much lower. The challenge is to reconcile or unite those two offences.
If the offences do not make a distinction between the seriousness of the offending, it is possible that the conviction rate could actually fall because juries might be reluctant to convict a driver in some less serious cases—ones where they could imagine themselves in the same position—for an offence with a very serious maximum penalty. Of course, sentences also may not increase, because a judge would still consider the culpability of the offender in deciding the appropriate sentence. I would not want to mislead victims or families that a broader offence might result in higher sentences. I am also not sure that a single offence would mean the Crown Prosecution Service is unable to accept a lesser plea in circumstances where that is inappropriate.
I hope I have addressed at least some of the wide-ranging concerns raised by the hon. Gentleman in this important debate. This is our last debate before we rise for Christmas. I cannot think of anything more tragic than the loss of a life, especially where that loss is avoidable—we are all trying to prevent such deaths.
Again, I extend my deepest condolences to the Winterburn family, especially as we approach Christmas time. No punishment will make up for the loss of a loved one—we all know that—but we can and should make sure that justice is properly done. That is the least the victims and the families deserve, and it is precisely what the public expect.
Question put and agreed to.
(7 years ago)
Commons ChamberI think the hon. Lady is right. The Minister will be able to clarify this later, but I think it is a key point that the vote on the primary legislation— on the implementation of the Bill—will not happen until after the treaty has been ratified. I think that there is still some confusion about whether the vote on a motion, or a resolution, will happen before or after the ratification of the treaty, but the main point I want to make about the weakness of trying to do this simply through a resolution is that it is the primary legislation that counts, and it is clear from what the Minister has said, and what has been said in the written ministerial statement, that the primary legislation vote, the statutory vote, will not happen until after the ratification and the whole legal process have been completed.
The written ministerial statement makes it very clear that the meaningful vote will come after the negotiations have been concluded, but before ratification. That is precisely why it was published today.
I think that there is a big difference between us on the word “meaningful”. I shall be happy to give way to the Minister again, but I think that he should clarify the position, and confirm that the only vote that we will have before the ratification of the treaty is a vote on a motion.
We are talking about a “take it or leave it” deal, and about a “take it or leave it” vote on the completed deal. That is the only thing that is there, even in the written ministerial statement; and there is no guarantee in the legislation, by the way. The Minister is not proposing to put that on the face of the Bill. Even if we take the written ministerial statement in good faith, and even if we rip up our commitment to putting things on the face of the Bill, all that the Minister has given us is the possibility of a vote on a motion, not a vote on primary legislation before the ratification of the treaty.
No. The hon. Gentleman can point and hail as many cabs as he wants, but I am not going to give way to him again because others wish to speak.
All too often, the Government have urged us to accept clause 9 and the related measures on the basis of trust alone. As has already been said, it is just too difficult to see how we can put that trust in their hands. For a start, they have systematically ignored resolutions of the House over the past seven years; they have regularly refused to allow annulment debates on statutory instruments so that they could be meaningful—they have refused to do that even when they have guaranteed at the Dispatch Box that they were going to do so; and they have insisted on having majorities on all Committees. I fear that if we allow the Government to have excessive powers, they will tend to use every single one of those powers. The truth is that they seem to want a carte blanche.
I wish the Government welcomed the role of Parliament in this process, but I just do not detect that. The devil will be in the detail. The Government cannot just bamboozle the people with verbiage that has absolutely no meaning whatsoever: “Brexit means Brexit”, “a red, white and blue Brexit”, “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”, and all the rest of it. It is a denigration of the English language, let alone anything else.
What we actually need is a Bill, with words in it that have legal effect, because, in the end, this is an existential matter for Parliament. Are we really a sovereign Parliament if we surrender our power to the Government? Not really. Are we really a representative democracy if MPs are denied a truly meaningful role in the process? Not really. Are we really a United Kingdom Parliament if we carry only 52% of the country with us? Not really.
It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), who made some very serious constitutional points with great colour and eloquence. I am grateful to hon. and right hon. Members who have contributed to this debate through their various amendments and speeches. My approach over the course of my speech—I suspect that it will take me an hour to get through it—will be to take clause 9 first, and then to come on to clauses 16 and 17 as well as schedule 7.
It may be helpful to hon. Members who want to intervene to know that I will first explain the function of clause 9 and why it is necessary, and then set out some of the illustrations that the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook) suggested were required. I will come on to talk about the limits, and then I will address the amendments, including amendment 7, which was tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). The key issue will come down to timing, so I will also touch on that, but first, let me set the scene.
Clause 9 highlights the interaction between diplomacy at the international level and the domestic legislative preparation for Brexit. The Government are committed to securing the best deal that we can with our EU partners for the whole United Kingdom against the very acute time pressure set out under the article 50 process imposed on us.
Clause 9 enables regulations to be made for the purposes of implementing the withdrawal agreement. It is now, as hon. Members have said, a supplementary provision to give us agility in the negotiations and the flexibility of legislative procedure to deliver the best deal under time pressure. The Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union announced to this House on 13 November the Government’s intention to bring forward new primary legislation in the form of the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill to give effect to the major elements of the withdrawal agreement. That will include citizens’ rights, the implementation period, the financial settlement and the other issues wrapped up within the exit negotiations.
May I just make a little progress?
I am not sure whether every hon. Member has had a chance to read the written ministerial statement that was published today—it is entitled “Procedures for the Approval and Implementation of EU Exit Agreements”—but it is worth taking a look at it with regard to some of the concerns that have been expressed. We intend to introduce the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill after there has been a successful vote on the final deal in Parliament. Notwithstanding that, it remains essential that clause 9 stands part of this Bill. We do not yet know the precise shape or outcome of future negotiations, and it is important that the necessary legislative mechanisms are available to us so that we fully implement the withdrawal agreement in time for the exit date.
I will make a small amount of progress but then, of course, I will take the right hon. Gentleman’s intervention.
There will be a wide range of more technical separation issues that will need to be legislated for in time for our exit on 29 March 2019. Some will be better suited to secondary legislation, and it would not be practical to account for the sheer volume of all these issues in primary legislation. It is of course not uncommon for the principles of an international agreement to be implemented, at least to some degree, through secondary legislation. To give just one example, the Nuclear Installations (Liability for Damage) Order 2016 implements the 2004 protocol to the convention on third party liability in the field of nuclear energy.
As for how we implement such secondary legislation, clause 9—this is the crux—offers a material benefit in terms of timing. We would be able to start—not complete—laying some of the statutory instruments soon after reaching agreement with our EU friends alongside the passage of new primary legislation. It is impossible to say with 100% precision at this point all the technical regulations that will be required to implement the withdrawal agreement before the full terms have been negotiated. That is obvious, and is accepted by Members on both sides of the House. However, some regulations might be required, and some will require a lead time of several months, so we need to reserve the ability to use clause 9 as soon as practically possible after a deal has been concluded. If we waited for further primary legislation to receive Royal Assent, that might be too late and we could be too squeezed for time, even in the scenario in which we reach an agreement in October, as is our current aim.
Does the Minister recognise my point about the situation that EU nationals are in now? Will the Government consider moving their issue into the immigration Bill, which should be coming imminently, rather than leaving them in limbo for another year?
All hon. Members should heartily welcome the agreement we have reached on the principles that will protect the 3 million EU nationals in this country—we want them to stay and to know they are valued—and the 1 million British expats abroad. Of course, there is still a significant amount of detail in the withdrawal agreement that will need to be worked up, so the hon. Lady may be putting the legislative cart before the diplomatic horse. Can we at least recognise that we have made substantial progress—and substantial progress from the EU’s point of view—which is why we are proceeding to trade talks?
I will come back to the right hon. Gentleman shortly. He has been very patient and I did say that would take his amendment. Sorry, I meant that I would take his intervention, not his amendment—just teasing.
Clause 9 is not intended to be used to implement major elements of the withdrawal agreement. Its role will be to assist with making regulations to deal with the more technical separation issues that are better suited to secondary legislation. There will be a large number of such regulations and they will need to be in place in time for exit day.
The Minister said that the House would vote on a resolution. This morning’s written ministerial statement also refers to the House voting on a resolution on the final agreement. What would the Government’s response be if the House were to vote against that resolution? What would it mean for Parliament and for the country?
I will come to that. It is very clear that we would not be able to proceed with the withdrawal agreement, but that does not mean that we would stop Brexit from happening. That is set out very clearly in the written statement, which also repeats points that have been made before in statements at the Dispatch Box.
I am just going to make a bit more progress.
I will address the point raised by the Labour spokesperson, the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich, because I think he was on to something regarding the need to spell out and illustrate, albeit not necessarily exhaustively, the kinds of scenarios in which clause 9 remains relevant in the light of the proposed primary legislation. Let me offer a few illustrative examples.
Clause 9 may be required to legislate for the position of ongoing administrative proceedings when we leave the EU. This is a broad basket of technical issues, including the technical aspects of ongoing proceedings on competition and anti-trust issues under regulation 1/2003, for example, which sets out the co-ordination between the Commission and national competition authorities. Another example is the ongoing procedures on concentrations between undertakings in mergers under regulation 139/2004, and the allocation of jurisdiction between the EU and national authorities. These detailed and technical issues do not need to be put on the face of a Bill, but they must be legislated for in time for exit.
Another area for which clause 9 could be used relates to the privileges and immunities afforded by the UK to the EU—its institutions, bodies and staff—post exit. Privileges and immunities are a standard feature of international law, and are generally considered necessary for the proper functioning of international organisations. Privileges and immunities for the EU are currently implemented under protocol 7 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union. After exit, the EU will continue to require privileges and immunities to cover any functions it has, although the precise contours may differ according to the deal that we strike. Our agreement on privileges and immunities will need to be implemented in domestic legislation.
The point is that clause 9 is so widely drafted that it could apply to absolutely anything that could be linked with EU withdrawal. I am sure that the Department for Exiting the European Union has done a great deal of analysis—indeed, the Minister is showing that in his speech—of the areas that may be affected at the point of withdrawal. Surely that is the point at which the Government need to come to the House and, rather than speculating about what might be affected, actually identify that to us so that the powers can be limited precisely to those areas for which the Government need them.
I thank my hon. Friend for the constructive way she makes her point. Of course, until we have the withdrawal agreement, we will not know precisely the nature of the technical—
May I at least give the answer before my right hon. and learned Friend jumps in?
That is why the agility that clause 9 gives us is important. I do not mean to correct my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury (Antoinette Sandbach) in a lawyerly way, but it is not quite right to say that clause 9 can legislate for anything in the context of departing the EU. It relates only to the withdrawal agreement, and I think she said it related to withdrawing from the EU.
Another illustration of what clause 9 could be used for is the spelling out of the technical detail of how ongoing UK cases at the European Court of Justice should be handled, and how the UK courts should treat resulting judgments. Some of that might be done under this Bill, and some under the withdrawal agreement, but we will need to clarify things such as the types of cases that would be in scope and the precise procedural points in terms of whether a case could be considered to be pending, among others. Without that clarification, how such cases should be treated might not be clear. We would run the risk of legal uncertainty, as well as uncertainty for the individuals involved in those cases.
I do not want to make too much of that before my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield jumps in. He is quite right—he has made this point before, and he may want to hear me out before I take his intervention—that, in 2016, there were 23 preliminary references from UK courts and just one infraction case against the UK. So we do not expect this issue to affect large numbers. None the less, for those affected, it is still important to get this right.
I want to understand this, because it is rather important. We are going to enact a withdrawal agreement Bill—I think that is what it is called. I would expect that to have statutory instrument powers—the very statutory instrument powers we can consider in relation to the scope of the withdrawal agreement when deciding what we then enact by secondary legislation to take us out. I begin to wonder whether, in fact, it is the Government’s intention not to have any statutory instruments made under that agreement at all, but to seek to make them entirely through the mechanism of clause 9 before we have had the opportunity of considering what we actually want. That is why clause 9 is, I have to say to my hon. Friend, so mischievous. While I would be prepared to listen to some great exception, abandoning the normal legislative process in this way seems to be utterly undesirable, so I would press my hon. Friend on what is going to happen with this withdrawal agreement Bill. Are we going to have secondary legislation under it?
I thank my right hon. and learned Friend. I should just say to my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury that I will come on to talk about the restraints on the exercise of clause 9 later. However, in relation to my right hon. and learned Friend’s point, if we waited for the withdrawal agreement Bill not just to be introduced after the withdrawal agreement has been signed but to be fully enacted—if we waited for it to complete its full passage—we would not have time to deal with the volume of technical secondary legislation that we need to put through.
No, that is not right. We would be required to wait for the withdrawal agreement Bill to be enacted, so that is not right.
No, I am going to make some progress.
I know that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield is engaging with this very seriously and constructively and that he is frustrated, but there is no getting around the timing issue that we have.
No, I am going to make some progress.
Nor is there any getting around the long tail of technical, regulatory secondary legislation that we will need to get through if we want to provide the legal certainty that will make for a smooth Brexit.
I will give way to the right hon. Lady later, and I am coming on to talk about her amendment.
I just want to address the point made by the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich about illustrations of what this power will be used for, because I hope that that will serve to assuage some of the concerns. The power could also be used to legislate, for example, for the status of goods that have been placed on the UK market at the time of our withdrawal, subject, of course, to what we agree with the EU on that. That could include a whole range of very technical, detailed measures to ensure that EU products continue to be made available in the UK, with no additional requirements on relabelling; to define what is meant by “placed on the market” for those products that benefit from the measures agreed; or to establish measures to facilitate continued oversight of those products. Again, these examples are illustrative, not exhaustive. However, I hope that I have at least addressed the kinds of cases that we are talking about, and also given an idea of the scale and volume of the technical separation issues that will need to be legislated for in time for exit day. Clause 9 will make an important contribution to a smooth Brexit in precisely those areas.
Timing is the crucial issue. Given that there are many examples of an accelerated process being used to get primary legislation through this place on many different matters, including in a single day when that has been necessary, why would it not be possible, if time was starting to run out, to have a very simple one or two-clause Bill that would do the bits of things on which the Minister needs to get agreement and to put the secondary powers in place, and therefore at least have a vote on primary legislation? Why is it not possible to do that very quickly to deal with the concerns that have been expressed?
It is just not practicable. I will come on to address the timeframe for how we are going to approach the agreement, the meaningful vote on a resolution, and then the withdrawal agreement Bill.
Does not my hon. Friend think that there should be a trigger within clause 9 to require the consent of the House to the overall withdrawal agreement that is reached before the powers are exercised? Otherwise those powers are unrestrained, and that seems wrong. Does he have a view on that?
My right hon. and learned Friend touches on a very important principle. I hope that I will be able to give him satisfaction on that precise point later.
Having dealt with the technical scope of the power and some illustrations of the scale of what it is going to be used for, and before I address the timing issues, I want to touch on the limitations and parameters—
I will give way to my right hon. Friend later. If she will just be patient, I want to make a bit of progress, given the time available.
It is worth looking very carefully at the limitations and parameters constraining the exercise of clause 9. It can only be used to implement the withdrawal agreement, and even then subsection (3) makes it clear that it cannot be used to levy taxation, to make retrospective provision, to create relevant criminal offences, or to repeal or amend the Human Rights Act 1998. Paragraph 6 of schedule 7 further requires the affirmative procedure in a whole range of scenarios, from the establishment of new public authority functions to the imposition of any fee exercised by any such authority. Critically—I am not sure that all hon. Members have picked this up—the power endures only until exit day. Its operation is shorter than that under clause 7. On the Government’s current expected timetable, it would, in practice, be used for only about six months, so it is not the open-ended power that some have suggested.
In addition, the Government have accepted the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker) to establish a sifting committee to advise on the scrutiny procedures used for secondary legislation under the Bill. That will apply to this clause. That is on top of the Government amendment tabled last week that mandates Ministers to provide explanatory material for all the statutory instruments made under the principal powers of the Bill. We are listening. We are committed to making sure that Parliament plays a crucial role—a fully transparent scrutiny role—in the exercise of clause 9.
In sum, the power under clause 9 is required to legislate domestically for the large number of more technical separation issues that must be settled in time for exit day if we are to have the smooth Brexit that, whether we voted leave or remain, we all agree is crucial from here on in. The regulations—
I will just finish this point before I finally give way to my right hon. Friend, who has been very patient.
The regulations will be subject to the established methods of parliamentary scrutiny, with additional scrutiny provided by the new sifting committee. This is a time-limited and constrained power, but it is also an important power to help us to prepare for a smooth Brexit.
Will my hon. Friend confirm that the Bill was drafted before the general election on 8 June? If I am wrong about that, could he please tell us when the Bill was drafted?
As someone who was brought into government reasonably recently and on to the Committee even more recently, I would have to check. I am happy to provide that clarity by the end of proceedings. I suspect that the process has been an iterative one, but let me see whether I can come back to my right hon. Friend on that.
Clause 9 is not just an important part of the procedural toolkit; it serves a much bigger function that we must not overlook. It sends a message of clarity and confidence to our EU partners that we are ready, willing and able to conclude and implement a deal. By the same virtue, it sends an equally important message to our citizens and businesses that we are equipped to secure a smooth legal transition. I understand the concerns raised through the various amendments, and we should debate them. I will come on to them, and I hope that I will be able to give hon. Members some further reassurance.
May I ask the Minister two questions? First, in respect of the statement made by the Brexit Secretary this morning, can the Minister confirm that the withdrawal agreement Bill is not guaranteed to come before the House for a vote before exit day? All the statement says is that the Bill will be introduced before exit day.
Secondly, why do the Government find so objectionable the idea of activating, if necessary, the third part of article 50, which allows for the Government to ask for an extension if we run out of time as a result of the many unforeseen practical problems? Ministers are talking from the Dispatch Box as though that third part of article 50 did not exist. Why was it included, if not to allow for an extension if the time expires and we have not achieved what we want?
I have enjoyed having proper debates with the hon. Gentleman both during the referendum and since. I point out that, as the written ministerial statement makes clear,
“the substantive provisions will only take effect from the moment of exit.”
I know that he wants to drag me down into the territory of the no deal scenario and Parliament’s ability to send the Government back to renegotiate. As a former Foreign Office lawyer who spent six years in that Department and worked on EU matters, in practice I think it unlikely that that would be meaningful in any way, shape or form. The point has been made in the debate that if that looked likely, we would be positively incentivising the EU to give us, and we would end up with, worse terms. [Interruption.] It is not pure speculation; it is grounded on six years of working as a lawyer in the Foreign Office and conducting negotiations. [Interruption.]
Order. [Interruption.] Order. The hon. Member for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock) should not have been shouting in the first place, and he definitely should not have been shouting over me as I called for order. We are having a very detailed discussion here, which does not lend itself to shouting from Members on one Bench or the other.
Thank you, Mrs Laing. Many of the amendments that have been tabled have focused on the exact nature of the regulations that will be made under the power in clause 9. The exact use of the power will, of course, depend on the content of the withdrawal agreement that we reach with the EU. That agreement will be debated and voted on by this Parliament. The Government have made a clear commitment on that, and it should not be prejudiced or pre-empted now. There has been a lot of talk about a meaningful vote in this House, and the hon. Member for Streatham (Chuka Umunna) has raised the matter again. I will come on to that, and to the key issue of timing. May I say to hon. Members gently, and with the greatest respect, that such a vote would be pretty meaningless in any event if we were not ready to implement on time the deal that we want to do with the EU?
I thought a moment ago that the Minister was rejecting the idea of a meaningful vote, but I am delighted to hear that he is getting on to it. Does he accept that it is perfectly likely that as the negotiations come to an end, the Government will want to enter into a deal, but they will have given in to pressure from the right wing of the Cabinet and Back-Bench Members of the party and rejected various things on offer from other EU members? That is a far more likely scenario than no deal being the other EU members’ preferred option. In such a case, it would be absolutely essential that the first thing we had was a parliamentary decision on a meaningful vote. We could then legislate, once that particular British issue had been resolved where it should be resolved—in Parliament.
From my experience, I must say that I think that is a rather rose-tinted perspective on EU negotiations. I should also say that the same arguments were made about my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister going into the phase 1 negotiations, yet we are on the cusp of formal ratification of the joint report dealing with the first phase issues. The Prime Minister has made some difficult compromises and shown flexibility precisely to get the deal that I think my right hon. and learned Friend welcomes—I also welcome it—even though we were on different sides during the referendum campaign.
I turn to new clauses 3 and 75, which attempt to remove clause 9 wholesale from the Bill. They would undermine one of the important strategic objectives of the Bill, which is to provide the legal means to implement the withdrawal agreement thoroughly in domestic law. I hope I have explained the important, albeit residual, role that clause 9 stands to play in light of the separate primary legislation covering the withdrawal agreement. To remove clause 9 would increase the legal uncertainty, and I hope that the new clauses will not be pressed.
I want to spend a little bit of time focusing on amendments 7, 47 and 355 and new clause 68, but particularly on amendment 7 in the name of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield. May I say at the outset that I do not think he has any ulterior motive in tabling the amendment? I have had a number of constructive conversations with him, and I look forward to more in the future. By dint of that, I hope he accepts that I have followed through on every assurance I have given him, and that I have not failed to live up to the undertakings I have given him. It is in that spirit that we on both sides of the debate need to proceed as the Bill goes through the House.
Amendments 7 and 355 call for a separate statute to be enacted approving the withdrawal agreement before the powers in clause 9 can be used. There are a number of problems with doing so. My right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) mentioned the constitutional issue, and I agree with him about that. From a practical point of view, however, the crucial problem is the effect that amendment 7 would have in significantly curtailing the timely advantage that we will gain from clause 9. One of the key benefits of the clause is the ability to start to use it reasonably swiftly after the withdrawal agreement has been reached.
To add an unnecessary Bill to the parliamentary agenda—in addition to Parliament’s meaningful vote, as set out in today’s written ministerial statement, and on top of the new withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill—would be restrictive enough. However, to make the first use of the powers in clause 9 wait until the additional legislation has fully passed through Parliament would unduly compress the time we will have to prepare the legislative groundwork, and would risk greater uncertainty. With the greatest respect in the world, I am afraid that is why the amendment tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield is defective.
If I may, I will finish my comments on this amendment, and I will then let my right hon. and learned Friend critique them in the round. I suspect such a critique is coming.
In rare and exceptional cases, we may need to exercise the powers in clause 9 to pass statutory instruments before the final enactment of the primary legislation, which will be on the date of exit. Let me give an illustration of why it may be necessary for operational changes to be in put in place before that point. An example is where specific statutory authority is needed for a monitoring body to supervise the implementation of the terms of the agreement on citizens’ rights, if that cannot be done in advance under other primary legislation. Such a body would need to be set up beforehand so that it was ready to operate on day one, but we may not know its precise content and contours until relatively late on in the negotiations.
Yes, the potential scope for reliance on clause 9 has been reduced by the Government’s commitment to primary legislation to implement the withdrawal agreement and the implementation period, but it is still important to retain it. The fetter imposed by amendment 7 would risk materially damaging responsible preparations for exit, including in sensitive areas such as citizens’ rights. I know that that is not the intention of my right hon. and learned Friend, to whom I am very happy to give way.
I am again most grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way. He will know—I touched on this in my comments—that when this issue was first raised, I suggested that one possibility might be to allow statutory instruments to be laid and voted on by this House prior to the enactment of the further statute, but not allow them to be brought into force until that further statute had been enacted. That would allow the House to stop the statutory process if it was not happy with it. As I understand it, the further statute has to be enacted before the date we leave, because without it we do not have the powers to pull out. In those circumstances, I find it impossible to understand why my suggestion might not solve his problem. I think he will agree that that is where our dialogue stopped. If he actually wants to do something even before that, I have to say to him that, as a matter of principle, I object.
My right hon. and learned Friend is right about almost everything; the only point he is not right about is that I think he will find that my suggestion to him was the appropriate way to deal with that. I will come on to give him precisely the assurance he is asking for, although we have not had a chance to get it on to the face of the Bill. I would argue that a political assurance, which I will give him on top of the others that have been given, ought adequately to address his concerns.
With the genuine and material risk of my right hon. and learned Friend’s amendment in mind, I hope I can go further, bridge the gap and reassure hon. Members, and assuage any residual concerns they may have about the operation of clause 9 in practice. I want to provide three very clear assurances to the House.
First, secondary legislation passed under clause 9 will either be affirmative or considered by the Committee established under the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne. Secondly, the Government are committed to publishing such statutory instruments in draft as far as possible, as early as possible, to facilitate maximum scrutiny, which is another point we have discussed.
Thirdly, we expect that the vast majority of statutory instruments enacted under clause 9 will not come into force until exit day, when the withdrawal agreement comes into force. But I can give my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, and the Committee, the concrete assurance that, following the timeframe set out in today’s written ministerial statement, none of the SIs introduced under clause 9 will come into effect until Parliament has voted on the final deal. I hope that that provides important reassurance and is sufficient for hon. Members to withdraw their amendments.
That approach has two advantages. First, it retains our ability to use clause 9 in time to fully implement the withdrawal agreement. It also squarely addresses the concern, fairly and honestly reflected in amendment 7, that there should be a meaningful vote—the critical point made by my right hon. and learned Friend—and that we should not bring new law implementing the withdrawal agreement into effect if Parliament votes that agreement down.
The hon. Lady, as ever, sums up the situation very neatly. Clause 9 is absolutely necessary to make sure that we can fully implement the withdrawal agreement and provide legal certainty. The problem with amendment 7 is that it emasculates that ability because of the time pressure it places on us. That is why, with the greatest respect to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, it is not an effective amendment and we cannot accept it.
We have only two hours left, and I want to make some progress, but I give way to my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset.
I think that my hon. Friend is suggesting a route to solving the problem raised by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). Could not the requirement that the resolution be sanctioned by the House before the implementation of those orders be put into a revised version of clause 9 on Report?
I would hope that the assurances we have made, along with the written ministerial statement, are adequate, but there is nothing stopping any hon. Member coming back and having another go. We have—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Rhondda is sitting there tapping knowingly. He has been talking about the separation of powers between the legislature and the Executive, and now I am being asked to correct homework for hon. Members. That is not necessarily the course on which to proceed. What I will do, as we have done all along and as I think as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield knows, is to continue to discuss all these matters with my right hon. and hon. Friends as we progress. The important point to understand—we have not had a huge amount of time to go into the details of what the compromise assurances might be—is that at the moment amendment 7 is defective and would have very real consequences for our ability to deliver on the deal we do with our European partners.
Does that mean, therefore, that the Government would accept an amendment on Report that put on the face of the Bill that there would be a vote, as is stated in the written statement, on a resolution in both Houses of Parliament that would cover the withdrawal agreement and the terms of our future relationship? Is that what the Minister is saying?
What I am saying is that my hon. Friend has had an assurance, given by me at the Dispatch Box, that I hope addresses his concern. If hon. Members want to come back on Report with further amendments, I will continue to give them proper consideration. I think all hon. Members who have dealt with me directly have found that I have been true to that commitment.
No, I am not going to give way again.
Amendment 47, tabled by the Chair of the Exiting the European Union Committee, is slightly different in that it would make the use of clause 9 dependent on approval of the withdrawal agreement by both Houses without specifying statute. Similar timing concerns apply. We would need to retain the option to ready statutory instruments before such approval, but I have made clear, and I make clear again, that they would not enter into force until Parliament had held its meaningful vote.
New clause 68 replicates the provisions of amendment 47, with the addition that the Government must seek the approval of Parliament no later than three months before the date of exit. We cannot bind ourselves to such strict sequencing constraints when the latter stages of the negotiations remain unknown. To do so, in fact, would be irresponsible. It is also a vague and arguably defective new clause, I say with the greatest respect, because it is not clear whether by the “conclusion” of the agreement the hon. Member for Swansea West (Geraint Davies) means finalisation of the text, signature, ratification or entry into force. For those reasons, I hope hon. Members will not press their new clauses and amendments.
I am going to make some progress.
Amendment 116 would require a referendum on accepting the deal or remaining in the EU before the clause 9 power could be used. I do not think that is feasible, and it is not desirable. The Government are clear that the British people have voted to leave the EU. We will deliver on their direction. We will deliver on their mandate. Frankly, this is a pretty thinly veiled attempt to block Brexit and defy the result of the referendum, in contrast to some of the other, legitimate, concerns raised across the House. If hon. Members wanted to hold a second referendum on the terms agreed with the EU, the proper time and place to argue for such a requirement was when the EU Referendum Act 2015 was passed. I therefore urge that the amendment not be pressed.
New clause 4 would require separate legislation to set the exit day, and new clause 66 states that the exit day cannot be set before Parliament has given its approval for the terms of the withdrawal agreement. The Government accept the case for legislative prescription of the exit day for the sake of finality and legal certainty, so I hope that the new clause has been rendered unnecessary.
New clause 19 and amendment 55 mandate that the power in clause 9 cannot be used until the publication of the withdrawal agreement, and that it should not be available until all other exit Bills have passed. It is clear that regulations cannot be made under clause 9 until an agreement exists and its contents are known. It is not necessary, then, to require on top of that that the agreement be published and placed in the House of Commons and House of Lords Libraries before the power can be relied on. It is of course standard practice to lay international treaties before Parliament under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. Equally, it is not right to tie the use of this power to the publication of other primary legislation passed in this Session. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie) not to press the amendment.
Amendment 361 was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), who is the Chair of the Justice Committee.
The amendment would create a separate power to legislate for the implementation period. I hope that the Government’s announcement of a separate Bill—primary legislation—covering the withdrawal agreement and the implementation period addresses his concern.
I am grateful for that. It was intended as a probing amendment, particularly to ensure that these issues were ventilated. Given the assurances in previous days of the debate, I obviously will not push it. While I am on my feet, however, may I ask the Minister to reflect again on the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford (Jeremy Lefroy)? I really think that the Government would find a means of resolving these matters if they were to bring forward their own amendment in the form suggested.
I thank my hon. Friend for his comments. I hope he understands how, in good faith, I am seeking to engage with hon. Members on all sides of the House. It was my suggestion that the assurance would be made to him. We will reflect further as we lead into Report—
I mentioned the wrong constituency name. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford would not at all want to be involved in that matter. The Minister knew who I meant. It was my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) who made the point, and I hope that the Minister will consider it.
My hon. Friend’s point is well made.
I turn now to equalities legislation. Last week, the Government tabled amendment 391 to schedule 7. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) said that the Government had not come back with any amendments in response to requests. This is a clear example of where we have listened and returned. The amendment will require Ministers to state in writing, when using the powers in clauses 7 to 9, whether they amend equalities legislation and that they have
“so far as required to do so by equalities legislation, had due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under the Equality Act 2010.”
The right hon. Gentleman is quick off the mark. I am about to address his point. When the Bill was introduced, the Government published an equalities analysis of the Bill, and I can reassure the Committee and him—I know that he raised this on a previous day—that, as promised, we will make a similar statement in relation to all other Brexit primary legislation that has been or will be introduced to this House. I pay tribute—if she is here—to my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller), the Chair of the Women and Equalities Select Committee, for raising this important issue and for her advice in helping us to address it in a sensible and practical way.
The amendment has been tabled, and I am giving the right hon. Gentleman the assurance now that the same formula will be applied to all Brexit-related primary legislation, so he can take that one to the bank.
I turn now to amendment 19, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Rhondda. I understand his position and what he is trying to establish, but if the regulations made under clause 9 were to lapse two years after exit day, it would set a very rigid legislative timeframe for the Government and risk unnecessary disruption. If the two-year deadline expired unmet, it would create holes or risk creating holes in the statute book. I sympathise with the intentions behind the amendment, and I just wonder whether it was intended to tempt Eurosceptics on the Government Benches, but it is too rigid a fetter on Parliament’s ability to manage its legislative priorities between now and 2021, and it would risk exacerbating the very uncertainty that the Bill is designed to reduce.
Amendments 74 and 75 attempt to tie the use of clause 9 to our continued membership of the single market and the customs union. The Government have been clear that we are leaving the EU, and that necessarily means we are leaving the single market and the customs union. The amendments rehash old ground. The Government are clear that we are seeking a deep and special partnership with the EU, including as frictionless free trade as possible, and that will inevitably be linked to the withdrawal agreement. It is good news that we are moving to the negotiations on that area, following the success of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union and the Prime Minister. The amendments, with the greatest respect to their SNP authors, would be counterproductive on their own terms, because they would undermine our ability to secure and implement the withdrawal agreement, which itself will be necessary for agreeing the future partnership agreement and maintaining barrier-free trade.
I have listened carefully to my hon. Friend’s argument on clause 9. It seems to me that the initial intention was to do the withdrawal agreement by regulation, since when the principle of a withdrawal agreement implementation Bill has been conceded. Under the circumstances, is not the proper thing to withdraw clause 9, to prevent Opposition Members, particularly from the SNP, from using it as a Christmas tree to put Brexit-stopping measures in place?
The problem is that clause 9, although now of residual use and scope, remains vital if we want the smooth Brexit that hon. Members in all parts of the House profess to want.
In fairness, we have spent a lot of time on those amendments. I want now to turn to amendments 142, 143, 275 and 156 and new clause 38, which seek to restrict the use of clause 9 with respect to citizens’ rights. As the Prime Minister reiterated in her speech in Florence on 22 September and since, we value the contributions of EU citizens living in the UK. We want them to stay. That is why the Government repeatedly made it clear that securing the rights of EU citizens resident in the UK on exit, and equally the rights of UK nationals living on the continent, was a top priority. I am sure the whole House will join me in welcoming the fact that the joint report by the UK and EU negotiators published last Friday forms the basis of the agreement after the first phase of negotiations, which will cover the rights of EU citizens here and British citizens on the continent, giving them the security, the assurances and the confidence they need.
Again, I acknowledge the vital contribution that EU citizens make to our economy and our social and national life. We will ensure that EU citizens living in the UK at the date to be specified in the light of the negotiations will be able to apply for settled status under UK immigration law once they have completed five years’ residence here. In the light of the agreement reached, I hope that hon. Members will not press those amendments.
New clause 38 and amendment 156, meanwhile, cover the specific issue of Irish citizens’ rights. Maintaining the common travel area with Ireland, protecting the reciprocal rights of British and Irish citizens, is a primary objective for the UK and has been since the Prime Minister’s Lancaster House speech in January. The common travel area arrangements between the UK and Ireland and the Crown dependencies, and the associated rights, have existed for many years. They pre-date the UK and Ireland’s membership of the European Union. Although it extends to the whole of the UK, the value of the common travel area and associated rights is clearly most felt in Northern Ireland. These arrangements facilitate, among other things, the north-south co-operation provided for in the Good Friday agreement and daily life on the island of Ireland.
There is a strong appetite on both sides of the border and in all parts of the UK to maintain those rights. They are distinct from EU membership and are already provided for by domestic legislation. The joint report by UK and EU negotiators safeguards these interests. Given that agreement and the strong commitment from both the UK Government and, in fairness, the European Commission that these arrangements are protected and will be protected, new clause 38 and amendment 156 are unnecessary, and I respectfully ask hon. Members not to press them.
I am very grateful indeed to the Minister for allowing me to intervene. I just want him to clarify a very important issue. We are talking about clause 9 and amendments to it. The Minister and his colleagues will know that any regulations that could be made under clause 7 are restricted, in that they cannot create new criminal offences, cannot have retrospective effect and cannot affect the Human Rights Act. Those exemptions are mirrored in clause 9, apart from the reference to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 and the protections given to the Good Friday agreement. In the light of the Prime Minister’s statement to the House on Monday about the commitments to the Northern Ireland Act and the Belfast/Good Friday agreement, why is there such a glaring omission in clause 9, in terms of the protections offered to the Northern Ireland Act?
I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention. There is absolutely no intention to use clause 9 in any way that would disrupt the Belfast agreement. The short answer to her is that these are just different technical devices, dealing with different technical aspects of withdrawal.
Forgive me for correcting the Minister. I do not mean to be rude, but clauses 7 to 9 extend to Northern Ireland, so these powers will also be extended to Northern Ireland—schedule 2 extends them to Northern Ireland—so if we had an Executive up and running again, Ministers in a devolved Assembly could make regulations that affected the Good Friday agreement. The protection to the Good Friday agreement—the Belfast agreement—has to be written into clause 9, so I suggest that the Government take it away tonight, redraft it and come back on Report with something that satisfies everyone in this House, including the Minister.
It is important that any changes that may need to be made to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 to ensure that the UK can honour its international commitments can be made. Any such changes could be made only to ensure ongoing compliance with our international obligations, and could not substantively change the agreed devolution settlement or deviate from the terms of the Belfast agreement. I should be happy to write to the hon. Lady and spell that out in more detail.
As a new Member, I have listened intently as many Members on both sides of the Committee—some who voted to remain and others who voted to leave—have talked about the fundamental flaws in clause 9. The rest of the world is watching how we regulate at the moment. Will the Minister give an undertaking that the Government will come up with amendments to clause 9 on Report?
As I said earlier, clause 9 retains the residual necessity to provide us with agility in these negotiations. I think that I have given the assurances on substance that Conservative Members and, I believe, some Opposition Members wished to hear. If other Members want to table amendments on Report, I will of course continue the dialogue in which I have engaged all along.
I am going to make some progress, because I have been on my feet for some time.
I will not give way to the hon. Gentleman, because I have given way to him already. I am going to make some progress.
Order. The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) knows better—and he also knows better than to raise his eyebrows because I have called for order. He does it often enough, and it is not his job.
A number of Members have tabled amendments seeking to maintain the UK’s membership of EU agencies, institutions and international agreements, as well as our participation in EU programmes and access to EU systems and databases. They also seek to ensure that measures are put in place so that we are ready domestically to thrive when we leave the EU. Those amendments include amendments 196 to 199, 241 to 261, 276, 224 and 225, and a number of others.
The Government recognise that a large number of the UK’s relationships with non-EU partners and international organisations are linked to our membership of the EU, and specifically to the Euratom treaty, which deals with nuclear co-operation. Maintaining close links after we leave is important, and in many cases will be in the interests of both the UK and the EU.
I know that my hon. Friend has been on his feet for 50 minutes. We should be happy to have another 50 minutes, because he is doing brilliantly. He has just mentioned Euratom. As he knows, amendment 300 was signed by more Members than any of the other amendments. I hate to keep asking him to come back with proposals on Report, but will he give a commitment that the Government will at least publish a strategy for their future relationship with Euratom by then, and that the strategy will be updated quarterly so that we can maintain progress? As I said in my speech earlier, Ministers have been brilliant on this issue, but we do need to partner with them.
The Government intend to present a written ministerial statement to Parliament before Report which will set out our vision, or strategy, for a close association with Euratom. I hope that the commitment to that statement will reassure my right hon. Friend, and that he will not feel the need to press his amendment to a vote.
On the subject of amendment 300, will the Minister confirm that the Government intend any implementation period for leaving the EU to apply to leaving Euratom as well?
That will be addressed in the written ministerial statement and the strategy that will be forthcoming very shortly, and the hon. Lady will have an opportunity for scrutiny then.
We will work with the Commission on addressing those international agreements when the parties have a shared stake, and a shared interest, in continuity. Similarly, the Government recognise the need to maintain a strong relationship with the EU in the future. We are seeking to forge a deep and special partnership with our EU friends, and our relationship with the EU’s agencies and bodies on exit will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. No final decisions have yet been made on our future relationship with the EU’s agencies and bodies after leaving the EU, and we are carefully considering a range of options. Where there is a demonstrable national interest in pursuing a continued relationship with an agency or other EU body, the Government will look very carefully at whether and how we can pursue that, and of course it is a matter for negotiations.
That brings me to why these amendments are, while well-intentioned, unhelpful. The first reason is because negotiations are ongoing and we cannot allow our negotiating position to be prejudiced or pre-empted. The Government are working to achieve the best possible deal with the EU. We welcome the constructive and thoughtful amendments from hon. Members, but we cannot accept any that might undermine the Government’s negotiating position or restrict our room for manoeuvre, not least in terms of striking the kind of arrangements that hon. Members in tabling these amendments want to see.
I am going to make some more progress, if I may.
Secondly, the Government have committed to ensuring that the withdrawal agreement with the EU can be fully implemented in UK law by exit day. The clause 9 power to implement the withdrawal agreement will be crucial in achieving this in the way I have described. This power will help to ensure we are in a position to swiftly implement the contents of the withdrawal agreement required to be in place for day one, ensuring maximum legal certainty upon exit. Again, I respectfully remind hon. Members that, if the UK is unable to implement the withdrawal agreement in time, that risks us being unable to meet our obligations under international law and scuppering the prospects of the very deal I think Members on all sides want to achieve.
To ensure a smooth and orderly exit, it is essential that appropriate legislative changes have been made by the point of exit. We want to give ourselves the capability to make those appropriate changes swiftly, and to support businesses and individuals and make sure the country is ready. The power in the Bill enables that, and those aims will be put at risk by these amendments.
I now turn briefly to amendments 227, 228 and 229, which prevent the clause 9 power from being used until a number of economic assessments have been published. The Government have been undertaking rigorous and extensive analysis to support our exit negotiations, to define our future partnership with the EU and to inform our understanding of how EU exit will affect the UK’s domestic policies. The Government have already established a process for providing economic and fiscal reports. The OBR independently produces official forecasts for the Government and is required to produce detailed five-year forecasts for the economy and public finances twice a year at autumn Budget and spring statement. Those forecasts reflect publicly stated Government policy at the time that those forecasts are made, and that includes policy on leaving the EU.
We have been very clear that we will not disclose material that might undermine the UK in the negotiations. In particular, in any negotiation, information on potential economic considerations is very important to the negotiating capital and negotiating position of all parties.
The Government want to get the best deal for the UK and hope—and, indeed, are confident—that this House is united in that goal, even if the means to achieve it may differ on some aspects of detail, and we do not want the UK’s negotiating position to be undermined. For that reason, we cannot support those amendments.
Amendment 230 requests an assessment of the broader responsibility of the Treasury. That is unnecessary. The Treasury’s core purpose is to be an effective finance and economics Ministry. As a finance Ministry, the Treasury will continue to account for public expenditure and manage the public finances. As an economics Ministry, it will continue to prioritise policy that reduces obstacles to growth, and manage key relationships with finance Ministries overseas. The Government do not see the UK’s withdrawal from the EU changing those core responsibilities of the Treasury, and an assessment to confirm that would be a waste of valuable public finances and is unnecessary.
I turn now to amendments 262 and 263. The Government recognise the huge importance of the legal services sector to the UK economy; it contributed £24 billion in 2015. The Government also recognise that legal services underpin many other important parts of the UK economy, including financial services, manufacturing and the creative industries. We propose a bold and ambitious partnership between the UK and the EU, and we will prioritise securing the freest trade possible in services. The Government are committed to securing the best deal for the legal profession.
In the Government’s July position paper, “Ongoing Union judicial and administrative proceedings”, the Government also made it clear that leaving the EU will end the direct jurisdiction of the European Court. At the same time, the UK is committed to minimising uncertainty and disruption for individuals and businesses, including those arising from changes in the treatment of cases pending at the time of exit. That is why we want an agreement on an implementation period based on the existing structure of rules and regulations, so that there is only one set of changes. The laying of such reports, as proposed in the amendments, would delay and impede the important legislative work necessary to prepare the legal services sector for all possible negotiation outcomes, and I urge hon. Members to withdraw the amendments.
Amendment 343 would prevent regulations from being made under clause 9 before the Secretary of State had laid before Parliament a strategy for a food standards framework after EU withdrawal. The UK has a world-leading set of standards on food safety and quality, backed up by a rigorous legislative framework. The Department of Health, the Food Standards Agency and other relevant Government bodies are working closely together to ensure that the regulatory regime for food safety remains robust as Britain leaves the EU. The Government are committed to ensuring high food standards at home and promoting high standards internationally. There will be opportunities to build on our world-leading reputation for quality and standards, but it would not be appropriate for the Government to tie their use of the clause 9 power to the publishing of any individual or particular reports.
The purpose of clause 9 is to incorporate the withdrawal agreement fully and comprehensively into UK law, so that we can fulfil our obligations under the withdrawal agreement and under international law. The power is not intended to be used to report on the Government’s post-exit domestic strategy. To caveat the power or to define it in that way would cause uncertainty, both for our EU partners and for businesses and citizens in this country. I hope that I have addressed as many of the amendments relating to clause 9 as possible, and that clause 9 will now stand part of the Bill unamended.
I shall now turn briefly to clauses 16 and 17 and schedule 7. Clause 16 gives effect to schedule 7, which provides for the parliamentary scrutiny of the secondary legislation made under the powers in the Bill, including under clause 9. The Bill attempts to strike a balance between the need to prepare our statute book in time for the end of the article 50 process and the need, on the other side, for Parliament to undertake proper scrutiny. The Bill does this using long-established parliamentary procedures. These are the usual procedures that have been used by all Governments for decades with no dilution of the normal scrutiny process.
However, the Government have always said that we would listen and reflect on the concerns raised by the House. We understand the concern that there might not be enough scrutiny of the instruments made under the Bill. That is why the Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker), made it clear in the Committee yesterday that the Government would support the amendments tabled by the Chair of the Procedure Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker), which I hope will be supported by the whole of this Committee.
These amendments draw on the Procedure Committee’s expertise and its recent interim report, and will ensure that the House has an opportunity to challenge the appropriateness of the use of the procedure for instruments made under the three main powers in the Bill. The amendments do this without undermining the certainty that we wish to provide. For instruments brought forward under clause 9, as with the other powers in the Bill, this means that where the Government propose the negative procedure for an instrument, the House will be able to recommend that it should instead be debated and voted on as an affirmative instrument, giving an even clearer voice to this House in scrutinising how these powers are used. Other instruments, if not made using the urgency procedure—which I will come to—will be affirmative, guaranteeing the opportunity for a debate on the instrument.
Schedule 7 sets out a series of triggers for the use of the affirmative procedure. These are for some of the substantial uses of the power or for those where more complex decisions are required—for example, creating a new public body, creating new fees or other charges, or creating new powers to legislate. The Minister responsible for the instrument can also choose the affirmative procedure even where the instrument does not meet any of the tests in schedule 7. We have taken the same approach to changes to either primary or secondary legislation. Some changes to primary legislation can be mechanistic and minor, and adopting the affirmative procedure for small corrections to primary legislation would be impractical. Instead, the requirement for affirmative procedures is based on the type of change rather than the type of legislation in which the change is being made.
In rare cases, there are urgency procedures, both in the Bill as introduced and in the amendments tabled by the Chair of the Procedure Committee. I can assure the Committee that we would only use those procedures very sparingly—for example, in cases where there was a clear practical reason to have a correction made in time for exit day or for a particular other day when limited time was available. Such a situation could arise, for example, because the content of a particular statutory instrument was dependent on a negotiation that took place nearer the end of the exit process. I know there are amendments on the paper today, such as those in the name of the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie)—I am trying to see whether he is still in his place, but no, he is not at the moment—which seek to restrict the use of this power to “emergency” situations. I hope the Committee will understand that the word “emergency” is not quite right in these circumstances, and that “urgency” is the more accurate description if we are to ensure that we have legal certainty.
Finally—I am grateful to the Committee for its patience—clause 17 is designed to make consequential and transitional provision to other laws as a result, not of our exit from the EU, but of the operation of the Bill. It contains powers to ensure that the Bill is properly bedded into the statute book and could be used, for instance, for housekeeping tasks such as revoking designation orders.
This debate started with an extremely eloquent and passionate contribution by the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) on the meaningful vote that this House has been promised, on the timing of that vote, and on how we can ensure that the Government do not proceed with the detail of the withdrawal agreement, and probably the ultimate trade agreement, without the consent of this House. My hon. Friend the Minister has spent an extremely valuable hour taking us through the foothills of the drafting of the Bill and the administrative procedures that might be necessary before we leave. I asked him for a political argument if he wants to resist the idea, put forward by many of my right hon. and hon. Friends, that this House demands a meaningful vote before the Government actually start enacting the outcome of any agreement they have made, so does he have a little time to address that? Is there anything left in his notes that covers that?
I welcome the chance to reiterate what has already been said and what is already set out in the written ministerial statement: we will guarantee that there will be a meaningful vote in this House, and that none of statutory instruments introduced under clause 9 will enter into force until we have had that meaningful vote. That squarely addresses the substantive issue that my right hon. and learned Friend is getting at. He criticises me for dealing with all the other amendments, but it is only fair in the proper course of parliamentary proceedings to ensure that all amendments from all hon. Members are fairly addressed.
I will not. I am going to finish, because I have been at it for well over an hour and I want to make my final points and give other Members the opportunity to have their say.
Orders under clause 7 will designate Ministers so that they can exercise the power in section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 to implement EU obligations. Once the 1972 Act is repealed, designation orders will be redundant, so we need to be able to tidy up such laws on the statute book. Hon. Members will know that consequential provisions are a standard part of many pieces of legislation, even legislation of constitutional importance such as the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 or the devolution Acts. Equally, transitional provisions are a standard way of smoothing the application of a change in the UK statute book.
The Bill already includes the lengthy schedule 8, which contains consequential amendments, but some more may be needed, and it will take time for departmental experts to identify and correctly resolve others. For example, the Bill amends the definition of “enactment” in the Interpretation Act 1978, and Departments will need to review all the references to “enactment” across the whole statute book to identify any that need amending as a consequence of the Bill. That is not a novel use of a consequential power, because the definition of “enactment” was inserted into the 1978 Act by the Scotland Act 1998, and the consequential power in the 1998 Act was then used to amend other references as a consequence. The Government are therefore taking a normal power to make these and other important but technical consequential amendments as they are identified.
Hon. Members will know that transitional, transitory and saving provisions are standard ways to smooth the introduction of change to the statute book. As with clause 9, it is important that we can provide legal certainty to everyone in the UK, from businesses to individual citizens. For example, the Bill removes the UK from the direct jurisdiction of the Luxembourg Court, but the UK will remain a full member of the EU up until the very moment of exit. The power could therefore make specific provision for court cases still before a court on exit day. Again, schedule 8 introduces some of those measures, but Government will need some residual flexibility to ensure that we do not create uncertainty as we leave. I can reassure the Committee that the Government cannot abuse such powers. Case law and an array of legal authorities provide a very narrow scope for the exercise of the powers, which are necessary to ensure that we can enable a process of exit from the EU that promotes maximum certainty. I commend clauses 16 and 17 and schedule 7 to the Committee.
I have listened carefully to the many esoteric legal arguments that have been advanced this evening. I am afraid that my comments will be far more prosaic and practical. I was on the remain side of the referendum debate, but, like most of my colleagues, I am now focusing on trying to secure the best possible deal, and that deal must centre on what a meaningful vote would be.
What does “a meaningful vote” mean? If it means “deal or no deal”, I think that that is a recipe for securing the best possible deal, but if it means “deal or no deal, or go back to the negotiating table”, perhaps indefinitely and with no time limit, I think that that is counterproductive. It would be detrimental, and would undermine our negotiating position. I am not suggesting for a second that that is the desire of those who promote a meaningful vote of that kind, but I think that that would be the effect.
Rather than looking only at the legal context, we need also to look at the political, economic and financial contexts. Of course the negotiations were always going to be difficult after 44 years of integration with the European Union, but they will also be difficult because of the European Union’s position. The EU clearly does not want us to leave, which is understandable for some of the reasons that I have given, but also, primarily, it does not want others to leave, and that must be its priority during the negotiations. If this were a marriage of equals and therefore a divorce of equals, that meaningful vote with those three different options would be fine, but that is not where we are. Of course, the EU also recognises that 75% of Members of Parliament were on the remain side of the argument.
We have to look at the EU’s perspective as well as that of the UK, which is why I think that the Prime Minister was not only right to offer a fair deal in her Florence speech, but right to say that we would not be afraid to walk away with no deal. That gives the EU one chance to get this right, whereas a meaningful vote-plus would give the EU many, many chances to get this right—to give the worst possible deal to get it right. Its incentive would be to put the worst deal on the table initially, knowing that Parliament would reject it and keep going back to the table. That cannot be the right negotiating position.
None of us wants to leave on the basis of no deal. WTO rules would clearly not be in the country’s interests, and it would not be in my own interests outside Parliament either. Nevertheless, I do not want to be locked into an organisation that simply will not let us leave other than on disadvantageous terms.
My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. Let me say to him that—reflecting the mood of the Committee, having taken advice, and, in particular, having listened very carefully to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin)—the Government are willing to return on Report with an amendment on the face of the Bill clarifying the undertaking and assurance that I gave in my speech that statutory instruments under clause 9 will not come into force until we have had a meaningful vote in Parliament.
I hope that the Minister’s intervention will satisfy some of my colleagues.
Let me end by saying that I will be supporting the Government this evening. In my view, it is time for us to grit our teeth and simply get on with it.
The Government have now made it clear that the House will have a final meaningful vote on the EU withdrawal agreement before the UK leaves, which is extraordinarily important because the last point in the process of withdrawal is actually the vote in the European Parliament. My former colleagues—the ones who are trying to help us get an amicable agreement in that Parliament—have told me that unless there is a full democratic process here, there will be people who try to scupper the deal in that last vote in the European Parliament. The rest of the world is watching how we legislate, and transparency is important.
I am new to British legislation, but I have heard it time and again from Members as diverse as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) that the powers in clause 9 are inappropriate, too strong and could mean that the Government are able to make material changes to legislation without a scrutiny process before we leave. I am therefore extremely pleased that the Minister made his announcement at the last minute. If he would like to, I would love him to intervene once more to ensure that everybody has heard exactly what he said.
I am delighted to intervene again and, reflecting the mood of the House, I can tell my hon. Friend that we are willing to return on Report to put an amendment on the face of the Bill making it crystal clear that statutory instruments under clause 9 will not enter into force until we have had a meaningful vote in Parliament.
(7 years ago)
Commons ChamberThe Government have made it a top priority to ensure that there is a smooth legal transition, both in our negotiations with the EU and as a matter for our domestic implementing legislation.
What steps will the Department take once we have left the EU to secure a review and possible reversal of European Court of Justice rulings that are affecting British companies and citizens?
We are taking back control over our laws—that is what the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill does—so that hon. Members in this House are properly accountable to the voters and the UK Supreme Court has the last word on the law of the land. From that point on, we can retain, revise or repeal any piece of retained law as we see fit for the British national interest.
The Minister may have seen the recent TheCityUK report, which underlined the importance of the legal sector to the United Kingdom’s economy and the City. Will the Minister update the House on the negotiations in respect of the report’s principal concern, which is whether contracts will continue to be enforceable and respected across the European Union after we leave?
In our negotiations with the EU, we have made it clear—for example, in our position paper on civil and judicial co-operation—that we want to maintain that win-win co-operation in areas such as recognition of contractual judgments, but also on decisions in family law disputes that support businesses and individuals on all sides.
Will the Minister get out and meet more people in the justice system? I have been talking to judges, barristers and campaigners who are all terrified about what will happen to our justice system if we leave the European Union. Who is he talking to, and why does he not broaden his circle?
May I gently suggest that the hon. Gentleman does not engage in such scaremongering? I have been talking to practitioners, legal groups and the judiciary. We have set out our plans in our position paper, and I would have thought that he would welcome that. Through the EU (Withdrawal) Bill, which I hope he will support, we will make sure that we have a smooth legal transition.
Will the Minister confirm to the House that it is his policy that the European Court of Human Rights will still have jurisdiction over Britain after we leave the EU?
The right hon. Gentleman will know, because it was in our manifesto and it has been repeated since, that we have no plans to withdraw from the European convention on human rights or the Strasbourg Court.
Does the Minister agree that we had a very effective legal system before we joined the EU, and we will have a very effective one for many years after we leave?
My hon. Friend is right. Of course, I take very seriously the concerns of those who think we need to mitigate the risks, and that is what our negotiations and the EU (Withdrawal) Bill will do. We also have a huge opportunity to promote UK legal services on a global level through trade liberalisation and by promoting the UK as a hub for international dispute settlement. We should grasp the opportunities as well as managing the risks.
Last month—just two weeks ago—while the House debated the EU (Withdrawal) Bill, the Prime Minister’s spokesman told journalists that the Government expect the role of the European Court of Justice to remain unchanged during an implementation period of two years after the Brexit date in March 2019. Will the Minister confirm to the House that that means that it will not be possible to bring into force large parts of the EU (Withdrawal Bill), including the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972, until the end of the implementation period?
The position is set out in the EU (Withdrawal) Bill, and the hon. and learned Lady will know from Committee debates that we have made it very clear that we are not going to pre-empt or prejudge the outcome of the negotiations on either the withdrawal agreement or the implementation period.
Last week “Sky News” reported that the Government wish to stay in the European Aviation Safety Agency after Brexit and accept that that will mean remaining under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, because it is the ultimate arbiter of EASA rulings. Will the Minister now confirm that this means the Prime Minister’s red line of no ECJ jurisdiction after Brexit has been shown to be utterly and completely untenable?
I am afraid that the hon. and learned Lady is relying yet again on second-hand reports via the media. We will not pre-empt or prejudice the outcome of negotiations on the partnership deal, and I hope that she will support us in getting the very best deal for that sector and for the UK as a whole.
Can the Minister confirm that elements of our civil and criminal law go back to Magna Carta in 1215 and earlier, that our legal system is far more long established than any EU legal system, that we have one of the most respected legal systems in the world and that, as far as future laws in this country are concerned, Brexit holds no fears for us?
My hon. Friend makes a powerful point. We have a rather different legal system, through our common law, and we have variations across the UK, but I think that we should have the courage of our convictions and confidence in our democracy. When it comes to the judiciary, of course, we want the UK Supreme Court to have the last word on the laws of the land.
The Government have published a post-legislative memorandum on the legal aid reforms introduced by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. We have launched a review of the operation of that Act, which will be thorough and will report by the summer recess.
I recently visited Hull chamber of commerce, where a solicitor explained to me that the cuts in legal aid are actually costing the courts so much more money, because so many people in Hull are trying to represent themselves, and the President of the Supreme Court has said that the legal aid reforms are actually a false economy. Does the Minister agree that restoring early legal advice would not only help solve some legal problems, but save taxpayers’ money?
I understand the point that the hon. Lady is trying to make, and she has done so in a constructive way, but I am not sure that the evidence is there to back up her assertion. We provide a wide range of legal help, for example in civil and family cases. Last year we spent £100 million on legal help, including practical support and telephone helplines that provided advice on 20,000 occasions last year. There are also online tools to make it clear to people when legal aid is available, but other sources of legal advice are also available.
When changes were made to legal aid in family matters, it was anticipated that there would be considerable growth in the use of mediation. In fact, the numbers using mediation have dropped massively, and all the evidence indicates that that is because early legal advice is a gateway to mediation for assisted parties and reduces the burden of litigants in person in the courts. Is it not time that the Minister looked again at the issue?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right that we need to be encouraging more alternative dispute resolution, and I think that there is agreement on both sides of the House that we should incentivise cases being settled and not going through the courts, because of the cost and the trauma for those involved. The LASPO review provides an opportunity to look at all of this in the round, but I do not think that the answer will be exclusively about money; it will also be about the positive incentives that we put in place.
It is estimated that providing early legal help in family court cases would cost less than £14 million because, as the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill) has just said, many cases would be resolved before getting to court. Why does the Minister continue to insist that this is not a cost-effective way of dealing with cases? Does he actually know how many cases are proceeding with litigants in person, and how much that is costing the courts system?
There is a range of support for early legal help, as I have already detailed—£100 million of support—and that can be online or telephone support, but also representation. Since 2015 we have invested £5 million in the litigants in person strategy. There is a range of support available, but of course we can review this in the round through the review.
We are a nation of laws, but we must be one nation too, with access to justice for people from all backgrounds. Does my hon. Friend agree that, post the LASPO review, the most careful thought should be given to bolstering legal aid resources so that we can have early advice and assistance for all?
My hon. Friend, as usual, makes a powerful point. We will be able to look at this in the round, but we do still spend £1.6 billion on legal aid, which is a quarter of my Department’s budget. If we want to put more resources in, the money has to be found elsewhere. We will also be looking carefully at making sure we have the right allocation to support those in the greatest need.
Was not the founding principle of legal aid full and free access to justice regardless of ability to pay? Has not that principle been eviscerated and ripped up by the Government, with the able assistance of Nick Clegg and his little Liberals?
The hon. Gentleman makes his point in his usual punchy way, but I have already detailed the support for early legal help and set out some of the support for litigants in person. The fact is that we provide £1.6 billion in legal aid. If we look at Council of Europe comparisons—I know that we cannot compare like with like exactly—we see that we are providing more legal aid per capita than any other Council of Europe country.
We have heard from the Law Society and the president of the Supreme Court on early legal help, which Labour’s manifesto also backs. My hon. Friends have asked questions about this and the Minister has said that the evidence is not there. I want to help the Minister, so will he show today that he is not driven purely by ideology and agree to a simple thing: to commission independent research into the savings that can come from early legal help to inform the Government’s legal aid review before it reports back next summer? Will he do it?
We have got the review in place. We will take a wide range of advice and set up expert panels to ensure that we get the proper and best advice. The hon. Gentleman should feel free to contribute. However, his proposals would add £400 million to the cost, and he needs to explain where the money would come from because it does not just grow on trees.
We are investing more than £1 billion in our court reform programme to make our justice system more sensitive to victims and witnesses and more accessible to the average citizen.
It is almost a year since I met Jill Saward, who sadly passed away at the beginning of this year. Jill was a tireless campaigner for victims of rape and sexual assault and she led the campaign that brought an end to accused rapists cross-examining victims. Will my hon. Friend outline what progress is being made to extend the law to protect victims of domestic violence during trials in family courts?
I pay tribute to my hon. Friend for the way in which she has championed this issue and to Jill Saward for her campaigning work. As part of our reform programme, we are rolling out section 28 pre-recorded cross-examination for vulnerable witnesses in the Crown courts. That will be rolled out initially in Leeds, Liverpool and Kingston upon Thames from next year, but the plan is for a national roll-out. We are also committed to extending section 28 to family law cases and we have announced legislation for that purpose in the Queen’s Speech.
The Minister is right that the victims should be central to Government policy. What support is available for both adult and child rape victims after the verdict, and will he outline the process whereby support is offered, regardless of the verdict?
In 2017-18, the Ministry of Justice allocated around £7 million as a contribution to 97 rape support centres across England and Wales to provide independent specialist support. In the same year, we allocated £68 million to police and crime commissioners. The hon. Gentleman raised an important aspect of the support, which remains available to victims after as well as before the conclusion of a trial, regardless of the verdict.
The Minister just said that legislation relating to this matter was outlined in the Queen’s Speech. We are particularly concerned about domestic violence victims in the family courts. When will that legislation be introduced on the Floor of the House?
The announcement was made in the Queen’s Speech. We are looking at the parliamentary timetable and we will be able to say something about that shortly.
Perpetrators of domestic violence can currently commit abuse of process by bringing vexatious court actions against their victims, often cross-examining them in person in civil and family courts. Will the Minister consider introducing legislation on that? When will he do it?
As I have just said, the legislation was announced in the Queen’s Speech. Obviously, we have a packed parliamentary timetable at the moment, with the EU measure and other aspects of that, but we are committed to introducing legislation and we will announce details soon.
Earlier this year, the Secretary of State generously agreed to amend the Courts legislation and introduce primary legislation to outlaw the cross-examination of victims by domestic abuse perpetrators. The principle of using primary legislation to tackle the matter has been agreed. When will he introduce primary legislation to tackle the issue?
As I have already made clear in two answers, we are committed to not only the courts Bill, but that specific reform. I look forward to the full-throated support of the hon. Gentleman and other Opposition Members.
The Government’s litigants in person support strategy provides a range of practical support and information to those without legal representation before the courts.
Senior judges are warning that the growing number of litigants in person is creating a huge burden on judges, lawyers and the litigants themselves. Will the Minister commit to restoring legal aid to the family courts, where this problem is most serious, as Labour has promised to do?
We have the LASPO review, which I have described. If I may, I will take this opportunity to point out that since 2015 we have invested £5 million in the litigant in person support strategy, which includes practical support such as: online and self-help resources, access to free or affordable legal advice, and, where possible, legal representation.
Representing themselves in court has been a real issue for domestic violence victims. Restoring legal aid is welcome, but that will not happen until January. I note the Justice Secretary is advertising for a second speechwriter at a rate of £70,000. As there is cash to spare, will he commit to ensuring that domestic violence victims who seek legal aid, as of yesterday’s announcement, will be able to claim retrospectively under the new criteria?
We will be laying the statutory instrument shortly and I think, beneath the political point-scoring, the hon. Lady welcomed it. It will make it easier to apply for legal aid in family cases where there has been a victim of domestic abuse. More broadly, wider personal support units provide trained volunteers who give free independent assistance to people facing proceedings in the family sphere and beyond. There are 20 centres in 16 cities. I hope she would welcome that.
We are looking at ways to make inquests more sensitive to the needs of bereaved families. The Lord Chancellor will update the guidance on exceptional case funding by the end of the year, and we will also look at this issue as part of the wider LASPO—Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012—review.
My hon. Friend will be aware that I raised the case of the Shoreham air show crash with the Prime Minister at questions a month ago. The Legal Aid Agency has refused exceptional case funding to the families of the victims. Can it be right that the families of the victims of an event that at the time resulted in the largest civilian loss of life since 7/7 might be the only ones not to have legal representation at the coroners’ inquest next year, not least when there is a wider public interest for the over 2 million people who attend 300-plus civilian air shows each year?
My deepest sympathies go to the victims of the Shoreham airshow disaster. My hon. Friend knows that I cannot comment on individual decisions, but I can say that we have protected early legal advice for inquests within the scope of legal aid, and there is an opportunity to look at the issue more broadly as part of the LASPO review. Legal aid is decided independently, but it was granted in over half of cases where inquest applications were made last year.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We have a range of robust community sentence options, which can include the whole range from unpaid work and curfews to rehab programmes and treatment for mental health and substances misuse problems. We are working with the judges and magistrates, and with the national probation service, to make sure community sentences are as operationally strong as they can be and can command public confidence.
I have repeatedly asked the Secretary of State how many staff have been axed since probation was privatised, and I have repeatedly been refused an answer. It is now being reported in the press that there was a 20% cut in the number of probation staff in the privatised community rehabilitation companies between 2015 and 2016. Can he confirm that CRC staff have been cut by a fifth?
My hon. Friend raises a good point. The Association of British Travel Agents reported a sixfold increase in gastric illness claims against tour operators between 2013 and 2016, but reports in resorts of illness were declining. This cost operators about £240 million last year, which of course hikes the cost for holidaymakers. We are calling for evidence on our plan to fix the legal cost to make it easier to defend dishonest claims, which will mean that honest families pay less for their hard-earned holidays.
No, we are making sure we have robust and rigorous regulation in place. The most important thing is to make sure that precious taxpayers’ money is put to the best use and that the debts are most effectively recovered.
I have been approached by a constituent whose vulnerable daughter was raped by a male under the age of 18 who was not given a custodial sentence. I am concerned that the lenient sentence sets a precedent for lesser sentences and does not give sufficient regard to the suffering of the victim. Will the Minister agree to meet me and the family of this rape victim to discuss the sentencing guidelines for those who commit rape when under 18?
I thank the hon. Gentleman. I totally understand the anguish of the victim and the family in these kinds of cases. He will know that sentencing guidelines—not just the sentences—are set by the Sentencing Council and not the Ministry of Justice, but I can confirm that the new guidelines on sentencing under-18s for sexual offences came into effect in June, and he may wish to take a look at those.
In my constituency, we have a higher level of road traffic incidents, including fatalities, compared with the rest of Sussex. I have long campaigned for increased sentences for dangerous driving. What signal does my hon. Friend believe was sent by the Government’s recent announcement on proposed increases to dangerous driving sentences?
We consulted extensively on that matter. Bearing in mind the seriousness of the worst offences and the anguish of the families, we have set out proposals to increase the maximum sentence for dangerous driving to life imprisonment. That is the reality for those engaged in such wilful acts.
(7 years, 1 month ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Robertson. I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Glasgow North East (Mr Sweeney) for securing this debate and for his powerful, tenacious speech.
One thing we all agree on at least as a matter of principle, is that legal aid is a fundamental pillar of access to justice. Last year, the Ministry of Justice spent £1.6 billion on legal aid in England and Wales, which accounts for more than a fifth of the Ministry’s budget. The Government have a responsibility to make sure that those in the greatest hardship, at the times of greatest need, can secure access to justice, that the most vulnerable are catered for, and that the resources are made available to do that. That is a responsibility that we take very seriously.
As the hon. Gentleman will be aware, legal aid in Scotland is a devolved matter. I appreciate that in this debate he has not talked a lot about that. It is also devolved in Northern Ireland. I can address the provision of legal aid in only England and Wales, for which we are responsible. The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald) raised this in relation to spending, but I would note that the Council of Europe’s most recent survey post-LASPO found that spending on legal aid per person in England and Wales was the highest of all Council of Europe members. The hon. Gentleman quite fairly made the point that we have a different system from the one used in many parts of continental Europe. Of course, the Council of Europe survey also looks at the spending per capita in Scotland, and in England and Wales it is 13% higher. Neither he nor the hon. Member for Glasgow North East touched on that, for all their critique of the system in England and Wales.
In fairness, I did touch on that by mentioning the fact that Alan Paterson highlighted the higher per capita spending in England and Wales compared with Scotland. He said that the reason for that was Scotland’s greater success in reducing the cost of courts, so the total bill was made smaller not by excluding folk from the scope of legal aid but by making courts less expensive to run.
I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s intervention and hope he accepts the figure showing that the spending in England and Wales per capita is 13% higher. I agree with him on a point that the hon. Member for Glasgow North East did not take up: this is not just about how much money is spent, but about how the resources are allocated. Indeed, the question of access to justice is broader than purely the administration or funding of legal aid, so on that point, I accept what he said.
In truth, the legal aid scheme has been the subject of regular change since its inception. Spending has increased substantially, and all Administrations—Labour, the coalition, and Conservative—have sought to exercise control over spending in recent times. I think we all agree that we need to exercise control over legal aid and other precious public services in order to ensure that the finite, precious resources go to those who need them most.
The most recent reforms were part of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, which came in the context of huge financial pressure on the country’s finances. The reforms were founded on the principle of ensuring that legal aid continues to be available for the highest priority cases—for example, when an individual’s life or liberty is at stake, when someone faces the loss of their home, in domestic violence cases, or when children may be taken into care—and in achieving that, delivering better value for money for taxpayers by reducing the cost of the scheme and discouraging unnecessary litigation. Again, although this has not been mentioned today, in some cases—not all—going to court is not the right thing to do, and I will touch on that if I have time later.
I appreciate that the changes in LASPO were contentious. They were subjected to a significant amount of rigorous scrutiny at the time, as the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Andy Slaughter) said. They were debated extensively and amendments were made before the legislation was approved by Parliament. It has been several years since the implementation of those landmark reforms, so it is absolutely right to take stock. That is why we recently laid before the House a detailed, post-legislative memorandum summarising how LASPO was implemented and making a preliminary assessment of its impact. In addition, my predecessors made a commitment to the House to conduct a detailed post-implementation review of the changes to establish to what degree the reforms had achieved their objectives. It is right that we are now fulfilling that pledge.
As hon. Members have acknowledged, that appraisal will cover each issue that has been subject to a previous commitment by Ministers in this House. The Lord Chancellor recently announced the start of the process. That will be led by officials, but I am keen to listen to interested parties, including hon. Members from across the House. Given the importance of the reforms, it is right that we take time to gather the necessary evidence and views of experts on the impact of the changes.
The hon. Member for Westminster North (Ms Buck) asked me about the detail of the review. I will write to stakeholders shortly to invite them to participate in a series of expert panels to consider and sift through relevant evidence to inform our review, which will be comprehensive. I want to ensure that we get the review right. Of course, I will not pre-empt or prejudice the outcome of the review—I am sure she expected me to say that—but we will publish our findings by the summer recess. One or two hon. Members asked about that.
We must acknowledge that the financial pressures in which the LASPO reforms were introduced remain with us today. The proportion of departmental spend on legal aid remains broadly the same today as it was prior to 2010. We in the Government have the responsibility to ensure that taxpayers get the best value for money, as well as deal with the challenges and fixing the problems of the legal aid system as and when they arise.
That is why I recently announced our changes to the fee scheme for criminal litigators in the Crown court. Defence solicitors do incredibly valuable work and we want to remunerate them fairly for it, but since 2013-14 there has been a rise of more than £30 million in the annual spend on that work. That is primarily attributable to a costs judge ruling that changed what we were paying for beyond the initial policy intention. We do not accept that that reflects an increase in the work done by defence solicitors and do not think that the rise reflects value for money for taxpayers, so it is right that we acted to address that.
We have targeted the action to the 2% of Crown court cases—the most expensive cases—in which the problem was identified. Effectively, the change involves a shift in policy so that more remuneration is for work that is actually done and not just for the amount of paperwork that is produced in court. It is absolutely right that solicitors are properly paid for work that is reasonably done through the scheme. At the same time, as the quid pro quo for putting the proper reforms in place to ensure that the precious, finite resources go to those with the greatest need, we announced our intention not to pursue the suspended 8.75% fee cut, which would have affected all solicitors. Those two parts of the jigsaw will make sure that we get this right. As I mentioned, this is not just about the money that goes in, but about ensuring that we get the best use out of it.
The hon. Member for Westminster North raised the issue of domestic violence, as did the shadow justice Minister, the hon. Member for Ashfield (Gloria De Piero). Domestic violence is absolutely abhorrent; it appals every one of us in this place, I am sure, and it is an absolute priority for this Government. We are completely clear that genuine victims of domestic violence and abuse must have access to the help that they need, including access to legal aid. That is why we retained legal aid for protective injunctions. Legal aid was granted in more than 12,000 protective injunction cases last year. In addition, in cases involving child arrangements and financial matters, funding is available for those who will be disadvantaged by facing their abuser in court.
As the hon. Lady mentioned, we are considering the findings of the further internal review of the evidence requirements. I will make an announcement on that shortly, which I am confident—or at least, I hope—will receive support from all parts of the House. She also asked who would be consulted. That is of the greatest importance and we are working very hard to get this into the right kind of shape, engaging Rights of Women, Resolution, Women’s Aid and the Law Society, so that we can be confident that we are doing everything we can to protect and support genuine victims.
Although it is right to ensure that those who are most in need of legal aid are able to access it, we should acknowledge that the courts are not going to be the right solution in non-domestic violence cases in other areas. I am thinking particularly of some family law disputes, which the hon. Lady mentioned. In many family law cases, the challenge is to see them not go to court. I accept the point about mediation not being as successful as we had hoped, but the answer is to renew and revive the efforts to achieve greater use of alternative dispute resolution in some cases. That is not just because of the financial implications, but because of the trauma of going to court—not for lawyers, but for the many people affected by such cases. I think that needs to be emphasised.
We need to do more to promote alternative dispute resolution, so we have protected legal help in many cases. Last year, we spent £100 million on early legal advice and assistance in civil and family cases. In other areas, we have introduced a telephone helpline to provide legal advice in certain categories of case to allow individuals to access advice quickly and easily. Last year, there were more than 20,000 instances of advice being obtained usefully and helpfully through that system. We have also developed a user-friendly digital tool—as the world becomes more digital, it is right that the justice system strives to catch up—to make it clear to people when legal aid is available to them.
When an alternative route is more appropriate, people should feel empowered to pursue it without having to find a lawyer at great expense, whether that is to themselves or the taxpayer. For instance, in cases involving separating couples, mediation can be less stressful and quicker than going to court, and it is often far cheaper than using a lawyer. Critically, it can help to reduce conflict after separation and the trauma of that, often on both sides, which in some cases litigation will make worse, not better.
The Government are committed to promoting mediation and its benefits, and legal aid remains available for these cases. In the 12 months to June 2017, a full or partial agreement was reached in 62% of publicly funded cases in which both parties engaged in mediation. Of course, as hon. Members have mentioned, citizens can and do represent themselves in court, in some cases irrespective of whether legal aid is available or whether they are privately funded. Litigants in person are not a new feature of our justice system. People involved in litigation are engaged in a variety of disputes and have a wide range of needs and capabilities. We recognise that for some people, representing themselves in court is purely a matter of choice, but for others it can be very challenging and demanding.
Is the Minister aware that there is a piece in this week’s Law Society Gazette about rewriting civil procedure rules to accommodate litigants in person, who may not fully understand court procedures in civil proceedings?
I have not seen that article, but we are constantly looking to ensure that the court system is as amenable as it can be to litigants in person. Contrary to what the shadow Minister suggested, a range of support is available for that; we have ensured that persons without legal representation can get help and support. Since 2015, the Government have invested £5 million of funding to support litigants in person through the litigant in person support strategy, which works with a range of partners across the advice, voluntary and pro bono sectors to provide practical support, whether that is online self-help resources, access to free or affordable legal advice or representation where possible. Personal support units provide trained volunteers who give free and independent assistance to people facing proceedings without legal representation in civil and family courts and tribunals. More personal support units have opened in courts to provide direct support and information to litigants in person, and there are now 20 such centres in 16 cities.
I hesitate to say this, but the Minister is being a bit complacent. All the organisations that he names are wholly laudable, but a PSU, for example, does not give legal advice. Pro bono services are excellent but they cannot compensate for the reduction in legal aid. Mediation is important, but there will be some cases in family law that need to go to a contested hearing. We would like to hear from the Minister that the review will look at the actual effects on the ground, and that where there is a deficit, there will be a genuine attempt to address that. Further, we are asking that he looks at the Bach commission report as part of that process.
The hon. Gentleman has made his intervention in his usual powerful way. I gave the assurance he wanted that the review would be comprehensive and I have looked at the Bach commission report. I would love to know where Opposition Members would make allocations of public funding to pay for the estimated £400 million needed to fund those reforms. On our side, we want to ensure that we can allocate legal aid as best we can, but we have to take the cost into account.
The point I was in the middle of making in relation to litigants in person was one that the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate (Bambos Charalambous) made in his intervention. We have also delivered training to better equip the judiciary to support litigants in person through the court process.
To respond to the points made by the hon. Member for Lewisham West and Penge (Ellie Reeves), my Department is taking steps to improve the situation of bereaved families at inquests. The inquest process is distinct; it can be incredibly traumatic for the bereaved. It is important to help them to understand how their loved ones died, which can be particularly hard so soon after the event. My heart goes out to anyone who goes through that—not just the grief but the fact-finding process, with all the legal and bureaucratic procedures of the inquest system, which must be rather daunting and challenging for a layperson. I agree that early legal advice can be helpful in allowing families to understand the process, which is why we have protected it for inquests within the scope of legal aid. Inquests are supposed to be inquisitorial, and most inquest hearings are conducted without the need for publicly funded representation. However, we recognise that legal representation may be necessary in some circumstances, for which funding is available through the exceptional case funding scheme.
Dame Elish Angiolini’s important report on deaths in custody highlighted that there are issues relating to public participation. I reviewed that report and I take it very seriously, which is why we committed to update the Lord Chancellor’s guidance so it is clear that the starting presumption is that legal aid should be awarded for representation of the families at an inquest following the non-natural death or suicide of a person detained in custody. I hope that that goes some way to reassuring hon. Members. We could debate that important work for much longer, but I will wind up shortly.
As well as looking back over the record of LASPO and some of the previous decisions, it is also crucial to look forward and ensure that access to justice, to which legal aid makes a hugely valuable contribution, is maintained and meets the needs of a modern society. We are investing over £1 billion to transform our courts and tribunals to build on our world-renowned justice system so that it is more sensitive to victims, more modern so that it works more efficiently, swifter and more accessible in the ways that I have described. As part of that, we will digitise our services to make them easier for the public to use, whether or not they are supported by a lawyer. It is essential that we continue our work to ensure that legal aid is made available to the most vulnerable, as part of that wider approach to making access to justice and the justice system fit for the 21st century.
I congratulate the hon. Member for Glasgow North East again on securing this debate. I welcome the thoughtful contributions on all sides and the opportunity to set out the Government’s position and our plans to take the justice system forward, not back.
(7 years, 1 month ago)
General CommitteesI beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Selection of the President of Welsh Tribunals Regulations 2017.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Henry. Perhaps it will help the Committee if I set out the background to the draft regulations. There are currently seven devolved tribunals under the responsibility of the Welsh Government: the mental health review tribunal for Wales, the special educational needs tribunal for Wales, the agricultural land tribunal for Wales, the adjudication panel for Wales, the residential property tribunal for Wales, the Welsh language tribunal, and a tribunal covering the registered school inspectors appeals panels and the registered nursery education inspectors appeals panels. Forty-one judges are currently appointed to those tribunals, and each tribunal has its own judicial lead, but those judges have limited access to senior judicial leadership within Wales. That is not consistent with the system for other judicial office holders in England and Wales. Sir Wyn Williams, a retired High Court judge, has been undertaking a leadership role on an informal basis but does not have any statutory powers.
To address this inconsistency, part 3 of the Wales Act 2017 created the new post of President of Welsh Tribunals. The president has responsibility for making arrangements for the training, guidance and welfare of Welsh tribunal members and for representing their views to Welsh Ministers and other Members of the National Assembly for Wales. He or she will be able to give practice directions and will be responsible for deploying tribunal members between the Welsh tribunals and between the UK-wide and Welsh tribunals.
The president will also be responsible for establishing and communicating the judicial strategic direction of the Welsh tribunals. In that role, he or she will be able to provide leadership and build effective relationships with the judicial leads of the Welsh tribunals and the Welsh Government’s tribunal unit, the Lord Chief Justice, the Judicial College and Ministers and officials of the Welsh Government on the whole range of policy issues that affect the Welsh tribunals.
Paragraph 2 of schedule 5 to the 2017 Act provides two routes to the appointment of the President of Welsh Tribunals. The first is by agreement between the Lord Chief Justice, the Lord Chancellor and the Welsh Ministers on the appointment of a person who is, or has been, a judge of the Court of Appeal or the High Court. The second route applies if such agreement cannot be reached. We do not foresee such a situation, but in any event it is catered for by paragraph 2(5), which requires the Lord Chief Justice to make a request to the Judicial Appointments Commission for a person to be selected for appointment to the office of President of Welsh Tribunals.
The procedure for appointment by the Judicial Appointments Commission is set out in the 2017 Act and is similar to the existing arrangements for the appointment of other judicial office holders. It includes a provision that the commission must appoint a selection panel. The members of the panel must include at least two who are non-legally-qualified, at least two judicial members and at least two members of the commission. The Lord Chancellor is also required to make further provision about the process to be applied. The draft regulations make such provision. In particular, they specify that the selection panel should consist of five members, and they make further provision about appointment to it, including the requirement that the chairperson of the panel is a person designated by the Lord Chief Justice who holds, or has held, office as a judge of the Supreme Court, a Lord Justice of Appeal or a High Court judge.
The draft regulations contain detailed provisions about how the other panel members are to be appointed and the necessary qualifications. They also make provision about the consultation during the process, the reporting of the panel’s selection to the Lord Chief Justice, and the Lord Chief Justice’s options when deciding on the selection. For consistency with the relevant primary legislation and the nature of the new office, the appointment process closely reflects that which applies to the selection of the Senior President of Tribunals.
The 2017 Act established the need for the President of Welsh Tribunals and what was required to appoint a judicial office holder. The regulations allow that appointment to be made, and I commend them to the Committee.
(7 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberIt is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield). At the outset, I would like to thank hon. Members from right across the House for their contributions to today’s debate, whether in speeches or in amendments. The Government will approach the Bill in the spirit of collaboration, and I certainly welcome the constructive contributions and diligent scrutiny hon. Members are rightly providing today. I shall seek to address clause 5, and the Solicitor General will address schedule 1 a bit later in the debate, to make sure we dwell adequately and with due consideration not only on the provisions of the Bill, but on the various issues and amendments, for which I am grateful to hon. Members, that have been raised.
Clause 5 serves two key strategic objectives: taking back democratic control over our laws and making sure we leave the EU in a way that facilitates a smooth Brexit and minimises legal uncertainty. The Bill aims to provide that the laws which apply immediately before exit day will continue to apply in the same way after we leave. Of course, the act of leaving the EU in itself means it is inevitable that some things will not and cannot stay the same. The changes made by clause 5 relate to certain aspects of EU law which are no longer appropriate, or which will not make sense when we leave the EU because we will then cease to be under the obligations that apply to us as an EU member state. The provisions are therefore essential.
Clause 5(1) ends the supremacy of EU law in relation to new law from the date of exit. That is crucial if we are going to give effect to the mandate from the referendum. At the same time, clause 5(2) makes sure that EU law passed before exit still applies as before, for the sake of legal certainty. That is important for mitigating the risks of legal uncertainty that are inevitable and inherent in departure from the EU. The rest of clause 5 reinforces those critical objectives, including by removing the instrument of the charter on fundamental rights as part of domestic law. I want to come on to address that in detail.
May I refer my hon. Friend to clause 5(2)? My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), in his rather amazing speech which I think we all found very illuminating, said that this was a completely new principle to be applied in British law. Is it not just a translation of an existing principle in EU law into United Kingdom law for the purposes of a smooth Brexit? Is it not, in fact, less exceptional than being a member of the European Union and allowing a court in a wholly different jurisdiction to impose itself on parliamentary sovereignty?
I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention and I will come on to address very carefully the speech made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). I agree that there is an inherent sense that, as we move to change, things are not going to be exactly as they were before. I want to draw a very important distinction. We are leaving the EU and taking back control over our laws and the way we make our laws, so that Members across the House can exercise proper democratic control. At the same time, the substantive law—the rules and the principles—will remain the same, because of the snapshot we are taking on exit day and retaining in UK law, thereby avoiding the putative legal cliff-edge.
I will just make a little bit of progress and then I will give way to my right hon. and learned Friend.
I will address the detail of this by reference to the new clauses and amendments that have been tabled, because they usefully highlight and flag up the different concerns of hon. Members. As a matter of guiding principle, I hope all hon. Members can agree that we should not make changes that exacerbate the risk of legal uncertainty, which I think goes to the point my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) was making in his intervention. Our substantive law will remain the same on exit day, but it would be wrong in principle—indeed, I think we would find it counter- productive in practice—to seek to cling to all the procedural mechanisms that are inherent, intrinsic and inextricable institutional features of EU membership.
I will not give way just for the moment, but I will give way to the hon. and learned Lady shortly.
I will give way shortly to the hon. and learned Lady, because I know she supports some of the amendments.
I turn now to amendments 297, 298 and 299, tabled my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, and to amendments 285 and 286, tabled by the leader of the Labour party, the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn). My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield wishes to remove any reference to “any rule of law”, which is a reference in the Bill to common law rules in relation to provisions addressing supremacy of EU law. In effect, his amendments—at least as I have understood them, and I stand to be corrected—would allow EU law to continue to trump the common law after the date of exit. However, this would undermine both of the key strategic objectives of the Bill. It would mean in relation to common law rules articulated after exit day that retained EU law trumps them, undermining the UK’s basic constitutional hierarchy that we are seeking to restore and affirm.
Allow me to make the point and then I will give way, because there are two sides to my right hon. and learned Friend’s amendment.
Paradoxically, with respect to the relationship between retained EU law and common law rules made up until exit day, my right hon. and learned Friend’s amendment would skew the clear and certain snapshot the Bill will take, because retained EU law would no longer supersede common law rules. By removing the common law from the operation of the Bill, I am afraid the amendments would—at least on the Government’s analysis—create considerable uncertainty for business and individuals alike.
No, I want these words removed because they are completely unnecessary. To use that wonderful word that lawyers like to apply, they are otiose—they add absolutely nothing to the Bill. The common law will be adjusted according to the statutory framework in which it operates, so I say with some regret—because someone clearly came up with the idea—that it seems rather poor drafting. Others, whom I consulted because I was puzzled by this, and who have spent their lives drafting precisely this sort of legislation, seem to agree with me. I was trying to help my hon. Friend, not create some devilish plot to scupper Brexit.
I am not sure where this devilish plot has come from—I have made no such suggestion; I was simply pointing out to my right hon. and learned Friend that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex, the Chair of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, mentioned earlier, some of the amendments run the risk of creating more, not less, uncertainty, notwithstanding their perfectly laudable and genuine aims.
If my right hon. and learned Friend’s amendment were passed, it would no longer be clear how common law rules would interact with a particular provision of retained EU law in the event of a conflict between the two. Across a range of issues, from animal welfare to competition law, the concern is that such an approach would create uncertainty about the legal position of citizens and businesses. I am sure that this was not his intention. I am not looking for devilish plots on either side of the House, but I do fear that that would be the practical reality.
On the subject of devilish plots and “The Screwtape Letters”, may I refer my hon. Friend to chapter 12 of Lord Bingham’s magisterial work, “The Rule of Law and the Sovereignty of Parliament?”? In this context, its reference to the rule of law is highly relevant, simply because it refers, indirectly or directly, to the issue of the constitutional supremacy of law making and the construction placed upon it by the courts themselves. On that issue, the rule of law does, I think, have considerable salience.
My hon. Friend makes a considered and thoughtful point. Given the changes we are making—for the purposes of greater certainty and clarity—I respectfully suggest to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield and other hon. Members across the House that it is worth having some clarity and certainty on this point.
I turn now to amendments 285 and 286. We discussed similar amendments from the leader of the Labour party on day one of the Committee in relation to clause 6, and for the same reasons given during that debate, we cannot support them. I note again what the Prime Minister said in her Florence speech:
“The United Kingdom will cease to be a member of the European Union on the 29th March 2019”.
I will not speculate on the contents of the withdrawal agreement. The Government will do whatever is necessary to prepare for our exit and have already made it clear that separate primary legislation will be brought forward to implement the terms of the withdrawal agreement and any implementation period. With that in mind, the amendments would pre-empt and prejudge the outcome of the negotiations and introduce a straitjacket of inflexibility for the duration of any implementation period. We are all in the House committed to securing the very best deal with our EU friends and partners, and I respectfully suggest that the amendments would undermine that objective. I urge the leader of the Labour party not to press them.
The hon. Gentleman said earlier that one of his guiding principles was not to exacerbate any legal uncertainty, but the Exiting the European Union Committee has heard evidence from a senior lawyer that the body of retained law will contain instruments that make explicit reference to the charter. If the charter is not part of retained EU law, how are the courts supposed to interpret the body of retained law that refers to it?
The hon. and learned Lady makes a perfectly respectable and legitimate point, but I will address it in the context of amendment 8, tabled in the name of the my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, and amendment 46, tabled in the name of the Leader of the Opposition, both of which, in different ways, seek to retain the charter of fundamental rights in domestic law after exit by removing subsections (4) and (5) of Clause 5. I understand and appreciate the sentiments behind the amendments. Hon. Members are understandably concerned that as we leave the EU we do not see any diminution or reduction in the substantive rights we all enjoy. The Government are unequivocally committed to that objective. I remind the Committee again of the country’s record of pioneering, defending and protecting human rights standards since well before the EU existed and of our ability as a nation to withstand the darker moments in European history that have touched other less fortunate nations.
My hon. Friend reassures us that even without the charter of fundamental rights the House of Commons can be relied upon. That was the argument when the Lisbon treaty was being ratified. There was a widespread feeling that it was not clear whether it would add anything, but we now see that it has added quite a lot, particularly around privacy law, on which the House had never done anything, and now data protection. The lobbies brought to bear on the House if ever we look at privacy by sections of the media and so on are very considerable. Why are we getting rid of a convention that has done no harm and actually has run ahead of this House of Commons at various stages? What will be gained by not leaving open that opportunity for the future?
I will come shortly to my right hon. and learned Friend’s substantive generic point and also touch on the data protection issue he raised.
The Government reaffirm and renew our commitment to human rights law. It is reflected through UK national law, including, most recently, the Human Rights Act, as well as a range of domestic legislation that implements our specific obligations under UN and other international treaties, from the convention against torture to the convention on the rights of the child. Of course, the principal international treaty most relevant to the UK’s human rights laws is the European convention on human rights. I again make crystal clear the Government’s commitment to respecting and remaining a party to the ECHR. There will be no weakening of our human rights protections when we leave the EU.
In fact, we have an opportunity to reinforce and build on our proud tradition of liberty and the protection of rights. We are already in the process of paving the way to ratifying the Council of Europe convention on preventing and combating violence against women, the Istanbul convention. We are leaving the EU, but our commitment to pan-European standards, human rights and the European co-operation in this area remains undimmed. Furthermore, as the my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield is aware, we will introduce an amendment before Report stage, dealing explicitly with the Equality Act 2010 issues that hon. Members have raised, including by requiring Ministers to make a statement before the House on the consistency of any Brexit-related legislation with the Equality Act.
It is worth reinforcing the point that the charter is not the original source of the rights contained within it. It was only intended to catalogue rights that already existed in EU law. Indeed, I am glad that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) intervened, because he wisely noted, as recently as 2011, before a European Committee, that protocol 30 governing the application of the charter
“sets out the boundaries around the charter by confirming that it neither creates nor extends any rights to EU citizens outside those that had existed pre-Lisbon, and it emphasises that member states are required to comply only when giving effect to EU law.”—[Official Report, European Committee B, 14 March 2011; c. 5.]
These rights, codified by the charter, came from a wide variety of sources, including the treaties, EU legislation and, indeed, case law, that recognised fundamental rights as general principles. All those substantive law principles and rights, of which the charter is a reflection not the source, will already be converted into domestic law by the Bill.
It is not necessary, therefore, to retain the charter in order to retain such substantive rights. With that in mind, it is right—this deals with the issue that the hon. Member for Nottingham East raised at the outset—for me to reaffirm the Government’s commitment, which the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union made to the Select Committee, to publish a detailed memorandum setting out how each article of the charter will be reflected in UK law after we leave. I can confirm that we will publish that by 5 December. I hope that that reassures the hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Sheffield Central, both of whom raised this point. Let me say to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield that I am very willing to continue my dialogue with him on these important matters.
Yes, it will, and, as I was about to say, there will indeed be a Report stage. If my right hon. Friend, or any other Member, feels that our analysis is deficient, or that we have missed out a substantive right that risks being removed if the charter is not retained, once the memorandum has been considered I will be happy to sit down with my right hon. Friend—and any other Members—and discuss the issue again.
This has been a long and complex legal argument, but let me summarise it. The issue of data protection is vital to many of my constituents, especially young people online, but it is also vital to our tech and financial services sectors. Can my hon. Friend assure me that there will be no risk of a legal challenge in relation to data protection because of the way in which these provisions are being brought into British law?
I know that my hon. Friend is an expert on these matters because of her time in the European Parliament. I shall be addressing data protection directly, but I shall be happy to give way to her again in due course.
The other argument that has been made about the charter is “If it does nothing wrong or does nothing by itself, where is the harm in keeping it?” However, as was pointed out by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe, the charter applies to member states only when they are acting within the scope of EU law. Indeed, it is a specific device intended to codify—not create—rights, and apply them to EU member states and other EU institutions operating within the framework of EU law. It would be curious, if not perverse, to incorporate that instrument directly in UK law, or implement it, at the very moment when we ceased to have the relevant obligations as a member of the EU.
I will make a slight bit of progress, and then I will give way.
Seeking simply to transplant the charter into our domestic law as it stands, dislocated from EU membership —given all the other points that Members have made about the way in which it would apply in practice—would not be appropriate, and, indeed, could introduce needless complexities that all of us, on both sides of the House, should legitimately seek to avoid.
My hon. Friend has addressed my question, but, with great respect, he has failed to give an answer. It is true that the charter was originally proposed as a statement of European values to which all members of the European Union could adhere, but, as we have heard, it has developed. If it is doing no harm, why are the Government going to such lengths to get rid of it as the one specific change in the Bill? Presumably it is because it contains the words “European” and “rights”, and this was intended as a Daily Telegraph gesture to the hard right wing of my party.
My right hon. and learned Friend’s intervention was not in quite the spirit in which we have conducted our proceedings so far, but I shall try to address his underlying concern, and I shall be happy to take another intervention from him shortly if he thinks that I have still not addressed it. He is a demanding customer, but I shall keep on trying.
I am going to make a bit of progress, but I will give way shortly.
Let me, again, be clear about what the Bill does. It takes a snapshot of substantive EU law, including the underlying fundamental rights and principles at the point of exit. It converts those into UK law, where they will sit alongside the Human Rights Act and other UK legislation on human rights. That is a crucial point. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield rather perceptively asked during debates on the Lisbon Treaty in 2008,
“Will the Lord Chancellor confirm that every country that is a member of the European Union is also a signatory of the European Convention on Human Rights? Indeed, I believe that every single one has incorporated it. In view of that, what is the purpose of the charter of fundamental rights?”—[Official Report, 5 February 2008; Vol. 471, c. 804.]
During the same debate, my right hon. and learned Friend made the point, far better than I can—and I say this with all due deference—that the risk of adopting the charter was that it would, at least potentially, run into conflict with domestic human rights law, thereby creating at least the potential for legal confusion. This is the point that I want to make to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe. If we incorporated or implemented the charter, we would in effect be triplicating human rights standards in UK law, opening up wide scope for uncertainty. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield was right about that then, and I think he is right about it now.
With all due respect, I do not understand the point that the Minister is making. The charter is already part of UK law, because we are a member of the European Union.
As we leave the European Union, it will make no sense to retain the institutional framework of membership. What we will do is retain, in the way that I have described very carefully, the substantive rights that were codified in the charter. If, when we publish the memorandum, the hon. and learned Lady, or any Member on either side of the House, thinks that there is a gaping gap, we will be able to address that.
Will the Minister confirm that the evolution of our rights through history shows that the best way in which they are created and defended is through the democratic instincts of the British people, and that they then trust this Parliament to make sure that those rights are fully entrenched? As the Minister has assured those rights, I really do not see what the problem is. What is the threat to those rights? We have a free Parliament representing a free people.
I suppose the theory is that a majoritarian dominance—a Government with a huge majority—would trample on rights and rattle legislation through the House of Commons, as the last Labour Government did with identity cards and proposals for 90 days’ detention without charge. We saw most of that off.
I want to make a little bit of progress, but I will of course give way to the Chair of the Select Committee.
I am grateful to the Minister. He said a moment ago that one of the arguments he was advancing for not incorporating the charter was that it might then come into conflict with our own human rights law. Given that, as we heard from the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), it has been part of our law for some time, can he give the Committee one single example of that happening?
I think that the right hon. Gentleman should look at, for example, the Devine case on prisoner voting. It is very unclear how the case law in the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts meshes together. It is possible to argue in favour of one or the other, but they are not entirely consistent or compatible. When giving evidence to a House of Lords Committee in 2015, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield defended the Strasbourg Court very validly by contrasting it with the “predatory” habits of the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg. I think that even those who have been the most enthusiastic human rights defenders, and those on the remain side of the argument, will recognise the clash and the inconsistency between those jurisprudences.
I am not going to give way again.
The point I wanted to reaffirm is that, given that the substantive rights codified by the charter will be retained in EU law, it does not make sense to incorporate the EU charter itself, an element of the EU’s institutional architecture designed to regulate EU membership, at precisely the moment when we are leaving.
Does my hon. Friend accept that there may be a third category of rights that are in the charter but are not in the Human Rights Act, and require protection, and that the source of those rights cannot be identified other than in the charter? If so, will he accept the suggestion made by my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) that there should be an Act of some sort to deal with them?
As I have made clear, we will publish a memorandum containing article-by-article analysis of the charter and how the substantive underpinning rights at the point at which it is codified can be reflected in UK law. I am happy to continue the dialogue with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield and my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset if they believe that any rights have been missed out.
I think that this is probably the right moment to deal with amendment 151, which was tabled by the right hon. Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms), and which relates to the protection of personal data.
I am going to make a bit more progress, but I will give way shortly.
The amendment relates to privacy and protections, an issue that has been mentioned by a number of Members on both sides of the Committee. I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman, respectfully and humbly, that the amendment is not necessary. It is not required because the Data Protection Bill will set high standards for protecting personal data, linked to the general data protection regulation. We will continue to maintain the highest standards of data protection after we leave the European Union. The Bill will also preserve in domestic law existing EU fundamental rights, including data protection rights and underlying case law, which were already part of EU law before the charter came into force. Individuals in the UK will continue to have access to well-established domestic and international mechanisms to bring their cases and obtain appropriate remedies, whether in Strasbourg or under the Human Rights Act, when they consider that their rights have been breached. That includes the right to seek a judicial remedy against data controllers or processers.
I thank the Minister for his words on the Data Protection Bill, which will give strong data protection in the UK. However, my understanding of general data protection regulation in Europe is that it is based on the fundamental principle that people own their own data, whereas the Data Protection Bill does not, as we have drafted it here, start with that fundamental principle. So we either need to amend that Bill or still recognise that principle in order for them to be equivalent; that is what we need to aim for if we want to achieve equivalence.
I thank my hon. Friend; she has made her point in a very careful way. I suggest that that is something for the passage of the Data Protection Bill in due course, if she feels there are gaps in it, and if, after having looked at the memorandum we are publishing, she is not persuaded that we will be reflecting in UK law after exit all the rights.
I am grateful to the Minister for addressing my amendment. Does he accept that it is essential that we avoid a declaration from the European Commission at some point in the future that data protection arrangements in the UK are not adequate, and we must therefore secure an adequacy determination? Does he also accept that not having article 8 somewhere on the UK statute book is an invitation to those elsewhere to find against us when that crunch decision comes?
The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that we need to be very careful to navigate our post-Brexit period in a way that minimises litigation. I cannot see that such litigation would be good for the UK and its taxpayers, and it is not good for sustaining a healthy relationship with our EU partners.
We do, of course, have article 8 in the ECHR, which is directly incorporated via the Human Rights Act, but, as I have said, if the right hon. Gentleman feels that any elements of it are not properly transposed into UK law when we publish the memorandum, the correct place for that to be considered will be the Data Protection Bill. The wider point is that the removal of the charter from UK law will not affect—
I am going to make some progress, because I have been speaking for over half an hour and the Solicitor General will want to speak again to address schedule 1.
The substantive rights that individuals already benefit from in the UK when their data is processed will be retained under this Bill. As I have pointed out, the charter is not the source of rights contained within it; it was intended only to catalogue those that existed in EU law at that moment in time.
Finally, I want to address the late new clauses tabled: new clause 78, tabled by the right hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake), and new clause 79. On the impact our departure from the EU might have on equalities legislation, I again reaffirm the commitment I made on day one in Committee to my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller), the Chair of the Women and Equalities Committee, when we discussed this issue at some length. I understand the intention behind this amendment and can reassure the right hon. Gentleman that there will be no reduction in the substantive equalities protections when we leave the EU. Equally, the right hon. Gentleman’s amendment presents some very real practical difficulties, not least his attempt effectively to copy and paste the procedural model used in the Human Rights Act and then put it into this Bill for the equalities purposes.
The Human Rights Act assesses compatibility according to an international instrument, the ECHR, which is not the same. There is not an equivalent that applies to the Equality Act, but I am more than happy to reaffirm the commitment I made to my right hon. Friend the Chair of the Select Committee that the Government will bring forward an amendment before Report stage that will require Ministers to make a statement before this House in the presentation of any Brexit-related primary or secondary legislation on whether and how it is consistent with the Equality Act. I hope that reassures the right hon. Gentleman that the Government are serious about addressing the issue he has rightly raised.
New clause 79 suggests a procedural device for incorporating certain EEA-related rules into UK law. This is entirely unnecessary given the wider snapshot of EU law this Bill will take at the point of exit.
I hope I have tackled, or at least have endeavoured to tackle—
As I said at the opening of my remarks, given the intention to address clause 5 in some detail and all the underlying amendments, we have split this up and the Solicitor General will address schedule 1 and all my right hon. and learned Friend’s concerns around Francovich and general principles in due course.
I hope I have tackled hon. Members’ concerns, at least in relation to clause 5 and the charter, and I urge hon. Members not to press their amendments to a vote. This Government and the ministerial team have listened, and we will continue to reflect carefully on all the arguments made today. Equally, the Government believe the exceptions to retained EU law contained in clause 5 are right as we carefully seek to separate our legal system from that of the EU, restore democratic control to this House, and do so in a way that leaves more, not less, legal certainty. I urge hon. Members to withdraw their amendments and to pass clause 5 unamended.
I rise to give my support and that of the Scottish National party to the amendments designed to retain the charter of fundamental rights in domestic law, and those designed to preserve legal remedies for individuals and businesses to enforce these rights in the courts and to be compensated when the rights are breached.
It is heartening to see such strong cross-party support for these amendments. I very much hope that the Conservative rebels will have the courage of their convictions to push these amendments to a vote tonight, despite the unpleasant pressure they have been subjected to as a result of the actions of certain newspapers. That is a matter for them. There are other cross-party amendments on the charter that I am sure will be pressed to a vote if those in the name of the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) are not.
Before I address why the SNP supports these amendments, I have a crucial question for the Minister. It needs to be answered, not for my benefit, but for the benefit of the whole House and, indeed, the country. The clause we are debating revolves around the supremacy of EU law and whether the charter will be part of domestic law after exit day, but, as has already been mentioned in our debate, this morning the Prime Minister’s official spokesman told a routine Westminster briefing that the Government expect
“the ECJ’s role to be unchanged during an ‘implementation period’ of around two years following the official Brexit date in March 2019”.
Are those on the Treasury Bench aware of that statement? Can they explain to us how it impacts on what we are debating today? If the Prime Minister is of the view, as her spokesman has said, that the Court of Justice’s role will be unchanged during a two-year implementation period from exit day, not only is the rather ridiculous amendment brought to this House by the Government last week defining exit day rendered utterly meaningless, but much of the debate we are having this afternoon about clause 5 and, indeed, the debate we had last week about clause 6 and other clauses are rendered meaningless.
I am not trying to score a party political point here. This is a matter of legal certainty which is of the utmost importance to all UK citizens and to UK business and universities. Which is it? Is what the Prime Minister’s official spokesman said this morning correct? Is the Court of Justice’s role going to continue unchanged during a two-year implementation period and, if so, how does that impact what we are debating today? I am very happy for the Minister to intervene on me to clarify that, but if he wishes to take advice, I am sure that his ministerial colleague the Solicitor General will clarify that vital point and the impact of the Prime Minister’s statement this morning on the entirety of this Bill, and most particularly the clause we are debating.
In any event, if this somewhat holed-beneath-the-waterline Bill is to survive and limp on, the SNP commits itself wholeheartedly to the amendments to keep the charter of fundamental rights, to keep individuals’ and businesses’ rights to sue and enforce, and to make those rights meaningful, because that is what the individual right of enforcement and Francovich damages are all about: making rights meaningful. For anyone who has studied law, a right without a remedy is a pretty useless thing; it is trite law.
The Scottish Government published their programme for government earlier this year, and reiterated their commitment to international human rights norms. It is important to remember that human rights are not wholly reserved by this Parliament when it comes to the devolution settlement, so what the Scottish Government choose to do could be very important, particularly if Scotland is to be taken out of the European Union against her will. My colleagues in the Scottish Government have emphasised that it is essential that existing safeguards are not undermined by Brexit, and that the rights enjoyed by everyone in these islands, as EU citizens, need to be permanently locked into a future deal. That is why we oppose the removal of the EU charter of fundamental rights from domestic law, and why we opposed the Government’s previous desire to repeal the Human Rights Act.
I was interested in the Minister’s reiteration—in fairness, this has been reiterated by the Government several times as part of this debate—that there is no intention to withdraw from the European convention on human rights. But, as I have already said, rights without remedies are not much use. The great thing about the Human Rights Act was that it gave UK citizens the opportunity to enforce their rights by raising actions in the courts of their own jurisdiction. Will the Minister—or the Solicitor General, when he gets to his feet—confirm the Government’s intentions regarding the Human Rights Act?
I think I have already said this, but I am very happy to reaffirm for the hon. and learned Lady that the Government have no plans to withdraw from the ECHR, or to revise or repeal the Human Rights Act.
I am grateful to the Minister for that. I had understood that the revision and repeal of the Human Rights Act was on the back burner, but Members on this side of the House and many Conservative Members can celebrate a great victory if that plan has now been dropped and the Government are backing down on it. Unfortunately, I very much doubt that we will be in the mood for celebration as we are facing the Government’s chaotic plans for Brexit, and that is what we have to discuss today.
My colleagues in the Scottish Government in Edinburgh have recently reiterated their firm commitment to the idea that international human rights norms should not just be signed up to by the jurisdictions of these islands, but should be given direct effect by giving individuals and businesses the opportunity to raise and realise their rights in the courts. The Scottish Government have indicated that they intend to
“implement the socio-economic duty in the Equality Act 2010 by the end of this year, placing a requirement on key parts of the public sector, including Scottish Ministers, to have due regard to reducing the inequalities caused by socio-economic disadvantage when taking strategic decisions. This is a key component of our approach to tackling poverty.”
The Scottish Government also committed in their programme for government to look at how they can further embed human, social, cultural and economic rights, including the UN convention on the rights of the child. That is an indication that the Scottish Government’s direction of travel on international human rights norms is very different from the UK Government’s. It reflects the fact, as I said earlier, that human rights are not a reserved matter save in so far as the repeal or amendment of the Human Rights Act is concerned. Indeed, the Scottish Government have the power to legislate to protect human rights and intend to do so.
That leads me to comment briefly on new clause 78 and a new right in relation to equality that is intended to apply across the United Kingdom. There is a laudable intention behind the new clause, but its application in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland would require discussion with and the consent of devolved Administrations, if it were to be incorporated into the devolution statutes. The Scottish Government’s and Scottish National party’s position on human rights also reflects the wishes of voters in Scotland, who voted to remain in the EU by a considerable margin and voted in considerably larger numbers for parties that support international human rights norms than for those that do not.
It is about time that this Parliament started to recognise that views across these islands are quite divergent from the sort of Brexit that the Government are proposing. The cross-party amendments would go some way towards the aim of keeping us in the charter and keeping remedies for UK citizens. Of course, that is not to say that there are not many people in England and Wales who voted to leave and also wish to see the charter of fundamental rights preserved. We heard, if I may say so, a typically eloquent speech by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield, who said that the rights that have come into our law as a result of our membership of the European Union have done good across these islands, particularly for the most vulnerable people in our society. One would hope that we could agree on that on a cross-party basis.
A lot of misinformation is going around about the charter, and that stems from a resistance to the idea that it is either desirable or necessary for international human rights norms to have direct effect in the United Kingdom. We have to recognise that the logical result of that antipathy to giving direct effect to international human rights norms is to take away rights, and the ability to realise them, from British citizens and businesses. That is surely not a desirable state of affairs, no matter which side of the House one sits on.
As we have heard from a number of hon. Members, the Government have tried to reassure us that importing EU law without also importing the charter will make no difference to the protection of rights in the various jurisdictions of the United Kingdom. Indeed, they state in paragraphs 99 and 100 of the explanatory notes to the Bill that it is unnecessary to include the charter as part of retained law because it merely codifies rights and principles already inherent in EU law. That is what the Minister told us from the Dispatch Box. As others have said, that rather begs a question: if it is just a simple codification, why bother not incorporating the charter?
As I pointed out in an intervention on the Minister, the Exiting the European Union Committee heard evidence from a senior legal academic who said that there will be legislation in retained EU law that refers to the charter, so there will be a lack of legal certainty if the charter is not there. The Minister would no doubt say, “Yes, but the general principles will still be there.” But the charter existed as a codification of the general principles in order to make them more readily accessible.
I am interested to see the list that the Minister is going to produce on 5 December, but he could make his life a lot easier—I know that he and his colleagues have a lot on their plate at the moment—if he just incorporated the charter, rather than running around with bits of paper listing the general principles when they are all listed in the charter anyway. Surely that would be the logical and practical thing to do; unless there is, to use someone else’s phrase, some devilish plot, whereby removing the charter of fundamental rights means that rights will be removed. There is some evidential basis for believing that at least some Government Members think it is a good thing not to incorporate the charter of fundamental rights because it includes rights that they do not like. I am sorry to single out one Government Member, but I did read the article in The Sun yesterday by the hon. Member for Fareham (Suella Fernandes). I am not normally a reader of The Sun, but it caught my eye on Google that it contained an article about the charter of fundamental rights and I thought that every newspaper should be given a chance from time to time, so I had a little look. Like me, the hon. Lady is a lawyer, and she writes:
“This week Parliament will be asked to vote on whether to incorporate the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights into UK law. If Labour, acting with others, manage to force this through there will be legal chaos. Not only will it hand new and long lasting powers to UK courts”,
but it has also
“crept into many areas of UK law, from asylum to even national security.”
So there we have it in the words of at least one Conservative Member. There are things in the charter of fundamental rights that some on the Government Benches do not wish to be incorporated into our law.
(7 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberThe right hon. and learned Gentleman is right, and that is what we seek to address with amendment 306.
I will briefly address some of the other amendments in the group. We support new clause 14, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie), as it sensibly calls for a report to be laid before Parliament on the interpretation of EU law during a transitional period.
We also support amendment 137, in the name of the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) and others, as it seeks to have UK courts pay due regard to any relevant decision of the ECJ when interpreting the new category of retained EU law.
Amendments 202 and 384, in the name of the right hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford), would allow matters pending on exit day to be referred to the ECJ, which is clearly common sense, and we are pleased to support the amendments. We also support amendments 203, 353 and 354, in the right hon. Gentleman’s name, on the definitions of EU retained law. Amendment 357, tabled by the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), raises important issues, and I look forward to the Minister’s clarification. We support amendment 358, which would help with the interpretation of EU retained law.
I end on the same note on which I began by urging the Government to accept amendment 278 and its consequential amendments and, in doing so, to put aside their obsession with the ECJ so that we can secure the effective transitional deal with the EU that they, we, business and trade unions want to achieve.
It is a great privilege and pleasure to speak on behalf of the Government on this essential Bill, and particularly on clause 6 and the various amendments proposed to it. The Bill is complex, but at root it boils down to achieving two basic but fundamental objectives, which it is worth bearing in mind as we consider the clause and amendments.
The first is that we are delivering on the referendum by taking back control over our laws, which is a major opportunity; that was the No. 1 reason why people voted to leave the EU in the referendum. The second thing that the Bill does is make sure there is legal certainty, with a smooth transition for citizens and businesses, mitigating one of the key risks of Brexit, which I believe is felt by people whether they voted leave or remain.
It is essential that the Supreme Court has certainty. The first part of clause 6(2) is admirably clear:
“A court or tribunal need not have regard to anything done on or after exit day by the European Court”.
Why then have the Government included the following phrase at the end of the provision:
“but may do so if it considers it appropriate to do so”?
I think Lord Neuberger has a point, and I give the Minister an opportunity to make the Government’s position clear.
I thank my hon. Friend for that, and I shall come to that point a little later. The basic point that I respectfully make to the House at the outset is that the various clauses and amendments should be judged according to those basic strategic objectives: taking back control over our laws and making sure that there is a smooth legal transition, which I believe is my hon. Friend’s point.
Clause 6 serves both objectives. It sets out how, once we have taken back control over EU law, retained EU law should be interpreted on and after exit day. It makes it clear that once the UK leaves the EU, domestic courts will not be able to refer cases to the European Court—an affirmation of the supremacy of our own courts and our own legal order.
My hon. Friend is making a powerful case. The Select Committee that I chair has looked at the implications for equality law. At the moment, individuals can take cases to the Court of Justice of the European Union and gain decisions there that may have a great impact on their lives, but they will not be able to do that in the future. How should the Government look further at how domestic courts might be able to assess the compatibility of UK law with equality law, to make sure that in the future we do not have any problems in the way our law develops in this area?
First, let me thank my right hon. Friend, the Chair of the Women and Equalities Committee, for her intervention and for highlighting this important issue constructively. I have looked carefully at the report of her Committee and had discussions with the Equalities Ministers on the points she has made, so today I can give her the reassurance, and tell the House, that we have commissioned work to be done on an amendment that the Government will table before Report. It will require Ministers to make a statement before the House in the presentation of any Brexit-related primary or secondary legislation on whether and how it is consistent with the Equality Act 2010. I hope that gives her the reassurance she needs that the Government are serious about addressing the legitimate point she has raised.
The point I was making before my right hon. Friend’s intervention was that once the UK leaves the EU, the domestic courts will not be able to refer cases to the ECJ. Clause 6 also provides that domestic courts and tribunals will not be bound by or required to have regard to ECJ decisions made after Brexit.
May I just finish this point, because I am at risk of answering the question before my right hon. and learned Friend puts it? As I say, UK courts will instead be able to take those post-exit judgments into account when making their decisions, if they consider it appropriate to do so, as they can, of course, with judgments of courts from other jurisdictions—common law, around the Commonwealth and elsewhere.
A number of different points feature in all this, but there is one point about the legal certainty, which was raised earlier. It is one thing to be able to take a case to the Supreme Court, but under a previously set up regime people could take it as a reference to the ECJ. Have the Government considered the propriety issues on removing that right for a case that is current? There is an issue to address there. The Government may be able to provide precedent and justification for what they are doing, but the issue troubles me. This strikes me as an odd way of going about things simply for the sake of trying to get rid of the ECJ in one fell swoop, which I think will be rather difficult in any case for other reasons.
I hope that I can give my right hon. and learned Friend some reassurance as the Committee makes progress. Some of what he says relates to clause 5 as much as to clause 6, but let me have a go at addressing it today. We may well return to it next week.
The Prime Minister has accepted that in a transitional period, the European Court of Justice would govern the rules of which we are part. Will the Minister explain to the Committee how that is compatible will clauses 5 and 6, which say that the ECJ will have no further sway after exit day, which the Government propose to set as 29 March 2019? Do the Government intend to amend the Bill as it proceeds through Committee to reconcile those two things, or do they propose to do it in the new Bill that the Secretary of State announced yesterday?
I think the Chair of the Select Committee has answered his own question. The point is that we will produce separate primary legislation to deal with the withdrawal agreement and the terms of any transition. We should not be putting the cart before the horse. This Bill is about making sure that we have at our disposal all the means to implement in UK law any deal, and its terms, as and when it is struck.
If the hon. Gentleman will allow me, I shall make a little progress, because I suspect that—
I am going to make a little progress, because I think that some of these queries will be addressed in the discussions on the amendments that others have tabled.
I return to clause 6. For as long as retained EU law remains in force in the UK, it is essential that there is a common understanding of what that law means. That is critical for legal certainty and, in real terms, for the very predictability of law that businesses and individuals rely on every day as they go about their lives. We want to provide the greatest possible certainty—I suspect that, for all the thunder and lightning in this debate, that is a shared objective underpinning it all—and the question is how we achieve that. Clause 6 will ensure that UK courts must continue to interpret retained EU law using the Court of Justice of the European Union’s pre-exit case law and retained general principles of EU law. Any other starting point would be to change the law. That is certainly recognised by the Government.
I am going to make a little more progress, but I will give way to my right hon. Friend in due course.
The crucial point reflected in clause 6 is that the intention is not to fossilise past decisions of the ECJ for ever and a day. The clause provides that our Supreme Court—and, indeed, the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland—will be able to depart from pre-exit case law. In doing so, they will of course apply the same tests as they do when departing from their own case law in the ordinary way.
We have, in my view at least, the finest judiciary in the world. Our courts are fiercely independent of Government, as they have already proved during the Brexit process. The clause will provide them with clarity about how they should interpret retained EU law after exit. As we take back control over our laws, it must be right that the UK Supreme Court, not the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg, has the last word on the laws of the land. It is therefore of paramount importance that the clause stands part of the Bill.
The Minister is being very helpful on one aspect of the Bill, which is how the Government think European law should be interpreted once we have finally exited, but he is sidestepping the key point put to him by the right hon. Member for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn). As it stands, clause 6 does not reflect current Government policy. It is not putting the cart before the horse to ask whether current Government policy, as represented in the Florence speech, should be reflected in the Bill. The fact is that the Government are seeking, expecting or contemplating the real possibility of a transition period during which we will stay in the single market and customs union and be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court. Why is the Bill being presented and urged by the Government in terms that are totally—
I will come to that precise point in the context of new clause 14, which has been tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie). The proposed change refers to the transitional period after the UK exits the EU. I thought that the hon. Gentleman put his points in a perfectly reasonable way.
Let me finish my point.
Therefore there will be full transparency and accountability to this House on the issue that the hon. Gentleman feels so strongly about. I urge him to withdraw his new clause, but I will give him one further crack at it.
I am grateful to the Minister for allowing me to probe him on this point. He has suggested that the legal architecture framework for the transitional period will be set out in the Bill that he brings forward for the implementation period. However, it is only possible to agree with that plan if he is guaranteeing that Royal Assent for the implementation Bill will come in ample time before exit day. Clearly, it would be nonsensical to have an implementation piece of legislation that leaves a vacuum between exit day and some later date, when the transition had already started. Can he guarantee that that Bill will be enacted and enshrined in law in good time, well before exit day?
I sense that the hon. Gentleman recognises that he is putting the legislative cart before the diplomatic horse. Of course the implementing legislation relates to the agreement, and we need to have one in place to comply with the terms of any obligations, whether they are under the withdrawal arrangement, the implementation period or the future partnership deal.
I now turn to amendment 357, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), Chair of the Justice Committee.
I agree with what my hon. Friend is saying about new clause 14. May I take him back to clause 6(4)(a)? It says that the Supreme Court “is not bound”. Will that enable it to look at the plain words of the treaties, and not at the previous expansive teleological jurisprudence of the ECJ?
I am not quite sure that I understand my right hon. Friend’s forensic point. It is a feature of the common law that UK courts already take into account and consider principles and precedents from other jurisdictions, but they do so with full autonomy as to how they might apply it, where they have discretion under the normal canons of interpretation. We are effectively seeking to apply the same basic principles, through this Bill, to retained EU law and the interpretation of it.
I am going to make some progress, as I have given way once. I want to turn to some other amendments; otherwise, I will not give them the attention that they rightly deserve. I turn to amendment 357 in the name of the Chair of the Select Committee on Justice.
My right hon. and learned Friend is very tempting, but not at this moment.
I understand the point of amendment 357, which is to provide a default mechanism for transposing EU law where regulations have not been made under clause 7. I can equally see that my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst is seeking to make default provision for any gaps that may exist in the law to avoid creating not just legal uncertainty, but any legal potholes that may strew the road that lies ahead. I hope that he does not mind me saying that he is, perhaps inadvertently, reinforcing the case for clause 7 because his concern appears to be with the risk that it might not being used comprehensively enough. I certainly share his concern to avoid legal cliff edges and legal potholes, for which I think he is trying to cater.
I mentioned to the Prime Minister during her statement a few days ago the bear trap that I can see coming up during the transitional period if we are not careful because of the manner in which the European Court operates by the purposive rule; I know my hon. Friend will understand. During the transitional period, when we are faced with a court operating under that rule and not by precedent, we could end up with the European Court dictating to us the basis upon which we would be operating during that period. Does my hon. Friend agree?
The Chair of the European Scrutiny Committee eloquently makes his powerful point. We need to avoid bear traps, cliff edges and potholes, and that is what this Bill does. That is a common goal that we all ought to be trying to pursue, on both sides of the House—whether we voted to leave or remain. I am not convinced that the amendment of the Chair of the Justice Committee would achieve that aim. Despite his best intentions and his rather ingenious drafting, I fear that the amendment would, in practice, create considerably more legal uncertainty, not less.
I will not claim credit for all the ingenuity of the drafting, as I hope I shall make apparent in due course, but what if I told my hon. Friend that it is based on the work of the International Regulatory Strategy Group—one of the most distinguished groups of practitioners in this field? Would he think again about totally dismissing the thing, recognise it as a serious point that needs to be addressed here and engage with it?
I absolutely will not dismiss it. I am happy to think twice, thrice and as many times as my hon. Friend wants to talk to me about it. But let me make a couple of points to illustrate the risk of uncertainty that his amendment would cause. Subsection (A3) of amendment 357 begs the question of whether retained EU law restrains acts or omissions that start within the UK but that may have effects outside of it. Equally, subsection (A5) conflates functions conferred on public bodies with those of the Secretary of State. They are not the same thing. I sense that, underpinning this, he is trying to legislate in advance for unknown unknowns. I understand that temptation but if we go down that path, there is a countervailing but very real risk of increasing, rather than mitigating, the legal uncertainty. With respect, I hope that he can be persuaded to withdraw his amendment.
In order that I might reflect on that as the debate goes forward, perhaps my hon. Friend would like to give me an example of the circumstances in which he thinks my amendment might increase the legal uncertainty, rather than assist it. I will obviously listen to that.
Well, I have just given two examples regarding subsections (A3) and (A5) of my hon. Friend’s amendment, but I would be happy to sit down with him and give some illustrative examples of how, in practical terms, I think that this is not actually the avenue or legal cul-de-sac that he wants to go down.
If my hon. Friend will forgive me, I will now turn to some of the other amendments in order that I give them due consideration in this important debate. In particular, I want to turn to amendment 278 and linked amendments 279 to 284 concerning exit day, which are from the Leader of the Opposition and other hon. Members.
The Prime Minister made it clear in her Florence speech that
“The United Kingdom will cease to be a member of the European Union on 29 March 2019.”
It is clear that the UK will leave the EU at the end of the article 50 process—some of the suggestions around the caveat are wildly unrealistic. The Government have tabled an amendment to make sure the drafting of the Bill is crystal clear on this point and to give the country—businesses and citizens alike—additional certainty and a measure of finality on it.
These amendments would replace that clarity and finality with uncertainty and confusion. They would alter the meaning of the term “exit day” in the Bill, but only for the purposes of the provisions of clause 6. For those purposes, but for those purposes alone, the UK would not leave the EU until the end of the transitional period. I am afraid that that would create damaging legal uncertainty, and the amendments are flawed. They would have the effect that, for the duration of any implementation period that might be agreed—and we hope one will be, sooner rather than later—all the important provisions on the interpretation of retained EU law set out in this clause could not apply; they could take effect, if I have understood correctly, only from the end of that period. Since we have not yet agreed an implementation period with our EU partners, the effect of the amendments would be to create an indefinite and indeterminate transitional period, which rather raises the question of whether the Labour party is really serious about facilitating the process of a smooth Brexit at all.
Rather than seek to confuse the issue, it would be helpful if the Minister clarified whether it is the intention of the Government to accept the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union during the transitional period. Yes or no?
The hon. Gentleman is very kind. He had the chance in his speech to make his rapier-like points. I am dealing with his amendment and the very real risk that, with the greatest will in the world, what her Majesty’s Opposition are proposing will add to, rather than mitigate, the uncertainty. When we go away from the fireworks of this debate, it ought to be our common endeavour to minimise that uncertainty.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union made it clear yesterday that there will be separate primary legislation for the withdrawal agreement and any implementation phase, so these amendments are entirely unnecessary in any event. We have also been clear—I think this addresses the hon. Gentleman’s point—that, in leaving the EU, we will bring an end to the direct jurisdiction of the European Court in the UK.
Our priority must be getting the right arrangements for Britain’s relationship with the EU for the long term.
I have given way to hon. Gentleman before. I am going to make some progress.
That priority means getting a close economic partnership, but out of the single market, out of the customs union and without the direct jurisdiction of the European Court. We want to get to that endgame in a smooth and orderly way, with the minimum of disruption.
That is why we want early agreement on the implementation period—on that much, we are agreed. That may mean we start off with the European Court still governing some of the rules we are part of for that period, but the Government are also clear that if we can bring forward a new dispute resolution mechanism at an earlier stage, we shall do so. These amendments do not allow for that. They prejudge and pre-empt the outcome of negotiations, and they introduce legislative inflexibility by saying that we must keep rules in domestic law that would bind us to the jurisdiction of the European Court after we leave, for the full duration of any implementation period, without our knowing for a second how long that might be. The Government are making the case for legal certainty. The Labour party is proposing legal limbo. We cannot accept that.
I actually agree—I should make this clear to my hon. Friend—about the issue of transition. I find it difficult to see how we can approach transition in the course of this Bill. However, there is an important underlying issue here, because, ultimately, our future relations with the EU will have a very powerful bearing, whether it is in transition or even after transition, on what we want EU law to do and how we want it to be interpreted, depending on transition, or indeed when we have completely gone, and on the extent to which we wish to be in comity with EU law. This is the elephant in the room, and it will have to be debated at some point as the Bill goes through, because some of it does not have to do with transition but has really to do with an entire future relationship, and it marries with great difficulty with the constant reiteration that the ECJ is somehow going to disappear out of the window.
I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend. I absolutely agree that the scope and parameters of the different options will need to be settled, but I think he has implicitly accepted and recognised that that is the subject of diplomacy. As has been said, we cannot put the legislative cart before the diplomatic horse, and I fear that that is what the amendment would do.
I now turn to amendment 202, which was tabled by the right hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford) and also relates to amendment 384. In leaving the EU, we will bring about an end to the direct jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, and this Bill is essential to ensuring the sovereignty of our Parliament as we take back democratic control. We understand, of course, the desire to ensure a smooth and orderly exit and continuity for those who have commenced matters before the courts before exit. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs Gillan) also made this point.
That is why we set out in our July position paper, “Ongoing Union judicial and administrative proceedings”, that we believe that UK cases before the ECJ on exit day should not be interrupted but should be able to continue to a binding judgment. We recognise that parties involved in such cases before the ECJ will have already gone through various stages of the process, potentially including making oral and/or written submissions. We do not think that they should have to repeat those stages before the UK courts, as this would not provide certainty but undermine it. The amendment would add further uncertainty rather than mitigate it. Pending matters before the UK courts will be able to reach a final judgment post exit without needing referral to the European Court. The Bill will convert directly applicable EU law into domestic law, so our domestic courts will then apply to those matters. In this way, we will have certainty about how the jurisdiction of the ECJ in the UK will be brought to an end.
Permitting the European Court to continue ruling on cases that were not before it procedurally on the day of withdrawal, as the amendment proposes, would give rise to considerable uncertainty. It would extend the period under which the European Court would continue to issue judgments in respect of the UK, and it is absolutely impossible to predict how long that may last. Furthermore, after exit day the UK will no longer be a member state of the EU. Under the EU treaties, the European Court itself can rule only on questions referred to it by member state courts, so it follows that without a new and separate international agreement, the references envisaged by the amendment would not, in any event, be possible.
I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is aware of the arrangements that were made in relation to the Privy Council when New Zealand chose to have its own supreme court. In fact, cases from New Zealand are still going to the Privy Council. All we are contemplating with these amendments, which I will address in more detail in a moment, is a similar arrangement.
I take the point that the hon. and learned Lady makes, but that is not the same mechanism. It is not analogous and it is not desirable.
I seek clarification on this point. Is the Minister saying that if a right of action has arisen before Brexit day that would have attracted, at the time that it arose, the full protections and a right to referral to the ECJ, that right will not be taken forward and those rights will, in effect, have been retrospectively changed?
I understand the point that my hon. Friend is making, although I do not accept that characterisation. It is absolutely right that cases that are procedurally before the dock of the court, if I may put it like that—that have been lodged before exit day—will continue to conclusion. However, in relation to facts that may or may not give rise to a cause of action at an indeterminate point in the future, we would end up with a long tail of uncertainty if we went down the path that she suggests. I gently say to her that it will be possible to continue those cases before the UK courts because of the way in which we will retain EU law. There would be more, not less, uncertainty for citizens and businesses alike if we allowed the kind of indeterminate access to the court that she suggests.
Surely, the Minister is ignoring the legitimate expectation that I have talked about. Frankly, if the Government do not look again at the matter, it will constitute an abuse of power, because it will remove from individuals rights that they legitimately expected to carry through to the end of a case.
My right hon. Friend makes an interesting point about legitimate expectations. I think there is an equally legitimate expectation, demand and need to have some finality to the legal and institutional arrangements that give rise to cases before the European Court.
Perhaps I can give way to my right hon. Friend when I come on to her amendments.
I turn to amendment 203, tabled by the right hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber, and to the related amendments 353 and 354. They would remove clause 6(7) and partially reinsert it into clause 14. Clause 6(7) provides key definitions of terms in the Bill that are crucial for the proper interpretation and full understanding of its content. Subsection (7) aims to alleviate any potential confusion and ensure that there is no vagueness or ambiguity about the different types of retained law mentioned in the Bill. That is vital for those who read, implement and interpret the Bill, because of the different effects of each type of retained law. The placement of the definitions in clause 6 is specifically designed to make the Bill easier to navigate and more user-friendly, by placing the definitions close to where they are used and deployed in the text.
I am going to make a bit of progress. Wider general definitions are set out in clause 14, and clause 15 provides an index of all the defined terms to make the Bill easier to use as a reference tool. To remove those definitions from clause 6 and only partially to reinsert them into clause 14, as the amendment would do, would undermine the certainty and clarity that we aim to provide.
Without statutory definitions of the different types of retained law, we would undermine the stability of our domestic legal regime after exit and exacerbate the burdens on the court system. Reinserting the definition of “retained domestic case law” into clause 14 would not alleviate that, because it would give rise to the question why that definition had been included, while others had not. Its placement in the body of clause 14, away from its original use in clause 4, would make the text far less easy to navigate—something that we are keen to avoid.
I turn to amendment 137, which is a joint SNP and Liberal Democrat amendment, in the name of the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry). Clause 6(2) will allow our domestic courts and tribunals to take into account any decisions made by the European Court, an EU entity or the EU itself on or after exit day, if they consider it appropriate to do so. That will ensure that our courts are not bound by the decisions of the European Court, while enabling them to consider its subsequent case law if they believe it is appropriate to do so. It is widespread practice in our domestic courts to carry out a similar exercise with the judgments of courts in other jurisdictions—I am thinking particularly of Commonwealth and common law jurisdictions—so, in principle, there is nothing new or particularly different here.
The UK has always been an open and outward-looking country, and our legal traditions reflect that. We pay attention to developments in other jurisdictions, including common law jurisdictions, and we embrace the best that the world has to offer, but we do so on our terms and under our control. That is decided by our courts and, ultimately, it is subject to the legislative will and sovereignty of this House. Amendment 137 is therefore unnecessary, as the Bill already provides that post-exit decisions of the European Court can be considered by the domestic courts.
Amendment 137 would go further, however, in that it would require our courts and tribunals to pay due regard to any relevant decision of the European Court. What does “due regard” mean? It is not defined and, indeed, it is far from clear. It is evidently intended to go further than clause 6, and tacitly urges our courts to heed, follow or shadow the Luxembourg Court, but there is no clarity about what would count as due consideration. The amendment would alter the inherent discretion the UK courts already have to consider, without fetters, the case law in other jurisdictions, and it seeks to apply to the European Court a procedural requirement that is stronger but so vague that it is liable to create more, not less, confusion. I hope that I have tackled, or at least addressed the concerns that the hon. and learned Lady has expressed in her amendment, and I urge her not to press it.
I will now turn to amendment 303 in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham. I thank her for tabling this amendment and for explaining it, as she did, in a very constructive spirit. I recognise that she is representing the interests of her constituents with her customary tenacity, but I will take a few moments to set out why we have taken our approach to the issues and my difficulties with her amendment.
Clause 6 supports the Bill’s core aim of maximising certainty. It is in no one’s interests for there to be a legal cliff edge. The Bill means that the laws and rules we have now will, as far as possible, continue to apply. It seeks to take a snapshot of EU law immediately before exit day. The Government have been clear that in leaving the EU, we will be bringing to an end the direct jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in the UK. To maximise certainty, any question about the meaning of retained EU law will be determined in UK courts by reference to ECJ case law as it existed before our exit. Using any other starting point would be to change the law, which is not our objective. Our domestic courts and tribunals will no longer be bound by or required to have regard to any decisions of the European Court after that point, but they can do so if they consider it appropriate. These clear rules of interpretation are set out in clause 6.
May I try again to ask my hon. Friend the question on which both my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), the former Attorney General, and I have been pressing him? My hon. Friend has just said that courts would be bound by judgments of the European Court about retained EU law. I asked him about clause 6(4)(a), which specifically says that
“the Supreme Court is not bound by any retained EU case law”.
It seems to us that he can have it one way or the other, so which is the governing clause—the one saying that the courts are bound to judge in accordance with the previous judgments of the ECJ, or the one saying that the Supreme Court is not bound by such a rule?
The point is that we take a snapshot of EU law, including case law, at the point of exit, but after that the normal rules of precedent will apply both to the Supreme Court and in Scotland. That will allow a departure from any precedents that apply, which again comes back to the question of how we achieve a smooth and orderly transition from retained EU law while making sure that, when push comes to shove as such case law evolves, the UK Supreme Court will have the last word. That is balance struck in the Bill.
I understand that issue, but there is another one. Let us assume for the moment that there is no transition or relationship with the EU at all. Is the Court supposed to apply EU law as currently applied—purposively—or is it supposed to ignore the underlying purpose by which it has constantly been applied heretofore, and in that case, which rules is it supposed to apply? The judiciary have expressed a real concern about what they are supposed to do, because it is quite unclear what Parliament intends. If we forget about a transition or a future relationship, what are they supposed to do? They have rules for interpreting this law at the moment. Are they supposed to stick to those rules when they no longer have an underlying purpose?
I have to be careful about not pre-judging or prejudicing what the courts decide to do, particularly given that the thrust of the Bill is to make sure that judges have autonomy and discretion. The reality is that the issue is dealt with in the Bill. It is possible for the UK courts, in relation to retained case law, to look at the underlying purpose or intention of any piece of legislation or any principles that have been articulated. Moving forward, they are free, of their own volition, to depart from any precedence in the usual way. That already applies in relation to wider common law jurisdictions. The question I would put back to my right hon. and learned Friend is: why on earth, when we are leaving the EU and given that we are an open and outward-looking country that does filter, take interest in and take account of different principles from different jurisdictions, would we put on an further elevated status the case law of the ECJ?
I may be able to assist the Minister with the explanatory notes.
That is kind, but I will make some progress; otherwise I will lose the thread in relation to amendment 303.
The amendment is at odds with the clear and certain position set out in the Bill, because it would continue to bind UK courts to some post-exit ECJ decisions and case law where the matters giving rise to the case have occurred before our exit. Those judgments would continue to be binding even after an implementation period. Strictly interpreted, the amendment would go further still. It would apply to anything happening before exit day and so would also include ECJ judgments on cases referred from outside the UK. For example, a preliminary reference made by another EU member state in relation to the interpretation of EU law might also fall within the scope of the amendment, if the facts of the case arose before exit day. The consequences would be far-reaching and risk creating considerable uncertainty and practical difficulties for the administration of justice.
UK courts and tribunals would continue to be bound by some new ECJ judgments for an indeterminate period. Those binding judgments could continue to be issued long after we have left the EU as cases continue to progress to the European Court from across the EU. Yet those judgments would not have formed part of the snapshot of retained EU case law that, under clause 6(3), will be binding on our courts, so far as is relevant, and subject to the rule in clause 6(4). By contrast, such post-exit judgments would bind our courts in all circumstances, including where the retained version of an EU regulation had since been modified by this Parliament or a devolved Administration. That would create foreseeable and entirely avoidable uncertainty, and it would not be necessary, because individuals whose cause of action predates our exit would, of course, continue to be able to take their case to the domestic courts, even if after exit they cannot reach the European Court. That is the fundamental point in relation to the procedural framework.
I now turn to amendment 304, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham, in relation to retaining ECJ referrals and jurisdiction for anything that happened before exit day. In leaving the EU, we will bring an end to the jurisdiction of the ECJ—we have made that clear. The proposed amendment would frustrate that objective, because our courts could continue to make references to the ECJ in relation to cases where relevant matters have occurred before our withdrawal from the EU. As a result, different rules and processes would apply for those cases, compared with those where the relevant circumstances arose after exit day. That would, I fear, give rise to more not less uncertainty, because it would be impossible to predict for how long UK courts would continue to be subject to binding judgments from Luxembourg.
When we exit the EU, we will know exactly how many pending UK cases are registered with the European Court, awaiting a preliminary reference and thus covered by any proposed agreement we have with the EU on the treatment of pending cases. That is important to deliver certainty about how and when the Court’s jurisdiction in the UK will be brought to an end. The amendment would remove that certainty. Like amendment 303, it is not necessary. Individuals will not lose their ability to vindicate their rights in court after exit. They will be able to take such cases to our domestic courts.
Forgive me, Sir David, but I thought it necessary to address my right hon. Friend’s amendments in detail. Equally, I want to say that I recognise the eloquence and the force with which she champions her constituents. Ministers will take away the underlying issue that she has brought and powerfully moved for consideration. I hope that on that basis she will not feel she needs to press the amendment.
I am following the Minister’s arguments very carefully, with helpful interventions from some of my colleagues. I appreciate that this is a very tricky matter, but it does relate to my constituent. I am therefore grateful that the Minister has undertaken to take the proposal away and look at the principle in relation to this case, because I feel that it would be most unjust not to do so. I have no love for the European Court of Justice and I want the Bill to go through, but not at the cost of justice for my constituent. This case has thrown the matter into stark relief. I am grateful to the Minister for that undertaking and I look forward to talking to him further on the matter.
I thank my right hon. Friend for her constructive approach. We will take that consideration forward after these proceedings.
I will now rattle through the final amendments, so I have done them all justice and given them due consideration. I will turn next to amendment 306, tabled by the Opposition. Clause 6(2) states that our courts are no longer bound by decisions of the European Court after our departure or required to consider in future cases, although they may do so if they believe it to be appropriate. Clause 6 is a vote of confidence in our judiciary: its independence and its expertise. Using similar exercises currently undertaken with court judgments in other jurisdictions, our courts are best placed to decide to what extent, if any, they pay regard to EU law in any case before them.
The intention of amendment 306 is to remove that discretion from clause 6 and replace it with a duty that sets fetters on which aspects of EU case law our judges must consider, although only in certain areas. In practice, that would create a presumption that EU decisions should be followed in those areas. That is the clear intention, but it is inappropriate. It would undermine the purpose of clause 6 in both its fundamental objectives. It would frustrate the return of control to this House and the UK Supreme Court and expose the UK to substantial additional and unnecessary legal uncertainty.
I am going to make a little bit more progress. I have given way to my hon. Friend.
The singling out of these areas of law appears somewhat arbitrary, given other fields the amendment might equally apply to. It would lead to a splintered approach to interpretation of the law and a fragmented UK jurisprudence—more uncertainty, not less. In any case, it is totally unnecessary. The UK has a proud history of ensuring the rights and protections of individuals in this country. The UK has high standards of protection domestically in relation to workers’ rights and human rights. We are recognised as a world leader in delivering robust, rigorous health and safety protections. That record and that commitment is not dependent on our membership of the EU; it is dependent on hon. Members in this House and their eternal vigilance. It will continue to be dependent on that after we leave. I hope that the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) and his colleagues in the Labour party will not press amendment 306.
Finally, I turn to amendment 358 tabled by the Chair of the Justice Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), which sets out the ability of UK courts to have regard to material used in the preparation of retained EU law. I hope that this is the point at which I give some reassurance to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin). Currently, when interpreting EU law domestically, our courts will look at the language used, as well as considering the legislation’s recitals, legal basis and other language versions to inform their interpretation. We do not want to change how this law is interpreted or to create any fresh uncertainty about its meaning, so the Bill provides for the courts to continue that approach. Clause 6 provides that questions on the validity, meaning or effect of retained EU law will be decided in accordance with retained case law and general principles of EU law. This requires taking a purposive approach to interpretation where the meaning of the provision is unclear, considering relevant documents such as the legislation’s treaty legal base, working papers that may have led to the adoption of the measure and the general principles of EU law. I hope that reassures my hon. Friend the Chair of the Select Committee and that he will not press his amendment.
My hon. Friend is making a powerful case on each of the amendments, but I am among those concerned about the confusion around the cut-off line. The general principles he just talked about will shift and change. Is there a point by which, when we reference the principles and those principles have changed post-exit, we do not consider them to be the principles we referenced rather than the principles that existed before and are now not modified? At what point do we have the cut-off point?
My right hon. Friend raises an excellent, if rather esoteric, point, but it is also fundamentally about clause 5 and schedule 1. If he can be patient, we will turn to that next week and, I hope, address all his concerns.
To sum up, I hope that I have at least sought to address all the underlying concerns in each of the amendments and, given the need to maximise legal certainty, minimise confusion and ensure a smooth transition, that all hon. Members will make sure that clause 6 stands part of the Bill unamended.
I rise to speak to amendment 137, which stands in my name and, I am happy to say, the names of many other hon. Members on these Benches, and to amendments 202 and 203, which stand in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford) and other Members on the SNP Benches. I was particularly delighted to hear the Labour party spokesman say that Labour was supporting my amendment 137, which also has the support of the Trades Union Congress, Justice, the Equality and Human Rights Commission and the Fawcett Society.
I will endeavour to explain in detail why amendment 137 is necessary. In essence, we have tabled it because it is necessary to create legal certainty for individuals and businesses by giving a clear instruction to the courts about how to treat decisions of the European Court of Justice after exit day. I am afraid that the Bill does not give that degree of clarity. The purpose of the amendment is also to protect the judiciary from having to make decisions open to political criticism. We saw some pretty heinous political criticism of judges on the Supreme Court earlier this year, and we have heard judges on that Court express concern about the possibility of not being given proper direction in the Bill. My amendment seeks to address that issue. Finally, and perhaps most importantly for our constituents, the amendment will encourage UK rights protections to keep pace with EU rights after Brexit.
Amendment 202 is also about giving certainty to individuals and businesses with cases pending before the domestic courts on exit day. I listened carefully to what the right hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs Gillan) said about her amendments, with which I have great sympathy. Amendments 202 and 203 have a similar purpose. I also listened with care to what the Minister said, but I regret that he has not given me any comfort that anything in the Bill will give the certainty required for people in the midst of litigation on exit day. That is why we seek to define a “pending matter” in amendment 384 as
“any litigation which has been commenced in any court or tribunal in the United Kingdom and which is not finally determined at exit day”.
We need clarity. It is not just me who says so, or those who support the amendment; these amendments were drafted with some care by the Law Society of Scotland, and I submit that they are necessary to protect litigants’ legitimate expectations, but I will return to that in a moment.
The underlying theme of all these amendments is the need to create the legal certainty that hon. Members on both sides of the House have referred to today. It is, of course, an absolute requirement of the rule of law that there should be legal certainty. I regret to say, however, that clause 6 does not give that degree of legal certainty. In accordance with our mandate the Scottish National party opposes Brexit, but we understand the need for withdrawal legislation, and we want to reach agreement on it if possible. We also want to ensure that the legislation is properly framed. Clause 6 is not properly framed, because it does not give the certainty that is required.
The hon. Gentleman was not here for large parts of the debate; if he reads Hansard, he will see that that was addressed very squarely.
For the benefit of viewers who have just tuned in on BBC Parliament, I am happy to give way to the Minister a second time if he would like to state very clearly for the record whether, in his view, on that fundamental point, the jurisdiction of the ECJ will apply during the transition period. It is a very simple question and it only requires a yes or no answer, but he will not respond.
I have to agree with my hon. Friend, but I am happy to be generous and give way to the Minister again. This is a very simple yes or no question.
The hon. Gentleman is very kind, but neither he nor the hon. Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes) has been in here for the entirety of the debate. This issue has been addressed squarely. We are not going to pre-empt or prejudice—[Interruption.]
I will pick up two or three points that have been made in this important debate. There have some magnificent contributions, particularly from my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin). I will start with what he had to say because it is central to the debate.
I appreciate what the Government have been trying to do with clauses 5 and 6 on the way in which retained EU law should be interpreted. I agree with my right hon. Friend that the wording is opaque, although I think that I understand the Government’s intention on the role and supremacy of the Supreme Court in developing law, but that still does not get us away from the fundamental problem that EU law is different from our law. Its rules of interpretation are different and its purpose is different.
We will come back to that problem right through this Bill, whether on the charter of fundamental rights or the general principles of EU law. We cannot just take EU law and drop it into our law without leaving guidance on what the Government expect that law to be used for. I worry that the lack of explanation is most peculiar. It is not a question of wanting to keep EU law—I assume that it will all ultimately go away, anyway—but in the meantime there is a lack of clarity, and I can well understand why the judiciary, particularly the senior judiciary, are troubled by the lack of guidance. It is almost as though the Government have found it too embarrassing to want to grapple with it. They want to maintain continuity, but they do not want to maintain the implication of continuity because that is a difficult message to sell to some Conservative Members.
We will really have to look at this as we go through the Bill, and I am quite prepared to try to help the Government to find a way through. It is not that I want to keep its aura, and there are many Conservative Members who do not like it at all, but the simple fact is that we need to look at it.
The other issues that have been raised are absolutely right, but they are not relevant to this debate. We do not have the slightest clue what the transitional arrangements will be. We will have to have a completely separate piece of legislation to sort that out, and I suspect it will take a long time to go through this House. Ultimately, if we have a long-term agreement, there will be an interesting issue about whether we will be instructing our courts to mirror EU law so as to maintain comity with the Court of Justice of the European Union or risk constantly having to readjust our legal frameworks for the sake of that deep and special relationship.
I do not want to disappoint some of my right hon. and hon. Friends too much, but the harsh reality is that our geographical location and our desire to have a close trading relationship with the European Union will inevitably mean that decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union continue to have a major influence on our law here—I am afraid that was rather disregarded in last year’s referendum. I think that it is called globalisation, and we will have to return to that as we go along.
We have listened carefully to all hon. Members in the various contributions and concerns that have been raised, and taken account of the amendments in this group. There are issues we will take away for further consideration. I refer in particular to what my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller) said about the Equality Act 2010, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs Gillan) raised her issue powerfully and constructively. My right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) also raised a number of points, and I think that we can address those. I think that they are covered by clause 6, but I will take them away and we will work further to make sure we provide the clarity that is required.
I am not going to give way; the hon. Gentleman has had his opportunity. Time is running out and I want to give the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie) the chance to wind up. We cannot accept amendments that create more rather than less legal certainty, so I urge all hon. Members to pass clause 6 unamended this evening.
I thank Members for a debate that has covered a wide range of issues relating to transition and the application of EU law, but that has also revealed a number of interesting facets of Government policy. It was particularly stark that the Minister, who would not give way just now to my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford North (Wes Streeting), could not let the words, “The ECJ would apply during a transition” pass his lips. That was the very phrase the Prime Minister, for it was she, put into the Florence speech. I thought that speech was Government policy, but it turns out apparently not to be—not today.
I will repeat, in terms, exactly what I said earlier. We want an early agreement on an implementation period. As the Prime Minister said in the Florence speech, that may mean we start off with the European Court still governing some rules we are part of for that period, but the Government are also clear that if we can bring forward a new dispute resolution mechanism at an earlier stage, we will do so. The hon. Gentleman should have listened to what I said earlier.
Well, well, well. The number of caveats, little changes and weasel words within that particular obfuscatory explanation were not as clear as what the Prime Minister said at that time. That was fascinating and I suspect the Minister will get a phone call from No. 10 in the morning. New clause 14, which I would like to test the will of the House on, is still very relevant; we need to get clarity from the Government a month after Royal Assent on how exactly transition would apply. It is clear that although they say there will be an Act of Parliament, we do not know that that can be completed and enacted before exit day. We may find ourselves with a vacuum. We need much more clarity from Ministers. The Minister has proven the point and made the case amply, which is why I wish to press new clause 14 to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
(7 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberMinisters in the MOJ and the Home Office have regular discussions on key aspects of criminal justice co-operation in relation to our EU partners, including on the European arrest warrant.
I thank the Minister for that reply. The police have repeatedly underlined the importance of the European arrest warrant in fighting crime. If the price of maintaining our citizens’ security and the effective operation of other European crime-fighting mechanisms is the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, will the Minister put crime fighting first or let his arbitrary red line jeopardise our citizens’ security?
I am not sure that making sure the UK Supreme Court has the last word on the law of the land is some arbitrary red line. However, the Government’s position in relation to our future partnership with the EU was set out in the position paper that was published in September. It was very clear that we have an ambitious plan for co-operation on security, law enforcement and criminal justice. The right hon. Gentleman will see if he looks at it carefully—I am sure he has—that maintaining strong extradition relations will be an important part of that agenda.
Will the Minister take on board the clear recommendation from the Justice Committee’s report in the last Parliament that underpinning any practical means of criminal justice co-operation, including the European arrest warrant, should be a continuing relationship on maintaining data equivalency? Unless the data regulations are equivalent, it will not be possible for European agencies to share with us or vice versa.
I thank the Chair of the Select Committee. That is, of course, why we have taken through the Data Protection Bill. We have extradition relations—very vigorous ones—with countries all around the world, and we see no reason why we would not continue to do so with our EU friends and allies.
Given that it took countries such as Iceland and Norway 13 years to negotiate extradition arrangements with the EU, does the Minister accept that not maintaining the European arrest warrant puts people in this country at risk of seeing criminals go free and that those criminals may well include terrorist suspects?
No, because we are not in the position of Iceland. We start from the position of the European arrest warrant, with strong, intensive co-operation on extradition, and we will make sure we continue that operationally for many years to come.
Does the Minister agree that one reason people voted to leave the European Union was to make the Supreme Court the supreme court?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Let us also not forget the advice of the former Lord Chief Justice, Lord Thomas, who made it clear in his evidence to the independent review of extradition that there were problems with the European arrest warrant. We have legislated for extra safeguards. We are ending the jurisdiction of the European Court, but there has been no suggestion that we are dispensing altogether with vital EU extradition—except, perhaps, as a figment of some of the furtive Liberal Democrats’ imaginations.
Surely the Minister can make it clear that the Government’s priority must be continued participation in the European arrest warrant and that that must come ahead of his obsession with ending the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice.
I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s intervention, but I gently suggest that he read the position paper on the future partnership, which was published in September, because it deals directly with the question he has just asked and makes it clear that we do want to continue vital extradition relations with our EU partners.
We recognise the distinct legal systems across the UK. We engage with our counterparts in the devolved Administrations to prepare the ground for Brexit, in terms both of achieving a smooth transition on things such as civil and judicial co-operation and of seizing the global opportunities for the UK legal sector, which contributed around £25 billion to the UK economy last year.
That being the case, what actual steps has the Department taken to ensure that Scottish legal services and the Scottish legal system are protected when the UK leaves the EU?
There is a two-part answer to that. First, in relation to the negotiations with our EU partners, we are very focused on making sure that the current co-operation continues as well and as optimally as possible. Secondly, in relation to the legal position, the EU withdrawal position will make sure that there is legal certainty for citizens across the UK.
I can tell the hon. Gentleman that we are absolutely committed to promoting every one of Scotland’s finest exports, from whisky through to its brilliant lawyers.
The Government’s EU position papers on enforcement and dispute resolution and on security, law enforcement and justice have significant implications for the Scottish legal system and for areas of law devolved to the Scottish Parliament. Yet, in advance of the publication of those papers, there was absolutely no consultation with the Scottish Government or the Scottish Law Officers. What assurance can the Minister give me that such oversight will not happen again?
I do not know about the specific drafting in the papers, but there was considerable dialogue with all the devolved Administrations on the substance underpinning the position papers and the negotiating position that the UK has taken.
Sir David Edward, a distinguished jurist and a former judge at the Court of Justice, recently gave evidence to the Scottish Parliament about these papers. He said, and I quote, that “the UK Government has overlooked the significance of the separate Scottish legal system, the Scottish judicial system and the Scottish prosecution system in relation to justice and home affairs issues such as Europol, the European Arrest Warrant, cross-border information systems and the conventions and regulations about recognition and enforcement of judgments.” Will the Minister undertake to meet me so that these oversights might be rectified?
I thank the hon. and learned Lady, but she has not actually pointed to one aspect, one paragraph or one point in the position paper that she thinks we have got wrong. We certainly accept, recognise and, indeed, embrace the huge contribution that the Scottish justice and legal systems make. In relation to the justice and home affairs strand of the negotiations, we will of course bear in mind very closely the different contours across the whole UK.
Yesterday, we laid a written ministerial statement before the House setting out the details of the review of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, and publishing the post-legislative memorandum, which discharges the promise made by previous Ministers to this House. I expect the review to be completed by the summer of 2018.
I thank the Minister for his response about progress on the review of legal aid reforms, but it is disappointing that, even though the Government first announced this review nine months ago, it still will not conclude for another nine months, which is nine more months of many thousands of people not being able to afford to access our justice system. His Government’s reforms of legal aid were intended to save £350 million. In fact, legal aid has fallen by double that. Will the Minister lobby his colleague the Chancellor, so that some of those additional savings go immediately to help those who have been priced out of access to our justice system?
I thought the hon. Gentleman might at least welcome the fact that we laid out the terms of the review yesterday. I am not sure whether he has had a chance to study the post-legislative memorandum. Let us be clear about one thing: last year, we spent £1.6 billion on legal aid in England and Wales, which is a quarter of the Ministry of Justice’s budget. International comparisons are not exact, but according to the Council of Europe’s review last year, the UK spent more per capita than any other Council of Europe member.
In looking at the effect of the reduction in legal aid on access to justice, will the Minister also comment on the impact on access to justice of the closure of magistrates courts. The closure of Kendal court this summer has removed easy access to justice for hundreds of people, increasing pressure on the police, legal professionals and local families. What will he do to restore such physical access to justice?
I understand the hon. Gentleman’s concern if the court estate is situated in his constituency, but we have a £1 billion court reform programme, which is investing in updating, modernising and introducing technology. As a result, we will actually deliver more sensitive justice for victims and witnesses, but also a better bang for the taxpayer’s buck.
The terms of reference have been set out very clearly. The post-legislative memorandum is wide in scope, and the hon. Lady should feel free to submit any particular points that she wants us to consider. I am obviously not going to pre-empt or prejudice the scope of the review that we have just undertaken.
Has my hon. Friend seen any evidence that reductions in legal aid have reduced the cost of litigation in this country? If not, will he look into why the market is not working properly?
A good many of those issues will be examined by the review. If my hon. Friend would like to write to me with any concerns he has, I would be very happy to look at them.
Twenty months ago, the Court of Appeal ruled that the Government’s restrictions on legal aid for victims of domestic violence were unlawful. Nine months ago, Ministers told the House that they would make changes by secondary legislation that would
“make it easier for victims of domestic violence to access legal aid.”—[Official Report, 25 April 2017; Vol. 624, c. 983.]
Nothing has happened. Victims cannot wait another nine months, so when will the secondary legislation be brought forward?
The hon. Lady is right that it is vital to ensure that legal aid is available to victims in circumstances of domestic violence. Of course, it was granted in more than 12,000 cases last year. We have reviewed the evidence requirements again and are committed to making it easier for victims to access legal aid. I will announce the details shortly.
We are investing over £1 billion to bring our courts into the 21st century, to make them more sensitive to victims and witnesses and to deliver swifter and more effective justice.
I am grateful to the Minister for that response. What can be done to ensure that the courtroom environment and the wider environment of the court building itself help to put victims and witnesses at ease, and support them through the process of giving evidence?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right that we need to reduce the stress and trauma experienced by victims and witnesses. We are doing a range of things. First, we are establishing model waiting rooms for victims and witnesses so that they will feel less stressed and more comfortable, meaning that they are more likely to give compelling evidence. Secondly, in the courtroom itself, we are rolling out section 28 measures for pre-recorded cross-examination to Crown courts nationally. This autumn, we will extend that to victims of sexual offences or modern slavery offences in Leeds, Liverpool and Kingston upon Thames.
The family courts are full of people representing themselves. The new President of the Supreme Court, Lady Justice Hale, has described the Government’s legal aid reforms as a “false economy”. Does not the Minister agree that restoring early legal aid would not only reduce the number of cases coming to court, but save court time? Will he guarantee that the legal aid review will include an analysis of the cost to the rest of the legal aid system that has resulted from the Government’s abolition of early legal aid?
It is certainly right that we need to try to reduce the number of cases getting into the family courts in the first place, especially given that witnesses and others involved are often more traumatised by the process of going to court. The terms of reference for the legal aid review have been clearly set out, and there is wide scope for the issues that the hon. Lady mentions to be taken into account, but I will not pre-empt or prejudice what the review will look at right now.
The exceptionally high cost to businesses of commercial litigation is good for commercial lawyers—perhaps I should declare an interest—but it is not good for businesses, whether they are large or small. One answer that has recently been developed is the use of commercial litigation financing. Will my right hon. Friend the Lord Chancellor look into ethical and other concerns surrounding that, as outlined by Lord Faulks in the other place recently?
I have looked into this important and sensitive area, and I have also spoken to my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller), the Chair of the Women and Equalities Committee. I urge the hon. Member for East Dunbartonshire (Jo Swinson) to send me any evidence that putting the limit back to six months would actually make a difference, because some of the considerations that apply in relation to three months would also apply to six months.
Following my ten-minute rule Bill in March calling for the reform of family law, including a robust enforcement of child arrangements orders, opening up the family courts in care proceedings and updating our anachronistic divorce laws, what progress have the Government made on their family law review, which was announced in the summer?
I thank my hon. Friend for her proposals and the thought that she has put into them. The time taken to conclude public family law cases has nearly halved since 2011. We are still working through very real issues with the relevant Departments, including the Department for Education. On private law, we are committed to facilitating the settlement of far more family disputes so that we avoid families, vulnerable witnesses and sometimes victims having to go through the trauma of court proceedings.
The hon. Lady raises her point tenaciously. I welcome the opportunity to sit down with her and the hon. Member for Sunderland Central (Julie Elliott) to look at the issue. We will ensure that the refurbishment is carried out as soon as reasonably practical. In the long term, we want to ensure that in her constituency and across the country we have the right courts in the right places, and with the right technology and refurbishment, to ensure that they deliver the best access to justice.
The reputation of our legal system partly depends on our respect for our international obligations. In advance of the Committee of Ministers, will my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State bear in mind that respecting the judgments of the European Court of Justice is a better guide for this country’s reputation than the amateur jurisprudence of the Dog and Duck?
The recently published Bach commission report highlighted a number of serious issues relating to access to justice, including representation at inquests. In the light of tragic events such as Grenfell Tower and Hillsborough, will the Minister commit to providing legal aid for inquests in all cases when the state is funding one or more of the other parties?
I thank the hon. Lady for her question on this pertinent and salient point. Legal aid remains available for inquests through the exceptional case funding scheme. Although those decisions are obviously decided independently, I reassure her that more than half the applications in relation to inquest cases in 2016-17 were granted.
Full-body scanners that detect drugs that are concealed within the person are successfully used across America. The Ministry of Justice has trialled one scanner. Has there been an evaluation, will we see more trials, and could the scanners be used on a mobile basis?
(7 years, 2 months ago)
Written StatementsWhen the Supreme Court handed down judgment in the case of R (Unison) v. Lord Chancellor on 26 July, the Government took immediate steps to stop charging fees in the employment tribunals. We also said that we would bring forward detailed arrangements to refund people who had paid fees. We will today be launching the first phase of the refund scheme.
We will use this first phase, which will last up to four weeks, to ensure that the refund process works efficiently and effectively. From today, officials in the Ministry of Justice will be writing to an initial group of up to 1,000 people who paid fees for proceedings in the employment tribunals, inviting them to take part. This group will consist of people who have contacted us since the Supreme Court judgment inquiring about a refund. Those who receive a refund will also be paid interest from the date their payment was received.
We recognise that during the initial phase of the refund scheme, there is likely to be considerable interest in the details of the scheme. For those who have paid employment tribunals fees, but have not been invited to take part in the initial stage, we are setting up a pre-registration scheme so that they can register an interest in applying when the full scheme is rolled out. Those who wish to do so can register either by email at: ethelpwithfees@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk: or alternatively by post to the following addresses:
For proceedings in England and Wales
Employment Tribunals Central Office (England and Wales)/Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) Fees
PO Box 10218
Leicester LE1 8EG
For proceedings in Scotland
Employment Tribunals Central Office Scotland/Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) Fees
PO Box 27105
Glasgow G2 9JRX
This phase is primarily aimed at people making applications for refunds in single claims. During this period, we will also be working with the trade unions on how this process should be best applied to applications for refunds in larger multiple claims.
We plan to roll out the full refund scheme early in November. At that point, anyone who has paid a fee in the employment tribunals, whether in a single or multiple claim, will be able to claim a refund.
Those who will be eligible to apply for a refund under the scheme are:
People who paid a fee directly to the Employment Tribunal or Employment Appeal Tribunal, and have not been reimbursed by their opponent pursuant to an order of the tribunal.
People who were ordered by the tribunal to reimburse their opponent their fee and who can show that they have paid it.
Representatives (such as a trade union) who paid a fee on behalf of another person and have not been reimbursed by that person.
The lead claimant (or representative) in a multiple claim who paid a fee on behalf of the other claimants.
Further guidance will be available when the scheme is rolled out.
To receive a refund, applicants will be invited to complete an application form with their details, details of their employment tribunal claim and the fees that they paid. These details will be verified against HMCTS’s records. Where people are unable to provide full details of the fees they paid, or the details they provide do not accord with the details we hold, their application will not be refused automatically, but it may take longer to process.
Where a person is claiming for fees that they reimbursed to their opponent pursuant to a tribunal order, they will be asked to provide a copy of the tribunal order, and proof of payment. In cases where a person reimbursed their opponent under a private settlement, they will not be eligible for a refund; in such cases, the person who paid the fee to the tribunal will be eligible for a refund.
All applicants will also be asked to sign a declaration of truth about the details they provide. Refunds will be made to the applicant’s bank account; if an individual does not have a bank account, they can contact HMCTS for alternative methods of payment.
[HCWS186]
(7 years, 2 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
It is a great pleasure, as ever, to speak under your doughty chairmanship, Mr Hollobone. I begin in the customary manner by congratulating the hon. Member for Cardiff West (Kevin Brennan) on securing this debate on sentencing for causing death by dangerous driving offences. I know that many colleagues here will have dealt with tragic cases in their constituencies; we have heard, movingly, of a couple of them. Those who have had that misfortune will know that reckless driving ruins lives and devastates families, whether the culprit is racing, talking on a mobile phone or under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
The hon. Gentleman has championed this cause tenaciously since the tragic case in the summer of 2016 in which Michael Wheeler and Melissa Pesticcio started a car chase that, as he described, left Sophie Taylor dead and her passenger Joshua Deguara seriously injured. I extend my deepest sympathies to Sophie’s mother Jackie, whom the hon. Member for Cardiff West described, and to Sophie’s wider family and friends. I cannot begin to imagine their loss. The technical and legal changes that we are making will not bring her back, but these reforms must try to deliver some reassurance and solace, through a greater sense that justice is being done. I also pay tribute to Joshua Deguara and his family, whose suffering has been immense. The case highlights the need for reform.
Thomas Crowther, QC, the Cardiff Crown court judge in the case of Sophie Taylor, said that
“that shattering of two families was completely avoidable. It was caused by…the self-righteous and jealous rage”
of the defendants, who were
“chasing her down to frighten her and teach her a lesson”.
The court sentenced Michael Wheeler to seven and a half years in prison and Melissa Pesticcio to six and a half years.
Such cases are far too common. The reforms that we have announced this week will come too late for the families of Kris Jarvis, John Morland and James Gilbey, to name the victims of just a few of the tragedies that have struck me as I have worked on proposals for reform. The hon. Members for St Helens South and Whiston (Ms Rimmer) and for Lewisham West and Penge (Ellie Reeves) gave moving accounts of tragedies in their constituencies; I pay tribute to them and extend my sympathies and condolences to the families. I appreciate the frustration and anguish that they must feel. I met Major Gilbey, James’s father, last week. It is right to pay tribute to his courage and strength, and to all the families who have campaigned for a change in the law. Numerous colleagues across the House have also raised cases with me and my predecessors at the Ministry of Justice.
We recognise that the law has too often prevented judges from handing down sufficiently long sentences for the very worst cases of dangerous driving, bearing in mind the severity of the harm and the anguish of the victims’ families. We have looked at the evidence, and now is the time to change the law. Although we cannot bring back lost loved ones, we can make sure that justice is done. Yesterday, we published our response to the consultation on driving offences and penalties relating to causing death and serious injury. The consultation, which closed earlier this year, received more than 9,000 submissions with different views on the offences and penalties. That shows the widespread public interest in reform and the concern about how the law has operated.
Based on the evidence, we propose three specific changes to the law. I hope the hon. Member for Cardiff West will welcome them, but I will also try to address his specific points. Even more importantly, I hope the changes will give the victims and the wider public a stronger sense that justice is being done. All three proposals received overwhelming support in the consultation.
First, we propose to increase the maximum penalty for causing death by dangerous driving from 14 years to life imprisonment. We want the courts to have additional powers to deal with the most serious cases in which life is lost. In 2016, the average sentence for causing death by dangerous driving was five years. In the last two years, three sentences of longer than 10 years have been imposed. That makes the case that those sentences are not attracting the level of seriousness that the hon. Member for Cardiff West and the Government think is due.
In answer to the hon. Gentleman, the point of the change is to send an unequivocal, crystal-clear message to the courts that they can and should impose a higher sentence—a life sentence—for the very worst cases. It is for the Sentencing Council to decide whether new guidelines are needed on this sentence or on any of the others that I will mention. He is right to mention that the ULS—unduly lenient sentences—scheme applies to those cases and that they will therefore be referred to the Court of Appeal if the Attorney General so decides. He rightly acknowledges that as politicians, we cannot and should not interfere with individual decision making, as opposed to the sentencing framework that applies in such cases.
In very serious cases in which there are multiple victims, in which the offender has previous convictions or in which their behaviour is particularly reckless and culpable—as in some of the cases described by the hon. Members for St Helens South and Whiston and for Lewisham West and Penge—offenders will face a maximum life sentence. The effect of that change is twofold. Offenders who receive a life sentence will serve a minimum period in prison and will be released only when the Parole Board considers it safe. For offenders who do not merit a life sentence, the court will have the power to impose a determinate sentence of any length. That will empower the courts to reflect the full severity of the worst offending and its devastating impact on victims and their families.
The Minister speaks about sending a powerful message. A powerful message is sent to the Sentencing Council too. Does he agree that for offences such as stalking, for which the maximum sentence has been doubled, that message has been reflected to a large extent in the Sentencing Council’s most recently published guidelines?
My hon. Friend is right. I remember his tenacious campaign on that subject from my early days as a Justice Minister. As well as empowering the courts, the change sends a message that will have an effect, right through the system, on the raw power available to a sentencing court. It will have a knock-on effect on the Sentencing Council and its ability to assess and consider whether further guidelines need to be provided. At the appeal level, there is also the ULS scheme.
In the time available, I will address the other key proposals. The second proposal is to raise the maximum penalty for the separate offence of causing death by careless driving while under the influence of drink or drugs. We recognise that although the driving in such cases may not amount to dangerous driving, the overall seriousness of the offence is the same, because of the combination of careless driving and the irresponsible decision to get behind the wheel under the influence of drink or drugs. Again, for the worst cases, we propose that the maximum sentence be life imprisonment.
Our third proposal will close a gap in the law. At the moment, if a driver who is driving carelessly injures another road user, passenger or pedestrian, the maximum penalty is a fine, even if the incident results in the victim being left with serious, debilitating or permanent injuries. The case that particularly struck me was that of Sophie Wilkinson, who was left in a coma with a life-changing set of injuries after a horror crash in 2007. We need the criminal law to cover careless driving that results in such severe harm and injury, so we will introduce a new offence of causing serious injury by careless driving. That offence will carry a custodial penalty and will sit alongside the existing offence of causing serious injury by dangerous driving.
Those are the three key areas of reform that we plan to implement as soon as parliamentary time allows. We will incorporate any further changes that emerge from the review of cycling safety announced by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Transport last month, so that we have a consistent overarching framework for sentencing people who kill or cause serious injury on our roads. I am grateful for the time and effort that so many people, including the hon. Member for Cardiff West and the campaigning families, put into their responses to the consultation. No punishment in these cases can make up for the loss of a loved one, but we can make sure that justice is properly done.
The Minister says that three sentences longer than 10 years have been imposed in the last couple of years, but he did not say that the maximum 14-year sentence had been used. I hope he wants to signal that that maximum sentence should be used more frequently.
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. As we develop these proposals, I look forward to working with him and other hon. Members across the House. It is the very least that the victims and their families deserve.
Question put and agreed to.